

JOAN TELLO

**Joan Lluís Vives's *Introductio ad sapientiam*:
Critical Edition and Philosophical Study**

Tesi doctoral

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V Era Sapientia est de rebus incors
rupte iudicare

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Philosophical Study

PhD Dissertation

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Colophon images: (1) aphorism 604 as it was stamped in the 1526 edition (Bruges: Hubert de Croock). Courtesy of Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent, R 630 || (2) Signature of Joan Lluís Vives as it appears in the manuscript letter sent to Francis van Cranevelt on 16 August 1527 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 246, verso). Courtesy of KU Leuven Libraries Special Collections BRES: Tabularium Magazijn (LC Ep. 246).

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Preface

Abstract | Resum

[EN]

Breaking new ground in advancing the work and thought of the Renaissance humanist Joan Lluís Vives (1492/3-1540), this dissertation includes the following materials: (1) an updated state of investigation in Vivesian studies; (2) a vindication of Vives as a philosopher rather than a pedagogue; (3) the first critical edition of the *Introductio ad sapientiam* (1524), his second most disseminated work; (4) an explanation of the philosophical content of the *Introductio ad sapientiam* through an exploration of three key aphorisms (numbers 1, 200 and 604) that shed light on items overlooked by previous scholarship; and, last but not least, (5) a probe into the meaning of the term *animus* through the lens of eleven Classical Latin and Renaissance authors.

KEYWORDS: *Animus*; Aphorism; Early Modern Philosophy; Epistemology; God / Christ; Humanism; Judgment; Knowledge of the Self; Moral Philosophy; Notion of Philosophy; (Joan Lluís) Vives; Wisdom / Prudence.

[CA]

Aquesta tesi doctoral obre nous camins per avançar en l'estudi de l'obra i del pensament de l'humanista renaixentista Joan Lluís Vives (1492/3-1540), i inclou els materials següents: (1) un estat actualitzat de la investigació en els estudis vivesians; (2) una reivindicació de Vives com a filòsof més que no pas com a pedagog; (3) la primera edició crítica de la *Introductio ad sapientiam* (1524), la seva segona obra més difosa; (4) una explicació del contingut filosòfic de la *Introductio ad sapientiam* a través de l'anàlisi de tres aforismes clau (números 1, 200 i 604) que fan llum sobre temes desatesos per estudis anteriors; i, finalment, (5) una indagació sobre el significat del terme *animus* a través d'onze autors llatins clàssics i renaixentistes.

PARAULES CLAU: aforisme; *animus*; coneixement del Jo; Déu / Crist; epistemologia; filosofia moral; filosofia del Renaixement; humanisme; judici; noció de filosofia; saviesa / prudència; (Joan Lluís) Vives.

Justification of my dissertation

In his book of how to catalogue rare books, R. B. McKerrow warns that the researcher «cannot, whatever he does, give all the information that may be derived from an examination of the book itself; nor can he foresee exactly what information may be needed by a worker who consults his book».¹ Similarly, a PhD candidate cannot, whatever he does, give the final word on a particular subject nor can he foresee what information may be expected by an audience that reads his enquiry. He is then impelled to «follow his own lights», carefully ponder all the elements that spring from his research and decide on his own what the important things to be said are.

The investigation that I am presenting aims at examining the second most disseminated work of Renaissance humanist Joan Lluís Vives (1492/3-1540),² the *Introductio ad sapientiam* ('Introduction to wisdom', 1524; henceforth *Ad sap.*), the first being the *Linguae Latinae exercitatio* (commonly known as 'Dialogues', 1539). My dissertation focuses on *Ad sap.*, a work of moral philosophy that encompasses various matters —not only issues about its philosophical content (for example, the soul, judgment, conduct, proper speech, the notion of God, Christian moral) but also about its format and its author—, each of which could perfectly become an independent dissertation by itself. In brief, my dissertation consists in exploring the text of *Ad sap.*, probing into its meaning, and placing it into its various contexts. To that purpose, I use a new tool (the critical edition of the work) and an innovative thesis: that the philosophical core of the work can be revealed through three key aphorisms: 1, 200 and 604.

The significance of Vives in Renaissance studies in general and Renaissance philosophy in particular is nowadays clearly recognized: he was an international man who was born in Valencia and lived in Paris, Bruges, Louvain, London, Oxford and Breda; he was associated with highly influential thinkers of his time such as Erasmus, Guillaume Budé and Thomas More; he corresponded with (and spoke to) statesmen and clergymen such as king Henry VIII, emperor Charles V, cardinal Thomas Wolsey, and pope Adrian VI; he was a close friend of highly influential women such as queen Catherine of Aragon, and countess Mencía de Mendoza; he was proficient in many branches of knowledge, especially in moral philosophy, logic, language, rhetoric, philosophy of education, political philosophy, and law.

The significance of Vives's *Ad sap.* has also been recognized by two PhD dissertations (Marian Leona Tobriner,³ 1966; Ángel Gómez-Hortigüela, 2000) and several modern translations into Catalan (1929, 1992), Chinese (2012), English (1968), French (2001), Italian (2012, 2018), Portuguese (1948), and Spanish (1930, 1947, 2001, 2010).⁴ Be that as it may, the *Ad sap.* was lacking the most fundamental tool, namely a critical edition that establishes the best available Latin text and thus provides the best version from which to examine its philosophical content. This fact triggered the beginning of my investigation.

¹ Cf. R. B. McKerrow, *An Introduction to Bibliography for Literary Students* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 147.

² Cf. *infra* Part I, beginning of section 1.

³ Sister Marian Leona Tobriner, also named Alice Tobriner.

⁴ Detailed references can be found *infra* Part I, section 2.2, p. 17-18; section 2.4.

Structure of my dissertation

Benefitting from my previous experience editing *De subuentione pauperum* (cf. Tello 2009),⁵ the short anthology of the adages of Erasmus (cf. Tello 2018a), the *De Aristotelis operibus censura* (cf. Tello 2019) and the *Satellitium siue Symbola* (cf. Tello 2020a), I undertook and finished the first critical edition of *Ad sap.*, which is included in Part III of my dissertation. In addition to the critical edition, this part also gives information about the circumstances of composition as well as the editions printed during and after Vives's life. Moreover, it carries out a meticulous discussion on the format of the work, it argues (and, for the first time, gives solid evidence of) the three stages of composition of *Ad sap.*, and it provides a lexicon of keywords to assist in the analysis of the work.

Once Part III was done, I deemed pertinent that the examination of the philosophical content of the work be preceded with two much needed materials: an updated state of the investigation (*status quaestionis*) in Vivesian studies, and a vindication of Vives as a philosopher. The state of investigation constitutes Part I of my dissertation. It is a handy tool that summarizes five centuries of Vivesian scholarship as from 1545 to present day, and it is arranged into three main sections: bibliographies, primary sources (Latin text and translations) and secondary sources (studies). This recompilation gathers what I consider to be the most valuable contributions from past scholars, and it includes the most recent research between 2007 and 2021, which the book of Enrique González (2007) was unable to cover for obvious reasons. Further, the recompilation is complemented with an assessment on studies of the Renaissance period and it attempts a thematic (but yet succinct) classification of the scholarship provided by both Vivesian and Renaissance scholarship.

The vindication of Vives as a philosopher constitutes Part II, and it aims at showing that in addition to being a pedagogue and a pacifist, Vives was considered a skillful philosopher by his own contemporaries. This part is divided into four sections: «Sketch of a personality», «Vives: by himself, by his friends», «Vives: by scholars, by tradition», «The most influential philosophers of the Greco-Roman world» and «Philosophy in Vives's writings». The first three sections deal with Vives's identity and reception; the fourth section aims at showing the importance of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca and Augustine in Vives's intellectual formation; finally, the fifth section examines the notions of philosophy gathered by Vives, and it contextualizes them within the Renaissance background.

After the state of the investigation in Vivesian studies had been explicated (and hence the pertinence of making the critical edition of *Ad sap.* had been justified), after the adequacy of treating Vives as a philosopher had been explained (and hence the pertinence of linking my dissertation to a doctorate in philosophy had been justified), and after the Latin text of the work that is the object of study of my dissertation had been established (and hence the need of philology in order to build a reliable philosophical commentary had been justified), the philosophical commentary of *Ad sap.*, which constitutes Part IV, was the next and most consequential step.

Part IV approaches *Ad sap.* from the fresh standpoint of interpreting its content through three essential aphorisms: numbers 1, 200 and 604. This way of proceeding allows to identify two main subjects —knowledge of oneself and knowledge of God— which, in turn, induce

⁵ This and other subsequent references can be consulted in full *infra* Part VI.

to consider Vives's views on psychology (section 2, «The care of the *animus*»); on epistemology and theory of knowledge (section 3, «*Bene sapere, bene iudicare*»); on philosophy of language and rhetoric (section 4.1, «*Bene dicere: sermo, lingua*»); on moral philosophy and virtue (section 4.2, «*Bene agere: uirtus*»); on the care of the body (section 5); on theology and Christian morals (section 6). Part IV gives Vives's insights on the aforesaid philosophical subjects as conveyed in *Ad sap.* and also incorporates salient passages of other works that are relevant to each of the philosophical issues dealt with, in an attempt to better contextualize *Ad sap.* within Vives's general philosophical production. Part IV also provides in section 1 a series of items that are central to proper comprehension of the work but that may have been neglected by previous research. Particularly groundbreaking is my proposal of a possible trace of Democritus's thought in *Ad sap.*, or my argument that *Ad sap.* is the second piece of a «tetralogy on knowledge».

The enquiry on *animus* as conveyed in *Ad sap.* and other writings (section 2) revealed an unforeseen problem: this term —unlike its cognate *anima*— lacked a comprehensive philosophical study. This difficulty prompted a slight modification in my dissertation. I deemed pertinent to include a Supplement that set the groundwork of a more extensive, more complete investigation on the term *animus*. Section 1 of the Supplement provides lexicographical tools that aid in studying the term (it is noteworthy the effort of summarizing 22 pages of the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, or the edition and English translation of the entry «Animus et anima» printed in Calepino's *Dictionarium*), while sections 2 and 3 reference the term *animus* in Roman thinkers who had Latin as a mother tongue (Accius, Lucretius, Cicero, Seneca, Tertullian, Macrobius, Augustine, and Isidore of Seville) as well as in three key Renaissance authors (Pico della Mirandola, Charles de Bovelles, and Erasmus of Rotterdam).

This being said, it should be noted that readers will not find in Part IV many scholarly footnotes in which secondary literature on a particular question is discussed. Elaborating such discussions in depth would have implied ending up making six entirely independent dissertations due to the extensiveness of existing secondary literature on each topic. Being the main purpose of my investigation to focus on Vives and to examine *Ad sap.* and associated additional writings, I decided that it was more coherent being exhaustive on Vives —something that has not often been done— than on contextual debates, which by the way can be found (and are duly explained) in the studies cited at the beginning of each section. In any case, the foundations have been laid so that these and other remaining issues can be addressed by me in subsequent research.

Part V gives a quick but at the same time detailed summary of the salient conclusions that can be derived from this present dissertation. Finally, Part VI displays more than 900 bibliographic items arranged into five sections: «Bibliographies»; «Journals»; «Vives: editions and translations»; «Other authors: editions and translations»; «Studies: Vives, the Renaissance, *animus*, aphorisms, Classical Tradition, and other subjects». All short references of editions, translations and studies used throughout my dissertation are displayed *in extenso* in this part. Furthermore, Part VI includes a complete catalogue of Vives's works, accompanied with an alphabetical list of abbreviations of his works employed in my dissertation and a detailed description of each work (date and place of publication, printer, USTC number, and the available critical or standard edition for that particular work).

All in all, due to the implications arising from the content of the work and the characteristics of its author, my research has primarily made use of philosophical knowledge, but it has also relied on other disciplines such as philology, theology, cultural studies, and history of the book and the print. It is my hope that this interdisciplinary approach may have served to improve the overall outcome of my dissertation.

Formal aspects

A few things should be said regarding citations, editions and translations used. As far as short citations are concerned, I use the APA system (author year: page), if the work is listed in the Bibliography (Part VI). If not, I give full reference in footnotes.

Regarding the citation of Latin texts, they have all been edited without distinguishing *u* and *v*, which was the common practice of well-reputed printers contemporary to Vives, such as Aldo Manuzio in Venice or Johann Froben in Basel. When it comes to referencing the edition of Vives's Latin text, I always give the traditional edition of Maians (VOO) first and then the critical edition preceded by «ed.» to indicate that this is the version chosen by me; for example: (VOO 4: 30; ed. Pédeflous and Tournoy 2013: 274). Concerning the Latin text of the Bible, it has been cited according to the edition of Colunga and Turrado 1946; the English translation reproduced is that of ESV; and the Latin short titles of the biblical books have been taken from ASD.

Translators either of Vives's texts or of other classical writers are duly noted. All translations of *Ad. sap* are mine and, if in other footnotes, no translator is referenced, «translation mine» is understood. If Vives quotes the Latin text of a classical author, I give an available English translation. It should be noted that I usually rely on the *Loeb Classical Library* series. It is true that some of its translations are a bit outdated, and others need to be improved for accuracy purposes. However, I have maintained them (and sometimes slightly modified them to fit in my argumentation or to precisely give more accuracy) because I honestly believe that they provide and witness a variety of approaches and interpretations that should not be ignored; moreover, they elicit discussion and foster critical thinking.

When the edition of a text and the translation of that text belong to different authors, I precede each reference with «ed.» or «tr.» to distinguish who made what, as the following example shows: (VOO 6: 268; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 301; tr. Watson 1913: 48). There is also the case in which both the critical edition and the English translation are made by the same author; for example: (VOO 3: 57; ed. tr. Fantazzi 1979: 76-79). In the event that I want to highlight a Latin keyword in a citation, I give it between square brackets and in nominative (either singular or plural). When the item to be highlighted is a long phrase or a sentence, then the item is edited as found in the original text, with words and verbs flexed.

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the Rare Books Department at the University of Ghent, the Rare Books Department at the Grootseminarie Brugge, and the Centre for Renaissance and Reformation Studies (CRRS) at the University of Toronto. In regard to individuals, I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to the following people related in field of Philosophy, Renaissance Studies, Neo-Latin Studies, and Philology: Dr. Josep Monserrat —supervisor and tutor of my dissertation—, Dr. Xavier Espluga —supervisor of my dissertation—, Dr. Miguel Ángel Granada, Dr. Andreu Grau, and Dr. Antoni Prevosti (University of Barcelona); Dr. Dirk Sacré, Dr. Gilbert Tournoy, and Dr. Jeanine de Landtsheer† (KU Leuven); Dr. Jan Bloemendal (Huygens Institute); Dr. Eric MacPhail (Indiana University Bloomington); Dr. Donald Gilman (Ball State University); Dr. Charles Fantazzi (East Carolina University); Dr. Ethan Matt Kavaler, Dr. Natalie Oeltjien, Dr. Kenneth Bartlett, Dr. James M. Estes, and Dr. Shaun Ross (University of Toronto); Dr. Tristan Vigliano (Aix-Marseille Université); Dr. Lorenzo Casini (Uppsala University); Dr. Kaarlo Havu (University of Helsinki); and last but not least Dr. Shinjiro Ando (Ryukoku University).

* * * * *

Finally, I wish to apologize in advance for any mistakes that the reader may find in this dissertation. Although a considerable effort has been made to create a smooth reading experience —if that is at all possible when it comes to philosophical issues—, there might still remain a few arguments that need to be slightly nuanced, some English constructions and phrases that require further editing, or minor errors and typos of any kind that have not been totally expunged. In these years of disease threats, a wide range of disruptions have occurred, affecting material, intellectual, and human resources.

I Status Quaestionis

1 Vives at the beginning of the 21st century

In this opening section, I examine the tools that we have at our disposal now, at the beginning of the 21st century, in order to study the life, the works and the thought of Valencian humanist *Ioannes Lodouicus Viues* or *Johannes Ludovicus Vives* (Valencia 1492/3 - Bruges 1540),¹ that is, Joan Lluís Vives (his native Catalan-Valencian name) or Juan Luis Vives (the Spanish version of his name, by which he is commonly known).

1.1 Bibliographies

There are three main bibliographic compilations devoted to Vives, namely Noreña (*A Vives Bibliography*, 1990), Calero and Sala (*Bibliografía sobre Luis Vives*, 2000), and González (*Una república de lectores*, 2007: 403-493); plus an ongoing online bibliography hosted at Oxford Bibliographies website (Fantazzi, González and Gutiérrez 2012).

Noreña (1990) is the natural outcome of his bibliographical knowledge on Vives in previous publications (1970, 1975, 1989). After having summarily reviewed the fortune of Vives's writings from the 16th century up to the 19th (iv-x), Noreña gives a meticulous account of Vivesian research in the 20th century, paying special attention to those studies published after 1970 (xvii-xxiii). The 59 pages of selected bibliography are organized into seven main sections: (1) Complete works; (2) Critical editions; (3) Available translations into Spanish, French, English, Italian, German, Catalan and Dutch; (4) Studies on the Renaissance with references to Vives; (5) Studies on Vives's biography; (6) Studies on Vives's thought; and (7) Bibliographical sources. The short notes added to some publications give precious information about each item.

Calero and Sala (2000) is divided into thematic disciplines (e.g. psychology, anthropology, ethics, metaphysics, society, rhetoric, jurisprudence, among others), and some entries are devoted to specific works of Vives.² Even though the total amount of entries is impressive (2196) and although there is an appendix filled with other materials such as newspaper articles and reviews, it should be noted that some books and articles are repeated

¹ Vives's year of birth (6 March 1492 or 1493) is still unclear. Arguments in favor and against either of both dates can be found mainly in Pinta and Palacio (1964: 98), Gómez-Hortigüela (1991: 23-24; 1998: 54-56). Vives was buried in Saint Donatian's church, in Bruges, and his tomb had an inscription which stated that «Joan lived 48 years and 2 months, and died in Bruges on 5 May 1540» (cf. Maians 1782: 162). Cf. also my comments about the book of Pinta and Palacio, in subsection 1.3.

² Regarding *Ad sap.*, cf. p. 276.

in different parts. The bibliography gathered by González (2007) is organized in four main sections, namely «Cited authors: 16-18th century», «Main bibliographic collections», «Bibliography on Vives: Hispanic languages», and «Bibliography on Vives: Non-Hispanic languages». The distinction between modern and ancient studies is certainly useful, particularly when it comes to the enquiry of how Vives was considered in his own time and in the following centuries.

Other interesting bibliographic resources are Bonilla y San Martín (*Luis Vives y la Filosofía del Renacimiento*, 1903: 713-814); Palau (*Manual del librero hispano-americano*, 1976, vol. 27: 392-436; revised edition); Empaytaz de Croome (*Juan Luis Vives: un intento de bibliografía*, 1989); Bartolomé («Un rastreo bibliográfico sobre la figura y obra pedagógica de Juan Luis Vives», 1992); and Huguet («Aproximación bibliográfica a Joan Lluís Vives», 2016), who catalogues 51 books that belong to the Rare Book collection of the University of Valencia, and 252 books that belong to its modern collection. The entry «Vives» at the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Casini 2021) provides the researcher with the most fundamental books on primary sources and secondary literature.

As far as journals are concerned, the following two are of paramount importance regarding bibliography about Vives and Renaissance authors: *Bibliographie internationale de l'Humanisme et de la Renaissance* (Droz, 1965-2014; Brepols, 2015 —), and *International Philosophical Bibliography / Répertoire bibliographique de la philosophie* (Peeters, 1934 —). Other journals, such as *Humanistica Lovaniensia* (Leuven University Press, 1928 —), *Vivarium* (Brill, 1963 —), *Renaissance Studies* (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1987 —), *eHumanista* (University of California Santa Barbara, 1999 —), and *Noctes Neolatinae* (Olms, 2001 —) include articles on Vives, though not on a regular basis. Finally, it should be mentioned that the University of Valencia launched in 2016 an online journal (*Vivesiana*) that is focused entirely on the Valencian humanist.

In regard to the various editions of Vives's works through time, a solid guidance can be found in the book of González, Albiñana and Gutiérrez (*Vives: Edicions princeps*, 1992), which can be complemented with the catalogues of NK (*Nederlandsche bibliographie van 1500 tot 1540*, 1923-1971), NB (*Netherlandish Books: Books Published in the Low Countries and Dutch Books Printed Abroad before 1601*, 2011), FB (*French Books III & IV: Books published in France before 1601 in Latin and Languages other than French*, 2012), IB 1-3 (*Iberian Books: Books Published in Spanish or Portuguese or on the Iberian Peninsula before 1601; Books published in Spain, Portugal and the New World or elsewhere in Spanish or Portuguese between 1601 and 1650*, 2010-2016); and USTC (2021), the digital bibliography of Early Modern print culture with an archive of around 740.000 editions and 4,000,000 surviving copies. The catalogues of Mateu i Llopis (*Catálogo de la Exposición Bibliográfica celebrada con motivo del IV Centenario de la muerte de Luis Vives*, 1940), Estelrich (*Vivès. Exposition organisée à la Bibliothèque nationale, Paris*, 1942),³ and Tournoy, Roegiers and Coppens (*Vives Te Leuven*, 1993) make an excellent complement.

1.2 Primary sources: Latin text

The Latin text of Vives's works has been transmitted through three main editions: BOO (1555), VOO (1782-1790) and SWJV (1987 —). Fifteen years after Vives's death (5 May 1540),

³ Cf. Coll-Vinent and Coroleu 2018.

almost all his works were edited and printed together for the first time by Nikolaus Bischoff⁴ and Jakob Künding (more commonly known by the Latin name of Nicolaus Episcopi and Iacobus Parcus), in two volumes, under the title of *Ioannis Ludouici Viuis Valentini opera in duos distincta tomos* (BOO).⁵ This *Opera omnia* did not include the monumental *Aurelii Augustini 'De ciuitate dei' commentarii*, which was printed separately by Bischoff and Hieronymus Froben, also in 1555.

Two centuries later, Gregori Maians i Siscar⁶ (1699-1781) prepared a new edition of Vives's complete works in eight volumes, the *Ioannis Ludouici Viuis Valentini opera omnia, distributa et ordinata in argumentorum classes praecipuas* (VOO).⁷ He arranged the content into different thematic areas, according to what he considered to be the main subject of each work:⁸ Prayers to God, Grammar (VOO 1); Philology, Rhetoric, Poetics (VOO 2); Philosophy (VOO 3); Morality (VOO 4); Politics and Morals, Law (VOO 5); Criticism,⁹ History (VOO 6); Christian religion, Letters (VOO 7). Volume 8 (VOO 8) was entirely devoted to *Ver. fid.* After his death in 1781, his brother Joan Antoni Maians i Siscar (1718-1801) undertook the project of publishing Vives's works, which was completed in 1790.¹⁰ The editors of VOO intended to emend the errors contained in BOO and for that purpose they collated as many old editions as they could.¹¹ The VOO (like the BOO) did not include *Ciu. dei*. A probable reason may have been the rejection expressed by some religious factions —primarily the Dominicans— against Vives.¹²

In 1987 a team of philologists and scholars launched the *Selected Works of Juan Luis Vives* (SWJV) series under the direction of Constant Matheussen, who was later relieved by Charles Fantazzi. The SWJV was born in order to provide reliable critical editions with a faithful English translation. Although the series offers a rather classicizing orthography and preserves only a few peculiarities of the 16th century idiosyncrasies,¹³ these are minor issues that should not deter us from acknowledging the important role that it plays in establishing a reliable

⁴ Cf. CEBR 1: 437b-438a.

⁵ A list of the works included in each volume of the BOO can be found *infra* Part VI, section 4.

⁶ A selection of studies on Maians: Mestre Sanchis 1968; Peset 1975; Cardona 1981; Robles 1981; Aleixos 2008; Mestre Sanchis 2009. As summarized by Mestre Sanchis (1968: 339), «Juan Luis Vives fue siempre escritor de su gusto. El erudito reconoce en el humanista uno de los hombres más beneméritos de la letras patrias. En muchos aspectos: reforma de la enseñanza, carácter sapiencial del sabio. Vives es un ejemplo a imitar. Mayáns aconseja su lectura y piensa publicar sus obras. Teme, sin embargo, la oposición de los religiosos. [...] Los dominicos sienten especial antipatía hacia el humanista. Mayáns piensa encontrar el origen de esa animosidad en los comentarios de Vives al *De ciuitate Dei* de San Agustín».

⁷ The VOO had been conceived around thirty years earlier (1752), but the project was deemed unfeasible at that time. Cf. Mestre Sanchis 2003.

⁸ A list of the works included in each volume of the VOO can be found *infra* Part VI, section 4.

⁹ *Critica* [opera], that is, works that offer an examination, evaluation or judgment about a subject. The Greek verb κρίνω (from which *critica* derives) means 'to distinguish', 'to decide', 'to judge', 'to interpret'.

¹⁰ Cf. Maians 1782: n. to the reader; Robles 1981; Mestre Sanchis 2014.

¹¹ Cf. Maians 1782: 219 («Monitum»): «Auxilio collationis exemplarium editionum antiquarum quotquot reperiri potuerunt omni ope atque opera charissimorum et eruditissimorum fratrum D. D. Gregorii et Ioannis Mayans».

¹² Cf. *supra* n. 6; also letter from Maians to Agustín Sales, 22 July 1752 (Mestre Sanchis 1968: 339, n. 127): «¿Por qué piensa Vm. que yo no insto la impresión de Vives? Por la frailería».

¹³ Cf. SWJV 1: x («General Introduction»).

source of Vives's works. The SWJV has published 13 volumes so far,¹⁴ which includes 21 out of the 60 works that I gather in my catalogue.¹⁵ In the SWJV series one can find fundamental works such as *Sub.* (SWJV 4), *Foem.* (SWJV 6-7), *Rat. dic.* (SWJV 11), *Diss. rep.* (SWJV 12), and *Conc.* (SWJV 13). Other volumes include literary and rhetorical works, such as *Pomp.* (SWJV 1), *Syll.* (SWJV 2, 9) and *Conscr.* (SWJV 3); also minor writings like *Ep. Fort.*, *Vit. Dull.*, *Prael. Conu.* or *Prael. Rhet.* (all in SWJV 5). Regarding philosophical works, this series includes *Philos.* and *An. sen.* (SWJV 1). Much remains to be done,¹⁶ but much has been accomplished as well.

Apart from the aforementioned sources, other important critical editions are scattered over different publishing houses and international journals. I offer below a summary of these publications, which edit the Latin text only or the Latin text accompanied with a translation into a modern language. The edited work is added in parenthesis, abbreviated.

Latin only: De Vocht 1928 (*Epistolae*);¹⁷ McCully 1969 (*Epistolae*);¹⁸ Matheussen 1984 (*Praef. Leg.*; *Aedes*); Ijsewijn et al. 1992-1995 (*Epistolae*);¹⁹ Pérez Durà and Estellés = CCD 1992-2010 (*Ciu. dei*); Tournoy 2005 (*Dull.*; *Ep. Barl.*; *Ep. Lamb.*; *Triumph. ep.*); Pédeflous and Tournoy 2013 (*Sap.*); Tournoy and Mund-Dopchie 2015 (*Epistolae*);²⁰ Tello 2020a (*Sat.*).

Latin and Catalan: Tello 2019 (*Arist.*).

Latin and English: Fantazzi 1979 (*Pseud.*); George 1989 (*Somn. uig.*).

Latin and French: Vigliano 2013a (*Disc. corr.*, *Disc. trad.*); Elasri 2014 (*Vit. Turc.*).

Latin and Spanish: Rodríguez 2000 (*Rat. dic.*); García Ruiz 2005 (*Ling.*).

1.3 Primary sources: translations

Translations of Vives's works can be found in four main sources: the aforementioned SWJV (1987 — ; English), R (*Juan Luis Vives: Obras completas*, 1947-1948; Spanish), CJLV (*Colección Juan Luis Vives*, 1992-2010; Spanish), Pérez Durà (*Joan Lluís Vives: Antologia de textos* / *Juan Luis Vives: Antología de textos*, 1992; Catalan and Spanish), and a recent compendium of sentences: *Sentències de Joan Lluís Vives* (Blay 2020).

R has the privilege to be the only hitherto complete translation into a modern language of Vives's works, if it is omitted the fact that *Ciu. dei* is not included. It was made by Llorenç Riber during the first years of Francisco Franco's dictatorship and, although one is impelled to acknowledge the herculean labor of the translator, nonetheless one is also obliged to admit that Vives's works are not always rendered accurately: while some passages are missing, others are translated too indulgently.²¹ In any case, Riber's enterprise is absolutely

¹⁴ A list of the works included in each volume of the SWJV can be found *infra* Part VI, section 4.

¹⁵ Cf. Tello 2018b, and the list of abbreviations *infra* Part VI, section 1.

¹⁶ A critical edition of Vives's epistles (around 220; 25 more than Jiménez 1978) is currently being undertaken by Gilbert Tournoy and Ronald Truman (to be published either in SWJV or *Humanistica Lovaniensia*).

¹⁷ De Vocht made a remarkable contribution when he edited and published the correspondence of Francis van Cranevelt, which includes 48 letters from Vives.

¹⁸ Letter from Vives to Jerome Aleander, 17 December 1522.

¹⁹ It includes 29 letters from Vives to Frans van Cranevelt.

²⁰ It includes the correspondence between Vives and Guillaume Budé.

²¹ Cf. Calero 1998.

not without merit and his translations are still now the only source in a modern language for those who are not familiar or do not have enough knowledge of the Latin language. Further, it includes the correspondence of Vives available in Maians (VOO 7: 133-202), Bonilla (1901) and De Vocht (1928).

The celebration of the 500th anniversary of Vives's birth —if we accept his year of birth as 1492—, encouraged the city council of Valencia to initiate in 1992, under the direction of Ismael Roca Meliá, the publication of new Spanish translations of Vives's works in order to improve those made by Riber almost fifty years earlier. CJLV consists of 11 volumes which include a wide range of subjects: philosophy (*Ad sap.*; *An. uita*; *Disc.*; *Ver. fid.*), political thought (*Conc.*; *Diss. rep.*; *Pacif.*; *Sub.*), social thought (*Comm. rer.*; *Sub.*), education (*Ad sap.*; *Disc.*; *Foem.*; *Ling.*; *Mar.*) and religion (*Ad sap.*; *Ciu. dei*; *Ver. fid.*). Indeed, the most significant contribution of this series is the first Spanish translation of *Ciu. dei*, which provides modern scholars with a much more accurate and, particularly, more annotated tool than the old English translation of Healy (1610). CJLV incorporates essays and monographs, which complement the translations.

Also in 1992, the University of Valencia published an anthology of Vives's works under the supervision of Pérez Durà (1992). It is a bilingual edition (either Latin-Catalan or Latin-Spanish), whose content is organized into nine sections: «Letters», «Philology», «Philosophy», «Law», «Religion», «Science and Medicine», «Women», «Pedagogy» and «Psychology». Although little annotated, it is a handy instrument in order to grasp what Vives considered to be his major concerns and interests.

Not long ago, a thorough anthology of passages and thoughts gathered by Francesc X. Blay Meseguer appeared at the presses of the University of Alacant (Valencia). Blay (2020) gives 4280 entries in a trilingual Latin-Catalan-Spanish edition, prefaced by a study on Vives's life and the genre of paremiology. The book includes an index of keywords in Catalan of more than 60 pages, although perhaps it would have been more accurate to present the keywords in Latin, because translators do not always render a particular Latin word the same way. In any case, this recent book is an important tool to grasp the fundamentals of Vives's literary and philosophical production.

Other important translations (I leave out those made before the 20th century) are spread over different publishers and international journals. I offer below a succinct list of these publications (in parenthesis, the corresponding work, abbreviated), arranged by language. Those already mentioned in the section of bilingual critical editions (cf. section 1.2 above) have been omitted.

Catalan: Avinyó 1929 (*Ad sap.*); Sarrió and Girbés 1992 (*Ad sap.*, *Sat.*, *Excit. dom.*, *Med. psal.*); Duran 1996 (*Fab.*, *Prael. Conu.*, *Praef. Georg.*); Grau i Arau 2008 (*Fab.*); Tello 2009 (*Sub.*), Pin i Soler 2017 (*Ling.*); Codonyer 2019 (*Philos.*); Blay 2021 (*Sat.*).

Chinese: M. Ferrero and M. Xa Xialou (in Rossetti 2012; *Ad sap.*).

English: Healey 1610 (*Ciu. dei*); Watson 1907 (*Rat. stud. I*; not complete); Watson 1908 (*Ling.*); Watson 1909 (*Rat. stud. II*); Watson 1912 (*Rat. stud. I*, *Sat.* [excerpts], *Foem.* [excerpts], *Mar.* [excerpts]);²² Watson 1913 (*Disc. trad.*); Lenkeith 1948 (*Fab.*); Tobriner

²² The excerpts of *Foem.* translated by R. Hyrde; the excerpts of *Mar.* translated by Th. Payell.

1968 (*Ad sap.*); Gonzalez 1973 (*Consult.*; PhD diss.); Guerlac 1978 (*Pseud., Disc. corr.* 3); Noreña 1990 (*An. uita* 3); Tobriner 1999 (*Sub.*; excerpt).²³

French: Aznar and Caby 1943 (*Sub.*); Prjevalinsky 1948 (*Sat.*);²⁴ Forero-Mendoza and Perrin 2001 (*Fab.*); Wolff 2001 (*Ad sap.*); Changy 2010a (*Foem.*); Changy 2010b (*Mar.*).

German: Bröring 1897 (*Ling.*); Sender and Hidalgo-Serna 1990 (*Disc. corr.*); Ott 1993 (*Rat. dic.*); Egel 2018 (*Pseud.*).

Italian: Gallinari 1959 (*Rat. stud.*); Batllori and García-Villoslada 1964b (Excerpts from *Ad sap., Philos., Pseud., An. uita, Ver. fid., Sub., Rat. stud., Ling., Foem., Mar., Epist.*); Gallinari 1974 (*Comm. rer.*); Gallinari 1980 (*Fab., Conc.* 1); Gallinari 1984 (*Disc. trad.*); Gallinari 1989 (*Foem.* 1); Gallinari 1990 (*Pacif.*); Del Nero 2008 (*Sub.*); Del Nero 2011 (*Disc.*); Rossetti 2012 (*Ad sap.*); Del Nero 2018 (*Ad sap., Sat., Excit. ep., Excit. praef., Excit. praep.*); Del Nero 2020 (*Ep. Aadr., Ep. Henr. reg. Gall., Ep. Henr. adm., Diss. Turc., Conc., Pacif., Vit. Turc.*).

Japanese: Kobayashi 1964 (*Disc. trad.*).

Portuguese: Pérez 1948 (*Ad sap.*).

Spanish: Alventosa 1930 (*Ad sap.*); Gomis 1944 (*Sat.*); Jiménez 1978 (*Epistolae*);²⁵ Frayle 1997 (*Sub., Comm. rer.*); Alcina 1988 (*Ling., Fab., Aedes*); Camacho 1998 (*Rat. dic.*); Frayle 2006 (*Sat.*); Frayle 2010 (*Ad sap.; Sap.*).

1.4 Secondary sources: from 1540s to the 1960s

The amount of scholarship is accelerating at a high rate in many fields. Even though this increase in intellectual production is good news, since it leads —apparently— to a better knowledge about a particular subject, it also generates the feeling that it is becoming harder and harder to master the most important investigations in a particular field of study. However, «that no single person can possibly master the entire field should not prevent us from trying to comprehend it as wholly and as clearly as we can».²⁶ Therefore, in front of other extraordinarily valuable but, somehow, less manageable tools,²⁷ I aim at presenting the most significant studies on Vives from the 16th century up to the present in both a succinct and handy way.

The first attempt to address Vives's life and works is that of Gessner (1545),²⁸ written only five years after Vives's death. The Swiss naturalist and bibliographer makes Vives a subject of the Hispanic (Spanish) confederated monarchy («natione Hispanus»)²⁹ Throughout eight pages, the reader is able to grasp what Gessner considered to be Vives's fundamental works by looking at those who include quotations, which are (in order of appearance): *Sat.*,

²³ I am currently reviewing the English translation and introductory study of *Sat.* (Tello 2022b).

²⁴ Unpublished university thesis. Cf. Tello 2020a: 36, n. 8.

²⁵ It is the most complete collection and translation of Vives's epistles available up to date. Although it contains some misinterpretations (cf. SWJV 5: 7), the overall work is meritorious and still a reference tool for all researchers.

²⁶ Waswo 1987: x.

²⁷ For example, Calero and Sala 2000; González 2007: 243-493.

²⁸ Cf. A. M. Blair, «Gessner, Conrad». In Ford, Bloemendal and Fantazzi 2014, vol. 2: 979-980. Gessner 1545 and other subsequent short references are fully referenced *infra* Part VI, section 6.

²⁹ Maians (1782: 60) introduces the following nuance: «Licet Hispanus, uere erat cosmopolites», that is, «Although he was Spanish, he was in fact a man of the world». Regarding the adjective *Spanish*, cf. complementary note.

Buc., Somn. uig., Rat. dic., Consult., Disc., An. uita, Conc., Foem., Excit., Ver. fid. and *Ciu. dei*. Out of these, four works stand out — *Disc., An. uita, Ver. fid.,* and *Ciu. dei*— due to the length of the quotation and because of the fact that the inner structure of the work is commented.

After Gessner, encyclopedists such as Lycosthenes (1551), Schott (1608), Antonio (1672) and Rodríguez (1747) included entries about Vives in their catalogues, all of which of various length and accuracy. Schott and Rodríguez also added some complementary materials, like epitaphs and epigrams mourning Vives's death. Paquot's (1763) short essay was basically a brief but useful commentary on the BOO, preceded by an outline of the humanist's life. Still in the 16th century, Cervantes de Salazar (1554) wrote a *Compendiosa Ludouici Viuis uita* as a preface to his translation of *Ling.* into Spanish. In this rare piece of writing,³⁰ the author claims that Vives's most remarkable characteristic was his profound knowledge of history, as it can be inferred from the annotations that Vives wrote in *Ciu. dei*.³¹ Further, Twyne (1590), in his book of British history, made allusions to Vives, his teacher, whom he remembers as «doctissimum uirum Ioannem Lodouicum Viuem».³² However, not all scholars spoke highly of Vives. Estienne (1585)³³ attacked the Valencian humanist in his edition (and apology) of Aulus Gellius's *Noctes Atticae*. He believed that Vives despised Gellius just because the Roman writer was not fond of Seneca, who was one of Vives's favourites thinkers.³⁴

Around 1780-1781, Maians wrote in Latin the most comprehensive study of Vives so far. Its 219 pages encompass a great amount of biographical, bibliographical³⁵ and critical reference notes. Chronologically structured, his *Viuis uita* (1792) deals with Vives's family, Vives's early studies in Valencia, and his stay in Paris, Louvain, England and Bruges. But, in my opinion, the major feature of this publication is the commentary made by Maians on almost every single work that the Valencian humanist published, accompanied with explanations of various length. Moreover, the *Vita* even introduces some controversy when the historian of the Age of Enlightenment claims that Vives wrote a pamphlet in Catalan on the constitution of schools (*Del stabliment de la Scola*), based on what Damià Savalls said in his *Oratio paraenetica de optimo statu Reipublicae litterariae constituendo* (Valencia: F. Díaz Romano, Oct. 1531).³⁶ All in all, despite Maians's meritorious efforts, some notions and statements

³⁰ As Calero (1996: 54, n. 3) reports, it has been transmitted in a unique existing copy of a book named *Commentaria in Ludouici Vives. Exercitationes linguae Latinae*, preserved at the University of Texas. The title of this book is not the original, since the title page is missing. In his article, Calero (1996: 57-64) gives the Latin text, a Spanish translation, and a commentary.

³¹ Cf. Calero 1996: 57: «Historiam omnium maxime tenuit, ut plane eius in Augustinum de ciuitate Dei commentaria testantur».

³² Twyne 1590: 6; cf. also 7, 41-44.

³³ Henri Estienne, also known by the Latin name of Henricus Stephanus. Cf. P. White, «Printing Centres: Estienne Family», in Ford, Bloemendal and Fantazzi 2014, vol. 2: 1155-1556.

³⁴ As a matter of fact, Estienne (1585: 30-31, at 30) took a step further and proclaimed that Vives disliked Gellius because the roman writer had criticized someone whose country of origin was the same as Vives, that is, *Hispania*. Hence, Vives unfolded a low passion when he showed that he loved his motherland more than the truth: «Vicit te, Ludouice Viue, uicit te amor patriae. Amicus Plato (dixit Aristoteles) sed amica magis ueritas. At tibi amica quidem fuit ueritas, sed amica magis patria». Cf. González 2007: 97-98.

³⁵ Among other resources, it seems that Maians had a copy of J. Bruckerus, *Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabulis ad nostram usque aetatem deducta* (Leipzig: Haered Weidemannus et Richius, 6 vols., 1766-1667), which he quotes and mentions at least on a dozen occasions.

³⁶ Cf. Maians 1782: 170-171; Bonilla 1903: 258-259; S. García Martínez, in Ijsewijn and Losada 1986: 256; Tello 2009: 49-50. This alleged work written in Catalan would have been a letter sent to the city council of Valencia. There are also claims that Vives wrote in Spanish; for example a letter to the

made by him have been subject to revision.³⁷ The 18th century also witnessed a little essay in Latin by Schaumann (1792), a German student who made his university dissertation about Vives's insights on anthropology and philosophy, especially the question about the soul.

In the 19th century, Namèche (1841) made a significant contribution when he attempted a thematic analysis of Vives's works. Although Maïans had indeed edited the works of Vives according to their main subject, he failed to introduce this division in his *Vivis uita*. The French scholar arranged Vives's writings into five areas: (1) philosophy; (2) pedagogy; (3) literature and philology; (4) ascetics and theology; (5) miscellaneous works. Forty years later, Mallaina (1872) followed Namèches's steps and proposed his own thematic arrangement, in fourteen areas: (1) *Ad sap.*;³⁸ (2) religious worship; (3) grammar; (4) philology; (5) rhetoric; (6) philosophy; (7) morals; (8) law; (9) politics; (10) history; (11) criticism; (12) Christianity; (13) epistles; (14) *Ciu. dei*. It is also worth mentioning Wood's (1813) interesting note on Vives in his history of the University of Oxford, as well as Torras i Bages's (1984 [1892]) insights. The Catalan bishop recognizes the Valencian humanist as an «advocate of peace and concord», who has a «cosmopolitan nature» but makes use of an excessive criticism. According to the bishop, scepticism is excellent for crumbling human knowledge but serves little to build science.³⁹

The 20th century began with what González has called «the most well founded book until the publication of Noreña's monograph (1970)».⁴⁰ The book of Bonilla (1903), highly praised by professor Watson (1913: xvii-xviii), addresses the life and thought of the Valencian humanist throughout more than 800 pages, out of which 117 correspond to notes and 77 to bibliography. The Spanish scholar arranges Vives's writings according to the object of knowledge («causa material»). As a result, the following classification emerges:⁴¹

(1) METAPHYSICS

1.a Ontology: *Disc. prima ph.*

1.b Theology: *Ver. fid.; Ciu. dei; Excit.; Geneth.; Temp.; Clyp.; Sacr.; Pass. Chr.; Prael. Triumph.; Triumph.; Ouatio.*

(2) LOGIC

2.a Criticism and methodology: *Disc. corr.; Disc. trad.; Disc. prob.; Disc. essent.; Disc. uer.; Arist.*

duke of Gandia (6 September 1535) edited in P. y F. [sic], «Una carta de Luis Vives dirigida al Duque de Gandía», *Revista Histórica Latina* 1/1 (May 1874): 26-27. Regarding other writings by Vives allegedly in Spanish, cf. *infra* Part VI, section 1, n. 6.

³⁷ Cf. González 1987: 127-132; 2007: 263-264; González 2008a: 15-17, 31-32, 48-49. Vivesian scholars would definitely welcome an annotated translation of Maïans's *Vivis uita* into a modern language. It would certainly be an excellent way to acknowledge his valuable contribution and, at the same time, improve it with the addition of the most recent and novel research.

³⁸ The variety of subjects included in *Ad sap.* may have impelled Mallaina not to ascribe this work to any discipline and, therefore, leave it out of any group.

³⁹ Cf. the original Catalan passages in Torras i Bages 1984: 622, 627, 662.

⁴⁰ Cf. González 2007: 329.

⁴¹ Bonilla 1903: 270-273. However, he (1903: 266) acknowledges the difficulty of devising a classification: «Parece cosa llana una clasificación bibliográfica, y, sin embargo, es de las tareas más escabrosas, porque supone nada menos que una total división de la ciencia. El libro representa materialmente un organismo científico; clasificarlo por su contenido —no por sus accidentes externos— es clasificar la ciencia misma. Infiérese de aquí que el punto do partida racional para una ordenación sistemática de las producciones de Vives no puede ser otro que la clasificación general de la ciencia. [...] Además, según el punto de vista que se adopte, podrán hacerse distintas ordenaciones».

2.b Grammar: *Ling.; Rat. stud.; Conscr.; Areop.; Nic.; Buc.; Praef. Georg.; Prael. Conu.; Ver. fuc.; Somn. uig. (Somn. praef.; Vig.)*.

2.c Rhetoric: *Rat. dic.; Consult.; Syll.; Pomp.; Prael. Rhet.*

2.d Dialectics: *Pseud.; Disc. disp.*

(3) THE NATURAL WORLD⁴²

3.a Force and Matter (partially): *Disc. prima ph.; An. uita.*

3.b Biology (partially): *An. uita.*

3.c Psychology: *An. uita.*

3.d Morals: *Ad sap.; Fab.; An. senis; Sap.; Sat.; Foem.; Mar.*

3.e Law: *Aedes, Prael. Leg.*

3.f Economy: *Sub.; Comm. rer.*

3.g Politics: *Conc.; Pacif.; Ep. Adr.; Ep. Henr. adm.*

(4) HISTORY

4.a *Philos.; Vit. Turc.; Caes.; Ep. Henr. reg. Gall.; Diss. Turc.*

Two salient features of Bonilla's book are the capacity of proceeding with a well-structured methodology, and the analysis of Vives's most remarkable qualities. According to Bonilla, Vives was a thinker whose main characteristic was his capability of judging things (criticism), and his strong belief that he was only a mere searcher of truth.⁴³ Therefore, it is no accident Vives's apparent easiness with gathering notions from different schools (the so called eclecticism).⁴⁴ Conversely, Bonilla may have overemphasized the role of Vives as a precursor of Bacon (empiricism)⁴⁵ and Kant.⁴⁶

Foster Watson was the first scholar to make a serious attempt to disseminate Vives's works to the English-speaking world. Not only was he a translator (cf. *supra* section 1.3), but also a researcher, mainly focused on pedagogy and philosophy of education. His two monographs (Watson 1918, 1922) are full of important details about Vives's stay in England, namely his relationship with king Henry VIII and queen Catherine of Aragon, his teaching at Corpus Christi College (Oxford),⁴⁷ and his English students and acquaintances. Watson was quite well documented, as one can infer from the following detail: he already knew in 1922 that the *Sat.* consisted of 239 symbols or mottoes,⁴⁸ instead of 213 (as established by BOO and

⁴² Since Bonilla uses *Physics* in a broad sense ('knowledge of nature') and not limited to matter or the laws of nature only, it seems coherent for clarity purposes that the phrase «obras físicas» be rendered as «works about the natural world».

⁴³ Cf. Bonilla 1903: 568.

⁴⁴ Cf. Andersson 2010; Noreña 1970: 148-175.

⁴⁵ More moderate seems to have been Haydn (1953: 207), who thinks that «Vives is pointing toward Bacon's induction». Cf. also Moreno 2006: 107-110.

⁴⁶ Cf. Bonilla 1903: 476: «Precursor de Kant por sus afirmaciones acerca de la distinción entre la razón *especulativa* y la razón *práctica*, la razón y el *entendimiento*, el fenómeno y la esencialidad, y por su pensamiento respecto de aquellas formas *a priori* que califica de *anticipaciones seu informationes naturales*». Carreras (1962: 65) already objected that «criticiste, certes, il [i.e. Vives] l'est, comme l'ont été tant d'autres philosophes tout au long de l'histoire; mais ce trait si fréquent n'autorise en rien à le proclamer père de la philosophie critique moderne, et encore moins, précurseur de Kant».

⁴⁷ A colloquium to celebrate the quincentenary of Corpus Christi College was held in September 2017 and its proceedings edited by Feingold and Watts (2019). Vives is mentioned at 88-89, 114, 205, 212, 214, 292-293, 322, 324-325, 327-328.

⁴⁸ Cf. Watson 1922: 69; Tello 2020a: 36, n. 7.

vo0). Further, Watson (1915) called Vives «the father of modern psychology», a statement that was widely spread; he (Watson 1927) also discussed the role that Vives's childhood in Valencia played in his later life as a philosopher and as a teacher. After Watson, professor De Vocht (1934) shed more light on Vives's visits to England in a study that includes the edition of four little poems that Vives composed for a Sun-dial erected in the churchyard of St. Mary's, Oxford.⁴⁹

As far as Spanish scholars are concerned, four publications should be taken into account after Bonilla (1903): Riber 1947; Urmeneta 1949; Monsegú 1961; Pinta and Palacio 1964; Batllori and García-Villoslada 1964b. Besides having translated most of Vives's works into Spanish and the correspondence of Vives available at that time, Riber wrote a bio-bibliographical essay on the Valencian humanist. Not only did he cover Vives's entire life but also some aspects of this thought: his pacifism, his religious concord and his moral philosophy (1947: 155-217). Nonetheless, his style denotes what González (2007: 349) describes as «Vivismo militante, exacerbado», which has more to do with the political and social ideas thriving in Spain during the late 1940s than with Vives himself.

Urmeneta (1949) examines the psychological and pedagogical works of Vives, namely *An. uita, Fab., Sap., An. sen., Somn. uig. (Somn. praef., Vig.), Disc. trad., Ad sap., Sat., Ling., Rat. stud., Foem. and Mar.* He precedes his systematic investigation with a chapter on Vives's philosophical fundamentals, in which *Philos.* and especially *Disc. prima ph.* are appraised. It is particularly informative Urmeneta's attempt at presenting a selection of earlier authors who exercised an influence on the Valencian humanist, and later authors who, in turn, were influenced by him.⁵⁰ On the other hand, the study of Monsegú (1961) focuses entirely on philosophy, its main subjects addressed being the following: Vives's notion of 'philosophy', the search for truth,⁵¹ the question about knowledge, an analysis of *Disc. prima ph.*, the question about the soul and the emotions, Vives's views on social thought, Scholasticism and Aristotelianism. However, unlike Urmeneta, Monsegú's study relied too much on the translations made by Riber (cf. *supra* section 1.3), and it was regarded as offering an image of Vives too much rooted in the Fathers of the Church and medieval scholasticism.⁵²

The book of Pinta and Palacio (1964) caused a huge commotion amidst Spanish academics of the time.⁵³ The authors transcribed documents held at the Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid) that were used in the Inquisitorial process against Blanquina March, Vives's mother. The conclusions undermined two well-established conceptions: that Vives was born in 1492, the *annus mirabilis* of the Spanish monarchy; and that a pure old Christian blood had always run in Vives's veins. According to the transcription made by Pinta and Palacio (1964: 41, 100), Vives's mother was still single (*donzella*) on 18 December 1491, which led the authors to argue that Blanquina March was unable to give birth to Joan Lluís Vives only three months later (6 March 1492). Further, Blanquina's confessions confirmed the

⁴⁹ Cf. De Vocht 194: 59-60; Tello 2018b: 70.

⁵⁰ Cf. Urmeneta 1949: 421-492.

⁵¹ Cf. Monsegú 1961: 351: «Amante de la verdad, la busca sobre todas las cosas y la acepta doquiera que esté y de quien quiera que se la dé. Aboga por la investigación personal y clama contra el despotismo intransigente que tenía como anquilosado el pensamiento filosófico, impidiéndolo moverse con libertad y holgura».

⁵² Cf. Noreña 1990: xiv.

⁵³ These discoveries collided with the Franco regime (Francisco Franco's dictatorship, 1939-1975), who aimed at presenting Vives as the exemplary model of a pure Catholic. Cf. complementary note 1.

Jewish ascendance of the family. As it was later explained by Angelina Garcia (1987), both Vives and March families adopted these Christian surnames in, approximately, 1391; otherwise our humanist would have been remembered as Joan Lluís Abenfaçam Xaprud.⁵⁴ The implications arisen from what Pinta and Palacio had discovered were so profound and disturbing that their project of publishing the Inquisitorial trials against Lluís Vives Valeriola (Vives's father), Castellana Guioret (Vives's aunt) and other family members⁵⁵ was abruptly cancelled.

Among other studies worth mentioning from 1800 to 1960s are Bussche 1871; Lange 1873; Arnaud 1887; Kayser 1896; Kuypers 1897; Hoppe 1901; Cassirer 1906: 124-130 (Spanish tr., 1953: 152-158); Kater 1908; Pin i Soler 1914; Bataillon 1930; Sentandreu 1930; Carreras 1931; Graf 1932; Thürlemann 1932; Torró 1932; Almela 1936; Faggi 1938; Ortega y Gasset (1940 = 1973); Xirau 1944; Zaragüeta 1945; Trueta 1946; Lewis 1948; De Vocht 1951-1955; Urmeneta 1951; Bataillon 1952; Salazar 1953; Sancipriano 1957; Vasoli 1961; Adams 1962; Colish 1962; Urmeneta 1962, 1963; Batllori and García-Villoslada 1964b; Urmeneta 1965a, 1969. Further, the following PhD dissertations are worth being noted: Daly 1924; Mecredy 1942; Baxter 1943; Stein 1952; Riley 1955; Kuschmierz 1961; Tobriner 1966.

I shall end this section with a few words about Batllori and García-Villoslada 1964b, and Tobriner 1966. The former is, in fact, a book chapter. It consists of 75 pages of selected texts translated into Italian and a succinct but dense introduction to Vives's thought. The authors arrange the Italian translation of Vives's works into five categories: (1) Science, philosophy and dialectic: *Ad sap., Philos.; Pseud.*; (2) Psychology: *An. uita*; (3) Politics and sociology: *Ver. fid., Sub.*; (4) Pedagogy and morals: *Rat. stud., Ling., Foem., Mar.*; (5) Vives and Erasmus: *Epistolae*. On the other hand, Tobriner's PhD dissertation is the first to be entirely devoted to *Ad sap.* For this reason, it will be examined separately *infra*, section 2.4 (a).

1.5 Secondary sources: from Noreña to the present

The book of Noreña (1970), which was the expanded and revised edition of his PhD dissertation (1967), represents a milestone in Vivesian studies. His was the first comprehensive study of Vives's life and thought ever published in English. The subjects addressed are, among others: Erasmus, eclectic criticism, philosophy of education, individual and social ethics, range and purpose of human knowledge, the process of knowledge, and the significance of Vives's thought in the history of European culture. As a review of the time notes,

[Noreña] gives more direct quotation and less paraphrase ...; and all this helps to give one a greater sense of meeting Vives at first hand, especially when a large part of the book is given over to an account of Vives's life. One welcomes Professor Noreña's use of Vives's correspondence with Erasmus and Cranevelt, which gives many vivid details of his feelings over the years down to 1528, among them his disappointment with Oxford,

⁵⁴ Inference according to the data reported by Garcia (1987: 122-133).

⁵⁵ Cf. Pinta and Palacio 1964: 98: «...declaración de su padre, que publicaré», 100: «...después del correspondiente proceso, que publicaré», 105: «...el proceso inquisitorial contra Castellana Guioret, que publicaré», 106: «...procesos inquisitoriales que se siguieron contra personas de estas familias y que también publicaré».

his difficulties with Erasmus, who could be a more than tetchy editor, his reactions to the inquisitorial proceedings against his father, and his moods of depression.⁵⁶

Noreña's book was a bit of a shock for some Spanish intellectuals (similar to that caused by Pinta and Palacio in 1964). He strongly criticized that «his [i.e. Vives's] thought had been grossly misrepresented by a large section of Spanish scholarship», especially because «Vives has been depicted by his own countrymen as a man of the counter-Reformation», and «as a symbol of the religious and political role which Spain was supposed to play in world history». Against these misconceptions, Noreña gave an «interpretation of Vives as a cosmopolitan European, indifferent to religious sectarianism, vulnerable to doubt, of secular and worldly ideas, is a radical departure from those provincial misconceptions».⁵⁷

The positive thriving of both Renaissance and Neo-Latin studies⁵⁸ stimulated the celebration of four international events entirely or mostly devoted to Joan Lluís Vives, the proceedings of which were published in Sáinz et al. 1977 (Madrid, 2-6 Sept. 1974); Buck 1981 (Wolfenbüttel, 6-8 Nov. 1980); Ijsewijn and Losada 1986 (Bruges, 23-26 Sept. 1985); and Strosetzki 1995 (Münster, 14-15 Dec. 1992). Further, numerous collective works helped disseminate the life and thought of the humanist: Mestre Sanchis 1992a; Fenández, Melero and Mestre 1998; Fantazzi 2008a; the complementary monographs included in CJVL (Abellán 1997; Belarte 2010; Calero 1994; Esteban 1994, 1997; Fontán 1992; Noreña 1989; Roca 2000); and Coronel 2016. In regard to studies of Vives's life and works as a whole, one should draw the attention to Guy 1972;⁵⁹ Sancipriano 1974 (11-80); Noreña 1989; Gómez-Hortigüela 1998; Moreno 2006; Zeller 2006; González 2007; and the recent study of Villacañas 2021.⁶⁰

As far as Vivesian scholars are concerned,⁶¹ I list the most representative below in alphabetical order. They are mostly based on Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Spain, Sweden, and United States. Next to their names, a selection of their studies is placed, along with some keywords that depict their main interests. Items mentioned in previous sections (such as bibliographies and translations) are also included.

Sh. Ando: 1994, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 | moral philosophy, rhetoric

M. Batllori: 1986, 1995a, 1995b, 1998 | Religion.

J. Beltrán: 2002, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010; CJLV 4A, 11A | religion, dialectics, classical tradition.

⁵⁶ R. W. Truman, «Juan Luis Vives, by Carlos G. Noreña». *The Modern Language Review* 69/2 (1974): 434-435, at 434. Cf. also the review of G. McCully, «Juan Luis Vives, by Carlos G. Noreña». *Renaissance Quarterly* 26/3 (1973): 308-312.

⁵⁷ All citations of this paragraph taken from Noreña 1970: xi-xii. Cf. complementary note 1.

⁵⁸ As an example, I shall mention a few international associations founded between 1950 and 1975: the Renaissance Society of America (RSA; New York, 1954); the Centre for Renaissance and Reformation Studies (CRRS; Toronto, 1964); the International Association for Neo-Latin Studies (IANLS; Louvain, 1971). As far as journals are concerned, cf. *infra* Part VI, section 3.

⁵⁹ Interestingly, E. Rivera de Ventosa considered Vives and Guy soulmates. Cf. «Juan Luis Vives y Alain Guy: dos almas gemelas», in J. M. Romero (ed.), *Homenaje a Alain Guy* (Barcelona: Publicacions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 2005), 227-242.

⁶⁰ The book of Villacañas is full of biographical, historical, and philosophical details. There is an exhaustive index of names and, within the entry «Vives», a meticulous list of his works and ideas. However, original Latin texts are not always provided, and Vives's thought is not given a specific chapter. Cf. the review of L. J. Prieto, «El cristianismo pacífico de Vives: A propósito de un reciente libro de José Luis Villacañas», *Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía* 38/3 (2021): 515-524.

⁶¹ Complementary information can be found in González 2007: 358-392.

- F. Calero: 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2009, 2012, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2017; CJLV 2A, 3A, 8A, 10 | pedagogy, rhetoric; educational writings, Europeanism.
- L. Casini: 2002, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2016, 2021 | philosophy, psychology; cognition, emotions, scepticism, soul.
- M. L. Colish: 2009a, 2009b | anthropology, religion, Turks.
- V. Del Nero: 1986, 1991, 1992, 1998, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2018, 2020 | education, language, religion; soul.
- Ch. Fantazzi: 1979, 1981, 2002, 2006, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009, 2011, 2014; SWJV 1, 3-8 | education, religion, social thought, early writings, Erasmus-Vives relationship.
- J. A. Fernández-Santamaría: 1977, 1990, 1992, 1998 | political thought, society, scepticism.
- A. Fontán: 1975, 2008 | Humanism.
- E. V. George: 1989, 1992, 1997, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2014; SWJV 1, 2, 9, 10, 12 | rhetoric, religion, political thought.
- Á. Gómez-Hortigüela: 1991, 1993, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2014 | Vives's background, Vives's thought; wisdom, virtue.
- E. González: 1987, 1989, 1992, 1998a, 1998b, 1999 (with V. Gutiérrez), 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2015a, 2015b | Vives's life; catalogue, survival and transmission of his works.
- A. Guy: 1972 | Vives's thought.
- K. Havu: 2018, 2021a, 2021b, 2022 | moral and political philosophy, rhetoric, religion.
- E. Hidalgo-Serna: 1983, 1984, 1990 (Sender et al. 1990), 1992, 1998 | language, rhetoric.
- J. Ijsewijn: 1977, 1986, 1992, 1998b | chronology of Vives's works, philology.
- H. Kobayashi 1982, 1985 | education
- P. Mack: 2005, 2008 | language, rhetoric, dialectic
- A. Mestre Sanchis: 1968, 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 2009, 2014 | religion, Maians.
- A. Monzón: 1982, 1985, 1987 (PhD diss.), 1992a, 1992b, 1998 | law.
- V. Moreno: 2006, 2007 | reception of Vives's works in Hispanic territories.
- C. G. Noreña: 1969, 1970, 1975, 1989, 1990, 2009, 2013 | Vives's life and thought, soul, emotions.
- F. J. Pérez Durà: 1992-2010, 1997, 2009, 2017 | Vives's life, religion, Scholasticism.
- I. Roca: 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000; CJLV 1A, 9 | philosophy, law, religion; wisdom.
- M. Sancipriano: 1974, 1986, 1996 | philosophy, anthropology; soul.
- T. Sasaki 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996 | life and works
- Chr. Strosetzki: 1995, 2010, 2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014 | philosophy, rhetoric, Erasmus-Vives relationship, wisdom.
- J. Tello: 2009, 2018a, 2018b, 2019, 2019-2020, 2020a, 2020b, 2022b | Vives's works, philosophy, social thought, knowledge.
- M. L. Tobriner (A. Tobriner): 1966, 1968, 1969, 1975, 1991, 1999 | philosophy, social thought, religion, Erasmus-Vives relationship.
- G. Tournoy: 1992, 1993, 1994, 2002a, 2002b, 2004, 2005, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2020; SWJV 12 | Vives's chronology, Vives's letters, political thought.
- C. Vasoli: 1998, 2007 | philosophy, logic, rhetoric.
- T. Vigliano: 2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2020 | philosophy, education, rhetoric, Vives's identity.
- S. Zeller: 2006, 2017 | Vives's life, social thought; Judaism, *conversos*.

The following books and articles should also be taken into account. Please notice that some items may be placed in more than one area:⁶²

⁶² In general, PhD dissertations have not been included; they can be consulted in chronological order at the end of Part VI, section 6.

LIFE (including letters, Inquisition, Judaism), GENERAL APPROACH, COLLECTIVE WORKS: Abellán 1986; Andersson 2010; Couzinet 2015; Cruselles 1995; De Landtsheer and De Schepper 2014; Deitz et al. 2014; Escudero 2009; Etchegaray 1977; Fuster 1989; Garcia 1986; García-Cárcel 1992; Coronel 2014, 2016; Cruselles 1995; Garcia 1987; Gómez Bayarri 2015; Hanke 2017; Hernández i Dobon 2014; Ibáñez 1994; Jiménez 1977; Mourelle de Lema 1999; Olivares-Merino 2007; Pérez 2015; Serra 2013; Tobriner 1969; Trueta 1970; Vilarroig 2017; Vosters 1964, 2007; Weir 2008.

THOUGHT (anthropology, education, philosophy, politics, psychology, society): Antón 2012; Beneš 2007; Capitán 1984; Carpintero 1993; Carreras 1968; Cercadillo 2019; Charpentier 2012; Cobos 1986-1988; Curtis 2008, 2011; De Bom 2008; Dumontet 2009; Dust 1987; Edouard 2012; Esteban 1992, 1994, 1997; Ferdinandi 1992; Fernández Suárez 1993; Ferrer 2015; Gallinari 1978; Gerbino 2020; Ginzo 2005, 2006; Hiscock 2015; Kohut 2014; Kolsky 2012; Lisembly 1987; López 2006; Margolin 1976a; Mestre Zaragoza 2006, 2018, 2020; Mištinová 2007; Nauta 2015, 2021; Ocampo 2010; Oiffer-Bonsel 2009, 2017; Perreiah 2016; Redondo 1966; Rivera 1977; Rivera 1986; Santoja 2006; Spicker 2010; Trujillo 1992; Verbeke 2014a; Verbeke 2014b; Vuilleumier 2000; Wolff 2005.

RHETORIC, POETICS, LANGUAGE: Battistini 1994; Bernal 2009; Brekle 1984, 1985; Brevia-Claramonte 1994; Coseriu 1978; Fernández López 2008; Gagliardi 2008; Monreal 2011; Muguruza 2009.

RELIGION: Belarte 1992, 2010; Estellés 2012; Gómez Aranda 2016; Graf 1932; Kriegel 1998; Maestre Sánchez 2003; Marín 1966; McCully 1967 (diss.); Monsegú 1954, 1955, 1986; Parello 2008; Tellechea 1992; Urmeneta 1951.

1.6 Secondary sources: Renaissance

The scholar devoted to Vives may enrich his research by consulting the following reference tools, since they frequently provide an enormous amount of information about the historical and intellectual context in which Vives lived and thought: *Il pensiero della Rinascenza e della Riforma* (Sciacca 1964); *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600* (Kretzmann, Kenny and Pinborg 1982); *Contemporaries of Erasmus: A Biographical Register of the Renaissance and Reformation* (CEBR, Bietenholz and Deutscher 1985-1987); *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Schmitt and Skinner 1988); *Renaissance Humanism: Foundations, Forms, and Legacy* (Rabil 1988); *Companion to Neo-Latin Studies* (Ijsewijn and Sacré 1990-1998); *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism* (Kraye 1996); *Encyclopedia of the Renaissance* (Grendler 1999); *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy* (Hankins 2007); *The Classical Tradition* (Grafton, Most and Settis 2010); *Brill's Encyclopaedia of the Neo-Latin World* (Ford, Bloemendal and Fantazzi 2014); *Léxico técnico de filosofía medieval* (Magnavacca 2014); *The Oxford Handbook of Neo-Latin* (Knight and Tilg 2015); *Encyclopedia of Renaissance Philosophy* (Sgarbi 2022 [in press]). The aforementioned publications can be complemented with the selection of books and articles listed below. Please bear in mind that some items may be placed in more than one area:

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: Belenguer 1989; Brewer et al. 1862-1932; Cahill 2015; Cantagrel 2012; Castellano and Sánchez-Montes 2001; Doran et al. 2011; Elton 1990; Farge 1980, 1985; Fowler 1893; Gilmore 1962; Guy 1997; Hay 1961; Laigneau 2013; Loades 1991, 1992, 2006; Mackie 1952; Marc'hadour 1963; Mattingly 1942, 1955; McConica 1965; Munro 2003; Paul

1966; Porter 2009; Prescott 2003; Renaudet 1953; Rex 2009; Richardson 2002; Thomas and Verdonk 2000; Tracy 2005; Tremlett 2010; Ventura 1978; Villacañas 2017, 2020.

HUMANISM, CLASSICAL TRADITION: Abellán 1982; Arnold 2011; Augustijn 1986; Bataillon 1977, 1991; Béné 1969; Black 1998; Bolgar 1954, 1970, 1971, 1976; Butinyà and Cortijo 2011; Campi et al. 2008; Coppens 1969; De Landtsheer and Nellen 2010; Deitz et al. 2014; Dowling 1986; Duran and Solervicens 1995; Ebbesmeyer 2017; Gagliardi 2007; Garin 1957, 1988, 2012; Gil 1997, 2015; Gilmore 1963; Grafton 2015; Grafton and Jardine 1986; Grau i Arau 1998, 2000; Grau Codina et al. 2003, 2009; Greene 1938; Gulik 2018; Heller 1984; Henderson 2012; Jardine 2015; King 2014; Margolin 2007; Martin 2009; Nativel 1997; Nauert 2006; Oberman and Brady 1975; Para 2002; Pérez Herranz 2016; Pfeiffer 1976; Rico 2016; Rummel 1985; Ryle 2014; Schoeck 1990, 1993; Sebastiani 2018; Vanautgaerden 2012; Woolfson 2002.

THOUGHT: Amo 2007; Castor 1964; Desan and Ferrer 2020; Flasch 2001; Granada 1994, 2000, 2021; Grassi 1980, 1986; Hamesse and Fattori 2003; Harvey 1975; Jaén 2018; King 2016; Krays 1997; Kristeller 1956-1966, 1961, 1964, 1979; Lines and Ebbesmeyer 2013; Lines 2018; Margolin 1969, 1976b; MacPhail 2011; McConica 1979; Popkin 2003; Rice 1958; Riedl 1940; Serés 2019; Teissier-Ensminger 2015; Vasoli 2002; Waswo 1987.

RELIGION, INQUISITION, *CONVERSOS*: Alberigo 2017; Amador de los Ríos 1875-1876; Ardit 1970; Banères 2002; Bethencourt 2009; Cantimori 1995; Delgado 2010; Febvre 1980; Homza 2006; Ingram 2018; Kamen 2014; Lea 1901, 1906-1907; Mackinnon 1962; Meyerson 2009; Narro 2011; Netanyahu 1999, 2001; Pérez and Escandell 1984; Rummel 2008.

RHETORIC, POETICS, LANGUAGE: Baranda 2007; Balavoine 1984; Esteve 2014; Mack 1996; Séris 2016.

PROVERBS AND SIMILAR GENRES: Cuartero 2002a; Cuartero 2002b; Daly 1980, 2004; Daly et al. 2001; Enenkel 2003, 2009; Grant 2017; Hrisztova-Gotthardt and Aleksa 2015; Hui 2018, 2019a, 2019b; MacPhail 2014; Manning 2002; Martin, Servet and Tournon 2008; Mieder 2004; Phillips 1964; Puig de la Bellacasa 2000; Raybould 2005; Rolet 2013; Talavera 2002; Taylor 2017; Volkmann 2018; Wildish 2017.

AUTHORSHIP, BOOKS, PRINTING: Bruni and Pettegree 2016; Considine 2008, 2019; Furno and Mouren 2013; Grafton 2001, 2020a, 2020b; Graheli 2019; McKitterick 2003; Pettegree 2010; Pittion 2013; Rummel 1996; Walsby and Constantinidou 2013; Werner 2019.

1.7 Future research

The solid study of Vives requires at least three fundamental instruments: (1) a complete catalogue of his works; (2) a critical edition of all his works; (3) a reliable translation in a modern language of all his works; (4) a thorough index of keywords that comprises the entire Vivesian production.

Regarding (1), González (1987: 189-192), González, Albiñana and Gutiérrez (1992: 99-206, 316-317), Gómez-Hortigüela (1991: 143-147), and myself (Tello 2018a) have attempted to produce a catalogue. However, an agreement should be reached in order to establish a definitive instrument. As far as (2) is concerned, it seems that the SWJV is undertaking this mission, though not with complete success, since some critical editions are being published elsewhere, either in academic journals or other series.⁶³ Concerning (3), it would be desirable

⁶³ For exemple: García Ruiz 2005, Tournoy 2005, Pédeflous and Tournoy 2013, Vigliano 2013a, Elasi 2014, Tello 2019, Tello 2020a.

to have all Vives's works available in two modern languages. The SWJV may play this role in English, whereas the CJLV could perhaps be re-launched and make this service in Spanish. However, it might also seem fair to make Vives's works available in his mother tongue too, that is, in Catalan-Valencian. To that purpose, Catalan speaking universities should work together in order to make a feasible proposal. Finally, item (4) would be an extraordinarily useful tool to study Vives's thought. It requires, though, both extensive readership and expertise in Vives's works.

As far as particular works are concerned, there is a strong need to edit and translate the third part of *Disc.* (*Disc. prima ph.*, *Disc. essent.*, *Disc. uer.*, *Disc. prob.* and *Disc. disp.*). These works were not covered by the critical edition of Vigliano (2013a) and have a rich philosophical content, though not always novel.⁶⁴ Further, *Ver. fuc.*, *Excit.*, and book 1 of *Ver. fid.* (book 4 has already been edited in SWJV 12) are also of enormous interest, because of their philosophical, anthropological and moral content.

2 The *Introductio ad sapientiam* at the beginning of the 21st century

2.1 Primary sources: Latin text

This item is addressed in Part III, section 3.

2.2 Primary sources: translations (in chronological order)

An account of translations into English, French, German and Spanish can be found in Bonilla (1903: 767-777) and Alventosa (1930: cxiii-cxxxvi). Here I shall only reference the first one in the aforementioned languages; if important for some reason, also later ones and in other languages as well. As from 1900, all translations in all languages will be noted.

Morrison, R. (tr.) (1540) *An introduction to wysedome*. London: John Daye. [English; reprinted at London: Thomas Berthelet, 1540]

Cervantes de Salazar, F. (tr.) (1544) *Introducción para ser sabio, compuesta en latín por el doctísimo varón Luys Viues*. Sevilla: Dominico de Robertis. [Spanish]⁶⁵

Bruno, Chr. (tr.) (1545) *Joan. Lodovici Vivis Zwayhundert und dreyzehen auszerlesner Trabanten, durch wölcher getrewe belaytung, nit allain Fürstliche und Hochadeliche personen, sonder auch ain jeder mensch, zu be warung leibs vn lebens, vor allem lüst vn argem betrug der widersacher, gewtlich versichert viuert, jetzt newlich durch Christophorum Brunonem Bayder Rechten Licentiaten, verteutschet*. Ingolstadt: Alexander Weysenhorn. [German; reprinted, 1546]

Cervantes de Salazar, F. (tr.) (1546) «Introducción y camino para la sabiduría», in *Obras que Francisco Ceruantes de Salazar a hecho, glosado, y traduzido...* Alcalá de Henares: Juan de Brocar. [Spanish; reprinted at Madrid: Antonio Sancha, 1772]⁶⁶

Colin, J. (tr.) (1548) *Introduction a vraye sapience*. Paris: Charles l'Angelier. [French]

⁶⁴ Casini (2006: 18), when talking about *An. uita*, gives a similar opinion: «In spite of the relative originality of his approach, Vives also pays considerable tribute to tradition».

⁶⁵ Available copy at Biblioteca Nacional de España, R/6243. Cf. Moreno 2006: 290-292, 309; González 2007: 144.

⁶⁶ Cf. A. Rodríguez-Moñino, *La imprenta de don Antonio de Sancha (1771-1790): primer intento de una guía bibliográfica para uso de coleccionistas y libreros* (Madrid: Castalia, 1971), 47, catalogue number 18.

- Paradin, G. (tr.) (1550) *Traité du vrai amour de sagesse divine, introduction à la sagesse, traduit du latin de Jean Loys Vivés*. Lyon: Maurice Roy. [French]
- Astudillo, Diego de (tr.) (1551) *Introduction a la sabiduría compuesta en Latín por el Doctor Iuan Luys Viues*. Antwerp: Ioannes Stelsius. [Spanish; reprinted at Valencia: Benet Monfort, 1765]
- Adam z Veleslavina, D. (tr.) (1586) *Navedeni k moudrosti*. Prague: M. Daniel Adamus a Veleslauina. [Czech with Latin text]
- Hoogstraeten, F. van (tr.) (1670) *Inleiding tot de waere wijsheid*. Rotterdam: François van Hoogstraeten, 1670. [Dutch]
- Pichó y Rius, P. (tr.) (1791) *Introducción a la Sabiduría, escrita en latín por J. L. Vives, traducida en verso castellano*. Valencia: Imprenta del Diario. [Spanish]
- Avinyó, J. (tr.) (1929) *Lluís Vives: Introducció a la saviesa*. Barcelona: Barcino. [Catalan]
- Alventosa, J. (tr.) (1930) *Introducción a la sabiduría*. Valencia: Imprenta Hijo de F. Vives Mora, 1-78. [Spanish]
- Riber, L. (tr.) (1947) «Introducción a la sabiduría». In *Juan Luis Vives: Obras completas*. Madrid: Aguilar, vol. 1: 1205-1257. [Spanish]
- Pérez, D. J. (tr.) (1948) «Juan Luís Vives: Introdução à Sabedoria, Diálogos». In *Moralistas Espanhóis*. São Paulo: Gráfica Editora Brasileira (Clássicos Jackson, 11). [Portuguese]
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- Roca, I. (tr.) (1992) «Introductio ad sapientiam» (excerpt). In J. Pérez Durà, F. J. (coord.), *Joan Lluís Vives: Antologia de textos*. Valencia: Universitat de València / Generalitat Valenciana, 244-287. [Catalan; there is also a Spanish edition]
- Sarrió, R. M.; Girbés, V. (tr.) (1992) «Introducció a la saviesa». In *Introducció a la saviesa i altres escrits*. Barcelona: Proa, 45-107. [Catalan]
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- Wolff, É. (tr.) (2001) *Joan Lluís Vives: Introduction à la sagesse*. Présentation de P. Gifreu. Monaco: Le Rocher. [French]

⁶⁷ This translation is the improved version of the former one included in her PhD dissertation (1966: II1-II88), which was, in fact, Morrison's translation (1540) thoroughly edited and revised by Tobriner.

⁶⁸ In p. 15 (n. 1), it is stated that «en la traducción seguimos el texto latino de la edición de Burgos, publicada en 1544, la cual contiene correcciones y adiciones, realizadas por el propio Vives, respecto de la edición primera, publicada en Lovaina en 1524, cuyo texto reproduce la edición de Basilea de 1555». In concordance with what González says (2007: 339), there is no proof of the existence of an edition printed in Burgos in 1544; only a further reference made by Maians (1792: 85). Rather, it seems that the Latin text used here for the translation is the edition printed in 1772 (Madrid: Antonio de Sancha, p. 113-175), which claims to follow the aforementioned edition of Burgos (p. xxii; modern orthography mine): «No ha sido poco feliz el hallazgo de esta impresión, que es la misma de que se sirvió Cervantes [i.e. Cervantes de Salazar] para su traducción, como lo he tocado por mis manos en el cotejo de esta con todas las demás que he podido ver, y con la propia traducción que sigue al pie de la letra la misma numeración y adiciones de esta de Burgos».

- Frayle, L. (tr.) (2010) «Introducción a la sabiduría». In *Juan Luis Vives: Introducción a la sabiduría, El sabio*. Madrid: Tecnos, 3-86. [Spanish]
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- Del Nero, V. (tr.) (2018) «Introductio ad sapientiam / Introduzione alla sapienza». In *Juan Luis Vives: Scritti spirituali*. Brescia: Morcelliana, 47-122. [Italian]

2.3 Secondary sources: from Gessner (1545) to Rice (1958)

The studies about *Ad sap.* that I would like to draw the attention to are of various nature and length: Gessner (1545: 430v), Maians (1782: 82-85, 113-114), Namèche (1841: 104-105), Mallaina (1872: 58-60), Bonilla (1903: 166, 176, 479-484), Alventosa (1930: lxxxix-cxxxix), Urmeneta (1949: 257-311), Rice (1958: 160-163), Tobriner (1966: 1-427; 1968: 1-74), Monzón (1992: 24-29), Gómez-Hortigüela (2001), González (2007: 70-76), Frayle (2010: ix-xli), and Del Nero (2018: 30-40, at 32-35). Of all, only two qualify as monographs (Tobriner 1966; Gómez-Hortigüela 2001). The rest are either introductions to translations (Alventosa 1930; Tobriner 1968; Monzón 1992; Frayle 2010; Del Nero 2018) or sections of a book (Gessner 1545; Maians 1782; Namèche 1841; Mallaina 1872; Bonilla 1903; Urmeneta 1949; Rice 1958; González 2007). I shall make a brief comment on each item.

The first review of *Ad sap.* made by a scholar after Vives's death is that of Gessner (1545: 430v) in his *Bibliotheca*. Although short, it is nonetheless a precious document to appraise how Vives's contemporaries conceived this work. Gessner defines *Ad sap.* as composed by around 600 *sententiae* ('maxims') or *aphorismi* ('aphorisms') printed in a quarto book. The entry is as follows (*italics mine*):

Introductio ad ueram sapientiam, scripta Brugis 1524. Sunt autem chartae 4 diuisae per sententias aut aphorismos pene sexcentos, quibus tituli generales inseruntur isti: Diuisio rerum, Rerum naturae ac potentia, De corpore, De animo, De eruditione, De affectibus, De religione, De conuictu hominum, De uerbis, Quomodo se quisque gerat erga seipsum.

Maians (1782), in his *Vita*, describes *Ad sap.* as a short compendium of moral philosophy, whose notions have been extracted from the finest works of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Epictetus, Seneca and Plutarch. According to him, Christian religion is explained in a simple and accurate way by virtue of a transparent philosophical methodology that consists of explaining things «without any disguise»⁶⁹ or falsity. He summarizes the content of the work by saying that it deals with the duties of each human being towards God, towards humankind and towards oneself. He adds that *Ad sap.* is a writing devised to help memorize what actions are appropriate to be carried out in life by each person as a citizen, a moral being and a Christian.⁷⁰ It is noteworthy that Maians did not catalogue *Ad sap.* as part of any thematic area, thus showing the complexity to index this work under one unique designation.

⁶⁹ «absque fucus». *Fucus, a, um* is an adjective derived from the verb *fucio* 'to paint', 'to disguise'. Vives was rather interested in the way things are disguised or falsified, to such an extent that he called one of his works *Veritas fucata* (*Ver. fuc.*, 1523), that is, *Painted truth* or *Truth in disguise*.

⁷⁰ Cf. Maians 1792: 82-83: «Auctor, qui recte censebat uirtutem fundamentum esse sapientiae, scripsit in hoc opusculo breue compendium philosophiae moralis, ut lectores in promptu haberent omnem

Namèche (1841: 105) defines *Ad sap.* as «a traité de morale chrétienne, en maximes ou aphorismes». Mallaina (1872: 59) elaborates his description by basically translating Maians's Latin text into Spanish, or paraphrasing it. Further, he makes the comparison that the 592 short paragraphs of *Ad sap.* are similar to the verses of the Bible. Like Maians, he also leaves *Ad sap.* out of any thematic classification.^{7169bis}

Bonilla (1903) conducts the analysis of *Ad sap.* in a chapter called «Vives's physical thought:⁷² Vives's notions about individual anthropology – Morality, Natural Law, Pedagogy». He emphasizes the pedagogical element of the work and considers it a book of civility; more specifically, a treatise on practical morals aimed at youth. In a note (1903: 685, n. 2^o), he links *Ad sap.* to Erasmus's *De ciuilitate morum puerilium libellus* (Basel: Johann Froben, ca. March 1530). Bonilla also indicates the salient themes of the work:⁷³ judging things without error; 'wisdom' as knowledge of one's self and of God; 'virtue' as piety toward God and good deeds toward mankind; the instruction of the soul; and first and foremost: how to know properly, how to speak properly, how to act properly. To this threefold purpose, Bonilla argues that humankind possesses creative intelligence (*ingenium*),⁷⁴ memory, and study. According to him (1903: 483), Vives proclaims that Γνωθι σεαυτόν is the rational foundation of ethics.^{7572bis}

The introduction of Alventosa (1930) makes clever use of previous books, namely the preface that Cervantes de Salazar wrote to his Spanish translation (1544), the study of Maians (1782), and Bonilla's book (1903). In addition to main themes and style, he gives a valuable account of editions and translations as from the 16th century.⁷⁶ Further, he realizes that the editors and printers of *Ad sap.* often changed its appearance, by arbitrarily splitting or merging sentences and chapters at their own will, which not always responded to a plausible and logic reason.⁷⁷ This remark, non-existent in previous studies, is of paramount importance to elucidate the original format of this work.⁷⁸

The study of Urmeneta (1949) is delivered with a well-defined and systematic approach. He interprets *Ad sap.* as a pedagogical treatise (like Bonilla) composed by the following elements:⁷⁹

succum et sanguinem doctrinae Platonis, Aristotelis, Ciceronis, Epicteti, Senecae et Plutarchi; semper ab oculos habens rationem naturalem et religionem Christianam, unicam morum magistram, per quam Viues perfecit illam doctrinam, reddens eam facilem, apertam et exactam stilo philosophico, hoc est, breui proprio et cato absque fuco, simplici, methodico et aperto. [...] Merito Ludouicus Viues libello suo aptauit titulum *Introductio ad sapientiam*, quia est dux ducens ad uitam uere Christianam; est index indicans hominis officia erga Deum, erga hominem et erga se ipsum; est libellus memorialis continens quidquid agi debetur in uita ciuili, morali et Christiana»; 113: «Eius *Introductio ad sapientiam* enchiridion est totius Ethicae Christianae».

⁷¹ Cf. *supra* n. 38.

⁷² «Doctrina física de Vives: Ideas de Vives acerca de la antropología individual. La Moral. El Derecho natural. La Pedagogía» (Bonilla 1903: 479). The Spanish scholar had previously explained (1903: 268-273) his classification of science according to the object of knowledge; cf. *supra* n. 41.

⁷³ Cf. Bonilla 1903: 480-481.

⁷⁴ As inferred from *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 8; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 9): «ingenii acumen uiuax et sua sponte actuosum. Hinc sunt nata inuenta hominum omnia, utilia, noxia, proba, improba». Noreña (1989: 108) renders *ingenium* as «full power of the mind». Cf. *infra* Part IV, section 3.1, n. 140.

⁷⁵ Cf. Bonilla 1903: 483.

⁷⁶ Cf. Alventosa 1930: cv-cxxxvi.

⁷⁷ Cf. Alventosa 1930: ciii.

⁷⁸ Cf. *infra* Part III, section 2.3.

⁷⁹ Adapted from Spanish by myself. Cf. Urmeneta 1949: 260-261.

PREFACE: ON WISDOM

PART I: RULES FOR SINGLE INDIVIDUALS

(1) Ontological aspect.

1. Physics: the being of things.
 - 1.1 Classification of things; 1.2 Nature of things.
2. Metaphysics: the being of humans.
 - 2.1 The human body; 2.2 The human soul.

(2) Deontological aspect.

1. Somatism: duties toward the body.
 - 1.1 Food; 1.2 Sleep.
2. Psychology: duties toward the soul.
 - 1.1 Knowledge; 1.2 Tendencies.

PART II: RULES FOR THE SOCIETY AS A WHOLE

(1) In relation to God.

1. Moral life.
 - 1.1 Virtue in general terms; 1.2 Virtue par excellence: charity.
2. Religious life.
 - 1.1 The duties of the religious man; 1.2 The duties of the Christian man as a Catholic.

(2) In relation to Humanity.

1. Social ties.
 - 1.1 Behaviour; 1.2 Relationships.
2. Human communication.
 - 2.1 Speech; 2.2 Oaths.

EPILOGUE: HOW WE OUGHT TO BEHAVE TOWARDS OURSELVES

After a close reading of his study, one concludes that the salient concepts examined are (in alphabetical order): *affectus*, *animus*, *charitas*, *Christus*, *conuictus hominum*, *corpus*, *delectatio*, *dignitas*, *diuitiae*, *eruditio*, *generositas*, *gloria*, *honor*, *iusiurandum*, *natura*, *nobilitas*, *pax*, *potentia*, *regnum*, *religio*, *sanitas*, *sapientia*, *somnium*, *species*, *uerbum*, *uires*, *uirtus*, and *uoluptas*. The main theme that unites all the aforementioned terms is that: (1) true wisdom is the result of true knowledge; (2) true knowledge serves to avoid vice and pursue virtue; (3) true knowledge is the result of, basically, three elements: adequate understanding, adequate speech and adequate behavior; (4) the aforementioned items can only be attained if one judges things without error.⁸⁰ As Bonilla rightly identified and Urmeneta also pointed out,⁸¹ one of the fundamental passages —if not the most— of *Ad sap.* is precisely item (3), which comes from aphorism 200:⁸² «Three things should be meditated on during our lifetime: how to understand, speak and act in a proper way».⁸³

⁸⁰ Cf. Urmeneta 1949: 264-265, 269, 285-286. Order also helps in this enterprise. Urmeneta recalls Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*: «Sapientia ... conuenienter iudicat et ordinat de omnibus» (I-II q57 a2 co), «...rationem, cuius est ordinare» (II-II q83 a1 co).

⁸¹ Cf. Bonilla 1903: 481; Urmeneta 1949: 286.

⁸² Numbering according to my critical edition. As it is explained *infra* Part III, section 3.3 (a), my edition usually follows the text provided by Hubert de Croock (1526).

⁸³ «Semper illa tria sunt homini, quamdiu uiuit, meditanda: quomodo bene sapiat, quomodo bene dicat, quomodo bene agat».

The study of Rice (1958) investigates the changes that the idea of virtue undertook in its transit from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance. The pages dedicated to *Ad sap.* are part of a chapter whose main idea is that the meaning of wisdom evolved «from contemplation to action, from a body of knowledge to a collection of ethical precepts, from a virtue of the intellect to a perfection of the will».⁸⁴ For Rice, Vives's *Ad sap.* deals with wisdom as moral virtue. «To be wise», he says, «is, first, to have true opinions about things and, second, to translate this knowledge into action by desiring only honorable things and avoiding the base, choosing good and rejecting evil».⁸⁵ Therefore, education consists of having true opinions about things as well as instructing the will. Rice's short but lucid account of *Ad sap.* implicitly leads to the following conclusion: good morals imply good habits, and good habits imply discipline and repetition.

2.4 Secondary sources: Tobriner (1966) and Gómez-Hortigüela (2001)

(a) Sister Marian Leona Tobriner (Alice Tobriner)

As indicated at the end of section 1.4, Tobriner (1966) was the first study devoted entirely to *Ad sap.*, and it aimed at explaining three main issues:

1/ THE FORMATION OF VIVES AS A RENAISSANCE ERUDITE through the main stages of his life, particularly Valencia, Paris (1509),⁸⁶ Flanders (Bruges 1512, Louvain, 1514) and England (London, Oxford, Windsor, 1523). Sister Tobriner examines Vives's teachers, students and closest friends in an informative and fluent style, while at the same time making short notices of every single work published by the Valencian humanist at a particular time.⁸⁷ Her detailed explanations are up to 1528, the year in which Vives's bonds with England stopped completely.⁸⁸ A section is added on translators (Richard Morison, *Ad sap.*; Richard Hyrde, *Foem.*; Thomas Paynell, *Mar.*; John Healy, *Ciu. dei*) and printers (Thomas Berthelet, Thomas Powell, Thomas East, Abraham Veale) who helped disseminate Vives's works in English.⁸⁹

2/ THE MAIN PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DEBATES⁹⁰ that makes Vives a Christian humanist:

a/ The changing role of *ratio*: «The dominance of reason brought to it an undue regard for its power rather than its capacity for knowledge. Education became a means to progress, a kind of social investment. [...] The "philosophy of the particular" broke into the schools».⁹¹

⁸⁴ Rice 1958: 149; cf. also 155: «Sixteenth-century humanists ... [redefined virtue] by transforming it from knowledge of divine things or of divine and human things and their causes to a code of ethical precepts, indistinguishable from prudence, or how to live well and blessedly. The result was an active, moralized wisdom more obviously in harmony with many contemporary needs».

⁸⁵ Rice 1958: 161.

⁸⁶ Dates according to Tobriner (1966: 452-457) indicate first date of arrival to a particular city.

⁸⁷ Since the focus of this PhD dissertation is primarily committed to Vives's thought, those interested in knowing Vives's teachers, students, friends and adversaries can consult Tobriner 1966: 9-150. This content was later published in Tobriner 1968: 9-36, though substantially abridged. Regarding studies devoted to Vives's life, cf. *supra* section 1.5, p. 13-14.

⁸⁸ Queen Catherine of Aragon dismissed Vives when he advised her not to cooperate with Henry's hearings on the divorce. Any financial support coming from the English monarchs was cancelled.

⁸⁹ Cf. Tobriner 1966: 151-167, with special emphasis on Richard Morison.

⁹⁰ Philosophical issues are dealt with in p. 168-193, 230-333. Its content was later published in Tobriner 1968: 48-74, though substantially abridged.

⁹¹ Tobriner 1966: 177, 181.

b/ The inroads of scepticism: «What knowledge we have gained can only be reckoned as probable and not assumed as absolutely true».⁹² However, Tobriner suggests that, in fact, «this is not scepticism, but an honest appraisal of the human mind in the presence of omnipotence».⁹³

c/ The necessity for discipline and social order, since the confidence in authority was being replaced by a growing confidence in the power of human will. «The liberty of humanism would follow only upon the containment of disorder. [...] From royalty to commoners, the entire population practiced excesses of personal disorder and social irreverence».⁹⁴

d/ Faith in man, and comprehensive approach to man: mind, will, senses, emotions, memory and hygiene directed to righteous life, to the practice of virtue.⁹⁵ However, strong criticism to the mob, considered to be the expression of irrationality, «the master of error».⁹⁶

e/ God and Christ: «Man in rebellion against God, like nations at war against each other, needs the Pacificator to bring rational order and honest good will to unruly passions».⁹⁷

f/ Wisdom. According to Tobriner, five interpretations of *sapientia* can be inferred from *Ad sap.*: (1) wisdom personified in God himself; (2) divine knowledge handed down from God; (3) the answer of the soul to the *inspirations* of the Spirit; (4) man's natural intelligence; and (5) practical wisdom, that is, the skill in using all things according to their proper function.⁹⁸

3/ THE TUDOR CURRICULUM. Sister Tobriner analyses in depth the usage of *Ad sap.* in English educational institutions. According to her, «the *Introduction to Wisdom* served two purposes in Tudor schools: practice in grammatical skills, and indoctrination of ethical precepts».⁹⁹ Furthermore, she describes with many details the management of these schools and the subjects studied.¹⁰⁰

(b) Ángel Gómez-Hortigüela

The PhD dissertation of Gómez-Hortigüela (2000) focuses on the notion of wisdom in Vives's works and it was later published (2001) as part of CJLV 9. This study became the second monograph entirely devoted to *Ad sap.* Its content is distributed in seven chapters, the salient ideas of which are as follows:

⁹² Tobriner 1966: 184. Quotation of *Disc. trad.* 4 (VOO 6: 347; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 389; tr. Watson 1913: cxii, 166): «quocirca uerisimilia consecretamur, magis quam assequimur quae pro comperto habeamus uera».

⁹³ Tobriner 1966: 185.

⁹⁴ Tobriner 1966: 190, 281.

⁹⁵ Cf. Tobriner 1966: 233-261.

⁹⁶ Cf. Tobriner 1966: 269-273 (at 272); Vives, *Ad sap.* 4.

⁹⁷ Tobriner 1966: 288. Christ, as it will be discussed in Part V, is also the exemplary model that can be imitated and understood, in front of God, that is unknowable in Himself.

⁹⁸ Cf. Tobriner 1966: 315-333; Tobriner 1968: 71-74.

⁹⁹ Tobriner 1966: 336.

¹⁰⁰ For those interested in Tudor education, Part I, chapter III of Tobriner's (1966: 334-421) dissertation is very precious. Unfortunately, it was not included in his later publication (1968).

1/ Different philosophies and individuals influenced Vives during his life. On the one hand, Nominalism, Dialectic and *Deutio moderna*. On the other hand, various humanists, clergymen, and monarchs: Guillaume Budé, Nicolas Bérault, Erasmus of Rotterdam, Guillaume (I) of Croy, Frans van Cranevelt, Thomas More, Henry VIII, and Catherine of Aragon.¹⁰¹

2/ When Vives employed the notion of ‘wisdom’, he implicitly gathered the nuances forged through time by different thinkers.¹⁰² Based on the explanations provided by the author of the study,¹⁰³ the notes below serve as a quick summary about this question:

Plato and Aristotle believed that the only true sage (σοφός) was God; human beings could only reach the status of ‘friends’ or ‘lovers’ of wisdom (φιλόσοφος).¹⁰⁴ Aristotle distinguished between *wisdom* (σοφία), a science (ἐπιστήμη) that deals with the principle of things,¹⁰⁵ and *prudence* (φρόνησις), a power of insight into practical matters.¹⁰⁶

Cicero considered *sapientia* the knowledge (*scientia*) of things human and divine; and *prudentia*, the practical knowledge of things to be sought for and of things to be avoided.¹⁰⁷ Cicero and Seneca also understood *sapientia* as *ars uiuendi* and they considered wisdom to stem from natural law.¹⁰⁸

According to Augustine (*De ciuitate Dei* 8.4; tr. Dyson 1998: 316-317), «the active part [of wisdom] has to do with the conduct of life, that is, with the regulation of morals; and the contemplative with the investigation of natural causes and the purest form of truth. Socrates is remembered as having excelled in the active branch, whereas Pythagoras directed the force of his intellect as far as possible to the contemplative side». Augustine also believes (*De ciuitate Dei* 8.1; tr. Dyson 1998: 312) that «if God ... is wisdom, ... then the true philosopher is a lover of God [*amator Dei*]».

According to Thomas Aquinas, since wisdom consists of knowing the truth, this truth can be attained by either grace or nature. Prudence is a kind of human wisdom oriented to human things.

Francesco Filelfo¹⁰⁹ devised three stages in the path to wisdom: knowledge from nature (pagan philosophers), knowledge from faith (Christian philosophers), knowledge from direct contact with God (saints in Glory). Further, he related wisdom to Christian piety.

In his *Oratio de hominis dignitate*, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola gave human beings the freedom to be what they choose by virtue of their will. This self-made identity reinforced the role of education, and considered the soul the only principle able to encompass and know everything that exists.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Gómez-Hortigüela 2001: 106-121.

¹⁰² From Ancient Greece to 16th century Northern Humanism, Gómez-Hortigüela (2001: 139-173) makes comments of various length and insight about Homer, Hesiod, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, Ramon Sibiuda, Nicholas of Cusa, Petarch, Coluccio Salutati, Francesco Filelfo, Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Josse Clichtove, Conrad Celtes, Charles de Bovelles, Guillaume Budé and Erasmus of Rotterdam.

¹⁰³ Cf. Gómez-Hortigüela 2001: 139-173.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Plato, *Phaedro* 278d; Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 1.2 (A 982b128-31).

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 11.1 (K 1059a18).

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* 6.5 (1140a24-28).

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Cicero, *De officiis* 1.43-153.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 94.69, 118.11-13.

¹⁰⁹ Vives published in 1514 the introduction to a course on Filelfo's *Conuiuia* (*Prael. Conu.*).

Guillaume Budé (*De philologia libri* 5.5) drew attention to the fact that wisdom without prudence turns out void and barren, almost a vice, a sin.

According to Erasmus, true wisdom is that of Christ, whose attendants (*comites*) are modesty and docility (*mansuetudo*). Docility makes us capable of receiving the divine Spirit and its fruits.¹¹⁰ Science is knowledge of the divine law through assiduous study of the Scripture. This task maintains the mind on good health. Arrogance and pride do not arise from learning but from ignorance.

3/ Wisdom is an essential element when examining a human being, truth, virtue, society, and plenitude.¹¹¹

4/ The notion of ‘sage’ in Vives can be traced in three previous works: *Fab.*, *Sap.*, and *Ciu.dei*.¹¹² Since the concept of ‘wise man’ was closely linked to that of ‘truth’, discussions about reason and faith, and the possibility of a dual truth (one philosophical, one theological) are present in Vives’s writings.¹¹³ Similarly, the notion of ‘wisdom’ can be investigated in other works such as *Foem.*, *Mar.*, *Conc.*, *Disc. trad. er.*, and *Ver. fid.*¹¹⁴ Vives asserts that the wise man is guided by righteous judgments, promotes peace and concord, is frugal and moderate, and displays an absolute commitment to truth. These qualities are found in Jesus Christ, the reconciler or «peace-maker» (*pacificator*), who is an exemplary model to be followed.¹¹⁵

5/ Seven main themes can be identified in *Ad sap.*: the human condition; the soul; the true goods; learning; religion; the coexistence between human beings; consciousness and ends. The soul is what makes a being human; but, in the soul, not only do science and virtue exist but also ignorance and vice.¹¹⁶

6/ Vives aims at building an integral vision of the human being, as in relationship with himself, with the world, and with God. He emphasizes the need for observation, introspection, and independent thought. Nonetheless, because of the fact that human reason is limited, ultimate wisdom (ultimate truth) may only be attainable through revelation.¹¹⁷

7/ Virtue is conceived as the result of respecting the natural order devised by God, who is the only one able to provide true happiness.¹¹⁸ This order is in jeopardy due to the many emotions and human weaknesses, which lead human beings into error. Study and education should correct this faulty path.¹¹⁹

2.5 Secondary sources: other studies up to the present

Monzón (1992) dedicates around five pages to *Ad sap.* The main ideas conveyed in his examination are as follows: the *Ad sap.* is a moral work inserted into what has been called

¹¹⁰ Cf. Erasmus, *Enchiridion militis Christiani* 3 (ASD V-8: 130, lines 490-495; tr. CWE 66: 40).

¹¹¹ Cf. Gómez-Hortigüela 2001: 269-285.

¹¹² Cf. Gómez-Hortigüela 2001: 175-190.

¹¹³ Cf. Gómez-Hortigüela 2001: 196-201

¹¹⁴ Cf. Gómez-Hortigüela 2001: 249-265.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Gómez-Hortigüela 2001: 274-280, 284.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Gómez-Hortigüela 2001: 209-247, 271.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Gómez-Hortigüela 2001: 269-273.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.13 (VOO 8: 110).

¹¹⁹ Cf. Gómez-Hortigüela 2001: 274-275.

«Christian Stoicism»;¹²⁰ will must follow the light of truth, that is, action (*uirtus*) must be guided by knowledge (*doctrina*); *uirtus* and *pietas* are strongly linked; sin —or error, in a broader scope— is the result of violating the natural order; hygiene, austerity and moderation in life reflect the *ethos* of Protestantism; *Ad sap.*'s final aphorism¹²¹ reflects the Augustinian «Deum et animam scire cupio».¹²² In addition to this, he makes two remarks: (1) Vives seems to confuse two Biblical concepts: «flesh» and «body»; (2) Maians's *Espejo moral con reflexiones christianas* (Madrid: Antonio Sanz, 1734) paraphrases Vives's *Ad sap.* at various points.

The excellent historiographical study of González (2007) includes almost six pages to explain the main editions and fortune of *Ad sap.* He describes this work as a school manual to practice Latin and good customs, a mirror of princes, a method or *ratio* of study, and even a sort of book to pray to God.¹²³ He also points out the relationship between *Ad sap.* and three other pieces (*Sat.*, *Rat. stud.* and *Caes.*) with which *Ad sap.* was frequently printed. According to him, the aphoristic format and the affordable level of Latin contributed to its popularity and dissemination: 113 editions known to date were printed during the 16th century. *Ad sap.* was the second most successful work of Vives, only after *Ling.*, of which 260 editions were printed up to 1700.¹²⁴ Finally, González poses the bold theory (but plausible) that there must have existed a 1525 edition (non-extant), whose text would have been used by Simon de Colines in 1527.¹²⁵

Although the introductory study of Frayle (2010) is neither abundant in explanatory footnotes nor in international bibliography or quotations of other works of Vives, it is a good instrument to approach the content of *Ad sap.*, because of his critical assessment. He describes Vives's philosophy as «un humanismo cristiano que busca la sabiduría o arte de buen vivir. [...] Él trata] de construir una antropología y una ética que entiendan al hombre de su tiempo y lo conduzcan por el camino del bien y la convivencia en paz».¹²⁶ He underlines the significance of judging things without error (one of the most important subjects addressed in *Ad sap.*), and the leading role that education should play. As far as the main themes are concerned, he highlights the following: the compatible mixture of Greco-Roman wisdom and Christian morality; the preeminence of the soul over the body; the education of the mind, the highest part of the soul; the diseases or emotions (*affectus*) of the soul and their subsequent restraint; love and friendship; language as an instrument of society and coexistence;¹²⁷ the necessity of following one's conscience and thus avoid doing things that, once done, one may be ashamed of.

Finally, the Italian scholar Del Nero (2018) published a few years ago the latest translation of *Ad sap.* He has been the first to gather *Ad sap.* together with *Sat.*, *Excit. ep.*, *Excit. praef.* and *Excit. praep.* in a volume called *Scritti spirituali*. Del Nero's choice reminds us that Vives should not be considered only a pedagogue or a thinker of philosophy of

¹²⁰ Monzón 1992: 24. Cf. Bouwsma 1975: 55: «Erasmus and above all Vives were heavily influenced by the Stoics, and Clichetove's ideal for the priesthood resurrects ... the Stoic conception of the sage».

¹²¹ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 604: «Hic est cursus absolutae sapientiae, cuius primus gradus est nosse se, postremus nosse deum».

¹²² Augustine, *Soliloquiorum libri duo* 1.7.

¹²³ Cf. González 2007: 73-74.

¹²⁴ Cf. González 2007: 79.

¹²⁵ Cf. González 2007: 74; also my argumentation *infra* Part III, section 3.2 (d).

¹²⁶ Frayle 2010: xii.

¹²⁷ Vives is fond to use the word *glutinum* to convey the binding effect of language, like glue. Cf. *infra* Part IV, section 4.3 (a).

education. In addition to clearly identifying *Ad sap.* within the genre of aphorisms, Del Nero underlines Vives's preference for a more secular approach: instead of focusing on the contents of an ascetic, contrite and monastic life, *Ad. sap.* aims at giving guidance on social relations, behavior, and coexistence among human beings, all undertaken within the framework of the Christian faith.¹²⁸

* * * * *

The state of the investigation in Vivesian studies ends here, after having reviewed five centuries of scholarship, from 1545 to present day. The next part of this dissertation revolves around vindicating Vives as a philosopher.

Complementary note

The unified state that Spain is now, in the 21st century, does not correspond with the confederation that Spain was when Vives was born (1492/3). Moreover, at that time Spain was a geographical name to denote a confederation of two individual polities: the Crown of Aragon (Kingdom of Aragon, Principality of Catalonia, Kingdom of Valencia, Kingdom of Majorca, Kingdom of Sardinia, Kingdom of Naples and Kingdom of Sicily) and the Crown of Castile (Kingdom of Leon and Kingdom of Castile). This confederated alliance was born when Isabel of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon married on 19 October 1469, in Valladolid. As Floristán (2004: 137) summarizes:

Desde Europa, y también al sur de los Pirineos, los aragoneses y los castellanos —también los portugueses y los navarros— eran vistos globalmente, y se sentían a sí mismos, como “españoles” en el sentido de peninsulares. [...] Los Reyes Católicos, en sus documentos oficiales, siguieron utilizando la intitulación completa de todos sus estados, comenzando por los de Castilla-León e intercalándolos con los de Aragón; y lo mismo hicieron con el escudo de armas. Jamás soñaron con ir más allá y respetaron las leyes, instituciones, aduanas y naturalezas distintas de sus súbditos. Sólo el nuevo tribunal de la fe, la Inquisición real, vino a ser una institución que no reconocía las fronteras de los reinos y, por eso, chocaba con sus leyes haciéndose muy problemática su aceptación. [... Había] la convivencia de dos Coronas distintas y meramente yuxtapuestas, pero gobernadas y coordinadas por el matrimonio regio.

The fact that the relationship between the different nationalities that conform Spain today are not yet well-cemented hinders an objective approach to the life and thought of Joan Lluís Vives. It would be strongly advisable that he be kept apart from any nationalistic dispute or any religious faction.¹²⁹ Furthermore, scholars should try to avoid applying contemporary political and ideological frameworks to the past,¹³⁰ and keep in mind that Vives lived in a time when the adjective *Hispanicus* ('Spanish') was employed to denote a geographical territory rather than a national community.

¹²⁸ Cf. Del Nero 2018: 33.

¹²⁹ Cf. Noreña (1967: ix-x): «Although the pedagogical views of Vives have been widely investigated, as a philosopher he has been either neglected by foreign scholars or entirely misrepresented by the religious and nationalistic prejudice of his own countrymen».

¹³⁰ A similar opinion is given by Kristeller (1961: 9) when he states that «this seems to me a bad example of that widespread tendency among historians to impose the terms and labels of our modern time upon the thought of the past».

II Vives as a Philosopher

1 Sketch of a personality

Vives firmly believed that human matters are neither firm nor stable or lasting.¹ He often wondered why we should take pains to possess so many worldly things.² Further, he was astonished to witness the passion, the excitement and rage by which most people were driven. Since we have brought nothing to this world, and given the fact that we will be unable to take anything from it,³ why (he asks) would any one live in such madness? What is it that I really want? What is it that I really need?⁴ Having doubts about the real goal in life or about the next step to be taken were two situations that, according to Vives, could somehow be described as 'being in the balance'. Indeed, he thought that being hesitant was a most unfortunate state.⁵

Vives seems to have been a fluctuating man. Conflict and indecision were quite common in him. The letters to his intimate friend Frans van Cranevelt⁶ depict this situation in detail. Before taking a ship to England, he wrote: «I depend [*pendeo*] on the events taking place in Hispania,⁷ and I do not <dare> decide <anything about the future>. At the moment, I do not know whether I should go there or stay here».⁸ Further, he wonders: «I am hesitant [*incertus*] about what I should do ... You just think: what tranquility does he have who is fluctuating [*fluctuans*] between these waves?».⁹ In such a state of mind, it is of little surprise that Vives, already in England, complained¹⁰ about the annoying weather, the food and the

¹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 86): «Sunt humana omnia infirma».

² Cf. Vives, *Excit. med. g.* 8 (VOO 1: 79): «Quo mihi ad tam breuem uitam tantum uiaticum?».

³ Cf. Vives, *Excit. med. g.* 8 (VOO 1: 80): «Nihil intulimus in hunc mundum, utique nec sumus quicquam ablaturi».

⁴ Cf. Vives, *Excit. med. g.* 8 (VOO 1: 79): «Quis est hic furor? Quid uolo? Quid requiro?».

⁵ Cf. Vives, *Sat.* 179 (VOO 4: 58 [*Sat.* 177]; ed. Tello 2020a: 86): «Miserrimum pendere». A similar idea is found in Petrarch, *Secretum* 3.17.15 (Mann 2016: 252-253): «Non est ulterius hesitandum», that is, «You must not hesitate a moment longer».

⁶ Regarding Frans van Cranevelt, cf. De Vocht 1928: xxxiii-lxxxv; Allen 4: Ep. 1145 (intr.); CEBR 1: 354b-355b.

⁷ Allusion to the trial being held by the Spanish Inquisition against Vives's father and the family assets. Vives was also worried about his three underaged sisters. Cf. Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 4 January 1523 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 32, lines 13-18); Pinta and Palacio 1964: 100-101.

⁸ Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 4 January 1523 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 32, lines 25-27): «Nam pendeo ex rebus Hispanis: nec de <futuro quidquam audeo> constituere. Nescio ire ne expediat his temporibus an manere».

⁹ Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 15 March 1523 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 47, lines 3, 7-8): «Icertus quid <mihi faciendum> ... Cogita tu, inter has undas quae fluctuanti quies?».

¹⁰ Apparently, another contradiction of his personality, since Vives's preferred motto was «Sine querela», that is, «Without complaint»; cf. *Sat.* 157 (VOO 4: 54-55 [*Sat.* 155]; ed. Tello 2020a: 83).

teaching assignments;¹¹ and confessed that he saw, approved of, and preached virtue but did not practise it.¹² Moreover, Erasmus¹³ also noticed Vives's fluctuating and changing behavior when he openly said to Glocenius that «I am surprised about Vives. He wrote to me that he was thinking of returning to Brabant».¹⁴

Vives's views on life and humankind were not particularly positive. At some point, he claimed that life is a continuous addition of faults and crimes, the next day being always worse than the previous one.¹⁵ He declared his weariness of living among despicable people,¹⁶ he showed his conviction that the mob—the crowd, the common people—was a great master of error,¹⁷ and he was not reluctant to assert that there are certain individuals who do not want—do not qualify—to be considered humans:¹⁸ in them, love and concord are absent, only arrogance thrives.¹⁹ He claimed that man's exaggerate confidence in his limited and overrated powers might lead him to complete ruin.²⁰ Vives, the so-called humanist and pedagogue, abhorred not only common people but also students. He openly admitted to Erasmus that «I am so tired of teaching that I would do anything rather than return to this dreary life and have schoolboys for company».²¹

¹¹ Cf. Vives, *Letter to Miranda* probably written on June 1523 (VOO 7: 202, lines 12-16); *Letter to Cranevelt* 11 November 1523 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 80, lines 12-16); *Areop. ep.* 5 (15 December 1523; VOO 5: 2-3; ed. SWJV 12: 164).

¹² Vives, *Letter to Miranda* ca. June 1523 (VOO 7: 202): «Ego enim is sum, qui non mediocriter sim culpandus, quod uirtutem et uideo et probo et praedico nec tamen praesto». Interestingly, in *Conc.* 2 (VOO 5: 249) he criticizes those who profess the instruction of wisdom but never apply it to themselves: «O quam haec sunt pudenda in hominibus sapientiae magisterium professis et qui se medicos esse animorum iactant, ipsi tam aegris pectoribus nunquam sibi adhibeant quam medicinam per ciuitates uenalem circumferunt!». Vigliano also admits Vives's inconsistencies when he detects the «contradiction qui traverse l'œuvre entière de Vives» (2013a: cxiii); «L'ouvrage de Vives ne pouvait pas construire sur ces imprécisions un édifice solide» (2013a: cxxvii).

¹³ Regarding Erasmus's life, works and thought, cf. Augustijn 1986; Rummel 1985; Schoeck 1990; Bataillon 1991; Schoeck 1993; Ryle 2014; Jardine 2015.

¹⁴ Erasmus, *Letter to Conradus Glocenius* 25 September 1523 (Allen 5: Ep. 1388, lines 4-5; tr. CWE 10: 89-90): «De Viue miror. Scripsit mihi se cogitare de reditu in Brabantiam».

¹⁵ Cf. Vives, *Excit. med. g.* 36 (VOO 1: 99): «Quid agimus aliud quottidie in uita quam delictis delicta accumulare, facinoribus facinora aggrauare? Vt peior sit semper posterior dies priore».

¹⁶ Cf. Vives, *Excit. med. g.* 38 (VOO 1: 100): «O quando erit finis afflictionis huius, initium illius laetitiae? Quando desinam uiuere cum malis, cum odiosis, molestis, inimicis?».

¹⁷ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 4: «Videlicet magnus erroris magister est populus»; also *infra* Part IV, complementary note 3.

¹⁸ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 2 (VOO 5: 246): «Plane ita est: non est homo sed pecus is homo qui homo non uult existimari». Erasmus (*De pueris instituendis*, ASD I-2: 31, line 21; tr. CWE 26: 304) pointed out a similar notion: «At homines, mihi crede, non nascuntur sed finguntur», that is, «But man certainly is not born, but made man».

¹⁹ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 1 (VOO 5: 201, 202): «Ergo oportet ab humanitate hominem discessisse, quam amorem et concordiam exuit. [...] Haesit praecordiis superbia affixa, graue malum et tyrannis saeuissima».

²⁰ Cf. Vives, *Excit. med. g.* 3 (VOO 1: 74): «Initium ruinae hominis sibi fidere; initium reparationis sibi diffidere, Deo confisum».

²¹ Vives, *Letter to Erasmus* 15 August 1522 (Allen 5: Ep. 1306, lines 43-45; tr. CWE 9: 163): «Me tenet tantum scholarum taedium, ut quiduis facturus sim citius quam ad has redire sordes et inter pueros uersari». Cf. De Vocht 1934: 8. In his PhD dissertation, Noreña (1967: 203) shrewdly noticed this and other contradictions in Vives: «He is known as a Humanist, but he despised the world of poetry and fiction. [...] He is supposed to be a characteristic figure of the Renaissance, although he considered

Vives realized that his efforts (in fact, all the efforts made by the eminent philosophers, theologians and writers of all times) to improve the minds and the hearts of both the rulers and the ruled were in vain: «What good to us are letters, what good is humane learning? The many arts of life? The riches of education?», he asks in despair, and continues: «What is the providence of almighty God, when among these goods so admirable we carry out the most degenerate imperatives of nature? [...] We roam in our thoughts over land and sea, provoking turmoil everywhere, lashing out at everything in obedience to the profligacy of our hearts».²² All in all, there were certain occasions when Vives could not bear anymore the burden of such a miserable earthy life and he felt the urge to ask from God the relief of his pains.²³ An anonymous poem in elegiac distiches echoed his various misfortunes and ended by proclaiming: «Why should we mourn Vives, who is borne into heaven? / He has escaped the many harms of a miserable life».²⁴

2 Vives: by himself, by his friends

In this section I will review some of Vives's early writings and the correspondence of Vives's friends in search of evidence that allows to shape his intellectual identity. In 1514, the Valencian humanist published *Sap.* (Paris: Gilles de Gourmont, May-June?),²⁵ a dialogue whose long title page qualifies him as a «philosopher» (underline mine, in this and the next two title pages): *Ioannis Lodouici Viuis Valentini uiri philosophi urbanus pariter ac grauis dialogus qui Sapiens inscribitur, in quo sapientem per omnes disciplinas disquirens professorum earum mores notat denique ueram sapientiam breui sermone depingit.* A few months later (19 October 1514), in Lyon, Guillaume Huyon published several works of Vives under a title page that reads *Ioannis Lodouici Viuis Valentini philosophi opera.* This edition included *Sap.*, with the aforementioned title unchanged (f. D3v), and *Praef. Leg.*, whose title reads as follows: *Ioannis Lodouici Viuis Valentini uiri philosophi in 'Leges' Ciceronis praelectio* (f. A2r).²⁶ Moreover, in *Praef. Leg.* and in its prefatory epistle, Vives insists up to three times that he is a philosopher who has the right to explain the *Laws* of Cicero before legal experts.²⁷ In 1519, Vives called himself *philosophus* again in *Pseud.*, when at the end of his

Plato and Aristotle the products of a childish and immature civilization. The author of revolutionary books on Pedagogy, he hated the noble art of teaching».

²² Vives, *Ep. Lincol.* 4-5 (VOO 5: 462; ed. tr. SWJV 12: 244-245): «Quid nobis litterae, quid humanitas prodest? Quid tot artes uitae? Tanta educatio? Quid magisterium Dei omnipotentis, cum inter haec tam admirabilia, corruptissima geramus naturae iudicia? [...] Per terras omnes ac maria circumuagatur, omnia turbantes, concutientes omnia».

²³ Cf. Vives, *Letter to Miranda* ca. June 1523 (VOO 7: 202-203): «Mihi uero cogitanti per quot labores atque aerumnas trahimus miserandam hanc uitam saepe impetit ac animum subit optandi a Deo finem laborum et tamquam portum in tempestate. Sed reuoco me, nec tantum in me nefas admittere sustineo, ut modum ponam misericordiae et iudiciis Dei de me». Based on this passage and the quick notes provided by Noreña (1970: 28, 129), I would highly recommend a deeper investigation on Vives's suicidal tendency. This could certainly be an article to be made in the near future.

²⁴ Cf. De Landtsheer and De Schepper 2014: 107-108 (number 6): «Cur igitur Viuem ploramus in aethera raptum? / Euasit uitae noxia multa malae».

²⁵ Cf. Pédeflous and Tournoy 2013: 253.

²⁶ Matheussen (1984: 2) does not include this reference.

²⁷ Vives, *Praef. Leg.* 1 (VOO 5: 494; ed. Matheussen 1984: 2, lines 6-7): «Credo ego uos omnes mirari quid sit quod philosophus ipse coram tot iure consultis *Leges* Ciceronis enarrem»; 18 (VOO 5: 494; ed.

invective against the teachers of the University of Paris he remarked that «I merely warn and give exhortation and, as befits a philosopher, say freely what I think».²⁸

These explicit allusions in his early writings of he being a philosopher denotes a wish to be treated as such. But was his own conception shared by his contemporaries? The correspondence of Erasmus with Vives, Budé, and More offers precious details. Although Erasmus was not quite fond of Vives at first,²⁹ he later spoke of him in glowing terms. In a letter to Juan de la Parra, he highlights Vives's impressive command of philosophy, his vast knowledge in different areas, his perfect imitation of the Classics, his clever usage of technicalities, and his cosmopolitanism (the fact that he was able to speak Spanish and French, as well as to understand Dutch):

We have amongst us Luis Vives of Valencia, a man not yet past his twenty-sixth year, I think, but of much more than common learning in every branch of philosophy, and in humane studies and the arts of writing and speaking so far advanced that in this generation I know scarcely another man I would dare set against him. There is no subject on which he has not a practised pen. When he writes, he reproduces in our own time the example of the Ancients, and that with such skill (believe me) that if you took away the author's name you would suppose the thing had arisen, not in our country and our age so much as in those fertile periods of Cicero and Seneca, when cooks and scullions commanded a somewhat better style than men do now who are ready to instruct the world. He is most scrupulous in observing the technicalities but conceals his use of them so skilfully that you would hardly think he was following a preconceived plan. [...] Besides his other gifts he has perfect Spanish, as a native Spaniard, and very good French, having lived some little time in Paris. My own native tongue he understands rather than speaks.³⁰

Matheussen 1984: 7, lines 17-19): «Audebo igitur iure meo de legibus philosophus ipse disserere, cum etiam Cicero non tamquam iuris peritus sed tamquam philosophus libros hos de legibus ediderit»; *Aedes ep.* 2 (also *ep.* to *Praef. Leg.*; Matheussen 1984: 1, lines 14-15): «Ac ut sciatur quatenus in hoc de legibus sermone progredi philosopho liceat...»

²⁸ Vives, *Pseud.* (VOO 3: 66; ed. tr. Fantazzi 1979: 97, lines 8-9): «Moneo atque hortor et, ut philosophum decet, libere quae sentio dico».

²⁹ Cf. Erasmus, *Letter to Thomas More* 8 March 1517 (Allen 2: Ep. 545, lines 15-17; tr. CWE 4: 274-275): «If Vives has been with you, often, you will easily guess what I have suffered in Brussels, where I have had to cope every day with so many Spaniards come to pay their respects, as well as Italians and Germans». In general, the Dutch humanist was not fond of Spaniards. Cf. *Letter to Heinrich Beyming* 17 October 1518 (Allen 3: Ep. 873, lines 8-10; tr. CWE 6: 141): «I have refused to see several tedious Spaniards who were pressing obstinately for an interview, though I know this will give offence, their national character [*gentis ingenium*] being what it is».

³⁰ Erasmus, *Letter to Juan de la Parra* 13 February 1519 (Allen 3: Ep. 917, lines 20-37; tr. CWE 6: 251-252): «Est apud nos Ludouicus Viues Valentinus, nondum opinor uigesimumsextum egressus annum, sed in nulla philosophiae parte non supra uulgum eruditus, tum in bonis literis atque etiam in dicendi scribendique facultate eo progressus ut hoc seculo uix alium norim quem ausim cum hoc committere. Nullum est argumentum in quo non exercuit stilum. Nunc ueterum exemplum referens declamat. sed tanta dexteritate, mihi crede, ut, si titulum adimas, putes rem non huius regionis nec huius esse seculi, magis autem felicissimis illis Ciceronis ac Senecae temporibus natam, quibus coquis et apiciis aliquanto plus erat eloquentiae quam nunc est iis qui uideri uolunt orbis magistri. Artis obseruantissimus est, sed eius affectationem ita dissimulat ut neget rem adumbratam agi. [...]

Erasmus also calls attention to Vives's qualities in the field of rhetoric. In a letter to Guillaume Budé, he comments that

he is now engaged in rhetoric and, I must say, with astonishing success. You would never think his subject-matter arose in this part of the world or in this age of ours; when he fights a case, it is not imaginary or academic, but true and serious. His gifts I always found adequate, but in his diction I used to feel a wish for greater flexibility. He is now so good at all points that I see no one in these days (and I hope I hurt nobody's feelings) who can challenge his supremacy in this field.³¹

Budé had previously praised Vives in a letter to Erasmus in the following terms: «Luis Vives, a most promising student of the humanities, as I discovered from his conversation».³² However, the most significant eulogy and the most detailed description of Vives made by Erasmus is found in a letter sent to Hermann von Neuenahr. The Dutch humanist portrays Vives as a skilled orator who searches the plausibility of both sides of a given subject. Erasmus argues that, although Vives's style follows the rules of the art of disputation, he nonetheless manages not to sink into commonplaces, making him an excellent sophist (*sophista*). Further, Erasmus reckons that Vives has gained considerable expertise in philosophy mostly due to his multifaceted and resourceful natural intelligence (*ingenium*). In a nutshell, Vives is an unbeatable combination of eloquence and philosophy. Such a fertile, sane, and vigorous intelligence (*ingenium*) is definitely —Erasmus implies— an example to be followed:

Luis Vives, while others rant, combines vigour and eloquence, reviving in himself the precedents of Antiquity; [...] For he manages it [i.e. eloquence] with such skill that if you took away the author's name you would think you were reading, not a production of our own country or generation but a survivor from the great creative days of Cicero or Seneca. The theme which he develops is invented, but he does it so that you feel some serious matter is afoot. He treats both sides of the question, but so plausibly that he seems already a convinced supporter of the side for which he argues. He strictly observes the rules of the art, but conceals his own artfulness so well (which is, as you know, a large part of the art itself), that you would think his work spontaneous. He never sinks into commonplaces, never wanders away from his theme. You might think he was pleading against the clock for a friend on trial for his life. His keen eye in the discovery and presentation of argument I admire less, because I know he has had long and successful experience in almost all branches of philosophy; such a source of strength to him is his wonderfully versatile intellect, whichever way he turns it. While he was engaged on those subtle but inarticulate subjects which are now so popular, no

Ad huius dotes et illud accedit, quod et Hispanice callet, utpote natus Hispanus, et Gallice perbelle, ut qui Lutetiae diutule sit uersatus. Nostrum sermonem intelligit magis quam sonat».

³¹ Erasmus, *Letter to Guillaume Budé* 17 February 1520 (Allen 4: Ep. 1066, lines 54-61; tr. CWE 7: 206): «Is nunc declamat, sed ita me Deus amet, incredibili felicitate. Dices rem nec hisce regionibus nec hoc seculo natam esse; nec ludicram aut umbraticam esse pugnam, sed ueram ac seriam. Ingenio mihi semper satisfecit, in phrasi desiderabam nescio quid aliquanto mollius. Nunc ita numeros omnes praestat ut non uideam his temporibus qui in hac palaestra queat illi palmam praeripere, pace omnium dixerim».

³² G. Budé, *Letter to Erasmus* 10 June 1519 (Allen 3: Ep. 987, lines 1-2; tr. CWE 6: 401): «Lodouicus Viues, homo literarum bonarum feliciter studiosus, ut ex eius sermone intellexi».

man showed more acumen in disputation or proved himself a better sophist. Now he is engaged wholly on more humane studies, and engaged to such good purpose that in this generation I know scarcely anyone whom I would dare set against him; for even if we grant that others may equal Vives in powers of eloquence, I see no one in whom you might find so much eloquence combined with such great knowledge of philosophy. His mind is fertile, sane, and vigorous; his memory exceptionally well stored, his energy inexhaustible, his years green even now. Out of all this we can promise ourselves some great and far from ordinary results. I hope there will be many hereafter who follow this splendid example.³³

Erasmus continues to praise Vives's high philosophical qualities in a later epistle to Thomas More. He also calls Vives a soldier of the sophist army (note the intensifier «so long») and shows his concern about the possibility of being overshadowed by Vives:

You speak of Luis Vives' gifts,³⁴ and I am delighted to find my estimate confirmed by yours. He is one of that band of people who will put the name of Erasmus in the shade. [...] He has a wonderfully philosophic mind. [...] No one is better fitted to break the serried ranks of the sophists, in whose army he has served so long.³⁵

³³ Erasmus, *Letter to Hermann von Neuenahr* ca. 15 March 1520 (Allen 4: Ep. 1082, lines 24-56; tr. CWE 7: 228-229): «Lodouicus Viues, dum alii clamant, gnauiter declamat, ueteris exempli nouiis autor. [...] Agit enim hoc tanta dexteritate ut, si titulum adimas, putes rem nec huius regionis nec huius esse saeculi, sed e felicissimis illis M. Tullii Seneceque temporibus relictam. Versatur in argumento ficto, sed ita ut rem seriam agi credas. Tractat utramque partem, sed tam probabiliter ut uideatur sibi persuasisse prius quod suadet. Artis obseruantissimus est, sed, quam scis esse bonam partem artis, sic artificium dissimulat ut neget rem adumbratam agi. Nusquam desidet in locis communibus, nusquam a causa digreditur. Credas hominem pro amico de capite periclitante ad clepsydrum dicere. Iam acumen in reperiendis ac tractandis probationibus minus admiror, cum in omni pene philosophiae parte sit diu felicissime uersatus: usque adeo ualet illi, ubiubi intenderit, ingenium mire uersatile. Cum in subtilibus quidem illis sed infantibus disciplinis uersaretur, nemo disputabat acrius, nemo magis agebat sophistam. Nunc totus in mansuetioribus litteris uersatur, et sic uersatur ut hoc saeculo uix alium norim quem ausim cum illo committere: siquidem, ut demus esse qui Viuem aequant eloquentiae uiribus, non uideo tamen in quo reperiatur tantum eloquentiae cum tanta philosophiae cognitione coniunctum. Ingenium felix, sanum ac uegetum; memoria nihil esse potest felicius; studium indefatigabile, etas uirens etiamnum. Quibus ex rebus nobis magnum aliquid minimeque uulgare pollicemur. Spero posthac fore complures qui pulcherrimum hoc exemplum sequantur».

³⁴ Cf. Th. More, *Letter to Erasmus* 26 May 1520 (Allen 4: Ep. 1106, lines 21-26; tr. CWE 7: 290-291): «Is dum primis illis diebus esset apud me, ostendit mihi opera quaedam Lodouici Viuis, quibus neque magis elegans neque magis eruditum quicquam iam diu uidi. Quotum enim quemque reperiatur, imo adeo quem unum ferme reperiatur usquam, qui tam uirente aetate (nam tu eum uirente etiamnum aetate scribis esse) tam absolutum ciclopedias orbem absoluerit?», that is, «In those first days, while he [i.e. Adrianus Aelius Barlandus?] was staying with me, he showed me some things by Luis Vives which were as stylish and as scholarly as anything I have seen for a long time. How few people one can find (indeed one can hardly find one anywhere) who at such a tender age (for you tell me in a letter that he is still quite young) have absorbed such encyclopaedic learning!».

³⁵ Erasmus, *Letter to Thomas More* ca. June 1520 (Allen 4: Ep. 1107, lines 6-8, 9, 11-12; tr. CWE 7: 295): «De Lodouici Viuis ingenio gaudeo meum calculum cum tuo consentire. Is unus est de numero eorum qui nomen Erasmi sint obscuraturi. [...] Est animo mire philosophico. [...] Non alius magis idoneus qui profliget sophistarum phalanges; in quorum castris diu meruerit».

Around the same dates, Erasmus sent a letter to Vives whose heading bears the following flattering phrase: «philosopho absoluto», that is, «to the accomplished philosopher».³⁶

There is no doubt that Erasmus and Vives enjoyed a strong relationship between 1519 and 1522, as the following passage conveys: «The bearer of this letter is Luis Vives. I expect you already know his quality by what he has written, and you will learn the rest from talking with him. He is among the number of my friends».³⁷ Furthermore, Erasmus cherished in his personal library some of Vives's philosophical works which were worthy enough to attract his attention. According to Van Gulik, out of the 413 items found in Erasmus's library, 5 included works of Vives, among which *Ad sap.*, *An. sen.*, *Ciu. dei*, *Fab.*, *Foem.*, *Philos.*, *Praef. Leg.* and *Pseud.* It should also be noted that Vives seems to have made use of Erasmus's library while both were living in Louvain.³⁸

ITEM 12/2. «One or more tracts published in 1532. Lyon: M. and G. Trechsel in Lyon 1532. Octavo». This item included *Ad sap.*, *Sat.*, *Rat. stud.* and *Caes.*³⁹

ITEM 25/2. «*Opuscula uaria*. Leuven: D. Martens 1519. Quarto». This item included *Aedes*, *An. sen.*, *Clyp.*, *Fab.*, *Geneth.*, *Praef. Georg.*, *Med. psal.*, *Ouatio*, *Philos.*, *Pomp.*, *Praef. Leg.*, *Prael. Triumph.*, *Pseud.*, *Temp.* and *Triumph.*⁴⁰

ITEM 41. «*Declamationes Syllanae quinque*. Antwerp: M. Hillen, April 1520. Quarto».⁴¹

ITEM 155/2. «*De institutione foeminae Christianae*. Antwerp: M. Hillen 1524. Quarto».⁴²

ITEM 242. «Augustine *De ciuitate Dei*, ed. Vives. Basel: J. Froben, September 1522. Folio».⁴³

However, Erasmus's compliments towards Vives seem to have abruptly stopped after *Ciu. dei* was printed in 1522. The fact that Vives had expressed his vast erudition and philosophical knowledge by making numerous footnotes to Augustine's *City of God* turned against him.

³⁶ Erasmus, *Letter to Joan Lluís Vives* ca. June 1520 (Allen 4: Ep. 1111, heading; tr. CWE 7: 307).

³⁷ Erasmus, *Letter to John Fisher* 1 September 1522 (Allen 5: Ep. 1311, lines 40-43; tr. CWE 9: 176): «Qui has reddit Lodouicus Viues, qualis sit, opinor te iam ex ipsius monumentis cognoscere. Quod reliquum est cognosces ex hominis colloquio. Est de numero meorum amicorum».

³⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* pr. (CCD 1: 28, lines 12-14): «Quum hic adesset Erasmus, eius bibliotheca adiuuabar», that is, «When Erasmus lived here, his library was helpful to me».

³⁹ Cf. Van Gulik 2018: 153, 212-214. Cf. also *infra* Part III, section 3.1 (b), edition T.

⁴⁰ Cf. Van Gulik 2018: 154, 228-229. Grafton and Jardine (1986: 140) report *Opera aliquot* —they must refer to *Opera* (Lyon: Guillaume Huyon, 19 October 1514)— as one of the books quite popular among students of the arts curriculum. This book of Vives was part of a gift of books from Thomas Bedel to Alexander Nowell. *Opera* included *Clyp.*, *Ouatio*, *Praef. Leg.*, *Prael. Conu.*, *Prael. Rhet.*, *Prael. Triumph.*, *Sap.*, *Sap. praef.* and *Triumph.*

⁴¹ Cf. Van Gulik 2018: 156, 239-240.

⁴² Cf. Van Gulik 2018: 166, 309. Cf. also 34: «Juan Luis Vives probably sent his *De institutione foeminae christianae* (Antwerp 1524) to Erasmus as a presentation copy; long before it was published the author had announced the work's completion and indicated that Erasmus would soon see it. It is also likely that at the same time the Spanish humanist presented his previous works, the *Opuscula varia* (Leuven 1519) and the *Declamationes Syllanae quinque* (Antwerp 1520), to Erasmus, who had written the letter of recommendation for the latter. Vives may have handed the books over in person, for both men were living in Leuven in those years and were very close friends», 122: «Erasmus sometimes knew about books in progress because he had encouraged his friends to write them or done his best to give a work a push, as was the case for example with Vives' edition of *De civitate Dei* and the *Proverbia* and *De rerum inventoribus* of Polidoro Virgilio».

⁴³ Cf. Van Gulik 2018: 172, 356.

According to Erasmus, Vives's commentaries were too long and included too much supplementary data, like personal digressions.⁴⁴ The Dutch humanist bitterly reported that

Froben has complained to me seriously that he cannot sell a single *De ciuitate Dei* at Frankfurt, and his expression as he said this was such that I think he is speaking the truth. You see how fortune rules even where the Muses are concerned. In that particular case I am ready to suspect anything; except that, had the book been shorter as I advised you long ago, this would have made it more saleable.⁴⁵

The previous selected passages taken from Erasmus's letters give us the following portray of Vives: a man knowledgeable in many subjects (especially Classics and history), who was most brilliant in philosophy and rhetoric. Regarding the latter, Vives developed high skills in the art of argumentation which, in the opinion of Erasmus, enabled him to become a great sophist. If we rely on Vives's words, a sophist is someone who does not seek truth but the favor of an audience in order to attain wealth, glory, the derision of others or the accomplishment of some other low passion.⁴⁶ Therefore, why did Erasmus describe Vives with this, allegedly, pejorative noun? Maybe because, for Erasmus, the noun was not entirely pejorative: on the one hand, it conveyed the Scholastic logician but, on the other hand, the skillful rhetorician who (like Protagoras) recognized that on every issue there are two speeches or two possible arguments (*logoi*).⁴⁷ By the time Erasmus made this remark, Vives had recently published *Pseud.*, a work written in a style that used the characteristics of sophistry to make an attack to it,⁴⁸ showing Vives's qualities in rhetoric. Further, *Pseud.* was published together with other short writings (for example, *Fab.*, *An. sen.* and *Aedes*) in which fable and allegory was an important element.⁴⁹ Erasmus was then right in describing Vives as a sophist, that is, a proficient rhetorician. An epitaph mourning Vives's death confirms his reputation in the field of philosophy and rhetoric: «Vives, champion of rhetoric exercise / ... / Vives, bright lamp of wisdom».⁵⁰

⁴⁴ Cf. complementary note 1.

⁴⁵ Erasmus, *Letter to Joan Lluís Vives* 27 December 1524 (Allen 5: Ep. 1531, lines 36-40; tr. CWE 10: 470): «Frobenius mihi serio questus est se ne unum quidem opus *De Ciuitate Dei* uendere Francfordiae; idque eo uultu dixit ut plane credam hominem nihil fingere. Vides etiam in Musarum rebus regnare fortunam. Ego illic nihil non suspicio, nisi quod breuitas quam tibi olim commendaui, reddidisset librum uendibiliorem».

⁴⁶ Cf. Vives, *Disc. disp.* (VOO 3: 79): «Sophista est qui non ueritatem sequitur rei sed opinionem auditorium uenatur de se, in qua finem sibi statuit uel quaestum uel gloriam uel irrisionem aduersarii aut aliquid affectus prauis».

⁴⁷ Cf. MacPhail 2006: 74, 88; and MacPhail 2011 (for a larger enquiry on sophistry in the Renaissance).

⁴⁸ This interpretation is endorsed by Perreiah (2016: 94): «Vives was famous for his skills as a sophister arguing *sophismata*. The *sophismata* were school exercises that challenged students to detect fallacies in a discourse amidst other claims that may be plausible or even true».

⁴⁹ *Fab.*, *An. sen.* and *Aedes* were published together with *Pseud.* in *Opusc.* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, 1519). As stated by Grassi (2015: 15, 16), a fable is «una forma que en la tradición humanista reivindica el derecho a revelar una verdad en una ficción»; in other words: «la representación fantástica de una verdad». Fable and allegory had also been employed recently by Thomas More in his *Utopia* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, 1516).

⁵⁰ De Landtsheer and De Schepper 2014: 109-111 (number 8): «Viues, rhetorices honos palestra / ... / Vives, lux sapientiae et lucerna».

Finally, there should be mentioned a poem⁵¹ written by Pedro de Maluenda,⁵² who was a student of Vives in Louvain. In it, the Spanish theologian and royal chaplain of Charles V, praises Vives's great customs, creative intelligence and studies;⁵³ and he is confident that Vives's writings will achieve a well-deserved recognition among learned people.⁵⁴

3 Vives: by scholars, by tradition

Vives's wish to be treated as a philosopher during and after his lifetime may have been fulfilled, as it is demonstrated by a portrait of him in Boissard's *Icones quinquaginta virorum illustrium...* (1597),⁵⁵ where he is called 'philosophus'. Vigliano, in the introduction to his critical edition of *Disc. corr.* and *Disc. trad.* concurs: «Il est vrai que Vives ne s'est pas vu en pédagogue, mais en philosophe».⁵⁶ Though not the majority, some past scholars have considered Vives a philosopher, as early as in the 18th century. Maians, in his *Vivis uita* (1782) clearly admitted that one cannot deny the fact that Vives exerted himself to philosophy,⁵⁷ and that he was a Christian philosopher who wrote on moral philosophy, among other subjects:⁵⁸ in addition to the fact that Vives was able to speak (or had knowledge on) Catalan (Valencian dialect), Spanish (here called Castilian), Italian, Dutch, English, Latin, Greek and Hebrew, Maians explains that Vives loved both human and divine wisdom; and that he was a hardworking man, a person of wide readings, a distinguished scholar in political affairs, an analyst (*criticus*), a philosopher, and a theologian.⁵⁹ Some years later, the title page of Schauman's university dissertation delivered in 1792 acknowledged Vives as a philosopher, and also ascribed to him the distinction of being an anthropologist: *De Ioanne Ludouico Viue Valentino philosopho, praesertim anthropologo...*, that is, «On Joan Lluís Vives of Valencia, philosopher, particularly an anthropologist».⁶⁰

In the 20th century, Riedl included Vives in his catalogue of Renaissance philosophers, but without relating him to any other philosophers or schools, in a group (XLI) that consists of him alone. He succinctly called Vives a «Spanish humanist and eclectic philosopher».⁶¹ Batllori and García-Villoslada made a central point: they noted that Vives was a philosopher,

⁵¹ This poem has been edited and translated for the first time by Moreno and Calero (2019). It is found in the Real Biblioteca of Madrid, ms. II/2534, f. 96r.

⁵² Cf. Maians 1782: 33; Noreña 1970: 68.

⁵³ Cf. Moreno and Calero 2019: 182: «Moribus, ingenio, studiorum nomine magnus».

⁵⁴ Cf. Moreno and Calero 2019: 182: «Non rapuit fama doctis est illa perennis / Credidit huic uitam demere scripta dabunt».

⁵⁵ J. J. Boissard, *Icones quinquaginta uirorum illustrium doctrina et eruditione praestantium ad uiuum effictae, cum eorum uitis descriptis* (Frankfurt am Main: Matthaeus Becker / Theodor de Bry [heirs of], 1597), part II: 182-184 (f. Z3v-Z4v). The portrait can be seen in complementary note 2.

⁵⁶ Vigliano 2013a: cxvii. E. González (2008b: 412) had also pointed out the need to have «translations of ... *De disciplinis*, which does not reduce it to a mere pedagogical work».

⁵⁷ Cf. Maians 1782: 24: «Dedisse Ludouicum Viuem Valentiae operam philosophiae negari non potest».

⁵⁸ Cf. Maians 1782: 46, 82, 94.

⁵⁹ Cf. Maians 1782: 168: «Veram sapientiam adamauit, non humanam solum sed etiam diuinam, quam plurimum illustrauit summa cum laude eloquentiae. [...] Perfecte calluit linguas Valentianam, Castellanam, Italicam, Flandricam, Anglicam, Gallicam, Latinam, Graecam et Hebraicam. [...] Fuit uir laboriosus, multiuigae lectionis, insignis politicus, criticus, philosophus et theologus».

⁶⁰ J. Chr. G. Schaumann 1792, in Bonilla 1903: 719.

⁶¹ Cf. Riedl 1940: 58.

but in the manner of the Renaissance, that is, «a thinker» rather than «a systematic thinker», greatly influenced by both Aristotle and Augustine.⁶² Schmitt and Skinner helped to disseminate Vives as a philosopher when they included him in their history of Renaissance philosophy, especially in the chapter on moral philosophy. He was given an entry as well in the «Biobibliographies» section, and was introduced as a «Spanish humanist, philosopher, educational, and social theorist».⁶³ Some years later, Monfasani reinforced the idea of Vives as a philosopher when he translated excerpts from *Disc. corr.* to be included in a two-volume set of important works on moral and political philosophy. He introduced Vives using almost the same words as Schmitt and Skinner: «Spanish humanist, philosopher, and educational theorist».⁶⁴

In the 21st century, more significant movements have been made to acknowledge Vives as a philosopher. Casini's (2006) monograph on *An. uita* clearly links its content to Renaissance philosophy. The items discussed leave no room for doubt: «Self-Knowledge: Scepticism and the Quest for a New Method», «The Soul and Its Relation to the Body», «The Faculties of the Vegetative and Animal Soul», «The Rational Soul», and «The Emotions». Krays, in an article on Stoicism, called Vives «Spanish humanist and philosopher»,⁶⁵ and Hankins (2007: 359) reprints the biobibliography of Vives previously made by Schmitt and Skinner, with some slight modifications. Andersson (2010) remarks that Vives was in essence Aristotelian, and he mentions the Swiss philosopher Johannes Thomas Fregius, who explicitly listed him as a «modern Peripatetic».⁶⁶ According to Andersson, Vives was interested in dialectics, theory of knowledge, and the limits of human understanding. However, «one has little sense in Vives (as with other humanists) that philosophy functions as an end in itself; the purpose of philosophy is the better to live the human life that God has enjoined».⁶⁷

Finally, the inclusion of Vives's entry in two highly regarded encyclopedias (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*; and *Encyclopedia of Renaissance Philosophy*, Springer) corroborates that Vives's wish to be treated as a philosopher has been fulfilled. Casini, the scholar in charge of the entry in both publications, identifies three main philosophical areas (2017): dialectic and language; epistemology and history; moral and social philosophy. In his other publication (2021),⁶⁸ Casini highlights the following topics: the opposition to Scholastic logic;⁶⁹ supremacy of the ordinary language over the abstract language; theory of knowledge (particularly the difficulty in attaining knowledge); mankind's natural propensity toward what is good and true; self-knowledge as the first step toward virtue; emotions as a breeding

⁶² Cf. Batllori and García-Villoslada 1964b: 302.

⁶³ Schmitt and Skinner 1988: 840.

⁶⁴ J. Monfasani, in Krays 1997: 91.

⁶⁵ J. Krays, in Hankins 2007: 99.

⁶⁶ Cf. Andersson 2010: 135. Waswo (1987: 117) objects that Vives was a solid Aristotelian or (as others claim) that Vives might have been Platonic in his ethics and Aristotelian in his logic. He concludes that «his intellectual ambivalence is deep, fundamental, and pervasive; it is in a sense the motivation of his entire program». Further (1987: 116), «Vives is thus led into many confusions, contradictions, and evasions, which have the collective result of making the exact contours of his new noetic map very difficult to identify».

⁶⁷ Andersson 2010: 135.

⁶⁸ Content available, under revision, at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02848-4_694-1.

⁶⁹ A totally different interpretation is that of Perreiah 2016: 87-102 (at 100-102). The American scholar defends that *Pseud.* is a piece of sophistry devised by Vives to challenge students to identify flaws in the discourse.

ground for dissension and conflict; the study of the soul; the role of history as the sum of all human experience; and the teachings of Christ.

It is undeniable that Vives made relevant contributions in the field of pedagogy, as Del Nero states: «In my opinion the educational and pedagogical theme is not only one of the most essential within the corpus of his writings but is also one of the major interpretive keys of his thought, from the preliminary ideas of the commentary on Augustine to the immensely successful *Colloquia* [i.e. *Ling.*]».⁷⁰ González confirms that Del Nero's interpretation has been the predominant one:

The interest awakened in Vives during the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century is chiefly due to the fact that he was seen as a pedagogue and therefore as a psychologist. It is not by chance that this focus took rise in Germany, the cradle both of empirical psychology and the first systematic efforts to create a pedagogy founded on the “natural history” of the mind.⁷¹

His conclusion is that

the perspective of Vives as a psychologist and pedagogue, a precursor of countless pedagogues of different countries, was centered on a very limited aspect of his intellectual activity, but it put his name in circulation again from the second half of the nineteenth century through the first decades of the twentieth. The theme, which has greatly declined in the last half-century, is far from being forgotten. Entrenched in historical dictionaries and encyclopedias, it is still a standard description, and undoubtedly will remain so for a long time —like every good commonplace— in numerous locations in Europe and America.⁷²

As González points out, scholars have traditionally tended to emphasize *only* one aspect of Vives's activity, namely pedagogy,^{72bis} overlooking a broader and deeper philosophical content of his works. In my opinion, Vives is a thinker who not only dealt with issues about education and pedagogy, but also about the human being as a whole. My interpretation is endorsed by a sentence of Terence that he was fond to quote in his works: «Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto»,⁷³ that is, «I am a human being: therefore, I consider nothing that pertains to human beings foreign to me». A similar thought is conveyed by a quotation from the Apostle Paul, who wondered: «Quis infirmatur et ego non infirmor?»⁷⁴ that is, «Who is weak and I do not become weak?». By these sentences, Vives showed the scope of his enquiries: to think and to care about *any* aspect that had something to do with humankind:⁷⁵ man has to be fully examined, from the inside as well as from the outside.⁷⁶

⁷⁰ Del Nero 2008: 293.

⁷¹ González 2008b: 395.

⁷² González 2008b: 398.

^{72bis} Also his pacifism. Cf., for example, Abellán 1997, Calero 1999, Dust 1987, Oïffer-Bomsel 2009.

⁷³ Terence, *Heautontimorumeros* 77. Also found in Cicero, *De officiis* 1.9.30; *De legibus* 1.12.33; Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 95.53. As far as Vives is concerned, cf., for example, *Sub.* 1.9.4 (VOO 4: 452; ed. SWJV 4: 60); *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 89); *Conscr.* 16 (VOO 2: 271; ed. SWJV 3: 38).

⁷⁴ Vives, *Conc.* 4.13 (VOO 5: 395). Quotation of 2 *Ad Corinthios* 11:29.

⁷⁵ Cf. Monsegú 1961: 85: «Es el humanismo vivista, como fácilmente se desprende de todo lo expuesto, un humanismo integral y reintegrador. Nada que sirva de alguna manera a la formación humana debe menospreciarse ni descuidarse. De ahí que Vives, lo mismo en el librito *Introductio ad sapien-*

Accordingly, Vives conceived philosophy as encompassing a wide range of disciplines and subjects, as the summary of *Disc.* clearly demonstrates: grammar and language, dialectics, rhetoric, the natural world, medicine, mathematics, ethics, law, and metaphysics. If ‘philosophy’ is understood in this widely *humane* sense, it is then utterly understandable that Vives did not care much to fit in any particular school, his purpose being the human being as a whole. This position has been summarized by Ibáñez (1994: 746):

Luis Vives is not easy to classify as a philosopher. [...] He took what he considered most valid from a variety of thinkers and combined it in a Christian world-view, based partly on Aristotle but also rooted in or at least sharing features with a great deal of classical thinking: Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Saint Thomas, Augustinism and occasionally Parisian nominalism. In the first paragraph of his *De prima philosophia* [First Philosophy] (Bruges, 1531), he specifies his object and method. He sets out to investigate the causes of Nature, maintaining that our guide, notwithstanding the darkness that clouds our minds, is what we can attain through experience and reflection, since what cannot be demonstrated by reason draws us into the realm of fantasy and illusion. This reliance on experience in a work of philosophy was unusual in his time and presaged the empiricist schools of thought of the Renaissance.

4 Presence and influence of six philosophers of the Greco-Roman world

Following Ibáñez’s standpoint that Vives was inspired by philosophical content taken from a variety of thinkers, I have tried to elucidate to what extent the following six philosophers of the Greco-Roman world are present in Vives’s writings: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca and Augustine.⁷⁷ To that purpose, I have conducted a computerized search in the eight volumes of VOO by counting the number of times that the name of each philosopher is explicitly mentioned. Since the computerized search, on the one hand, has dealt with a considerable amount of data (the complete VOO consists of almost 4200 pages) and, on the other hand, it has relied on how well the OCR files have been processed, figures displayed in tables 1 and 2 should be regarded as an estimate.

By looking at table 1, one comes to the conclusion that Cicero is by large Vives’s most mentioned Classical thinker: he is named around 800 times. In second position comes Aristotle, who appears in almost 580 occasions. Next comes Plato, whose name is found 400 times approximately. Socrates is mentioned 270 times; Seneca, around 185. Finally, Augustine is referred to in more than 100 occasions. These figures might be slightly different if we consider Socrates and Plato together. In this case, they surpass Aristotle with a total amount of, approximately, 665 mentions.

tiam que en la enciclopedia De disciplinis, se ocupe, para dar plenitud a la perfección humana, no sólo de lo que atañe al alma, sino también de lo que compete al cuerpo».

⁷⁶ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 5 (VOO 6: 402; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 451): «noscendus est homo totus intus et foris».

⁷⁷ According to Urmeneta (1949: 421-456), the main philosophers from whom Vives received an influence are Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle (1949: 427-441), Carneades, Theophrastus, Cicero (1949: 445-447), Seneca, Philo of Alexandria, Augustine, Boetius, Cassiodorus, Bede the Venerable, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. Regarding thinkers contemporary to Vives, Urmeneta highlights Erasmus (pedagogy), Guillaume Budé (law), Thomas More (social and political thought), Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (metaphysics), Philip Melanchthon (style), Antonio Nebrija (linguistics) and Juan de Vergara (history).

	Socrat. and Plato			Arist.	Cic.	Sen.	Aug.
VOO 1 (<i>Ad sap.</i> , Rogativa ad Deum, Grammatica)	6	12	18	9	15	6	2
VOO 2 (Philologica, Rhetorica, Poetica)	22	49	72	44	215	51	12
VOO 3 (Philosophica)	85	67	152	172	128	18	9
VOO 4 (Moralia)	27	36	63	38	46	37	18
VOO 5 (Politico-Moralia, Legalia)	31	64	95	29	121	25	6
VOO 6 (Critica, Historica)	79	114	193	246	217	35	24
VOO 7 (Christiana, Epistolica)	2	5	7	4	25	3	32
VOO 8 (<i>Ver. fid.</i>)	18	46	64	33	29	9	7
TOTAL	270	393	663	575	796	184	110
	11.6%	16.9%	28.5%	24.7%	34.2%	7.9%	4.7%

TABLE 1. APPEARANCES OF NAMES (VOO 1-8). Figures include the amount of times that a given name (*Aristoteles*) or adjective forms derived from it (*Aristotelicus, a, um*) appear in the eight volumes of the *Opera omnia* edited by Maians (1782-1790). Titles of chapters, titles of subsections and notes in margin have been included in the search, whereas data from the indexes placed at the end of each volume has been removed. Philosophers are displayed chronologically.

	Socrat. and Plato			Arist.	Cic.	Sen.	Aug.
CJLV (<i>Ciu. dei</i>)	43	197	240	121	269	50	261
Maians, <i>Vivis uita</i>	2	6	8	30	73	10	55
TOTAL	45	203	248	151	342	60	316
	4.0%	18.2%	22.2%	13.5%	30.6%	5.4%	28.3%

TABLE 2. APPEARANCES OF NAMES (OTHER MATERIALS). Data from *Ciu. dei* has been taken from the index placed at the end of CJLV 6.5; numbers indicate the amount of pages in which a given name appears. Numbers from *Vivis uita* indicate the amount of times that a given name appears in the text. Philosophers are displayed chronologically.

In table 2, Cicero is again the most mentioned thinker in *Ciu. dei*, although Plato is given preeminence over Aristotle.⁷⁸ This makes sense, since Augustine's philosophical background is more Platonic than Aristotelian. Based on this result and the previous one mentioned a few lines earlier, the following question springs to mind: was Vives more influenced by Aristotle or, on the contrary, by Plato? Since answering this question could indeed become a dissertation in itself, let it suffice in the meantime to conclude (in conjunction with Margolin) that Vives continued the Socratic mission (handed down by Plato and Cicero) of bringing philosophy down to the city, that is, to put the focus on ethics and practical life, whereas he took from Aristotle the basis of logical reasoning.⁷⁹ More details about these and other influential thinkers are displayed in the next sections, always bearing in mind that Vives did not accept their authority without exercising a sensible criticism, when needed.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ I. Roca (CJLV 6A: 71-77) considers that Vives's commentaries on Plato are most abundant in book 8 of *Ciu. dei*. The presence of Aristotle is more modest, and it can be found principally in *Ciu. dei* 8 and 22.

⁷⁹ Cf. Margolin 1976a: 247, 250; Hankins 2007: 45: «Humanists insisted that philosophy should serve the city by inculcating prudence and other virtues into its citizens».

⁸⁰ Cf. Vives, *Disc. praef.* (VOO 6: 6; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 6): «Porro de scriptis magnorum authorum extimare multo est litteris conducibilis quam autoritate sola acquiescere, et fide semper aliena accipere omnia».

4.1 Cicero

On 19 October 1514 (Louvain: Dirk Martens), the Valencian humanist published *In 'Leges' Ciceronis praeformatio* and *In quartum 'Rhetoricorum ad Herennium' praelectio*. The former was an introduction to Cicero's *De legibus* whereas the latter was an introduction to the fourth book of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (allegedly written by the Roman orator), which deals with rhetorical devices. Six years later (Antwerp: Jean Thibault, 1520), Vives published *Somnium et uigilia*, a rather complex piece divided into two parts: a debate on dreams in the realm of Sleep (*Somn.*), and a commentary (*Vig.*) on Cicero's *De re publica*, book 6, commonly known as *Somnium Scipionis*. These three writings demonstrate Vives's early interest for the soul, political thought, law, and rhetoric. Since such elements were at the core of Cicero's works, it appears self-evident why the Roman politician pleased Vives in his philosophical and rhetorical dimension. Further, the fact that Vives had close contact with relatives and friends who were experts in law and jurisprudence definitely contributed to increase his skills and his involvement in this field.⁸¹

In *Praef. Leg.*, Vives reflects on natural law (*ius naturale*),⁸² the innate elements of human nature (religion and communication), and the ultimate good, that is, living according to nature (*uiuere secundum naturam*).⁸³ He conceives laws as not being in contradiction with nature and, accordingly, he argues that laws should be forged with the power of equity and honesty (*aequi honesti uis*).⁸⁴ This short writing includes a summary of Cicero's life written by Vives himself.⁸⁵

On the other hand, *Prael. Rhet.* emphasizes the fact that eloquence should be used to advise what is honorable and deter men from bloodshed (*caedes*) and beastly life (*uictus ferinus*).⁸⁶ The last paragraph of this writing has enormous implications, because Vives asserts

⁸¹ Enric March (Vives's uncle) was a lawyer who «when I was still a child, [...] explained to me in my native city the *Institutiones* of Emperor Justinian» (*Ciu. dei* 19.21.176; CCD 4: 319, lines 20-22; cf. Maians 1782: 5; Garcia 1987: 171, 199). Frans van Cranevelt, doctor in civil and canon law, and since October 1522 member of the Grand Council of Mechelen, became one of the closest and most intimate friends of Vives (cf. De Vocht 1928: xxxiii-xci; CEBR 1: 354b-355b). Jan van Fevijn and Mark Lauwerijns pursued studies of law. The former officiated at the wedding of Vives with Margarida Valldaura that took place in 26 May 1524, in Bruges. On the other hand, Lauwerijns's house in Bruges served as a meeting place and even a guest-house for politicians, diplomats and humanists (cf. De Vocht 1928: xci-xcix; CEBR 2: 26a-b, 306a-307b). Thomas More, lawyer and councilor of king Henry VIII since approximately August 1517, may have first met Vives in person in 1520 at Bruges, while the English diplomat was in the Low Countries joining the international meeting gathered at the Field of Cloth of Gold at Calais, 7-24 June (cf. CEBR 2: 456a-459a). Guillaume Budé should also be taken into account among those close friends of Vives who held studies in Law and published research on this field: the *Annotationes in quatuor et uiginti Pandectarum libros* (Paris: Badius Ascensius, 1508) is a fine example. Both humanists met in Paris around May 1519 and they maintained epistolary exchange until, apparently, 1533 (cf. CEBR 1: 212b-217a; Tournoy 2015). Vives highly praised Budé's knowledge of law in *Ciu. dei*, where he wrote that «thanks to him, the knowledge of law [*scientia iuris*], which had fallen to pieces, has begun to be restored» (*Ciu. dei* 2.17.195; CCD 2: 206, lines 35-36).

⁸² Vives, *Praef. Leg.* 2 (VOO 5: 494; ed. Matheussen 1984: 2, lines 17-18): «quod habet eandem uim ubique».

⁸³ Cf. Vives, *Praef. Leg.* 6 (VOO 5: 496; ed. Matheussen 1984: 4, line 4).

⁸⁴ Cf. Vives, *Praef. Leg.* 22 (VOO 5: 501; ed. Matheussen 1984: 9, line 13).

⁸⁵ Cf. Vives, *Praef. Leg.* 20-37 (VOO 5: 500-507; ed. Matheussen 1984: 8-15).

⁸⁶ Cf. Vives, *Prael. Rhet.* 6 (VOO 2: 89; ed. SWJV 5: 134).

that, if eloquence is separated from wisdom, then it serves to nothing.⁸⁷ This undoubtedly puts the embellishment of language as a means to better attain wisdom (if that is ever possible), not (on the contrary) to conceal it. The passage of Cicero to which Vives alludes is worth being quoted, since it also describes, quite accurately, the point of view of the humanist:

I have been led by reason itself to hold this opinion first and foremost: that wisdom without eloquence does too little for the good of states, but that eloquence without wisdom is generally highly disadvantageous and is never helpful. Therefore if anyone neglects the study of philosophy and moral conduct, which is the highest and most honourable of pursuits, and devotes his whole energy to the practice of oratory, his civic life is nurtured into something useless to himself and harmful to his country; but the man who equips himself with the weapons of eloquence, not to attack the welfare of his country but to defend it, he (I think) will be a citizen most helpful and most devoted both to his own interests and those of his community.⁸⁸

In *Somn. uig.*, Vives deploys his skills as a philosopher, orator, historian, and commentator. In a dreaming atmosphere that permeates the entire work, Vives gives «not my views but those of Cicero, or of Plato when Cicero was following him», since «Cicero emulated Plato practically everywhere, and transferred Plato's philosophy with exactly equivalent expressions into his own».⁸⁹ The Valencian humanist describes the Roman politician as «an exquisitely diligent bee», which has «gathered from the flowers of all learning: from history, astronomy, geography, arithmetic, moral and natural philosophy».⁹⁰ By this description, Vives was making, in fact, a portray of himself or, at least, an ideal portray of the interdisciplinary Renaissance man he would like to be.

Somn. uig. is also an excellent example of Vives's fondness to make fictional speeches of great men of the past (*ethopoeia*), to express his poetic playfulness, and to show his vast knowledge in any field (for example, in cosmology).⁹¹ In this writing, Vives recreates the mind of Cicero (*Somn. praef.* 64-69; *Somn. arg.* 1-6), Publius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus minor (*Vig.* 1-7, 48-50, 130) and his adopted father, Publius Scipio Africanus (*Vig.* 8-47, 51-129).

⁸⁷ Cf. Vives, *Prael. Rhet.* 6 (VOO 2: 89; ed. SWJV 5: 134): «Semper moderatrix omnium praesto sit sapientia; qua ab eloquentia separate, ut ait Cicero, numquam eloquentia profuit».

⁸⁸ Cicero, *De inuentione* 1.1 (Hubbell 1949: 2-3): «Ac me quidem diu cogitantem ratio ipsa in hanc potissimum sententiam ducit, ut existimem sapientiam sine eloquentia parum prodesse ciuitatibus, eloquentiam uero sine sapientia nimium obesse plerumque, prodesse nunquam. Quare si quis omissis rectissimis atque honestissimis studiis rationis et officii consumit omnem operam in exercitatione dicendi, is inutilis sibi, perniciosus patriae ciuis alitur, qui uero ita sese armat eloquentia, ut non oppugnare commoda patriae, sed pro his propugnare possit, is mihi uir et suis et publicis rationibus utilissimus atque amicissimus ciuis fore uidetur».

⁸⁹ Vives, *Vig. praef.* (1521 version) 14, 13 (VOO 5: 108; ed. tr. George 1989: 242-243): «Nec quod ipse sentirem interdum protuli sed quod uel Cicero uel Plato, quem Cicero sequitur. [...] Aemulatus enim est Cicero fere ubique Platonem, multaque ex illius philosophia in suam». In *Vig. praef.* 3 (VOO 5: 72; ed. tr. George 1989: 88-89), Vives again remarks that «I am expounding a Platonic book and presenting its author in the Platonic style, not Peripatetic».

⁹⁰ Cf. Vives, *Vig. praef.* 2 (VOO 5: 108; ed. tr. George 1989: 86-87): «Cicero non aliter uideatur flosculos uniuersae eruditionis quam apis diligentissima delibasse ab historia, ab astronomia, geographia, arithmetica, a philosophia morum et naturae».

⁹¹ Cf. George 1989: liv-lv.

Vives's fictional Cicero is happy to know that the populace can «acquire from my books the richness and ease of my speaking-style [...] or wisdom and the rules for the good and happy life»;⁹² and he admits that «I follow Plato in these books on the republic. However, I have added a conclusion to my treatise on the state far different from his and have taken different sides of human capacities into account».⁹³ The fictional Scipio Africanus lectures Scipio Aemilianus on the destiny of the statesman, the cosmos and its harmony, earthly glory versus true glory, the eternal creator, and the immortal human soul.

Throughout the twenty books of *De disciplinis* (Antwerp: Michaël Hillen, 1531), Vives quotes passages chiefly taken from or inspired by *De oratore*, *De officiis*, *Brutus*, *Orator*, *Tusculanae disputationes*, *Academica* and *Topica*.⁹⁴ These passages are mostly oriented to questions within philosophy of law, philosophy of education, logic, rhetoric (linked to ethics), and epistemology. In the following paragraphs, I offer some selected examples.

Based on Cicero's *De oratore*, the Valencian humanist argues that knowledge of law (*ius*) implies knowledge of all branches of study (*disciplinae*) and the methodologies or techniques (*artes*) proper to each one.⁹⁵ Further, he asserts that all branches of knowledge are connected to each other (in the same way that virtues are) and, therefore, there is a kind of agreement and harmony underlying them.⁹⁶ Later, Vives quotes Cicero's *Brutus* in order to show the important role that logic plays in the discipline of law, particularly when it aims at finding out what is true and what is false:

—This [i.e. knowledge of civil law] he [i.e. Scaevola] could never have attained through knowledge of the law alone had he not acquired in addition that art which teaches the analysis of a whole into its component parts, sets forth and defines the latent and the implicit, interprets and makes clear the obscure; which first recognizes the ambiguous and then distinguishes; which applies in short a rule or measure for adjudging truth and falsehood, for determining what conclusions follow from what premises, and what do not.

—The art of logic I suppose you mean.

—Quite right.⁹⁷

⁹² Vives, *Somn. praef.* 64 (VOO 5: 91; ed. tr. George 1989: 58-59): «...ex meis libris uel copiam facundiamque sermonis nostri [...] uel philosophiam praeceptaque bene et beate uiuendi».

⁹³ Vives, *Somn. arg.* 1 (VOO 5: 94; ed. tr. George 1989: 66-67): «...me in his de re publica libris Platonis comitem esse, multo tamen quam ille aliam meae ciuitati clausulam adieci, alia etiam hominum respectans ingenia».

⁹⁴ Regarding Classical sources used by Vives in *Disc. corr.* and *Disc. trad.*, I am indebted to the detailed *index locorum* prepared by Vigliano (2013a: 709-725; Cicero at 712-713).

⁹⁵ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 21; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 23): «L. Crassus apud Ciceronem omne disciplinarum atque artium genus cognitione iuris contineri asseuerat»; Cicero, *De oratore* 1.36.167. Vigliano (2013a: xxviii) defines *ars* as «un recueil de préceptes universels, destinés à la connaissance, à l'action, ou à la mise en œuvre».

⁹⁶ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 63; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 70): «...natus est ille (ut Cicero inquit) concentus doctrinarum omnium et consensus»; Cicero, *De oratore* 3.6.21. Quintilian (*Institutio oratoria* 1.10.1) calls this agreement «that circle of education [*orbis ille doctrinae*]», which renders into Latin the Greek word ἐγκυκλοπαιδεία.

⁹⁷ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 3 (VOO 6: 112; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 123): «Quod nunquam effecisset ipsius iuris scientia, nisi eam praeterea didicisset artem quae docet rem uniuersam tribuere in partes, latentem explicare diffiniendo, obscuram explanare interpretando, ambiguam primum uidere, deinde

History⁹⁸ is considered by Vives a branch of knowledge allocates precious resources. He quotes a passage of *De oratore*, in which history is defined as a witness to the passing of the ages, the light of truth, that which enlivens memories, the teacher of life, and the messenger of antiquity.⁹⁹

When dealing with rhetoric, Vives quotes *De oratore* again to underline the fact that eloquence must not be used by someone devoid of wisdom or integrity. Since words may change people's opinion and set people's mind in a particular state, it would be extremely dangerous to put such a powerful resource in the wrong hands: «The stronger this faculty is, the more necessary it is for it to be combined with integrity and supreme wisdom».¹⁰⁰ As a result of this, only a good person can therefore be a good orator.¹⁰¹ Or, in other words, a wicked person will never be an orator, even if he is seemingly proficient in every single technique of the *ars dicendi*.

In *De epistolis conscribendis*, a mature work (Antwerp: Michäel Hillen, 1534), Vives made again use of Cicero's writings, especially *Epistulae ad Atticum* and *Epistulae ad familiares*. Examples taken from these two works can be found especially in the section called «A miscellany taken from the epistolary usage of ancient writers, both public and private, mostly from Cicero» (*Conscr. misc. Cic.*).¹⁰² Finally, it should be noted that, when Vives wrote the third book of *An. uita* (Basel: Robert Winter, 1538), devoted to the emotions, he may have used Cicero's *Tusculanae disputationes* (particularly books 3 and 4) and other works¹⁰³ as a source; for example, when forging the definition of happiness (*laetitia*), envy (*zelotypia*) and sadness (*moeror*).¹⁰⁴

Since Vives was familiar with Cicero's writings and he seems to have liked his multifaceted personality, it is also plausible that some of Cicero's ideas seeded in Vives's mind. The following two texts are an example of Cicero's *criticism*, that is, the search for the

distinguere, postremo habere regulam qua uera et falsa iudicarentur, et quae quibus propositis essent, quae non essent consequentia". "Dialecticam mihi uideris dicere". "Ita plane". The English translation of Vives's *Disc. corr.* is that of Cicero's *Brutus* 41.152-153 (Hubbell 1949: 133).

⁹⁸ On philosophy of history, cf. Noreña 1970: 149-153.

⁹⁹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 2 (VOO 6: 158; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 177): «Historia est testis temporum, lux ueritatis, uita memoriae, magistra uitae, nuncia uetustatis»; Cicero, *De oratore* 2.9.36. This quotation is repeated, slightly altered, in *Disc. trad.* 5 (VOO 6: 158; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 177), which demonstrates its importance.

¹⁰⁰ Vives, *Disc. corr.* 4 (VOO 6: 158; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 177): «Quo maior est uis, hoc est magis probitate iungenda summaque prudentia». The English translation of Vives's *Disc. corr.* is that of Cicero's *De oratore* 3.14.56 (Rackham 1948: 45). Notice that the «supreme wisdom» is *prudentia*, that is, practical wisdom, not a theoretical *sapientia*.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 12.1.1; also *infra* Part IV, section 4.3 (b).

¹⁰² Cf. Vives, *Conscr. misc. Cic.* 80-92 (VOO 2: 302-307; ed. SWJV 3: 106-117).

¹⁰³ In the chapter on love (*An. uita* 3.2), Sancipriano (1974: 475-479, 487-491) notices clear influence of passages from *De natura deorum*, *De amicitia* and *De officiis*.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 3.8, 3.16, 3.19 (VOO 3: 463, 490, 498; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 564, 638, 662): «Laetitia est motus animi ex iudicio praesentis iam boni uel pro certo appetentis. [...] Zelotypia ... est metus ne quis, quem nos nollemus, fruatur forma aliqua. [...] Moeror est animi de malo praesenti contractio uel de eo quod iam habetur pro praesenti»; Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 4.7.14, 4.8.17, 3.11.25 (King 1945: 342, 346, 254): «Laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo efferri rectum esse uideatur. [...] Obtreptatio autem est ea quam intellegi ζήλοτυπίαν uolo: aegritudo ex eo quod alter quoque potiat eum quod ipse concupiuerit. [...] Aegritudo est opinio magni mali praesentis».

most plausible argument (verisimilitude)¹⁰⁵ regardless of any preference for a particular school of philosophy.

Accordingly these considerations always led me to prefer the rule of the Peripatetics and the Academy of discussing both sides of every question, not only for the reason that in no other way did I think it possible for the probable truth to be discovered in each particular problem, but also because I found it gave the best practice in oratory.¹⁰⁶

But let everyone defend his views, for judgment is free: I shall cling to my rule and without being tied to the laws of any single school of thought which I feel bound to obey, shall always search for the most probable solution in every problem.¹⁰⁷

This philosophical stance was later expressed by Vives in a plain but loud exclamation: «Followers of truth, wherever you think it might be, stand by its side!»¹⁰⁸

4.2 Socrates and Plato

In *Veritas fucata* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, Jan. 1523) Vives portrayed himself as a «man of a natural intelligence less than average, of no education, and almost an Academic philosopher».¹⁰⁹ This statement indicates two things: on the one hand, his likeness for Platonism; on the other hand, his increasing involvement with Aristotle (cf. *infra* section 4.3). Vives expressed his views on Plato and Platonism especially in book 8 of *Aurelii Augustini 'De ciuitate dei' commentarii* (Basel: Johann Froben, 1522). He believed that Plato was not being given enough attention by contemporary scholars and, therefore, he tried to somewhat reverse this undeserved disregard. Moreover, he felt that such apparent indifference was not justifiable at all, since Plato's philosophy and proposals were fairly concordant with

¹⁰⁵ However, the search for the most plausible argument was not genuine of Cicero but, rather, Cicero's appreciation of Socrates's philosophy. Cf. *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.4.8 (King 1945: 10-11): «The procedure was that, after the would-be listener had expressed his view I opposed it. This, as you know, is the old Socratic method of arguing against your adversary's position; for Socrates thought that in this way the probable truth [*quid ueri simillimum*] was most readily discovered»; *De finibus* 2.1.2 (Rackham 1914: 79): «His [i.e. Socrates's] own way», says the Roman orator, «was to question his interlocutors and by a process of cross-examination to elicit their opinions, so that he might express his own views by way of rejoinder to their answers».

¹⁰⁶ Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 2.3.9 (King 1945: 154-155): «Itaque mihi semper Peripateticorum Academiaeque consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partes disserendi non ob eam causam solum placuit, quod aliter non posset quid in quaque re ueri simile esset inueniri, sed etiam quod esset ea maxima dicendi exercitatio».

¹⁰⁷ Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 4.4.7 (King 1945: 334-335): «Sed defendat quod quisque sentit; sunt enim iudicia libera: nos institutum tenebimus nulliusque unius disciplinae legibus astricti, quibus in philosophia necessario pareamus, quid sit in quaque re maxime probabile semper requiremus».

¹⁰⁸ Vives, *Disc. praef.* (VOO 6: 7; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 8): «Veritatis sectatores, ubicunque eam esse putabitis, ab illa state!». At the very beginning of his translation of Isocrates's *Nicoles*, one can find a similar phrase: «sapientiae assectatores» (VOO 5: 36; ed. SWJV 12: 214). Cf. Carreras 1968: 170-171: «Su [i.e. Vives's] afán constante de servir a la verdad por encima de toda vanagloria personal y de todo ineficaz esteticismo».

¹⁰⁹ Vives, *Ver. fuc.* (VOO 2: 530): «...[a me], homine ingenio minus quam mediocri, eruditione nulla, et prope Academico».

Christian religion.¹¹⁰ Unlike regarding Aristotle, Vives did not have mixed thoughts about Plato.¹¹¹ He called Plato *sanctissimus*¹¹² and considered Socrates, Plato's master, the wisest man among pagans, and the one who came closest to Christian wisdom.¹¹³

Either by citing passages of Plato's writings or by referring directly to Socrates's teachings,¹¹⁴ the reader can undoubtedly feel Vives's effort to convey the profound shift that the Socratic movement represented. While most of the thinkers in Classical Athens were proud to publicly announce their extensive knowledge, Socrates bravely admitted that he did not know anything.¹¹⁵ Indeed, this was a criticism against the sophists, who were 'experts' (σοφιστής) who sold their wisdom and made public performances to show their skills.¹¹⁶ Further, Socrates did not aim at inquiring about things that were kept in concealment by nature, but at examining issues that took place in ordinary life, so that people could live better, that is, spend a life led by virtue and devoid of vices.¹¹⁷ Indeed, this was a criticism against the early Greek philosophers, who were preoccupied by the ultimate matter of the universe, such as Anaximander (ἄπειρον 'the limitlessness'), Anaximenes (ἀήρ 'air'), Thales (ὔδωρ 'water'), Xenophanes (ὔδωρ 'water', and γῆ 'earth'), Anaxagoras (ὁμοιομέρεια 'homoeomereity'), Empedocles (mixture of the four elements: πῦρ 'fire', ἀήρ 'air', ὔδωρ 'water', γῆ 'earth'), Leucippus and Democritus (ἄτομοι 'atoms'); by the nature of being ('what

¹¹⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8-10 pr. (CCD 2: 157, lines 9-12): «[sententiae Platonis] a nostris hominibus ... prorsus sunt ignoratae. Cum sint tamen cognosci dignissimae, tum propter subtilitatem rerum magno ingenio curaque extusarum, tum uel maxime quod uicinae sunt nostri pietati».

¹¹¹ Cf. Margolin 1976a: 258: «Ses jugements about Platon sont moins nombreux et surtout moins contradictoires. [...] Il peut admirer Platon sans gêne».

¹¹² Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.10.1101 (CCD 2: 205, lines 24-25): «Ferendum non est Platonem, sanctissimum philosophum, praeteriri».

¹¹³ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.2.n29 (CCD 2: 167, lines 27-29): «Hic est Socrates ille, de quo nihil satis posset pro dignitate dici, quem fuisse gentilium omnium sapientissimum constat, proximeque ad Christianam sapientiam ex illis omnibus accessisse». Plato (*Apologia* 21a) relates that the Pythia of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi uttered that there was no one wiser (σοφώτερος) than Socrates.

¹¹⁴ Vives is not conclusive concerning Plato's original thought. On the one hand, he calls attention to the fact that Plato affirmed that all his writings had been inspired by Socrates. But, on the other hand, he affirms that what Socrates says in Plato's writings should be authored to Plato, not to his master. Cf. *Ciu. dei* 8.4.n49 (CCD 2: 176, lines 26-27): «Plato quaecumque scripserat Socratis dicebat esse, ut in epistolis ait ad Dionysium [cf. Plato, *Epistolae* 7, 324e-325c]»; 8.4.n55 (CCD 2: 178, lines 20-21): «In omnibus dialogis eius quae Socrati dantur, ea sunt ex sententia Platonis credenda».

¹¹⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.2.n29 (CCD 2: 167, lines 32-33): «Hic primus, quum caeteri nihil se nescire profiterentur, nihil se scire professus est»; Plato, *Apologia* 21d (Burnet 1992, vol. 1; tr. Cooper 1997: 21): «So I withdrew and thought to myself: "I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know [οὐδὲ ὄνομαι εἰδέναι] what I do not know [ὄτι ἄ μὴ οἶδα]».

¹¹⁶ Cf. Plato, *Sophista* 233b (Burnet 1992, vol. 1; tr. Cooper 1997: 253): «How the sophists can ever make young people believe they're wiser [σοφώτατοι] than everyone else about everything»; Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.6.13; Guthrie 1969: 30, 35-36, 41.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.3.n30 (CCD 2: 170, lines 2-8): «Socrates mihi uidetur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura inuolutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerant auocauisse philosophiam et ad uitam communem adduxisse, ut de uirtutibus et de uitiis, omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quaeretur; coelestia autem uel procul esse a naturae cognitione censeret, uel si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene uiuendum». In fact, Vives quotes a passage of Cicero, *Academica* 1.4.15.

is', in Parmenides; 'dialectic between opposites', in Heraclitus); or by cosmology and the soul, such as Pythagoras.

According to Xenophon, Socrates dismissed any investigation about the nature of the universe (περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως),¹¹⁸ and he considered foolish (μωραίνοντες)¹¹⁹ those who troubled their mind with such problems. Xenophon reports four arguments that Socrates used to employ to support his position:¹²⁰ (1) knowledge of human affairs is not as complete as to invest time in considering only divine things; (2) the nature of the universe cannot be solved, as the different and opposite theories existing on this issue clearly demonstrate; (3) the study of nature does not necessarily imply gaining effective control over it, hence making such study questionable; (4) what the gods have chosen not to reveal should not be coveted by human beings, because they may lose their sanity.

Plato emphasized the importance of (1), when he described the many ways by which Socrates devoted his life to learn about himself. «I cannot yet, in the words of the Delphic precept, “know myself”», he said, therefore «it seems to me ridiculous to be studying alien matters when still ignorant of this».¹²¹ Vives's liking for the Delphic precept¹²² is found in some of his works, and it is often associated with the call made by Socrates to attain true comprehension of the human condition. For example, in *Philos.*, Vives warns that omitting knowledge of oneself is most shameful and contrary to the famous oracle of Apollo, which maintained that the first stage of wisdom is precisely to know oneself.¹²³ In *Vig.*, the fictional Publius Scipio Africanus explains to his adopted son that *Nosce te* is attributed to an immortal god and it means to know the mind, which is the principal part of the soul (*animus*).¹²⁴ In *Disc.*, Vives raises the following ironic question: are human beings able to identify the efficient cause, the end and the power of a particular thing but unable to know the aforementioned items regarding themselves?¹²⁵

The Valencian humanist seems to have cherished the figure of Socrates as an exemplary model of a man focused on virtue, good customs and daily human affairs,¹²⁶ rather than on enquiries beyond human reach or on solely theoretical philosophy. Vives, probably based on Cicero's *Tusculans*, explains that

¹¹⁸ Cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.11.

¹¹⁹ Id.

¹²⁰ Cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.12-15; 4.7.5-6.

¹²¹ Plato, *Phaedrus* 229e (Guthrie 1969: 420, n. 2). Vigliano (2013a: 584), like other scholars, rightfully asserts that «l'oracle de Delphes nous est surtout connu par Platon (*Protagoras* 343b; *Charmide* 164e; *Philèbe* 48c; *Premier Alcibiade* 124a-b), repris par Cicéron (*Tusculanes* 1.22.52) et relevé par Érasme parmi ses *Adages* (I vi 95)».

¹²² Cf. also *infra* Part IV, section 2.1.

¹²³ Cf. Vives, *Philos.* 35 (VOO 3: 15; ed. SWJL 1: 36): «...se ipsos praetermitterent incognitos; quod maxime dedecorum est contrarium illi Apollinis oraculo, primo ad sapientiam gradui γνῶθι σεαυτόν»; *Ad sap.* 604: «Hic est cursus absolutae sapientiae, cuius primus gradus est nosse se, postremus nosse deum».

¹²⁴ Cf. Vives, *Vig.* 111-112 (VOO 5: 156; ed. George 1989: 194): «Nosce te ... immortalis deo attribuitur. [...] Is iubet ... ut animi praecipuam noscat partem, quae est diuina mens».

¹²⁵ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 6 (VOO 6: 208; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 234): «Sententia illa uetus “Nosce te”. [...] Scilicet norit homo quid quicque sit, quae eius efficiens causa, qui finis, quae uis, de seipso haec ignorabit?».

¹²⁶ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.4.151 (CCD 2: 177): «Actiuam dicit, quae ad uirtutem, mores uitamque agendam spectat, in qua totus fuit Socrates».

Socrates was the first to take philosophy, which had previously limited itself to circulating in the realm of heavens and the elements, and apply it to the daily life and customs both of states and of individuals. This he did so that mortals should come to know what things were useful and indeed necessary to know.¹²⁷

In *Excit. praep.*, Vives holds the same opinion of Socrates: human beings are still ignorant (*rudis*) of many things, because the mysteries that pertain to the human realm have not been handed out by God and still remain concealed (*lateant*). Further, he firmly warns not to investigate the causes of things that only God's wisdom (*diuina sapientia*) can understand, since our blindness (*caecitas, caecutio*) and ignorance (*ruditas*) makes us unfit to fathom not only those issues related to God but also —most regrettably— those related to human beings.¹²⁸ In *Ciu. dei*, this argument is reinforced: it is said that heavenly matters can only be taught if God helps.¹²⁹ In *Disc.*, Vives is against overly curious, morbid, and insatiable researches which do not contribute to the bettering of our lives nor to strengthen Christian religion.¹³⁰ It is then of little surprise that, concerning the study of the soul, Vives says that he is not interested in defining what the soul *is* (*quid sit*) but in describing what the soul *does* (*eius opera*).¹³¹

In book 8 of *Ciu. dei*, the Valencian humanist considers the following issues raised by Socrates also to be of great importance. He comments that Socrates conceived philosophy as *mortis meditatio*, that is, as a constant reflection on death, which is the event that enables the soul to set free from the body; and that this reflection can only be properly undertaken if emotions (*affectus*) are restrained.¹³² Further, he asserts that, according to Socrates, life can

¹²⁷ Vives, *Philos.* 35 (VOO 3: 89; ed. tr. SWJV 1: 36-37): «Socrates primus philosophiam in caelis elementisque uersantem et diuagantem ad ciuitatum atque hominum singulorum usus uitamque deuocauit, ut ea primum mortales scirent quae scire et expediret et oporteret». Cf. complementary note 4.

¹²⁸ Cf. Vives, *Excit. praep.* 4, 12, 13 (VOO 1: 54-55): «4 Nec singulorum causas inquiras, quae sitae sunt in diuina sapientia, quam ne angeli quidem assequuntur. [...] 12 Fac ueniat tibi in mentem te esse puerum, et sapientiam Dei non assequi, qui etiam in humanis passim caecutias; 13 esse rudem, nec arcana Dei didicisse, quum etiam humana te prope omnia lateant».

¹²⁹ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.3.n33 (CCD 2: 171, lines 2-3): «In *Epimenide*, peritiam rerum coelestium doctorum aliquem nisi opem deus tulerit, negat». Allusion to Plato, *Epinomis* 991d (Burnet 1992, vol. 5; Cooper 1997: 1632): «It is better to call on God for help [θεὸν ἄμεινον ἀεὶ καλεῖν]». Scholars generally agree that Plato is not the author of this work.

¹³⁰ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 1 (VOO 6: 258; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 289): «Curiosa etiam delectatio scrutandi nihil ad pietatem facit, quae quidem nulli esse ualeat deinceps usui ad uitam».

¹³¹ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 1.12 (VOO 3: 332; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 188): «Anima quid sit, nihil interest nostra scire: qualis autem et quae eius opera, permultum. Nec qui iussit ut ipsi nos nossemus de essentia animae sensit, sed de actionibus ad compositionem morum ut, uicio depulso, uirtutem sequamur».

¹³² Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.3.n33 (CCD 2: 170, lines 23-25, 28-30): «Socrates ... in *Phaedone* ... philosophari neminem recte posse nisi se, quam maxime fieri possit, a consortio corporis, id est, ab omnibus affectibus seiungat. [...] Idcirco philosophia diffinitur mortis meditatio, id est, corporis animaeque separatio et ceu diuortium quoddam, ut animus purus sit, corporis fece non contaminatus». Allusion is made to some passages of Plato's *Phaedo* (Burnet 1992, vol. 1; tr. Cooper 1997: 58-59, 72); for example, 67c-d: «And does purification [κάθαρσις] not turn out to be what we mentioned in our argument some time ago, namely, to separate the soul [ψυχή] as far as possible from the body [σῶμα] [... ;] and that freedom [λύσις] and separation [χωρισμός] of the soul from the body is called death [θάνατος]?»; 67e: «Those who practice philosophy in the right way are in training for dying [οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφούντες αποθνήσκειν μελετῶσι] and they fear death least of all men»; 82c: «Those who practice

be deemed happy provided that it be focused on knowledge (*doctrina*) and virtue.¹³³ Moreover, honesty (virtue), beauty, and goodness are absolutely linked;¹³⁴ and wisdom can only be attained by good men, namely by those who practice virtue.¹³⁵ From this, it may be inferred that: (1) wisdom is in concordance with virtue; (2) any sort of knowledge that gives rise to wickedness and malice is not to be considered knowledge as such. Evil people may be experienced and cunning, but they will never qualify to be called ‘wise’.¹³⁶

In book 8, Vives also comments on the question about truth. He mentions that Plato, although he considered the knowledge of truth (*cognitio ueritatis*) as the highest good (*summum bonum*), admitted that it was not attainable in this earthy life, because of the many wants, needs, debilities, limitations and imperfections of the body, which hamper the mind from understanding (*comprehendere*). This fact makes humans impossible to be called ‘happy’ (*beati*) and, therefore, locates true knowledge (*pura sapientia*) and true happiness in the afterlife (*post uitam*).¹³⁷

The question of God as «I am who I am» is also examined. Vives deploys in a long note his erudition not only as a philosopher but also as a philologist: he uses grammar at the

philosophy in the right way keep away from all bodily passions [τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀπασῶν], master them and do not surrender themselves to them».

¹³³ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.8.n84 (CCD 2: 194, lines 12-14): «In *Gorgias* sententia Socratis est, in doctrina et uirtutem sitam esse beatam uitam pronunciatque bonos beatos, improbos miseros». Allusion is made to some passages of Plato’s *Gorgias* (Burnet 1992, vol. 3; tr. Cooper 1997: 851, 869); for example, 507c: «So, it’s necessarily very much the case, Callicles, that the self-controlled man [τὸν σῶφρονα], because he’s just and brave and pious [δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρείον καὶ ὅσιον], as we’ve recounted, is a completely good man [ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα τελέως], that the good man does well and admirably whatever he does, and that the man who does well is blessed and happy [τὸν δ’ εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι], while the corrupt man, the one who does badly, is miserable»; 527b: «It’s not seeming to be good but being good that a man should take care of more than anything, both in his public and his private life [καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ]»; 527e: «This way of life is the best: to practice justice and the rest of excellence both in life and in death [τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι]». Note the translation of ἀρετή (‘virtue’) as ‘excellence’.

¹³⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.8.n84 (CCD 2: 194, lines 15-16): «...cum illud tam perpetuum sit apud Platonem: solum honestum pulchrum bonum esse». It is an allusion to Plato’s notion that only the virtuous man is beautiful and good. Cf., for example, *Gorgias* 527d (Burnet 1992, vol. 3; tr. Cooper 1997: 869): «Nothing terrible will happen to you if you really are an admirable and good man, one who practices excellence [καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετὴν]».

¹³⁵ Cf. *Ciu. dei* 8.3.n33 (CCD 2: 171, lines 1-2): «In *Cratylus* solos bonos uiros sapientes esse dicet». Allusion to Plato, *Cratylus* 398b (Burnet 1992, vol. 1; tr. Cooper 1997: 116): «Are good people any different from wise ones? [οἱ δ’ ἀγαθοὶ ἄλλο τι ἢ φρόνιμοι;]». Note that the Greek adjective φρόνιμοι (φρόνησις) is made equivalent to *sapiens* (*sapientia*). This conveys that *sapiens* is used by Vives in the sense of ‘he who has practical wisdom’.

¹³⁶ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 111): «Peritos enim et malos non sapientes nominamus sed callidos, astutos, uersutos, uafros».

¹³⁷ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.8.n83 (CCD 2: 193, lines 11-16; 197, lines 4-6): «Plato in libris *de republica* et *legibus* et *Phaedone* cognitionem ueritatis summum hominibus bonum esse affirmat; quae cum perfecte contingere in hac uita nequeat, fit ut difficile putet uiuentium aliquem uere posse beatum dici, magnam tamen esse spem, ut eam cognitionem assequamur uita functi; liberi iam corporis uinculis et impedimento ad res mente comprehendendas maximo. [...] Si uere philosophus est, illa apud eum opinio ualere multum debet, ut non alibi puram sapientiam consequi se speret quam post uitam»; Plato, *Phaedo* 67a, 68b, 109e; *Respublica* 6, 508e; *Leges* 5, 703c.

service of philosophy.¹³⁸ By saying «'Εγὼ εἰμι ὁ ὢν», God manifests that He¹³⁹ does not have either past or future but exists always in a constant present, since ὢν is a participle that denotes present relative time.¹⁴⁰ By citing the Bible (Isaias, Iob) and Plato (*Timaeus*, *Sophista*), Vives vindicates that God is the sole existing being, of which it can only be said that «It is», because He does not suffer any change:

Furthermore (he says) these are all portions of time: not only “it was” but also “it will be”. These portions, which are time elapsed, are thoughtlessly ascribed by us to the everlasting essence; and this is not fitting. Indeed, we often say of the everlasting essence that “it will be”, “it was” and “it is”. But, in fact, only “it is” agrees with it, whereas “it was” and “it will” should belong to things that come into being in time and go forward with time. If these are two motions, what remains the same in the entire eternity is not moved by any movement, it never entails becoming older or younger, or having hitherto existed, or to exist from now on.¹⁴¹

A careful reading of n110 of *Ciu. dei* 8.11 brings more details about Vives’s insight on God: He has never been born, and He is always existing.¹⁴² His boundless and limitless nature makes Him impossible to be designated with exactitude by any word (*nomen*), to be enclosed within a definition (*diffinitio*), to be thought (*cogitatio*) or to be grasped (*capi*). God is not a being (*nec ens*): He remains something unfathomable, impossible to be explained, above and beyond all beings.¹⁴³ Precisely, of all beings, only the spiritual (of

¹³⁸ As Hankins (2007: 45) indicates, «the study of philosophy began to include philological study of the text in order to come closer to the philosopher’s thought and language». In order to appraise the meaning of a text as close and adequately as possible to the author’s intent, command of Latin and Greek grammar (particularly morphology and syntax) was paramount.

¹³⁹ When I refer to ‘God’ I usually employ ‘He’. For further discussion on this issue, cf. for example L. Zogbo, «Pronouns for God: He, She, or It?» *The Bible Translator* 40/4 (1989): 401-405; J. Ellington, «Can Pronouns Be Divine?» *The Bible Translator* 43/2 (1992): 223-230.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.11.n110 (CCD 2: 210, lines 2-4): «Et quoniam ὢν participium est praesens tempus, significat ut uideatur deus nec futurum habere nec praeteritum sed semper esse». Interestingly, the Latin translation (*Ego sum qui sum*) is unable to grasp the significance of ὢν, since the verb *sum* does not have a participle. Cf. *Ciu. dei* 8.11.n110 (CCD 2: 209, lines 14-15): «Hoc enim uerbum Graecum uno Latino uerti non potest, ut inquit Seneca libro epistolarum octauo [cf. *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 58.6-7]».

¹⁴¹ Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.11.n110 (CCD 2: 210, lines 13-23): «Porro (inquit) haec omnia temporis sunt partes, et “fuit” et “erit”; quae sunt temporis facti imprudenter a nobis sempiternae attribuuntur essentiae, quod non decet. Ita enim solemus de illa loqui, “erit”, “fuit”, “est”. Atqui solum modo “est” ei congruit; “fuisse” uero aut “fore” conuenit decidere quae in tempore genita cum tempore progreditur. Motus siquidem haec duo sunt, quod autem idem tota est aeternitate nullo mouetur motu nec decet seniore unquam fieri aut iuniorem, nec fuisse hactenus, nec fore deinceps». Vives cites Plato’s *Timaeus* (37e-38a) and provides both the Greek text and a Latin translation, apparently made by himself. This is an interesting passage, because the original Greek text of Plato, the Greek text provided by Vives, and Vives’s translation into Latin differ in some places. Cf. Complementary note 5.

¹⁴² Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.11.n110 (CCD 2: 209, lines 32-33): «Et in *Timaeo*: τὸ ὄν μὲν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, id est, semper ens ingenitum».

¹⁴³ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.11.n110 (CCD 2: 209, lines 23-26): «In eodem *Sophista* et in *Parmenide* deum unum et ens appellat, a quo sint reliqua uniuersa, nec diffinitione claudi, nec cogitatione teneri, nec noticia nec uerbis capi»; (CCD 2: 211, lines 4-6): «[Deum] nec ens illum esse sed supra omnia potius entia

divine nature) do exist, while those non-spiritual are subject to change and, therefore, they are made of nothingness.¹⁴⁴

The character of Socrates, as portrayed by Plato, must have left a deep impression on Vives's soul. He saw a man totally absorbed in the moral task of making better citizens. Moreover, he saw a man who believed that true education consisted in imitating the divinity; a man who preferred to trust God (an unfathomable and unreachable God) rather than the crowd, «a master of error».¹⁴⁵ In brief, he saw a man who conceived God as the highest good.

4.3 Aristotle

Even though Aristotle is Vives's third most referenced author, there is no doubt that it deserves to be put in first position as far as influence is concerned. Vives considered Aristotle the prince of all philosophers, the most talented, the most acute, very judicious in all areas of human knowledge, a leader on education with a sober style and of rich content.¹⁴⁶ Vives did value Aristotle's wisdom, particularly in logic, but he could not help seeing him now and then as a pagan and thus «not so much a good man as a learned one».¹⁴⁷ The next paragraphs review some of Vives's works in which the Greek philosopher has more predominance.

At the age of 26, Vives published a short essay about the meaning of philosophy, its various objects of study, its history, and its different (Greek) schools: *De initiis, sectis et*

inexplicabile quiddam; quod scire quid non sit facile est, quid autem sit impossibile»; Plato, *Sophista* 244b ff.; *Parmenides* 137c ff. Cf. also Vives, *Ciu. dei* 9.16.143 (CCD 2: 313, lines 23-26): «Platonis haec uerba sunt: “θεὸν μοῦ εὐρεῖν οὐ ῥάδιον, γινῶναι καὶ ἀδύνατον”, id est, “Deum quidem inuenisse haud facile est, intellexisse autem impossibile”». The cited phrase of Plato can be rendered as «Finding God is not easy at all; but it is impossible to understand Him». Vives took this Platonic phrase from Apuleius (*De Platone* 1.5.191), who in fact wrote the following (Moreschini 1991: 92): «Platonis haec uerba sunt: “θεὸν εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον, εὐρόντα τε εἰς πολλοὺς ἐκφέρειν ἀδύνατον”». The cited passage of Plato, as given by Apuleius, can be rendered as «Finding God is a laborious task; if found, it would be impossible to disclose Him to all people». However, the original source (Plato, *Timaeus* 28c) reads as follows (Burnet 1992, vol. 4; tr. Cooper 1997: 1235): «Τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν», that is, «Now to find the maker and father of this universe is hard enough, and even if I succeeded, to declare Him to everyone is impossible».

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.11.1110 (CCD 2: 209, lines 21-23): «Plato in *Timaeo* et *Sophista* res corporales nunquam uere esse, res autem spirituales solas uere esse affirmat»; *Isaias* 41:24: «Ecce uos estis ex nihilo».

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 4; *Disc. corr.* 6 (VOO 6: 209; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 235, 234): «Veram formationem arbitratus est imitationem numinis. [...] Socrates maluit deo credere, hoc est naturali praeceptioni excussae, quantum fieri potuit, ac purgatae communi dementia. [...] Populum habuit semper suspectum, quem ille magnum erroris magistrum nominare consueuerat et peruersum interpretem ueri»; also *infra* Part IV, complementary note 3.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Vives, *Buc. praef.* (VOO 2: 1): «...philosophorum plerique, inter quos fuit et Aristoteles princeps (mea sententia) omnium»; *Foem.* 1.8.66 (VOO 4: 111; ed. SWJV 6: 90, lines 22-23): «Aristoteles, philosophus ingeniosissimus»; *Disc. praef.* (VOO 6: 6; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 6): «Aristoteli in primis, cuius ego in humanis artibus ingenium, industriam, diligentiam, iudicium, unice praeter caeteros et admiror et suspicio»; *Conscr.* 47 (VOO 2: 286; ed. SWJV 3: 70, line 30): «Aristotelis, philosophi acutissimi»; *Rat. dic.* 3.47 (VOO 2: 227-228; ed. SWJV 6: 396, lines 20-21): «Princeps in tradendis artibus Aristoteles rebus est densissimus, parcus uerborum».

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Vives, *Sub.* 1.11.8 (VOO 4: 461; ed. SWJV 4: 80): «Aristoteles philosophus gentilis non perinde bonus ac doctus».

laudibus philosophae (Louvain: Dirk Martens, 1519). In this writing, Vives deployed an enthusiastic admiration for Aristotle and the Peripatetic school, whose wandering members he considered to be *his* philosophers: «Our own philosophers, whose leader and by far the wisest of all philosophers was Aristotle of Stagira, [...] are named, of course, Peripatetics».¹⁴⁸ The following informative summary of Aristotle's writings proves Vives's interest in, and command of, the *opus aristotelicum*.¹⁴⁹

If we wish to know about the secrets of nature and the mysterious workings of the universe, so many different books of Aristotle on the natural sciences lie ready to hand;¹⁵⁰ but if what we seek are the very subtle rules and formulae of dialectic and the clever cavillings of the skillful sophist, his volumes on logic, an art which he himself originated and perfected, are at our disposal.¹⁵¹ If the methods and artifices of public speaking and the writing of poetry are desired, there are two works on rhetoric and one on the art of poetry;¹⁵² and if anyone asks how he may best order his life, twenty volumes on ethics have been prepared for him.¹⁵³ If it is a question of governing the state or the household, there are eight books on Politics for this purpose and two on domestic management.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Vives, *Philos.* 42 (VOO 3: 18; ed. tr. SWJV 1: 44-45): «At uero nostrates philosophi, quorum princeps idem philosophorum omnium facile sapientissimus Aristoteles Stagiritis fuit, [...] Peripatetici certe appellati sunt». According to J. Roberts (SWJV 1: 45, n. 42), *nostrates philosophi* is an expression taken from Cicero (*Tusculanae disputationes* 5.32.90) and it refers to the philosophers of Greece. Roberts remarks that «in Vives, *nostrates* has no geographical meaning», hence we should interpret it as a subtle way that Vives employs to express his agreement with the Peripatetic school.

¹⁴⁹ Diogenes Laertius (5.22-27) gives a catalogue of Aristotle's works consisting of 156 titles, which (according to him) add up to 445.270 lines. Cf. P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain: Éditions Universitaires de Louvain, 1951); G. Reale, «Le opere di Aristotele», in *Introduzione a Aristotele* (Roma: Laterza, 1977), 202-206.

¹⁵⁰ This description can be applied to the following works (location in Bekker's edition is given in parentheses): *Physica* (184a-267b), *De caelo* (268a-313b), *De generatione et corruptione* (314a-338b), *Meteorologica* (338a-390b), *De anima* (402a-435b), *Parua naturalia* (436a-480b: *De sensu et sensibili*, *De memoria et reminiscencia*, *De somno et uigilia*, *De insomniis*, *De diuinatione per somnum*, *De longitudine et breuitate uitae*, *De iuuentute et senectute*, *De uita et morte*, *De respiratione*), *Historia animalium* (486a-638b), *De partibus animalium* (639a-697b), *De motu animalium* (698a-704b), *De incessu animalium* (704a-714b), *De generatione animalium* (715a-789b), *Problemata* (859a-967b), *Metaphysica* (980a-1093b). Other works attributed to Aristotle that may fit in this group: *De mundo* (391a-401b), *De spiritu* (481a-486b), *De coloribus* (791a-799b), *De audibilibus* (800a-804b), *Physiognomonica* (805a-814b), *De plantis* (814a-830b), *De mirabilibus auscultationibus* (830a-847b), *Mechanica* (847a-858b), *De lineis insecabilibus* (968a-972b), *Ventorum situs* (973a-b), *De Melisso*, *Xenophane*, *Gorgia* (974a-980b).

¹⁵¹ This description can be applied to the following works: *Categoriae* (1a-15b), *De interpretatione* (16a-24b), *Analytica priora* (24a-70b), *Analytica posteriora* (71a-100b), *Topica* (100a-164b), *De Sophisticis elenchis* (164a-184b).

¹⁵² Vives alludes to *Rhetorica* (1354a-1420b), *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (1420a-1447b; nowadays considered to be of doubtful authorship), and *De poetica* (1447a-1462b).

¹⁵³ This description applies to *Ethica Nicomachea* (1094a-1181b; ten books), *Magna Moralia* (1180a-1213b; two books), and *Ethica Eudemia* (1214a-1249b; eight books). Other works attributed to Aristotle that may fit in this group: *De uirtutibus et uitis* (1249a-1251b).

¹⁵⁴ Vives, *Philos.* 42 (VOO 3: 18; ed. tr. SWJV 1: 44-45): «Si enim desiderantur naturae arcana et secretissimae rerum rationes, praesto sunt tam multi tamque uarii Aristotelis de rebus physicis libri; sin uero dialectices subtilissimae rationes ac formulae et callidi sophistae astuta cauilla, adsunt

It is Vives's estimation that Aristotle expressed himself in accurate and clear terms (*ueris expressisque nominibus*),¹⁵⁵ but ignorant, lazy and neglectful minds obscured and misunderstood the Greek text when rendering it into Latin.¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, Vives argues that Aristotle and the Peripatetic school introduced order into what had hitherto been a confused mass of knowledge.¹⁵⁷ Aristotle's attempt to organize, arrange and classify the different elements of reality through definitions, categories and logical parameters may have caught the attention of the young Vives. In those formative years, he may have considered the Greek philosopher the exemplary model of a methodic mind whose teachings included not only a theoretical approach to the world to be reflected upon but also a set of ethical doctrines to be of assistance in daily life. On the other hand, Aristotle may have made Vives realize the crucial and influential role that language plays in human life, as he similarly admitted some years later: words can, in fact, shape and determine knowledge, understanding, thoughts, and feelings.¹⁵⁸

Be that as it may, Vives's view on Aristotle evolved into a more nuanced position as years passed by. In *Disc.* (1531), we still find Vives's general approval of Aristotle: he argues again that Aristotle's writings were distorted by incompetent scholars who neither translated them into accurate Latin nor edited them properly in Greek;¹⁵⁹ he encourages students to learn in depth the logic of Aristotle;¹⁶⁰ and he considers both the *Physica* and the *Methaphysica* works full of instruction and intelligence.¹⁶¹ However, *Disc.* also conveys without any doubt Vives's disagreement with the Greek philosopher, whom he respects but,

logica eius uolumina; quae ars ab eodem et incepta et perfecta est; sin orandi et poesis uia atque inuentio, duo sunt de rhetoricis opera et unum de poetica arte; si quis autem mores sibi poscit componendos, parata ei sunt moralium rerum uolumina uiginti; at gubernanda est siue respublica siue res familiaris: conscripti sunt ad ipsum institutum libro de Republica octo, de Re uero familiari duo». In this last sentence, Vives alludes to *Politica* (1252a-1342b) and *Oeconomica* (1343a-1353b). *Athenaion Politeia* is not mentioned, since the papyrus that contained this work was not discovered until late 19th century, in Egypt by Kenyon, who was in charge of preparing the first edition of the papyrus. Cf. F. G. Kenyon (ed.), *Aristotle: On the constitution of Athens* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891).

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Vives, *Philos.* 43 (VOO 3: 19; ed. SWJV 1: 46, lines 16-17).

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Vives, *Philos.* 43 (VOO 3: 19; ed. SWJV 1: 46, lines 17-22): «Desidia, mihi credite, nostra et ignoratio Graecarum litterarum effecerunt ut eum quibusdam in locis obscure locutum existimemus. Est enim multo apertior, multo clarior, multo lucidior Graecus ipse quam Latinus. Nam interpres noster, cum conatur singulis uerbis Graecis singula uerba Latina reddere, caespitat, inuertit, obscurat, confundit et dictionem totam et sensa».

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Vives, *Philos.* 44 (VOO 3: 19; ed. SWJV 1: 46, lines 31-32): «omnia ante sua tempora fluctuantia».

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prima ph.* 1 (VOO 3: 193): «Ad hoc uis prope omnis sciendi atque intelligendi in uerbis est sita; nam uerbis sensa consignantur, et quae quisque mente ac cogitatione assequitur uerbis exprimit, iisque (quantum facere potest) coniunctis cum explicatione naturae rei cuiusque».

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 69; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 77): «Versus est male ab imperitis qui, dum in Latinum transferunt, nec Latinum fecerunt nec reliquerunt Graecum». In the sentences next to the preceding one (VOO 6: 69-70; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 77), Vives comments further on the medieval scholar by saying that it is difficult to translate what one does not understand («ut difficile est interpretari quae non capias»), and that they had to make something up and invent («hic quoque comminisci aliquid et fingere»).

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 4 (VOO 6: 346; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 388-389): «Cognoscet uniuersam Aristotelis Dialecticam attentus».

¹⁶¹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 4 (VOO 6: 351-352; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 394): «Multum enim tum eruditionis habent, ut illius omnia, tum ingenii».

at the same time, from whom he dares to *modestly* differ.¹⁶² For example, when examining *Categoriae* and *De interpretatione*, Vives ridicules Aristotle by claiming that he does not provide an actual tool to make arguments;¹⁶³ and that his long explanation about demonstration (ἀπόδειξις)¹⁶⁴ is useless (*nulli sunt usui*) because, if it relies on what is first (*ex primis*; πρῶτον), necessary (*ex necessariis*; ἀναγκαῖον), and without middle (*quae sine medio*; ἄμεσον), our weak, limited and error-prone human mind is unable to fathom it. The darkness of our intellect —Vives underlines— can hardly allow us to know what is first and most necessary for ourselves. Then, how could we ever attain knowledge about the most concealed parts of nature?¹⁶⁵ Further, in a demonstration —Vives continues— it is impossible to reach universal coverage: on the one hand, every single person understands «first» (or any other concept) in his own peculiar and, hence, different way; and, on the other hand, if singular elements are infinite, how can they be ever gathered together in the universal? If just a single element is missing, the universal cannot be complete.¹⁶⁶

Another strenuous objection to Aristotle is made when Vives discusses the corruption of moral philosophy.¹⁶⁷ He is absolutely against Aristotle's conviction that happiness (εὐδαιμονία) can be attained in this earthy life. Using the art of syllogism, Vives claims that: (1) everyone seeks happiness; (2) the search for happiness is a natural desire; (3) happiness cannot be reached in this life, as facts clearly demonstrate; therefore (4) happiness is to be attained somewhere *else*, since —as Aristotle claims— that which everyone desires is natural and must exist, otherwise it would be vain and meaningless.¹⁶⁸ At this point, Vives considers that Aristotle's notion of happiness is entirely fictitious and it should be dismissed.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, such happiness is utterly opposite to Christian religion (*pietas*) and, thus, against upright reason. Since religion does not place happiness in this brief earthly existence or in our weak body, reason (i.e. the logic inference of the argument) dictates

¹⁶² Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 1 (VOO 6: 124; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 137): «De Aristotele [...], quem ego ueneror, uti par est, et ab eo uerecunde dissentio». Maians, when editing *Disc.*, added some titles of his own which reflected this shift; for instance, VOO 6: 117, when the Spanish scholar wrote that Vives carefully examines Aristotle's *Analytica priora*, *Analytica posteriora* and *Topica*, but also disapproves of its content in many places: «Priorum ac posteriorum analyticorum libros, item de locis argumentorum octo, et Porphyrii opus de quinque uocibus acute examinat et in multis improbat».

¹⁶³ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 3 (VOO 6: 114; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 125): «Nemo est enim qui, quantumlibet diligenter lecta et excussa uniuersa Aristotelis Logica, sentiat se instrumentum habere quo in aliqua ad disserendum materia argumenta in promptu excogitet».

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora* 1 (71a-89b).

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 3 (VOO 6: 118; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 130): «Qui scio ego quae sint prima, quae sine medio, quae tu uocas ἄμεσα, quae necessaria naturae? Quae sint mihi talia uix scio, nedum ut illa norim naturae intima, ad cuius manifestissima (ut tu ipse fateris) caligamus. Inanis est ergo tota de demonstratione traditio, et sine usu».

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 3 (VOO 6: 119; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 131).

¹⁶⁷ Noreña (1970: 171) calls it «a massive attack against Peripatetic ethics».

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 6 (VOO 6: 212; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 238). Aristotle's syllogism: «Quod omnes homines expetunt naturale est, at naturalia frustra esse non queunt; expetunt porro beatitatem omnes, qui appetitus inanis esset, si nullus eam nancisceretur nec fieret uoti compos». Vives's syllogism: «Beatitudinem omnes expetunt, naturalis ergo appetitus, non ergo uanus; atqui hic nulli assequuntur, ut res docet; alibi ergo est quaerenda».

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 6 (VOO 6: 214; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 241): «Si ficta est Aristotelis beatitudo, ualeat, etiam gentilibus ipsis parum sana et pia! Nos uera discamus et scire et tueri».

that real happiness is to be found in our immortal life, in our immortal body.¹⁷⁰ Vives firmly believed that the precepts of Christ and those of Aristotle were incompatible.¹⁷¹

It is fitting here to complement Vives's religious objections to Aristotle with the following passage taken from *Ver. fid.*, in which he vehemently condemns Aristotle's notion of the First Mover (ὁ οὐ κινούμενος κινεῖ).¹⁷² Vives totally rejects that the First Mover be called 'God' (θεός) because, in so doing, the Greek philosopher deprives God of freedom.¹⁷³

Aristotle steals from God what is most authentic in beings endowed with reason and intelligence: freedom. He transforms the maker of the world into the servant of nature. [...] Because Aristotle enclosed God with necessity, he deprived him of any kind of worship, charity and grace. Indeed, who would attribute something to someone who, what he does, cannot do otherwise? Who thanks fire because it cooked the meat and heated the water? Who thanks water because it wetted us and refreshed us?¹⁷⁴

In September 1538, Vives published *De anima et uita* (Basel: Robert Winter). As it is explained in the preface addressed to the Duke of Béjar, Vives arranged this work into three books: on the soul of the animals, on the rational soul, and on the emotions.¹⁷⁵ In books 1 and 2, he is highly inspired by Aristotle's *De anima*, *De sensu et sensato*, *De generatione et corruptione*, *Metaphysica*, and *Problemata*.¹⁷⁶ The classification of the living beings proposed by Vives in book 1 follows closely that of the Greek philosopher:¹⁷⁷ it is arranged according to the complexity of their soul (*animarum genera*), and it implies that a higher degree of complexity encompasses all previous lower degrees.¹⁷⁸ The *anima uegetatrix* is that of vegetables, and it regulates nourishment, growth, and reproduction; the *anima sentiens* is that of plants and zoophytes, and it regulates the external senses; the *anima cognoscens* is that of insects and animals, and it regulates both the external senses and internal senses (in animals); finally, the *anima rationalis* is the most complex type of soul, only present in

¹⁷⁰ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 6 (VOO 6: 213; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 239-240): «Sed Aristotelicam felicitatem contrariam esse pietati nostrae, atque ideo rectae rationi, neminem puto dubitare. Nam pietas non in uita hac breui et imbecillo corpore, casibus et calamitatibus obiecto, ponit felicitatem, nec tam male agit nobiscum; sed in illo immortalia corpore nostro, iniuriae omnis experti, ad immutabilem firmitatem reficito».

¹⁷¹ Cf. *Disc. corr.* 6 (VOO 6: 218; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 246): «Non possumus Christo seruire et Aristoteli contraria praecipientibus».

¹⁷² Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 12.7 (Λ 1072a24-26); cf. *Physica* 7.1 (241b24).

¹⁷³ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 12.7 (Λ 1072b25).

¹⁷⁴ Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.10 (VOO 8: 81): «Adimit Deo Aristoteles id quod in entibus ratione atque intelligentia praeditis est optimum: libertatem; et ex principe mundi facit ministrum naturae, cui in agendo seruiat. [...] Iam quod sepsit necessitate, abstulit ab eo cultum omnem, caritatem, gratiam: quis enim ei quicquam debeat, qui quae agat, non possit aliter agere? quis igni habet gratiam, quod carnes coxerit et aquam feruefecerit; aut aquae, quod nos humectarit ac refrigerarit?».

¹⁷⁵ Cf. Vives, *An. uita praef.* (VOO 3: 299; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 86): «Opus hoc tribus uoluminibus explicatum: de anima brutorum, de rationali et de affectionibus».

¹⁷⁶ Cf. I. Roca, in CJLV 1A: 22-23.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* 2.2 (413a20-414a4).

¹⁷⁸ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 1 intr., 1.12 (VOO 3: 300-301, 338-340; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 88-93, 204-211); Casini 2006: 87-91 («The vegetative soul»), 91-98 («The sensitive soul»), 98-106 («The cogitative soul»), 107-130 («The rational soul»: the mind, memory, the will).

human beings. It enables them to have mind (intelligence), will, and memory.¹⁷⁹ Still in book 1, Vives comments on the Aristotelian term ἐντελέχεια. He believes that the Greek philosopher was right and clever to designate the soul with a new name: «that which carries with itself its own perfection».¹⁸⁰ This term consists of the preposition ἐν ('in', 'within'), the word τέλος ('end') and the verb ἔχω ('to have'); taken as a whole, it means «that which has the end or purpose in itself», or simply «accomplished reality».¹⁸¹

In the second book, Vives relies on Aristotle in various places to support his argumentation; for example: when he distinguishes between theoretical reasoning (whose end is truth) and practical reasoning (whose end is good),¹⁸² when he mentions melancholy (*atra bilis*),¹⁸³ or when he describes the sense of hearing (*audiendi sensus*).¹⁸⁴ However, the intricate subject about the immortality of the soul impels Vives to express again his doubts about Aristotle's coherent argumentation. He points out the fact that, in one passage, Aristotle claims that if the mind is unable to understand without the aid of phantasy (a faculty clearly linked to the senses) then the mind cannot be detached from it (and therefore, from the senses), whereas in another passage the Greek philosopher asserts that the mind can be detached from both the senses and the body. Because of this alleged contradiction, Vives admits that he has nothing to say about what the obscure and cunning Aristotle really thought.¹⁸⁵

The third book of *An. uita* focuses on the emotions (*affectiones*), and Vives makes clear that he, unlike Aristotle in his *Rhetorica*, will not make an account that can be used by speakers (*uir politicus*) to elicit a particular response from an audience.¹⁸⁶ Nonetheless, Vives

¹⁷⁹ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2 intr. (VOO 3: 337; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 216): «Ita hominis anima, qua est hominis, ex tribus constat praecipuis siue functionibus siue facultatibus siue uiribus siue muneribus ac officiis siue (ut alii appellant) potentiis ac partibus: [...] Hae autem sunt mens siue intelligentia, uoluntas ac memoria».

¹⁸⁰ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 1.12 (VOO 3: 337; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 202): «Meritoque Aristoteles et acute (ut solet) animam nouo nuncupauit nomine ἐντελέχειαν quasi perfectionem secum adferentem»; Casini 2006: 51. Vives had already reflected on this term in *Ciu. dei* 8.6.n70 (CCD 2: 187), where he argued that ἐντελέχεια is «a kind of everlasting act [*perennem quondam actum*]»; cf. also 22.11.n52 (CCD 5: 147, lines 12-15): «Itaque non 'ἐνδελείχεια' (aiunt), id est 'perpetuam motionem', Aristoteles animam nominauit, cum id reprehenderit in Platone, sed 'ἐντελέχεια', quasi 'ἐντελές ἔχειν', hoc est 'perfectam habitionem' et, ut uertit Hermolaus, 'perfecti habiam'».

¹⁸¹ Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* 1.1 (402a26), 2.1 (412a19-23). Other translations: 'actuality' (R. D. Hicks, J. A. Smith, Chr. Shields), 'actual existence' (W. S. Hett).

¹⁸² Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.4 (VOO 3: 337; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 202): «Ratio speculatiua, cuius finis est ueritas; et ratio practica, cuius bonum». In fact, Aristotle (*Metaphysica* 2.1; α 993b20; Ross ed. 1924, tr. 1928) makes the same distinction but he focuses on 'action' (ἔργον) rather than 'good' (*bonum*): «The end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action [θεωρητικῆς μὲν γὰρ τέλος ἀλήθεια, πρακτικῆς δ' ἔργον]».

¹⁸³ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.6 (VOO 3: 367; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 294).

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.8 (VOO 3: 373; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 314).

¹⁸⁵ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.19 (VOO 3: 416; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 440): «Uno in loco dicit: "Si intelligere potest mens absque phantasia, separari potest ab ea; sin secus, non potest". [...] Alio tamen in loco idem ait Philosophus separari mentem a sensibus ac corpore». Therefore: «De Aristotle, quid senserit, nihil habeo dicere: obscurus est, lubricus, uaffer; in hoc etiam ne a more suo discedat».

¹⁸⁶ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 3 intr. (VOO 3: 421; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 454).

quotes Aristotle's definitions of some concepts, namely of pity (*miser cordia*), fear (*metus*) or shame (*pudor*).¹⁸⁷

Also in September 1538, the Valencian humanist published *De Aristotelis operibus censura* (Basel: Ioannes Oporinus). This short writing was, in fact, the introductory pages to the complete works of Aristotle in Latin, edited by German theologian Simon Grynaeus.¹⁸⁸ Vives's familiarity with the Aristotelian writings (as it has been shown)¹⁸⁹ must have convinced both Oporinus and Grynaeus to commission this assignment to Vives; further, his friendship with Grynaeus may have also played an important role.¹⁹⁰

Although this short work was named *censura* it was devised as a preface or short introduction rather than a detailed evaluation of Aristotle.¹⁹¹ In this preface, Vives wrote a short commentary on the following works:¹⁹² *De interpretatione* (Περὶ ἑρμηνείας), *Categoriae* (Κατηγορίαι), *Priora Analytica* (Ἀναλυτικά πρότερα), *Posteriora* (Ἀναλυτικά ὕστερα), *Topica* (Τοπικά), *Elenchi* (Περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων), *Physica* (Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις), *De generatione* (Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς), *De coelo* (Περὶ οὐρανοῦ), *De mundo* (Περὶ κόσμου πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον), *Meteororum* (Μετεωρολογικά), *De anima* (Περὶ ψυχῆς), *Metaphysica* (Τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά), *De historia animalium* (Περὶ τὰ ζῶα ἱστορίας), *Problemata* (Προβλήματα), *Ethica* (Ἠθικά Νικομάχεια and Ἠθικά Εὐδῆμεια), *Magna Moralia* (Ἠθικά Μεγάλα), *Oeconomica* (Οἰκονομικά), *Politica* (Πολιτικά), and *Rhetorica* (Τέχνη ῥητορική).¹⁹³ It is worth noting that *Physica* is given the smallest attention (a meager four per cent of the entire content), whereas the moral writings and the logic / grammar works constitute each one thirty per cent of the entire commentary. These figures convey Vives's preference for practical philosophy and for those writings that are «deemed useful to human life»,¹⁹⁴ because he (as many other Renaissance scholars) was aware of the fact that «philosophy now had to address, not the professional caste of specially trained experts with its own technical language, but the ruling classes of

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 3.7, 3.21, 3.23 (VOO 3: 458, 502, 508; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 552, 674, 692): «Miser cordiam Aristoteles finiuit dolorem de malo, quod nobis uidetur accidere indigno; id uero malum dicit esse φθαρτικόν. [...] Metus est (inquit Aristoteles) mali appropinquantis phantasia. [...] Pudor ... ab Aristotele definitur dolor seu perturbatio animi, de iis quae dedecus uidentur inferre»; Aristotle, *Rhetorica* 2.8 (ἔλεος; 1385b13-1386b8), 2.5 (φόβος; 1382a21-22), 2.6 (αἰσχύνη; 1383b12-15).

¹⁸⁸ Grynaeus (or Griner) put together a variety of translations that had been made in the past two centuries (14-16). He also incorporated Boetius's *Analytica priora*. Cf. complementary note 3.

¹⁸⁹ Noreña (1970: 168-169) warmly says that «I dare to say without fear of exaggeration that Vives was the most outspoken, knowledgeable, judicious, independent, and constructive critic of Aristotle among all the scholars of the sixteenth century». Ch. H. Lohr acknowledges Vives as a commentator of Aristotle in his monumental *Latin Aristotle Commentaries* (Florence: Olschki, 1988-1995; 5 vols.). Vives has an entry in vol. 2: 486-487. Guy (1972: 21-35) gives a clear and accurate account of Vives's praise as well as criticism of Aristotle.

¹⁹⁰ Two letters from Vives to Grynaeus are extant; cf. Jiménez 1978: Ep. 174, Ep. 175. Vives also introduced a character named Gryneus in dialogue 23 of *Ling.* (VOO 1: 391-396; ed. García Ruiz 2005: 362-373, 524-525). Grynaeus was a humanist scholar and editor of classical texts, by which he entered the circle around Erasmus and the Froben press. Cf. CEBR 1: 142a-1446b; Allen 9: Ep. 2433, 2434; CWE 17: 223-227.

¹⁹¹ Cf. my Latin-Catalan edition of *Arist.* (Tello 2019: 24), where I explain my choice for having rendered the Latin title into *Presentació de les obres d'Aristòtil (Introduction to the works of Aristotle)*.

¹⁹² Titles according to the name given by Vives. In parentheses, the original Greek title.

¹⁹³ Vives did not include *De poetica* in his account.

¹⁹⁴ J. Hankins, «Humanism, scholasticism, and Renaissance philosophy», in Hankins 2007: 45.

the city-state. [...] Elegance and urbanity became more important than originality or power of thought».¹⁹⁵

Arist. is a small piece of writing that has one big challenge, namely to explain Greek philosophy in Latin language. Although Vives admits that «it is extremely difficult to say all this in one Latin word»,¹⁹⁶ he manages to make his own way, experienced as he is in Aristotelian vocabulary, which he must have learned when he was studying in the colleges of Paris.¹⁹⁷ A few examples are listed below:

corpora naturae (σώματα φυσικά), *essentia* (οὐσία), *princeps motor* (πρώτον κινούν);¹⁹⁸
auctus (αὐξησις);¹⁹⁹
effectio (ποίησις), *uegetatio* (τροφή);²⁰⁰
principium (ἀρχή, τὸ πρόωτον), *causa* (αἰτία), *actio* (πράξις);²⁰¹
habitus (ἔξις).²⁰²

To sum up Vives's view on Aristotle, it seems appropriate to cite the following passage of *Arist.* In it, the Valencian humanist claims that *ingenium* ('natural intelligence', 'creative intelligence') is the key element for human beings in order to make real intellectual progress. The mere accumulation of data does not bring any real knowledge at all; data must be reflected upon, strengthened, purified, and be critically evaluated.

Aristotle does not pursue the embellishment of the subject or the charms of language in order to catch the reader and seduce him with a vain amusement and then let him go empty. His speech is thorough by virtue of the powerful fruit of knowing things that are worthy of being known. He does not seek the immediate, trivial, momentary charm but brings a lasting benefit. Therefore, such a great author is neither to the liking of everyone nor needs any common reader. The works of Aristotle require a reader who has intelligence: not only shrewd but also deep, solid, healthy and cautious; a reader who is attentive, careful, impregnated with readings of various authors and with knowledge of many topics. If these prerequisites are not fulfilled, nothing will be harsher, more unpleasant and more unpleasant than the books of Aristotle.²⁰³

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 45-46.

¹⁹⁶ Vives, *Arist.* 4, line 115 (VOO 3: 28; ed. Tello 2019: 40): «uno autem uerbo Latine dicere perdifficile».

¹⁹⁷ Cf. González 1987: 132-165; Gómez-Hortigüela 1998: 113-162, esp. 114-116 («El organum aristotélico»); González 2008a: 31-39.

¹⁹⁸ Vives, *Arist.* 9, lines 186, 187, 191 (VOO 3: 30; ed. Tello 2019: 50, 52).

¹⁹⁹ Vives, *Arist.* 10, line 194 (VOO 3: 30; ed. Tello 2019: 54).

²⁰⁰ Vives, *Arist.* 12, lines 236, 241 (VOO 3: 31, 32; ed. Tello 2019: 60).

²⁰¹ Vives, *Arist.* 13, lines 255-256 (VOO 3: 32; ed. Tello 2019: 66).

²⁰² Vives, *Arist.* 16.5, line 368 (VOO 3: 35; ed. Tello 2019: 82).

²⁰³ Vives, *Arist.* 1.3-4 (VOO 3: 26; ed. Tello 2019: 32): «Non persequitur rerum flosculos et orationis delicias, quis inani oblectamento delinitum lectorem teneat, postea remittat uacuum. Plena est illius oratio ingenti fructu cognitionis rerum sciri dignarum; non captat praesentem gratiam leuem ac momentaneam sed adfert diuturnam utilitatem. Idcirco nec ad quemlibet gustum facit tantus autor, nec quemlibet lectorem desiderat. Volunt Aristotelis opera lectorem ingenii non acuti tantum sed etiam profundi, solidi, sani, circumspecti; uolunt attentum, diligentem, imbutum lectione uariorum autorum et cognitione rerum multarum. Haec si desint, nihil Aristotelicis libris existimabitur asperius, insuauius, inamoenius».

4.4 Seneca

Of Seneca's *De tranquillitate animi* (or *De tranquillitate uitae*),²⁰⁴ Vives took two important notions that defined his attitude towards life and intellectual research: acceptance and humility. In *Satellitium siue Symbola* (Louvain: Pieter Martens, 1524) 157,²⁰⁵ Vives admonishes princess Mary, the daughter of king Henry VIII and queen Catherine of Aragon,²⁰⁶ to be content and to behave exemplarily. After having quoted Seneca to reinforce his argument, Vives then discloses his moral maxim, «Sine querela»:

WITHOUT COMPLAINT. You should live in such a way that there is no reason for anyone to complain about you, or for you to complain about anyone or about fortune; and you should not do wrong to anyone or think that wrong has been done to you. Seneca, *On the tranquility of life*, says: «One must become accustomed to his condition, complain about it as little as possible and seize whatever good it has to offer. Nothing is so harsh that a calm soul cannot find some solace in it».²⁰⁷ This [i.e. «Without complaint»] is my symbol.²⁰⁸

In *Ad sap.* (202), Vives paraphrases again *De tranquillitate animi*, when he warns that arrogance severely hinders the road to wisdom. In the following passage there is also a subtle flavor of Socratic ignorance:

Besides, arrogance considerably hampers any progress in study. In fact, many people would have been able to achieve wisdom if they had not supposed that they had already attained it.²⁰⁹

Vives introduced in *Sat.* quite a few texts quoted from or inspired by Seneca. For example, when talking about the capacity of fulfilling what one has set out to do, he states

²⁰⁴ Erasmus edited Seneca's *De tranquillitate animi* as *De tranquillitate uitae*, as it can be found in *L. Annaei Senecae opera* (Basel: Johann Froben and Johann Herwagen, Mar. 1529), 348-360. Vives too often refers to this work as *De tranquillitate uitae*.

²⁰⁵ VOO 4: 54-55 (*Sat.* 155); ed. Tello 2020a: 83.

²⁰⁶ Cf. CEBR 1: 282b-284b; 2: 178b-181b, 401b-403a.

²⁰⁷ Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 10.4.

²⁰⁸ VOO 4: 54-55 (*Sat.* 155); ed. Tello 2020a: 83: «SINE QUERELA. Viuendum ita ut non sit cur uel de te quisquam conqueratur uel ipse de quoquam aut de fortuna, nec ipse cuiquam facias iniuriam nec factam tibi credas. Seneca *De tranquillitate uitae*: "Assuescendum itaque conditioni suae et quam minimum de illa querendum, et quicquid habet circa se commodi apprehendendum. Nihil tam acerbum est, in quo non aequus animus solatium inueniat". Hoc est symbolum nostrum». Vives's symbol also appears, at least, in *Syll.* 5.15 (VOO 2: 450; ed. SWJV 9: 234, line 8) and *Mar.* 194 (VOO 4: 407; ed. SWJV 8: 210, line 18). Vives's *Sine querela* contrasted with Erasmus's *Concedo nulli* («I yield to no one»; cf. Allen 7: Ep. 2018, line 4). In order to explain the apparent fierceness of the motto, Erasmus wrote to Alfonso de Valdés on 1 August 1528 (Allen 7: Ep. 2018, lines 16-19; tr. CWE 14: 241) that «those who know me more closely through friendly conversation will attribute any other vice to me but arrogance. They will declare that I resemble more the Socratic "I know one thing, namely, that I know nothing [*Hoc unum scio, me nihil scire*]" than "I yield to no one"».

²⁰⁹ «Multi enim potuissent ad sapientiam peruenire, ni iam putassent se peruenisse». Translation mine. Cf. Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 1.16. This thought can also be found in Vives, *Conc.* 1 (VOO 5: 340); *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 20; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 22); *Disc. trad. er.* (VOO 6: 416; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 467); *An. uita* 2.8 (VOO 3: 375; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 320).

that «it is not important how much time one has but how he uses it. Life does not have to be long in order to be good».²¹⁰ Therefore, one should ask «not how long but how good»²¹¹ a lifetime can be spent. For it is evident that «a single day of a wise person is preferable to the endless eternity of the foolish».²¹² This last passage, which Vives claims to have been taken from Cicero's *Tusculanae disputationes* (5.2.5), seems to come from Seneca: «A single day among the learned lasts longer than the longest life of the ignorant».²¹³

Seneca's influence in *Sat.* is also found in passages where Vives expresses his view on governance. In *Sat.* 123, whose title is «The prince has to look after many»,²¹⁴ he affirms that the role of a prince is «to put the public interests above his own, and to be of the opinion that there is no one among his subjects who does not deserve his particular concern».²¹⁵ Therefore, «ruling is a duty, not a kingly function».²¹⁶ On the other hand, in *Sat.* 182, Vives admits that «in the affairs of the world, the reward for work is either non-existent or, at least, unsubstantial; or it is another work which might be more attractive but also more troublesome, like those who exchange one position for another one».²¹⁷ Therefore, «the end of one tribulation is the first step to the following one».²¹⁸ This last sentence accords closely with the humanist's natural proneness to pessimism.

In *De subuentione pauperum siue De humanis necessitatibus* (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, Mar. 1526), Vives cites a long passage of Seneca's *De beneficiis* in order to encourage Christians to make good deeds (*beneficia*) irrespective of the subsequent gratitude or ingratitude shown by the benefited person. «It is the mark of a great and noble spirit not to look for some reward for his good deeds but to seek the good deeds themselves», says Vives through Seneca, because «virtue consists in doing good without the certainty of any return».²¹⁹ In *Sat.*, Vives had already warned princess Mary that «certainly, people cease doing good deeds if they have encountered ungrateful persons», because «when they have been offended by ungrateful persons, they are reluctant to encounter those that are grateful.

²¹⁰ Vives, *Sat.* 126 (VOO 4: 50 [*Sat.* 124]; ed. Tello 2020a: 79): «Ideo non refert quanta sit ei diuturnitas sed qualis administratio. Nec uitam, ut sit bona, longam esse oportet».

²¹¹ Vives, *Sat.* 126 (symbol's title; VOO 4: 50 [*Sat.* 124]; ed. Tello 2020a: 79): «Non quam diu sed quam bene». Almost identical to Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 101.15: «Quam bene uiuas refert, non quam diu».

²¹² Vives, *Sat.* 25 (VOO 4: 36 [*Sat.* 25]; ed. Tello 2020a: 65): «Praeferendus est dies unus sapientis longissimae aeternitati stultorum».

²¹³ Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 78.28 (Gummere 1920: 198-199): «Vnus dies hominum eruditorum plus patet quam imperitis longissima aetas». This is, in fact, a quotation of Posidonius, possibly from his *Προτρεπτικά* (*Exhortations*).

²¹⁴ VOO 4: 50 (*Sat.* 121); ed. Tello 2020a: 79: «Princeps multis consulendo».

²¹⁵ VOO 4: 50 (*Sat.* 121); ed. Tello 2020a: 79: «...publicas utilitates suis antepone, existimareque neminem esse inter subditos cuius cura peculiariter ad se non pertineat».

²¹⁶ VOO 4: 50 (*Sat.* 121); ed. Tello 2020a: 79: «Officium est imperare, non regnum». Almost identical to Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 90.5.

²¹⁷ VOO 4: 58 (*Sat.* 179); ed. Tello 2020a: 87: «Laboris in res mundanas uel praemium est nullum aut certe uanitas uel alter labor, speciosior quidem sed molestior, ut qui dignitates dignitatibus mutant».

²¹⁸ VOO 4: 58 (*Sat.* 179); ed. Tello 2020a: 87: «Finis unius mali gradus est sequentis». Quotation of Seneca, *Hercules furens* 208-209: «... finis alterius mali / gradus est futuri».

²¹⁹ Vives, *Sub.* 1.8.2 (VOO 4: 443; ed. tr. SWJV 4: 44-45): «Hoc et magni animi et boni proprium est: non fructum beneficiorum sequi, sed ipsa. [...] Tunc est uirtus dare beneficia non utique reditura». Faithful quotation of Seneca, *De beneficiis* 1.1.12, the only variant being *tunc* (Vives) instead of *nunc* (Seneca).

This is why there was a law in Macedonia against the ungrateful, because this improper conduct was considered to be greatly detrimental to social relationships and coexistence».²²⁰ Vives's source may have been again Seneca: in *De beneficiis*, the Roman writer comments on Macedonian law (3.6.2), and he complains that no law has yet been enacted against those who are ungrateful (4.17.1). Furthermore, he dedicates the entire letter 81 of *Epistulae ad Lucilium* to address the subject of ingratitude.

Now I would like to draw the attention to a note of Vives to Augustine's *De ciuitate Dei* (*Ciu. dei* 14.9.155), in which he explains the meaning of ἀπάθεια, an important Stoic term. In his work, Augustine explains that *apatheia*, «which might possibly be rendered in Latin as *impassibilitas*» is «a word which refers to a condition of the mind rather than the body. If, then, we are to understand this impassibility to mean a life without those emotions [*sine his affectionibus*] which arise contrary to reason and which disturb the mind, it is clearly a good and desirable condition». However, «if *apatheia* is to be defined as a condition such that the mind cannot be touched by any emotion whatsoever, who would not judge such insensitivity [*stuporem*] to be the worst of all vices?». ²²¹ Vives's note aims at showing that he, like Seneca, understands *apatheia* not as complete insensitivity (*impatientia*) but as awareness of a suffering: a person acknowledges suffering, he feels (*sensit*) it, but he is not disturbed by it and, as a result, he can eventually overcome (*uincit*) it.

We are bound to meet with a double meaning if we try to express the Greek term 'lack of feeling' [ἀπάθεια] summarily, in a single word, rendering it by the Latin word *impatientia*. For it may be understood in the meaning the opposite to that which we wish it to have. What we mean to express is a soul which rejects any sensation of evil; but people will interpret the idea as that of a soul which can endure no evil. Consider, therefore, whether it is not better to say «a soul that cannot be harmed», or «a soul entirely beyond the realm of suffering». There is this difference between ourselves and the other school:²²² our ideal wise man feels his troubles, but overcomes them; their wise man does not even feel them.²²³

Finally, it should be mentioned Vives's involvement in the second edition of the complete works of Seneca (*L. Annaei Senecae opera*) prepared by Erasmus and published by

²²⁰ Vives, *Sat.* 129 (VOO 4: 51 [*Sat.* 127]; ed. Tello 2020a: 80): «Cessant enim homines benefacere, si in ingratos inciderint. Ita gratos recusant experiri ab ingratis laesi. Idcirco lex erat in Macedonia quae in ingratos animaduertebat, quod id uitium uideretur communioni et societati hominum uehementer damnosum».

²²¹ Last three quotations as rendered by Dyson 1998: 600.

²²² Allusion to Stilpo (ca.360 - ca.280 BC) and the Megarian school. Important disciples of Stilpo were Pyrrho (the founder of Pyrrhonism), and Zeno of Citium (the founder of Stoicism).

²²³ Vives, *Ciu. dei* 14.9.155 (CCD 3: 35): «In ambiguitatem incidendum est, si exprimere ἀπάθειαν uno uerbo cito uoluerimus et impatientiam dicere. Poterit enim contrarium ei, quod significare uolumus, intellegi. Nos eum uolumus dicere, qui respuat omnis mali sensum; accipietur is, qui nullum ferre possit malum. Vide ergo, num satius sit aut inuulnerabilem animum dicere aut animum extra omnem patientiam positum. Hoc inter nos et illos interest: noster sapiens uincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit; illorum ne sentit quidem». Faithful quotation. The English translation of Vives's *Ciu. dei* is that of Seneca's *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 9.2-3 (Gummere 1917: 43-45).

Johann Froben and Johann Herwagen (Basel, Mar. 1529).²²⁴ In a letter sent to Erasmus, Vives expresses his appreciation for the Roman writer, who «so much deserves to be read and to be known». He explains to Erasmus that «what I have on Seneca are annotations: some of which I took from ancient manuscripts, others are my own based on what I was able to derive partly from the meaning of the words, partly from the nature of the subject matter».²²⁵ By these words, we can grasp Vives's interest for Seneca's writings, which the Valencian humanist read and consulted during his whole life.

4.5 Augustine

Noreña (1970: 133) claims that «Vives does not seem to have read much of Saint Augustine's work besides *Ciuitas Dei*, the only book he recommended, with certain reservations, as a model of classical Latin».²²⁶ This affirmation may need to be reconsidered in light of the evidence that I present below. If we carefully analyze Vives's commentaries to Augustine's *De ciuitate Dei*, we will find out numerous references to other works of Augustine,²²⁷ which demonstrates Vives's familiarity with the *corpus augustinianum*, either directly or through miscellanies. I shall give a few examples:

Confessiones: 8.27.n192 (CCD 2: 265), 10.29.n137 (CCD 2: 431).

Contra academicos: 9.20.n27 (CCD 2: 294).

Contra aduersarium Legis et prophetarum: 14.12.n73 (CCD 3: 46).

Contra Faustum Manichaeum: 15.26.n98 (CCD 3: 182).

Contra Iulianum haeresis Pelagianae defensorem: 16.21.n83 (CCD 3: 256).

Contra Priscillianistas et Origenistas: 12.17.n51 (CCD 2: 587).

Contra sermonem Arianorum: 14.2.n2 (CCD 3: 7).

De bono coniugali: 14.12.n73 (CCD 3: 46).

De correptione et gratia: 12.9.n24 (CCD 2: 564).

De diuersis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum: 13.5.n6 (CCD 2: 631).

De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus:²²⁸ 8.8.n85 (CCD 2: 197), 11.25.n78 (CCD 2: 513), 12.25.n75 (CCD 2: 609), 14.2.n2 (CCD 3: 7).

²²⁴ Erasmus had long been dissatisfied with the first edition (Basel: Johann Froben, 1515). Cf. Allen 1: 13, lines 12-14 (tr. CWE 9: 310; Ep. 1341a): «Then in Cambridge I came on several ancient codices, and set about Seneca the rhetorician, with great efforts on my part, but the edition proved somewhat unfortunate»; Allen 2: Ep. 325 (CWE 3: 63-68).

²²⁵ Vives, *Letter to Erasmus* 1 October 1528 (Allen 7: Ep. 2061, lines 1-5; tr. CWE 14: 372): «In Seneca quae habeo, alia ex uetustis sunt mihi codicibus annotata, alia iudicio meo ex eo sensu quem mihi uidebar partim ex uerbis, partim ex propositi argumenti ratione, colligere. [...] ...authorem illum, legi et cognosci multo dignissimum...».

²²⁶ Although Vives warns that dialect words proper of the North African region may be found in Augustine's Latin text, he nevertheless strongly recommends the reading of *De ciuitate Dei*. Cf. *Disc. trad.* 3 (VOO 6: 337; ed. Vighiano 2013a: 377): «Ad philologiam etiam pertinet opus Augustini de ciuitate Dei», (VOO 6: 340; ed. Vighiano 2013a: 381): «Augustinus multum habet Africitatis in contextu dictionis, non perinde in uerbis, praesertim in libris de ciuitate Dei, quod unum ex eius operibus legendum censeo philologo: id enim bona ex parte in media philologia uersatur, quemadmodum superius admonui».

²²⁷ Cf. Bonilla 1903: 113-114, 613 (n. 36).

²²⁸ Vives also cites this work as *LXXX quaestiones*.

De doctrina Christiana: 5.7.n30 (CCD 1: 498), 8.11.n103 (CCD 2: 208), 10.3.n30 (CCD 2: 345), 10.3.n31 (CCD 2: 345), 11.25.n78 (CCD 2: 513).

De Genesi ad Litteram imperfectus liber: 2.4.n7bis (CCD 1: 156).

De Genesi ad litteram: 5.7.n30 (CCD 1: 498), 11.7.n24 (CCD 2: 466), 11.7.n26 (CCD 2: 466), 11.34.n118 (CCD 2: 536), 12.9.n24 (CCD 2: 564), 12.24.n71 (CCD 2: 607), 13.21.n57 (CCD 2: 674), 14.11.n68 (CCD 3: 44), 14.11.n69 (CCD 3: 44), 15.7.n19 (CCD 3: 113), 20.15.n21 (CCD 4: 387).

De Genesi contra Manichaeos: 13.24.n68 (CCD 2: 689).

De haeresibus ad Quoduultdeum: 5.21.n100 (CCD 1: 553), 6.11.n63 (CCD 2: 46), 14.2.n2 (CCD 3: 7), 14.5.n14 (CCD 3: 17), 16.34.n120 (CCD 3: 289), 18.53.n366 (CCD 4: 240).

De symbolo ad Catechumenos: 10.22.n104 (CCD 2: 406).

De Trinitate: 11.25.n78 (CCD 2: 513), 11.33.n114 (CCD 2: 533), 13.18.n51 (CCD 2: 665), 19.25.n88 (CCD 4: 331)

Enarrationes in Psalmos: 17.14.n56 (CCD 3: 370), 19.23.n84 (CCD 4: 328).

Epistolae: 10.6.n45 (CCD 2: 353).

Expositio epistolae ad Galatas: 11.31.n106 (CCD 2: 527).

In euangelium Ioannis: 10.2.n17 (CCD 2: 340), 14.2.n2 (CCD 3: 7), 14.9.n56 (CCD 3: 35-36).

Quaestiones euangelicae: 1.10.n74 (CCD 1: 72).

Quaestiones Veteris et Noui Testamenti: 21.13.n57 (CCD 5: 51).

Retractationes: 10.8.n49 (CCD 2: 358), 17.5.n26 (CCD 3: 343).

Sermones: 1.10.n74 (CCD 1: 72), 11.31.n107 (CCD 2: 527).

Of all these works, Vives must have certainly cherished Augustine's *Retractationes*, since in *Disc.* he speaks highly of this work as a piece of writing in which Augustine manifests his moderate nature (*modice de se ipse sentiens*), and his honest will to acknowledge mistakes and emend them.²²⁹ Such humble approach, which rejects arrogance and welcomes forgiveness, must have pleased a soul like Vives, who in *Ciu. dei praef.* kindly asked that any disagreement about his notes be resolved with fairness and without insulting—that is, without arrogance and with forgiveness—, because the purpose of criticism should always be learning and to improve comprehension of a particular subject.²³⁰

Indeed, *Ciu. dei* allowed Vives not only to show his erudition on a wide range of subjects (philosophy, ethics, rhetoric, theology, history, geography, natural sciences, mathematics, tales)²³¹ but also to revise and improve his knowledge of different philosophical schools.²³²

²²⁹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 25; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 28): «Vnus Aurelius Augustinus, uir tantus, retractationum libros reliquit, simpliciter ac bona fide, quem nullus est ad hoc tempus imitatus: uidelicet mansueto uir ingenio et modice de se ipse sentiens. Isti nostri, fastu et superbia turgidi, inuerti ac corrumpi malunt quod non ignorant uerum esse, quam uideri errasse aut fuisse a quo monstrari illis aliquid potuerit»; Umeneta 1949: 449.

²³⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei praef.* (CCD 1: 31, lines 31-34): «Hoc solum etiam atque etiam rogo et obsecro: ut si quis a me dissenserit uolueritque id scriptis testari, meminerit modestiae et sine conuitiis asperisque morsibus me, quod ignorauerim, doceat».

²³¹ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei praef.* (CCD 1: 24, lines 29-32; 25, lines 6-9): «Quod opus bona ex parte tum rerum gestarum fabularumque narrationibus tum disputationibus philosophicis occuparetur, quibus rebus magnam aetatis partem uidebamur impendisse, magno quidem conatu ac uoto, utinam pari successu. [...] Nam opus, praeterquam quod est longissimum, habet in se miram rerum omnium uarietatem: historias, fabulas, naturalia, rhetorica, mathematica, geographica, moralia, theologica; et horum nihil prope uel tenuiter uel mediocriter»; Rivera 1977: 151-162.

Such laborious enterprise left him exhausted (*fractus*) and sick, whereby he did not hesitate to express his irritation in public: neither money nor scholar recognition paid off the unpleasant (*inamoenus*) toil undertaken, full of disgusting and boring issues (*taediorum ac fastidiorum plenus*).²³³

In any case, *Ciu. dei* is —together with *Disc.*, *An. uita*, and *Ver. fid.*— one of the most complex and richest literary productions of the Valencian humanist.²³⁴ In the manifold comments scattered throughout *Ciu. dei*, one can notice themes that will be developed in later works.²³⁵ I shall give two examples relevant to this PhD dissertation. On the one hand, the notions of *mens*, *anima*, and *animus*. These terms are mainly dealt with in 4.11.n60 (CCD 1: 409), 11.2.n1 (CCD 2: 452), 11.26.n79 (CCD 2: 515), 12.18.n52 (CCD 2: 590), 13.23.n64 (CCD 2: 682), 13.24.n75 (CCD 2: 690), 14.2.n3 (CCD 3: 7), 14.4.n13 (CCD 3: 13-14), 14.15.n90 (CCD 2: 57); and they will be later addressed in *Ad sap.* (12-15, 122-125) and, especially, in *An. uita* (1.10-12; 2.1-6, 2.12, 2.19). On the other hand, Augustine's treatment of sin, vice, will, passions, and emotions in books 8, 9 and 14 prompted Vives to elaborate some comments; cf. for example 8.17.n138-141 (CCD 2: 228), 9.4.n6 (CCD 2: 279), 9.4.n13 (CCD 2: 280), 9.5.n14 (CCD 2: 283), 14.2.n3 (CCD 3: 7), 14.3.n5 (CCD 3: 10), 14.5.n17 (CCD 3: 17), 14.6.n18-19^{bis} (CCD 3: 19), 14.7.n23 (CCD 3: 22), 14.7.n26-27 (CCD 3: 23), 14.8.n28-29 (CCD 3: 27), 14.9.n53 (CCD 3: 35), 14.9.n55 (CCD 3: 35). These seminal comments were later developed in the third book of *An. uita* (1-24), which deals with emotions.

Augustine's realization that *he* was a big question that could only be truly answered by examining his inner self,²³⁶ was in agreement with the Delphic precept «Γνῶθι σεαυτόν» (*Nosce te ipsum*). This approach was also dear to Vives, who openly admitted that «in the quest for wisdom, the first step is that celebrated saying of old “Know thyself”». ²³⁷ He also encouraged princess Mary —and any human being— to «pay attention to the chest», since «the heart, the center of thoughts, is in the chest. It is as if you were to say “Know thyself”». ²³⁸ Augustine's sincerity²³⁹ must have left a deep imprint in Vives's heart. The bishop of Hippo bewilderedly confessed in one of his works:

²³² Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei praef.* (CCD 1: 26, lines 23-25): «Narrandae fuerunt fabulae et historiae, describendae regiones et urbes, tum consulendi Platonici pene omnes et reliquae philosopharum nationes et theologica tractanda».

²³³ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei praef.* (CCD 1: 26, lines 16-17, 20-23): «Venique ad praefationes scribendas adeo fessus et labore tanto tamque uario fractus [...] ut, quum at calcem perueni, nec pecuniam nec gratiam studiosorum ullam nec aliud quicquam existimarim aequae esse precium operae, ac solum tandem liberatumque esse me labore tam sinuoso et plerumque inamoeno»; (CCD 1: 28, lines 29-30) «Nobis certe haud sane credat quisquam, quam taediorum fuerit ac fastidiorum plenum»; *Letter to Cranevelt* 8 July 1522 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 8, lines 7-8): «Sic sum noctes et dies intentus ut misere timeam ne, dum *Ciuitatem* construo, corpus destruo».

²³⁴ Urmeneta (1962: 203) considers *Ciu. dei* «la obra fundamental» of Vives.

²³⁵ Cf. Bonilla 1903: 116; Roca 2000: 104-105.

²³⁶ Cf. Augustine, *Confessiones* 4.4.9 (Skutella et al. 2009: 60): «Factus eram ipse mihi magna quaestio»; *De uera religione* 39.72 (Martin and Daur 1962: 234): «Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi. In interiore homine habitat ueritas».

²³⁷ Vives, *Ad sap.* 11: «Ergo in curriculo sapientiae primus gradus est ille ueteribus celebratissimus “Seipsum nosse”». Cf. *infra* Part IV, section 2.1., n. 83-87.

²³⁸ Vives, *Sat.* 104 (VOO 4: 47 [*Sat.* 102]; ed. Tello 2020a: 76): «OCVLOS IN PECTVS. In pectore est cor, sedes cogitationum. Perinde est ac si dicas “nosse teipsum”».

²³⁹ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei ep.* (CCD 1: 21, line 16): «Fuit ipse syncerioris pietatis».

The mind commands the body and is instantly obeyed. The mind commands itself and meets resistance. The mind commands the hand to move, and it is so easy that one hardly distinguishes the order from its execution. Yet mind is mind, and hand is body. The mind orders the mind to will. The recipient of the order is itself, yet it does not perform it. What causes this monstrosity and why does this happen? Mind commands, I say, that it should will, and would not give the command if it did not will, yet does not perform what it commands. The willing is not wholehearted, so the command is not wholehearted. [...] Therefore there is no monstrous split between willing and not willing. We are dealing with a morbid condition of the mind.²⁴⁰

The Valencian humanist too bewilderedly confessed that «I see virtue, I approve it and even preach it, and yet I do not attain it».²⁴¹

5 Philosophy in Vives's writings

5.1 Definitions

In this section, I shall give a short account of Vives's definitions of 'philosophy' (see below [1-12]) that he wrote here and there, especially in his early writings. Citations are displayed in chronological order. The next section (5.2) will contextualize these definitions within the general framework of the Renaissance.

(1) It is agreed that philosophy is the one greatest and best boon that the immortal gods have bestowed upon us; and that this alone has power to bring mankind to perfection and lead it to live blessedly and well.²⁴²

(2) Philosophy as the understanding of things human and divine.²⁴³

²⁴⁰ Augustine, *Confessiones* 8.9.21 (Skutella et al. 2009: 171; tr. Chadwick 1991: 147-148): «Imperat animus corpori, et paretur statim; imperat animus sibi, et resistitur. Imperat animus ut moueatur manus, et tanta est facilitas ut uix a seruitio discernatur imperium: et animus animus est, manus autem corpus est. Imperat animus ut uelit animus, nec alter est nec facit tamen. Vnde hoc monstrum? Et quare istuc? Imperat, inquam, ut uelit qui non imperaret nisi uellet, et non facit quod imperat. Sed non ex toto uult: non ergo ex toto imperat. [...] Non igitur monstrum partim uelle, partim nolle, sed aegritudo animi est».

²⁴¹ Vives, *Letter to Miranda* ca. June 1523 (VOO 7: 202): «uirtutem et uideo et probo et praedico nec tamen praesto». Cf. *supra* Part II, section 1, n. 12. Similar thought in Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 7.20-21: «...uideo meliora proboque / deteriora sequor»; *Ad Romanos* 7:15: «Quod enim operor non intelligo: non enim quod uolo bonum, hoc ago; sed quod odi malum, illud facio».

²⁴² Vives, *Philos.* 1 (VOO 3: 3; ed. tr. SWJV 1: 8-9): «Constat unam philosophiam munus illud esse quod a diis immortalibus maximum optimumque nobis donatum est; quae sola homines reddere perfectos potest et ad bene beateque uiuendum ... perducere». Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 47b (Burnet 1992, vol. 4; tr. Cooper 1997: 1250): «Ἐξ ὧν ἐπορισάμεθα φιλοσοφίας γένος, οὐ μείζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' ἦλθεν οὔτε ἤξει ποτὲ τῷ θνητῷ γένει δωρηθὲν ἐκ θεῶν», that is, «These pursuits have given us philosophy, a gift from the gods to the mortal race whose value neither has been nor ever will be surpassed»; Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.26.64 (King 1945: 74-75): «Philosophia uero, omnium mater atrium, quid est aliud nisi (ut Plato) donum (ut ego) inuentum deorum?», that is, «As to philosophy, the mother of all arts, what else is it except (as Plato held) the gift or (as I hold) the discovery of the gods?».

²⁴³ Vives, *Philos.* 19 (VOO 3: 9; ed. tr. SWJV 1: 22-23): «Philosophia est rerum et humanarum et diuinarum cognitio». *Cognitio* can also be understood as 'knowledge'.

(3) But what a crime it would be if I omit you, oh mother theology! Or should I call you the highest and purest part of philosophy, or rather philosophy itself in its totality?²⁴⁴

(4) Thus far I have set forth briefly that part of philosophy that investigates reality. It remains to discuss the part that concerns language, and this is by far a more recent science than the other. For it is divided into three parts, different members, so to speak: grammar, dialectic and rhetoric.²⁴⁵

(5) For it is through this discipline that our life is restored to its humanity, through this that we are taught justice, prudence, courage, as well as modesty and temperance in all things and constancy and decorum in words and deeds. I refer to moral philosophy, which has imparted truly civilized customs to states, to households and to the souls of individuals, which has even created households and states and constructed our individual character. Without its teachings and its precepts no private or public institution could stand, and no community of mortals could be honored and celebrated. Just as physical medicine affords sound remedy and solace to bodies, so does philosophy afford a most ready cure to our troubled minds.²⁴⁶

(6) Let them proclaim that wealth is more useful for human happiness, although people could live better without it but could not live at all without the teachings of philosophy. Let them maintain that there is any other thing whatever more necessary to mankind than philosophy, although without all other things a person is still human but without philosophy he is not a human being but a wild beast.²⁴⁷

(7) O philosophy, searcher out of Virtue, expeller of vices! What could not only I but human life in general have achieved without you? You created cities, you brought scattered human beings together in communal living, you joined them to each other, first with dwellings, then with marriage, then common bonds of writing and speech. You were the inventress of laws, you the instructress in morals and ordered living.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁴ Vives, *Philos.* 27 (VOO 3: 12; ed. tr. SWJV 1: 30-31): «Sed quo te piaculo, theologia mater, praeteribo! Suprema atque purissima philosophiae pars dixerim an ipsa potius tota philosophia?» Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 11.7 = 1064b1-4 (ed. Ross 1924; tr. Ross 1928): «δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τρία γένη τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔστι, φυσική, μαθηματική, θεολογική. βέλτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ τῶν θεωρητικῶν γένος, τούτων δ' αὐτῶν ἡ τελευταία λεχθεῖσα», that is, «Evidently, then, there are three kinds of theoretical sciences: physics, mathematics, theology. The class of theoretical sciences is the best, and of these themselves the last named [i.e. theology] is best; for it deals with the highest of existing things».

²⁴⁵ Vives, *Philos.* 29 (VOO 3: 13; ed. tr. SWJV 1: 32-33): «Hactenus exposita est a me paucis ea philosophiae pars quae de rebus ipsis inquirat. Illa superest quae tota est de sermone; multoque est quam altera illa recentior. Nam cum ea in tria uelut membra sit secta: grammaticam, dialecticam atque rhetoricam».

²⁴⁶ Vives, *Philos.* 52 (VOO 3: 23; ed. tr. SWJV 1: 54-55): «Per haec enim nostra humanitati suae reddita est, per quae docemur iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem, adde etiam modestiam in omnibus rebus et temperantiam, in dictis et factis constantiam atque modum. Haec est illa ethice philosophia, quae mores uere humanos in ciuitates, domos animosque singulorum inuexit, immo uero domos et ciuitates ipsa fecit, animos nostros composuit; sine cuius institutis atque praeceptis non res ulla priuata, non res publica consistere, non ullus hominum conuentus coli et celebrari posset; ac sicut medicina illa corporibus, ita haec nostris affectissimis animis remedium medelamque praesentissimam affert».

²⁴⁷ Vives, *Philos.* 54 (VOO 3: 24; ed. tr. SWJV 1: 54-55): «Dicant opes uitae humanae utiliores esse, cum absque illis melius uiueretur, sine philosophiae dogmatis ne uiui quidem possit. Asserant homini aliud quicquam magis philosophia necessarium, cum sine caeteris rebus homo equidem sit semper, absque philosophia uero fera sit, non homo».

²⁴⁸ Vives, *Praef. Leg.* 17 (VOO 5: 499-500; ed. Matheussen 1984: 7): «Tu es igitur uitae, philosophia, dux; tu uirtutum indigatrix expultrixque uitiorum. Quid enim non modo nos sed omnino uita hominum

(8) Cicero treats the most delicate problems of natural philosophy in his *Academic Questions*; he treats the immense topic of moral philosophy in his *Laws*, his *De officiis*, his *De finibus*, and his *Tusculan Disputations*; the three books entitled *On the Nature of the Gods* contain a divine philosophy, namely, the religious belief in the gods.²⁴⁹

(9) ...philosophy, the mother of wisdom...²⁵⁰

(10) Philosophy and the entire wisdom of the world is pure ignorance, insanity, madness and passion if you ignore the one who should be known before all else.²⁵¹

(11) [We say that] philosophy is a discipline which ranges through the heavens and through all things, human and divine, and forms our mind through the study of those things, preparing and fortifying us so that we are able to stand fast against the winds of fortune, contemptuous of those things which the crowd desires.²⁵²

(12) The principal point and the main axis of all philosophy is to judge about the ends of good and evil.²⁵³ [...] The goal of all philosophy: what is the end of a human being, what is the true beatitude he desires, how he will achieve it, and where all religion is heading to.²⁵⁴

The aforementioned definitions can be sorted into three main groups:

- | | |
|---|---|
| (a) philosophy as knowledge: 2, 4, 8, 9, 11. | <i>cognitio, cogitatio, inquisitio.</i> |
| (b) philosophy as betterment: 1, 5, 6, 7, 12. | <i>humanitas: bene beateque uiuere.</i> |
| (c) philosophy as theology: 3, 10. | <i>philotheia.</i> |

In the first set of definitions (2, 4, 8, 9, 11), Vives conceives philosophy as the ‘understanding’ (*cognitio*), an ‘investigation’ (*inquisitio*) or a ‘reflection’ (*cogitatio*) about reality (*de*

sine te esse potuisset? Tu urbes peperisti; tu dissipatos homines in societatem uitae conuocasti; tu eos inter se domiciliis primo, deinde coniugiis, tum litterarum et uocum communione iunxisti; tu inuentrix legum, tu magistra morum et disciplinae fuisti». Quotation of Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 5.2.5, with minor variants at the beginning of the text which do not affect the meaning. The English translation of Vives’s *Praef. Leg.* is that of Cicero’s *Tusculans* (Douglas 1990: 83).

²⁴⁹ Vives, *Prael. Conu.* 7 (VOO 2: 98; ed. tr. SWJV 5: 150-151): «Subtilissima in naturali philosophia disputat Cicero in *Academicis quaestionibus*; immensam philosophiam moralem in *Legibus*, in *Officiis*, in *Finibus bonorum*, in *Tusculanis disputationibus* tractat; diuinam philosophiam, id est deorum religionem, tres libri continent *De natura deorum dicti*».

²⁵⁰ Vives, *Sap.* 15 (VOO 4: 26; ed. Pédeflous and Tournoy 2013: 270, line 128): «...sapientiae philosophia mater...».

²⁵¹ Vives, *Med. psal.* 2 (VOO 1: 182): «Philosophia et omnis mundi sapientia mera est inscitia, amentia, insania, furor, cum eum quem primum cognosci decet ignorat».

²⁵² Vives, *Rat. dic.* 3.4 (VOO 2: 199; ed. tr. SWJV 11: 332-333): «[Dicimus] philosophiam esse disciplinam, quae per coelos perque diuina et humana omnia peruagatur animumque nostrum cogitatione rerum illarum instruit, tum ita componit et munit, ut inuictum illum praestet contra minas fortunae, contemptorem earum rerum, quas uulgus admiratur».

²⁵³ Cicero wrote a book entitled *De finibus bonorum et malorum*. In it, the word *finis* can be interpreted as ‘purpose’ (*On the ends of good and evil*), ‘limit’ (*On the limits of good and evil*) or ‘culminating point’ (*On the supreme good and the supreme evil*).

²⁵⁴ Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.2 (VOO 8: 10): «...caput et cardo uniuersae philosophiae existimetur sententia de finibus bonorum et malorum»; 3.11 (VOO 8: 358): «...metam uniuersae philosophiae, nempe quis sit hominis finis, quae sit uera beatitudo quam expetit, quomodo consequetur, et quorsum pietas omnis pertineat».

rebus ipsis), which includes both human and divine things.²⁵⁵ Philosophy is considered to be a discipline (*disciplina*) or, rather, knowledge on different disciplines, since it encompasses the natural world (*naturalis philosophia*), the world of human behavior and actions (*moralis philosophia*), and the world of divine beings (*diuina philosophia*). According to Vives —I follow the arrangement established in *Philos.*—, the study of the natural world includes learning about the various heavens (*de caelorum cognitione*),²⁵⁶ the science of music (*musicæ peritia*),²⁵⁷ arithmetic (*arithmetica*), geometry (*geometria*),²⁵⁸ the phenomena of wind and sea (*quæ in uentis quæque in mari*),²⁵⁹ the artifice of nature (herbs, stones, metals; *herbæ, lapides, metalla*),²⁶⁰ medicine,²⁶¹ and mathematics.²⁶² The world of human behavior and actions includes ethics (*mores*),²⁶³ language (grammar, dialectic and rhetoric; *sermo: grammatica, dialectica, rhetorica*),²⁶⁴ governance (*politica*)²⁶⁵ and law (*de iure ciuili*).²⁶⁶ Finally, the world of divine beings includes the attempt at studying the gods and religious belief (*deorum religio*).²⁶⁷

Definition (2) of ‘philosophy’ is apparently taken from Cicero’s *Tusculanae disputationes*. In book 4, the Roman orator affirms that «wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human and acquaintance with the cause of each of them, with the result that wisdom copies what is divine, whilst it regards all human concerns as lower than virtue».²⁶⁸ Apart from introducing more details into the definition, there is a significant difference between Vives and Cicero: while the former’s object of study is *philosophia*, the latter’s is *sapientia*. This change, which was already present in Isidore of Seville,²⁶⁹ seems to prove the equating of philosophy and knowledge.

This equation is, however, problematic since it is unclear whether true knowledge is attainable by human beings. Vives was aware of this problem, when he stressed that Pythagoras said «that in this life it is not possible for any mortal to arrive at true wisdom or at true happiness. [...] For this reason he had called himself a philosopher, i.e., an eager lover or student, as it were, of wisdom; not its partner».²⁷⁰ Similarly, Cicero’s *De oratore* includes a

²⁵⁵ Cf. Lines 2018: 284: «With its insistence on all human and divine matters, [it] shows that philosophy is a way of perceiving all things».

²⁵⁶ Cf. Vives, *Philos.* 4 (VOO 3: 4; ed. SWJV 1: 12).

²⁵⁷ Cf. Vives, *Philos.* 12 (VOO 3: 6; ed. SWJV 1: 16).

²⁵⁸ Cf. Vives, *Philos.* 17 (VOO 3: 8; ed. SWJV 1: 20).

²⁵⁹ Cf. Vives, *Philos.* 19 (VOO 3: 9; ed. SWJV 1: 22).

²⁶⁰ Cf. Vives, *Philos.* 19 (VOO 3: 9; ed. SWJV 1: 22).

²⁶¹ Cf. Vives, *Philos.* 20 (VOO 3: 9; ed. SWJV 1: 22).

²⁶² Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 5 (VOO 6: 203-207; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 228-233).

²⁶³ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 6 (VOO 6: 208-222; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 234-250).

²⁶⁴ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 2-4 (VOO 6: 77-180; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 86-202).

²⁶⁵ In *Arist.* 16.9 (VOO 3: 36; ed. Tello 2019: 88-91), Vives includes Aristotle’s *Politica* as part of the *libri morales*.

²⁶⁶ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 7 (VOO 6: 222-242; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 251-272).

²⁶⁷ Cf. Vives, *Prael. Conu.* 7 (VOO 2: 98; ed. SWJV 5: 150, line 100).

²⁶⁸ Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 4.26.57 (King 1945: 392-393): «...sapientiam esse rerum diuinarum et humanarum scientiam cognitionemque, quæ cuiusque rei causa sit; ex quo efficitur ut diuina imitetur, humana omnia inferior uirtute ducat».

²⁶⁹ Cf. Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae* 2.24.1.

²⁷⁰ Vives, *Philos.* 33 (VOO 3: 14; ed. tr. SWJV 1: 34-35): «Pythagoras, praeclare reputans non magis ad sapientiam quam ad ueram beatitudinem mortalium quemquam posse in uita hac peruenire, [...]

definition of ‘philosopher’ as someone who aims at knowing, who strives to know, but who does not necessarily attain or have knowledge: «He who strives to know the significance, nature and causes of everything divine or human, and to master and follow out as a whole the theory of right living, is to be thus [i.e. philosopher] denominated».²⁷¹

In the second group of definitions (1, 5-7, 12), Vives focuses on the notion of ‘improvement’. Philosophy is described as a gift (*munus*) from God that enables human beings to fully develop their humanity. Among other qualities, humanity would consist of justice (*iustitia*), prudence (*prudentia*), courage (*fortitudo*), modesty (*modestia*), temperance (*temperantia*), constancy (*constantia*) and decorum (*modus*). In this set of definitions, philosophy is seen as a discipline that brings order and good customs to individuals, households and states by expelling vices (*uitia*) and beast-like (*fera*) behavior. Further, it studies what the ultimate end of human beings are and, in so doing, it attempts to cure their troubled minds. In a nutshell, philosophy gives the opportunity to live well and happily (*bene beateque uiuendum*).

It is worth noting here that the notion of philosophy as betterment has deep implications in anthropology and education. On the one hand, since «it is given to man to have that which he chooses and to be that which he wills»,²⁷² philosophy guides human beings to make the right choices and to will the things that fit their nature. On the other hand, since «man certainly is not born, but made man»,²⁷³ philosophy gives human beings the humanity that they would otherwise be lacking.

Finally, the third set of definitions (3, 10) links philosophy with theology and considers the latter as the highest part of the former.²⁷⁴ If philosophy is indeed the study of all reality, theology studies the most elevated part of it. Moreover, if human reasoning is a beam of godly light²⁷⁵ and if in «God’s hands are the progress and outcome of events»,²⁷⁶ then the fact of ignoring theology, Vives suggests, will leave our knowledge of reality incomplete; moreover, any knowledge would be nothing else than mere ignorance (*inscitia*), insanity

idcirco sese φιλόσοφον nominasse: quasi amantissimum uel quasi studiosissimum sapientiae, non socium eius».

²⁷¹ Cicero, *De oratore* 1.48.212 (Sutton 1942: 150-151): «Qui studeat omnium rerum diuinarum atque humanarum uim, naturam causasque nosse, et omnem bene uiuendi rationem tenere et persequi, nomine hoc [i.e. philosophus] appelletur».

²⁷² Pico della Mirandola, *Oratio de hominis dignitate* (Garin 2004: 106; tr. Wallis 1998: 5): «cui [i.e. homini] datum id habere quod optat, id esse quod uelit».

²⁷³ Erasmus, *De pueris instituendis* (ASD 1-2: 31, line 21; tr. CWE 26: 304): «At homines, mihi crede, non nascuntur sed finguntur».

²⁷⁴ Aristotle expressed himself in a similar way. Cf. *Metaphysica* 6.1 (E 1026a19-24; Ross ed. 1924, tr. 1928): «Ὡστε τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν φιλοσοφίαι θεωρητικαί: μαθηματική, φυσική, θεολογική (οὐ γὰρ ἄδηλον ὅτι εἴ ποῦ τὸ θεῖον ὑπάρχει, ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει ὑπάρχει), καὶ τὴν τιμιωτάτην δεῖ περι τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι. Αἱ μὲν οὖν θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αἰρετώταται, αὕτη δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν», that is, «There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies: mathematics, physics, and what we may call theology, since it is obvious that if the divine is present everywhere, it is present in things of this sort. And the highest science must deal with the highest genus. Thus, while the theoretical sciences are more to be desired than the other sciences, this [i.e. theology] is more to be desired than the other theoretical sciences»; R. Black, in Hankins 2007: 13: «...theology, normally regarded as the pinnacle of knowledge».

²⁷⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid. praef.* (VOO 8: 2): «Nihil enim est aliud humana ratio quam radius quidam diuinae lucis»; 1.3 (VOO 8: 13): «Est ergo nostra ratio ueluti riuulus e fonte Dei».

²⁷⁶ Vives, *Ad sap.* 309: «Deus enim, in cuius manu sunt progressus et exitus».

(*amentia*), madness (*insania*) and passion (*furor*). However, if, as suggested by Pythagoras, human beings can only be ‘friends of wisdom’ (φιλόσοφοι) because they can aspire at best to yearn to attain wisdom (φιλοσοφία), one may as well argue that human beings can only be able to be ‘friends of God’ (φιλόθεοι)²⁷⁷ since they may aspire at best to yearn to attain God (φιλοθεΐα, *philotheia*).²⁷⁸ The reasoning implied here is that the most elevated part of *philosophy*, that is, theology, should perhaps be conceived as *philothē* or, as Augustine explains, one should just perform θεοσέβεια, that is, the worship or reverence of God, which can be rendered in Latin as *pietas* or, more adequately, as *dei cultus*.²⁷⁹ The bishop of Hippo quotes a passage of Job (28:28), although slightly modified to support his argument: «Ecce pietas est sapientia; abstinere autem a malis, scientia»,²⁸⁰ that is, «to worship God, that is wisdom; and to turn away from evil is science». Knowledge and worship of God will be examined later in this dissertation (cf. *infra* Part IV, section 6).

5.2 A note about ‘philosophy’ in the age of Vives

Vives’s works reflect the philosophical drives of his time, namely (1) the comprehensiveness that philosophy still enjoyed at the beginning of the 16th century; (2) the preeminence of moral philosophy among other philosophical disciplines; (3) the loss of absolute truth; and (4) a critical attitude towards tradition.

Gregor Reisch’s *Margarita philosophica totius philosophiae rationalis, naturalis et moralis principia dialogice duodecim libris complectens* (Freiburg: Johann Schott, 1503 | USTC 675099)²⁸¹ is an example of the comprehensiveness that philosophy still had in the age of Vives. In his book addressed to university students, Reisch divided philosophy into two main areas: theoretical and practical. The former included metaphysics, mathematics (arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy), the natural world, grammar, rhetoric and logic. The latter included ethics, politics, management of households and monasteries, and mechanical techniques in various fields: wool, weaponry, navigation, agriculture, hunting, surgery and dramaturgy.²⁸² Such richness was in agreement with that definition that considered philosophy the understanding of things human and divine.²⁸³

In Vives, this broad conception of philosophy (which he was fond to convey by the famous verse of Terence «I am a human being: therefore, I consider nothing that pertains to human beings foreign to me»)²⁸⁴ can be found, for example, in *Disc. corr.*, where the

²⁷⁷ *Philotheos* is an adjective already attested in Aristotle (*Rhetorica* 2.17.6, 1391b2) and the New Testament (2 *Ad Timotheum* 3:4). Cf. Augustine, *De ciuitate Dei* 8.1 (Dombart and Kalb 1993, vol. 1: 320; tr. Dyson 1998: 312): «Si sapientia Deus est ... uerus philosophus est amator Dei», that is, «If God is wisdom ... the true philosopher is a lover of God».

²⁷⁸ The word φιλοθεΐα is already attested in the *Catalogus codicum astrologorum Graecorum* (Cat. Cod. Astr.) 2.177.

²⁷⁹ Cf. Augustine, *De trinitate* 14.1.

²⁸⁰ The original verse reads: «Ecce timor Domini, ipsa est sapientia; et recedere a malo, intelligentia».

²⁸¹ Cf. CEBR 3: 137a-b; Vega, García and López 2010.

²⁸² Reisch’s thorough division of philosophy can be consulted in complementary note 6.

²⁸³ Cf. *supra* section 5.1, definition (2).

²⁸⁴ Cf. *supra* n. 73. Cf. also J. Huxley (ed.), *The Humanistic Frame: The Modern Humanist Vision of Life* (New York: Harper, 1961), 14: «Humanism is necessarily unitary instead of dualistic, affirming the unity of mind and body; universal instead of particularism affirming the continuity of man with the

Valencian humanist reviews the degeneration process that a series of *artes* or disciplines have suffered: grammar, logic (dialectic), rhetoric, physic, medicine, mathematics, ethics, and law. If philosophy is conceived with such a broad approach, almost the entire literary production of Vives should be considered philosophical. However, the core of Vives's philosophical production may be limited to the following works: *An. sen.*, *An. uita*, *Ciu. dei*, *Conc.*, *Disc.*, *Philos.*, *Pseud.*, *Sap.*, *Sat.*, *Ver. fuc.*, and *Ver. fid.* My statement seems not to be in contradiction with Casini, who in his preprinted article of Vives for the four-volume encyclopedia of Renaissance philosophy directed by Sgarbi (2022), considers *Pseud.*, *Disc.*, *Philos.*, *Ad sap.*, *Conc.*, *An. uita*, and *Ver. fid.* Vives's essential philosophical works.

Nonetheless, the comprehensive and broad notion of philosophy faded away gradually, to the extent that nowadays «the signifier 'philosophy' [remains] naked and hesitant»,²⁸⁵ devoid of many (if not of almost all) parts that had in the 16th century. This fact would have certainly disturbed Reisch and Vives.²⁸⁶ Furthermore, Renaissance humanists did not develop all parts of philosophy with equal devotion. Generally speaking, they were no longer interested in arduous problems of metaphysics or in technicalities that were still vehemently discussed by scholastics; rather, their focus of attention was placed on genuine human concerns and particularly on civic life, that is, in ethics, political thought and rhetoric, which was a valuable tool to express arguments adequately and successfully.²⁸⁷ The cities of the Renaissance (as it had happened centuries ago in the old city of Athens) were populated by human beings who, on the one hand, constituted passive objects of study and, on the other hand, were subjects of active life. Accordingly, Vives's writings reflected this dualism. On the one hand, he wrote books in which the human being is examined: his body, his soul, his religious belief, his behaviour and his actions (for example, *Ad sap.*, *An. uita*, *Conc.*, *Excit.*, *Sub.* or *Ver. fid.*); on the other hand, he wrote other books in order to assist human beings in

rest of life, and of life with the rest of the universe; naturalistic instead of supernaturalist, affirming the unity of the spiritual and the material; and global instead of divisive, affirming the unity of all mankind. *Nihil humanum a me alienum puto* is the Humanist's motto».

²⁸⁵ Cf. O. Fullat, *La filosofía: problema y concepto* (Barcelona: Vicens-Vives, 1988), 27. Translation mine.

²⁸⁶ Cf. R. Frodeman, A. Briggie, «When Philosophy Lost Its Way», *The New York Times* 11 January 2016: «With the natural and social sciences mapping out the entirety of both theoretical as well as institutional space, what role was there for philosophy? A number of possibilities were available: Philosophers could serve as (1) synthesizers of academic knowledge production; (2) formalists who provided the logical undergirding for research across the academy; (3) translators who brought the insights of the academy to the world at large; (4) disciplinary specialists who focused on distinctively philosophical problems in ethics, epistemology, aesthetics and the like; or (5) as some combination of some or all of these». Article available at <https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/when-philosophy-lost-its-way>.

²⁸⁷ Cf. C. Vasoli, in Schmitt, Skinner 1988: 60-61; Hankins 2007: 32, 46-47: «The scope of humane studies was to improve the quality of human beings *qua* human. The humanists claimed that study of good letters made people better, more virtuous, wiser, and more eloquent. It made them worthy to exercise power and made them better citizens and subjects when not exercising power. [...] Indeed, beginning with the so-called "civic humanists" of the early fifteenth century, humanists insisted that philosophy should serve the city by inculcating prudence and other virtues into its citizens. Philosophy now had to address, not a professional caste of specially trained experts with its own technical language, but the ruling classes of the city-state: men and women who had studied humanistic Latin but had no special qualifications for philosophical study. Elegance and urbanity became more important than originality or power of thought».

their active lives, to which purpose he employed a variety of genres: aphorisms (*Sat.*), dialogues (*Ling.*), methods of study (*Rat. stud.*), and treatises (*Disc. trad.*: on disciplines to be taught and how; *Conscr.*: on writing letters; *Rat. dic.*: on language and speech). As Black (1998: 276) summarizes, «Humanism succeeded because it persuaded Italian and ultimately European society that without its lessons no one was fit to rule or lead».

This need to instruct others for their betterment (which in the long run may eventually bring improvement to the whole society) impelled humanists and philosophers to search for, and provide with, the best available materials and explanations. This enterprise implied, on the one hand, the revision of the existing manuscripts of ancient writers (philology) and, on the other hand, the re-evaluation of pre-established truths (criticism).²⁸⁸ Here it emerged a fascinating paradox: the more the humanists sought to establish the most faithful text to that devised by the author through collation of the many different manuscripts available at that time, the more apparent it seemed that certainty and the authority argument was being questioned.²⁸⁹ Moreover, the fact of being aware that reality could not be fully enclosed or explained because of the limitations of human language and human reasoning prepared the intellectual framework to progressively accept ‘truth’ as ‘approximation’. Nicholas of Cusa had already posed the problematicity about the apprehension of truth one century earlier, when he affirmed that the intellect is unable to comprehend truth accurately, as it is,²⁹⁰ and only capable of elaborating «possibility».²⁹¹

* * * * *

The vindication of Vives as a philosopher ends here, after having reviewed how Vives’s personality and his literary production have been interpreted by himself, by his contemporaries, and by tradition. The next part of this dissertation revolves around the critical edition of *Ad sap.* and the circumstances of composition of this work.

²⁸⁸ Cf. Schmitt and Skinner 1988: 74.

²⁸⁹ The conservative theologians believed that Erasmus’s new edition of the New Testament (*Nouum instrumentum omne*, Basel: Johann Froben, 1516) had inspired Luther to begin his reformation postulates. In a letter to Johannes Caesarius (16 December 1524) Erasmus rejected such accusation, but admitted the existence of intense loathing for him through the famous slogan (Allen 5: Ep. 1528, line 11; tr. CWE 10: 464) «Ego peperit ouum, Lutherus exclusit», that is, «I laid the egg, and Luther hatched it».

²⁹⁰ Cf. Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia* 1.3.10 (Peroli 2017: 14): «Intellectus igitur, qui non est ueritas, numquam ueritatem adeo praecise comprehendit. [...] Patet igitur de uero nos non aliud scire quam quod ipsum praecise, uti est, scimus incomprehensibile»; Schmitt and Skinner 1988: 66-67; Peroli 2017: 2188 (n. 34). In a complementary note called «Relación del conocimiento con la verdad: la aproximación a la verdad y la precisión», Machetta and D’Amico (2003: 136) write that «tal incomprendibilidad de la verdad ha de entenderse, evidentemente, no como apología de lo absurdo sino como testimonio de la insuficiencia de parte de alguna inteligencia para abarcarla perfectamente».

²⁹¹ Cf. Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia* 1.3.10 (Peroli 2017: 14): «...et nostro intellectu, ut possibilitate».

Complementary notes

[NOTE 1]

Vives somehow acknowledged the fact that his commentaries in *Ciu. dei* were too long and included too much supplementary data, when he wrote the following words to Erasmus on 1 April 1522 (Allen 5: Ep. 1271, lines 10-18; tr. CWE 9: 52):

Ego enim in hoc opere breuitate, quantum potui, studui placere. Incurrerunt quidam loci in quibus id praestari non potuit, ut quum erant res non admodum theologis nostris cognitae; sicut historiae, fabulae, philosophica, praecipue Platonica. Ideo in octauo et decimo libris longior fui forsitan quam oportebat; tum ut recondita illis aperirem et proferrem, tum ut Platonica prorsus non ignorarent, uiderentque haec nihil Aristotelicis cedere, et inciperent alios quoque magnos authores uelle cognoscere.

► In this work I have tried, so far as I could, to please the public by my brevity. I encountered some passages in which I could not achieve this, for instance when there were subjects not very familiar to our divines, such as history and mythology and philosophy, especially Platonism. Consequently in books 8 and 10 I have perhaps been longer than I ought to have been, not only in order to open and display to them these recondite subjects, but also to leave them not wholly ignorant of Plato and aware that he is by no means inferior to Aristotle, which may arouse a wish to get to know other important authors.

Even in *Ciu. dei* (8-10 pr.), Vives openly admitted his lack of brevity (CCD 2: 157, line 17): «difficile fuit propositam seruare breuitatem». In fact, not only did he add notes on philosophy but also on history, mythology, and Greco-Roman literature. He also indulged himself by making several digressions about personal matters; for example, on his uncle Enric March (*Ciu. dei* 19.21.n76; CCD 4: 319) or on his wife's father, Nicolau Valldaura (*Ciu. dei* 14.15.n87 [CCD 3: 57, *apparatus criticus*]; 21.4.n18 [CCD 5: 16]).

However, it seems that Erasmus may also have failed in supervising *Ciu. dei* properly, because Vives objected that (*Letter to Erasmus* 1 April 1522; Allen 5: Ep. 1271, lines 8-10; tr. CWE 9: 52): «Voluissem lectis nonnullis paginis in iis libris quos misi, iudicium ad me sententiamque tuam perscripsisses, ut scissem quid uitandum mihi, quid sequendum, quid tenendum esset», that is, «I could have wished that you had read some pages in the books I sent you, and had told me what you make of them and written your opinion at some length, so that I could have known what to avoid and what to follow, and what my policy should be».

[NOTE 2]

Portrait of Vives, as displayed in J. J. Boissard, *Icones quinquaginta uirorum illustrium doctrina et eruditione praestantium ad uiuum effictae, cum eorum uitis descriptis* (Frankfurt am Main: Matthaeus Becker / Theodor de Bry [heirs of], 1597), part II: 182 (f. Z3v).



[NOTE 3]

A thorough examination of the *Opera omnia* of the works of Aristotle in Latin published by Oporinus allows us to identify the following translators, in chronological order: Severino Boezio (475/7-524/6), Leonardo Bruni (Areino; ca. 1370-1444), Theodoros Gazis (Teodoro Gaza; ca. 1398 - ca. 1475),²⁹² Giorgio di Trebisonda (1395-1472/3), Francesco Filelfo (1398-1481), Cardinal Bishop Bessarion (1403-1472), Ioannes Argyropoulos (Giovanni Argiropulo; ca. 1415-1487), Niccolò Leonicensis (1428-1524), Giorgio Valla (Placentinus; 1447-1500), Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples (Stapulensis; ca. 1455 - ca. 1536), Celio Calcagnini (1479-1541), Alessandro Pazzi de' Medici (Paccius; 1483-1530), Pietro Alcionio (ca. 1487-1527), Jakob Schegk (1511-1587), Simon Griner (Grynaeus; 1493-1541), Antoine de Mouchy (Demochares; 1494-1574), and Alexandre Chamaillard (16th century).

The list below presents the works of Aristotle included in the *Opera Omnia* published by Oporinus in alphabetical order, accompanied by the translator. In some works, the translator is unknown (*incertus*). An asterisk preceding the title of the work conveys doubtful authorship.

WORK	TRANSLATOR
<i>Analytica posteriora</i>	Ioannes Argyropoulos
<i>Analytica priora</i>	Severino Boezio
<i>Categoriae (Praedicamenta)</i>	Ioannes Argyropoulos
<i>De anima</i>	Ioannes Argyropoulos

²⁹² Vives calls him «the prince of all translators». Cf. Vives, *Rat. stud. II* (VOO 1: 279): «Princeps interpretum consensu omnium est Theodorus Gaza in libris de animalibus et problematis Aristotelis et de stirpibus Theophrasti, siue decore atque elegantia interpretationis, siue copia Latina qua certauit cum Graeca, siue felici audacia fingendis ad analogiam uocabulis quibus carebant Latini, ut commodius Graeca redderet»; *Disc. trad.* 3 (VOO 6: 303, 333; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 339-340, 372-373).

<i>De caelo</i>	Ioannes Argyropoulos
* <i>De coloribus</i>	Celio Calcagnini
<i>De generatione animalium</i>	Theodoros Gazis
<i>De generatione et corruptione (De generatione et interitu)</i>	Pietro Alcionio
<i>De interpretatione</i>	Ioannes Argyropoulos
* <i>De lineis insecabilibus</i>	Jakob Schegk
* <i>De mirabilibus auscultationibus</i>	<unknown>
* <i>De mundo</i>	Pietro Alcionio
<i>De partibus animalium</i>	Theodoros Gazis
* <i>De plantis</i>	<unknown>
<i>De poetica</i>	Alessandro Pazzi
* <i>De spiritu</i>	<unknown>
* <i>De uirtutibus et uitis (De uirtutibus)</i>	Simon Griner, Alexandre Chamailard
<i>Ethica Eudemia</i>	<unknown>
<i>Ethica Nicomachea</i>	Ioannes Argyropoulos
<i>Historia animalium</i>	Theodoros Gazis
<i>Magna moralia</i>	Giorgio Valla
* <i>Mechanica (Quaestiones mechanicae)</i>	Niccolò Leonicensi
<i>Metaphysica</i>	Cardinal Bishop Bessarion
<i>Meteorologica (Meteoron liber)</i>	Pietro Alcionio
<i>Oeconomica 1 (Oeconomicorum siue De rebus domesticis)</i>	Leonardo Bruni
<i>Oeconomica 2</i>	Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples
Parua naturalia:	
<i>De diuinatione per somnum (De praesensione per somnum)</i>	Pietro Alcionio
<i>De incessu animalium (De communi animalium gressu)</i>	Pietro Alcionio
<i>De insomniis (De somniis et imaginibus)</i>	Pietro Alcionio
<i>De iuuentute et senectute, De uita et morte, De respiratione (De iuuentute et senectute Vitaque et obitu; De spiratione)</i>	Pietro Alcionio
<i>De longitudine et breuitate uitae (De diuturnitate et breuitate uitae)</i>	Pietro Alcionio
<i>De memoria et reminiscencia</i>	Pietro Alcionio
<i>De motu animalium (De communi animalium motione)</i>	Pietro Alcionio
<i>De sensu et sensibilibus</i>	Pietro Alcionio
<i>De somno et uigilia</i>	Pietro Alcionio
<i>Physica (De naturali auscultatione)</i>	Ioannes Argyropoulos
* <i>Physiognomonica</i>	<unknown>
<i>Politica (Politicorum siue De rebus publicis libri)</i>	Leonardo Bruni
<i>Problemata</i>	Theodoros Gazis
* <i>Rhetorica ad Alexandrum regem</i>	Francesco Filelfo
<i>Rhetorica ad Theodecten</i>	Giorgio di Trebisonda
<i>Sophistici elenchi</i>	Simon Griner
<i>Topica</i>	Antoine de Mouchy

[NOTE 4]

The role of Socrates as the man who brought philosophy down to daily life is also mentioned in *Disc. corr.* 6 (VOO 6: 208; Vigliano 2013a: 234): «Ideoque dictus est philosophiam in coelis et elementis sublimem peregrinantem illinc in domos et ciuitates abduxisse»; and *Ver. fid.* 1.2 (VOO 8: 10): «Meritoque consensu omnium laudatur Socrates Atheniensis, qui primus philosophiam in coelis atque elementis naturae immersam ac errantem deuocarit in terram ad inquisitionem uirtutis et in ciuitates domosque introduxerit ad usum hominum et ut quisque, qua tandem causa esset conditus,

scrutaretur». Erasmus, in a letter sent to Johann von Vlatten ca. October 1523 (Allen 5: Ep. 1390, lines 36-45; tr. CWE 10: 97), also recalls Socrates's role:

Philosophiam, quae primum in rerum naturalium contemplatione occupata procul aberat a uita communi, Socrates primus in terras atque etiam in domos deduxisse legitur. Plato et Aristoteles conati sunt eam et in aulas regum et in senatum et in ipsa tribunalia producere. M. uero Tullius mihi uidetur eam etiam in proscenium perduxisse: cuius opera sic loqui didicit ut promiscuum etiam uulgius possit applaudere. Atque huius generis tam multos libros scripsit uir ille difficillimis temporibus summoque reipublicae tumultu, quosdam etiam rebus in summam desperationem adductis, et non pudet nos nostrarum confabulationum atque conuiuiorum.

► Philosophy at first was absorbed in the contemplation of the natural world and had little contact with life; it was Socrates, we read, who first brought her down to earth and even into the homes of men. Plato and Aristotle tried to introduce her to the courts of kings, to the legislature, and even to the law-courts. But Cicero seems to me to have brought her almost onto the stage, for with his help she has learned to speak in such a fashion that even a miscellaneous audience can applaud. And in this field that great man wrote so many books in a time of great crisis when his country was in the utmost confusion, and some of them he wrote when public affairs were in the most desperate state. Surely we ought to be ashamed of our casual conversations and our dinner-table talk.

Both Vives and Erasmus must have been inspired by passages taken from Cicero's *Tusculanae disputationes* 3.4.8 and 5.4.10.

[NOTE 5]

The Greek text of Plato's *Timaeus* (37e-38a) provided by Vives (V = CCD 2: 210, lines 4-13) has some disagreements with the edition of Burnet (B) = J. Burnet (ed.), *Platonis opera: tomus IV, tetralogiam VIII continens* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902). The brief *apparatus criticus* notes these variants between V and B. It should also be mentioned that the Latin translation of Vives (below, on the right = CCD 2: 210, lines 13-23) rephrases some sentences of the Greek text, while omitting particular words, such as εἶδη (*species*) in line 3.

Plato in *Timaeo* sic inquit: «ταῦτα δὲ πάντα
μέρη χρόνου, καὶ “τό τ’ ἦν” “τό ἔσται” χρόνου
γεγονότος εἶδη, φέροντες λανθάνομεν ἐπὶ τὴν
αἰδίον οὐσίαν οὐκ ὀρθῶς. λέγομεν γὰρ δὴ ὡς “ἦν”
5 “ἔστιν” τε καὶ “ἔσται”, τῆ δὲ “τό ἔστιν” μόνον κατὰ
τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει, “τό δὲ ἦν” “τό τ’
ἔσται” περὶ τὴν ἐν χρόνῳ γένεσιν ἰούσαν πρέπει
λέγεθαι, κινήσεις γὰρ ἔστων, τὸ δὲ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα
ἔχον ἀκινήτως οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον
10 προσήκει γίγνεσθαι ποτὲ οὐ τε γεγονέναι νῦν οὐδ’
εἰς αὐθις ἔσεσθαι, τὸ παράπαν τε οὐδὲν ὅσα
γένεσις τοῖς ἐν αἰσθήσει φερομένοις προσήψεν,
ἀλλὰ χρόνου ταῦτα αἰῶνα τε μιμουμένου καὶ κατ’
ἀριθμὸν κυκλουμένου γέγονεν εἶδη».


«Porro», inquit, «haec omnia temporis sunt partes, et
“fuit” et “erit”; quae sunt temporis facti imprudenter a
nobis sempiternae attribuuntur essentiali, quod non
debet. Ita enim solemus de illa loqui, “erit”, “fuit”,
“est”. Atqui solum modo “est” ei congruit; “fuisse” uero
aut “fore” conuenit decidere quae in tempore genita
cum tempore progreditur. Motus siquidem haec duo
sunt, quod autem idem tota est aeternitate nullo
mouetur motu nec decet seniore unquam fieri aut
iuniorem, nec fuisse hactenus, nec fore deinceps; nec
incurrit in id quicquam, quae res corporales et quas
sensibus usurpamus, patiuntur sed istae sunt
temporis aemuli aeternitatis, et ad numerum se
conuoluentis species».

2 τό ἔσται V : τό τ’ ἔσται B || 3 γεγονότος V : γεγονότα B | φέροντες V : ἀ δὴ φέροντες B || 8 λέγεθαι V :
λέγεσθαι B || 10 γίγνεσθαι ποτὲ οὐ τε γεγονέναι V : γίγνεσθαι διὰ χρόνου οὐδὲ γενέσθαι ποτὲ οὐδὲ γεγονέναι B ||
13 αἰῶνα τε V : αἰῶνα B

[NOTE 6]

Before the beginning of book 1, Georg Reisch placed in his *Margarita philosophica* a sketch of the various disciplines that philosophy encompasses. For clarity purposes, I give below the sketch as printed in the edition of March 1583 (Basel: Sebastianus Henricpetrus, f. a5r).

PHILOSOPHIAE PARTITIO.



III *Introductio ad sapientiam: The Text and Its Context*

1 The making

1.1 The circumstances of composition: Oxford and Bruges

Approximately on 11 May 1523, Joan Lluís Vives departed from Bruges and probably arrived in England the following day. Even though his intent was to return to his native city of Valencia,¹ he somehow aborted that dangerous plan (the Spanish Inquisition was persecuting his family members)² and remained in England, teaching at Corpus Christi College (Oxford)³ while strengthening the bonds with both king Henry VIII (1491-1547) and queen Catherine of Aragon (1485-1536).⁴

¹ Cf. Vives, *Letter to Erasmus* 10 May 1523 (Allen 5: Ep. 1362, lines 102-105; tr. CWE 10: 15): «Ego nulla ratione subtrahere me potui Hispanico itineri, quod puto me cras aut perendie ingressurum; quod uelit Christus mihi prospere succedere. Per Britanniam proficiscar, et ibi et in patria amici in te hominis officium praestabo», that is, «I have been quite unable to get out of a journey to Spain, on which I expect to set out tomorrow or the next day; and may it be Christ's will that all goes well. I shall go to England first, and both there and in my native country I will do anything for you that a friend can»; *Letter to Cranevelt* around 11 May 1523 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 56, line 14): «Cras discedo Brugis in Britanniam»; *Letter to Erasmus* 15 August 1522 (Allen 5: Ep. 1306, lines 37-38, 41-42; tr. CWE 9: 163): «Next month I think of crossing to England ... I do not plan to stay there more than three months or four at most».

² Cf. Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 4 January 1523 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 32, lines 13-29), 22 February 1523 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 45, lines 8-10, 13-16).

³ Vives accepted cardinal Wolsey's proposal to teach Latin, Greek and Rhetoric but complained about the high amount of work involved. Cf. *Areop. ep.* 5 (15 December 1523; VOO 5: 2-3; ed. tr. SWJV 12: 164-165): «Ergo chartulas istas haud aliter interpretabere quam certissimum pectoris mei signum, tot ac tantorum beneficiorum non immemoris. [...] Nam hoc tempore districto tot laboribus curisque, et potissimum publica Oxoniae professione quam mihi imposuisti, nec meum aliquid licuit parere nec concinnare alienum quod esset longum», that is, «Therefore you will regard these pages as nothing other than the surest sign of a heart that is mindful of your kindnesses so many and so great. [...] During this time that is limited by so many labors and obligations, especially the public professorship at Oxford which you have imposed upon me, I have not been free to prepare anything of mine or an elaboration of someone else's work which would be large»; Watson 1918: 76; De Vocht 1934: 7; CEBR 3: 410b.

⁴ Most relevant historical and cultural studies on the Tudors are (in chronological order): Mackie 1952; Hay 1961; Elton 1990; Woolfson 2002; Rex 2009. On Henry VIII, cf. Brewer et al. 1862-1932; McConica 1965; Dowling 1986; Richardson 2002; Weir 2008; CEBR 2: 178b-181b. On Catherine of Aragon, cf. Mattingly 1941; Paul 1966; Tremlett 2010; CEBR 1: 282b-284b. On her daughter, future queen Mary, cf. *infra* n. 8bis.

Such bonds had begun approximately in 1521, when Vives was granted a financial aid by the queen, and he expected to secure a higher income through the efficient management of Thomas More.⁵ On 7 July 1522 he dedicated his *Ciu. dei* to the king, and ended the prefatory epistle with the following words: «Farewell, most excellent king. Count Vives as your most devoted servant, wherever he might be, as long as he is among your intimates».⁶ The king's reply seemed quite complimentary. In addition to expressing his immense gratitude, he stated that his favour and attentive care would always accompany Vives.⁷ Finally, on 5 April 1523, the Valencian humanist dedicated *Foem.* to the queen, who was enthusiastically praised in the prefatory epistle: «All women will have an example to follow in your life and actions, and in this work dedicated to you, precepts and rules for the conduct of their lives».⁸ This epistle is also important because it is the first time that Vives mentions princess Mary (1516-1558),^{8bis} the daughter of king Henry VIII and queen Catherine of Aragon, to whom he later addressed *Rat. stud. I* and *Sat.* «Your daughter Mary will read these recommendations», he says to the queen, «and will reproduce them as she models herself on the example of your goodness and wisdom to be found within her own home».⁹

Further, the fact that Vives asked Erasmus to help him enter the circle of English humanists and intellectuals¹⁰ demonstrates his will to not only visit England but stay and live there, which apparently contradicts his original plan of going back to Valencia. It is certainly a very unstable period of his life, full of opposite thoughts, as he openly admits in a very gloomy letter to his intimate friend Frans van Cranevelt.¹¹ In any case, his lessons at the Corpus Christi College were a complete success. John Twyne, a student¹² of Vives, recalls the master with the following words: «I myself knew Vives, honoured him and heard him

⁵ In a letter sent to Erasmus (10 July 1521), Vives acknowledges that he is enjoying a royal aid (Allen 4: Ep. 1222, line 17; tr. CWE 8: 267): «Pecunia reginea me huc usque alui et alo», that is, «So far I have maintained myself on the queen's money, and still do». He also comments that (Ibid., lines 17-21) «Moro scripsi me prolixo collocuturum cum eo cum uenerit. Susplicari potest quid uelim, sed non aperte quicquam, quum nollem te inconsulto, tametsi consilium tuum propemodum noui: ut parem ocium aci uitam studiosam undecunque queam», that is, «I wrote to More that I should have a long talk with him on his arrival. He can suspect what I mean, but I put nothing openly; I did not want to without consulting you, though I pretty much know your advice: to secure leisure for a life of study from whatever source I can». Cf. Vives, *Declam. 2 praef.* (VOO 2: 484); De Vocht 1934: 2.

⁶ Vives, *Ciu. dei ep.* (CCD 1: 22, lines 12-13): «Vale optime rex, et Viuem tibi addictissimum quouis loco numera, modo inter tuos».

⁷ Cf. Jiménez 1978: Ep. 55.5. I have been unable to check the Latin text. According to Jiménez, it is found in Oxford, Col. Copus Christi, cod. ms. f/146r.

⁸ Vives, *Foem. praef. 7* (VOO 4: 69; ed. tr. SWJV 6: 10-11): «Habebunt igitur feminae omnes, ut per uitam et actiones tuas exemplum, sic per hoc tibi dedicatum opus praecepta et rationem uiuendi».

^{8bis} Most relevant studies on future queen Mary are (in chronological order): Loades 1991; Loades 1992; Prescott 2003; Loades 2006; Porter 2009; Doran and Freeman 2011; CEBR 2: 401b-403a. Cf. *supra* n. 4.

⁹ Vives, *Foem. praef. 7* (VOO 4: 69; ed. tr. SWJV 6: 10-11): «Leget haec monita mea Maria, filia tua, et effinget ea dum se ad domesticum exemplar componit probitatis et sapientiae tuae».

¹⁰ Cf. Vives, *Letter to Erasmus* 15 August 1522 (Allen 5: Ep. 1306, lines 39-41; tr. CWE 9: 163): «Simul te oro per eundem mittas mihi literas aliquas ad amicos illic tuos commendatitias, saltem ut sciant me amicum esse tuum, quo me pluris faciant», that is, «I beg you to send me by the same hand some letters of introduction to your friends there, so that at least they may know that I am a friend of yours and make more of me accordingly».

¹¹ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 1, n. 8-9.

¹² Other students were Nicolas Udall, Reginald Pole, Edward Wotton, Richard Pate, John Eliares and Antony Barker (Noreña 1970: 85). Watson (1922: 46-48) mentions John Twyne and Nicolas Wotton.

lecturing on authors, whilst he abode in the sacred College of Corpus Christi»;¹³ he then reports the opinion of John Foche (Vochius), abbot of St Augustine Church (Sturry), who considered Vives «a well-known teacher and most loved».¹⁴ His lessons attained such great fame that the king and the queen broke a long tradition and entered the city of Oxford to pay a visit to the renowned teacher. «The queen has taken a trip in this area», Vives wrote to Cranevelt, «and the king has come with her. They have dared to defy the ancient superstition that kings were not allowed to enter the city. When they were already here, that very holy lady asked me when I would spend more than a day in the Royal Court».¹⁵ This anecdote illustrates that, as time passed, Vives and the queen became very close friends and even shared philosophical conversations, and visited spiritual places together.¹⁶ It is then of little surprise that Jan van Fevijn,¹⁷ a friend of both Vives and Cranevelt, explained to the latter that Vives lived at the royal palace, with the king, the queen, the cardinal, and the members of the aristocracy.¹⁸ In such favourable circumstances, Vives managed to get acquainted with many scholars: «I enjoy the company of friends who excel in any discipline and are worthy of admiration. You know, people like More, Linacre, Tunstall, Latimer, Claymond, Mountjoy, Fisher. We are expecting Pace and Hannibal soon; also Sampson, at any time».¹⁹

Vives's teaching at Oxford combined with the esteem and friendship of the queen that he enjoyed stimulated the making of three works primarily addressed to young students of the wealthy and ruling classes: *Rat. stud.* (*Rat. stud. I* to princess Mary; *Rat. stud. II* to Charles Blount), *Sat.* (to princess Mary), and *Ad sap.* (without addressee, presumably to Vives's school students). He certainly began composition of these works in England, and finished them either in England itself (dedicatory epistle of *Rat. stud. I* is dated 9 October 1523, Oxford; that of *Rat. stud. II* is dated 1523, without any more details, London) or in Flanders (dedicatory epistle of *Sat.* is dated 1 July 1524, Bruges; *Ad sap.* bears no date). Indeed, Vives returned momentarily to Bruges at the end of March 1524²⁰ in order to marry Margarida Valldaura, the

¹³ Cf. Twyne 1590: 6-7: «...doctissimumque uirum Ioannem Lodouicum Viuem in Angliam atque Oxonium prosequuti. Quem ego in collegio uestro Christi Corpori sacro commorantem noui, eolui atque publice praelegentem audiui»; tr. Watson 1922: 48.

¹⁴ Twyne 1590: 41: «...Ioannis Lodouici Viuis, familiaris ac praelectoris omnium uestri amantissimi».

¹⁵ Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 25 January 1524 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 90, lines 6-11): «Quum hac fecisset iter regina uenissetque una rex ipse, ausus contemnere ueterem superstitionem qua oppidum hoc reges uetabuntur ingredi. Quum ergo hic essent, quaesiuit ex me probissima illa et sanctissima matrona, ecquando essem futurus plus quam diem unus aulicus».

¹⁶ Cf. Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 25 January 1524 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 90, lines 26-39); *Sat.* 56 (VOO 4: 40; Tello 2020a: 69).

¹⁷ Cf. CEBR 2: 26a-b.

¹⁸ Cf. Fevijn, *Letter to Cranevelt* 21 December 1524 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 130, lines 9-12): «Interim uero accepi literas a Viue nostro, quem demiror potuisse non aliquid ad uos scriber, cum adhuc agat Londini, nullis (ut reor) studiis degrauatus; est enim in media aula, cum rege, regina, cardinale et primatibus».

¹⁹ Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 11 November 1523 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 80, lines 3-7): «...et amicis furor omni disciplinarum genere magnis et suspiciendis: nosti Moros, Li<nacros,> Tunstallos, Latimeros, Claymundos, Montioyos, Roffenses; expectamus indies Pacaeum, Annibalem; etiam aliquando Sampsonem». CEBR provides a succinct biography of William Blount (1: 154a-156b), John Claymond (1: 307b-308b), John Fisher (2: 36a-39b), William Latimer (2: 302a-303b), Thomas Linacre (2: 331b-332b), Thomas More (2: 456a-459a), Richard Pace (3: 37b-39a), Richard Sampson (3: 192a-b) and Cuthbert Tunstall (3: 349b-354b); cf. also De Vocht 1928: 197-198, n. 4-7.

²⁰ Cf. Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 1 May 1524 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 102, lines 4-5): «Superiore hebdomade ueni Brugas», that is, «I arrived in Bruges last week». Incidentally, Vives's arrival took place one

daughter of a merchant family from Valencia that had settled in Flanders around 1498.²¹ The marriage ceremony took place on 26 May 1524 (the feast of Corpus Christi), and it was officiated by Jan van Fevijn,²² to whom Vives gave a copy of *Foem.* as present for their close friendship.²³ In a letter sent to Erasmus on 16 June 1524, Vives wrote a summary of these events and expressed his desire to go to back to England as soon as possible.

I left England in April, solely to get married, and with instructions from the leading men and the cardinal [i.e. Wolsey] to return by the end of September. And I will do so, unless forcibly prevented by some necessity or wholly incapacitating cause, for those people have treated me so well that it would be wrong not to fall in their wishes, since they comply in so many things with mine. On the feast of Corpus Christi I bowed my neck under the yoke of matrimony, and do not yet feel it at all heavy or the sort of thing I should like to shake off; but the outcome is in God's hands. So far I have no reason to complain, and all those who know us are delighted; nothing, they say, has happened here for years that has won such universal approval.²⁴

1.2 The circumstances of publication: Louvain

A few weeks after the wedding, Vives must have travelled to Louvain in order to hand the manuscript of *Ad sap., Sat.,* and *Rat. stud.* over to Pieter Martens, the son of the renowned Dirk Martens of Aalst (also known as Theodoricus Martinus).²⁵ These three works were bound together in a 8^o book format, throughout 72 unnumbered sheets (a-s⁴).²⁶ Publication

month after the beginning of a conjunction of all planets in Piscis, an astrological sign related to creativity but also to instability. Cf. L. Thorndike, «The conjunction of 1524», in *A History of Magic and Experimental Science* (New York: Columbia U. P.), vol. 5: 178-233.

²¹ Cf. CEBR 3: 365a-366a; De Vocht 1928: Ep. 102, intr.; Noreña 1970: 51. Cf. G. A. Bergenroth, *Calendar to letters, dispatches and statepapers relating to the negotiations between England and Spain, preserved in the archives at Simancas and elsewhere* (London: Longman et al., 1862), vol. 1: 195. Entry 225 presents a letter dated 26 August 1498 from «Valdaura» to «the very magnificent Doctor De Puebla, ambassador from Spain to England, in London». It could be inferred that this «Valdaura» stands for Bernard Valldaura, the father of Margarida Valldaura.

²² Cf. CEBR 2: 26b; Noreña 1970: 52.

²³ This rare copy, preserved at the library of the Royal Palace (Madrid), has the autographed dedicatory of Vives at the end of the book. According to Bonilla (1903: 758), it reads «Ioannis phoeuyini. rs. / Authoris operis huius. dono / 1.5.2.4. / Brugis. / quo anno cōiūxisti & conligasti / uxori. margarite Valdaure / Sacratī festo die».

²⁴ Allen 5: Ep. 1455, lines 1-11; tr. CWE 10: 284: «Ex Britannia discessi mense Aprili, tantum ad ducendam uxorem, iussus a principibus et Cardinale eo redire ad finem mensis Septembris. Quod faciam, ni necessitas aliqua et uis maior impediāt, aut causa maxime sontica: ita enim sunt homines illi de me meriti, ut iniquum sit me non obsecundare eorum uoluntati, quum illi multis in rebus indulgeant meae. Feriis Eucharistiae subieci ceruicem iugo muliebri, nondum mihi quidem graui et quod cupiam adhuc excutere: sed euentum Deus uiderit. Hactenus nec mihi factum displicet, et iis omnibus qui nos norunt, mirifice placet; ut aiunt, nihil hic esse multis annis actum tanta omnium approbatione».

²⁵ Cf. both printers in CEBR 2: 394b-396b.

²⁶ Cf. NK 1: 769 (Catalogue number 2168); González, Albiñana and Gutiérrez 1992: 160 (Catalogue number 23). A copy of this rare edition is preserved at the KU Leuven Bibliotheken (cf. *infra* section 3.1.a, edition L).

took place most probably between July and November 1524, as it can be inferred from the following evidence: on the one hand, the latest date found in the dedicatory epistles of the three works is that of *Sat.* (1 July 1524); and, on the other hand, in a letter addressed to Frans van Cranevelt dated 1 November Vives already made comments on the printed book, namely about the numerous printing errors found in the *editio princeps*:

Ruffault,²⁷ who was in charge of correcting the book, wrote to me that the manuscript that I had handed over in Louvain was smeared and became unclear in many passages, so it was necessary for him to guess. I have not yet seen a printed copy of the book, but I suspect that, based on Ruffault's words, it has been issued carelessly.²⁸

The 8^o book printed by Pieter Martens opened with *Ad sap.*, which (in this first edition) consisted of 592 numbered aphorisms —or, as Vives calls them, *praecepta*²⁹ ('maxims' or 'precepts')—, basically aimed at students but also at the general reader, as it can be inferred from his own words. On 25 January 1525 Vives wrote to his friend Cranevelt seeking his honest opinion about the content of *Ad sap.*, intended «to introduce boys [*pueri*] and, more precisely, young men [*adolescentes*] to wisdom».³⁰ Some months later, Vives wrote to Cranevelt again and admitted that the ultimate purpose of the precepts gathered in *Ad sap.* was to help any reader make progress on the path to wisdom:

What else was I looking for with those maxims but that some of the readers could make progress on the path to wisdom? For I do not do philosophy to show off my talent or out of sheer vanity, but to adjust our lives to the maxims of wisdom and at the same time encourage and lead others to our imitation through my sayings and my examples. However, two abominable vices (ambition and avarice) have taken hold of all souls to such an extent that no door has kept open to more healthy advices.³¹

²⁷ Jérôme Ruffault of Lille; cf. CEBR 3: 176b-177a.

²⁸ De Vocht 1928: Ep. 122, lines 22-26: «Scripsit Ruffaldus, qui castigationi praefuit, relictum esse exemplar Louanii multis locis interlitum et confusum, ut fuerit ipsi diuinandum. Nondum uidi libellum excusum sed ex his uerbis Ruffaldi suspicor mendose esse editum».

²⁹ Cf. *infra* n. 31.

³⁰ Cf. Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 25 January 1525 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 136, lines 24-32): «Louaniensis chalcographus excusit; nec eum puto tam auidos mercatores nactum, exemplaria ut omnia distraxerit. Quocirca peruelim te unum ex iis libris curare tibi per aliquem amicorum, et impendere mihi dieculam aliquam ex illis ociosioribus, si quas habes, ut tuo iudicio fiam certior, quantum operae precii fecerim introducendis ad sapientiam pueris, imo etiam adolescentibus, nisi mea me opinio falsum habet».

³¹ Cf. Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 7 March 1525 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 144, lines 3-11): «Quid enim aliud mihi praeceptis illis quaerebatur quam aliquis legentium ad sapientiam progressus? Neque enim ad ostentationem ingenii et uanitatem quandam philosophamur, sed ut et uitam nostram praeceptis sapientiae accommodemus, simul dictis exemplisque nostris alios ad similitudinem nostri incitemus adducamusque; taetsi omnium animos ad eum modum duo pessima uicia (ambitio atque auaricia) occuparunt, ut aditus ad saniora consilia nullus sit relictus». Vives had already made this request previously, at least in two occasions. Cf. *Letter to Cranevelt* 1 November 1524 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 122, lines 20-21): «Volo ex te scire ecquid sentias de libello meo, qui recens Louanii prodiit»; 2 December 1524 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 128, lines 12-14): «Velim nihilominus sententiam tuam ad me priuatim perscribas et de libellis, qui nouissima mea foetura prodierunt».

Vives made another relevant allusion to *Ad sap.* in *Disc.* (1531), when he asserted that «for the expounding of these things I have written a little book called *Instruction in Wisdom*, and it will be easy for the teacher to pick out for the use of his pupil little flowers from the philosophers and sacred authors, as it were from the most verdant meadows».³²

On the other hand, the fact that *Ad sap.* was considered to be a recollection of flowers and that the word *sapientia* was explicitly written in its title enabled this work to be included within the tradition of wisdom literature, as Bradshaw points out:

The significance of the nexus between *humanitas* and *sapientia* in the minds of the humanists requires to be reformulated. In fact, its meaning becomes abundantly evident by references to treatments of the theme in the humanist genre of Wisdom literature: as, for instance, in the systematic exposition by Erasmus himself in the *Antibarbari* or, in more didactic form, in a host of manuals of the *ars uiuendi* variety, represented in the north, for instance, by the *Introductio ad sapientiam* (1524) of Vives [...] or, indeed, by Erasmus' own best-selling *Enchiridion militis Christiani* (1504).³³

In view of the fact that the amount of maxims, their division into chapters, and the subjects dealt with are issues that I will address later (cf. *infra* Part III, sections 2-3; Part IV, sections 1-6), I shall focus now on describing the other two works that accompanied *Ad sap.*

(a) *Satellitium siue Symbola*

The second work included in the 8^o book was *Sat.*,³⁴ which was an excellent complement to *Ad sap.* Its format —a collection of *satellites* (also called *symbola* and *sententiae*) followed by a short commentary— was not too far from the aphoristic layout of *Ad sap.* Further, both works shared the ethical and educational component. In the dedicatory epistle, Vives says to the addressee of the work, princess Mary, that

you will be given about two hundred guardians (I do not take into account the total number), which you will transform into such intimate assistants that you must not allow them to withdraw from the protection of your soul and your life a nail's breadth by night or by day, at home or in public.³⁵

³² Vives, *Disc. trad.* 2 (VOO 3: 293; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 329; tr. Watson 1913: 84): «Nos ad haec exponenda libellum conscripsimus, cui titulum fecimus de introductione ad sapientiam; et praeceptorum facile erit eiusmodi flosculos ex philosophis et sacris authoribus, tanquam e pratis uernantissimis, in usum discipuli decerpere». Cf. Tobriner 1966: 336: «Specifically, the *Introduction to Wisdom* served two purposes in Tudor schools: practice in grammatical skills and indoctrination of ethical precepts», 424: «The *Introduction to Wisdom* was designed by its humanist author as a manual of advice for pre-University scholars»; Tobriner 1968: 37: «As a device for training in grammatical skills, the *Introductio* ranked with the Renaissance restorations of admired Greek and Romans, or with the linguistic prodigies of Erasmus and Budé. As a wellspring of ethical precepts, it provided moralistic advice for upright living»; Ingram 2018: 29: «The ideal target was middle-class youth, who the author approached through his *Introductio ad sapientiam* (*Introduction to Wisdom*), published, significantly, in the year of his father's execution».

³³ B. Bradshaw, «Transalpine humanism», in Burns 1991: 108.

³⁴ Existing editions: VOO 4: 30-64; Tello 2020a. Existing translations: Watson 1912: 151-158 (excerpts); R 1: 1177-1204; Sarrió and Girbés 1992: 111-155; Frayle 2006; Del Nero 2018: 125-183.

³⁵ Vives, *Sat. ep.* 3 (VOO 4: 31; ed. Tello 2020a: 61): «Accipies igitur satellites ducentos (nam excurrentem numerum non imputo), quos sic tibi facies familiares ut nec noctu nec interdiu nec domi nec in publico sinas a tutela animae ac uitae tuae uel latum unguem abscedere».

These attendants, assistants or guardians³⁶ (239 in the final stage of the text issued in Bruges by Hubert de Croock in 1526) are short wise sayings³⁷ (*sententiae*) of five words at most, and a sort of distinctive marks (*notae*), similar to those with which princes used to distinguish themselves.³⁸ These sayings are followed by a short commentary, inspired quite probably by the format set by Erasmus in his *Adagiorum collectanea* (Paris: Johann Philippi, ca. June-July 1500) and later in his *Adagiorum chiliades* (Venice: Aldo Manuzio, September 1508).³⁹ Taken as a whole, the 239 symbols form a bodyguard (*satellitium*), whose mission was to protect the soul of princess Mary. «I shall place a bodyguard around your soul», Vives explains, «which will keep you safer and more invincible than any soldier armed with spear or arrow».⁴⁰ Therefore, Vives's intention was to provide princess Mary with a series of emblems⁴¹ acting as guardians, which could protect her as long as she let the wisdom concealed in them govern her actions and populate her thoughts. All in all, Vives's book of proverbs constitutes a sort of protective device.

On the other hand, calling 'symbols' his collection of wise sayings and making direct allusion to Pythagoras,⁴² suggests Vives's intention that the *Sat.* could become part of the revival of the symbolic and Pythagorean tradition that had flourished in the fifteenth century. For example, Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) had translated Iamblichus's *Protrepticus* and *Vita Pythagorae*, and he had been the author of the *Pythagorae philosophi aura verba*, the *Symbola Pythagorae philosophi*,⁴³ and of a *Commentariolus in Symbola Pythagorae*.⁴⁴

But, above all, the word 'symbol' must have been seen by Vives as a marvelous linguistic instrument by which to express a way of life based on concord and unity. In ancient Greece, σύμβολον (*symbolon*) referred to any of the two halves of an object which two people or two

³⁶ Cf. Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae* 10.255 (Lindsay 1911; tr. Barney et al. 2006: 229): «Attendant (*satelles*): one who clings to another (*alter*), or guards his side (*latus*)».

³⁷ Cf. Vives, *Sat. ep.* 6 (VOO 4: 31; ed. Tello 2020a: 61): «Porro symbolorum haec est lex: ut sententiam absoluant uerbis ad summum quinque».

³⁸ Cf. Vives, *Sat. ep.* 4 (VOO 4: 31; ed. Tello 2020a: 61): «Symbola appellauit quasi notas quasdam cuiusmodi vetus mos erat principibus se insignire, quod et fit hodie».

³⁹ For more details about Erasmus's *Adages*, cf. *infra* section 2.1.

⁴⁰ Vives, *Sat. ep.* 2 (VOO 4: 30; ed. Tello 2020a: 60): «Ego ... satellitium circundabo animo tuo, quod te securiorem magisque inexpugnabilem praestabit quam hastati aut sagittarii quicumque».

⁴¹ Cf. Vives, *Sat. ep.* 5 (VOO 4: 30; ed. Tello 2020a: 61): «se insignire», «insignia».

⁴² Cf. Vives, *Sat. ep.* 6 (VOO 4: 31-32; ed. Tello 2020a: 61-62): «Obscuritatis aliquid et allegoriae symbolum condit, ut paulum a naturali sensu deflectatur; modo ne tanta sit quanta Pythagoras est usus, ut ab intelligentia ditorum suorum arceret imperitos. Qui symbola sua longissime uerbis abduxit illinc quo sensus spectabat adeo ut Tyrrenos induxerit citra allegoriam omnem illis parere, quum eam non assequerentur. Idcirco et expositiunculas addidi breues quidem pro rei argumento, sed in hoc tantum ne te in multis ambiguitas uel remoraretur uel falleret», that is, «A symbol contains a bit of obscurity and allegory so that it deviates slightly from the usual sense, but not as much as Pythagoras made use of in order to prevent the uninitiated from understanding his sayings. He composed his symbols with words whose meaning was far removed from what was expected, to such an extent that he induced the Tyrrenians to obey them without paying attention to the allegory, since they did not understand it. That is why I have added some simple explanations (they are certainly brief) according to the content of each matter, but only in order that the ambiguity encountered in many symbols might not hinder or deceive your understanding».

⁴³ Cf. *Marsilii Ficini Florentini ... opera* (Basel: Henricus Petri, 1561), vol. 2: 1978-1979.

⁴⁴ For more details about the Pythagorean revival, cf. Celenza 1999; Ruii 2018: 31-38; and principally the monograph of Vuilleumier 2000.

contracting parties broke between them. When these two people met each other again, the fitting of the two broken pieces corroborated the true identity of both bearers. At the beginning of the 16th century, Filippo Beroaldo (1453-1505)⁴⁵ made a meticulous philological study of the term 'symbol' in the first pages of his *Symbola Pythagorae a Philippo Beroaldo moraliter explicata* (Bologna: Benedictus Hectoris, 1503). Based on Latin authors, and perhaps on the Suda lexicon as well, the Italian humanist distinguished six meanings:⁴⁶ (1) *collatio* 'combination', 'contribution'; (2) *annulus* 'ring'; (3) *etymologia, notatio* 'etymological interpretation'; (4) *augurium, uaticinium* 'omen', 'prediction'; (5) *nota, indicium, signum* 'mark', 'evidence', 'sign'. As for the sixth meaning, which could be summarized as 'revelation of a concealed knowledge that includes moral sentences', I quote the entire Latin text:

Symbola Pythagorae, uidelicet indicia quaedam et signa mysteriorum doctrinae sanctioris, quibus sententiae morales atque salutaria documenta continentur. Quibus tanquam uasculis fictilibus thesaurus preciosus includitur. Et plane haec symbola leges quadamtenus imitantur. Quarum scriptum angustum est, interpretatio diffusa; parca sunt uerborum, foecunda sententiarum; foris corticosa, intus succosa; aliud sonantia, aliud significantia, quibus praecepta quaedam catholica, hoc est, uniuersalia sunt insoluta: ad uitam sancteque beateque degendam ualde congruentia.⁴⁷

In a fragile world troubled by hostilities and warfare, Vives undoubtedly expressed the unifying and protective power of the symbol. Each symbol is an invitation to human beings, who seem to be divided and antagonized, to be reunited and unified⁴⁸ by practicing the humanistic values that each wise saying elicits. Furthermore, these symbols stimulate the reader to experience a loving, affective, and compassionate feeling that neutralizes all reproach, hatred or aggression; as a result, everyone's protection is assured, since no one feels the need to attack their fellow neighbour. According to Vives, if we engrave each symbol in our soul, peace is guaranteed.

(b) *Epistulae duae de ratione studii puerilis*

The third piece of the 8^o book was *Rat. stud.*,⁴⁹ which consists of two epistles that present a proposal about the ideal curriculum for children.⁵⁰ It therefore complemented the

⁴⁵ An engaging study of this humanist is that of Fabrizio-Costa and La Brasca 2005.

⁴⁶ Cf. Vuilleumier 2000: 60-61, 412-415.

⁴⁷ Cf. Vuilleumier 2000: 414. In the last sentence, I follow the 1503 edition and thus I have edited *sanctaeque beateque* instead of *sanctaeque beataeque* (Vuilleumier's edition).

⁴⁸ This was something that often preoccupied Vives's mind. Cf., for example, *Vig.* 12 (VOO 4: 30; ed. tr. George 1989: 106-107): «How to bring truly humane laws to all peoples and nations, how to spread a civilized awareness among barbarians and tribes of savages, how to gather and bind the scattered human race [*quomodo ... dispersum genus humanum congregat et deuinciat*] by the communication and, in a sense, the chain of a common tongue».

⁴⁹ Existing editions: VOO 1: 256-280. Existing translations: Watson 1907 (*Rat. stud. I*; repr. Watson 1912: 137-149); Watson 1909 (*Rat. stud. II*); R 2: 317-335.

⁵⁰ It might correspond to what Vigliano (2013a: xxxvii) has called «level 1», from 7 to 15 years old, approximately. According to the French scholar (2013a: xxxvii-xlii), level 1, 2 (from 15 to 25 years old) and 3 (as from 25 years old) are presented in depth in *Disc. trad.* 3. Erasmus published in 20 October 1511 his own insights on the method of study (*Ratio studii ac legendi interpretandique iuuenibus*

two previous educational works: the general introduction to moral philosophy of *Ad sap.* and the collection of wise dicta of *Sat.* The first epistle, dated 9 October 1523, is addressed to princess Mary, and it essentially deals with Latin language and culture. According to the revised version published in 1526 (Bruges: Hubert De Croock), it has the following sections: «Reading» (*Lectio*), «Parts of speech» (*Partes orationis*), «Writing» (*Scriptio*), «Memory» (*Memoria*), «Declension of nouns» (*Inflexio nominum*), «Verbs» (*De uerbis*), «Syntax» (*Syntaxis*), «Participles» (*Participia*), «Verbal nouns» (*Verbalia*), «Unusual verbs» (*Anomala*), «Vocabulary» (*Vocabula*), «The practice of writing Latin» (*Exercitatio Latine scribendi*), «Authors to be learned» (*Authores*), «A supplementary section on verbs» (*Reditus ad priora exactius*), «Conversational guidelines» (*Sermo*), «Correct accent» (*Accentus*), «Taking notes» (*Annotationes*), «Authors to be knowledgeable about» (*Authores*).

It is worth mentioning Vives's strong recommendation to study the distiches of Cato, the sentences of Publilius Syrus, and the aphorisms of the seven sages, all of which —Vives points out— were edited and annotated by Erasmus «in a little book».⁵¹ Further, he encourages to read authors who help improve not only the Latin language but also good morals, the ultimate aim being to live well and uprightly.⁵² According to Vives, fitting authors are Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, Jerome (*Epistulae*),⁵³ Augustine, Erasmus,⁵⁴ and Thomas More (*Utopia*). A brief summary of all authors mentioned by Vives in *Rat. stud. I* is given below (particular works are indicated only if Vives does so).

AUTHORS MENTIONED BY VIVES TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

GREEK: Plato, Plutarch, (The) Seven Sages.

LATIN: Cato (*Disticha*), Cicero, Florus, Horace (selected poems), Justin, Lucan, Publilius Syrus (*Sententiae*), Seneca, Valerius Maximus.

apprime utilis. Paris: Georges Biermant, Jean Granjon). Short title: *De ratione studii*; cf. ASD I-2: 111-151; CWE 24: 665-691.

⁵¹ Cf. Vives, *Rat. stud. I* (VOO 1: 265): «Simul cum his discet Catonis disticha et mimos Publianos et sententias septem sapientum, quae omnia eodem libello Erasmus coniunxit et explicauit». Erasmus did indeed edit and publish Cato's proverbs, Publilius Syrus's wise sayings and the sentences of the seven sages with a brief commentary in a book issued by Dirk Martens in Louvain (July 1514). Its complete title was: *Opuscula aliquot Erasmo Roterodamo castigatore et interprete, quibus prime etati nihil prelegi potest neque utilius neque elegantius: Libellus elegantissimus qui uulgo Cato inscribitur complectens sanctissimae uitae communis precepta; Mimi Publiani; Septem sapientum celebra dicta; Institutum Christiani hominis carmine pro pueris ab Erasmo compositum. Parenesis Isocratis, Rodolpho Agricola interprete, castigatore Martino Dorpio. Epigramma Gerardi Noviomagi in laudem D. Erasmi Roterodami, theologi eloquentissimi*. Cf. Allen 2: Ep. 298 (intr.); CWE 2: 2 (Ep. 298, intr.). It should be noted the existence of another edition published by Valentinus Auriga in Nuremberg, whose title is *Catonis disticha moralia cum scholiis*. Its prefatory epistle is dated 1 August 1513, which (if not an error) would make this edition earlier than that of Martens.

⁵² Cf. Vives, *Rat. stud. I* (VOO 1: 269): «Auctores in quibus uersabitur, ii erunt qui pariter et linguam et mores excolant atque instituant; quique non modo bene scire doceant sed bene uiuere». Cf. *supra* Part II, n. 117, 211, 271.

⁵³ Erasmus edited four out of the nine volumes of the complete works of Jerome: *Omnium operum diuini Eusebii Hieronymi Stridonensis* (Basel: Johann Froben, 25 August 1516), 9 vols.

⁵⁴ Among Erasmus's works, Vives mentions *Institutio principis Christiani* (Basel: Johann Froben, May 1516), *Enchiridion militis Christiani* (Antwerp: Dirk Martens, 15 February 1503), and the *Paraphrases* of the New Testament, issued between 1517 and 1524 by different printers (Michaël Hillen, Dirk Martens, and Johann Froben).

CHRISTIAN: Ambrose, Arator, Augustine, Jerome (*Epistulae*), New Testament, Paulinus, Prosper, Prudentius, Sidonius Apollinaris.

HUMANISTS: Erasmus (*Institutio principis Christiani, Enchiridion, Paraphrases in Novum Testamentum, Colloquia*).

GRAMMARIANS AND LEXICOGRAPHERS: Ambrogio Calepino, Erasmus (*De constructione octo partium orationis*),⁵⁵ Thomas Linacre (*Rudimenta grammatices*), Antonio Mancinelli (*Thesaurus de uaria constructione*), Melanchthon (*Syntaxis seu De constructione*), Niccolò Perotti.

The second epistle, simply dated 1523 (it lacks more detailed temporal references), is addressed to Charles Blount,⁵⁶ the son of William Blount (fourth Baron Mountjoy, and Erasmus's patron), and focuses fundamentally on Greek language and culture. According to the revised version published in 1526, it examines the following matters: «Religion» (*Religio*), «Effort» (*Opera*), «Memory» (*Memoria*), «The teacher» (*Praeceptor*), «Student mates» (*Condiscipuli*), «Rivalry» (*Coertatio*), «Taking notes» (*Annotiones*), «Concentration when writing» (*Diligentia scribendi*), «Reading» (*Lectio*), «Asking questions» (*Interrogatio*), «Being corrected» (*Emendatio*), «Language» (*Sermo*), «Style» (*Stilus*), «Recommended authors» (*Authores*), «Writers on history» (*Historiae*), «Writers on agronomy» (*Scriptores Agricolationum*), «Poets» (*Poetae*), «Grammarians» (*Grammatici*), «Commentators» (*Interpretes*); «Greek letters» (*Graecae literae*): «Pronunciation of sounds» (*Prolatio sonorum*), «Declensions» (*Inflexiones*), «Fist practice in reading of authors» (*Prima exercitatio lectionis auctorum*), «Syntax» (*Syntaxis*), «Reading» (*Lectio*), «Translations» (*Interpretationes*), «The benefit of Greek culture» (*Fructus Graecitatis*).

Here the curriculum proposed is intended for a more advanced level than that of *Rat. stud. I*: the list of recommended authors is larger and Greek writers are introduced. I give below a brief summary of authors mentioned by Vives in *Rat. stud. II* (particular works are indicated only if Vives does so).

AUTHORS MENTIONED BY VIVES TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

GREEK: Aeschines, Aesop, Aristides, Aristophanes, Aristotle, Demosthenes, Euripides, Homer, Isocrates, Lias, Lucian (*Dialogi*), Plato, Plutarch, Sophocles, Theophrastus, Thucydides, Xenophon.

LATIN: Apuleius (*Metamorphoseon, Florida*), Caesar (*Commentarii de bello Gallico, Commentarii belli ciuilis*), Cato, Cicero (*Epistulae*), Columella, Horatius, Livy, Lucanus, Palladius, Pliny the Older, Pliny the Younger (*Epistulae*), Sallust, Seneca, Silius Italicus, Suetonius, Tacitus, Terence, Varro, Virgil, Vitruvius.

CHRISTIAN: Arator, Juvencus, Paulinus of Nola, Prosper of Aquitaine, Prudentius, Sedulius,⁵⁷ Sidonius Apollinaris.

HUMANISTS: Eliseo Calenzio, Erasmus (*Colloquia*), Francesco Filelfo (*Epistulae*), Angelo Poliziano (*Epistulae*), Lorenzo Valla (*Elegantiae linguae Latinae*).

⁵⁵ Vives refers to it as a work that has circulated (*circumfetur*) under the name of Erasmus. As a matter of fact, Erasmus undertook a revised edition of this work of William Lily (London: Richard Pynson, 1513), which was published later by Johann Froben (Basel, August 1515).

⁵⁶ Cf. CEBR 1: 154a-156b.

⁵⁷ Probably Coelius Sedulius (5th century), not Sedulius Scottus (9th century).

Vives also acknowledges the invaluable help provided by the following commentators, who shed light on ancient writers: Helenius Acro and Pomponius Porphyrio, on Horace; Aelius Donatus, on Terence; Maurus Servius, on Virgil. Further, he encourages students to consult grammatical books of the following authors: Hieronymus Aleander, Apollonius Dyscolus, Theodoros Gazis, John VII of Constantinople, Antonio Mancinelli, Aldo Manuzio, Philip Melanchthon, Antonio de Nebrija, Ioannes Oecolampadius, Niccolò Perotti, Jan de Spouter of Ninove (Ioannes Despauterius Ninivita), Sulpicius Apollinaris, Lorenzo Valla, and Hieronymus Aleander (*Tabulae*).

As far as lexicons (*uocabularia*) are concerned, Vives complains not only about the scarcity of resources but also about the fact that the existing tools do not cover all what is needed; moreover, they are not always reliable.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, he recognizes the contribution of lexicographers such as Guillaume Budé (*Pandectae, De asse*), Ambrogio Calepino, Festus, Marcellus, Niccolò Perotti (*Cornucopia*), and Varro. Vives particularly recommends two dictionaries: Hesichius's alphabetical collection of all words, compiled in the 5th or 6th century;⁵⁹ and *Suidas*, an alphabetical encyclopedia compiled during the 10th century.⁶⁰ Finally, Vives finds suitable to use Latin translations of Greek works made by the following scholars: Guillaume Budé (some small works of Plutarch), Erasmus and Thomas More (Lucian's *Dialogi*), Theodoros Gazis (Aristotle's books on animals, *Problemata*; Theophrastus's *Characteres*),⁶¹ Angelo Poliziano (Herodianus), and Lorenzo Valla (Herodotus, Thucydides). He does not recommend Ermolao's translation of Temisthius, because he was carried too far away from the original due to his desire of being grandiose.⁶²

To sum up, the most important points that Vives wanted to emphasize in *Rat. stud. II* are the following: (1) asking questions is not disgraceful but ignorance;⁶³ (2) one book leads to another book;⁶⁴ (3) dictionaries and vocabularies are of much assistance when studying.⁶⁵ These convictions exemplify Vives's strong belief in modesty, hard study, relentless research, and trust on authority.

⁵⁸ Cf. Vives, *Rat. stud. II* (VOO 1: 277): «Magna partis huius laboramus in Latinis litteris inopia. [... Vocabularia] nec satis plena sunt et docta parum, nec quibus tuto fidatur».

⁵⁹ Original title: *Συναγωγή πασῶν λέξεων κατὰ στοιχεῖον* (*Synagoge pason lexeon kata stoicheion*). *Editio princeps*: Marcus Musurus (ed.), *Ἡσυχίου λεξικόν / Hesychii dictionarium* (Venice: Aldo Manuzio, 1514). Critical edition: K. Latte et al. (eds.), *Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon* (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2005-2020), 4 vols. Cf. E. Dickey, *Ancient Greek Scholarship: A Guide to Finding, Reading, and Understanding Scholia, Commentaries, Lexica, and Grammatical Treatises, from Their Beginnings to the Byzantine Period* (New York: Oxford U. P., 2007), 88-90.

⁶⁰ *Editio princeps*: Demetrius Chalcondylas (ed.), *ΤΟ ΜΕΝ ΠΑΡΟΝ ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΣΟΥΪΔΑ = Lexicon Graecum* (Milan: Ioannes Bissolus / Benedictus Mangius, 15 November 1499). First Latin edition: Hieronymus Wolf (tr.), *Suidae historica* (Basel: Johann Oporinus / Johann Herwagen, 1564). Critical edition: A. Adler (ed.), *Suidae lexicon* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1928-1938; repr. Munich / Leipzig: Saur, 2001), 5 vol. Cf. Dickey 2007 (as in previous note), 90-91.

⁶¹ Vives undoubtedly praises Gazis by calling him «princeps interpretum» (VOO 1: 279).

⁶² Cf. Vives, *Rat. stud. II* (VOO 1: 279): «calore iuuenili et sui ostendandi cupiditate».

⁶³ Cf. Vives, *Rat. stud. II* (VOO 1: 273): «Nec pudeat rogare quae nescis; neque enim hoc est turpe sed ignoratio turpis est».

⁶⁴ Cf. Vives, *Rat. stud. II* (VOO 1: 277): «Nec de nihilo est quod dicitur: libro librum aperiri».

⁶⁵ Cf. Vives, *Rat. stud. II* (VOO 1: 277): «Vocabularia eodem loco haberi possunt, quae uelim tibi semper, dum studes, praesto esse ut illa subinde consulas, si quid dubitas».

2 The format

Once the circumstances of composition and publication have been expounded, attention should be drawn now to an element of paramount importance when it comes to *Ad sap.*, namely format and, to be more specific, the aphoristic style.⁶⁶

2.1 The importance of aphorisms at the beginning of the 16th century

In 1511, Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466/9-1536) devoted a few lines of the *De ratione studii* (Paris: Georges Biermant and Jean Granjon) to stress the importance of employing the aphoristic style in order to strengthen memory:

It will be of considerable help if you take things which it is necessary but rather difficult to remember [...] and have them written as briefly and attractively as possible on charts and hung up on the walls of a room where they are generally conspicuous even to those engaged on something else. In the same way you will write some brief but pithy sayings [*dicta*] such as aphorisms [*apophthegmata*], proverbs [*prouerbia*], and maxims [*sententiae*] at the beginning and at the end of your books; others you will inscribe on rings or drinking cups; others you will paint on doors and walls or even in the glass of a window so that what may aid learning is constantly before the eye. For, although these measures seem trivial in themselves when taken singly, yet taken together they make a profitable addition to the treasury of knowledge [*doctrinae thesaurum*].⁶⁷

A few years later, in the *Institutio principis Christiani* (Basel: Johann Froben, 1516), Erasmus wrote about the powerful force of aphorisms, maxims, and wise sayings when applied to education. He strongly believed that one ought to

fortify the young mind [*animus*] with healthy precepts and relevant principles [*decreta ac praecepta*]. [...] But it is not enough just to hand out the sort of maxims [*decreta*] which warn him off evil things and summon him to the good. No, they must be fixed in his mind, pressed in, and rammed home. And they must be kept fresh in the memory in all sorts of ways: sometimes in a moral maxim [*sententia*], sometimes in a parable [*fabella*], sometimes by an analogy [*simile*], sometimes by a live example [*exemplum*], an epigram [*apophthegma*],⁶⁸ or a proverb [*prouerbium*]; they must be carved on rings,

⁶⁶ As far as studies on aphorisms, maxims, and proverbs are concerned, cf. Balavoine 1984; Mieder 2004; Lelli 2007; Hrisztova-Gotthardt and Aleksa 2015; Taylor 2017; Hui 2018; Hui 2019a; Hui 2019b. Regarding thesaurus of wise sayings, cf. De Mauri, Nepi and Paredi 1978; Herrero 2010; Tosi 2017.

⁶⁷ Erasmus, *De ratione studii* (ASD IV-2: 118-119; tr. CWE 24: 671): «Adiuuabit non mediocriter, si quorum necessaria quidem sed subdifficilis erit memoria [...] ea quam fieri potest breuissime simul et luculentissime in tabulas depicta, in cubiculi parietibus suspendantur, quo passim et aliud agentibus sint obuia. Item si quaedam breuiter sed insigniter dicta, uelut apophthegmata, prouerbia, sententias, in frontibus atque in calcibus singulorum codicum inscribes, quaedam anulis aut poculis insculpes, nonnulla pro foribus et in parietibus aut uitreis edam fenestris depinges, quo nusquam non occurrat oculis, quod eruditionem adiuuet. Haec enim tametsi singula per se pusilla uidentur, tamen in unum collata acruum doctrinae thesaurum lucro augent».

⁶⁸ As it can be inferred from the subtitle of Erasmus's *Apophthegmata* (Basel: Hieronymus Froben, Johann Herwagen and Nicolaus Episcopus, March 1531), apophthegms are (ASD IV-4: 49, lines 2-3; tr.

painted in pictures, inscribed on prizes, and presented in any other way that a child of his age enjoys, so that they are always before his mind even when he is doing something else.⁶⁹

In a like manner, in *De recta Latini Graecique sermonis pronuntiatione* (Basel: Officina Frobeniana, 1528) Erasmus recommends that «ethics will be taught by means of aphorisms, especially aphorisms that refer to the Christian religion and to one's duties towards society».⁷⁰ It is appropriate to point out here that Seneca, a widely read author by both Erasmus and Vives, conceived *praecepta* ('precepts', 'maxims') as a necessary part of philosophy, since weaker souls are in need of guidance in order to know what should be avoided and what ought to be done.⁷¹

Adages also aid to education and the instruction of moral philosophy. In the preface of *Adagiorum chiliades* (1508), Erasmus explains that three of the most important reasons for collecting adages is to keep «the sparks of that ancient philosophy, which was much clearer-sighted in its investigation of truth than were the philosophers who came after»,⁷² «persuade others»,⁷³ and add «authority and beauty to style».⁷⁴

Adagia ('adages') *apophthegmata* ('sayings of remarkable people'),⁷⁵ *dicta* ('sayings'), *praecepta* ('principles', 'precepts', 'maxims'), *proverbia* ('proverbs'), and *sententiae* ('moral maxims') were all considered to be of great assistance in the field of education: not only did they transmit maximum knowledge with minimum words, but also helped memory to assimilate a particular item and remember it more easily. Such properties clearly stated by Erasmus —whom Vives considered his master (*mi domine*) and beloved teacher (*praeceptor carissime, mi praeceptor*)—,⁷⁶ must have certainly influenced the Valencian humanist when

CWE 37: 1) «lepide dicta principum, philosophorum ac diuersi generis hominum ex Graecis pariter ac Latinis autoribus selecta», that is, «agreeable sayings of rulers, philosophers, and men of diverse kinds selected from Greek and Latin authors». Vives made his own definition in *Disc. trad.* 5 (VOO 6: 392; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 440; tr. Watson 1913: 236): «Tum dicta et responsa hominum praedictorum ingenio, sapientia, usu rerum, ea potissimum quae Graeco uerbo ἀποφθέγματα dicuntur», that is, «Then should be read the sayings and answers of men who have been gifted with wit, wisdom, experience of affairs, especially those sayings known by the Greek word ἀποφθέγματα».

⁶⁹ Erasmus, *Institutio principis Christiani* (ASD IV-1: 140, lines 137-138, 143-148; tr. CWE 27: 210): «...muniat animum illius salubribus decretis ac praeceptis accommodis. [...] Neque satis est huiusmodi decreta tradere, quae uel a turpibus auocent uel inuitent ad honesta: infigenda sunt, infulcienda sunt, inculcanda sunt et alia atque alia forma renouanda memoriae, nunc sententia nunc fabella nunc simili nunc exemplo nunc apophthegmate nunc prouerbio; inculpanda anulis, appingenda tabulis, asscribenda stemmatis, et si quid aliud est, quo aetas ea delectatur, ut undique sint obuia etiam aliud agentis».

⁷⁰ Erasmus, *De recta pronuntiatione* (ASD I-4: 31, lines 569-570; tr. CWE 26: 387): «Hoc [i.e. mores] aphorismis instillabitur, praesertim ad pietatem Christianam et officia uitae communis pertinentibus».

⁷¹ Cf. Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 94.50, 94.52 (Cardó 1930: 102, 103): «Imbecillioribus quidem ingeniis necessarium est aliquem praeire: hoc uitabis, hoc facies. [...] Haec sunt per quae probatur hanc philosophiae partem superuacua non esse».

⁷² Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* prol. 6 (ASD II-1: 60, lines 278-280; tr. CWE 31: 14): «Subesse enim uelut igniculos quosdam uetustae sapientiae, quae in peruestiganda ueritate multo fuerit perspicacior quam posteriores philosophi fuerint».

⁷³ Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* prol. 7 (ASD II-1: 62, line 318; tr. CWE 31: 15): «aliis persuadere».

⁷⁴ Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* prol. 8 (ASD II-1: 64, line 374; tr. CWE 31: 17): «uel dignitatis uel ueneris adiungat orationi».

⁷⁵ Cf. *supra* n. 68.

⁷⁶ Cf. Allen 4: Ep. 1222, lines 41-42; Allen 5: Ep. 1306, lines 70-71; Ep. 1455, line 39; 7: Ep. 1836, line 77.

he was pondering the format of *Ad sap.* Vives himself acknowledged the usefulness of sapiential devices. For example, in *Rat. stud.*, he encourages princess Mary (and, in a broader sense, all young students and learned readers) to choose those little moral maxims (*sententiolae*) which are particularly useful in life and may serve as antidotes for whatever happens, whether it is fortune or misfortune.⁷⁷ Later, in *Disc. trad.*, he again stresses the fact that maxims, proverbs, and apophthegms are essential in the formation of characters.⁷⁸

The intellectual and literary background of the first decades of the 16th century definitely fostered the growth of sapiential literature. Precisely, on the threshold of the sixteenth century, at least five significant books were published in the field of proverbs, maxims, and precepts, namely: the *Prouerbiorum libellus*⁷⁹ of Polidoro Virgilio⁸⁰ (Venice: Christophorus de Pensis, 1498), the *Adagiorum collectanea* of Erasmus (Paris: Johann Philippi, ca. June-July 1500),⁸¹ the aforesaid *Symbola Pythagorae moraliter explicata* of Filippo Beroaldo (Bologna: Benedictus Hectoris, 1503),⁸² the *Oratio prouerbiorum* of the same author (Paris: Jean Barbier, 1505), and the *Hieroglyphica*⁸³ of Horapollo Niliacus, an Egyptian scribe who lived in the fifth century (Venice: Aldo Manuzio, 1505; Greek text).

Of all, the book of Erasmus gathered extraordinary success, and the Dutch humanist revised and enlarged his collection of proverbs until the end of his life. The *Collectanea adagiorum* encompassed 818 proverbs, which was enlarged up to 838 in 1505 / 1506 (Paris: Jean Petit / Josse Bade); it was later completely renewed and renamed as *Adagiorum chiliades* (Venice: Aldo Manuzio, 1508; 3411 adages),⁸⁴ and *Prouerbiorum chiliades* (Basel: Johann Froben, 1515; 3422 adages). It was reprinted again with this last name in 1517 / 1518 (Basel: Johann Froben; 3422 adages), 1520 (Basel: Johann Froben; 3443 adages), and 1523 (Basel: Johann Froben; 3482 adages). In 1526, Froben reedited the book as *Adagiorum opus* (3535 adages), which was reprinted with changes by his son, Hieronymus Froben, in 1528 (3658 adages) and 1533 (4146 adages). The book had one last improvement in 1536, four months before Erasmus's death (12 July 1536), being edited with the final name of *Adagiorum chiliades* (Basel: Hieronymus Froben; 4151 adages).⁸⁵

⁷⁷ Cf. Vives, *Rat. stud. I* (VOO 1: 265): «Ediscet ex illis sententiolis aliquot uitas maxime utiles, quas habeat in posterum uelut antidota aduersus uenenum et prosperae fortunae et iniquae».

⁷⁸ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 5 (VOO 6: 390; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 438): «Mitto sententias tot, prouerbia, apophthegmata, quibus componendi mores impensissime adiuuantur: quae omnia e media historia petuntur».

⁷⁹ There is a complete translation of this work in Spanish: Serrano 2007.

⁸⁰ Cf. CEBR 3: 397b-399b.

⁸¹ Complete translation: CWE 30 (English). In 1515, Vives already was aware of both books of Virgilio and Erasmus, as he himself states in a letter sent to Adrianus Cornelius Barlandus ca. February 1515; cf. Jiménez 1978 (Ep. 3): 111; Tournoy 2005: 115, lines 25-27.

⁸² Cf. *supra* section 1.2 (a), p. 84.

⁸³ Existing translations: González de Zárate and García 1991 (Spanish); Boas 1993 (English); Rigoni and Zanco 1996 (Italian). Cf. also the studies of Wildish 2017; Volkman 2018.

⁸⁴ Complete translations: CWE 31-36 (English); Saladin 2011 (French); Lelli 2014 (Italian). Anthologies, with introductory studies: Phillips 1964; Blum et al. 1992; Barker 2001; Puig de la Bellacasa 2008. Cf. also the thorough study on the *Adages* by Grant (2017).

⁸⁵ Cf. Phillips 1964: xii-xiii. The total amount of adages in any of the editions of Erasmus and Virgilio may differ from the final printed number, because unaccounted mistakes did occur in various places. For example, Erasmus's adages «Elucet egregia uirtus» and «Mutua defensatio» are both catalogued III viii 62 (Basel: Johann Froben, 1536, p. 820-821); so is the case with «Cum sis nanus, cede» and «Nocte lucidus, interdiu inutilis» (Basel: Johann Froben, 1536, p. 911-912), both catalogued IV iii 29.

In turn, Virgilio's *Prouerbiorum libellus* (306 proverbs, unnumbered) went also through revisions and enhancements, although lesser in extension than the book of Erasmus. It was reedited with notable changes in 1521 as *Adagiorum liber* (Basel: Johann Froben; 306 profane and 431 sacred proverbs), in 1525 as *Adagiorum opus* (Basel: Johann Froben; 298 profane and 503 sacred proverbs), and in 1541 with the same title (Basel: Johann Bebel; 298 profane and 624 sacred proverbs). The book had one last improvement in 1550 under the name of *Adagiorum aequae humanorum ut sacrorum opus* (Basel: Michael Isengrin; 298 profane and 703 sacred proverbs).⁸⁶

Regarding Horapollon's *Hieroglyphica* (189 hieroglyphics), the Greek text printed by Manuzio was first translated into Latin in 1515 by Bernardino Trebazio (Basel: Johann Froben, 1518), and two years later Filippo Fasanini made another Latin version (Bologna: Girolamo de Benedetti,⁸⁷ 1517). The book attained great popularity amongst humanists, especially due to the depiction of different aspects of human society, religion, and the world.

Other books which might have indirectly included maxims and wise sayings were also available at the beginning of the sixteenth century. For example, the *Annotationes centum* of Beroaldo (Bologna: Girolamo de Benedetti / Benedetto Faelli,⁸⁸ 1488), Niccolò Perotti's *Cornucopiae* (Venice: Paganino de Paganini, 1489), Angelo Poliziano's *Miscellanea* (Florence: Antonio di Bartolomeo Miscomini, 1489), or Giovan Battista Pio's *Annotationes* (Venice: Giacomo Penzio, 1502). However, none of them presented the materials in the appealing format that Virgilio and Erasmus did. They simply placed a proverb or an adage in a neat line, and offered a commentary below. Perhaps inspired by this layout, three decades later, the printer Heinrich Steyner set the standard format of another genre of great success, the emblem, by placing a picture between the proverb or wise saying and its explanation. Andrea Alciato's *Emblematum liber* (Augsburg, 1531; 99 emblems, unnumbered; unauthorized edition) reached 212 emblems in its final edition: it was called *Emblemata* (Lyon: Guillaume Rouillé / Macé Bonhomme, 1550), and it was reprinted extensively during the following centuries.⁸⁹ One remarkable subsequent edition is that which incorporates Claude Mignault's commentaries (Paris: Denis du Pré, 1571).

As a result of this intellectual and creative environment, it seems plausible that *Ad sap.* was arranged in such a layout that it could be associated with both wisdom literature and educational books focused on moral philosophy.⁹⁰ But was, in fact, the aphoristic layout Vives's actual first choice? I shall discuss this issue in the next subsection.

2.2 Common practices at printing houses

Anthony Grafton, a highly respected historian of cultural studies, has published two important monographs on the printing world in the Renaissance: *The Culture of Correction in*

⁸⁶ Cf. Serrano 2007: 32-33.

⁸⁷ Also known with the Latin name of Hieronymus Platonides.

⁸⁸ Also known with the Latin name of Benedictus Hector.

⁸⁹ According to A. Grafton (in Boas 1993: xviii), «Erasmus's *Adagia* and Alciato's *Emblemata* were perhaps the most original and influential of the period's efforts to crystallise great truths in lapidary form, inaccessible to the wicked and slothful but incomparably moving to those with eyes and spirits capable of receiving them». Available translations of the *Emblemata*: Daly, Callahan and Cuttler 1985 (English); Sebastian and Pedraza 1985 (Spanish); Moffitt 2004 (English). Studies on Alciato and the Emblem: Daly 1980; Daly, Manning and Vaec 2001; Manning 2002; Daly 2008; Daly 2014.

⁹⁰ Cf. *supra* n. 31.

Renaissance Europe (2011), and *Inky Fingers* (2020a). He patently asserts that «readers, publishers and correctors agreed that printing, whatever its other qualities, was one great kingdom of error. [...] Errors, in all their different forms, entered the process at many different points».⁹¹ In the first place, a scribe (*scriba, exscribens*) may have written down the author's work incorrectly.⁹² Later, editors, proofreaders or correctors (*castigatores, correctores*) may have introduced changes in the text, which ranged from simple emendation of typographical errors to severe distortion of format and content:

Correctors, as they were usually called, prepared manuscripts for the press, read proofs, and often added original material of their own. They were everywhere in the world of print, and many early modern humanists—including those whose names remain familiar— either praised or denigrated them and their work. [...] They corrected authors' copy as well as proofs. They identified and mended typographical and other errors, to the best of their ability. They divided texts into sections and drew up aids to readers: title pages, tables of contents, chapter headings, and indexes. [...] Correctors had every reason to feel ill used. True, their names came first, as we have seen, in the Froben and Episcopius payrolls. But their actual pay was modest: lower than that of the best-paid compositors and pressmen.⁹³

Finally, the printer (*chalcographus, excusor, typographus*) and his assistants may have corrupted the work of an author by poor handling and carelessness, as the following apology written by Hieronymus Posthumus, corrector at Ottaviano Pretrucci's press, conveys:

Honest reader, if you find any errors in this work, please do not lay them to the account of the corrector, but to that of the printers. Since they are not learned, it is inevitable that they often turn letters upside down, replace one word with another, and have to replace the syllables that jump about.⁹⁴

Vives's experience with printing houses confirms the narrative of Grafton. The Valencian humanist bitterly complained in many occasions about mistakes, intrusive practice and poor handling of the work. Here are four examples:

You see how great the negligence of printers is! And how gross! Like when they print *uidendum* instead of *uiuendum*, *millium* instead of *militum*, *cogita* instead of *cogitata*,

⁹¹ Grafton 2011: 79, 91. Cf. P. White, «Humanist printers», in Ford, Bloemendal and Fantazzi 2014, vol. 1: 181: «The making of printed books was the work of several hands performing functions in close collaboration with one another: mechanics, businessmen and intellectuals brushed shoulders in the bustling space of the printing house. Collaboration was the essence of book production, as is illustrated in the famous emblem of Badius Ascensius, which depicts the division of labour in the printing house between compositor, inker, and pressman»; cf. complementary note 1.

⁹² Grafton (2011: 84) shows the apologies written by Matthias Schürer (ed.) in Jacob Wimpheling, *Epithoma rerum Germanicarum* (Strasbourg: Ioannes Prius, 11 March 1505), colophon: «Do not be surprised or fly into a rage if there are inversions, transpositions, changes and omissions in this book. No one can see everything. [...] Moreover, the printer's copy was truncated, corrupt and full of mistakes, all of which was the scribe's fault». Original Latin text in Grafton 2011: 84, n. 17.

⁹³ Grafton 2020a: 29, 35, 43.

⁹⁴ Paul of Middelburg, *Paulina de recta Paschae celebratione* (Fossombrone: Ottaviano Pretrucci, 1513), f. GG4v. Translation by Grafton (2011: 85); original Latin text in Grafton 2011: 85, n. 20.

obedient instead of *obeant!* They make sure to print not what the author decided, but what they understand. [...] In the example of the virgins of Locris⁹⁵ I quoted verbatim the words of Saint Jerome. In the chapter “How she will behave in public”, it was printed *harum* instead of *haud*.⁹⁶ In this same chapter, there was a shameful stop: two or three lines were skipped,⁹⁷ which I cannot restore without consulting the manuscript. [...] The rest of mistakes were made by printers, as you rightly guessed.⁹⁸

They spoiled many places, while believing that they were correcting them, such as *in ea colitur, saeuientis etsi*.⁹⁹

I do not know whether you have read my book *On the relief of the poor*, full of errors and, of course, printed in Bruges: forgiveness for he who makes its first attempt!¹⁰⁰

At present those who can distinguish the various editions get some idea of your intentions, but later generations, who will not be able to unravel the different editions (for the printers leave everything in a muddle), will be robbed of much of the value of your work.¹⁰¹

I wish we had one of your printers here! Ours are all deficient and worthless, even more deficient in their soul than in their body. I wish I had served yours rather than our shabby ones, with whom it is most irritating to carry out or complete tasks.¹⁰²

⁹⁵ Cf. Vives, *Foem.* 1.10.90 (VOO 4: 126; ed. SWJV 6: 120-121).

⁹⁶ Cf. Vives, *Foem.* 1.11.102 (VOO 4: 135, line 20; ed. SWJV 6: 138, line 6).

⁹⁷ Cf. Vives, *Foem.* 1.11.93-112 (VOO 4: 129-141; ed. SWJV 6: 126-148). Subsequent editions introduced many additions, which makes difficult to locate the passage that Vives is referring to. I give those passages of more than two lines omitted by *editio princeps*, according to the *apparatus criticus* provided by Ch. Fantazzi: 1.11.93, lines 21-24; 1.11.94, lines 24-26; 1.11.95, lines 2-4, 17-18; 1.11.98, line 30 – 1.11.99, line 10; 1.11.100, lines 3-11; 1.11.101, lines 17-22; 1.11.105, lines 22-25; 1.11.107, line 28 – p.144, line 3; 1.11.112, lines 10-14.

⁹⁸ Disapproval about the edition of *Foem.* printed by Michaël Hillen (Antwerp, 1524). Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 1 May 1524 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 102, lines 21-25, 31-37, 58-59): «Vides quanta sit typographorum negligentia! quam crassa! ut quum ‘uidendum’ pro ‘uiuendum’, et ‘millium’ pro ‘militum’, et ‘cogita’ pro ‘cogitata’, et ‘obediant’ pro ‘obeant’ excudunt! Nimirum non id quod autho<r> sensit, sed quod ipsi intelligunt! [...] In exemplo de <Lo>cridibus, ad uerbum retuli Hieronymi uerba. In capite ‘Quomodo foris aget uirgo’, ‘harum’ impressum est pro ‘haud’; in eodem capite flagitiose cessatum est, duobus uersibus a<ut> etiam tribus praetermissis, quos restituere non possum nisi autographo consulto. [...] Caetera sunt excusorum, in quis recte coniectasti».

⁹⁹ Disapproval about the edition of *Ad sap., Sat. and Rat. stud.* printed by Pieter Martens (Leuven, 1524). Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 7 March 1525 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 144, lines 30-31): «Deprauarunt illi nonnulla loca, dum se crederent corrigere, ut ‘in ea colitur’, ‘saeuientis etsi’». Regarding «in ea colitur», cf. *Sat.* 87, *apparatus criticus* (Tello 2020a: 74). Regarding «saeuientis etsi», cf. *Ad sap.* 265, *apparatus criticus* (L 263). Cf. also *supra* n. 28.

¹⁰⁰ Disapproval about the edition of *Sub.* printed by Hubert de Croock (Bruges, 1526). Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 13 April 1526 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 185, lines 12-14): «Nescio an legeris meum libellum de subuentione pauperum, bene mendosum, nempe Brugis excusum: συγγνώμη πρωτοπέριω».

¹⁰¹ Vives, *Letter to Erasmus* 6 August 1526 (Allen 6: Ep. 1732, lines 21-25; tr. CWE 12: 268): «Nam nunc qui editiones distinguunt, utcunque sensum animi tui deprehendunt; posteri uero, quibus editiones separare non licebit, confundentibus omnia typographis, maxima monumentorum tuorum utilitate frustrabuntur».

¹⁰² Vives, *Letter to Simon Grynaeus* ca. 1538: «Vtinam hic aliquem haberemus ex uestris typographis: nostri enim omnes tenues sunt et miseri, animis etiam tenuiores quam re. Vellem profuissem istis uestris quantum his sordidis, cum quibus aliquid agere aut contrahere odiosissimum est». Latin text

2.3 Evidence to attempt to elucidate the genuine format of the work

Keeping in mind the influential role and the general practice of scribes, editors, proofreaders and printers, let us examine now what might have been the genuine format of *Ad sap.* For that purpose I shall focus on the first (Louvain: Peter Martens, 1524; henceforth L) and second edition (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, 1526; henceforth C) of this work.¹⁰³ A close examination of L reveals that since the very beginning *Ad sap.* lacked an introductory epistle, and its content was not divided into chapters but presented in a continuous flow of maxims, precepts or aphorisms, whose length varied dramatically. Although the majority of maxims ranged from one single line to five, certain fragments were extremely long in comparison: 445 (19 lines), 528¹⁰⁴ (18 lines), 573 (11 lines), 598 (21 lines).

Two years later, C introduced some significant changes in the arrangement of the work. On the one hand, long fragments were broken into smaller pieces: L 445 became C 433-440 (between 2-6 lines each); L 573 became C 563 (5 lines) and 564 (7 lines); but two still remained quite long after being re-edited: L 528 became C 526 (2 lines) and 527 (17 lines); L 598 became C 590 (10 lines) and 591 (13 lines). The rearrangement carried out by C suggests a will to reinforce the aphoristic layout, which nonetheless was not fully attained, because some fragments were still longer than average. On the other hand, C introduced another substantial innovation: it added titles every now and then in order to fit the content into a sort of unnumbered chapters. This division into chapters was kept by subsequent editions with minor discrepancies: title chapters were placed in slightly different locations, which demonstrates that such division implied, to some extent, an element of randomness.¹⁰⁵

It is precisely this flavor of randomness and carelessness what Alventosa (1930) highlighted in the preface to his translation. Moreover, he claimed that the content of *Ad sap.* was mixed in such a way that what might have been a logical piece of writing in origin turned into an incoherent mess.¹⁰⁶ Frayle (2010) also noticed this fact when he mentions, in passing, that some aphorisms, although they are formally separated, conform a logical unity; as a matter of fact (he points out), they are often linked by conjunctions.¹⁰⁷ Although Tobriner

taken from G. Th. Streuber (ed.), *Simonis Grynaei clarissimi quondam academiae Basiliensis theologi ac philologi epistolae* (Basel: J. G. Neukirch, 1847), 11 (Ep. 8). Cf. Jiménez 1978: 607, n. 1.

¹⁰³ A table of concordances between my edition and other main editions is available *infra* section 4.3.

¹⁰⁴ In fact, mistakenly printed as number 578.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. the table of concordances *infra* section 4.3.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Alventosa 1930: ciii: «Es tan varia y diferente la partición de la Obra, comparando sus diversas ediciones, que parece imposible llegar a conocerla, en este aspecto, tal como salió de manos de su autor. [...] Sus autores y preparadores se han creído en el deber, poco halagüeño, de cambiar, diríamos, su fisonomía, partiéndola arbitrariamente en capítulos a su antojo, seccionándola minuciosamente en versículos a su placer y fundiendo como separando, a su personal arbitrio, no siempre lógico, capítulos cortos con largos, y haciendo de la que fue juiciosa y reflexiva división de cláusulas, numeradas, revoltijo, a veces, informe, que no nos permite no sólo conocer su forma y partición primitiva, sino cuál fuese la más aproximada, que, para nosotros, sería lo mismo que decir la más lógica».

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Frayle 2010: xix: «Con frecuencia una serie de máximas versa no sólo sobre un mismo tema sino sobre un punto concreto del mismo, y así cada una es continuación de la anterior y podían haber estado unidas, pues solo las separa el número de la máxima; de hecho muchas veces van enlazadas por conjunciones».

(1966), Roca (2001), and even Sancha (as early as 1772) did grasp the existence of differences between L and C,¹⁰⁸ they did not implicitly address the issue of the format.

(a) Evidence in favour of a continuous piece of writing

Scholars agree that aphorisms, maxims, proverbs, and wise sayings are short and well-delimited pieces, whose meaning begins and ends in themselves.¹⁰⁹ The name ‘aphorism’ itself conveys this succinctness, as it can be inferred from the meanings given in the entry ‘ἀφορισμός’ at LSJ: ‘delimitation’, ‘assignment of boundaries’, ‘separation’, ‘distinction’, ‘pithy sentence’, ‘aphorism’.¹¹⁰ Vives conceives moral maxims (*sententiae*) to be of «five words at most»;¹¹¹ and Erasmus considers brevity as a quality of the adage, when he comments that «if the adage seems a tiny thing, we must remember that it has to be estimated not only by its size but by its value».¹¹² Scholars on paremiology such as Norrick, claim that «the proverb is a traditional figurative saying which can form a complete utterance on its own», and that «according to Seiler (1922), proverbs must be self-contained sayings (in sich geschlossene Sprüche)».¹¹³ Even though some aphorisms and maxims can definitely be gathered into thematic sections, nonetheless each one keeps its self-sufficiency. As Hui (2019b: 419) summarizes:

Though an aphorism by definition is succinct,¹¹⁴ it almost always proliferates into an innumerable series of iterations. By nature, the aphorism —like the hedgehog— is a solitary animal. Striving to cut out all verbiage, its not-so-secret wish is to annihilate its neighbor so that its singular potency reigns supreme. Yet aphorisms also have a herd mentality. Indeed, from the wisdom literature of the Sumerians and Egyptians onward, they find strength in the social collective of anthologies. Each aphorism might very well be «complete in itself», as Schlegel claims, but it also forms a node in a network.

A philological analysis of *Ad sap.* reveals evidence that suggests that its aphorisms or maxims are not always self-sufficient and succinct. While the lack of succinctness has

¹⁰⁸ Tobriner (1966: II-ii) alludes to the edition printed in Lyon by Melchior and Gaspard Trechsel, which followed C: «In using the 1532 Latin edition, for example, I have found a number of corroborations of Morison’s translations; previously I had assumed them to be part of his creative development of Vives’ themes». Roca (2001: 15, n. 1) explains that he follows an alleged edition issued in Burgos in 1544, which contained corrections and additions made by Vives himself. Such edition was allegedly used by Sancha (1772: xxi-xxii) and, by the readings implied, it seems to follow the edition issued by Michaël Hillen (Antwerp, 1531), who in turn followed C through the edition printed by Robert de Keyser (Antwerp, 1530). Cf. *supra* Part I, section 2.2, n. 68.

¹⁰⁹ A selection of studies is found *supra* n. 66.

¹¹⁰ Cf. LSJ = H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones (eds.), *A Greek-English Lexicon, with a revised supplement* (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 1996), 292.

¹¹¹ Cf. Vives, *Sat. ep.* 6 (in *supra* n. 37).

¹¹² Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* prol. 5 (ASD II-1: 60, lines 261-262; tr. CWE 31: 13): «Quodsi minutula quaequam res uidetur adagium, meminimus ista non mole sed precio aestimari oportere».

¹¹³ R. N. Norrick, «Subject Area, Terminology, Proverb Definitions, Proverb Features», in Hrisztova-Gotthardt and Aleksa 2015: 8, 9.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Hui 2019a: 1: «Its minimal size is charged with maximal intensity».

already been addressed a few paragraphs earlier (L 445, 528, 573, 598; cf. *supra* p. 94), the absence of self-sufficiency will be tackled in the next lines through two clear examples.

Example 1: conjunctions and linking adverbs

If we assume that aphorisms should be well-delimited and self-contained, why is it then that many maxims in *Ad sap.* begin with a conjunction or a linking adverb? In the first eight precepts of *Ad sap.* (numbering according to my critical edition) the attentive reader can notice five of them being introduced by connectors (signaled in italics):

1. Vera sapientia est de rebus incorrupte iudicare, ut talem unamquamque existimemus qualis ipsa est, ne uilia sectemur tanquam preciosa aut preciosa tanquam uilia reiiciamus, ne uituperemus laudanda neue laudemus uituperium merita.
2. *Hinc* enim error omnis in hominum mentibus ac uitium oritur, nihilque est in humana uita exitiabilius quam deprauatio illa iudiciorum, quum singulis rebus non suum precium redditur.
3. *Quocirca* perniciosae sunt persuasiones uulgi, quod stultissime de rebus iudicat.
4. *Videlicet* magnus erroris magister est populus.
5. *Nec* aliud magis laborandum est quam ut sapientiae studiosum a populari sensu abducamus et uindicemus.
6. Primum omnium suspecta illi sint quaecunq̄ue multitudo magno consensu approbat, nisi ad illorum normam reuocarit qui singula uirtute metiuntur.
7. Assuescat unusquisque iam tum a puero ueras habere de rebus opiniones, quae simul cum aetate adolescent.
8. *Et* ea cupiat quae recta sint, fugiat quae praua. Assuefactio haec (bene agere) uertet ei prope in naturam, ut non possit nisi coactus et reluctans ad male agendum pertrahi.

Out of these five connectors, two are conjunctions (*nec*, *et*) and three are linking adverbs (*hinc*, *quocirca*, *uidelicet*) that undoubtedly refer to a previous content. As the very name conveys, conjunctions and linking adverbs relate elements, which implies that the elements detached either by L or C may have originally been devised and written attached, without separation. Based on this reasoning, I present below the first eight maxims of *Ad sap.* merged into a continuous flow of text, wherever that was naturally possible.¹¹⁵

Vera sapientia est de rebus incorrupte iudicare, ut talem unamquamque existimemus qualis ipsa est, ne uilia sectemur tanquam preciosa aut preciosa tanquam uilia reiiciamus, ne uituperemus laudanda neue laudemus uituperium merita. *Hinc* enim error omnis in hominum mentibus ac uitium oritur, nihilque est in humana uita exitiabilius quam deprauatio illa iudiciorum, quum singulis rebus non suum precium redditur, *quocirca* perniciosae sunt persuasiones uulgi, quod stultissime de rebus iudicat, *uidelicet* magnus erroris magister est populus. *Nec* aliud magis laborandum est quam ut sapientiae studiosum a populari sensu abducamus et uindicemus. Primum omnium suspecta illi sint quaecunq̄ue multitudo magno consensu approbat, nisi ad illorum normam reuocarit qui singula uirtute metiuntur. Assuescat unusquisque iam

¹¹⁵ This procedure, if plausible, can be applied to the entire work. The outcome could be presented in a future article aimed at further discussing the format of *Ad sap.*

tum a puero ueras habere de rebus opiniones, quae simul cum aetate adolescent, *et ea cupiat quae recta sint, fugiat quae praua. Assuefactio haec (bene agere) uertet ei prope in naturam, ut non possit nisi coactus et reluctans ad male agendum pertrahi.*

Apart from the aforementioned examples, other maxims are introduced as well by conjunctions and linking adverbs. I give below a few examples,¹¹⁶ with connectors being signaled in italics (translations all mine):

44. *Vt* transeam quot insidiae diuitiis tenduntur, quot et quam uariis casibus pereunt, in quam multa uitia detrudunt.

44. So that I shall not mention how many snares lie in wait for riches, in how many different circumstances they perish, into how many vices they push us.

48. *Ita* diuitiarum pars maxima, aedificia, supellex numerosa et lauta, gemmae, aurum, argentum, ornamentorum omne genus spectantium oculis et comparantur et exponuntur, non possidentium usibus.

48. Thus, great riches, buildings, abundant and fashionable furniture, jewels, gold, silver, and all kinds of ornaments are purchased and displayed for the eyes of spectators, not for the uses of their owners.

76. *Ergo*, exclusis uulgi sensibus, maximum malum putato non paupertatem aut ignobilitatem aut carcerem aut nuditatem, ignominiam, deformitatem corporis, morbos, imbecillitatem, sed uitia et his proxima: inscitiam, stuporem, dementiam.

76. Hence, having rejected the opinions of the crowd, do not think that the worst evil is poverty or a humble origin or prison or nakedness, dishonor, an ugly body, illnesses or helplessness, but vices and that resembles them: ignorance, stupidity and folly.

238. *Hinc* tenebrae oboriuntur oculo mentis. Et, ubi regnum affectus occupauere, iam illis tanquam dominis blandimur, indulgemus, paremus.

238. As a result, darkness emerges and blinds the eye of the mind. And once the emotions have assumed control, we flatter them as though they were our masters, give into them, and obey them.

372. Non *ergo* uno congressu (quod nonnulli faciunt temerarii), non centum, non longissimo conuictu de ingenio, de uitiiis aut uirtutibus cuiusquam sententiam in totum feras.

372. Therefore, you should absolutely not pass judgment on anyone's character, vices or virtues on the basis of one single encounter (which some people do rashly), even after a hundred meetings or a very long relationship.

426. *Sed* risus potest esse causa aliqua, irrisus nulla.

426. However, there may be a reason to laugh, but never to mock.

429. *Nec* assuesce quenquam caedere. Ex talitro uenitur ad pugnum, hinc ad fustem et ferrum.

429. Do not get in the habit of hitting people. A light tap turns into a punch, and from there into a stick and a sword.

¹¹⁶ Further philological analysis can be undertaken in order to quantify how many maxims are introduced by conjunctions and linking adverbs. The outcome could be presented in a future article aimed at further discussing the format of *Ad sap.*

445. *Nec quisquam tantus est quem non aliquando fortuna indigere minimis cogat.*

464. *Nec contumeliosum usurpes sermonem aut reprehensorium aut rigidum, sed neque blandum aut fractum aut adulatorium.*

472. *Idcirco psalmista inquit: «Pone custodiam ori meo et ostium circumstantiae labiis meis».*

491. *Ideo consultius est omnia esse aperta, nuda, simplicia.*

502. *Sed si uis in opinione tua uerum inesse, ne facile credas nisi comperta uel magnam ueri faciem prae se ferentia.*

553. *Et est profecto aequum ut eam tu des hominibus ueniam, qua in eisdem delictis aut aliis non paulo leuioribus ipse eges.*

563. *Idcirco sic ipse omnibus edicit: «Mihi uindictam et ego retribuam».*

594. *Et imminet semper occasioni suae diabolus, per quem nunquam nobis licet securis agere.*

598. *Et in oratione, quam ipse nos docuit, illa est coronis: «Et ne nos inducas in temptationem, sed libera nos a nefario illo insidiatore».*

445. And no one is so great that fortune does not force him now and then to require the help of the lowliest.

464. And do not use abusive, condemnatory, rough language; or soft, weak and flattering words.

472. That is why the psalmist says: «Place a guard on my mouth, and a door to enclose my lips».

491. Therefore, it is more advisable that all things be clear, undisguised and simple.

502. But, if you wish your opinions to be accurate, do not believe anything readily except what has already been validated or has a strong semblance of veracity.

553. And it is certainly just that you grant to men the forgiveness of which you yourself are in great need because of the same misdemeanours or others of no less gravity.

563. Therefore, the Lord proclaims to all of us: «Leave vengeance to me, and I will repay».

594. The devil is always on the lookout for his chance. This is why it is impossible for us ever to live safely.

598. And in the prayer that he taught us, this is the ending: «Lead us not into temptation» but liberate us from that nefarious plotter.

I would like to end this selection by mentioning a passage that is introduced by a neutral pronoun (*haec*), which alludes to all the previous content and, hence, it provides a sort of recap. This way of proceeding is commonly found in narrative speech and, conversely, not proper of aphorisms as a self-sufficient utterance.

258. *Haec ad hominem ex homine. Nunc altius, nempe ex deo; etiam si illa quoque ex deo, sed haec aliquanto expressius ac propius.*

258. These things have been said from man to man. But now let us ascend higher, to things said from God himself. Although the previous content also originates from God, nonetheless the following is somewhat more expressly and closely related to God.

Example 2: shattered sentences

There are quite a few places in L and C where a subordinate clause is edited detached from its main clause and thus converted into an independent maxim. This practice hinders an appropriate comprehension of the text, and it may constitute evidence of a process of intrusive partition that does not necessarily benefit understanding but, rather, serves the purpose of creating a layout as aphoristic as possible. Some examples¹¹⁷ are given below (numbering according to my critical edition):

113. Leuaturus animum fac cogites quam exiguum tempus datum sit uitae hominum, ex illo non oportere multum descendi ad lusus, ad comessationes, ad puerilitates, ad ineptias;

114. breue spatium esse uitae nostrae, etiam si totum bonae menti impenderetur;

115. non esse nos a deo creatos ad lusum, ad nugae sed ad seria: ad moderationem, modestiam, temperantiam, religionem, omne genus uirtutis et laudis.

225. Quumque nihil sit aliud haec uita quam peregrinatio, qua in alteram sempiternam tendimus, paucissimisque rebus ad hoc iter conficiendum egeamus,
226. quid est quamobrem his, quae huc atque illuc uolui et iactari cernimus, sollicitemur aut omnino moueamur?

255. Quid enim ridiculum magis quam tantulum tam imbecillum animalculum sic ferocire ac furere,

256. et tantas tragoedias tam atroces uilissimis de rebus excitare ut de corporeis, de fortuitis, etiam (si diis placet) de uno uerbulo?

113. When you are about to get up, realize how short a time has been granted to human life, because of which it is not fitting to demean yourself to such a degree in amusements, drinking parties, childish matters and trivialities;

114. <realize> that the span of our life is brief, even if all of it were devoted to the bettering of the mind;

115. <realize> that God has not created us for games or frivolities, but to be engaged in serious matters such as moderation, modesty, temperance, religion and every kind of moral goodness and praiseworthy deeds.

225. Since this life is nothing but a pilgrimage in which we strive for another everlasting life, and we need very few things to accomplish this journey,

226. why is it that we are moved and worried by things that we see slipping by and tossed about here and there?

255. In fact, what is more ridiculous than a tiny helpless animal that rampages and rushes furiously around,

256. and that arouses so many terrible tragedies for the most trivial reasons, like things related to the body, or chance happenings, or even (so please the gods) for one little word?

¹¹⁷ As in example 1, further philological analysis can be undertaken in order to quantify how many subordinate clauses are edited detached, and present the outcome in a future article aimed at further discussing the format of *Ad sap.*

264. Mundus hic est uelut domus quaedam eius uel potius templum. Ipse ex nihilo in hanc faciem atque ornatum protulit. Vnde mundi nomen apud nos accepit, apud Graecos ornati. Idem regit atque administrat non minore conseruationis miraculo quam creationis,

265. hanc esse uniuersi legem (non alium esse in rebus casum, non fortunam aut sortem):

266. omnia ab eo geri summa aequitate et sapientia, tametsi uis nobis ignoratis;

267. quaecunque cuius contingunt ad eius referri commoda, si sit bonus, non ad ista pecuniolae aut mundi huius momentanei sed aeternae illius felicitatis.

317. Expende quantum illud sit tot uitis uniuersitatis mundi huius tam uariam quotidie alimoniam sufficere, conseruare omnia et uindicare ab interitu quo nutu suo tendunt;

318. nullam neque hominum neque angelorum sapientiam non modo hoc posse praestare sed nec intelligere.

364. Tam amicus pacis, concordiae, charitatis, ut nullum uicium magis sit insectatus quam superbiam et quae illinc oriuntur: arrogantiam, ambitionem, contentionem, dissidia, simultates;

365. ostendens nihil esse quod quis uel ab externis sibi quicquam arroget uel a corporeis, quum sint aduentitia et aliena,

366. nec ab internis et uirtute, quum a deo dentur et ob hoc ipsum tolluntur: quod quis eiusmodi muneribus sese efferrat nec fontem atque originem agnoscat, despiciens eos ad quorum utilitatem haec a deo accepit.

264. This world is God's house, as it were, or, more precisely, his temple. He brought the world into existence out of nothing, and gave it this appearance and this embellishment. For this reason, we use the word mundus ('clean') and the Greeks use the word ornatus ('κόσμος', 'embellishment'). God himself rules and governs this world, and its maintenance is no less a miracle than its creation,

265. <and He rules and governs that> this is the law of the universe (there is no other chance, no other fortune, no other lot in things):

266. God accomplishes everything with the greatest equity and wisdom, even though we fail to recognize his methods;

267. whatever happens to anyone leads to his profit, if he is good, not small money gains or goods of this transitory world, but eternal happiness.

317. Ponder how extraordinary it is to supply sufficient varied nourishment every day for so many lives in the whole world, to preserve all things, and to protect them from the extinction to which they tend by their own inclination;

318. and that neither human intelligence nor the wisdom of the angels can provide or comprehend this.

364. He was a friend of peace, concord and charity to such an extent that he did not condemn any sin more than pride and all the vices which rise from it: arrogance, ambition, contention, discord and resentment;

365. and he showed that there is no reason why anyone should arrogate anything to himself either because of any external or personal qualities since they are random possessions and not his own;

366. and that there is no reason to attribute to ourselves any of our inner qualities, not even virtue, since they are granted by God; and for this reason can be taken away,, if someone should extol himself because of such gifts and does not acknowledge their source and origin, looking down on those for whose benefit he received these gifts from God.

458. Verumtamen reprehendens ne utare acerbitate aut atrocitate ulla uerborum. Fac ut obiurgationis amarori aliquid admisceatur dulce et quod plagam leniat, si quam facis,

459. modo ne fructus pereat reprehensionis, dum rem studes nimium mitigare, neu in assentationem prolaboris.

470. Christus, dominus noster (sciens ex loquacitate plurima oriri mala, et illa potissimum quae pugnant cum praecipuo capite legis suae: rixas, discordias, similitates),

471. ad circumspectionem loquendi interminatus est de omni uerbo ocioso, quod homines fuerint loquuti, reddituros eos rationem in disquisitione illa mundi.

523. Crede te illi esse charum a quo amice reprehenderis,

524. nec unquam reprehensionem obesse uel inimici. Nam, si uera obiicit, ostendit quod emendemus; sin falsa, quod uite-mus. Ita semper uel meliores reddit uel saltem cautiore.

535. Malorum hominum consuetudinem non secus atque ictos peste deuicta (utrinque enim metuendum contagium),

536. nisi talis sis qui confidas te posse illos meliores reddere.

543. Si quid a minore proficiscatur quod tibi parum placeat, cogita non id protinus contumeliam esse sed libertatem,

544. te etiam nimis esse delicatum, cui leues titillationes grandes uideantur esse plagae.

588. Ergo, quandoquidem laborandum est quocumque nos uertamus,

589. quanto praestat anniti ut maxima merces opera nostra quaeratur quam exigua, uilis, euanida, atque hinc sempiternus cruciatus et moeror.

458. Nevertheless, if you have to reprove anyone, do not employ any harsh or cruel words. Proceed in such a way that the bitterness of the reproof is combined with something sweet that can alleviate the wound, if you happen to cause any,

459. as long as the result of the reproach is not lost in your attempt to soften the blow and you do not slip into flattery.

470. Christ, our Lord (who knows that many sins arise from talkativeness, and especially those which contradict the principal point of his law, namely quarrels, disagreements and rivalries),

471. in order to promote circumspection in speaking, threatened that for any idle word that human beings will have spoken they would have to render an account, in that last judgment of the world.

523. You must believe that you are dear to those who admonish you in a friendly manner;

524. and that an admonition is never harmful, even if it comes from an enemy. For, if his reproaches are true, they point out what we ought to rectify; but if false, they show what we should avoid. Such admonitions can always make us better or, at least, more cautious.

535. Avoid the company of wicked persons —as you would those stricken by the plague (indeed, contagion is to be feared in both cases)—,

536. unless you are one who has every confidence in making them better.

543. If someone of inferior condition does something which displeases you, consider that this is not an insult but a mere act of impertinence;

544. and that you are too delicate if a slight tickling seems like a severe blow.

588. Therefore, since one must work wherever we turn,

589. how much better it is to strive to procure the greatest reward for our labor rather than a tiny, worthless, ephemeral recompense, which leads to endless torment and sorrow.

(b) Evidence in favour of an aphoristic style

Although maxims beginning with connectors seem to be a majority, nonetheless there are also a few that may qualify as aphorisms. This is the case, for example, of maxims 22-32, which constitute a bunch of definitions that are self-sufficient and brief:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>22. Gloria: bene audire de praestanti uirtute.</p> <p>23. Honor: ueneratio ob magni precii uirtutem.</p> <p>24. Gratia: fauor propter amabilem uirtutem.</p> <p>25. Dignitas est uel recta hominum opinio de bene merita uirtute uel decor quidam ex interiore uirtute foras prominens.</p> <p>26. Potentia et regnum: habere multos quibus probe ac recte consulas.</p> <p>27. Nobilitas: excellentia actuum esse cognitum, uel a bonis prognatum similem parentum se praebere.</p> <p>28. Generosus est ad uirtutem a natura optime compositus.</p> <p>29. Sanitas: talis habitudo corporis ut ualeat mens.</p> <p>30. Species: lineamenta corporis, quae animum formosum ostendant.</p> <p>31. Vires et robur: ut exercitiis uirtutis sufficias, ne facile defatigeris.</p> <p>32. Voluptas: delectatio pura, solida et diuturna, qualis capitur ex iis solis quae ad animum pertinent.</p> | <p>22. Glory is to have a good reputation, which comes from outstanding virtue.</p> <p>23. Honor is the admiration of pre-eminent virtue.</p> <p>24. Goodwill is the sympathy deriving from endearing virtue</p> <p>25. Dignity is either the good opinion of men earned by virtue or a certain distinction that manifests itself externally from internal virtue.</p> <p>26. Power and dominion is to have many people whose interests you consult justly and rightly.</p> <p>27. Nobility is to be known for the excellence of one's actions, or to show oneself similar to the good parents who gave you birth.</p> <p>28. A noble-spirited person is one who is endowed by nature to be virtuous.</p> <p>29. Health is a particular disposition of the body that makes for a sound mind.</p> <p>30. Beauty is the features of the body that reveal a beautiful soul.</p> <p>31. Strength and vigor allow you to be capable of practicing virtue and not to be easily discouraged.</p> <p>32. Pleasure is a pure, firm and lasting delight, which can only be attained through those things that are related to the soul.</p> |
|---|--|

2.4 The lack of an addressee

Unlike the two other accompanying works (*Sat.* and *Rat. stud.*), *Ad sap.* lacks a prefatory or dedicatory epistle that states to whom the work is addressed, and what the purpose of the work is; nor does it have an opening paragraph or section that introduces the content and presents the salient themes. The absence of a prefatory epistle also occurs in *Declam.* (a rhetorical exercise), *Pass. Chr.* (a meditation); and in works that are formally letters, for example: *Dull.*, *Ep. Adr.*, *Ep. Barl.*, *Ep. episc. Linc.*, *Ep. Fran. Chr.*, *Ep. Fort.*, *Ep. Henr. reg. Gall.*, *Ep. Henr. adm.*, *Ep. Lamb.*, and *Pseud.* Two other writings (*Comm. rer.* and *Consult.*) do not have a prefatory epistle but bear an addressee in its title (to the people of Germania Inferior; to Louis of Praet). The lack of a prefatory epistle or an explicit addressee are not two characteristics unique to *Ad sap.*, and they show a will to reach a broad audience.

2.5 A plausible explanation regarding the format

Based on the following facts derived from the philological analysis of *Ad sap.*:

- (1) *Ad sap.* was set in an aphoristic style since the first edition, and Vives referred to its content as *praecepta* ('maxims'). Subsequent editions grouped maxims into different sections or chapters introduced by a title.
- (2) Some extremely long maxims were divided into minor units by subsequent editions in an attempt to make the format as aphoristic as possible.
- (3) Given the fact that maxims and aphorisms are self-sufficient, it is weird to find them introduced by connectors, and thus making their content only fully understandable provided that previous statements and thoughts are taken into account.
- (4) Only a few maxims (mainly definitions) convey a self-sufficient meaning.

and taking into account the following elements about the cultural context:

- (5) Printing offices re-edited both the content and the format of a particular work, if needed, and without the author's consent.
- (6) *Ad sap.* was issued together with *Sat.*, a work of symbols, that is, of maxims and wise sayings.
- (7) The cultural context in which *Ad sap.* was published was highly influenced by books of proverbs and sapiential literature that were having great success: the *Prouerbiorum libellus* of Polidoro Virgilio and, fundamentally, the *Adagiorum chiliades* of Erasmus.
- (8) Erasmus, one of the leading scholars in the age of Vives, encouraged the use of aphorisms in education and moral philosophy.¹¹⁸ Seneca also found precepts to be of assistance in philosophy.

one may therefore argue that it is plausible that Vives produced a manuscript in which a large majority of sections was written as a continuous flow of speech («essay format») while a few sections were conceived as genuine aphorisms, maxims or definitions («aphoristic format») that followed Erasmus's recommendations on teaching ethics and instructing moral education. Vives must have handed such manuscript out to Pieter Martens in Louvain together with *Sat.* and *Rat. stud.* But the printer may have persuaded Vives to approve the process of turning all parts of the work into aphoristic style. In view of the fact that (1) *Sat.* was clearly aphoristic (numbered moral maxims followed with a short commentary) and *Rat. stud.* was clearly pedagogical; and (2) that the *Agades* of Erasmus —whose layout was similar to that of *Sat.*— were having a great success, the printer may have argued that presenting the content of *Ad sap.* in a similar layout as that of *Sat.* and the *Adages* of Erasmus would make the marketing of the book more appealing. Furthermore, the printer may have also argued that the division of long passages into short maxims would increase the pedagogical value of the book, allowing to memorize the content more easily, although at

¹¹⁸ Cf. *supra* section 2.1, n. 69, 70.

the cost of undermining syntax. It is precisely the arrangement in aphoristic style, together with the fact that the work lacks an addressee, that endorses the conjecture that *Ad sap.* may have been issued bearing in mind its usefulness as a supporting textbook to be used in classrooms or as a self-studying guidebook aimed at a broad audience of learned people.

In any case, although Vives complained about printers changing words and introducing novelties of their own,¹¹⁹ no evidence remains about he objecting to changes of format, either in the *editio princeps* or in subsequent editions, where chapters were introduced headed by a short title. Therefore, one must admit that Vives agreed in one way or another to the printer's will to make the work as aphoristic as possible: maybe he realized the pedagogical value of the aphoristic layout, maybe he was forced to comply with the printer's aim to make a good sale.¹²⁰ It goes without saying that *Ad sap.* was issued since the first edition in an aphoristic style (whether it was intended or not), but the great amount of connectors and the awkward breaking of many sentences lead to seriously wonder whether *Ad sap.* had been, in fact, devised in a continuous flow of speech. At this point —and I assume that an answer to this question may never be reached—, I cannot help but recall what Vigliano (2013a: cxxxv) comments about *Disc. corr.* and *Disc. trad.* in the introduction of his critical edition:

Le *De disciplinis* n'est pas d'abord un texte à consulter par entrées ou par segments. Les livres qui le composent forment au contraire de longs discours, destinés à la lecture ou même à la diction, dont la coulée massive souligne les continuités. Les éditeurs successifs, de Gymnich¹²¹ à Mayans,¹²² les ont progressivement défaits : on aimerait les restaurer.

3 Exposition of the first critical edition

Ad sap., the most successful work of Vives only after *Ling.*,¹²³ rightfully deserves to be given the appropriate attention and, accordingly, its text established through a reliable critical edition. In this section, I shall mention the editions consulted to make my critical

¹¹⁹ Cf. *supra* section 2.2, n. 98-101. Later, Maians also introduced novelties in Vives's works; cf. *infra* n. 122.

¹²⁰ Both Vives and Erasmus relate in their correspondence how important financial gain was for printers and book dealers. Cf., for example, Vives, *Letter to Erasmus* 10 May 1523 (Allen 5: Ep. 1362, lines 50-53; tr. CWE 10: 13): «Ego uero et gloriae iam nunc et studiis omnibus renuncio, si hac necessario eundum sit. Pudet literariae conditionis, si exiturus liber non sit nisi illiteratorum auaritiae approbetur», that is, «Personally, I am resigning from all thought of reputation and all literary work immediately, if this is the only way. I hate to think of the state of literature, if a book cannot come out unless it commends itself to the greed of some illiterate»; Erasmus, *Letter to Vives* (Allen 5: Ep. 1531, lines 36-39; tr. CWE 10: 470): «Frobenius mihi serio questus est se ne unum quidem opus *De Ciuitate Dei* uendere Francfordiae; idque eo uultu dixit ut plane credam hominem nihil fingere. Vides etiam in Musarum rebus regnare fortunam», that is, «Froben has complained to me seriously that he cannot sell a single *De ciuitate Dei* at Frankfurt, and his expression as he said this was such that I think he is speaking the truth. You see how fortune rules even where the Muses are concerned».

¹²¹ Johann Gymnich issued editions of *Disc.* in Cologne in 1531, 1532 and 1536.

¹²² Maians divided each book of *Disc.* into chapters, at the beginning of which he added a very short summary of the content using his own Latin. Cf. V00 3: 68-297; V00 6: 1-437.

¹²³ Cf. González 2007: 79: «Podemos calcular en 260 el número de ediciones documentadas de los *Diálogos* durante el siglo XVI, y en 113 las de la *Introductio ad sapientiam*. Por su parte, la *Institutione foeminae christianae* (1524) y su contraparte, *De officio mariti* (1529), habrían rondado las 56, lo que les confiere el tercer rango en popularidad durante la centuria».

edition, I will reveal the three different stages of the text, and I will mention the editorial principles followed. My critical edition is accompanied with an index of keywords and proper names, a table of concordances between the most important editions, and a bibliography related to the philological methodology used in my critical edition. This bibliography (cf. *infra* section 4.4) should be used when studies preceded by an asterisk (*) are cited.

3.1 Summary of the editions consulted ¹²⁴

(a) Primary editions

L = IOANNIS / LODOVICI VIVIS VA / LENTINI. / Introductio ad Sapientiam. / EIVSDEM, / Satellitium siue Symbola. / EIVSDEM / Epistolae duae de ratione studii puerilis / Louanii apud Petrum Martinum Alo / stensem. Anno M. D. XXIII. [Consulted copy: KU Leuven Bibliotheken, Bijzondere Collecties, CaaA 1927 | USTC 404738]

C = IOANNIS / LODOVICI VIVIS / VALENTINI / Introductio ad Sapientiam. / Satellitium siue Symbola. / Epistolae duae de ratione / studii puerilis. / Ab Authore ipso recognita / & locupletata. / Impressit Brugis Hubertus / de Crooc Anno. M. D. / XXVI. Mense Februario. / Prostant venales Brugis in Bur / go apud Simonem vermuelen. [Consulted copy: Gent, Universiteitsbibliotheek, R 630 | USTC 410711]

P = IOANNIS / LODOVICI VIVIS / Valentini / Introductio ad sapientiam. / Satellitium siue Symbola. / Epistolae duae de ratione studii puerilis. / Tria capita addita initio Suetonii Tranquilli. / PARISIIS / Apud Simonem Colinaeum / 1527. [Consulted copy: Gent, Universiteitsbibliotheek, A 39684 | USTC 145850]

K = IOAN / NIS LODOVICI / Viuis Valentini, / Introductio ad sapientiam. / Satellitium siue Symbola. / Epistolae duae de ratione studii puerilis. / Ab Authore ipso recognita & locupletata. / Antuerpiae Apud Martinum Caesa / rem. Anno M. D. XXX. [Consulted copy: KU Leuven Bibliotheken, Maurits Sabbebibliotheek, FG Pg40.224 | USTC 410728]

H = IOAN / NIS LODOVICI VI / uis Valentini / Introductio ad Sapientiam. / Satellitium siue Symbola. / Epistolae duae De ratione stu / dii puerilis / Ab Authore ipso nuper recognita / & locupletata. Nunc vero a mendis / plurimis quibus undique scatebant / postremo repurgata. / Antuerpiae in Rapo excudebat Michaël / Hillenius, Anno a restitutione humana / M. D. XXXI. Mense Ianuario. [Consulted copy: Brussel, KBR, VH 1.164 A2 (RP) | USTC 437577]

B = IO. LV- / DOVICI VI- / VIS VALENTINI OPE- / RA, IN DVOS DISTINCTA TO- / MOS: QVIBVS OMNES IPSIVS LVCVBRATIONES, / quotquot unquam in lucem editas uoluit, complectuntur: praeter Commenta- / rios in Augustinum De ciuitate Dei, quorum desiderio si quis afficiatur, / apud Frobenium inueniet. Quae uero singulis tomis continean- / tur, in utriusque sectionis primo ternione indicatur. / EPISCOP. / Cum Gratia & Priuilegio Caesareo ad quinquennium, / & Regis Galliarum in decennium. / BASILEAE ANNO MDLV.

Colophon (vol. 1): BASILEAE, PER NIC. EPISCOPIVM / IVNIOREM, ANNO / M.D.LV. [BOO 1: 70-94. Consulted copy: KU Leuven Bibliotheken, Bijzondere Collecties, CaaB304 1-2 | USTC 667058]

V = JOANNIS / LUDOVICI VIVIS VALENTINI / OPERA OMNIA, / DISTRIBUTA ET ORDINATA / IN ARGUMENTORUM CLASSES PRAECIPUAS / A GREGORIO MAJANSIO, GENER. VALENT. ... TOMUS I. / VALENTIAE EDETANORUM. / IN OFFICINA BENEDICTI MONFORT / EXCmi. ET ILLmi. DOMINI / Archiepiscopi Typographi. Anno M.DCC.LXXXII. [VOO 1: 1-48. Consulted copy: Barcelona, CRAI Biblioteca de Reserva, 07 M-5295bis5]

¹²⁴ A diagram of editions is available in complementary note 5.

(b) Supplementary editions

L^{err} = correctiones in L secundum annotationes quae in ultima pagina huius editionis inueniuntur.

T = OPVSCVLA / ALIQVOT VERE / CATHOLICA, AC IMPRIMIS / erudita, Ioannis Lodouici / Viuis Valentini, accu / rate impressa. / INTRODVCTIO AD SAPIENTIAM. / SATELLITIVM SIVE SYMBOLA. / DE RATIONE STVDII PVERILIS / EPISTOLAE II. / LVGDVNI, / Ex officina Melchioris & Gasparis Trechsel Fratrum, / ANNO M. D. XXXII. [Consulted copy: Barcelona, CRAI Biblioteca de Reserva, 07 CM-1856-2 | USTC 156001]

S = OPVSCVLA / ALIQVOT VERE CA / THOLICA, AC IMPRIMIS / erudita, Ioannis Lodouici / Viuis Valentini, accu- / rate impressa. / INTRODVCTIO ad Sapientiam. / SATELLITIVM siue Symbola. / DE RATIONE Studii puerilis / Epistolae II. / Argentorati, apud Petrum / Schoeffer. [s.a.] [Consulted copy: KU Leuven Bibliotheken, Bijzondere Collecties, CaaA 896 | USTC 679887]

F = IOANNIS LVDOVICI VIVIS VALENTINI / AD SAPIENTIAM INTRODVCTIO. In: TOMVS QVINTVS / IN QVO CONTINENTVR OMNES LIBRI / VETERIS INSTRVMENTI QVI SVNT EXTRA CANO= / nem Hebraicum, perperam Apocryphi, rectius autem / ... / Danielis & Esther, Commentarijs / Chuonradi Pellicani Ru= / beaquensis expositi. / CHRISTOPHORVS FROSCHOVERVS / EXCVDEBAT TIGVRI MENSE MARTIO. / ANNO M. D. XXXV. [Consulted copy: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, 2 Exeg. 425-4/5 | USTC 698728]

La = DE RATIO / NE STVDII PVERILIS EPI / stolae duae IOAN. LVDOVICI VI / VIS, quibus absolutissimam inge / nuorum adolescentium ac puella- / rum institutionem, doctissi / ma breuitate com- / plectitur. / EIVSDEM, / Ad ueram Sapientiam introductio. / ITEM / Satellitium animi, siue Symbola, ad / omnem totius uitae, maxime Prin / cipum institutionem, mi- / re conducentia. / Libellus uere aureus, & qui non solum uersetur / omnium manibus, sed ediscatur / etiam, dignissimus. / BASILEAE / M. D. XXXVII.

Colophon: BASILEAE, PER BALTHA / SAREM LASIVM ET / Thomam Platterum, Mense / Martio, / ANNO / M. D. XXXVII. [Consulted copy: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Paed.pr. 3822 | USTC 631223]

F² = IOANNIS LVDOVICI VIVIS VALENTINI / AD SAPIENTIAM INTRODVCTIO. In: TOMVS QVINTVS / IN QVO CONTINENTVR OMNES LIBRI / VETERIS INSTRVMENTI QVI SVNT EXTRA CANO= / nem Hebraicum, perperam Apocryphi, rectius autem / ... / Danielis & Esther, Commentarijs / Chuonradi Pellicani, ministri / ecclesiae Tigurinae, / expositi. / CHRISTOPHORVS FROSCHOVERVS / EXCVDEBAT TIGVRI MENSE MARTIO. / ANNO M. D. XXXVIII. [Consulted copy: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, 2 Exeg. 426-5 | USTC 698729]

Bl = DE RATIO / NE STVDII PVERILIS EPI= / stolae duae IOAN. LVDOVICI VI= / VIS, quibus absolutissimam inge= / nuorum adolescentium ac puella= / rum institutionem, doctissi / ma breuitate com= / plectitur. / EIVSDEM / Ad ueram Sapientiam introductio. / ITEM. / Satellitium animi, siue Symbola, ad / omnem totius uitae, maxime Prin / cipum institutionem mi- / re conducentia. / ... / LIPSIAE / M. D. XXXVIII

Colophon: EXCVSVM PER / Michaelem Blum Mensae / Aprilis. / ANNO. / M. D. XXXVIII. [Consulted copy: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 74.Y.67 | USTC 631224]

W = IOAN. LODOVICI VIVIS / DE RECTA INGE- / NVORVUM ADOLESCENTVM / ac puellarum institutione, Libel- / li duo, multa eruditione / ac pietate referti. / EIVSDEM / Ad ueram Sapientiam introductio. / Satellitium animi, siue Symbola, Prin- / cipum institutioni potissimum / destinata. / Adiecimus quoque in studiosorum gratiam / ARISTOTELIS DE VIRTVTIBVS / Libellum uere aureum, nuper quidem Graece inuen- / tum, iam uero primum a SIMONE GRYNAEO & / Latinitate donatum, & exactiore uirtutum diuisio- / ne illustratum:

dignum equidem, qui non solum / legatur ab omnibus, sed summa cum dili- / gentia ediscatur etiam. / BASILEAE.

Colophon: BASILEAE, / IN OFFICINA ROBERTI / VVINTER, MENSE / Martio. Anno / M. D. XXXIX. [Consulted copy: Barcelona, CRAI Biblioteca de Reserva, 07 XVI-1634 | USTC 667303]

W² = IOANNIS LO / DOVICI VIVIS VA / lentini, Excitationes animi / in Deum. / Præparatio animi ad orandum. / Commentarius in orationē Dominicam. / Preces & meditationes quotidianæ. / Preces & meditationes generales. / EIVSDEM / Ad ueram Sapientiam introductio. Satel- / litium animi, siue Symbola, Princi- / pum institutioni potissimum / destinata. / Ex postrema recognitione autoris. / BASILEAE.

Colophon: BASILEAE, / IN OFFICINA / ROBERTI VVINTER / Mense Septembri Anno / M. D. XXXX. [Consulted copy: Biblioteca Valenciana Nicolau Primitiu, XVI/194 | USTC 667798]

D = IOANNIS / LODOVICI / VIVIS VA= / LENTINI, / Introductio ad sapientiam. / Satellitium siue Symbola. / Epistolae duae de ratione / studii puerilis. / Ab Authore ipso recogni- / ta & locupletata.

Colophon: Dumaëus [i.e. Anthonis van der Haeghen] imprimebat Antuerpiae / An. M. D. XLII. [Consulted copy: Brussels, Bibliothèque royale/ Koninklijke Bibliotheek, III 94.462 A | USTC 408298]

O = IOANNIS LO- / DOVICI VIVIS VA- / lentini Excitationes animi / in Deum. / Præparatio animi ad orandum. / Commentarius in orationem Dominicam. / Preces & meditationes quotidianæ. / Preces & meditationes generales. / EIVSDEM / Ad ueram Sapientiam introductio. / Satellitium animi, siue Symbola, Prin- / cipium institutioni potissi- / mum destinata. / BASILEAE. / 1548.

Colophon: BASILEAE, EX / officina Ioannis Oporini, Anno / M. D. XLVIII. / Mense Augusto. [Consulted copy: KU Leuven Bibliotheken, Maurits Sabbebibliotheek, P940.224.1 VIVE Exci | USTC 667802]

Lo = Ioannis Lodoui- / CI VIVIS VALENTINI, / Introductio ad sapientiam. / Satellitium siue. Symbola. / Epistolae duae de ratione studii puerilis. / Ab Authore ipso recognita & locupletata. / ... / ANTVERPIAE, / Ex Officina Ioannis Loëi, / Anno M. D. L. [Consulted copy: Brugge Grootseminarie, A 22.530 | USTC 404160]

Lo² = IOANNIS / LODOVICI VI- / VIS VALENTINI / INTRODVCTIO / ad Sapientiam: / SATELLITIVM, SIVE SYM= / bola: Epistolae duae de ratione stu- / dij puerilis: / Ab auctore ipso recognita & locupletata. / ... / ANTVERPIAE, / Apud Viduam Ioannis Loëi, / Anno 1568. [Consulted copy: KU Leuven Bibliotheken, Bijzondere Collecties, CaaA 256 | USTC 404572]

M = IOANNIS / LODOVICI VIVIS VALENTINI / INTRODVCTIO AD SAPIENTIAM / AB AVCTORE IPSO RECOGNITA / ET LOCUPLETATA. In: OBRAS / QVE FRANCISCO CERVANTES / DE SALAZAR / HA HECHO GLOSSADO I TRADVcido. / ... / INTRODVCCIÓn I CAMINO PARA LA SABIDVRIA / COMPVESTA EN LATÍN, COMO VA AHORA, / POR JVAN LVIS VIVES, / VVELTA EN CASTELLANO CON MVCHAS ADICIONES / POR EL MISMO CERVANTES. / CON LICENCIA DEL CONSEJO. / EN MADRID POR DON ANTONIO DE SANCHA, / M. DCC. LXXII. [Consulted copy: Barcelona, Universitat Ramon Llull, Biblioteca Episcopal, 860 Cer]

(c) Symbols

- π lectiones communes in P, B, V.
 β lectiones communes in C, K, H.
 ω lectiones communes in L, P, C, K, H, B, V

3.2 Establishment of the text

In order to establish the text, I have proceeded according to the principles of textual criticism adapted to humanistic texts.¹²⁵ Since no autograph manuscript of *Ad sap.* survives, I have taken the *editio princeps* (L) as the original source and have undertaken the *recensio*¹²⁶ of the text: it has consisted in examining almost all printed editions of the text during Vives's life (1524-1540: L, C, P, K, H, T, S, La, F, Bl, F², W, W²), five editions after Vives's death (D, O, Lo, Lo², M), and the text included in the two complete works of Vives (B, V). The collation of the aforementioned printed editions has generated a serious of variants that has brought to light substantial differences (*lectiones uariae*), which have led me to differentiate two main groups of editions after L (1524): the edition of Bruges (C, 1526) and those that follow it (C, K, H, T, S, F, F², D, Lo, Lo², M); and the edition of Paris (P, 1527) and those that follow it (P, La, Bl, W, W², B, V).

Once the *recensio* or thorough examination has been completed, then the *constitutio textus*¹²⁷ has been carried out. It has consisted in choosing C as the best available text and, consequently, its readings have prevailed, albeit some particular cases, where readings from other editions have been preferred. The *apparatus criticus* located at the bottom of each page of my critical edition gathers all the significant variants between all the editions taken into account. As far as the *dispositio textus*¹²⁸ is concerned, I have been as faithful as possible to the Latin displayed in C and I have, therefore, maintained a policy of minimal intervention (as explained *infra* section 3.3). In all my editorial choices I have always been led by the will to present *Ad sap.*'s text as close as possible to that devised by Vives and, thus, cleansed of any element foreign to the author.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ Fundamental studies in textual criticism, displayed in chronological order (entries preceded by * are fully referenced *infra* section 4.4), are those of *Maas 1958; *André 1972; *Kenney 1974; *Blecua 1983; *Quetglas 1985: 28-67; *Chiesa 2011; *Pérez 2011. Regarding studies on editing humanistic and Neo-Latin texts, cf. *Allen 1906; *McKerrow 1928; *Waszink et al. 1969; *Kenney 1974; *Matheussen, Fantazzi and George 1987; *Rabbie 1996; *Rummel 1996; *Maestre 1997; *Ijsewijn and Sacré 1998; *Huygens 2000; *Ramming 2006; *Bloemendal and Nellen 2014; *Deneire 2014; *Poel 2014. As far as the history of philological practices is concerned, cf. *Pasquali 1971; *Herrero 1976; Pfeiffer 1976; Reynolds and Wilson 2013.

¹²⁶ Cf. *Pérez 2011: 115-116: «La primera fase de una edición crítica es la *recensio*. [...] Consiste ésta esencialmente en una operación de búsqueda, descripción y, sobre todo, de filiación de los testimonios que han transmitido una determinada obra, sean estos manuscritos o impresos»; *Blecua 1983: 33-34: «La *recensio* puede subdividirse en: a) *fontes criticae*, esto es, el acopio y análisis histórico de los testimonios; b) *collatio codicum*, es decir, la colación o cotejo de todos los testimonios entre sí para determinar las *lectiones uariae* o variantes; c) *examinatio* de las variantes; d) *constitutio stemmatis codicum* si es posible».

¹²⁷ Cf. *Blecua 1983: 34 (slightly re-edited): «La *constitutio textus* puede dividirse en: a) *selectio* de las variantes; b) *emendatio*; c) *dispositio textus*: grafías, acentuación, puntuación, signos diacríticos, etc.; d) *apparatus criticus*»; *Pérez 2011: 143-204.

¹²⁸ Cf. *Pérez 2011: 153: «Reconstruido teóricamente el arquetipo o el texto más próximo al original, seleccionadas las variantes sustantivas y enmendados los errores, es decir, realizadas las dos primeras operaciones de la edición crítica del texto, la *recensio* y la *emendatio*, el editor ha de abordar aún la fase de la *dispositio textus*, la tarea de presentar y ofrecer aquel texto en toda su materialidad y extensión de la manera más precisa, clara e inteligible».

¹²⁹ Cf. *Blecua 1983: 18-19: «La crítica textual es el arte que tiene como fin presentar un texto depurado en lo posible de todos aquellos elementos extraños al autor».

(a) The edition of Louvain (L)

The *editio princeps* (L) of the *Ad sap.* was printed in 1524 in Louvain by Pieter Martens, and it consisted of a continuous row of 602 numbered maxims, one after another, without any interruption and without any preface or dedicatory letter. The edition had some numbering mistakes located at the following maxims (I give the correct numbering between parentheses; printing mistakes are not accounted for): 52 (51), 248 (246), 259 (256), 367 (363), 400 (387). As a result, the actual number of maxims should be considered to be 589. L also included a page of corrections (L^{err}) at the end, which apparently were not made by Vives himself.¹³⁰ In a letter sent to Cranevelt from Oxford on 7 March 1525, Vives complained that

they [i.e. proofreaders] spoiled many places, while believing that they were correcting them, such as *in ea colitur, saeuientis etsi*. I think that I wrote *meruit*, but if this past tense is not used, I was misled by similar forms and rules of the grammar. *In bonas artes eruditio* is an expression of Gellius, taken from Marcus T. Varro. Some write *honera* as well as *honustus*. Regarding *trahere lineam*, check whether it can be said like this. *Quatenus* is used correctly instead of *quoniam*, as found in Pliny: «*Quatenus non datur diu uiuere, saltem faciamus aliquid, quo nos uixisse testemur*».¹³¹

«In ea colitur», «honera», and «trahere lineam» refer to words and phrases that appear in *Sat.* L86 (87),¹³² L108 (110), L202 (205); whereas «saeuientis etsi», «meruit» and «in bonas artes eruditio» refer to *Ad sap.* L263,¹³³ L361 (363), L445 (437). In the revised edition of Bruges (C 1526), Vives wrote «lineam ... duxisset» instead of «lineam ... traxisset», which demonstrates that he did have this expression checked.

(b) The edition of Bruges (C)

In 1526, Hubert de Croock published in Bruges a second edition of *Ad sap.* Unfortunately, the numbering errors persisted, though in places different than L: C274 (instead of 275), C283 (instead of 283),¹³⁴ C553 (instead of 562). This last error made C end with an alleged

¹³⁰ Some of Erasmus's works reveal these practices as well. See, for example, what H. J. de Jonge (*ASD* ix-2: 49-50) comments about the *Apologia respondens ad ea quae Iacobus Lopis Stunica taxauerat in prima duntaxat Noui Testamenti aeditione*: «The first edition, here designated as A, was printed by Dirk Martens at Louvain in September 1521 and published before 10 October of that year. [...] The final pages of Martens' edition (f. q3v-Q4r) contain a list of some 80 corrigenda of misprints, introduced by a brief note from Martens to the studious readers. This list creates a curious problem in so far as it includes, apart from obvious and useful corrections, absurd proposals by which the original text of A would definitely be deteriorated».

¹³¹ Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 7 March 1525 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 144, lines 30-39). Accurate quotation of Pliny the Younger (*Epistulae* 3.7.14; Melmoth and Hutchinson 1915: 212-213) is as follows: «*Quatenus nobis denegatur diu uiuere, relinquamus aliquid quo nos uixisse testemur*», that is, «Since it is not granted us to live long, let us transmit to posterity some memorial that we have at least lived».

¹³² The numbering of the *editio princeps* is preceded by letter «L». In parenthesis, the numbering according to my critical editions: Tello 2020a (*Sat.*), and this dissertation (*Ad sap.*).

¹³³ This maxim (265) is not included in my critical edition; cf. *infra* section 3.2 (b), p. 111-112.

¹³⁴ Funnily enough, this numbering error (the addition of one unit) corrected the previous one (one unit subtracted).

total number of 595 maxims, which in fact were 604. However, the most relevant changes were in format and content. On the one hand, either the printer or his assistants decided to segment the work into unnumbered chapters and introduce each of them with a short title.¹³⁵ This innovation was kept by all the subsequent editions, with slightly variations. I give below the list of chapter titles according to C (when the numbering of C is wrong, I add the correct one in parenthesis):

DISTRIBUTION INTO CHAPTERS

C1-C11: —

C12-C16: Divisio rerum humanarum (The classification of human existence)

C17-C84: Rerum naturae ac precia (Characteristics and value of things)

C85-C121: De corpore (The body)

C122-C206: De animo (The soul)

C207-C258: De uirtute et affectibus (Virtue and the emotions).

C259-C274: De religione (Religion)

C275-C315 (276-315): De Christo (Christ)

C316-C331: De sumptione cibi (The consumption of food)

C332-C346: De somno (Sleep)

C347-C417: De charitate (Charity)

C418-C447: De conuictu hominum (On human socialization).

C448-C504: De sermone et colloquiis (Language and conversation).

C505-C509: De iureiurando (Oaths)

C510-C556 (510-565): Quomodo hominibus utendum (How to deal with one's fellow

C557-C595 (566-604): Quomodo se quisque geret erga seipsum (How we ought to behave towards ourselves)

On the other hand, C presented a text in which numerous passages were rephrased and, most crucially, some were completely original with respect to L. Out of the almost 260 novelties, I give below some examples of both practices (when the numbering of a particular edition is wrong, I add the correct one after the equal sign):

REWRITING

uituperium merita (L1) : uituperanda (C1)

uulgi opiniones, quae stultissime de rebus iudicant (L3) : persuasiones uulgi, quod stultissime de rebus iudicat (C3)

uoluntatemque (L18) : qui coniunctus est cum uoluntate (C18)

mortale immortalis ac diuino (L34) : mortale immortalis, terrenum diuino (C35)

agere (L37) : admittere (C38)

tollit (L65) : aufert (C68)

Prolixus quaestus est pietas cum sufficientia (L76) : Nullus est quaestus prolisior quam animo, si adsit pietas; corpori uero, si sciat praesentibus qualibuscunque acquiescere (C79)

opiniones pietatis nostrae contrarias (L131) : placita pietati nostrae contraria (C136)

iuuatura (L208) : adiutura (C213)

¹³⁵ Cf. Grafton 2020a: 29, 35, 43 (in *supra* section 2.2, p. 92, n. 93).

et, tranquillitate animorum compositisque affectionibus, simus deo et angelis quam
 simillimi (L209) : compositisque affectionibus, perpetua quadam tranquillitate et
 quieta constantia deo et angelis simus quam simillimi (C214)
 Vnde mundi nomen accepit (L262) : Vnde mundi nomen apud nos accepit, apud
 Graecos ornati (C264)
 fieri (L267) : geri (C266)
 sustinet (L318) : sustentat (C316)
 admittere (L327) : edere (C325)
 certissima est et breuissima (L420 = 410) : patentissima est ac directissima (C408)
 Stultum (L429 = 419) : Quam foedum ac intolerabile (C417)
 laedat (L473 = 463) : offendat (C468)
 tanta (L479 = 469) : adeo suavis (C475)
 ardua in primis (L490 = 480) : uehementer ardua (C487)
 etiam si affirmes uerissima (L501) : etiam asseueranti uerissima (C498)
 debet esse (L519 = 509) : esse par est (C516)
 et praestantius (L549 = 539) : ac felicius (C548)
 timoris et sollicitudinis sit plenum (L589) : periculi sit plenum et eam ob causam
 timoris ac sollicitudinis (C581 = 590)
 subinde (L596 = 586) : non semel (C588 = 597)
 ducantur (L596 = 586) : sinantur descendere (C588 = 597)

NEW WORDS, PHRASES AND SENTENCES

singulis (C2) | Videlicet (C4) | atque inuersae (C20) | Gratia: fauor propter amabilem
 uirtutem (C24) | Acute quisquis sic diuitias expressit: sunt breuis uiae longum uiaticum
 (C41) | quae nulla est diuturna (C69) | Perinde hoc esset tanquam si multo auro
 paululum emeris luti aut potius grauem morbum salute (C78) | manus (C95) | rationis
 expers (C123) | atque efficacissima (C126) | quae eadem studium dicitur (C145) |
 deinceps (C194) | simul (C200) | ipsum (C219) | sollicitus (C254) | et ueneratio (C259) |
 atque adoretur (C262) | laetus alacerque (C273 = 274) | animo (C298) | atque instructi
 (C347) | ambages ac (C373) | nec iniquitatem quaeras in domo iusti (sicut inquit
 sapiens) (C414) | aetate (C433) | Ne tam inanis esto ut oris flatu impellare! (C438) | non
 gestu (C441) | quoque (C446) | Et ante omnia caueto ne cuius turpitudinem retegas aut
 uelis cognoscere. Est enim hoc inhumani pectoris et acerbi animi (C446) | ipse (C455) |
 praecipuo (C470) | esse (C473) | aut extra periculum (C483) | saltem (C524) | et uafre
 (C529) | et simpliciter (C529) | Xenophon (C548) | Cicero (C548) | si non se penitus
 corrupendam affectibus permisit (C563 = 572) | Insane, an refertius theatrum quaeris
 aut nomen apud aliquos diuturnius? (C566 = 575) | ex coelesti sapientia (C576 = 585) |
 Ergo, quandoquidem laborandum est quocumque nos uertamus (C579 = 588) | et dolos
 (C587 = 596) | sapienti (C595 = 604) | in secula seculorum. Amen. Brugis 1524 (C595 =
 604)

Another significant intervention in C is located between maxims 264 and 265, where
 three maxims of L (263-265) have been deleted. None of the scholars that have edited
 (Sancha 1772; Maians 1781) or translated *Ad sap.* (particularly Tobriner 1966, 1968; Alventosa
 1930; Roca 2001) has hitherto attempted to explain this passage in detail. The Latin text is as
 follows (*italics mine*):

L (1524)

261. Mundus hic est uelut domus quaedam eius uel potius templum. Ipse ex nihilo in hanc faciem atque ornatum protulit.
 262. Vnde mundi nomen accepit. Idem regit atque administrat non minore conseruationis miraculo quam creationis.
 263. Et quemadmodum in domo prudentissimi patris familias nihil iniussu eius agitur, sic in omni mundo nihil iniussu dei geritur, *omnia potentis et scientis*:
 264. illi angelos, daemones, homines, animantia, stirpes, lapides, coelos et elementa, cuncta denique curae esse ac parere;
 265. nihil fieri, nihil moueri, nihil contingere, ac ne stipulam quidem attolli ullam aut floccum uolitare extra illius praescripta et iussa;
 266. *hanc* esse uniuersi legem (non alium esse in rebus casum, non fortunam aut sortem);
 267. omnia ab eo fieri cum summa aequitate et sapientia, tametsi uis nobis ignoratis;
 268. quaecunq̄ cuius contingunt ad eius referri commoda, si sit bonus, non ad ista pecuniolae aut mundi huius momentanei sed illius aeternae salutis.

C (1526)

264. Mundus hic est uelut domus quaedam eius uel potius templum. Ipse ex nihilo in hanc faciem atque ornatum protulit. Vnde mundi nomen apud nos accepit, apud Graecos ornati. Idem *regit atque administrat* non minore conseruationis miraculo quam creationis,
 265. *hanc* esse uniuersi legem (non alium esse in rebus casum, non fortunam aut sortem);
 266. omnia ab eo geri summa aequitate et sapientia, tametsi uis nobis ignoratis;
 267. quaecunq̄ cuius contingunt ad eius referri commoda, si sit bonus, non ad ista pecuniolae aut mundi huius momentanei sed aeternae illius felicitatis.

Apparently, all the infinitive clauses (L264-268) complement the participle *scientis* ('knowing'). However, all existing translations interpret *omnia* as the object of both *potentis* and *scientis* («he is all-powerful and all-knowing»). By so doing, translators have considered the subsequent infinitive clauses to be a clarification of the indefinite pronoun *omnia*, making a hard and, to some extent, awkward transition. I propose another interpretation. As shown in my translation below, a more smooth transition can be achieved if *omnia* is considered to be only the object of *potentis*, and all infinitive clauses become the object of *scientis*:

261 This world is God's house, as it were, or, more precisely, his temple. He brought the world into existence out of nothing, and gave it this appearance and this embellishment. 262 For this reason, we use the word *mundus* ('clean') and the Greeks use the word *ornatus* ('κόσμος', 'embellishment'). God himself rules and governs: the the maintenance of the world is no less a miracle than its creation. 263 And just as in the house of a wise head of the family nothing is performed without his command, so in the whole world: nothing is carried out without God's command, since he is all-powering and knows 264 that angels, devils, human beings, living creatures, plants, stones, heavens, the elements, in brief, all things are under his care and obey him; 265

that nothing is made, nothing moves, nothing happens, not even a single stalk rises from the ground or a tuft flutters in the air without his consent and command; 266 that this is the law of the universe (there is no other chance, no other fortune, no other lot in things); 267 that God accomplishes everything with the greatest equity and wisdom, even though we fail to recognize his methods; 268 and that whatever happens to anyone leads to his profit, if he is good: not to small money gains or goods of this transitory world but to eternal happiness.

In any case, that this passage was indeed problematic is sustained by the following facts. In the page of *errata* found at the end of the Louvain edition (L^{err}), either the printer or the correctors working at Pieter Martens's printing house proposed the reading *omnia et potentis et saeuientis* («not only is he all-powerful but also forceful»). This proposal disliked Vives enormously, as it is shown in a letter that he wrote to Cranevelt. When it comes to *saeuientis*, he complained that «they spoiled many places, while believing that they were correcting them».¹³⁶ Vives was right: the verb *saeuo* does not take any object and, therefore, neither *omnia* nor the infinitive clauses can grammatically complement *saeuientis*. Accordingly, it is then plausible that Vives insisted in emending these lines when the second edition (C) of *Ad sap.* was being taken care of. The result was as follows:

264 This world is God's house, as it were, or, more precisely, his temple. He brought the world into existence out of nothing, and gave it this appearance and this embellishment. For this reason, we use the word *mundus* ('clean') and the Greeks use the word *ornatus* ('κόσμος', 'embellishment'). God himself rules and governs (the maintenance of the world is no less a miracle than its creation) 265 that this is the law of the universe (there is no other chance, no other fortune, no other lot in things): 266 that God accomplishes everything with the greatest equity and wisdom, even though we fail to recognize his methods; 267 and that whatever happens to anyone leads to his profit, if he is good: not to small money gains or goods of this transitory world but to eternal happiness.

In the text provided by C the infinitive clauses are the object of *regit* and *administrat*, and *hanc* (265) does no longer refer to the previous content (as in L266) but to the next: the law of God is not «that nothing is made, nothing moves, nothing happens, not even a single stalk rises from the ground or a tuft flutters in the air without his consent and command», but «that God accomplishes everything with the greatest equity and wisdom, even though we fail to recognize his methods».

(c) The edition of Paris (P)

The edition issued by Simon de Colines (P, Paris 1527) was the third edition of *Ad sap.* but, surprisingly, only included a portion of all the new or re-edited words (around 60), or phrases and sentences introduced by C (around 260). In many occasions, P maintained readings of C which were original with respect to L, as the list below details (when the numbering of a particular edition is wrong, I add the correct one after the equal sign):

¹³⁶ Cf. Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 7 March 1525 (in *supra* n. 99).

REWRITING

trahi (L8) : pertrahi (C8, P8)
 fungi (L17) : defungi (C17, P17)
 magna (L40) : ingentia (C41, P40)
 in scurras et mimos (L57) : in comessiones, scurras, mimos (C60, P57)
 lintheo (L89) : linteolo (C93, P89)
 satisfaciamus (L99) : morem geramus (C103, P99)
 prodest (L131) : expedit (C136, P131)
 poenitentiam (L245) : poenitentia (C250, P245)
 intelligimus (L269) : assequimur (C268, P269)
 huic (L344) : hinc (C342, P344)
 malis (L365) : malorum (C363, P365)
 dum (L407 = 397) : modo (C395; P407 = 397)
 dignatus est (L451 = 441) : dignatur (C446; P451 = 441)
 maiore cura dederent (L577 = 567) : suae liberius uendicarent (C568 = 577; P577 = 567)
 cum religione (L600 = 590) : ex religione (C593 = 602; P600 = 500)

NEW WORDS, PHRASES AND SENTENCES

probe ac (C26, P25) | obiecta et (C37, P36) | Suborta est in uestitu contentio, quae multa docuit superuacanea et damnosa, dum homines etiam ex eo quod infirmitatem nostram arguit honorem captant (C47, P45) | redundantia noxiis humoribus (C120, P116) | Hebraeus quoque concionator inquit: «Altiora te ne quaesieris, et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris; sed quae praecepit tibi deus, illa cogita semper. Et in pluribus operibus eius ne fueris curiosus» (C134, P128) | uero (C236, P231) | de nobis statuit ac (C273, P274) | inter caetera (C277 = 278, P279) | et statuto custodiendae pietatis (C340, P342) | in totum (C372; P375 = 374) | Ipse si non salutare aut resalutare, negligentiae magis adscrito uel inconsyderantiae quam contemptui. Parum blande aut non satis honorifice appellatus, seu moribus seu naturae attribue, non maliciae uel odio (C438; P445 = 440) | Hisce interpretationibus ac similibus, sanctam tibi ac iucundissimam parabis uitam, quippe omnes diliges nec a quoquam te offensum arbitrare (C439; P445 = 440) | aut certe ignotos (C527; P528 = 518)

However, in most of the cases, **P** did not incorporate the innovations of **C** and, therefore, kept the text of the *editio princeps* (**L**). All the novelties of **C** listed *supra* in section 3.2 (b) under the headings «Rewriting» (p. 110-111) and «New words, phrases and sentences» (p. 111) were not introduced in **P**. Regarding the segmentation of the work into sections, **P** also maintained the tendency of not incorporating the innovations of **C**. The Paris edition turned two chapter titles into annotations in the margin, and it did not indicate the section on sleep (*De somno*) and that on oaths (*De iureiurando*). Conversely, **P** innovated by introducing a section on education (*De eruditione*).

DISTRIBUTION INTO CHAPTERS

P1-P11: —

P12-P16: Divisio rerum (The classification of reality)

P17-P80: Rerum naturae ac precia (Characteristics and value of things)

P81-P117: De corpore (The body) | **C** title chapter; **P** in the margin

P118-P121: De animo (The soul) | C title chapter; P in the margin
 P122-P201: De euriditione (Education) | C — ; P in the margin
 P202-P203: De uirtute (Virtue) } edited
 P204-P254: De affectibus (The emotions) } together in C
 P255-P276: De religione (Religion)
 P277-P317: De Christo (Christ)
 P318-P353: De sumptione cibi (The consumption of food)
 [C332-C346: De somno; P —]
 P354-P431 (=354-421): De charitate (Charity)
 P432-P452 (=422-442): De conuictu hominum (On human socialization).
 P453-P512 (=443-502): De uerbis (Language).
 [C505-C509: De iureiurando | P —]
 P513-P566 (=503-556): Quomodo hominibus utendum (How to deal with one's fellow
 men)
 P567-P602 (=567-592): Quomodo se quisque geret erga seipsum (How we ought to
 behave towards ourselves)

(d) The three stages of composition ¹³⁷

Based on the data provided by the previous analysis one is impelled to admit that, even though the chronological order of the editions is L C P, the three stages of composition must have been L P C. This conclusion stems from the following evidence:

- (a) The fact that P does not maintain all the changes and innovations of C shows that the manuscript or the textual source of the Paris edition (P, 1527) is not the same as the one used in the Bruges edition (C, 1526), otherwise P would have incorporated all the aforesaid modifications.
- (b) The fact that C and P concur in some readings and both differ from L in other readings shows that C and P display a stage of the text posterior to that of L.
- (c) The fact that, on numerous occasions, L and P have the same text and only C offers a different reading demonstrates that P is the printed version of a manuscript source whose text was in a stage of writing prior to that used in C but, as a result of what has been said in (b), posterior to that used in L.¹³⁸

The next example summarizes and exemplifies the proposed chronological order L P C. Maxims 261-262 of the *editio princeps* (stage one) read:

¹³⁷ The arguments deployed in this section are similar to those employed by me to explain the three stages of writing found in *Sat.* (cf. Tello 2020a: 52-55). This evidence confirms that both *Ad sap.* and *Sat.* were written around the same period of time and eventually also rephrased simultaneously.

¹³⁸ González (2007: 74) was the first to indicate that there must have been an intermediate edition between the 1524 edition of Martens and the 1526 edition of De Croock, which is no longer extant. The text of this lost edition would have been transmitted by the edition of De Colines (1527). In order to show that this situation was not unique to Vives's *Ad sap.*, cf. what Grafton (2020: 54) comments about Copernicus's *De reuolutionibus*: «Copernicus himself must have made many of these changes in an intermediate text that served as printer's copy and that no longer survives».

261. Mundus hic est uelut domus quaedam eius uel potius templum. Ipse ex nihilo in hanc faciem atque ornatum protulit.

262. Vnde mundi nomen accepit. Idem regit atque administrat non minore conseruationis miraculo quam creationis.

The Paris edition of 1527 (stage two) rearranges the maxims and adds a new phrase (italics mine):

261. Mundus hic est uelut domus quaedam eius uel potius templum. Ipse ex nihilo in hanc faciem atque ornatum protulit. Vnde mundi nomen accepit, *apud Graecos ornati*.

262. Idem regit atque administrat non minore conseruationis miraculo quam creationis.

Finally, the Bruges edition (stage three) joins the two maxims, keeps the new text of P and adds a new phrase of its own (italics mine):

264. Mundus hic est uelut domus quaedam eius uel potius templum. Ipse ex nihilo in hanc faciem atque ornatum protulit. Vnde mundi nomen *apud nos* accepit, apud Graecos *ornati*. Idem regit atque administrat non minore conseruationis miraculo quam creationis.

I shall give another example¹³⁹ that follows the same pattern in order to reinforce my argument. Maxim 164 of the *editio princeps* (stage one) begins as follows:

164. Scurras, parasitos, imperite loquaces aut spurce, moriones, nugatores et id genus hominum...

The Paris edition of 1527 (stage two) adds a new word (italics mine):

164. Scurras, parasitos, imperite loquaces aut spurce, moriones, nugatores, *bibaces* et id genus hominum...

Finally, the Bruges edition (stage three) keeps the new word of P and adds two more of its own (italics mine):

169. Scurras, parasitos, imperite loquaces aut spurce, moriones, nugatores, *bibaces*, *lurcones sordidos* et id genus hominum...

(e) Other editions during Vives's life

Editions based on C

Between 1526 and 1537 all the editions of *Ad sap.* took the Bruges edition (C) as the base text. From this period are the editions of Robert de Keyser¹⁴⁰ (K, Antwerp 1530), Michaël

¹³⁹ Two more examples of this sort, though less clear, can be found in the *apparatus criticus* of my critical edition in maxims 42 and 300a.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. CEBR 2: 258a-259a.

Hillen¹⁴¹ (H, Antwerp 1531), Gaspard and Melchior Trechsel¹⁴² (T, Lyon 1532), and Peter Schöffer¹⁴³ (S, Strasbourg ca. 1533).¹⁴⁴ Keyser (K, Antwerp 1530) followed C quite faithfully and corrected its numbering errors. But he also added some minor modifications (around 27) that did not improve the text significantly, or even worsen it in some cases. I give some examples below:¹⁴⁵

a populo : populo (K33) | deus ipse : decus ipse (K35) | euehit : inuehit (K58) | uitiorum : uirorum (K71) | sapientium : sapientum (K81) | scelestissima : sceleratissima (K82) | etiam si : etsi (K114) | ne curaueris : ne curaueritis (K116) | ipse quid siue audis : ipse quid audis (K149) | quo : quae (K188) | imitarere : imitates (K195) | salubre sit : salubre fit (K199) | perscripta : praescripta (K212) | unusquisque : unuscuiusque (K216) | futurus : fruiturus (K319) | Documenti : Documentum (K357) | filios : filius (K384) | patentissima : patientissima (K408) | obiurgationis amarori : obiurgationis amarae ori (K458) | Operam si : Operam sic (K515) | quis : quia (K520) | excelsior : excellentior (K557)

Of all of these examples, a comment should be made on two, which help understand the variety of vicissitudes that a printed text may suffer. Maxim 35 of C includes the phrase «et natura et ratio et deus ipse iubent», in which *deus* is abbreviated *de*⁹. Keyser edited this phrase as «et natura et ratio et *decus* ipse iubent». He either made a mistake or wrongly interpreted the abbreviation «⁹». This mistake was kept by Hillen (H), but the Trechsel brothers (T) restored the reading of C. A very peculiar copy preserved at KU Leuven proves that K made a mistake (and, therefore, that *decus* was not a change suggested by Vives): an attentive reader scratched the letter *c* of *decus* in an attempt to emend the wrong reading.¹⁴⁶

On the other hand, maxim 359 of L begins with the following words: «Documenti huius», that is, «of this model of life». The Bruges edition (maxim 357 of C) made a printing error and did not include the genitive ending of the word: «Document huius». This event forced Keyser to guess a new ending and thus printed «Documentum huius», which broke the concordance between *documenti* and *huius*.¹⁴⁷

The edition of Hillen (H, Antwerp 1531) followed K but introduced more readings of its own (around 45). Like K, not only did new readings not improve the text significantly but even worsen it in some occasions. I give some examples below:¹⁴⁸

tanquam preciosa : tanquam speciosa (H1) | uilitas : utilitas (H16) | Regina et princeps : Regina ac princeps (H17) | tegumentum uel mancipium : tegumentum et mancipium (H35) | uiae : uitae (H41) | uera : uero (H54) | sic : hic (H63) | et ad : atque ad (H110) |

¹⁴¹ Cf. CEBR 2: 191b-192a.

¹⁴² Cf. CEBR 3: 343b-344b.

¹⁴³ Cf. CEBR 3: 228b-229a.

¹⁴⁴ This edition bears no date. According to Marcus de Schepper, researcher at the Royal Library of Brussels between 1974 and 2016, it might have been printed around 1533. Institutional catalogues date this edition in 1530 (KU Leuven, Bern Universitätsbibliothek, Vatican Library), 1533 (Basel Universitätsbibliothek) or 1538 (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, USTC). Philological data provided in the next page endorse this date.

¹⁴⁵ First, I give the reading of C; then, the novelty of K. The numbering of K and my critical edition agree.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. complementary note 2 to see the visual evidence.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. complementary note 3 to see the visual evidence.

¹⁴⁸ First, I give the reading of CK; then, the novelty of H. The numbering of H and my critical edition agree.

decedat : concedat (H126) | mores probos : probos mores (H170) | institutori : institutioni (H181) | decore : decoro (H183) | ni : nisi (H202) | uel altera : aut altera (H232) | Hanc nosse perfecta est sapientia : Hanc nosce, perfecta est sapientia (H282) | illum : illius (H288) | in animum admittas : admittas in animo (H295) | ut : et (H325) | imbecillos : imbecilles (H333) | dei uiuentis : Dei, uiuentes (H344) | iam hominibus : ex hominibus (H346) | gratiosum : gratiorem (H382) | uirtutem eis : uirtutem eius (H400) | uilitate : utilitate (H437) | quiddam : quidem (H465) | illa : eo (H492) | odorare : adorare (H517) | nominatur : appellatur (H554) | reuerentur : uerentur (H576) | maius : magis (H600)

In 1532 the Trechsel brothers (T) printed in Lyon a very careful edition. It included a preface to the dear reader (*amico lectori*)¹⁴⁹ in which the printer explained the labour undertaken in presenting a clear text, cleansed of the many typographical errors with which C was crammed. Regarding textual variants, these are minimal. T follows K, takes a few readings directly from C, and does not reproduce the innovations of H. However, T makes seven new readings of its own:¹⁵⁰

in dei maiestatem : dei maiestatem (T130) | fabricamur peritiam : fabricamur peritia (T145) | ipse quid siue audis : ipse aut quid audis (T149) | imitarere (C197): imitareris (T197) | uniuerso : uniuerso orbe (T308) | hostis : hostes (T333) | quam nos instituit : qua nos instituit (T600)

The Lyon edition was later reprinted by Schöffler (S) in its entirety: it included both the preface to the reader and the seven innovations. Given the fact that S keeps the novelties of T, it should be dated later than 1532, hence around 1533.

A very particular edition of *Ad sap.* was issued by Christoph Froschauer (F, Zurich 1535), placed at the beginning of the fifth volume of the Latin version of the New Testament. In the preface to the volume, its editor, Conrad Pellicanus briefly introduced the *libellus* of Vives, who was described as a «eruditissimus» and «piissimus» man. The edition was improved by the addition of keywords and short summaries in the margin of the page in order to help the reader find a particular content. Furthermore, the editor did not maintain the numbering of previous editions and gave an independent numbering to each section of the work. Three years later, Froschauer (F², Zurich 1538) reprinted the Latin version of the New Testament and maintained *Ad sap.* as its introductory piece. Regarding textual variants, F is useful to solve the right declension of some words that were printed abbreviated in previous editions. For example: «felicissimam» (352), which had been printed by C K H as «feliciss.»; or «potissimum» (470), which had been printed by C K H as «potiss.». As far as new readings are concerned, those introduced in maxims 3, 137 and 208 do not seem to be a good choice.

Editions based on P

The Paris edition (P 1527) was not used as the base text in any reprint until 1537, in the edition issued by Balthasar Ladius and Thomas Platter (La) in Basel.¹⁵¹ This edition followed P

¹⁴⁹ Cf. complementary note 4.

¹⁵⁰ The reading of CK is given first; then, the novelty of T. The numbering of T and my critical edition agree.

¹⁵¹ González (2007: 105, n. 63) suggests that the edition of *Ad sap.* issued by Ladius and Platter may not have been authorized by the author, otherwise Vives would have sent the revised version of 1526 (C)

almost completely, except in a couple of cases where a reading identical to C was taken,¹⁵² possibly through the Antwerp editions (K H), or even directly from the Bruges edition itself. However, one must not rule out the possibility of being just a simple coincidence. La also introduced a few new readings. For example:¹⁵³

nostri (128) : nostro (La 124) | ex contagie (137) : ex contagio (La132) | sic (221) : sis (La 216) | debet hoc (507) : hoc debet (La 500) | ut non multo (514) : non in multo (La 507)

Two years later, in 1539, Lasius and Platter reprinted this edition without a single change. In 1538, Michael Blum (Bl) issued in Leipzig a reprint of the Paris edition with only two remarkable changes: he correctly emended the verb of maxim 113 (*descendi*) and introduced a variant in maxim 528 (*cunctatior*), which was later reproduced by B and V. Another edition came to light the following year, that of Winter (W 1539), who took P as the base text, but deferred from it (as well as from L and C) in 13 passages. In the following edition of 1540 (W²), which was described as «ex postrema recognitione autoris», six more new readings were added. Examples are given below:¹⁵⁴

angelis et deo (13) : et angelis et Deo (W13) | sunt homini curanda (42) : homini sunt curanda (W41) | haec ex rebus (60) : ex his rebus (W57) | intraria (64) : intranea (W61) | non uel legeris (198) : uel non legeris (W193) | sequamur (203) : sectamur (W198) | hoc posse (318) : hoc non posse (W² 320) | alimentis non (326) : non alimentis (W² 328) | nominis (340) : numinis (W² 342) | ames (381) : amas (W383) | Age potius deo (396) : Age Deo potius (W398) | amandam (409) : amandum (W411) | Generosiss. (437) : Generosissime (W² 435) | Haec (449) : Hae (W² 444) | Ne celeritatem (467) : Nec celeritatem (W² 462) | imperitissimis (473) : peritissimis (W468) | a quibus (490) : quibus (W483) | non (509) : si non (W502) | Nimium (583) : Nimirum (W573)

Even though Vives seems to have sent to Winter's printing office revised and improved manuscripts of other works (such as *Foem.* and *Mar.*),¹⁵⁵ the analysis of the aforesaid variants

or 1530 (K) instead of the Paris edition: «Si hubiesen editado la *Introductio* a propuesta del autor, quizás éste no les habría enviado la versión corriente de su texto, datada en 1525 y difundida por Colines en 1527, sino la ampliada en 1530. Lasius y Platter desconocerían, por lo tanto, la nueva y definitiva revisión».

¹⁵² La 203 (C208): a Deo | La 453 (C458): utare.

¹⁵³ First, I give the reading of P which was also maintained by C; then, the novelty of La. I provide the numbering of my critical edition in the first case; then that of La, which is the same as P.

¹⁵⁴ First, I give the reading of P; then, the novelty of W or W². I add in parenthesis the numbering of my critical edition in the first case; then that of W or W², which is the same as P.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Fantazzi on *Foem.*, in SWJV 6: xix: «Around 1537 an association of printers in Basel, including the Hellenist Ioannes Oporinus, Balthasar Lazius and Thomas Platter, with the financial backing of Robert Winter, launched the publication of numerous works of Vives, some in their original form and others revised by the author. Prominent among this was the *De institutione*, Robert Winter, 1538 and 1540, and Oporinus, undated but probably from the year 1540 or 1542. Vives took this opportunity to submit the work to a thorough revision, stylistic and doctrinal, which constitutes a substantial re-writing of the treatise». Cf. also Fantazzi on *Mar.*, in SWJV 8: xv: «As in the *De institutione feminae Christianae*, with which it is joined in this new edition of both works commissioned by Robert Winter, Vives revised the text anew. The revisions are not so thorough-going as in the companion work, but still provide insight into Vives' evolving ideas about marriage and women. As always in the

of Winter's edition does not necessarily lead to the same conclusion regarding *Ad sap.* However, readings from **La**, **Bl**, **W** and **W²** are important because they demonstrate that changes which seemed to appear for the first time in **B** (1555) had been, in fact, first introduced in these previous editions.

(f) Noteworthy editions after Vives's death

The text printed in the first *Opera omnia* of Vives's works (**B**), which was issued by Nikolaus Bischoff¹⁵⁶ and Jakob Künding (more commonly known as Nicolaus Episcopi and Iacobus Parcus), followed **P** and kept some of the changes introduced by the aforementioned editions of **La**, **Bl**, **W** and **W²**. The fact that **B** ignored **C** and the editions based on it contributed to establish **P** as the *textus receptus*¹⁵⁷ of *Ad sap.*

Two centuries later, the edition of Gregori Maians i Siscar —included at the beginning of the first volume of the *Opera omnia* of Vives printed by Benet Monfort in Valencia (**V**, 1782)— followed **B** consistently, but incorporated some readings of **C** and **H**. For example, before maxims 276, 316, 332 and 305,¹⁵⁸ Maians incorporated title chapters that were only available in **C K H**; further, he chose readings only available through **C K H**, such as «muro hoc septum» (573) and «sapienti» (604). These variants might have been available to Maians through an edition of *Ad sap., Sat. and Rat. stud.* that had been published in Medina del Campo in 1551, which reproduced, in turn, the edition of Hillen published in 1531. However, there is all likelihood that he consulted a closer edition, that of Antonio de Sancha (**M**), which was printed in Madrid in 1772. This edition, placed at the end of a volume devoted to Cervantes de Salazar's translations,¹⁵⁹ was the very first attempt to make a critical edition of *Ad sap.*, since the editor included a comparison between **B** and an alleged edition printed in Burgos in 1544 that followed **C** and those editions based on it.¹⁶⁰ The editor of **M** also introduced some corrections of his own in maxims 377 (*uelut*), 384 (omission of *non conditio*), 397 (*alicuius*), 458 (*obiurgationibus amatori*), 467 (*ne*), 524 (*uel illa*) and 599 (*ineundum sit*). The fact that **V** chose the reading of **M** in maxim 467 seems to prove that Maians did indeed consult the edition of Antonio de Sancha.

Finally, I shall draw the attention to the edition printed in Antwerp by Jan vander Loe (**Lo**) in 1550. It follows the editions based on **C**, and it includes up to 33 new variants of its own located in maxims 16, 21, 33, 40, 59, 82, 83-86, 88-90, 168, 169, 233, 282, 286, 312, 343, 359, 410, 442, 463, and 541. Although the title page reads that this edition has been «ab autore ipso recognita et locupletata», it is uncertain whether the long passages inserted between

revision of his works for republication, he takes the opportunity to strengthen his argument by introducing additional citations from the classical authors, passages from the scriptures, and the fathers of the church».

¹⁵⁶ Cf. CEBR 1: 437b-438a.

¹⁵⁷ Philological term to refer to the most disseminated version of a particular work. Cf. *Pérez 2011: 113: «Por *textus receptus* se entiende el más divulgado y aceptado de una obra, sin atender a la calidad de sus lecciones y sólo avalado por la propia tradición, que ha terminado imponiendo esa edición vulgata, admitida por todos como más autorizada».

¹⁵⁸ The numbering of all maxims that appears in this and the next paragraphs until the end of section 3.2 belong to (or agree with) my critical edition of *Ad sap.*

¹⁵⁹ Cf. *supra* Part I, section 2.2, n. 66.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. *supra* Part I, section 2.2, n. 68.

maxims 83-86 and 88-90 were written by Vives's own hand or dictated to one of his scribes. I give below a comparison (new text has been signaled in italics):

L π β

83. Etiam mala quae dicuntur corporis uel fortunae licebit in bonum uertere, si patienter feras, et tanto sis ad uirtutem promptior quo minus tibi in illis succedit ac proinde expeditior.

84. Saepenumero ex damnis corporis uel externorum magnae sunt accessiones factae uirtutibus.

85. Et, quoniam in hac nostra peregrinatione animum gestamus in corpore inclusum maximasque opes in uasis fictilibus, non omnino repudiandum nobis est et abiiciendum corpus.

86. Sic curandum tamen ut se non dominum, non socium esse sentiat sed mancipium, nec sibi pasci aut uiuere sed alteri.

88. Quo mollius habetur corpus, hoc acrius menti reluctatur et, ut equus delicate pastus, sessorem excutit.

89. Grauis sarcina corporis animum elidit. Acumen ingenii sagina corporis aut indulgentia retunditur.

90. Cibi, somni, exercitationes, tota corporis curatio ad sanitatem referenda est, non ad uoluptatem ac delicias, ut animo prompte inseruiat nec ferocia cultus insolescat neu uirium inopia decidat.

Lo (1550)

83. Etiam mala quae dicuntur corporis (*ut quae corpus afficiunt*) morbos, aegritudines uel etiam fortunae mala, licebit in bonum uertere, si modo ea patienter feras, et tanto sis ad uirtutem promptior quo minus tibi in illis succedit ac proinde expeditior.

84. Saepenumero ex damnis *atque* corporis uel *externarum rerum detrimentis* magnae sunt accessiones factae uirtutibus.

85. Et, quoniam in hac nostra peregrinatione (*quis enim uetabit quo minus uitam hanc peregrinationem uocemus?*) animum gestamus in corpore inclusum maximasque opes in uasis fictilibus, non omnino repudiandum nobis est et abiiciendum corpus.

86. Sic curandum tamen ut se non dominum, non *item* socium esse sentiat sed mancipium *et seruum*, nec sibi pasci aut uiuere *dumtaxat* sed *etiam* alteri.

88. Quo mollius *atque tenerius* habetur corpus, hoc acrius menti reluctatur et, ut equus delicate pastus, sessorem excutit.

89. Grauis sarcina corporis animum elidit; *et ab eo, quod ipsa ratio unice amplexandum monet, transuersum agit.* Acumen ingenii sagina corporis aut indulgentia retunditur.

90. Cibi, somni, exercitationes, *lusus, colloquia, prodeambulationes et denique* tota corporis curatio ad *suam ipsius* sanitatem *et bonam ualetudinem* referenda est, non *autem* ad uoluptatem ac (*quod ii fere facere solent qui, dum uel solo luxuriae nomine infames misereque, luxu omnis generis perditum molliter curant cuticulam: uentri primum, posthabita mentis curatione, seruire student*) *primas* delicias, ut animo prompte *ac expedite* inseruiat nec ferocia cultus *temere* insolescat neu uirium inopia decidat.

In 1568, the widow of Jan vander Loe (Lo²) issued a new edition with 18 more new variants, located in maxims 74, 88, 123, 130, 137, 142, 149, 160, 181, 356, 370, 516, 517, 566, and 600. Owing to the quantity and, in some cases, the length of the novelties introduced by Lo and Lo², I have decided to note them in the *apparatus criticus* of my critical edition. However, I again emphasize the fact that there is no conclusive proof that they were either suggested or authorized by Vives.

3.3 The present edition

(a) My text and the *apparatus criticus*

Notwithstanding the many typographical errors in the edition prepared by the printing house of Hubert de Croock; and despite the fact that P (and the editions based on it) was the version included in the 800 as well as the most disseminated version after Vives's death, the *collatio* of the various editions has prompted me to consider C the best available text. I have used C as the main edition for establishing the critical edition, because (as the previous evidence has shown) it most probably reflects the third and final stage of the work. Hence, I have followed the readings of C almost completely. Some exceptions have been made, which can be traced through the *apparatus criticus*. Even though later editions based on C (K 1530, H 1531, T 1532, S ca. 1533, F 1535, F² 1538) were printed more carefully and lacked typographical errors, their variants did not improve the text significantly. Therefore, it is unlikely that those readings be attributed to Vives himself. I have also discarded the corrections printed on the final page of L (L^{err}). In the aforesaid letter sent to Cranevelt on 7 March 1525, Vives complained about the interference of either the editors or the correctors, who introduced changes that worsened the text.¹⁶¹

Regarding the editions to be found in the *apparatus criticus*, they can be categorized into three groups: L (the *editio princeps*); P and those that follow it (La, Bl, W, W², B, V); C and those that follow it (K, H, T, S, F, F², Lo, Lo², M). In order to make the consultation of the *apparatus* smoother, I have used three symbols: β (an allusion to Bruges) gathers common readings of C, K, H; π (an allusion to Paris) gathers common readings of P, B, V; ω (an allusion to omnes, 'all') gathers common readings of L, P, C, K, H, B, V.

(b) Format, orthography, and punctuation

Given the fact that no original autograph of *Ad sap.* has survived, I have deemed appropriate to edit *Ad sap.* as close as it was able to be consulted by its first readers.¹⁶² Therefore, I have edited Vives's maxims according to the layout of L, that is, I have not included any division into chapters or any chapter headings but have presented a running flow of numbered maxims from 1 to 604. However, chapter titles have been noted in the *apparatus criticus* in the precise location where they appear in the various editions. As I shall explain later (cf. *infra* Part IV, section 1.3.a), thematic divisions do not work well, because maxims were not written by Vives to fit in pre-established groups. Regarding the edition of

¹⁶¹ Cf. *supra* n. 28, 99.

¹⁶² This is also the position of Vigliano in his critical edition of *Disc. corr.* and *Disc. trad.* (2013a: cxxxvi): «Il n'est pas sans intérêt de présenter le texte tel que pouvaient le consulter ses premiers lecteurs»; cf. also 2013a: cxxxv (citation is available *supra*, p. 104, at the end of section 2.5).

maxims that are broken into different fragments, I have changed the initial upper case letter into lower case wherever necessary in order to help notice the connection between them (cf., for example, 255-256, 264-267, 317-318, 349-350, 364-367, 458-459, 470-471, 535-536, 543-544). Regarding the debate whether *Ad sap.* was originally written using an aphoristic style or, conversely, a style closer to an essay, cf. *supra* Part III, section 2.3.

The art of editing Neo-Latin texts is not without perils, especially when it comes to orthography and spelling. As *Deneire (2014)¹⁶³ has clearly summarized, scholars take two main standpoints: either to classicize the Neo-Latin text or to maintain it with all its idiosyncrasies. *Rabbie (1996) and Ijsewijn (*Ijsewijn and Sacré 1998) seem to favour the first option, whereas *Allen (1906), the editorial board of ASD (*Waszink et al. 1969) and *Ramminger (2006) seem to foster the second. If one is honest enough about this controversial subject, one is impelled to admit that all arguments are equally reasonable. However, in my opinion, what was not meant to be Classical Latin or did not attain the Classical form by itself, should not be altered in order to achieve what it did not. It seems more honest and faithful to the original work that it be preserved as close as possible to what the author or the scribe decided to write. Consequently, I have edited the text with minimal intervention, a practice that I have already applied when editing two other works of Vives.¹⁶⁴

I have expanded all abbreviations and written *s* instead of *ſ*. I have not maintained the distinction of *v* at the beginning of the word and *u* in other positions —even though it is the common practice in all the editions up to 1532: L, C, P, K, H, T— but followed the common practice of well-reputed printers contemporary to Vives, such as Aldo Manuzio in Venice or Johann Froben in Basel, which edited *u* in all positions.¹⁶⁵ Thus the reader will find *uiuere*, *una* instead of *viuere*, *vna*. Adjectives derived from proper nouns have been capitalized, thus *Christianus* or *Graecus*. Apart from the aforementioned examples, I have maintained the spelling and orthography¹⁶⁶ of the base edition, that is, C. Thus the reader will find forms such as *caussa*, *charitas*, *consydera*, *delitia*, *intelligit*, *lachryma*, *ocium*, *pronunciauit*, *quum*, *seipsum*, *tanquam* instead of *causa*, *caritas*, *considera*, *delicia*, *intellegit*, *lacrima*, *otium*, *pronuntiauit*, *cum*, *se ipsum*, *tamquam*. Inconsistencies in spelling or pronunciation have also been maintained. Thus the reader will find both *author* and *autor* instead of *auctor*; or both *uicium* and *uitium*.

As far as punctuation is concerned, I have followed modern standards. We should all keep in mind that, in the 16th century, writers did not adhere to the same rules as we do, and printers often introduced punctuation according to their own particular taste and judgment.¹⁶⁷ Vives's way of writing exclamation sentences may serve to illustrate this point.

¹⁶³ Bibliographical entries preceded by * are fully referenced *infra* section 4.4.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. my edition of Vives's *De Aristotelis operibus censura* (Tello 2019) and *Satellitium siue Symbola* (Tello 2020a). I also followed this practice in my short anthology of Erasmus's *Adagiorum chiliades* (Tello 2018a).

¹⁶⁵ Editions of *Ad sap.* as from 1533 (S) follow this practice as well.


¹⁶⁶ Regarding orthography and spelling, cf. the thorough analysis of *Maestre 1997: 1088-1094.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. G. Ioppolo, «Early Modern Handwriting», in M. Hattaway (ed.), *A New Companion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture* (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell), 183: «The use of punctuation was much different from the modern age, in which writers adhere to the same rules. [...] Early modern writers used much lighter punctuation, and when they did punctuate, they were often inconsistent. [...] If writers do use punctuation at the end of a sentence or line it was often not a period (.) but a colon (:), semi-colon (;) or virgule (/). Question marks (?) are often used interchangeably with exclamation marks (!). A hyphen was sometimes represented by an equals sign (=), especially at the

In manuscript letters written to Cranevelt by either Vives or his scribe, some sentences bear no exclamation marks whereas others are signaled with question marks, for example: «Quanto iucundius esset audire conuitia quam ictus; spectare tristes, quam cruentos; referre e pugna exhaustos, quam exanimes»;¹⁶⁸ or «Dii boni? Quam alia est et <diuersa> uia quam furiosorum?»¹⁶⁹ In view of this, some sentences that in the printed editions end with question marks have been edited with exclamation marks.¹⁷⁰

I end this section by expressing my indebtedness to those scholars that have carefully taken care of Erasmus's works in the various critical editions published in the ASD series. Their critical editions and the one already mentioned of Vigliano (2013a) have profoundly inspired my work. As I said in a recent article (Tello 2020a: 60), «if Erasmus has been given the chance to be preserved for future generations as faithfully as possible to his own Latin in the majestic editions of the ASD, it would seem fair enough that Vives be given an equal chance as well». I sincerely hope that this critical edition may contribute to it.

4 Critical edition



Title page of the *editio princeps* of *Ad sap.* (Louvain: Pieter Martens, 1524). Picture courtesy of KU Leuven Bibliotheken for personal, non-commercial use

end of a line, rather than a short dash (-); Vigliano 2013a: cxxxix: «Le lecteur voudra bien noter, cependant, que ces ancêtres des guillemets peuvent être ajoutés par l'imprimeur ou par le correcteur, plutôt que par l'auteur; de même pour les manchettes».

¹⁶⁸ Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 24 June 1522 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 6, lines 34-36). De Vocht adds an exclamation mark at the end of the sentence: «quam exanimes!».

¹⁶⁹ Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 10 August 1522 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 13, lines 26-27). De Vocht adds an exclamation mark after *boni!* and *furiosum!*. Cf. visual evidence in complementary note 6.

¹⁷⁰ Cf., for example, maxims 53, 64, 251, 304, 359, 360, 368, 435, 436, 438. In these cases, question marks found in C have been edited as exclamation marks.

Ioannis Lodouici Viuis Valentini ad sapientiam introductio

1. Vera sapientia est de rebus incorrupte iudicare, ut talem unamquamque existimemus qualis ipsa est, ne uilia sectemur tanquam preciosa aut preciosa tanquam uilia reiiciamus, ne uituperemus laudanda neue laudemus uituperium merita.

2. Hinc enim error omnis in hominum mentibus ac uitium oritur. Nihilque est in humana uita exitiabilius quam deprauatio illa iudiciorum, quum singulis rebus non suum precium redditur.

3. Quocirca perniciosae sunt persuasiones uulgi, quod stultissime de rebus iudicat.

4. Videlicet magnus erroris magister est populus.

5. Nec aliud magis laborandum est quam ut sapientiae studiosum a populari sensu abducamus et uindicemus.

6. Primum omnium suspecta illi sint quaecunque multitudo magno consensu approbat, nisi ad illorum normam reuocarit qui singula uirtute metiuntur.

7. Assuescat unusquisque iam tum a puero ueras habere de rebus opiniones, quae simul cum aetate adolescent.

8. Et ea cupiat quae recta sint, fugiat quae praua. Assuefactio haec (bene agere) uertet ei prope in naturam, ut non possit nisi coactus et reluctans ad male agendum pertrahi.

9. Deligenda est optima uitae ratio; hanc consuetudo iucundissimam reddet.

10. Tota reliqua uita ex hac puerili educatione pendet.

11. Ergo in curriculo sapientiae primus gradus est ille ueteribus celebratissimus «Seipsum nosse».

12. Homo ex corpore constat et animo. Corpus habemus ex terra et his elementis quae cernimus ac tangimus, corporibus bestiarum simile.

Titulus Lodouici L P β : Ludouici B V | Valentini L P V β : *deest in B* | ad sapientiam introductio L P B β : introductio ad sapientiam V || *Ante 1 titulus est* DE SAPIENTIA B V : *deest in L P β* || 1 tanquam preciosa L π C K : tanquam speciosa H | uituperium merita β : uituperanda L π || 2 singulis β : *deest in L π* || 3 persuasiones uulgi, quod (quae F²) stultissime de rebus iudicat (iudicant F²) β : uulgi opiniones, quae stultissime de rebus iudicant L π || 4 Videlicet β : *deest in L π* | est β : *deest in L π* || 8 assuefactio ... uertet β : ut assuefactio ... uertat L π | pertrahi π β : trahi L || 9 Deligenda est β : Eligenda est L π || 10 Tota reliqua π β : Tota paene reliqua L || *Ante 12 titulus est* DIVISIO RERVM HVMANARVM β : *deest in L* : DIVISIO RERVM π || 12 ex terra et his elementis ω : ex terra, his elementis || 13 angelis et deo ω : et angelis et Deo W

13. Animum, diuinitus datum, angelis et deo similem, unde censetur homo et qui solus merito esset homo appellandus, ut maximis uiris placuit.

14. In corpore sunt forma, sanitas, firmitas, integritas, robur, celeritas, delectatio; et his aduersa: deformitas, morbus, mutilatio, imbecillitas, tarditas, dolor; et alia corporis seu commoda seu incommoda.

15. In animo, eruditio et uirtus; et contraria: ruditas, uitium.

16. Extra hominem sunt diuitiae, potentia, nobilitas, honores, dignitas, gloria, gratia; et contraria his: paupertas, inopia, ignobilitas, uilitas, dedecus, obscuritas, odium.

17. Regina et princeps rerum omnium praestantissima est uirtus, cui reliqua omnia, si suo uelint officio defungi, ancillari oportet.

18. Virtutem uoco pietatem in deum et homines: cultum dei, et amorem in homines qui coniunctus est cum uoluntate benefaciendi.

19. Reliqua, si quis ad uirtutem hanc referat, haud quaquam mala uidebuntur.

20. Nec qui primum haec nuncupauere bona sic de illis censuerunt ut nunc hominum uulguis, quod ueros illos ac naturales significatus corrupit, unde et rerum aestimationes mutatae atque inuersae sunt.

21. Sic enim sunt intelligenda haec quatenus bona iudicantur. Diuitiae sunt non gemmae aut metalla, non magnifica aedificia uel supellex instructa, sed non iis carere quae sunt ad tuendam uitam necessaria.

22. Gloria: bene audire de praestanti uirtute.

23. Honor: ueneratio ob magni precii uirtutem.

24. Gratia: fauor propter amabilem uirtutem.

25. Dignitas est uel recta hominum opinio de bene merita uirtute uel decor quidam ex interiore uirtute foras prominens.

26. Potentia et regnum: habere multos quibus probe ac recte consulas.

27. Nobilitas: excellentia actuum esse cognitum, uel a bonis prognatum similem parentum se praebere.

28. Generosus est ad uirtutem a natura optime compositus.

29. Sanitas: talis habitudo corporis ut ualeat mens.

30. Species: lineamenta corporis, quae animum formosum ostendant.

31. Vires et robur: ut exercitiis uirtutis sufficiat, ne facile defatigeris.

32. Voluptas: delectatio pura, solida et diuturna, qualis capitur ex iis solis quae ad animum pertinent.

33. Si quis haec aliter (nempe ut a populo intelliguntur) discutiat ac expendat, reperiet inepta, uana, noxia esse.

14 aduersa β : contraria L π || 15 ruditas, uitium L π C: ruditas et uitium K H || 16 gloria, gratia ω : gratia, gloria Lo | uilitas L π C K: utilitas H || Ante 17 titulus est RERVM NATVRAE AC PRECIA π β : deest in L || 17 Regina et princeps L π C K: Regina ac princeps H | defungi π β : fungi L || 18 qui coniunctus est cum uoluntate β : uoluntatemque L π || 19 haud quaquam β : non L π || 20 censuerunt β : senserunt L π | hominum uulguis β : uulguis L π | atque inuersae β : deest in L π || 21 sunt intellegenda ω : intellegenda sunt Lo | bona iudicantur β : censentur bona L π | sunt non L π C K: non sunt H | quae sunt ad tuendam uitam necessaria π β : quae ad tuendam uitam sunt necessaria L || 22 praestanti β : deest in L π || 23 magni precii β : deest in L π || 24 Gratia ... uirtutem β : deest in L π || 25 Dignitas est ... prominens β : Dignitas: recta hominum opinio de magna uirtute L π || 26 probe ac π β : deest in L || 33 nempe ut a populo (ut populo K H) intelliguntur β : ut a populo uidelicet intelliguntur L π | expendat ω : perpendat Lo

34. Primum externa omnia uel ad corpus referuntur uel ad animum: ut diuitiae ad tuendam uitam, honor ad iudicium uirtutis.

35. Corpus ipsum nihil aliud est quam tegumentum uel mancipium animi, cui et natura et ratio et deus ipse iubent subiectum esse ut brutum sentienti, mortale immortalis, terrenum diuino.

36. Porro in ipso animo eruditio in hoc paratur ut cognitum uitium facilius fugiamus, cognitam uirtutem facilius persequamur teneamusque; alioqui superuacanea est.

37. Quid aliud est uita quam peregrinatio quaedam tot undique casibus obiecta et petita, cui nulla hora non impendet finis qui potest leuissimis de causis accidere?

38. Quare stultissimum est cupiditate tam incertae uitae foedum aliquid aut prauum admittere, quasi uero compertum habeas te, postquam id feceris, diu esse uicturum.

39. Et, quemadmodum in uia, sic in uita: quo quis expeditior et paucioribus sarcinis implicitus, hoc leuius et iucundius iter facit.

40. Tum natura humani corporis ita constituta est ut paucissimis egeat. Vt si quis propius animaduertat, haud dubie insaniae damnet eos qui tam multa tam anxie congerunt, quum sit tam paucis opus.

41. Acute quisquis sic diuitias expressit: sunt breuis uiae longum uiaticum. Diuitiae namque et possessiones et uestimenta in usum tantum parari debent, quem non adiuuant immensae opes sed opprimunt, ut nauem ingentia onera.

42. Nec aurum, si non utare, a coeno differt, nisi quod magis angit eius custodia. Et efficit ut, dum illi uni studes, ea negligas quae maxime sunt homini curanda.

43. Est enim pecunia idolorum seruitus, quum ei reliqua posthabentur; magna illa et natura prima: pietas ac sanctum.

44. Vt transeam quot insidiae diuitiis tenduntur, quot et quam uariis casibus pereunt, in quam multa uitia detrudunt.

45. Culta uestimenta quid aliud sunt quam instrumenta superbiae?

46. Vtile indumentum excogitauit necessitas, preciosum luxus, elegans uanitas.

47. Suborta est in uestitu contentio, quae multa docuit superuacanea et damnosa, dum homines etiam ex eo quod infirmitatem nostram arguit honorem captant.

48. Ita diuitiarum pars maxima, aedificia, supellex numerosa et lauta, gemmae, aurum, argentum, ornamentorum omne genus spectantium oculis et comparantur et exponuntur, non possidentium usibus.

49. Iam nobilitas quid est aliud quam nascendi sors et opinio a populi stultitia inducta, ut quae saepenumero latrociniis quaeritur?

34 iudicium L P B β : indicium V || 35 tegumentum uel mancipium L π C K : tegumentum et mancipium H | deus ipse L π C : decus ipse K : decus ipsi H | mortale immortalis, terrenum diuino β : mortale immortalis ac diuino L π || 37 obiecta et π β : *deest in L* | impendet β : imminet L π || 38 admittere β : agere | quasi uero ... esse uicturum β : *deest in L π* || 40 constituta est H : constitutum est L π C K | propius β : *deest in L π* : proprius L o || 41 Acute ... uiaticum β : *deest in L π* | uiae C K : uitae H | parari debent β : parantur L π | ingentia π β : magna L || 42 et efficit ... curanda β : et efficit ut ea negligas quae maxime sunt homini curanda, dum illi uni studes L : et efficit ut, dum ubi uni studes, ea negligas quae maxime sunt homini (homini sunt W) curanda π || 43 magna illa et natura prima β : *deest in L π* | pietas ac β : etiam pietas ac L : nempe pietas et π || 45 instrumenta superbiae β : superbiae instrumenta L π || 47 Suborta est ... captant π β : *deest in L* | contentio, quae β : contentio. Haec π || 48 lauta β : opulenta L π || 49 quid est aliud L π C : quid aliud est K H

50. Vera et solida nobilitas a uirtute nascitur. Et dementia est gloriari te parentem habuisse bonum, quum sis ipse malus et turpitudine tua dedecus ac labem adferas pulchritudini generis.

51. Sed certe omnes ex eisdem constamus elementis, et idem omnium pater deus.

[51a] Natales cuiusquam contemnere, hoc est deum nascendi autorem tacite reprehendere.

52. Potentia quid est aliud quam speciosa molestia? In qua, si quis sciret quae sollicitudines, quae anxietates insint, quantum malorum mare et quam uastum, nemo est tam ambitiosus qui non eam fugeret ut grauem miseriam et, quemadmodum rex ille dixit, nollet diadema iacens humi tollere.

53. Quantum est odium, si regas malos! Quanto maius, si malus ipse!

54. Honor, si ex uirtute non oritur, prauus et peruersus est nec uere oblectare potest, quum reclamet conscientia. Sin ex uirtute, hoc praestat uirtus: ut is negligatur; aliter uera non erit uirtus, si quid honoris facit gratia. Sequi enim debet honor, non expeti.

55. Dignitates quis potest sic appellare, quum indignissimis quoque hominibus contingant? Nempe astu, fraude, ambitu, precio, pessimis artibus quaesitae.

56. Scilicet quum ab illa mandentur multicipiti bestia, quae nihil agit ratione ac iudicio.

57. Et gloria estne aliud quam, ut ille dixit, «aurium uana inflatio»?

58. Ex qua, ut honore et dignitate, nihil omnino ad eum pertingit de quo sunt. Et incertae, uagae, iniquae, momentanae sunt; similes parentis suae multitudinis, quae eodem die eundem hominem et commendat atque euehit summe et uituperat ac deprimit extreme.

59. Ergo usu uidemus uenire ut maxime sequentem honor celerrime fugiat, ad illum conferat se qui contemnebat. Hoc quoque est ingenium uulgi.

60. Quid dicam nasci haec ex rebus partim deridendis partim stultis partim sceleratis, sicut ludo pilae, profusione patrimonii in comessationes, scurras, mimos, bello potissimum (hoc est impunito latrocinio), quo magis uulgi dementiam agnoscas?

61. Secedat in se unusquisque ac solus hisce de rebus cogitet. Inueniet quam parum ad se attingat ex fama, rumoribus, ueneratione, honore populi, de quibus gloriatur.

62. Quid in somno, quid in solitudine inter summum regem interest et infimum seruum?

63. Denique sic unusquisque sentiat nobilitatem, honores, potentiam, dignitates ex prisca hominum persuasione, quam Christus animis illorum qui uere ipsius sunt adimit, nata et relicta esse et in Christianos homines inuecta tanquam lolium, quod hostis diabolus aspersit bonae segeti dei.

64. In corpore ipso quid est forma? Nempe cuticula bene colorata. Si intraria cerni possent, quanta uel in corpore speciosissimo cerneretur foeditas! Nec est aliud pulcherrimum corpus quam sterquilinum candido et purpureo linteolo contactum.

50 Et dementia β : Stultumque L π | malus et L π : malus ac β | dedecus ... generis β : dedecori sis generis pulchritudini L: dedecori sis pulchritudini generis π || 51 Natales cuiusquam β : Ignobilitatem L π || 52 et quam uastum β : *deest in* L π | et, quemadmodum ... tollere β : *deest in* L π || 54 et peruersus β : *deest in* L π | nec uere ... conscientia β : *deest in* L π | uera L π C K: uero H || 55 astu, fraude, ambitu, precio β : fraude, ambitione L: fraude, ambitione, praemiis π || 56 Scilicet ... iudicio β : *deest in* L π || 58 parentis suae multitudinis π β : parenti suae multitudini L | euehit L π C: inuehit K H || 59 Ergo usu ... uulgi β : *deest in* L π | conferat ω : conferas L ω || 60 haec ex rebus L P β : ex his rebus W B V | in comessationes, scurras, mimos π β : in scurras et mimos L || 61 hisce de rebus β : *deest in* L π || 63 sic L π C K: hic H | animis ... adimit β : animis suorum ademit L π || 64 intraria ω : intranea W | Nec est ... contactum β : *deest in* L π

65. Lineamenta et corporis decor quid iuuant, si turpis sit animus et, sicut Graecus ille dixit, «in hospitio pulchro hospes deformis»?

66. Robur quorsum pertinet in homine, quum res maximae et homine dignae non uiribus neruorum gerantur sed ingenii?

67. Nec uires, quantumcunque augeantur, maiores erunt quam tauri uel elephantum; ratione illos ingenio, uirtute superamus.

68. Transeo quod forma, uires, agilitas et caeterae corporis dotes ut flosculi celeriter marcescunt, exiguis casibus diffugiunt: uel una febricula ualidissimum quandoque hominem concutit et summum decorem aufert.

69. Et, ut nihil accadat, certe necesse est illa omnia cum aetate, quae nulla est diuturna, flaccescere ac decidere.

70. Nemo ergo potest externa iure sua dicere, quae tam facile ad alios transeunt; nec corporea, quae tam cito auolant.

71. Quid quod haec, quae multi admirantur, magnorum uitiorum sunt causae uelut insolentiae, arrogantiae, socordiae, ferocitatis, liuoris, aemulationis, simultatum, rixarum, bellorum, caedis, stragis, cladis?

72. Delectatio corporis, ut corpus ipsum, uilis ac pecudina est, qua saepius et uehementius et diutius pecora quam homines incitantur ac perfruuntur.

73. Ex hac, quum morbi plerique ad corpus redundant et ad rem familiarem per magna damna, tum ad animum certa poenitentia et hebetudo ingenii, quod deliciis corporis extenuatur ac frangitur. Postremo, impatientia sui ipsius et odium uirtutum omnium.

74. Nec aperte frui licet. Nam ut dedecent generositatem nostrae mentis, ita nemo tam perditus est quin eas erubescat apud arbitros capere. Pariunt enim ignominiam, idcirco tenebras et latebras quaerunt.

75. Quid quod sunt fugacissimae et momentanae, nec retineri ulla ui possunt, nec unquam ueniunt purae et cuiuscunque amaritudinis expertes?

76. Ergo, exclusis uulgi sensibus, maximum malum putato non paupertatem aut ignobilitatem aut carcerem aut nuditatem, ignominiam, deformitatem corporis, morbos, imbecillitatem, sed uitia et his proxima: inscitiam, stuporem, dementia.

77. Magnum bonum credito horum contraria, uirtutem et quae huic sunt finitima: peritiam, acumen ingenii, sanitatem mentis.

78. Reliqua uel externa uel corporis, si habes, proderunt tibi ad uirtutem relata; oberunt ad uitia. Si non habes, caue ne quaeras uel cum minimo dispendio uirtutis. Perinde hoc esset tanquam si multo auro paululum emeris luti aut potius grauem morbum salute.

79. Nullus est quaestus prolixior quam animo, si adsit pietas; corpori uero, si sciat praesentibus qualibuscunque acquiescere.

80. Fama, tametsi nihil agendum est ut uidearis, conseruanda tamen est integra, quod interdum ea cura a multis nos turpibus cohibet, sed praecipue in exemplum caeterorum.

68 aufert β : tollit L π || 69 Et β : deest in L π | quae nulla est diuturna β : deest in L π || 71 uitiorum L π C H : uirorum K || 72 uilis L P V β : utilis B | incitantur ac β : deest in L π || 73 postremo impatientia sui ipsius β : deest in L π | et odium L β : denique odium π || 74 arbitros ω : arbitrios Lo² || 75 purae et cuiuscunque β : purae, cuiuscunque L π || 78 Perinde hoc ... salute β : deest in L π || 79 Nullus est ... acquiescere β : Prolixus quaestus est pietas cum sufficientia L π

81. Vnde praeceptum illud sapientium et sanctorum uirorum: «Nec malum faciendum, nec eius simile».

82. Quod si hoc assequi non possumus, conscientia debemus esse contenti. Et, quum tam deprauati erunt hominum sensus, ut quae sunt optima putent esse scelestissima, tunc laborandum erit ut interna et externa soli deo approbemus. Idque abunde nobis sufficiat.

83. Etiam mala quae dicuntur corporis uel fortunae licebit in bonum uertere, si patienter feras, et tanto sis ad uirtutem promptior quo minus tibi in illis succedit ac proinde expeditior.

84. Saepenumero ex damnis corporis uel externorum magnae sunt accessiones factae uirtutibus.

85. Et, quoniam in hac nostra peregrinatione animum gestamus in corpore inclusum maximasque opes in uasis fictilibus, non omnino repudiandum nobis est et abiiciendum corpus.

86. Sic curandum tamen ut se non dominum, non socium esse sentiat sed mancipium, nec sibi pasci aut uiuere sed alteri.

87. Quo curatius est corpus, hoc animus neglectior.

88. Quo mollius habetur corpus, hoc acrius menti reluctatur et, ut equus delicate pastus, sessorem excutit.

89. Grauis sarcina corporis animum elidit. Acumen ingenii sagina corporis aut indulgentia retunditur.

90. Cibi, somni, exercitationes, tota corporis curatio ad sanitatem referenda est, non ad uoluptatem ac delicias, ut animo prompte inseruiat nec ferocia cultus insolescat neu uirium inopia decidat.

91. Nihil est quod aequae et uigorem mentis debilitet et robur ac neruos corporis infringat ut uoluptas. Quippe uires omnes et corporis et mentis opere ac labore uegetantur, ocio et mollicie uoluptatis languescunt.

92. Mundicies corporis et uictus citra delicias aut morositatem ad ualetudinem et ingenium confert.

93. Ablues subinde manus et faciem frigida, detergesque mundo linteolo.

94. Repurgabis crebro eas partes quae sordibus et recrementis ad extima corporis meatus praebent.

81 sapientium L π C : sapientum K H || 82 scelestissima L π C : sceleratissima K H | Idque ω : Atque id quidem Lo || 83 quae dicuntur corporis ... si patienter feras ω : quae dicuntur corporis (ut quae corpus afficiunt) morbos, aegritudines uel etiam fortunae mala, licebit in bonum uertere, si modo ea patienter feras Lo | expeditior β : es expeditior L π || 84 corporis ω : atque corporis Lo | externorum ω : externarum rerum detrimentis Lo | factae uirtutibus β : uirtutibus natae L π || *Ante 85 titulus est DE CORPORE β La B V : deest in L : De corpore in margine P : DE CORPORE, quod eius cura non omnino est reiicienda, ut animo alacrius obtemperare possit Lo || 85 peregrinatione animum ω : peregrinatione (quis enim uetabit quo minus uitam hanc peregrinationem uocemus?) animum Lo | abiiciendum β : contemnendum L π || 86 socium ω : item socium Lo | mancipium ω : mancipium et seruuum Lo | sed alteri ω : dumtaxat sed etiam alteri Lo || 88 mollius ω : mollius atque tenerius Lo : mollius atque tenacius Lo² || 89 elidit ω : elidit; et ab eo, quod ipsa ratio unice amplexandum monet, transuersum agit Lo || 90 exercitationes, tota ω : exercitationes, lusus, colloquia, prodeambulationes et denique tota Lo | ad sanitatem referenda ω : ad suam ipsius sanitatem et bonam ualetudinem referenda Lo | non ω : non autem Lo | ac delicias β : *deest in L π* : ac (quod ii fere facere solent qui, dum uel solo luxuriae nomine infames misereque, luxu omnis generis perditum molliter curant cuticulam: uentri primum, posthabita mentis curatione, seruire student) primas delicias Lo | prompte ω : prompte ac expedite Lo | insolescat ω : temere insolescat Lo || 93 linteolo π β : lintheo L*

95. Hae sunt caput, aures, oculi, nares, manus, axillae et pudenda.
96. Foueantur pedes mundi et calidi.
97. Arceatur frigus quum ab aliis partibus tum uel maxime a ceruice.
98. Ne statim edas a quiete nec ante prandium nisi tenuiter.
99. Ientaculum enim sedando stomacho aut refocillando datur corpori, non sacietati.
100. Ideo tres aut quatuor panis buccae sufficiunt sine potione, aut certe exigua atque ea tenui. Salutare hoc non minus ingenio quam corpori.
101. In prandio et coena assuesce non uesci nisi uno obsonii genere: eodem simplicissimo et (quantum per facultates licebit) saluberrimo, quamuis multa mensae inferantur. Et, si tua sit mensa, noli admittere.
102. Varietas ciborum homini pestilens, pestilentior condimentorum.
103. Munda et pura parsimonia temperatis et castis animis congruens, conseruatricis rei familiaris. Et quae sola efficit ne multis indigere nobis uideamur, nec suscipiamus pessima facinora quaestus gratia quo gulae morem geramus, irritatae uel luxu uel lauticiis uel delicatis nimium cibus et exquisitis.
104. Tum praestat ut quae adsunt non modo nobis sufficiant sed ex eis liceat egentibus impartiri.
105. Ostendit hoc dominus exemplo sui, qui post exaturatam multitudinem reliquias perire panum et piscium non est passus.
106. Natura necessaria docuit, quae sunt pauca et parabilia. Stultitia superflua excogitauit, quae sunt infinita et difficilia.
107. Naturae si des necessaria, delectatur et roboratur tanquam propriis; sin superflua, debilitatur et affligitur tanquam alienis.
108. Stultitiam necessaria non explent. Superflua obruunt, non satiant.
109. Potus erit uel naturalis ille uniuersis animantibus in commune a deo paratus (pura et liquida aqua) uel tenuissima ceruisia uel uinum bene dilutum.
110. Nihil est quod iuuenum corporibus magis officiat quam calidus cibus aut potus: incendit enim et exurit eorum uiscera. Hinc animi praeferuidi atque impudentes fiunt feroci quadam temeritate, insani et ad libidinem effraenes.
111. A coena ne bibe aut, si id admonet sitis, sume humidum aliquid et frigidiusculum aut perpusillum leuis potiunculae.
112. Inter eam potionem et quietem interpone quum minimum horae dimidium.
113. Leuaturus animum fac cogites quam exiguum tempus datum sit uitae hominum, ex illo non oportere multum descendi ad lusus, ad comessationes, ad puerilitates, ad ineptias;
114. breue spatium esse uitae nostrae, etiam si totum bonae menti impenderetur;
115. non esse nos a deo creatos ad lusum, ad nugas sed ad seria: ad moderationem, modestiam, temperantiam, religionem, omne genus uirtutis et laudis.
116. Morbos corporis morbis animi ne curaueris.

95 manus β : *deest in L* π | axillae ω : maxillae S || 96 Foueantur ... calidi β : Pedes mundi et calidi foueantur L π || 101 uno β : ex uno L π || 103 morem geramus π β : satisfaciamus L | cibus et exquisitis β : et exquisitis cibus L π || 108 obruunt β : quum obruant L π || 110 Hinc animi ... effraenes β : agitque in libidinem et temeritatem praecipites L π | et ad C K: atque ad H || 111 leuis β : tenuis L π || 113 descendi BI: descindi L P B β : discindi V || 114 etiam si L π C: etsi K H || 115 ad lusum, ad nugas β : ad lusum aut nugas L π || 116 curaueris L π C: curaueritis K H

117. Exercitationes corporis non erunt immodicae, caeterum aptandae rationi ualetudinis. In quo sequenda erunt medicinae consultorum consilia.

118. Sic tamen ne quid habeant turpe, immodestum, obscœnum, flagitiosum. Etiam in remissionibus et refectionibus animi existat aliqua recordatio uirtutis.

119. Absit arrogancia, contentio, rixa, inuidia, cupiditas. Qui enim conuenit cruciare animum, dum delectare studes? Non aliter quam si fel infundas in id mel, quod cupis esse quam dulcissimum.

120. Somnus sumendus est tanquam medicina quaedam curando corpori, tantummodo quantus sufficit. Immodicus enim reddit corpora redundantia noxiis humoribus, segnia, pigra, lenta; et celeritatem mentis tardat.

121. Nec est existimandum uitae id tempus quod somno impenditur. Vita enim uigilia est.

122. In animo duae sunt partes. Illa quae intelligit, meminit, sapit; ratione, iudicio, ingenio utitur ac ualet. Haec pars superior appellatur et proprio nomine mens, qua homines sumus, qua deo similes, qua caeteris animantibus praestamus.

123. Est altera ex coniunctione corporis (rationis expers, bruta, fera, atrox, bestiae quam hominis similior), in qua sunt motus illi qui siue affectus siue perturbationes nominantur (Graece $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$): arrogancia, inuidia, maleuolentia, ira, metus, moeror, cupiditas, stulta gaudia. Pars inferior atque abiectior nuncupatur, qua nihil a beluis differimus et quam longissime discedimus a deo, extra morbum et perturbationem omnem posito.

124. Hic est naturae ordo: ut sapientia regat omnia, pareant homini caetera quae uidemus; in homine uero corpus menti, mens deo. Si quid hunc ordinem egreditur ac dissoluit, peccat.

125. Ergo peccatum est in homine perturbationes illas tumultuari, saeuire ac trahere ad se ius et ditionem totius hominis, sprete et contempta mente; mentem etiam, relicta dei lege, affectionibus et corpori seruire.

126. Idcirco menti indita est uis intelligendi, ut singula expendat sciatque quid factu bonum sit, quid secus; et uis uolendi summa atque efficacissima, ut imperio huius nihil sit in animo quod non pareat, si illa contendat nec de iure decedat suo.

127. Ingenium multis artibus humanis diuinisque excolitur et acuitur; instruiturque magna et admirabili rerum notitia, quo exactius singulorum naturas et precia cognoscat possitque uoluntatem edocere quid sequendum bonum, quid uitandum malum.

128. Igitur fugiendae artes illae quae cum uirtute pugnant, quales sunt diuinatrices omnes (quae a Graecis $\mu\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ dicuntur): ut chiromantia, pyromantia, necromantia, hydromantia, etiam astrologia; quibus occultatur plurimum pestiferae uanitatis, excogitatae ab impostore nostri diabolo.

129. Tractantque et profitentur id quod sibi uni deus reseruauit, cognitionem futurarum rerum atque abstrusarum.

118 existat aliqua recordatio β : adsit aliqua memoria L π || 120 redundantia noxiis humoribus π β : *deest in L* || *Ante 122 titulus est DE ANIMO* β La B V: *deest in L*: De animo *in margine P* || 123 rationis expers β : *deest in L* π | $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$ L π : *pathe* β : *pathae T* | atque abiectior nuncupatur β : nominatur etiam animus L π | qua nihil L La B V β : quia nihil P | posito ω : positi L ω ² || 124 corpus menti, mens deo β : corpus animo, animus menti, mens deo L π | ac dissoluit β : *deest in L* π || 125 affectionibus β : animo L π || *Ante 126 titulus est DE ERVDITIONE* La B V: *deest in L* β : De eruditione *in margine P* || 126 atque efficacissima β : *deest in L* π | decedat L π C K: concedat H || 127 humanis diuinisque β : et humanis et diuinis L π | edocere β : docere L π || 128 $\mu\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$ L P B: *manteiae* β : $\mu\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ V | quibus ... pestiferae β : in quibus est plurimum noxiae L: in quibus est plurimum exitiabilis π | nostri L P β : nostro La B V || 129 cognitionem ... abstrusarum β : futurarum et abstrusarum rerum peritiam L π

130. Nec inquirendum in dei maiestatem et archana a cognitione nostra procul remota, a quibus deus hominem arcuit.

131. «Qui scrutatur maiestatem opprimetur a gloria».

132. Et Paulus iubet nos non plus sapere quam oporteat, sed sapere moderate.

133. Et archana illa quae uidit negat licere homini eloqui.

134. Hebraeus quoque concionator inquit: «Altiora te ne quaesieris, et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris; sed quae praecepit tibi deus, illa cogita semper. Et in pluribus operibus eius ne fueris curiosus».

135. Vitanda ars omnis a daemone tradita, cum quibus uelut dei hostibus nullum debet nobis esse commercium.

136. Nec expedit uel philosophorum uel haereticorum placita pietati nostrae contraria cognoscere, ne quem scrupulum subtilis artifex diabolus in animos nostros iniiciat, qui nos nimium torqueat et fortassis impellat in exitium.

137. Non attingendi autores spurci, ne quid sordium animo ex contagie adhaereat.

138. «Corrumpunt bonos mores collocutiones malae».

139. Reliqua eruditio sincaera est et frugifera, referatur modo ad suum scopum: uirtutem, hoc est recte agere.

140. Est diuina quaedam eruditio a deo exhibita, in qua sunt thesauri omnes scientiae et sapientiae reconditi. Haec est uera mentium lux. Reliqua omnis ad hanc collata densissimae sunt tenebrae et, ut res hominum, ludicra et puerilis.

141. Legitur tamen uel in hoc: quo tanquam ex comparatione fulgentior appareat nostra lux;

142. tum ut testimoniis hominum aduersus eos utamur, qui diuinis parum acquiescunt, ut uitiosi oculi auersantes solis splendorem;

143. ad nos quoque commonefaciendos: quum in multis gentilium tanta praestantia fuerit uirtutis, quantam esse conueniat in homine Christiano, discipulo magistri dei, cui ex luce pietatis quam profitetur magna est imposita necessitas bene uiuendi.

144. Adde his quod suppeditant facundiam et usum ac prudentiam uitae communis, quis non nihil interdum indigemus.

145. Tribus uelut instrumentis fabricamur peritiam: ingenio, memoria, cura, quae eadem studium dicitur.

146. Ingenium exercitatione acuitur.

147. Memoria excolendo augetur.

148. Vtrumque eneruant deliciae, bona ualetudo confirmat; otia et diuturnae remissiones profligant, exercitamenta ad manum et in promptu ponunt.

149. Siue legis ipse quid siue audis, attentus id fac. Nec uagetur mens tua, sed coge illam ibi esse et agere quod adest, non alia.

130 in dei maiestatem ω : dei maiestatem T | a cognitione nostra L π C K : cognitione nostra H : a nostra cognitione Lo^2 || 131 scrutatur L π K H : scrutetur C || 132 moderate β : ad moderationem L π || 134 Hebraeus ... curiosus π β : *deest in L* || 135 cum quibus L P B β : cum quo V | hostibus L P B β : hoste V || 136 expedit π β : prodest L | placita ... contraria β : opiniones ... contrarias L π | et fortassis impellat β : etiam adducat L π || 137 ex contagie L P β : ex contagio La B V ex contagine F² : ex contigie Lo^2 || 139 sincaera β : munda L π || 140 quaedam L^{err} β : *deest in L* π | exhibita β : tradita L π || 142 auersantes ω : aduersantes Lo^2 || 143 conueniat β : conuenit L π || 144 Adde his quod suppeditant β : Suppeditant quoque L π || 145 fabricamur peritiam (peritia H) β : fabricamur eruditionem L π : fabricamur peritia T | quae eadem studium dicitur β : *deest in L* π || 149 ipse quid siue audis L π C : ipse quid (quod Lo^2) audis K H : ipse aut quid audis T

150. Si incipit digredi, paruo murmure eam reuoca. Cogitatus omneis ab studiis alienos in aliud tempus differ.

151. Scito te operam et tempus perdere, si quae legis uel audis non attendas.

152. Quae ignoras ne pudeat quaerere. Ne erubescas a quouis doceri, quod maximi uiri non erubuerunt. Erubescas potius ignorare aut nolle discere.

153. Quae ignota tibi sunt ne te scire iactes. Sciscitare potius ab iis quos scire credis.

154. Si uideri uis doctus, da operam ut sis. Nulla est compendiosior uia, quemadmodum non alia ratione facilius consequeris ut existimeris bonus quam si sis talis.

155. Denique quicquid uideri cupias fac ut sis, aliter frustra cupis.

156. Falsa tempus infirmat, uera corroborat.

157. Nulla simulatio diuturna.

158. Magistrum semper sequere, noli praecurrere. Et illi crede, ne repugna.

159. Ama illum et parentis loco habe. Putaque uerissima et certissima esse quaecumque dicit.

160. Attende ut quod semel errasti, emendatus iterum aut tertio, ne idem pecces. Labora ut proficiat emendatio.

161. Illorum decet te praecipue meminisse in quibus quandoque es falsus, ne te rursum decipiant.

162. Cuiusuis hominis est errare, nullius nisi insipientis perseuerare in errore.

163. Scito nullum esse sensum per quem promptius ac celerius docemur quam auditum.

164. Vt nihil facilius quam audire multa, sic nihil utilius.

165. Nec malis leuia aut inepta aut ridicula audire quam seria, grauia, prudentia.

166. Pari labore utraque discuntur, quum sit adeo commodum dispar.

167. Ne labores quam multa respondeas, sed quam apte et in tempore.

168. Prandio tuo et coenae illos adhibe qui te possint instituere, quique suauis ac docta commentatione pariter et exhilarent te et peritiorem reddant.

169. Scurras, parasitos, imperite loquaces aut spurce, moriones, nugatores, bibaces, lurcones sordidos et id genus hominum aptum ad risum uel uerbis uel factis mouendum nec honore mensae tuae digneris; nec illi te, dum reficeris, oblectent. Potius, iucunda aliqua et ingeniosa confabulatio.

170. Non os modo a turpibus cohibe, sed etiam aures tanquam fenestras animi. Memor dicti ueteris, quod citat apostolus: «Corrumpunt mores probos confabulationes malae».

171. Siue ad mensam siue alio quouis loco diligenter quid quisque dicat ausculta.

172. Ex sapientibus disces quo fias melior.

173. Ex stultis, quo fias cautior.

174. Quae sapientes probarint sequeris.

175. Quae stulti laudarint uitabis.

176. Si quid uideris a cordatis recipi tanquam uel argute uel grauiter uel sapienter uel docte uel ingeniose uel urbane dictum, retinebis ut et ipse per occasionem utaris.

150 Cogitatus omneis ... alienos β : Cogitationes omnes ... alienas L π || 153 ne te scire iactes β : ne iactes te scire L π || 155 quicquid L P B β : quidquid V | cupias β : cupis L π || 160 emendatus L P B β : emendatius Lo²: emendes V || 161 quandoque es falsus β : falsus es L π || 163 ac celerius β : *deest in* L π || 164 Vt ... sic β : Et ... et L π || 168 commentatione β : collocutione L π : commendatione Lo || 169 bibaces, lurcones sordidos β : *deest in* L: bibaces π | uel uerbis uel factis mouendum β : mouendum L: mouendum uel uerbis uel factis π | Potius ω : Sed potius Lo || 170 mores probos L π C K: probos mores H || 176 per occasionem β : in occasione L π

177. Habebis librum chartae uacuae, in quo annotabis si quid legeris uel audieris dictum festiue aut eleganter aut prudenter, uel uocabulum aliquod exquisitum, rarum, utile sermoni quotidiano ut, quum usus poscat, habeas paratum.

178. Annitere ne sola uerba intelligas, sed praecipue sensa.

179. Quae legeris uel audieris fac aliis narres, tum tuis condiscipulis Latine tum aliis lingua tibi uernacula; et conare ne minus ipse uel lepide uel uenuste referas quam audieris aut legeris. Sic et ingenium exercebis et linguam.

180. Est etiam tractandus et agitandus saepenumero stilus, optimus dicendi magister.

181. Scribe, transcribe, rescribe crebro atque annota. Compone alternis diebus (aut ad summum tertio quoque) epistulam ad aliquem qui tibi respondeat, et tuam ostende institutori emendandam. Mendarum quas sustulerit fac recordere, ne rursus ad easdem impingas.

182. Post cibum, uelut a prandio et coena, cesset paulisper studium. Sumpto prandio, sede, confabulare, audi aliquid suaue, aut sic lusita ne nimium corpus exagites et concutias.

183. Cenatus, deambulato cum iucundo aliquo et docto confabulatore, qui te sermone oblectet, cuius uerba et sententias imitari cum decore possis.

184. Inter coenam et quietem uita omnino potum. Nihil perniciosius simul corpori, memoriae, ingenio. Quum urgebit te sitis, si biberis, pone inter potum et lectum interuallum quum minimum semihorae.

185. Memoriam non negliges, nec sines incultam torpescere.

186. Nihil est quod aequae labore et gaudeat et per magna incrementa breui sumat.

187. Commenda ei quotidie aliquid.

188. Quo saepius commendabis, hoc custodiet omnia fidelius; quo rarius, hoc infidelius.

189. Quum aliquid ei credideris, sine eam quiescere. Et aliquanto post ab ea uelut depositum reposece.

190. Si quid uis ediscere, id de nocte quater aut quinque attentissimus legito. Hinc cubato. De mane exigo a memoria rationem eius quod pridie credideris.

191. Cauendum a crapula, a cruditate, a frigore potissimum ceruicis.

192. Vinum ut neruorum uenenum, ita memoriae mors.

193. Optimum esset singulis noctibus, paulo antequam cubitum concederes, in sella te sine arbitris sedentem quaecunque die illo uidisses, legisses, audisses, egisses ad memoriam reuocare.

194. Si quid fecisses honeste, moderate, prudenter, cordate, cum decore et laude, gauderes sciresque id esse dei munus; et similia pergeres deinceps facere.

195. Si quid turpiter, immodeste, flagitiose, pueriliter, inepte, uituperio dignum, scires ex tua malitia profectum; doleres et uitares in posterum.

196. Si quid uel audisses uel legisses elegans, doctum, graue, sanctum, retineres.

177 chartae uacuae β : chartaceum L π | sermoni L β V : sermone P B || 181 institutori L π C K : institutioni H | recordere π β : meminere L : recordare S | ne ω : nec L ω^2 | rursus β : rursus L π || 182 paulisper β : *deest in* L π || 183 Cenatus β : Post cenam, quam uolo esse modicam L π | decore L π C K : decoro H || 185 Memoriam ... torpescere β : Memoriam quiescere non sines L π || 186 et gaudeat ... sumat β : gaudeat et augeatur L π || 188 Quo (Quae K) saepius commendabis, hoc (haec S) custodiet (custodies H) β : Quo plura commendabis, hoc custodiet L π | rarius β : pauciora L π || 190 Hinc ω : Homine D | cubato β : ito cubitum L π || 192 Vinum ... mors β : Vinum: memoriae mors L π || 193 ad memoriam β : in memoriam L π || 194 deinceps β : *deest in* L π

197. Si quid uidisses probatum, imitarere; si quid improbatum, fugeres.

198. Nulla tibi abeat dies in qua non uel legeris uel audieris uel scripseris aliquid quod seu eruditionem seu iudicium seu uirtutem augeat.

199. Cubitum iturus lege uel audi aliquid dignum, quod memoriae mandetur et de quo salubre sit ac iucundum per quietem somnare, ut etiam nocturnis uisis discas et fias melior.

200. Studio sapientiae nullus in uita est terminus statuendus, cum uita simul est finiendum. Semper illa tria sunt homini, quamdiu uiuit, meditanda: quomodo bene sapiat, quomodo bene dicat, quomodo bene agat.

201. Ab studiis arrogancia omnis submouenda. Nam ea quae uel doctissimus mortalium nouit non sunt minutissimum eorum quae ignorat. Exiguum quiddam et obscurum et incertum est quicquid homines sciunt; mentesque nostrae in hoc corporeo carcere deuinctae magna ignoracione et altissimis tenebris premuntur; aciemque adeo retusam habemus ut nec summas penetremus rerum facies.

202. Tum profectui studiorum plurimum nocet arrogancia. Multi enim potuissent ad sapientiam peruenire, ni iam putassent se peruenisse.

203. Vitanda etiam contentio, aemulatio, obtrectatio, inanis gloriae cupido, quum in hoc sectemur studia: ut saeua illorum dominatione liberemur.

204. Nihil excogitari potest iucundius cognitione multarum rerum; nihil intelligentia uirtutis fructuosius.

205. Studia res laetas condiunt, tristes leniunt, temerarios impetus iuuentae cohibent, senectutis molestam tarditatem leuant. Domi foris, in publico in priuato, in solitudine in frequentia, in ocio in negotio comitantur, adsunt; imo praesunt, opitulantur, iuuant.

206. Eruditio pastus ingenii uerissimus, ut indignum sit pasci corpus esuriente animo. Ex qua uoluptates existunt atque oblectamenta et solida et perpetua, quae alia ex aliis nascentia ac se renouantia nunquam nos deserunt nec delassant.

207. Praestantissima illa rerum uniuersarum uirtus neque dono ab hominibus datur neque accipitur, diuinitus contingit.

208. Idcirco a deo suppliciter ac pie petenda est.

209. Summum in literis omnibus atque eruditione est ea philosophia quae ingentibus animi morbis remedium adfert.

210. Magna cura adhibetur curando corpori; maior adhibenda est animo, quo huius morbi et occultiores et grauiiores et periculosiores sunt.

211. Hi non iniuria tempestates, cruciatus, tormenta, flagra, faces, furiae animi nuncupantur. Maximam hi adferunt calamitatem et incredibiles dolores, si regnent, si agitentur; placidissimam uero tranquillitatem et beatitudinem, si sedentur et cohibeantur.

197 imitarere L P V C : imitares K H : imitareris T : imitare B || 198 non uel legeris L P β : uel non legeris W B V || 199 salubre sit (fit K H) ac iucundum β : salubre ac iucundum sit L π || 200 est terminus statuendus β : terminus statuendus est L π | simul β : *deest in* L π || 201 submouenda β : eiicienda est L : arcenda est π || 202 ni L π C K : nisi H || 203 sectemur β : sequamur L π : sectamur W | saeua ... liberemur β : illa fugiamus L π || 206 existunt atque β : et L π | ac se β : et se L π | nos L π β : nec L^{er} | delassant β : lassant L π || *Ante 207 titulus est* DE VIRTUTE ET AFFECTIBVS β : *deest in* L : DE VIRTUTE π || 208 a deo β La B V : adeo L P | suppliciter ... est L π : suppliciter illam ac pie petendum est (petendam esse F) β || *Ante 209 titulus est* DE AFFECTIBVS π : *deest in* L β || 211 animi β : animi humani L π | incredibiles β : indicibiles L π | placidissimam uero β : incredendam L π

212. Huc tendunt quaecunque a maximis ingeniis de uita moribusque acutissime sunt excogitata atque perscripta.

213. Hoc est ingens praemium laboris literati, cuius uerissimus fructus est: ut non in admirationem aut ostentationem uanam sit nobis magna illa rerum et uaria supellex collecta, sed ut transeat in usum uitae; et primum omnium prosit possidenti, nec in eius mente sit tanquam in pixidicula unde petitur res alios adiutura ipsi uasculo inutilis.

214. Nec aliud aeque spectat pietas Christiana quam ut serenitas humanos animos exhilaret; compositisque affectionibus, perpetua quadam tranquillitate et quieta constantia deo et angelis simus quam simillimi.

215. Remedia his morbis uel ex rebus ac nobis ipsis, uel ex deo, uel ex Christi lege ac uita petuntur.

216. Natura rerum est ut incerta et fluxa et momentanea et uicissitudinaria et uilia sint omnia praeter animum, qui est unusquisque aut certe potissima eius pars. Reliqua ab aliis ad alios transferuntur, ne quis extra animum quicquam possit suum dicere.

217. Quae habet non donata esse putet sed accommodata.

218. Quocirca ingentis dementiae est graue aliquod crimen et magna luendum poena ob res minutas suscipere.

219. Nec se quisquam efferat quod aliquid ipsum de externis aut corporeis contigerit, quum id omne breue futurum sit ac incertum nec proprium sed alienum. Quod, ut concessum est, sic etiam reposcetur: ad summum in morte, saepe in uita ipsa.

220. Nec dolendum, si quod accommodatum ac uelut depositum est repetatur; agenda potius gratiae, quod tantisper uti licuit.

221. Intolerandae ingratitude est si, sic aliquando affectus beneficio, iniuriam te credas accipere, quod id non sit perpetuum. Nec quid habueris spectes aut quamdiu, sed quid aut quamdiu non habueris.

222. Nec laetandum quod fortuita tibi accesserunt aut amicis, adempta sunt inimicis, quum in omnibus tanta sit celeritas et ambiguitas ut plerumque inani laeticiae proximus sit acerbus fletus.

223. Nec despondendus animus aut contrahendus, reflante fortuna, quippe aduersis matutinis interdum succedunt prospera uespertina.

224. Iam quae conditio corporum; quae ratio uitae fictis ex tam uili initio tam fragili, quum sit anceps uita saepe tot undique periculis? Et, ut sit aliquantisper certa, utique non est diu duratura. Quid habemus quur in tanta infirmitate ferociamus?

225. Quumque nihil sit aliud haec uita quam peregrinatio, qua in alteram sempiternam tendimus, paucissimisque rebus ad hoc iter conficiendum egeamus,

226. quid est quamobrem his, quae huc atque illuc uolui et iactari cernimus, sollicitemur aut omnino moueamur?

212 perscripta L π C : praescripta K H || 213 laboris literati β : literati laboris L π | in admirationem ... uanam π C K : in admirationem aut uanam ostentationem L : in admiratione aut ostentatione uana H | et uaria β : *deest in* L π | adiutura β : iuuatura L π || 214 aeque spectat β : conatur L π | compositisque ... simillimi β : et, tranquillitate animorum compositisque affectionibus, simus deo et angelis (Deo, angelis B V) quam simillimi L π || 216 unusquisque L π C : uniuscuiusque K H || 218 aliquod L π K H : aliquot C || 219 ipsum β : *deest in* L π || 220 agenda potius gratiae β : quin potius agenda gratiae L π || 221 sic L P V β : sis La B || 224 ut sit L π : ut si β || 226 sollicitemur aut omnino moueamur π β : moueamur aut sollicitemur L

227. Cupiditati quare seruiendum est, quum sint futura incertissima et praesentia paucis contenta?

228. Liber ille qui cupit solum quae sunt in sua manu, seruus qui contra.

229. Iam fortunae muneribus expleri, quid aliud est quam peditem multis sarcinis impediri ac obrui?

230. Nemo est tam stupide amens qui se non illi ciuitati, ad quam tendit et ubi morari destinat, adornet componatque magis quam itineri.

231. Vita haec nostra, quum sit natura sua fugax et arcta, maxima eius pars ac fere tota perturbationibus perit. Neque enim uiuimus quamdiu affectibus concutimur et in primis mortis metu.

232. Quae quum ex infinitis caussis immineat et appropinquet, expauenda non est ex una uel altera. Quumque necessario peruentura, fugienda non est per scelus aut maerendum quod accedat.

233. Quum sit uita innumeris tediis ac miseriis referta, cur est tam arcte retinenda? Quum ad alteram aeternam proficiscamur, ita nos comparemus ut recta ad illam euolemus plenissimam bonorum omnium.

234. Ergo praemimur saepius nostris erroribus quam rebus ipsis, quum magna mala aut bona censemus quae non sunt.

235. Natura et conditio et uera rerum precia illa sunt quae initio posui. Vnde colligi licet nihil praeter uirtutem pulchrum aut magnum esse aut etiam nostrum.

236. Nos uero, in consilium et deliberationem eorum quae sunt nobis agenda, corporis amorem et cupidinem rerum uitae huius accersimus, quae a multis uocari solent amor nostri.

237. Hic animos uiriles eneruat, ut nulla res tam minuta sit quae in eos non penetret nec ulla tam exilis aut tenuis quin eos concutiat.

238. Hinc tenebrae oboriuntur oculo mentis. Et, ubi regnum affectus occupauere, iam illis tanquam dominis blandimur, indulgemus, paremus.

239. Ita aliena mordicus tanquam nostra apprehendimus et, si detrahantur, lamentamur et afflictamus nos ipsos.

240. Et nostra tanquam aliena negligimus. Et auersamur profutura ceu uehementer noxia. Et nocitura amplectimur pro utilibus.

241. Aliena mala nobis uidentur leuissima; nostra, illis non maiora, intolerabilia. Et semper queruli nec aliena desideria ferimus nec nostra.

242. Nec iam nobis placemus ipsi, nec hic mundus cum sua lege nobis satisfacit. Immutatas uellemus rerum naturas. Tanta est ex delitiis impatientia.

243. Quae cruces possunt cum his comparari? Nec sunt alia apud uita functos tormenta.

244. Nec daemones aliis suppliciis sunt miserrimi quam superbia, inuidia, odio, ira.

245. Cernere est uultus eorum qui his affectibus tenentur. Quam uarii sunt; quam anxii, anhelii, truces, horridi. Ad eundem modum et animi sunt affecti.

228 sua β : ipsius L π || 230 se non β : non se L π | adornet ... itineri β : potius quam itineri adornet L : potius quam itineri adornet componatque π || 232 uel altera C K : et altera L π : aut altera H | Quumque β : Quum L π || 233 euolemus L π H : euoluemus C K : euoluemur Lo || 235 Vnde colligi licet β : Quo apparet L π || 236 uero π β : *deest in* L | et deliberationem ... agenda β : animi L : mentis π | corporis amorem β : amorem corporis L π || 240 ceu uehementer β : tanquam inprimis L : ceu in primis π || 242 placemus π β : non placemus L

246. Ira, perturbationum omnium atrocissima, maxime hominem dedecet;
 247. naturam hominis in truculentam mutat feram.
 248. Et, quum quaeuis perturbatio mentis aciem et iudicium omne obscuret, tum ira tenebras densissimas offundit ut nec uerum nec utile nec decorum possit intueri;
 249. arrodit cor et ualeitudinem affligit;
 250. id cogit facere quod ilico poenitentia consequatur.
 251. Iam in facie, quam turpis mutatio! Quae tempestas! Oculorum ardor! Dentium stridor! Depumatio! Et totius oris pallor! Foeda in lingua titubatio, et clamor!
 252. Vt ille, qui iratum se ad speculum aspexit, non sine causa dicatur se non agnouisse.
 253. Ob hanc toruitatem uultus, atrocitatem dictorum, crudelitatem factorum adimitur uiro omnis authoritas, omnis beneuolentia. Diffugiunt amici, decedunt obuii. Solitudo undique. Omnes oderunt, omnes detestantur.
 254. Quo fit ut maximi uiri nihil uel cauerint magis uel texerint sollicitius quam iram et irati opera, adeo ut naturae etiam suae repugnarint et uim attulerint.
 255. Quid enim ridiculum magis quam tantulum tam imbecillum animalculum sic ferocire ac furere,
 256. et tantas tragoedias tam atroces uilissimis de rebus excitare ut de corporeis, de fortuitis, etiam (si diis placet) de uno uerbulo?
 257. Iram facile domabis, si illud animo perceptum et fixum tenueris: iniuriam non fieri, nisi laedatur animus; cui a nemine noceri potest, nisi a possidente introducto in eum uicio.
 258. Haec ad hominem ex homine. Nunc altius, nempe ex deo; etiam si illa quoque ex deo, sed haec aliquanto expressius ac propius.
 259. Nihil potuit hominum generi dari maius aut praestabilius quam religio, quae est cognitio et amor et ueneratio principis parentisque uniuersitatis mundi huius.
 260. In nullos homines aequae est beneficus deus ac in illos quos docet qui sit uerus sui cultus.
 261. Idcirco psalmista inter maxima dei in populum Israeliticum munera illud ponit: «Qui annunciat uerbum suum Iacob, iusticias et iudicia sua Israeli, non fecit taliter omni nationi et iudicia sua non manifestauit eis».
 262. Per religionem deus cognoscitur. Cognitus, fieri nequit aliter quin ametur atque adoretur.
 263. Vnus deus est princeps, author, dominus uniuersorum, qui potest, qui scit omnia.
 264. Mundus hic est uelut domus quaedam eius uel potius templum. Ipse ex nihilo in hanc faciem atque ornatum protulit. Vnde mundi nomen apud nos accepit, apud Graecos ornati. Idem regit atque administrat non minore conseruationis miraculo quam creationis:
 265. hanc esse uniuersi legem (non alium esse in rebus casum, non fortunam aut sortem);

248 intueri β : cernere L π || 250 poenitentia π β : poenitentiam L || 252 aspexit β : uidit L π || 253 decedunt β : recedunt L π || 254 sollicitius β : *deest in* L π | et uim β : ac uim L π || 256 uilissimis de rebus excitare β : de uilissimis rebus excitari L : de uilissimis rebus excitare π || 258 illa β : et illa L π | propius β W B V : proprius L P || *Ante 259 titulus est* DE RELIGIONE π β : *deest in* L || 259 et ueneratio β : *deest in* L π | parentisque β : et parentis L π || 262 atque adoretur β : *deest in* L π || 263 princeps, author, dominus β : princeps et author et dominus L π || 264 Vnde mundi ... ornati β : Vnde mundi nomen accepit L : Vnde nomen accepit apud Graecos ornati π || *Ante 265 est* [263] Et, quemadmodum in domo prudentissimi patris familias nihil iniussu eius agitur, sic in omni mundo nihil iniussu dei geritur,

266. omnia ab eo geri summa aequitate et sapientia, tametsi uis nobis ignoratis;

267. quaecunque cuius contingunt ad eius referri commoda, si sit bonus, non ad ista pecuniolae aut mundi huius momentanei sed aeternae illius felicitatis.

268. Ergo quae in uita hac accidunt (qualia sint cunque) tanquam ab authore deo profecta aequis animis accipienda atque approbanda sunt, ne affectu nostro et tanquam iudicio consilium damnare uideamur et improbare uoluntatem iustissimi illius et sapientissimi rectoris omnium dei, quia non assequimur.

269. Ei nos obsequi et dicto audientes praebere, laudare atque approbare cuncta quae facit, fas piisque est.

270. Nos, pueri et meliorum rerum inscii, quae damnosissima sunt deflemus non dari tanquam utilissima, quae utilissima horremus ceu impense damnosa.

271. Vt nihil sit nobis saepenumero pestilentius quam fieri uotorum nostrorum compotes.

272. Quumque in tantis tenebris ignorationis uersemur, sic deo uisum est ut nobis sola sit praestanda culpa, caetera omnia illius curae remittantur.

273. Nobis (uelimus nolimus) exequendum est quod de nobis statuit ac iubet rector huius tanti operis. Quorsum igitur spectat malle cum lachrymis detrectantes et reluctantes trahi quam hilariter atque ultro duci?

274. Certe amicus omnis dei legibus et uoluntati amici laetus alacerque obtemperabit.

275. Haec potissima ratio est dei amandi, sicut Christus ait: «Vos amici mei eritis, si feceritis quae ego uobis praecipio».

276. Pacificator humani generis cum deo et author salutis nostrae est Iesus Christus, homo deus, dei omnipotentis filius unigenus; quem ad hoc ipsum pater misit, quum ei uisum est misereri generis humani, quod ipsum maximo suo malo inimicum se fecerat deo, patri ac conditori suo.

277. Nullum excogitari potest malum pestilentius aut exitiabilius quam per peccatum a deo separari, perenni bonorum omnium fonte; ad perniciosissimam conuerti miseriam, et a dulcissima uita in acerbissimam mortem.

278. In hoc inter caetera Christus uenit: ut rectissimam uiam nos edoceret, qua insisteremus proficiscentes ad deum, nec ab ea uel pilum deflecteremus.

279. Hanc ipse et uerbis indicauit ac patefecit, et exemplo uitae suae munuit expeditissimam atque certissimam.

280. Humana omnis sapientia, si cum religione Christiana conferatur, coenum est et mera stulticia.

omnia potentis et scientis (et potentis et saeuientis L^{err}); [264] illi angelos, daemones, homines, animantia, stirpes, lapides, coelos et elementa cuncta denique curae esse ac parere; [265] nihil fieri, nihil moueri, nihil contingere, ac ne stipulam quidem attolli ullam aut floccum uolitare extra illius praescripta et iussa L π [263-265] : *deest in* β [cf. *supra* Part III, p. 111-113] || 266 geri β : fieri L π | summa aequitate β : cum summa aequitate L π || 267 aeternae illius felicitatis β : illius aeternae salutis L π || 268 quae in uita ... cunque β : quaecunque in hoc mundo accidunt L π | assequimur π β : intelligimus L || 269 et dicto audientes β : ac subditos L π || 270 ceu impense damnosa β : tanquam aduersissima L π || 273 de nobis statuit ac π β : *deest in* L | atque β : et L π || 274 laetus alacerque β : *deest in* L π || 275 ait β : inquit L π | uobis praecipio β : praecipio uobis L π || *Ante 276 titulus est DE CHRISTO* β V : *deest in* L P B || 276 unigenus L β : unigenitus π | ipsum β : *deest in* L π | patri ac conditori suo β : *deest in* L π || 277 perenni (a perenni B V) ... fonte L π C K : perenni omnium bonorum fonte H || 278 inter caetera π β : *deest in* L

281. Quicquid graue, prudens, sapiens, purum, sanctum, religiosum; quicquid cum admiratione, exclamatione, plausu apud gentiles sapientes legitur; quicquid ex illis commendatur, ediscitur, in coelum tollitur; id totum purius, rectius, apertius, expeditius inuenitur in pietate nostra.

282. Hanc nosse perfecta est sapientia, iuxta hanc uiuere perfecta uirtus. Sed nemo uere nouit qui non sic uiuat.

283. Vita Christi testatur humanam eius probitatem, miracula omnipotentiam diuinitatis, lex coelestem sapientiam.

284. Vt ex probitate accedat exemplum ad imitandum, ex autoritate uis ad obediendum, ex sapientia fides ad credendum.

285. Probitas amorem eliciat, maiestas cultum, sapientia fidem.

286. Si quis quae Christus praecipit expendat, comperiet omnia ad nostras utilitates referri, ut nemo nisi maximo suo bono sentiat se credere.

287. Vt nihil est homini gratius quam fidi sibi, ita nec deo. Nec quisquam bene de illo cogitat cui timide seipsum credit.

288. Fundamentum salutis est credere deum esse patrem, et huius filium unicum Iesum Christum legislatorem nostrum, et ex utroque spirari sanctum illum afflatum, sine quo nihil agimus, nihil cogitamus excelsum aut profuturum nobis.

289. Verus dei cultus est animum morbis et prauis affectibus perpurgare, et in illius quam proxime possumus transformari simulachrum, ut puri et sancti simus sicut et ipse est, neminem oderimus, omnibus prodesse studeamus.

290. Quo magis te a corporalibus ad incorporea transtuleris, hoc uitam diuiniorem uiues.

291. Ita fiet ut deus cognatam et similem sibi naturam agnoscat, eaque delectetur, ac uelut in uero et germano templo habitat multo sibi acceptiore quam ista sunt lapidum et metallorum.

292. «Templum dei sanctum est», inquit Paulus, «quod estis uos».

293. Tantus hospes conseruandus est, nec tetro peccatorum foetore expellendus.

294. Corporalia opera fatua sunt ante deum, nisi conditura ex animo addatur.

295. In occultissimis recessibus et procul ab omnium oculis (atque adeo in corde ipso atque in animo tuo) scito te habere deum arbitrum, testem, iudicem omnium etiam cogitationum tuarum, ut illius praesentiam reueritus nihil non modo facias sed nec in animum admittas nefarium aut turpe.

296. Charitas erga deum haec esse debet ut illum caeteris rebus uniuersis anteponas, honoremque et gloriam illius chariorem habeas cunctis uitae huius honoribus et commodis.

297. Et quemadmodum amicus, quum amici memoria occurrit, beneuola quadam afficitur et pia laetitia, sic curare te decet ut diuina omnia amicissima tibi sint (et proinde gratissima) uerserisque in illis multo libentissime.

298. Quoties nominari audis deum, maius quiddam et admirabilius animo occurrat quam quod possit humana mens capere.

299. Quae de illo et diuis dicuntur audi non quomodo humana sed cum magna animi admiratione.

282 Hanc nosse perfecta est sapientia L π C K : Hanc nosce, perfecta est sapientia H | uiuat ω : uiuit Lo ||
 286 praecipit ω : praecepit Lo | omnia L π : animo β || 288 illum L π C K : illius H || 293 peccatorum L P V β : peccatum B || 295 in animum admittas L π C K : admittas in animo H || 298 animo β : deest in L π

300. De deo ne quid temere censeas aut de illius factis pronuncies aliter quam uenerabundus et timide.

[300a] Impium in res sacras iocari aut dicta sanctarum scripturarum ad lusus, ineptias, aniles fabulas, scommata conuertere, ceu quis medicina ad salutem parata coenum aspergat. Ad obscoenitatem autem trahere, id uero nefarium atque abominandum est.

301. Omnia decet illic esse admiranda et cum ingenti dignatione in animos recipienda.

302. Sacris intersis attente ac pie, non ignarus quaecunque ibi seu uides seu audis esse purissima et sacrosancta spectareque ad immensam illam dei maiestatem, quam adorare facile est, comprehendere impossibile.

303. Ita ut in diuina illa sapientia altiora semper existimes latere quam quo possit uis ulla humani ingenii pertingere.

304. Dicta sapientum hominum etiam non intellecta ueneramur. Quanto id aequius est diuinis deferri!

305. Quoties nominari audis Iesum Christum, toties ueniat tibi in mentem charitas illius in nos inaestimabilis. Et recordatio illius sit tibi dulcedinis et uenerationis plena.

306. Quum titulum aliquem aut epitheton Christi audis, extolle te in eius contemplationem et ora ut talem se praebeat erga te. Velut cum clementem, mitem, placidum, ut talem experiare illum; quum omnipotentem, ut id ostendat in te ex pessimo reddens optimum, ex hoste filium, ex nihilo aliquid; quum terribilem, ut eos a quibus terrere terreat.

307. Quum dominum uocas, fac illi seruias. Quum patrem, fac ames et te dignum praestes tanto patre filium.

308. Nulla res est in toto uniuerso, cuius si uel originem uel naturam uiresque intuearis, non suppeditet quo authorem omnium deum admireris et adores.

309. Nihil exordire, non inuocato prius numine. Deus enim, in cuius manu sunt progressus et exitus, optatos eos tribuit iis actibus quos ab ipso auspicamur.

310. Quicquid aggressurus es finem spectato. Et, ubi tu rectum consilium praestiteris, de euentu ne sis sollicitus.

311. Illi fide in cuius potestate sunt rerum euentus.

312. Quandoquidem religio omnis sita est in intimis pectoris, preces da operam ut intelligas et caue ne ore tantum permurmures. Sed, quum oras, totus et animo et mente et cogitatione et uultu in hoc sis, ut omnia secum consentiant et excellentissimae respondeant actioni.

313. Execrantur illum coelestia oracula qui opus dei facit negligenter.

314. Si in citharoedo turpe est aliud ipsum ore, aliud fides eius sonare, multo est turpius, cum deo psallimus, aliud linguam dicere, aliud animum cogitare.

315. Vota nostra sobria sint et digna, quae a deo petantur et quae deus det, ne stulta illum aut inepta offendant.

316. Sumpturus cibum recordare omnipotentiae dei, qui cuncta ex nihilo condidit; sapientiae ac benignitatis, qui ea sustentat; mansuetudinis et clementiae, qui etiam inimicos suos pascit.

300a medicina ad salutem parata L P β : medicinae ad salutem paratae B V | ad obscoenitatem ... atque abominandum est β : *deest* in L : ad obscoenitatem ... et intolerabile π || 305 ueniat tibi L π C : tibi ueniat K H || 306 experiare illum β : illum experiare L π || 308 uniuerso ω : uniuerso orbe T || 312 in intimis ω : intimis L o | excellentissimae L π : excellentissime β || *Ante 316 titulus est DE SVMPTIONE CIBI β V : deest in L P B* || 316 sustentat β : sustinet L π || 318 hoc posse L P β : hoc non posse W² B V || 319 futurus L π C : fruiturus K H

317. Expende quantum illud sit tot uitis uniuersitatis mundi huius tam uariam quottidie alimoniam sufficere, conseruare omnia et uindicare ab interitu quo nutu suo tendunt;

318. nullam neque hominum neque angelorum sapientiam non modo hoc posse praestare sed nec intelligere.

319. Itaque, quum scias te de illius bonis uiuere, cogita quam execrandae sit ingratitude, quam perditae temeritatis audere te cum illo inimicitias exercere, cuius beneficio et uoluntate consistis, non amplius (si nolit) futurus.

320. Ad mensam sint casta omnia, pura, cordata, sancta; qualis ille est, inter cuius munera tunc uersaris.

321. Omnis detractio, uirulentia, atrocitas, crudelitas a mensa arceatur, in qua tu sentis incredibilem dei erga te suauitatem et clementiam.

322. Quo intolerabilius est eum te locum asperitate aut odio in fratrem contaminare, ubi tu benignam et largam in te lenitatem percipis.

323. Quod nec gentiles ignorarunt, qui eam ob causam mensae sacra nominabant laeta et festa, ad quam triste aliquid aut atrox dici fieriue nefas erat.

324. Quumque sis omnipotenti, sapientissimo, largissimo deo curae, tu immodicam sustentandi tui curam depone, tanquam bonitati illius diffisus; unicam curam suscipe: quomodo illi placeas ac satisfacias.

325. Stultissimum est alimenti causa prauum ullum facinus edere et illum offendere a quo solo alimenta ueniunt, ut eum tibi iratum facias a quo aliquid contendis impetrare.

326. Praesertim quum epulis non conseruetur uita sed uoluntate dei, quemadmodum diuinis oraculis declaratum est non pane hominem uiuere sed uerbo dei.

327. Habemus syngrapham Iesu, uniuersorum in coelo et in terra domini, nihil eorum quae opus sunt homini defuturum iis qui quaesierint regnum dei et iustitiam eius.

328. Tum ex dei donis quae ipse arbitrio suo et largitur et tollit, quum is in te tam benignus fuerit, tu in fratrem tuum, illius filium, malignus ne esto, reputans uos ex aequo esse dei filios nec deum plus tibi debere quam illi; tantum uoluisse te dispensatorem et administratorem esse et a quo secundum deum frater tuus peteret.

329. Nihil uerius datur Christo quam quod egenis datur.

330. Sumpto cibo, consydera cuius sit sapientiae, cuius potentiae uitam nostram iis rebus quas edisti sustentare et ruentem fulcire.

331. Itaque habeas deo gratiam; non quantam haberes illi qui tibi pecunia sua cibarium emisset, sed quanta habenda est ei qui te et cibum ipsum condidit (et cibum propter te) et cibo te sustentat non ui illius sed sua.

332. Quum petis quietem et quum surgis, reminiscere beneficiorum dei, non in te solum sed in totum genus hominum atque adeo mundum uniuersum.

333. Cogita quantae sint hostis hominum per licentiam quietis insidiae, dum homo uelut cadauer iacet impos sui. Quo instantius orandus est Christus, ut nos tam imbecillos tueatur.

334. Nec ullo nostro peccato irritandus est custos et praeses noster.

335. Et frons et pectus crucis nota exterius muniendum, interius uero piis precibus et sanctis meditationibus.

321 detractio π : detrectatio (detractatio C) L β || 322 in te π β : tibi L || 325 edere β : admittere L π | ut L π C K : et H || 326 epulis non β : alimentis non L P : non alimentis W² B V | declaratum est π β : dictum est L || Ante 332 titulus est DE SOMNO β V : deest in L P B || 333 hostis ω : hostes T | imbecillos L π C K : imbecilles H

336. Vbi iam lectum ingredieris, fac cogites unumquemque diem imaginem esse humanae uitae: cui succedit nox; et somnus, simulacrum mortis expressissimum.

337. Itaque rogandus est Christus ut in uita et in morte adsit perpetuo secundus ac fauens, illamque ipsam noctem praebeat nobis placidam atque tranquillam.

338. Neue insomniis terreamur, semperque etiam sopitis ille menti nostrae obuersetur. Illius solatiis recreati ad matutinum tempus sospites et laeti perueniamus cum pia memoria sanctissimae mortis ipsius precii, quo genus humanum redemptum est.

339. Cubile seruabis castum mundumque, ne ius ullum in id inueniat author ille et caput totius spurcitiei.

340. Signo crucis et sacra aqua et inuocatione diuini nominis, sed in primis sanctis cogitationibus et statuto custodiendae pietatis, omnem ab eo diaboli ditionem pelles.

341. De mane surgens commenda te Christo, cui et age gratias, quod illius ope ac praesidio non es illa ipsa nocte oppressus dolis et inuidia immanis hostis.

342. Et quemadmodum de nocte dormiisti, postea euigilasti, sic nostra corpora recordare dormitura per mortem; hinc reddenda uitae a Christo, quum apparebit iudex uiuorum et mortuorum.

343. Quem supplex obtestare ut sequentem diem uelit ac faciat te in obsequio suo totum consumere, ne quem laedas neu a quo laedatur tua probitas; sed septus undique ac munitus pietate Christiana, incolumis ac integer tot euadas retia, tot pedicas quot per uias omnes et aditus humanos sparsit tetenditque insidiosus diabolus.

344. Sanctissimam, dei parentem, Mariam et reliquos diuos diuasque uenerare tanquam charos amicos Christi, dei uiuentis in secula seculorum.

345. De illorum uita et actis crebro uel legito uel audito attentissimus et libentissime, pio et uenerabundo animo, ut tibi ad imitationem prosint.

346. De illis sic senti, sic loquere tanquam non iam hominibus sed supergressis naturam omnem et fastigium humanum, diuinitati proximis et coniunctis.

347. Inter homines uero quum tanta sit cognatio similitudinis in corpore et toto animo, simusque omnes pari iure in mundum inuecti ad societatem et uitae communionem facti atque instructi, ad hanc conseruandam lex est a natura proclamata: ne quis alteri fecerit quod sibi nolit factum.

348. Hoc unum instaurator ille naturae collapsae suum esse dogma professus est, sed explicatum atque illustratum.

349. Nam ut humanam naturam ad similitudinem dei (quoad eius fieri potest) sublatam suis omnibus numeris consummaret, non modo mutuum amorem imperauit sed eorum quoque qui nos oderunt,

350. ut simus coelestis patris similes, qui suos quoque inimicos amat (quod declarat beneficiis illos prosequendo, et quidem maximis), neminem odit.

336 ingredieris β : ingrederis L π || 337 perpetuo secundus β : semper propitius L π || 338 insomniis L π H: in somniis C K || 339 in id L π C K: *deest in H* || 340 nominis L P β : numinis W² B V | et statuto custodiendae pietatis π β : *deest in L* || 342 hinc π β : huic L || 343 incolumis ac β : sospes et L π | tetenditque ω : retenditque Lo || 344 dei uiuentis L π C K: Dei, uiuentes H || 346 iam hominibus L π C K: ex hominibus H || *Ante 347 titulus est DE CHARITATE* β : *deest in L* π || 347 atque instructi β : *deest in L* π | nolit factum β : factum nolit L π || 348 atque β : et L π || 349 consummaret π K H: consumaret L C || *Ante 352 titulus est DE CHARITATE* π : *deest in L* β

351. Quid quod hominum ingenium ita fert ut beneuolos in se illos uelint, etiam in quos ipsi sunt maleuoli?

352. Sapientissimus uitae nostrae magister, nempe et author, unicum dedit ad uiuendum documentum: ut amemus; gnarus uitam nostram, si amemus, fore felicissimam nec aliis opus esse legibus.

353. Nihil felicius quam amare. Idcirco deus et angeli felicissimi, qui amant omnia.

354. Infelicius nihil quam odisse, quo affectu miserrimi sunt diaboli.

355. Verus amor omnia exaequat. Vbi is uiget, nemo alteri quaerit praeferrī, nemo a dilecto rapere, quum apud se esse censeat quae apud illum;

356. non litem mouere fratri charo, ac neque se unquam iniuria putat ab illo affici. Ideo nec ultionem meditatur. Nemo inuidet ei quem amat, nec quisquam malis amici gaudet, nec bonis indolet. Contra potius «gaudet cum gaudentibus», iuxta dictum apostoli, «flet cum flentibus». Idque non fecte aut simulate sed ex animo, quoniam amor omnia reddit communia, suaque esse existimat quae sunt eius quem amat.

357. Documenti huius solidum et uerissimum exemplar, oculis nostris ad imitationem propositum, sunt Christi actiones.

358. Venit enim dei filius non ut uerbis modo sed exemplo uitae suae rectam nos doceret uiuendi rationem ut, illustratis sole illo suo animis nostris, aperte qualis quaeque res esset cerneremus.

359. Primum, exercitus per omne genus patientiae, quantam ostendit animi moderationem in quanta potentia! Impetitus tot tam grauibus contumeliis, nemini remaledixit. Tantum docuit uiam dei, aduersam detestatus. Vinciri se est passus, qui mundum euertere uel unico poterat nutu.

360. Calumniam quam patienter tulit!

361. Denique sic gessit sese ut nemo in eo potentiam nouerit, nisi ad iuuandum.

362. Rex et dominus uniuersorum, per quem fecit pater hunc mundum, quam aequae tulit aequari se infimis mortalium, et propriam sibi domum et charis suis ministris deesse alimenta!

363. Conditor rectorque naturae malorum naturae nostrae expers non fuit: esuriit, sitiit, delassatus fuit et moestus. Quorsum haec nisi ad exemplum nostrum?

364. Tam amicus pacis, concordiae, charitatis, ut nullum uicium magis sit insectatus quam superbiam et quae illinc oriuntur: arrogantiam, ambitionem, contentionem, dissidia, similtates;

365. ostendens nihil esse quur quis uel ab externis sibi quicquam arroget uel a corporeis, quum sint aduentitia et aliena,

366. nec ab internis et uirtute, quum a deo dentur et ob hoc ipsum tolluntur: quod quis eiusmodi muneribus sese efferat nec fontem atque originem agnoscat, despiciens eos ad quorum utilitatem haec a deo accepit.

367. Et ad superbiam infringendam, ne quis tanquam rite subditus religioni et seruator legis euangelicae sibi placeat, audiuius ab eo: «Quum omnia quae uobis praecepi feceritis, dicite: serui inutiles sumus».

352 felicissimam F B V : feliciss. L β : felicissimos P || 356 reddit ω : dedit Lo² || 357 Documenti L π C : Documentum K H || 359 remaledixit ω : re male dixit Lo | poterat π β : potest L || 363 malorum π β : malis L | delassatus fuit et moestus π β : delassatus est, moeruit L | Quorsum π : Quorsus L β

368. Quanta stultitia est eorum qui se exacte Christianos gloriantur et aliis sese in obseruanda lege anteponunt!

369. Quum nemo de se norit an uirtutem habeat, utrum odio dei an gratia dignus sit; an ille, cui sese praefert, uirtute sit locupletior; an ascitus et destinatus in consortium coelestium, quum sit ipse miseriis sempiternis assignatus;

370. idcirco iudicium omne de homine homini ademit, caeco et ignaro recessuum cordis, ad se transtulit scrutatorem pectoris humani.

371. Exteriora enim, quae sola oculus hominis intuetur, infirma et incerta sunt interiorum signa.

372. Non ergo uno congressu (quod nonnulli faciunt temerarii), non centum, non longissimo conuictu de ingenio, de uitiiis aut uirtutibus cuiusquam sententiam in totum feras.

373. Longissimae et obscurissimae sunt in humano corde ambages ac latebrae. Quae humana acies in tantam caliginem penetrabit?

374. Et cum Christus uniuersum genus hominum morte sua sibi asseruerit tantoque precio de seruitute diaboli redemerit, nemo ausit contemnere, nemo ludere animam, quam ita dominus amauit ut nihil cunctatus sit pro illa suum sanguinem effundere et uitam impendere.

375. Pro uniuersis crucifixus est dominus et pro singulis.

376. Nec speres fore Christo rem gratam, si tu oderis quem ille amat.

377. Hanc uult referri sibi gratiam: ut, quemadmodum ipse dominus nos seruos nequam et pessime meritos amauit, ita et nos conseruos nostros.

378. Hic inchoauit mutuam hominum inter se et cum deo charitatem; hoc est humanae beatitudinis iecit fundamenta, in coelo absoluit.

379. Haec est uita et gratia Christi: sapientia humanum ingenium excedens, aequitate intelligentibus congruens, bonitate cunctos alliciens.

380. Nemo se Christianum esse putet, nemo se deo esse charum confidat, si quem odit, quum Christus nobis homines omnes commendarit.

381. Hominem tibi a deo commendatum (si dignus est) ama, quia dignus est quem ames; sin indignus, ama, quia deus dignus cui pareas.

382. Non ieiunia, non erogatae opes omnes in pauperum usus hominem deo gratiosum reddunt. Sola hoc praestat in homines charitas. Hoc nos eius apostolus docuit.

383. Nullum uidebis hominem quem non existimes debere tibi esse fratris germani loco, ut eius rebus prosperis gaudeas, aduersis doleas, iuuesque quantum erit opis tuae.

384. Non natio affectum hunc minuat, non ciuitas, non cognatio, non professio, non conditio, non ingenium. Vnus est omnium pater deus, quem tu edoctus a Christo quotidie patrem compellas; qui te filium agnoscet, si tu eius filios fratres agnoueris.

385. Ne sit tibi turpe fratrem illum habere quem deus non dedignatur filium.

386. Pacem et concordiam et amorem inuexit deus.

368 sese ... anteponunt β : in obseruanda lege sese anteponunt L π || 370 scrutatorem ω : seruatorem L ω^2 || 372 de ingenio, de uitiiis aut (ac H) uirtutibus β : de uitiiis aut uirtutibus L : de ingenio, uitiiis aut uirtutibus π | in totum π β : *deest in L* || 373 ambages ac β : *deest in L* π || 374 pro illa ... impendere β : uitam suam pro illa effundere L π || 377 uult ω : uelut M | referri sibi β : sibi referri L π || 381 ames ω : amas W || 382 usus β : usum L π | gratiosum L π C K : gratiorem H | in homines β : hominum L π | Hoc nos eius ... docuit β : *deest in L* : Hoc nos apostolus eius docuit π || 384 non ciuitas, non cognatio L π β : non ciuitas, non familia, non cognatio L^{err} | non conditio ω : *deest in M* | filios L π C : filius KH

387. Partes et factiones et priuatas utilitates cum alienis damnis sicut etiam dissidia, rixas, contentiones, bella, diabolus peritissimus horum artifex.

388. Deus, quia uult nos saluos, spargit beneuolentiam; diabolus, quia perditos, inimicitias.

389. Concordia etiam pusilla coalescunt, discordia maxima dissipantur.

390. Qui pacem, qui concordiam student inter homines uel conciliare uel conseruare sartam tectam, ii filii dei uocabuntur, teste Christo. Hi uere sunt pacifici de quibus ipse loquitur. Qui uero discordias serere, charitatem hominum inter se rescindere, ii filii diaboli.

391. Summum inimicitiarum, quo beluarum feritatem omnium homo superat, bellum. Scito rem esse non hominum sed, quod uerbum ipsum loquitur, beluarum.

392. Quam detestatur natura, quae hominem inermem genuit ad mansuetudinem et communionem uita! Auersatur deus, qui penitus uult et imperat mutuum inter homines omnes charitatem.

393. Nec quisquam homo homini uel bellum facere uel nocere potest sine scelere.

394. Si quem arbitraris iniquo aut infenso esse in te animo, nullum laborem aut operam refugias, dum illum quacunque ratione lenias et places tibi.

395. Neque in ea re uel precibus uel obsequio uel fortunae parcas, modo tibi gratiam omnium pares, breuissimam uiam ad gratiam dei.

396. Neminem irriseris, non ignarus quod uni alicui accidit posse cuius accidere. Age potius deo gratias, quod te extra eam sortem posuerit. Et ora tum tibi ne quid tale accidat, tum illi sic afflicto remedium aliquod uel aequum saltem animum; et ipse subueni, si potes.

397. Crudelis animi est alienis malis gaudere et non miserari communem naturam.

398. Esto hominibus misericors et consequere a deo misericordiam.

399. Fortuna et casus humani communes sunt omnibus: unicuique minantur, unicuique impendent.

400. Huic amori hominibus debito nihil existimato posse te facere aptius et congruentius quam si maximum bonum (hoc est uirtutem) eis procuraueris; si studueris ut omnes, si potes (utique quam plurimos), bonos reddas.

401. Nihil magis amori dissonum, nihil damnosius aut deterius feceris quam si quos malos reddideris uel suasibus uel exemplo uel ullo alio incitamento.

402. Primum omnium et felicissimum est si ames etiam odiosus. Sed iucundissimum quoque est et maxime tutum amari.

403. Nullae certiores opes quam certae amicitiae.

404. Nullum potentius satellitium quam amici fideles.

405. Solem e mundo tollit quisquis e uita amicitiam.

406. Sed uera et solida et duratura amicitia tantummodo est inter bonos, inter quos facile amor coalescit.

407. Mali nec inter se amici sunt nec cum bonis.

390 uere L π C K : uero H || 395 fortunae β : fortunis L π | modo π β : dum L | breuissimam β : celerem L π || 396 non ignarus β : cogitans L π | Age potius deo ω : Age Deo potius W | remedium ... animum β : uel remedium aliquod uel aequum animum L : saltem remedium aliquod uel aequum animum π || 397 alienis ω : alicuius M || 399 communes sunt omnibus β : sunt omnibus communes L π || 400 Huic amori β : Hoc amore L π | posse te π β : te posse L | uirtutem) eis L π C K : uirtutem eius) H | bonos reddas β : reddas bonos L π || 402 est et L π C H : et est K | maxime L π : maximum β || 405 quisquis β : qui L π || 407 amici sunt L π C K : sunt amici H

408. Vt ameris, patentissima est ac directissima per amorem uia. Nihil enim sic amorem elicit ut amor.

409. Conciliatur quoque uirtute, quae natura sua amabilis est, ut uel ignotissimos ad se amandam inuitet et pene cogat.

410. Tum etiam uirtutis signis: mansuetudine, modestia, pudore, humanitate, comitate, affabilitate; si nihil uel dixeris uel feceris quod arrogantiam aut insolentiam aut petulantiam aut obscoenitatem respiat. Omnia sint dulcia, mitia, lenia et pura.

411. Amicitiae uenenum, si ames tanquam osurus, et amicum sic habeas ut putes posse inimicum fieri.

412. Salutare illud «odi tanquam amaturus».

413. In amicitia nulla sit inimicitiae cogitatio. Quem habes amicum ne credas futurum unquam inimicum, alioqui infirma et fragilis erit amicitia.

414. In qua decet inesse fidem, constantiam, simplicitatem, ut de amico nec ipse sinistre suspiceris nec suspicantibus aut deferentibus aurem accommodes.

415. Vita non est uita suspicacibus aut timidis sed assidua mors.

416. Ne in alienas uitas inquiras nec iniquitatem quaeras in domo iusti (sicut inquit sapiens), neue curiosus scruteris quid quisque agat. Et ante omnia caueto ne cuius turpitudinem retegas aut uelis cognoscere. Est enim hoc inhumani pectoris et acerbi animi. Multaeque hinc suboriuntur simultates.

417. Et qui haec faciunt suorum solent esse incuriosi, alienorum solliciti. Quam foedum ac intolerabile est alios tam probe nosse, seipsum ignorare!

418. Nec amare tantum homines debes, sed etiam quos aequum est reuereri ac inter eos honeste uersari et cum decore. In quo est officium uitae communis.

419. Ne putes nihil interesse ubi, cum quibus, apud quos agas uel loquare.

420. Sit tibi inter homines modestia et moderatio in uniuerso corpore, et praecipue in oculis ac ore toto, a quo absit species omnis fastidii et contemptus, absit gesticulatio et lasciuiia. Serenitas illud et quietudo exornent, argumentum animi ad eum modum affecti.

421. Solum humanae faciei tegumentum decoris in primis et fauorabile modestia et uerecundia. Qua nudis, nihil dici potest deformius aut detestabilius.

422. Desperanda illius salus quem desiit pudere malefacere.

423. Nec uultus sit in atrocitatem aut seueritatem nimiam compositus, unde colligitur saeuus atque impotens animus.

424. Risus ne sit frequens aut immoderatus aut cum clamore et concussionem corporis, ne in cachinnum aut irrisum exeat.

425. Nullam esse rem talem existima quae te tantopere queat exhilarare ut ingentem attollere risum cogat.

426. Sed risus potest esse causa aliqua, irrisus nulla.

408 patentissima (patientissima K H) est ac directissima β : certissima est et breuissima L π || 409 amandam L P B β : amandum W V | pene cogat β : trahat L π || 410 respiat ω : respiciat Lo || 412 Salutare illud π β : Illud salutare L || 414 nec ipse L π C K : ne ipse H | sinistre β : *deest in L π* || 416 nec iniquitatem ... sapiens β : *deest in L π* | Et ante omnia ... animi β : *deest in L π* | Multaeque β : Multae L π || 417 Quam foedum ac intolerabile β : Stultum L π || *Ante 418 titulus est DE CONVICTV HOMINVM β : deest in L π* || 419 uel loquare β : *deest in L π* || *Ante 420 titulus est DE CONVICTV HOMINVM π : deest in L β* || 421 decoris β : decorum L π | deformius β : foedius L π || 423 atque β : et L π || 425 esse rem talem L π C K : rem esse talem H

427. Irridere bona nefas, mala crudelitas, media stulticia; probos impium, improbos saeuum, notos immanitas, ignotos dementia; denique hominem inhumanum.

428. Oculi sint quieti; manus ne ludibundae, ne gesticultrices.

429. Nec assuesce quenquam caedere. Ex talitro uenitur ad pugnum, hinc ad fustem et ferrum.

430. Solos bonos uero ac germano honore prosequere, qui ex ueneratione animi nascitur.

431. Magistratibus exteriorem honorem exhibe illisque audiens esto, etiam si grauia et molesta imperent. Hoc enim uult deus propter publicam quietem.

432. Diuitibus cede, ne irritati et tibi et aliis bonis noceant.

433. Seni assurge reueritus aetatem et rerum usum prudentiamque, quae in illa aetate esse solet.

434. Honorationi alienae ne graueris paria facere. Salutantem non resalutare nec feliciter precanti feliciter reprecari (si id factum cognoscas) aut socordis barbariei est aut iacentis incuriae.

435. Quam exiguae res sunt et nullius impendii salutatio, affabilitas, comitas, honor!; at quam magnas amicitias conglutinant exhibitae, dissoluunt praetermissae!

436. Quanta est bonarum rerum ignorantia nolle multorum beneuolentiam tantulo redimere!

437. Generosissime ut quisque est et optime educatus, ita se maxime mitem omnibus et comem praebet; ut fastidium et ferocia ex uilitate sunt aut hebetudine aut imperitia. Vnde in bonas artes eruditio humanitas nuncupata est.

438. Ipse si non salutare aut resalutare, negligentiae magis adscrito uel inconsyderantiae quam contemptui. Parum blande aut non satis honorifice appellatus, seu moribus seu naturae attribue, non maliciae uel odio. Ne tam inanis esto ut oris flatu impellare!

439. Hisce interpretationibus ac similibus, sanctam tibi ac iucundissimam parabis uitam, quippe omnes diliges nec a quoquam te offensus arbitrare.

440. Vetus dictum est: «Vt uerax, ne suspicax». Hoc uerbis nouum, sententia priscum: «Vt quietus, ne suspicax».

441. Neminem contemnere uidearis non uultu, non uerbo, non gestu, non facto aliquo.

442. Si inferior es, quis superiorum ferat se despici abs te? Sin maior, irritas et auertis minorem contemptu.

443. Intolerabilis est contemptus, propterea quod nemo uidetur sibi tam uilis ut contemptum mereatur.

444. Multi laborant ut a contemptu se uindicerent, sed plures ut de contemptu.

445. Nec quisquam tantus est quem non aliquando fortuna indigere minimis cogat.

446. Praeter haec omnia nullus est contemptibilis quem deus filium dignatur, nisi in hoc dei quoque iudicium contemnas.

429 caedere π : cedere L C K || 430 ac L π C K : et H || 433-437 β : 445 L π || 433 aetate β : *deest in L π* || 434 ne graueris paria facere β : non modo paria facito uerum etiam iuxta praeceptum apostoli praeuerte L π | socordis β : extremae L π | iacentis incuriae β : incuriae socordissimae L π || 437 Generosissime W^2 B V : Generosiss. L P β : Generosissimus S | uilitate L π C K : utilitate H || 438 Ipse si non ... uel odio π β : *deest in L* | non satis β : *deest in π* | Ne tam inanis ... impellare β : *deest in L π* || 439 Hisce interpretationibus ... arbitrare π β : *deest in L* || 440 Vetus dictum ... quietus, ne suspicax π β : *deest in L* | est β : *deest in π* || 441 non gestu β : *deest in L π* || 442 despici β : contemni L π | auertis ω : euertis L O || 446 dignatur π β : dignatus est L | quoque β : *deest in L π*

447. Et saepe quem homines contemptu dignum putant, si perscrutarentur, ueneratione et adoratione dignissimum comperirent.

448. Linguam dedit deus hominibus, ut sit instrumentum societatis et communionis, ad quam natura hominem homini conciliat.

449. Haec magnorum et bonorum et malorum est caussa, prout utaris. Praeclare Iacobus apostolus assimilauit eam clauo nauis. Fraeni sunt illi iniiciendi et cohibenda, ne uel aliis noceat uel sibi ipsi.

450. Nullum est peccati ut facilius instrumentum ita nec crebrius.

451. Nemini conuitium feceris, neminem execreris, nemini noceto non modo in re sed nec in fama atque existimatione.

452. In neminem petulantius aut procacius debaccheris uel effusius ac immoderatus inuehere etiam lacessitus et laesus. Magis enim te et apud deum et apud homines cordatos laedes quam illum ipsum cui maledicis.

453. Conuitium conuitio regerere est lutum luto purgare.

454. Minitari muliercularum est nec probarum.

455. Nec ipse sis tam tener ut uerbulis transuerbereris.

456. Nec facundiam exerceas caninam nec disertum laudem affectes in alienam contumeliam, in quam infantem et mutum esse satius est.

457. Alios reprehendere ne sis sollicitus. Hoc cura: ne in te sit quod alii possint merito taxare.

458. Verumtamen reprehendens ne utare acerbitate aut atrocitate ulla uerborum. Fac ut obiurgationis amarori aliquid admisceatur dulce et quod plagam leniat, si quam facis,

459. modo ne fructus pereat reprehensionis, dum rem studes nimium mitigare, neu in assentationem prolaboris.

460. Assentatio deforme uitium: turpe illi qui dicit, perniciosum ei qui audit.

461. Nec putes rem ullam esse tanti ut a recto et uero propter eam sustineas deflectere. Non hoc abs te opes, non ullae necessitudines, non preces, non minae, non mortis metus et certum periculum extorqueant.

462. Sic tibi et auctoritatem parabis et fidem, ut oracula putentur esse quaecumque dicas. Aliter despiceris et indignissimus iudicaberis qui uel audire.

463. Sermone utitor modesto, ciuili, comi; non aspero, non rusticano uel imperito, sed nec accurato aut affectato nimis. Ne, quum loquendum sit ut intelligamur, sermoni tuo interprete sit opus.

464. Nec contumeliosum usurpes sermonem aut reprehensorium aut rigidum, sed neque blandum aut fractum aut adulatorium.

465. Est quiddam mediocre, quod nec suam dignitatem abiicit nec alienam tollit.

466. Lasciuia et spurcicia a sermone extirpanda, ut a cibis uenenum.

447 adoratione L P β : admiratione B V || Ante 448 titulus est DE SERMONE ET COLLOQUIIS β : deest in L : DE VERBIS π || 449 Haec L P V β : Hae W² B | Praeclare β : Scite L π | assimilauit L C K : assimilauit π H || 451 in fama L β : fama π || 455 ipse β : deest in L π || 456 in quam L β W V : in quem P B || 458 Verumtamen β : Verum L π | utare β La B V : utere L P | obiurgationis amarori L π C : obiurgationis amarae ori K H : obiurgationibus amatori M | et β : deest in L π | quam facis L P β : quam forte facis B V || 459 prolaboris L π : prolaboris β || 461 tanti β : tantam L π || 463 intelligamur ω : intelligamus Lo || 465 quiddam L π C K : quidem H

467. Ne celeritatem in loquendo nimiam suscipias: nec ut cogitationem praeuertant uerba, nec respondeas antequam qua de re agatur plene intellexeris et quid ille cui respondes dixerit senseritque.

468. Rarissimum debet esse illud Ciceronis «quicquid in buccam», et merito soli Tito Attico dictum. Ac nescio an usquam admittendum, quum inter amicos cauendum sit ne quid temere dicamus, quod amicitiam dirimat aut offendat.

469. Quam turpe illud et periculosum «lingua, quo uadis?»

470. Christus, dominus noster (sciens ex loquacitate plurima oriri mala, et illa potissimum quae pugnant cum praecipuo capite legis suae: rixas, discordias, simultates),

471. ad circumspectionem loquendi interminatus est de omni uerbo ocioso, quod homines fuerint loquuti, reddituros eos rationem in disquisitione illa mundi.

472. Idcirco psalmista inquit: «Pone custodiam ori meo et ostium circumstantiae labiis meis».

473. Ne sis in sermone immodicus ac ne multus quidem, neue audiri uelis solus. Est enim in loquendo uicissitudo, etiam si cum imperitissimis agas aut uilissimis. Sed nec adeo rarus aut tardus, ut ipse te auscultare existimeris idque facere quod singula tua uerba singulae tibi rosae esse uideantur.

474. Inter prudentes praestat audire quam loqui. Sed est locus ubi tacere tam est uitium quam loqui quando non oportet.

475. Nulla uoluptas est adeo suauis quae comparari queat colloquio prudentis hominis ac disertis.

476. Ne sis nimius percontator. Est enim molestum atque odiosum. Noris et illud Horatii: «Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est».

477. In commentando ne sis contentiosus aut pertinax. Si uerum audias, hoc protinus silentio reuerere illique tanquam diuinae rei assurgito.

478. Sin non audias, nihilominus tribue hoc uel amico uel modestiae tuae, praesertim ubi nullum neque probi mores detrimentum accipiunt neque pietas.

479. Superuacanea est contentio, si non adsit proficiendi spes.

480. Arrogantiam aut iactantiam aut superbam et fastidiosam auctoritatem non ferunt homines, ne in maximis quidem uiris et omnem laudem meritis.

481. Ne uerbis quod scis ostentes, sed rebus te ostende scire.

482. Nec quicquid est iucundum tibi dicenti, idem credideris esse aliis audientibus.

483. Caue ne quid facias quod securus aut extra periculum non sis, nisi celetur. Sed, si fecisse contingat, nemini aperueris. Quod taceri uis, prior ipse taceas. Sin detecturus es, uide etiam atque etiam cui.

484. Arcanum quid aut celandum maxime amico quum committis, caue ne iocum admisceas ne ille, iocum ut referat, occultum enunciet.

485. Tibi uero arcanum creditum accuratius et fidelius custodi quam depositam pecuniam.

486. Nihil erit in humana uita tutum, si tollatur secretorum fides.

467 Ne celeritatem L P β : Nec celeritatem W² B V | nec ut L P B β : ne M V || 468 Tito β : *deest in L π* | temere β : *deest in L π* | offendat β : *laedat L π* || 470 potissimum F : in primis L π : potiss. β : potissima S | praecipuo β : *deest in L π* || 473 imperitissimis ω : peritissimis W | esse β : *deest in L π* || 475 adeo suauis β : tanta L π || 476 atque β : et L π || 477 commentando β : disserendo L π || 478 tribue β : concede L π || 483 aut extra periculum β : *deest in L π* | aperueris β : detexeris L π || 484 enunciet β : retegat L π

487. Si quid promiseris, praesta, etiam si res sit uehementer ardua et difficilis, saltem ut obligatam alteri tuam fidem soluas.

488. Si quid tibi sit promissum, ne exigas. Acrior semper in te iudex quam in alios.

489. Existimare decet te homines habere sensum, rationem, mentem, iudicium. Ne speres te illis posse persuadere malefacta esse benefacta aut contra, nec falli posse rebus simulatis, tectis, fucatis, adumbratis, quae tandem produnt se et fiunt tanto foediores ac inuisiores quanto prius occultiores fuerant.

490. Infestis enim animis ea accipimus quibus sumus decepti.

491. Ideo consultius est omnia esse aperta, nuda, simplicia.

492. Nam etsi aliquando ueritas initio odiosa sit, deinceps tamen nihil est illa amabilius aut gratius.

493. Laborat aliquando ueritas, nunquam opprimitur.

494. Nec mendacii utilitas solida est ac diuturna, nec ueritatis damnum diu nocet.

495. A mendacio tanquam corruptela quadam abhorreto. Nihil est enim humanae conditioni abiectius, ut quod illam procul a deo separat, diabolo similem ac mancipium facit.

496. Deinde siue tarde siue celeriter mendacium tandem deprehenditur, uertiturque mentienti in turpem ignominiam.

497. Quid despectius aut uilius mendace?

498. Si mendacem te norint, nemo credet tibi etiam asseueranti uerissima.

499. Contra, si ueracem, maiorem habebit fidem nutus tuus quam aliorum sanctissimum iusiurandum.

500. Si non uis loqui repugnantia, si uis inesse uerbis tuis constantiam, nihil opus est memoria aut arte alia quam ut dicas semper quod credis uerum esse.

501. Verum uero consentiens, falsum nec uero nec falso.

502. Sed si uis in opinione tua uerum inesse, ne facile credas nisi comperta uel magnam ueri faciem prae se ferentia.

503. Neu sis suspicax. Vnde illud sapienter dictum: «Si uis esse uerax, suspicax non eris».

504. Miserum illum qui id egit, unde extricare se non potest nisi per mendacium.

505. Iurare ne consuescas. Sapiens enim ait: «Vir multum iurans replebitur iniquitate et non recedet a domo eius plaga».

506. Et dominus in euangelio suo uetat nos penitus iurare, tantum affirmare «ita est», aut negare «non est».

507. Magna est dei reuerentia non illum passim aut facile testem adducere. Non debet hoc, nisi ab inuito et coacto fieri.

508. Qui facile in seriis iurat, in iocis iurabit. Qui in iocis, et in mendacio.

509. Si qui tibi credituri sunt, aequae iniurato credent ut iurato; non credituri, magis etiam iureiurando auertentur.

510. Inter homines est aliquod faciendum discrimen. Sunt enim ex eis alii domestici, alii noti tantum, alii ignoti.

487 uehementer ardua β : ardua in primis L π || 490 ea accipimus β : accipimus ea L π | quibus W B V : a quibus L P β || 492 illa C K : *deest in* L π : eo H || 495 humanae conditioni L P V β : humana conditione B || 496 siue ... siue β : seu ... seu L π | tandem β : *deest in* L π || 498 etiam asseueranti uerissima β : etiam si affirmes uerissima L π || 502 ne L P B β : nec V || *Ante 505 titulus est* DE IVRE IVRANDO β V : *deest in* L P B || 507 debet hoc L P β : hoc debet La B V || 509 non L P β : si non W B V || *Ante 510 titulus est* QVOMODO HOMINIBVS VTENDVM π β : *deest in* L

511. Domesticos uoco consanguineos, affines et quibus cum in eadem domo et familia degis.

512. Omnes sunt diligendi. Etiam in ignotos talem te ostendes ut sentiant te in uniuersum toti generi humano amicum esse omnibusque bene cupere.

513. Non tamen te eundem praestabis omnibus ut lineam albam in albo saxo. Alios adhibebis consiliis, aliis parebis et obsequere; alios reuerberis ac coles, aliis gratiam referes (si quod ab eis beneficium tuleris), et iis potissimum quorum opera usus es utili tibi aut diligenti aut fideli.

514. In quo animus pro opere computandus est, ut non multo peiore loco uideatur esse qui conatus est quique uoluit prodesse quam qui profuit.

515. Operam si accepisti, ne sis minus de reddendo et compensando sollicitus quam si pecunias mutuas.

516. Nec putes minus esse operam dedisse (dumtaxat honestam et a sincero profectam animo) quam pecuniam. Quin hoc maius, quo cuique corpus quam externa charius esse par est.

517. Ne expectes dum necessitates ad te suas familiaris deferat. Tu illas odorare et eis ultro subuenias. Honestis precibus occurre et, antequam oreris, exorare.

518. Parentes non amabis solum sed secundum deum unice uenerabere. Illorum iussis tanquam diuinis imperiis obtemperabis.

519. Persuasus id, quod res habet: illos uicem tibi referre in terris dei, nec te uel chariorem cuiquam esse uel maiori curae.

520. His proximi sunt praeceptores, paedonomi, tutores, denique quibus commendata est morum tuorum cura, quis nihil est in homine preciosius aut praestabilius.

521. Istos uelut alteros parentes ama et reuerere. His modeste imo cum alacritate quadam pare, reputans quaecunque praecipiant non ad sua illos referre commoda sed ad tua.

522. Quod quum ita sit, pessimam tu illis gratiam redderes si, ubi ipsi commodis tuis intentissimi sunt, tu eis odium aut contumaciam pro tali beneficio reponeres.

523. Crede te illi esse charum a quo amice reprehenderis,

524. nec unquam reprehensionem obesse uel inimici. Nam, si uera obiicit, ostendit quod emendemus; sin falsa, quod uitemus. Ita semper uel meliores reddit uel saltem cautiore.

525. Quos familiares tibi facturus es explora prius: quibus sint moribus et quemadmodum se cum aliis amicis gesserint, ne te postea necessitudinis poeniteat.

526. Ne familiaris illi fias cuius familiaritatem bonos uides auersari.

527. [1] Eos etiam uita qui non te amabunt sed tua, quales sunt parasi et quorum consuetudine ac tanquam affricu uel peior fies uel labem aut periculum contrahes. [2] Illos quoque qui amicis felicioribus inuident. [3] Tum qui, iocorum studiosi, nihil pensi habent in uitam et maxime arcana amicorum ludere, aut dicta dicere, aut innata loquacitate magnopere reticenda effutire. [4] Sed illos potissimum qui ob leuem rixulam grauissimas inimicitias cum charissimis suscipiunt, acriusque in eos ulciscuntur quos aliquando amarunt quam quos semper odere barbarica quadam persuasione: minus ferendam esse iniuriam quae fit ab amico quam quae ab inimico. In quo se ostendunt nunquam amasse, alioqui non putarent se tam cito laesos. [5] Eiusmodi praestat inimicos aut certe ignotos habere quam amicos.

513 beneficium tuleris β : tuleris beneficium L π || 514 ut L P β : *deest in La B V* | multo L P β : in multo La B V | quique β : qui L π || 515 Operam si L π C: Operam sic K H || 516 honestam ω : honestatem Lo² | esse par est β : debet esse L π || 517 Ne ω : Nec Lo² | odorare L π C K: adorare H || 520 morum π β : *deest in L* | quis L π C: quia K H || 524 uel meliores ω : uel illa M | saltem β : *deest in L π* || 527 [3] aut

528. Esto in admittendis ad familiaritatem cunctantior; in retinendis, semel admissis, constantior.

529. Familiares elige non placituros tantum sed et profuturos: non eos qui omnia loquentur ad gratiam, sed qui ad commodum; nec qui suauiter et uafre assentabuntur, sed qui uere et simpliciter admonebunt.

530. Si consueueris assentatoribus delectari, nunquam uerum audies.

531. Ex bestiis exitiabiles maxime inter feras inuidia, inter mansuetas adulatio.

532. Quam amandae sapientia et uirtus tam execranda assentatio, quae impedit ne illuc perueniamus, dum suadet iam peruenisse. Tam diligenda recta admonitio, quae illuc prouehit dum quantum supersit et quemadmodum conficiendum sit docet.

533. Si reprehendi fers aegre, reprehendenda ne feceris.

534. Miserum illum qui admonitorem, cum eget, non habet.

535. Malorum hominum consuetudinem non secus atque ictos peste deuota (utrinque enim metuendum contagium),

536. nisi talis sis qui confidas te posse illos meliores reddere.

537. Sed huic fiduciae non est nimis fidendum, praesertim quoniam natura nostra in malum fertur prona. Ad uirtutem autem accliuus est atque ardua semita.

538. Explora et ipse qui sis, quo loco, qua conditione. Nec res ulla tantos tibi spiritus subdat ut censeas debere plus tibi quam caeteris licere.

539. Quo tibi plus concedente more licet, hoc minus retrahente moderatione libeat.

540. In minores praebe te comem, in maiores reuerentem, in pares facilem ac tractabilem.

541. Sic ut uitio sis semper durus, rigidus, inexorabilis.

542. A potentioribus contemni te ne inique accipias. Potiusque id crede fortunae uitio accidere quam hominis.

543. Si quid a minore proficiscatur quod tibi parum placeat, cogita non id protinus contumeliam esse sed libertatem;

544. te etiam nimis esse delicatum, cui leues titillationes grandes uideantur esse plagae.

545. Nec oportet existimes te solum esse hominem, reliquos pecudes quibus nec mutire liceat. Homo es, uiue aequo cum reliquis hominibus iure.

546. Imo uero si sapientior es, si melior, hoc indulge, hoc concede magis de iure tuo caeteris tanquam imperitioribus aut imbecillioribus. Tibi uero minus uelis ignosci, cui tantum robur sapientia et uirtus attulerint.

547. Si uirtute non excellis, cur postulas uideri aliis potior? Si excellis, cur affectibus moderandis non plusquam uulgi praestas?

548. Iniuriam accipere quam facere, decipi quam decipere satius ac felicius. Quod nec humana ignorauit sapientia, ut Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aristoteles, Cicero, Seneca.

549. Memineris humanae imbecillitatis esse falli, errare, ne te grauius aliorum delicta offendant praesertim aduersum te.

dicta β : ac dicta L π | magnopere β : *deest in* L π | effutire β : cum primis effutiunt L π | [4] odere β : oderunt L π | [5] aut certe ignotos π β : *deest in* L || 528 Esto π β : Sis L | cunctantior L P β : cunctatior B I B V || 529 et uafre β : *deest in* L π | et simpliciter β : *deest in* L π || 537 huic π β : *deest in* L || 538 Nec (Ne K H) res ... licere β : Nec putes rem ullam esse tantam ob quam tibi plusquam caeteris liceat L π || 541 inexorabilis ω : inexecrabilis L o || 542 accidere β : fieri L π || 546 attulerint β : attulere L π || 548 ac felicius β : et praestantius L π | Xenophon β : *deest in* L π | Cicero β : *deest in* L π || 549 aduersum te L β V : aduersum P B

550. Ignoscere generosi pectoris; iram retinere atrocis, saeui, degeneris, abiecti et uilis. Quod et natura in mutis animantibus ostendit.

551. Quumque deus nihil uel crebrius faciat uel libentius quam ignoscere, quis est tam demens qui negare possit illud esse pulcherrimum atque excellentissimum, quo tam prope ad naturam illam accedimus summi et praepotentis dei?

552. Eris in homines talis qualem cupis Christum erga te.

553. Et est profecto aequum ut eam tu des hominibus ueniam, qua in eisdem delictis aut aliis non paulo leuioribus ipse eges.

554. Nulla oratio gratior aut efficacior apud deum illa quam edocti sumus ab eius filio, Christo domino, quae idcirco dominica nominatur.

555. At illam non potes uere ac puro animo dicere, nisi toto pectore homini condonaris quicquid ipse condonari tibi a deo petis.

556. Hac lege remittitur nobis ingens debitum, si nos exiguum remittamus.

557. Quicquid unquam homo in hominem peccauit minutissima pars est eius quod quiuis hominum singulis momentis in deum peccat. Nimirum tantum quanto maior et excelsior est homine deus.

558. Si cui es iratus, fac iuxta monitum apostoli: «Ne sol occidat super iram tuam».

559. Concessurus cubitum, omneis ex animo rixas, iras, offensiones, cupiditates, sollicitudines depone, ut composito et tranquillo animo placidissime te quieti tradas.

560. Cui semel ignoueris cura ut ille sentiat optima id esse fide actum, ut nec ipse iniuriarum memineris, et experiatur te amicum, si qua in re iuuare aut commodare illi potes.

561. Affectus iniuria, caue ne ultionem tuis manibus de quoquam sumas, nec eam ulli mortalium mandes. Non est tibi ius in seruuum alienum, imo in conseruum tuum. Domino tuo iniuriam facis, si non illi cognitionem relinquis de conseruo tuo.

562. Atqui deus est omnium dominus, uniuersi sumus eius serui. Sit satis te questum, ac ne queraris quidem. Oculus domini singula intuetur, et iuxta sacrum uerbum ipse nouit et facientem iniuriam et patientem.

563. Idcirco sic ipse omnibus edicit: «Mihi uindictam et ego retribuam».

564. Nam quum in animo sit iniuria, non in facto, solus deus scit qui fuerit animus et quod ei debetur supplicium.

565. Plerunque putamus eam esse iniuriam quae non est, ut sunt nobis affectus nostri nimis chari, qui non sinunt nos singula rite examinare sed ad iudicandum transuersos ui sua rapiunt.

566. Conuenit te non charum modo esse tibi ipsi sed etiam praebere uenerabilem, ut pudeat te tuimetipsius aliquid facturi uel inepte uel imprudenter uel impudenter, foede, flagitiose, scelerate, nefarie, impie.

567. Pluris facias conscientiae tuae iudicium quam uoces omnes ingentis multitudinis, quae imperita et stulta est: ignota temere ut probat, sic et damnat.

550 abiecti et β : *deest in L* π || 554 gratior β : praestantior *L* π | nominatur *L* π *C* *K*: appellatur *H* || 557 excelsior *L* π *C*: excellentior *K* *H* | homine *L* π *C* *K*: homini *H* || 559 placidissime β : placidissimae *L* π | tradas *L* *P* *V* β : tradis *B* || 560 optima id esse fide (fide esse *H*) β : bona fide id esse *L* π || *Ante 566 titulus est QVOMODO SE QVISQVE GERET ERGA SEIPSVM* π β : *deest in L* || 566 Conuenit π β : Expedit *L* | praebere uenerabilem β : uenerabilem praebere *L* π | tuimetipsius β : tuiipsius *L* π | uel impudenter ω : *deest in Lo*² || 567 conscientiae tuae iudicium β : iudicium conscientiae tuae *L* π

568. Conscientia, est quae turbata, maximos affert animo cruciatus; tranquilla, maximam beatitudinem, cui nullae opes, nulla possunt regna comparari.

569. Hoc est quod dominus in euangelio pollicetur suis: multo plura etiam in hac uita recepturos eos quam quae pro se repudiarint.

570. Fama nec profutura malo nec laesura bonum.

571. Mortuus, quid plus referes de fama quam pictura Apellis laudata aut equus in Olympia uictor? Nec uiuo quidem prodest, si eam ignorat; si nouit, nihil adfert aliud nisi ut sapiens contemnat, insipiens sibi magis placeat.

572. Conscientia uerum et solidum et duraturum reddit testimonium, plurimum in illo dei iudicio ualiturum; uitaeque huius magna est magistra, si non se penitus corrumpendam affectibus permisit.

573. Quin est etiam, quemadmodum scite ille dixit, «murus aheneus», quo et muniti agimus inter innumera uitae pericula et securi. Nec ullus est tantus terror qui muro hoc septum commoueat; est enim mente defixus deo, illique fidit uni, ac ei se nouit peculiari esse curae cui scit parere uniuersa.

574. Turpe est aliis notum esse ignotum sibi.

575. An non tibi sufficit te et tibi notum esse et (quod maximum est) deo? Insane, an refertius theatrum quaeris aut nomen apud aliquos diuturnius?

576. Qui tamen existimationis curam abiiciunt, ut audacius et proiectius peccent, ii dupliciter sunt mali, quod nec homines reuerentur nec deum.

577. Et in conscientiam iniurii sunt, quam derident ac deludunt, tanquam ob id spreuerint famam ut se conscientiae suae liberius uendicarent; quae hac de causa effusius delinquit, quod iam nullo metu coercetur.

578. Hoc est amare se: conari, laborare, magnis precibus a deo petere, ac contendere ut excellentissima nostri pars ornata atque exulta sit ueris germanisque ornamentis, nempe religione.

579. Non is amat se qui opes, qui honores amat, qui uoluptates, denique quaecunque siue extra nos sunt siue in corpore, quum potissima hominis pars sit mens.

580. Nec amat se qui ignorance sui seipsum fallit uel falli se ab aliis patitur. Interdum gaudet quum ea sibi persuadet inesse bona quae nulla insunt.

581. Hic non est in homine amor sui (quum ipse sit animus) sed amor corporis: inconsultus, caecus, ferus, perniciosus sibi et aliis.

582. Quem non iniuria caput esse ac originem malorum omnium Socrates querebatur, quippe adimit charitatem mutuum, unde in genere humano mala omnia nascuntur.

583. Nimium qui se hoc modo amat, is nec alium amat nec ab alio amatur.

584. Superbus mitibus discors, superbis multo etiam magis.

572 si non se ... permisit β : *deest in L π* || 573 Quin est etiam β : *Et L π* | muniti β : *tuti L π* | muro hoc septum β V : *eum L P B* || 575 Insane ... diuturnius β : *deest in L π* || 576 existimationis β : *nominis L π* | proiectius β : *securius L π* | reuerentur L π C K : *uerentur H* || 577 suae liberius uendicarent π β : *maiore cura dederent L* || 578 germanisque π β : *ac germanis L* || 579 extra nos β : *extrinsecus L π* || 580 inesse L P β : *interesse B V* || 581 quum L P V β : *deest in B* || 582 querebatur β : *pronunciauit L π* | adimit β : *tollit L π* || 583 Nimium L P β : *Nimirum W B V*

585. Seruator noster ex coelesti sapientia breui declarat documento quid sit amare se, quid odisse. «Qui odit», inquit, «animam suam, nihil illi in rebus istis fortuitis aut perituris indulgendo, is uere amat eam et saluam cupit. Qui uero amat indulgendo, is odit, is uult perditam».

586. Laborem pro aeterno et coelesti praemio quis nisi amens refugiat, quum nec caduca haec et fragilia citra laborem acquirantur?

587. Haec est lex eorum quibus pater est Adam: ut laborent. Haec eorum execratio quibus mater Eua: ut affligantur.

588. Ergo, quandoquidem laborandum est quocumque nos uertamus,

589. quanto praestat anniti ut maxima merces opera nostra quaeratur quam exigua, uilis, euanida, atque hinc sempiternus cruciatus et moeror.

590. Quid quod facilius et tutius et securius (ac proinde iucundius leuiusque) est bene agere, quum peccatum periculi sit plenum et eam ob causam timoris ac sollicitudinis?

591. Peccatum hominis mors, ut iugulare seipsum uideatur quisquis peccat. Abducit enim se a deo, uita nostra, et a quiete conscientiae suae, qua nihil est beatius.

592. Peccati sordes ablues lachrymis, poenitentia et inuocatione diuinae clementiae, multum huic confisus.

593. Occasio omnis peccandi et causa intentissima cura uitanda est. Sapiens ait: «Qui amat periculum peribit in eo».

594. Et imminet semper occasioni suae diabolus, per quem nunquam nobis licet securis agere.

595. Semper est cum eo belligerandum, ut uere Iob dixerit: «Militia est uita hominis super terram».

596. Et quum sit hostis tam potens, robustus, uafers, tam callidus, ueteranus, exercitatus (tot uires habeat, tot stratagemata et dolos), nulla ratione aut arte aut ui nostra propria possemus pares illi, nedum superiores, e conflictu excedere. Idcirco diffisi nostris copiis ad deum accurrendum est ad opem implorandam.

597. Hac causa dominus ac magister noster suis illud non semel praecipit: orent et religiosi affectibus a patre omnium petant, ne in tentationem sinantur descendere, hoc est in praelium quo manus cum diabolo conserant.

598. Et in oratione, quam ipse nos docuit, illa est coronis: «Et ne nos inducas in temptationem, sed libera nos a nefario illo insidiatore».

599. [1] Sic ergo agamus semper, tanquam in acie armati, uigilantes, accincti, intenti, occasionibus nostris non indormientes. [2] Et quum tanta sit uitae fugacitas in tanta incertitate ut ne crastinum quidem possit sibi quisquam polliceri, magnae stultitiae est et atrocis periculi si spes nostras in longum tendamus differamusque nos adornare necessario itineri, quo singulis momentis uocamur inscii quando (uelimus nolimus) trahemur.

585 ex coelesti sapientia β : *deest in L* π || 586 et fragilia *L* π *C K* : nec fragilia *H* || 588 Ergo, quandoquidem ... uertamus β : *deest in L* π || 589 nostra quaeratur π β : quaeratur nostra *L* | uilis, euanida β : uilis et euanida *L* π || 590 periculi ... sollicitudinis β : timoris et sollicitudinis sit plenum *L* π || 596 et dolos β : *deest in L* π || 597 non semel β : subinde *L* π | sinantur descendere β : ducantur *L* π || 598 nefario β : prauo *L* π || 599 [1] agamus *L P V* β : amamus *B* | [2] incertitate *P* β : incertitudine *L B V* | magnae stultitiae ... periculi β : stultum est et periculosissimum *L* π | necessario β : futuro *L* π | trahemur *L* : in illud pertrahemur π : ineundum sit trahemur *C K* : ineundum sit, trahemur *H* : ineundum sit *M*

600. [1] Quamobrem paremus nobis thesaurum ad futuram uitam, cui aliquid quotidie accrescat; quo instructi et confisi nunquam per segnitiem aut secordiam inopinantes opprimamur aut discedamus moesti, sed parati abire et, uitae huius pleni, agentes prae nobis magnam et optimam spem uitae innocenter sancteque transactae per fidem filii dei et pietatem, quam nos instituit. [2] Quo munere nullum potuit homini a deo maius aut optabilius dari, quo deum noscimus et (quantum effici a mortali potest) non modo aemulamur ac sequimur uerum consequimur quoque.

601. Sine hoc, quid est homo aliud quam immortale pecus?

602. Vt unus dies humanae uitae praeferendus est longissimae aetati corui aut cerui, ita dies unus ex religione actus (hoc est diuinae uitae) toti aeternitati sine religione anteponeendus.

603. «Haec est uita aeterna», inquit Christus dominus, «ut agnoscamus patrem et quem ille misit, Iesum Christum».

604. Hic est cursus absolutae sapientiae, cuius primus gradus est nosse se, postremus nosse deum.

Regi seculorum immortalis et inuisibili,
soli sapienti deo honor et gloria
in secula seculorum.
Amen.

Brugis 1524.

600 [1] quam (qua T) nos instituit β : quam nos edocuit L π : quam instituit L^o | [2] potuit ω : ponit L^o | a deo L P V β : Deo B | maius L π C K : magis H | optabilius β : pulchrius L π : aptabilius L^o | non modo aemulamur ... quoque β : sequimur ac aemulamur L : aemulamur, sequimur, consequimur π || 602 ex religione π β : cum religione L || 604 sapienti β V : *deest in L P B* || in secula seculorum. Amen β : *deest in L π* || Brugis 1524 π β : *deest in L*

4.1 Index fontium

Direct citations are not frequent in *Ad sap.* This section collects both direct quotations and paraphrased texts of authors other than Vives.

1. (ne uituperemus ... merita) Epicurus, *Epistulae* 130.
11. (Seipsum nosse) Plato, *Charmides* 164e; *Phaedrus* 229e; *Protagoras* 343b; Xenofon, *Memorabilia* 4.2.24; Cicero, *Epistulae ad Quintum* 6.7; *De finibus* 3.22.73, 5.16.44; *De legibus* 1.58; *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.22.52, 5.25.70; Ovid, *Ars amatoria* 2.499-500; Juvenal, 11.27; Pausanias, 10.24.1; Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* 595 (ASD II-2: 117-120).
56. (multicipiti bestia) Horace, *Carmina* 2.13.14.
57. (aurium uana inflatio) cf. Euripides, *Andromacha* 319-320: «ὦ δόξα δόξα, μύριοισι δὴ βροτῶν / οὐδ' ἐν γεγῶσι βίστον ὠγκώσας μέγαν»; Boethius, *Consolatio philosophiae* 3.6; Bernard of Clairvaux, *De conversione ad clericos sermo seu liber* (PL 82: 842c). This saying in this particular Latin form is attributed to Vives by contemporary writers such as Erasmus Alberus (ca. 1500-1553); cf. Erasmus Alberus, Ioannes Stigelius, *Praecepta uitae ac morum honestatis et pietatis* (Frankfurt: Christopherus Egenolphus, 1548), 65r: «LVDO. VIVES: Quid gloria humana, quam (ut ille dixit) aurium uana inflatio?».
79. (si sciat ... acquiescere) 1 *Ad Timotheum* 6:6.
85. (in uasis fictilibus) 2 *Ad Corinthios* 4:7.
131. (qui scrutatur ... gloria) *Prouerbia* 25:27.
132. (sapere moderate) *Ad Romanos* 12:3.
133. (Et archana ... eloqui) 2 *Ad Corinthios* 12:4.
134. (Altiora te ... curiosus) *Sirach* 3:22; cf. Horace, *Carmina* 1.11: «scire nefas».
138. (corrumpunt ... malae) Menander, *Thais* = FCG 4: 132; Tertullian, *Ad uxorem* 1.8; 1 *Ad Corinthios* 15:33.
170. (corrumpunt ... malae) cf. *Ad sap.* 138.
202. (Multi enim ... se peruenisse) cf. Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 1.16.
228. (Liber ille ... contra) Epictetus, *Enchiridion* 1.2.
261. (Qui annunciat ... manifestauit eis) *Psalmi* 147:19-20.
273. (Nobis ... ultro duci) Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 107. 11.
275. (Vos amici ... praecipio) *Iohannes* 15:14.
292. (Templum dei ... estis uos) 1 *Ad Corinthios* 3:17.
300. (scommata) Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 7.3.14.
309. (Deus enim ... et exitus) *Sapientia* 7:16.
324. (Quumque sis ... depone) *Matthaeus* 6:25; *Lucas* 12:22.
326. (non pane ... verbo dei) *Deuteronomium* 8:3; *Matthaeus* 4.3-4; *Lucas* 4.4.
327. (nihil eroum ... iustitiam eius) *Matthaeus* 6.33.
347. (ne quis alteri ... factum) *Tobias* 4:15; *Matthaeus* 7:12.
349. (sed eorum ... oderunt) *Matthaeus* 5.44; *Lucas* 6:27-28.
350. (patris similes ... amat) *Matthaeus* 5:45; *Lucas* 6:35.
356. (gaudet ... flentibus) *Ad Romanos* 12:15 | (amor ... communia) cf. Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* 1: «Amicorum comunia omnia».
367. (Serui inutiles sumus) *Lucas* 17:10.
390. (Qui pacem ... Christo) *Matthaeus* 5:9.
398. (Esto hominibus ... misericordiam) *Matthaeus* 5:7.
412. (odi tanquam amaturus) cf. Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* 1072: «Ama tanquam osurus, oderis tanquam amaturus».
416. (Ne in alienas ... domo iusti) *Prouerbia* 24:15.
434. (Honorationi ... paria facere) *Ad Romanos* 12:10.
440. (Vt verax, ne suspicax) Eucherius, *Epistula ad Valerianum* = PL 50: 725b.
449. (Praeclare Iacobus ... sibi ipsi) *Iacobi Epistula* 3:4-5.
453. (lutum luto purgare) Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* 967.
456. (facundiam caninam) Sallust, *Historiarum fragmenta* 4.54 (ed. Maurenbrecher) = Lactantius, *Institutiones diuinae* 6.18.26; Jerome, *Epistulae* 119.1.3; Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* 1334.
468. (Quicquid in buccam) Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 1.12.4, 12.1.2; Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* 472.
469. (Lingua, quo vadis?) Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* 1139.
472. (Pone custodiam ... labiis meis) *Psalmi* 141:3 (140:3).

476. (Percontatorem ... idem est) Horace, *Epistulae* 1.18.69.
 503. (Si uis ... non eris) cf. *Ad sap.* 440.
 505. (Vir multum ... eius plaga) *Sirach* 23:12.
 506. (tantum affirmae... non est) *Matthaeus* 5:37.
 513. (lineam albam) Erasmus, *Adagiorum collectanea* 21; cf. Gellius, praef. 11; Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* 488.
 558. (Ne sol ... iram tuam) *Ad Ephesios* 4:26.
 561. (Non est ... conseruum tuum) Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 47.10.
 562. (Oculus domini ... intuetur) *Psalmi* 33(32):13-15; *Hebr.* 4:13.

563. (Mihi uindictam ... retribuam) *Ad Romanos* 12:19; *Ad Hebraeos* 10:30.
 569. (multo plura ... repudiarint) *Matthaeus* 19:29.
 573. (murus aheneus) Horace, *Epistulae* 1.1.60.
 585. (Qui odit ... uult perditam) *Iohannes* 12:25; *Matthaeus* 10:39, 16:25; *Marcus* 8:35; *Lucas* 9:24.
 593. (Qui amat ... in eo) *Sirach* 3:26.
 595. (Militia ... terram) *Iob* 7:1.
 598. (Et ne nos ... insidiatore) *Matthaeus* 6:13, *Lucas* 11:4.
 603. (Haec est uita ... Christum) *Iohannes* 17:3.
 604. (Regi seculorum ... Amen) 1 *Ad Timotheum* 1:17.

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4.3 Table of concordances

The first column presents the numbering of my edition. The second column includes the numbering of L (*editio princeps*: Leuven, 1524); the third, the numbering of P (Paris, 1527), which reproduce, corrected, B (Basel, 1555) and V (Valencia, 1783); and the fourth, the numbering of C (Bruges, 1526), which is the one that follows, corrected, my edition. The seventh column contains the titles that appear in each edition. Symbols used:

.	not included	SN	without number
*	printing error	[title included in the margin
**	numbering error	✓	title included

Tello	L	P	C	B	V	CHAPTER TITLE	Tello	L	P	C	B	V	CHAPTER TITLE
.	.	.	.	✓	✓	De sapientia	40	39	39	40	39	39	
1	1	1	1	1	1		41	40	40	41	40	40	
2	2	2	2	2	2		42	41	41	42	41	41	
3	3	3	3	3	3		43	42	42	43	42	42	
4	4	4	4	4	4		44	43	43	44	43	43	
5	5	5	5	5	5		45	44	44	45	44	44	
6	6	6	9*	6	6		46	45	45	46	45	45	
7	7	7	7	7	7		47	.	45	47	45	45	
8	8	8	8	8	8		48	46	46	48	46	46	
9	9	9	9	9	9		49	47	47	49	47	47	
10	10	10	10	10	10		50	48	48	50	48	48	
11	11	11	11	11	11		51	49	49	51	49	49	
.	.	✓	.	✓	✓	Diuisio rerum	51a	49	50	51	50	50	
.	.	.	✓	.	.	Diuisio rerum hu- manarum	52	50	51	52	51	51	
12	12	12	12	12	12		53	52**	52	53	52	52	
13	13	13	13	13	13		54	53	53	54	53	53	
14	14	14	14	14	14		55	54	54	55	54	54	
15	15	15	15	15	15		56	.	.	56	.	.	
16	16	16	16	16	16		57	55	55	57	55	55	
.	.	✓	✓	✓	✓	Rerum naturae ac precia	58	56	56	58	56	56	
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31	30	30	31	30	30		73	70	70	73	70	70	
32	31	31	32	31	31		74	71	71	74	71	71	
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38	37	37	38	37	37		80	76	76	80	76	76	
39	38	38	39	38	38		81	77	77	81	77	77	

82	78	78	82	78	78	140	135	135	140	135	135	
83	79	79	83	79	79	141	136	136	141	136	136	
84	80	80	84	80	80	142	137	137	142	137	137	
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85	81	81	85	81	81	144	139	139	144	139	139	
86	82	82	68*	82	82	145	140	140	145	140	140	
87	83	83	87	83	83	146	141	141	146	141	141	
88	84	84	98*	84	84	147	142	142	147	142	142	
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100	96	96	SN*	96	96	159	154	154	159	154	154	
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120	116	116	120	116	116	179	174	174	179	174	174	
121	117	117	121	117	117	180	175	175	180	175	175	
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122	118	118	122	118	118	182	177	177	182	177	177	
123	119	119	123	119	119	183	178	178	183	178	178	
124	120	120	124	120	120	184	179	179	184	179	179	
125	121	121	125	121	121	185	180	180	185	180	180	
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126	122	122	126	122	122	187	182	182	187	182	182	
127	123	123	127	123	123	188	183	183	188	183	183	
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133	129	129	133	129	129	194	189	189	194	189	189	
134	·	128	134	128	128	195	190	190	195	190	190	
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203	198	198	203	198	198	259	255	255	259	255	255	
204	199	199	204	199	199	260	SN*	256	260	256	256	
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206	201	201	206	201	201	261	257	258	261	258	258	
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220	215	215	220	215	215	274	275	275	SN*	275	275	
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324	326	326	324	326	326	382	385	385	SN*	384	384	
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330	332	332	330	332	332	388	400**	400**	388	390	390	
331	333	333	331	333	333	389	401	401	389	391	391	
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345	347	347	345	347	347	404	416	416	404	406	406	
346	348	348	349*	348	348	405	417	417	405	407	407	
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347	349	349	347	349	349	407	419	419	407	409	409	
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351	353	353	351	353	353	411	423	423	411	413	413	
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355	357	357	395*	357	357	416	428	428	416	418	418	
356	SN*	358	359*	358	358	417	429	429	417	419	419	
357	359	359	357	359	359	.	.	.	✓	.	.	De conuictu hominum
358	360	360	358	360	360	418	430	430	418	420	420	
359	361	361	359	361	361	419	431	431	419	421	421	
360	362	362	360	362	362	.	.	✓	.	✓	✓	De conuictu hominum
361	363	363	361	363	363	420	432	432	420	422	422	
362	364	364	362	346*	364	421	433	433	421	423	423	
363	365	365	363	365	365	422	434	434	422	424	424	
364	367**	367**	364	366	366	423	435	435	423	425	425	
365	368	368	365	367	367	424	436	436	424	426	426	
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427	439	439	427	429	429	486	489	489	486	479	479
428	440	440	428	430	430	487	490	490	487	480	480
429	441	441	429	431	431	488	491	491	488	481	481
430	442	442	430	432	432	489	492	492	489	482	482
431	443	443	421*	433	433	490	493	493	490	483	483
432	444	444	432	434	434	491	494	494	461*	484	484
433	445	445	433	435	435	492	495	495	462*	485	485
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437	445	445	437	435	435	496	499	499	496	489	489
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441	446	446	441	436	436	500	503	503	500	493	493
442	447	447	442	437	437	501	504	504	501	494	494
443	448	448	443	438	438	502	505	505	502	495	495
444	449	449	444	439	439	503	506	506	503	496	496
445	450	450	445	440	440	504	507	507	504	497	497
446	451	451	446	441	441	.	.	.	✓	.	✓ De iureiurando
447	452	452	447	442	442	505	508	508	505	498	498
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448	453	453	448	443	443 et colloquii	508	511	511	508	501	501
449	454	454	449	444	444	509	512	512	509	502	502
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451	456	456	451	446	446	510	513	513	510	503	503 utendum
452	457	457	452	447	447	511	514	514	511	504	504
453	458	458	453	448	448	512	515	515	512	505	505
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455	460	460	455	450	450	514	517	517	514	507	507
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467	471*	472	497*	462	462	526	578*	528	526	518	518
468	473	473	468	463	463	527	578*	528	527	518	518
469	474	474	469	464	464	528	529	529	528	519	519
470	475	475	470	465	465	529	530	530	529	520	520
471	SN*	476	471	466	466	530	531	531	530	521	521
472	477	477	472	467	467	531	532	532	531	522	522
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474	479	479	474	469	469	533	534	534	533	524	524
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476	480	480	476	470	470	535	536	536	535	526	526
477	481	481	477	471	471	536	537	537	536	527	527
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483	487	487	483	477	477	542	543	543	542	533	533
484	487	487	484	477	477	543	544	544	543	534	534
485	488	488	485	478	478	544	545	545	544	535	535

545	546	546	545	536	536	575	575	575	566	565	565
546	547	447*	546	537	537	576	576	576	567	566	566
547	548	548	547	538	538	577	577	577	568	567	567
548	549	549	548	539	539	578	578	578	569	568	568
549	550	550	549	540	540	579	579	579	570	569	569
550	551	551	550	541	541	580	580	580	571	570	570
551	552	552	551	542	542	581	581	581	572	571	571
552	553	553	552	543	543	582	582	582	573	572	572
553	554	554	553	544	544	583	583	583	574	573	573
554	555	555	554	545	545	584	584	584	575	574	574
555	556	556	555	546	546	585	585	585	576	575	575
556	557	557	556	547	547	586	586	586	577	576	576
557	558	558	557	548	548	587	587	587	578	577	577
558	559	559	558	549	549	588	.	.	579	.	.
559	560	560	559	550	550	589	588	588	580	578	578
560	561	561	610*	551	551	590	589	589	581	579	579
561	562	562	561	552	552	591	590	590	582	580	580
562	563	563	553**	553	553	592	591	591	583	581	581
563	564	564	554	554	554	593	592	592	584	582	582
564	565	565	555	555	555	594	593	593	585	583	583
565	566	566	556	556	556	595	594	594	586	584	584
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566	567	567	557	557	557	597	596	596	588	586	586
567	568	568	558	558	558	598	597	597	589	587	587
568	569	569	559	559	559	599	598	598	590	588	588
569	570	570	560	560	560	600	598	598	591	588	588
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573	573	573	564	563	563	604	602	602	595	592	592
574	574	574	565	564	564						

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With numbering errors	—	602	602	595	—	—
Without numbering errors	604	589	592	604	592	592
Without numbering errors, including unnumbered aphorisms (51a, 300a)	606					

TABLE. Total number of maxims, before and after numbering errors have been expunged.

4.4 Bibliography of Part III, sections 3-4

The following list gathers studies and articles that have helped me in the process of making the critical edition. They have not been included in the final Bibliography, due to its very specialized philological content.

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* * * * *

Once the circumstances of composition and publication of *Ad sap.* have been addressed and the salient issues related to the critical edition of *Ad sap.* have been examined, it is time to study the philosophical content of the work.

OFFICINÆ TYPOGRAPHICÆ DELINEATIO.

Complementary notes


[NOTE 1]

UP RIGHT. Picture of a printing office as shown in H. Hornschuch, *Ὀρθοτυπογραφία, hoc est: Instructio operas typographicas correcturis et admonition scripta sua in lucem edituris utilis et necessaria* (Leipzig: Michael Lantzenberger, 1608). Cf. Ph. Gaskell, P. Bradford (eds., trs.), *Hornschuch's Orthotypographia 1608* (Cambridge: The University Library, 1972), [xvi]; Grafton 2011: 11. Picture courtesy of Cambridge University Library for personal, non-commercial use.



LEFT. Picture of a printing office stamped in the title page of Erasmus, *De duplici copia ac uerborum commentarii duo* and other works (Paris: Josse Bade, July 1512). RIGHT. Picture of a printing office stamped in the title page of G. Budé, *De asse et partibus eius, libri quinque, nuper recogniti et ampliores facti* (Paris: Josse Bade, 1531). Both pictures courtesy of Alamy, for personal, non-commercial use.


[NOTE 2]



sum nihil aliud est, quā
vel mancipium animi,
ratio, & deus ipse iubet
se, vt brutum sentienti,
mortali, terrenum diuino.

Folio A4r of the edition printed by Michæel Hillen (Antwerp, 1530) in a copy preserved at the Maurits Sabbebibliotheek (KU Leuven Bibliotheken), FG P940.224. The enhanced section clearly shows the deletion of letter c. Picture courtesy of KU Leuven Bibliotheken for personal, non-commercial use.

[NOTE 3]



The three different readings:
documenti (L, UP),
document (C, MIDDLE)
and *documentum* (K, DOWN).
All pictures courtesy of KU Leuven Bibliotheken for personal, non-commercial use.

[NOTE 4]

A M I C O L E C T O R I .

Quantæ iam dudum typographiæ, candide Lector, tibi erigantur, ca-
leant, & sudet ad optimos quosq;
autores q̄ emendatissime imprimendos,
nullū puto vel lippū aut tōsorē latere, vt
talē literarū amor te deniq; reddat, qua-
lem semper studiū fuit excusis vtriusq; li-
teraturæ passim voluminibus, velut por-
recta manu, in melius leuare, ad tuę vitæ
testimonium posteris relinquendū, æter-
nitatiq; memoriā tuā consecrandā. Et
inter tot laborātes, ne vnus viderer ocia-
ri, cœpi ego nuper doliū voluere, meiq;
sic in te animū ad rem tuam bene iuuā-
dā amplissime constare volui: & hoc no-
mine Symbolū tibi præbeo, nempe quod
ad vitā probe instituendā maxime con-
ducatur, vt vna progressum faciamus, tu
ad doctrinā alacriter sumendā, nos vero
ad mutos magistros, sed meliores magis
magisq; indies cudēdos. Sume igitur bo-
no vultu e nouo prælo nouū receptū au-
toris libellū, dū tibi maiores nō pollice-
mur tantū, sed etiā apparamus accurata
semper castigatione, & characterū mun-
dicie atq; elegantia. Vale ad optatum.

Preface to the dear reader found in the verso of the title page of the Lyon edition (Gaspard and Melchior Trechsel, 1532). Picture courtesy of University of Barcelona Reserva for personal, non-commercial use.

[NOTE 6]

*dii boni q̄ alia
furiosorum?*

Enhanced section of the manuscript in which can be seen the question mark being used as exclamation mark in *dii boni?* and *furiosorum?* Pictures courtesy of KU Leuven Bibliotheken for personal, non-commercial use.

[NOTE 5]




Diagram of editions from the *editio princeps* (L 1524) to the second *Opera omnia* of Vives (V 1782). Thick stroke links editions published during Vives's life.

IV A Handbook of Practical Wisdom Chiefly Concerned With Knowledge of Oneself and of God

1 Central elements that may have been neglected

1.1 The place of the *Introductio ad sapientiam* within Vives's philosophical production

Many scholars agree that, generally speaking, the Renaissance was a period of time where prior knowledge was put to the test (that is, 'examined' or 'criticized'),¹ new perspectives flourished, and a considerable need of reform appeared, affecting religion, society and education.² In the field of philosophy, Scholasticism was frequently attacked,³ whereas Plato and Neo-Platonism,⁴ and Aristotle and Aristotelianism⁵ were either reinforced or reevaluated in order to restore them to a more faithful interpretation. Further, other philosophical schools such as scepticism, Epicureanism and Stoicism were recovered and vindicated.⁶ The assessment of past knowledge also reached the biblical texts: Erasmus made a new Latin translation of the New Testament accompanied with annotations and

¹ Cf. Bonilla 1903: 561 (italics mine): «...el *criticismo* representado por todo el Renacimiento», 565: «Estimulado el entendimiento con tan anchuroso campo de investigación, dióse a comparar ideas con ideas, doctrinas con doctrinas, y ante el espectáculo de la Escolástica, decadente y los muchos vicios de la enseñanza tradicional, surgió una corriente de abierta oposición contra el sistema dominante. De ahí la lucha, la contradicción entre las viejas y las nuevas ideas, los antiguos y los nuevos métodos, y el consiguiente desasosiego y natural efervescencia de los espíritus»; Vasoli 1988: 73-74: «Above all, the principal lesson from the various Renaissance conceptions of philosophy — a lesson whose force was to be felt over the next two centuries— was the need to jettison pre-established truths, to re-evaluate constantly all doctrinal and methodological choices and to respect the perpetual newness of the problems with which philosophy and scientific research have to deal»; Moreno 2006: 67-80. Regarding the term *criticism*, cf. *supra* Part I, section 1.2, n. 9.

² Cf. Hankins 2007: 342: «The bewildering flood of new arguments, new texts, and new perspectives, whose impact was vastly multiplied through the printing press, enforced radical rethinking of Christianity and what it meant to be a Christian. [...] Philosophers took the lead in helping Christian society evolve towards new self-understandings. [...] This is, indeed, another striking characteristic of Renaissance philosophers: the degree of their engagement with the world, their zeal for reform».

³ Cf. Vasoli 1988: 59: «As far as the early humanists were concerned, the incipient formalisation of logical techniques and scholastic language confirmed the unbridgeable gulf between the language of the professional scholastics, which was comprehensible only to themselves, and the need for a straightforward and effective language of civic administration suitable for political and ethical discourse».

⁴ Cf. Chr. S. Celenza, «The revival of Platonic philosophy», in Hankins 2007: 72-96.

⁵ Cf. L. Bianchi, «Continuity and change in the Aristotelian tradition», in Hankins 2007: 49-71.

⁶ Cf. J. Kraye, «The revival of Hellenistic philosophies», in Hankins 2007: 97-112.

paraphrases,⁷ while Luther and Lutherans proposed a new and bold approach to the entire Scripture.⁸ Traditional knowledge went through a thorough revision and «the growing criticism of the powers of reason»⁹ grew in Vives as well.

Scholars of Vives's thought have already signaled his active participation when it comes to assessing the past. Maians reckoned Vives's careful examination and revision of knowledge carried out in *De disciplinis*, by which the Valencian historian did not hesitate to call Vives a most judicious analyst (*criticus ... iudiciosissimus*) and among the best.¹⁰ Bonilla concurred with Maians regarding Vives's good analytical skills by stating that the Valencian humanist was good at grasping errors and misunderstandings incurred by different philosophical schools.¹¹ Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset stressed Vives's role in the Renaissance as a man who decided to step aside and wonder about what was being accepted from the past, what was being done in the present and what was the ultimate purpose of everything aimed at the near-future.¹² Noreña assigned one chapter of his book to address what he called «the eclectic criticism of Vives».¹³ In it, Noreña based his argumentation primarily on the twenty books of *Disc.*, and some passages of *Pseud.*, *Philos.* and *Somn. uig.*

Nonetheless, these scholars may have overlooked the place that *Ad sap.* occupies within Vives's «eclectic criticism». In my opinion, *Ad sap.* should be considered the second piece of a tetralogy constituted by *Pseud.*, *Ad sap.*, *Disc.* and *Ver. fid.*, aimed at discussing what true knowledge is. In the first piece of the tetralogy (*Pseud.*), Vives formulated as early as 1518 his intention to fight error: «If by God's favor I shall live for another ten years in reasonably good health, I shall rid their minds of this error».¹⁴ This promise was partially achieved not ten but six years later, with the publication of *Ad sap.* (1524), a short work whose purpose (as the first aphorism reads) is to reflect on things without error, which is according to Vives what in fact true wisdom consists of.¹⁵ In the third piece of the tetralogy appeared in 1531 (*Disc.*), Vives systematically deployed his argumentation against error¹⁶ in the seven books of *Disc. corr.*,

⁷ Cf. R. D. Sider, «The New Testament Scholarship of Erasmus: An Introduction», in *CWE* 41: 3-388; Sider 2020.

⁸ Cf. Mackinnon 1962; Elton 1990; Alberigo and Segna 2017: 59-61, 79-181.

⁹ Cf. Noreña 1970: 298.

¹⁰ Cf. Maians 1782: 114: «Criticus fuit maximi iudicii, ut ostendunt septem eius libri *De corruptis artibus*, quinque *De tradendis disciplinis sive De doctrina Christiana*, et octo *De artibus*, qui ei, dum uiueret, palmam dedere tamquam scriptorum omnium sui saeculi iudiciosissimo», 115: «...ob opus immortale *De corruptis artibus* et *De tradendis disciplinis* censetur Viues inter maximos criticos».

¹¹ Cf. Bonilla 1903: 568: «[Vives] es pensador profundo, de sano y clarísimo juicio, de vigoroso entendimiento. Sabe apreciar atinadamente los errores y desviaciones de las escuelas: marca el camino que han de seguir las ciencias para recuperar su antiguo esplendor».

¹² Cf. Ortega y Gasset 1973: 59 (when talking about the importance of *Disc.*): «Es Vives el primer hombre de este siglo que, ayudado por su temperamento tranquilo, por su pulcritud y sentido de la responsabilidad se detiene en la carrera loca que fue el Renacimiento y se pregunta qué es lo que estamos haciendo, adónde van todos estos esfuerzos, estos trabajos, libros, discursos».

¹³ Cf. Noreña 1970: 148-175.

¹⁴ Vives, *Pseud.* (VOO 3: 57; ed. tr. Fantazzi 1979: 76-79): «Quem errorem ego, si decem annos ualeitudine non prorsus aduersa Dei beneficio uixero, e mentibus illorum non argumentis sed ipsa re delebo». In this passage, Vives is referring to the logic imparted by the Scholastic teachers at the university of Paris. Cf. Noreña 1970: 148-149.

¹⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 1.

¹⁶ Cf. Vigliano 2013a: xii-xxvii, particularly xiii: «L'ouvrage ... s'agira d'expurger les disciplines profanes de leurs erreurs païennes. Mais Vives, pour ce faire, s'appuiera seulement sur des raisons tirées de la

where the debasement of knowledge taken place in different areas is examined: grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, natural philosophy, medicine, mathematics, moral philosophy and law. Vives laments that error, ignorance, misunderstanding and darkness permeate each parcel of knowledge,¹⁷ to the extent that falsehood seems to be preferred to truth, of which peril he unequivocally warns.¹⁸ *Disc. corr.* was complemented with three books on metaphysics (*Disc. prima ph.*), one book on the essence of things (*Disc. essent.*), two books on the evaluation of truth (*Disc. uer.*), one book about finding arguments (*Disc. prob.*), and a last book on the rules of discussion (*Disc. disp.*).¹⁹ In these writings, Vives tried to present instruments to avoid the aforementioned error, dissipate darkness and hence overcome ignorance.

Finally, *Ver. fid.* (posthumously published in 1543) constitutes the fourth piece of the tetralogy, as Vives himself suggested at the end of book 5 of *Disc. trad.*²⁰ In *Ver. fid.*, Vives thoroughly explains the true knowledge conveyed by Christian creed and fights against the error held by Jews and Muslims.²¹ Vives insists in being aware of errors that cause blindness in the mind, which, in turn, predispose a seemingly blind will: for him, blindness and error take place in our minds, not in nature.²² Further, the more humankind is separated from God the more it generates, lives under, and suffers from, error, for which reason Vives admits that

nature: il ne fera pas appel à la Révélation», xv: «Troisième cause [de ces ténèbres]: les erreurs que les anciens eux-mêmes ont commises», xxv: «Vives met en avant la diversité des opinions philosophiques sur la question du souverain bien: comme d'habitude, le genre doxographique lui sert à souligner les contradictions, et par conséquent, les erreurs des différentes écoles».

¹⁷ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 14; Vigliano 2013a: 15): «Adduxit excolendas artes magnitudo rei et opus unum, excellentia mentis nostrae longe dignissimum: cupiditas ueri inueniendi, qua nihil est praeclarius nec quod magis deceat hominem, sicut ignorare, falli, decipi, turpe ac miserum iudicamus»; (VOO 6: 35; Vigliano 2013a: 39) «Neque enim dici potest quos errores in se admiserint ueteres philosophi, ducti leuissimis argumentis, quod rationem atque artem colligendi ignorarent».

¹⁸ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 6 (VOO 6: 214; Vigliano 2013a: 241): «Periculosum est contra ueritatem pro falso stare».

¹⁹ Cf. Á. Gómez-Hortigüela, «El acceso a la excelencia», in Esteban 1997 (CJLV 7D): 143-183; Vigliano 2013a: xlv-xlvii.

²⁰ In *Disc. trad.* 5 (VOO 6: 415; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 466; tr. Watson 1913: 271), Vives admits that the assessment of theology will not be conducted in *Disc.* but at a later time: «... ad Theosophiam et Theologiam ascendet. De hoc beato atque admirabili non est nobis dicendum cum aliis, et iam de cursu tanto fessis: propriam curam exigunt haec. Dicemus aliquando, si deus dederit, per ocium, renouato animo, et maiore musarum ardore incitato. Nam ea res amplior atque augustior est quam homines opinantur», that is, «...the study of Theosophy and Theology. Concerning this blessed and wonderful subject we must not speak whilst treating of other topics, especially as we are now fatigued at the end of so long a course. These subjects demand a special treatment to themselves. Sometime we will speak on them if God will, at leisure, with fresh spirit, and stirred by the Muses to a greater ardour. For this theme is more comprehensive and more noble than men ordinarily think». Cf. E. V. George, in SWJV 10: 1: «Thus his massive survey and critique of the academic disciplines, the *De disciplinis* of 1531, omitted theology, but ending with an intention to rectify the omission later. He kept the promise at the end of his life in the form of his last work, the five-book *De ueritate fidei Christianae* (*On the Truth of the Christian Faith*)».

²¹ Cf. Colish 2009a; Belarte 2010: 197-255.

²² Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.1 (VOO 8: 9): «Animaduertere est errores et quam perniciosi existant quotidie in hominum uita, quum caeca mens ducit caecam uoluntatem»; 1.9 (VOO 8: 59): «Nam casus et fortuna ab iis est nata, qui causas rerum uel non perpendunt uel non assequuntur, quae plurimorum est origo errorum in omni uita et cognitione».

the devil has deemed impiety —that is, the cessation of paying respects to God— the most essential fault to be installed in a human soul.²³

1.2 A guidebook to the fundamentals of practical wisdom

The *Introductio ad sapientiam* is, as the title conveys, an ‘introduction’, a writing by which the reader enters (*intro...*) into a content whose aim is to lead and guide (*...ductio*, from *ducere*) him in through the path to wisdom (*ad sapientiam*). This guidance is neither meticulous nor systematically organized, but a modest and casual entrance to the fundamentals of what Vives considers to be ‘wisdom’ or, in other words, of what knowledge Vives deems essential for a wise person to have. The fact that the work lacks an opening paragraph where the author explains its structure and its content reinforces the notion that *Ad sap.* may well be a compilation of notes on a variety of subjects to be developed in later works. Moreover, the absence of a dedicatory epistle with an explicit addressee endorses the argument that *Ad sap.* be considered a formative tool aimed at a wide range of readers rather than to a particular member of the leading classes: the clergy (like, for example, *Med. psal.* addressed to cardinal Croy), the aristocracy (like, for example, *Rat. stud. II* addressed to Charles Blount) or the royalty (like, for example, *Rat. stud. I* and *Sat.* addressed to princess Mary; or *Ling.* addressed to prince Philip, the son of emperor Charles V). In consequence, *Ad sap.* must have been devised by Vives having in mind not only his students (especially those in the classrooms of England), who may use the work as a supporting textbook,²⁴ but also the general learned people, who may use the work as a self-studying guidebook, the ultimate purpose being the formation of good subjects or (in a more modern term) good citizens.²⁵

The fundamentals of *Ad sap.* are encircled by two definitions of *sapientia* (and implicitly of the wise man): one is placed at the very beginning of the work —«True wisdom consists in reflecting on things without error»—;²⁶ the second one is placed at the end of it, acting as a conclusion: «This is the path of complete wisdom, whose first step is to know oneself, whose last to know God».²⁷ These are two intriguing phrases, because while Vives states that the aim of a human being is to attain complete and true wisdom, he at the same time suggests that there is a kind of wisdom which is neither complete nor true. Is wisdom subject to relative degrees? Can one have just *a bit of* wisdom? Moreover, is such complete wisdom

²³ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 5.9 (VOO 8: 453): «Quumque nulla sit maior hominis et Dei disiunctio quam impietas, cuius caput est Deum uerum non agnoscere et colere, hunc potissimum errorem cupit daemon hominum animis iniectum. Idque si perfecit, non est de reliquiis uitii et sceleribus admodum sollicitus, quoniam quidem, hoc erroris iacto fundamento, quicquid proborum morum uirtutumque superstruxeris, nihil prorsus ad immortalem beatitudinem confert».

²⁴ Tobriner (1966: 424) concluded that «the *Introduction to Wisdom* was designed by its humanist author as a manual of advice for pre-University scholars». Cf. *supra* Part III, section 1.2, n. 30.

²⁵ Cf. Hankins 2007: 45: «Indeed, beginning with the so-called “civic humanists” of the early fifteenth century, humanists insisted that philosophy should serve the city by inculcating prudence and other virtues into its citizens»; Campi et al. 2008: 361 (regarding the formative role of *Ad sap.*): «Rules for sociable conduct lead to the acquisition of the social competence required in a society composed of rich and poor, rulers and ruled, and which can prosper only if peace is maintained and social conflict averted».

²⁶ Vives, *Ad sap.* 1: «Vera sapientia est de rebus incorrupte iudicare».

²⁷ Vives, *Ad sap.* 604: «Hic est cursus absolutae sapientiae, cuius primus gradus est nosse se, postremus nosse deum».

attainable? Does he, perhaps, refer only to the *longing for* attaining wisdom instead of the actual possession of it? If that were the case, as far as the acquisition of wisdom is concerned such process could indeed be quantified in terms of relative degrees of accomplishment. In sum, what does Vives ultimately mean when he uses the term *sapientia*?

The question about wisdom, knowledge of oneself and truth seems to have preoccupied Vives since his adolescence. In one of his early works, the dialogue *Sapiens* (Paris: Guillaume Gourmont, 1514), the Valencian humanist writes that «I think that wisdom should not be expected at all in a person who does not know himself».²⁸ Therefore, it is paramount to bear always in mind the Delphic precept γνῶθι σεαυτόν (*nosse se*)²⁹ and put it into practice. But a few lines later he admits, through the character of the theologian, that «it is madness to wish for a complete wisdom, which (I think) no mortal being has been given the opportunity to attain».³⁰ Moreover, the theologian explains that Aristotle «believes that wisdom about the things of the world cannot take place, but only wisdom about the world that is distorted, which God will destroy along with the wise people that possess it. Such wisdom is foolishness from the point of view of God».³¹ Contrarily to what one may expect, the dialogue ends with some encouraging words that somehow contradict the impracticality of the enterprise: «For the time being», concludes the theologian, «I advise you that you try to go after wisdom with all your soul [*totus animus*], provided that you set free from the petty and ephemeral things of the world as well as from certain words of the rabble, which is very changeable».³²

In *De initiis, sectis et laudibus philosophiae* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, 1519), Vives begins to clarify the contradiction left in *Sap.* when he explains the origin of the term φιλόσοφος and the difference between this word and σοφός through the argument articulated by Pythagoras:

Then the tyrant asked what a philosopher was and what difference there was between him and a *sophos*; and Pythagoras, reflecting most shrewdly that in this life it is not possible for any mortal to arrive at true wisdom or true happiness, replied that he simply did not dare to arrogate to himself the name of wise man [... but ...] had called himself a 'philo-sopher', i.e., an eager lover or student, as it were, of wisdom — not its partner (which status the earlier wise men appear to have claimed for themselves), but rather its client and follower, one who lived according to its precepts and regulations, who took the greatest pleasure in obeying its edicts and believed that he had achieved something outstanding if he could succeed in doing this.³³

²⁸ Vives, *Sap.* 18, lines 167-168 (VOO 4: 27; ed. Pédeflous and Tournoy 2013: 272): «Propterea in isto, qui se non noscit, desiderandam esse sapientiam minus censeo».

²⁹ Cf. *infra* section 2.1, n. 83-87.

³⁰ Vives, *Sap.* 27, lines 247-248 (VOO 4: 30; ed. Pédeflous and Tournoy 2013: 274): «Nam furor est perfectam optare, quam nulli mortalium datam contigisse credo». Nicholas of Cusa formulated a similar thought sixty-four years earlier in *De sapientia*, composed in 1450. Cf. complementary note 2.

³¹ Vives, *Sap.* 26, lines 235-237 (VOO 4: 27; ed. Pédeflous and Tournoy 2013: 273-274): «[Aristoteles] ...nullam circa res mundi credam esse sapientiam sed eam mundi sapientiam, quam corrumpitur, quam perdet Deus cum eius sapientibus; quaeque apud Deum stultitia est».

³² Vives, *Sap.* 28, lines 250-252 (VOO 4: 27; ed. Pédeflous and Tournoy 2013: 274): «Vos autem interim moneo ut, dimissis mundi reculis momentaneis et uoce quadam instabilissimae plebeculae, hanc sequi toto animo conemini».

³³ Vives, *Philos.* 33 (VOO 3: 14-15; ed. tr. SWJV 1: 34-35): «Rursus quaesivit quidnam philosophus, quidque discriminis esset inter eum et sophum. Tum Pythagoras, praeclare reputans non magis ad sapientiam quam ad ueram beatitudinem mortalium quemquam posse in uita hac peruenire,

In this passage, Vives acknowledges that wisdom is out of reach for a human being but nonetheless absolutely worthwhile being pursued. This is why he qualifies with the word *studiosus* (from *studeo*, ‘to strive for something’) those who long for wisdom. They are *studiosi sapientiae*,³⁴ that is, «seekers» of wisdom but never «holders» of it, because *sapientia* is something pertaining to God, the only being who is «all-powerful and all-knowing»³⁵ and therefore capable of having a complete and comprehensive understanding of all.³⁶ Only He has the highest wisdom (*summa sapientia*), since only He is a perfect being.³⁷ Consequently, Vives dares write that human knowledge (*humana sapientia*) is, in comparison to God’s, either nothing or very little or sheer madness.³⁸ He also warns that «it is said, in the words of a very wise man, “In much wisdom is much grief, and he that increased knowledge also increased sorrow”».³⁹

If human wisdom is such an unworthy matter and clearly unattainable, why did the Valencian humanist care to write a book whose aim is to present what *true* wisdom is?⁴⁰ Perhaps the following passage of *Disc. trad.* may enlighten us about his motive:

In the affairs of life, practical wisdom [*prudencia*] stands at our side, ready to be an ally; in matters of religion, we have piety to teach us who God is, and how it behoves us to act towards Him. This latter kind of knowledge stands alone and has a special claim to the name of Wisdom [*sapientia*], but this is not the place to treat of it in detail. Practical wisdom [*prudencia*], however, is the skill of accommodating all things of

tantum nomen sapientis ... non ausum se contingere dixit [... sed ...] sese φιλόσοφον nominasse: quasi amantissimum uel quasi studiosissimum sapientiae, non socium eius (quod priores utpote sophi profiteri uisi sunt), sed clientem atque sectatorem, sed eum qui ex illius praeceptis et institutis uiuere, qui edictis illius parere maxime gaudeat secumque actum praeclare putet, si id assequatur».

³⁴ Cf., for example, *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 34; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 38): «a priscis sapientiae studiosis»; (VOO 6: 57; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 63) «studium ueritatis ac sapientiae». In *Disc. trad.* 3 (VOO 6: 323; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 363) *sectator* is employed: «sectatorum sapientiae».

³⁵ Vives, *Ad sap.* 264, *apparatus criticus*: «...omnia potentis et scientis».

³⁶ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.8 (VOO 8: 57): «Accedit his summa sapientia; nouit enim omnia, nec ulla cognitioni illius interponitur nubecula, quo minus omnia liquido prospiciat. Quod si sapientissimus non esset neque omnipotens, aliquid uidelicet posset uelle, quod perficere per ignorantiam non ualeret, quemadmodum pueri aut rudes atque inexperti aut etiam homines prudentes, quos tamen latent et fallunt permulta».

³⁷ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.8 (VOO 8: 57): «Nec re ulla extra se indiget, per se sufficiens et plenus».

³⁸ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 6 (VOO 6: 212; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 238): «Humana sapientia aut nihil aut perparum est, solus deus sapiens est»; *Disc. trad.* 5 (VOO 6: 418; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 469): «...ut Paulus inquit, humana omnis sapientia comparata mera est dementia». The first citation is from Plato, *Apologia* 23a (Burnet 1992, vol. 1), slightly modified: «τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὧ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός». The second one is perhaps inspired from 1 *Ad Corinthios* 3:19: «Sapientia enim huius mundi stultitia est apud Deum».

³⁹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 1 (VOO 6: 268; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 301; tr. Watson 1913: 48): «In concione uiri sapientissimi scribitur: “In multa sapientia multa est indignatio; et qui addit scientiam, addit et laborem”». Citation of *Ecclesiastes* 1:18. Similar thought expressed in *Ver. fid.* 1.6 (VOO 8: 46): «“Vbi enim multa scientia”, inquit Salomon, “multa afflictio et curae et cogitationes et sollicitudines graues ac molestae”».

⁴⁰ Vives’s contradictory character has been pointed out *supra* Part II, section 1 (cf. particularly n. 12).

which we make use in life, to their proper places, times, persons, and functions. [...] Practical wisdom is born from two things: judgment and experience.⁴¹

Here Vives insists in defining *sapientia* (σοφία) as pertaining to the realm of God and religion (*pietas*), but introduces the term *prudentia* as pertaining to human life. Furthermore, he states that *prudentia* is the result of judgment and experience. This notion of *prudentia* is in agreement with Aristotle, who relates *prudentia* (φρόνησις ‘practical wisdom’) to good judgment (τὸ εὖ βουλευέσθαι) and human affairs, and he considers it to be a habit (ἔξις) that enables human beings to know what is good or bad in order to act (πρᾶξις) accordingly and live well (τὸ εὖ ζῆν), with plenitude.⁴²

If then Vives consistently associates *sapientia* with God and divine matters, and associates *prudentia* with human affairs, judgment and action, why is it that in *Ad sap.* he affirms that *sapientia* (divine realm) consists in judging (human realm of *prudentia*) without error? Two passages of late medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) may give us a clue. In the *Summa Theologiae*, he affirms that, in the general course of a human life, the term ‘wise’ (*sapiens*) is applied to the ‘man of practical wisdom’ (*prudens*), who has the ability to arrange his actions to the due end.⁴³ Further, he emphasizes judgment as the key element of practical wisdom, when he defines *prudentia* as good counseling (*bene consultatiua*) on matters that take place during a man’s entire life, and on the end of human life itself.⁴⁴ In these passages, Thomas Aquinas acknowledges the usage of *sapientia* with the

⁴¹ Vives, *Disc. trad.* 5 (VOO 6: 386; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 433; tr. Watson 1913: 227-228): «In uitae negociis prudentia praesto est nobis atque auxilio. In rebus diuinis pietas, quae qui sit deus docet, et quemadmodum nos aduersus illum decet gerere; eamque unam uere ac maxime proprie sapientiam nominarunt, de qua non est hic dicendi locus: curam sibi peculiarem tanta res postulat. Prudentia uero peritia est accommodandi omnia quis in uita utimur locis, temporibus, personis, negociis. [...] Duabus autem ex rebus prudentia nascitur, iudicio atque usu rerum».

⁴² Cf. *Ethica Nicomachea* 6.5 = 1140a24-27, a28, a31, b4-6 (Batalla 1995, vol. 2: 72-73; tr. Ross 2009: 105-106): «Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλευέσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα ..., ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὄλως. [...] φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός. [...] [φρόνησις] εἶναι ἔξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικῆν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά», that is, «Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it. Now it is thought to be a mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself ..., about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general. [...] The man who is capable of deliberating has practical wisdom. [...] [Practical wisdom] is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man»; 6.8 = 1141b8-10, b16 (Batalla 1995, vol. 2: 79; tr. Ross 2009: 108-109): «Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστι βουλευέσασθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναι φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλευέσθαι. [...] [ἡ φρόνησις] πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα», that is, «Practical wisdom on the other hand is concerned with things human and things about which it is possible to deliberate; for we say this is above all the work of the man of practical wisdom: to deliberate well. [...] [Practical wisdom] is aimed at action, and action is concerned with particulars». Last sentence of the translation has been slightly modified by me.

⁴³ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I q1 a6 co (Leo XIII 1951: 9; tr. Fathers 1920: 9): «Et rursus, in genere totius humanae uitae, prudens sapiens dicitur, in quantum ordinat humanos actus ad debitum finem». Thomas defines *prudentia* as «recta ratio agibilium», that is, «right reasoning on what is to be done»; cf. *Summa Theologiae* I-II q3 a6 co, q56 a3 co; II-II q55 a3 co.

⁴⁴ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II q57 a4 ad3 (Leo XIII 1955: 372; tr. Fathers 1915: 94): «Prudentia est bene consiliatiua de his quae pertinent ad totam uitam hominis, et ad ultimum finem

meaning of *prudentia*, and confirms that judgment leading to action is a distinctive element of practical wisdom. Moreover, he reinforces the argument by quoting a verse of *Prouerbia* 10:23 («Sapientia est uiro prudentia»)⁴⁵ in order to convey that, when it comes to human beings, wisdom means, in fact, practical wisdom.

One may say that at the beginning of the 16th century the notion of *sapientia* already moved from what Tobriner (1966: 318-320) describes as «wisdom personified in God itself» to «man's natural intelligence» and «practical wisdom, that is, the skill in using all things according to their proper function». Further, Fernández-Santamaría (1990: 80) argues that, in Vives, *prudentia* constitutes the aim of human beings in *this* life and the necessary preparation for the *next* one, in which they will reach *sapientia* by virtue of divine light. Moreover, in his monograph on wisdom, Rice (1958: 149) grasps this renewal in the usage of the term *sapientia* during the Renaissance:

This transformation of wisdom from contemplation to action, from a body of knowledge to a collection of ethical precepts, from a virtue of the intellect to a perfection of the will is humanism's chief contribution to the development of the idea of wisdom in the century between Bovillus' *De sapiente* [1510] and Charron's *De la Sagesse* [1601].

In light of all this, the first sentence of *Ad sap.* may be interpreted in a new way as long as we make a bold but coherent inference. The usage of *sapientia* with the meaning of *prudentia*⁴⁶ allows to understand the first aphorism of *Ad sap.* as follows. When Vives writes that «uera *sapientia* est de rebus incorrupte iudicare», he may, in fact, be meaning that «uera *prudentia* est de rebus incorrupte iudicare». Judgment, that is, reflecting on things without error, would constitute the key to attain prudence or 'practical wisdom' (φρόνησις), and that is a goal completely feasible for a human being: it remains within the realm of the world of matter, which is changeable and subject to opinion (thus, suitable for deliberation, action, pursue of truth and rejection of falsity). In a like manner, when Vives writes that «hic est cursus absolutae *sapientiae*, cuius primus gradus est nosse se, postremus nosse *deum*», he may, in fact, mean that «hic est cursus absolutae *prudentiae*, cuius primus gradus est nosse se, postremus nosse *Christum*». Again, complete wisdom (only available for God) is not a feasible aim for a human being due to his intellectual and biological limitations. But it is definitely feasible a certain degree (*gradus*) of practical knowledge of oneself (*nosse se*). Similarly, there is no way of having a comprehensive understanding of God (*nosse deum*), but it is definitely feasible to understand the practical knowledge of God, that is, the exemplary life and teachings of Christ (*nosse Christum*), the human and, as it were, *limited* son of God.

Based on this evidence, I am confident to propose that *Ad sap.* be conceived in its entirety as a handbook of *prudentia* ('practical wisdom') chiefly concerned with knowledge

uitae humanae»; also J. F. Keenan, «Virtues», in Ph. McCosker, D. Turner (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Summa Theologiae* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 2016), 202: «Through prudence, we become what we do: people only become dancers by dancing, runners by running, and just persons by doing justice. Prudence then is for the doer. It is about right reason for things to be done and its ambit is enormous: Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding our entire living».

⁴⁵ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I q1 a6 co (Leo XIII 1951: 9; tr. Fathers 1920: 9).

⁴⁶ Fernández-Santamaría (1992: 243) notes that Vives «implicitly agrees to interpret *sapientia* in terms both human and divine», implying that Vives also uses *sapientia* (divine realm) meaning *prudentia* (human realm).

of oneself and of God, and whose implicit aim is the formation of a good citizen who thinks, speaks and acts uprightly.⁴⁷ Still, the following objection might be raised: If *Ad sap.* is, in fact, a handbook of practical wisdom, why was not the work titled *Introductio ad prudentiam* in the first place? The answer to this objection may lie on the fact that *prudentia* does not encompass all human knowledge available; there is also a kind of knowledge given by revelation, which constitutes the expression of God's infinite wisdom.⁴⁸ Vives's profound religiosity must have played a decisive role in choosing *sapientia* over *prudentia*. The Valencian humanist could not help implying that, even though *prudentia* is the feasible and attainable wisdom by a human being, *sapientia*, however unattainable and unfathomable it might be through human means, it is the only true and unparalleled wisdom. By titling the work *Introductio ad sapientiam*, Vives expressed his profound belief that knowledge is not actually a human enterprise but a gift gracefully bestowed by God almighty.

1.3 The core of the *Introductio ad sapientiam*

(a) A work without systematic themes

When it comes to identifying the main topics of *Ad sap.*, the fact that the *editio princeps* (Louvain: Pieter Martens, 1524) bears neither a distribution into chapters nor titles for each chapter leads to believe that Vives did not devise this work to be structured into thematic units but, rather, as a continuous flow of speech in which different themes resonate throughout the entire work, although some may be predominant or primarily located in a particular group of aphorisms.

Since the very first edition *Ad sap.* was printed with an aphoristic style, most probably to appeal the reader (in an attempt to emulate the *Adages* of Erasmus), to facilitate study and memorization,⁴⁹ and to allow content be either read in sequence (from the first aphorism to the last one) or randomly (for example, picking a aphorism by sheer pleasure). However, later printers (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, 1526; Paris: Simon de Colines, 1527) felt that a thematic structure was needed and thus they made the work more systematic by dividing it into chapters preceded by a short title.⁵⁰ In any case, Vives never complained about the intervention of printers regarding the aphoristic format and division into chapters.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Cf. *supra* section 1.2, n. 25.

⁴⁸ Cf. Coluccio Salutati, *De seculo et religione* (Marshall 2014: 58-59) 1.11.5: «...a rerum consideratrice, prudentia, ... in omnium uisibilium et inuisibilium cognitione uersatur», that is, «...the power of considering things, discretion, ... consists in the understanding of all things visible and invisible». Interestingly, Salutati's notion of *prudentia* introduces a substantial —and rather overlooked— nuance in the correlation between *sapientia* and *prudentia*. In a first correlation, *sapientia* encompasses both divine (*sapientia*) and human (*prudentia*) affairs; cf. for example Cicero, *De officiis* 1.43-153 (Valentí 1938: 73): «Illa autem sapientia ... rerum est diuinarum et humanarum scientia». In a second one, *sapientia* refers to the divine while *prudentia* refers to the human; this is the view hold by Vives. In a third one, which conveys Salutati's view as cited in this note and is in opposition to Cicero's, *prudentia* encompasses both the invisible affairs (the divine; *sapientia*) and the visible affairs (the world, the human; *prudentia*). For further reading on Salutati, cf. Rice 1958: 36-43; Witt 1983.

⁴⁹ Cf. Erasmus's arguments in favour of aphorisms *supra* Part III, section 2.1.

⁵⁰ Place of chapters and titles is given at the end of my critical edition. Cf. *supra* Part III, section 4.3.

⁵¹ Cf. *supra* Part III, section 2.5., p. 104.

It is precisely the division into chapters introduced by Hubert de Croock and Simon de Colines, which was kept in the two *Opera omnia* of Vives's works in 1555 and 1782,⁵² that gives objective information about the sort of topics that were identified in *Ad sap.* by readers of its own time: wisdom (1-11),⁵³ the classification of human existence (12-16), characteristics and value of things (17-84), the body (85-121), the soul (122-125), learning (126-206), virtue and the emotions (207-258), religion (259-275), Christ (276-315), the consumption of food (316-331), sleep (332-346), charity (347-417), on human socialization (418-447), language and conversation (448-504), oaths (505-509), how to deal with one's fellow men (510-565), how we ought to behave towards ourselves (566-604). These subjects were nuanced in the 1535 (F) and 1537 (F²) editions, printed by Christoph Froschauer in Zurich,⁵⁴ by the addition of keywords or summary phrases in the margin.⁵⁵

(b) My innovative approach: an interpretation based on three key aphorisms

As I have reviewed in the *Status quaestionis*, *Ad sap.* has been the object of study of two previous doctoral dissertations, namely Tobriner (1966) and Gómez-Hortigüela (2000).⁵⁶ What differentiates my approach from the previous two is that I propose to interpret the content of *Ad sap.* as from three key aphorisms that allow not only to explain the essential philosophical core of the work but also to identify important philosophical questions that preoccupied Vives during his entire life.

The first key aphorism is located at the end; it acts as a conclusion and therefore it presents the three essential areas covered by the work (wisdom, knowledge of oneself, knowledge of God): «This is the path of complete wisdom, whose first step is to know oneself [*nosse se*], whose last to know God [*nosse deum*]».⁵⁷ The second key aphorism defines what knowledge of oneself consists of: «Three things should be meditated on during our lifetime: how to show good sense [*bene sapiat*],⁵⁸ how to speak well [*bene dicat*], how to act well [*bene agat*]».⁵⁹ The third key aphorism reveals how to show good sense, and it is placed right at the beginning: «True wisdom consists in reflecting on things without error [*incorrupte iudicare*], so that we can evaluate each thing as it really is».⁶⁰

⁵² Nikolaus Bischoff (BOO 1: 70-71) gathered the opening aphorisms (1-11) under the title *De sapientia* (On wisdom), which the preceding editions lacked.

⁵³ Numbering of the aphorisms according to my critical edition. The original Latin headings can be consulted *supra* Part III, section 3.2 (b-c), 4.3. A heading for chapter one (*De sapientia*) was first added by BOO.

⁵⁴ Cf. *supra* Part III, section 3.2 (e), p. 118.

⁵⁵ Cf. complementary note 1.

⁵⁶ Cf. *supra* Part I, section 2.4.


⁵⁷ Vives, *Ad sap.* 604.

⁵⁸ Vives defines *sapere* in *Ciu. dei* 10.6.n46 (CCD 2: 353) as follows: «Cogitare, sentire de se aliisque et fratribus et rebus», that is, «To ponder; to have an opinion about oneself and the rest: not only about your fellow brothers but also about things». «Quomodo bene sapiat» could also be rendered as «How to have a right opinion», «How to have a proper judgment», «How to ponder / think carefully».

⁵⁹ Vives, *Ad sap.* 200: «Semper illa tria sunt homini, quamdiu uiuit, meditanda: quomodo bene sapiat, quomodo bene dicat, quomodo bene agat». Bonilla (1903: 481) and Urmeneta (1949: 286) already pointed out the importance of this aphorism but never placed it at the center of their argumentation.

⁶⁰ Vives, *Ad sap.* 1: «Vera sapientia est de rebus incorrupte iudicare, ut talem unamquamque existimemus qualis ipsa est».

The accompanying chart shows the unfolding of the argumentation, which appears to be constructed backwards, that is, from the end to the beginning of the work; and from the general (God, Oneself) to more specific items, in which the next item expands an element contained in the preceding item: (1) *absoluta sapientia = nosse deum, nosse se*; (2) *nosse se = bene sapere, bene dicere, bene agere*; (3) *bene sapere = incorrupte iudicare*.



According to my proposed approach, *Ad sap.* can be interpreted as a handbook of complete practical wisdom⁶¹ (*absoluta sapientia* understood as *absoluta prudentia*), organized around two main subjects: knowledge of oneself (*nosse se*) and knowledge of God (*nosse deum*). As I will explain, knowledge of oneself implies care of the soul (*animus, cura animi*): good thinking (*bene sapere*), judgment without error (*incorrupte iudicare*), good speech (*bene dicere*), good deeds (*bene agere*); and care of the body (*cura corporis*). In turn, knowledge of God implies acceptance of Christ as an exemplary model, and of religion as a source of true knowledge. In the lines below I give the aphorisms where keywords associated with the aforesaid two main subjects can be found (aphorisms in bold emphasize a group of aphorisms where the subject is relevant).

I. KNOWLEDGE OF ONESELF (NOSSE SE)

1. ANIMVS

animus: **12-15, 122-127** | 12, 13, 15, 34-36, 63, 65, 73, 79, 85, 87, 89, 90, 103, 110, 113, 116, 118, 119, 122, 126, 136, 137, 170, 206, 209-211, 214, 216, 223, 237, 245, 257, 268, 289, 294, 295, 298, 299, 301, 312, 314, 345, 347, 356, 358, 359, 394, 396, 397, 416, 420, 423, 430, 490, 514, 516, 555, 559, 564, 568, 581

2. BENE SAPERE, INCORRVPTE IVDICARE

cognitio: 129, 130, 204, 259, 561 || *eruditio*: 15, 36, 139, 140, 198, 206, 209, 437 || *error*: 2, 4, 160, 162, 234, 549 || *affectus, perturbationes*: **209-258** | 123, 125, 221, 231, 238, 245-246, 248, 268, 289, 354, 384, 420, 547, 561, 565, 572, 597

3. BENE DICERE, BENE AGERE

sermo, lingua: **448-477** | 177, 179, 183, 251, 314, 448, 463-464, 466, 469, 473 || *ueritas, uerus, uerax*: 7, 54, 140, 156, 235, 260, 248, 406, 440, 477, 492-494, 499, 500, 502, 503, 524, 530, 572, 578, 600 || *uirtus*: **207-208** | 6, 15, 17, 19, 22-25, 28, 31, 34, 36, 50, 54, 67, 73, 77, 78, 83, 84, 115, 118, 128, 139, 143, 198, 204, 207, 235, 282, 366, 369, 372, 400, 409, 410, 532, 537, 546, 547

4. THE CARE OF THE BODY

corpus: **64-75, 83-91, 92-97, 98-105, 316-342** | 12, 14, 29, 30, 34, 35, 40, 64, 65, 68, 70, 72, 73, 76, 78, 79, 83-85, 87-92, 94, 99, 100, 110, 116, 117, 120, 123-125, 182, 184, 201, 206, 210, 219, 224, 236, 256, 290, 294, 342, 347, 365, 420, 424, 516, 579, 581

⁶¹ Cf. *supra* section 1.2.

II. KNOWLEDGE OF GOD (NOSSE DEVM): THE TEACHINGS OF CHRIST

1. DEVS

Deus: 259-315 | 13, 18, 35, 51, 63, 82, 109, 115, 122-125, 129, 130, 134, 135, 140, 143, 194, 208, 214, 215, 254, 258, 260-262, 263, 268, 272, 274-278, 287-289, 291, 292, 294-296, 298, 300, 302, 308, 309, 313-315, 316, 321, 324, 326-328, 331, 332, 344, 349, 353, 358, 359, 366, 369, 378, 380-382, 384-386, 388, 390, 392, 395, 396, 398, 431, 446, 448, 452, 495, 507, 518, 519, 551, 554, 555, 557, 562, 564, 572, 573, 575, 576, 578, 591, 600, 604

2. RELIGIO

religio, religiosus: 115, 259, 262, 280, 281, 312, 367, 578, 597, 602 || *charitas*: 296, 305, 364, 378, 382, 390, 392, 582 || *cultus; ueneratio, ueneror*: 18, 23, 45, 61, 90, 259-260, 285, 289, 300, 304-305, 344-345, 430, 447, 518, 566

3. CHRISTVS

Christus: 277-289 | 215, 275, 276, 278, 283, 286, 288, 305, 306, 329, 333, 337, 341, 342, 344, 357, 374, 376, 379, 380, 384, 390, 470, 552, 554, 603

1.4 An overlooked trace of Democritus's thought in one of the key aphorisms

Scholars of Vives have overlooked what seems to be an influence of Greek pre-Socratic thought in the Valencian humanist. The aforementioned statement that «three things should be meditated on during our lifetime: how to show good sense [*bene sapere*], how to speak well [*bene dicere*], how to act well [*bene agere*]»⁶² recalls a thought of Democritus passed on to us through at least six different sources: four notes (*scholia*) to Homer's *Ilias* (verses 1.194 and 8.39); one note to Homer's *Odyssea* (verse 3.378); and one entry of a lexicon of the 5th century composed by Orion of Thebes. I present below the original texts gathered here all together for the first time with their corresponding sources duly referenced.

SCHOLIASTS AND COMMENTATORS OF HOMER [*Ilias* 1.194] 1 Τριτογένεια [...] κατὰ δὲ Δημόκριτον ἢ γ' γεννώσα· βουλευεῖν καλῶς· πράττειν δεξιῶς· κρίνειν ὀρθῶς· | [*Ilias* 8.39] 2 Δημόκριτος δὲ ἐτυμολογῶν τὸ ὄνομά φησιν ὅτι φρόνησις ἐστίν, ἀφ' ἧς τρία συμβαίνει, εὖ λογίζεσθαι, λέγειν καλῶς, πράττειν ἄ δεῖ. 3 Δημόκριτος δὲ ἐτυμολογῶν τὸ ὄνομά φησιν ὅτι ἀπὸ τῆς φρονήσεως τρία ταῦτα συμβαίνει· τὸ εὖ λογίζεσθαι, τὸ εὖ λέγειν καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἄ δεῖ. 4 Τριτογένεια δὲ ἀλληγορικῶς ἢ φρόνησις, ἐπεὶ κατὰ Δημόκριτον τρία γίνεται ταῦτα ἐξ αὐτῆς, τὸ εὖ λογίζεσθαι, τὸ λέγειν καλῶς τὸ νοηθέν, καὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς πράττειν αὐτό. τελείας γὰρ ὄντως φρονήσεως τὸ νοῆσαι, τὸ εἰπεῖν, τὸ ποιῆσαι, καὶ πάντα καλῶς | [*Odyssea* 3.378] 5 Τριτογένεια ἢ φρόνησις, καθὸ τρίτον γένος ἦτοι καθόλου τῆς ψυχῆς, τριμερῆς γὰρ ἢ ψυχῆ· ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ τρεῖν καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις παρέχουσα· ἢ διὰ τρία ταῦτα, διὰ τὸ εὖλογίζεσθαι, διὰ τὸ λέγειν καλῶς, καὶ διὰ τὸ πράττειν ἄ δεῖ || ORION OF THEBES 6 Τριτογένεια ἢ Ἀθηνᾶ· κατὰ Δημόκριτον φρόνησις νομίζεται. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ φρονεῖν τρία ταῦτα· βουλευεῖσθαι καλῶς, λέγειν ἀναμαρτήτως καὶ πράττειν ἄ δεῖ.

SOURCES | 1 = Ioannes Tzetzes, *Exegesis in Homeri Iliadem*. In J. Mansfeld, O. Primavesi (eds., trs.), *Die Vorsokratiker* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2012), 676 (Democritus, fr. 16); 2 = H. Erbse (ed.), *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem* (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1971), vol. 2: 307, lines 38-40; 3 = DK 68 B2 = J. Nicole (ed.), *Les scholies Genevoises de l'Iliade* (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1891) vol. 1: 111, lines 3-5; 4 = J. G. Stallbaum (ed.), *Eustathii archiepiscopi Thessalonicensis commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem* (Leipzig: Weigel, 1828), vol. 2: 186, lines 6-8; 5 = W. Dindorf (ed.), *Scholia Graeca*

⁶² Vives, *Ad sap.* 200.

in *Homeri Odysseam* (Oxford: Typographeus Academicus, 1855), vol. 1: 158, entry «κυδίστη Τριτογένεια»; 6 = DK 68 B2 = Orion of Thebes, *Etymologicon*, entry «Tritogeneia». In F. G. Sturzius (ed.), *Orionis Thebani Etymologicon* (Leipzig: I. A. G. Weigel, 1820) 153, lines 5-8 | DK 68 B2 = H. Diels, W. Kranz (eds.), *Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1952), vol. 2: 132.

In these sources, scholiasts, commentators and lexicographers make an explanation of the adjective *Tritogeneia* (Τριτογένεια). They argue that, according to Democritus, this adjective refers to goddess Athena, to practical wisdom (φρόνησις), and to the fact that practical wisdom consists of three (τρία) elements:⁶³ to reason uprightly (τὸ εὖ λογίζεσθαι), to speak well (λέγειν καλῶς), and to act uprightly (τὸ ὀρθῶς πράττειν). All meanings with their variants taken from the aforementioned sources have been summarized below:

- (1) REASON, THOUGHT, EVALUATION: κρίνω ‘to choose’, ‘to decide’, ‘to judge’, ‘to estimate’; βουλευέω ‘to deliberate’, ‘to advise’; λογίζομαι ‘to count’, ‘to consider’, ‘to infer’, ‘to conclude by reasoning’; νοέω ‘to perceive’, ‘to think’, ‘to conceive’.
- (2) SPEECH, LANGUAGE: λέγω ‘to say’, ‘to speak’, ‘to mean’; εἶπον ‘to speak’, ‘to say’.
- (3) ACTION: πράττω ‘to achieve’, ‘to manage’, ‘to do’.

These three elements of Democritus’s formula are also present in Vives’s aphorism, as the chart below demonstrates:

VIVES	(bene) sapere	(bene) dicere	(bene) agere
DEMOCRITUS	κρίνω (to choose, to decide, to judge, to estimate uprightly): κρίνειν ὀρθῶς. βουλευέω (to deliberate, to advise uprightly): βουλευεῖν καλῶς. λογίζομαι (to count, to conclude by reasoning, to infer, to consider uprightly): εὖ λογίζεσθαι, τὸ εὖ λογίζεσθαι, τὸ εὖ λογίζεσθαι. νοέω (to perceive, to conceive, to think uprightly): τὸ νοηθέν, τὸ νοῆσαι καλῶς, τὸ εὐλογίζεσθαι, βουλευέσθαι καλῶς.	λέγω (to say, to mean, to speak well): λέγειν καλῶς, τὸ εὖ λέγειν, τὸ λέγειν καλῶς, τὸ λέγειν καλῶς, λέγειν ἀναμαρτήτως. εἶπον (to speak, to say): τὸ εἶπεῖν καλῶς.	πράττω (to achieve, to manage, to do uprightly): πράττειν δεξιῶς, πράττειν ἅ δεῖ, τὸ πράττειν ἅ δεῖ, τὸ ὀρθῶς πράττειν, τὸ ποιῆσαι καλῶς, τὸ πράττειν ἅ δεῖ, πράττειν ἅ δεῖ.
MEANING IMPLIED	Sound thought, straight thinking, right deliberation, good reasoning, appropriate reasoning.	Sound speech, speaking well, speaking without error.	Acting uprightly, acting well, doing what is right.

My hypothesis that Democritus’s thought may have proved influential in the writing of one of the three key aphorisms of *Ad sap.* can be sustained by the fact that the Valencian

⁶³ Other grammarians explain *Tritogeneia* as an epithet of goddess Athena in Athamanian dialect, meaning ‘head’. It may refer to the fact that Athena was born out of the head of Jupiter, her father.

humanist showed familiarity with Democritus's philosophy in some of his writings,⁶⁴ as I will show in the coming paragraphs. However, from what particular sources he gained knowledge of Democritus and, more importantly, knowledge of the tripartite notion of φρόνησις, that is an issue which is difficult to elucidate. Vives may have had the opportunity to become familiar with Democritus while he was in Paris (1509-1512/4). At that time, the Latin translation of Diogenes Laertius's *De philosophorum uita decem per quam fecundi libri ad bene beateque uiuendum commotiui* made by Ambrogio Traversari had been printed several times at the presses of Jean Petit, at least in 1509 (USTC 143463, 768186), 1510 (USTC 143584), and 1511 (USTC 143779). Vives, a good reader of Cicero, may have also acquired valuable information of Democritus from *Tusculanae disputationes*, *De natura deorum* and *Academica*.

The first reference of Democritus made by Vives seems to have appeared as early as 1519. In *Philos.*, the Valencian humanist calls to mind Democritus's belief that «truth ... lies submerged in a deep well».⁶⁵ In *Somn. uig.* (1520), Vives makes the fictional character of Scipio say that «the followers of Anaxagoras and Democritus hold that the stars that receive the shining of the Sun twinkle and gleam, while the others acquire a sort of hazy, indistinct light and a milkish glow which is more nearly proper to all stars».⁶⁶ He also insists that «everything in your life is hemmed in and covered over with deceit, with the darkness of ignorance, with flagrant lapses, shame and crime, and, to use Democritus's words, sunk as within a deep well».⁶⁷ In *Ciu. dei* (1522), Vives makes a note on Democritus's notion of εὐθυμία, and explains that the Greek philosopher considered that the highest degree of happiness relied on the tranquility of the *animus* (or 'mind').⁶⁸ Probably, it was inspired by the following passage of Diogenes Laertius (9.45):

⁶⁴ Historian and Jesuit Miquel Batllori emphasized Vives's high command of ancient philosophy in general, but not particularly of Democritus. Cf. M. Batllori, *De l'Edat Mitjana als temps moderns i contemporanis* (Vic: Eumo, 1994), 42: «La filosofia antiga, des dels presocràtics a l'època patristica, [Vives] la coneixia i la dominava d'una manera extraordinària».

⁶⁵ Cf. Vives, *Philos.* 1 (VOO 3: 3; ed. tr. SWJV 1: 9-10): «Veritas, ut Democritus aiebat, altissimo in puteo demersa latet». He again mentions Democritus at *Philos.* 23, 34. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, 9.72 (Hicks 1925, vol. 2: 454; tr. Mensch and Miller 2018: 471): «ἐτεῆ δὲ οὐδὲν ἴδμεν· ἐν βυθῷ γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια», that is, «In reality, men know nothing: for truth is in an abyss»; Cicero, *Academica* 1.12.44 (Rackham 1933: 452): «... dixerunt ..., ut Democritus, in profundo ueritatem esse demersam»; 2.10.32 (Rackham 1933: 508).

⁶⁶ Vives, *Vig.* 47 (VOO 5: 128; ed. tr. George 1989: 138-139): «Anaxagorici uero et Democritici ea quae sol splendore suo collustrat astra fulgentia micantiaque esse perhibent; quae secus, haec uelut concretum obtinere lumen, et ceu lacteum quendam nitorem, qui est stellis omnibus propius». He also names Democritus in *Somn.* 25.

⁶⁷ Vives, *Vig.* 124 (VOO 5: 161-162; ed. tr. George 1989: 206-207): «In uestra uita omnia mendacio, tenebris ignorantiae, tum labe flagitiorum, spurcitiis, sceleribus sunt saepta et contacta, ac uelut in profundo puteo (ut dicebat Democritus) demersa».

⁶⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 19.11.n288 (CCD 4: 288, lines 6-8): «Et eadem pax animi est illa ipsa εὐθυμία, hoc est, animi tranquillitas, quam Democritus dixit summam felicitatem caeteraeque philosophorum nationes eam esse beatam consenserunt». He also names Democritus in 5.1.n1 (CCD 1: 480, line 23), 5.7.n28 (CCD 1: 498), 6.5.n22 (CCD 2: 18), 7.9.n46 (CCD 2: 78), 11.34.n119 (CCD 2: 536, line 27), 12.12.n34 (CCD 2: 572), 18.16.n144 (CCD 4: 96, line 10), 22.11.n52 (CCD 5: 146, line 4). Short reference to Democritus's thought is given in 4.11.n60 (CCD 1: 409 | *mundi animus* 'soul of the world'), 5.10.n46 (CCD 1: 513 | the *animus* may turn human beings into slaves, i.e., because of unbridled emotions),

The goal is tranquillity [εὐθυμία], which is not identical to pleasure [ἡδονή], as some have mistakenly understood it to be, but a state in which the soul [ψυχή] proceeds calmly and steadily, untroubled by any fear or superstition or any other emotion [πάθος]. This he [i.e. Democritus] calls well-being [εὖεστώ] and give it many other names.⁶⁹

In a letter to Frans van Cranevelt (1523), Vives brought up again Democritus's notion of εὐθυμία when he confesses that he is unable to attain peace in his mind.⁷⁰ In *Disc. corr.* (1531), Vives shows knowledge on Democritus and Pre-Socratic philosophy when he harshly refutes Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle. Concerning Democritus, Vives argues that the Greek philosopher did not put mathematical beings at the foundation of natural beings, and stresses his contribution on indivisible particles (atoms) and the vacuum.⁷¹ In *Disc. disp.*, Vives alludes again to Democritus's belief that truth lies concealed at the bottom of a well.⁷²

In *Rat. dic.* (1533), Vives claims that Democritus called 'language' 'ῥεῦμα λόγου', that is, 'the flow of reason',⁷³ an assertion that is not found in the Pre-Socratic corpus, where one finds instead that Democritus (and Epicurus) declared that voice is 'ῥεῦμα ἀτόμων', that is, 'a stream of atoms'.⁷⁴ This discrepancy in readings is caused by the fact that early modern printed editions of Aulus Gellius's *Noctes Atticae*, in which the phrase of Democritus is found, stamp «ῥεῦμα λόγων, id est, flumen uerborum appellant» instead of «ῥεῦμα ἀτόμων appellant». This is the case of the *editio princeps* (Rome: In domo Petri de Maximis, 1469 | USTC 994778), the 1508 edition (Paris: Jean Petit | USTC 180330), and the 1517 edition (Paris: Josse Bade and Jean Petit | USTC 187272). Besides, these editions add a clarification («id est, flumen uerborum»), which does not belong to the classical text. Therefore, Vives must have taken from one of these early modern editions the notion that Democritus called language 'ῥεῦμα λόγων' ('a flow of words'), which he, in turn, reproduced slightly modified: 'ῥεῦμα λόγου' ('the flow of reason'). In *Rat. dic.*, Vives also refers to Democritus's preference for *ingenium* ('natural intelligence' or 'talent') by citing a verse of Horace.⁷⁵

6.9.n37ter (CCD 2: 35 | whether women expel semen), 7.6.n26 (CCD 2: 69 | *mundi animus*: God is not above the soul of the world), 11.5.n17 (CCD 2: 461 | the atoms).

⁶⁹ Hicks 1925, vol. 2: 454; tr. Mensch and Miller 2018: 457.

⁷⁰ Cf. Vives, *Letter to Cranevelt* 22 February 1523 (De Vocht 1928: Ep. 45, lines 12-13): «ἀδύνατον συμβῆναι τὴν εὐθυμίαν ἐκείνην τὴν τοῦ Δημόκριτου».

⁷¹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 5 (VOO 6: 193-194; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 217): «Quid ais? Anaxagoras et Empedocles et Democritus mathematica entia faciebant principia rerum naturae? Atqui Anaxagoras adfert sua ὁμοιομερῆ, Empedocles quattuor elementa, Democritus corpuscula insecabilia et inane».

⁷² Cf. Vives, *Disc. disp.* (VOO 3: 68): «Pronuntiauit Democritus ueritatem in altissimo puteo demersam latere».

⁷³ Cf. Vives, *Rat. dic.* 1.1 (VOO 2: 93; ed. SWJV 12: 64): «Homo ... ut se aliis possit explicare sermonem est sortitus, qui ex mente deriuatur tamquam ex fonte riuus. Illumque ea de causa Democritus philosophus ῥεῦμα λόγου nuncupauit, quasi defluxum rationis».

⁷⁴ Cf. Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 5.15.8 (Rolfe 1927, vol. 1: 128-129): «Democritus ac deinde Epicurus ex indiuiduis corporibus uocem constare dicunt eamque, ut ipsis eorum uerbis utar, ῥεῦμα ἀτόμων appellant», that is, «Democritus, and following him Epicurus, declare that voice consists of individual particles, and they call it, to use their own words, "a stream of atoms"». This fragment is edited by Usener (1887: 353) as pertaining to the Epicurean corpus (Fr. 321).

⁷⁵ Cf. Vives, *Rat. dic.* 3.34 (VOO 2: 219; ed. SWJV 12: 378-380): «Ex cuius sententia Horatius: "Ingenium misera quia fortunatius arte / ducit et excludit sanos Helicone poetas / Democritus"». Horace (*Arts poetica* 295-297) writes *credit et excludit*, not *ducit et excludit*.

In *An. uita* (1538), the Valencian humanist examines in depth the term *ingenium* and comments that Plato took from Democritus the saying «There is no talent without madness».⁷⁶ He again insists in claiming that Democritus considered language as «the river of reason», and underlines that *logos* means both ‘word’ and ‘reason’.⁷⁷ He also follows the tradition of depicting Democritus as a smiling person, who scoffed at stupidity and vanity.⁷⁸ Finally, in *Ver. fid.* (†1543), Vives recalls once more «the well of Democritus»,⁷⁹ Democritus’s corporeal theory of the reality,⁸⁰ and his firm belief that everything inevitably occurs as it actually happens.⁸¹

One last detail will serve as proof that Vives cherished the Greek philosopher during his entire life: in *Ling.* (1538), one of the characters of the dialogue on precepts and education bears the name of Democritus.⁸² Therefore, it seems hardly a coincidence that under the name of Democritus Vives gathered education, aphorisms, the gnostic tradition, the difficulty of attaining the truth, and three items essential to practical wisdom: proper thought, proper speech, and proper action.

1.5 A note on methodology

In the subsequent sections 2 to 6, I analyse the two main subjects that constitute the philosophical core of *Ad sap.*: knowledge of oneself and knowledge of God. I deploy my enquiry in accordance with the table of concepts and short phrases displayed in pages 183-184 (cf. *supra*), and I include in each section the following items: (1) a short introduction to the section: I relate the topic to the philosophical problem or philosophical discipline implied; I signal the works of Vives where the topic is mainly found; I make a selection of relevant studies on that particular topic regarding Vives; and, finally, I mention other humanists interested in the topic; (2) an enquiry into the topic as presented in *Ad sap.* as well as in other works of Vives: I usually begin my explanation by *Ad sap.* and then reinforce my argumentation with complementary passages of other works; (3) comments: now and then I point out niceties of how Vives addresses the topic, or I raise complementary questions.

⁷⁶ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.6 (VOO 3: 367; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 294): «Huc pertinet Platonis dictum illud ex Democrito Abderita sumptum: “Nullum excellens ingenium sine mania”». The saying can be found in Cicero, *De diuinatione* 1.37.80; Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 17.10. Plato (*Phaedro* 244b-c) and Aristotle (*Problemata* 30) examined the subject of *μανία*.

⁷⁷ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.7 (VOO 3: 369; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 302): «Democritus sermonem apte nominauit riuum rationis: et Graecis eadem uox λόγος et sermonem et rationem signat»; *Disc. trad.* 2 (VOO 6: 291; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 326): «In graeco sermone λόγος et ratio est et computatio».

⁷⁸ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 3.pr (VOO 3: 423; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 460): «Vt Democritus semper ridebat tanquam in perpetuis hominum stultitiis atque ineptiis, Heraclitus semper flebat tanquam in continua hominum miseria»; 3.10 (VOO 3: 470; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 582): «Democriti risus perpetuus affectatus erat magis quam naturalis; et irrisus non risus ad incessendas hominum stultitias, quas illi sapientiam esse ducerent». Cf. Horace, *Epistulae* 2.1.194; Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 15.2, *De ira* 2.10.5.

⁷⁹ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* pr. (VOO 8: 2): «...ueritatem iam tum in abstruso et (quod aiunt) in Democriti puteo delitescentem».

⁸⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.9 (VOO 8: 59): «Vetustissimi philosophorum nihil considerarunt aliud quam mera corpora; itaque omnia existimabant e corporibus fieri ac constare, mutatis solum inhaerentibus, uelut Democritus, Leucippus, Anaxagoras».

⁸¹ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.10 (VOO 8: 82): «Democritus necessitate censet omnia euenire».

⁸² Cf. Vives, *Ling.* 17 (VOO 1: 350-360; ed. García Ruiz 2005: 270-290).

2 Knowledge of oneself: the care of the *animus*

2.1 The importance of *animus* in Vives

In *Ad sap.* 11 (as well as in *Ad sap.* 604), Vives clearly states that «in the quest for wisdom, the first step is that celebrated saying of old: “Know thyself”». ⁸³ The maxim *Nosce te ipsum* (from the Greek Γνώθι σεαυτόν) has usually been attributed to Thales of Miletus ⁸⁴ and, according to Pausanias, it was engraved on the pronaos of the temple of Apollo, in Delphi. ⁸⁵ Vives cherished this maxim in his heart, and he cited it in many of his works. As early as 1519, he realized that «the first stage of knowledge was *gnothi seauton*». ⁸⁶ In 1520, he made the fictional character of Scipio explain that

the human being is a cloak, a vessel, a repository, chains, a prison, or whatever other name it pleases you to give it. That sage understood it, whoever he was, who inscribed the words “Know thyself” on the doorway of the temple of Apollo. The power, the significance of this admonition are so great that is not believed to have come from any human being but is attributed to an immortal god. ⁸⁷

The significance, as he puts it, of this divine admonition is clarified in the following terms. In order to know oneself, examination should be undertaken of what is real in us, the soul (*animus*); ⁸⁸ and, in the soul, one should

get to know that principal part, the divine mind [*diuina mens*], and to contemplate it and observe the skills that equip it, the virtues that adorn it, and to consider how active it is and how well constructed and suited for flying back upward in a brief time to this dwelling-place, its former home. Each of us is directed to examine and contemplate the

⁸³ Vives, *Ad sap.* 11: «Ergo in curriculo sapientiae primus gradus est ille ueteribus celebratissimus “Seipsum nosse”». Cf. *Sat.* 104 (VOO 4: 47 [*Sat.* 102]; ed. Tello 2020a: 76); *Sat.* epil. 2 (VOO 4: 64; ed. Tello 2020a: 96); *Disc. trad.* 5 (VOO 6: 402; ed. Vigliano 2013: 451). Erasmus in *Enchiridion militis Christiani* (ASD V-8: 132, lines 502-; tr. CWE 66: 40) conveys the same thought: «Caput autem huius sapientiae esse puta, ut temetipsum noris. Quod uerbi e coelo profectum credidit antiquitatis et magnis autoribus usque adeo placuit, ut in eo omnem sapientiae uim summam contineri iudicarent», that is, «The beginning of this wisdom is to know thyself, a saying that antiquity believed to have come down from heaven and that found such acceptance with the great authors that they considered it to be the epitome of all wisdom».

⁸⁴ Cf. Diogenes Laertius, 1.40 (Hicks 1925, vol. 1: 40; tr. Mensch and Miller 2018 : 21): «He was the author of “Know thyself” [Γνώθι σεαυτόν], which Antisthenes, in his Successions, attributes to Phemonoe, and which was appropriated by Chilon».

⁸⁵ Sources of the ancient maxim are: Plato, *Charmides* 164e; *Phaedrus* 229e; *Protagoras* 343b; Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2.24; Cicero, *Epistulae ad Quintum* 6.7; *De finibus* 3.22.73, 5.16.44; *De legibus* 1.58; *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.22.52, 5.25.70; Ovid, *Ars amatoria* 2.499-500; Juvenal, 11.27; Pausanias, 10.24.1; Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* I vi 95 (ASD II-2: 117-120; tr. CWE 32: 63-64).

⁸⁶ Vives, *Philos.* 35 (VOO 3: 15; ed. tr. SWJV 1: 36-37): «primo ad sapientiam gradui: γνώθι σεαυτόν».

⁸⁷ Vives, *Vig.* 111 (VOO 5: 156; ed. tr. George 1989: 194-195): «Est enim corpus hominis seu amiculum seu uas seu receptaculum seu uinula seu carcer seu quo alio appellari libet nomine. Quod intellexit sapiens ille quisquis fuit, qui post aedis Apollinis “Nosce te” inscripsit; cuius praecepti tanta uis est, tanta sententia, ut non ab homine aliquo profectum putetur sed immortalis deo attribuitur».

⁸⁸ Vives, *Vig.* 111, line 11 (VOO 5: 156; ed. tr. George 1989: 194-195): «...non sis ipse corpus sed animus», that is, «...your real self is soul, not body».

power of memory, of the inventive faculty and of thought, by which means he discriminates, judges [*iudicat*], categorizes, pursues and discovers, and has at his recall so many wonders.⁸⁹

Knowledge of oneself is what differentiates a human being from an animal or a devil,⁹⁰ and such knowledge is provided by our real self, the *animus*. It is then of paramount importance to elucidate what Vives meant by this term, the enquiry on which can be inserted in what has traditionally been called ‘psychology’ (the study of the ψυχῆ) or ‘philosophy of mind’. There are no specific studies on the term *animus* in Vives, hence the importance of addressing the issue in this dissertation; nor is there a monograph on the term *animus* in general, hence the suitability to present a first approach to the historical study of this term at the end of Part IV as a «Supplement». Nonetheless, what we do have are studies on Vives’s psychology and his notion of ‘soul’, the most important being Urmeneta 1949: 59-128; Sancipriano 1957: 69-87; 1974: 34-50; Del Nero 1986; Noreña 1989: 81-137; Gómez-Hortigüela 2001: 209-218; Casini 2006a: 47-130; Del Nero 2008; Casini 2010; 2012.⁹¹ A general introduction to the soul in Renaissance philosophy can be found in Schmitt and Skinner 1988: 455-534; P. Richard, in Hankins 2007: 211-233. These two studies also review the position of the most relevant philosophers of the period regarding the soul: Paul of Venice (1369/72-1429), Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525), Agostino Nifo (1469/70-1538), Phillip Melancthon (1497-1560), Francesco Piccolomini (1523-1607), and Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), among others. Casini 2007 examines Pomponazzi as within the Aristotelian tradition.

As far as Vives is concerned, in addition to *Ad sap.* (1524), the notion of *animus* (and some complementary terms such as *anima*, *mens* and *affectus*) can be devised from a selection of passages of the following works (displayed by date of publication):

Ciu. dei 4.11.n60 (CCD 1: 409), 7.23.n101 (CCD 2: 121), 8.6.n70 (CCD 2: 187), 9.4.n6 (CCD 2: 279), 9.4.n13 (CCD 2: 280), 9.11.n30 (CCD 2: 296-298), 11.2.n1 (CCD 2: 452), 13.23.n64 (CCD 2: 682), 13.24.n77 (CCD 2: 690-691), 14.2.n3 (CCD 3: 7), 14.4.n13 (CCD 3: 13-14), 14.15.n90 (CCD 3: 57) || *Ad sap.* 12-13, 15, 122-127 (VOO 1: 2, 10-11) || *Mar.* 32 (VOO 4: 320; SWJV 8: 38-39) || *Conc.*

⁸⁹ Vives, *Vig.* 112 (VOO 5: 156; ed. tr. George 1989: 194-195): «[Sed iubet] ut animi praecipuam noscat partem, quae est diuina mens, in eamque frequenter intueatur uideatque quibus instructa artibus, quibus ornata uirtutibus sic, quam exercitata, quam ad reuolandum breui tempore in has sedes et pristinum domicilium instructa et apta. Scrutetur ac consideret uim memoriae, inuentionis, mentis, cogitationis, quibus sapit, iudicat, ratione colligit, assequitur et inuenit, et recordatur tam multa atque admirabilia».

⁹⁰ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 4.3 (VOO 5: 338): «Incipiat iam ergo homo esse homo, id est, nosse se; nam neque daemones se norunt, quia nolunt, nec bestiae, quia non possunt. Hae nunquam nactae fuerunt tanti boni facultatem, illi accumulatione et continuatione scelerum prorsus amiserunt», that is, «Humans should begin to be human, that is, to know themselves. Indeed, neither devils (because they do not have the will to do it) nor animals (because they are not able to) know themselves: animals have never developed a faculty aiming at such an excellent good; devils lost it entirely due to their accumulated and uninterrupted crimes».

⁹¹ All studies take *An. uita* as the core of their investigation, except Gómez-Hortigüela 2001 (who examines the soul in *Ad sap.*). Urmeneta 1949 and Noreña 1989 examine the content thoroughly while Casini 2006a provides more philosophical context. Casini 2010 deepens two topics already addressed in 2006a, namely (1) the notion of ‘soul’ in Vives; and (2) the soul and its relation to the body. Sancipriano 1957 includes a section on the influence of Aristotle and Galen in Vives, while Del Nero 2008 includes one about Vives’s place within tradition and, at the same time, as an innovator.

3 (VOO 5: 255), 4.1 (VOO 5: 331-332), 4.2 (VOO 5: 337), 4.3 (VOO 5: 338-340), 4.5 (VOO 5: 347-349), 4.7 (VOO 5: 358), 4.11 (VOO 5: 382, 383), 4.12 (VOO 5: 385, 387) || *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 18; Vigliano 2013a: 20); *Disc. trad.* 1 (VOO 6: 261-263; Vigliano 2013a: 293-295), 4 (VOO 6: 375-376; Vigliano 2013a: 421-422), 5 (VOO 6: 401-402; Vigliano 2013a: 450-451); *Disc. prima ph.* 2 (VOO 3: 225, 252); *Disc. uer.* 1 (VOO 3: 144, 158); *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 115); *Disc. disp.* (VOO 3: 68-70) || *Consult.* (VOO 2: 239, 252, 257) || *Rat. dic.* 2.60-74 (VOO 2: 164-171; SWJV 11: 248-265) || *Excit. med. d.* 6.2 (VOO 1: 66); *Excit. med. g.* 12 (VOO 1: 82-83), 24 (VOO 1: 91), 26 (VOO 1: 92), 27 (VOO 1: 93) || *An. uita* 1.9 (VOO 3: 325-326; Sancipriano 1974: 166-167), 1.10 (VOO 3: 327-329; Sancipriano 1974: 170-175), 1.12 (VOO 3: 330-341; Sancipriano 1974: 180-215), 2.pr (VOO 3: 341-343; Sancipriano 1974: 216-221), 2.2 (VOO 3: 345; Sancipriano 1974: 228-229), 2.4 (VOO 3: 354-357; Sancipriano 1974: 256-265), 2.9 (VOO 3: 380; Sancipriano 1974: 334-335), 2.12 (VOO 3: 387-390; Sancipriano 1974: 356-363), 2.19 (VOO 3: 404-420; Sancipriano 1974: 410-453), 3.pr (VOO 3: 421, 424-425; Sancipriano 1974: 454-455, 460-465), 3.1 (VOO 3: 426-427; Sancipriano 1974: 466-471) || *Ver. fid.* 1.1 (VOO 8: 7, 9), 1.5 (VOO 8: 30-31, 34-35, 41), 1.9 (VOO 8: 72), 1.12 (VOO 8: 96), 1.13 (VOO 8: 110-111), 1.16 (VOO 8: 119-120).

2.2 Vives's notion of *animus* in the *Introductio ad sapientiam*

In *Ad sap.*, Vives assigned nine aphorisms to describe the *animus*: 12-13, 15 and 122-127. In the *editio princeps* these aphorisms were not particularly indicated by any heading, but as from the 1526 edition (Bruges: Hubert de Croock), aphorisms 122-125 were gathered under a specific chapter called *De animo*, while 126-127 acted as the opening aphorisms of a chapter called *De eruditione*. In 1555, BOO (Basel: Nicolaus Episcopus Iunior and Ioannes Parcus) added the heading *De sapientia* before aphorisms 1-16, hence allocating aphorisms 12-13 and 15 within the chapter on wisdom. The content of these aphorisms is as follows:

12 A human being is composed of body and soul [*animus*]. Our body comes from the earth and from those elements which we perceive and are able to touch; it is similar to the bodies of animals. **13** We have a soul, given to us by God, similar to that of the angels and God, which makes us a human being. And the soul alone entitles us to be called a human being, as was generally agreed by the most eminent of men. [...] **15** In the soul are learning and virtue, and their opposites: ignorance and vice.

122 The soul has two parts. One part understands, remembers and is wise. It makes proficient use of reason, judgment and intelligence. This part is called 'superior' and it has its own name: 'mind' [*mens*], by virtue of which we are human beings, are similar to God, and surpass other living creatures. **123** The other part of the soul, due to its association with the body, is devoid of reason [*ratonis expers*], wild, fierce, more like an animal than a human being. In this part are those impulses which are called 'emotions' [*affectus*] or 'disorders' [*perturbationes*] (*πάθη*, in Greek): arrogance, envy, malice, wrath, fear, grief, greed and stupid pleasures. This part is called 'inferior' and 'more lowly', in which we are no different from beasts and depart furthest from God, who is beyond the scope of any malady or disorder. **124** This is the order of Nature: that wisdom should rule all things, and that everything else we see should obey human beings. But in human beings, the body must be obedient to the mind, the mind to God. If anything departs from this order or upsets it, it sins [*peccat*]. **125** Therefore, it is sinful that those disturbances create confusion in a person, and rage and arrogate to themselves the right and control over the entire person, treating the mind with scorn and contempt; and that the mind abandons the law of God and serves the emotions and the body. **126** For this

reason, the mind has been endowed with the power of understanding [*uis intelligendi*], so that it can ponder everything and know what is good to be done and what is not. And it has been given a transcendent and very effective power of will [*uis uolendi*], so that there is nothing in the soul which does not obey its authority, if the will demands it, and does not deviate from its law. **127** The natural intelligence [*ingenium*] is cultivated and sharpened by many skills [*artes*], both human and divine. It is equipped with a great and remarkable knowledge of reality [*rerum notitia*], in order that it can discern the nature and value of every single thing more accurately and can teach the will [*uoluntas*] what good is to be followed and what evil is to be avoided.⁹²

Deus		MAKES HUMAN BEINGS SIMILAR TO			
Homo	animus	pars superior; mens	sapere; intelligere, uis intelligendi; memini; uis uolendi	ratio, iudicium, ingenium; eruditio, uirtus	Deus, angeli
		pars inferior atque abiectior; rationis expers	motus, affectus, perturbationes, πάθη; tumultuari	ruditas, uitium, tumultus	beluae
	corpus				bestiae

In *Ad sap.*, Vives conceives human beings as composed by a body (*corpus*) and a soul (*animus*); and he consistently uses *animus* as the general term for soul —or, more precisely, due to its characteristics— ‘conscious soul’. The *animus*, which is the distinctive characteristic of a human being,⁹³ consists of a superior part, which Vives identifies with the

⁹² Vives, *Ad. sap.* 12-13, 15, 122-127: «**12** Homo ex corpore constat et animo. Corpus habemus ex terra et his elementis quae cernimus ac tangimus, corporibus bestiarum simile. **13** Animum, diuinitus datum, angelis et deo similem, unde censetur homo et qui solus merito esset homo appellandus, ut maximis uiris placuit. [...] **15** In animo, eruditio et uirtus; et contraria: ruditas, uitium. [...] **122** In animo duae sunt partes. Illa quae intelligit, meminit, sapit; ratione, iudicio, ingenio utitur ac ualet. Haec pars superior appellatur et proprio nomine mens, qua homines sumus, qua deo similes, qua caeteris animantibus praestamus. **123** Est altera ex coniunctione corporis (rationis expers, bruta, fera, atrox, bestiae quam hominis similior), in qua sunt motus illi qui siue affectus siue perturbationes nominantur (Graece πάθη): arrogantia, inuidentia, maleuolentia, ira, metus, moeror, cupiditas, stulta gaudia. Pars inferior atque abiectior nuncupatur, qua nihil a beluis differimus et quam longissime discedimus a deo, extra morbum et perturbationem omnem posito. **124** Hic est naturae ordo: ut sapientia regat omnia, pareant homini caetera quae uidemus; in homine uero corpus menti, mens deo. Si quid hunc ordinem egreditur ac dissoluit, peccat. **125** Ergo peccatum est in homine perturbationes illas tumultuari, saeuire ac trahere ad se ius et ditionem totius hominis, sprete et contempta mente; mentem etiam, relicta dei lege, affectionibus et corpori seruire. **126** Idcirco menti indita est uis intelligendi, ut singula expendat sciatque quid factu bonum sit, quid secus; et uis uolendi summa atque efficacissima, ut imperio huius nihil sit in animo quod non pareat, si illa contendat nec de iure decedat suo. **127** Ingenium multis artibus humanis diuinisque excolitur et acuitur; instruiturque magna et admirabili rerum notitia, quo exactius singulorum naturas et precia cognoscat possitque uoluntatem edocere quid sequendum bonum, quid uitandum malum». The opposition ‘body - soul’ is formulated with the same words in Erasmus, *Lingua* ep. (ASD IV-1a: 20, line 19; tr. CWE 29: 257): «...homo, sicuti corpore constat et animo».

⁹³ Cf. *Ad sap.* 13; 216: «... the soul [*animus*], which constitutes every single person or is, at least, a very important part of us».

mind (*mens*),⁹⁴ and a more lowly part, which is not given a particular name but described as ‘inferior’ and ‘devoid of reason’ (*rationis expers*). It is important here to stress that, while Vives clearly gives a name for the superior part (*mens*), he is unable to find any for the inferior part.

The mind knows (*sapere*), understands (*intelligere*), remembers (*memini*) and wills (*uis uolendi*). It has three faculties: reason (*ratio*), judgment (*iudicium*) and natural intelligence (*ingenium*); and two main outcomes: learning (*eruditio*)⁹⁵ and virtue (*uirtus*). Furthermore, the mind is in charge of pondering (*expendat*) whether something is good to be done: once it has been carefully assessed (*iudicium*), the will sees to it that the decision taken be carried out. On the other hand, the part devoid of reason is affected by emotions (*affectus*) and passions (*perturbationes*), which cause ignorance (*ruditas*), disorder (*uitium*) and confusion (*tumultuari*) in a human being. This part of the *animus* is to be properly taken care of through philosophy, which «brings a cure for the grave illnesses of the soul».⁹⁶ Vives also stresses the fact that while mind relates human beings to God and angels,⁹⁷ the inferior part of the *animus* and the body relates human beings to animals and beasts.

This explanation of the *animus* is the one found in the third and final stage of the text (C 1526);⁹⁸ the first and the second stages convey a slightly different conception. According to the *editio princeps* (L 1524) and the Paris edition (P 1527), the soul (*animus*) has two parts. The superior is called ‘mind’ but «the inferior part is also called *animus* [*pars inferior nominatur etiam animus*]».⁹⁹ Further, L P do not yet include the phrase that indicates that this part is devoid of reason (*rationis expers*).

	L (1524), P (1526) [first and second stage of the work]	C (1526) [third stage of the work]
animus	pars superior; mens	pars superior; mens
	pars inferior atque abiectior; rationis expers	pars inferior; etiam animus

Moreover, the admonition found in aphorism L P 120 (C 124) is not totally coherent: «This is the order of Nature: that wisdom should rule all things, and that everything else we see should obey human beings. But in human beings, the body must be obedient to the soul

⁹⁴ As stated in *Ad. sap.* 122, this is the element by which mankind is similar to God. In *An. uita* 2.12 (VOO 3: 388; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 356-358), he further explains that, since God has created the mind so that human beings can be united with Him in eternal bliss, the mind can be defined as that which is able to grasp the divine and join it: «Quando [mens] in hoc est a Deo condita ut cum ipso ad immortalitatem beatitudinis iungatur, nihil possumus definire aptius quam si eius esse dicamus substantiae, quae et capax sit diuinitatis et iungi cum ea possit».

⁹⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 36: «In ipso animo eruditio», that is, «The soul has the capacity of learning».

⁹⁶ Vives, *Ad sap.* 209: «...philosophia, quae ingentibus animi morbis remedium adfert». In the next aphorism (210), Vives complains that «great care is employed to look after the body», when in fact «greater care must be devoted to the soul [*animus*], whose diseases [*morbi*] are more disguised, more grievous and more dangerous».

⁹⁷ A similar thought is found in Pico della Mirandola. Cf. *infra* Supplement, section 3.1, particularly the explanatory chart (p. 292).

⁹⁸ Regarding the three stages of composition of *Ad sap.*, cf. *supra* Part III, section 3.2 (d).

⁹⁹ Vives, *Ad sap.* 119 (L P editions).

[*animus*], the soul to the mind [*mens*], the mind to God». Vives uses here the term *animus* to designate both the soul in general and the lower part of the soul prone to emotions and disorders. Further, he concludes that the body must obey the lower part of the soul, that this part must obey the mind, and that the mind must obey God.

This hierarchy does not seem very convincing especially because of the first admonition: it mandates the body to be subject to the many emotions and disorders to be found in the lower part of the soul. Vives must have found this explanation rather contradictory as well, and thus he rephrased aphorisms L P 119-120 in order to state that the body must obey the mind, not the emotional part of the soul. In *Disc.*, Vives had the opportunity to rephrase the hierarchy again, conveying it as follows: «The body ought to obey the soul [*animus*]; and the impulses [*motus*] devoid of reason existing in the soul must obey reason as mistress and empress. In other words, we are human beings due to reason».¹⁰⁰ This explanation seems to return to the original hierarchy of L P, but a key emendation is introduced. In this passage of *Disc.*, it is made clear that the body obeys the *animus* and, within the *animus*, the lower and emotional part obeys the higher and rational part.

2.3 Vives's notion of *animus* before the *Introductio ad sapientiam*

In the preface of *Ciu. dei* (1522), Vives confesses that he has filled both «my *animus* and my mind with numerous thoughts teeming with honesty and purity».¹⁰¹ This phrase, that recalls the Lucretian formula «*animum mentemque*»,¹⁰² may equate 'soul' with 'mind'. However, *animus* may also convey here the 'inferior soul', and thus the meaning implied in the phrase would be that he has filled both «my heart —that is, my emotional self— and my mind with numerous thoughts». However, in *Ciu. dei* 7.23 Vives employs *anima* (not *animus*) when he makes a note on the three types of soul described by Pythagoras and Plato. Vives is certainly influenced by the text of Augustine, who writes *anima* and, apparently, follows what I summarize as the «Aristotelian based tradition»,^{102bis} consisting of using the term *anima* to express the soul in general and adding qualities to it. In this particular case, Vives explains that Plato and Pythagoras believe that there are three kinds of soul: one capable of growth and reproduction (*anima uegetalis*), one capable of sensation (*anima sensibilis*), and one capable of reason (*anima rationalis*).¹⁰³ In *Ciu. dei* 14.1 Vives makes an interesting annotation, when he explains the usage of *anima* to refer to *homo* ('human being') may be an influence from the Hebrew language.¹⁰⁴

But in other passages, Vives follows what I summarize as the «Acciusic based tradition»^{104bis} when he, for example, acknowledges the usage of *anima* made by other

¹⁰⁰ Vives, *Disc. trad.* 5 (VOO 6: 401; ed. Vighiano 2013a: 450): «...corpus debere obsequi animo; in animo uero motus rationis expertes rationi ipsi dominae ac imperatrici, uidelicet unde homines sumus».

¹⁰¹ Vives, *Ciu. dei* pr. (CCD 1: 31, lines 22-23): «...et animum mentemque crebris cogitatis honestate ac sanctitate refertissimis inbuisse».

¹⁰² Cf. *infra* Supplement, n. 556.

^{102bis} Cf. *infra* Supplement, section 4, p. 299.

¹⁰³ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 7.23.m101 (CCD 2: 121): «Pythagoras et Plato tres animae species esse dicunt: uegetalem, sensibilem et rationis participem».

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 14.4.m13 (CCD 3: 13): «'Animam' pro 'homine' dici Hebraismus est». This metonymy has passed on to our language. We commonly say «there is no soul» meaning «There is no person».

^{104bis} Cf. *infra* Supplement, section 4, p. 299-300.

authors meaning ‘life’,¹⁰⁵ ‘wind’ and ‘breath’;¹⁰⁶ or when he employs *animus* to convey the conscious soul. In *Ciu. dei* 11.2, Vives explains that the most excellent part of the *animus* is the mind, which enables human beings to understand (*intelligere*), to deploy arguments (*arguere*), to infer (*colligere*) and to make conclusions (*ratiocinare*).¹⁰⁷

Be that as it may, *Ciu. dei* 14.15 includes a note about the phrase «Ipse animus eius» (n90), which may constitute an example not only of the mutual influence and interference between both semantic traditions but also of a narrowing usage of the word *animus*. The Latin text reads (CCD 3: 57):

In anima mens est quae ad rationale partem spectat, et animus qui ad inferiorem animalem seu brutalem, ubi est mare illud saeuus affectuum tempestatibus assiduo agitatum.

Here the general term to convey ‘soul’ is *anima* and Vives asserts that the mind (*mens*) is an element proper of the rational part of the *anima*, whereas the *animus* is proper to the inferior part of the soul, which is found in animals and beasts. In this note, the *animus* is narrowed to convey that part of the soul where emotions (*affectus*) and passions (*perturbationes*) thrive.

One year later Vives presents in *Consult.* (finished in 1523, published in 1533) a rather different explanation of what the *animus* is. The complete Latin text reads (VOO 2: 239):

In animo est acumen ingenii, firmitas memoriae, dotes naturae, docilitas, iudicium et quae industria atque usu comparantur: disciplinae et artes omnes, siue quae ingenio exercentur solo siue quibus manus adhibentur, prudentia, mores, uirtutes et horum omnium contraria: hebetudo, obliuiositas, ruditas, imprudentia, improbitas; tum affectus, desideria, cupiditates, spes, metus, dolores, aegritudines, laetitiae, amor, amicitia, inimicitiae, odium, iracundia [...] ; quae omnia radices habent in parte animi inferiore fixas, et uel pullulant uel comprimuntur ut alimentum et occasio et consuetudo uel additur uel detrahitur.

According to this description, the *animus* is the seat of natural intelligence (*ingenium*), memory and judgment. With effort (*industria*) and practice (*usus*), the *animus* is able to fathom (*comparare*) the different branches of knowledge (*disciplinae*), create a wide range of skills and methodologies (*artes*), and foster practical wisdom (*prudentia*), good customs (*mores*) and the many virtues (*virtutes*). Unfortunately, the *animus* is also capable of being the seat of forgetfulness (*obliuiositas*), of ignorance (*ruditas*), of thoughtlessness (*imprudentia*) and of many emotions (*affectus*), such as desire, hope, fear, pain, love or hatred. Vives devises here an *animus* divided into a lower (*inferior*) part inhabited by emotions and capable of negative actions and a higher part in which intelligence and good judgment prevails.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.6.n70 (CCD 2: 187): «Animam appellat uitam».

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 13.24.n77 (CCD 2: 690-691): «Animam et animum pro aere et flatu multi Latinorum posuerunt. [...] Vergilius: “Semina terrarumque animaeque marisque fuissent”. [...] Et Terentius: “Compressi animam”. Et Plautus: “Foetet anima uxoris tuae”. Et Plinius: “Anima leonis uirus graue, ursi pestilens». All examples gathered aim at explaining the meaning of *anima* as ‘air’, ‘wind’, ‘breath’. The inclusion of *animus* at the beginning of this note may seem a mistake.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Vives, 11.2.n1 (CCD 2: 452): «Mentem hominis praestantissimam et purissimam in animo partem uocamus, qua intelligimus, qua etiam arguimus, colligimus, ratiocinamur».

2.4 Vives's notion of *animus* after the *Introductio ad sapientiam*

In 1529, Vives conveys his conception of *animus* in a brief passage of *Mar.* The passage is coherent and concordant with *Ad sap.*, and it argues that emotions and passions are caused by a supposition (*opinio*), which (Vives clarifies later in *An. uita*)¹⁰⁸ is the result of a wrong assessment about what is good and what is bad.

Man is composed of body and soul [*animus*]. In the soul there are two parts, so to speak: a higher part in which reside judgment, wisdom, and reason, which is called the mind [*mens*], and a lower part, in which lie those impulses and passions which the Greeks call *πάθη*. Passions [*affectus*] arise from mental concepts [*ex opinionibus*], but these concepts [*opiniones*] have greater or lesser power over individual persons according to their physical constitution and makeup and their personal habits [*mores*] and customs [*assuefactio*]. Age, health, diet, time and place contribute much to this, factors that affect and modify the body and therefore affect that part of the mind which is joined to the body, which we have called the lower part.¹⁰⁹

Still in 1529, Vives describes the soul (*animus*) in *Conc.* 4 with similar terms: the mind is considered «the greatest and most lofty part of the soul»,¹¹⁰ and the inferior part of the *animus* is conceived as being constantly shaken and disturbed by emotions.¹¹¹ However, there is one passage of book 11 where Vives uses *anima* as the general term for soul. In it, he wonders whether «a pious man may esteem rumors, words, money, clothes or even his body to be of greater importance than the soul [*anima*]». Immediately after his question, he wonders if something can be compared to the mind. He concludes that «there is nothing in the world greater than a human being or in a human being anything greater than the mind». The usage here of the word *anima* to refer to the soul in general may be influenced by Christian creed, as the quotation following the aforementioned passage demonstrates: «What will it profit a man if he gains the whole world and forfeits his soul? [*anima sua*]». ¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 3.pr (VOO 3: 422; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 456-457): «Bonum et malum in praesentia id uoco, non tam quod reuera tale est quam quod quisque sibi esse iudicat; nam quid bonum esse existimemus, quid malum, iudicii est: eoque tanta circa haec opinionum fraus, quoniam multae sunt et praedensae in iudicio nostro tenebrae».

¹⁰⁹ Vives, *Mar.* 32 (VOO 4: 320; ed. tr. SWJV 8: 38-39): «Homo ex corpore constat et animo; in animo tamquam duae sunt partes, superior, in qua iudicium, consilium, ratio, quae mens dicitur; inferior uero, in qua motus illi et aestus perturbationum, quae Graece *πάθη* nominantur. Affectus ex opinionibus nascuntur; opinioniones uero aliae in aliis plus aut minus ualent, pro constitutione ac ratione corporis, pro moribus atque assuefactione. Aetas, ualetudo, uictus, tempora, loci multum ad eam rem faciunt quis omnibus corpus afficitur ac mutatur, et proinde ea quoque animi pars quae corpori est adiuncta, quam inferiorem nominauimus».

¹¹⁰ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 4.3 (VOO 5: 339): «...mens ipsa, suprema animi et celsissima pars».

¹¹¹ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 4.3 (VOO 5: 338): «Habet animum. Primum quam concussum et agitatum affectuum tempestatibus! quam discissum diuulsumque illa discordia ciuili, quam secum (quocumque fugiat) circumfert! Sollicitus, anxius, metuit, sperat, moeret, contrahitur, dilatatur, leuissima aurula totus ab immo concitatur».

¹¹² Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 4.11 (VOO 5: 382): «An ille [i.e. uir pius] uel rumores uel uerba uel pecuniam uel uestem uel etiam suum ipsius corpus pluris quam animam aestimabit? Quid est quod comparari possit menti? Non est in mundo maius aliquid homine, nec in homine maius aliquid mente. "Quid commutabit domo cum anima sua?" inquit ille coelestis sapientiae magister». Embedded quotation of *Matthaeus* 16:26 (tr. ESV).

On the other hand, an important point made by Vives in this work is the parallelism between the inner state of the soul and the outer state of society. Just as the soul lives in discord and convulsion when the lower part prevails,¹¹³ so is society when each action of a human being is driven by blind emotions, such pride, arrogance, envy and anger.¹¹⁴ Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the *animus* (which encompasses natural intelligence, judgment and reason) considers each thing as it really is and acts as a *ensor*,¹¹⁵ that is as an analyst in charge of conducting an assessment.

In 1533, a new nuance is found in *Disc.*, when Vives states that a sort of enlightenment (*lux*) enables the *animus* to know, and a kind of heat (*ardor*) enables it to will. In the same passage it is said that the human mind and his hands are two powers given by God to mankind, by which humans are superior to animals:

The soul [*animus*] is nourished and made pure by that which brings light to it —so that it may know— or zeal to it, so that it pursues what should be desired in life, or to escape what ought to be avoided. [...] God has given us one power: the mind in the soul; and one instrument: the hands in the body. With these two features, we surpass by far all other living creatures.¹¹⁶

The divine origin of the *animus*¹¹⁷ prompts Vives to firmly believe that it is capable of going beyond the limits of human nature,¹¹⁸ and inherently tend to know and love God.¹¹⁹ In this last passage fully quoted in the footnote, Vives employs *anima* to convey ‘soul’, something that also occurs in a paragraph where the different types of life and the different types of soul are associated. The content follows the Aristotelian based tradition,¹²⁰ and the Valencian humanist is influenced by its terminology, namely the addition of attributes to the term *anima*:

On the other hand the study of human soul [*de hominis anima*] exercises a most helpful influence on all kinds of knowledge [*disciplinae*]. [...] The discussion about the soul will proceed parallel with the order of nature itself: first, life in general should be

¹¹³ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 4.3 (VOO 5: 338): «Habet animum: primum, quam concussum et agitatum affectuum tempestatibus! quam discissum diuulsumque illa discordia ciuili, quam secum (quocunque fugiat) circumfert!».

¹¹⁴ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 1 (VOO 5: 194, 196): «...discordia et dissensio homines nos esse non sinit, cogit nos a praestantia degenerare originis ac stirpis nostrae. [...] Habet quidem homo animi motus quosdam uehementes et incitatos cum quadam perturbatione, quibus extimulatur ad desciscendum ab hac concordia, nempe superbiam, arrogantiam, liuorem, iracundiam».

¹¹⁵ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 4.5 (VOO 5: 348): «Hoc erit eius [i.e. animi] opus, ingenii, iudicii, rationis: ut tum demum ad considerationem rerum descendat et quasi censor quidam singula ad precium atque aestimationem aduocet, quod uel ipse satis sibi notus ac fidens multumque ad eam rem nactus prudentiae imponet».

¹¹⁶ Vives, *Disc. trad.* 1 (VOO 6: 261; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 293; tr. Watson 1913: 36): «Excolitur et purgatur animus iis quae illi uel lucem adferunt, ut noscat, uel ardorem, ut quae amanda sunt prosequatur, fugienda uitet [...] facultatem unam dedit nobis Deus: mentem in animo; instrumentum unum: manuum in corpore; quis duobus reliqua omnia animantia longe anteimus».

¹¹⁷ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 13.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Vives, *Disc. uer.* 1 (VOO 3: 158): «Nam animus noster humanae nature terminos excedit, unde apparet longinquiorem esse eius originem».

¹¹⁹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prima ph.* 2 (VOO 3: 225): «Humanae animae mente ac ratione sunt praeditae, quod est plus quam coeleste, nempe diuinum, quo Deum et nouerunt et diligunt».

¹²⁰ Cf. *infra* Supplement, section 4.

addressed; then vegetation, sensation, the feelings, and the mind, which may be said to consist of diverse functions, e.g. intelligence, memory, reason and judgment.¹²¹

In 1535, the format of *Excit.*, which was a mixture between the aphoristic style of *Ad sap.* and the layout deployed in *Sat.*,¹²² allowed Vives to write concise statements about the *animus*. The Latin text reads:

Excit. med. g. 1 Conditus sum homo ex corpore terreno, caduco, mortali; ex animo coelesti, firmo, immortalis. 2 Praeditus mente, hoc est intelligentia, ratione, iudicio, quibus intelligam supremum bonum, qui est Deus. || *Excit. med. d.* 12 Homo ex mente est homo, ex affectionibus brutum. Qui ergo iuxta mentem uiuit homo est, et ratione utitur, et ea agit quae sunt digna homine. Qui uero iuxta affectus, brutum nec ratione utitur, et ea agit quae sunt a Deo alienissima. [...] 24 Affligitur quidem et debilitatur animus in morbo, confirmatur autem et roboratur mens prudentia et sano iudicio. [...] 26 Sed ea ipsa mens, quatenus corpori est annexa, sentit illius affectiones atque eis commouetur. 27 Quod si praecipua et uera hominis pars est animus, et in animo mens, ut propemodum ea sola mereatur dici homo, quantum erit sanam esse mentem, hoc est bene institutam ualente ratione, solidam iudicio, recte et sane statuentem de rebus!

In these passages, Vives describes human beings as composed by soul (*animus*) and body. He qualifies the body as belonging to earth, perishable and mortal, whereas the soul belongs to the sky, it is stable and immortal. The soul has a mind (*mens*), whose inner faculties —understanding (*intelligentia*), reason (*ratio*), and judgment (*iudicium*)— allow it to pursue the highest good, that is, God. The soul —not the body— is considered to be the true element (*uera pars*) in a human being, and the mind is again defined as to what makes human beings human, whereas the emotions are conceived as the cause of the illnesses of the soul (*animi morbi*), making human beings dull (*bruti*) and similar to animals. It is interesting to note here that Vives does not explicitly state that the emotions take place in the lower part of the *animus*, hence allowing the possibility that they are a physical reaction —not mental— that interfere with the fine performance of the soul. In any case, the only way for the mind to avoid these maladies and thus keep its healthiness and soundness (*sana mens*) is through the education (*instituta [mens]*) provided by adequate reasoning (*ualens ratio*), through a solid foundation provided by judgment (*solida [mens] iudicio*), and through the making of upright and sound decisions (*[mens] recte et sane statuens*). The chart below summarizes the aforementioned content.

Homo	animus: coelestis, firmus, immortalis	mens: homo ex mente est homo	intelligentia, ratio, iudicium; prudentia, sanum iudicium; bona institutio	supremum bonum: Deus
	corpus: terrenus, caducus, mortalis	affectus: homo ex affectibus est brutum		

↙ morbi ↘

¹²¹ Vives, *Disc. trad.* 4 (VOO 6: 375-376; ed. Vigliano 2031a: 421-422; tr. Watson 1913: 211): «Contra uero speculatio de hominis anima maxima disciplinis omnibus adfert adiumenta. [...] Eius tractatio cum naturae ipsius ordine pariter procedet, ut primum de uita disputetur in genere, hinc de uegetatione, tum de sensu, de affectionibus, de mente, in qua de intelligentia, de memoria, de ratione, de iudicio».

¹²² Regarding *Sat.*, cf. *supra* Part III, section 1.2 (a).

In 1538, Vives published *An. uita*, which according to the words of the Valencian humanist, consists of one book about the soul of irrational beings (*de anima brutorum*),¹²³ one book about the soul of rational beings (*de [anima] rationali*), and one last book about the emotions (*de affectionibus*).¹²⁴ Given the fact that the content of this work has already been examined by Noreña (1970: 254-274; 1989: 71-227, 243-254; 1990), Sancipriano (1974: 34-58), Roca (1992: 9-27) and Casini (2006a), it suffices here to highlight Vives's preference for the term *anima* instead of *animus*. The reason that may have led Vives to make this choice is to be found in his indebtedness to Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition.¹²⁵ For example, in the first book of *An. uita* (1.12; VOO 3: 338-340; Sancipriano 1974: 204-211), Vives addresses the issue about the different types of soul (*animarum genera*)¹²⁶ inspired by Aristotle's proposal (cf. *De anima* 2.2; 413a20-414a4). However, Vives introduces a novelty consisting of distinguishing between incomplete animals (*inchoata animalia*, like bees, ants, spiders or worms) that are born with some senses and complete animals (*perfecta animalia*) that are born with all five senses. To the former he ascribes a low sentient soul, capable of limited feeling; to the latter he ascribes a complete sentient soul, capable of experiencing sensation and even develop a certain degree of psychic life.

	Latin Aristotle	Vives: type of soul ¹²⁶ with its corresponding type of being and characteristic		Reisch
anima	intellectuum	rationalis	human being with conscious life	intellectiua
	—	cognoscens siue cogitans	animals with all five senses and a degree of conscious life	sensiua
	loco motuum	sentiens	plants and animals with some senses, but without conscious life	
	sensituum			
	appetituum			
	nutrituum	uegetatrix	plants and metals: only nutrition and growth	uegetatiua

Example of how to read this chart. In Latin Aristotle: «anima [with a power or faculty called] intellectuum», and so on. In Vives and Reisch: «anima rationalis», «anima intellectiua», and so on.

¹²³ The adjective *brutus, a, um* properly means 'dull', 'insensible'. When applied to beings, it conveys the quality of 'devoid of reason'.

¹²⁴ Cf. Vives, *An. uita pr.* (VOO 3: 299; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 86-87): «Opus hoc tribus uoluminibus explicatum: de anima brutorum, de rationali et de affectionibus».

¹²⁵ Cf. *infra* Supplement, section 4.

¹²⁶ It should be noted that by 'types of soul' (*animarum genera*), Vives does not imply that different souls coexist in the same body at the same time. He clearly states that animals and human beings have only one soul, but that it may perform different functions. Cf. *An. uita* 1.12 (VOO 3: 339; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 208): «Sed unica est in singulis animalibus anima», 2.12 (VOO 3: 388; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 358): «Anima in unoquoque homine una est». Vives believes that every stage of evolution requires a soul with specific qualities, and the higher form (or 'type of soul') replaces the lower form by incorporating the characteristics of the lower form and adding a new one. Cf. Casini 2006a: 52.

In *Ver. fid.*, Vives's last work (†1543), a description of the *animus* is to be found particularly in chapter 5 of book 1 (VOO 8: 30-44). I have chosen three passages that will serve to exemplify Vives's omissions as well as tacit assumptions. In the first passage at VOO 8: 31, the *animus* is described as a characteristic existent in both human being and animals (*communis ... cum bestiis*):

In animo, quem communem fecimus cum bestiis, sunt sensus interni: imaginatio, phantasia, existimatio, memoria; hinc affectus uarii de opinione boni et mali praesentis ac uenturi, laetitia, maeror, cupiditas, metus, et alia quae subtilius exequi non est loci huius. Iam in corpore sunt sensus externi; in illis integritas et uigor, tum integritas membrorum, sanitas, uires, robur, species, habitudo et per sensus uoluptas infusa.

According to this passage, the *animus* of both humans and animals hosts the inner senses (*sensus interni*): imagination, phantasy, instinctive assessment (*existimatio*)¹²⁷ and memory. And it is by virtue of the *animus* that emotions (*affectus*) originate, as a result of a supposition (*de opinione*) about something good or bad either to be about to happen now (*praesens*) or in the near future (*uenturus*). It is not made clear by Vives whether this capacity of the *animus* is a unique feature of human beings or also of animals with complete senses (*perfecta animalia*). If Vives states that the *animus* is a feature shared by both humans and animals, one is led to assume that, whatever features the *animus* has, they are in both types of beings. However, the chosen passage of *Ver. fid.* does not explicitly affirm or deny this statement.

In the second passage at VOO 8: 35, Vives continues to elaborate his description of the *animus*. After recalling that (1) a human being is human because of his mind;¹²⁸ (2) that the highest good is to be found in the mind; and (3) that his ultimate aim (*finis*)¹²⁹ must be in agreement with what makes him human,¹³⁰ he concludes that the highest good of, and the ultimate aim of, a human being must take place in the *animus* («in animo reposuerunt hunc finem»):

Quid magis conuenit quam ut id quod homini est supremum et optimum, in eo reponatur quod est in homine optimum et praestabilissimum? Id satis intellexerunt Aristoteles, Academici, Stoici et alii, qui in animo reposuerunt hunc finem. Stoici uirtutem dixerunt esse, qua mores componuntur et reguntur prauae animorum perturbationes; sed haec in parte humili uersatur animi, quae nobis communis est cum belluis. Nec uirtus esse potest ultimum bonorum, qua nihil est propter uitae incommoda laboriosius, aerumnosius, calamitosius.

¹²⁷ In *An. uita* 1.10 is also called *estimatrix* (VOO 3: 326; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 168) and *estimatiua facultas* (VOO 3: 328; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 172).

¹²⁸ The mind is called «the light of the soul [*lux animi*]» in *Ver. fid.* 1.1 (VOO 8: 7): «Quare mens ... nihil aliud est quam lux animi».

¹²⁹ Vives gives two definitions of *finis* 'end' in *Ver. fid.* 1.5. One at VOO 8: 32: «Finem uoco, ad quem referuntur cetera omnia, ipse ad aliud nihil», that is, «I name 'end' that towards which all the rest of things are directed while it does not direct itself to nothing else». Another at VOO 8: 37: «Finem ex consensu omnium philosophorum (quod res ipsa docet) appello, quod perfectum hominem ac beatum reddit», that is, «Based on the agreement reached by all philosophers (which the word itself conveys) I call 'end' that which makes a human being perfect and happy».

¹³⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.5 (VOO 8: 35): «Itaque finem homini peculiarem et proprium ex ea est quaerendum hominis parte, qua homo est homo, a ceteris rebus omnibus distinctus. [...] Est ergo summum bonorum ad mentem pertinet et in ea collocandum».

Vives mentions that, according to the Stoics, the highest good is virtue (*uirtus*), but he does not seem to find this proposal entirely convincing. If virtue consists in restraining the emotions and the emotions are located in the lower part of the *animus* («in parte humili animi»), which is shared with animals, then neither the highest good nor the ultimate aim can come from what is *not* a unique and exclusive human feature. This second passage (VOO 8: 35) of *Ver. fid.* demonstrates that, when Vives was describing the *animus* in the first chosen passage (VOO 8: 31), he had in mind the *humilis animus* but decided not to introduce any specification. He used the general term to convey only a part of it.

The third passage at VOO 8: 41 corroborates that the notion of *animus* sketched in *Ad sap.* did not change through time:

Scrutemur, si placet, animum, in cuius parte ima et ea quae corpus attingit sunt motus illi perturbationesque, qui affectus uocantur. His uero quid turbulentius, atrocius, saeuus? Qui minimo excitantur flatu saeuasque tempestates in toto homine concitant, ut non uideatur iam homo esse sed plane pecus aut fera; uitamque uniuersam tantum abest ut beatam efficiant, ut reddant prorsus insuauem atque amarissimam. Omnisque moralis philosophiae in hoc uersatur cura et labor: ut sedentur, ut conquiescant hi motus. Altera superior pars ac melior mens dicitur. Quae sunt illius bona? Duo, uti et functiones duae. In intelligentia est peritia, in uoluntate uirtus. In intelligentia humana tantae sunt tenebrae, ea nox ut quod acutissimus et peritissimus homo assequitur non multum abesse uideatur ab eo, quod nocte obscurissima cernimus lucernis remotis.

Here Vives conceives a section located at the bottom of the *animus* (*ima pars*),¹³¹ where the emotions thrive due to proximity with the body; and a section located at the top (*superior pars*), where the mind operates and, thanks to its activity, two goods are achieved: knowledge gained by experience (*peritia*), and upright principles of conduct gained by practice (*uirtus*).

2.5 Awareness of the difficulties involved

At the beginning of section 2, I raised the necessity to determine what Vives meant with *animus*. I present here a succinct conclusion. The notion of *animus* as divided into two parts (cf. *Ad sap.* 122-123), with its specific names and attributes, is not always made explicit by Vives in his works. The reader is then confronted with the task to elucidate in what sense the term *animus* is used: (1) general term for ‘conscious soul’; (2) superior part or ‘mind’; (3) lower part or ‘emotional part’. The context usually helps determine the right interpretation but, since one sense may gather smaller parts, accurate understanding of what is actually being communicated may not be that easy. For example, the sense of ‘mind’ encompasses the notions of ‘understanding’, ‘will’, ‘memory’, ‘reasoning’ and ‘judgment’; and the sense of ‘emotional part’ includes various states: fear, hope, wrath, joy, sadness, and many more. Therefore, a phrase like *ex animo meo* may signify, among other possible meanings, ‘from my mind’, ‘in my heart’, ‘by my willingness’, ‘thanks to my courage’, ‘from my feelings’. It is then of little surprise the many different ways of rendering the term *animus* in a modern language.

Without proper awareness of the many difficulties (and implications) involved in the term *animus*, scholars and learned readers may be misled and drawn to erroneous conclusions if they only rely on a translation and do not examine the original Latin text. But even if they

¹³¹ «Pars humilis» is called in the second chosen passage of *Ver. fid.*; «pars inferior atque abiectior» is called in *Ad sap.* 123.

do examine the Latin text, they would still have to ponder what the most plausible sense in the original Latin text is. In my opinion, every time that *animus* is found in a text of Vives, one should bear in mind all three main senses. Although one out of the three may be the predominant by context, *animus* is not limited to one meaning, but encompasses all three and, therefore, all three must spring to mind as one indivisible unit. Caring for a person's *animus* involves not only looking after the intellectual powers but also the emotional drive. By so doing, one can show good sense (*bene sapere*), speak well (*bene dicere*) and act well (*bene agere*).¹³²

3 Knowledge of oneself: *bene iudicare* is conducive to *bene sapere*

This section deals mainly with epistemology and issues associated with knowledge, its process, its attainability, and the elements that might hinder it (namely, emotions and darkness). The topic is primarily addressed by Vives in *Disc. prima ph.* 1, *Disc. prob.*, and *An. uita* 2. In addition to *Ad sap.*, my argumentation will be either supported or enhanced by selected passages from the following writings (full references are found in subsequent footnotes): *Ciu. dei* 8.7.1174; *Rat. stud. I*; *Conc.* 1, 3, 4.5, 4.11, 4.13; *Disc.* (*Disc. corr.* 1, 5; *Disc. trad.* 1, 4; *Disc. trad. er.*; *Disc. prima ph.* 1, 3; *Disc. uer.* 1; *Disc. prob.*; *Disc. disp.*); *Consult.*; *Excit. med. g.* 7, 9-11, 22, 26-27; *An. uita* 1.10, 2.1-6, 2.8-12, 2.19, 3.pr; *Ver. fid.* 1.3-6, 1.11-12, 1.17, 5.4. The most important studies related to epistemology and theory of knowledge in Vives are Monsegú 1961: 115-185; Noreña 1970: 228-274; Guy 1972: 41-61; Limbrick and Thomson 1988: 29-36; Noreña 1989: 86-112; Gómez-Hortigüela 1997: 148-169; 1998: 238-278; Casini 2006a: 25-46; Fernández Zamora 2007; Casini 2009; Nauta 2015, 2021.¹³³ Specifically concerned with the emotions, cf. Urmeneta 1949: 129-164; Noreña 1970: 269-274; Guy 1972: 61-67; Noreña 1989: 145-218; Casini 2002, 2005, 2006a: 131-159.

A general introduction to theories of knowledge in Renaissance philosophy can be found in Schmitt and Skinner 1988: 668-684 (by R. H. Popkin). Bundy 1927, Castor 1964, and Harvey 1975 contextualize faculty psychology in Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance thought. During the Renaissance, one finds a tendency to assume that complete knowledge about how reality actually is can only come from revelation and Scripture, since human senses and reason are limited. This line of thought fostered growing scepticism (cf. Cobos 1986-1988; Popkin 2003; Paganini and Maia 2009), primarily expressed by Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486-1535) in his *De incertitudine et uanitate scientiarum atque artium declamatio*, Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) in some of his *Essais*, and Francisco Sanches (1550/1-1623) in his *Quod nihil scitur*.¹³⁴

¹³² Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 200.

¹³³ Informative introductions to knowledge and its problematicity are Monsegú 1961, Noreña 1971, and Casini 2006a; more focused on language is Nauta's (2015) approach. The cognitive process in Vives is particularly discussed in Noreña 1989 (based on *An. uita*); Gómez-Hortigüela 1997: 148-169 (based on *Disc. prima ph.*); and 1998: 238-278 (mostly based on *Disc. prima ph.* and *An. uita*). Guy 1972 presents an explanation arranged by key phrases or words. Casini 2009 delves into Vives's scepticism. Limbrick and Thomson 1988, although specialists on Francisco Sanches (not on Vives), provide a useful summary of the main issues (including epistemological) dealt with by Vives in the 21 books of *Disc.* It should also be mentioned Tello 2020b, who tackles the unattainability of knowledge, faith, and the mind as a means to rise and go back to the divine origin.

¹³⁴ In *Les essais* 1.21 (ed. P. Michel; Paris: Gallimard, 1965, vol. 1: 136), Montaigne says that Vives added a complementary example to the text of Augustine (*Ciu. dei* 14.24.1124; CCD 3: 80), namely a German man who could brake wind many times without making any odour. Sanches defends Vives against Scaliger in *Quod nihil scitur* 54 (Limbrick and Thomson 1988: 132), when he states that «[Scaliger] Viuem absurdum uocat: quod mentis naturae perscrutationem obscuratis plenam dicat. Imo ego, si

3.1 The importance of judging without error

The first ten aphorisms of *Ad sap.* set the basis of how the reader (either a teenage student or a learned adult) should face the pursue of true knowledge. In addition to stating that «true wisdom consists in reflecting on things without error, so that we can evaluate each thing as it really is», Vives says that:

1 We should not pursue what is worthless as if it were precious, or reject what is precious as though it were worthless. Nor should we criticize what deserves to be praised, or praise what deserves to be criticized. 2 From this arise all errors and vices in the minds of men. There is nothing more fatal in human life than the perversion of judgment when each thing is not given its true value. 3 Therefore, the beliefs of the common people are dangerous since their judgment is utterly stupid. 4 Obviously, the common people are great teachers of error. 5 We should make every effort to divert those who are engaged in the pursuit of wisdom from the judgment of the common people, and protect them from it. 6 First of all, whatever the masses approve of with full accord should be regarded with mistrust, unless it conforms to the standards of those who estimate everything according to its true worth. 7 Everyone should become accustomed from an early age to have accurate opinions about things, which should mature with age. 8 Everyone should desire what is right and avoid what is wrong. This habit (that is, acting well) will become almost natural, so that one cannot be induced to act wrongfully unless he is compelled or does so against his will. 9 One must choose the best way of life. Habitual practice will render it most agreeable. 10 The rest of our life depends on our childhood upbringing.¹³⁵

In order to display good sense (*bene sapere*),¹³⁶ one must evaluate (*iudicare*) each thing as it really is (*incorrupte*); otherwise, errors occur:

234 Consequently, we are overcome by our own errors more often than by reality itself, because we mistake the greatest evils for the greatest goods and vice versa.¹³⁷

illius opinio absurda est, absurdissimus esse uolo: qui non solum obscuritatis plenam censeo sed caliginosam, scabrosam, abstrusam, inuiam, pluribus tentatam, nulli superatam nec superandam». It should be added that Francesco Filelfo (cf. *supra* Part I, n. 109) translated into Latin some fragments of Sextus Empiricus's *Aduersus Ethicos* in his *Commentationes Florentinae de exilio*.

¹³⁵ Vives, *Ad sap.* 1-10: «1 ...Ne uilia sectemur tanquam preciosa aut preciosa tanquam uilia reiiciamus, ne uituperemus laudanda neue laudemus uituperium merita. 2 Hinc enim error omnis in hominum mentibus ac uitium oritur. Nihilque est in humana uita exitiabilius quam deprauatio illa iudiciorum, quum singulis rebus non suum precium redditur. 3 Quocirca perniciosae sunt persuasiones uulgi, quod stultissime de rebus iudicat. 4 Videlicet magnus erroris magister est populus. 5 Nec aliud magis laborandum est quam ut sapientiae studiosum a populari sensu abducamus et uindicemus. 6 Primum omnium suspecta illi sint quaecunque multitudo magno consensu approbat, nisi ad illorum normam reuocarit qui singula uirtute metiuntur. 7 Assuescat unusquisque iam tum a puero ueras habere de rebus opiniones, quae simul cum aetate adolescent. 8 Et ea cupiat quae recta sint, fugiat quae praua. Assuefactio haec (bene agere) uertet ei prope in naturam, ut non possit nisi coactus et reluctans ad male agendum pertrahi. 9 Deligenda est optima uitae ratio; hanc consuetudo iucundissimam reddet. 10 Tota reliqua uita ex hac puerili educatione pendet». The importance of childhood upbringing is also raised in *Sub.* 1.3.3 (VOO 4: 428; ed. SWJV 4: 18): «In illa puerili institutione magna uis est ad reliquam omnem uitam».

¹³⁶ Regarding the meaning of *sapere*, cf. *supra* section 1.3 (b), n. 58.

¹³⁷ *Ad sap.* 234: «Ergo praemimur saepius nostris erroribus quam rebus ipsis, quum magna mala aut bona censemus quae non sunt». Cf. *Ad sap.* 1-2 in previous note.

In this opening section, Vives places judgment (*iudicium, iudicare*) as the central item that enables the acquisition of true knowledge (*uera sapientia*, that is, reliable practical wisdom), the assessment of what is right (*quae recta sint*), and the utterance of accurate opinions (*uerae opiniones*). However, this process may be hindered by ignorance (*stultitia, stultissime iudicare*), unsubstantiated beliefs held by people (*persuasiones uulgi, popularis sensus*), and unbridled emotions (*perturbationes, πάθη*), as stated in a later aphorism: «It is sinful that those disturbances create confusion in man».¹³⁸ The mind (*mens*), conceived as the superior part of a human being's soul (*animus*)¹³⁹ —with the aid of proper instruction (*educatio*) and discipline (*assuefactio, consuetudo*)— will be responsible of undertaking this process with success by making use of the will (*uoluntas, uis uolendi*) and each person's natural intelligence (*ingenium*)¹⁴⁰ in order to dissipate the above said dangers:

126 For this reason, the mind has been endowed with the power of understanding [*uis intelligendi*], so that it can ponder everything and know what is good to be done and what is not. And it has been given a transcendent and very effective power of will [*uis uolendi*], so that there is nothing in the soul which does not obey its authority, if the will demands it, and does not deviate from its law. 127 The natural intelligence [*ingenium*] is cultivated and sharpened by many skills [*artes*], both human and divine. It is equipped with a great and remarkable knowledge of reality [*rerum notitia*], in order that it can discern the nature and value of every single thing more accurately and can teach the will [*uoluntas*] what good is to be followed and what evil is to be avoided.¹⁴¹

Erasmus also stressed the importance of judging without error, when he acknowledges that «the first requisite is to judge rightly about each matter, because opinions are like springs from which all the actions of life flow, and when they are contaminated everything must needs be mismanaged».¹⁴² Without proper judgment, the outcome is corrupted, biased or, to put it in a straightforward manner, false; one is likely to convey thoughts through inappropriate words (*corrupte dicere*) that would ultimately lead to wrong actions (*corrupte agere*). This sort of faulty procedure is precisely what Vives believes that the majority of the populace does, to the point of considering the common people as great masters of error.¹⁴³

That the right assessment of things was an issue that preoccupied Vives can be corroborated by the many passages in which he raised this point. For example, in *Consult.*,

¹³⁸ Vives, *Ad sap.* 125: «Peccatum est in homine perturbationes illas tumultuari».

¹³⁹ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 122, in *supra* n. 92.

¹⁴⁰ *Ingenium* is described by Vives in *An. uita* 2.6 (VOO 3: 364; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 286-287) as «the whole power of our mind [*uniuersam mentis nostrae uim*]». In *Ver. fid.* 5.4 (VOO 8: 435) *ingenium* is considered to deal with the unimportant matters (*humiliora*) of human existence: «[Christus] cetera humiliora, quae ad uitae huius decursum pertinerent, humani ingenii solertiae reliquit». Studies on this term in Vives are mainly those of Guy 1972: 57-61; Hidalgo-Serna 1983, 1984; Del Nero 1992: 199-207; Del Nero 2008: 297, 303; Grassi 1993: 111-120; Grassi 2015: 17-18; Noreña 1970: 268; Noreña 1989: 108-112.

¹⁴¹ Vives, *Ad sap.* 126-127 (cf. *supra* n. 92).

¹⁴² Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* I iii 1 (ASD II-1: 308, lines 99-101; tr. CWE 31: 230): «Ac primum quidem est recte de singulis iudicare, propterea quod infectis opinionibus ceu fontibus, unde omnes uitae scitent actiones, omnia perperam gerantur oportet». Epicurus (*Epistula ad Menoeceum* 130) noticed the importance of right discernment (*κρίνειν*) in all things; Seneca (*Epistulae ad Lucilium* 89.14), of proper assessment (*aestimare*). Cf. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 17 (PL 40: 239): «Pro uero quippe approbat falsum, quod est erroris proprium».

¹⁴³ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 4: «Videlicet magnus erroris magister est populus»; also complementary note 3.

he mentions the countless philosophical treatises written to help restrain the emotions and reduce the amount of inaccurate judgments, so that no one is fond of worthless things, or take trifles for excellent things.¹⁴⁴ In *Rat. stud.* he encourages princess Mary to get accustomed to hold true and authentic notions (*opinionones*) so that she may consider good only those things which actually are (namely, virtue and education); or only bad those things which actually are (namely, vices, ignorance and stupidity). He warns her not to regard slight and fickle things as great, or despise great and precious things as if they were worthless.¹⁴⁵ In *Conc.*, Vives explains that one task of the *animus* (that is, of natural intelligence, of judgment, of reason) is to perform an examination (*consideratio*) of reality and call each thing by its right value (*precium*) and appraisal (*aestimatio*), acting as a sort of critic (*ensor*). This examination can only be carried out successfully if the amount of knowledge (*notus*), confidence (*fidens*) and practical wisdom (*prudencia*) is adequate (*satis*). Otherwise, error and misery prevails, which are caused by ignorance, that is, that bad things are deemed to be good and good things are deemed to be bad.¹⁴⁶ In *Disc.*, Vives emphasizes that God gave mankind the light of judgment (*iudicium*) and deliberation (*consilium*; also 'decision') so that it would be able to assess (*censere*) every single thing created by the Lord as well as its value and importance.¹⁴⁷ Further, this light would allow to determine what is true and what is false through experience, common sense and intelligence;¹⁴⁸ and it would ultimately lead to do good through good deeds stemming from upright knowledge of things.¹⁴⁹

The issue about right judgment is directly linked with the problem of right appraisal of the world around us. For example, in *Conc.*, Vives strongly complains that people have lost their connection with reality.¹⁵⁰ In *Disc.*, he cautions that probability and verisimilitude may impel someone to consider something false as true.¹⁵¹ In *Excit.*, he writes a meditation against the deception of the world, and warns us about the fact that our sight is constantly deceived:

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Vives, *Consult.* (VOO 2: 255): «Adsunt hoc loco philosophorum tot uoluminibus contra affectus nostros et deprauata rerum iudicia explicatae disputationes, ne admiremur uilia neu minutissima pro maximis suspiciamus».

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Vives, *Rat. stud. I* (VOO 2: 265): «Assuescat iam nunc in hac tenera aetate ueras et incorruptas habere opinionones, ut ea sola bona putet, quae uere sunt talia, uelut uirtutes, et eruditionem; ea mala, quae re uera mala, ut uitia et ignorantiam et stultitiam, ne mala pro bonis sumat aut econtrario: ne tenuibus et exiguis rebus tamquam magnis capiatur, et moneatur, ne etiam magna et pretiosa tamquam uilia contemnat».

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 4.5 (VOO 5: 348): «Hoc erit eius [i.e. animi] opus, ingenii, iudicii, rationis: ut tum demum ad considerationem rerum descendat et quasi censor quidam singula ad precium atque aestimationem aduocet, quod uel ipse satis sibi notus ac fidens multumque ad eam rem nactus prudentiae imponet. [...] Error ac miseria omnis in humana uita ex ignoratione nascitur: quod mala pro bonis ducimus, et rursus bona pro malis».

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prima ph.* 1 (VOO 3: 189): «[Homo] fuit igitur ornatus ... tum luce iudicii et consilii, ut quid et cuius quidque esset pretii momentique censeret in iis quorum erat dominus factus».

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Vives, *Disc. uer.* 1 (VOO 3: 155): «Censere quae enuntiatio uera sit, quae falsa, id nullius est artis certae sed uniuscuiusque in sua materia, et (in iis quae sunt uitae communis) uiri prudentis multum in negotiis et usu rerum uersati, quique communem sensum atque intelligentiam acute animaduertit».

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prima ph.* 3 (VOO 3: 290): «Proximus gradus ad bene agere est bene sentire ac sapere de rebus, neque ad sapientiam nisi per intelligentiam uenitur, nec ad intelligentiam nisi per cognitionem tum animi internam tum exteriorem sensuum».

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 4.13 (VOO 5: 398): «Quid haec indicant aliud ... quam nos ... rem prorsus abiecisse?».

¹⁵¹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 5 (VOO 6: 189; ed. Vigliano 2013: 212): «quae porro falsa pro ueris colligimus ratione aliqua probabili, in iis fallimur densitate tenebrarum aut fallaci aliqua luce simili uerae: unde etiam uerisimilia nominantur».

some big and desirable things may, in fact, be small and despicable; what is fearful may, in fact, be not frightening at all; what is to be avoided at all costs should, in fact, be yearned for. The following excerpt conveys the aforementioned thoughts:

Heu quibus ludibriis praestigiator hic mundus debiles nostros atque obtusos oculos ludificatur, quales ostentat procul rerum species, ut magna appareant, et expetenda quae sunt re uera parua, inania, contemnenda; ut formidanda, in quibus nihil est periculi fugienda, quae conueniret appetere.¹⁵²

3.2 The elements involved in judgment

Before exploring in depth the characteristics of judgment, I shall give a succinct account of the cognitive process as devised by Vives in *An. uita*,¹⁵³ in order to set the proper context. The senses (*sensus*) are the source of knowledge. Imagination (*imaginatio*) generates images (*imagines*) with the information provided by the senses, and fantasy (*phantasia*) arranges them with freedom and active intervention:¹⁵⁴ it merges and splits images, it adds and removes features to them. These images are then either sent to memory in order to be stored, or they are processed by reason (*ratio*) in order to make them meaningful and significant. The role of reason consists in drawing the essence (*substantia*) out of the accidents (*adhaerentia*),¹⁵⁵ attaining truth, and seeking the good.¹⁵⁶ Judgment evaluates (*censura*) the propositions of reason and, once approved, commands to will (*uoluntas*) to implement the verdict.

At the beginning of *De instrumento probabilitatis*, Vives affirms that the mind is the faculty able to know the truth, because it shares a common origin (*cognatio*) with preconceptions (*anticipationes*), which are the «first truths» and a kind of seeds from which everything springs. Prompted by wonder (*admiratio*) and novelty, the mind assigns the mission of examining (*quaerere*) and investigating (*inuestigare*) the reality to judgment (*iudicium*), whose task is to approve (*assensio*) and approach what has been deemed true, but disapprove (*dissensio*) and turn away from what has been deemed false. However, judgment may neither approve nor disapprove if the investigation brings ambiguity (*ambiguitas*)¹⁵⁷ or is unable to push forward and induce (*impellere*) a clear resolution. The Latin text that conveys the aforementioned thoughts reads as follows:

Mens humana, quae est facultas ueri cognoscendi, naturalem quandam habet cognitionem atque amicitiam cum ueris illis primis et tamquam seminibus, unde reliqua nascuntur, quae anticipationes atque informationes nominantur, a Graecis προλήψεις.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵² Vives, *Excit. med. g.* 7 (VOO 1: 77).

¹⁵³ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 1.10, 11; 2.1-6, 9, 11-12 (VOO 3: 326-330, 343-369, 378-380, 382-390; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 168-179, 222-301, 328-335, 340-355); also Noreña 1989: 86-112; Casini 2006a: 107-130.

¹⁵⁴ A most recent article of Havu (2021) explores the implications of *phantasia* in the persuasion of audiences and the formation and counsel of rulers.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.3 (VOO 3: 353; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 252-253): «Transit ratio ab adhaerentibus ad substantiam».

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.4 (VOO 3: 355; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 258-259): «Ratio speculatiua, cuius finis est ueritas; et ratio practica, cuius bonum».

¹⁵⁷ Vives advocates for accuracy in order to avoid ambiguity as much as possible. Cf. *Disc. disp.* (VOO 3: 75): «Cauenda est hic, ut in omni genere argumentationis, ambiguitas».

¹⁵⁸ R. Hernández (CJLV 7C: 277, n. 360) notes that Vives made a mistake by writing καταλήψεις ('cognitions') instead of προλήψεις ('preconceptions'). It is indeed an error because: (1) Vives already

[...] Sed nouitas omnis admirationem parit, quae ... stimulat ad quaerendum atque inuestigandum. Ea prouincia iudicio mandatur, unde assensio sequitur eius quod iudicatum est uerum, et quasi accessio; dissensio autem et auersatio ab eo quod falsum. Est medium quiddam, quum neutrum horum agit, quod contigit uel ambiguitate (distracto iudicio argumentorum momentis in uarias partes, qui est motus et nutatio iudicii) uel quiescente iudicio, quum a quo impellatur non habet. Et assensio unius est oppositi dissensio, ac uice uersa.¹⁵⁹

In *De prima philosophia*, Vives goes further in the explanation of judgment when he describes two kinds of evaluation (*iudicia*): one is natural, one is artificial. The natural evaluation can be conducted in two ways: one relies on the senses (*sensus*), and it arrives at a conclusion that can be shared by everyone; the other relies on the natural intelligence (*ingenium*) of a person who is knowledgeable, highly educated, not influenced by eagerness, not shaken by any beliefs. On the other hand, the artificial evaluation is carried out through an argumentation that is the result of a methodology (*ars*), debate (*arbitrium*) or deliberation (*consilium*). In this last evaluation, consensus is hard to reach, because each person may think using different ways of reasoning, and may come up with disparate conclusions. The Latin text that conveys the aforesaid thoughts reads as follows:

Et humana quidem iudicia sunt quaedam naturalia, sunt alia siue artificialia siue arbitraria (libeat appellare) siue etiam consulta. Naturaliter dicuntur iudicari quae ab omnibus eodem modo et semper, ut quae usurpantur a sensibus; item quae a parte maxima, et ab iis quorum ingenium integrum est ac rectum, id est, plane humanum, non deprauatum uel stupore uel educatione quadam ferina, non studiis ac persuasionibus infectum et detortum. Artis siue arbitrii siue consilii sunt quae ab aliis aliter et alias censentur.¹⁶⁰

This artificial evaluation is examined again in *De disputatione*, where Vives explains that judgment needs to carefully identify two kind of arguments and decide accordingly. One kind is based on things that are sure (*ex certis*), have been proved (*ex exploratis*) and cannot be otherwise (*ex necessariis*). These arguments are constructed in a clear and transparent way, which leads to an irrefutable conclusion. The other kind is based on things that do not convey a clear connection between what is being said and the proof given (*non manifesta connexio*), which leads to a hesitant, probable¹⁶¹ conclusion that does not show assurance or inspire trust. The Latin passage that conveys the aforesaid thoughts reads as follows:

Hi iudicii motus e tribus argumentorum generibus excitantur, in quibus et res debent spectari et connexio. Argumenta omnia uel ex certis, exploratis, necessariis depromuntur rebus; uel ex probabilibus, et quae de coniecturis pendent. [...] Quae eliciuntur ex certis nexuque iunguntur euidenti ac perspicuo cum iis quae confirmant,

used *προλήψεις* correctly in *Ciu. dei* 8.7.1174 (CCD 2: 190, line 2); and (2) he is definitely talking about 'preconceptions' (*anticipationes*), not 'cognitions'. Cf. *infra* section 3.5, n. 249bis-255.

¹⁵⁹ Vives, *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 82-83).

¹⁶⁰ Vives, *Disc. prima ph.* 1 (VOO 3: 185).

¹⁶¹ «Probable» is defined by Vives in *Disc. disp.* (VOO 3: 70-71) as follows: «Probabile est quod cuique uidetur ita esse, non certa et euidenti ratione sed uerisimiliore quam sit contraria», that is, «Probable is what seems to be the case to each one, not because of an unquestionable and obvious reason but because of a reason that is more likely than its opposite».

iudicium ad se pelliciunt securum; argumentatio huiusmodi nominatur certa atque euidens. Quae uero uel probabilia sunt uel non manifesta complexione cum eo cohaerent cui probando adhibentur, iudicium ad se inuitant nutans et suspectum, plane nec sibi fidens ipsi.¹⁶²

In any of the aforementioned three types of evaluation, an investigation must be carried out, in which at least the following three elements are to be observed: (1) framing a question (*quaestio*) in such a way that allows to examine the essence and the accidents of a particular thing;¹⁶³ (2) setting a procedure that addresses the unknown object of enquiry from what is already known and certain;¹⁶⁴ (3) being aware of the three different sources and degrees of trustworthy information.

When it comes to information, Vives maintains that senses inspire the highest degree of trust (*prima fides*) and, if they deceive us, that is because of the qualities of the thing observed, not because of the senses themselves (provided that they are not faulty).¹⁶⁵ As strange as it may seem, Vives places emotions (*affectus*) second in a scale of trust. Although he acknowledges that, when an emotion takes hold of the soul (*animus*), it covers natural intelligence (*ingenium*) and the capacity of judging (*iudicium*) with a sort of dense fog, nevertheless he also admits that the force and imprint of an emotion can play a decisive role in the way one perceives reality and thus help decide¹⁶⁶ a person to pursue something felt as good or refuse something felt as bad.¹⁶⁷ Finally, Vives ascribes the third place to the power of the chosen arguments. This allegedly low degree of trust is justified on the ground that some people prefer what *seems* real (*ueri simile*) to what *is* real (*necessarius*, 'what cannot happen otherwise'), while others rely on authority,¹⁶⁸ that is, on an opinion given by a person supposedly competent on a particular subject.¹⁶⁹

All in all, Vives is in favor of natural evaluation, the one that comes from the senses, because it generates a verdict that can be shared by everyone through a common understanding. His strong exhortation to accept reality as it is leads him to conclude that

¹⁶² Vives, *Disc. disp.* (VOO 3: 70).

¹⁶³ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 83): «Primus aggressus uocatur quaestio, qua uolumus scrutari de essentia aut inhaerente alicuius rei».

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 84): «Tum [mens], ex iis quae a sensibus didicit, attollit se altius ac penitius se condit in rerum intima, aliaque assequitur et eruit occulta atque abstrusa; sic tamen ut aditus ad incognita sint prius cognita, ad incerta uero sint certa, credibilia quoque ac uerisimilia ad ea de quibus ambigit».

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 84): «Ordo uero eorum quae creduntur hic est: primam fidem arbitramur esse sensuum; hanc uulgus certissimam esse ducit nec falli se ab illa posse»; (VOO 3: 85): «Sunt pauca quaedam in quibus necessario sensus labuntur, non culpa sua sed rerum».

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 91): «Actio esse non possit ubi non et passio et contra».

¹⁶⁷ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 85): «Secundus fidei locus est, quod suus cuique affectus suasit; qui, quandiu dominatur animo, omnia sui iuris facit et, quamlibet falsa, exploratissima creduntur, nam acumen ingenii et acrimoniam iudicii nebula quadam obducit»; *An. uita* 3.pr (VOO 3: 422; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 456-457): «Ergo istarum facultatum, quibus animi nostri praediti a natura sunt ad sequendum bonum uel uitandum malum, actus dicuntur affectus siue affectiones, quibus ad bonum ferimur uel contra malum uel a malo recedimus».

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 85): «Dehinc sunt argumentorum et rationis uires, tum auctoritas dicentis. Sed in iis non omnes ad eundem sese modum habent. Sunt qui omnia argumentis tribuant, non tam necessariis quam uerisimilibus».

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 108): «In argumentum sumitur alicuius sententia, eam ad rem de qua agitur pertinens. Haec auctoritas et testimonium a Cicerone nuncupatur».

«what is natural cannot originate from what is false»; that «God has not provided humankind with false notions about reality»; and that «nature [is] the truest and most reliable teacher».¹⁷⁰

In *De anima et uita*, Vives devotes chapter 5 of book 2 to study judgment. He defines *iudicium* as *censura*, that is, an ‘assessment’, ‘evaluation’ or ‘criticism’ of the things investigated and scrutinized by reason,¹⁷¹ at the end of which process an approval (*approbatio*) or disapproval (*improbatio*) is obtained.¹⁷² This choice¹⁷³ (between approving and disapproving) is made after judgment has assessed two elements: the argument deployed (*discursus*), and the conclusion reached (*clausula, connexio*). If the argument includes sound premises, so the conclusion must be sound as well. But if the conclusion does not make sense (*absurda*), then the assessment comes to a standstill (*haeret*) and a better argument is articulated so that a valid conclusion is reached and approved.¹⁷⁴ At this point, Vives stresses that the power of arguments should be the only influential component in the mind.¹⁷⁵

As far as the approval is concerned, Vives distinguishes between strong approval (*assensus firmus*), which is called ‘trust’ (*fides*) or ‘firm opinion’,¹⁷⁶ and weak approval (*assensus infirmus*), which is called ‘suggestion’ (*suspicio*) because it is an assumption partially endorsed by some evidence.¹⁷⁷ Further, he believes that an appropriate and sound judgment is that which carefully ponders: (1) how something is originated; (2) what is suitable for it; (3) what is alien to, and inconsistent with it; (4) what is in correspondence with and proper to

¹⁷⁰ Vives, *Disc. prima ph.* 1 (VOO 3: 185): «Quod naturale est non potest esse ex falso, neque enim falsas de rebus opiniones humanis ingeniis Deus indidit [...] ...natura, uerissimo ac certissimo doctore».

¹⁷¹ According to Vives, reason is of two kinds: speculative (or contemplative, theoretical) and practical (or active, utilitarian). The aim of the former is to attain truth, while the aim of the latter is to achieve good. Cf. *An. uita* 2.4 (VOO 3: 355; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 258-259): «Duplex existit decursus: ratio speculatiua, cuius finis est ueritas et ratio practica, cuius bonum»; (VOO 3: 356; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 260-261): «Rationis meta in contemplatio est ueritas; in agendis autem, bonum». One of the main duties of reason is to investigate (*inquisitio*) or scrutinize (*scrutatio*). Cf. *An. uita* 2.4 (VOO 3: 354; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 256-257): «Est discursus quidam rationis, iussus a uoluntate, ut aliquid uel uerum inquirat menti uel bonum ipsi uoluntati»; 2.4 (VOO 3: 355; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 258-259): «Ratio data est homini ad inquirendum bonum»; 2.10 (VOO 3: 380; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 336-337): «Ratio est ueluti scrutatio».

¹⁷² Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.5 (VOO 3: 362; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 278-279): «Iudicium est censura, hoc est approbatio et improbatio rationis, discursus uidelicet et clausulae». *Approbatio* is also called *assentio* (VOO 3: 82, line 27) and *assensus* (VOO 3: 362, line 25); *improbatio* is also called *dissensio* (VOO 3: 82, line 29; VOO 3: 362, line 26). Cf. also *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 82-83), in *supra* p. 206-207, n. 159.

¹⁷³ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.10 (VOO 3: 380; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 336-337): «Iudicium [est ueluti] electio».

¹⁷⁴ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.5 (VOO 3: 362; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 278-279): «Vbi [ratio] functa est suo munere, exurgit censura et iudicat primum de connexione, hinc de discursu; quem si approbet, non potest reprobare clausulam. Haec si absurda uideatur et receptae infixaeque prius sententiae contraria, haeret iudicium seque falsum esse suspicatur. Sin autem nihil metuit fallaciae, transit in sententiam diuersam ui argumentationis impulsus».

¹⁷⁵ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.5 (VOO 3: 362; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 278-279): «Eaque [i.e. uis argumentationis] est maxima uis seu unica potius, quae potest menti adferri».

¹⁷⁶ Regarding *firma opinio*, Vives forwards the reader to the following passage of Cicero’s *De partitione oratoria* 8.27 (Rackham 1948: 332-333): «The second division [of speech], narrative [*narratio*], and the third, proof [*confirmatio*], are the parts that procure belief in what is said [*fidem facit orationi*]».

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.5 (VOO 3: 364; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 282-285): «Suspicio gignitur, quum leues quidem remur esse coniecturas, non tamen nullas».

it.¹⁷⁸ A judgment of this sort and qualities proves crucial not only in general life but in any discipline or skill to be mastered. Furthermore, it makes the difference between a bright person and an ordinary one.¹⁷⁹

3.3 Darkness: the emotions

Vives dedicates a section of *Ad sap.* (209-258) to address the issue of emotions and passions (*affectus, perturbationes*), because he identifies them as the main cause for error in judgment since they blind the mind¹⁸⁰—even though he will nuance later in *An. uita* that they may aid decision-making—.¹⁸¹

236 But in order to take counsel and give careful consideration to what we must do, we turn to love for our body and desire for the things of this life, which many people call 'self-love'. 237 This self-love weakens our manly spirits to such an extent that the most insignificant matter is able to transfix them, and the most unsubstantial or slight thing can upset them. 238 As a result, darkness emerges and blinds the eye of the mind. And once the emotions have assumed control, we flatter them as though they were our masters, give into them, and obey them.¹⁸²

Vives regards emotions as illnesses of the soul,¹⁸³ and he considers pride (*superbia*), envy (*inuidia*), hatred (*odium*) and anger (*ira*) the most pernicious. He believes that people under

¹⁷⁸ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.5 (VOO 3: 363; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 280-281): «Iudicium rectum et sanum est quod apte circumspicit, quid ex quo nascatur, quid cuique sit consequens, quid alienum, quid repugnans, quid congruens et consentaneum».

¹⁷⁹ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.5 (VOO 3: 363; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 280-281): «Hoc bono nullum est maius ad disciplinas atque artes omnes, denique ad uitam uniuersam. Non usu, non cognitione rerum multarum et uariarum, non acumine, non eruditione et scientia disciplinarum atque artium, sed hoc solo distant maxima et praestantissima ingenia ab infimis aut mediae notae».

¹⁸⁰ *Tenebrae* 'darkness', *caecus* 'blind', and *caecitas* 'blindness' are notions often used by Vives associated with the limitation or the degradation of the human mind. Cf. Vives, *Med. psal.* 7 (VOO 1: 251): «Miserere mei miserrimi; illumina meos oculos, qui caecus, qua ingrediendum mihi sit non uideo»; *Sub.* 1.8.11 (VOO 4: 447; ed. SWJV 4: 52): «Caeci exemplis non mouemur quae quotidie oculis se ingerunt»; *Sacr. concio* (VOO 7: 87): «Voluntas nostra, quae caecum habet ducem (nempe mentem nocte et tenebris obrutam), caeca est; tum delicto macerata et corrupta, mala est. Quid ergo conducibile potest uidere caeca?»; *Conc.* 1 (VOO 5: 211): «Habet ingenium homo et natura sua angustum et peccato obscurum, magnaue in humanis pectoribus et tenebrosa densatur nox. Iudicio, usu rerum, prudentia nihil fere possumus; omnia sunt in humana uita errore et ignorantii plena, ut nihil magis uideatur esse hominis quam labi, errare, falli»; *Excit. med. d.* 8 (VOO 1: 66): «surdus et caecus et saxeus nihil sentio»; *Excit. med. g.* 27 (VOO 1: 93): «Nos uero simus ne caeci an cenamus, equidem haud scio», 38 (VOO 1: 100): «Nos caeci, mundus tenebrae», 49 (VOO 1: 131): «Me cunctum et inscium trado, commendoque tibi scientissimo; et caecum uidenti; et optimo ac praepotenti malum atque infirmum».

¹⁸¹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 85, 91) and *An. uita* 3.pr (VOO 3: 422; Sancipriano 1974: 456-457), in *supra* n. 166, 167.

¹⁸² Vives, *Ad sap.* 236-238: «236 Nos uero, in consilium et deliberationem eorum quae sunt nobis agenda, corporis amorem et cupidinem rerum uitae huius accersimus, quae a multis uocari solent amor nostri. 237 Hic animos uiriles eneruat, ut nulla res tam minuta sit quae in eos non penetret nec ulla tam exilis aut tenuis quin eos concutiat. 238 Hinc tenebrae oboriuntur oculo mentis. Et, ubi regnum affectus occupauere, iam illis tanquam dominis blandimur, indulgemus, paremus».

¹⁸³ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 209, in *supra* n. 96.

the influence of these emotions are anxious, breathless, savage; in a nutshell: horrible.¹⁸⁴ Further, he is convinced that, out of these four emotions, anger¹⁸⁵ stands out as the most devastating:

246 Anger, the most brutal of all emotions, is the greatest disgrace to mankind. 247 It turns the nature of man into a wild beast. 248 And while any disturbance can obscure the keenness of the mind and judgment, anger spreads such a dense darkness that the mind cannot discern either the truth or what is useful or proper. 249 It erodes the heart and undermines health. 250 It compels us to do something which is immediately followed by remorse. 251 Then, what a repulsive transformation in appearance! What turbulence! What fire in the eyes! What gnashing of teeth! What foaming at the mouth! The whole face is pale! The tongue stutters in a disgusting manner. What foul shouting!¹⁸⁶

In addition to these emotions, Vives also focuses on condemning the dangers of arrogance (*arrogantia*; *Ad sap.* 201-202), which in *Ad sap.* 480 is equated with ostentation (*iactantia*), conceit (*superbia*) and disdain (*fastidiositas*). Of arrogance, he strongly admonishes that it should be removed from the learning process because of two main reasons: (1) no one can proclaim to know all, since only a very tiny portion of the entire knowledge is fathomable by a human mind; (2) it hampers progress in study, because of the fact that one supposes to have attained wisdom.¹⁸⁷ This last assertion was, in fact, attributed to Greek philosopher Bion of Borysthenes (3rd BC), while the explanation of the assertion is, in fact, a quotation of Seneca.¹⁸⁸ Vives reproduced this thought of Bion and Seneca again in *Disc.*, and *An. uita*.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 244-245: «244 Nec daemones aliis suppliciis sunt miserrimi quam superbia, inuidia, odio, ira. 245 Cernere est uultus eorum qui his affectibus tenentur. Quam uarii sunt; quam anxii, anhelii, truces, horridi. Ad eundem modum et animi sunt affecti».

¹⁸⁵ Seneca devoted one entire work to address this emotion. The opening sentences of *De ira* (1.1) read as follows (Basore 1928: 106-107): «You have importuned me, Novatus, to write on the subject of how anger may be allayed, and it seems to me that you had good reason to fear in an especial degree this, the most hideous and frenzied of all the emotions [*hunc praecipue affectum pertimuisse maxime ex omnibus taetrum ac rabidum*]. For the other emotions have in them some element of peace and calm, while this one is wholly violent and has its being in an onrush of resentment, raging with a most inhuman lust for weapons, blood, and punishment, giving no thought to itself if only it can hurt another, hurling itself upon the very point of the dagger, and eager for revenge though it may drag down the avenger along with it».

¹⁸⁶ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 246-251: «246 Ira, perturbationum omnium atrocissima, maxime hominem dedecet; 247 naturam hominis in truculentam mutat feram. 248 Et, quum quaeuis perturbatio mentis aciem et iudicium omne obscuret, tum ira tenebras densissimas offundit ut nec uerum nec utile nec decorum possit intueri; 249 arrodit cor et ualetudinem affligit; 250 id cogit facere quod ilico poenitentia consequatur. 251 Iam in facie, quam turpis mutatio! Quae tempestas! Oculorum ardor! Dentium stridor! Despumatio! Et totius oris pallor! Foeda in lingua titubatio, et clamor!».

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 201-202: «201 Ab studiis arrogantia omnis submouenda. Nam ea quae uel doctissimus mortalium nouit non sunt minutissimum eorum quae ignorat. [...] 202 Tum profectui studiorum plurimum nocet arrogantia. Multi enim potuissent ad sapientiam peruenire, ni iam putassent se peruenisse».

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Diogenes Laertius, 4,50 (Hicks 1925, vol. 1: 428): «τὴν οἴησιν ἔλεγε προκοπῆς ἐγκοπὴν». Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 1.16 (Basore 1935: 210): «Puto multos enim potuisse ad sapientiam peruenire, ni putassent se peruenisse».

¹⁸⁹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 24; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 27): «Bion philosophus superbiam dicebat esse impedimentum profectus»; *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 20; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 22): «De quibus grauissime

These and other disturbances of the soul were meticulously described by Vives in the third book of *An. uita*. But, since this book has already been examined by Noreña (1989: 141-227, 250-254; 1990; 1992: 227-343) and Casini (2006a: 131-159), it would be more relevant in this dissertation to succinctly review Vives's insights on the emotions in previous works that have been given less attention. In *Conc.*, when examining discord between human beings — opinions and judgments included —, he clearly identifies four emotions as the cause: pride, arrogance, envy (*liuor*) and anger.¹⁹⁰ Of these, he considers envy (*inuidia*) and anger to be at the outset of hatred (*odium*) due to their explicit aim of inflicting harm.¹⁹¹ Further, he stresses that pride originates faulty judgment which leads to despising others.¹⁹² In *Disc.*, when explaining the deterioration of the different branches of knowledge, Vives emphasizes again the role of emotions when it comes to hindering the performance of the mind. According to him, emotions debilitate the light of the soul (*lux animi*) and distort the perception of truth, as if a dense fog obscured the vision of the eyes.¹⁹³ He condemns pride (*superbia*) and arrogance (*arrogantia*). Of the proud person, he particularly reprimands his disposition to assign to himself whatever is deemed beautiful and valuable;¹⁹⁴ of the arrogant person, his blindness, his proneness to lies, his lack of shame,¹⁹⁵ and his rage against anyone who dares give him advice.¹⁹⁶ Finally, in *Excit.*, he dedicates four meditations to rebuke pride, envy, anger, and emotions in general. Of pride, he wonders why one should esteem oneself more highly than others, if they are not less important.¹⁹⁷ Of envy, he exhorts to realize that it is proper of a sick person to be envious of things that are worthless, perishable and pitiful.¹⁹⁸ Of

Seneca “puto” inquit “multos ad sapientiam potuisse peruenire, nisi se iam crederent peruenisse”; *Disc. trad. er.* (VOO 6: 416; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 467); *An. uita* 2.8 (VOO 3: 375; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 320).

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 1 (VOO 5: 194): «Habet quidem homo animi motus quosdam uehementes et incitatos cum quadam perturbatione, quibus extimulatur ad desciscendum ab hac concordia, nempe superbiam, arrogantiam, liuorem, iracundiam».

¹⁹¹ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 1 (VOO 5: 204): «Vtraque et inuidia et ira uoluntate malefaciendi est armata; quae uoluntas, quum inueterauit, fit odium ut ex uino acetum»; 2 (VOO 5: 229): «Odii sunt (quemadmodum in superioribus diximus) fontes duo: inuidia et ira».

¹⁹² Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 4.13 (VOO 5: 398): «Hic noster superbus et contumax spiritus in unoquoque interponit iudicium, non de se sed de ceteris, unde superbia et arrogantia et aliorum contemptus, atque hinc rixae, inimicitiae, odia capitalia».

¹⁹³ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 18; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 20): «Iam affectus omnes animi, si non retundunt mentis aciem, certe impediunt ac retardant et quasi rubigine obducunt. Quocumque illi inuaserunt, lucem offuscant animi et dispicientiam ueri perturbant, non secus ac densae nebulae ante oculos offusae».

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 21; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 23): «Videlicet hoc est superbiae ingenium: quantum ualeat sibi arrogare atque ad eum se modum componere, ut nulla uideatur re carere, quae quidem pulchra esse ac magnificianda uideatur».

¹⁹⁵ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 20; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 22): «Caeca est arrogantia et, quocumque intendit, per confidentiam atque impudentiam temere grassatur. Ergo nihil dubitat quiduis subito intrepide asseuerare, etiam de archanis rebus et maxime reconditis».

¹⁹⁶ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 1 (VOO 6: 25; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 28): «Admonitioni cuiusque ferocem se superbus praebet et contra bene monentem consurgit, ut rabiosus canis, uel quia inferri sibi aliunde lucem posse non putat, uel quia, si illata credatura, ignominiam esse censet».

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Vives, *Excit. med. g.* 9 (VOO 1: 80): «Cur aliis me antepono, certe non peioribus me?».

¹⁹⁸ Cf. Vives, *Excit. med. g.* 10 (VOO 1: 81): «Quam uile uitium et ignobile; quam inutile! [...] Nec tamen confiteri audes morbum. Considera quid inuides: uilia, caduca, breuia, miseranda, potius quam inuidenda».

anger, he highlights its capacity to turn a human being into a beast; and to darken the mind so that understanding is obstructed.¹⁹⁹ To sum up, judgment must be kept away from the influence of emotions because, once they have been triggered, emotions cover reason and judgment with a sort of smoke (*fumus*) that ruins the chance of ascertaining truth.²⁰⁰

It is then of little surprise Vives's call to peace, particularly peace of mind. In *Ad sap.*, he firmly believes that the precepts gathered under Christian religion can bring serenity to human beings; and that, after quelling the emotions, humans may become as similar as possible to God and the angels,²⁰¹ who are freed from the bodily constitution that generates the emotional element. In book 3 of *Conc.*, Vives makes a beautiful defense of peace (*pax*), tranquility (*quies*) and concord (*concordia*) as necessary conditions to foster natural intelligence (*ingenium*) and the many arts (*artes*): just as still water is transparent but, if disturbed, becomes murky and nothing can be seen, so the pursue of wisdom and knowledge requires quietness, otherwise disturbances may darken the capacity to discern.²⁰²

In a following passage —and still bearing in mind the metaphor of the water—, Vives underlines that, if the eye of the mind is darkened by dust and fog caused by emotions such as hatred and anger, then the mind will be unable to carefully consider (*ad dispiciendam*) what is right and what is true (*rectum uerumque*); nor will it be able to grasp or communicate the details of what humans have discovered.²⁰³ The existence of conflict and discord, either in the soul or in the external world, makes impossible to stimulate anyone's natural intelligence through education (*cultus*)²⁰⁴ and studies (*studia, eruditio*), which are the condiment of happiness, the true food of intelligence, and an effective restraint on rash impulses.²⁰⁵

¹⁹⁹ Cf. Vives, *Excit. med. g.* 11 (VOO 1: 82): «Quam alienum uitium a mansuetudine humanae conditionis, ut in feram uideatur degenerare homo. Quam obscurat mentem, ne quid cernat».

²⁰⁰ Cf. Vives, *Disc. disp.* (VOO 3: 79): «Conseruandum est iudicium integrum, minime perturbatum tempestate aliqua affectionum, quae omnes incitatae et accensae uelut fumum quendam rationi et facultati iudicandi offendunt, quo ueri perspicientia impeditur»; *Excit. med. g.* 22 (VOO 1: 90): «Iudicium nostrum falsum, quoniam non ex mente recte instituta iudicamus sed ex affectu ignaro et prauo».

²⁰¹ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 214: «Nec aliud aequae spectat pietas Christiana quam ut serenitas humanos animos exhilaret; compositisque affectionibus, perpetua quadam tranquillitate et quieta constantia deo et angelis simus quam simillimi».

²⁰² Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 3 (VOO 5: 307): «Pace opus est quiete, concordia, ut ingenia excolantur et uigeant artes. “Quiescendo”, sicut est apud Aristotelem, “paratur sapientia”, non motibus et perturbationes animi; haud aliter quam in turbulenta aqua nihil uidetur, quae clara perspicuaque (dum quiescit) et pisciculos et calculos in immo ostendit». The metaphor of the water is taken from *Prouerbia* 25: 25-26, and also occurs in *Sat.* 4 (VOO 4: 33; ed. Tello 2020a: 63).

²⁰³ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 3 (VOO 5: 308): «Eundem ad modum res se in ingenuis habet artibus et studiis totius philosophiae: si enim uis illa et quasi mentis oculus odii atque iracundiae puluere ac nebula obductus est, penetrare ad recti uerique dispiciendam ut non ualeat, nec percipere poterit illum inuentorum a maximis ingeniis subtilitatem nec tradere».

²⁰⁴ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 3 (VOO 5: 305): «Ingeniorum nullus esse per discordiam potest cultus».

²⁰⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 205-206: «205 Studies [*studia*] are the condiment of happiness [*res laetas*]; they alleviate sadness, restrain the rash impulses [*temerarios impetus*] of youth, and ease the annoying slowness of old age. At home or in the street, in private and in public, in solitude or in a crowd, in our leisure time and at work, they accompany us, they are present or, more precisely, they guide us, they help us and bring us relief. 206 Learning [*eruditio*] is the true food of the whole mind [*pastus ingenii uerissimus*], so that it would be shameful to feed the body while the soul is starving. It provides

3.4 Darkness: human knowledge itself

In *Ad Sap.*, Vives makes the following statement:

There is a certain knowledge [*eruditio*] granted by God in which are concealed all the treasures of science and wisdom. This is the true light of the mind. Any other knowledge, when compared to this, is thick darkness [*tenebrae*] and, like human affairs, is childish and ludicrous.²⁰⁶

In *Conc.*, the attentive reader is shocked to discover the following sentence:

If we are guided by our judgment, there is such ignorance in it that judgment is unable to undertake a full consideration and make a serious attempt.²⁰⁷

In *Ver. fid.*, Vives openly admits that

first and foremost, we cannot know the true and genuine essence of anything by itself, because it lies hidden in the most inner part of that particular thing, where our mind is unable to penetrate due to the burden of the body and confusion in life. Our reason determines what and how a particular thing is, based on its constitutive elements and, above all, from its activity. Indeed, as it has been keenly observed by Aristotle, not only is each thing as it appears but also as it performs: its functions and its actions disclose the quality, the quantity and the nature of its essence.²⁰⁸

In these passages we are confronted by an uncomfortable fact. The Valencian humanist had proclaimed at the beginning of *Ad sap.* that true (practical) wisdom consists in assessing things without error.²⁰⁹ But in a short sentence concealed within the many pages of *Conc.*, he dares contradict himself proclaiming that judgment itself is not safe from the error caused by ignorance. This ignorance, as explained in the embedded passage of *Ver. fid.*, originates from the fact that the human mind is unable to grasp the very essence of things, which remains hidden. Only the observable traits of a particular thing —that is, the constitutive elements (*inhaerentes*) and the performance (*actio*)— can be perceived by our senses and only that information can be later processed by our mind, which would make the appropriate

pleasure and amusements that are substantial and long-lasting, which, since they are produced one from the other, never abandon or weary us». Regarding *ingenium* as «whole mind», cf. *supra* n. 140.

²⁰⁶ Vives, *Ad sap.* 140: «Est diuina quaedam eruditio a deo exhibita, in qua sunt thesauri omnes scientiae et sapientiae reconditi. Haec est uera mentium lux. Reliqua omnis ad hanc collata densissimae sunt tenebrae et, ut res hominum, ludicra et puerilis».

²⁰⁷ Vives, *Conc.* 4.11 (VOO 5: 384): «...siue iudicio ducimur, in eo est ignorantia ne possit assequi ut maxime attendat et conetur».

²⁰⁸ Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.12 (VOO 8: 96): «Principio rerum omnium uerae germanaeque essentiae ipsae per se non cognoscuntur a nobis, abditae latent in penitissimis cuiusque rei, quo mens nostra in huius corporis mole et tenebris uitae non penetrat. Ex inhaerentibus et actione potissimum, quid et quale quicque sit ratio nostra colligit. Nam, sicuti est ab Aristotele animaduersum acute, res omnis sic habet se adesse quemadmodum ad operari, eius uidelicet opera et actus qualitatem quantitatemque et ingenium essentiae declarant».

²⁰⁹ Cf. Vives, *Pseud.* (VOO 3: 57; ed. tr. Fantazzi 1979: 76-79), in *supra* n. 14.

enquiries through reason²¹⁰ and approve or reject the appropriate conclusions through judgment. Unfortunately, the premises lead us to a grim outcome: if the essence of things is never actually attained, the conclusion approved by judgment cannot be other than erroneous, as Vives confesses in a very low voice. However —and here comes the nuance I would like to draw the attention to—, the knowledge derived from this conclusion can be erroneous as far as the essence is concerned, but it is *plausible* (though not genuinely *true*) regarding the inference made from the information given by the senses. Just as for a human being *sapientia* ('wisdom') is not attainable but *prudentia* ('practical wisdom'),²¹¹ so *cognitio* ('knowledge') is not reachable but *uerisimilitudo* ('likelihood'). Vives's words expressed in *An. uita* endorse this nuance:

Res uel sunt naturae huius mutabilis ac temporariae uel illius immutabilis ac perpetuae; ad haec intuenda opus est lumine supernaturali, cuius cognitio sapientia nominatur. Si est naturae huius fluxae ac instabilis uel est in ea uariabile, ut quae de singularibus cognoscuntur uel de uniuersalibus quidem sed quae non obtinent constantiam perpetuam, opinabilia nuncupantur a M. Tullio. Eorum claritas sit sane uerisimilitudo siue (ut aliis placet) opinio, uertentibus e Graeco δόξαν. [...] Restat tertium, quod est in natura mutabili perpetuum et constans; qualia sunt quae semper eadem atque uniusmodi persistere animaduertimus uelut caelestia et, in his sublunaribus, quae naturalia sunt generi alicui aut formae. Huius lucem habemus a natura inditam, sicut prius loquebar; ex quibus alia permulta colligit ratio, cuius cognitio scientia uocatur.²¹²

Res (praesens, absens)	immutabilis ac perpetua	sapientia	supernaturale lumen
	fluxa, instabilis, uariabilis; (de singularibus, de uniuersalibus sine constantia)	uerisimilitudo, opinio, δόξα	
	mutabilis ac temporaria	perpetua, constans; semper eadem	naturalis lux

In this passage, Vives distinguishes two kinds of objects that can be perceived by either the senses (*res praesens*) or the imagination (*res absens*). One sort consists of objects whose nature remains unaltered and lasts forever (*res immutabilis ac perpetua*); another, of objects whose nature changes and is limited in time (*res mutabilis ac temporaria*) but yet they have a regular (*constans*) element while they are evolving. Knowledge or comprehension (*cognitio*) of the first kind of objects leads to wisdom (*sapientia*) and can only be attained through the power of a light coming beyond the natural world (*supernaturale lumen*). Knowledge of the second kind of objects leads to science (*scientia*) and can be attained by the power of a light within the natural world (*naturalis lux*). But a third sort of objects is introduced by Vives, arranged in a configuration that is just the opposite of the objects explored by science: they are fleeting, not steady and likely to change (*res fluxa, instabilis, uariabilis*) but circumscribed

²¹⁰ Cf. *supra* n. 156, 171.

²¹¹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 1.2.

²¹² Vives, *An. uita* 2.9 (VOO 3: 379; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 330-333).

in a larger framework, which remains unaltered. Knowledge of such objects leads to verisimilitude (*uerisimilitudo*) or to matters subject to opinion (*opinio*, δόξα).²¹³ Philosophy and the arts heavily rely on this kind of knowledge.²¹⁴ Simply put: while science is clearly positioned within the realm of the natural world and wisdom within the supernatural world, verisimilitude is located somewhere between, acting as a bridge between the two realities.

Based on the chart above, I propose Vives's notion of *uerisimilitudo* —a rhetorical term used here related to cognition and psychology— be interpreted as follows: it stands as the highest degree of likeness in relation to what truth (wisdom) should be, and it establishes the closest point to truth that a human mind can attain by rational means. Compared to divine wisdom, verisimilitude emerges as an achievable goal on a human scale, although Vives does not explicitly manifest what kind of light it relies on. Verisimilitude is a transition (a sort of mental, elevating process of abstraction) from science to wisdom; *from* knowledge derived from the observation of the natural, material, limited and mutable world *to* knowledge derived from being one with a supernatural, immaterial, unlimited and permanent reality. In other words: science *observes* what is relatively constant within the fleeting and temporary world; verisimilitude *devises* complete and stable things using abstractions that still allude to particular and mutable items; wisdom just *is*.

In Vives's approach, human knowledge (*humana sapientia, scientia*) is rubbish (*coenum*), because it speaks about temporary and perishable things; religion (the supernatural light) should take precedence, because it speaks about unchangeable realities.²¹⁵ However shocking it might sound, Vives's point of view is sound: as it has been stated by Sir Karl Raimund Popper, the very essence of scientific knowledge lies on the fact that it can be proven wrong, that it is falsifiable;²¹⁶ that it is valid as long as no evidence is found that may indicate otherwise. This characteristic is possibly the reason that drove Vives to consider religion a higher source of knowledge than science: it cannot be proven to be wrong, hence it cannot be false. In any case, Vives is well aware of the fact that complete understanding of the essence of things (*essentiae ratio*) is an enormous challenge: «If we accomplish it, that is great; but if not, let us go after what is closest [to the essence], as much as we are able to».²¹⁷

3.5 Reflecting on things beyond human reach: error or congruence?

After having briefly described the mind and its two assisting powers (*uis intelligendi* 'understanding', and *uis uolendi* 'will'),²¹⁸ Vives acknowledges the limitations of the capabilities of human intellect and admonishes not to inquire that which is beyond its capacity and its power:

²¹³ Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 28a: «δοξαστόν»; Cicero, *Academica* 1.8.31: «opinabilis».

²¹⁴ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad. er.* (VOO 6: 417; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 468): «Philosophia opinionibus tota et coniecturis uerisimilitudinis est nixa»; *An. uita* 2.9 (VOO 3: 379; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 330-333): «Nam de generalibus statui possunt regulae ac praeceptiones, unde ars existat aliqua et disciplina».

²¹⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 280: «Humana omnis sapientia, si cum religione Christiana conferatur, coenum est et mera stulticia».

²¹⁶ Cf., for example, K. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London / New York: Routledge, 2002; first published in 1935 as *Logik der Forschung*), 316: «In so far as a scientific statement speaks about reality, it must be falsifiable: and in so far as it is not falsifiable, it does not speak about reality».

²¹⁷ Vives, *Disc. essent.* (VOO 3: 126): «Si assequimur, bene habet; sin minus, consecramur quantum possumus proxima».

²¹⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 126-127, in *supra* n. 92, 141.

130 We should not investigate into the majesty of God nor the secrets that lie far beyond our comprehension [*a cognitione nostra*], from which God has barred mankind. 131 «He who explores the majesty of God will be overwhelmed by its glory».²¹⁹ 132 Paul tells us not to know more than we ought, but to know in moderation [*sapere moderate*].²²⁰ 133 And he says that he is not allowed to disclose to us the sacred mysteries that he saw. 134 Moreover, the Hebrew sage said: «Do not inquire into what is beyond your capacity [*altiora te*] nor scrutinize what is beyond your power [*fortiora te*]».²²¹

Such recommendation recalls Horace's famous warning to

ask not, Leuconoë (we cannot know), what end the gods have set for me, for you, nor make trial of the Babylonian tables! How much better to endure whatever comes, whether Jupiter allots us added winters or whether this is last, which now wears out the Tuscan sea upon the barrier of the cliffs! Show wisdom.²²²

And it is strongly formulated by Vives in *Ver. fid.*²²³ and *Excit.*, with slight variations:

4 Do not inquire about the causes of each of the things included in the wisdom of God, because not even the angels themselves can comprehend it. 8 Do not look for things beyond your capacity or examine things that are beyond your power; instead, always think what God has commanded you and do not be curious about His many works. 10 Do not examine superfluous things in many ways, and do not be not curious about His many works.²²⁴

Erasmus also reckoned the convenience of leaving some things unexamined, when he admitted that

there are things we must enquire into; on some points we must even have a decision. I do not dissent. But on the other hand there are a great many better let go than pursued

²¹⁹ *Prouerbia* 25:27. Cf. Vives, *Sat.* 190 (VOO 4: 59 [*Sat.* 187]; ed. Tello 2020a: 88), *Excit. praep.* 6 (VOO 1: 54).

²²⁰ *Ad Romanos* 12:3. Cf. Vives, *Excit. praep.* 7 (VOO 1: 54): «sapite ad sobrietatem».

²²¹ Vives, *Ad sap.* 130-135: «130 Nec inquirendum in dei maiestatem et archana a cognitione nostra procul remota, a quibus deus hominem arcuit. 131 “Qui scrutatur maiestatem opprimetur a gloria”. 132 Et Paulus iubet nos non plus sapere quam oporteat, sed sapere moderate. 133 Et archana illa quae uidit negat licere homini eloqui. 134 Hebraeus quoque concionator inquit: “Altiora te ne quaesieris, et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris». *Hebraeus* alludes to the book of Sirach (also known as the book of Ecclesiasticus), a Jewish work of ethical teachings originally in Hebrew. Quotation embedded in *Ad sap.* 134 belongs to *Iesus Sirach* 3:22.

²²² Horace, *Carmina* 1.11.1-6 (Bennett 1912: 32-33): «Tu ne quaesieris (scire nefas) quem mihi, quem tibi / finem di dederint, Leuconoë, nec Babylonios / temptari numeros. Vt melius quicquid erit pati! / Seu pluris hiemes seu tribuit Iuppiter ultimam, / quae nunc oppositis debilitat pumicibus mare / Tyrrhenum. Sapias, ...».

²²³ Cf. *Ver. fid.* 1.3 (VOO 8: 14): «Altiora te ne quaesieris et fortiora te ne fueris scrutatus»; 1.4 (VOO 8: 14): «Sapienter Socrates: “Quae supra nos nihil ad nos”»; 1.10 (VOO 8: 79): «Non est fas homini causas et rationes scrutari, quibus Dei uoluntas uelut adducitur ad agendum».

²²⁴ Vives, *Excit. praep.* 4 (VOO 1: 54): «Nec singulorum causas inquiras, quae sitae sunt in diuina sapientia, quam ne angeli quidem assequuntur», 8 (VOO 1: 55): «Altiora te ne quaesieris et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris, sed quae praecipit tibi Deus ea cogita semper, et in pluribus eius operibus ne fueris curiosus», 10 (VOO 1: 55): «In superuacuis rebus noli scrutari multipliciter, et in pluribus operibus eius non eris curiosus».

(and it is part of knowledge to recognize that certain things are not for our knowing), a great many things on which to doubt is a more healthy state than to lay down the law.²²⁵

The Valencian humanist is well aware of the limitations of the capabilities of human intellect and, endorsed by the words of the apostle Paul, advises to know in moderation, that is, not to indulge ourselves in issues that we are unable to comprehend (*non quimus peruenire*) but to focus our enquiries (*studia*) on those matters that are necessary for our everyday life (*ad uitae necessitates*), as it is evidenced by the following excerpt of *Disc.*:

In naturae contemplatione ac uentilatione primum sit praeceptum ut, quandoquidem scientiam ex his parare nullam possumus, ne nimium indulgeamus nobis iis scrutandis et exquirendis, ad quae non quimus peruenire, sed studia nostra omnia ad uitae necessitates, ad usum aliquem corporis aut animi, ad cultum et incrementa pietatis conferamus.²²⁶

Further, a few lines after, Vives insists that examination of the nature of reality (*contemplatio rerum naturae*) is superfluous and even harmful, provided that it is useful for those skills (*artes*) necessary in life, or it help us know (*notitia*), venerate and love God (*Author*).²²⁷ In a nutshell: one must reject any activity aimed at merely satisfying curiosity.²²⁸ Moreover, in *Ver. fid.* he reprimands²²⁹ Aristotle for having been aware of the limits of human intelligence (*ingenium*) and yet having dared to postulate that the end (*finis*) of a human being is the contemplation of the supreme things while in this earthly life. In doing so, Vives says, Aristotle increased in mankind the desire for something that they were unable (*non ualerent*) to achieve.²³⁰

At this point a most intriguing series of questions arises: if human beings should not go after things beyond their reach, why is it then that (at least) some human beings feel urged to find *the* truth, search for *the* cause of everything, and sense that there is something *beyond* the world of sensation? Why would a human being not be content with only the verifiable

²²⁵ Erasmus, *Letter to Maarten van Dorp* May 1515 (Allen 2: Ep. 337, lines 417-420; tr. CWE 3: 125): «At sunt uestiganda quaedam, sunt et decernenda quaedam. Non abnuo. Sed e diuerso permulta sunt quae rectius sit omittere quam inquirere (et scientiae pars est quaedam nescire); permulta de quibus salubrius est ambigere quam statuere».

²²⁶ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 4 (VOO 6: 347; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 389-390).

²²⁷ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 4 (VOO 6: 348; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 390): «Quare contemplatio rerum naturae, nisi artibus uitae seruiat aut ex notitia operum sustollat nos in Authoris notitiam, admirationem, amorem, superflua est ac plerunque noxia». Knowledge of God will be dealt with *infra*, section 6.

²²⁸ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 4 (VOO 6: 348; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 390): «Quapropter illa abiicienda sunt penitus, quae ad curiositatem quandam solum pertinent»; *Disc. trad.* 1 (VOO 6: 258; ed. Vigliano 2013: 289): «Curiosa etiam delectatio scrutandi nihil ad pietatem facit, quae quidem nulli esse ualeat deinceps usui ad uitam».

²²⁹ Regarding Vives's views on Aristotle, cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.3; also *Arist.* (Tello 2019); *Disc. corr.* (particularly books 3, 5 and 6); *Philos.* 42-43 (SWJV 1: 45-47); Casini 2005, 2006; Guy 1972: 21-35; Noreña 1970: 166-173.

²³⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.5 (VOO 8: 41): «Quo magis Aristotelis sententiam miror, qui (quum non ignoraret quam infirmae essent etiam circa corporalia, quae sub sensus ueniunt, ingenii nostri uires) finem hominis in contemplatione posuit rerum supremarum; et quidem in hac uita, ut nihil uideatur fecisse aliud quam excitare hominibus cupiditatem eius rei, quam consequi non ualerent».

information provided by the senses and the coherent verisimilitude delivered by judgment? Is this the proof of a deception perpetrated by the images processed, mixed, arranged and rearranged by imagination and fantasy? Does this alleged deception originate spontaneously, or is it induced by a person himself in order to ease the fact that his life is mortal and often deprived of sense?

Particularly in *Ver. fid.*, Vives wholeheartedly exhorts to avoid matters that are beyond human capacity and power but, at the same time, he admits that the call to pursue these defying issues has a foundation, because «we cannot desire what is unknown to us». ²³¹ For example, there is a strong likelihood that a person's natural desire to know ²³² and attain wisdom (*desiderium sciendi et sapientiae*) is not a delusion, because what is natural must be rooted on something that exists (*de nihilo esse ... non potest*) and is necessary (*superuacaneum non potest*). ²³³ Furthermore, the desire to know *the* truth must be eventually fulfilled, because everything in Nature has been created towards an end (*finis*): ²³⁴ just as it would not make any sense that animals be given eyes but not sight and thus live in darkness, it would be absurd that humans be given the desire for truth but not be allowed to attain it. ²³⁵ In a like manner, Vives wonders why mankind has been endowed with intelligence and a desire for eternal happiness if it can never be achieved, as if a famished and thirsty man were offered edibles and drinks but could not touch anything at all. ²³⁶

This paradox —that is, the existence of a *natural* desire for something that, apparently, cannot actually be reached due to the limitations of human *nature*— is also found at the very heart of the soul, namely in the mind: one wonders why the loftiest part of the soul ²³⁷ is, on the one hand, considered as being able to grasp the divine nature and join it, and it is defined as a spirit capable of knowing God, ²³⁸ but, on the other hand, it is *also* described as

²³¹ Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.6 (VOO 8: 47): «Incognita enim expetere non possumus».

²³² This phrase recalls Aristotle, *Metaphisica* 1.1, 980a21 (Ross 1924): «Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει», that is, «All human beings by nature desire to know».

²³³ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.12 (VOO 8: 104): «Socratis unum ex argumentis est in *Phaedone* Platonis: naturale esse hominibus desiderium sciendi et sapientiae; [...] quod naturale est de nihilo esse ac superuacaneum non potest». As Vives declares, arguments are taken from Plato's *Phaedo* (66d and ff.). Cf. also *Ver. fid.* 1.4 (VOO 8: 26): «Quod si est naturale, non ergo falsum. Nam falsum nos inuenimus, natura non indidit; caligo atque hebetudo nostrorum ingeniorum illud peperit»; *Disc. prima ph.* 1 (VOO 3: 185): «Quod naturaliter est non potest esse ex falso». Nature does not create falsehood.

²³⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.6 (VOO 8: 45): «Natura ergo, quae est sapientissima omnium, nempe a sapientissimo composita, constituta, instructa, [...] creauit quicque et ei attribuit hunc finem ut bene sit illi». For a definition of *finis* ('end'), cf. *supra* n. 129.

²³⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.12 (VOO 8: 104): «Quemadmodum frustra essent oculi astructi animalibus, si nunquam daretur cernere, semper in nocte ac tenebris uitam acturis, ita et cupiditas ueritatis, si numquam essemus illam assequuturi, superuacanea res esset ac deridicula».

²³⁶ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.11 (VOO 8: 92): «Quorsum attinet gladium ad scindendum diligenter exacuere, si nihil potest scindi? Quid famelico aut sitibundo edulia uel potiones proponere, tamquam Tantalo, quae non ualeat attingere? Tale esset hominem condi cum intelligentia et ex eo desiderio aeternae felicitatis, si peruenire ad eam non posset».

²³⁷ Cf. *Ad sap.* 122; *Mar.* 32 (VOO 4: 320; ed. SWJV 8: 38-39); *Conc.* 4.11 (VOO 5: 382); cf. also *supra* section 2.2-2.3, and n. 92, 109, 112.

²³⁸ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.12 (VOO 3: 388; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 356-359): «[mentem] eius esse dicamus substantiae quae et capax sit diuinitatis et iungi cum ea possit; ... [spiritus] aptus cognitioni Dei»; *Ver. fid.* 1.12 (VOO 8: 93): «Creauit ergo Deus mentes sui capaces, immateriatas».

being unable to reach the most profound and deepest reality of God,²³⁹ and even as not being necessary at all for this earthly life.²⁴⁰ In *Ver. fid.* Vives painfully struggles to sort out a way to solve this paradox.

Firstly, he states that the mind is aware of the fact that something is missing (whence the desire) but is unable to fathom what in particular is lacking, owing to the ignorance and darkness that surround the body and the world.²⁴¹ Secondly, he identifies the origin of this ignorance and darkness as mankind's choice to put the mind at the service of the body instead of keeping its link with the divine light:

The mind of human beings was illuminated by the great light of God and boosted with love so that it could pursue the road upwards.²⁴² The flesh, by virtue of that light and that heat, was subordinate to the mind and everything was subordinate to human beings. But mankind, separating itself from God through sin, passed from subordination to mind into subordination to flesh. The flesh, whose nature is to pull downwards (that is, towards its origin), pulls away from God (that is, from the spirit). Because of its essence and inclination, the flesh has its own needs and desires, which are alien to the spirit but were restrained with help of God's support. Thus human beings lost those gifts that they had obtained by grace of divine power; and, out of spiritual and divine beings, they became fleshy and earthly.²⁴³

Thirdly, he manifests that life in this world of sensation does not fulfill the genuine end of mankind because, if it were fulfilled, mankind would be in a state of balance and rest.²⁴⁴ When something reaches its end, movement ceases, because the force that was pulling towards the end no longer exists.

²³⁹ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.4 (VOO 8: 27): «Quapropter diuina illa intima non attingit suis facultatibus nostra mens».

²⁴⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.6 (VOO 8: 46): «Adde quod est huic uitae organum minime necessarium mens».

²⁴¹ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.11 (VOO 8: 89): «[Mens] intelligit sibi deesse aliquid sed, ignorantia et tenebris huius corporis ac mundi obstupefacta, quid illud sit non assequitur».

²⁴² Cf. Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 1.pr.12 (in *infra* Supplement, n. 614).

²⁴³ Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.17 (VOO 8: 127): «Mens hominis et illustrata erat magna luce Dei et amore accensa ut sursum ferretur; caro uero beneficio illius lucis et ardoris subdita menti et omnia homini. Homo uero, per peccatum auertens se a Deo, transiit a mente in carnem. Caro, cuius natura est deorsum trahere, nempe ad suam originem, procul a Deo trahit, nempe ab spiritu; habet enim caro natura atque ingenio suo desideria sua et cupiditates alienas ab spiritu, sed quae beneficio fauoris diuini reprimantur. Ita amisit homo ea munera, quae gratia numinis erat nactus; et ex spiritali ac diuino factus est carnalis terrenusque». A similar thought is found in *Ver. fid.* 1.3 (VOO 8: 127), where Vives explains that, when human beings became apart from God, the mind could no longer receive the illumination of divine light; instead, blindness and darkness took its place. Because of this state, sound appraisal of things is compromised by either emotions or ignorance or negligence: «At, ubi separans se a Deo lapsus est in hanc calamitatem, obscurata est lux illa, caecitas et caligo menti obducta, ut nec uera nec utilia satis perspiciat; et, si quando intueatur, confestim oborta nubes uel affectuum uel ignorantiae uel inconsiderationis densissima, conspectum omnem adimit».

²⁴⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.5 (VOO 8: 36): «Si quis hominem intus ac foris inspexerit, facile intelliget finem nullum habere in uita homine dignum et in quo possit conuiescere». Mankind's state of constant unbalance is heavily criticized by Vives when he, for example, loudly protests (*Ad sap.* 224): «Quid habemus quur in tanta infirmitate ferociamus?», that is, «What reason do we have to behave so fiercely in such weak condition?».

Fourthly, he notices that, while animals usually have a bodily structure prone to the ground, human beings enjoy a body that points at the sky above, as if signaling the land from which they were cast into this pilgrimage or earthly exile.²⁴⁵ Moreover, while the mind of an animal focuses on the present and does not make any projection into the future because the senses provide all what is required, the mind of a human being often acts in the opposite way: it is preoccupied about what lies ahead, and the senses are not able to provide complete fulfillment.²⁴⁶

Fifthly—and most importantly—, Vives shrewdly notes that nothing exceeds that from which it receives its essence and strength.²⁴⁷ The outer senses (*externi*: sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell) perceive that which can be measured (*quantitas*) but are not able to grasp that which is not present or beyond their capability to measure. The inner senses (*interni*: imagination, fantasy, instinctive assessment [*estimatiua facultas*], and memory), although being able to grasp absent objects, are not capable of perceiving spiritual realities such as the angels and God.²⁴⁸ Therefore, if we follow Vives's approach, one must infer that neither inner nor outer senses are able to exceed the boundaries of the world of sensation and thus neither imagination nor fantasy can receive and combine images of objects or entities beyond this earthly realm. In consequence, if a human being has notions such as 'God' and the 'angels', this must occur by virtue of the mind. And given the fact that the capabilities of something created cannot exceed the capabilities of its creator, Vives's approach leads to the following conclusion: the mind must be of the same spiritual reality as God and the angels.²⁴⁹ Furthermore, Vives holds that one proof of the mind's divine nature is the fact that it incorporates *anticipationes* ('prenotions', 'precognitions', 'preconceptions') or *semina* ('seeds').^{249bis}

Following Epicurus through Cicero's explanation,²⁵⁰ Vives considers that a prenotation (*πρόληψις*) is a sort of information about a particular thing that has been placed in the soul /

²⁴⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 37: «What else is life but a pilgrimage [*peregrinatio*] that is exposed to so many hazards and menaced on all sides, over which the end is looming at every hour and can occur for the slightest reasons?», 85: «And since in this our earthly pilgrimage we carry our soul confined in the body and immense treasures in vessels of clay, we should in no way reject or debase the body», 225: «...this life is nothing but a pilgrimage in which we strive for another everlasting life». Cf. also complementary note 4.

²⁴⁶ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.6 (VOO 8: 35): «Adstipulatur huic nostrae sententiae corporis nostri status rectus et spectans in coelum, tanquam in patriam ex peregrinatione aut exilio; iam uitae nostrae ratio, quae nusquam sistit nec acquiescit praesentibus, intenta semper et prona in futurum. Bestiae acquiescunt praesentibus et fruuntur hac uita, quod sensus nostri declarant, qui praesentibus sunt contenti. Mens uero perennis in modum fluminis nusquam substitit, semper in futurum agit suspensa et anxia». Similar thought about mankind's disposition of the body can be found in *An. uita* 2.19 (VOO 3: 412; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 430-431).

²⁴⁷ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.12 (VOO 8: 97): «Nihil enim assurgit aut transgreditur id, a quo accipit essentiam et uires».

²⁴⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.12 (VOO 8: 96): «Sensus nostri externi, nempe extensi et praediti quantitate, non capiunt quae sunt quantitatis in munia, nec quae molem habent ampliorem quam pro eorum ambitu neque absentia. Sensus interni non capiunt spiritalia, nempe angelos et Deum».

²⁴⁹ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.12 (VOO 8: 96): «Mens ergo, quae haec capit, cognoscit, comprehendit sola ex rebus sublunaribus, spiritus est ut illa ipsa, et quae intelligit illorum immortalitatem, immortalis quoque; alioqui nullo caperet modo id, a quo infinita amplitudine excederetur».

^{249bis} Cf. Augustine's notion of *semina* in *De trinitate* 3.8.13 (PL 42: 876; tr. Bourke 1974: 102-103); *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim* 9.17.32 (PL 34: 406; tr. Bourke 1974: 103).

²⁵⁰ Cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.16.43; Diogenes Laertius, 10.33.

mind (*animus*) beforehand, without which understanding, examination or discussion could not possibly take place.²⁵¹ He is also certain that prenotions are pieces of information, which one is born with (*ingenitae informationes*) and allude to things with real existence;²⁵² they can also be regarded as reminders or warnings impressed and fixed in our soul / mind by nature.²⁵³ Vives also says that prenotions are seeds that are susceptible to suffocation and destruction by idleness and laziness, but can be invigorated by education and be refined by judgment.²⁵⁴ He explicitly states that these divine seeds placed in a person's mind are the origin of all skills (*artes*), practical wisdom (*prudentia*) and sciences, for which reason it is of little surprise that the mind have a hint on many different subjects.²⁵⁵

As a result of what has been argued in the preceding paragraphs —the fact that: (1) the mind thinks and longs for things that, apparently, exceed human capabilities but do not exceed the capabilities of the mind itself; and (2) all ends must be eventually fulfilled, otherwise they would not comply with the law of Nature—, Vives fervently believes that, since the mind is what makes humans human, the realization of the end that mind pursues (and therefore the ultimate end of a human being) cannot possibly be effective in this life but in the next. Accordingly, he declares that «this is why a person, to whom a mind been granted and who makes little, or no use of it in the present life, has another birth, so that he may perform the functions of the mind».²⁵⁶

Vives's belief in another life is absolutely consequential with his premises. If a person is given a mind, there must be a way so that he can deploy all its potential and be able to come into contact with all the objects thought by it.²⁵⁷ Reflecting on items beyond human reach is, in fact, within human reach and congruent with Nature, but the actual attainment of such items is not to happen in this earthly life but in the next one. This fact prompts a most

²⁵¹ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 8.7.n74 (CCD 2: 190, lines 7-10): «Idem dicit Cicero, et προλήψεις ait primum ab Epicuro uocatas, ceu quis dicat anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi nec quaeri nec disputari possit». Almost an identical quotation of Cicero is found in *Disc. corr.* 5 (VOO 6: 205; Vigliano 2013a: 230-231).

²⁵² Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 5 (VOO 6: 190; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 212): «Nam uerorum sunt nobis naturaliter ingenitae informationes atque anticipationes, non falsorum».

²⁵³ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 1 (VOO 6: 251; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 281): «...προλήψεις, quasi dicat quis anticipationes et monitiones animis nostris a natura impressas ac infixas».

²⁵⁴ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 1 (VOO 6: 251; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 281): «Haec semina inertia et socordia opprimit extinguitque; educit uero in stirpem ac fructus exercitatio per usum rerum; excolit iudicium et temperat».

²⁵⁵ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.4 (VOO 3: 357; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 264-265): «Sic in mente uniuscuiusque semina sunt initia, origines artium, prudentiae, scientiarum omnium; quo fit ut ad omnia nascamur idonei, nec ulla est ars aut disciplina, cuius non specimen aliquod mens nostra possit edere, rude quidem et malignum sed aliquod tamen».

²⁵⁶ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.12 (VOO 8: 102): «Homo, cui donata est mens, qua nihil aut parum utitur in hac uita, profecto ortum alium habet, in qua mentis obeat munia».

²⁵⁷ This argument was already found in Thomas Aquinas and Dante, as Waswo (1987: 48) explains: «He [i.e. Dante] makes a syllogistic argument (derived from Aquinas) that because nature has implanted in man's reason a hope for life after death, that life must necessarily exist. It would be unthinkable illogical for it not to exist; since nature has created a "perfect" (i.e., complete) world, and since the mind (*ragione*) of man is the most perfect thing in it, what is found in one must be found in the other. If not, the universe would be absurdly self-contradictory: "Ancora seguiterebbe che la natura contra se medesima questa speranza nella mente umana posta avesse, poi che detto è che molti alla morte del corpo sono corsi per vivere nell'altra vita: e questo è anche impossibile". Embedded citation of Dante's *Il Convivio* 2.12 (=2.8) according to the bilingual edition at <https://dante.princeton.edu>.

inspiring inference about the human existence: just as life in the womb is the preparation for the upcoming life in a body, so life in a body must be the preparation for the upcoming life in a mind —namely, in an incorporeal form of life—;²⁵⁸ just as the fetus seems to die together with the inner life of the womb but, as a matter of fact, is getting ready for the outer and more advanced life, so a person seems to die together with this earthly and rational life but, in fact, is getting ready for the higher and spiritual life of the mind.²⁵⁹ Vives elaborates his deduction with the following explanation:

The soul [*animus*] is afraid of moving away from this life because of the transcendental change that takes place. And it finds itself in a situation similar to that of the child who is going to be born, if it were granted some capacity to know and to think. Indeed, both the child who is born and the person who dies come out into a new light and into a new appearance of reality to be admired. Due to this novelty, both are very terrified, and they would not want to leave their small hut hovel if nature's craftiness did not force them to. Certainly, there is no doubt that a person's death has great affinity and similarity with his birth as shown by the imperfection of a child while in the womb and of a person while in this life. Because, if the child had all his parts developed and was already perfect while still inside the mother, he would have no need to be born. But, since it has been given to him sensation and the ability to know, which he cannot practice inside the womb, he comes out into this intense light where he can feel and know.²⁶⁰

In sum, it seems plausible to argue that Vives's preoccupation concerning the right appraisal of the world around us stated in *Ad sap.* is intimately related to his standpoint that a person must not be detached from reality. One must accept things as they are. In this process, immediate reality is grasped by the natural light of the senses, which enables science to take place; but there is a higher reality that only the mind may be aware of and which can only be grasped by virtue of the supernatural light that enables wisdom to take

²⁵⁸ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.19 (VOO 3: 413; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 432-433); *Ver. fid.* 1.12 (VOO 8: 102). The same Latin text is given by Vives without a single variation in both works: «Itaque paramur in utero uitae corporis, in corpore autem uitae mentis».

²⁵⁹ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.19 (VOO 3: 413; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 432-433); *Ver. fid.* 1.12 (VOO 8: 102). The same Latin text is given by Vives without a single variation in both works: «Nec aliter quam, quum tempus nascendi appetit, flaccescit uita uteri quasique infans emoritur illo utique uiuendi genere, ad eundem modum, quum homo e uita orbis huius excessurus est et tanquam pariendus ad uitam alteram moritur hac uitae ratione ut uiuat altera tanto praestantiore quanto haec est lucis huius melior quam illa uteri».

²⁶⁰ Vives, *An. uita* 2.19 (VOO 3: 413; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 432-433); *Ver. fid.* 1.12 (VOO 8: 102). The same Latin text is given by Vives without a single variation in both works: «Horret animus discessum ex hac uita propter ingentem mutationem; et sic est affectus quemadmodum infans nasciturus, si ei sensus aliquis daretur noscendi et cogitandi. Exit enim et infans nascens et homo moriens uterque in lucem nouam faciemque rerum admirandam; qua nouitate uterque perterrefactus, nollet ex suo gurgustio prodire, nisi urgeretur artificio naturae. Non est profecto dubitandum quin hominis mors magnam habeat cum ortu cognitionem et similitudinem propter eam imperfectionem, quae est infanti in utero et homini in hac uita. Nam si perfectus esset suis omnibus partibus atque absolutus infans in locis maternis, nihil ei esset opus ortu; sed, quum ei sensus sit tributus et facultas cognoscendi, quae exercere non potest in utero, egreditur in hanc spaciosam lucem, ubi sentire possit et cognoscere».

place. Vives knows —because he emotionally *feels* it as such—²⁶¹ that these two plains of reality are equally true and, therefore, both must be faced as what they actually are, so that an assessment on things can be carried out without error. Furthermore, he comes up with a strong and inspiring analogy that associates both realities: death is a transition from human body to incorporeal being, just as birth is a transition from the fetus, who *dies* in order to become a human body.

4 Knowledge of oneself: *bene dicere, bene agere*

In addition to pondering on things uprightly, Vives wholeheartedly encourages students and learned readers of *Ad sap.* to speak well and act well. The former focuses on speech (*sermo*) and language (*lingua*), and it falls within the boundaries of philosophy of language and rhetoric; the latter focuses on virtue (*uirtus*) and conduct of life, and it falls within the boundaries of moral philosophy.

Although Vives devoted *Rat. dic.* to examine speech from a rhetorical point of view, the study of language and its implications (such as *ueritas*) should take into account other works. In addition to *Ad sap.*, my argumentation will rely on the following anthology of passages (full references are found in subsequent footnotes): *Conc.* 1, 3; *Disc.* (*Disc. trad.* 3; *Disc. trad. er.*; *Disc. prima ph.* 1; *Disc. essent.*; *Disc. uer.*; *Disc. prob.*; *Disc. disp.*);²⁶² *Rat. dic.*; *An. uita* 2.7; *Ver. fid.* 2.9, 3.11. The most relevant studies on language in Vives are Noreña 1970: 277-283; Waswo 1987: 113-133; Noreña 1989: 113-118; Del Nero 1991; George 1992; Mack 2005; Vasoli 2007; Mack 2008; Monreal 2011: 114-120; Perreiah 2014: 87-122; Walker in *SWJV* 11 (2018): 8-46.²⁶³ Besides Waswo 1987 and Perreiah 2014, essential studies on this subject in the Renaissance period are Grassi 1980 (2015), 1986 (1993); Schmitt and Skinner 1988: 143-198 (by E. J. Ashworth), 715-745 (by B. Vickers).²⁶⁴

²⁶¹ Cf. *supra* section 3.2, p. 208, and n. 166, 167.

²⁶² It should be noted that the some of the issues addressed by Vives in *Disc. ess.*, *Disc. uer.*, *Disc. prob.* and *Disc. disp.* (particularly the elements of language —words and propositions—, the syllogism, and the common themes or topics for argumentation) may have benefitted from Rudolph Agricola's (1443/4-1485) *De inuentione dialectica* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, 1515 | USTC 400342). Cf. Noreña 1970: 279: «Finally —and this is by far his most important contribution to the history of humanistic dialectics— Vives led the revival of medieval topical literature initiated by Agricola to its ultimate conclusion». Regarding Agricola's work, cf. Van der Poel 2018 (Latin-French selection of *In laudem philosophiae et reliquarum artium oratio, De formando studio, and De inuentione dialectica*); Mundt 1992 (Latin-German complete edition of *De inuentione dialectica*)

²⁶³ George 1992 gives a comprehensive review of Vives's works dealing with rhetoric, while Mack 2005 and Walker 2018 examine the content of *Rat. dic.* Del Nero 1991 and Vasoli 2007 link language with the main disciplines involved (grammar, dialectic and rhetoric) and examine *Disc.* and *Pseud.* Noreña 1989 focuses on language as an expression of the soul, while Monreal 2011 reflects on the notion of language and the study of it according to Vives. The most challenging, inspiring but also controversial studies are Waswo 1987 and Perreiah 2014. Waswo (1987: 123) stresses Vives's notion of truth as socially and historically constituted. Perreiah argues that *Pseud.* is a sophisticated exercise and Vives is defined as a «skilled polemicist» (2017: 100). He also gives a thorough analysis of *Disc. uer.* concerning the truth, points out Vives's contradictions and inaccuracies, and points out that, against what it seems, Vives agrees with many logical scholastic principles.

²⁶⁴ The chapters of E. J. Ashworth and B. Vickers (in Schmitt and Skinner 1988) examine traditional (Medieval) logic, humanistic logic (with an emphasis on Lorenzo Valla, Rudolph Agricola, Petrus Ramus, and Agostino Nifo), poetics, and rhetoric (and its influence on philosophy). Grassi 1986 is useful when it comes to studying language in Italian authors such as Dante, Albertino Mussato,

As far as virtue and its implications (such as *benefacere* and *pietas*) are concerned, in addition to *Ad sap.* Vives expresses his views mainly in the following works: *Ciu. dei* 10.1.n9; *Foem.* 2.1.5; *Sat.* 66; *Sub.* 1.4.3, 1.10.7-8; *Ep. Henr. adm.* 13; *Conc.* 3; *Pacif.*; *Mar.* 10.200; *Disc.* (*Disc. trad.* 1; *Disc. trad. er.*); *Ver. fid.* 5.9. Scholars who explicitly review the notion of ‘virtue’ in Vives are Urmeneta 1949: 268-275; Tobriner 1968: 66; Noreña 1970: 154, 174 (n. 86), 178, 203-205; Gómez-Hortigüela 1998: 221-223; 2001: 218-220, 273-276; Fantazzi 2008b: 67, 72-73, 78, 80-81, 89, 98.²⁶⁵ Abellán (1997), Curtis (2008), Fernández-Santamaría (1992, 1998), Monzón (1992a, 1998), and Noreña (1970: 200-227) examine broader questions of moral philosophy: society (charity, welfare, assistance), governance (the exemplary ruler, the common good, concord and international peace, the Christian commonwealth), law (the equity and simplicity of law). Out of these broader issues, the education of princes, concord and the Christian commonwealth were also of great interest for Erasmus, who published (among other works) the *Institutio principis Christiani* (Basel: Johann Froben, 1516), the *Querella pacis* (Basel: Johann Froben, 1517), and the *Enchiridion militis Christiani* (1503), which aimed at giving the salient principles of how a Christian should conduct his life. Detailed introductions on moral philosophy in the Renaissance are J. Krays in Schmitt and Skinner 1988: 303-386; Krays 2005; D. A. Lines in Hankins 2008: 304-318; and Lines and Ebbesmeyer 2013.²⁶⁶

4.1 *Sermo, lingua*

In *Ad sap.*, language is conceived as an instrument that fosters companionship and kinship (*societas et communio*), and brings human beings together in society (*conciat*). Depending on how it is used, language may cause great blessings and great evils (*et bonorum et malorum caussa*), for which reason it must be restrained and controlled to avoid harming (*noceat*) either others or oneself.²⁶⁷ In order to foster harmony among human beings and avoid sin,²⁶⁸ Vives unequivocally condemns any excessive language. He encourages to make

Petrarca, Leonardo Bruni, Angelo Poliziano, Coluccio Salutati, Giovanni Pontano, Guarino Veronese, Leon Battista Alberti.

²⁶⁵ It is difficult to find a chapter or article devoted to explain the notion of *uirtus* in Vives taking into account his entire philosophical production. This is certainly a gap to be filled. In the meantime, I give a selection of relevant pages from various sources. Perhaps the most systematic study of *uirtus* in *Ad sap.* is Urmeneta 1949; Tobriner 1968 simply relates *uirtus* to *pietas*, whereas Gómez-Hortigüela 2001 gives a reflection on *uirtus* and society. Fantazzi 2008b explains *uirtus* as depicted by Vives in *Foem.* and *Mar.*

²⁶⁶ Krays (in Schmitt and Skinner 1988) examines the Renaissance concepts of ‘human being’, and makes a comprehensive survey of the principal ethical systems, namely Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic and Neostoic, Epicurean, and Christian. Krays 2005 is a collective work, whose contributors focus on Scholasticism, theories of human rights and dominion, and Reformation (particularly Philip Melancthon and early Calvinism). Interestingly, Vives is mentioned within the section on «Reformation and Humanists». Lines (in Hankins 2008) delves into the coexistence between Scholasticism and the humanists. Lines and Ebbesmeyer 2013 attempts to break new ground by giving attention to the culture (locations, literary genres, and vernacular languages) in which ethical matters are produced.

²⁶⁷ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 448-449: «448 Linguam dedit deus hominibus, ut sit instrumentum societatis et communionis, ad quam natura hominem homini conciat. 449 Haec magnorum et bonorum et malorum est caussa, prout utaris. Praeclare Iacobus apostolus assimilauit eam clauo nauis. Fraeni sunt illi iniiciendi et cohibenda, ne uel aliis noceat uel sibi ipsi».

²⁶⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 450: «There is no instrument that can cause sin [*peccati*] more easily and more frequently than the tongue».

use of moderate, polite and elegant language instead of severe, gross, and uneducated; or too sophisticated or affected language.²⁶⁹ He suggests to neither employ insulting, condemnatory, rough language nor, conversely, soft, weak and flattering words.²⁷⁰ He compares retaliating slander with slander to cleaning mud with mud,²⁷¹ and rebukes those who practice the eloquence of a barking dog.²⁷² He insists that one should avoid speaking too fast,²⁷³ or too much,²⁷⁴ or say whatever comes to one's head, without premeditation.²⁷⁵ Vives's educational proposal of civility may well be compared to Erasmus's later treatise *Lingua* (Basel: Johann Froben, 1525), where the Dutch humanist explains the nature and capacity of language and also warns about the evils of an undisciplined tongue.

Vives often points out in his works that language is a distinctive mark of humanity. Since the ability to speak is made possible by virtue of reason and mind—that is, owing to the highest part of the *animus*—, and since animals lack both of them, it is then without doubt that they can neither have a language nor talk.²⁷⁶ Moreover, language is the way that the soul (*animus*) speaks out:²⁷⁷ words (*uoces*) are the manifestation of the whole *animus*—that is, of both the higher and the inferior part—,²⁷⁸ and speech flows from the mind as if springing from a fountain.²⁷⁹ The Valencian humanist pictures speech as a tool of communication that

²⁶⁹ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 463: «Sermone utitor modesto, ciuili, comi; non aspero, non rusticano uel imperito, sed nec accurato aut affectato nimis».

²⁷⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 464: «Nec contumeliosum usurpes sermonem aut reprehensorium aut rigidum, sed neque blandum aut fractum aut adulatorium».

²⁷¹ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 453: «Conuitium conuitio regerere est lutum luto purgare». Regarding «cleaning mud with mud», cf. Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* I x 67 (ASD II-2: 464; tr. CWE 32: 263).

²⁷² Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 456: «Nec facundiam exerceas caninam». By *facundiam caninam*, Vives alludes to a fierce way of winning an argument by making use of strong criticism. Cf. Sallust, *Historiae* 4.54 (ed. Maurenbrecher); Lactantius, *Institutiones diuinae* 6.18.26; Jerome, *Epistulae* 119.1.3; Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* II iv 34 (ASD II-3: 348, lines 624-627; tr. CWE 33: 208): «This remark of Appius passed into a proverb among well-read authors, as a description of those for whom obloquy was the sole purpose of the pursuit of eloquence, the phrase being taken from the way dogs bark when they fight [*rixare*]. In fact, the letter *r*, the initial of *rixare*, is called the canine or dog letter».

²⁷³ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 467: «Ne celeritatem in loquendo nimiam suscipias».

²⁷⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 473: «Ne sis in sermone immodicus ac ne multus quidem». He also warns about asking too many questions. Cf. *Ad sap.* 476: «Ne sis nimius percontator»; *Sat.* 172 (VOO 4: 57 [*Sat.* 170]; ed. Tello 2020a: 85): «Abi, molestus percontator». Vives's classical source may have been Horace, *Epistulae* 1.18.69: «Percontatorem fugito; nam garrulus idem est».

²⁷⁵ Vives (*Ad sap.* 468) conveys this thought by saying that one should seldom resort to that motto of Cicero «Whatever comes into your mouth [*quicquid in buccam*]». Cf. Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 1.12.4, 12.1.2; Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* I v 72 (ASD II-1: 546; tr. CWE 31: 447).

²⁷⁶ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 3 (VOO 6: 298; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 334): «Prima in homine peritia est loquendi, quae statim ex ratione ac mente tanquam ex fonte profluit. Idcirco bestiae omnes sicut mente, ita et sermone carent»; *Conc.* 1 (VOO 5: 197): «Sermonem accepimus, quo reliquae uniuersae animantes carent».

²⁷⁷ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 3 (VOO 6: 298; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 334): «Est etiam sermo societatis humanae instrumentum: neque enim aliter retegi posset animus tot inuolucris et tanta densitate corporis occultus».

²⁷⁸ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.7 (VOO 3: 369; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 308-309): «Voces in homine signa sunt animi uniuersi: et phantasiae et affectuum et intelligentiae et uoluntatis».

²⁷⁹ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.7 (VOO 3: 369; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 302-303): «Ex uniuersa autem mente tanquam ex fonte fluit sermo».

enables a particular mind to transfer (*transuāsare*) its knowledge to another,²⁸⁰ and considers good speech the distinctive mark of a person of good sense (*homo prudens*).²⁸¹

Vives points out as well the need to employ words in their widely accepted sense, so that communication can successfully take place. In *Disc. uer.*, he reminds that Aristotle states that, «with the exception of interjections, all other words have meaning *κατὰ συνθήκην*, that is, by something agreed upon, by convention, by a common view among speakers».²⁸² Words must be employed in their usual and ordinary sense (*communis usus, utemur naturaliter*), so that what is uttered can effectively be understood by the audience,²⁸³ and no suspicion of trickery is raised due to an odd usage of language.²⁸⁴

(a) *Deffinitiones*

In direct relation to words and proper understanding of language, Vives included in *Ad sap.* eleven aphorisms (22-32) acting as definitions:

22 Glory is to have a good reputation, which comes from outstanding virtue. **23** Honor is the admiration of pre-eminent virtue. **24** Goodwill is the sympathy deriving from endearing virtue. **25** Dignity is either the good opinion of men earned by virtue or a certain distinction that manifests itself externally from internal virtue. **26** Power and dominion is to have many people whose interests you consult justly and rightly. **27** Nobility is to be known for the excellence of one's actions, or to show oneself similar to the good parents who gave you birth. **28** A noble-spirited person is one who is endowed by nature to be virtuous. **29** Health is a particular disposition of the body that makes for a sound mind. **30** Beauty is the features of the body that reveal a beautiful soul. **31** Strength and vigor allow you to be capable of practicing virtue and not to be easily discouraged. **32** Pleasure is a pure, firm and lasting delight, which can only be attained through those things that are related to the soul.²⁸⁵

²⁸⁰ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 1 (VOO 5: 197): «... sermo ... instrumentum communicationi hominum aptius, ut ... nihil sic denique quod homo eloqui et, uelut per linguae infundibulum, a mente sua in alienam transfundere et quasi transuāsare non ualeat».

²⁸¹ Cf. Vives, *Rat. dic.* pr. (VOO 2: 90; ed. SWJV 11: 58-59): «Non enim est aliud tantopere hominis prudentis ac sermone apte uti et dextre».

²⁸² Cf. Vives, *Disc. uer.* (VOO 3: 90): «Praeter interiectiones reliquae omnes uoces significant, ut Aristoteles dicit, *κατὰ συνθήκην*, hoc est, ex compacto, ex conuentione et quadam loquentium conspiratione ac consensu». Note here that all words employed by Vives bear the prefix *con-* (*cum* 'with'), which reinforces the notion that the meaning of words in language is a collective construction. In this passage, Vives alludes to Aristotle's *De interpretatione* 2 (16a19).

²⁸³ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prima ph.* 1 (VOO 3: 193): «Ideo diligenter sunt animaduertenda uerba quibus quisque obseruata sua communicauit, ut intelligamus quid sit id quod perhibetur»; (VOO 3: 194) «Itaque diligenter communis uerborum usus est animaduertendus. [...] Teneat philosophus sensum communem in uerbis».

²⁸⁴ Cf. Vives, *Disc. disp.* (VOO 3: 81): «Itaque dabimus nos operam ne ludere atque argutari in uerbis existimemur, sed iis utemur naturaliter eo ipso sensu quo ab spectantibus consueuerunt sumi». However, Vives seems to contradict himself in a passage of *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 117) when he affirms that common speech is ambiguous and obscure: «...ad hanc autem obliquitatem et infuscationem communis sermonis».

²⁸⁵ Vives, *Ad sap.* 22-32: «**22** Gloria: bene audire de praestanti uirtute. **23** Honor: ueneratio ob magni precii uirtutem. **24** Gratia: fauor propter amabilem uirtutem. **25** Dignitas est uel recta hominum

This section of definitions was never given a specific heading or mark in any of the editions during and after Vives's life, nor have modern scholars paid much attention to it. Therefore, I would like to devote some paragraphs of my dissertation to highlight what —I believe— constitutes a good example of Vives's likeness for making definitions and their critical role when it comes to avoiding confusion in any given matter.²⁸⁶ As the Valencian humanist himself explains, a definition (*ὄρος*; *deffinitio*, *finitio*) sets boundaries or limits (*finis*), like a border marker that separates different elements so that each element does not interfere with each other's territory. Consequently, the main purpose of a definition is to speak and to think coherently about a particular matter; otherwise, confusion emerges, because the limits and the boundaries of a given object are unknown.²⁸⁷ If a definition has been properly made, everything becomes more accurate and comes forth more easily.²⁸⁸

According to Vives, a good definition is only successful provided that it describes the object of study in full.²⁸⁹ It should consist of a short explanation of what is similar and what is different in a given object of study; of what is common and what is individual; of what is referred to the general, and what to the particular.²⁹⁰ To this purpose, a successful definition should be formulated, so to speak, from «a higher point», from where the object can be properly seen and conveyed.²⁹¹ In fact, a definition implies a sort of segmentation and division (*diuisio*), since one goes either from the generic to the specific, different and particular; or from the whole to the parts.²⁹² In other words, first the essence is identified; then, the accidents.²⁹³ Such procedure poses a significant limitation: a definition may not be feasible when the scope of the object surpasses human capacity, because there is no way of limiting the object as from a higher point. In such case, the whole may be attempted to be defined by

opinio de bene merita uirtute uel decor quidam ex interiore uirtute foras prominens. 26 Potentia et regnum: habere multos quibus probe ac recte consulas. 27 Nobilitas: excellentia actuum esse cognitum, uel a bonis prognatum similem parentum se praebere. 28 Generosus est ad uirtutem a natura optime compositus. 29 Sanitas: talis habitudo corporis ut ualeat mens. 30 Species: lineamenta corporis, quae animum formosum ostendant. 31 Vires et robur: ut exercitiis uirtutis sufficiat, ne facile defatigeris. 32 Voluptas: delectatio pura, solida et diuturna, qualis capitur ex iis solis quae ad animum pertinent».

²⁸⁶ Cf. *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 87): «Quaecunque ergo res in dubitationem uenerit, eam oportet penitus inspicere interne, externe, sursum, deorsum, ante, retro; cogitatione et mente omnia perlustrare, ut uerum istud (ad iudicium utique nostrum tam multis coopertum et occultatum inuolucris) detegatur atque in apertum se proferat».

²⁸⁷ Cf. Vives, *Disc. essent.* (VOO 3: 131): «Finitio seu diffinitio nominantur a Graecis ὄρος, quasi terminus et designatio limitum [...] alioqui magna sequeretur et in loquendo et sentiendo perturbatio, qualem uidemus accidere quum de rebus agitur quarum ignoratur diffinitio».

²⁸⁸ Cf. Vives, *Disc. essent.* (VOO 3: 141): «Si rite ab exordio diffinitum, omnia certiora existunt et multa facillima».

²⁸⁹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. essent.* (VOO 3: 134): «Qui recte diffiniturus aut diuisurus est rem esse perspectam penitus, et cognitam oportet intus foris».

²⁹⁰ Cf. Vives, *Disc. essent.* (VOO 3: 131): «Ergo finitio sit nobis intellecta breuis explanatio similitudinis et dissimilitudinis, communionis et proprietatis; illud in genere, hoc in proprio».

²⁹¹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. essent.* (VOO 3: 133): «Quapropter ad recte diffiniendum sumendum est de principio non tam genus quam superius quiddam accommodatum exprimentae rei siue id essentiae sit siue adhaerentis siue etiam metaphorae; tum concinnandum et coarctandum adiunctione inferiorum, dum illud totum quadret ac fiat proprium».

²⁹² Cf. Vives, *Disc. essent.* (VOO 3: 135): «A genere in formam ..., ad differentes..., ad singulas res [...] A toto ad partes».

²⁹³ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 87): «Primo loco est rei essentia, hinc inhaerentia».

its parts,²⁹⁴ since its parts are better known than the whole.²⁹⁵ But then —Vives argues— a definition could not possibly be attained,²⁹⁶ since no limits or divisions would be given.

In the last paragraphs of *Disc. essent.*, Vives gives six valuable rules for making good definitions. According to him, a definition should: (1) be equal to what is being defined; (2) provide an explanation; (3) not contain anything superfluous or redundant —i.e. nothing that, if suppressed, is detrimental to the whole—; (4) not be long; (5) be adapted to the intellectual capacity of the audience; (6) be formulated as coherently as possible, given a current situation.²⁹⁷ Indeed, definitions rely on how reality is perceived and understood at a particular place and time. Further, a definition, even if it is absolutely apt, may not perform its role if the recipient is unable to understand it. This last remark may raise the following question: to what extent comprehension of a particular item needs to be modified or *distorted through language* in order to be made understandable? Moreover, how useful is to make understandable something that may have been modified to such a degree that no longer faithfully relates to the real item?

In sum, Vives admits that making definitions is an art only attainable by a great and excellent person, for he must not only examine the object of study thoroughly but also have significant knowledge in other areas. Otherwise, he will not be able to include the object of study in a general framework, or divide it into parts; nor will he be able to establish its limits and distinguish it from what surrounds it. The art of defining things is certainly out of reach for people who are confused due to their ignorance (*ruditas*) and numbness (*torpedo*).²⁹⁸

(b) *Veritas*

If language is the way used by the *animus* to communicate,²⁹⁹ and if the purpose of reason (a portion of the mind, the loftiest part of the *animus*) is to find truth,³⁰⁰ it can then be inferred that language speaks out the truth. Vives may have performed this syllogism³⁰¹ as

²⁹⁴ Cf. Vives, *Disc. essent.* (VOO 3: 136): «Nonnunquam retrorsum uenitur: ut per inferiora finiatur superius et maius, quum eo loci positum est superius ut ultra se nihil admittat quo explicetur aut certe non possit apte; [...] diffinitio a partibus totius».

²⁹⁵ Cf. Vives, *Disc. essent.* (VOO 3: 136): «...quae utique diffinitio tum demum assignatur quum notiores sunt partes quam totum».

²⁹⁶ Cf. Vives, *Disc. essent.* (VOO 3: 136): «...ita magis tum arctioribus tamquam exemplo quodam ostenditur quam diffinitur».

²⁹⁷ Cf. Vives, *Disc. essent.* (VOO 3: 140-141): «Vt diffinitio sit aequalis diffinito, non minor neu maior; tum ut rem explicet ...; nihil uero continere superuacaneum uel redundans ...; nec longas esse conuenit ...; eorum [i.e. audientium] captui applicetur ...; maxime praesenti negotio congruat».

²⁹⁸ Cf. Vives, *Disc. essent.* (VOO 3: 141): «Apparet profecto quam sit diffiniendi hoc munus magni uiri et excellentis. Quique non uniuersam modo eiusce rei, quam diffiniturus est, naturam explorarit, sed alia plurima non ignoret; neque enim aliter poterit eam rem, quam limitandam suscepit, et in maiore includere et in minora diducere; et a uicinis circumfususque secernere ac separare; neque ulla nota alia aequae doctum ab indocto, acrem a tardo, distinxeris ut peritia diffiniendi. Nam quibus multa sunt per ruditatem aut torpedinem confusa, ii discernere ea nesciunt».

²⁹⁹ Cf. *supra* section 4.1, and n. 276-280.

³⁰⁰ Cf. *supra* n. 156, 171. However, Vives had his own doubts. As he implicitly wondered in 1523 in *Veritas fucata* (*Painted Truth* or *Truth in disguise*), does the truth need to be wrapped in a disguise in order to be humanely understood? Is reality only be able to be appraised after it has been distorted, that is, *adjusted* to the limits of a human mind? Cf. *supra* Part I, section 2.3, n. 69.

³⁰¹ In *Disc. uer.* (VOO 3: 169-182), Vives examines the syllogism in depth and gives eighteen combinations. He defines syllogism (*ratiocinatio*) as a collection of three statements, where the third, which is

well, when he decided to include in *Ad sap.* some aphorisms dealing with truth in the section devoted to language:

492 For even though the truth may sometimes be unpleasant at first, eventually there is nothing more pleasant and gratifying. 493 Sometimes truth has to struggle, but it is never overcome. 494 The benefits stemming from a lie are not solid or long-lasting and, the harm done by truth does not last long. 495 Shun lies as though they were some kind of rotten corruption. For there is nothing more despicable to human nature since they separate it far from God, and make it like the devil, and turn it into the his slave. 496 Furthermore, a lie is bound to be discovered sooner or later, and it brings shameful disgrace to the liar. 497 What is more despicable or wicked than a liar? 498 If people know that you are a liar, no one will believe you, even if you insist on telling the absolute truth. 499 Conversely, if people know that you are truthful, your nod of assent will have more credence than the holiest oath of someone else. 500 If you do not want to say contradictory things but want your words to have consistency, there is no need of memory or any other skill than always saying what you believe is the truth. 501 Truth agrees with truth; falsehood agrees with neither truth nor falsehood. 502 If you wish your opinions to be accurate, do not believe anything readily except what has already been validated or has a strong semblance of veracity. 503 Do not be distrustful. Whence that wise maxim: «If you want to be truthful, you will not be distrustful».³⁰²

In these aphorisms, Vives alludes to the role of judgment in validating (502) the propositions established by reason; also, to the acceptance of verisimilitude as the nearest point to truth that can be attained without the intervention of divine light. But, above all, Vives is concerned here with showing the implications at a societal level of saying the truth

meant to be the one that is inferred, naturally arises from the connection of the other two. He remarks that by *naturally* he means that no other extrinsic element is necessary: intelligence does not need to add any supplementary items; if it would have to, then the syllogism should not be deemed as such. Cf. VOO 3: 169: «Ratiocinatio est collectio trium enuntiationum, in quibus tertia (quae inferri significatur) ex duarum connexione naturaliter elicitur; naturaliter dico, ut aliud nihil sic extrinsecus necessarium sed natura sua ex eis nascatur sine supplemento intelligentiae, nam qui eo indiget perfectus syllogismus non est».

³⁰² Vives, *Ad sap.* 492-503: «492 Nam etsi aliquando ueritas initio odiosa sit, deinceps tamen nihil est illa amabilius aut gratius. 493 Laborat aliquando ueritas, nunquam opprimitur. 494 Nec mendacii utilitas solida est ac diuturna, nec ueritatis damnum diu nocet. 495 A mendacio tanquam corruptela quadam abhorreto. Nihil est enim humanae conditioni abiectius, ut quod illam procul a deo separat, diabolo similem ac mancipium facit. 496 Deinde siue tarde siue celeriter mendacium tandem deprehenditur, uertiturque mentienti in turpem ignominiam. 497 Quid despectius aut uilius mendace? 498 Si mendacem te norint, nemo credet tibi etiam asseueranti uerissima. 499 Contra, si ueracem, maiorem habebit fidem nutus tuus quam aliorum sanctissimum iusiurandum. 500 Si non uis loqui repugnantia, si uis inesse uerbis tuis constantiam, nihil opus est memoria aut arte alia quam ut dicas semper quod credis uerum esse. 501 Verum uero consentiens, falsum nec uero nec falso. 502 Sed si uis in opinione tua uerum inesse, ne facile credas nisi comperta uel magnam ueri faciem prae se ferentia. 503 Ne uis suspicax. Vnde illud sapienter dictum: “Si uis esse uerax, suspicax non eris”». This last saying had already been stated in *Ad sap.* 440: «Vetus dictum est: “Vt uerax, ne suspicax”»; and can be found in *Sat.* 154 (VOO 4: 54 [*Sat.* 152]; ed. Tello 2020a: 83): «Vt uerax, ne suspicax». Cf. *Excit. praep.* 16 (VOO 1: 55): «[Fac ueniat tibi in mentem] esse suspicacem, et ex te alia metiri diuina ex humana mensura censere, saepe etiam ex tua ipsius, hoc est parua et praua»; Eucherus, *Epistula ad Valerianum* (PL 50: 725b): «Si uis esse uerax, suspicax non eris»; Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* III x 10 (ASD II-6: 555; tr. CWE 35: 361): «Vulgus suspicax».

or telling a lie. Truth is beneficial, long-lasting (494) and inspires trust (499), whereas lies are a sort of corrupted thought and corrupted language (495); they are despicable by nature (497) and engender mistrust (498). Further, he remarks a few lines earlier that «we take with a hostile disposition those things by which we have been deceived», thus «it is more advisable that all things be clear, undisguised and simple».³⁰³ This is a strong reminder of the opening words of *Ad sap.*, where Vives greatly encourages to «evaluate each thing as it really is».³⁰⁴ By accepting reality as it is truth comes forth naturally and in the most simple way,³⁰⁵ whereas falsity often implies a complex fabrication where reality is distorted and considerable —but never sufficient— justification is needed.

Truth may be difficult to elucidate, make known or accept, but truth and reality are one and the same thing, and they are what they are, irrespective of what we do: a human being (be he a philosopher or a theologian or a layperson) cannot change truth, because a human being cannot change Nature.³⁰⁶ As Frankfurt (2006: 45) puts it,

The relevant facts are what they are regardless of what we may happen to believe about them, and regardless of what we may wish them to be. This is, indeed, the essence and the defining character of factuality, of being real: the properties of reality, and accordingly the truths about its properties, are what they are, independent of any direct or immediate control by our will.

Vives is absolutely convinced that, in the long run, it is truth only (not lies) that prevails, because one cannot defeat reality, that is, Nature. «Time weakens what is false», Vives concludes, «and strengthens what is true».³⁰⁷ Moreover, if truth is not seriously pursued and respected, the very existence of individuals, societies and nations may be seriously threatened. As Frankfurt puts it:

Civilizations have *never* gotten along healthily, and *cannot* get along healthily, without large quantities of *reliable factual information*. They also cannot flourish if they are beset with troublesome infections of *mistaken* beliefs. To establish and to sustain an advanced culture, we need to avoid being debilitated by error or by ignorance. [...] Without truth, either we have no opinion at all concerning how things are or our opinion is wrong. One way or the other, we do not know what kind of situation we are in. We don't know what's going on, either in the world around us or within ourselves.³⁰⁸

4.2 *Virtus*

Vives formulates explicitly the notion of acting well, acting righteously or doing good (*bene agere, recte agere*) in the following aphorisms:

³⁰³ Vives, *Ad sap.* 490: «Infestis enim animis ea accipimus quibus sumus decepti».

³⁰⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 1: «...ut talem unamquamque existimemus qualis ipsa est».

³⁰⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 3.11 (VOO 8: 330): «Veritatis uia unica est et simplex; falsum uero multiplex, uastum, infinitum». On truth in Vives, it is highly recommended the reading of Perreiah 2014: 103-122.

³⁰⁶ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad. er.* (VOO 6: 436; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 489; tr. Watson 1913: 304): «Veritatem non peperit philosophus aut theologus sed natura ... Nam uerum nemo gignit», that is, «It is not the philosopher or theologian but Nature which gives birth to truth ... No one can create truth».

³⁰⁷ Vives, *Ad sap.* 156: «Falsa tempus infirmat, uera corroborat». Cf. complementary note 5.

³⁰⁸ Frankfurt 2006: 34, 59. Italics by the author.

8 Everyone should desire what is right and avoid what is wrong. This habit (that is, acting well) will become almost natural, so that one cannot be induced to act wrongfully unless he is compelled or does so against his will. [...] 139 All other learning will be genuine and fruitful provided that it is directed to its proper goal: virtue, that is, to act righteously. [...] 590 Moreover, what is easier and safer and free of care and, therefore, more enjoyable and less burdensome than doing good, whereas sin is full of danger and for that reason full of fear and anxiety?³⁰⁹

Similarly to the approach developed regarding truth (*bene dicere*) and lies (*male dicere*), Vives antagonizes (590) acting well (*bene agere, recte agere*) and wrongdoing (*male agere*): the former brings joy, easiness and safety, whereas the latter causes anxiety, trouble (anxiety) and danger. The reason that acting righteously is to be preferred can be explained in the following terms. On the one hand, if one adheres to judgment without error and therefore accepts what reason has deemed true and good,³¹⁰ one must necessarily wish what is right (8). On the other hand, if acting well is equated with virtue (139), and virtue is considered to be «the queen and supreme leader of all things, to which everything should be subservient, if each thing is to assume its proper role»,³¹¹ one must consequently conform to virtue. Through these aphorisms, Vives is saying that acting well implies doing what is right and, above all, complying with virtue. It is then of paramount importance to understand what virtue is from the point of view of the Valencian humanist.

In *Ad sap.* 18, Vives writes that «I understand virtue to be dutiful respect [*pietas*] towards God and human beings: the worship of God [*cultus dei*]; and love of mankind [*amor in homines*], which is joined with the will of doing good [*uoluntas benefaciendi*]». ³¹² According to this aphorism, virtue mainly consists of *pietas*, a Latin concept which originally meant ‘dutiful conduct’ towards parents, family, native land and the divinity.³¹³ However, it

³⁰⁹ Vives, *Ad sap.* 8, 139, 590: «8 Et ea cupiat quae recta sint, fugiat quae praua. Assuefactio haec (bene agere) uertet ei prope in naturam, ut non possit nisi coactus et reluctans ad male agendum pertrahi. [...] 139 Reliqua eruditio sincaera est et frugifera, referatur modo ad suum scopum: uirtutem, hoc est recte agere. [...] 590 Quid quod facilius et tutius et securius (ac proinde iucundius leuiusque) est bene agere, quum peccatum periculi sit plenum et eam ob caussam timoris ac sollicitudinis?».

³¹⁰ Cf. *supra* n. 156, 171; Noreña 1970: 288: «According to Vives, the wise philosopher and the prudent judge are much alike in many respects. [...] The personal choice of the judge is a moral choice. A prudent judge needs to be a good man, free from uncontrolled passions».

³¹¹ Vives, *Ad sap.* 17: «Regina et princeps rerum omnium praestantissima est uirtus, cui reliqua omnia, si suo uelint officio defungi, ancillari oportet».

³¹² Vives, *Ad sap.* 18: «Virtutem uoco pietatem in deum et homines, cultum dei, et amorem in homines qui coniunctus est cum uoluntate benefaciendi». As far as the scope of *amor in homines* is concerned, in addition to the will of doing good, Vives also mentions the duties (*officium*) derived from living with others. Cf. *Ad sap.* 418 (*infra* n. 329).

³¹³ Cf. Cicero, *De re publica* 6.3.16 (Zetzel 1995: 87; tr. Zetzel 2017: 98): «Scipio, you should be like your grandfather here and like me, your father, in cultivating justice and piety [*iustitiam cole et pietatem*]; it's important in relation to your parents and family [*in parentibus et propinquis*], but most important in relation to your fatherland [*in patria*]»; *De natura deorum* 1.41.116 (Rackham 1933: 112-113): «Piety is justice towards the gods [*est enim pietas iustitia aduersum deos*]»; Augustine, *De ciuitate Dei* 10.1 (Dombart and Kalb 1993, vol. 1: 403; tr. Dyson 1998: 392): «Pietas quoque proprie Dei cultus intellegi solet, quam Graeci εὐσεβείαν uocant. Haec tamen et erga parentes officiose haberi dicitur. More autem uulgi hoc nomen etiam in operibus misericordiae frequentatur», that is, «‘piety’, which the Greeks call *eusebeia*, is usually understood in the strict sense to mean the worship of God;

later became a synonym of ‘religion’ and ‘worship of God’, of which evolution Vives was aware when he noted in *Ciu. dei* that «*religio* and *pietas* are taken for the same, although *pietas* is properly of native land, parents and kindred».³¹⁴ In *Disc.*, he stresses the fact that piety (equated here with religion) refers to knowledge on how to worship God,³¹⁵ and implies love (*charitas*).³¹⁶ In *Conc.*, he nuances *pietas* as consisting of two principles: on the one hand, love and charity towards human beings (who can be seen) and God (who cannot); on the other hand, peace and concord.³¹⁷

Regarding the will of doing good (*uoluntas benefaciendi*) as part of love of mankind, Vives extensively developed this matter in *Sub.*, so that «everyone may know what is the correct procedure, and in what manner a good deed [*beneficium*]³¹⁸ is to be received or performed, and how much gratitude one should have in each case».³¹⁹ In this work, he honestly believed that «there is a desire marvelously built into the human heart that generous spirits wish to do good [*benefacere*], and to help as many as possible; and think there is nothing more honorable or praiseworthy, even if it brings no advantage to themselves and even at a huge price of life and fortunes».³²⁰

Before proceeding to further analysis of the content of aphorism 18, a clarification needs to be done. This aphorism has traditionally been interpreted as a definition of *uirtus* composed by three elements (*uirtus* = *pietas*, *cultum dei*, *amor in homines*). Based on the characteristics explicitly or implicitly formulated in aphorism 18, and endorsed by the complementary passages of other works of Vives given just a few lines earlier as well as by the punctuation of the 1526 edition (C, Bruges: Hubert de Croock) which the 1530 edition made even more apparent (K, Antwerp: Robert de Keyser),³²¹ I propose to interpret aphorism

yet this word is also used to denote the duties which we owe to parents. Also, in common speech, the word frequently refers to works of mercy»; *De trinitate* 14.11. Cf. also *supra* Part II, section 5.1, p. 69.

³¹⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 10.1.19 (CCD 2: 337): «Nam religio et pietas pro eodem capiuntur; at pietas patriae, parentibus, sanguineque iunctis debet». This is a commentary to the text of Augustine cited in the previous note.

³¹⁵ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 1 (VOO 6: 256; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 287): «...intelligentia diuini cultus, quae pietas et eadem religio nuncupatur». In *Ver. fid.* 2.9 (VOO 8: 183) he defines *pietas* as «scientia colendi Dei», that is, «the science of worshipping God».

³¹⁶ Cf. Vives, *Disc. trad.* 1 (VOO 6: 256; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 287): «Perfectio uero pietatis illorum est qui altius sese attollunt per charitatem».

³¹⁷ Cf. *Conc.* 3 (VOO 5: 311): «Porro uera et sancta Christiana pietas duobus est uelut capitibus uniuersa comprehensa: iisque amoris, caritatis, pacis, concordiae; amoris proximi quem uides, et amore Dei quem non uides. In his duobus legem ac prophetas omnes sitos esse ac conclusos ueritas ipsa pronuntiat».

³¹⁸ Seneca, in *De beneficiis* 1.6.1, defines *beneficium* as follows (Cardó 1933: 12; tr. Cooper and Procopé 1995: 202): «An act of benevolence [*beniuola actio*] bestowing joy and deriving joy from bestowing it, with an inclination and spontaneous readiness to do so. Thus what matters is not the deed or the gift [*quid fiat aut quid detur*] but the mentality [*mens*] behind them: the kindness [*beneficium*] lies not in the deed or gift but in the mind [*animus*] itself of the person responsible for the deed or gift [*dans aut faciens*]».

³¹⁹ Vives, *Sub.* 1.3.1 (VOO 4: 426; ed. tr. SWJV 4: 14-15): «Vt sciat quisque qui sit beneficiorum ordo, et quomodo uel accipiendum beneficium uel dandum, et quanta cuique habenda sit gratia».

³²⁰ Vives, *Sub.* 1.4.3 (VOO 4: 432; ed. tr. SWJV 4: 24-25): «Itaque ea cupiditas mirifice est humanis pectoribus inaedificata, ut generosi animi benefacere quam plurimis et iuuare uelint, nihilque honestius aut praestantius arbitrentur, idque sine ulla sui utilitate etiam cum ingenti uel fortunarum uel uitae dispendio».

³²¹ Cf. complementary note 6.

18 as follows: *uirtus* = *pietas: cultum dei, amor in homines*. The chart below succinctly summarizes all this information in light of my innovative interpretation.

Virtus	pietas (amor, charitas)	in deum (amor dei, quem non uides)	cultum
		in homines (amor proximi, quem uides)	uoluntas benefaciendi
			officium uitae communis
		pax, concordia	

Vives elaborates the first part of *uirtus* as *pietas* (*cultus dei*) basically in a collection of aphorisms devoted to religion (259-275) and Christ (276-315), while he addresses the second part (*amor in homines*) particularly in a group of aphorisms devoted to coexistence and dealing with others (418-447, 510-565). A section of aphorisms about love and dearness (347-417) deploys content relevant to either the worship of God or to human conduct, since *amor* and *charitas* are two characteristics of *pietas* that apply to both dimensions.³²² Precisely in this last section, Vives demonstrates his firm belief that *charitas* is a key element in society, as it guarantees peace and concord among human beings. Allusion is made to the Gospel of John, when Vives affirms that «the consummately wise master and, of course, author of our life gave us only one precept for living: to love [*ut amemus*], knowing that, if we love, our life will be very happy and there will be no need for any other laws».³²³ According to the Valencian humanist, love makes everything equal,³²⁴ it fosters strong friendship,³²⁵ it helps

³²² Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 296: «Charity towards God [*charitas erga deum*] should be such that you give him preference over all other things, and consider his honor and glory to be dearer than all the honors or benefits of this life»; 378: «...that mutual bond of love among men and with God [*inter se et cum deo charitatem*]»; 382: «Neither fasting nor all riches donated to the benefit of the poor can render a person agreeable to God. Only love for others [*in homines charitas*] achieves it»; 390: «Those who sow discord and tear apart love [*charitas*] among human beings will be called the sons of the devil».

³²³ Vives, *Ad sap.* 352: «Sapientissimus uitae nostrae magister, nempe et author, unicum dedit ad uiuendum documentum: ut amemus; gnarus uitam nostram, si amemus, fore felicissimam nec aliis opus esse legibus». Cf. *Iohannes* 13:34-35: «Mandatum nouum do uobis, ut diligatis inuicem; sicut dilexi uos, ut et uos diligatis inuicem. In hoc cognoscent omnes quia discipuli mei estis: si dilectionem habueritis ad inuicem», 15:12: «Hoc est praeceptum meum: ut diligatis inuicem, sicut dilexi uos». These texts of John are partially cited by Vives in *Sub.* 1.10.7 (VOO 4: 456; SWJV 4: 68).

³²⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 355: «Verus amor omnia exaequat». The 'equality' established by love makes sharing possible. Cf. *Ad sap.* 356: «...amor omnia reddit communia»; *Sub.* 1.10.8 (VOO 4: 456; ed. tr. SWJV 4: 68-69): «Amoris haec est natura ut omnia faciat communia», that is, «The nature of love is such that it causes all things to be shared in common»; Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades* I i 1 (ASD II-1: 84-86; tr. CWE 31: 29-30): «Amicorum omnia communia».

³²⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 404: «No bodyguard [*satellitium*] is more powerful than loyal friends [*amici fideles*]», 406: «True, solid and lasting friendship [*amicitia*] can only exist among good persons [*inter bonos*], among whom love thrives easily»; *Sat.* 66 (VOO 4: 42 [*Sat.* 65]; ed. Tello 2020a: 71): «MAGNUM SATELLITVM AMOR. Claudianus: "Non sic excubiae nec circumstantia pila ut tutatur amor". Salustius: "Non arma aut opes praesidia regni sunt sed amici. Nemo enim vult nocere ei quem amat"», that is, «LOVE IS A STRONG BODYGUARD. Claudian writes: "Neither sentinels nor being encircled by spears can

understand humankind's common condition and fate,³²⁶ it dissipates envy and disputes;³²⁷ but, above all, it does prevent war (*bellum*), a crime that equates human beings to beasts (*belua*).³²⁸

In addition to these beneficial qualities, Vives argues that love towards humankind also involves abiding by the duties upon which life with others (*officium uitae communis*) is built, namely respect (*reuerari*), honesty (*honeste uersari*) and propriety (*cum decore*);³²⁹ modesty (*modestia*) and self-control (*moderatio, uerecundia*) are the unequivocal sign of proper behavior.³³⁰ Aphorisms 424-447 give advice on a variety of matters, all aimed to improve coexistence with others: laughter must not be frequent, excessive or loud;³³¹ the eyes and hands should remain calm;³³² acknowledgement should be given to the authorities for the sake of public peace,³³³ one ought to yield to the wealthy³³⁴ and rise in deference to the elders;³³⁵ no one is to be despised.³³⁶

keep you safer than love". And Sallust: "The defenses of a kingdom are not weapons or wealth but friends, because no one wishes to hurt the one he loves". Citation of Claudian belongs to *Panegyricus de quarto consulatu Honorii* 281; citation of Sallust belongs to *De bello Iugurthino* 10.4.

³²⁶ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 396: «You must not make fun of anyone, mindful that what happens to one person can happen to anyone at all». Cf. Publilius Syrus (*Sententiae* 133) and Seneca (*De tranquillitate animi* 11.8) in *infra* Supplement, n. 626.

³²⁷ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 355-356: «355 ...Where love thrives, no one seeks to be preferred to anyone else; no one seeks to steal from one he loves because he feels that what belongs to the beloved belongs to him. 356 Nor does anyone wish to file a suit against his dear brother or think that he would suffer harm from the loved one unjustly. Therefore, no one contemplates revenge. No one envies the one he loves, or takes delight in his friend's misfortunes, or feels sad at his friend's good fortune. Quite the opposite, according to the saying of the apostle, he rather "rejoices with those who rejoice, weeps with those who weep". And they do not do so feignedly or insincerely but from the heart, since love enables all things to be shared in common, and considers whatever belongs to the loved one to be his». The words of the apostle Paul are taken from *Ad Romanos* 12:15.

³²⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 391-393: «391 War [*bellum*] is the greatest of enmities, by which humans surpass the ferocity of beasts [*beluarum feritas*]. Take note that it is not a human activity but proper to beasts. 392 How much Nature detests war, since it created man unarmed, to be mild and share community of life! God recoils from war, for he profoundly wishes and bids humans to express mutual love for each other [*mutuam inter homines charitas*]. 393 No one can make war on man or inflict damage on another without committing a crime [*scelus*]». Cf. complementary note 7.

³²⁹ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 418: «Nec amare tantum homines debes, sed etiam quos (aequum est) reuereri ac inter eos honeste uersari et cum decore. In quo est officium uitae communis».

³³⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 420: «Sit tibi inter homines modestia et moderatio in uniuerso corpore», 421: «Solum humanae faciei tegumentum decoris in primis et fauorabile modestia et uerecundia. Qua nudis, nihil dici potest deformius aut detestabilis».

³³¹ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 424: «Risus ne sit frequens aut immoderatus aut cum clamore et concussionem corporis, ne in cachinnum aut irrisum exeat».

³³² Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 428: «Oculi sint quieti; manus ne ludibundae, ne gesticulatrices».

³³³ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 431: «Magistratibus exteriorem honorem exhibe illisque audiens esto, etiam si graua et molesta imperent. Hoc enim uult deus propter publicam quietem».

³³⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 432: «Diuitibus cede, ne irritati et tibi et aliis bonis noceant».

³³⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 433: «Seni assurge reueritus aetatem et rerum usum prudentiamque, quae in illa aetate esse solet».

³³⁶ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 441: «Neminem contemnere uidearis non uultu, non uerbo, non gestu, non facto aliquo», 446: «Praeter haec omnia nullus est contemptibilis quem deus filium dignatur, nisi in hoc dei quoque iudicium contemnas». Complementary advice on pride in *Ad sap.* 538: «Examine who

Vives heavily emphasizes that «the more noble-minded and well educated a person is, the more mildly and politely he behaves with everyone», because education in the liberal arts (*in bonas artes eruditio*) intends to make each person more humane (*humanitas*).³³⁷ Moreover, education leads to proper understanding of the human condition and its weaknesses (*humana imbecillitas*). Consequently, Vives says, it must always be borne in mind that, since deception and error are inherent to human nature, people's misjudgments (which may result in offenses and unfair actions) should not be let to have an impact on us and thus should be forgiven.³³⁸

4.3 Two outcomes of *bene dicere* and *bene agere*

(a) Language and love as the glue of society

Vives's decision to include speaking well and acting well as indispensable features in the path to attain practical wisdom may well lie in the fact that, according to him, some of their elements —*lingua* 'language', in the case of *bene dicere*; *amor* 'love', in the case of *bene agere*— act as a glue (*glutinum*; also *gluten* 'gum') that keeps human beings as well as human society together, cemented, united in harmony. In *Foem.*, he explicitly says that whatever alliance is fastened together with the glue («*hoc glutine*») of love does not need of any other laws, edicts, statues, pacts or agreements, because all proceeds in the greatest tranquility and harmony.³³⁹ In *Conc.*, he affirms that language and words (*lingua et uoces*) are the glue for a life in common (*glutinum communis uitae*).³⁴⁰ In *Disc.*, he reminds that nothing but the glue of love can generate a spiritual bond,³⁴¹ while in *Mar.* he underlines the very adhesive quality

you are, where you are, and what your status is. Nothing should arouse so much pride in you that you think that more is owed to you than is allowed to others».

³³⁷ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 437: «Generosissime ut quisque est et optime educatus, ita se maxime mitem omnibus et comem praebet; ut fastidium et ferocia ex uilitate sunt aut hebetudine aut imperitia. Vnde in bonas artes eruditio humanitas nuncupata est». Vives's understanding of the word *humanitas* can be found, for example, in *Pacif.* (VOO 5: 432): «Tum liber tantis malis ac morbis animus formatur ad mansuetudinem atque humanitatem; unde institutionem ad bonas artes humanitatem ueteres appellabant»; *Disc. trad. er.* (VOO 6: 429; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 481): «Artes humanitatis nominantur, reddant nos humanos! A Deo optimo sunt traditae, reddant bonos!». In the first passage, Vives highlights the role of the Humanities in forging a soul free from evils and illnesses. In the second passage, Vives affirms that the Humanities are called *artes* because they are a method consisting in the acquisition of certain skills (taught by God) that render us more human and better persons.

³³⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 549: «Memineris humanae imbecillitatis esse falli, errare, ne te grauius aliorum delicta offendant praesertim aduersum te», 550: «Ignoscere generosi pectoris».

³³⁹ Cf. Vives, *Foem.* 2.1.5 (VOO 4: 177; ed. tr. SWJV 7: 6-7): «Saepissime Christus testatus est ut se mutuo deligerent. Sapientissimus artifex affectuum humanorum non ignorabat quaecumque societas hoc glutine coiret ei nullis aliis legibus, edictis, statutis, pactis, conuentis opus fore; omnia in placidissima tranquillitate et concordia futura; nullas rixas, nullas lites, nullas querimonias suborituras».

³⁴⁰ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 1 (VOO 5: 197): «Et quemadmodum lingua et uoces praesenti societati seruiunt et glutinum sunt communis uitae, ita scriptura priores cum posterioribus coniungit, et multas aetates unam facit».

³⁴¹ Cf. Vives, *Disc. prima ph.* 1 (VOO 3: 189): «Amor enim uinculum est unicum rerum spiritalium, siquidem non alio glutino possunt illae copulari».

(*tenacissimum*) of it.³⁴² In *Ep. Henr. adm.*, Vives regards virtue as a glue capable of creating solid and long-lasting friendships.³⁴³

This capability of *sermo / lingua* and *amor* to both unify and cement (*glutinum*) what is widely diverse was in agreement with Vives's firm desire to neutralize *discordia*,³⁴⁴ that is, conflict. In most of his social and political works published later between 1526 and 1529 (*Ep. Henr. reg. Gall.*; *Ep. Henr. adm.*; *Sub.*; *Conc.*; *Pacif.*; *Vit. Turc.*) one can realize the extent to which discord of human beings between human beings and of nations between nations is unequivocally condemned³⁴⁵ and fought against. The *Sat.*, published together with *Ad sap.*, offers another solid proof of Vives's vigorous pursuit of concord: by calling *symbola* (*syn-*'with') his recollection of wise sayings he patently stressed that union and accord were critical issues for rulers and any policymaker.³⁴⁶

(b) The orator as an underlying model

The importance given by Vives to judging, speaking and acting uprightly seems to have a parallel in the description of the orator as portrayed in rhetoric by classical Latin authors. Quintilian defines rhetoric as «the science of speaking well»,³⁴⁷ which holds «the power of persuading».³⁴⁸ He sincerely believes that «the ideal orator [...] should be a good man»,³⁴⁹ moreover, «I affirm that no man can be an orator unless he is a good man».³⁵⁰ By *uir bonus*,

³⁴² Cf. Vives, *Mar.* 10.200 (VOO 4: 411; ed. tr. SWJV 8: 218-219): «Omnes amor copulabit mutuus uester tamquam tenacissimum glutinum».

³⁴³ Cf. Vives, *Ep. Henr. adm.* 13 (VOO 5: 178; ed. tr. SWJV 12: 66-67): «Non est enim amicitiarum certius aliud uel diuturnius glutinum quam uirtus».

³⁴⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 390: «Qui uero discordias serere, charitatem hominum inter se rescindere, ii filii diaboli», that is, «Those who sow discord and tear apart love among men will be called the sons of the devil». Cf. *Ver. fid.* 5.9 (VOO 8: 449): «Atque ut maximum ciuitatis bonum est pax et concordia, ita maximum est malum dissensio et odia publica et priuata, unde nascuntur simultates, inimicitiae, lites, iurgia, et illatio manuum ad pugnam et caedes».

³⁴⁵ Cf., for example, *Conc.* 3 (VOO 5: 314): «Et quum leges *bonis* tutelam ac securitatem, malis terrorem adferant, poenas et supplicia minentur, discordia (in diuersum mutatis rebus) pauorem bonis, impunitatem malis et securitatem praebet»; (VOO 5: 321): «Ex discordia relinquuntur dispersi ac dispalati homines, pleni terrore ac formidine, nulli se loco, nulli hominem credentes. [...] Dissipati conuentus et congregationes, sublatis legibus, rupto concordia foedere; aedificia, uillae, urbes dirutae; quidquid solo affixum erat euulsum; fames, pestis, inopia rerum omnium, imperitia, inertia, pessimi mores; et ex militibus exautoratis peritissimi ac strenui latrones». *Bonis* is the reading of the *editio princeps* (1529), instead of *boni* (VOO).

³⁴⁶ Cf. *supra* Part III, section 1.2 (a).

³⁴⁷ Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 2.15.34 (Butler 1920: 314-315): «...rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam».

³⁴⁸ Cf. Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 2.15.3 (Butler 1920: 300-301): «Est igitur frequentissimus finis, rhetoricen esse uim persuadendi». Aristotle had argued that rhetoric (how something is being said) is a tool that can be used to exert an influence over the giving of decisions, that is, over the things that judgment decides and commands to be enacted; cf. *Rhetorica* 2.1 (1377b21-22; Cope and Sandys 2009, vol. 2: 2): «...ἔνεκα κρίσεως ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ (καὶ γὰρ τὰς συμβουλὰς κρίνουσι καὶ ἡ δίκη κρίσις ἐστὶν)».

³⁴⁹ Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 2.15.33 (Butler 1920: 314-315): «...perfectum oratorem ... esse uirum bonum uolumus». Cf. the definition of Cato cited in 12.1.1 (Butler 1922b: 354): «A M. Catone finitur: uir bonus dicendi peritus».

³⁵⁰ Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 12.1.3 (Butler 1922b: 356-357): «Dico ... ne futurum quidem oratorem nisi uirum bonum».

Quintilian means that «the orator must above all things devote his attention to the formation of moral character and must acquire a complete knowledge [*omnis disciplina*] of all that is just and honourable. For without this knowledge no one can be either a good man or skilled in speaking [*dicendi peritus*]». ³⁵¹ Quintilian again emphasizes a few lines later that «no one will achieve sufficient skill [*peritus*] even in speaking, unless he makes a thorough study [*perspicere*] of all the workings of nature and forms his character on the precepts of philosophy and the dictates of reason». ³⁵²

From the above passages it can be inferred that a good speaker must know a wide range of subjects (*bene sapere*) in order to articulate an argument with appropriate words and style (*bene dicere*) that is able to persuade the audience, and thus move them to act in a certain direction. ³⁵³ This last stage is controversial, because persuasion can be used for either a good purpose (*bene agere*) or a bad one (*male agere*), something which Quintilian reckons when he admits that «rhetoric sometimes substitutes falsehood for truth». ³⁵⁴

In light of the notion of the good speaker deployed by Quintilian (which can be complemented by that of Cicero's *De oratore*) ³⁵⁵ and given the attention paid by Vives himself to rhetoric, ³⁵⁶ it cannot therefore be ruled out the possibility that Vives may have composed *Ad sap.* with the intention that it be used as a textbook (or self-teaching book) for the formation of future articulated, fluent and convincing speakers.

5 Knowledge of oneself: the care of the body

This section deploys the argument that, for Vives, the caring of the body is an indispensable duty as part of the superior and loftier duty of the care of the soul. Although *Ad sap.* presents one of Vives's most complete standpoint on the nourishment and hygiene of the body, his views can be complemented with passages from *Sat.* 10, 84, 174; *Sub.* 2.1.3; *Conc.* 4.4; *Excit.* (*Excit. praep.* 46-50, 92-93; *Excit. dom.*; *Excit. med. d.* 9-11; *Excit. med. g.* 13, 26); and *Ling.* 8, 18, 23. Medicine as a discipline is discussed by Vives in *Disc. corr.* 5 (VOO 6: 198-

³⁵¹ Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 12.2.1 (Butler 1922b: 382-383): «Mores ante omnia oratori studiis erunt excolendi atque omnis honesti iustique disciplina pertractanda, sine qua nemo nec uir bonus esse nec dicendi peritus potest».

³⁵² Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 12.2.4 (Butler 1922b: 382-383): «Ne dicendi quidem satis peritum fore qui non et naturae uim omnem penitus perspexerit et mores praeceptis ac ratione formarit».

³⁵³ In a review of an updated French anthology of Agricola's texts, B. Renner (*Renaissance Quarterly* 73/2: 601) precisely points out «the focus on practicality over purely formal aspects ... *Docere* has to lead to *mouere*: public reception represents an essential criterion for the humanist orator who aims at influencing public opinion by touching critically on social, political, and religious issues».

³⁵⁴ Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 2.17.19 (Butler 1920: 332-333): «Ego rhetorice nonnunquam dicere falsa pro ueris confitebor».

³⁵⁵ Cf., for example, *De oratore* 1.15.68 (Sutton 1942: 50-51): «Quoniam philosophia in tres partes est tributa: in naturae obscuritatem, in disserendi subtilitatem, in uitam atque mores, ... tertium uero, quod semper oratoris fuit, nisi tenebimus, nihil oratori, in quo magnus esse possit, relinquemus», that is, «Since philosophy is divided into three branches, which respectively deal with the mysteries of nature, with the subtleties of dialectic, and with human life and conduct, ... unless we keep our hold on the third, which has ever been the orator's province, we shall leave the orator no sphere wherein to attain greatness».

³⁵⁶ Cf., for example, Vives's *Syll.* (1520), *Declam.* (1523), *Disc. corr.* 4 (1531), and *Rat. dic.* (1533); also, Quintilian's presence in the works of Vives, such as *Declam.* 1-2, and *Disc. corr.* 4.

203; Vigliano 2013a: 222-228), where he deplores that physicians do not have enough experience, knowledge of reality and philosophical judgment, but seem to be driven for the most part by profit and a desire for praise.³⁵⁷

Studies entirely devoted to examine Vives's views on the care of the body are scarce: a few pages of Tobriner (1966: 254-261)³⁵⁸ and Gómez-Hortigüela (2001: 211-212). This significant gap in Vivesian studies could begin to be filled by, for example, comparing Vives's views with those held by Erasmus in *De ciuilitate morum puerilium* (Basel: Officina Frobeniana, 1530).³⁵⁹ As far as general studies on the care of the body in the Renaissance are concerned, these are usually found within the disciplines of 'natural philosophy' or 'medicine', and often associated with Hippocrates, Galen and the theory of humors. The contributions of W. A. Wallace (in Schmitt and Skinner 1988: 201-235), Siraisi 1990, Nutton 2005, Henderson 2006, Siraisi 2007, and Kodera 2010 cover a wide range of contents, ranging from philosophy and medical practice to printed editions on this subject.

5.1 A healthy body is conducive to a healthy mind

Since a human being is composed of soul (*animus*) and body,³⁶⁰ Vives dedicates around seventy aphorisms of *Ad sap.* to reflect on the body, his main purpose being to draw awareness to the fact that a healthy body is in the best interest of the soul (and the mind). As stated in aphorism 29, «health [*sanitas*] is a particular disposition of the body that makes for a sound mind».³⁶¹ This principle, that sustains that the healthiness of the body is critical to set the best material conditions for the mind to successfully perform its duties, is again alluded to in a later aphorism. After reminding that «food, sleep, exercise, every single care of the body [*curatio corporis*] should be focused on health [*ad sanitatem*], not on enjoyment and pleasure», he clearly affirms that «care of the body will be of service to the soul [*animus*] without hesitation».³⁶²

Vives insists on this thought in at least two other works. In *Sat.*, he emphasizes that one must keep healthy (*sanus*) not only on the outside (the body) but also on the inside (the soul).³⁶³ In *Excit. praep.*,³⁶⁴ he questions that a person be healthy if his mind is sick. Further, in *Excit. med. g.*, he warns that full health can only be ensured by keeping strong the most important part of our being, namely that whose nature is the most similar to God, that is, the

³⁵⁷ Cf. Vives, *Disc. corr.* 5 (VOO 6: 199, 202; Vigliano 2013a: 223, 227): «Prima illius corruptela et saeuissima est, ubicunque uel deest experientia et usus rerum, uel iudicium philosophicum ... Alii contra, philosophiae praeceptis instructi, ignari usus, expertes rerum, manum curationibus admouent. [...] Ad haec fastidiuit ostentatio ueterem et uulgatam medendi uiam: nouam, insolitam quaesiuit, quae admirationem excitaret».

³⁵⁸ Unfortunately, the eight pages of Tobriner's PhD dissertation were reduced to a single sentence in Tobriner 1968: 63: «Caution against undue and excessive indulgence of the body is frank and undisguised».

³⁵⁹ Cf. Erasmus, *De ciuilitate morum puerilium* 1 (ASD I-8: 315-324; tr. CWE 25: 273-278).

³⁶⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 12, in *supra* n. 92.

³⁶¹ Cf. *Ad sap.* 29: «Sanitas: talis habitudo corporis ut ualeat mens». In *Ad sap.* 77, Vives recalls this principle when he alludes to «the health of the mind [*sanitas mentis*]».

³⁶² Cf. *Ad sap.* 90: «Cibi, somni, exercitationes, tota corporis curatio ad sanitatem referenda est, non ad uoluptatem ac delicias, ut animo prompte inseruiat».

³⁶³ Cf. Vives, *Sat.* 10 (VOO 4: 34; ed. Tello 2020a: 63): «SANVS INTVS ET EXTERIVS. Iuuenalis ex Socrate: "Orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano"».

³⁶⁴ Cf. Vives, *Excit. praep.* 49 (VOO 1: 57): «Sanus: quorsum si mens insana?».

mind, the lofty part of the *animus*. He also insists that a strong and vigorous (*ualeat*) body will help attain a pure (*integra*) and healthy mind.³⁶⁵ The notion that a healthy body is conducive to a healthy mind seems to have been originated in Juvenal's famous verse «You should pray for a sound mind in a sound body»,³⁶⁶ and it can be traced back to earlier periods if we look into Greek ancient authors. According to Diogenes Laertius, to the question of «Who is happy?», Thales of Miletus answered «the man who is healthy in body, resourceful in mind, and educable in nature».³⁶⁷

5.2 Vives's views on the body in the *Introductio ad sapientiam*

After having briefly announced why the body should be taken care of, Vives arranges his discourse in four different stages. In the first stage, he comments on various shortcomings of the body (64-75, 83-91) in order to point out that it should not assume the leading role in life. Vives shows how deceptive beauty (*forma*, *lineamenta*, *decor*) and strength (*robur*) of the body can be: while the body may look nice and powerful from the outside, its inner parts are ugly,³⁶⁸ and the most effective power leading to successful action is not provided by brutal force of the body but by intelligence of the whole mind.³⁶⁹ Furthermore, the pleasures that the body can provide are fleeting (*fugacissimae*), brief (*momentaneae*),³⁷⁰ vulgar (*uilis*) and

³⁶⁵ Cf. Vives, *Excit. med. g.* 26 (VOO 1: 92): «Vera atque unica est salus: id ualere in nobis quod nostri est pars potissima tuique, Domine, simillima; hoc est fieri eam, quoad eius perfici queat, cultu atque amore uicinam coniunctamque tibi, qui solus es salus nostra. Sed ea ipsa mens, quatenus corpori est annexa, sentit illius affectiones atque eis commouetur. [...] Da pater ut recte ualeamus corpore, quo integra et sana sit mens».

³⁶⁶ Juvenal, *Saturae* 10.356 (Ramsay 1918: 218-219): «Orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sano».

³⁶⁷ Thales of Miletus, in Diogenes Laertius, 1.37 (Hicks 1925, vol. 1: 38; tr. Mensch and Miller 2018: 20): «Τίς εὐδαίμων; ὁ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ὑγιής, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν εὐπορος, τὴν δὲ φύσιν εὐπαιδευτος».

³⁶⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 64: «What is beauty [*forma*] in the body? You will say a fair-colored complexion. But if one could examine the inner parts of the flesh, how much hideousness would be seen even in a very beautiful body! A very beautiful body is nothing else but a manure heap [*sterquilinum*] covered with purple and white linen», 65: «Of what benefit are the features [*lineamenta*] and the pleasing appearance [*decor*] of the body, if the soul is repulsive [*si turpis sit animus*]? As that famous Greek said, "A repugnant guest in a beautiful lodging"». The Greek saying is also found in *Sat.* 184 (VOO 4: 58 [*Sat.* 181]; ed. Tello 2020a: 87): «DEFORME GIGANTEM IN NANO. In tam pusillo corpore, quantum natura dedit hominibus, tam fragili et infirmo turpissimum est esse tam ferum et superbum animum, qui stultitia et superbia coelos etiam contingat et transcendat»; *Excit. praep.* 47 (VOO 1: 57): «Vide ne in formoso hospitio habitet hospes deformis». For a much more loathsome comment on the body, cf. *Conc.* 4.4 (VOO 5: 342-346). In the first lines of the chapter the body is called «putrid bilge [*putris sentina*]», «ruined sewer [*cloaca ruinosa*]» and «manure pile covered by skin [*sterquilinum opertum cute*]».

³⁶⁹ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 66: «What good is it for a human being to have physical power [*robur*], since the most significant actions and those worthy of a person are not accomplished by physical strength [*uires*] but by the power of the intelligence [*ingenium*]?».

³⁷⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 75: «In addition, the pleasures of the body are very fleeting, brief, and no force can retain them, and they are never free of defilement and a certain bitterness». For this reason, Vives will add in *Sat.* 174 (VOO 4: 57 [*Sat.* 172]; ed. Tello 2020a: 86) that «when pleasures [*uoluptates*] come, they delight us [*delectant*]. Therefore, they are considered beautiful and agreeable. But when they fade away [*recedentes*], they reveal shame and ugliness [*turpitude*, *deformitas*] and leave behind a sense of regret [*poenitentia*]». In *Ad sap.* 91, Vives warns that «all the strength of body and mind are invigorated by activity and labor, whereas they languish through idleness [*ocium*] and the softness [*mollicies*] of pleasure [*uoluptas*]».

proper of beasts (*pecudina*), which by the way happen to be more skilled in enjoying their bodies than humans themselves.³⁷¹ In a nutshell, the soul is confined in the body similarly to an immense treasure put in a vessel of clay.³⁷²

This last statement leads Vives to the second stage: although the body must not be allowed to take command of a person's life but, conversely, it must be kept under control,³⁷³ nonetheless it cannot be completely despised and abandoned,³⁷⁴ since it harbors the soul. In consequence, Vives gives advice on how to keep the body in good condition (92-97).³⁷⁵ The body must be kept warm,³⁷⁶ and clean; and hygiene ought to be especially good in parts such as the head, hands and genital area.³⁷⁷ However, neatness (*mundicies*) should not be obsessively meticulous (*morositas*), otherwise this detrimental imbalance may impede to accomplish the primary aim of hygiene, which is to be conducive to health (*ualetudo*) and intelligence (*ingenium*).³⁷⁸ In *Ling.*, Vives insists on condemning an excessive eagerness (*cura*) for neatness.³⁷⁹

In a third stage, Vives focuses on two activities critical to bodily survival: nourishment and sleep. Of solid nourishment (98-105), he says that it be light, simple, and without mixing different types of food or seasoning.³⁸⁰ Moderation (*parsimonia*; cf. *Ad sap.* 103) should be

³⁷¹ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 72: «Taking pleasure in one's body [*delectatio corporis*], like the body itself, is a vulgar [*uilis*] and bestial [*pecudina*] pleasure. Animals [*pecora*] stimulate and enjoy their bodies more often, longer and with more intensity than humans», 91: «There is nothing that diminishes the vigor of the mind [*mens*] and the resilience and the physical powers of the body as does pleasure [*uoluptas*]».

³⁷² Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 85: «...in hac nostra peregrinatione animum gestamus in corpore inclusum maximasque opes in uasis fictilibus...». The expression *in uasis fictilibus* is found in 2 *Ad Corinthios* 4:7; also in 2 *Ad Timotheum* 2:20, slightly modified: *uasa ... fictilia*.

³⁷³ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 86: «Sic curandum tamen ut se non dominum, non socium esse sentiat sed mancipium».

³⁷⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 85: «Non omnino repudiandum nobis est et abiiciendum corpus».

³⁷⁵ Vives was well aware of the importance of keeping illnesses at bay. Cf. for example *Sub.* 2.1.3-4 (VOO 4: 466-467; tr. SWJV 4: 90-93) where Vives speaks of the frequent danger (*periculum commune*) of contagious diseases (*morbi*) and the need to combat them and preventing them from spreading to others.

³⁷⁶ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 96: «The feet must be kept clean and warm [*calidi*]», 97: «The cold [*frigus*] has to be kept away from other parts of the body, especially from the back of the neck»; 191: «Beware of drunkenness, indigestion and cold, especially in the back of the neck».

³⁷⁷ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 93-95: «93 Wash your hands and your face at frequent intervals with cold water, and dry them with a clean linen towel. 94 Frequently clean those parts of the body which provide a passage-way to the exterior for bodily secretions and excrement. 95 These parts are the head, the ears, the eyes, the nostrils, the hands, the armpits and the private parts».

³⁷⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 92: «Mundicies corporis et uictus citra delicias aut morositatem ad ualetudinem et ingenium confert».

³⁷⁹ Cf. Vives, *Ling.* 8 (VOO 1: 306; ed. García Ruiz 2005: 174): «GRAC. Ego quidem munditiam probo, anxiam et morosam illius curam improbo».

³⁸⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 98: «Do not eat immediately after waking up from sleep or before lunch, except lightly [*tenuiter*]», 100-102: «100 Therefore, three or four pieces of bread suffice without anything to drink, or at least very little [*tenuis*]. This is no less salutary for the intelligence [*ingenium*] than for the body. 101 At lunch or at dinner, become accustomed to eating one single type of food: the simplest and (as far as your means allow) very healthy, even though many dishes may be brought to the table. And if it is your own table, do not allow a great quantity of dishes. 102 Diversity of food [*uarietas ciborum*] is harmful [*pestilens*], but diversity of seasoning [*condimenta*] is even more harmful [*pestilentior*]».

observed at all times: taking breakfast as an example, Vives indicates that meals should calm the appetite, not to make you feel replete.³⁸¹ Moreover, lack of fulfillment (not only regarding meals but also everyday circumstances) may be a sign of having eaten unnecessary food or having been engaged in superfluous activities, because «what is unnecessary overwhelms but does not satisfy».³⁸² Of liquid nourishment (109-112), he emphasizes again to follow moderation and recommends to drink the natural beverage provided by God, namely clean water, a mild beer or a well-diluted wine.³⁸³ As far as sleep is concerned, Vives considers it a medicine (*medicina*), whose purpose is to heal the body. But, as in eating, he condemns any excess in sleeping as well, because it may cause harmful fluids,³⁸⁴ render the body apathetic, sluggish and slow; and even diminish the quickness of the mind.³⁸⁵

Finally, in a four and last stage, Vives describes the state of mind and recommended actions that one should have before, during and after nourishment and sleep (316-342). According to him, before eating a meal one should recall God's almightiness, his extraordinary power to supply sufficient and varied nourishment for so many lives, and be deeply grateful for.³⁸⁶ In turn, before going to bed one ought to remember the blessings that God has granted during the day, and fortify oneself both exteriorly (performing the sign of the cross) and interiorly (uttering devout prayers).³⁸⁷ While eating, one should maintain a peaceful disposition and see to that the place where one eats is clean both at a material level (hygiene) and at a spiritual level (devoid of evilness and any hostility towards the others).³⁸⁸ In turn, while being on the bed, one ought to protect oneself from the dominion of the devil (*diabolus*)³⁸⁹ by performing the sign of the cross, using holy water and invoking God's

³⁸¹ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 99: «Breakfast is designed to calm the stomach or restore the body, but not to the point of satiety [*sacietas*]».

³⁸² Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 108: «Superflua obruunt, non satiant», that is, «What is unnecessary overwhelms, but does not satisfy».

³⁸³ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 109: «Potus erit uel naturalis ille uniuersis animantibus in commune a deo paratus (pura et liquida aqua) uel tenuissima ceruisia uel uinum bene dilutum». In *Ling.*, Vives dedicates an entire dialogue (18; VOO 1: 360-366; ed. García Ruiz 2005: 292-307) to censure drunkenness (*ebrietas*).

³⁸⁴ Regarding the *humores*, cf. complementary note 8.

³⁸⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 120: «Somnus sumendus est tanquam medicina quaedam curando corpori, tantummodo quantus sufficit. Immodicus enim reddit corpora redundantia noxiis humoribus, segnia, pigra, lenta; et celeritatem mentis tardat».

³⁸⁶ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 316: «Sumpturus cibum recordare omnipotentiae dei», 317: «Expende quantum illud sit tot uitis uniuersitatis mundi huius tam uariam quottidie alimoniam sufficere», 319: «Itaque, quum scias te de illius bonis uiuere, cogita quam execrandae sit ingratitude, quam perditae temeritatis audere te cum illo inimicitias exercere»; 331: «Itaque habeas deo gratiam».

³⁸⁷ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 332: «Quum petis quietem et quum surgis, reminiscere beneficiorum dei, non in te solum sed in totum genus hominum atque adeo mundum uniuersum», 335: «Et frons et pectus crucis nota exterius muniendum, interius uero piis precibus et sanctis meditationibus».

³⁸⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 320-322: «320 At table, everything should be clean, neat, sensible [*cordata*] and holy [*sancta*], as God himself is, whose gifts are before you. 321 All slander, malice, brutality, or cruelty [*detractio, uirulentia, atrocitas, crudelitas*] must be kept far from the table, where you sense the incredible mildness and compassion [*suauitas et clementia*] of God towards you. 322 For this reason, it is totally intolerable that you contaminate [*contaminare*] that place, where you experience an immense kind-hearted tenderness [*lenitas*] towards you, with violent feelings and hatred against your brother».

³⁸⁹ The devil is by definition (from *διαβάλλω* 'to make a quarrel between', 'to deceive') an entity that separates (*δια-*) and antagonizes people by its deceptions. In *Ad sap.* mention to the devil is made in

name.³⁹⁰ After eating, Vives prescribes to examine whose wisdom (*sapientia*) and whose power (*potentia*) is able to maintain life with the food that has been eaten,³⁹¹ whereas, after waking up, he advises to implore Christ so that one does not harm other or others harm him; but, above all, that one is not caught in the many nets and snares that the cunning devil has set and scattered over many places.³⁹²

5.3 The true sustenance

But perhaps the most crucial message among these aphorisms is that one should put aside the excessive worry about sustenance (*sustentus*), trust (*fides*) God, and leave this matter in his capable hands.³⁹³ Vives's thought recalls the Gospel of Matthew, where we read: «Therefore I tell you: do not be anxious about your life, what you will eat or what you will drink, nor about your body, what you will put on».³⁹⁴ However, even though the body harbors the soul and, because of this, the body must be kept in good condition and nourishment, Vives also draws attention to the fact that «in the divine prophecies it is said: a person does not live on bread alone but on the word of God».³⁹⁵ This second allusion to the Gospel of Matthew³⁹⁶ conveys the fact that, if the most important part of a human being is the soul (and, more specifically, the mind), then it would be rather unwise to focus only on the survival of the body while failing to give proper care to the soul. If the soul is divine, it seems undeniable that it be given nourishment appropriate to his essence, here summarized by the phrase «the word of God».

aphorisms 63, 128, 136, 340, 343, 354, 374, 387, 388, 390, 495, 594 and 597. Cf. *Sat. ep.* 3 (VOO 4: 31; ed. Tello 2020a: 61): «Accipies igitur satellites ducentos ... ne, his aut certe similibus destituta, praedae sis diabolo, qui (ut Petrus ait) “tanquam leo rugiens circumit quaerens quem deuoret”». Vives encourages princess Mary to embrace the protecting symbols or wise sayings that he has collected to avoid becoming prey to the devil, who (according to the apostle Peter) «goes around roaring like a lion seeking whom he may devour» (*Petri epistola* 1 5:8).

³⁹⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 339: «You will keep the bed [*cubile*] pure and clean [*castum, mundum*] so that the author and source of all filth is unable to claim any rights over it», 340: «By the sign of the cross and holy water and the invocation of God's name but, above all, by having spiritual thoughts [*sanctis cogitationibus*] and the resolution to preserve your piety, you will drive away from your bed any dominion [*ditio*] of the devil».

³⁹¹ Cf. *Ad sap.* 330: «Sumpto cibo, consydera cuius sit sapientiae, cuius potentiae uitam nostram iis rebus quas edisti sustentare et ruentem fulcire».

³⁹² Cf. *Ad sap.* 343: «Quem [i.e. Christum] supplex obtestare ut sequentem diem uelit ac faciat te in obsequio suo totum consumere, ne quem laedas neu a quo laedatur tua probitas; sed septus undique ac munitus pietate Christiana, incolumis ac integer tot euadas retia, tot pedicas quot per uias omnes et aditus humanos sparsit tetenditque insidiosus diabolus».

³⁹³ Cf. *Ad sap.* 324: «Quumque [deus] sis omnipotenti, sapientissimo, largissimo deo curae, tu immodicam sustentandi tui curam deponere, tanquam bonitati illius diffisus».

³⁹⁴ *Matthaeus* 6:25 (tr. ESV): «Ideo dico uobis: ne solliciti sitis animae uestrae quid manducetis, neque corpori uestro quid induamini». Almost identical text with similar meaning is found in *Lucas* 12:22.

³⁹⁵ Cf. *Ad sap.* 326: «...diuinis oraculis declaratum est non pane hominem uiuere sed uerbo dei».

³⁹⁶ Cf. *Matthaeus* 4:4: «Scriptum est: “Non in solo pane uiuit homo sed in omni uerbo, quod procedit de ore Dei”», that is, «It is written: “Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that comes from the mouth of God”» (tr. ESV). A few verses later (6:25), it is found a similar text under the form of question: «Nonne anima plus est quam esca, et corpus quam uestimentum?», that is, «Is not life more than food, and the body more than clothing? (tr. ESV)». Cf. also *Deuteronomium* 8:3; *Lucas* 4:4.

Vives returns to this topic in *Excit. praep.*, where he associates the condition of *famelicus* ('famished') with the fact that it is not bread that feeds us, but the word of God; and he defines *satur* ('well-fed') as being full of the teachings of Christ (*doctrina Christi*).³⁹⁷ In his commentary to the Lord's Prayer, Vives examines the word *panis* ('bread'). According to him, this term has two senses. On the one hand, it conveys the nourishment or 'bread' of the body (*panis corporum*),³⁹⁸ that is, all the things needed in order to cover the inevitable necessities of this life, but not the superfluous things coveted by pride and pleasure.³⁹⁹ On the other hand, it conveys the nourishment or 'bread' of the mind (*panis mentium*), which is defined in similar fashion to *satur*: the «teachings of your son [*doctrina filii tui*]», that is, Christ. Vives does not hesitate to assert that a human being is in greater need of this second type of bread because, without it, the soul cannot extend its life beyond the death of the body.⁴⁰⁰ The teachings of Christ are, as it will be explained in the next section, directly related to the second step proposed by Vives in the path of wisdom.⁴⁰¹

6 Knowledge of God: the teachings of Christ

This section deals with issues that fall within the boundaries of theology (the notion of God and its veneration) and moral philosophy (Christ as a model of conduct, which Erasmus help disseminate as *Philosophia Christi*). I explore the topic based on passages mainly taken from *Ad sap.*; *Ciu. dei* 10.3.n24; *Conc.* 1; *Excit.* (*Excit. praef.*; *Excit. praep.* 20-23); and *Ver. fid.* 1.4, 1.8-10, 2.1, 2.4-5, 2.8-9, 5.5. Vives's religious writings also include the following works (arranged in chronological order): *Chyp.*, *Ouatio*, *Triumph.*, *Geneth.*, *Temp.*, *Med. psal.*, *Pass. Chr.*, and *Sacr.* The most important studies related to theology and religion in Vives are Graf 1932; Urmeneta 1951; Monsegú 1954, 1955; Marín 1966; McCully 1967 (diss.); Monsegú 1986; Belarte 1992; Mestre Sanchis 1992b; Tellechea 1992; Gómez-Hortigüela 1998: 207-210; Maestre Sánchez 2003; George 2007; Parello 2008; Colish 2009a; Belarte 2010; Estellés 2012; E. V. George 2016 (in *SWJV* 11: 1-22): 1-22; Gómez Aranda 2016; and Havu 2018. The three studies published in 1992 constitute a good overview about Vives's theology and spirituality as well as the censorship undertaken by the Spanish inquisition in his works.⁴⁰² These studies can be complemented with Belarte 2010, who reviews Vives's project for reform in theology taking into account his early writings (*Ouatio*, *Triumph.*, *Chyp.*, *Praef. Leg.*), *Disc.* and *Ver. fid.* More narrow in scope are the studies of Monsegú (1954, 1955, 1986), Marín (1966) and Maestre Sánchez (2003), focused on God and Christ only; and Parello (2008), who deals with Vives's criticism of Judaism.^{402bis}

³⁹⁷ Cf. Vives, *Excit. praep.* 93 (VOO 1: 60): «Famelicus: non alit nos panis sed uerbum Domini. Et satur es, si pastus pane, hoc est doctrina Christi».

³⁹⁸ The term *panis corporum* is found in VOO 1: 150, line 27.

³⁹⁹ Cf. Vives, *Excit. dom.* (VOO 1: 150): «Idcirco panis nomine id declaratur quo necessitates uitae huius ineuitabiles tolerantur. [...] Reliqua superuacanea sunt, quae inuexit partim superbia partim uoluptas; et ex ea ortae deliciae».

⁴⁰⁰ Cf. Vives, *Excit. dom.* (VOO 1: 150): «Est et mentium alter quidam [i.e. panis], sine quo minus ualeat animus noster uitam propagare, quam corpus absque illo, nempe doctrina filii tui. [...] Hic est magis necessarius mentium panis quam ille corporum».

⁴⁰¹ Cf. *Ad sap.* 604, in *supra* n. 27.

⁴⁰² Tellechea (1992: 469, 481-482) identifies five censored passages of *Ad sap.* (272, 273, 382, 596, 597).

^{402bis} Regarding specific works, *Disc.* is the object of study of Urmeneta 1951, Gómez-Hortigüela 1998. *Ver. fid.* is examined by Graf 1932, George 2007, Colish 2009, George 2016 (*SWJV* 11), Havu 2018. Gómez Aranda (2016: 11-13) explains the Ten Commandments as conceived in *Diálogo de doctrina cristiana*, a

6.1 *Deus*

The second step in the path of wisdom is to know God (*nosse deum*), and Vives reflects on this issue mainly in aphorisms 259-315 of *Ad sap.* He believes that, although 'God' can be imagined (*occurrere*) by the soul as something larger and more worth admiring than anything the human mind can comprehend,⁴⁰³ nonetheless God's immense greatness (*maiestas*) is not possible to be grasped (*comprehendere*) or attained (*pertingere*) by the natural intelligence (*ingenium*) of any human being.⁴⁰⁴ In addition to God's greatness and wisdom, the methods (*uiaie*)⁴⁰⁵ chosen by him to implement his will remain concealed and beyond reach too.⁴⁰⁶ Consequently, unable to understand God's workings, humanity is compelled to unconditionally concur with what he does,⁴⁰⁷ to admire (*admirari*) him, and to worship (*adorare*) him.⁴⁰⁸

Vives's depiction of God portrayed in *Ad sap.* can be deeper examined by looking into chapters 8-9 of the first book of *Ver. fid.* There, he admits that it is easier to say what God is *not* than what he *is*, because God exceeds the boundaries of our knowledge⁴⁰⁹ to such an extent that the more one searches for him, the less one is able to find him.⁴¹⁰ However, he attempts to make a definition by stating that

work attributed to Vives by F. Calero (cf. *infra* Part VI, section 1, n. 6). The unpublished dissertation of McCully (1967) on the problem of evil in Vives and in his time can be accessed through ProQuest.

⁴⁰³ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 298: «Quoties nominari audis deum, maius quiddam et admirabilius animo occurrat quam quod possit humana mens capere».

⁴⁰⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 302: «...ad immensam illam dei maiestatem, quam adorare facile est, comprehendere impossibile», 303: «Ita ut in diuina illa sapientia altiora semper existimes latere quam quo possit uis ulla humani ingenii pertingere». In *Ver. fid.* Vives admits that there are no appropriate words to truly and adequately communicate God's essence, and therefore it should not come as a surprise if a human being cannot find a word for what his intelligence is unable to penetrate; cf. 1.8 (VOO 8: 55): «Nam propria, quibus uere apteque essentia illa declaretur, nulla habemus. Nec mirandum est non suppetere homini uerba in eo, quo eius intelligentia non peruatit»; 1.9 (VOO 8: 69): «Nam propriis et appositis uerbis diuina illa exprimi a nobis non queunt». Cf. also my proposal of *theologia* as *philotheia* ('philothy'), *supra* Part II, section 5.1, p. 69.

⁴⁰⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 266: «omnia ab eo geri summa aequitate et sapientia, tametsi uis nobis ignoratis»; *Ad Romanos* 11:33: «Quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius [i.e. Dei], et inuestigabiles uiae eius!».

⁴⁰⁶ Cf. *Ver. fid.* 1.10 (VOO 8: 79): «Non est fas homini causas et rationes scrutari, quibus Dei uoluntas uelut adducitur ad agendum», (VOO 8: 80): «Quod non intelligamus diuina, ea praecipua causa est quod de Deo sentimus nimis humane et illius tempora metimur ut nostra»; 1.9 (VOO 8: 65): «Male profecto agitur cum pietate numinis, quoties humana infirmitas ad Deum transfertur ... creditur Deus malus atque imbecilli homini similis». In these passages, Vives expresses his conviction that human beings must not investigate the reason that impels God to act according to his will; further, that the inability to understand divine matters lies in the fact that a person cannot avoid thinking about God from a human point of view, ascribe to God the same human weaknesses, and measure time from the limited and limiting parameters of human existence.

⁴⁰⁷ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 269: «It is right and pious [*fas piūque*] for us to comply with his will [*ei*] and to hearken to his word, and to praise and approve [*laudare atque approbare*] everything that he does».

⁴⁰⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 308: «Nulla res est in toto uniuerso, cuius si uel originem uel naturam uiresque intuearis, non suppeditet quo authorem omnium deum admireris et adores».

⁴⁰⁹ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.8 (VOO 8: 54): «De Deo facilius est quid non sit dicere quam quid sit, superat enim ingenii nostri captum».

⁴¹⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.8 (VOO 8: 54): «Quoniam ... quo magis inquirō eo minus inuenio». According to Vives, this is in fact the answer given by Semonides to Hieron of Siracusa. Vives's text was later used by E. Leigh in his *A Systeme or Body of Divinity* (London: William Lee, 1654), 121-122.

God is the most important and supreme being of all that exists; and there cannot be anything greater than him because, if something greater than him could be devised [*inueniri*], this God would no longer be God but some other being greater and more outstanding. I also state that God is unique. Indeed, this is the characteristic of being supreme: to be only one and alone, and not a variety of essences, entities or things.⁴¹¹

Vives continues the «negative» approach to God by explaining that God cannot «be a body, move, fall down, be in pain, increase, decrease, be tired, forget, be compelled, undergo violence, be defeated, die»⁴¹² because, contrary to what one may believe, these are not signs of power (*potentia*) but of weakness (*imbecillitas*). God is complete (*plenus*) and therefore self-sufficient, without any need, all-knowing;⁴¹³ impossible to be subjected to change (including death) or damage; impossible to act against his nature,⁴¹⁴ otherwise something alien to God would be required to exist.

The aforementioned passages of *Ad sap.* and *Ver. fid.* not only succinctly present Vives's understanding of God but also provide evidence of Vives's association with the line of thought regarded as 'apophatic theology' (from ἀπόφασις 'denial', 'negation') or 'negative theology' (*uia negativa*).⁴¹⁵ Although the most influential writer of this theological thinking may have been Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (late 5th to early 6th century) and his works *De diuinis nominibus* (PG 3: 585-996) and *De mystica theologia* (PG 3: 997-1002), I will draw the attention to two subsequent authors —Anselm of Canterbury (ca.1033-1109) and Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464)— with whose texts Vives shares some resemblance. For example, Vives's «negative» approach to God is quite similar to that applied by Anselm in his *Proslogion*:

Therefore, Lord, not only are You that than which a greater cannot be thought [*cogitari*], but You are also something greater than can be thought. For since it is

⁴¹¹ Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.8 (VOO 8: 55): «Iam primum Deum eorum omnium, quae sunt, praecipuum quiddam esse ac summum aimus; nec eo aliquid posse maius esse quippe, si quid inueniri maius posset, non iam hic Deus esset Deus sed illud alterum amplius atque praestantius. Aimus quoque esse unicum; haec namque est summi ratio: ut unum sit ac solum nec essentiarum pluralitas uel entium uel rerum».

⁴¹² Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.8 (VOO 8: 56): «Neque enim corpus esse potest aut moueri, caedi, dolere, augeri, minui, delassari, obliuisci, cogi, uim pati, uinci, interire». In 1.11 (VOO 8: 56), Vives emphasizes that given the fact that God is neither a body nor does he have volume, size or parts, he therefore cannot be touched or be added something to it: «Et, quoniam quidem non est Deus corpus nec molem aliquam habet uel magnitudinem, non tangitur per partes nec adhaerere quicquam parti alicui potest, in quo nullae sunt partes».

⁴¹³ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.8 (VOO 8: 57): «Nec re ulla extra se indiget, per se sufficiens et plenus. [...] Accedit his summa sapientia, nouit enim omnia».

⁴¹⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.8 (VOO 8: 57-58): «Nec uoluntatem habere potest ut intereat. [...] Nec res ulla naturam illam potest peruertere. [...] Deum nihil potest laedere. [...] Nihil autem facit contra suam naturam; id enim faceret inuitus et coactus et uim patiens, quod contingere non potest».

⁴¹⁵ Its counterpart is the *uia positiua*, *uia eminentiae* ('way of eminence') or cataphatic theology (from κατάφασις 'affirmation'). A general overview of both theologies is that of A. Louth, «Apophatic and Cataphatic Theology», in A. Hollywood, P. Z. Beckman (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 2012), 137-146. Cf. entries «Apophatic Theology» and «Negative Theology» in A. C. Thiselton (ed.), *The Thiselton Companion to Christian Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015).

possible to think that there is such a being, then, if You are not this same being, something greater than You could be thought – which cannot be.⁴¹⁶

This «negative» approach was defined by Nicholas of Cusa as an inner way (*uia intra te*) by which one removes any limiting attribute or quality (*ablatio terminatorum*) of God.⁴¹⁷

On the other hand, the notion of God's inscrutability⁴¹⁸ was explored by Nicholas of Cusa in a dialogue entitled *De deo abscondito* (*On the concealed God*), composed ca. 1440-1449 (cf. Peroli 2017: 2457). Its salient arguments are as follows: God is Truth, but Truth cannot be spoken out;⁴¹⁹ Truth is God, but Truth cannot be communicated to any other reality out of it;⁴²⁰ if God is known, then it cannot be God, because God is beyond anything that one can know or conceive;⁴²¹ one is not able to put into words something which it is impossible to be measured.⁴²² These reflections were again raised in a later work, *De quaerendo deum* (*On the quest for God*), written in 1455 (cf. Peroli 2017: 2461). At some point, Nicholas of Cusa says that the apostle Paul states that there is no human understanding (*intellectus*) able to conceive God.⁴²³ It should be noted that this remark of Paul was also discussed by Erasmus in his *Paraphrasis* to the *Acts of the apostles*:

Since, however, God cannot in his own nature be grasped [*incomprehensibilis*] by the capacities of human intellect [*ingenium humanum*], weighed down, as it is, by the heavy mass of the body, he has endowed human beings with reason so that they might be able to infer one thing from another: the invisible from the visible, the universal from the particular, the eternal from the temporal, the things that are grasped only by the intellect from the things perceived by the senses.⁴²⁴

⁴¹⁶ Anselm, *Proslogion* 15 (Charlesworth 1979: 136-137): «Ergo, domine, non solum es quo maius cogitari nequit, sed es quiddam maius quam cogitari possit. Quoniam namque ualet cogitari esse aliquid huiusmodi: si tu non es hoc ipsum, potest cogitari aliquid maius te; quod fieri nequit».

⁴¹⁷ Cf. Nicholas of Cusa, *De quaerendo deum* 5.49 (Peroli 2017: 570-573): «Est denique adhuc uia intra te quaerendi deum, quae est ablationis terminatorum. [...] Dum igitur deum concipis esse melius quam concipi possit, omnia abicis quae terminantur et contracta sunt». This method was, in fact, first proposed by Plotinus (ca.205-270) through the notion of ἀφαίρεσις or 'removal'; cf. *Enneades* 5.3.17.38 («ἄφελε πάντα», that is, «remove everything»); 5.5.13.7-13; 6.7.34.1-4; 6.8.21.25-28.

⁴¹⁸ This notion is already found in the books of the Old Testament under the formula «God is concealed» (cf. *Isaias* 45:15: «Vere tu es Deus absconditus»), «God conceals his face» (cf. *Isaias* 8:17: «Et expectabo Dominum, qui abscondit faciem suam»), or «God does great and unknowable things» (cf. *Iob* 5:9: «Qui facit magna et inscrutabilia»).

⁴¹⁹ Cf. Nicholas of Cusa, *De deo abscondito* 6 (Peroli 2017: 528): «Colo ... ipsum deum, qui est ipsa ueritas ineffabilis».

⁴²⁰ Cf. Nicholas of Cusa, *De deo abscondito* 7 (Peroli 2017: 528): «Incommunicabilis est ueritas, quae deus est, alteri».

⁴²¹ Cf. Nicholas of Cusa, *De deo abscondito* 8 (Peroli 2017: 528): «Scio quod omne id quod scio non esse deum, et quod omne id quod concipio non esse simile ei, sed quia exsuperat».

⁴²² Cf. Nicholas of Cusa, *De deo abscondito* 10 (Peroli 2017: 530): «Cuius magnitudo concipi nequit, ineffabilis remanet».

⁴²³ Cf. Nicholas of Cusa, *De quaerendo deum* 1.18 (Peroli 2017: 538): «Paulus ... nullo intellectu humano concipi posse affirmat».

⁴²⁴ Erasmus, *Paraphrasis in Acta apostolorum* 17 (LB 7: 736; tr. CWE 50: 109): «Quoniam autem iuxta suam naturam incomprehensibilis est ingeniis humanis, corporum mole grauatis, constituit homines ratione praeditos, ut aliud ex alio possint colligere e uisibilibus inuisibilia, ex singularibus uniuersalia, ex temporariis aeterna, ex his quae sensibus percipiuntur ea quae non nisi intellectu comprehenduntur».

6.2 *Religio*

If, as stated by Vives (cf. *Ad sap.* 302-303), God is not possible to be grasped or attained by the natural intelligence of any human being, how can then anyone be able to know God and fulfill the second and highest step in the path of wisdom?⁴²⁵ The answer to this question is given in aphorism 262: «Per religionem deus cognoscitur», that is, «God is known through religion». Consequently, Vives declares at the end of *Ad sap.* that «a single day spent according to religious values (that is, of divine life) is to be esteemed more highly than an entire eternity without religion.⁴²⁶ In the coming paragraphs I give an approach to Vives's notion of the term 'religion'.

(a) Meaning

Vives had explained the term *religio* in book 10 of *Ciu. dei*, in two important notes: one equates *religio* with *pietas*,⁴²⁷ while the other one gives three explanations of the term by citing three authoritative sources (Cicero, Lactantius, and Augustine):

Cicero, in the second book of *On the nature of the Gods*,⁴²⁸ thinks that religion was derived from *relegere* 'to read again', because it is like a knowledge of God, which agrees with that statement of Mercury: «Ἐὐσεβεία γνῶσις τοῦ θεοῦ»,⁴²⁹ «Religion is knowledge of God». Lactantius, in book 4, prefers that 'religion' be named from *religare* 'to tie up',⁴³⁰ as if religious people were constrained and tied to God by the bond of piety. Augustine, prefers that it be named from *religere* 'to choose again'. This is (I believe) because he plays with the word in a context fitting for that.⁴³¹

In this passage, Vives implies to the reader that religion is: (1) knowledge of God gained through reading the Scripture or other authoritative works again and again (*relegere*, that is, *re+lego*); (2) a bond with God that needs to be tightened over and over by constant devotion (*religare*, that is, *re+ligo*); (3) a second choice made by humans in an attempt to

⁴²⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 604, in *supra* n. 27.

⁴²⁶ Vives, *Ad sap.* 602: «Dies unus ex religione actus (hoc est diuinae uitae) toti aeternitati sine religione anteponeendus». A similar structure is used by Vives when praising 'philosophy' and the 'wise man'; cf. *Philos.* 54 (VOO 3: 24; ed. tr. SWJV 1: 56-57): «Vnus dies bene et ex praeceptis huius [i.e. philosophiae] actus toti etiam immortalitati anteponeendus», that is, «One day lived well and according to the precepts of philosophy is to be preferred even to an entire eternity»; *Sat.* 25 (VOO 4: 36; ed. Tello 2020a: 65): «Praeferendus est dies unus sapientis longissimae aeternitati stultorum», that is, «A single day of a wise person is preferable to the endless eternity of the foolish». These passages seem to have been taken from Cicero (*Tusculanae disputationes* 5.2.5) and Seneca (*Epistulae ad Lucilium* 78.28).

⁴²⁷ Cf. Vives, *Ciu. dei* 10.1.n9 (CCD 2: 337), in *supra* n. 314.

⁴²⁸ Cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.28.72.

⁴²⁹ Cf. Lactantius, *Diuinae institutiones* 2.15.6.

⁴³⁰ Cf. Lactantius, *Diuinae institutiones* 4.28.3.

⁴³¹ Vives, *Ciu. dei* 10.3.n24 (CCD 2: 334): «Cicero II *De natura deorum* religionem a relegendo dictam esse putat, quod sit ceu cognitio dei, quod cum illo Mercurii dicto consentit: “Ἐὐσεβεία γνῶσις τοῦ θεοῦ”, “religio notitia est dei”. Lactantius liber IIII a religando religionem mauult esse nominatam, quasi deo obstricti et religati sint religiosi pietatis uinculo. Augustinus a religendo. Credo quod allusione nominis ad manum ex occasione capta».

regain union with God (*religere*, that is, *re+eligo*). This last interpretation, to which Vives refers as a «play on words [*allusio nominis*]», needs further clarification. The text of Augustine reads as follows:

In choosing [*eligentes*] Him or, rather, in re-choosing [*religentes*] Him, for we had lost Him by our neglect; in re-choosing [*religentes*] Him, then (and ‘religion’ is also said to be derived from this word) we approach Him through love [*dilectio*].⁴³²

Apparently, Augustine is making an association between the verb *religo* ‘to tie up’ and *eligo* ‘to choose’. Just as *ligo*, *ligare* ‘to tie’ can be strengthened into *religo*, *religare* ‘to tie again’, Augustine seemingly proceeds to strengthen *eligo*, *eligere* ‘to choose’ into **religo*, **religere* ‘to choose again’ (from an alleged non-contracted form **reeligo*, **reeligere*). However, neither the *Latin Dictionary* (C. T. Lewis, C. Short, eds.) nor the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (P. G. W. Glare, ed.) record such verb **religo* <**reeligo*, which endorses Vives’s opinion that Augustine is here playing on words. Nonetheless, the same dictionaries do record the adjective *religens*, *ntis*, whose meaning is interpreted as ‘devout’, ‘God-fearing’, ‘pious’. This form occurs only in Aulus Gellius, who cites a verse of Publius Nigidius Figulus’s *Commentarii grammatici*:

Religentem esse oportet, religiosum nefas.⁴³³

► It is proper to be a devotee; it is sinful to be a religious person.

These two sentences are certainly controversial, as they state that the adjective *religiosus* applies to someone who is basically superstitious and behaves contrarily to divine law (*nefas*), while *religens* applies to someone who is a sincere devotee and lives in agreement with divine law (*fas*). Figulus, says Gellius, argued that «the suffix *-osus* in words of this kind (such as *uinosus*, *mulierosus*, *religiosus*) always indicates an excessive amount of the quality in question. Therefore *religiosus* is applied to one who has involved himself in an extreme and superstitious devotion, which was regarded as a fault».⁴³⁴

Since Vives conceives, as stated in aphorisms 262 and 600 of *Ad sap.*, that God can be known and reached through religion,⁴³⁵ it is then sound that he regards religion as the greatest and most important gift (*munus*) given to mankind.⁴³⁶ Religion —which he finds to be a natural element in human existence (and therefore true)⁴³⁷ and a true and genuine

⁴³² Augustine, *De ciuitate Dei* 10.3 (Dombart and Kalb 1993, vol. 1: 406; tr. Dyson 1998: 395): «Hunc eligentes uel potius religentes (amiseramus enim neglegentes); hunc ergo religentes, unde et religio dicta perhibetur, ad eum dilectione tendimus».

⁴³³ Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 4.9.1.

⁴³⁴ Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 4.9.2 (Rolfe 1927, vol. 1: 338-339): «Hoc —inquit— inclinamentum semper huiusmodi uerborum (ut uinosus, mulierosus, religiosus) significat copiam quandam inmodicam rei, super qua dicitur. Quocirca religiosus is appellabatur, qui nimia et superstitiosa religione sese alligauerat, eaque res uitio assignabatur».

⁴³⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 262: «Per religionem deus cognoscitur», 600: «...pietatem..., quo deum noscimus et ... consequimur quoque».

⁴³⁶ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 259: «Nihil potuit hominum generi dari maius aut praestabilius quam religio», 600: «...pietatem..., quo munere nullum potuit homini a deo maius aut optabilius dari».

⁴³⁷ If what is natural cannot be false —cf. for example *Ver. fid.* 1.4 (VOO 8: 26): «si est naturale, non ergo falsum»—, then religion (*religio*, *pietas*), which has naturally sprung among human beings, must be

embellishment of the soul⁴³⁸ — is defined as «the knowledge [*cognitio*], love [*amor*] and worship [*ueneratio*] of the originator and father of the whole world». ⁴³⁹ I shall look into these three elements in the following paragraphs.

(b) *Cognitio dei*

As far as knowledge of God is concerned, Vives argues in *Ver. fid.* that it is primarily conveyed through Christ and its Gospel.⁴⁴⁰ Since «the son of God, Christ, is the mind and the wisdom of his father, God»;⁴⁴¹ and since «the understanding of the father, God, comes from the son, Christ»,⁴⁴² it is then inferred that knowledge of God is made possible through his son,⁴⁴³ because «a person made of flesh can more easily grasp and understand and follow a God made of flesh». ⁴⁴⁴ If knowledge of the invisible, immaterial and unattainable God is to be acquired through the visible, corporeal and thus attainable Christ, one must then seek the sources where Christ speaks out.

Although Vives acknowledges that Christ did not leave any writings by himself because he wanted to write in people's hearts rather than in scrolls,⁴⁴⁵ he finds to be of high reliability the writings of some of «those who accompanied the Lord when he dwelled here on earth,

true as well; cf. *Ver. fid.* 2.1 (VOO 8: 137): «religio naturalis est in genere», (VOO 8: 138): «pietatis cura indita est naturaliter homini».

⁴³⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 578: «...ut excellentissima nostri pars ornata atque exulta sit ueris germanisque ornamentis, nempe religione».

⁴³⁹ Vives, *Ad sap.* 259: «...religio, quae est cognitio et amor et ueneratio principis parentisque uniuersitatis mundi huius». Cf. *Ver. fid.* 2.6 (VOO 8: 158): «Dei enim cognitio et colendi scientia, quae religio dicitur, uera est sapientia».

⁴⁴⁰ However, in addition to the Gospel, Vives also reckons in *Ver. fid.* 2.7 (VOO 8: 159-161) that God, having compassion of humankind, stimulated some venerable men (among whom Moses, Isaac, Jacob, Job, Salomon, Jesus the son of Sirach, and the prophets) to write about the creator of all things, how sin first began and was transmitted, and how God punishes the evil. These *sancti* are authoritative sources of the Old Testament that reveal knowledge about God so that people can learn and remind all these things.

⁴⁴¹ Vives, *Ver. fid.* 2.4 (VOO 8: 153): «Filius Dei mens, et sapientia est Patris sui»; cf. *Disc. trad.* 5 (VOO 6: 402; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 451; tr. Watson 1913: 252): «Deum nemo uidit unquam: dei interpretem atque internuncium habemus Christum Iesum», that is, «No one has seen God at any time. We have as the interpreter of God and as mediator, Jesus Christ»; *Disc. trad. er* (VOO 6: 423; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 474): «Non erit nobis Christus, Dei sapientia?», that is, «Will not be Christ, for us, the wisdom of God?». I follow Vigliano's interpretation of this passage.

⁴⁴² Vives, *Ver. fid.* 2.4 (VOO 8: 153): «Intelligentia autem Patris est Filius».

⁴⁴³ A passage of *1 Ad Corinthios* (2:16; tr. ESV) clearly endorses this interpretation: «Quis enim cognouit sensum Domini, qui instruat eum? Nos autem sensum Christi habemus», that is, «For who has understood the mind of the Lord so as to instruct him? But we have the mind of Christ».

⁴⁴⁴ Vives, *Ver. fid.* 2.5 (VOO 8: 155): «Homo ... carneus ... Deum iam (ut sic dicam) carneum facilius et capere ac intelligere potest et sequi». Cf. *Disc. trad.* 5 (VOO 6: 402; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 451): «dei interpretem atque internuncium habemus Christum Iesum»; *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 108): «Huius [i.e. Dei] uoluntas ac sententia potissimum declarata est nobis ab unigenito, eius filio, qui semper est in eius sinu; *Excit. praep.* 20-23 (VOO 1: 55-56); *Ver. fid.* 2.5 (VOO 8: 155): «Interpretem illius [i.e. Dei] et pacis nostrae sequestrum habemus Christum, Dei filium».

⁴⁴⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 2.8 (VOO 8: 170): «Christus ipse nihil penitus scripto reliquit, quia non uenerat ut legem suam in tabulis aut membranis exararet sed in humanis cordibus».

and knew him more closely and with greater intimacy», because they passed on the deeds and sayings of the Lord to posterity with a considerable degree of detail and precision: «They recorded the place and the time that each event took place, and even gave the names of those who had been present at the event, so that the truth might be more certain and without dispute».⁴⁴⁶ Furthermore, Vives encourages the reading of the life and teachings of Christ as reported by the four evangelists (*quatuor sacrosancti*: Matthew, Mark, Luke and John) and the first Church Fathers (*patres illi*),⁴⁴⁷ because they constitute authoritative sources: while the Early Church approved the gospels of the four evangelists as containing the most solid faith and truth, the writings of the first Church Fathers were directly inspired by the Holy Spirit.⁴⁴⁸ In sum, Vives concludes that the Gospel is the expression of the divinity: though written by a human hand, it is not the work of a human being but of God, since the natural intelligence (*ingenium*) of a human being could have never be able to write such work without proper and special divine inspiration (*numinis afflatus*).⁴⁴⁹

(c) *Amor dei, charitas dei*

As far as love of God (*amor dei, charitas dei*) is concerned, it can be understood as love from God as well as love for God.⁴⁵⁰ In *Ad sap.*, Vives writes that «God introduced peace, concord and love».⁴⁵¹ In *Ver. fid.* he goes a bit further and affirms that «love was the cause of the creation of the world. God loves all things, because they are his possession and hence they are good».⁴⁵² Vives emphasizes the intensity and steadiness of this love of God towards humankind, his creation, by wondering: «What love is there stronger and more solid than the love of God?».⁴⁵³ And he makes an essential definition of this divine love through another

⁴⁴⁶ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 2.8 (VOO 8: 172): «Ex iis ergo, qui Dominum agentem hic in terris comitati sunt et propius ac familiarius nouerunt, quidam facta et dicta illius prodiderunt memoriae, consignatis locis et temporibus, quibus quaeque res essent actae, etiam nominatis iis qui affuissent, ut certior esset atque indubitatio ueritas».

⁴⁴⁷ Regarding the Fathers of the Church, one may start by consulting H. Chadwick, *The Early Church* (London / New York: Penguin, 1967); H. R. Drobner, *The Fathers of the Church: A Comprehensive Introduction* (tr. S. S. Schatzmann; Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007); E. Mühlenberg, «Early Church», in E. Fahlbusch et al. (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Christianity Online* (Brill, 2018 — ; http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2211-2685_eco_E6).

⁴⁴⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 2.8 (VOO 8: 172): «Ex omnibus tamen iis qui acta Christi et doctrinam litteris mandarunt, antiquissima illa et prima Ecclesia, illorum temporum poene aequalis, solos quatuor tanquam sacrosanctos et firmissimae fidei ac ueritatis approbavit ac retinuit: Matthaei et Ioannis, qui rebus omnibus interfuerunt; Marci ex relatione Petri; Lucae tum ex Pauli reuelatione tum relatu aliorum, qui erant cum Domino uersati», (VOO 8: 173): «Secuti sunt etiam patres illi iudicium Spiritus sancti, qui eos docuit Euangelia haec maiore sapientia atque Spiritu esse composita quam humano, diuinitus esse illorum pectoribus infusa».

⁴⁴⁹ Cf. Vives, *Ver. fid.* 2.9 (VOO 8: 175): «Si quis Euangelii uirtutes gratiamque admirabilem propius attentiusque contempletur, intelliget haud dubie non hominis esse opus sed Dei nec potuisse ab humanis ingeniis sine proprio et peculiari numinis afflatu componi».

⁴⁵⁰ Cf. Campi et al. 2008: 362: «Vives introduces the necessity for social virtues, the highest and most general of which is *charitas*».

⁴⁵¹ Vives, *Ad sap.* 386: «Pacem et concordiam et amorem inuexit deus».

⁴⁵² Vives, *Ver. fid.* 1.9 (VOO 8: 68): «Adde quod amor causa fuit condendi mundum. Amat Deus omnia, quia sua et idcirco bona».

⁴⁵³ Vives, *Ver. fid.* 5.5 (VOO 8: 436): «Quis autem amor Dei amore fortior aut firmior?».

rhetorical question: «What is more holy, more pure, more upright, more orderly than the love of God, which consists in reverencing and esteeming highly of truth, wisdom and uprightness?».⁴⁵⁴

To such love from God, Vives firmly declares that human beings must reciprocate by giving him preference over all things, honors and benefits of this life.⁴⁵⁵ But, even more important than this, reciprocation must involve unconditional acceptance of God's will and commands:

274 Certainly, anyone who is a friend of God will conform to the laws [*leges*] and to the will [*uoluntas*] of his friend with joy and alacrity. 275 This is the best way of loving God, as Christ said: «You shall be my friends if you do what I command you».⁴⁵⁶

According to Vives, this compliance —or, more adequately, this trust and faith in God— must necessarily happen because (as it has been said earlier), if God's complete design remains beyond reach since no human being is able to grasp God's entire and unlimited existence,⁴⁵⁷ then there is no human being able to correctly interpret God's will and commands, under which situation the only sound course of action is to accept all things the way they unfold and act accordingly. It should be noted here that the strong remark held in the first aphorism of *Ad sap.* —«reflecting on things without error [*incorrupte iudicare*], so that we can evaluate each thing as it really is [*existimemus qualis ipsa est*]»— directly applies to divine matters as well: reflecting on God without error implies to evaluate his will and commands as they really are, that is, to conform to his laws and his will, which in turn means to conform to the authoritative sources where God has spoken through his son, Christ, or through other venerated men, such as the prophets and the Church Fathers. The implications of this last assertion are enormous. It is not here the place to open discussion on this intricate (and perhaps irresolvable) debate, but I am at least going to frame the problem: God's will may be such and such depending on (1) which sources are considered to be authoritative at a particular time in history, and (2) who is designated to determine what sources are to be considered authoritative. Conflict between different factions within the same religion and the subsequent raise of the so-called heresies are directly related to the problem framed.

(d) *Veneratio dei, cultus dei*

Vives conveys the notion of 'worship' through two words: *ueneratio* (cf. *Ad sap.* 259) and *cultus* (cf. *Ad sap.* 289). The first term (derived from the Latin verb *ueneror*) implies the act of requesting the goodwill of a deity while, at the same time, expressing deep respect and doing

⁴⁵⁴ Vives, *Ver. fid.* 5,5 (VOO 8: 437): «Amore autem Dei quid sanctius, purius, rectius, compositius, qui est ueritatis et sapientiae et rectitudinis cultus ac dilectio?».

⁴⁵⁵ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 296: «Charitas erga deum haec esse debet ut illum caeteris rebus uniuersis anteponas, honoremque et gloriam illius chariorem habeas cunctis uitae huius honoribus et commodis».

⁴⁵⁶ Vives, *Ad sap.* 274-275: «274 Certe amicus omnis dei legibus et uoluntati amici laetus alacerque obtemperabit. 275 Haec potissima ratio est dei amandi, sicut Christus ait: "Vos amici mei eritis, si feceritis quae ego uobis praecipio"». Embedded citation is of *Iohannes* 15:14.

⁴⁵⁷ Cf. *supra* n. 403, 404.

obeisance. The second term (derived from the Latin verb *colo*) implies the cultivation, maintenance and embellishment of the relationship between a human being and a deity, and it also relates to the fact that the deity may dwell in a particular place. This last nuance can be noticed in a statement of Paul cited by Vives, in which the apostle locates the dwelling of God in us: «The temple of God is holy, which is you».⁴⁵⁸ But perhaps the most significant description of what worship of God is can be found in the following passage. Vives explains that

the true way of worshiping [*cultus*] God is to cleanse our soul [*animus*] completely of vices [*morbi*] and perverse emotions [*pravi affectus*], and to transform ourselves as closely as possible into God's image [*simulachrum*] so that we may be pure and holy as he is, will hate no one, and will strive to do good to others.⁴⁵⁹

In this excerpt, Vives underscores that a relationship with God can hardly be fostered and cultivated unless the soul is cleaned from the disorders (*uitia*), illnesses (*morbi*) and emotions (*affectus*) caused by contact with the body and its rampaging desires.⁴⁶⁰ Once this healing process (often summarized by the phrase *cura animi* 'the care of the soul') has been thoroughly carried out, Vives is convinced that a human being would then be able to achieve such strong relationship with God that he would attain a condition that may resemble that of God while he is still in this earthly life. Such condition is described with the word *simulachrum*, which suggests a being who has now become an appropriate instrument (conveyed by the suffix *-crum*) to represent (*simulare*) what God is; and thus he may embody a visual, limited, understandable and somehow defective imitation of the invisible, unlimited, impenetrable and perfect God.

However, the attainment of a God-like condition not only requires cleansing of the soul and respect for God and the word of God handed down by authoritative sources,⁴⁶¹ but also the utterance of fervent and heartfelt prayers (*preces*). Vives notes that:

Inasmuch as any religious practice is situated in the most intimate place of our hearts [*pectus*], apply yourself to understanding your prayers, and take care not merely to mumble them in your mouth. But, when you pray [*orare*], you should be totally absorbed in your prayers in soul [*animus*], mind [*mens*], thought [*cogitatio*] and facial

⁴⁵⁸ Vives, *Ad sap.* 292: «Templum dei sanctum est», inquit Paulus, «quod estis uos». Citation of 1 *Ad Corinthios* 3:17

⁴⁵⁹ Vives, *Ad sap.* 289: «Verus dei cultus est animum morbis et pravis affectibus perpurgare, et in illius quam proxime possumus transformari simulachrum, ut puri et sancti simus sicut et ipse est, neminem oderimus, omnibus prodesse studeamus».

⁴⁶⁰ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 215: «The cure [*remedia*] for the illnesses of the soul is obtained either from the material world [*ex rebus*] and ourselves, or from God, or from the law [*lex*] and life [*uita*] of Christ», 290: «The more you transfer yourself from things pertaining to the body [*a corporalibus*] to incorporeal things [*ad incorporea*], the more you will live a more divine life».

⁴⁶¹ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 300: «Do not have random thoughts about God or speak about his works except with respect and fearfully [*uenerabundus et timide*]», 300a: «It is irreverent [*impium*] to scoff at religious subjects [*res sacrae*] or to distort the words of the Holy Scriptures and turn them into games, trifles, old wives' tales or insulting language [*scommata*], which would be like sprinkling mud on a medicine prepared for the purpose of healing. To apply the Holy Scriptures to obscenities is truly sinful and detestable [*nefarium atque abominandum*]».

expression [*uultus*], in order that all these elements harmonize with each other and correspond to such an excellent activity.⁴⁶²

That praying was considered by Vives an essential activity in a person's life can be proved by the fact that in 1535 he published a book entirely devoted to this content: *Ad animi excitationem in Deum commentatiunculae* (Antwerp: Michaël Hillen). In the preface of this book, Vives defines 'prayer' (*oratio, precatio*) as that by which a person's heart speaks to God—or, in other words, that by which the soul lifts itself up to God—⁴⁶³ either with words pouring out the mouth or remaining in silent.⁴⁶⁴ The book consists of four writings: (1) *Praeparatio animi ad orandum*, which contains 147 preliminary aphorisms whose purpose is to set the right mental conditions for praying; (2) *Preces et meditationes diurnae*, which is a collection of 17 prayers devised and commented by Vives to be said during daytime; (3) *Ad precationem dominicam commentarius*, which examines the Lord's prayer in depth; (4) *Preces et meditationes generales*, which consists of a very diverse miscellany of prayers distributed into 49 thematic sections that address a wide range of issues.

6.3 *Christus*

(a) The exemplary model

Since, as it has been said a few paragraphs earlier (6.2.b), knowledge of God is made possible through his son (Christ), Vives considers that the words of Christ must be taken into account and his way of life must be imitated:⁴⁶⁵ through his words, a person can learn a way towards God (*rectissima uia ad deum*); through his life, a person can have an example of how to live righteously (*ratio uiuendi*) while still on earth:⁴⁶⁶

278 Among other things, Christ came to show us the straightest path [*rectissima uia*] to follow as we proceed on our way towards God, from which we should not deviate in the slightest. 279 He himself indicated and revealed this road to us through his words [*uerba*], and by the example of his life [*exemplum uitae suae*] made it passable and safe. [...] 283 Christ's life proves his goodness [*probitas*] towards humanity, his

⁴⁶² Vives, *Ad sap.* 312: «Quandoquidem religio omnis sita est in intimis pectoris, preces da operam ut intelligas et caue ne ore tantum permurmures. Sed, quum oras, totus et animo et mente et cogitatione et uultu in hoc sis, ut omnia secum consentiant et excellentissimae respondeant actioni».

⁴⁶³ Cf. Vives, *Excit. praef.* (VOO 1: 50): «Attollit se animus ad Deum».

⁴⁶⁴ Cf. Vives, *Excit. praef.* (VOO 1: 50): «Haec oratio seu precatio dicitur per quam, tacentibus nobis uel uerba in ore formantibus, cor nostrum Deo loquitur».

⁴⁶⁵ The concept *imitatio Christi* experienced an increasing interest during the Renaissance especially because of the success of the aphoristic manual *De imitatione Christi*, which was put into circulation in 1418 and was first printed possibly by Günther Zainer in Augsburg, in 1473 (USTC 740931). The aim of the book was to instruct Christians how to seek perfection by following Christ as a model. It has traditionally been attributed to Thomas à Kempis (Thomas Hemerken, 1380-1471), who was deeply influenced by the *devotio moderna*. Critical edition available by T. Lupo (ed.), *De imitatione Christi* (Città del Vaticano: Vaticana, 1982).

⁴⁶⁶ Cf. Campi et al. 2008: 362: «The teachings of Christ form the central element: his acts of sacrifice and redemption have provided all mankind with an example of selfless love and of the path that can lead one to God».

miracles [*miracula*] show the omnipotence of his divinity, his law [*lex*] attests to his heavenly wisdom. 284 So that by his goodness he may provide us with an example to imitate, by his authority give us strength to obey, by his wisdom give us the faith to believe. [...] 358 The son of God came to teach us how to live properly [*recta uiuendi ratio*], not only through words but by the example of his life, in order that our souls [*animi nostri*] might be illuminated by his shining light and might clearly discern what true reality was.⁴⁶⁷

Vives explains that the teachings of Christ through his words and his life are related to the best interests of human beings,⁴⁶⁸ and they are summarized by one command: to love one another (*mutuus amor*), which encompasses even loving those who are hostile to us:

349 For in order to perfect human nature elevated in every aspect to the likeness of God (as far as it was possible), not only did he [i.e. Christ] command us to love one another [*mutuus amor*]⁴⁶⁹ but also to love those who hate us,⁴⁷⁰ 350 so that we would be like our heavenly Father, who also loves his enemies⁴⁷¹ (which God demonstrates by rewarding them with benefits, which are very great indeed) and hates no one.⁴⁷²

Interestingly, Vives insinuates that the principle of loving all beings can only be performed successfully provided that one truly loves oneself. Vives's notion of 'self-love' (*amor sui*) is entirely divergent from that of a reader of the 21st century. The Valencian humanist strongly associates *amor sui* with the care and safety of the most excellent part of oneself, that is, the soul (*animus*) and, more specifically, the mind. Loving oneself means to keep the soul far from the fortuitous and perishable things of the external world (riches, honors), as well as not to yield to love of the body (*amor corporis*) and its unbridled

⁴⁶⁷ Vives, *Ad sap.* 278-279: «278 In hoc inter caetera Christus uenit: ut rectissimam uiam nos edoceret, qua insisteremus proficiscentes ad deum, nec ab ea uel pilum deflecteremus. 279 Hanc ipse et uerbis indicauit ac patefecit, et exemplo uitae suae muniuit expeditissimam atque certissimam», 283-284: «283 Vita Christi testatur humanam eius probitatem, miracula omnipotentiam diuinitatis, lex coelestem sapientiam. 284 Vt ex probitate accedat exemplum ad imitandum, ex autoritate uis ad obediendum, ex sapientia fides ad credendum», 358: «Venit enim dei filius non ut uerbis modo sed exemplo uitae suae rectam nos doceret uiuendi rationem ut, illustratis sole illo suo animis nostris, aperte qualis quaeque res esset cerneremus».

⁴⁶⁸ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 286: «If anyone ponders Christ's teachings, he will discover that everything is related to our own best interests [*ad nostras utilitates referr*], so that everyone will feel that having faith [*credere*] is for their own greatest good [*maximo suo bono*]».

⁴⁶⁹ Similar thought in Vives, *Ad sap.* 352 (cf. *supra* n. 323).

⁴⁷⁰ Similar thought is found in *Lucas* 6:28; *Ad Romanos* 12:14; 1 *Ad Corinthios* 4:12. Vives alludes to this Christian precept in *Conc.* 4.12 (VOO 5: 390) in order to point out that violence and jeers are deterring peace with the Turks: «Amandi sunt Turcae, nempe homines, amandi ab iis qui illi uoci uolunt parere "diligite inimicos uestros". Illis ergo, quod ueri est amoris, bene cupiemus illudque optabimus unicum et maximum bonum, agnitionem ueritatis, quod nunquam assequentur conuiciis aut maledictis nostris».

⁴⁷¹ Similar thought is found in *Matthaeus* 5:44; *Lucas* 6:27, 6:35. Cf. previous note.

⁴⁷² Vives, *Ad sap.* 349-350: «349 Nam ut humanam naturam ad similitudinem dei (quoad eius fieri potest) sublatam suis omnibus numeris consummaret, non modo mutuum amorem imperauit sed eorum quoque qui nos oderunt, 350 ut simus coelestis patris similes, qui suos quoque inimicos amat (quod declarat beneficiis illos prosequendo, et quidem maximis), neminem odit».

pleasures. Accordingly, the more one loves oneself, the more one cares about his soul, the less one cares about bodily and mundane matters, and therefore one is able to love all beings free from violent emotions, insatiable desires and blinding ignorance. The following aphorisms illustrate the preceding content:

579 You do not love yourself [*amat se*] if you adore riches, honors, pleasures [*opes, honores, uoluptates*]; in short whatever exists outside us or in our body, since the most excellent part of man is the mind [*mens*]. 580 Neither do you love yourself if, owing to your lack of self-knowledge [*ignoratio sui seipsum*], you deceive yourself or allow yourself to be deceived by others. Meanwhile, you enjoy yourself persuaded that you possess assets which, in reality, are non-existent. 581 This is not true self-love in man [*amor sui*] (since he himself is the soul [*animus*]), but love of the body [*amor corporis*]: insensitive, blind, ruthless, harmful both to himself and to others». [...] 585 Our Savior, in his heavenly wisdom, declares in a short text what it is to love oneself and what it is to hate oneself. «He who hates his soul», he says, «not allowing it to be involved in those fortuitous or perishable things, truly loves it and wishes it to be saved. But he who loves it by giving in to it, hates it and wants it to be damned.⁴⁷³

Of Vives's depiction of Christ, it should also be highlighted the epithet chosen to refer to Christ: *pacifactor*, that is, 'the bringer of peace' or 'he who generates peace'. By employing this term, Vives wants to reinforce the notion that Christ—who is described here as being both «man and God», and «the only begotten son of God almighty»⁴⁷⁴— is the one who reconciles humankind with God, its creator. In *Conc.*, Vives explains that harmony between humans and God were set apart⁴⁷⁵ when humans ambioned to become like their creator.⁴⁷⁶ This explosion of pride and arrogance, which demonstrated that humans did not know themselves (*se non agnouit*), was encouraged by the devil and propelled humans to climb to such an impossible height⁴⁷⁷—certainly, a great *peccatum* 'error'— that an even greater fall (*casus*) followed. This fall is the one that Christ was sent to heal through his message of concord and union through love.

⁴⁷³ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 579-581: «579 Non is amat se qui opes, qui honores amat, qui uoluptates, denique quaecunque siue extra nos sunt siue in corpore, quum potissima hominis pars sit mens. 580 Nec amat se qui ignoratione sui seipsum fallit uel falli se ab aliis patitur. Interdum gaudet quum ea sibi persuadet inesse bona quae nulla insunt. 581 Hic non est in homine amor sui (quum ipse sit animus) sed amor corporis: inconsultus, caecus, ferus, perniciosus sibi et aliis», 585: «Seruator noster ex coelesti sapientia breui declarat documento quid sit amare se, quid odisse. "Qui odit", inquit, "animam suam, nihil illi in rebus istis fortuitis aut perituris indulgendo, is uere amat eam et saluam cupit. Qui uero amat indulgendo, is odit, is uult perditam"». Citation imbedded in this last aphorism is not found verbatim in the Bible, but it alludes to the following passages: *Iohannes* 12:25; *Matthaeus* 10:39, 16:25; *Marcus* 8:35; *Lucas* 9:24.

⁴⁷⁴ Cf. Vives, *Ad sap.* 276: «...homo deus, dei omnipotentis filius unigenus». *Vnigenus* is a term also used by Vives in *Conc.* 4.12 (VOO 5: 388, line 20) and *Disc. prob.* (VOO 3: 108, line 35).

⁴⁷⁵ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 1 (VOO 5: 201): «Quid aliud existimandum est quam defecisse hominem a natura sua?».

⁴⁷⁶ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 1 (VOO 5: 201-202): «Non fuit homo humanitate contentus diuinitatem expetiuit; idcirco et humanitatem, quam relinquebat, amisit nec, quam affectarat, diuinitatem est consecutus».

⁴⁷⁷ Cf. Vives, *Conc.* 1 (VOO 5: 202): «Sed se non agnouit, et diaboli uersuta sublatus fraude eo ascendit, unde non posset sine grauissimo casu descendere».

(b) *Philosophia Christi*

Vives's exhortation to follow the teachings of Christ must have led Bataillon (1991, vol. 1: 677) to define *Ad sap.* as «un excellent memento de la *Philosophia Christi*». This term, although it seems to have been created by the Greek Fathers of the Church,⁴⁷⁸ played a fundamental role in Erasmus, to such an extent that the Latin term is commonly accepted to be a defining characteristic of his thought.⁴⁷⁹ The Dutch humanist mooted the term as a concept (although not explicitly) in the adage «Sileni Alcibiadis». In the passages added in the expanded 1515 edition of the *Adagiorum chiliades III iii i* (Basel: Johann Froben), Erasmus describes the conduct and qualities of Christ —that is, Christ's «philosophy» or «way of life»—⁴⁸⁰ as follows:

What a treasure you will find, in that cheap setting what a pearl, in that lowliness what grandeur,⁴⁸¹ in that poverty what riches, in that weakness what unimaginable valour, in that disgrace what glory, in all those labours what perfect refreshment, and in that bitter death, in short, a never-failing spring of immortality! [...] This above all was the philosophy of His choice, worlds away from the principles laid down by philosophers and from the reasoning of the world, but the one and only way to achieve the end which others pursue by differing means, that is, true felicity.⁴⁸²

Erasmus did explicitly employ the term for the first time in the *Paraclesis*,⁴⁸³ a writing that was printed as a preface to his Greek edition and innovative Latin translation of the New Testament (Basel: Johann Froben, 1516 | USTC 678727). Here one finds the term *Christi philosophia*⁴⁸⁴ along with equivalent ones such as *Christiana philosophia*⁴⁸⁵ and *Christi doctrina*.⁴⁸⁶ Under these three phrases Erasmus tries to synthesize the following notions: that

⁴⁷⁸ Cf. Augustijn 1996: 75.

⁴⁷⁹ Cf. O'Malley (CWE 66: xxii-xxviii) and Schoeck (1993: 38-39) for a general account of the term; Tracy (1996: 56-126) and Fitzpatrick (2000, 2012) for a more complete enquiry. Daily (2017: 53-56) discusses how seriously one should take Erasmus's standpoint about Christ being a philosopher and having a philosophy.

⁴⁸⁰ Cf. Augustijn 1996: 76: «This long quotation [i.e. the text cited below] shows that Erasmus used the word philosophy in the sense of a way of life».

⁴⁸¹ Similar thought is found in Vives, *Ad sap.* 359: «Quantam ostendit animi moderationem in quanta potentia!», that is, «What an extraordinary moderation he showed though he had so much power!»

⁴⁸² Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades III iii i* (ASD II-5: 164, lines 81-85, 91-93; tr. CWE 34: 264, 265): «Quam ineffabilem reperies thesaurum, in quanta uilitate quale margaritum, in quanta humilitate quantam sublimitatem, in quanta paupertate quantas diuitias, in quanta infirmitate quam incogitabilem uirtutem, in quanta ignominia quantam gloriam, in quantis laboribus quam absolutam requiem, denique in morte tam acerba perennem immortalitatis fontem. [...] Hanc potissimum delegit philosophiam a philosophorum decretis, a mundi ratione longe lateque diuersam, sed eam quae sola omnium praestaret, quod alii aliis uis conantur assequi, nempe felicitatem».

⁴⁸³ Cf. Fitzpatrick 2000: 63.

⁴⁸⁴ All examples of this note and the next two are taken from ASD V-7: 287-298 (tr. CWE 41: 404-422). *Christi philosophia* occurs in lines 33, 138, 144, 168, 196. In Ep. 858 to Paul Volz (introductory epistle to the 1518 revised edition of the *Enchiridion militis Christiani*), it is added the qualification of 'heavenly' (*coelestis Christi philosophia* | Allen 3: 367, line 209; 368, lines 230-231). Vives uses the term *coelestis sapientia* to refer to Christ in *Ad sap.* 585 (cf. *supra* n. 473).

⁴⁸⁵ *Christiana philosophia* occurs in lines 6, 101-102, 160.

⁴⁸⁶ *Christi doctrina* occurs in lines 84-85, 171, 183; 244 (*Christiana doctrina*).

Christ provides learning (*discere*), a model of life (*uiuendi forma*), a remedy (*pharmacum*) against the distressing desires of the soul (*cupiditates animi*), and instruction (*lectio*) to rouse the mind (*animus*).⁴⁸⁷ Erasmus exhorts «all mortals to the holy and healing study of the philosophy of Christ»,⁴⁸⁸ and to do it directly, from the Gospel, rather than from secondary sources.⁴⁸⁹ In sum, he considers the *philosophia Christi* «a rebirth [*renascentia*]» and «the restoration of [human] nature, which was created whole and sound [*instauratio bene conditae naturae*]». ⁴⁹⁰ Therefore, he unequivocally concludes later in the *Enchiridion* that Christ «is the sole archetype, and whoever departs from it even in the slightest deviates from what is right and runs outside the true path». ⁴⁹¹

It is safe to say that both Erasmus and Vives shared the need that the existence of every Christian and, generally speaking, of any person be ruled by the teachings and the exemplary life of Christ. The Dutch humanist urged to «place Christ before you as the only goal of your life». ⁴⁹² The Valencian humanist firmly stated that:

CHRIST IS THE GOAL OF LIFE. Let this first symbol be a kind of lucky omen for all the others, by which we are reminded that everything must be focused on Christ and directed to him, just as archers aim their arrows at the target. ⁴⁹³

* * * * *

The study of the content of *Ad sap.* ends here, but Part IV continues with a «Supplement» that constitutes a first approach to the historical study of the term *animus*.

⁴⁸⁷ Cf. Erasmus, *Paraclesis* (ASD V-7: 294, lines 201-206; tr. CWE 41: 417): «Siue quid discere cupimus, cur alius autor magis placet quam ipse Christus? Siue uiuendi formam requirimus, cur aliud nobis prius est exemplum quam Archetypus ipse Christus? Siue pharmacum aliquod aduersus molestas animi cupiditates desyderamus, cur alibi putamus remedium esse praesentius? Siue cupimus residem ac languescentem animum expergefacerere lectione, quaeso, ubi reperias igniculos aequae uiuos et efficaces?».

⁴⁸⁸ Erasmus, *Paraclesis* (ASD V-7: 287, lines 5-6; tr. CWE 41: 405): «Mortales omnes ad sanctissimum ac saluberrimum Christianae philosophiae studium adhortor».

⁴⁸⁹ Erasmus, *Paraclesis* (ASD V-7: 294, lines 207-208; tr. CWE 41: 417): «Cur statim malumus ex hominum literis Christi sapientiam discere quam ex ipso Christo?», that is, «Why do we unhesitatingly prefer to learn the wisdom of Christ from the writings of human beings rather than from Christ himself?».

⁴⁹⁰ Erasmus, *Paraclesis* (ASD V-7: 293, lines 168-169; tr. CWE 41: 415).

⁴⁹¹ Erasmus, *Enchiridion militis Christiani* 8.6 (ASD V-8: 218, lines 827-828; tr. CWE 66: 84): «Hoc est unicum archetypum, unde quisquis uel unguem discesserit a recto discedit atque extra uiam currit».

⁴⁹² Erasmus, *Enchiridion militis Christiani* 8.4 (ASD V-8: 170, lines 121-122; tr. CWE 66: 84): «Haec tibi quarta sit regula, ut totius uitae tuae Christum uelut unicum scopum pefigas».

⁴⁹³ Vives, *Sat.* 1 (VOO 4: 32; ed. Tello 2020a: 62): «SCOPVS VITAE CHRISTVS. Sit hoc primum symbolum tanquam felix auspiciu caeterorum, quo monemur omnia referenda in Christum et in eum dirigenda ut iaculantium sagittas in scopulum».

Supplement Groundwork for a philosophical study of the term *animus*

Books, chapter books or articles that examine the notion of ‘soul’ in general or in a particular author or school with reference to the terms employed by that author or school are quite common,⁴⁹⁴ but a comprehensive study about the term *animus* (not *anima*) is hard to find.⁴⁹⁵ This Supplement attempts to set the foundation of a broader and deeper enquiry to be presented in the near-future on this Latin term and thus fill the existing gap in this field.

The Supplement is arranged into four sections. The first one examines the term *animus* according to four modern linguistic dictionaries and one Latin lexicon of the sixteenth century: the *Dictionarium* of Ambrogio Calepino.

The second section presents a selection of texts of authors who tried to elucidate the meaning of *animus* and were native speakers of Latin. In doing so, I aim at giving the interpretation of *animus* as it was understood when Latin was a living language. My choice includes writers such as Accius, Lucretius and Cicero (Roman Republic); Seneca, Tertullian, and Augustine (Roman Empire); and Isidore of Seville, who lived under the Kingdom of the Visigoths and is considered to be one of the last writers of Latin as a native speaker.

The third section presents a selection of texts of three authors contemporary of Vives who can give a glimpse of the notion of *animus* at the beginning of the 16th century. My choice is limited to Pico della Mirandola, Charles de Bovelles and Erasmus for various reasons. In the case of Pico, it is of interest his conception of *animus* as a middle point between the angelical soul and the animal soul. Regarding Bovelles, it is engaging his meticulous attempt of interpreting the whole existence. As far as Erasmus is concerned, his relationship with Vives makes him an author to be taken into account when it comes to examine Vives’s intellectual formation and inspirational sources.

Finally, the fourth section argues the existence of two semantic traditions when it comes to describing the soul: one distinguishes between a principle of life (*anima*) and a principle of consciousness (*animus*), while the other one establishes *anima* as the sole term and adds attributes to it (e.g. *anima rationalis*).

⁴⁹⁴ A few examples. Onians 1951: 93-300 (The immortal soul and the body); Guthrie 1981: 282-285 (The definition of soul and its relation to the body in Aristotle); Long and Sedley 1987, vol. 1: 313-323 (The soul in Stoic physics); O’Daly 1987 (Augustine’s philosophy of mind); Schmitt and Skinner 1988: 485-534 (The intellective soul in Renaissance philosophy); Del Nero 2008: (Vives and his *De anima et uita*); Serés 2019 (History of the soul).

⁴⁹⁵ An attempt was made by Morreale (1957), but focused on the way the terms *anima* and *animus* were rendered into Spanish by writers from the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

The reader is advised that translations used of the aforementioned authors have usually been kept unchanged, however questionable they might be at some point. In so doing, one can realize the variety of choices made by translators when it comes to rendering and interpreting the term *animus*. However, in some occasions I have slightly modified the translations and I have kept *animus* and *anima* untranslated for clarity purposes.

1 Lexicography

1.1 Modern tools

I shall begin the analysis of the term *animus* by looking into the information provided by four relevant philological tools. Firstly, Wodtko, Irslinger and Schneider assert that, according to Indo-European linguistics, from the ancient root **h₂enh₁-* ('breath', 'to breathe') derive two secondary roots: **h₂anh₁-mah₂-*, and **h₂ánh₁-mo-*. While the former evolved into the Latin word *anima* (< **anamā*; 'air', 'breath', 'soul', 'life'), the latter engendered the Greek word *ἄνεμος* ('wind'), the Oscan word *anams* ('spirit', 'courage'), and the Latin word *animus* (< **anamos*; 'spirit', 'soul').⁴⁹⁶

Secondly, the monumental *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (1900 – ; 11 volumes so far), which meticulously documents the Latin language from, approximately, the 4th century BC until the 7th century AD, examines *animus* (and its cognate *anima*) through more than twenty pages of textual sources.⁴⁹⁷ Its content can be summarized as follows:

animus, i (m.)

gr. ἄνεμος; ψυχή, διάνοια, νοῦς, λογισμός, θυμός || 1 uniuerse omnes facultates ψυχικὰς comprehendit, opponitur corpori plerumque, sed etiam singulis suis viribus et animae | 2 cogitandi facultas: 1 uniuerse; 2 de animi intentione; 3 de statu eius qui suae mentis compos uel non compos; 4 sententia, iudicium; 5 memoria; 6 diuinationis sedis | 3 concupiscendi facultas, uoluntas: 1 cupido, libido; 2 consilium | 4 sentiendi facultas: 1 de animi commotione (animus commouetur cura, laetitia, metu, spe, ira, ferocia; depressus morbo, dolore); 2 temporarius animi status (quies, aequitas animi, animus incertus); 3 mores; 4 fortitudo, audacia; 5 de animi superbia, atrocitate; 6 adlocutio | 5 καταχρηστικῶς: 1 de bestiarum animis; 2 idem quod *anima*.

► gr. ἄνεμος; ψυχῆ, διάνοια, νοῦς, λογισμός, θυμός || 1 in general, *animus* conveys all the faculties of the ψυχή; it is frequently used as opposed to the body, but also to each power of the body, and to the principle of life | 2 faculty of thinking: 1 in general; 2 applied to attention and awareness; 3 applied to the condition of having or not having control over one's mind; 4 opinion, judgment; 5 memory; 6 the seat of prediction | 3 faculty of desire, will: 1 eagerness, desire; 2 decision, intention | 4 faculty of sensation: 1 applied to agitation (the *animus* is influenced by carefulness, happiness, fear, hope, wrath, fierceness; is oppressed by sickness, pain); 2 applied to fleeting conditions (rest, calmness, uncertainty); 3 character, customs; 4 strength, courage; 5 applied to pride, brutality; 6 used in exhortations | 5 improper or abusive usage: 1 in animals; 2 with the same meaning as *anima*.

⁴⁹⁶ Cf. Wodtko, Irslinger and Schneider 2008: 307-308; Hamp 1987: 695-696. Vaan (2008: 33) also agrees with the indoeuropean root **h₂enh₁-*.

⁴⁹⁷ Cf. *ThLL*, vol. 2 (1906): 69-73 (*anima*), 89-105 (*animus*).

anima, ae (f.)

gr. ψυχῆ || 1 spiritus | 2 aer | 3 1 uita, ψυχῆ; 2 manes; 3 de bestiis; 4 de plantis; 5 per circumlocutionem; 6 pro animali | 4 pro eo quod est *animus*.

► gr. *psychḗ* || 1 breath | 2 air | 3 1 life, ψυχῆ; 2 spirit or soul of a dead person; 3 applied to animals; 4 applied to plants; 5 periphrastic usage;⁴⁹⁸ 6 instead of 'animal' | 4 instead of what is *animus*.

Thirdly, the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* edited by P. G. W. Glare (2016) gives the senses of both *animus* and *anima* in the terms summarized below.

animus, i (m.)

1 the mind (*animus* including *mens*) as opposed to the body | 2 the mind or soul as constituting with the body the whole person | 3 the immortal part of a person; the spirit or soul of the universe, in some philosophical systems | 4 1 the seat of consciousness, sense; 2 the organ of thought, judgment, opinion; 3 the seat of memory; 4 the mind as directed to a particular object, attention; 5 the originator of intentions, design, purpose; 6 the seat of desire, volition, inclination, instinct, zeal, enthusiasm; 7 the seat of feelings and emotions: pain, suffering, hope, fear, anger, animosity, feelings towards others, etc.; 8 the seat of pride, haughty feelings; 9 the seat of courage, spirit, morale | 5 the moral and mental constitution of a person; disposition, character, attitude | 6 substitute for the person | 7 the element of air as principle of life

anima, ae (f.)

1 breath, breathing, air breathed | 2 the characteristic manifestation of life (as opposed to death); life | 3 the non-material part (as opposed to the body): the soul | 4 consciousness | 5 the life of an individual; a person, a friend | 6 a disembodied spirit, ghost | 7 air as one of the four elements

Finally, the *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine* of Ernout and Meillet deploys in a single unified entry a philological explanation of *animus* and *anima*.⁴⁹⁹ Their description can be summarized as follows:

animus, i (m.)

gr. θυμός || the thinking principle, opposed to *corpus* and *anima*, often associated with *mens* and *cogitatio* | it designates the mind (*esprit*); it is applied to the dispositions of the mind (*esprit*), to the heart as the seat of passions, courage, desire, inclinations (as opposed to *mens*: intelligence, thought) | twofold sense: rational and affective | as from the Roman Imperial period, *spiritus* (translation from the Greek πνεῦμα) tends to replace *animus* | *animus* has not survived in Romance languages, which have preserved *anima*.

anima, ae (f.)

gr. ψυχῆ || breath (*souffle*), air | air as vital principle, breath of life, soul, soul of the dead (as vital breath departed from a dying person and gone to the underworld) | tendency to use *anima* in the sense of *animus*.

⁴⁹⁸ For example, the use of *anima* to affectionately refer to a particular person, e.g. «my life», «my soul».

⁴⁹⁹ Cf. Ernout and Meillet 2001: 34.

These four linguistic sources report a common semantic origin of both *animus* and *anima* —‘breath’—, and stress the mental or conscious aspect of the former: *animus* is a kind of breath or air that makes possible thought, sensation and will; it may be equated with ‘mind’; and it encompasses the meanings of the Greek words ψυχή, θυμός, νοῦς, διάνοια, λογισμός and πνεῦμα.⁵⁰⁰ Further, this term is used to convey ‘soul’ as opposed to the body (*corpus*) and to the principle of physical life (*anima*). It is also worth mentioning that, as time went by, the characteristics of *animus* were overtaken by either *spiritus* or *anima*, which implied loss of meanings. In her *Léxico técnico de Filosofía Medieval*, Magnavacca (2014: 73)⁵⁰¹ notes the semantic reduction of the term *animus*, narrowed to basically convey the impulses of the soul, mainly desire (*cupiditas*) and strong emotion (*uis irascibilis*). As a matter of fact, in our modern languages, *animus* barely signifies ‘will’ and ‘mood’;⁵⁰² and it is well known a passage of Descartes in which the terms that once were differentiated by Classical authors are presented by the French philosopher as equivalent: «*Res cogitans*, that is, *mens* or *animus* or *intellectus* or *ratio*».⁵⁰³

1.2 Renaissance tools: the *Dictionarium* of Ambrogio Calepino

The linguistic framework can be now completed with the analysis of the entry «Animus et anima» included in one of the «most comprehensively useful lexicon of the sixteenth century»:⁵⁰⁴ the *Dictionarium* of Ambrogio Calepino (Reggio dell’Emilia: Dionigio Bertocchi, 1502 | USTC 817774). It benefitted from Niccolò Perotti’s *Cornucopiae linguae Latinae* (Venice: Paganino Paganini, 1489 | USTC 992340) and was later the inspirational source for Robert Estienne’s *Dictionarium siue Latinae linguae thesaurus* (Paris: Estienne, 1531 | USTC 146288).⁵⁰⁵ The significance of Calepino’s reference work lies in the fact that he alphabetized and enlarged the content displayed in Perotti’s *Cornucopiae*, which mainly consisted of a thorough commentary of the epigrams of Martial word by word in a derivational, not alphabetical, layout. My choice of examining the entry of a highly used dictionary of the 16th century agrees to Vives’s own recommendation to consult vocabularies when studying a particular subject. «Vocabularies are also to be had, which I should wish you always to have at hand whilst studying»,⁵⁰⁶ he admonishes to his young student Charles Blount. Vives

⁵⁰⁰ According to Cassin (2014: 405), «the Latin *animus* ... evokes will, memory, thought, desire, intention, and mood».

⁵⁰¹ Cf. also the entry «Anima/Animus», in Fontanier 2002: 18-22.

⁵⁰² For example: *ànim* (Catalan: ‘mood’, ‘will’), *ánimo* (Spanish: ‘mood’, ‘will’), *animus* (English: ‘strong feeling’). Cf. Morreale 1957: 7.

⁵⁰³ Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia* 2.21. In Ch. Adam, P. Paul Tannery (eds.), *Oeuvres de Descartes* (Paris: Leopold Cerf, 1904), vol. 7: 27. Incidentally, Descartes mentioned Vives in *Les passions de l’âme* 127 (*Oeuvres de Descartes...*, 1909, vol. 11: 422), of whom he says that «Vives escrit de soy-mesme, que lors qu’il avoit esté long temps sans manger, les premiers morceaux qu’il mettoit en sa bouche, l’obligeoient à rire». Descartes alludes to Vives’s own experience conveyed at the beginning of *An. uita* 3.10 (VOO 3: 469; Sancipriano 1974: 578-579).

⁵⁰⁴ Cf. A. Moss, «Dictionaries and Encyclopedias». In Grendler 1999, vol. 2: 153-156, at 154.

⁵⁰⁵ Cf. J. Considine, «Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries», in Ford, Bloemendal and Fantazzi 2014, vol. 1: 251-263, at 254-255; Considine 2008: 29-31, 40-43; Considine 2019: 292-294; CEBR 1: 244a-b (Ambrogio Calepino), 3: 68a-b (Niccolò Perotti). Erasmus mentions Calepino and Perotti in Ep. 1725 (Allen 6: 367, line 12; tr. CWE 12: 254) and Ep. 2446 (Allen 9: 177, line 142; tr. CWE 17: 278).

⁵⁰⁶ Vives, *Rat. stud. II* (VOO 1: 277; tr. Watson 1909: 377b): «Vocabularia eodem loco haberi possunt, quae uelim tibi semper dum studes praesto esse».

included both Perotti's and Calepino's works within the works of reference to be kept in a personal library. Although he acknowledges the usefulness of these works, he cannot help criticize its shortcomings:

The following books should be accessible in a library for reference: Varro's three books on the Latin tongue (*De lingua Latina*) which are very involved and singular in their style and, on that account, have been spoilt and corrupted by the copyists; the abridgement of Festus Pompeius; Nonius Marcellus. Of the more recent writers, the *Cornucopiae* of Nicolaus Perottus, a book which no one will ever repent spending time in studying if he can find leisure. Nestor, who is not very learned. Tortellius, who is careful in his orthography. Ambrosius Calepinus compiled his dictionary from these writers. He was a very good compiler, but was not good at supplying the deficiencies of others.⁵⁰⁷

The *Cornucopiae* of Perottus and the work of Calepinus, which we all use, are not sufficiently comprehensive, and lack scholarship; nor are they safely to be trusted. Perottus accomplished what he could, but what he left underdone is considerable. Calepinus, indeed, quaffed the horn of Perottus, but took upon himself to teach others when he himself rather needed a teacher. But in the meantime we must make use of these dictionaries until there shall be forthcoming for the world some other which shall hand down this part of scholarship more happily.⁵⁰⁸

In the following paragraphs I edit and translate for the first time Calepino's entry regarding *animus*, which also includes the word *anima*. I have used the enlarged edition printed in 1520 (Venice: Bernardino Benali | USTC —), which I have collated with that of 1538. Although the content included in this last one is clearly abridged, it paradoxically has some additions now and then, particularly of Greek terms and word clarifications. These novelties have been introduced in square brackets. Calepino's quotations of Latin authors have been edited as found in his *Dictionarium*, even if they disagree at some point with modern critical editions.

1 Animus et anima [ψυχή] in hoc differunt: quod anima sit uitae, animus consilii, licet haec a poetis abusiue usurpentur. 2 Nam anima in homine est qua uiuimus et sentimus, mouemur; ita ut contineat uim uegetandi, mouendi et sentiendi. Quae omnia communia sunt nobis cum caeteris animantibus: nam ipsa aluntur, crescunt et gignunt, mouentur praeterea et sentiunt.

⁵⁰⁷ Vives, *Disc. trad.* 3 (VOO 6: 332; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 372; tr. Watson 1913: 141-142): «Quos uero in bibliotheca ad consulendum collocabit, hi erunt. Varronis de lingua latina libri tres, intricati ex illo dicendi more ipsi peculiari, atque ea de caussa mendis a librariis inductis maculosi ac deformes; Festi Pompeii decurtatio; Nonius Marcellus. Ex recentioribus Nicolai Perotti *Cornucopiae*, quod si uacet legere, non poenitebit collocatae in eo operae. Nestor haud satis eruditus. Tortellius ad ortographiam diligens. Ex quibus dictionarium suum Ambrosius Calepinus congressit, homo congerendis quidem illis idoneus, explendis uero quae deerant non idoneus».

⁵⁰⁸ Vives, *Rat. stud. II* (VOO 1: 277; tr. Watson 1909: 377b): «Quae uero terunt omnes, *Cornucopiae* Perotti et opus Calepini, nec satis plena sunt et docta parum nec quibus tuto fidatur: praestitit quod potuit Perottus, nec omnino contemnendum quod reliquit. Calepinus uero cornu exhaustor accessit ad alios docendos, quum ipse potius egeret doctore. Sed interea utendum erit istis, donec existat aliquis, qui hanc litterarum partem felicius orbi tradat».

3 Animus [διάνοια] uero est quo homines sumus, quo sapimus et intelligimus. Quae uis non est educta de potentia materiae, sed a deo immortalis⁵⁰⁹ de nihilo creatur eodem tempore et infunditur in corpus nostrum. Augustinus: «Animus est substantia quaedam rationis particeps regendo corpori accommodata».⁵¹⁰ Cicero libro I *Tusculanarum* sic disserit: «Animum alii animam etiam fere nostri declarant nominari. Nam et ‘agere animam’ et ‘efflare animam’ dicimus, et ‘animosos’, et ‘bene animatos’, et ‘ex animi sententia’. Ipse autem animus ab anima est dictus».⁵¹¹ 4 Sciendum tamen quod animus pro anima plerumque sumitur, ut apud eundem in *Catone*: «Qui si in hoc erro, quod animos immortales credam, libenter erro».⁵¹² Et iterum: «Sic mihi persuasi, sic sentio cum tanta celeritate animorum».⁵¹³ Eius contrarium est ‘inanimis’, qui anima caret. Similiter ‘exanimus’ seu ‘exanimis’. Semianimus [ἡμιθνής]: qui semiuiuus est. 5 Sumitur pro ingenio siue intellectu. Sallustius: «Omnis homines qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab omni odio, amicitia, ira atque misericordia uacuos esse decet. Haud facile animus uerum prouidet, ubi illa officiant; neque quisquam hominum libidini simul et usui paruit. Vbi enim intenderis ingenium, ualet».⁵¹⁴ 6 Aliquando ponitur pro uoluntate siue affectu et delectatione [ψυχαγωγία]. Plautus, in *Epidico*: «...captiuam adulescentulam / de praeda mercatus [est]. Quid ego ex te audio? Hoc quod fabulor. / Cur eam emerit? Animi causa. Quot ille animos habet?».⁵¹⁵ Hinc fit ‘unanimis’ [ὁμόψυχος]: qui unius est animi, id est, uoluntatis. 7 Quandoque pro spiritu siue flatu ac uento, [unde anima uel animus nomen accepit]. Lactantius libro de opificio: «Alii sanguinem animam esse dixerunt, alii ignem, alii uentum, unde anima uel animus nomen accepit, quod Graece uentus ἀνεμος dicitur».⁵¹⁶ Cicero libro I *Tusculanarum*: «Si animus anima est,⁵¹⁷ fortasse dissipabitur», id est, uentus. Et iterum: «...siue illi animi sint animales, id est, spirituales».⁵¹⁸ Terentius in *Adelphis*: «Animum recipe»,⁵¹⁹ id est, spiritum siue flatum recupera seu quiesce. 8 Nonnunquam pro ira [θυμός], unde illud: «Pone animos et pulsus abi».⁵²⁰ Sed rectius de anima dicitur. Plinius: «Ergo et haec animi asperitas siue potius animae dulciore succo mitigatur».⁵²¹ 9 Interdum pro memoria. Virgilius: «Omnia fert aetas, animum quoque».⁵²² 10 Quandoque pro fortitudine, unde ‘animosus’, [μεγαλόψυχος] ‘magnanimus’ et ‘pusilanimus’ [μικρόψυχος].

⁵⁰⁹ in mortalis (1520 edition) : immortalis (1555 edition).

⁵¹⁰ Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* 1 (PL 40: 781).

⁵¹¹ Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.9.19.

⁵¹² Cicero, *Cato de senectute* 23.85.

⁵¹³ Cicero, *Cato de senectute* 21.78.

⁵¹⁴ Sallust, *De coniuratione Catilinae* 51.

⁵¹⁵ Plautus, *Epidicus* 43-45.

⁵¹⁶ Lactantius, *De opificio Dei* 17.2.

⁵¹⁷ I have edited *Si animus anima est* instead of the original *Si anima animus est*, otherwise it would not make sense. The abridged quotation arranged by Calepino comes from a passage of Cicero’s *Tusculanae disputationes* (1.11.24), which is rather longer. In it, the term *animus* is compared to the heart (*cor*) and the brain (*cerebrum*), and then to the life-principle (*anima*): «Nam si cor aut sanguis aut cerebrum est animus, certe, quoniam est corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore; si anima est, fortasse dissipabitur» (Valentí 1948: 20).

⁵¹⁸ Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.17.40. Calepino edits *spirituales* instead of Cicero’s *spirabiles*.

⁵¹⁹ Terence, *Adelphoe* 324. Interestingly, consultation of Rubio’s (1966: 133) critical edition shows that the established text is *animam recipe* (in agreement with Teubner’s edition, 1898), but a variant *animum recipe* is noted in the *apparatus criticus*. What is even more surprising is that the reading *animum* appears in all codices (Σ), except the oldest: A (ca. 4th-5th century) = codex Bezae Cantabrigiae, Vat. Lat. 3226.

⁵²⁰ Virgil, *Aeneidos* 11.366.

⁵²¹ Pliny the Elder, *Naturalis historia* 22.51.111.

⁵²² Virgil, *Eclogae* 9.51.

11 De anima uero, qua animatur corpus et a qua animus esse dicitur, Sallustius: «At nobis est domi inopia, foris aes alienum, mala res, spes multo asperior: denique quid reliqui habemus praeter miseram animam?»⁵²³ Iuuenalis: «I nunc et uentis animam committe, dolato / confisus ligno, digitis a morte remotis / quattuor aut septem, si sit latissima theda».⁵²⁴ 12 Similiter⁵²⁵ anima capitur pro mente, id est, pro animo. Macrobius: «Tunc enim anima libera [est] et nulla corporis cogitatione impedita».⁵²⁶ 13 Aliquando pro uento, siue spiritu aut flatu, et oris odore. Virgilius: «Quantum ignes animaeque ualent».⁵²⁷ Horatius: «Impellunt animae littora Thraciae».⁵²⁸ Plautus in *Asinaria*: «Dic, amabo, an foetet anima uxoris tuae?»⁵²⁹ Virgilius: «Animas et olentia Maedi / ora fouent illo».⁵³⁰ Graeci animam ψυχήν uocant, quasi ἀναψυχήν: quod respirando refrigeret. Causa enim corporis uiuendi est, respirandi et refrigerandi uim exhibens; uel quasi φυσικήν: quod scilicet physim, id est, naturam [facit]. «Auctor», Plato in *Cratilo*.⁵³¹ Terentius: «Hoc ubi audiui, ad fores / suspenso gradu placide ire perrexi accessi astiti, / animam compressi, aurem admoui».⁵³² Plautus: «Ne quid emittat animae dormiens».⁵³³ 14 Et anima pro ira. Plautus: «Animam comprime».⁵³⁴ Hinc 'animosus' et 'animatus' pro 'iracundo'. 15 Sumitur et pro aqua. Idem: «Ni ego illi puteo, si occepso, animam omnem intertraxero».⁵³⁵ 16 Varro posuit animam pro sono: «Et Phrygias audire animas».⁵³⁶ 17 Virgilius pro ipso homine: «Ite, ait, egregias animas, quae sanguine nobis / hanc patriam peperere suo...».⁵³⁷ Sciendum autem in homine quattuor animas esse.⁵³⁸

⁵²³ Sallust, *De coniuratione Catilinae* 20.13.

⁵²⁴ Juvenal, *Saturae* 12.57-59. Calepino has slightly changed the declension of some words (italics mine), thus altering the inner concordances: «...digitis a morte *remotus* / quattuor aut septem, si sit latissima, *taedae*».

⁵²⁵ Calepino points out that *anima* can be used instead of *animus*, a phenomenon similar to what had been previously described in 4 («Sciendum tamen...»): the use of *animus* instead of *anima*.

⁵²⁶ Apparently, not a faithful quotation. It may allude to *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* 1.13.9 (Willis 1970: 53; tr. Stahl 1952: 139-140): «Oporet, [Plotinus] inquit, animam post hominem liberam corporeis passionibus inueniri», that is, «He says that the soul, after departing from the man, should be found to be free of all bodily passions».

⁵²⁷ Virgil, *Aeneis* 8.403.

⁵²⁸ Horace, *Carmina* 4.12.2. Calepino has edited *littora* («The Tracian breezes are striking the *seashores*») instead of *lintea* («The Tracian breezes are swelling the *sails* of ships»)

⁵²⁹ Plautus, *Asinaria* 894.

⁵³⁰ Virgil, *Georgica* 2.134-135.

⁵³¹ Calepino may allude to *Cratylus* 393e (Burnet 1992, vol. 1): «...ὥστε μὴ οὐχὶ τὴν ἐκείνου τοῦ στοιχείου φύσιν δηλῶσαι ἔλω τῷ ὀνόματι οὐδ' ἐβούλετο ὁ νομοθέτης». Latin translation from Ioannis Serranus (tr.), *Platonis opera quae extant omnia* ([Geneva]: Henricus Stepahus, 1578), vol. 1: 393: «...quominus nominum illorum autor et institutor illius elementi naturam, quam uolebat, toto nomine repraesentet». In this passage Plato is talking about the rule-setter (ὁ νομοθέτης, *autor et institutor*) and his faculty of conveying the nature of a particular thing (τοῦ στοιχείου φύσις, *illius elementi natura*) with names (ὀνόματα, *nomina*). Calepino interprets *anima* as a sort of νομοθέτης, that is, as a principle whose faculty is to make (*autor*) and establish (*institutor*) the law (νόμος) of life in the physical world.

⁵³² Terence, *Phormio* 866-868.

⁵³³ Plautus, *Aulularia* 303. Calepino edits *emittat* instead of *amittat*.

⁵³⁴ Plautus, *Amphitruo* Fr. 18 (14) = Lindsay 1903, vol. 2: 347, line 21.

⁵³⁵ Plautus, *Amphitruo* 673.

⁵³⁶ Citation not found.

⁵³⁷ Virgil, *Aeneis* 11.24-25.

⁵³⁸ The 'four souls' (ψυχή, *anima*) mentioned by Calepino would be, according to Aristotle, the following 'four powers' of the soul: κινήτη (*uitalis*), αἰσθητική (*sensualis*), διανοητική (*intellectualis*), and θρεπτική (*physica, naturalis* or *uegetatiua*). Cf. *infra* n. 726.

uitalem, scilicet quae et in uermibus est, qua⁵³⁹ tantum mouentur; sensualem, ut in brutis animalibus, in quibus est sensus et timoris et gaudii; intellectualem, quae est in hominibus tantum, qui et cogitare et iudicare possunt; et quae infra homines est, physicam, hoc est, naturalem, ut ea quae est in arboribus et herbis, qua⁵⁴⁰ (etsi non mouentur) uita tamen habent, cum nascantur, crescant et pereant. 18 Praeterea «anima», teste Augustino, «est spiritus intellectualis rationalis semper uiuens, semper in motu, bonae malaeque uoluntatis capax secundum benignitatem creatoris; ac secundum sui operis officium uariis nominibus dicitur: scilicet, anima, dum uegetat; spiritus, dum contemplatur; sensus, dum sentit; animus, dum sapit; mens, dum intelligit; ratio, dum discernit; memoria, dum recordatur; uoluntas, dum uult.⁵⁴¹ Differunt ista non substantia sed nominibus. Vna anima est, proprietates diuersae. In spiritu tamen et anima potest esse differentia. Nam omnis anima spiritus, non omnis spiritus anima».⁵⁴²

► 1 There is a difference between *animus* and *anima* (*psyché*): *anima* is associated with life and *animus* with judgment, although poets have employed these terms loosely. 2 In a human being, *anima* is that by which we are alive, are able to perceive, and can move. So it comprises the power of invigorating, the power of motion, and the power of sensation. We share all these characteristics with the rest of animals: by virtue of the *anima*, they are nourished, they grow and they give birth; furthermore, they are able to move and perceive.

3 The *animus* (*diánoia*) is that by which we are human beings, we are sensible, and we understand. This power does not come from the capabilities of matter but it is created out of nothing by the immortal God and, at the same time, poured into our body. Augustine says: «The *animus* is a substance that participates in reason and is adjusted to rule a body». Cicero, in the first book of the *Tusculan disputations* puts it this way: «Others also identify soul and breath as we Romans practically do. The name explains this, for we speak of ‘giving up the ghost’ and ‘expiring’ and of ‘spirited people’ and ‘people of good spirit’ and ‘to the best of one’s belief’. Moreover, the actual word for ‘soul’ has come from the word for ‘breath’ in Latin». 4 It should be noted that *animus* is frequently chosen instead of *anima*, as in Cicero’s *Cato*: «And if I err in my belief that the souls of men are immortal, I gladly err». And again: «That is my conviction, that is what I believe, since such is the lightning-like rapidity of the soul». The opposite of this is *inanimis*, ‘someone who lacks the *anima*’. Similarly are *exanimus* or *exanimis* (‘lifeless’). *Semianimus* (*hēmithnēs*) means ‘someone who is half alive’. 5 *Animus* is also chosen instead of *ingenium* (‘character’, ‘natural intelligence’) and *intellectus* (‘intellect’, ‘understanding’). Sallust: «All men who deliberate upon difficult questions ought to be free from hatred and friendship, anger and pity. When these feelings stand in the way, the mind cannot easily discern the truth, and no mortal mal has ever served at the same time his passions and his best interests. When you apply your intellect, it prevails». 6 Now and then is placed instead of *uoluntas* ‘will’, or *affectus* ‘mood’, and *delectatio* ‘delight’ (*psychagōgía*). Plautus, in *Epidicus*: «...From the booty he bought a lovely young miss. What’s this I hear? The tale I’m telling. Why did he buy her? She won his heart. How many hearts has that fellow got?». From this sense comes *unanimis* (*homóphychos*), ‘someone who is of one mood’, that is, ‘of one will’. 7 Sometimes instead of *spiritus* ‘breath’ or *flatus* ‘blowing’ and *uentus* ‘wind’, from which the name of

⁵³⁹ *qua* (correction) : *quae* (1520 edition).

⁵⁴⁰ *qua* (correction) : *quae* (1520 edition).

⁵⁴¹ Cf. Isidore, *Etymologiae* 11.1.6-13.

⁵⁴² Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* 13 (PL 40: 788).

anima or *animus* comes. Lactantius in his book *On the workmanship of God*: «Some said that this life-principle was blood; some fire; some wind, whence the soul (*anima*) or the mind (*animus*) got its name, because in Greek wind is *ánemos*». Cicero, in the first book of the *Tusculan disputations*: «If the soul is breath, it will perhaps be dispersed in space»,⁵⁴³ that is, if it is wind. And again: «...whether those souls are airy, that is to say, of the nature of breath». Terence in *The Brothers*: «Get your breath back», that is, recover your breath or ease your blowing. 8 Sometimes instead of *ira* ‘wrath’ (*thymós*), whence that verse «Set your pride aside and, conquered, give way» (A. S. Kline, tr.). But, more correctly, *ira* should be said of the *anima*. Pliny: «Therefore also this roughness of the mind, or rather I should say of the soul, is made smoother by a sweeter flavour». 9 Occasionally, instead of *memoria* ‘memory’. Virgil: «Time robs us of all, even of memory». 10 Sometimes instead of *fortitudo* (‘courage’, ‘strength’), from which derive *animosus* ‘courageous’, *magnanimus* (‘big-hearted’, ‘brave’) (*megalóphychos*) and *pusilanimus* ‘faint-hearted’ (*mikróphychos*).

11 Regarding the term *anima* (that by which a body is made alive, and by which the *animus* is said to exist), Sallust writes: «But we have destitution at home, debt without, present misery and a still more hopeless future; in brief, what have we left, save only the wretched breath of life?». Juvenal: «Go now, and commit your life to the winds! Go trust yourself to a hewn plank, by four finger-breadths far from death, or seven if the pine wood be extra thick!». 12 Similarly,⁵⁴⁴ *anima* is used instead of *mens* ‘mind’, that is, instead of *animus*. Macrobius: «Then, the soul is free and it is not hampered by any bodily thought». ⁵⁴⁵ 13 Somewhat, it is used instead of *uentus* ‘wind’, or *spiritus* ‘breath’, or *flatus* ‘blowing’ and *oris odor* ‘smelly mouth’. Virgil: «Whatever fire and air may avail». Horace: «The Tracian breezes are striking the seashores». ⁵⁴⁶ Plautus, in *The Comedy of Asses*: «Do tell me, there’s a dear: your wife’s breath isn’t bad, is it?». Virgil: «With it [i.e. that flower] the Mede treats his mouth’s noisome breath». The Greeks convey *anima* with the word *ψυχή* (*psyché*), almost like *ἀναψυχή* (*anapsyché*) ‘a cooling’: that which cools off by breathing. For the *anima* is the cause of life in a body, and produces the power to breathe and to cool off. It is a sort of physical power: clearly, it creates the *physis*, that is, the natural world. «The maker», says Plato in *Cratylus*. ^{546bis} Terence: «When he told me this, I started for the door on tip-toe very quietly, got there, stood close, held my breath, put my ear to the panels». Plautus: «So as not to chance losing any breath when he’s asleep». 14 And *anima* instead of *ira* ‘wrath’. Plautus: «Hold your breath». From here comes *animosus* ‘violent’ and *animatus* ‘prone’, instead of *iracundus* ‘irritable’. 15 *Anima* is also employed instead of *aqua* ‘water’. Plautus: «If I do not drain that well of its breath, once I begin». 16 Varro placed *anima* instead of *sonum* ‘sound’: «And listen to the Phrygian souls». 17 Virgil employed it instead of *homo* ‘human being’: «Go —he said—, grace with the last rites those noble souls, who with their blood have won for us this our country». One should know that a human being has four souls: the life-soul, which is also existent in worms and by which they are only given movement; the sense-soul, existent in wild animals that perceive fear and delight; the intellect-soul, which is only existent in human beings, who are able to think and judge; finally, the soul existent underneath human life, that is, the physic-soul or nature-soul: it is that soul found in trees and plants, by which these living things (even though they are not given

⁵⁴³ Cf. *supra* n. 517.

⁵⁴⁴ Cf. *supra* n. 525.

⁵⁴⁵ Cf. *supra* n. 526.

⁵⁴⁶ Cf. *supra* n. 528.

^{546bis} Cf. *supra* n. 531.

movement) have yet life: they are born, they grow and they die. 18 Moreover, «The soul», as Augustine indicates, «is an spirit with intellect and reason that continuously lives, is always in motion, and is capable of good will and ill will owing to the kindness of its creator. And, depending on the duty of its function, the soul can be called with various names: *anima*, when it invigorates; *spiritus*, when it observes; *sensus*, when it perceives; *animus*, when it knows; *mens*, when it understands; *ratio*, when it distinguishes; *memoria*, when it remembers; *uoluntas*, when it wills. All these designations differ on the name but not on the essence. There is only one soul, but its characteristics are many. However, there can be a difference between *spiritus* and *anima*: every soul is a spirit, but not every spirit is a soul».

Embedded translations by: Fairclough 1916 (Virgil, *Eclogae, Georgica*); Fairclough 1917 (Virgil, *Aeneis*); Falconer 1923 (Cicero, *Cato de senectute*); Jones 1951 (Pliny the Elder, *Naturalis historia*); King 1945 (Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*); McDonald 1965 (Lactantius, *De opificio Dei*); Nixon 1916 (Plautus, *Amphitruo, Asinaria, Aulularia*); Nixon 1917 (Plautus, *Epidicus*); Ramsay 1918 (Juvenal, *Saturae*); Rolfe 1921 (Sallust, *De coniuratione Catilinae*); Sargeaunt 1920 (Terence, *Adelphoe, Phormio*).

In this joint entry of «Animus et anima», the Italian scholar points out that: (1) *animus* is what makes a human being actually human, and it can be found conveying the same meaning as soul, character, natural intelligence, will, mood, delight, breath, blowing, wind, wrath, memory, strength and courage; (2) *animus* is related to judgment, knowledge and understanding, whereas *anima* is related to life, perception and motion; (3) *anima* gives life to the body and enables the *animus* to exist, further it is a physical power that creates the natural world; (4) *anima* can be found conveying the same meaning as mind —«that is, instead of *animus*»,⁵⁴⁷ Calepino remarks—, wind, breath, blowing, wrath, water, sound and person; (5) a human being has four souls: life-soul, sense-soul, intellect-soul, physic-soul; (6) a soul can be called different names according to its function. The following chart sums up all the aforementioned information.

animus	anima
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · consilium; sapere, intelligere. · quo homines sumus. · = anima; ingenium, uoluntas, fortitudo, ira, memoria; spiritus, flatus, uentus. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · uita; uiuere, sentire, mouere; refrigerare, respirare. · qua animatur corpus; a qua animum esse dicitur. · = mens (animus), homo; uentus, spiritus, flatus, aqua, sonus; uis physica (uis naturalis). · 4 animae: uitalis, sensualis, intellectualis; physica. · animae officia = anima (uegetare), spiritus (contemplare), sensus (sentire), animus (sapere), mens (intelligere), ratio (discernire), memoria (recordare), uoluntas (uelle).

2 Reference authors: Roman civilization

2.1 Accius

The first piece of Latin writing in which *animus* is defined may well be a fragment of Lucius Accius's (ca. 170-85 BC) tragedy *Epigoni*, passed on to us by Nonius Marcellus, a

⁵⁴⁷ Cf. section 12 of the entry «Animus et anima».

grammarians of the 4th century AD. In it, Accius writes: «Sapimus animo, fruimur anima; sine animo anima est debilis», that is, «We have understanding through the *animus* and we enjoy [things?] by means of the *anima*. Without the *animus* the *anima* is feeble»; or «Intelligence is ours through the mind; enjoyment, in our breath. When mind is absent, breath is a thing enfeebled». ⁵⁴⁸ In this short fragment, it is clear that the *animus* is a sort of invisible breath that enables us to know (*sapimus*) and is a key element when it comes to the strength and wholeness of the *anima*. In turn, the *anima* is an invisible breath by which we can «enjoy», meaning «enjoy life», that is, «be alive». Nonius, in the introduction to this fragment, remarks this quality: «Animus et anima hoc distant: animus est quo sapimus, animus qua uiuimus», that is, «The *animus* and the *anima* differ in the following way: it is by means of the *animus* that we have understanding, and it is by means of the *anima* that we have life». ⁵⁴⁹

2.2 Lucretius

In the third book of *De rerum natura* (*On the nature of things*), ⁵⁵⁰ Titus Lucretius Carus (ca. 94-55 BC) demonstrates through 29 proofs ⁵⁵¹ that the soul does not survive after the body ceases to live, his purpose being to free human beings from fear of dying ⁵⁵² and fear of the afterlife. ⁵⁵³ But before dealing with this issue, the Roman poet tries to elucidate the two elements from which the soul is compounded: the *animus* and the *anima*. ⁵⁵⁴ His is the first thorough analysis of both terms in Latin language, though highly influenced by the notions of Epicurus.

As far as the *animus* is concerned, Lucretius maintains «that the *animus*, which we often call mind —the seat of the guidance and control of life—, is part of a man, no less than hand or foot or eyes are parts of a whole living creature». ⁵⁵⁵ Further, «what I may call the

⁵⁴⁸ Accius, *Epigoni* Fr. 274. Ed. and tr. consulted: Warmington 1936, vol. 2: 420-421; Dalzell 1996: 98.

⁵⁴⁹ Nonius Marcellus, 426 = Lindsay 1903, vol. 3: 689, lines 25-26. Cf. Warmington 1936, vol. 2: 420; Dalzell 1996: 98.

⁵⁵⁰ Editions, commentaries and translations consulted: Bailey 1949; Ernout and Robin 1962; Valentí 1976; Kenney 1971; Latham 1994; Brown 2007. Unfortunately, Vives did not recommend Lucretius because of conflict with Christian belief. In *Disc. trad.* 3 (VOO 3: 320; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 359; tr. Watson 1913: 124-125) he warns that «a boy inclined to impiety must be kept from Lucretius, and most of the philosophers, especially Epicurus and his followers».

⁵⁵¹ Kenney 1971: 134-192; cf. Bailey 1949, vol. 2: 1064-1131.

⁵⁵² Cf. Lucretius, 3.41-93. For 'fear' he employs terms such as *formido*, *tímor*, *terror*. Vives (cf. *Ver. fid.* 1.9; VOO 8: 62) rebukes the intention of Epicurus and Lucretius to erase the presence of God in human society.

⁵⁵³ Cf. Lucretius, 3.578-579, 830-831 (Kenney 1971: 55, 64; tr. Latham 1994: 81, 87): «Dissolui sensus animi fateare necessest / atque animam, quoniam coiunctast causa duobus / [...] Nihil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum, / quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur», that is, «The senses of the *animus* and the *anima* likewise disintegrate, since body and mind can only exist when joined together [...] Death is nothing to us and no concern of ours, since the nature of the *animus* is now held to be mortal». Cf. Epicurus, *Epistula ad Menoeceum* 124 (=Diogenes Laertius 10.24; tr. Mensch and Miller 2018: 533): «Accustom yourself that death [θάνατος] is nothing to us. For all good and all bad are vested in sense perception [ἐν αἰσθήσει], and death is privation of sense perception. Hence, a correct understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable».

⁵⁵⁴ Cf. Lucretius, 3.35-36 (Kenney 1971: 38; tr. Latham 1994: 67): «Hasce secundum res animi natura uidetur / atque animae claranda meis iam uersibus esse».

⁵⁵⁵ Cf. Lucretius, 3.94-97 (Kenney 1971: 40; tr. Latham 1994: 69): «Primum animum dico, mentem quam saepe uocamus, / in quo consilium uitae regimenque locatum est, / esse hominis partem nilo minus ac manus et pes / atque oculi partes animantis totius exstant».

head and the dominant force in the whole body is that guiding principle which we term *animus* or mind. This is firmly lodged in the mid-region of the breast. Here is the place where fear and alarm pulsate. Here is felt the caressing touch of joy. Here, then, is the seat of mind and the *animus*. [...] Only the *animus* experiences thought of its own by itself, and joy in itself». ⁵⁵⁶ Moreover, «note also that it is the *animus*, far more than the *anima*, that keeps life under lock and key and has the greater mastery over life. Without mind and *animus* no scrap of the *anima* can linger one instant in our limbs». ⁵⁵⁷

From these passages, one can conclude that: (1) the *animus* is equivalent to *mens* 'mind', and it encompasses both the rational (*consilium* 'decision', *regimen* 'control', *sapere* 'to know', 'to be sensible') and the emotional (fear, joy, *gaudere*); (2) it is a physical component to be found in the breast; ⁵⁵⁸ (3) it governs the *anima*. If *animus* may be considered a breath bearing the principle of conscious life (reason and feeling), *anima* may be understood as a breath carrying the principle of life to all members of the body. While the second makes life possible, the first brings awareness and manages the event of being alive.

However, the *animus* (or mind) and the *anima* (or life) do not function as two independent principles —they are powerless by themselves—, ⁵⁵⁹ but «are interconnected and compose between them a single substance [*natura*]»; ⁵⁶⁰ they «are everlasting linked together» ⁵⁶¹ and their nature is material (*corporea*). ⁵⁶² Such interdependence generates, in fact, a unity in which *animus* and *anima* are substantially one single principle. ⁵⁶³ In this, Lucretius would like to follow the structure devised by Epicurus: the soul (*ψυχή*) is composed by an irrational part (*τὸ ἄλογον μέρος*, *anima*) and a rational part (*τὸ λογικόν μέρος*, *animus*) that governs the former. ⁵⁶⁴ Note here the absence in Latin of a word that encompasses both *animus* and *anima*. This «poverty of our language» ⁵⁶⁵ impelled Lucretius

⁵⁵⁶ Cf. Lucretius, 3.138-142, 145 (Kenney 1971: 41; tr. Latham 1994: 70): «Sed caput esse quasi et dominari in corpore toto / consilium quod nos animum mentemque uocamus. / Idque situm media regione in pectoris haeret. / Hic exultat enim pavor ac metus, haec loca circum / laetitiae mulcent, hic ergo mens animusquest [...] Idque sibi solum per se sapit, id sibi gaudet». Bailey (1949, vol. 2: 1006) points out that «*mens* only represents the intellectual side of *animus* and neglects the emotional».

⁵⁵⁷ Cf. Lucretius, 3.396-399 (Kenney 1971: 49; tr. Latham 1994: 76-77): «Et magis est animus uitai claustra coercens / et dominantior ad uitam quam uis animai. / Nam sine mente animoque nequit residere per artus / temporis exiguam partem pars ulla animai».

⁵⁵⁸ Onians (1951: 171) notes that «*animus* thus appears to have been the same in origin as *θυμός*, the breath that was consciousness in the chest».

⁵⁵⁹ Cf. Lucretius, 3.565 (Kenney 1971: 55; tr. Latham 1994: 81): «Sic anima atque animus per se nil posse uidetur».

⁵⁶⁰ Cf. Lucretius, 3.136-137 (Kenney 1971: 41; tr. Latham 1994: 70): «Nunc animum atque animam dico coniuncta teneri / inter se atque unam naturam conficere ex se».

⁵⁶¹ Cf. Lucretius, 3.416 (Kenney 1971: 50; tr. Latham 1994: 77): «Hoc anima atque animus uincti sunt foedere semper».

⁵⁶² Cf. Lucretius, 3.166-167 (Kenney 1971: 42; tr. Latham 1994: 71): «...nonne fatendumst / corporea natura animum constare animamque?»; also 3.161-162, 175-176.

⁵⁶³ Cf. Bailey 1949, vol. 2: 1032 (n. to verse 137).

⁵⁶⁴ Cf. Epicurus, Fr. 311 (Usener 1887: 216-217) = *Epistula ad Herodotum* 66 (scholia); Diogenes Laertius, 10.66 (scholia).

⁵⁶⁵ Cf. Lucretius, 1.136-139 (Bailey 1949, vol. 1: 182; tr. Latham 1994: 13): «I am well aware that it is not easy to elucidate in Latin verse the obscure discoveries of the Greeks. The poverty of our language [*egestas linguae*] and the novelty of the theme [*rerum nouitas*] often compel me to coin new words for the purpose».

to employ either *animus* or *anima* to convey the unity of both, generating a series of passages where the reader must infer the broader scope of the word (the compound *animus+anima*) instead of the narrower (either *animus* or *anima*).⁵⁶⁶ The poet was aware of this fact to such a point that he admits that «both objects are to be embraced under one name. When, for instance, I proceed to demonstrate that the *anima* is mortal, you must understand that this applies equally to the *animus*».⁵⁶⁷

This single substance consisting of *animus* and *anima* is very subtle (3.179: *persubtilem*) and is made of small particles (3.179-180: *minutis ... corporibus*) or very small and round seeds (3.186-187: *rutundis ... seminibus ... perquamque minutis*; 3.216-217: *perparuis ... seminibus*).⁵⁶⁸ Such particles are, according to Lucretius, wind (*aura*, cf. 3.232), heat (*uapor*, cf. 3.233) and air (*aer*, cf. 2.233); to which a fourth particle (3.241: *quarta ... natura*) is added: a nameless element (3.242: *nominis expers*).⁵⁶⁹ This nameless element is described as that than which «there is nothing more mobile or more tenuous; nothing whose component atoms [*elementa*] are smaller or smoother. This it is that first sets the sensory motions coursing through the limbs».⁵⁷⁰ Apart from sensation, the nameless element also creates the «sensory motions that originate the meditations revolved in the mind».⁵⁷¹ Therefore, the existence and activities of both the *animus* and the *anima* rely on this mysterious particle, which lays hidden (*laetet*) deep within us, beneath our bodies, and is the foundation of our being (*subset*). For this, Lucretius considers it to be «the soul of the whole soul» (*anima animae totius*).⁵⁷² the nameless particle ignites the compound *animus+anima*, which in turn gives life and sensation to the body, understanding and emotion to the mind.

As the reader may have realized, I have altered the translations used in the previous paragraphs by keeping the original Latin terms (*animus*, *anima*). I have done so because modern languages have almost (if not completely) lost the distinction between these words.⁵⁷³ Bailey (1949, vol. 2: 1006) comments:

It is sufficient to say that the *anima*, the ‘soul’ or ‘vital principle’ consists of nuclei of ‘soul-particles’ distributed throughout the body and is the seat of sensation; the *animus* or ‘mind’ is an aggregate of undiluted ‘soul-particles’, situated in the breast and is there the seat of thought and emotion. It is unfortunate that there are no English words adequate to represent the ideas: ‘soul’ is too vague, and ‘mind’ does not suggest the seat of emotion, but they must serve in default of better.

⁵⁶⁶ For example, the compound *animus+anima* is conveyed through *anima* only at 3.143 and 3.150, and through *animus* only at 3.175, 3.177 and 3.237. Kenny (1971: 99) makes an important remark when he admits that such a variation, «if it is not to be attributed to pure negligence, may be metrical», because Lucretius has to abide to the rules of the hendecasyllable.

⁵⁶⁷ Lucretius, 3.421-424 (Kenney 1971: 50; tr. Latham 1994: 77). Bailey (1949, vol. 2: 1065) sees a slight tendency of Lucretius to use *anima* as the inclusive term.

⁵⁶⁸ *Corpora* and *semina* render Epicurus’s ἀτομοί. Cf. *Epistula ad Herodotum* 43, 45, 54-55.

⁵⁶⁹ Lucretius adapts Epicurus’s «τὸ ἀκατονόμαστον» (Fr. 315 = Usener 1887: 218). Cf. Plutarch, *Moralia* 897d.

⁵⁷⁰ Lucretius, 3.243-244 (Kenney 1971: 44; tr. Latham 1994: 73).

⁵⁷¹ Lucretius, 3.239-240 (Kenney 1971: 44; tr. Latham 1994: 73): «...creare / sensiferos motus et mens quaecumque uolutat».

⁵⁷² Lucretius, 3.273-275 (Kenney 1971: 45; tr. Latham 1994: 73): «Nam penitus prorsum latet haec natura subestque, / nec magis hac infra quicquam est in corpore nostro, / atque anima est animae proporro totius ipsa».

⁵⁷³ Cf. Ernout and Meillet 2001: 34, in *supra* Supplement, section 1.1, p. 261.

Kenney (1971: 88, n. to verse 94) also laments that «‘mind’ may be used for the sake of convenience to render *animus*, but no English term is entirely satisfactory». He later adds (1971: 90, n. to verse 117) that *anima* is «‘vital principle’; for convenience in translating ‘soul’ may be used». Long and Sedley (1987, vol. 2: 68) state that *animus* and *mens* «operate as straight synonyms in his discourse, as indeed they do. We have, therefore, to avoid confusion, adopted the single translation ‘mind’ for both». Latham (1994), in general, renders *anima* as ‘spirit’,⁵⁷⁴ *animus* as ‘mind’ but then he is forced to translate *mens* as ‘intellect’. I have not found in his translation any place where ‘soul’ is used. Brown (2007: 10) explains that, outside Lucretius, «*animus* approximates to ‘mind’, ‘heart’ or ‘soul’ according to context, and *anima* (retaining more of the root connection with Greek *ἀνεμος* or wind than does *animus*) to ‘breath’ and so to ‘life-breath’ or ‘spirit’». Therefore he (2007: 11) decides to use «‘mind’ and ‘spirit’ respectively for *animus* and *anima* in their technical senses» and employ «‘soul’ where either term is used inclusively». The following chart displays a summary of all the translations proposed.

Lucretius	Bailey 1949	Kenney 1971	Latham 1994	Brown 2007
anima + animus	soul	soul	—	soul
anima	vital principle, soul	vital principle, soul	vital spirit, spirit	spirit
animus	mind	mind	mind	mind
mens	understanding	mind	intellect	intellect

It should also be noted that scholarship of Lucretius’s *De rerum natura* during the early Renaissance⁵⁷⁵ witnessed the publication in 1511 of a massive commentary of Giovanni Battista Pio (ca. 1460/4-1540/8),⁵⁷⁶ *In Carum Lucretium poetam commentarii a Ioanne Baptista Pio editi...* (Bologna: Girolamo Benedetti | USTC 838802), mainly aimed at defusing the Epicurean philosophy of the Roman poet.⁵⁷⁷ In it, Pio made some notes on the term *animus*, particularly to verses 35-36: «animi atque animae» (f. LXXXVIr-v); 136: «Nunc animum» (f. XCIIv);⁵⁷⁸ and 138: «Sed caput esse quasi» (f. CIIIr). In these sections, Pio confirms that, although «the *animus* and the *anima* are united in one single substance», nonetheless, «in the *anima*, the *animus* is the guiding part, the manager and the leader».⁵⁷⁹ Further, in «Sed caput esse quasi», Pio insists that the difference between *animus* and *anima* is the same as between the head and the rest of the body and he rejoices to see «as if Lucretius felt that the *animus* is that part

⁵⁷⁴ He definitely takes the original meaning of *spiritus* as ‘breath’, from *spiro* ‘to breathe’.

⁵⁷⁵ Cf. J. Kraye, «Epicureanism and the Other Hellenistic Philosophies» and «Lucretius: Editions and Commentaries», in Ford, Bloemendal and Fantazzi 2014: 617-625, 1038-1040; Gillespie and Hardie 2007: 205-324; Palmer 2014; Norbrook, Harrison and Hardie 2016.

⁵⁷⁶ Of him, Vives indifferently writes in *Disc. trad.* 3 that «I have no desire to speak [*piget loqui*] of Baptista Pius and Cornehus Vitellius. Posterity may judge of our contemporaries» (VOO 6: 344; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 386; tr. Watson 1913: 162).

⁵⁷⁷ Later, in 1563, Denis Lambin published an edition and commentary of Lucretius’s poem: *Titi Lucretii Cari De rerum natura libri VI* (Paris: Guillaume Rouillé / Philippe Gautier de Rouillé; revised edition at Paris: Jean Bienné, 1570). In it, Lambin rejected those views incompatible with Christian belief.

⁵⁷⁸ Cf. *supra* n. 554, 560.

⁵⁷⁹ Cf. Pio 1511: f. XCIIv: «Animum et animam asserimus in unam naturam coisse: caeterum animus est in anima dux, moderator et princeps».

of the *anima* that has been called *intellectus* by recent philosophers». ⁵⁸⁰ Paradoxically, Pio's extremely long annotation to verse 94 («Primum animum»; f. LXXXVIIIv-XCiv, seven crammed pages) does not deal with the *animus* but with the notions expressed on the *anima* by Aristotle, Galen, Ioannes Scotus Eriugena, Averroes, and Thomas Aquinas.

It is interesting to bring up here a passage of Varro mentioned by Pio, which in fact is a quotation of Augustine's *De ciuitate Dei* (7.23), slightly modified and with two interpolations of his own. ⁵⁸¹ In this passage, which Vives annotated (cf. *supra* n. 103), Varro explains the three grades of soul (*anima*): (1) that which enables life; (2) that which gives sensation; (3) that which gives intelligence. This third grade «is the highest, and is called mind [*animus*]; and, here, intelligence prevails. All mortal creatures apart from man lack this grade of soul. *Given the fact that men seem to be similar to God*, this part of the soul of the world, Varro says, is called God, while in us *God* is called *genius*». ⁵⁸² It seems that the *animus* or 'mind' is made equivalent to God, which is a part of the soul of the world. As a result, the individual *animus* or the individual God living within each person would be the *genius*. This interpretation may be coherent in this context —and certainly to Pio's belief of a conscious and immortal soul—, and it is even endorsed by a later Roman author, Lucius Apuleius Madaurensis (125-ca.170), ⁵⁸³ but finds serious difficulties with the traditional Roman conception of *genius*. ⁵⁸⁴

⁵⁸⁰ Cf. Pio 1511: f. XCIIIr: «Tanquam Lucretius sentiat animum eam partem esse animae quae a philosophis recentioribus uocatur intellectus». By 'recent philosophers', Pio may allude to (for example) Ficino, who in the following passages of *Theologia Platonica* seems to use *intellectus* in the sense of *animus*. Cf. 9.1 (Hankins and Allen 2003: 10-11) «Animam in se revolui modis quatuor alias diximus, scilicet per intellectum in naturam suam, quando quaerit, inuenit consideratque seipsam», that is, «Elsewhere we said that the soul reflects upon itself in four ways: through the intellect upon its own nature when it seeks, finds, and considers itself», 9.2 (Hankins and Allen 2003: 12-13): «Praestantissimae animae partes sunt intellectus atque uoluntas», that is, «The soul's most outstanding parts are the intellect and the will».

⁵⁸¹ Interpolations are signaled in italics both in the English translation (Dyson 1999: 294) and the Latin text included in the next footnote.

⁵⁸² Cf. Pio 1511: f. LXXXVIv: «Varro tamen in libro de diis selectis tres esse affirmat animae gradus in omni uniuersaque natura. Vnum: quod omnes partes corporis, quae uiuunt, transit et non habet sensum, sed tantum ad uiuendum ualetudinem; hanc uim in nostro corpore permanere dicit in ossibus, unguibus et capillis, sicut in mundo arbores, quae sine sensu aluntur et crescunt et modo quodam suo uiuunt. Secundum gradum animae dicit, in quo sensus est; hanc uim peruenire in oculos, aures, nares, os, tactum. Tertium gradum animae esse summum, quod uocatur animus, in quo intelligentia prominet; hoc praeter hominem omnes carere mortales. *In qua, quoniam homines deo uidentur esse similes*, hanc partem animae mundi deum dicit, *deum* autem in nobis *genium* uocari». Migne (PL 41: 212, n. 2) warns that the phrase «In qua, quoniam homines deo uidentur esse similes» has been added by some editors, but is absent in all manuscripts. Vives (*Ciu. dei* 7.23.1101; CCD 2: 121) writes a note to the entire passage of Augustine, highlighting that Pythagoras and Plato said that each person has one soul (*anima*) consisting of two parts: one that is devoid of reason (*rationis expers*), one that takes part in reason (*rationis particeps*).

⁵⁸³ Cf. Apuleius, *De deo Socratis* 15.150-151 (Moreschini 1991: 25): «Eum [i.e. δαίμων] nostra lingua, ut ego interpretor (haud sciam an bono, certe quidem meo periculo), poteris Genium uocare, quod is deus qui est animus sui cuique». Apuleius argues that the Greek notion of δαίμων can be rendered in Latin with the term *genius*; and he understands *genius* as a kind of god that constitutes the *animus* of every single person».

⁵⁸⁴ Cf. Onians 1951: 129: «The Roman conception of the conscious self was virtually identical with that of the Greeks. It has a slightly different emphasis in surviving literature, but the *genius* was, I suggest, in origin the Roman analogue to the ψυχή as here explained, the life-spirit active in procreation, dissociated from and external to the conscious self that is centred in the chest».

2.3 Cicero

In his task of disseminating philosophy among his Roman countrymen and giving a reasoned guidance for living,⁵⁸⁵ Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC) debated the question about the soul, particularly in *Disputationes Tusculanae* and *De re publica* (book 6, also known as *Somnium Scipionis*).⁵⁸⁶ In *Tusculan disputations*, Cicero summarizes what previous philosophers believed the *animus* was. First, he reviews the opinions «ordinarily held [*uolgo*]»:

As to what the *animus* itself is in itself, or where its place in us, or what its origin, there is much disagreement. Some think the *animus* is the actual heart (*cor*), and so we get the words *excordes* ‘without heart’, *uecordes* ‘wanting heart’, and *concordes* ‘of one heart’, meaning ‘senseless’, ‘feeble-minded’ and ‘of one mind’; [...] Empedocles holds that the *animus* is blood permeating the heart: others thought that a particular part of the brain had claim to the primacy of the *animus*. [...] Others have said that the heart is the local habitation of the *animus*, whilst others place it in the brain; others however identify *animus* and *anima* ‘breath’ as we Romans practically do. The name explains this: for we speak of *agere animam* ‘giving up the ghost’, and *efflare* ‘expiring’, and of *animosos* ‘spirited people’, and *bene animatos* ‘people of good spirit’ and *ex animi sententia* ‘to the best of one’s belief’; moreover the actual word for ‘soul’ (*animus*) has come from the word for ‘breath’ (*anima*) in Latin; Zeno the Stoic holds the *animus* to be fire.⁵⁸⁷

What is most interesting of this passage is that Cicero employs *animus* to designate the soul as the general term, while he leaves *anima* strictly to the meaning of ‘breath’ or ‘vital principle’. When Cicero next summarizes the opinions on the *animus* held by particular philosophers, he continues to apply the same usage:

Aristoxenus ... held the *animus* was a special tuning-up of the natural body analogous to that which is called harmony in vocal instrumental music. [...] Xenocrates ... said that it was a number. [...] Plato imagined the *animus* to be of three-fold nature: the sovereign part, that is, reason, he placed in the head as the citadel, and the other two parts, anger and desire, he wished to be subservient, and these he fixed in their places: anger in the breast, and desire below the diaphragm. [...] Dicaearchus [... said that] neither in man nor in beast is there a principle of consciousness (*animus*) or a principle of life (*anima*). [...] Aristotle ... considers that there is a fifth nature from which comes mind ... and accordingly applies to the actual *animus* a new term, ἐνδελέχεια, descriptive of a sort of uninterrupted and perpetual movement.⁵⁸⁸

⁵⁸⁵ Cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.3-5; M. Schofield, «Writing Philosophy», in Steel 2013: 73-87, at 78.

⁵⁸⁶ Editions, commentaries and translations consulted: Fohlen and Humbert 1931; Roggia 1940-1942; King 1945; Valentí 1948-1950; Douglas 1994; Zetzel 1995; Medina 2005; Kennedy 2010; Zetzel 2017.

⁵⁸⁷ Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.9.18-19 (King 1945: 22-25): «Quid sit porro ipse animus aut ubi aut unde, magna dissensio est. Aliis cor ipsum animus uidetur, ex quo ‘excordes’, ‘uecordes’ ‘concordes’que dicuntur; [...] Empedocles animum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem. Aliis pars quaedam cerebri uisa est animi principatum tenere. [...] Alii in corde, alii in cerebro dixerunt animi esse sedem et locum; animum autem alii animam, ut fere nostri. Declarat nomen: nam et ‘agere animam’ et ‘efflare’ dicimus et ‘animosos’ et ‘bene animatos’ et ‘ex animi sententia’; ipse autem animus ab anima dictus est; Zenoni Stoico animus ignis uidetur».

⁵⁸⁸ Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.9.19-1.10.23 (King 1945: 24-29): «Aristoxenus ... ipsius corporis intentionem quandam, uelut in cantu et fidibus quae harmonia dicitur. [...] Xenocrates ... numerum

According to Cicero's terminology, philosophers argued the *animus* to be harmony (ἀρμονία),⁵⁸⁹ to encompass both reason (*ratio*) and irrationality (*cupiditas* 'desire', and *ira* 'anger');⁵⁹⁰ and to be ἐνδελέχεια, made of a fifth element (*aether*), from which mind comes too. Regarding this last assertion, it might seem that Cicero modified Aristotle's ἐντελέχεια ('that which carries with itself its own perfection')⁵⁹¹ into ἐνδελέχεια ('continuous movement') in order to relate the nature of the *animus* and the human mind to that of the stars and heavenly bodies: if the *animus* and the mind of a human being have capabilities —to reflect on things (*cogitare*), to foresee (*providere*), to learn (*discere*), to teach (*docere*), to discover (*inuenire*), to remember (*meminisse*), to feel—⁵⁹² which are not found in the four elements (water, fire, earth and air), then such capabilities must have been enabled owing to the nature of the fifth element (*aether*). And since the fifth element is found in the heavenly bodies, which have their own minds and a circular, never-ending motion, human souls and human minds must also have the same continuous, eternal motion. That is why ἐνδελέχεια may not be a misinterpretation of Cicero but rather a term deliberately chosen.⁵⁹³ The Renaissance scholar Filippo Beroaldo the Elder (1453-1505), in his *Commentarii Quaestionum Tusculanarum* (Bologna: Benedetto di Ettore, 1496 | USTC — ; citations according to Venice: Simone Bevilacqua, 1502 | USTC 814176), tried to mediate in the debate about the term *endelechia* (Biv). He found that both terms (*endelechia* and *entelechia*) conveyed an «appropriate meaning [*significatio conueniens*]», the former being «a continuous movement [*continua motio; continuata mobilitas*]», and the latter being «some completion [*perfectio quaeipiam*]».⁵⁹⁴

Cicero continues his description of the *animus*, and states that «whatever it is that is conscious, that is wise, that lives, that is active, must be heavenly and divine and for that

dixit esse. [...] Plato triplicem finxit animum, cuius principatum, id est rationem in capite sicut in arce posuit, et duas partes ei parere uoluit, iram et cupiditatem, quas suis locis iram in pectore, cupiditatem subter praecordia locauit. [...] Dicaearchus ... neque in homine inesse animum uel animam nec in bestia. [...] Aristoteles ... quintam quandam naturam censet esse, e qua sit mens ... et sic ipsum animum ἐνδελέχειαν appellat nouo nomine quasi quandam continuatam motionem et perennem». This debate is addressed by Vives in *Ciu. dei* 22.11.n52 (CCD 5: 146-148).

⁵⁸⁹ Cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 92a (Burnet 1992, vol. 1; tr. Cooper 1997: 79): «The soul [ψυχή] is a kind of harmony of the elements of the body in a state of tension [ἐντεταμένοι]».

⁵⁹⁰ Cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 4.5-10 (King 1945: 338-339): «...the distinction made first by Pythagoras and after him by Plato, who divide the *animus* in two parts: to the one they assign a share in reason [*rationis particeps*], to the other none [*expers*]»; Plato, *Respublica* 439d (Burnet 1992, vol. 4; tr. Cooper 1997: 1071): «We'll call the part of the soul with which it calculates [λογίζεταί] the rational part [τὸ λογιστικόν] and the part with which it lusts, hungers, thirsts, and gets excited by other appetites [ἐπιθυμιαί] the irrational appetitive part [ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν], companion of certain indulgences and pleasures».

⁵⁹¹ On Vives's opinion about this term, cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.3, p. 55.

⁵⁹² Cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.10.22.

⁵⁹³ Gigon (1998: 462, note to §22) argues that we have no right to affirm that Cicero misunderstood his source: «Da wir aber audi mit den verlorenen Dialogen (in diesem Falle vor allem "Über die Philosophie" und "Eudemos") rechnen üssen, haben wir kein Recht, den vorliegenden Text als Umdeutung oder Miß Verständnis Ciceros». However, Kennedy (2010: 50) remarks that «the former term [ἐνδελέχεια] was widespread enough, but the latter [ἐντελέχεια] was a neologism by Aristotle; therefore, the words *nouo nomine* must surely point to the fact that Cicero wrote ἐντελέχειαν».

⁵⁹⁴ Strange nuance expressed by *quampiam*: is it possible that there only be a bit of perfection? Perhaps Beroaldo tries to convey here the notion of a thing in the process of being finished, that is, of attaining its realization.

reason eternal». ⁵⁹⁵ Here the *animus* is described as a breath that has awareness (*sentire*), intelligence (*sapere*), life (*uiuere*), and will (activity, *uigere*). Moreover, it must be of divine origin because «in [the four earthly] elements ⁵⁹⁶ there is nothing to possess the power of memory, thought, reflection, nothing capable of retaining the past, or foreseeing the future and grasping the present». ⁵⁹⁷ In *De re publica*, he insists in the divine nature of the *animus* owing to the fact that it does not receive movement from the outside but from itself. «Since it is clear that what is moved by itself is eternal», Cicero writes, «who could deny that the *animus* has such nature? Whatever is moved by an external force is inanimate; but whatever is animate is stirred by its own internal motion. That is the special nature and force of the *animus*». ⁵⁹⁸ Now in *Tusculan disputations*, Cicero reinforces the description of the *animus* as a self-aware and a self-moving breath, when he points out that the *animus* «is conscious that it is in motion; and, when so conscious, it is at the same time conscious of this: that it is self-moved by its own power and not an outside power, and that it cannot ever be abandoned by itself». ⁵⁹⁹

This divine ⁶⁰⁰ breath that is located in the head ⁶⁰¹ but whose natural home (*domicilius, naturalis sedes*) is located in heaven, ⁶⁰² has nevertheless an important threat: disorder (*perturbatio*), that is, «an agitation of the *animus* alien from reason and contrary to nature» or, in other words, «a longing for undue violence, ‘unduly violent’ understood to mean a longing which is far removed from the equability of nature», ⁶⁰³ or still «a movement of the *animus* either destitute of reason, or contemptuous of reason, or disobedient to reason». ⁶⁰⁴

⁵⁹⁵ Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.27.67 (King 1945: 78-79): «Ita quidquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod uiuit, quod uiget, caeleste et diuinum ob eamque rem aeternum sit necesse est».

⁵⁹⁶ That is, water, air, fire and earth.

⁵⁹⁷ Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.27.66 (King 1945: 76-77): «His enim in naturis nihil inest quod uim memoriae, mentis, cogitationis habeat, quod et praeterita teneat et futura prouideat et complecti possit praesentia».

⁵⁹⁸ Cicero, *De re publica* 6.28 (Zetzel 1995: 92; tr. Zetzel 2017: 103): «Cum pateat igitur aeternum id esse quod a se ipso moueatur, quis est qui hanc naturam animis esse tribuam neget? Inanimum est enim omne quod pulsus agitur externo; quod autem est animal, id motu cietur interiore et suo; nam haec est propria natura animi atque uis».

⁵⁹⁹ Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.23.55 (King 1945: 64-65): «Sentit igitur animus se moueri: quod cum sentit, illud una sentit: se ui sua, non aliena moueri, nec accidere posse ut ipse umquam a se deseratur».

⁶⁰⁰ Cf. Cicero, *De re publica* 6.17 (Zetzel 1995: 88; tr. Zetzel 2017: 99): «The souls given to the human race by the gift of the gods [*animos munere deorum hominum generi datos*]».

⁶⁰¹ Cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.39.70: «in capite».

⁶⁰² Cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.10.24; 1.19.43 (King 1945: 52-53): «When the *animus* has reached conditions of lightness and heat resembling its own, it becomes quite motionless, as though in a state of equilibrium with its surroundings, and then, and not before, finds its natural home [*naturalis sedes*]». Note here the notion of *equilibrium* as a balanced, motionless state. Movement somehow implies incompleteness and need.

⁶⁰³ Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 4.21.47 (King 1945: 378-379): «ut perturbatio sit auersa a ratione contra naturam animi commotio [...] ut perturbatio sit appetitus uehementior, ‘uehementior’ autem intelligatur is, qui procul absit a naturae constantia»; cf. 4.6.11, 4.15.34: «turbidi animorum concitati que motus», that is, «troubled and agitated movements of the *animus*». The Greek term *πάθος* is usually rendered by Cicero as *perturbatio* or *motus*; Seneca prefers *affectus*.

⁶⁰⁴ Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 3.11.24 (King 1945: 254-255): «...omnis perturbatio sit animi motus uel rationis expers uel rationem aspernans uel rationi non obediens».

These illnesses that jeopardize the peace of both mind and life⁶⁰⁵ are mainly caused by a wrong supposition (*opinio*) of what is good and what is bad. The following chart summarizes the explanation of the four disturbances (*perturbationes, motus*) of the soul as explained by Cicero in *Tusculan disputations* (3.11.24-25; 4.7.14-15), accompanied with the three equable states (*tres constantiae*) proposed in 4.6.12-14.

Quattuor perturbationes / motus animi [The four disorders / disturbances of the soul]			Tres constantiae [The three equable states]
ex opinione boni [caused by the supposition that sth. is good]	praesentis [now]	uoluptas gestiens, elata laetitia [exuberant pleasure, joy excited beyond measure]	gaudium [joy]
	impendentis [about to come]	cupiditas, libido [desire, lust]	uoluntas [wish]
ex opinione mali [caused by the supposition that sth. is bad]	praesentis [now]	aegritudo [distress]	— ⁶⁰⁶
	impendentis [about to come]	metus [fear]	cautio [precaution]

Without doubt, the Roman thinker prescribes philosophy as the cure (*medicina*) that heals such disorders⁶⁰⁷ by expelling vices and fostering virtue.⁶⁰⁸ Philosophy is the guide (*dux*) that can assist humans in the difficult (and unavoidable) process of restoring health to their souls. This sort of argument leads Cicero to affirm that the meaning of the Delphic maxim *Nosce te* is, in fact, *Nosce animum tuum*.⁶⁰⁹ The thing to be known and to be taken care of within us is the *animus* and, in it, the most excellent part —the mind—, as Cicero himself acknowledges: «You are not what your physical shape reveals, but each person is his mind, not the body that a finger can point at».⁶¹⁰

2.4 Seneca

Lucius Annaeus Seneca's (4BC-65AD) notion of *animus* can mainly be found in *De tranquillitate animi* and the *Epistulae ad Lucilium*, as well as in some passages of *Quaestiones naturales* and *De uita beata*.⁶¹¹ In Ep. 121, Seneca admits the limitations about attaining

⁶⁰⁵ Cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 4.15.34.

⁶⁰⁶ Cicero argues that there is no harmonious state in opposition to distress.

⁶⁰⁷ Cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 3.3.6 (King 1945: 230-231): «Est profecto animi medicina, philosophia, cuius auxilium non ut in corporis morbis petendum est foris, omnibusque opibus atque uiribus, ut nosmet ipsi nobis mederi possimus, elaborandum est», that is, «Assuredly there is an art of healing the *animus*: I mean philosophy, whose aid must be sought not, as in bodily diseases, outside ourselves, and we must use our utmost endeavour, with all our resources and strength, to have the power to be ourselves our own physicians».

⁶⁰⁸ Cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 5.2.5 (King 1945: 230-231): «O uitae philosophia dux, o uirtutis indagatrix expultrixque uitiorum!», that is, «O philosophy, you guide of life, o you explorer of virtue and expeller of vice!»

⁶⁰⁹ Cf. Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 1.22.52.

⁶¹⁰ Cicero, *De re publica* 6.26 (Zetzel 1995: 91; tr. Zetzel 2017: 103): «Nec enim tu is es quem forma ista declarat, sed mens cuiusque is est quisque, non ea figura quae digito demonstrari potest».

⁶¹¹ Editions and translations consulted: Gummere 1917-1925; Cardó 1924, 1926, 1928-1931, 1956-1959; Basore 1928-1935; Lazzarini and Lotito 1997; Mariné 2000; Anderson 2015; Orpianesi and Costa 2018. It is also

knowledge of what the *animus* is. According to him, although each being is aware of how he is arranged, it is hard for him to explain *why* he is *that* being *such* arranged. One can sense that one moves, but can hardly explain what is the ultimate source of that movement. Accordingly, the *animus* is felt, but its essence, its location and its origin remains an intricate question:

Nature is easier to understand than to explain; hence, the child of whom we were speaking does not understand what ‘constitution’ is, but understands its own constitution. He does not know what ‘a living creature’ is, but he feels that he is an animal. Moreover, that very constitution of his own he only understands confusedly, cursorily, and darkly. We also know that we possess a soul [*animus*], but we do not know the essence [*quid sit*], the place [*ubi sit*], the quality [*qualis sit*], or the source [*unde*], of the soul. Such as is the consciousness [*sensus*] of our souls which we possess, ignorant as we are of their nature and position, even so all animals possess a consciousness of their own constitutions. [...] They must necessarily have a feeling of the principle which they obey and by which they are controlled. Everyone of us understands that there is something which stirs his impulses, but he does not know what it is. He knows that he has a sense of striving, although he does not know what it is or its source. Thus even children and animals have a consciousness of their primary element, but it is not very clearly outlined or portrayed.⁶¹²

Albeit his skeptical foundation, Seneca claims that the *animus* is made of «air [*spiritus*] in a certain state»,⁶¹³ and that this particular air belongs to the immense regions above (*sursum*).⁶¹⁴ Therefore, the *animus* struggles to return from where it came, and it is proof of the divine nature of the *animus* the fact that, as the body of a person is set in straight position so that it can look up, so the *animus* is set to long for divine things above this earthly world, and to unite with the whole (*deus*).⁶¹⁵ Since this «spiritual» (i.e. air-made)

highly recommended: Damschen, Heil and Waida 2014 (succinct analysis of works mentioned: 141-146, 153-160, 161-166, 181-190, 213-214; analysis of the notion of *animus*: particularly at 346-351, 355).

⁶¹² Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 121.11-13 (Gummere 1925: 402-403): «Facilius natura intellegitur quam enarratur; itaque infans ille quid sit constitutio non nouit, constitutionem suam nouit. Et quid sit animal, nescit, animal esse se sentit. Praeterea ipsam constitutionem suam crasse intellegit et summam et obscure. Nos quoque animum habere nos scimus; quid sit animus, ubi sit, qualis sit aut unde, nescimus. Qualis ad nos animi nostri sensus, quamuis naturam eius ignoremus ac sedem, talis ad omnia animalia constitutionis suae sensus est. [...] Necessae est eius sensum habeant, cui parent, a quo reguntur. Nemo non ex nobis intellegit esse aliquid, quod impetus suos moueat; quid sit illud ignorat. Et conatum sibi esse scit; quis sit aut unde sit, nescit. Sic infantibus quoque animalibusque principalis partis suae sensus est non satis dilucidus nee expressus».

⁶¹³ Cf. Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 50.6 (Gummere 1917: 334-335): «Quid enim est aliud animus quam quodam modo se habens spiritus?». This *spiritus* is the Latin version of the Greek πνεῦμα. Seneca, following the Stoic philosophical framework, believes that the *spiritus* (πνεῦμα) acts like a glue that maintains coherence in all elements of the universe, and infuses motion into the animus. Cf. Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 2.6.5-6.

⁶¹⁴ Cf. Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 1.pr.12 (Corcoran 1971: 8-11): «Cum illa [i.e. sursum] tetigit, alitur, crescit ac uelut uinculis liberatus in originem redit et hoc habet argumentum diuinitatis suae: quod illum diuina delectant», that is, «When the *animus* contacts those regions, it is nurtured, grows and returns to its origin just as though freed from its chains. As proof of its divinity it has this: divine things cause the *animus* pleasure».

⁶¹⁵ Cf. Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 92.30 (Gummere 1920: 466-467): «Totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est et deus; et socii sumus eius et membra. Capax est noster animus, perfertur illo, si uitia non

animus is, at the same time, part of the whole (*deus*; τὸ ὄν, *quod est*) and part of a human being,⁶¹⁶ Seneca claims that, somehow, God is within us.⁶¹⁷ Furthermore, this «spiritual» *animus* is what distinguishes a person from the rest of the animals. While beasts have only the principle of life, human beings have, in addition, the principle of consciousness:

I distribute 'that which exists' into these two species: things with, and things without, substance. There is no third class. And how do I distribute substance? By saying that it is either animate [*animantia*] or inanimate [*inanima*]. And how do I distribute the animate? By saying: certain things have mind [*animus*], while others have only life [*anima*].⁶¹⁸

The *animus* is «that which is the peculiar property of a human being», and what sets someone's true value.⁶¹⁹ By stating this, Seneca acknowledges that the *animus* has two parts: one superior, the mind (*mens*; τὸ ἡγεμονικόν would be the Stoic term); one prone to fall (*animus labens*),⁶²⁰ when it focuses on the many activities and distractions of the outer earthly world,⁶²¹ and when it yields control to emotions and passions (*affectus*).⁶²² When the

deprimant. Quemadmodum corporum nostrorum habitus erigitur et spectat in caelum, ita animus, cui in quantum uult licet porrigi, in hoc a natura rerum formatus est, ut paria dis uellet. Et si utatur suis uiribus ac se in spatium suum extendat, non aliena uia ad summa nititur», that is, «All this universe which encompasses us is one, and it is God; we are associates of God; we are his members. Our *animus* has capabilities, and is carried thither, if vices do not hold it down. Just as it is the nature of our bodies to stand erect and look upward to the sky, so the soul, which may reach out as far as it will, was framed by nature to this end, that it should desire equality with the gods. And if it makes use of its powers and stretches upward into its proper region it is by no alien path that it struggles toward the heights»; *Ad Marciam* 24.5; *Ad Heluam matrem* 6.8; *Ad Polybium* 9.8.

⁶¹⁶ Cf. Seneca, *Quaestiones naturales* 1.pr. 14 (Corcoran 1971: 10-11): «Nostris melior pars animus est».

⁶¹⁷ Cf. Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 41.1 (Gummere 1917: 272-273): «Prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus est», that is, «God is near you, he is with you, he is within you». In 66.12, Seneca argues that *ratio* is the part of the divine spirit in a person as, perhaps, another way of conveying *animus-mens* (cf. *infra* n. 619).

⁶¹⁸ Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 58.14 (Gummere 1917: 394-395): «'Quod est' in has species diuido: ut sint corporalia aut incorporalia. Nihil tertium est. Corpus quomodo diuido? Vt dicam: aut animantia sunt aut inanima. Rursus animantia quemadmodum diuido? Vt dicam: quaedam animum habent, quaedam tantum animam».

⁶¹⁹ Cf. Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 41.8 (Gummere 1917: 276-277): «...quod proprium hominis est. Quaeris quid sit? Animus et ratio in animo perfecta»; 76.32 (Gummere 1920: 166-167): «Atqui cum uoles ueram hominis aestimationem inire et scire, qualis sit, nudum inspicere; ponat patrimonium, ponat honores et alia fortunae mendacia, corpus ipsum exuat. Animum intueri, qualis quantusque sit, alieno an suo magnus», that is, «But when you wish to inquire into a man's true worth, and to know what manner of man he is, look at him when he is naked; make him lay aside his inherited estate, his titles, and the other deceptions of fortune; let him even strip off his body. Consider his *animus*, its quality and its stature, and thus learn whether its greatness is borrowed, or its own».

⁶²⁰ Cf., for example, this phrase in the last sentence of *De tranquillitate animi* (17.12).

⁶²¹ Cf. Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 14.2 (Basore 1932: 266-269): «Vtique animus ab omnibus externis in se reuocandus est: sibi confidat, se gaudeat, sua suspiciat, recedat quantum potest ab alienis, et se sibi applicet; damna non sentiat, etiam aduersa benigne interpretetur», that is, «Most of all, the *animus* must be withdrawn from external interests into itself. Let it have confidence in itself, rejoice in itself, let it admire its own things, let it retire as far as possible from the things of others and devote itself to itself, let it not feel losses, let it interpret kindly even adversities».

⁶²² Cf. Seneca, *De ira* 1.7.4 (Basore 1928: 124-125): «Animus, si in iram, amorem aliosque se proiecit ad affectus, non permittitur reprimere impetum; rapiat ilium oportet et ad inimum agat pondus suum et uitiorum natura procliuius», that is, «The mind, if it plunges into anger, love, or the other passions, has

animus loses the equilibrium and thus compromises its serenity (*tranquillitas*, εὐθυμία),⁶²³ it enters into a state of illness. According to Seneca, one of the best remedies to keep the *animus* in good health is to live in such a state of mind that «none of the things that happen shall be unexpected».⁶²⁴ Since everything is liable to be turned upside down (*uersabilis*),⁶²⁵ and «whatever can one man befall can happen just as well to all»,⁶²⁶ then «one must become reconciled to his lot, must complain of it as little as possible, and must lay hold of whatever good it may have: no state is so bitter that a calm *animus* cannot find in it some consolation».⁶²⁷ Getting accustomed to all things (*consuetudo*), keeping the attention in our inner self (*in nos conuersi*), being flexible (*facilis*), practicing sobriety (*parsimonia*), and being preoccupied as little as possible for our possessions (since nothing is, in fact, ours but a loan made to us)⁶²⁸ are complementary measures to keep the *animus* balanced and focused in his path to return to the regions above.

Seneca's writings strongly stress the well-being of the *animus* because our thoughts (*sensus*), our words (*uerba*), our dispositions (*habitus*), our expressions (*uultus*), and our very gait (*incessus*) issue from it.⁶²⁹ As long as the *animus* remains intact (*incolumis*)—that is, not injured, not disturbed by any element from the outside—, all functions of the soul and all the elements of the body remain on duty (*in officio*) and serve with obedience. Conversely, when the *animus* is unbalanced (*uacillat*), nothing performs correctly.⁶³⁰ For example, the state of the *animus* affects the quality of the *ingenium*: «If a person's soul is wholesome, well-ordered, serious, and restrained, his natural intelligence or character also is sound and sober. Conversely, when the one degenerates, the other is also contaminated».⁶³¹ In a nutshell, it is Seneca's deep belief that the *animus*

no power to check its impetus; its very weight and the downward tendency of vice needs must hurry it on, and drive it to the bottom»; *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 75.12 (Gummere 1920: 142-143): «Adfectus sunt motus animi inprobabiles, subiti et concitati, qui frequentes neglectique fecere morbum», that is, «Passions are objectionable impulses of the *animus*, sudden and vehement; they have come so often, and so little attention has been paid to them, that they have caused a state of disease». *Adfectus* (*affectus*) is the Latin term used by Seneca to render the Greek πάθος.

⁶²³ In *De tranquillitate animi* 2.3 (Basore 1932: 212-213), Seneca defines *tranquillitas* as an «abiding stability of mind [*stabilem animi sedem*]», which «the Greeks call *euthymía*, and on which there is an excellent treatise by Democritus». Diogenes Laertius (9.46) includes *Περὶ εὐθυμίας* among his ethical works.

⁶²⁴ Cf. Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 11.6 (Basore 1932: 258-259, 256-257): «Ne quid ex iis, quae eueniunt, subitum sit». Similar thought is found in Epictetus (*Enchiridion* 8; Oldfather 1928: 490-491): «Μὴ ζήτει τὰ γινόμενα γίνεσθαι ὡς θέλεις, ἀλλὰ θέλε τὰ γινόμενα ὡς γίνεταί καὶ εὐροήσεις», that is, «Do not seek to have everything that happens happen as you wish, but wish for everything to happen as it actually does happen, and your life will be serene».

⁶²⁵ Cf. Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 11.10.

⁶²⁶ Cf. Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 11.8: «Cuius potest accidere quod cuiquam potest». A quotation of Publilius Syrus, *Sententiae* 133 (Duff 1935: 30): «Cunctis potest accidere quod cuius potest».

⁶²⁷ Cf. Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 10.4 (Basore 1932: 250-251): «Adsuescendum est itaque condicioni suae et quam minimum de illa querendum et quicquid habet circa se commodi adprehendendum: nihil tam acerbum est, in quo non aequus animus solacium inueniat».

⁶²⁸ Cf. Seneca, *De tranquillitate animi* 3.7, 6.1, 9.1, 10.2, 11.1, 14.1, 17.3.

⁶²⁹ Cf. Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 114.22.

⁶³⁰ Cf. Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 114.23.

⁶³¹ Cf. Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 114.3 (Gummere 1925: 300-301): «Si ille sanus est, si compositus, grauis, temperans, ingenium quoque siccum ac sobrium est; illo uitiat, hoc quoque adflatur».

should be equipped with many skills, many precepts,⁶³² and patterns of conduct taken from many epochs of history; but all should blend harmoniously into one aim. “How”, you ask, “can this be accomplished?” By constant effort, and by doing nothing without the approval of reason.⁶³³

2.5 Tertullian

Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus (ca. 155-220), who was highly praised by Jerome and whom Vives recommended (though if properly read),⁶³⁴ wrote a treatise on the soul (*De anima*)⁶³⁵ in order to defend Christian truth against the teachings and arguments of ancient philosophers and Gnostics. In chapters 12-13 and 18, Tertullian examines the notion of *animus* in order to refute the distinction (*differentia*) between this term and *anima*.⁶³⁶ Unlike Cicero and Seneca, Tertullian employs *anima* (not *animus*) to designate the soul as a whole.⁶³⁷ He supports his decision on the basis of the common usage of language, where *anima* has become a synonym of *homo* ‘human being’.⁶³⁸ In chapter 12, he clearly states that:

⁶³² Note here the importance of learning skills and maxims (therefore, the role of education) as a means to attain the equilibrium of the *animus*, which is defined as a «curiosus spectator» in *Naturales quaestiones* 1.pr.12.

⁶³³ Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium* 84.10-11 (Gummere 1920: 282-283): «Multae in illo artes, multa praecepta sint, multarum aetatum exempla, sed in unum conspirata. “Quomodo”, inquis, “hoc effici poterit?” Adsidua intentione; si nihil egerimus, nisi ratione suadente».

⁶³⁴ Cf. Jerome, *Epistulae* 70.5. Although Vives complains about Tertullian’s prior paganism and his confusing, hard style («perturbatissime loquitur»; «durus, nempe Afer»), he recommends the reading of his works if undertaken in the proper way («bene lecta»); cf. *Disc. trad.* 1 (VOO 6: 269; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 301), 3 (VOO 6: 340; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 381); *Conscr.* 108 (VOO 2: 312; ed. SWJV 3: 132).

⁶³⁵ Editions and translations consulted: Holmes 1870; Quain 1950; Ramos 2001; Waszink 2010; Vicastillo 2016; Leal and Mattei 2019. Holmes is an old but faithful English translation, whereas Quain’s version is much more readable and understandable, but also more free than literal.

⁶³⁶ Cf. Tertullian, *De anima* 18.10 (Waszink 2010: 26, line 9). In 12.6, he admits that Democritus proved correct in denying all distinction between *animus* and *anima* (ψυχή and νοῦς, if we follow the passage from Aristotle, *De anima* 404a27-28).

⁶³⁷ Apuleius (ca. 125-170), in *De Platone et dogmate eius* 1.13.207 (Moreschini 1991: 103; tr. Fowler 2016: 175-176) seems to have been the first Latin author to use the term *anima* to refer to the soul as a whole. Interestingly, he somehow considers that the mind encompasses both the rational part (the mind properly) and the irrational part (desire and longing): «Quare idem bene hominis pronuntiat esse *animam* corporis dominam. At enim cum tres partes *animae* ducat esse, rationabilem, id est *mentis* optumam portionem, hanc ait capitis arcem tenere, irascentiam uero procul a ratione ad domicilium cordis deductam esse obsequique eam in loco respondere sapientiae; cupidinem atque appetitum, postremam *mentis* portionem, infernas abdominis sedes tenere ut popinas quasdam et latrinarum latebras, deuersoria nequitiae atque luxuriae; relegatam uero idcirco longius a sapientia hanc partem uideri», that is, «Therefore, the same one [i.e. Plato] rightly declares that the human *soul* is the master of the body. But in fact, as there are in his opinion three parts of the *soul*, he says that the rational part, that is to say the best part of the *mind*, controls the citadel of the head; next, the irascible is drawn down some distance away from reason to its home in the heart, but it obeys reason and answers to wisdom in its place; an, last, desire and longing, the last part of the *mind* [Fowler translates *soul*], hold the lowest seats of the belly and are, just like certain taverns and secret corners of the bathhouses, the storehouses of wickedness and wanton excess. So this part seems to have been far removed from wisdom». Italics mine.

⁶³⁸ Among several linguistic examples (*De anima* 13.2-3), he holds that a rich man may say «How many souls [*animae*] do I support?», not «How many minds [*animi*]»; and that Christ came to bring

(1) the *animus* is the mind or νοῦς; (2) the *animus* ‘mind’ and *anima* ‘soul’ are not two different principles but the former conveys a particular feature, or carries out a particular function, of the soul; (3) the *animus* gives the *anima* the means to reflect on itself.

The next point is with regard to the *animus*, or mind, which the Greeks call *noûs*. By ‘mind’ [*animus*] I mean merely that faculty which is inherent and implanted in the soul [*anima*] and proper to it by birth and by which the soul acts and gains knowledge. The possession of this faculty makes it possible for the soul to act upon itself, the soul being moved by the mind as if they were distinct substances. [...] We hold that the soul is so united to the mind that they are not distinct substances, but that the mind is a function⁶³⁹ of the soul. [...] At the outset we said that the mind [*animus*] is merely a faculty and structure⁶⁴⁰ of the soul [*anima*].⁶⁴¹

Attention should be drawn to the nouns applied to the *animus*: *suggestum* (12.1, 18.5), *officium* (12.6), *instrumentum* (13.3), *structum* (18.5), *uis* (18.9). *Suggestum* derives from *subgero* > *suggero* ‘to heap up’, ‘to supply’, ‘to advise’, ‘to add’. The meaning implied is that the *animus* is a ‘power’⁶⁴² or ‘faculty’⁶⁴³ that provides something to the soul, namely action (*agere*) and knowledge (*sapere*). Such power is later conveyed with the term *uis* ‘force’⁶⁴⁴ or ‘active power’.⁶⁴⁵ *Officium* implies the notion that the *animus* performs a duty, thus meaning ‘function’.⁶⁴⁶ *Instrumentum* makes clear that Tertullian conceives the *animus* as subordinated to the whole soul. It is therefore its ‘tool’, ‘instrument’;⁶⁴⁷ or ‘servant’.⁶⁴⁸ *Structum* is a word coined by Tertullian that occurs here for the first time (cf. Waszink 2010: 261). It comes from *struo* ‘to build’, ‘to arrange’, ‘to compose’. The notion implied is that the *animus* is something that arranges and creates things. Holmes (1870: 451) and Quain (1950: 220) interpret the term as signifying ‘instrument’; Ramos (2001: 82) renders it as ‘structure’, Leal and Mattei (2019: 249) as ‘apparatus’. In my opinion, *structum* may refer to the capacity of the *animus* mentioned by Tertullian to create a sort of apparent detachment from the soul — a ‘structure’, an ‘arrangement’ — by virtue of which the *anima* is able, among other features, to reflect on itself.

In 18.8, Tertullian equates *animus* ‘mind’ with *intellectus* ‘understanding’ and, in 18.6, he argues that *animus* / *intellectus* is one out of the two branches at the service of the soul, the

salvation to souls (*animae*), not to minds. Cf. Luke 9:56: «Ὁ γὰρ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἦλθεν ψυχὰς ἀπολέσαι, ἀλλὰ σῶσαι», «Filius hominis non uenit animas perdere sed saluare».

⁶³⁹ Quain (1950: 206) renders *officium* as ‘faculty’.

⁶⁴⁰ Quain (1950: 220) renders *structum* as ‘instrument’.

⁶⁴¹ Cf. Tertullian, *De anima* 12.1, 12.6, 18.5 (Waszink 2010: 16-17, 25; tr. Quain 1950: 205, 206, 220): «Proinde et animum siue mens est νοῦς apud Graecos, non aliud quid intellegimus quam suggestum animae ingenitum et insitum et natiuitus proprium, quo agit, quo sapit, quem secum habens ex semetipsa secum moueat in semetipsa, atque ita moueri uideatur ab illo tamquam substantia alio. [...] Nos autem animum ita dicimus animae concretum, non ut substantia alium, sed ut substantiae officium. [...] Praestruximus neque animum aliud quid esse quam animae suggestum et structum».

⁶⁴² Waszink 2010: 202; Vicastillo 2016: 117; Leal and Mattei 2019: 211.

⁶⁴³ Holmes 1870: 435; Quain 1950: 205.

⁶⁴⁴ Vicastillo 2016: 155.

⁶⁴⁵ Holmes 1870: 452; Leal and Mattei 2019: 251.

⁶⁴⁶ Holmes 1870: 437; Vicastillo 2016: 121; Waszink 2010: 205; Leal and Mattei 2019: 215.

⁶⁴⁷ Holmes 1870: 438; Vicastillo 2016: 123; Leal and Mattei 2019: 217.

⁶⁴⁸ Quain 1950: 207.

other one being the senses (*sensus*). The mind provides knowledge of non-corporeal things; the senses, of corporeal.

While corporeal, visible, and tangible things belong to the province of sense, the spiritual, invisible, and secret things are under the dominion of the understanding.⁶⁴⁹ Yet, both classes come under the soul for the purpose of being at its service; thus, the soul perceives corporeal things with the help of the body and spiritual things by means of the mind. [...] If we must say that corporeal things are 'sensed' and spiritual things are 'understood', it is the nature of those objects which causes the distinction and not the abode of sensation and understanding, that is, the soul and the mind.⁶⁵⁰

However, Tertullian does not give preeminence to the *animus* / *intellectus* over the senses, because «how can there be a real superiority of understanding over sense when the former depends on the latter for its guidance to the truth?».⁶⁵¹ Moreover, «we know that truth is apprehended by means of visible images, that is, the invisible through the visible».⁶⁵² It is without doubt that, in Tertullian, the *animus* and the senses are interlinked and both are a function and instrument of the *anima* (the soul).

2.6 Macrobius

Macrobius Ambrosius Theodosius (fl. 400) wrote two books of *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*,⁶⁵³ in which he explained in depth the meaning of some passages of the sixth book of Cicero's *De re publica*. Of all, it is of interest those devoted to elucidate what Cicero implied when he wrote *animus*. Cicero's text reads:

Humans are given an *animus* from those eternal fires which you call constellations and stars, which are spherical globes, endowed with divine minds.⁶⁵⁴

To which Macrobius points out that Cicero employed *animus* in two senses: one instead of *mens* 'mind', which is correct (*proprie*); one instead of *anima* 'soul', which is a misuse of the term (*abusivae*):⁶⁵⁵

⁶⁴⁹ Quain (1950: 220) renders *intellectus* as 'mind'.

⁶⁵⁰ Tertullian, *De anima* 18.6, 18.8 (Waszink 2010: 25; tr. Quain 1950: 220, 221): «Corporalium et spiritalium, uisibilium et inuisibilium, publicatarum et arcanarum, quod illae sensui, istae intellectui attribuantur, apud animam tamen et istis et illis obsequio deputatis, quae perinde per corpus corporalia sentiat, quemadmodum per animum incorporalia intellegat. [...] Si corporalia quidem sentiuntur, incorporalia uero intelleguntur, rerum genera diuersa sunt, non domicilia sensus et intellectus, id est, non anima et animus».

⁶⁵¹ Tertullian, *De anima* 18.11 (Waszink 2010: 26; tr. Quain 1950: 222): «Quomodo enim praeferatur sensui intellectus, a quo informatur ad cognitionem ueritatum?». Here Quain renders *intellectus* as 'intellect'.

⁶⁵² Tertullian, *De anima* 18.12 (Waszink 2010: 26; tr. Quain 1950: 222): «Veritates per imagines apprehenduntur, id est inuisibilia per uisibilia noscuntur».

⁶⁵³ Editions and translations consulted: Jan 1848-1852; Stahl 1952; Willis 1970; Navarro 2006.

⁶⁵⁴ Cicero, *De re publica* 6.15 (Zetzel 1995: 87; tr. Zetzel 2017: 98): «Iisque [i.e. hominibus] animus datus est ex illis sempiternis ignibus quae sidera et stellas uocatis, quae globosae et rotundae diuinis animatae mentibus». Note here that constellation and stars have been given life (*animatae*, from *anima* as 'principle of life') by divine minds.

[Cicero] is using the word *animus* in both its proper and improper senses. The proper meaning of *animus* is of course ‘mind’, which no one denies is more divine than *anima*, but sometimes we also assume for the word *animus* the meaning ‘soul’. Accordingly, when he says «*Animi* have been given to them out of those eternal fires», he wants us to understand ‘mind’, which is the essence that we alone have in common with the sky and stars. But when he says «Your *animus* must be kept in the custody of your body», he is then referring to the soul, imprisoned in the confines of the body, to which the divine Mind is not subject.⁶⁵⁶

However, here one ought to bear in mind that Macrobius’s notion of *anima* is quite far from Cicero’s ‘breath of life devoid of reason’, and near to Neoplatonism and the doctrine of the three hypostases.⁶⁵⁷ If we continue to read Macrobius’s commentary, he explains that God creates Mind (*mens*, νοῦς) out of himself owing to his greatness (*maiestas*); that Mind creates Soul (*anima*) out of itself, when it looks down instead of looking up to God; and that Soul produces bodily entities by further looking to inferior things: first, heavenly bodies (*corpora supera*), then earthly bodies (*corpora terrena*: human beings, animals and plants) by increased degradation. Since *anima* comes from *mens*, the *anima* keeps a rational part (τὸ λογικόν) that he passes completely on to heavenly bodies and, only in a small portion, on to human bodies. The following passage summarizes it all:

God, who both is and is called the First Cause, is alone the beginning and source of all things which are and which seem to be. He, in a bounteous outpouring of his greatness, created from himself Mind. This Mind [*mens*], called *nous*, as long as it fixes its gaze upon the Father, retains a complete likeness of its Creator, but when it looks away at things below creates from itself Soul. Soul [*anima*], in turn, as long as it contemplates the Father, assumes his part, but by diverting its attention more and more, though itself incorporeal, degenerates into the fabric of bodies. Thus it has purest reason, *logikón*, from Mind from which it springs; moreover, out of its own nature it takes on the first beginnings of sense-perception and growth, *aisthetikón* and *phytikón*. [...] Soul, creating and fashioning bodies for itself ... endowed those divine or ethereal bodies, meaning the celestial sphere and the stars which it was first creating, with mind; divine minds were infused into all bodies which had smooth spherical shapes. [...] [Soul discovered that only] human bodies were found to be capable of sustaining, with difficulty, a small part of it [i.e. mind], ... since only the erect can always gaze with ease at the heavens. [...] Man alone was endowed with reason, the power of mind, the seat

⁶⁵⁵ Cf. [Cicero], *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 4.45 (Kaplan 1954: 342-343): «Abusio est quae uerbo simili et propinquo pro certo et proprio abutitur», that is, «the inexact use of a like and kindred word in place of the precise and proper one».

⁶⁵⁶ Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* 1.14.3-4 (Willis 1970: 55-56; tr. Stahl 1951: 143): «[Cicero] hoc loco animum et ut proprie et ut abusive abusive dicitur posuit. Animus enim proprie mens est, quam diuiniorem anima nemo dubitauit: sed non nunquam sic et animam usurpantes uocamus. Cum ergo dicit “hisque animus datus est ex illis sempiternis ignibus”, mentem praestat intellegi, quae nobis proprie cum caelo sideribusque communis est; cum uero ait “Retinendus animus est in custodia corporis”, ipsam tunc animam nominat, quae uincitur custodia corporali, cui mens diuina non subditur».

⁶⁵⁷ Cf. Plotinus, *Enneades* 4.4.16.23-31, 5.1.7, 5.2.1; Porphyry, *Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes* 30-31. The three hypostases found are: “Ἐν ‘One’ (the pure, unlimited, unrestricted being); Νοῦς ‘Mind’; and Ψυχή ‘Soul’. Θεός ‘God’ encompasses all three deployments of the existence.

of which is in the head; but he was also given the other two faculties of sense-perception and growth, since his body is mortal.⁶⁵⁸

Human beings alone (not animals, not plants) keep the connection with God through the portion of Mind that Soul infused in them. As a result, it makes sense to feel and say, along with Seneca, that God is within us.⁶⁵⁹ This share of Mind, passed on by the *anima*, is what, according to Macrobius, is called *animus*.⁶⁶⁰ And this share of Mind also connects human beings (bodily entities) with heavenly bodies, such as the constellations and stars mentioned by Cicero in the passage cited at the beginning.

2.7 Augustine

Aurelius Augustinus Hipponensis (354-430) wrote around 115 works⁶⁶¹ and scholars agree that terminological nuances and variances are observed in his literary production. O'Connor (1921: 38) admits that «one is confronted by a difficulty arising from the lack of a fixed terminology», but O'Daly (1987: 7) is more optimistic when he states that «the terms used by Augustine to refer to the soul, while they do not represent a systematic usage in any sense, are sufficiently consistent to be classifiable». Chiefly based on some passages of *De trinitate*, *De immortalitate animae* and *De quantitate animae*,⁶⁶² I will outline Augustine's notion of *animus*, «a thing which cannot be seen with the eyes».⁶⁶³

Augustine equates *animus* with *mens* 'mind', *intellectus* 'understanding', *ratio* 'reason',⁶⁶⁴ *anima rationalis* 'rational soul' and *anima intellectualis* 'intellectual soul'. He considers the

⁶⁵⁸ Cf. Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* 1.14.6-10 (Willis 1970: 56-57; tr. Stahl 1951: 143-144): «Deus qui prima causa et est et uocatur, unus omnium quaeque sunt quaeque uidentur esse princeps et origo est. Hic superabundanti maiestatis fecunditate de se mentem creauit. Haec mens, quae νοῦς uocatur, qua patrem inspicit, plenam similitudinem seruat auctoris, animam uero de se creat posteriora respiciens. Rursum anima patrem qua intuetur induitur, ac paulatim regrediente respectu in fabricam corporum incorporea ipsa degenerat. Habet ergo et purissimam ex mente, de qua est nata, rationem quod λογικόν uocatur et ex sua natura accipit praebendi sensus praebendique incrementi seminarium, quorum unum αἰσθητικόν alteram φυτικόν nuncupatur. [...] Anima ergo creans sibi condensque corpora ... corpora illa diuina uel supera, caeli dico et siderum, quae prima condebat, animauit, diuinaeque mentes omnibus corporibus quae in formam teretem, id est in sphaerae modum; [...] [Anima deprehendit] immo partem eius uix solis humanis corporibus conuenire, quia ... et sola caelum facile tamquam semper erecta suspiciunt. [...] Soli ergo homini rationem, id est uim mentis, infudit cui sedes in capite est, sed et geminam illam sentiendi crescendique naturam, quia caducum est corpus, inseruit».

⁶⁵⁹ Cf. *supra* Supplement, section 2.4, n. 617.

⁶⁶⁰ Cf. Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* 1.14.16 (Willis 1970: 58; tr. Stahl 1951: 145): «His ergo dictis solum hominem constat ex terrenis omnibus mentis, id est animi, societatem cum caelo et sideribus habere communem».

⁶⁶¹ Cf. Rego 2001: 718-733; *Catalog 2021: The works of Saint Augustine: A translation for the 21st century* (New City Press, 2021), 16-19.

⁶⁶² Editions and translations consulted: McMahon 1947; Schopp 1947; Rettig 1988; Matthews and McKenna 2002; Foley 2019. Studies consulted: O'Connor 1921; O'Daly 1986, 1987; Rego 2001; Alesanco 2004.

⁶⁶³ Augustine, *De trinitate* 8.6.9 (PL 42: 953; tr. Matthews and McKenna 2002: 14): «...animum, rem quae oculis uideri non potest».

⁶⁶⁴ Cf. O'Daly 1993: 185: «It is in virtue of *intellectus*, *ratio*, *animus*, that the interior homo resembles God»; Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1.17.28.

animus to be the most excellent part in a human being, which distinguishes humans from the rest of the animals:

...man is superior to other animals, namely, in reason and understanding, and whatever else can be said of the rational or intellectual soul that pertains to that thing which is called 'mind' [*mens*] or 'rational soul' [*animus*]. Several Latin authors, according to their own special terminology, called *animus* that which excels in man and is not in the beast, thus distinguishing it from *anima* which is also found in the beast.⁶⁶⁵

This higher part is a substance in charge of governing the body,⁶⁶⁶ and it is enlightened by God (here *animus* is equated with *intellectus* and *mens*).

So in our soul [*in anima nostra*] there is something which is called understanding [*intellectus*]. This very part of the soul [*anima*], which is called understanding and the mind [*mens*], is enlightened by a higher light. Now that higher light by which the human mind is enlightened is God.⁶⁶⁷

Note that here Augustine employs the term *anima* to refer to the soul. In other works, he calls the most excellent part in a human being «the head of the *anima*».⁶⁶⁸ As Matthews (2002: 7 n8, 13 n11) summarizes, Augustine uses *animus* when referring to the mind or the rational / intellectual soul, while *anima* is preferred as the general term, or to denote animal souls:

Quite consistently in this work [i.e. *De trinitate*] Augustine uses *anima* for the principle of life to be found in all living beings, including human beings. He uses *animus* for the rational soul, which is to be found in human beings but, Augustine thinks, not in other animals. Later on, especially in Book 10, he focuses on *mens*, the conscious human self. [...] It is especially important to keep in mind that Augustine has two words for 'soul': the feminine word, *anima*, and the masculine word, *animus* ... Augustine uses *anima* for the rational principle of all living things, including human beings. But the *anima* that human beings have, in his view, is a rational *anima*, that is, an *animus*, or mind.

On the other hand, only the *animus* (here equated with *mens* and *ratio*) can provide a happy life:

⁶⁶⁵ Augustine, *De trinitate* 15.1.1 (PL 42: 953; tr. Matthews and McKenna 2002: 167): «homo ... caeteris animalibus antecellit, id est ratione uel intellegentia, et quidquid aliud de anima rationali uel intellectuali dici potest quod pertineat ad eam rem quae mens uocatur uel animus. Quo nomine nonnulli auctores linguae Latinae id quod excellit in homine et non est in pecore ab anima quae inest et pecori suo quodam loquendi mores distinguunt».

⁶⁶⁶ Cf. Augustine, *De quantitate animae* 13.22 (PL 32: 1048; tr. McMahan 1947: 83): «Et ideo quaeris quid sit animus. Facile respondeo. Nam mihi uidetur esse substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori accommodata», that is, «If you wish a definition of what the *animus* is, I have a ready answer. It seems to me to be a certain kind of substance, sharing in reason, fitted to rule the body».

⁶⁶⁷ Augustine, *In Evangelium Ioannis tractatus* 15.19.3 (PL 35: 1517; tr. Rettig 1988: 89): «Sic in anima nostra quiddam est quod intellectus uocatur. Hoc ipsum animae quod intellectus et mens dicitur, illuminatur luce superiore. Iam superior illa lux, qua mens humana illuminatur, Deus est».

⁶⁶⁸ Cf., for example, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 3.3 (PL 36: 73-74): «Mentem ipsam humanam hic accipiendam puto quod caput animae non absurde appellatur».

“What do you think living happily is,” I said, “other than living according to that which is best in man?” [...] “Who would doubt,” I said, “that man’s best is nothing else than that ruling part of the soul [*animus*] which the other parts in man should obey? Moreover, lest you demand yet another definition, this part can be called mind or reason [*mens aut ratio*]”⁶⁶⁹

Furthermore, the *animus* / mind is able to see the incorporeal reality.⁶⁷⁰ Thanks to this last natural capacity («the mind seeks to know itself and is inflamed with this desire»),⁶⁷¹ it is able to perform a reflection on itself through the power of reason and intelligence:

But to few men is it allowed to discern the *animus* by the *animus* itself, that is, so that the *animus* sees itself. It sees, moreover, through the intelligence. [...] Reason,⁶⁷² by which the *animus* also finds itself.⁶⁷³

It remains, therefore, that the sight of the mind is something belonging to its nature, and the mind is recalled to it when it thinks of itself, not as it were by a movement in space but by an incorporeal conversion.⁶⁷⁴

In *De immortalitate animae* —observe here again the usage of the term *anima* to refer to the soul in general (that is, encompassing the principle of life and the rational soul)—, Augustine insists on equating *animus* with reason⁶⁷⁵ and on considering it the faculty where reasoning takes place: «When we reason, it is an act of our *animus*; for only the being who is able to understand can do it».⁶⁷⁶ Further, the *animus* lives forever because —Augustine

⁶⁶⁹ Augustine, *Contra academicos* 1.2.5 (PL 32: 908-909; tr. Foley 2019: 18): «“Quid censes”, inquam, “esse aliud beate uiuere, nisi secundum id quod in homine optimum est uiuere?” [...] “Quis”, inquam, “dubitauerit nihil aliud esse hominis optimum quam eam partem animi, cui dominanti obtemperare conuenit caetera quaeque in homine sunt? Haec autem, ne aliam postules definitionem, mens aut ratio dici potest”». In *Retractiones* 1.1.4 (PL 32: 587; tr. Bogan 1968: 10), Augustine remarks that man’s highest good is not the mind but God, «because to be happy the mind finds joy in Him as its highest good».

⁶⁷⁰ Cf. Augustine, *De quantitate animae* 13.22 (PL 32: 1047; tr. McMahon 1947: 83): «...animum, quo uidemus illa incorporalia».

⁶⁷¹ Augustine, *De trinitate* 10.3.5 (PL 42: 975; tr. Matthews and McKenna 2002: 46): «Ecce enim mens semetipsam quaerit ut nouerit, et inflammatur hoc studio». Augustine argues that the maxim «Nosce te ipsum» means, in fact, «Cognosce te ipsam» (*De trinitate* 10.9.12), that is, «Mind, know thyself».

⁶⁷² Reason enables the *animus* to grasp, to see itself. Cf. *De quantitate animae* 27.53 (PL 32: 1065; tr. McMahon 1947: 120): «Hence, by reasoning [*ista*, i.e. *rationatio*], we search; by reason [*illa*, i.e. *ratio*] we see. Further, when this sight of the mind, which we call reason, sees some reality upon which it is focused, we call that knowledge [*scientia*], but when the mind does not see, though it focuses its sight, that is called not-knowing or ignorance [*inscitia uel ignorantia*]».

⁶⁷³ Augustine, *De quantitate animae* 14.24 (PL 32: 1048, 1049; tr. McMahon 1947: 85, 86): «Sed paucis licet ipso animo animum cernere, id est, ut ipse se animus uideat; uidet autem per intelligentiam. [...] ...ratio, qua [animus] etiam se inuenire molitur».

⁶⁷⁴ Augustine, *De trinitate* 14.6.8 (PL 42: 1042; tr. Matthews and McKenna 2002: 145): «Proinde restat ut aliquid pertinens ad eius naturam sit conspectus eius, et in eam, quando se cogitat, non quasi per loci spatium sed incorporea conuersione reuocetur».

⁶⁷⁵ Cf. Augustine, *De immortalitate animae* 2.2 (PL 32: 1022; tr. Schopp 1947: 17): «Ratio profecto aut animus est aut in animo», that is, «Reason, certainly, is either the *animus* or it is in the *animus*».


⁶⁷⁶ Augustine, *De immortalitate animae* 1.1 (PL 32: 1021; tr. Schopp 1947: 16): «Iam uero cum ratiocinamur, animus id agit. Non enim id agit nisi qui intellegit».

explains— reason relies on things that always exist in the same way (for example, «four is the sum of two and two») and, consequently, death cannot occur to things not subject to change.⁶⁷⁷ If *animus* is reason (and mind), then it is immutable and immortal as well.

Another argument to endorse the immortality of the *animus* is that, being the *animus* life itself (*uita quaedam*), and being a living substance defined as «anything that causes moving in such a way that it does not undergo any change»,⁶⁷⁸ it cannot be deprived of it; otherwise, the *animus* / mind would not be a living but dead object:

But the *animus* is a certain principle of life. Thus, it is understood that everything animated is alive, while all that is inanimate (but can be animated) is dead, i.e., deprived of life. Therefore, the *animus* cannot die. Moreover, if the *animus* could ever be in need of life, it would not be *animus*, but something that has been given life.⁶⁷⁹

From what has been said so far, and taken into account the analysis of O'Connor (1921: 38-39), O'Daly (1987: 7-8), Rego (2001: 294-300), Alesanco (2004: 77-80) and Foley (2019: xv-xxii), the following chart shows in a nutshell Augustine's notion of soul (*anima*), which includes *animus* as the higher part of it.



2.8 Isidore of Seville

In chapter 1 of book 11 of *Etymologiarum sive Originum libri XX*,⁶⁸⁰ a lexicon of substantial influence during the Middle Ages but less disseminated during the Renaissance,⁶⁸¹ Isidorus

⁶⁷⁷ Cf. Augustine, *De immortalitate animae* 2.2.

⁶⁷⁸ Cf. Augustine, *De immortalitate animae* 3.3 (PL 32: 1022; tr. Schopp 1947: 19): «Illud igitur quod ita mouet ut non mutetur non potest esse nisi uiua substantia».

⁶⁷⁹ Augustine, *De immortalitate animae* 9.16 (PL 32: 1029; tr. Schopp 1947: 34-35): «Est autem animus uita quaedam: unde omne quod animatum est, uiuere; omne autem inanime quod animari potest, mortuum, id est uita priuatum intellegitur. Non ergo potest animus mori. Nam si carere poterit uita, non animus sed animatum aliquid est».

⁶⁸⁰ Editions and translations consulted: Lindsay 1911 (without pagination); Oroz and Casquero 1983; Barney et alii 2006.

⁶⁸¹ Cf. Barney et alii 2006: 25-26; A. Fear, J. Wood (eds.), *Isidore of Seville and His Reception in the Early Middle Ages: Transmitting and Transforming Knowledge* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam U. P., 2016); W. Black, «Isidore of Seville in Scholastic Europe», in A. Fear, J. Wood (eds.), *A Companion to Isidore of*

Hispaliensis (ca. 560-636) examines human beings and their parts. After introducing the term *anima*,⁶⁸² he then moves to the controversy between *anima* and *animus*. He acknowledges that «some people say that the will [*animus*] and the soul [*anima*] are the same, even though soul is characteristic of life, while will is characteristic of intention [*consilium*]». ⁶⁸³ Isidore recalls the classical distinction between *anima* as principle of life and *animus* as principle of consciousness, but narrows the range of *animus* to *consilium* ('deliberation', 'intention'), that is, the capacity to judge things and come up with a decision. Unlike Augustine, Isidore does not equate *animus* and *mens*, but insists in constricting the meaning of *animus* to 'will': «The mind [*mens*] is so called in that it knows; the will [*animus*], in that it desires». ⁶⁸⁴

In the following passage, fundamental to understand the notion of soul at the end of Roman civilization, Isidore contextualizes the notion of *animus* within the many functions that the soul (*anima*) carries out. Further, he convincingly argues that *sententia* ('opinion', 'judgment') is a product of the *animus*, because it is the result of what the *animus* has felt, that is, what the mind has observed through the senses and, accordingly, pondered:

Different terms have been allotted to the soul according to the effects of its causes. [...] Therefore it is soul [*anima*] when it enlivens the body; will [*animus*], when it wills; mind [*mens*], when it knows; memory [*memoria*], when it recollects; reason [*ratio*], when it judges correctly; spirit [*spiritus*], when it breathes forth; sense [*sensus*], when it senses something. Will [*animus*] is said to be sense [*sensus*] with regard to what it senses; whence also the word 'idea' [*sententia*] derives its name. ⁶⁸⁵

3 Reference authors: Renaissance

3.1 Pico della Mirandola

The fourth exposition of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola's (1463-1494) *Heptaplus*⁶⁸⁶ (Florence: Bartolomeo di Libri, Nov. 1489 | USTC 992047)⁶⁸⁷ deals with the nature of human beings. After stating at the outset of chapter 1 that a human being consists of a body (*corpus*)

Seville (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2020), 569-603. *Editio princeps* (data taken from the colophon): *Ethimologiae* (Augsburg: Gunther Zainer, 19 Nov. 1472 | USTC 746020). Isidore's complete works were not printed until 1580: Marguerin de La Bigne (ed.), *Sancti Isidori Hispaliensis episcopi opera omnia quae extant...* (Paris: Michel Sonnius | USTC 170528).

⁶⁸² Isidore relates *anima* (not *animus*; cf. *supra* Supplement, section 1.1, p. 260) to ἀνεμος 'wind' and *spiritus* 'breath'. In so doing, he argues that life consists of breathing air into the body.

⁶⁸³ Isidore, *Etymologiae* 11.1.11 (Lindsay 1911: *ad locum*, lines 15-16; tr. Barney et alii 2006: 231): «Item animum idem esse quod animam; sed anima uitae est, animus consilii».

⁶⁸⁴ Isidore, *Etymologiae* 11.1.11 (Lindsay 1911: *ad locum*, lines 18-19; tr. Barney et alii 2006: 231): «Nam mentem uocari ut sciat; animum ut uelit».

⁶⁸⁵ Isidore, *Etymologiae* 11.1.12-13 (Lindsay 1911: *ad locum*; tr. Barney et alii 2006: 231-232): «Ita autem haec omnia adiuncta sunt animae ut una res sit. [...] Nam et memoria mens est, unde et inmemores amentes. Dum ergo uiuificat corpus, anima est; dum uult, animus est; dum scit, mens est; dum recolit, memoria est; dum rectum iudicat, ratio est; dum spirat, spiritus est; dum aliquid sentit, sensus est. Nam inde animus sensus dicitur pro his quae sentit, unde et sententia nomen accepit».

⁶⁸⁶ Editions and translations consulted: Garin 2004 [1942]; Carmichael 1998. Studies: Black 2006; Rummel 2008: 34-35.

⁶⁸⁷ Date according to Garin 2004: 92.

and a rational soul (the term used here is *anima rationalis*),⁶⁸⁸ Pico deploys his arguments in the next paragraphs and chapters making use of the term *animus*. He describes the *animus* or *animus rationalis* as made of «heavenly substance»⁶⁸⁹ and «that by virtue of which we are human». He then introduces the notion of spirit (*spiritus*), conceived as a light or medium that links the earthly substance of mankind (body) and its heavenly substance (*animus*). The following passages express the aforementioned thoughts:

But between the earthly body and the heavenly substance of the *animus* there had to be a connecting link to join together such different natures; to this task was assigned that delicate and airy body [*tenue et spiritale corpusculum*] which physicians and philosophers call the spirit [*spiritus*] ... This is called 'light'. [...] We saw mention made of the three parts of human substance: the rational [*de rationali*], this mortal body, and the intervening spirit [*medius spiritus*] ... The rational part, by virtue of which we are men.⁶⁹⁰

What is remarkable about Pico is his attempt to organize the different dimensional realities of existence with their corresponding kind of souls and make the *rationalis animus* the distinctive quality of humans. In his *Oratio de hominis dignitate* (Bologna: Benedetto Faelli, 1496 | USTC 992054),⁶⁹¹ Pico explains that humans are given the privilege to choose⁶⁹² the kind of seed (i.e. soul) they want to grow and make the dominant one, among from all the available possibilities:

The Father infused in man, at his birth, every sort of seed [*semina*] and all sprouts [*germina*] of every kind of life. These seeds will grow and bear fruit in each man who sows them. If he cultivates his vegetative seeds, he will become a plant. If he cultivates his sensitive seeds, he will become a brute animal. If he cultivates his rational seeds, he will become a heavenly being. If he cultivates his intellectual seeds, he will be an angel and a son of God. [...] Who will not wonder at this chameleon of ours?⁶⁹³

⁶⁸⁸ Cf. Pico della Mirandola, *Heptaplus* 4.1 (Garin 2004: 270; tr. Carmichael 1998: 118).

⁶⁸⁹ Cf. Pico della Mirandola, *Heptaplus* 4.1 (idem): «Rationalis animus caelum dicitur».

⁶⁹⁰ Pico della Mirandola, *Heptaplus* 4.1, 4.2 (Garin 2004: 270, 274; tr. Carmichael 1998: 119, 120): «Verum inter terrenum corpus et caelestem animi substantiam opus fuit medio uinculo, quod tam distantes naturas inuicem copularet; huic muneri delegatum illud tenue et spiritale corpusculum, quod et medici et philosophi spiritum uocant ... Hic lux nuncupatur. [...] Factam uidimus mentionem de triplici parte humanae substantiae, uidelicet de rationali, de mortali hoc corpore et medio spiritu ... partem rationalem, qua homines sumus».

⁶⁹¹ Editions and translations consulted: Borghesi, Papio and Riva 2012.

⁶⁹² Cf. Pico della Mirandola, *Oratio de hominis dignitate* 18, 20 (Borghesi, Papio and Riva 2012: 116-117): «We have given you, Adam, no fixed seat or form of your own, no talent peculiar to you alone. This we have done so that whatever seat, whatever form, whatever talent you may judge desirable, these same may you have and possess according to your desire and judgment [*pro tua sententia*]. [...] You, constrained by no limits, may determine your nature for yourself, according to your own free will [*pro tuo arbitrio*]».

⁶⁹³ Pico della Mirandola, *Oratio de hominis dignitate* 27-29, 31 (Borghesi, Papio and Riva 2012: 120-123): «Nascenti homini omnifaria semina et omnigenae uitae germina indidit Pater. Quae quisque excoluerit, illa adolescent, et fructus suos ferent in illo. Si uegetalia, planta fiet; si sensualia,

But, irrespective of what seed human beings choose to cultivate, they nonetheless encompass all of them —he argues in *Heptaplus*—, since it is a feature of their miraculous nature (*magnum miraculum*):

There is also in man the life of the plants, performing all the same functions in him as in them: nutrition, growth and reproduction. There is the sense of the brutes, inner and outer; there is the soul [*animus*], powerful in its heavenly reason; there is participation in the angelic mind. There is the truly divine, simultaneous possession of all these natures flowing together into one, so that we may exclaim with Mercury: «A great miracle, oh Asclepius, is man!»⁶⁹⁴

Humans are a peculiar mixture. They are beings endowed with reason (*ratio*) who struggle to decide what force (out of two) dominates: the body and its senses (*sensus*), which associate mankind with the animals; or the intelligence (*intelligentia*) / intellect (*intellectus*, ‘understanding’),⁶⁹⁵ which associates mankind with angels:

And since we share no less with the angels than with the brutes, just as below reason there are the senses through which we have fellowship with the animals, so above reason is the intelligence through which we are able to say with John: «Our fellowship is with angels».⁶⁹⁶

Then it can be said, according to Pico, that there are four degrees of souls with their corresponding realities and beings (plants, animals, humans and angels). In the following chart, it is made clear that the human *animus* is properly reason but it includes a higher part (the intellect, the νοῦς) that opens the access door to superior realities: the heavenly angels and, ultimately, God.

obrutescet; si rationalia, caeleste euadet animal; si intellectualia, angelus erit et Dei filius. [...] Quis hunc nostrum chamaeleonta non admiretur?».

⁶⁹⁴ Pico della Mirandola, *Heptaplus* 5.6 (Garin 2004: 304; tr. Carmichael 1998: 135): «Est praeterea in homine uita plantarum, omnibus his apud eum quibus et apud illas muneribus fungens, nutriendi, augendi et generandi. Est sensus brutorum tam intimus quam externus; est caelesti animus ratione pollens; est angelicae mentis participatio. Est harum omnium simul in unum confluentium naturarum uere diuina possessio, ut libeat exclamare illud Mercurii: “Magnum, o Asclepi, miraculum est homo”». Embedded quotation in Pico’s text from *Asclepius* 1.6a, in W. Scott (ed.), *Hermetica* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), vol. 1: 294.

⁶⁹⁵ Cf. Pico della Mirandola, *Heptaplus* 4.2 (Garin 2004: 274, 276; tr. Carmichael 1998: 120): «Intellectum enim, qui est in nobis, illustrat maior atque adeo diuinus intellectus siue sit Deus (ut quidam uolunt), siue proxima homini et cognata mens», that is, «A greater, even divine, intellect illuminates the intellect in us, whether it be God (as some would have it) or a mind more nearly related to man’s».

⁶⁹⁶ Pico della Mirandola, *Heptaplus* 4.2 (Garin 2004: 274; tr. Carmichael 1998: 120): «Et quoniam non minor nobis cum angelis quam cum brutis communicatio, quemadmodum infra rationem est sensus unde commercium cum animalibus, ita supra rationem intelligentia est, per quam dicere illud Ioannis possumus “societas nostra cum angelis est”». Embedded quotation in Pico’s text from *Ioannis epistola* 1 (1:3), slightly modified.

	TYPE OF SOUL	PROPER TO		
Anima	intellectiua	angels	intellectus	
	rationalis = animus	human beings	intellectus, intelligentia	Homo
			ratio	
	sensitiua	animals	sensus	
	uegetatiua	plants	uita	

3.2 Charles de Bovelles

Charles de Bovelles (1479-1567), a disciple of Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, published, among other works, the *Liber de sapiente* (Paris: Henri Estienne and Jean Petit, 1510 | USTC 143698).⁶⁹⁷ This book, considered to be «the most curious and in some respects the most characteristic creation of Renaissance philosophy» (Cassirer 1963: 88), was not given the recognition it deserved, not even in Bovelles’s own time period. In general terms, debates leading to proposals that could be applied for the betterment of human conduct (Ethics) were more welcomed than those fostering speculative interpretations of the whole existence (Metaphysics), that is, of the visible and of the invisible:


De sapiente is one of Bovelles’ most important works, which fuses the three main concerns of his lifetime: knowledge (epistemology), man (philosophical anthropology), and God (theology). As Magnard reminds us in the introductory essay to his translation of *De sapiente*, if the book did not have the impact that its intellectual vigor and spiritual inspiration would have merited at another time, it is because the questions that it sought to answer had become anachronistic within a few decades of its being written. The question remains as to whether an intuitive encyclopedic grasp of worldly knowledge through universal metaphysical truths is something that can still resonate today.⁶⁹⁸

As far as the question of the *animus* is concerned, it is mainly dealt with in chapters 13, 20, 25 and 32. Bovelles considers the existence to be organized in four worlds: two of them are related to the intellect: the ethereal region and the human *animus*; the other two are related to the senses: the region under the Moon and the human body.⁶⁹⁹

⁶⁹⁷ Editions and translations consulted: Klibansky 1927; Magnard 1982; Quillet 1983; Riedl 2014 (excerpts). When citing Bovelles, I have kept his Latin as established by the editors; for example, I have not restored diphthongs: *celis* is found, not *caelis*. The *editio princeps* of *De sapiente* (published when Vives was in Paris, ca. 1509-1512/4) was issued together with the following works: *Liber de intellectu*, *Liber de sensu*, *Liber de nichilo*, *Ars oppositorum*, *Liber de generatione*, *Liber de duodecim numeris*, *Epistolae complures*, *De numeris perfectis*, *De mathematicis rosis*, *De geometricis corporibus* and *De geometricis supplementis*.

⁶⁹⁸ M. Ferrari, «Introduction to Bovelles’ *Liber de sapiente*». In Ferrari and Albertini 2011: 265.

⁶⁹⁹ Cf. the original chart in Bovelles, *De sapiente* 20 (Klibansky 1927: 345; Magnard 1982: 159).



The human being belongs to the realm of both the intellect and the senses because of his twofold nature: humans have existence in the latter by the body; they have existence in the former by the *animus*. Further, by virtue of this duality humans become the link (*uinculum, connexio*) between the intellectual and the material worlds.⁷⁰⁰ Moreover, the world of the intellect can come into being and occur in the world of the senses owing precisely to the *animus*⁷⁰¹ (or *mens*),⁷⁰² which is defined as «a type of world where intellect and reason are possible», and «the residence of all ideas provided by the intellect».⁷⁰³ In the world of sensation, the only element proper to the world of the intellect is the *animus*.⁷⁰⁴

In the section of aphorisms that follows the aforementioned chart, Bovelles summarizes the qualities of the *animus* as well as those of the *Anima*. I present a selection of aphorisms, accompanied by my own English translation:⁷⁰⁵

animus

Hominis animus equalis est etheree supercaelestique regioni | Hominis animus capax est etheree regionis et eorum, que in ea uersantur | Nunc per Hominis animum intelligibilia in sensibili mundo sunt | Nullus sub celis est immortalis actus preter Hominis animum | Naturalis animi regio est intellectualis mundus maior | E propriis thalamis nunc in corporis regionem peregrinatur animus | E propria quoque regione sua corpus in animi patriam assumetur | Impossibile est sine corpore animus sensibili mundo inesse | Tandem in animi regione habitabit corpus animo coniunctum | Ex presenti animi et corporis temporali federe elicietur eorum indissociabile fedus.

► The *animus* of a human being is equal to the ethereal region above the skies | The *animus* of a human being is able to perceive the ethereal region and all that is in it | By

⁷⁰⁰ Cf. Bovelles, *De sapiente* 20 (Klibansky 1927: 344): «Est enim, ut in libro de Intellectu dictum est, Homo et animo et corpore uniuersa. [...] Est igitur Homo mundus uterque: intelligibilis animo, sensibilis corpore; idem est mundi utriusque scirpus, uinculum, coherentia et connexio».

⁷⁰¹ Cf. Bovelles, *De sapiente* 20 (Klibansky 1927: 345): «Et mirabili profecto concinentia per Hominis medium uterque mundus in utrumque transfertur. In presenti enim seculo per Hominis animum intelligibilis mundus sub celis fit».

⁷⁰² Cf. Bovelles, *De sapiente* 20 (Klibansky 1927: 345): «Per Hominis mentem intelligibilis mundus in mundo est sensibili».

⁷⁰³ Bovelles, *De sapiente* 20 (Klibansky 1927: 345): «Est enim Hominis animus intelligibilis quidam et rationalis mundus, intelligibilium omnium notionum thalamus».

⁷⁰⁴ Cf. Bovelles, *De sapiente* 20 (Klibansky 1927: 344): «Nam nichil sub celis est intelligibilium preter Hominis animum».

⁷⁰⁵ Bovelles, *De sapiente* 20 (Klibansky 1927: 345-346).

the *animus* of a human being, the notions of the intellect have existence in the world of sensation | Immortal performances do not take place under the skies except those of the human *animus* | The natural region of the *animus* is the upper world of the intellect | Exiled from its own residence, the *animus* now travels through the region of the bodies | The body, in turn, exiled from its own region, will be welcomed into the homeland of the *animus* | It is impossible for the *animus* to be in the world of sensation without a body | The body, ultimately, joined to the *animus*, will inhabit the region of the *animus* | From the temporal pact which currently unites the *animus* and the body will emerge their indissoluble pact.

Anima

Intellectualis minor est humana Anima, rationum omnium locus | Impossibile est sine Anima corpus in celum euehi et attolli | Nunc in regione corporis habitat Anima corpori sociata | Nunc per sensibilem mundum corpus Animam defert | Tandem per mundi intellectualis aulam Anima corpus uectitabit | Anima nunc in corpore et in sensibili mundo temporalem habet mansionem | Futurum est ut corpus cum Anima in intellectuali mundo eternam mansionem recipiat.

► The lower world of the intellect is the *Anima*, the site of reasoning | It is impossible for the body to be carried and be taken to heaven without the *Anima* | Now the *Anima* dwells in the region of the body because it is united with it | The body now brings the *Anima* through the world of the sensation | In the end, the *Anima* will carry the body through the palace of the world of the intellect | The *Anima* has now its temporal abode in the body and in the world of sensation | It will happen that the body, together with the *Anima*, will receive its eternal abode in the world of the intellect.

It should be noted Bovelles's intention to draw a clear distinction between *animus* and *Anima*, when he consistently writes the former term in minuscule letters and capitalizes the latter term. It may be inferred that *animus* is related to *mens*, while *Anima* to *ratio*. But this distinction becomes confusing when Bovelles affirms in the aforementioned chart that the *animus* belongs to the *mundus intellectualis minor*, but then in the section of aphorisms he, conversely, asserts that it belongs to the *mundus intellectualis maior*, because it is the *Anima* what is proper to the *mundus intellectualis minor*. Are we facing a mistake in the printed edition, or is this proof of a deeper problem, namely Bovelles's own difficulties with establishing a clear distinction between both terms? It seems plausible that *Anima* be ascribed the qualities of reason (lower intellectual world), and *animus* the qualities of mind (upper intellectual world). But then one wonders why the term allegedly belonging to the upper region (*animus*) is edited in minuscule letters while term allegedly belonging to the lower region (*Anima*) is capitalized. Perhaps the purpose of capitalizing certain words (*Anima, Homo, Vniuersum*) conveys Bovelles's intention of stressing their general meaning: just as *Homo* ('the human being', 'a human being') is not the same as *homo* ('a particular human being', 'a certain person'),⁷⁰⁶ *Anima* ('the soul') is not the same as *animus* ('a specific item or aspect of the soul'). In any case, this is undoubtedly an issue worthy of further study as it affects meaning and interpretation.

⁷⁰⁶ Cf., for example, the following passage in chapter 4 (Klibansky 1927: 310; italics mine): «Manifestum ex his, que diximus, est *hominem* trifariam tribusve de causis *Hominem* posse dici», that is, «From what has been said it is clear that *a certain person* can be called *a human being* in three ways or because of three reasons».

According to Bovelles, this particular item of the soul called *animus* is arranged (*eruditur*) through the action of three elements: intelligence, memory and contemplation. Intelligence enables an understandable notion —or shape or idea— (*intelligibilis species*) to grow inside the *animus*; memory stores and keeps this notion; contemplation gives the means so that the notion be examined by the understanding (*intellectus*) and be showed to the memory.⁷⁰⁷ Out of these three elements, contemplation is considered to be the main function of the *animus* and the true action of the soul (*Anima*).⁷⁰⁸ Contemplation is also conceived as one out of the four faces of the *animus*.⁷⁰⁹ Through the *animus* the *Anima* is able to bend itself towards itself, creating an apparent subject-object duality which does not incur in any factual breaking or disruption of its unity.⁷¹⁰ By this contortion, the *Anima* observes (*animaduertio*) itself, and attains knowledge (*notio*) of itself by itself.⁷¹¹

In general terms, the *animus* is able to acquire two kinds of knowledge or comprehension (*cognitio*): material and visible (provided by the imagination and the five external senses); immaterial and invisible (provided by the understanding or intellect).⁷¹² But here Bovelles introduces again a bit of confusion when he adds that the immaterial knowledge of the *Anima* (he does not use now the term *animus*) is provided not by one but three elements: reason, by which the *Anima* can be shown before itself; understanding, by which the *Anima* can gain comprehension of the world of angels; and limited mind,⁷¹³ by which a divine spark may spring in the *Anima*.⁷¹⁴

⁷⁰⁷ Cf. Bovelles, *De sapiente* 25 (Klibansky 1927: 352): «Humanus animus haud simul aut non unico actu eruditur sed in tempore et actibus trinis: primo Intelligentie, quo profertur et oritur in animo intelligibilis species; secundo Memoriae, quo species eadem sistitur, conseruatur et collocatur in Memoria; tertio Contemplationis, quo species eadem ab Intellectu spectatur et presentatur a Memoria». Note here the capitalization of some terms to convey the general sense of them.

⁷⁰⁸ Cf. Bovelles, *De sapiente* 13 (Klibansky 1927: 330): «Hec autem animi functio est Contemplatio, hec uera illa est et laudatissima Anime actio immortalis».

⁷⁰⁹ Bovelles explains that the *animus* has four faces or aspects: one allows the understanding to examine memory; one allows memory to look at the understanding; one allows contemplation to focus on memory; one allows contemplation to turn back to the understanding. Cf. *De sapiente* 32 (Klibansky 1927: 371): «Sapientis igitur et consummati Hominis animus quadrigeminus est, id est facierum, uultuum et aspectuum quattuor. Est enim facies eius prima intellectualis, qua Intellectus spectat in Memoriam. Facies animi secunda uultus est Memoriae, quo uersa ad Intellectum respicit Intellectum. Medii uero et acquisiti totius animi aspectus sunt medie amborum speciei, qua fit ipsa Contemplatio; horum enim aspectuum unus uertitur in Memoriam, alius in Intellectum conuertitur».

⁷¹⁰ Cf. Bovelles, *De sapiente* 27 (Klibansky 1927: 356): «sine sui diuisione in se tota Anima flectitur».

⁷¹¹ Cf. Bovelles, *De sapiente* 27 (Klibansky 1927: 356): «in notione Anime ab Anima».

⁷¹² Cf. Bovelles, *De sapiente* 13 (Klibansky 1927: 330-331): «Sunt enim, ut in libro Sensuum docuimus, materiales animi cognitiones gemine: Imaginatio et exterior Sensus; illa simplex, hic quinque partibus disclusus; illa intus in corpore fit, hi uero in mundum discurrunt atque in eo negociantur. Immaterialis autem animi cognitio quandoque unica, quandoque uero trina censetur. Nam plerique omnem immaterialem cognitionem siue immaterialium inuisibiliumque rerum noticiam nomine uno Intellectum uocant».

⁷¹³ Bovelles writes *Mentis portio*, 'a share of the Mind', that is, a share of the Whole Divine Mind. I have interpreted that, being the human mind only a portion of the divine mind, it must inherently have limitations and restrictions. But also because of the fact that the human mind is a portion of the Whole Divine Mind, it can be enlightened by a divine spark. This fact allows Bovelles to state that (*De sapiente* 32; Klibansky 1927: 371) «the Understanding [*Intellectus*] is the Sun of the *animus*».

⁷¹⁴ Cf. Bovelles, *De sapiente* 13 (Klibansky 1927: 331): «...imaterialem Anime cognitionem trinam esse diffinimus; qua enim sibiipsa it obuam sibiique presentatur, uocetur Ratio; qua angelice scientie fit

3.3 Erasmus of Rotterdam

Among all the literary production of Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus (1466/9-1536), the *Familiarium colloquiorum formulae* (Basel: Johann Froben, November 1518 | USTC 657249; henceforth *Colloquia*)⁷¹⁵ is perhaps the work in which the Dutch humanist best put together his two main aims for writing in Latin: on the one hand, to disseminate the language in a good standard register; on the other hand, to educate the youth with good morals.⁷¹⁶ Therefore, being the *Colloquia* a work where words are carefully chosen for educational purposes, I have deemed pertinent to examine what Erasmus says about the *animus* in this writing, particularly in *Puerpera* (*The new mother*; henceforth *Coll. Puerpera*).

In this dialogue, a young mother admits that she is not worried about her offspring's body but how the *animus* of her offspring (translated as 'mind') will turn out.⁷¹⁷ An examination then begins about what the *animus* is and what may put its functions in jeopardy. According to Eutrapelus, who is called a sophist by the young mother at a certain point,⁷¹⁸ the *animus* is without shape, size and corporeality, and it cannot be perceived through the senses (*sentitur*). But from the fact that it lacks all these qualities, it is inferred that it is perfect, like God and the angels.⁷¹⁹ Furthermore, just as God cannot be perceived directly with the senses but in the creation (*in rebus conditis*), likewise the *animus* is seen by its activity (*ex actione*).⁷²⁰

The young woman then inquires what sort of activities the *animus* undertakes and what organs carry them out. She asks that, if «the *animus* perceives and hears through eyes and ears», does this mean that «it understands, remembers, loves, hates, grows angry, and is appeased through certain organs»?⁷²¹ Eutrapelus answers her question positively, when he

particeps, sit Intellectus; qua denique illi exigua in tenebris micat et excutitur diuinitatis scintillula, Mentis portio dictitur».

⁷¹⁵ The book underwent many revisions and additions, as Erasmus himself acknowledges in the second dedicatory letter (Ep. 1476; ASD I-3: 124; tr. CWE 39: 3): «The book is so popular and is in such demand and is so dog-eared by the fingering of the young who wish to learn that your father has had to reprint it several times and I have had to enrich it from time to time with fresh additions». Last edition was printed in March 1533 (Basel: Hieronymus Froben and Nicolaus Episcopus | USTC 657252). Editions and translations consulted: ASD I-3; CWE 39-40; Solana and Carande 2020. *Colloquia* will be abbreviated *Coll.* when the name of a particular dialogue is added.

⁷¹⁶ Cf. Erasmus, *Colloquia* (ASD I-3: 124, line 25; tr. CWE 39: 3): «...tam multos hic libellus et Latiniore reddiderit et meliores», that is, «...this book has made so many better Latinists and better men»; L.-E. Halkin, F. Bierlaire, R. Hoven, in ASD I-3: 5: «Un manuel latin, pour apprendre, à la fois, les bonnes manières et le beau langage».

⁷¹⁷ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 458, lines 192-193; tr. CWE 39: 596): «De corpore non multa laboro, modo sit animus qualem optamus».

⁷¹⁸ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 460, line 245; tr. CWE 39: 597): «Tu nunc mihi uidere sophistam agere».

⁷¹⁹ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 461, lines 292-267; tr. CWE 39: 599): «FABVLLA. Quanta quae specie est animus? EVTRAPELVVS. Riddle percontaris de magnitudine aut figura, quum fatearis incorporalem. FABVLLA. Ego corpus intelligo quod sentitur. EVTRAPELVVS. Imo quae non sentiuntur perfectissima sunt, ueluti Deus et angeli».

⁷²⁰ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 464, lines 379-381; tr. CWE 39: 601): «EVTRAPELVVS. At nihil minus uideri potest quam Deus. FABVLLA. Videtur in rebus conditis. EVTRAPELVVS. Itidem uidetur animus ex actione».

⁷²¹ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 460, lines 247-249; tr. CWE 39: 598): «Opinor hoc te uelle dicere, quod animus quemadmodum cernit et audit per oculos et aures, ita per organa quaedam intelligit, meminit, amat, odit, irascitur et placatur?».

states that «the organs of intellect, will, and memory are within the skull, less gross than eyes and ears but material none the less».⁷²² Therefore, it can be interpreted that the *animus* is located in the head, and consists of three instruments (*organa*): understanding (*intellectus*), will (*uoluntas*) and memory (*memoria*). Furthermore, Eutrapelus asserts that by virtue of the *animus* one is able to perceive with greater certitude, and one can command the body to move.⁷²³ He concludes that the aforementioned activities of the *animus* demonstrate the presence of the *anima*:

When you see a man feel, perceive, hear, be moved, understand, remember, reason, you perceive the presence of the soul [*anima*] more certainly than you now see this tankard. One sense can be mistaken; so much evidence of the senses cannot be wrong.⁷²⁴

By *anima* ('soul'), Erasmus seems to convey here the principle of life. Eutrapelus argues that «soul gives life»⁷²⁵ and recalls the description of Aristotle of the *anima* (ψυχή) as having three powers: that which gives life only (*animans*); that which invigorates (*uegetans*); and that which enables to perceive (*sentiens*).⁷²⁶ «He classified the soul [*anima*] as animating, vegetative and sentient», he explains and adds: «Your soul animates your body, causes it to grow, and renders it capable of sensation».⁷²⁷ It is precisely the existence of these three powers of the soul in a single body what makes animals are what they are.⁷²⁸ But what makes human beings be human is the existence of an additional power, rationality (*anima rationalis*),⁷²⁹ which is infused into the body at the same time with life (*uita*).⁷³⁰ Now here Erasmus seems to equate *anima* with *uita* ('life'), while *anima rationalis* would convey, in fact, that part of the soul whose characteristic is to have an *animus* (or *mens* or *ratio*), as the

⁷²² Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 460, lines 260-262; tr. CWE 39: 598): «Ex hoc colligis intra cranium esse intellectus, uoluntatis ac memoriae organa, minus quidem crassa, quam sunt aures et oculi, sed tamen materialia».

⁷²³ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 464, line 377; tr. CWE 39: 601): «Sed certius cernuntur ea quae uidemus animo»; (ASD I-3: 464, line 395; tr. CWE 39: 601): «Omnis autem corporis motus naturalis ab animo proficiscitur».

⁷²⁴ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 464, line 382-385; tr. CWE 39: 601): «Quum uides hominem sentire, cernere, audire, moueri, intelligere, meminisse, ratiocinari, certius uides animam adesse, quam nunc uides hunc cantharum; potest enim falli sensus unus, tot argumenta sensuum non fallunt».

⁷²⁵ Erasmus, *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 465, line 435; tr. CWE 39: 603): «Anima uitam dat».

⁷²⁶ In fact, Aristotle (*De anima* 2.2-3; 413a20-415a12) indicated up to five powers of the soul. Cf. Guthrie 1981: 285-286; also this Supplement *infra*, section 4, where a possible explanation is given regarding Erasmus's wrong (?) assumption.

⁷²⁷ Erasmus, *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 465, lines 434-435, 450; tr. CWE 39: 603): «Ille quidem descripsit in genere animam animantem, uegetantem ac sentientem. [...] Animat, uegetat, sensibile reddit corpus anima tua».

⁷²⁸ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 465, lines 441-442; tr. CWE 39: 603): «Quod autem uiuit ac sentit animal est».

⁷²⁹ Aristotle's ψυχή διανοητική, if we are to follow his description in *De anima* 2.2-3 (cf. *supra* n. 726).

⁷³⁰ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 467, line 497; tr. CWE 39: 604): «Nobis probabilius est simul cum uita infundi rationale animam». In *Coll. Conuiuium religiosum* (ASD I-3: 260, line 909; tr. CWE 39: 202), the fictional character of Timothy explains that «here, he uses the word *anima* [soul] to mean 'life'». In a like manner, in *Coll. Proci et puellae* (ASD I-3: 279, line 87; tr. CWE 39: 260), the fictional character of Maria asks: «When the soul's [*anima*] gone, then the body's dead?».

phrase *animus rationalis* proves.⁷³¹ If, in the *Colloquia*, is found that reasoning (*rationalis*) and understanding (*intelligere*) are said to be an act of both the *anima*⁷³² and the *animus*,⁷³³ then it is evident that sometimes in Erasmus the term *anima* comprises the rational and conscious qualities of the *animus*. A bit of confusion is even originated in some passages, when he writes that «the mind [*animus*] acts through the physical organs of the body», but also that «the soul [*anima*] does nothing except through the organs».⁷³⁴ Is Erasmus being inaccurate in a work that should present language in an accurate way?⁷³⁵ For the time being, I leave the question unanswered.

I shall add now a few more things about the *animus*. Throughout the diverse dialogues of the *Colloquia* and through a variety of fictional characters, Erasmus argues that the *animus* is only known to God⁷³⁶ and is given life by the Holy Spirit;⁷³⁷ that it is the principal part of a human being,⁷³⁸ and is endowed with consciousness;⁷³⁹ that it is bound to a body, willingly, becoming a sort of guest in it;⁷⁴⁰ that it is free,⁷⁴¹ but at risk of being interfered by emotions;⁷⁴²

⁷³¹ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 461, lines 289-291; tr. CWE 39: 599): «Animi rationalis natura non corrumpitur quidem ipsa, sed organis uitiatu impeditur illius uis et actio», that is, «The nature of the rational mind is not itself corrupted, but its power and activity are weakened if the organs are injured».

⁷³² Cf. *supra* n. 724.

⁷³³ Cf. *supra* n. 721.

⁷³⁴ Cf. *Coll. Conuiuium profanum* (ASD I-3: 229, lines 73-74; tr. CWE 39: 145): «...animus agit per organa materialia corporis»; *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 464, line 398; tr. CWE 39: 602): «...anima nihil agit nisi per organa».

⁷³⁵ Vives emphasizes the need that the audience effectively understands what is uttered in, for example, *Disc. prima ph. 1*. Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 4.1, n. 283.

⁷³⁶ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. De rebus ac uocabulis* (ASD I-3: 569, line 132; tr. CWE 40: 813): «Animum solus Deus nouit», rendered as «Their conscience is known only to God».

⁷³⁷ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Inquisitio de fide* (ASD I-3: 370, lines 234-235; tr. CWE 39: 428): «Quia quemadmodum corpora nostra uiuunt halitu, ita tacito Sancti Spiritus afflatu uiuificantur animi nostri», that is, «Because as our bodies live by breath, so our souls are animated by the silent inspiration of the Holy Spirit».

⁷³⁸ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Diluculum* (ASD I-3: 638, lines 60-61; tr. CWE 40: 918): «Tu certe fateberis, opinor, animum esse principalem hominis portionem, corpus animi ministrum», that is, «Surely you'll admit, I suppose, that soul is the principal part of man; and body, the servant of soul». In *De recta pronuntiatione* (ASD I-4: 14, lines 31-32; tr. CWE 26: 368), he recognizes that this is the distinctive part of a human being: «The outward form does not make a man. Statues have that. It is the mind which makes us men or animals [*animo sumus uel homines uel bestiae*]».

⁷³⁹ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Epicureus* (ASD I-3: 721, lines 44-47; tr. CWE 40: 1075-1076): «HEDONIVS. Nihil est miserius quam animus sibi male conscius. SPVDAEVS. Non reiicio dictum; sed quid hinc colligis? HEDONIVS. Si nihil miserius animo sibi male conscio, consequitur nihil esse felicius animo sibi bene conscio», that is, «HEDONIUS. Nothing is more wretched than a bad conscience. SPUDAEUS. A saying I don't reject; but what's your inference? HEDONIUS. If nothing is more wretched than a bad conscience, it follows that nothing is more blessed than a good one».

⁷⁴⁰ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Proci et puellae* (ASD I-3: 286, lines 319-323; tr. CWE 39: 266): «PAMPFILVS. ...Sed ipsi uero capistro digni sunt, qui sic uocant. Dic mihi, quaeso: An non tuus animus est alligatus corpori? MARIA. Videtur. PAMPFILVS. Non aliter quam auicula caeuae. Et tamen consule illum an cupiat esse liber? Negabit, opinor. Quamobrem? Quia libenter est alligatus», that is, «PAMPFILUS. ...Tell me, I beg you, isn't your soul bound to your body? MARIA. Evidently. PAMPFILUS. Like a little bird in a cage. And yet ask him if he desires to be free. He'll say no, I think. Why? Because he's willingly confined»; (ASD I-3: 284, lines 257-260; tr. CWE 39: 264): «PAMPFILVS. ...hospitem magis adamo. MARIA. Quem hospitem? PAMPFILVS. Animum istum tuum, cuius decor semper cum aetate crescet», that is, «PAMPFILUS. ...I love the guest more. MARIA. What guest? PAMPFILUS. Your mind, whose beauty will forever increase with age».

that is, to sum up, a term that can be used to denote the very person.⁷⁴³ In addition to ‘mind’, ‘soul’ and ‘conscience’, the term *animus* is rendered in the *Colloquia* with the following words: ‘heart’,⁷⁴⁴ ‘intention’,⁷⁴⁵ ‘will’,⁷⁴⁶ ‘courage’⁷⁴⁷ and ‘pride’.⁷⁴⁸ The meanings of ‘persuasion’ and ‘decision’ are also implied.⁷⁴⁹

4 *Animus* and the mutual interference of two semantic traditions

The analysis carried in sections 1 to 3 regarding the usage and meaning of the term *animus* could be, perhaps, simply summarized by answering the question that I left unanswered a few lines before: was Erasmus being inaccurate in the usage of *animus* and *anima*? And my answer is, well maybe not. To me, it appears to be fairly reasonable that we may be witnessing the mutual interference between two intellectual and semantic traditions. Namely, between (1) an Aristotelian based tradition (with influences from subsequent schools), which employs the term *anima* and adds qualities to it (e.g., *anima uegetatiua*, *anima sensitiua*, *anima intellectiua* or *rationalis*);⁷⁵⁰ and (2) an Acciusic based tradition (from

⁷⁴¹ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Conuiuuium religiosum* (ASD I-3: 250, lines 60-61; tr. CWE 39: 191): «Animus meus liber est».

⁷⁴² Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Puerpera* (ASD I-3: 461, lines 308-309; tr. CWE 39: 599): «Horum quodcunque dixeris, consequitur actiones animi corporis affectionibus impediri», that is, «Whichever of these names you use, it follows that acts of mind are curtailed by states of the body».

⁷⁴³ In *Coll. Breuis de copia praeceptio* (ASD I-3: 216, line 33; tr. CWE 39: 166), words are given to substitute ‘me’ in the sentence «Your letter pleased me very much»: «ME: animum meum, pectus meum, oculos meos, cor meum, Christianum», that is, «ME: my soul, my breast, my eyes, my heart, a Christian».

⁷⁴⁴ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Coniugium* (ASD I-3: 309, lines 281-283; tr. CWE 39: 316): «The man’s heart [*hominis animus*] was so touched, so overcome by such wifely speech, that he solemnly promised her he would never lay a hand on her again, and he didn’t; *Coll. Ἰχθυοφαγία* (ASD I-3: 532, lines 1375-1376; tr. CWE 40: 717): «...the heart should be trained to godliness [*animus magis ad pietatem educandus*]».

⁷⁴⁵ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Conuiuuium profanum* (ASD I-3: 227, line 19; tr. CWE 39: 143): «In many matters it’s not the fact but the intention [*non res sed animus*] that distinguishes us from the Jews»; *Coll. Ἰχθυοφαγία* (ASD I-3: 517, lines 785-788; tr. CWE 40: 698): «BUTCHER. Then what’s the difference between a fixed resolution and a vow made by silent deliberation? FISHMONGER. The intention of binding one’s self [*animus obligandi*]. BUTCHER. Earlier you denied that intention [*animus*] prevails in this circumstance».

⁷⁴⁶ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Conuiuuium religiosum* (ASD I-3: 258, lines 828-829; tr. CWE 39: 200): «In the first place, there ought to be a will [*animum adesse oportet*] to assist everybody»; *Coll. Concio* (ASD I-3: 659, lines 233-236; tr. CWE 40: 946): «Those who don’t know Latin think *humilitas* signifies only an unusual modesty, whereas it sometimes refers to a state or condition, not a moral virtue [*ad animi uirtus*]; at other times it refers to the will [*ad animum*] in such a way as to suggest a fault».

⁷⁴⁷ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Formulae* (ASD I-3: 132, lines 231-233; tr. CWE 39: 13): «Bono sis animo oportet. Forti infractoque sis animo. Multum iuuat animus in re mala bonus», that is, «You must cheer up. Be brave and unflinching. Courage is a great help in adversity».

⁷⁴⁸ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Virgo poenitens* (ASD I-3: 300, lines 69-71; tr. CWE 39: 304): «He had with much difficulty mastered his feelings, that I in turn must now master my pride [*uincerem animum meum*] and not bring on him the disgrace of having backed out of the bargain».

⁷⁴⁹ Cf. Erasmus, *Coll. Ars notoria* (ASD I-3: 647, lines 60-61; tr. CWE 40: 933): «ERASMIUS. How do I do it? DESIDERIUS. First, by persuading yourself to love studies [*ut animum inducas amare studia*]. Secondly, by admiring them»; *Coll. Opulentia sordida* (ASD I-3: 677, line 20; tr. CWE 40: 983): «I had a reason, so at the time I simply decided to stay [*et sic tunc erat animus*]».

⁷⁵⁰ This classification is found, for example, in G. Reisch’s *Margarita philosophica* 10.1 (*anima uegetatiua*), 10.2 (*anima sensitiua*), 11 (*anima intellectiua*). Cf. *supra* Part II, section 5.2; also Schmitt and Skinner 1988: 465-467.

the poet Accius), which aims at distinguishing *anima* (meaning ‘principle of life’) and *animus* (meaning ‘principle of consciousness’). That this was an unresolved and controversial issue still in the Renaissance can be exemplified with the editorial choice made by Joachim Périon and Nicholas de Grouchy: they translated Aristotle’s *Περὶ ψυχῆς* as *De animo* (Paris: Thomas Richard, 1549 | USTC 150203).

Regarding the Aristotelian based tradition, a further commentary should be made. The Greek philosopher explained his notion of soul (ψυχή) particularly in *De anima* 2.2-3 (413a20-415a12). At 413b10-13 (Hett 1935: 74-77), he mentions that the soul has four faculties or functions:

But for the moment let us be satisfied with saying that the soul [ψυχή] is the origin of the characteristics we have mentioned, and is defined by them, that is by the faculties of nutrition [θρεπτικόν], sensation [αἰσθητικόν], thought [διανοητικόν] and movement [κίνησις].

At 414a29-32 (Hett 1935: 80-81), he mentions five, the new one being the appetite (ὄρεκτικόν):

Of the faculties of the soul [δύναμεις τῆς ψυχῆς] which we have mentioned, some living things have all, others only some, and others again only one. Those we have mentioned are the faculty for nourishment [θρεπτικόν], for appetite [ὄρεκτικόν], for sensation [αἰσθητικόν], for movement in space [κίνητικόν κατὰ τόπον], and for thought [διανοητικόν].

These five powers, faculties or functions of the soul as depicted in *De anima* 2.3 (414a29-32) were rendered into Latin using the following terms:⁷⁵¹

δύναμεις		potentiae		powers	
ψυχή	διανοητικόν	anima	intellectiuum	soul	thought
	κίνητικόν κατὰ τόπον		loco motiuum		movement in space
	αἰσθητικόν		sensitiuum		sensation
	ὄρεκτικόν		appetituum		appetite
	θρεπτικόν		nutritiuum or uegetatiuum		nourishment

Example of how to read this chart. In Latin: «anima [habens] intellectiuum», and so on. In English: «soul [having the power / faculty of] thought», and so on.

If Aristotle formulated a soul with five powers, how could Erasmus assert that the Greek philosopher conceived a soul with three powers or functions?⁷⁵² The answer to this shift may be found in the following passages of Thomas Aquinas.⁷⁵³ He first objects that:

⁷⁵¹ Latin translation by Ioannes Argyropoulos, taken from Bekker 1831: 215b. Regarding the Latin translators of Aristotle’s works, cf. *supra* Part II, complementary note 3.

⁷⁵² Cf. *supra* n. 726.

It would seem that there are not to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul, namely vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive and intellectual. For the powers of the soul are called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly assigned, namely the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of powers in the soul, and not five.⁷⁵⁴

And then he concludes that «there are five genera of powers of the soul, as above numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes of living».⁷⁵⁵ Aquinas—unlike Aristotle—understands that there are various souls (*diuersae animae distinguntur*): *anima rationalis*, *anima sensibilis* and *anima uegetabilis*; and five types of powers (*genera potentiarum*)—like Aristotle—: *uegetatiuum*, *sensitiuum*, *intellectiuum*, *appetitiuum* and *motiuum secundum locum*.⁷⁵⁶ Therefore, Aquinas’s role as commentator of the works of Aristotle may have contributed to disseminate the notion that the Greek philosopher only distinguished three powers in the soul. Humanists like Erasmus and scholars like Gregor Reisch may have then considered valid this interpretation (or even believed to be genuinely Aristotelian) and thus conveyed it in their works.

	Latin Aristotle	Aquinas	Reisch	
anima [with a power (<i>potentia</i>) called...]	intellectiuum	rationalis	intellectiua	anima
	loco motiuum			
	sensitiuum	sensibilis	sensitiua	
	appetitiuum			
	nutritiuum or uegetatiuum	uegetabilis	uegetatiua	

On the other hand, to this intellectual—and somehow unaware—tension between the Aristotelian-based sematic tradition and the Lucretian and Ciceronian-based semantic tradition, a religious element should be added to the equation, that is, the resolution by the

⁷⁵³ Vives considered Thomas Aquinas the soundest and least inept of all scholastic authors. Cf. *Disc. trad.* 5 (VOO 6: 404; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 452-454): «Simile est huic opus Diui Thomae Aquinatis secundae partis *Summae*, quod duos in tomos diuiditur, scriptoris de schola omnium sanissimi ac minime inepti».

⁷⁵⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I q78 a1 arg1 (Leo XIII 1951: 563-564; tr. Fathers 1922: 75): «Videtur quod non sint quinque genera potentiarum animae distinguenda, scilicet uegetatiuum, sensitiuum, appetitiuum, motiuum secundum locum, et intellectiuum. Potentiae enim animae dicuntur partes ipsius. Sed tantum tres partes animae communiter ab omnibus assignantur, scilicet anima uegetabilis, anima sensibilis, et anima rationalis. Ergo tantum tria sunt genera potentiarum animae, et non quinque». Cf. *Sentencia De anima*, lib. 2, l. 5, n. 7: «Et secundum hoc triplex esse distinguitur communiter triplex anima: scilicet uegetabilis, sensibilis et rationalis».

⁷⁵⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I q78 a1 co (Leo XIII 1951: 564; tr. Fathers 1922: 76): «Respondeo dicendum quod quinque sunt genera potentiarum animae, quae numerata sunt. Tres uero dicuntur animae. Quatuor uero dicuntur modi uiuendi».

⁷⁵⁶ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I q78 a1 co, *passim* (Leo XIII 1951: 564-565; tr. Fathers 1922: 76-78).

authorities of the Church to make *anima* the predominant and standard term to refer to the soul as a whole.⁷⁵⁷ This determination can be found as early as in the Fourth Council of Constantinople (869-870), in which is said (*canon 11*) that in the Old Testament and the New Testament a human being has «one rational and intellectual soul»,⁷⁵⁸ thus equating *rationalis* and *intellectualis*. The Fifth Council of the Lateran (session seven, 19 December 1513) again equated both adjectives when, on the one hand, allusion to the nature of the «rational soul» is made and, on the other hand, a few lines later, a statement confirms the rejection of the mortality of the «intellectual soul».⁷⁵⁹

In conclusion, it seems plausible to sustain that whereas in Old and Classical Latin (Accius, Lucretius, Cicero, Seneca) a distinction between *anima* as the principle of life and *animus* as the principle of consciousness was preferred, the Aristotelian way of describing the soul—that is, by the addition of attributes that allude to a performed function—gained predominance as time went by, especially due to the influence exerted by the Church when it established *anima* as the central term to refer to the soul.

* * * * *

This «Supplement» on the term *animus* puts an end to Part IV, in which *Ad sap.* has been examined from a philosophical standpoint. Part V will now summarize the most important conclusions reached in Parts I-IV of my dissertation.

⁷⁵⁷ Cf., for example, Erasmus, *Enchiridion militis Christiani*, particularly the section «On the three parts of man: spirit, soul, and flesh [*De tribus hominis partibus: spiritu, anima et carne*]» (ASD V-8: 152-158; tr. CWE 66: 51-54); *Coll. De rebus ac uocabulis* (ASD I-3: 568, lines 65-66; tr. CWE 40: 811): «Aren't men fools who rush off and enlist in the army in the hope of booty—not very much booty at that—at risk to body and soul [*corpus et animam*]?»; *Coll. Epicureus* (ASD I-3: 722, lines 75-76; tr. CWE 40: 1076): «First of all, you'll grant, I suppose, that there's some difference between body and soul [*inter animam et corpus*]». But *animus* is used, for example, in *Coll. Gerontologia* (ASD I-3: 387, lines 430-431; tr. CWE 39: 460): «To better govern both body and soul [*et animum et corpus*] and to counsel my friends sometimes». In this last case, perhaps the translation is misleading. Erasmus may not be referring to govern «both body and soul» but «both body and mind».

⁷⁵⁸ Cf. Alberigus 1962: 151, lines 4-6: «Veteri et nouo testamento unam animam rationalem et intellectualem [μίαν ψυχὴν λογικὴν τε καὶ νοεράν] habere hominem...».

⁷⁵⁹ Cf. Alberigus 1962: 581, lines 15, 19-20: «...de natura praesertim animae rationalis... [...] damnamus et reprobamus omnes asserentes animam intellectiuam mortalem esse». Usage of *anima* to refer to the soul as a whole is also found, for example, in Erasmus, *Enchiridion militis Christiani*, particularly the section «On the three parts of man: spirit, soul, and flesh [*De tribus hominis partibus: spiritu, anima et carne*]» (ASD V-8: 152-158; tr. CWE 66: 51-54); *Coll. De rebus ac uocabulis* (ASD I-3: 568, lines 65-66; tr. CWE 40: 811): «Aren't men fools who rush off and enlist in the army in the hope of booty—not very much booty at that—at risk to body and soul [*corpus et animam*]?»; *Coll. Epicureus* (ASD I-3: 722, lines 75-76; tr. CWE 40: 1076): «First of all, you'll grant, I suppose, that there's some difference between body and soul [*inter animam et corpus*]». But *animus* is used, for example, in *Coll. Gerontologia* (ASD I-3: 387, lines 430-431; tr. CWE 39: 460): «To better govern both body and soul [*et animum et corpus*] and to counsel my friends sometimes». In this last case, perhaps the translation is misleading. Erasmus may not be referring to govern «both body and soul» but «both body and mind».

Complementary notes

[NOTE 1]

An example of keywords and summary phrases found in the margin in the first aphorisms of *Ad sap.* as edited by Froschauer in the 1535 edition (F):

- 1** **Iudicium re-
sum.** **V** Era sapientia est de rebus incorru-
pte iudicare, ut talem unāquantq̄
existimemus qualis ipsa est: ne ui-
lia sectemur tanquā preciosa, aut
preciosa tanquam uilia reiiciamus: ne uitu-
peremus laudanda, neue laudemus uitupe-
rium merita.
- 2** Hinc enim error omnis in hominū men-
tibus ac uitium oritur, nihilq̄ est in huma-
na uita exitiabilius, quā deprauatio illa iu-
dicatorum, quum singulis rebus non suam
precium redditur.
- 3** **Error uul-
gi.** Quocirca perniciosæ sunt persuasiones
uulgi quod stultissime de rebus iudicat.
- 4** Videlicet magnus erroris magister est po-
pulus.
- 5** Nec aliud magis laborandum est, quā
ut Sapientiz studiosum à populari sensu ab-
ducamus, & uindicemus.
- 6** Primum omnium suspecta illi sint, quæ-
cunq̄ multitudo magno cōsensu approbat,
nisi ad illorum normam reuocari, qui singu-
la uirtute metiuntur.
- 7** **Ratio uiræ.** Assuescat unusquisq̄ iam tum à puero ue-
ras habere de rebus opinionones, quæ simul cū
ætate adolescent.
- 8** Et ea cupiat quæ recta sint, fugiat quæ pra-
ua: assuefactio hæc bene agere uertet ei pro-
pe in naturam, ut non possit nisi coactus, &
reluctans ad male agendum pertrahi.
- 9** Dejigēda est optima uiræ ratio, hanc con-
suetudo iucundissimam reddet.
- 10** Tota reliqua uita ex hac puerili educatio-
ne pendet.
- 11** **Nosse sci-
psum.** Ergo in curriculo Sapientiz, primus gra-
dus est ille ueteribus celebratissimus, seipsum
nosse.

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[NOTE 2]

In *De sapientia* 9-10, Nicholas of Cusa expresses his views on wisdom, which he regards as not being able to be known, spoken out or conceived by a human being. I first give the Latin text as edited by Peroli (2017: 798, 800) followed by the English translation of Rice (1958: 22-23).

Vnde sapientia, quam omnes homines, cum natura scire desiderent, cum tanto mentis affectu quaerunt, non aliter scitur quam quod ipsa est omni scientia altior et inscibilis et omni loquela ineffabilis et omni intellectu inintelligibilis et omni mensura immensurabilis et omni fine infinibilis et omni termino interminabilis, et omni proportione impropor-tionabilis et omni comparatione incomparabilis et omni figuratione infigurabilis et omni formatione informabilis et in omni motione immobilis et in omni imaginatione inimaginabilis et in omni sensatione insensibilis et in omni attractione inattractabilis et in omni gustu ingustabilis et in omni auditu inaudibilis et in omni uisu inuisibilis et in omni apprehensione inapprehensibilis et in omni affirmatione inaffirmabilis et in omni negatione innegabilis et in omni dubitatione indubitabilis et in omni opinione inopinabilis. Et quia in omni eloquio est inexpressibilis, harum locutionum non potest finis cogitari, cum in omni cogitatione sit incogitabilis, per quam, in qua et ex qua omnia.

► Of wisdom, therefore, which all men by nature desire to know and seek with such mental application, one can know only that is higher than all knowledge and thus unknowable, unutterable in an words, unintelligible to any intellect, unmeasurable by any measure, unlimitable to any limit, unterminable by any term, unproportionable by any proportion, incomparable by any comparison, unfigurable by any figuration, unformable by any formation, unmovable by any motion, unimaginable by any imagination, insensible to any sense, unattractable by any attraction, untasteable by any taste, inaudible to any ear, invisible to any eye, unapprehendable by any apprehension, unaffirmable in any affirmation, undeniable by any religion, indubitable by any doubt, and no opinion can be held about it. And since it is inexpressible in words, one can imagine an infinite number of such expressions, for no conception can conceive the wisdom through which, in which and of which all things are.

[NOTE 3]

Vives was a complex man (cf. *supra* Part II, section 1). Due to his fluctuating character, he was able to genuinely harbor a philanthropic desire to improve the education of all members of society while, at the same time, despise the common people. «What can I say ... to make you more conscious of the madness of the masses?», he cries out.⁷⁵⁹ Vives expresses his view on the wrong judgment hold by the populace (*populus*, *uulgus*, *multitudo*) in quite a few places throughout his literary production.⁷⁶⁰ I give below a selection of texts.

Ciu. dei 1.22.1138 (CCD 1: 107): «Populum sapientes olim magnum erroris magistrum soliti sunt appellare»; *Foem.* 2.4.58 (VOO 4: 211; SWJV 7: 70): «a magno erroris magistro populo»; 2.2.135 (VOO 4: 260; SWJV 6: 162): «magnus erroris magister populus»; *Consult.* (VOO 2: 252, line 1): «stulta multitudo»; *Sub.* 1.2.6 (VOO 4: 426; SWJV 4: 14): «populus, magnis erroris

⁷⁵⁹ Cf. *Ad sap.* 60: «Quid dicam ... quo magis uulgi dementiam agnoscas?».

⁷⁶⁰ So it does Erasmus in, for example, *Institutio militis Christiani* (ASD V-8: 217-218, lines 825-826; tr. CWE 66: 84): «Animus ad Christum anhelantis a uulgi tum factis tum opinionibus quammaxime dissentiat», that is, «The mind of one who aspires after Christ should be in complete disaccord with the actions and opinions of the crowd».

doctor»; *Conc.* 1 (VOO 5: 211): «Habet ingenium homo et natura sua angustum et peccato obscurum, magnaue in humanis pectoribus et tenebrosa densatur nox. Iudicio, usu rerum, prudentia nihil fere possumus; omnia sunt in humana uita errore et ignorantis plena, ut nihil magis uideatur esse hominis quam labi, errare, falli», 1 (VOO 5: 217): «Adiuuamur ueteribus dictis uel ab imperitia uulgaris ortis uel a poetis sensum et famam multitudinis pro duce usis pecuniam esse cuique uitae uice», 4.8 (VOO 5: 367): «Quocirca studiosus ille sapientiae [...] a uulgaribus sensibus sustollet ac uindicabit», 4.10 (VOO 5: 374, 379): «amplissimum theatrum refertum stultitia opificum et turbae popularis; [...] ab ignoratione uulgi»; *Pacif.* (VOO 5: 411-412): «Mouent animos mortalium haec fere: opes primum, quibus oculi et mentes multitudinis perstringuntur, pecuniae, possessiones, familiae, clientelae. Multum hisce tribuit uulgi, quod non perinde ad iudicium rationemque res omnes reuocat atque expendit, ut sensu quodam externo adducitur»; *Disc. corr.* 5 (VOO 6: 206; Vigliano 2013a: 232): «turba imperita»; *Disc. corr.* 6 (VOO 6: 209; Vigliano 2013a: 234-235): «[Socrates] populum habuit semper suspectum, quem ille magnum erroris magistrum nominare consueuerat et peruersum interpretem ueri, quod uideret fere pessima placere pluribus»; *Disc. trad.* 4 (VOO 6: 353; Vigliano 2013a: 396): «populus, a quo manat sermonis copia, rerum essentiam, naturam, uim non capit»; *Ver. fid.* 1.9 (VOO 8: 71): «quod dictum ex malorum et bonorum ignorantia est natum, in quo sapientes a uulgo uehementer dissentiant; uulgi enim omnia metitur corpore, sapientes animo».

In *Sat. ep.* 4, Vives considers the populace (*uulgi*) 'a fountain of stupidity' (*ex stultitiae fonte*). This metaphor is found in Greek authors such as Theognis (959-962) and Chalmachus (*Epigrammata* 28.3-4); or in Latin authors such as Horace (*Carmina* 3.1.1).

[NOTE 4]

Life as pilgrimage (*peregrinatio*) or exile was a subject dear to Vives, which he mentioned in many other works. The motive is already found in ancient Latin texts, for example in Sallust (*De coniuratione Catilinae* 2.8). Coluccio Salutati devoted one chapter of *De seculo et religione* (1.34; Marshall 2014: 175) to the fact that «as long as we remain in this world, we are pilgrims [*peregrini*] and strangers [*aduene*] before the Lord, and our task is to seek our homeland». Erasmus as well dedicated one of his adages to this subject: «Vita hominis peregrinatio». (IV x 74; ASD II-8: 258). Unable to develop an enquiry on this subject here, I give the main sources in Vives's literary production that will be used as basis for a forthcoming research article.

Med. psal. 7 (VOO 1: 254): «Itaque de aerumnis, de miseris, de calamitatibus, de tempestatibus peregrinationis et somni huius, quam nos uitam appellamus, animam meam ad te reuocabis, hoc est e tenebris ad lucem, e nocte ad diem, a morte ad uitam»; *Sat.* 44 (VOO 4: 38; Tello 2020a: 68): «Viue ut post uiuas. Sic est hic uiuendum ut ad alteram perueniamus meliorem atque adeo ueram uitam. Nam praesens uita, quid aliud est quam mors aut, ut melius dicam, peregrinatio?», 177 (VOO 4: 57 [*Sat.* 175]; Tello 2020a: 86): «Non refert qua sed quo. Nihil refert qua transeas in hac peregrinatione uitae, sed quo peruenias. In omni loco, in omni fortuna licet recte agere et illo peruenire quo intendimus»; *Ep. Henr. reg. Gall.* 15 (VOO 5: 178; SWJV 12: 68): «peregrinationem quandam hanc uitam esse rectissime censens»; *Mar.* 2.65 (VOO 4: 339; SWJV 8: 76): «peregrinatio est uita haec, altera illa patria et domus sempiterna»; *Conc.* 3 (VOO 5: 255): «Vita haec nostra, qua immortalis humana mens putri hoc et caduco corpore includitur, quam ideo ueterum quidam alii carcerem alii mortem nominarunt, nostri appositius peregrinationem atque exilium; ea ergo, quocumque sit nomine censenda, uia est ad illam aeternitatem, si modo apte et conuenienter ad illam exigatur. Viae huius unicum est uiaticum uirtus»; *Disc. prima ph.* 1

(VOO 3: 192): «Nos tamen interea, dum hanc uitam degimus, siue quis eam peregrinationem siue exilium nomet, quaedam annotauimus huic itineri conducentia»; *Excit. med. d.* 8 (VOO 1: 67): «Peregrinatio est haec uita nostra: a Domino discessimus, ad Dominum tendimus», 11 (VOO 1: 69): «haec [i.e. uita] modo uia est ad aeternam illam»; *Excit. med. g.* 22 (VOO 1: 89): «Vita haec nostra peregrinatio est ad patriam ab exilio, hoc est ad te beatitudinem ab omni miseria quae longissime recessit a te»; *Ling.* 20.123-124 (VOO 1: 375; García 2005: 326): «Vita haec, nonne est uelut iter quoddam et profectio perpetua?»; *An. uita* 3.14 (VOO 3: 486; Sancipriano 1974: 624): «Quid enim illi, qui in coelestem patriam est intentus, cum offensiunculis breuis huius peregrinationis?»; *Ver. fid.* 1.5 (VOO 8: 37): «...necesse est profecto hominum frustra esse a tanto auctore Deo conditum, etsi in hanc uitam quasi in peregrinationem missum aut in exilium», 1.6 (VOO 8: 50): «Adstipulatur huic nostrae sententiae corporis nostri status rectus, et spectans in coelum tanquam in patriam ex peregrinatione aut exilio», 1.13 (VOO 8: 110-111): «Et in omni peregrinatione quasque exilio reditus in patriam dulcissimus est atque optabilis, eo magis si molesta sit peregrinatio et turbulenta uel exilium turpe ac difficile, patria autem quieta et suaui. Animi nostri, in hanc uitam ceu in peregrinationem et exilium a Deo egressi, quam multa perferunt grauia, iniqua, laboriosa, acerba et dignitate sua indignissima, ut philosophorum quidam non iniuria corpus hoc uincula et carcerem animi nuncuparint! In Deo autem quieta omnia, pulcherrima, beatissima, plus quam possumus non eloqui modo, uerum etiam optare. Illuc ergo mire cupit animus reuerti, et suspirat et clamat», 1.17 (VOO 8: 133): «Quandoquidem ad coelestem uitam est homo factus, cur Deus hic eum posuit in terra, hoc est in peregrinatione, et non in patria ubi erat permansurus? Quorsum opus erat hoc decursu uitae?», 3.9 (VOO 8: 306): «In isto rerum uestrarum statu unusquisque uestrum transit per terram peregrinationis huius, de qua nihil potuit dici aptius quam 'transire'. Peregrini enim sumus omnes, ut et patres nostri», 3.10 (VOO 8: 309): «Atqui opus nostri Messiae est peregrinatio, atque exilium huius terrae, et reductio in patriam coelestem», 5.7 (VOO 8: 440): «Quid potest accidere in hac peregrinatione uitae, quod nobis uel attollat animos uel deiiciat, modo de reditu ad immortalitatem bona et firma sit spes in nostris pectoribus?».

[NOTE 5]

As a seeker of truth,⁷⁶¹ Vives firmly believed that truth eventually prevails. He developed this thought in several works. For example, in *Satellitium siue Symbola*:

91 VERITAS TEMPORIS FILIA. Verum, quod diu latuit, procedente tempore existit et apparet, ne quis fidat mendacio uel putet in occulto semper ueritatem fore. Cicero: «Opinionum commenta delet dies, naturae iudicia confirmat». (Tello 2020a: 75)

► TRUTH IS THE DAUGHTER OF TIME.⁷⁶² Truth that has long been hidden comes into existence and becomes visible as time goes by, so that no one may trust a lie or think that the truth would always remain in concealment.⁷⁶³ Cicero writes: «The passing of days erases the inventions of opinions but confirms the good judgments of Nature».⁷⁶⁴

⁷⁶¹ Cf. Vives, *Pseud.* (VOO 3: 67; ed. tr. Fantazzi 1979: 98-99): «Opera mea ... non litigandi sed inquirendae ueritatis causa», that is, «my work ... is not simply for dispute, but for seeking out the truth»; *Disc. prae.* (VOO 6: 7; ed. Vigliano 2013a: 8): «Veritatis sectatores, ubicunque eam esse putabitis, ab illa state!», that is, «Followers of truth, wherever you think it might be, stand by its side!». Cf. **also supra Part II, section 4.1, n. 108.**

⁷⁶² Cf. Aulus Gellius, 12.11.7. When princess Mary became queen, she issued a coin with this motto.

⁷⁶³ Cf. Vives, *Sat.* 93; *Matthaeus* 10:26; *Marcus* 4:22; *Lucas* 8:17 (tr. ESV): «For nothing is hidden that will not be made manifest, nor is anything secret that will not be known and come to light».

⁷⁶⁴ Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.2.5.

92 LVPVS MENDACIO TEMPVS. Vorat enim et absunit. (Tello 2020a: 75)

► TIME IS A WOLF FOR A LIE. For it swallows and consumes it.

93 VERITAS PREMITVR, NON OPPRIMITVR. Laborat uerum, sed eluctatur tandem. (Tello 2020a: 75)

► TRUTH IS PRESSED BUT NOT SUPPRESSED. Truth struggles but, in the end, finds a way out.

Other passages include *Foem.* 2.6.76 (VOO 4: 224; SWJV 7: 94): «Nam ueritatis parens est tempus; falsa tempus debilitat ac tollit, uera confirmat et corroborat»; *Vit. Turc.* 21 (VOO 5: 459; Elasm 2014: 300): «Adfert tempus ipsum ueritati splendorem ac lucem, et ipsa ueritas posteaquam diu latuit, emergit tandem»; *Disc. trad. er.* (VOO 6: 421; Vigliano 2013a: 472): «Res ueras solidasque tempus confirmat, inanes autem dissipat et absunit»; (VOO 6: 421; Vigliano 2013a: 473): «Accedit huc quod (uti dicebam modo) opinionum commenta delet dies, recta iudicia corroborat»; *Ver. fid.* 2.19 (VOO 8: 225): «Plane est quod ille pronuntiauit: “Veritas est rerum omnium fortissima”», 3.8 (VOO 8: 300): «Opinionum commenta delet dies, ut inquit sapiens quidam de gentibus, recta iudicia confirmat». The theme can be found in classical sources such as Menander, *Monostichoi* 11 (FCG 4: 340): «Ἄγει δὲ πρὸς φῶς τὴν ἀλήθειαν χρόνος»; Titus Livius, *Ab urbe condita* 22.39.19: «Veritatem laborare nimis saepe aiunt, extinguere nunquam»; Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.2.5: «Etenim uidemus ceteras opiniones fictas atque uanas diuturnitate extabuisse [...] Opinionis enim commenta delet dies, naturae iudicia confirmat»; Seneca, *De ira* 2.22.2: «ueritatem dies aperit»; Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 12.11.6-7: «Propterea uersus istos Sophocli, prudentissimi poetarum, in ore esse habendos dicebat: “Πρὸς ταῦτα κρύπτει μηδὲν, ὡς ἄπανθ’ ὁρῶν / καὶ πάντ’ ἀκούων πάντ’ ἀναπτύσσει χρόνος”. Alius quidam ueterum poetarum, cuius nomen mihi nunc memoriae non est, Veritatem Temporis filiam esse dixit».

Erasmus wrote in his *Adagiorum chiliades* pr. 7 (ASD II-1: 64, lines 366-367; tr. CWE 31: 17, line 57) that «ueritate nihil esse robustius». He dedicated adage II iv 17 (ASD II-3: 330; tr. CWE 33: 198) to comment on the motto «Tempus omnia reuelat».

[NOTE 6]

¶ Rerum naturę ac precia
17 Regina & princeps rerū oīm præstā-
 tissima ē VIR TVS, cui reliq̄ oīa si
 suo uelit officio, defungi ancillari oportet.
18 Virtutem uoco pietatē in deum & homi-
 nesc. uultum dei, & amorem in homines,
 q̄ coniunctus est cū uoluntate bñfaciēdi.
19 Reliqua si quis ad uirtutem hanc referat,
 haud quaę mala uidebunt̄.

¶ Rerum naturę ac precia.
17 Regina & princeps rerum omniū
 præstantissima est VIR TVS, cui
 reliqua omnia si suo uelint officio de-
 fungi, ancillari oportet.
18 Virtutem uoco pietatem in deū & ho-
 mines; cultum dei, & amorem in hoīes
 qui cōiūctus est eū uolūtate bñfaciēdi.
19 Reliqua si quis ad uirtutem hanc refe-
 rat, haud quaquam mala uidebuntur.

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In the 1526 edition (C, Bruges: Hubert de Croock; LEFT), a full stop appears between *homines* and *cultum* in aphorism 18, although not located in the right place (certainly a typo). In any case, it is clear that the underlying aim of the printer was to separate *Virtutem uoco pietatem in deum et homines* from *cultum dei, et amorem in homines qui coniunctus est cum uoluntate benefaciendi* so that the reader may infer that *cultum dei et amorem in homines...* was a clarification of the word *pietas*. The printer of the 1530 edition (K, Antwerp: Robert de Keyser; RIGHT) understood the aim of the full stop but realized that it was not the best way to signal a clarification, and thus he printed a semicolon, which expressed without doubt the fact that *cultum dei* and *amorem in homines...* was an explanation of the word *pietas*. This nuance introduced by punctuation has been overlooked by modern translators (Avinyó 1929; Alventosa 1930; Riber 1947; Tobriner 1968; Sarrió and Girbés 1992; Roca 2001; Wolff 2001; Frayle 2010; Rossetti 2012; Del Nero 2018).

[NOTE 7]

Vives often liked to associate *bellum* with *belua*. In other works he spelled the word with a double «l» (*bellua*) to reinforce this connection, his intention being to remark the mindless and *humaneless* condition of both war and beasts. Cf., for example (italics mine), *Conc.* 2 (VOO 5: 235): «Quod *belli* nomen a *belluis* deductum esse testatur Festus, Latini sermonis bonus auctor, quippe res est *belluis* magis congruens quam hominibus. Hic enim ad humanitatem mansuetudinemque est a natura formatus ac fictus, illae uero ad feritatem et incursus animorum [...] *Belluarum* dicis esse *bellum*? Atqui nulli animanti quam homini, sicut Plinius inquit, pauor confusior, nulli rabies acrior»; *Conc.* 3 (VOO 5: 288): «Illud uero iam non humanum sed uel *belluinum* ex stupore ac inconsiderantia, uel diabolicum ex impia malitia», (VOO 5: 295): «Nec est quod quisquam miretur, quum in uirtute laudetur homo, in *bello bellua*»; *Disc. prima ph.* 3 (VOO 3: 279): «Quod fit, quum in otio iacuit ratio diu languens ac dissoluta, affectibus uero impulsoribus gesta omnia, quo quid aliud est esse *belluum*?»; *Mar.* 1.11 (SWJV 8: 14): «Quod si affectuum insistat uia, ita in praeceptis fertur ut iam paene alieni iuris, nempe domini quem in animum admisit illique mancipatus et traditus, immane dictu, quanta ex homine fit *bellua*! Quae nox pectori densatur! Quam degener sua origine!», 5.158 (SWJV 8: 172): «Adeo qui hoc faciunt homines, malignitate et pusillo ac degenerare animo inferiores sunt *belluis*. Sed quantum inter ipsos et belluas interest qui humani habent nihil praeter faciem?, 10.199 (SWJV 8: 216): «...immo uero, non hominum sed *belluarum*, quae nihil mente et ratione ualent, motibus illis sensuum ad actiones incitantur atque impelluntur, qui simul ac consederunt, habitus quoque animorum mutantur». Interestingly, all editions of *Ad sap.* until 1537 (L 1524, C 1526, P 1527, K 1530, H 1531, T 1532, S ca. 1533, F 1537) edited the word *belua* as such, but as from the 1537 edition (La), *bellua* was edited with a double «l». The subsequent editions based on La 1537 (Bl 1538, W 1539, W² 1540, O 1548, B 1555, V 1782) kept the change.

The brief selection of texts given above share one same underlying theme: human nature needs to be educated, otherwise he can easily fall to the condition of beasts. Cf. *Conc.* 3 (VOO 5: 246): «Non est homo sed pecus is homo, qui homo non uult existimari»; *Vit. Turc.* (VOO 5: 457): «Si [homo] sibi relinquatur, nullum animal efferatius euadat, nullum magis barbarum atque incompositum, nec ulla fera *bellua* tam sit immanibus moribus et inhumanis tam *belluae* similis, ac homo». It is fitting to recall here Erasmus's view expressed in *De pueris instituendis* (ASD I-2: 31, line 21; tr. CWE 26: 304): «Human beings —believe me— are not born but made human [*homines, mihi crede, non nascuntur sed finguntur*]».

[NOTE 8]

The theory of 'humors' or 'fluids' (χυμοί, *humores*) was developed by the Pythagorean school, Hippocrates (ca.460-370 BC) —particularly in *De natura hominis* and *De humoribus*—, the Alexandrian writers of the *Corpus Hippocraticum* (3rd century BC), and Galen (ca.130-200; the physician of emperor Marcus Aurelius) in *De temperamentis*. According to these authors,⁷⁶⁵ the body has four types of fluids (blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile) that, depending on which one predominates, can cause four types of character: bloody, phlegmatic, angry or melancholic. The four fluids are also associated with a season of the year, a bodily organ, and an element. Humoralism teaches that a physician can restore a patient's health by skillfully combining the aforementioned items. Vives is inspired by much of these ideas when he explains how fluids determine the qualities of *ingenium* in *An. uita* 2.6 (especially VOO 3: 366-368; Sancipriano 1974: 292-299). He also points out the role of 'spirits' or "exhalations' (*spiritus*), which he considers them to be very thin and shining,

⁷⁶⁵ For a more detailed historical account in the literature of the ancients, cf. Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl 1979: 3-66.

and to be blown out by the heart up to the brain.⁷⁶⁶ According to him, if these exhalations are cold, they cause slowness and weakness in the mind; if, on the contrary, they are warm, they lead to quickness and determination.⁷⁶⁷ That is why the heart is so important when it comes to thought (*cogitatio*) and intelligence (*intelligentia*),⁷⁶⁸ to the extent that the mind will not be able to understand, get angry, be afraid, get sad or feel shame unless those exhalations, which spring from the heart, have reached the brain.⁷⁶⁹

Greek	Latin	Body	Season	Element	Quality	Character
αἷμα	sanguis [blood]	liver	spring	air	hot and humid	bloody
χολή	flava bilis [yellow bile]	spleen	summer	fire	hot and dry	angry
φλέγμα	pituita [phlegm]	lungs	winter	water	cold and humid	phlegmatic
μέλαινα χολή	atra bilis [black bile]	gallbladder	fall	earth	cold and dry	melancholic or genius ⁷⁷⁰

⁷⁶⁶ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.6 (VOO 3: 365; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 288-289): «Spiritus quidam tenuissimi et lucidissimi, quos illuc [i.e. ad cerebrum] exhalat sanguis cordis».

⁷⁶⁷ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.6 (VOO 3: 365; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 288-291): «Qui [i.e. spiriti] cum frigidi sunt ..., segnes existunt actiones mentis et languidae [...] Rursum quum calidi sunt spiritus, celeres et concitatae sunt actiones».

⁷⁶⁸ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.6 (VOO 3: 365; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 290-291): «Hinc fit, ut cordis habitudo atque affectio ad cogitationes atque intelligentiam non parum conferat».

⁷⁶⁹ Cf. Vives, *An. uita* 2.6 (VOO 3: 366; ed. Sancipriano 1974: 290-291): «Nec enim intelliget mens aut irascetur, metuet, moerebit, pudefiet, priusquam spiritus illi a corde exilientes ad cerebrum peruenerint».

⁷⁷⁰ Cf. Aristotle, *Problemata* 30. A bilingual Greek-English edition is included in Klíbanky, Panofsky and Saxl 1979: 18-29.

V Conclusions

The purpose of this dissertation was to study the second most published work of Vives (113 editions during the 16th century)¹ by taking an approach different to that of the two previous dissertations of Tobriner (1966) and Gómez-Hortigüela (2000). My approach has consisted in studying the content of the *Introductio ad sapientiam* (Part IV) using a new tool —the first critical edition of the Latin text— and an innovative thesis: the philosophical core of the work can be revealed through three key aphorisms: 1, 200 and 604.² Furthermore, the making of the critical edition (Part III) is an outcome from the appraisal of the state of investigation in Vivesian studies (Part I); similarly, Part II of this dissertation was deemed necessary in order to contextualize Vives as a philosopher. The investigation that has been carried out in parts I to IV is in agreement with my approach, and it has led to a series of conclusions that I summarize in the following paragraphs.

1 Status quaestionis

1.1 Latin text and translations

The standard edition of the complete works of Vives by Gregori Maians i Siscar in eight volumes (commonly known as VOO, 1782-1790) is currently being updated by the bilingual Latin-English critical editions of SWJV (1987 –) and by some other critical editions published in academic journals or in independent monographs.³ Regarding translations, the complete works of Vives rendered into Spanish by L. Riber (1947-1948) have not yet been surpassed, although there is much need of a complete translation in a more reliable version. The CJLV has not been able to complete this mission in Spanish, because the project ended in 2010. Unlike Erasmus —whose complete works are projected to be critically edited in Latin in ASD and translated into English in CWE—, Vives does not have a similar project at present. The scope of SWJV seems to aim at providing only a selection of his works, while translations are scattered in different publishers and languages. In view of this dispersion, it needs to be assessed the feasibility of establishing a unified collection devoted to disseminate the critical editions of Vives's works, either in Latin only or bilingual (Latin-English, or another modern

¹ Cf. *supra* Part I, section 2.5, n. 124.

² Vives, *Ad sap.* 1: «Vera sapientia est de rebus incorrupte iudicare», 200: «Semper illa tria sunt homini, quamdiu uiuit, meditanda: quomodo bene sapiat, quomodo bene dicat, quomodo bene agat», 604: «Hic est cursus absolutae sapientiae, cuius primus gradus est nosse se, postremus nosse deum».

³ For example: Elasri 2014, García Ruiz 2005, Pédeflous and Tournoy 2013, Tournoy 2005, Vigliano 2013a, Tello 2019, Tello 2020a.

language); as well as another collection devoted to disseminate Vives's complete works in a modern language with a reliable version.

As far as Vives's philosophical writings are concerned, it is of paramount importance to critically establish the Latin text of —at least— *Ver. fuc., Excit.*, the third part of *Disc.* (*Disc. prima ph., Disc. essent., Disc. uer., Disc. prob. and Disc. disp.*), the first book of *Ver. fid.*, because of their philosophical, moral, and anthropological content. The third part of *Disc.* is not covered by the critical edition of Vigliano (2013a) and SWJV 12 only includes the critical edition of book 4 of *Ver. fid. An. uita*, one of the most important writings of Vives already enjoys a critical edition (Sancipriano 1974), and Italian (Id.) and Spanish (CJLV 1A) complete translations. A complete English translation with commentary should replace that of Noreña (1989) of book 3 only.

1.2 Studies

When it comes to Vives's life, the forthcoming publication of the critical edition of the entire correspondence of Vives by G. Tournoy and R. Truman (either in SWJV or *Humanistica Lovaniensia*), may lead to revise the existing accounts of Riber 1947, Noreña 1970, González (1987, 2007, 2008a, 2008b) and Villacañas 2021, which frequently rely on the information provided by the letters as edited in VOO, Allen or R. Moreover, it would be of great interest to resume Pinta and Palacio y de Palacio's (1964) project about the edition of the trials of the Inquisition against Vives's family members, which may reveal valuable information in order to have a better understanding of Vives's background and his early years. This project was cancelled due to the content exposed by the two researchers: it shed light to the fact that Vives was not a pure Christian but of Jew origin.

As far as studies are concerned, Noreña 1970 still remains the most complete and balanced introductory monograph to the life and thought of Joan Lluís Vives, while a complete catalogue of his works can be found in González, Albiñana and Gutiérrez 1992, and Tello 2018a. Part I of my dissertation has reviewed the most important scholarship published from 1545 to present day. The most comprehensive study reviewing the entire works of Vives arranged by the object of study was attempted by Bonilla in 1903. Later, many studies focusing on a particular field of study (ethics, psychology: soul and emotions, politics, society, religion) have been published, and, although more insightful,⁴ they do not systematically relate to a common and shared system of classification by all scholars.

Indeed, Vives's tendency to introduce reflections and comments on issues other than the subject that he was addressing makes the classification of his works problematic. This is one of the reasons that he has been called an «eclectic» author,⁵ an attribute that is endorsed by the fact that he explicitly admitted that he was «a human being: therefore, I consider nothing that pertains to human beings foreign to me».⁶ Moreover, he put the pursuit of truth above any other consideration,⁷ even if it could undermine coherence of thought.⁸ Although

⁴ For example: Abellán 1997; Belarte 2010; Casini 2006a; Del Nero 1991, 2015; Fantazzi 2008; George 1992; Guy 1972; Mestre Sanchis 1992a; Roca 1993; Sancipriano 1957; Urmeneta 1949; Vilarroig 2017.

⁵ Cf. *supra* Part I, section 1.4, n. 44; Part II, section 3, n. 61.

⁶ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 3, n. 73.

⁷ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.1, n. 108.

⁸ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.4, n. 217.

these facts should be borne in mind, the enterprise of making a comprehensive study of the works of the Valencian humanist according to the disciplines of philosophy should not be ruled out. Since Vives considered himself a philosopher⁹ in the broad sense of the term (that is, in the aforementioned sense that anything pertaining to the human world concerned him), a collection of monographs —probably nine; see chart below— should be made in which to examine all writings of Vives from the point of view of a particular discipline of philosophy. In each monograph, relevant issues of that particular discipline would be discussed as expressed and argued by Vives in his writings. The monographs could fall into three main groups:

- I 1. Metaphysics.
- 2. Theology and religion.¹⁰
- 3. Natural philosophy (the natural world, the human body).
- II 4. Philosophy of language and logic.
- 5. Epistemology.
- 6. Psychology (soul and emotions).
- III 7. Moral philosophy.
- 8. Political philosophy and society.
- 9. Philosophy of education.

1.3 Bibliography

The bibliographical instruments of Calero and Sala 2000, and Gozález 2007 review a tremendous amount of items. However, the passing of the years has made necessary an update regarding the latest publications in Vivesian studies, which the bibliography included at the end of my dissertation provides. My bibliography has collected the most relevant research between 2007 and 2021 and thus it has filled the existing gap in this area.

2 Vives as a philosopher

2.1 Personal and intellectual personality

The balanced and conciliatory tone that Vives frequently employs in his writings, which transmits a willingness to attain concord and cleanness of the soul, is often missing in his private, non-aimed-at-publishing letters. In them, one sees a fluctuating and hesitant man, with traits of suicidal behaviour,¹¹ who (contrarily to what he recommends) complains now and then, even angrily.¹² What he dares not confess in his published works, he does dare in manuscript letters to his intimate friend Frans van Cranevelt: he preaches virtue but he fails to practise it.¹³ It may be this concealed weakness, along with the silent pain from all the

⁹ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 2.

¹⁰ If the scope of Vives's enquiry is all that belongs to the human realm, theology and religion definitely fit in because they provide practical knowledge and a conduct of life that is helpful to get through this earthly life and prepare for the next one. Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.2, 6.3.

¹¹ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 1, n. 8-9, 16-21, 23.

¹² Cf. *supra* Part II, section 1, n. 10-11, 206; Part III, section 2.2, n. 98-102.

¹³ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 1, n. 12.

blows of the Inquisition towards his family,¹⁴ that propels him to be so firm and convincing in his writings intended for publication, as though a conscious or unconscious (over)reaction to foster his self-esteem.

When it comes to Vives's intellectual identity, he has traditionally been depicted as a pedagogue or pacifist,¹⁵ based on the content expressed in works such as *Rat. stud.*, *Disc. trad.*, *Ling.*, *Diss. rep.*, and *Pacif.* However, scholars have not paid enough attention to how Vives was directly described by himself or by his friends. My dissertation has provided relevant passages where Vives undoubtedly attributes to himself the condition of *philosophus*, particularly in his early writings (*Sap.*, *Praef. Leg.*, *Pseud.*).¹⁶ Further, it has been underscored the extent by which Erasmus and Budé praised Vives's command of philosophy, of his resourceful natural intelligence (*ingenium*), of his knowledge on a wide variety of subjects, and of his expertise in sophistry, that is, in the art of deploying an argument and its opposite regarding a given matter.¹⁷ Furthermore, the relevance and dissemination of some philosophical works of Vives (especially *Aedes*, *Ad sap.*, *An. sen.*, *Ciu. dei*, *Fab.*, *Philos.*, and *Pseud.*) has been noted by indicating that Erasmus cherished a copy of them in his personal library.¹⁸

2.2 The notion of philosophy and theology

Vives's broad notion of philosophy —namely, that it encompasses all that is related to a human being— is to be understood as pertaining to a period of time where philosophy still had the scope of comprehensiveness. Encyclopedic publications of that period, such as Gregor Reisch's *Margarita philosophica*, constitute an example of interdisciplinary knowledge and a sense of unity, in which particular disciplines are not conceived independently from the whole.¹⁹ Vives was aware of such comprehensiveness, which he exemplified in *Disc. corr.* by reviewing the causes that cause a decline and degeneration of each field of knowledge. In addition to this broad notion, Vives helped disseminate more narrowed notions of philosophy, which my dissertation has gathered in Part II, section 5.1. In a nutshell, Vives conceives philosophy as (1) 'understanding' (*cognitio*), an 'investigation' (*inquisitio*) or a 'reflection' (*cogitatio*) about reality (*de rebus ipsis*), which includes both human and divine things; (2) a gift (*munus*) from God that enables human beings to fully develop their humanity and thus live well and happily (*bene beateque uiuere*); (3) theology, which is considered the highest part of philosophy. This last formulation has allowed me to argue —based on what Pythagoras and Vives maintained— that just as human beings can only be friends of wisdom because it is not *humanely* attainable, theology should accordingly be considered a sort of 'philothly', because human beings can only be friends of God, since knowledge of God and God Himself are not *humanely* attainable either.²⁰

¹⁴ Cf. *supra* Part III, section 1, n. 2.

¹⁵ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 3, n. 71-72. Regarding his pacificism, cf. Part II, section 3, n. 72bis; Part IV, section 3.3 (n. 202), 4.2 (n. 317, 333), 6.2.c (n. 451).

¹⁶ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 2, p. 29-30.

¹⁷ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 2, p. 30-33.

¹⁸ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 2, n. 39-40.

¹⁹ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 5.2, and complementary note 6.

²⁰ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 5.2, p. 69.

2.3 The most referenced philosophers of the Greco-Roman world

The first ever attempted survey to calculate to what extent a group of six influential Greco-Roman thinkers appear in Vives's works as edited by VOO (whose length is close to 4200 pages) has corroborated the predominance of Cicero (34% of appearances), followed by Socrates/Plato (28%), Aristotle (25%), Seneca (8%) and Augustine (5%). These figures allow to grasp that Vives's intellectual and philosophical formation mainly revolves around a Ciceronian-Platonic background (62%), followed by Aristotelian thought (25%).

Cicero was an author often referenced by Vives, especially in his early writings. He made brief introductions to Cicero's *De legibus* (*Praef. Leg.*) and to the allegedly Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (*Prael. Rhet.*); he also took Cicero's sixth book of *De republica* as the basis for his *Somn. uig.* Cicero's view on law —the Roman orator argued that it implied knowledge of all branches of study—, and Cicero's methodology —the search for the most plausible argument (verisimilitude)— proved influential in Vives, particularly in the inception of a broad concept of 'philosophy' and the refusal to blindly accept any statement.²¹ Vives's enterprise of assessing reality (or arguments in a given subject) without error benefitted considerably from Cicero's techniques in the art of speech applied to the practice of law. Moreover, the law element was reinforced by a family background and a circle of friends that fostered it.²² Thanks to Cicero (and perhaps Augustine), Vives may have also get acquainted with Epicurus's concept of πρόληψις or *anticipationes / semina*.²³

Of Socrates (as handed down by Plato), Vives admired his commitment to know truth as well as his ability to focus on virtue and daily human affairs, rather than on enquiries beyond human reach or on merely theoretical philosophy.²⁴ Vives conveyed his views of Socrates and Plato mainly in the eighth book of *Ciu. dei*, where he emphasizes Socrates's conception of philosophy as a reflection on death (*mortis meditatio*), and Socrates's standpoint that virtue, beauty and goodness are completely interwoven.²⁵

As far as Aristotle is concerned, in my dissertation I have argued that, although the Greek philosopher falls third in Vives's most referenced authors, there is no doubt that it deserves to be put in first position when it comes to influence. Vives considered Aristotle the prince of all philosophers, and the most talented and judicious in all areas of human knowledge; moreover, Vives explicitly confessed that the Peripatetics, whose leader was Aristotle, were *his* philosophers.²⁶ Conversely, he confessed —note the nuance here— to be «almost» (*prope*) an Academic, that is, not entirely a follower of Platonism.²⁷ Furthermore, Vives was brave enough to discuss and oppose some of Aristotle's views on logic and the making of arguments (*Disc. corr.* 3); on moral philosophy and the claim that happiness could be reached in this earthly life (*Disc. corr.* 6);²⁸ and on the First Mover and its lack of freedom (*Ver. fid.* 1.10).²⁹ A man capable of questioning nuclear aspects of Aristotle's

²¹ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.1, p. 40-44.

²² Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.1, n. 81.

²³ Cf. *supra* Part IV, p. 221, n. 249bis, 250.

²⁴ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.2, p. 46-48.

²⁵ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.2, n. 132, 134.

²⁶ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.3, n. 146-148.

²⁷ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.2, n. 109.

²⁸ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.3, p. 52-54.

²⁹ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.3, p. 54.

thought and of prefacing the edition of the complete works of Aristotle published in 1538 (cf. *Arist.*) must have had a deep understanding of the author whom he was introducing and debunking. Interestingly, *Arist.* is a short piece that allows to examine the way that some Aristotelian concepts (for example: οὐσία, πρῶτον κινῶν, αὐξησις, ποίησις, etc.) have been adapted to the Latin language (*essentia, princeps motor, auctus, effectio*).³⁰ Although I have carried out a preliminary study of vocabulary in Tello 2019, a more meticulous research would help cast new light on Vives's understanding of Aristotelian key concepts.

Finally, Seneca and Augustine were relevant for Vives in many respects. From Seneca, Vives took the Stoic strengthness for acceptance —synthesized in the motto «Sine querela», that is, «Without complaint»— and endurance (ἀπάθεια), as well as the notion of selfless good deeds (*beneficia*).³¹ Regarding 'ἀπάθεια', Vives pointed out that he did not understand this term as 'complete insensitivity' but as 'awareness' of a suffering that is eventually overcome.³² In Augustine, Vives found a kind of mirror, because they both underwent a sort of transformation: either from a pagan or Jewish background into Christian creed. Further, they were both troubled by the contradiction between willing one thing but not actually being able to perform it.³³ Vives's commentary of Augustine's *De ciuitate Dei* enabled the Valencian humanist to deploy his erudition and vast knowledge of philosophy and its different ancient schools.³⁴ Lastly but not least, Augustine's views on error³⁵ (and prenotions)³⁶ may have been influential on Vives, a line of research that should be explored more deeply.

3 The critical edition of the *Introductio ad sapientiam*

My dissertation has provided the first critical edition of the Latin text of *Ad sap.*, which will allow researchers to study the content of this work more accurately. The careful analysis of the work has shown new evidence about the original format, it has proven the existence of three stages in the writing of the content, and it has deemed pertinent not to divide the work into chapters.

3.1 The format

In Part II, section 2.2 I have explained the way printing houses worked at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and the many emendations and changes that the printer and his assistants often inflicted upon the text regardless of the author.³⁷ These interventions caused errors, about which Vives bitterly complained.³⁸ However, Vives did not complain about the aphoristic format with which *Ad sap.* was set and issued. This format, as I have argued in Part III, section 2.3, is problematic, because many of the alleged aphorisms begin with connectors

³⁰ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.3, n. 198-202.

³¹ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.4, n. 208, 219, 223.

³² Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.4, p. 60.

³³ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.5, n. 240, 241.

³⁴ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.5, n. 232.

³⁵ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.1, n. 142.

³⁶ Cf. *supra* n. 23.

³⁷ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 2.2, n. 91-93.

³⁸ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 2.2, n. 98-102.

(conjunctions, linking adverbs) or have pronouns that refer to content said in previous aphorisms. These peculiarities are in opposition to what is conventionally understood by the term ‘aphorism’, namely a succinct and singular item that, although it can be a nod in a network, should be complete in itself.³⁹

The fact that many aphorisms of *Ad sap.* are not complete in themselves, has led me to propose that the original format of the work as conceived by Vives consisted of a large majority of sections written as a continuous flow of speech («essay format»)⁴⁰ while a few sections were conceived as genuine aphorisms, maxims or definitions («aphoristic format»)⁴¹ that followed Erasmus’s recommendations on teaching ethics and instructing moral education.⁴² Pieter Martens, the printer in charge of the *editio princeps*, may have not liked the mixed format of Vives’s manuscript, and therefore he must have convinced Vives that an aphoristic style throughout the entire work would be more appealing. As a persuasive argument, Martens may have emphasized (1) the success that books of aphorisms and adages were having at that time, such as Erasmus’s *Adagiorum chiliades* and Polidoro Virgilio’s *Prouerbiorum libellus*, among others;⁴³ and (2) the need to present *Ad sap.* with a format similar to that of *Sat.*, which was undeniably a collection of genuine maxims (*sententiae*).⁴⁴

On the other hand, my critical edition restores the text in a layout as close as possible as it was originally conceived by Vives. All the editions during and after the humanist’s life have maintained the division of the work into chapters preceded by a short heading,⁴⁵ but I have discarded this division based on two strong arguments: (1) a particular subject is not to be found *exclusively* in one section of the work,⁴⁶ thus the coherence of the *editio princeps* of not dividing *Ad sap.* into thematic chapters; and (2) my methodology is endorsed by the critical edition of *Disc. corr.* and *Disc. trad.* made by Vigliano, who applied the criterion of restoring the text by deleting the division into segments perpetrated by later editors.⁴⁷ In view of this, my edition of *Ad sap.* may be at first shocking for a scholar accustomed to the edition of Maians (VOO), but it may not have been for Vives’s first readers, nor for Vives himself who handed out the manuscript without any division into chapters, less alone with thematic sections. Moreover, the lack of an explicit addressee or an introductory paragraph where the content is explained⁴⁸ reinforces the argument that Vives did not have in mind a clear thematic division of the content.

³⁹ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 2.3 (a), p. 95.

⁴⁰ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 2.3 (a). Page 96 includes the novelty of a passage of *Ad sap.* restored to the essay format.

⁴¹ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 2.3 (b).

⁴² Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 2.1, p. 88-89; section 2.5.

⁴³ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 2.1, p. 90-91.

⁴⁴ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 1.2 (a).

⁴⁵ For example, editions printer as from 1526 gathered aphorisms 122-125 under the chapter *De animo*, but the soul is also described in aphorisms 12-15. Cf.

⁴⁶ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 2.3, p. 94; section 3.2, p. 110, 114-115. A table of chapter titles can be consulted in Part III, section 4.3. Furthermore, a table of keywords (Part III, section 4.2) shows how certain subjects such as the soul (*animus*), the body (*corpus*), emotions (*affectus*), God (*deus*), religion (*religio*), Christ (*Christus*) or conduct (*agere*) are scattered throughout the work.

⁴⁷ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 2.5, p. 104.

⁴⁸ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 2.4.

3.2 The text

From the careful study of the *editio princeps* (L = Louvain: Pieter Martens, 1524) and the comparison between the first edition and the second and third (C = Bruges: Hubert de Croock, 1526; P = Paris: Simon de Colines, 1527) emerged a firm conclusion: the text of 1524 was substantially modified in 1526 and 1527, with the intriguing evidence that the text published in 1526 incorporated more changes than that of 1527.

As far as changes in the content of *Ad sap.* are concerned, my critical edition gives evidence of what González raised intuitively in 2007: that the Paris edition of 1527 might have been a reprint of a lost edition issued in 1525.⁴⁹ My critical edition identifies L, C and P as the three main stages of the text,⁵⁰ and examines the subsequent editions based on C and those based on P,⁵¹ which included slight and very minor changes that, in some cases, even worsened the text. Further, I meticulously examine the variants between L, C and P that allow me to prove that the three stages of the writing of the content are not L 1524 > C 1526 > P 1527 but L 1524 > P 1527 > C 1526.⁵² It seems unfeasible to find the alleged lost edition printed in 1525, but it is a fact that the Paris edition of 1527 issued a text whose stage was prior to the text issued in the Bruges edition of 1526. Therefore, it is plausible to sustain that Vives wrote a first improved version of *Ad sap.* in 1525, whose manuscript, for unknown reasons, was not put into type until 1527; and that Vives wrote a second improved version of *Ad sap.* in 1526, whose manuscript was readily put into type the same year.

As far as the text established in my critical edition is concerned, I have chosen C as my base edition, because it contains the third and last stage of the text, albeit it also includes many typographical errors.⁵³ It should also be noted that I have been faithful to the orthography of the base edition. As I have argued,⁵⁴ it seems more honest to me to present Vives's text with the original linguistic characteristics of the time when it was printed rather than to edit it with a classical orthography, which Vives (or Vives's scribes, or Vives's printers) never observed. In this sense, my edition⁵⁵ follows—and vindicates—the principles of esteemed series such as ASD (*Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami*).

3.3 A philosophical lexicon

Another contribution of my dissertation to the philosophical analysis of *Ad sap.* is the presentation of an index of words and proper nouns at the end of Part III (section 4.2). This lexicon consists of almost 170 entries, out of which only eight are proper nouns (Aristoteles, Christus, Cicero, Iesus, Paulus, Plato, Socrates, Xenophon). The rest is a selection of the most important vocabulary that is relevant in view of a philosophical study of *Ad sap.* For example:

⁴⁹ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 3.2 (d), n. 138.

⁵⁰ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 3.2 (a-c).

⁵¹ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 3.2 (e-f).

⁵² Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 3.2 (d) for details and examples that support the argumentation.

⁵³ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 3.3 (a).

⁵⁴ Cf. *supra*, Part III, section 3.3 (b).

⁵⁵ The same applies to Tello 2019 (edition of *Arist.*) and Tello 2020a (edition of *Sat.*).

aequitas, aequus | affectus | anima | animus | cibus | corpus, corporeus, corporalis | deus | diabolus | dominus | fides, fidelis, fideo | homo | ingenium | ira, iratus | mens | mors, mortuus, mortalis | natura, naturalis | peccatum, pecco | potentia, potens | ratio | sapientia, sapiens | stultitia, stultus | ueritas, uerus, uerax | uirtus | uita.

4 The content of the *Introductio ad sapientiam*

4.1 Neglected elements in the analysis of *Ad sap.*

At the beginning of Part IV, I have indicated three elements that have been hitherto neglected, either partially or completely, when it comes to examine the content of *Ad sap.* Firstly, I have noted the fact that *Ad sap.* is part of a tetralogy composed by *Pseud.*, *Ad sap.*, *Disc.*, and *Ver. fid.* that aims at discussing what true knowledge is.⁵⁶

Secondly, I have explained that *Ad sap.* should principally be considered a handbook of practical wisdom (*prudentia*), since one of the essential elements of the prudent man (*prudens*) consists in judging things without error: *incorrupte iudicare* or, in Aristotelian terms, τὸ εὖ βουλευέσθαι. Moreover, such ability of reflecting on things properly is something feasible for a human being, in opposition to absolute wisdom (*sapientia*), which is only feasible for God (not for human beings), as Pythagoras pointed out.⁵⁷ Based on this important remark, I argue that by *Introductio ad sapientiam* Vives means, in fact, *Introductio ad prudentiam*, because the work as a whole is a handbook of practical wisdom chiefly concerned with knowledge of oneself and of God (that is, knowledge of the teachings of Christ), and its implicit aim is the formation of a good subject—or, in a more modern term, a good citizen—who thinks, speaks and acts uprightly. Therefore, I have deemed fair to sustain that Vives did not conceive an unfeasible treatise about theoretical, absolute and unattainable wisdom but a feasible handbook about practical knowledge that a young student or a learned reader should bear in mind when it comes to ethics and proper conduct. Vives's decision to employ the term *sapientia* (not *prudentia*) in the title may simply express his profound belief that true and ultimate knowledge is not a human enterprise but a gift gracefully bestowed by God almighty.⁵⁸

And thirdly, I have noted two overlooked lines of research derived from the examination of aphorism 200 («Semper illa tria sunt homini, quamdiu uiuit, meditanda: quomodo bene sapiat, quomodo bene dicat, quomodo bene agat»). One line explores a possible trace of Democritus's thought due to the resemblance between aphorism 200 and the attribution to Democritus by late commentators that the goddess Athena (a symbol of practical wisdom, φρόνησις) encompassed three elements: reason, thought, evaluation (τὸ εὖ λογίζεσθαι); speech, language (λέγειν καλῶς); and action (τὸ ὀρθῶς πράττειν).⁵⁹ The similarity found between *bene sapere* / τὸ εὖ λογίζεσθαι; *bene dicere* / λέγειν καλῶς; and *bene agree* / τὸ ὀρθῶς πράττειν should encourage further research in order to find more evidence of Pre-Socratic thought in Vives's writings.

⁵⁶ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 1.1, p. 174-176.

⁵⁷ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 1.2, n. 33.

⁵⁸ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 1.2, especially p. 179-181.

⁵⁹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 1.4.

A second line of research explores the parallel between aphorism 200 and the description of the orator as portrayed in rhetoric by classical Latin authors.⁶⁰ According to Quintilian, a good speaker must know a wide range of subjects (*bene sapere*) in order to articulate an argument with appropriate words and style (*bene dicere*) that is able to persuade the audience to act in a certain direction. This last stage is controversial, because persuasion can be used for either a good purpose (*bene agere*) or a bad one (*male agere*).

4.2 A new approach to the study of *Ad sap.*

The careful analysis of the content of *Ad sap.* according to my critical edition, which has discarded the division into chapters and thus thematic units, has turned the focus from title chapters to the aphorisms themselves. As a result of this, three aphorisms (out of the 604) have emerged as significantly relevant because of the meaning borne: the first one («Vera sapientia est de rebus incorrupte iudicare»), the last one («Hic est cursus absolutae sapientiae, cuius primus gradus est nosse se, postremus nosse deum») and the aforesaid 200. My new approach based on these three aphorisms has allowed me to explain and interpret the content of *Ad sap.* using a quite peculiar framework—from the end to the beginning, and from the most general to the most particular—: (1) *absoluta sapientia = nosse deum, nosse se*; (2) *nosse se = bene sapere, bene dicere, bene agere*; (3) *bene sapere = incorrupte iudicare*.⁶¹

By this procedure two main subjects have been identified: (1) knowledge of oneself and (2) knowledge of God. The former subject includes knowledge of: (1a) the *animus*, the real self of a human being; (1b) how to have good sense and good judgment; (1c) how to speak and act uprightly; (1d) how to take care of the body, which is where the *animus* spends the earthly existence. The latter subject includes knowledge of: (2a) what God is not; (2b) religion as a source of truth; (2c) Christ, his teachings and his exemplary conduct. These two main subjects and their corresponding elements are associated with key concepts that I have gathered in a table at the end of Part IV, section 1.3 (b).

4.3 Knowledge of oneself

(a) The human soul (*animus, anima rationalis*)

In my dissertation, I have emphasized that, according to Vives, knowledge of oneself is what differentiates a human being from an animal or a devil,⁶² and that such knowledge of oneself consists in examining what is real in us, that is, the *animus* ('soul')—not the body—, and, more precisely, the *mens* ('mind') as the most important part the *animus*: it is what makes human beings human and it relates them to God.⁶³ Be that as it may, it should be noted that Vives's conception of the *animus* has some subtle nuances.

Thanks to my critical edition, I have demonstrated that in the first and second stages of writing (L 1524, P 1527) of *Ad sap.*, Vives conceives the *animus* ('soul') as having a superior part called *mens* ('mind') and an inferior part also called *animus* ('inferior soul'). The mind

⁶⁰ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 4.3 (b).

⁶¹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 1.3 (b), p. 182-183.

⁶² Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 2.1, n. 90.

⁶³ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 2.1, p. 189-192, n. 88, 89, 92 (*Ad sap.* 122), 93; section 2.4, p. 198 (*Excit. med. d.* 12).

understands (*intelligere*), shows good sense (*sapere*), wills (*uis uolendi*) and remembers (*memini*), while the inferior soul is in a state of disturbance (*tumultuari*) caused by the emotions (*affectus*) and passions (*perturbationes*) that thrive in it. The mind makes humans similar to God and the angels, while the inferior soul brings humans closer to the beasts. The fact that the ‘soul’ in general and a part of it are both called *animus* leads to confusion and misunderstanding, for which reason Vives made a change in the third and final stage of writing (C 1526). Here the *animus* (‘soul’) is described as having a superior part called *mens* (‘mind’) and an inferior part, which is characterized as *rationis expers* (‘devoid of reason’). The third stage of writing makes things clearer, because it employs *animus* only to describe ‘soul’ in general, and it simply defines the two parts of the soul as *superior* (or *mens*) and *inferior* (without a specific name).⁶⁴ Later, in *Mar.* (1529),⁶⁵ Vives maintains the notion of soul (*animus*) as established in the third stage of writing of *Ad sap.*, which confirms that, on the one hand, C (1526) is the final stage of the work and, on the other hand, that the notion of soul as presented in C was the one preferred. But in *Excit.* (1535), the Valencian humanist does not explicitly state that the emotions take place in the lower part of the *animus*, nor does he conceive the *animus* as having two parts,⁶⁶ thus allowing the possibility that emotions and disturbances are a physical reaction —not mental— that interfere with the fine performance of the soul.

To sum up, as far as *animus* in Vives is concerned there are two issues to be taken into account. On the one hand, the reader is confronted with the task to elucidate in what sense the term *animus* is used: (1) general term for ‘conscious soul’; (2) superior part or ‘mind’; (3) lower part or ‘emotional part’.⁶⁷ On the other hand, if the *animus* encompasses a superior part (*mens*) and an inferior part (*rationis expers*), then one must infer that, for Vives, the real self of a human being consists of both a mind (divine element) and an emotional / passionate part (animal or beast-like element). Although the mind is the loftiest part, knowledge of oneself implies to accept that neither of both parts is to be neglected: not only the mind needs to be taken care of, but also emotions and disturbances. These emotions are to be restrained or tamed through proper education, adequate reasoning, solid judgment and sound decisions.⁶⁸ It is then of little surprise that Vives devoted the third book of *An. uita* to mutinously describe these disturbances, also called *animi morbi* or ‘illnesses of the soul’.

In my dissertation I have also pointed out that Vives did not always use the term *animus* to refer to the real self, that is, to the ‘soul’. In other works, such as *Ciu. dei* and *An. uita* he employed *anima rationalis* to express this meaning.⁶⁹ The existence of two ways of conveying the same concept has driven me to postulate a new line of research to be further examined and developed that I have called «The mutual interference of two semantic traditions»:⁷⁰ I have given the first one the tentative name of «Acciusic based tradition»,⁷¹ which aims at distinguishing between a principle of life (*anima*) and a principle of

⁶⁴ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 2.2, p. 191-194.

⁶⁵ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 2.4, n. 109.

⁶⁶ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 2.4, p. 198 (*Excit. med. g. 1; Excit. med. d. 12*).

⁶⁷ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 2.5.

⁶⁸ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 2.4, p. 198.

⁶⁹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 2.3, p. 194-195; section 2.4, p. 199.

⁷⁰ Cf. *supra* Part IV, Supplement, section 4.

⁷¹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, Supplement, section 2.1. «Acciusic based tradition» is named after the epic poet Accius (ca. 170-85 BC), who is the oldest source of my study.

consciousness (*animus*); I have given the second one the tentative name of «Aristotelian based tradition», which aims at establishing *anima* (ψυχή) as the sole term and adds attributes to it (e.g. *anima rationalis*).

The need for a comprehensive study of the term *animus*

The enquiry on the term *animus* carried out in Vives has revealed a broader problem, namely the lack of a comprehensive philosophical study about this term. The Supplement included in my dissertation is the first step to begin to fill this gap by examining the philosophical meaning of *animus* in eight salient authors who still had Latin as their mother tongue (Accius, Lucretius, Cicero, Seneca, Tertullian, Macrobius, Augustine, and Isidore of Seville)⁷² and three Renaissance authors (Pico della Mirandola, Charles de Bovelles, and Erasmus of Rotterdam)⁷³ who, as I have explained, are relevant for various reasons.⁷⁴ Moreover, the Supplement provides the first edition and translation of the entry «Animus et anima» of Ambrogio Calepino's *Dictionarium*,⁷⁵ which is a firsthand document that corroborates that in the sixteenth century the above said two semantic traditions coexisted. Although at first Ambrogio states that «*anima* is associated with life [i.e. principle of life] and *animus* with judgment [i.e. principle of consciousness]»,⁷⁶ he also acknowledges that «the intellect-soul [i.e. *anima intellectualis*, or *anima rationalis*] ... is only existent in human beings, who are able to think and judge».⁷⁷ Calepino's dictionary is also useful to study the various meanings that *animus* encompasses, such as *ingenium*, *uoluntas*, *spiritus*, *ira*, *memoria*, and *fortitudo*.⁷⁸

(b) *Bene iudicare, bene sapere*

Knowledge of how to display good judgment (*bene iudicare*) and, consequently, good sense (*bene sapere*) is paramount in order to be a prudent man and attain reliable practical wisdom.⁷⁹ My investigation has shown that judgment is conceived by Vives as a process consisting of two steps: (1) an evaluation (*iudicium*) or assessment (*censura*) of a particular item based on evidence provided by the senses (natural evaluation, which inspires the highest degree of trust in a scale from one to three) or by argumentation (artificial evaluation, which ranks three in the above said scale of trust);⁸⁰ (2) a verdict or decision

⁷² Cf. *supra* Part IV, Supplement, section 2, p. 268-289.

⁷³ Cf. *supra* Part IV, Supplement, section 3, p. 289-299.

⁷⁴ Cf. *supra* Part IV, Supplement, p. 259.

⁷⁵ Cf. *supra* Part IV, Supplement, section 1.2, p. 263-268.

⁷⁶ This exemplifies the so-called «Acciusic based tradition»; cf. A. Calepino, *Dictionarium: Animus et anima* 1 (in *supra* Part IV, Supplement, section 1.2): «Animus et anima [ψυχή] in hoc differunt: quod anima sit uitae, animus consilii».

⁷⁷ This exemplifies the so-called «Aristotelian based tradition»; cf. A. Calepino, *Dictionarium* (as in n. 73) 17: «Sciendum autem in homine ... [animam] intellectualem, quae est in hominibus tantum, qui et cogitare et iudicare possunt».

⁷⁸ Cf. A. Calepino, *Dictionarium: Animus et anima* 5-10. In *supra* id.

⁷⁹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.1.

⁸⁰ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.2, p. 207-208.

regarding the evidence, whose outcome is either a disapproval (*improbatio*) or an approval (*probatio*), which in this case can be strong (*fides*, ‘trust’) or weak (*suspicio*, ‘assumption’).⁸¹

My investigation has also drawn attention to the fact that Vives ranks emotions second in the above said scale of trust, arguing that their imprint help make a decision —that is, to help approve or disapprove of something—,⁸² while at the same time he unequivocally warns that unbridled emotions (*perturbationes*, πᾶθη; the maladies of the soul) are the main cause for error and darkness in judgment.⁸³ This seeming contradiction may well be resolved by the nuance between *affectus* (‘emotion’) and *perturbatio* (‘passion’): the former may help decide by virtue of an emotional and positive involvement of the subject; the latter may bring darkness and thus error because it makes the subject become involved to such an excessive degree that it becomes blind and, therefore, devoid of the capacity of making a proper and right assessment. In the darkness, the mind (or reason) finds neither what is right nor what is true.⁸⁴

Another seeming contradiction in Vives that my investigation has identified deals with knowledge itself: the Valencian humanist states at the beginning of *Ad sap.* (1) that one should evaluate things without error but, at the same time, he admits in *Ver. fid.*⁸⁵ that the essence of each thing cannot actually be reached, because it lies hidden in its most inner part. This paradox —which recalls Democritus’s maxim (dear to Vives) that truth lies concealed at the bottom of a well—⁸⁶ seems to be overcome once verisimilitude is integrated: just as wisdom (*sapientia*) is not attainable but practical wisdom (*prudencia*), accordingly knowledge (*cognitio*) is not attainable but likelihood (*uerisimilitudo*), that is, what seems closest to truth based on the best that can be guessed at a particular time, conditions being such and such. This conclusion is endorsed by a passage of *An. uita* (2.9),⁸⁷ where Vives describes three grades of knowledge: *scientia*, *uerisimilitudo*, and *sapientia*. While science is clearly positioned within the realm of the natural world and wisdom within the supernatural world, verisimilitude is located somewhere between: it stands as the highest degree of likeness in relation to what truth (wisdom) should be, and it establishes the closest point to truth that a human mind can attain by rational means,⁸⁸ thus outlining a feasible means to discern higher realities. It is noteworthy Vives’s innovative usage of the term *uerisimilitudo* that he relates here to cognition (*ratio* and understanding) instead of rhetoric (*oratio* and persuasion). This is a line of research that needs to be further explored and nuanced.

My interpretation of this passage of *An. uita* confirms Vives’s standpoint made in *Ad sap.* that human wisdom (that is, science) is rubbish (*coenum*),⁸⁹ because it speaks of temporary and perishable things. Further, it has allowed me to argue that Vives considers verisimilitude higher than *human* science —note the italics— because, while science *observes* what is relatively constant within the fleeting and temporary world, verisimilitude *devises* complete and stable things using abstractions (although they still allude to particular and mutable

⁸¹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.2, p. 209.

⁸² Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.2, p. 208.

⁸³ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.3, p. 210.

⁸⁴ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.2, n. 156; section 3.3, n. 203.

⁸⁵ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.4, n. 208.

⁸⁶ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 1.4, n. 65, 72, 79.

⁸⁷ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.4, n. 212.

⁸⁸ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.4, p. 215 (chart), 215-216 (explanation of the chart).

⁸⁹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.4, n. 215.

items).⁹⁰ The notion and role of verisimilitude in Vives is definitely a question that needs to be examined more deeply, because (as I have emphasized) it may hold the key in Vives's thought to better understand his reasoning about the natural world, the supernatural world and the transition (a sort of mental, elevating process of abstraction) from one to the other.

Finally, my dissertation has addressed a third seeming contradiction, namely the fact that the mind reflects on (and longs for) things that, theoretically, surpass its limits and are beyond human reach.⁹¹ Vives postulates that one cannot desire what is unknown,⁹² and he makes two⁹³ strong premises: (1) that life in this world of sensation does not fulfill the genuine end of mankind because, if it were fulfilled, mankind would be in a state of balance and rest;⁹⁴ and (2) that nothing exceeds that from which it receives its essence and strength.⁹⁵ As a result of this, Vives concludes that the end which the mind pursues —unity with God— does exist and is possible to be fulfilled but, since it exceeds this limited, bodily, and earthly life, will be *undoubtedly* fulfilled in the next one. This fact prompts a most inspiring inference about the human existence: just as life in the womb is the preparation for the upcoming life in a body, so life in a body must be the preparation for the upcoming life in a mind, namely in an incorporeal form of life.⁹⁶

In sum, Vives's preoccupation concerning the right appraisal of the world around us stated in *Ad sap.* is intimately related to his standpoint that a person must not be detached from reality. One must accept things as they are. In this process, immediate reality is grasped by the natural light of the senses, which enables science to take place; but there is a higher reality that only the mind may be aware of and which can only be grasped by virtue of the supernatural light that enables wisdom to take place. Both plains of reality are equally true and, therefore, both must be faced as what they actually are.

(c) *Bene dicere, bene agere*

According to Vives, language (*lingua*) and the ability to speak (*sermo* 'speech') are a distinctive mark of humanity. Language is the way that the soul speaks out;⁹⁷ and, if the purpose of reason (a portion of the mind, the loftiest part of the *animus*) is to find truth,⁹⁸ it can then be inferred that language speaks out the truth. Vives's striving for seeking out the truth in any given matter⁹⁹ may have naturally led him to include a section of aphorisms in *Ad sap.* that act as definitions of some key terms pertaining to moral philosophy, such as *gloria*, *dignitas*, *nobilitas*, and *uoluptas*.¹⁰⁰ In my dissertation I have signaled the importance that Vives gave to making good definitions¹⁰¹ as a means to avoid confusion and aim at truth.

⁹⁰ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.4, p. 216.

⁹¹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.5.

⁹² Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.5, n. 231.

⁹³ In all, I have gathered five, which can be consulted *supra* Part IV, section 3.5, p. 220-221.

⁹⁴ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.5, n. 244.

⁹⁵ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.5, n. 247.

⁹⁶ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.5, p. 223.

⁹⁷ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 4.1, n. 277.

⁹⁸ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3.2, n. 156, 171.

⁹⁹ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.1, n. 108.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 4.1 (a), n. 285.

¹⁰¹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 4.1 (a), p. 228-229.

I have also emphasized Vives's warning about the fact that extensive knowledge is needed about the object of study and complementary areas, otherwise a person would not be able to include the object of study in a general framework, or divide it into parts; nor will he be able to establish its limits and distinguish it from what surrounds it. In addition to epistemological implications, definitions and the pursue of truth are essential because of the implications at a societal level: truth is beneficial, long-lasting and inspires trust,¹⁰² whereas lies are the result of corrupted thought and corrupted language, and they lead to discord and confrontation.

If one has made a proper judgment, it necessarily follows that he will wish what is right and therefore he will act uprightly (*bene agere, recte agere*) too.¹⁰³ Such conduct is what Vives understands as virtue.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, I argue (according to my proposed interpretation of aphorism 18 of *Ad sap.*)¹⁰⁵ that Vives considers acting uprightly (that is, to be a virtuous person) a synonym of *pietas*, whose power of love and charity everyone should direct towards God and human beings. In Vives's explanation of virtue one finds a deep sense of respect (*reuerari, cultus*) for both the human and the divine world, the purpose being to seek concord with others and with God. Vives's advice on a variety of matters to improve coexistence between human beings is summarized with the famous passage of the Gospel of John (13:34) «mandatum nouum do uobis, ut diligatis inuicem».¹⁰⁶

In my dissertation, I have pointed out that the Valencian humanist was firmly convinced that, on the one hand, the upright conduct carried out under *pietas / amor* and, on the other hand, a language (*lingua*) who spoke out the truth were both a powerful glue (*glutinum*) in order to cement and harmonize all members of the human society.¹⁰⁷ After the publication of *Ad sap.* and *Sat.* (1524), he expressed his wish for social and political harmony especially in works published during the period 1526-1529, such as *Ep. Henr. reg. Gall.*; *Ep. Henr. adm.; Sub.; Conc.; Pacif.*; and *Vit. Turc.*

(d) The care of the body

Vives's approach follows Juvenal's maxim «mens sana in corpore sano»:¹⁰⁸ the healthiness of the body is critical to set the best material conditions for the mind —that is, the loftiest part of the soul— in order to perform its duties successfully. In other words: the body must be healthy so that the soul is damaged by physical decay as little as possible.¹⁰⁹ In my dissertation, I have identified what seems to be an underlying methodology of Vives by which he addresses the issue of the body in four stages:¹¹⁰ (1) disdain: the body has many shortcomings, it must be kept under control, and it must not be allowed to take control of a person's life; (2) acceptance: the body cannot completely be despised, because it harbours

¹⁰² Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 4.1 (b), p. 230-231.

¹⁰³ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 4.2, p. 232 and n. 309.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 4.2, n. 309 (*Ad sap.* 139).

¹⁰⁵ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 4.2, p. 233-234.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 4.2, p. 234-235.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 4.3 (a).

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 5.1, n. 366, 367.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 5.1.

¹¹⁰ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 5.2.

the soul; (3) care: the body must be given proper nourishment and proper sleep; (4) the fostering of a particular mental state in order to favour bodily care: before, during and after getting nourishment and sleep, one ought to maintain a peaceful behaviour and meditate on the divine.

A five stage perhaps should be added, in which Vives overcomes all materiality and leaves the care and sustenance of the body (and hence, implicitly, the earthly life of the soul) to the capable hands of God. As stated in the Gospel of Matthew, «non in solo pane uiuit homo sed in omni uerbo, quod procedit de ore Dei».¹¹¹ As a matter of fact, Vives emphasizes that the true sustenance is the bread of the mind (*panis mentium*), that is, the wisdom imparted in the teachings of Christ.¹¹²

4.4 Knowledge of God

(a) *Deus* and *religio*

The second main subject of *Ad sap.* is knowledge of God, whom Vives considers larger and more worthy of admiration than anything the human mind is able to comprehend.¹¹³ Given the fact that God's infinite greatness cannot be grasped by the limited human mind, Vives employs the theological methodology of the *uia negatiua*¹¹⁴ in order to give an approximate description of God by saying what He¹¹⁵ is not. In my dissertation, I have related Vives's notion of an unattainable God to that of Anselm of Canterbury (particularly with a passage of his *Proslogion*),¹¹⁶ Nicholas of Cusa and Erasmus.¹¹⁷ Further, I have noted that it is through religion that Vives solves the apparent contradiction between (1) his clear admission that God is not possible to be grasped by the natural intelligence of any human being and (2) his firm belief that knowledge of God is the final step to attain complete wisdom. Since religion is a key element in order to know God, Vives elucidates the etymological meaning of *religio* in a note to *Ciu. dei* 10.23 (n24).¹¹⁸ Moreover, in *Ad sap.*, he equates religion with *pietas*,¹¹⁹ and defines religion as primarily consisting of three elements: knowledge (*cognitio*), love (*amor*, *charitas*), and worship (*ueneratio*, *cultus*) of the creator of the entire world.¹²⁰

As far as knowledge of God is concerned, Vives clearly states in *Ver. fid.* that this can be reached through his son, Christ, because the latter is «the mind and the wisdom of his father, God».¹²¹ Accordingly, Vives encourages the reading of the life and teachings of Christ as reported by the four evangelists (Matthew, Mark, Luke and John) and the first Church

¹¹¹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 5.3, p. 243.

¹¹² Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 5.3, p. 244.

¹¹³ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.1, n. 403.

¹¹⁴ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.1, p. 246. A future research could examine to what extent the authors of the so-called *uia negatiua* may have proven influential in Vives.

¹¹⁵ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.2, n. 139.

¹¹⁶ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.1, n. 416: «[Tu] es quo maius cogitari nequit».

¹¹⁷ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.1, p. 246-247.

¹¹⁸ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.2 (a), n. 431.

¹¹⁹ Vives does not only equate *uirtus* with *religio* but also with *pietas* (respect and love for God and human beings; cf. *supra* Part IV, section 4.2, p. 234).

¹²⁰ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.2 (a), n. 439.

¹²¹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.2 (b); citation from n. 441.

Fathers.¹²² Regarding love from God, Vives emphasizes that humans must reciprocate by giving him preference over all things, which basically means to conform to his laws and his will as handed down by the authoritative sources that report Christ's words and thought.¹²³ As far as worship of God is concerned, I have noted that, for Vives, the most adequate way of gaining God's goodwill and of expressing deep respect to him is through two inner operations: (1) cleansing the soul (*animus*) of vices (*morbi*) and perverse emotions (*pravi affectus*); and (2) uttering fervent and heartfelt prayers.¹²⁴

(b) Christ

When it comes to knowledge of God, Christ emerges as a crucial element. As I have explained, on the one hand, Christ symbolizes concord and unity: he is the binger of peace (*pacificator*) who redeems humans from their foolish and unjustifiable pride and reconciles them with their creator.¹²⁵ On the other hand, he is a fountain of practical wisdom: he is the one who transforms the unfathomable divine *sapientia* (God's infinite wisdom) into useful human *prudentia* by speaking out plain and understandable words, giving an example of how to live righteously (*ratio uiuendi*) while still on earth, and showing the most straight path (*rectissima uia*) towards God.¹²⁶ Furthermore, he gives the supreme command of loving one another (*mutuus amor*).¹²⁷ Associated with the notion of love, I have deemed interesting to note how distant is Vives's understanding of *amor sui* ('self-love') from that of a person of the 21st century. For the Valencian humanist, true self-love is to take care of the most excellent part of oneself, that is, the soul (*animus*) and, more specifically, the mind.¹²⁸

These and other attributes and qualities of Christ¹²⁹ had been summarized some years earlier by Erasmus in his work *Paraclesis* (1516) under the phrase *Christi philosophia*.¹³⁰ In addition to providing learning (*discere*) and a model of life (*uiuendi forma*), Erasmus conceives Christ as a remedy (*pharmacum*) against the distressing desires of the soul (*cupiditates animi*), and as an instructor (*lectio*) who rouses the mind (*animus*). In sum, the Dutch humanist considers *Christi philosophia* the basis that will restore humans to their genuine nature.¹³¹ Both Vives and Erasmus share the need that the existence be ruled by the teachings and the exemplary life of Christ, perhaps the only way to get to know who God is.

5 An overall and final evaluation

My dissertation has been predicated on the fact that *Ad sap.* —the second most disseminated work of Vives, and the second piece of a tetralogy (*Pseud., Ad sap., Disc., Ver.*

¹²² Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.2 (b), p. 251.

¹²³ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.2 (c), p. 252.

¹²⁴ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.2 (d).

¹²⁵ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.3 (a), p. 256.

¹²⁶ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.3 (a), p. 254-255.

¹²⁷ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.3 (a), n. 469.

¹²⁸ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.3 (a), p. 255.

¹²⁹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.3 (b), n. 487.

¹³⁰ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.3 (b).

¹³¹ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 6.3 (b), n. 490.

fid.) concerning search for true knowledge—¹³² was lacking a proper critical edition of the Latin text. The making of the edition has revealed the importance of maintaining the layout of the *editio princeps* (L 1524), which has led to focus the analysis of the content on the aphorisms themselves rather than on chapter arrangement. This novel approach has identified three key aphorisms (*Ad sap.* 1, 200, 604), which allow to explain the content of *Ad sap.* in full detail: knowledge of oneself is basically taking care of the soul by cleansing it from vices and extreme emotions, as well as assessing reality as it is. This last operation is crucial to convey good sense, speak properly and, consequently, act uprightly too. The teachings and life of Christ are an exemplary model that not only help to assess reality as it is and act uprightly, but also to get to know the infinite and unfathomable God through the words of the finite and fathomable Christ.

My dissertation has shed light on the peculiar use of two key terms: *sapientia* and *deus*. I have argued that Vives's exhortation to strive for true wisdom (*sapientia*) and to attain knowledge of God (*cognitio dei*) should be, in fact, interpreted as Vives's encouragement to pursue practical wisdom (*prudentia*) and live according to the teachings of Christ (*Christi philosophia*). Moreover, there is a line of thought that relates *sapientia* (σοφία) with God (*deus*), true knowledge (*uera cognitio*), and contemplation; whereas *prudentia* (φρόνησις) is related to Christ (*Christus*), verisimilitude (*uerisimilitudo*), and action. Only the latter (*prudentia* and its associated terms) are attainable relying on the capabilities of a human being, and therefore they are in agreement with Vives's effort to evaluate each thing as it actually is, that is to say, without error. Indeed, it is a mistake (*peccatum*, a sin) to inquire into what is beyond human capacity or scrutinize what is beyond human power.

My dissertation has also vindicated Vives as a philosopher and it has identified four phrases or sentences scattered in the works of the humanist that provide a fair summary of his philosophy and his complex personality: «Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto» ('I am a human being: therefore, I consider nothing that pertains to human beings foreign to me');¹³³ «Veritatis sectatores, ubicunque eam esse putabitis, ab illa state!» ('Followers of truth, wherever you think it might be, stand by its side!');¹³⁴ «Errorem ego ... delebo» ('I shall get rid of ... error');¹³⁵ «Virtutem et uideo et probo et praedico nec tamen praesto» ('I see virtue, I approve it and even preach it, and yet I do not attain it');¹³⁶ and «Sine querela» ('Without complaint').¹³⁷

On the other hand, my dissertation has set the groundwork for undertaking further research in the following areas: (1) Vives's personality: to what extent the content of his private thoughts and his published works were in agreement or in fierce contradiction; (2) philosophy of mind: how humors and the heart influence the mind and its process of right assessment; (3) epistemology: how rhetoric, judgment and skills (*artes*) are interwoven; (4) history of philosophy: the presence and influence of pre-Socratic philosophy in Vives; and especially (5) psychology: a comprehensive philosophical study of the term *animus*. To these five items, it could be added (6) epistemology: to what extent Vives agrees or disagrees with

¹³² Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 1.1, p. 174-175.

¹³³ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 3, n. 73.

¹³⁴ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.1, n. 108.

¹³⁵ Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 1.1, n. 14.

¹³⁶ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 1, n. 12 ; section 4.5, n. 241.

¹³⁷ Cf. *supra* Part II, section 4.4, n. 208.

Greek sceptical authors —particularly Sextus Empiricus—¹³⁸ when it comes to the (un)attainability of knowledge, the (un)satisfactory role of language in expressing the reality, and the importance of assessment (κριτήριον, *iudicium*).

All in all, the *Introductio ad sapientiam* is a handbook of practical wisdom that fits in the period of time in which it was devised and published: although it seemingly aims at metaphysics (the attainment of complete and divine wisdom; *sapientia* and *deus*), it in fact gives assistance for the earthly practicalities of life (a moral philosophy based on *prudentia* and *Christus*), the purpose being the formation of active members of society who think, speak and act uprightly.

However, I cannot help but end this dissertation by indicating a possible and disturbing consequence as a result of retrieving the focus from metaphysics and turning it to the human world. The idea that human beings —not God or Nature— are the central element of life on Earth and, moreover, that they are born with the right to be (and to accomplish) *whatever* they wish may have laid the foundations for the future development of what we most unfortunately witness in our present day: the excessive individualism and the depredation of the natural environment that allows and sustains life for mankind. I admit that the following statement is bold and even startling, but it is time to wonder whether the humanistic movement «laid the egg» that the Enlightenment and, more decisively, the society of consumerism of the 20th century «hatched».¹³⁹

¹³⁸ Principally his views conveyed in *Aduersus logicos* (= *Aduersus dogmaticos* 1-2; *Aduersus mathematicos* 7-8). Cf. *supra* Part IV, section 3, n. 133-134.

¹³⁹ It recalls the famous slogan uttered by Erasmus in Ep. 1528 (Allen 5: 609, line 11; tr. CWE 10: 464) regarding the accusation that he had triggered the Protestant Reformation: «Ego peperit ouum, Lutherus exclusit», that is, «I laid the egg and Luther hatched it».

VI Bibliography¹

1 Abbreviations of Vives's works²

ABBREVIATION	TITLE ³
<i>Ad sap.</i>	<i>Introductio ad sapientiam</i> (Louvain: Pieter Martens, 1524 USTC 404738 VOO 1: 1-48).
<i>Aedes</i>	<i>Aedes legum</i> (Louvain: Dirk Martens, [1519] USTC 403389 VOO 5: 483-493, 508-518; Matheeußen 1984: 1-2, 16-30).
<i>An. sen.</i>	<i>Anima senis</i> (Louvain: Dirk Martens, [1519] USTC 403389 VOO 4: 9-20; SWJV 1: 66-67, 84-105).
<i>An. uita</i>	<i>De anima et uita libri tres</i> (Basel: Robert Winter, Sept. 1538 USTC 667800 VOO 3: 298-520; Sancipriano 1974: 82-721).
<i>Areop.</i>	<i>Isocratis Atheniensis Areopagitica oratio de republica Atheniensi</i> (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, Dec. 1526 USTC 404746 VOO 5: 1-35; SWJV 12: 162-173, 176-211).
<i>Arist.</i>	<i>De Aristotelis operibus censura</i> (Basel: Johannes Herbster, ⁴ Sept. 1538 USTC 612936 VOO 3: 25-37; Tello 2019: 28-93).
<i>Buc.</i>	<i>In 'Bucolica' Vergilii interpretatio potissimum allegorica</i> (Basel: Robert Winter, Mar. 1539 USTC 667059 VOO 2: 1-71).
<i>Caes.</i>	<i>Addita Suetonio in uita C. Iulii Caesaris</i> (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, Feb. 1526 USTC 410711 VOO 6: 438-440).
<i>Carm.</i>	<i>Carmina in horologo uniuersitatis Oxoniensium</i> (Oxford, 1523 USTC — VOO — ; De Vocht 1934: 59-60).
<i>Ciu. dei</i>	<i>Aurelii Augustini 'De ciuitate dei' commentarii</i> (Basel: Johann Froben, Sept. 1522 USTC 667041 Episcopus 1555: 5-1398; CCD 1-5). Vives's notes cited as in CCD (example: 8.4.n51 = note 51 of book 8, chapter 4). The following section was considered an independent work by Maïans:

¹ Two considerations: (1) When the author of an article or part of a book and the author of the entire publication are the same person, the name is not repeated. Example: Surname, N. (date) «Title of chapter». In *Title of publication*. City: Publisher. (2) Specific bibliography related to philology only can be found *supra* Part III, section 4.4.

² List of the first editions of Vives's works revised from the catalogue established by Tello 2018b. Neither introductory epistles nor prefaces have been given a separate entry. Wherever applicable, *ep.* or *praef.* should be added to the abbreviation, for example: *Aedes ep.*; *Med. psal. ep.*; *Ciu. dei praef.*; *An. uita praef.*; *Disc. praef.* In any case, the pages of both the introductory epistle and the preface have been included in the data of the critical or standard edition. When the title includes the title of another work, single quotation marks have been added, for example: *Praefatio in 'Leges' Ciceronis*.

³ Elements displayed after the title: first edition (place of print: printer, date) | USTC number (cf. *infra* last entry of section 2) | standard edition (VOO or Episcopus); critical edition (if available).

⁴ Commonly known with the Latin name of Ioannes Oporinus.

- Ciu. dei Gothi* *Quinam hominem fuerint Gothi et quomodo Romam ceperint* (VOO 6: 440-449)
- Clyp.* *Christi clypei descriptio* (Paris: Jean Lambert, Jun. [1514] | USTC 183496 | VOO 7: 33-40; SWJV 5: 104-125).
- Comm. rer.* *De communione rerum ad Germanos inferiores* (Antwerp: Merten de Keyser, 1535 | USTC 437748 | VOO 5: 464-482).
- Conc.* *De concordia et discordia in humano genere ad Carolum V Caesarem libri quattuor* (Antwerp: Michaël Hillen, 1529 | USTC 404769 | VOO 5: 187-403).
- Conscr.* *De epistolis conscribendis* (Antwerp: Michaël Hillen, 1534 | USTC 410765 | VOO 2: 263-314; SWJV 3: 22-139).
- Consult.* *De consultatione* (Louvain: Rutgerus Rescius, Sept. 1533 | USTC 400536 | VOO 2: 238-262).
- Declam.* *Declamationes duae* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, Feb. 1523 | USTC 437211 | VOO 2: 472-500).
- Disc.* *De disciplinis libri XX* (Antwerp: Michaël Hillen, Jul. 1531 | USTC 400513 | VOO 6: 1-437; Vigliano 2013a: 1-490; VOO 3: 68-297). Inner structure:
- Disc. ep.* *Ioanni tertio Lusitaniae et Algarbiorum regi inclyto domino Guineae et caetera* (VOO 6: 1-4; Vigliano 2013a: 1-4).
- Disc. praef.* *In libros 'De disciplinis' praefatio* (VOO 6: 5-7; Vigliano 2013a: 5-8).
- Disc. corr.* *De causis corruptarum artium* (VOO 6: 8-242; Vigliano 2013a: 9-272).
- Disc. trad.* *De tradendis disciplinis seu De institutione Christiana* (VOO 6: 243-437; Vigliano 2013a: 273-489).
- Disc. trad. er.* *De uita et moribus eruditi* (VOO 6: 416-437; Vigliano 2013a: 466-489).
- Disc. prima ph.* *De prima philosophia siue De intimo naturae opificio* (VOO 3: 184-297).
- Disc. essent.* *De explanatione cuiusque essentiae* (VOO 3: 121-141).
- Disc. uer.* *De censura ueri* (VOO 3: 142-184).
- Disc. prob.* *De instrumento probabilitatis* (VOO 3: 82-120).
- Disc. disp.* *De disputatione* (VOO 3: 68-82).
- Diss. rep.* *De Europae dissidiis et republica* (it includes: *Areop.*, *Diss. Turc.*, *Ep. Adr.*, *Ep. episc. Linc.*, *Ep. Henr. reg. Gall.*, *Ep. Henr. adm.*, and *Nic.*).
- Diss. Turc.* *De Europae dissidiis et bello Turcico* (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, Dec. 1526 | USTC 404746 | VOO 6: 452-481; SWJV 12: 90-159).
- Dorp.* *Epitaphium Martini Dorpii* (Basel: Johann Froben, Mar. 1528 | USTC 631329 | VOO — ; De Vocht 1928: 480).
- Dull.* *Vita Ioannis Dullardi* (Paris: Thomas Kees, 30 May 1514 | USTC 183428 | VOO — ; Tournoy 2005: 112-114; cf. SWJV 5: 14-15).
- Ep. Adr.* *Ad Adrianum VI pontificem de tumultibus Europae* (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, Dec. 1526 | USTC 404746 | VOO 5: 164-174; SWJV 12: 24-47).
- Ep. Barl.* *Hadriano Barlando suo* (Paris: Gilles de Gourmont, [1515] | USTC 452710 | VOO — ; Tournoy 2005: 115-116).
- Ep. episc. Linc.* *Domino Ioanni episcopo Lincolniensi a confessionibus inclyti Britanniae regis* (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, Dec. 1526 | USTC 404746 | VOO 5: 461-464; SWJV 12: 242-249).
- Ep. Fran. Chr.* *Francisco Christophoro Valentino uiro philosopho*; cf. *Dull.*
- Ep. Fort.* *Ioanni Forti uiro philosopho et contubernali* (Paris: Jean Lambert, [ca. Apr. 1515]⁵ | USTC 144250 | VOO — ; SWJV 5: 8-9).

⁵ The colophon is without date of print. 31 March 1514 is the date found at the end of the letter. According to Tournoy (2002: 8), the printer was observing the Parisian style, running from Easter to Easter, and thus the date would be, in fact, 31 March 1515.

- Ep. Henr. reg. Gall.* *Ad Henricum VIII Angliae regem de rege Galliae capto* (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, Dec. 1526 | USTC 404746 | VOO 6: 449-452; SWJV 12: 50-57).
- Ep. Henr. adm.* *Ad Henricum VIII de regni administratione, bello et pace* (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, Dec. 1526 | USTC 404746 | VOO 5: 175-186; SWJV 12: 60-87).
- Ep. Lamb.* *Pascasio Lamberto* (Paris: Jean Lambert, 17 Apr. 1514 | USTC 183441 | VOO — ; De Schepper 2000: 200; cf. Tournoy 2005: 1106-1107).
- Excit.* *Ad animi excitationem in Deum commentatiunculae* (Antwerp: Michaël Hillen, 1535 | USTC 403927 | VOO 1: 49-162). Inner structure:
- Excit. praep.* *Praeparatio animi ad orandum* (VOO 1: 54-61)
- Excit. praep. acc.* *Accessus ad orandum* (VOO 1: 61-63)
- Excit. dom.* *Ad precationem dominicam commentarius* (VOO 1: 136-162)
- Excit. med. d.* *Preces et meditationes diurnae* (VOO 1: 64-72)
- Excit. med. g.* *Preces et meditationes generales* (VOO 1: 72-131)
- Fab.* *Fabula de homine* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, [1519] | USTC 403389 | VOO 4: 1-8).
- Foem.* *De institutione foeminae Christianae* (Antwerp: Michaël Hillen, 1524 | USTC 403719, 442383 | VOO 4: 65-301; SWJV 6: 2-211; SWJV 7: 2-241).
- Geneth.* *Genethliacon Iesu Christi* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, [1519] | USTC 403389 | VOO 7: 1-18).
- Ling.* *Linguae Latinae exercitatio* (Basel: Robert Winter, Mar. 1539 | USTC 673019 | VOO 1: 280-420; García Ruiz 2005: 118-401).
- Mar.* *De officio mariti* (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, Jan. 1529 | USTC 410230 | VOO 4: 302-419; SWJV 8: 2-233).
- Med. psal.* *Meditationes in septem psalmos poenitentiae* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, [1519] | USTC 403389 | VOO 1: 162-255).
- Nic.* *Isocratis adiutoria oratio siue Nicocles de monarchia, Viue interprete* (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, Dec. 1526 | USTC 404746 | VOO 5: 36-61; SWJV 12: 214-239).
- Opera* *Opera* (it includes the following first editions: *Praef. Leg.*, *Prael. Conu.*, *Prael. Rhet.*, *Prael. Triumph.*)
- Opusc. duo* *Opuscula duo* (it includes the following first editions: *Clyp.*, *Ouatio*, *Triumph.*).
- Opusc. uar.* *Opuscula uaria* (it includes the following first editions: *Aedes*, *An. sen.*, *Fab.*, *Geneth.*, *Georg.*, *Med. psal.*, *Philos.*, *Pomp.*, *Pseud.*, *Temp.*)
- Ouatio* *Mariae parentis Christi Iesu ouatio* (Paris: Jean Lambert, Jun. [1514] | USTC 183496 | VOO 7: 122-131; SWJV 5: 72-103).
- Pacif.* *De pacificatione liber unus* (Antwerp: Michaël Hillen, 1529 | USTC 410231 | VOO 5: 404-446).
- Pass. Chr.* *Meditatio de passione Christi in psalmum 37* (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, Dec. 1529 | USTC 410720 | VOO 7: 91-100).
- Philos.* *De initiis, sectis et laudibus philosophiae* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, [1519] | USTC 403389 | VOO 3: 1-24; SWJV 1: 6-57).
- Pomp.* *Pompeius fugiens* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, [1519] | USTC 403389 | VOO 2: 501-516; SWJV 1: 112-147).
- Praef. Georg.* *Praefatio in 'Georgica' Vergilii* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, [1519] | USTC 403389 | VOO 2: 71-82).
- Praef. Leg.* *Praefatio in 'Leges' Ciceronis* (Lyon: Guillaume Huyon, 19 Oct. 1514 | USTC — | VOO 5: 494-507; Matheussen 1984: 2-15).
- Prael.* *Praelectiones quinque* (it includes: *Praef. Leg.*, *Prael. Conu.*, *Prael. Rhet.*, *Prael. Triumph.*, *Sap. praef.* [cf. *Sap.*]).
- Prael. Conu.* *In 'Conuiuia' Philelphi praelectio* (Lyon: Guillaume Huyon, 19 Oct. 1514 | USTC — | VOO 2: 83-86; SWJV 5: 144-151).

- Prael. Rhet.* *In quartum 'Rhetoricorum ad Herennium' praelectio* (Lyon: Guillaume Huyon, 19 Oct. 1514 | USTC — | VOO 2: 87-89; SWJV 5: 130-137).
- Prael. Triumph.* *In suum 'Christi triumphum' praelectio* (Lyon: Guillaume Huyon, 19 Oct. 1514 | USTC — | VOO 7: 100-108; SWJV 1: 66-83). [This work has also been cited as *Veritas fucata I*; cf. *Ver. fuc.*]
- Pseud.* *In pseudodialecticos* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, [1519] | USTC 403389 | VOO 3: 37-68; Fantazzi 1979: 26-99).
- Rat. dic.* *De ratione dicendi libri tres* (Louvain: Rutgerus Rescius, Sept. 1533 | USTC 400536 | VOO 2: 89-237; SWJV 11: 56-485).
- Rat. stud.* *Epistulae duae de ratione studii puerilis* (Louvain: Pieter Martens, 1524 | USTC 404738 | VOO 1: 256-280).
- Sacr.* *Sacrum diurnum de sudore Iesu Christi* (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, Dec. 1529 | USTC 410720 | VOO 7: 43-91).
- Sap.* *Sapiens* (Paris: Gilles de Gourmont, [May-June? 1514] | USTC — | VOO 4: 20-30; Pédeflous and Tournoy 2013: 267-274).
- Sat.* *Satellitium siue Symbola* (Louvain: Pieter Martens, 1524 | USTC 404738 | VOO 4: 30-64; Tello 2020a: 60-97).
- Somn. uig.* *Somnium et uigilia* (Antwerp: Jean Thibault, [1520] | USTC 403687 | VOO 5: 62-163; George 1989: 2-245).
- Somn. praef.* *Somnium quae est praefatio ad Somnium Scipionis Ciceroniani* (VOO 5: 64-84; George 1989: 8-65)
- Somn. Cic. or.* *Oratio Ciceronis ad Lachesin* (VOO 5: 85-88; George 1989: 214-221)
- Somn. Cato* *Sermo Catonis censorii ad senatum* (VOO 5: 88-94; George 1989: 220-227)
- Somn. arg.* *Argumentum Somnii Scipionis Ciceroniani* (VOO 5: 94-95; George 1989: 66-69)
- Somn. Cic. rep.* *Somnium Scipionis ex Ciceronis libro 'De republica' sexto* (VOO 5: 96-102; George 1989: 70-85)
- Vig. praef.* *In uigiliam suam in Somnium Scipionis praefatio* (VOO 5: 103-109; George 1989: 86-95)
- Vig.* *In Somnium Scipionis ex sexto 'De republica' Ciceronis uigilia* (VOO 5: 109-163; George 1989: 96-211)
- Sub.* *De subuentione pauperum siue De humanis necessitatibus libri II ad senatum Brugensem* (Bruges: Hubert de Croock, Mar. 1526 | USTC 404747 | VOO 4: 420-494; SWJV 4: 2-169).
- Syll.* *Declamationes Syllanae quinque* (Antwerp: Michaël Hillen, Apr. 1520 | USTC 402979 | VOO 2: 315-471; SWJV 2: 14-113; SWJV 9: 32-285).
- Temp.* *De tempore quo natus est Christus* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, [1519] | USTC 403389 | VOO 7: 19-32).
- Triumph.* *Christi Iesu liberatoris nostri triumphus* (Paris: Jean Lambert, Jun. [1514] | USTC 183496 | VOO 7: 108-122; SWJV 5: 21-71).
- Ver. fid.* *De ueritate fidei Christianae libri quinque* (Basel: Johannes Herbster, Jan. 1543 | USTC 667804 | VOO 8: 1-458; SWJV 10: 26-193).
- Ver. fuc.* *Veritas fucata siue De licentia poetica: Quantum poetis liceat a ueritate abscedere* (Louvain: Dirk Martens, Jan. 1523 | USTC 403399 | VOO 2: 517-531). [This work has also been cited as *Veritas fucata II*; cf. *Prael. Triumph.*]
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Regarding letters written by Vives and not included in printed editions during Vives's life, cf. VOO 7: 132-222 (*Epistolica*, 61 letters); De Vocht 1928; Jiménez 1978: 92-96; Ijsewijn et al. 1992-1995; Tournoy and Mund-Dopchie 2015. Regarding works that have been attributed to Vives, studies on this controverted matter are given in footnote.⁶

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⁶ Cf. Paquot 1763: 59-60; Namèche 1841: 117-119; Noreña 1970: 8 (n. 13); González, Albiñana and Gutiérrez 1992: 221-229; F. J. Hernández, «Recuperació d'un fragment d'una obra perduda de Joan Lluís Vives», in Coronel 2016: 529-566. Cf. also the following books of F. Calero: *Juan Luis Vives, autor del 'Diálogo de las cosas acaecidas en Roma' y del 'Diálogo de la Lengua'* (Valencia: Ajuntament de València, 2004); *Juan Luis Vives, autor del 'Diálogo de Mercurio y Carón'* (Valencia: Ajuntament de València, 2004); *Juan Luis Vives, autor del 'Lazarillo de Tormes'* (Valencia: Ajuntament de València, 2009; reprint at Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2014); *El verdadero autor de los 'Quijotes' de Cervantes y Avellaneda* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos / UNED, 2015); *Estudio de autoría de 'Los Trabajos de Persiles y Sigismunda', 'Philosophía antigua poética' y 'Novelas ejemplares'* (Madrid: Dykinson, 2017); *¿Luis Vives o Antonio de Guevara? El inicio del enigma* (Madrid: Dykinson, 2019); with M. A. Coronel (eds.), *Juan Luis Vives: Diálogo de doctrina cristiana*. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos / UNED, 2009).

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- eHumanista: Journal of Iberian Studies* (1999 —). University of California Santa Barbara.
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- Erudition and the Republic of Letters* (2016 —). Brill.
- Explorations in Renaissance Culture* (1974 —). Brill.
- Gutenberg-Jahrbuch* (1926 —). Gutenberg-Gesellschaft.
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- Journal of Early Modern Christianity* (2014 —). Gütersloher Verlagshaus.
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- Nouvelle Revue du XVIe Siècle* (1984-2004). Droz.
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- BOO = N. Episcopius (ed.) (1555), *Ioannis Ludouici Viuis Valentini Opera, in duos distincta tomos*. Basel: N. Episcopius Iunior / I. Parcus [BOO 1 (1555); BOO 2 (1555)]. The index of volumes 1 and 2 is as follows:
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- BOO 2: *De initiis, sectis et laudibus philosophiae; Anima senis siue Praelectio in librum 'De Senectute' Ciceronis; Somnium siue Praelectio in Somnium Scipionis; Vigilia ad Somnium Scipionis apud Ciceronem; Introductio ad sapientiam; Satellitium animi uel Symbola; Γενεθλιαξόν Iesu Christi; De tempore quo natus est Christus; Veritas fucata seu In 'Triumphum Christi' praefatio; Iesu Christi triumphus; Clypei Christi descriptio; Virginis Dei parae ouatio; In septem psalmos poenitentiales*

meditationes septem; De passione Christi meditatio; Excitationes animi in Deum; Commentarium in orationem dominicam; De sudore Iesu Christi sacrum diurnum; De ueritate fidei Christianae; De anima et uita; De officio mariti; De institutione foeminae Christianae; De concordia et discordia; De pacificatione; De conditione uitae Christianorum sub Turca; De subuentione pauperum; De communiōe rerum ad Germanos inferiores; Epistolae uariae.

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dominicam commentarius; Meditationes in septem psalmos quos uocant poenitentiae | GRAMMATICA: *De ratione studii puerilis I-II; Exercitatio linguae Latinae.*

VOO 2 (1782): PHILOLOGICA: *In allegorias 'Bucolicorum' Vergilii praefatio; Publii Vergilii Maronis Bucolica; In 'Georgica' Vergilii praelectio; Praelectio in 'Conuiuia' Francisci Philelphi* | RHETORICA: *In quartum 'Rhetoricorum ad Herennium' praelectio; In libros De ratione dicendi praefatio; De ratione dicendi; De consultatione; De conscribendis epistolis; Declamationes Syllanae quinque; Marci Fabii Quintiliani declamatio Paries palmatus inscripta: Pro caeco contra Nouercam; Declamatio qua Quintiliano respondet pro Nouerca contra caecum; Pompeius fugiens* | POETICA: *Veritas fucata sive De licentia poëtica.*

VOO 3 (1782): PHILOSOPHICA: *De initiis, sectis et laudibus philosophiae; De Aristotelis operibus censura; In Pseudo-dialecticos; De disputatione; De instrumento probabilitatis; De explanatione cuiusque essentiae; De censura ueri in enuntiatione; De prima philosophia; De anima et uita.*

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VOO 5 (1784): POLITICO-MORALIA: *Isocratis Areopagitica; Isocratis Nicocles; Somnium, quae est praefatio ad 'Somnium Scipionis' Ciceronianis; In 'Somnium Scipionis' oratio Ciceronis ad Lachesin; Sermo Catonis ad Senatum; Argumentum 'Somnii Scipionis' Ciceroniani; 'Somnium Scipionis' ex Ciceronis libro 'De republica' sexto excerptum; In uigiliam in 'Somnium Scipionis' praefatio; In 'Somnium Scipionis' ex sexto 'De republica' Ciceronis uigilia; De Europae statu ac tumultibus epistola ad Hadrianum VI pontifex maximus; De pace inter Caesarem et Franciscum Galliarum regem Deque optimo regni statu epistola; Epistola ad Carolum Caesarem; De concordia; Praefatio ad libros De pacificatione; De pacificatione; De conditione uitae Christianorum sub Turca; Epistola ad D. Ioan. Episc. Lincolniensem; De communionem rerum ad Germanos inferiores* | LEGALIA: *Aedes legum; In 'Leges' Ciceronis praelectio.*

VOO 6 (1785): CRITICA: *In libros De disciplinis praefatio; De causis corruptarum artium (I. De artibus in uniuersum, II. De grammatica, III. De dialectica, IV. De rhetorica, V. De philosophia naturae, medicina, et artibus mathematicis corruptis, VI. De philosophia morali, VII. De iure ciuili); De tradendis disciplinis (I-V); De uita et moribus eruditi* | HISTORICA: *In Suetonium quaedam; In uita C. Iulii Caesaris; De gente Iulia; Caesarum familia; Ortus Caesaris et educatio; Quinam hominum fuerint Gothi et quomodo Romam ceperint; De Francisco Galliae rege a Caesare capto; De Europae dissidiis et bello Turcico dialogus.*

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Hic est cursus absolute sapiētie, cui⁹ prim⁹
grad⁹ est nosse se, postrem⁹ nosse deum.

