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**Palestinian Civil Resistance: A Case Study of the
Popular Struggle Against the Wall
2002-2013**

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ABSTRACT

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Palestinian Civil Resistance: A Case Study of the Popular Struggle Against the Wall from 2002-2013

My dissertation explores the Israeli Apartheid Walls' violence through the theoretical framework of Johan Galtung's triangle of violence. By highlighting the violence triangle, I am able to interpret effective civil resistance strategies used in the popular struggle against the Wall. Drawing upon Galtung's theory of violence and peace, I argue that all violence must be equally resisted to achieve positive peace. In Palestine, to achieve peace civil resistance must be employed against the violence triangle of the Wall, and the Israeli occupation. By combating the triangle of violence with civil resistance, the cyclical existence of violence can be transformed into a pathway of peace.

Using the case study of the Apartheid Wall highlights the violence triangle in an extreme contemporary situation. I emphasize how civil resistance strategies were effectively used to combat the violence of the occupation. For my research, I applied qualitative research methods to obtain various types of data from 2002-2013. As a participant observer, I immersed myself in the popular struggle as a solidarity activist from 2003-2005. From 2006-2013, I conducted in-depth interviews with various Palestinian communities affected by the Wall since its construction. During these ten years I photographed the violence of the Wall, and the resistance movement, as part of a visual ethnography.

What this research revealed was grassroots resistance against the Wall was not successful in ending the occupation; this was largely due to Israel's ability to increase structural and direct violence and repress the civil resistance movement. The resistance against the Wall was successful in combating Israel's cultural violence, which was achieved by using unarmed methods, ultimately exposing Israel's violence triangle to the numerous activists working in solidarity with the Palestinian people. The narrative was then shifted from "Palestinian as terrorist perpetrating the violence", to one of "Palestinian as victim of Israeli violence." My work highlights how Palestinian civil resistance has the ability to end the occupation, and achieve positive peace, when used against the violence triangle.

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This dissertation is more than a document for me; it is a tribute to the Palestinian people who continue to endure violence, and maintain resilience in the hopes that their resistance will put an end to their suffering. I have been honored to share space in the movement against the Wall, and to accomplish what has been asked of me each time I visited another West Bank village – to share the story. I am sharing the story as part of my activism, and I hope this document will make a contribution.

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Introduction

This dissertation, “Palestinian Civil Resistance: A Case Study of the Popular Struggle Against the Wall from 2002-2013,” uses Johan Galtung’s triangle of violence as a theoretical framework to analyze the Israeli Apartheid Wall’s violence and, more specifically, how the Palestinian civil resistance movement combated this violence. Examining the Apartheid Wall’s development in the West Bank from 2002 through 2013, I illustrate how it affected the indigenous Palestinian people through Israel’s various means of violence, and how the Palestinian people resisted their oppressive situation.

I focus on the Wall because it exemplifies how Israel uses the politics of technology, by way of the triangle violence, to control Palestinian lands and resources, as well as the Palestinian people themselves. This feature of the Israeli occupation has served a dual purpose for Israel. The Wall unilaterally annexes Palestinian land, including the contentious city of Jerusalem, essentially dissolving the 1967 Armistice Green-Line. The Wall also separates Palestinian communities from each other, creating an open-air prison, thus limiting collective resistance. By utilizing Galtung’s theory of violence I am able to identify how Israel maintains control over the Palestinian people through direct, structural and cultural violence. Identifying the violence triangle through the Apartheid Wall, informs activists to the degree in which the violence triangle represses the indigenous Palestinian people. This clarity with which Israel utilizes violence in turn

supports activists' activities on the ground; they are able to use this knowledge to nonviolently resist the violence triangle in total, combating direct, structural and cultural violence. Both the knowledge of Israel's violence, and the use of nonviolent techniques, in turn reframes the narrative from the "Palestinian as terrorist perpetrating the violence", to one of "Palestinian as victim of Israeli violence." The reframing of the narrative is essential for the nonviolent resistance movement to increase activist support for the Palestinian people in their goal of self-determination.

Although human rights groups have published studies of the Wall's violence, there is a gap in regards to long-term academic studies. Human rights organizations working in the West Bank, such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) and the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem publish annual reports on the Wall to share information about the effects of the occupation. This information is important to various stakeholders, but it has not been examined outside of this context. This study uses fieldwork and photography, gathering information from human rights reports and Palestinian informants, to investigate the long-term effects of the Wall project through the framework of Johan Galtung's triangle of violence. By using Galtung's typology of violence we can analyze how the Wall is detrimental for the Palestinian people, and how a resistance movement can respond to the varying layers of violence in an effective way. This research broadens our understanding of how Israeli violence impacts Palestinians' existence, and more importantly, how they resist this form of colonial violence.

Civil resistance in Palestine is not new. Palestinians have resisted colonial violence since before the state of Israel was established. The Palestinian people have

participated in two contemporary *intifadas* (uprisings). Activists of the First *Intifada*, which took place in 1989, utilized unarmed techniques to convince the Israeli government to negotiate with the then-exiled Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). These resistance methods increased the movement's power, and Israel was not willing to allow this to occur again. Although the 1993 Oslo Accord negotiations were framed as a success, they actually created a more repressive environment for the Palestinian people. These "peace" negotiations aimed at eliminating "negative peace," or the absence of direct violence, but only from the Palestinian side, and they failed to address Israel's direct and structural violence against the Palestinian population. As a result, the Oslo Accords exacerbated Israel's structural violence; these "negotiations" proved ineffective. As a punishment for the First *Intifada*, Israel separated the Palestinian people into Bantustans¹ and established numerous checkpoints to track Palestinian movement. Israel performed these actions (a new form of violence) to prevent another uprising. Palestinian activists resisted Israeli violence for the second time in 2000. Unlike the First, in this Second *Intifada*, activists used armed resistance methods, which enabled Israel in their ongoing attempt to justify to their own citizens, as well as the international community, the use of enhanced collective violence against the Palestinian people living inside the West Bank. As a result, Israel established the Apartheid Wall, which instigated a new iteration of Palestinian resistance: the popular struggle against the Wall.

¹ Bantustans originated in South Africa as territories, or black homelands, in the Apartheid system. Various scholars have used this term in the case of Palestine, and scholar Leila Farsakh specifically discusses the analogies of South Africa and Palestine. She focuses on the separation of land territories allotted to Palestinian inhabitants inside the Occupied Territory of the West Bank, which restricts the possibilities of a viable Palestinian state. (2005: 230)

For some scholars, such as Norman (2013), the Second *Intifada* extends past 2002 into 2006, including the time the Wall construction and the resistance against it began. However, I argue that the Second *Intifada* ended in 2002 and the popular struggle against the Wall is a distinct uprising in the succession of Palestinian struggles against the occupation. The struggle against the Wall is a separate movement, and activists have learned from each previous *intifada*. The movement against the Wall began as a struggle against the construction of the Apartheid Wall, which aimed to annex Palestinian land for the expansion of illegal Israel settlements. Local farmers began to resist the demolition of their agricultural lands and the uprooting of their trees to save their livelihood. As the Wall continued to travel south through the West Bank, entire villages saw it as the third *Nakba* (catastrophe) and joined in the struggle against it. Starting in 2002, when Wall construction began, Palestinians living along the Wall have referred to the resistance against it as the “Third *Intifada*.”

Few scholars have examined the demonstrations against the Wall. Some focus on the role of international activists, while others discuss the role of Palestinians, but none experienced the resistance as an activist-researcher. As I am a solidarity activist, my research does not reflect a Palestinian perspective. Because Palestinians’ perspectives are important for this work, I interviewed numerous Palestinians living in the West Bank and analyzed their narratives about the Wall’s violence and the resistance. It is vital for the issues I discuss here to reflect the realities on the ground, and the interviews helped achieve accuracy. I aimed to construct what Richard Jackson describes as, “in-depth, contextualized, face-to-face ethnographic research in which the subjects are allowed to speak for themselves or participate directly in the construction of the research process

itself' (2015: 27). The testimonials in this dissertation are first-hand accounts of Palestinians living inside the West Bank who illustrate the Wall's destruction.

I investigated the realities on the ground in the West Bank, the violence of the Wall, and civil resistance strategies using theoretical frameworks within the fields of Palestine Studies, Peace Studies, and Resistance Studies. Palestine Studies scholars have analyzed Palestinian experiences through the approaches of law, human rights, economics, and history. Few scholars have explored the grassroots Palestinian uprising against the Wall with a Peace Studies lens. Most Peace Studies researchers take a neutral stance toward Palestine/Israel, leaving unexamined the power difference between the two groups. According to Richard Jackson:

This is certainly the case in terms of the Israel-Palestine conflict, a focus of a great many peace studies scholars who nonetheless continue to attempt forms of reconciliation and conflict resolution based on the implicit assumption that Palestinians and Israelis represent two equal parties in a conflict – rather than a situation of colonial dispossession and oppression by one powerful party against a much weaker party who employ a range of resistance strategies. (2015: 33)

To address this problem, I examine the power dynamic that manifested through the occupier's use of violence and the resistance strategies the occupied used. This case can be usefully examined using Galtung's theory of violence. According to Richard Jackson, "Galtung's original formulations of the linked concepts of structural and cultural violence have received little serious empirical or theoretical attention in the intervening years, and are rarely used as an explicit analytical framework within peace research" (2015: 32). Galtung's theory of violence is unique in that it supports a multi-dimension approach to violence, and not merely a singularly perceptive of violence. I thus use Galtung's theory

to unpack the layers of violence Israel has imposed on Palestinian people between 2002 and 2013 to envision how violence might transform to peace.

All scholars do not share the perception of Galtung's theory of violence as an effective analytical tool for achieving peace, and this must be noted in regards to ongoing research. Kathleen Weigert highlights the disadvantages of using structural violence as a framework of understanding peace, "Structural violence seems, in effect, to reduce if not eliminate the notion of human agency. Worse yet, the concept may engender a fatalism which precludes action" (2010: 132). Weigert asserts that structural violence has the tendency to restrict collective action due to the violence itself viewed as beyond the scope of resistance. I agree with Weigert that there is potential for impotence when facing violence at an extreme level. Because of this, violence needs to be isolated to a specific case to allow room for the oppressed to conceptualize effective resistance. The prospect of ending the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories could be debilitating for the occupied population in the face of extreme violence, but focusing on the Wall through the violence triangle expands the possibility for resistance.

It isn't merely the scope of structural violence that allows room to critique Galtung's theory; C. A. J. Coady discusses the flaws of Galtung's theory in regards to the focus of eliminating both direct and structural violence to achieve peace. He asserts that Galtung assumes that direct violence alone isn't worth aspiring to abolish, and thus is problematic for peace aspirations.

This justification of the value of his definition is either muddled or mischievous (and just possibly both). If the suggestion is that peace cannot be a worthy social ideal or goal of action unless it is the total ideal, then the suggestion is surely absurd. A multiplicity of compatible but non-inclusive ideals seems as worthy of human pursuit as a single

comprehensive goal, and, furthermore, it seems a more honest way to characterise social realities (2008: 28).

Coady's concerns are valid; eliminating direct violence should be enough to constitute a successful campaign. With that said, negative peace, or the absence of direct violence, does not mean that the violence won't return. By eliminating both direct and structural, as Galtung argues, the opportunities for direct violence to resume are reduced. In the case of Israeli violence, the elimination of direct violence does not mean peace will be achieved for Palestinians. The absence of direct violence will limit harm to the Palestinian population, but it will not result in a viable future. By eliminating structural violence as well the chances for direct violence are decreased, and is a more sustainable aim for a resistance movement.

By examining how the violence triangle manifests in the context of contemporary Palestine, specifically in the case of the Wall, I analyze the effectiveness of civil resistance strategies used in the popular struggle. I conclude that before pursuing civil resistance strategies, it is essential to identify how the violence triangle is manifesting in order to combat the violence and achieve positive peace. This research investigates how the struggle against the Wall resisted the Israeli violence triangle and effectiveness of this particular social movement.

Literature Review

Civilian-based, unarmed resistance is only effective against violence when it addresses all forms of violence. Building on Galtung's theory of violence and peace, I argue that direct, structural and cultural violence must be equally resisted to achieve positive peace. Galtung defines peace as positive and negative: negative peace is the

absence of direct violence, and positive peace is the absence of direct and structural violence (1969: 168). However, in my view, when direct and structural violence are absent I define it as *neutral peace*. The additional absence of cultural violence is necessary in order to establish true positive peace, which is the absence of the entire violence triangle.

To achieve positive peace, resistance is necessary to eliminate violence.

Analyzing the violence triangle can lead to the design of more effective civil resistance strategies. “Civil resistance theory” is largely understood as pertaining to “nonviolence.” However, this term is not widely used in the context of Palestine. In this section, I examine the violence triangle, as well as the various understandings of unarmed civil resistance, to give greater understanding to the violence triangle in the Occupied Palestinian Territory known as the West Bank. I also discuss the Palestinian movement to combat the violence triangle of the Wall. Palestinian resistance is largely based on nonviolent tactics to combat the violence triangle, but is locally referred to as “the popular struggle.”

Triangle of Violence

Understanding the triangle of violence is essential when focusing on Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territories. The violence triangle is the dominating force that upholds the occupation and oppresses the Palestinian people. Galtung published his initial theory on violence in the article, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research” (1969). As a pioneer in peace studies, he explored how violence is viewed in relation to peace. For Galtung, “What we intend is only that the terms 'peace' and 'violence' be linked to each

other such that 'peace' can be regarded as 'absence of violence'" (1969: 168). Just as there is not only one form of violence, neither is there a single definition of peace. Galtung defined various aspects of violence within a triangular model and in direct relation to both positive and negative peace.

In the West Bank, the violence triangle limits Palestinians' abilities to thrive. For Galtung, violence is "present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations" (1969: 168). The potential versus the actual is of primary importance. If thriving is possible, the potential is greater than the actual, and if the potential cannot be achieved due to external powers, then violence is present. In this early article, Galtung focused on two forms of violence: direct violence and structural violence. He highlighted the differences between these; direct violence is "the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as personal or direct," and he defined "violence where there is no such actor as structural or indirect" (1969: 170). An actor or an army commits direct violence. Although this definition is how the concept of "violence" is widely understood, in Galtung's formulation, this is only one aspect of violence. As direct violence is visible, it is most often regarded as "violence." Direct violence refers to bodily harm, such as hitting, punching, maiming, and killing. Structural violence is harder to identify, as it is invisible and may therefore be viewed as "normal." Structural violence is ingrained into societal structures. Essentially, it is inequality: unequal power within the system, which benefits one social group over another. Structural violence is exploitative, making the overall life chances of different groups unequal. It "increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance" (Galtung, 1969: 168). In


“Violence, Peace and Peace Research,” Galtung refers to direct and structural violence as personal and indirect violence. He interchanges the words “in two different ways, using the word-pairs personal structural and direct-indirect respectively (Galtung, 1969: 171). Direct and structural violence are visible and invisible, and they exist simultaneously. Direct violence enforces and maintains structural violence.

In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, direct and structural violence are not the only forms of violence present; they are achieved through cultural violence. In his later work, Galtung extended his violence theory into a triangle formation, including cultural violence. He defined cultural violence as “any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural form. Symbolic violence built into a culture does not kill or maim like direct violence or the violence built into the structure” (Galtung, 1990: 291). Palestinian cultural attributes, such as the concept of nationalism, typically shown through the use of the Palestinian flag, the celebrations during funerals when Palestinian martyrs die at the hands of Israeli violence, the Arabic language in itself, and religious teachings, are all deemed as negative in contrast to Israeli ideology. The Israeli state, through their pop culture and mainstream education, considers the Palestinian as lesser and aggressive. In other words, cultural violence is essentially racist ideology, in which the Other is inferior due to their identity. Cultural violence paints all of the Palestinian population as inherently violent, and subsequently as terrorists. Unlike direct and structural violence, cultural violence is not fatal, but it is used to legitimize these other forms of violence, “Cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right – or at least not wrong” (Galtung, 1990: 291). Israel uses cultural violence against the Palestinian people as a means to enforce more direct and structural

violence. As Galtung argues, “One way cultural violence works is by changing the moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right or at least to yellow/acceptable” (Galtung, 1990: 292). Direct violence is visible and easily acknowledged as violence, while cultural and structural violence are invisible and harder to recognize, making them extremely dangerous.



Together, these three forms of violence create the violence triangle. They work together to maintain control and ultimately to oppress. To simplify these, Galtung explains that, “Direct violence is an event; structural violence is a process with ups and downs; cultural violence is an invariant, a 'permanence', remaining essentially the same for long periods” (1990: 294). In the West Bank, the triangle of violence is always present, physically oppressing, continuously reproducing inequality within the system to limit potential, and relying on hate to perform dominance over the Palestinian people.



In the West Bank, the triangle of violence upholds the occupation, which is driven by structural violence. Direct and cultural violence support structural violence, the essential component to Israel's dominance. The triangle can be positioned at any angle; the bottom points of violence indicate that they are a byproduct of the top point. As Galtung notes, "Violence can start at any corner in the direct-structural-cultural violence triangle and is easily transmitted to the other corners" (1990: 302). Cultural and direct violence are at the base of the triangle, implying that they maintain structural violence at the pinnacle of the triangle. As Galtung notes, "When the triangle is stood on its 'direct' and 'structural violence' feet, the image invoked is cultural violence as the legitimizer of both" (1990: 294). All three forms of violence maintain the violence triangle; it can shift to highlight which form of violence is leading. The tip of the triangle is the identifier, the main aspect of violence under examination, and the other forms of violence maintain it with control and domination.

Peace is the ultimate goal in regards to the occupation, yet peace is only obtainable through the absence of violence. Galtung distinguishes between different forms of violence to explore two aspects of peace. For Galtung, "Peace also has two sides: absence of personal violence, and absence of structural violence" (1969: 183). In

this regard, personal violence is synonymous with direct violence. He refers to these two sides as negative peace and positive peace:

The reason for the use of the terms “negative” and “positive” is easily seen: the absence of personal violence does not lead to a positively defined condition, whereas the absence of structural violence is what we have referred to as social justice, which is a positively defined condition (egalitarian distribution of power and resources). (Galtung, 1969: 183)

To obtain positive peace (social justice), eradicating negative peace is necessary.

Galtung does not, however, discuss cultural violence in this context. Although Galtung defines violence in a three-point triangle, he explores peace only in a two-part model.




Figure 2

This theoretical inconsistency presents problems for the case of Palestine’s future, where an absence of structural violence and a presence of cultural violence would fail to lead to positive peace. In this case, the absence of direct violence is negative peace, but the absence of structural violence does not necessarily negate all violence into positive peace, as Galtung suggests. If it is not resisted, latent cultural violence continues and may reinvigorate the violence triangle. I call the absence of structural violence *neutral peace*.

Neutral peace is neither positive nor negative, but stable. In a state of neutral peace, direct violence is absent and social justice is present to an extent, but cultural violence remains dormant and easily accessible. The “open bridges”² years in the West Bank allowed more rights for Palestinian residents in the West Bank, yet these rights were quickly revoked when the “cultural violence” threat of Palestinians was revisited by Israeli politicians. Unless all three forms of violence are abolished, the violence triangle threat is ever-present, and will re-emerge with time. To achieve what I see as true *positive peace* and long-lasting justice, cultural, direct, and structural violence must all be abolished.

Nonviolence Triangle

A state of positive peace would essentially be a nonviolent violence triangle, meaning direct, structural and cultural nonviolence In Israel/Palestine; a single, non-bordered truly democratic state could allot equal rights to all people. Building on Galtung’s violence theory, Jorgen Johansen formulated a nonviolence theory for an ideal society, considering direct, structural and cultural nonviolence. Johansen defines direct nonviolence as “the full scale of pragmatic nonviolent methods and strategies” (2007: 151). Another term for direct nonviolence is strategic nonviolent resistance. For Johansen, structural nonviolence “consists of those structures in our society that promote cooperation, reconciliation, openness, equality and peaceful actions in conflict situations” (2007: 151). Essentially, direct nonviolence, or nonviolent resistance, is found in a social structure built on social justice ideals where rights are realized. Johansen identifies

² Open-Bridges years refer to the time period between 1967-1987, shortly after Israel began to occupy the West Bank. During this time Palestinians were able to move beyond the Green-Line with more ease. 1987 was the start of the First Intifada, when Israel became more strict with Palestinian travel.

cultural nonviolence as “those parts of our culture that transmit traditions of nonviolent behavior and which commemorate and honour nonviolent values and qualities” (2007: 151). Although this is what positive peace can look like as an end result, the people must create the peace, as it cannot merely be given. The implementation of the violence triangle will limit positive peace. To achieve a nonviolent, direct-structural-cultural positive peace triangle ideal, resistance by the people is essential.

The Palestinian people have been resisting Israeli colonization since the state was established. Resistance is a set of actions taken by the oppressed to transform the status quo. For Jacques Semelin, “the term ‘resistance’ refers to acts through which a determination to refuse is expressed collectively” (1993: 27). Resistance can be armed or unarmed. Richard Jackson highlights the dangers of resistance, considering the “Twin temptations to either embrace violent revolutionary action or to reject the idea of ‘resistance’ outright because of its connotations with violent activities” (2015: 21). Resistance broadly encompasses varying definitions along a spectrum. According to Chenowith and Stephan, “The term *resistance* implies that the campaigns of interest are noninstitutional and generally confrontational in nature. In other words, these groups are using tactics that are outside the conventional political process” (2011: 12). In their book, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, which highlights both armed and unarmed resistance campaigns over the past century, they find that “Between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts” (Chenowith and Stephan, 2011: 7). Nonviolent campaigns achieving their intended goals was more probable, largely due to their tactics, which allowed for more participation (Chenowith and Stephan, 2011: 11). In Jorgen Johansen’s

view, unarmed campaigns are more effective than armed resistance because “Violence is blind. Most nonviolent means are much more specific” (2007: 144). Johansen argues that nonviolence targets issues but violence is indiscriminate, and although violence can impact humans, the political ideologies remain unchanged (2007: 144). There is also a greater chance that armed resistance techniques will provoke violent retaliation. This is not to say that violent reactions to unarmed resistance do not happen, but in most cases, retaliatory violence to unarmed resistance is less severe.

This dissertation examines primarily unarmed resistance from the Palestinian perspective. I employ Jacques Semelin’s definition of civil resistance, initially introduced in his book *Unarmed Against Hitler* as “civilian resistance” (1993). Semelin describes civilian resistance as, “civil society’s spontaneous process of struggle, by unarmed means, against the aggression of which it is victim” (1993: 27). For Semelin, civil society has the power to rise up against violence using unarmed means. Unarmed resistance is often defined as “nonviolence,” but, for Véronique Dudouet:

This definition does not imply, however, that all actions without violence have to be nonviolent. Nonviolence might be described as a direct substitute for violent behaviour: it implies deliberate restraint from expected violence, in a context of contention between two or more adversaries. One advantage of the term *nonviolent resistance* over the more general *nonviolence* is this emphasis on conscious and active opposition to violence. The label *civil resistance* is also widely used in reference to the unarmed, non-military character of nonviolent movements. (2008: 4)

Civil resistance is unarmed confrontation performed by a civilian population against an opponent. Civil resistance allows for culture and language to shape how unarmed resistance movements are defined outside of the nonviolence rubric. “Civil” refers to people (the masses) and “resistance” implies opposition or confrontation. Essentially,

civil resistance is a people-powered mass movement in struggle for justice. For Howard Clark, “‘People power’ has frequently been used to describe the mass mobilization of one section of ‘the people’ against another” (2009: 4). Clark grounds this definition in historic protest movements that took governments down due to their rigged elections. Although different issues are at work, “people-powered movement” accurately describes Palestinian grassroots resistance against Israel’s colonial endeavors.

As the Palestinian movement relies on the masses, it is typically defined as a popular struggle. The terms used to describe unarmed resistance movements are extremely important. The label of a movement cannot be imposed by outside parties; it must come from within the movement itself. The next section will explore various definitions of unarmed nonviolent resistance. I explore nonviolence in depth as a progression to express the ways the theory is understood, and also practices by activists to give context to the use of unarmed resistance by Palestinians. Starting with nonviolent resistance, I examine two schools of nonviolence (principled and pragmatic) and where the Palestinian people situate their struggle. Extending the mainstream definitions of nonviolent resistance, I analyze the Palestinian concept of popular struggle and Palestinian civil society’s unarmed movement against Israel’s occupation.

Nonviolence Theory

The concept of nonviolence has been widely observed as a method of resistance. Jorgen Johansen details how the term is not often used alone and typically accompanies another word to specify the circumstances, “It is often used as a specifier for other topics and hence followed by another word – nonviolent action, nonviolent philosophy,

nonviolent communication, nonviolent defense, and many more” (Johansen, 2007: 143).

In the context of the violence triangle, “nonviolence” is paired with the word “resistance”

to denote unarmed techniques. For Véronique Dudouet:

The basic principles of nonviolent resistance encompass an abstention from using physical force to achieve an aim, but also a full engagement in resisting oppression, domination and any other forms of injustice. It can thus be applied to oppose both *direct* (physical) violence and *structural* violence (2008: 3).

There are two main families of nonviolent resistance: principled and pragmatic. One is based on ideology and the other on strategy. Both have been starting points for Palestinian resistance. Principled nonviolence emphasizes morality and is found in traditional and/or religious beliefs. Pragmatic nonviolence is a choice an individual makes to create a strategic social change model. According to Thomas Weber, these two separate approaches “have been termed ‘principled,’ where emphasis is on the human harmony and a moral rejection of violence and coercion, and ‘pragmatic,’ where conflict is seen as normal and the rejection of violence as an effective way of challenging power” (2003: 250). Both principled and pragmatic nonviolence are used, often simultaneously, when resisting an opponent; therefore, they are not mutually exclusive.

Principled Nonviolence

Principled nonviolence is based on the pacifist tradition, where hurting others is morally wrong for religious and philosophical reasons. For Johansen, “In the pacifist tradition, we include nonviolent ideas, aspects, views and visions from religions, philosophies, ethics and lifestyles” (2007: 145). Dudouet explains, “in other words, by conviction rather than by expediency” (2008: 6). Of primary importance in this

understanding of nonviolence is the idea that the process should encapsulate the intended end, or as Johansen notes, “That the aims do not justify the means” (2007: 146). In the following section, I will explore two primary principled nonviolence theorists: Mahatma Gandhi and Judith Stiehm. Gandhi was one of the first to cultivate the theory and practice of principled nonviolence. Stiehm built on this work a few decades later by developing two approaches to nonviolence, coining the term, “conscientious nonviolence,” a model combining principled and pragmatic nonviolence.

Gandhi is widely known for nonviolence; people have called him “the godfather of nonviolence activism” (2003: 251). His was a humanistic approach based on morals. His first venture into resistance began in South Africa, where he worked with local activists against the oppressive system. He eventually moved back to his native India, where he began a campaign against the British Empire. Gandhi resisted the British through *Satyagraha*, or “clinging to truth,” which is the holding of truth within the soul or spirit. According to Gandhi, “Satyagraha in the general sense of the word means the way of life of one who holds steadfastly to God and dedicates his life to him” (1969: iii). This model is based on religious implications. A true Satyagrahi is a man of God who believes that change can be derived by way of love. *Satyagraha* is a way of being and soul force, and nonviolence is the weapon of a Satyagrahi.

Principled nonviolence concerns itself with the process of resisting as much as the end results. For Gandhi, the means and the ends were to be the same. For Thomas Weber:

Means and ends should be equally pure. The end growing out of the means is just as logical as the tree growing from a seed, and what is attained by love is retained for all time, while what is obtained by violence has within it the seeds of its own destruction. (2003: 253)

Gandhi used methods of conversion, believing that the opponent could convert to a new way of being. He felt that taking an injury would allow the rival to come to an understanding through reason and conscience. Self-sacrifice and endurance of pain and suffering without imposing them onto your rival are key to embodying true *Satyagraha*. *Satyagraha* means proving dedication to the cause and oneself. This allows one to tolerate inflictions while staying true to the soul. As Gandhi notes:

The motive is to convert the opponent and make him one's willing ally and friend. It is based on the idea that the moral appeal to the heart and conscience is, in the case of human beings, more effective than an appeal based on threat of bodily pain and violence. (1969: iii)

The aim is to gain an ally by showing the opponent the situations' severity through *Satyagraha*'s soulfulness.

Although *Satyagraha* is a peaceful way of using nonviolence, it is not passive resistance. *Satyagraha* is seen as a weapon of the strong, where truth binds the people. It combines various aspects of resistance, such as police or military non-cooperation and withdrawal, tax payment refusal, court boycott, and alternative institution-creation. Another method the Indian *Satyagrahi* movement used was civil disobedience. This tactic relied on disciplined groups' actions demonstrating the endless capacity of suffering without retaliation. It also involved fasting, an action away from the self for the love of the rival, "Gandiji showed that for nonviolence to be effective requires constructive effort in every sphere of life, individual, social, economic, and political" (Gandhi, 1969: v). One who is nonviolent in her everyday life is also nonviolently resisting.

In 2014, *Newsweek* published a story entitled, "Where is the Palestinian Gandhi?" – a common question in discussions of Palestinian resistance. According to the journalist Jeff Stein, "The Palestinians who preached nonviolence and led peaceful marches,

boycotts, mass sit-downs and the like are mostly dead, in jail, marginalized or in exile” (2014). But this account fails to adequately examine the complexities of local resistance. Since Gandhi’s movement, numerous practitioners have utilized principled nonviolence, including activists in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

A few decades after the success of Gandhi’s revolutionary *Satyagraha*, Judith Stiehm wrote an essay entitled, “Nonviolence Is Two” (1968), describing two forms of nonviolent resistance. What Stiehm called “conscientious nonviolence” resembles Gandhi’s “principled” approach; she also theorized a “pragmatic” framework of resistance. For Stiehm, conscientious nonviolence reflects a “religious or ethical belief, which categorically prohibits injury to another” (1968: 23). This form of nonviolent resistance is associated with pacifist and passive resistance movements. Pragmatic nonviolence, according to Stiehm, “is more or less spontaneous response by an unarmed populace or by a minority group to a situation regarded as intolerable” (1968: 24). Numerous mass movements are formed through pragmatic nonviolence. Both conscientious and pragmatic nonviolence approaches reject violence as a means to change, but they differ in practice.

Conscientious nonviolence is more concerned with an individual’s behavior than the outcome of the resistance. Like in Gandhi’s model, from this approach, the conscientious nonviolence practitioner cannot achieve success without committing to nonviolence in everyday life. The approach is based in the psyche. A moral understanding is thought to lie within each conscientious nonviolence follower. According to Stiehm, in this tradition, “One must obey one’s own conscience, and one must neither tempt nor coerce another to violate his” (1968: 24). The practitioner must

have high morals and religious beliefs. This approach assumes that communication failures between an individual and their conscience create conflict. Like Gandhi's *Satyagraha*, the approach aims to convert the enemy through reason or emotion rather than self-sacrifice, helping the opponent understand and change their own conscience. Conscientious nonviolence attempts to create awareness, to teach, and to facilitate opponents' insight in order to transform the situation.

These approaches to nonviolence are different in several ways. Conscientious nonviolence assumes that the opponent merely needs education to tap into their conscience, which limits the potential for change. In addition, this form of nonviolence is framed as an individual's duty to God, as conscientious nonviolence followers are pacifists (Christians), which may lessen the appeal to secular would-be practitioners. Pragmatic nonviolence, which is not situated in a religious tradition, is seen as a "business-like" resistance strategy. For Stiehm, it is, "waging effective goal-oriented struggle against a stronger opponent, or minimally, against an opponent capable of inflicting severe damage if the conflict should become violent" (1968: 25). This approach mobilizes nonviolence as a weapon in a different way from Gandhi's approach. For Gandhi, nonviolence is a spiritual weapon that can totally eliminate conflict. In pragmatic nonviolence, nonviolence is a weapon engaged in conflict – basically, a soldier without arms.

Pragmatic nonviolent practitioners do not use physical means to convince opponents to change, but they use coercion as a tactic. According to Stiehm:

Even though it utilizes coercion and even illegal techniques this type of nonviolence professes to be part of the democratic process since it assumes that victory (which goes with the stronger side) will usually go to

the side with the largest number of supporters; thus, the majority rules.
(1968: 26)

Creating a situation where the opponent feels compelled to change their behaviour for their own interest is coercive. The practitioners' tactics force that need for change in the opponent.

Pragmatic Nonviolence

In the struggle against the Wall, Palestinians utilize unarmed pragmatic nonviolence methods against Israel's militarized army. Pragmatic nonviolence relies on a group to be precise in their decision-making methods. According to Johansen, the pragmatic approach "regards nonviolent actions as being important and effective as political tools, as a collection of techniques, and as a means for communication, for revolutions, for a social movement, and for a system of defense" (2007: 145). Strategic nonviolence mimics war, but as they oppose violence, practitioners are unarmed. For Dudouet, "It involves the waging of 'battles,' requires wise strategy and tactics, employs numerous 'weapons,' and demands courage, discipline and sacrifice of its 'soldiers' (2008: 7). Scholar Gene Sharp, who was once an avid follower and student of Gandhi's principled nonviolence approach, focused on pragmatic nonviolence. He adapted a strategic model widely known today in Peace Studies. According to Dudouet, Sharp "justifies the recourse to civil resistance on strategic grounds" (2008: 7). For Sharp, pragmatic nonviolence is a tool utilized in conflict, and numerous methods are used in this approach (1973).

According to Weber, "Nonviolent action is a strategy for imperfect people in an imperfect world" (2003: 257). Sharp uses the pragmatic approach to develop a precise

strategy that anyone interested can use. His perspective allows various practitioners to adopt nonviolence without the judgments of their morality. Sharp distinguishes between belief systems and techniques for those engaged in a nonviolent movement. For Sharp, the pragmatic approach is a way of conducting nonviolence, not resolving or eliminating it (1973). He refers to nonviolence as a way to act as if in a war, except one side is unarmed: “It involves the matching of forces and the waging of ‘battles,’ requires wise strategy and tactics, and demands of its ‘soldiers’ courage, discipline, and sacrifice” (Sharp, 1973: 67). Strategic nonviolence is a political way of dealing with social and political issues. For Sharp, nonviolence is “one response to the problem of how to act effectively in politics, especially how to wield power” (1973: 64). In this model, coercion can defeat the opponent if it forces them to change their mind without any will or agreement, and in the process, changing the situation’s power dynamics.

Forms of Nonviolent Resistance

The Palestinian popular movement utilizes various nonviolent resistance methods in their struggle against the occupation. Sharp examines various methods, such as nonviolent protests, nonviolent noncooperation, nonviolent intervention, nonviolent direct action, nonviolent revolution, and civil disobedience (1973). These forms are typically used in pragmatic nonviolence actions, and some forms of principled nonviolence utilize these methods as well.

Nonviolent protests pursue persuasion through symbolic acts, such as protests, slogans, formal statements, dramatic and musical performances, and memorializing actions. These acts can usefully share information with a wide audience, but typically do

not effectively transform situations. According to Johansen, “Nonviolent protests are actions of peaceful opposition but do not go as far as refusing to cooperate or directly intervene” (2007: 149). Alternatively, nonviolent noncooperation much more effectively coerces opponents, and can occur in the context of social noncooperation, economic noncooperation and political noncooperation. The point is “to decrease or withdraw completely the normal level of cooperation” which “changes the power relation between the actors” (Johansen, 2007: 149). Psychological interventions like fasting and physical interventions like nonviolent obstruction are forms of pragmatic resistance. Although these forms of nonviolent intervention are useful, their effectiveness often depends on the participation of third parties. For Johansen, “Some of these actions are there to support the local civil society; others are carried out as ‘third’ parties acting with their own agendas” (2007: 149). Nonviolent direct action, another form of resistance, uses physical actions in order to force change. Such forms of direct action are sit-ins, strikes, vandalism or graffiti. Some other widely used forms of direct action are street theater and street projections. Civil disobedience, also a form of direct action, is the active refusal to obey certain laws. Civil disobedience resisters can use numerous tactics, such as peacefully blocking an area or occupying a facility. Nonviolent revolution, which consists of a significant change occurring in a relatively short period of time using nonviolent means, is difficult to obtain. This is only possible if governments do not take brutal measures against protesters, which is rare. Nonviolent revolutions did occur between 2000 and 2005 in post-communist, Eastern European countries in the colored (or flower) revolutions. There are numerous ways to use pragmatic nonviolent methods to combat an enemy; these are merely a few examples of the most widely used. Although these

methods are grounded in nonviolence theory, not all practitioners identify with the concept of nonviolence.

Nonviolence is not a concept accepted by all resistance activists. Peter Gelderloos takes an anarchist approach to understanding nonviolence in his critique entitled, *How Nonviolence Protects the State*. Gelderloos highlights how nonviolence is ineffective through its use of patriarchy and racism, which ultimately gives more power to the state. He argues that nonviolence “has implicit and explicit connections to white people’s manipulations of the struggles of people of color.” (2007: 8) He discusses how violence is already present for people of color, and that “pacifism assumes that white people who grew up in the suburbs with all their basic needs met can counsel oppressed people, many of whom are people of color, to suffer patiently under an inconceivably greater violence” (2007: 33) Gelderloos’ argument is based on critiquing the theory of principled nonviolence, which focuses on a pacifist tradition. In Palestine, the majority of nonviolent resisters use pragmatic nonviolence, but there are entire organizations, such as al Watan center in Hebron, that take a principled approach to nonviolence education and resistance. In the Palestinian context, nonviolence as a concept is not widely accepted due to the many reasons Gelderloos highlights. In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, resistance is referred to as popular resistance as a way to maintain ownership of the movement away from the white western perspective.

Not all resistance movements use nonviolence as a means of struggle. In the case of Palestinians, violent resistance has been utilized in an effort to achieve self-determination. As Wendy Pearlman highlights in her analysis of Palestinian violent and nonviolent resistance, “movements rarely use violent or nonviolent protest to the

complete exclusion of the other” (2011: 4). Violence has proven ineffective as a resistance model, and has set back the Palestinian cause due to the increase of Israeli violence. Nonviolent activism has always been a characteristic of Palestinian resistance, and the grassroots have utilized various strategic methods in the hopes to achieve their goal of self-determination, including the use of stone throwing at nonviolent demonstrations, “For movements that espouse armed struggle, a shift towards stone throwing represents a decrease in the violent character of the protest” (Pearlman, 2011: 4). In the case of Palestinian resistance against the Wall, pragmatic nonviolence is utilized, with the addition of stone throwing, in an attempt to combat the highly militarized Israeli army. Movements can define their own struggles, take techniques from strategic nonviolence, and adapt unarmed movements within their own cultural contexts and local understandings of resistance.

Popular Struggle

In the Palestinian context, although resisters’ tactics are often nonviolent, the people do not typically use the term “nonviolence” to describe their struggle. However, as there is a great power imbalance between the heavily armed Israeli military and the indigenous Palestinian people, nonviolent tactics are viewed as the most effective and an essential way to resist pragmatically. According to Beshara Doumani, Palestinians need to use nonviolent tactics, even if they are not based on a principled ideology, “Palestinians cannot afford to give up the moral high ground by resorting to tactics and strategies that allow for indiscriminate violence” (2007: 62). Violence escalates violence, and due to the power imbalance, Palestinian armed resistance has been ineffective and

harmful to the overall population. Nonviolent tactics could disrupt the “violent Palestinians” narrative, but this is not the main reason this form of resistance is used. Palestinians utilize unarmed means because it is the most effective form of resistance against the heavily armed Israeli military. Fayez, a farmer and activist leader from Tulkarm, described the need to take up nonviolent tactics of resistance as a strategic move for Palestinian people living under occupation:

We need to play on our side, not on the Israeli side. The Israeli side is strong army, they have the tanks, the jeeps, the planes (f16), and they have the atom bomb. With the violence ... we cannot do anything when we need to go to play with this [violent] side. But with our side, when we took the nonviolence way, I think it's very good for us. We can show all the people in the world that we are in the right, and we have important idea, and this means we need to have our freedom.³

Although the Palestinian movement has been using nonviolent tactics, the movement is referred to as a “popular struggle” throughout the Occupied Territory, not “nonviolent resistance movement,” as international and Israeli communities often refer to it.

Palestinians prefer to use the term “popular struggle” (*muqawameh sha'abiyeh* in Arabic), when discussing this resistance movement against Israeli violence. George Rishmawi, an activist from Beit Sahour, explained how people understand these two words: “Popular struggle [Palestinian] people immediately think about struggling against the occupation. This [word] became attached to it.”⁴ Countless Palestinians I interviewed understood the Arabic term *laa 'oonph* (“nonviolence”) to mean “no resistance,” and also found the term too passive an identifier for Palestinian resistance. George described how over time using the word “resistance” after “nonviolence” transformed some minds, but

³ Interview with Fayez. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

⁴ Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

the linguistic change still did not carry the same meaning as “popular struggle” for the people inside the West Bank. As Palestinians related to the word “popular struggle” with regard to general resistance for self-determination, this term was the most effective descriptor of local resistance against the Wall and Occupation. “Popular” is a term Palestinians use to identify the people rising up together. According to Dudouet, “Popular participation in demonstrations and civil disobedience increased the unity of the resistance, creating connections across factions, age groups, social and geographical divisions” (2008: 14). “Popular struggle” can mean unarmed resistance against the occupation and can avoid dealing with the conceptual issues surrounding “nonviolence.” George explained: “There is no difference in the technique, and it’s a matter of terminology.”⁵ The meaning of the word “nonviolence” is subjective and there is a “western” connotation. Searching for peace in Israel/Palestine has been a topic for mainstream media outlets and political and academic circles, who typically identify the situation as a conflict rather than an occupation. This labeling positions Palestinians as violent aggressors and Israelis as victims. Countless international peace practitioners think that peace will manifest if Palestinians use nonviolence, rather than if Israel withholds violence. This is another reason why Howard Clark prefers the term, “unarmed resistance” instead of “nonviolence”:

It is more accurate in situations where there is a threat of violence, a measure of counter-violence (such as stone throwing), or where a movement has an armed wing but adopts “unarmed” methods in many circumstances as do the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico and Palestinians. (2009: 4)

⁵ Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

Using the term “popular struggle,” which suggests unarmed resistance, the Palestinian people define their anti-occupation, anti-colonial struggle using both tactics under the rubric of nonviolence, and including another, local method of resistance, stone throwing.



Boy with slingshot hiding from the Israeli military. Bil'in 2005

As nonviolence practitioners typically view stone-throwing as violent, numerous Palestinians do not use the term “nonviolence” to describe their movement. However, as they do not view stones as weapons, Palestinians view their struggle as unarmed. Although Palestinians have utilized unarmed techniques, outsiders who attempt to define this movement disapprove of the use of stones. Mazen Qumsiyeh contextualized the resistance in Palestine:

When you have an unarmed society and you have an armed colonial settler that is using extreme violence to kick us off our land, people resist it, as I said, with a variety of methods, hundreds of methods. Some people choose to throw stones, small number of people.⁶

There are numerous stones on the ground in the West Bank, and some people use them to resist the military violence they encounter while attempting to stay on their land.

⁶ Interview with Mazen Qumsiyeh. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

However, not all Palestinian activists utilize stones. Even those who choose not to use stones still find the action of stone throwing incomparable to Israeli violence. According to Ayed Morrar from Budrus:

The stone in Palestine doesn't target to kill, or to affect seriously the other side. They [Palestinian people] want to show the people that we are strong, we can dare you, and we can stop you. You aren't our destiny, we have another alternative, and we don't agree for your occupation. We have our own power to stop you.⁷

Richard Falk would agree: "Reliance on symbolic and low-tech violence (stone throwing), especially if directed at military or illegal and armed settler personnel, seems clearly to be permissible given the present conditions of occupation" (2002: 27). The violence the Palestinian people endure on a daily basis from a heavily armed military is viewed as an acceptable reason to take up stones and hurl them at armed Israeli soldiers. Stone throwing causes outside practitioners to question whether the movement is nonviolent, but locals largely accept the act. Dudouet highlights this point:

The use of stones by Palestinian youth embodied this principle of turning the opponent's superior force to one's own advantage. Strategically, the Israeli army was not trained for such a type of non-lethal guerrilla warfare. Symbolically, the battle of stones against tanks and automatic weapons represents an unfair fight: the massive Israeli retaliation upset the status quo by damaging morale in the army's troops and increasing public sympathy for the Palestinians. (2008: 16)

Stones were an integral part of the First *Intifada*, which is understood as a nonviolent movement. These same tactics have been utilized during the resistance against the Wall. For George, stone throwing is relatively safe depending on the situation: "Stone throwing at army jeeps or tanks, you know 100% that you aren't harming anyone when you are

⁷ Interview with Ayed Morrar, Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. January 2007.

throwing the stone at the tank.”⁸ He shared, however, that he would intervene if he saw stone throwing at a demonstration against the Wall – he does not believe it is wrong, but it gives the army a reason to attack the demonstrators. George quickly added that soldiers attack demonstrators even if no one has thrown a stone. Whether stones have been thrown or not, the Israeli army appears to respond to each demonstration the same way: with violence towards the demonstrators. Jamal from the Stop the Wall campaign, an organization that supports the villages in the resistance to the Wall, defended the stone throwing:

Here you are facing a military, a military who came and started shooting at you immediately, and they killing you, so don't ask us not even to react to this in our ways. Don't take out of us, of our hands, our own experience that we built in the nonviolence as Palestinians.⁹

Jamal asserted that the Palestinian people know how to resist and do not need suggestions from the international or Israeli communities. The Palestinian people want to own their own movement without the interference of others. The term “popular struggle” allows Palestinians to maintain their power and defines the movement more precisely than the term “nonviolence.”

⁸ Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

⁹ Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.



Young boys throwing stones at the bulldozers and the military jeep during the construction of the Wall. Beit Liqia. March 2004.

Although Palestinians have decided to use nonviolent tactics in the popular uprising against Israeli violence, they are still asked repeatedly to use nonviolence when discussing resistance inside the Territories. In 2005, a conference was held in Bethlehem in cooperation with the Holy Land Trust organization. The Stop the Wall campaign was invited to speak at the conference, and 600 people from around the world attended. Jamal asked the audience one question: “How many conferences, how many of you have been to Israel and conduct such a meeting, or training courses, or conferences? Why us? We are the ones who are aggressive and savage? It is accusing us that we are violent.”¹⁰ The typical narrative is that Palestinians are violent; therefore, they need to be educated in nonviolence, even when they are resisting a violent army without the use of arms. However, although the Israeli army causes great violence for the Israeli people’s “security,” no one makes an effort to educate the Israeli population on how to be nonviolent. According to Jamal Juma, “We organized thousands of demonstrations since

¹⁰ Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

2002, not a single bullet has been shot at the demonstrations, not a single one.”¹¹ The international community should recognize Israel violence and support the Palestinian people's right to self-determination via their popular struggle against the brutal occupation. Essentially, the international community needs to recognize the violence Israel imposes daily on the Palestinian population and it needs to put more pressure on Israel to decrease their violence against this population. Due to the power asymmetries between the civilian Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Israeli army, it is essential that the people use methods that will support them in their goals for self-determination. In the face of extreme violence, it might seem trivial to utilize these methods, but although they are unable to defeat the violence, they are effective in exposing it. As Dudouet observed: “Although the power of nonviolent resistance does seem weak and inefficient in the face of acute power asymmetries, it has proven to be a very strategic tool in the hand of marginalized communities to redress structural imbalance and claim rights to justice or self determination” (2008: 2). The unarmed movement highlights Israel’s violence, rather than continuing the mainstream narrative of violent Palestinians. According to Richard Jackson:

It will also re-focus attention on power asymmetries, the much-greater lethality and destruction of structural and cultural violence, the key concept of justice, the necessity of abandoning the morally dubious but dominant approach to neutrality in conflict management, the importance and role of (nonviolent) resistance in achieving social justice and local peace, and the key issue of pacifism and anti-violence, among others. (2015: 21)

To achieve peace in Palestine, civil resistance must be employed against the violence triangle. Starting with the structural violence of the Wall, and thus the Israeli occupation,

¹¹ Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

popular struggle can begin to shift the balance of power. Civil resistance can be a pathway to transform the cyclical existence of violence into peace.

The Researcher

Personally, I came to this work from my mixed religious identity. I am the daughter of a Moroccan Muslim father and an American Jewish mother. My Jewish identity specifically brought me to this work. I grew up in a Zionist household, like most American Jewish families. My synagogue taught about Israel, but always from the Jewish perspective of persecution. As I obtained more formal education, I became more interested in the “Palestinian/Israeli Conflict.” In 2003, when I was in my mid-twenties, I traveled to Israel for the first time to learn more about what the mainstream media and my synagogue had taught me. On that trip, my religious identity as a Jew and extensive documentation from my local Rabbi enabled me to extend my visa for six months. As my name is Islamic, I was forced to prove my Judaism to receive the privileges Israel allots to Jews. After resisting the Wall as a political solidarity activist with numerous Palestinian villages for six months, I returned to the U.S. and applied for *Aliyah*¹². Although I recognized the issues I would face living in Israel with an Islamic name, I was not fully aware of the significance of this action. I lived in Israel for roughly ten months after that, and continued resisting the Wall. As time passed, the ID I had acquired became a personal and political issue for me. I was taking advantage of my identity privilege, which is based on a racist system, while Israel did not recognize the basic rights of the Palestinian communities I was working with. I attempted to renounce my Israeli

¹² Based on the ‘Law of Return’, which views Jewish people in diaspora the right to ‘return’ to the state of Israel and become an Israeli citizen.

citizenship in 2005, a year and a half after I had received it. The process to attain Israeli citizenship had taken me roughly 30 minutes in an US based Jewish Agency office to prove my Judaism, but renouncing it took over a year. Eventually, I was able to successfully give up this privilege that I had never deserved. As I continued my solidarity work, I grew as an activist and as a scholar.



Palestinian activists with a sign in Spanish that reads: Palestine is our land, no justice, no peace. Beit Ula November 2004

Methodology

In this research, I mixed qualitative research methods to obtain data for the ethnographic case study. I conducted fieldwork intermittently from 2003 to 2013. As a participant observer and solidarity activist, I immersed myself in the popular struggle against the Wall from 2003 to 2005. This method was necessary for my project.

Jorgensen notes:

Participant observation, whereby the researcher interacts with people in everyday life while collecting information, is a unique method for investigating the enormously rich, complex, conflictual, problematic, and

diverse experiences, thoughts, feelings, and activities of human beings and the meanings of their existence. (Jorgensen, 2015)

In addition, I photographed the struggle against the Wall as it traveled throughout the villages, documenting the land destruction and the resistance movement as part of a visual ethnography. As Jan Brace-Govan asserts, “Visual ethnography is an anthropological approach that incorporates visibility throughout the research process” (2007: 736). I used thousands of images I captured from 2003 – 2013 to visually investigate and illustrate the processes of violence I was analyzing.

The images I captured during the several years I was working on the ground provided a historical archive for this period of time, and were documented as visual symbols of injustice. According to Thomas Olesen, visual injustice symbols occur when suffering is not only photographed, but also when the images convey meaning beyond the photo itself (2011: 4). My photography during the struggle against the Wall not only documented the resistance movement, but also captured daily life under occupation. This body of work was part of a larger narrative of violence and resistance. Essentially, these images were “snapshots of a reality more or less accidentally witnessed by the photographer” (Olesen 2011: 4). I then used these images in the larger context of anti-occupation activism. Photographs are often used by activists for political objectives, and have the ability to move beyond textual analysis. As Olesen notes,

In the process of infusing a photograph with an injustice meaning, activists draw on injustice frames located in the political-cultural structure of society; second, once created, visual injustice symbols themselves enter the political culture and memory structure, of society to become potential resources in subsequent activism (Olesen, 2011: 5).

Visual injustice symbols, as a political tool, support peace framing. Peace framing positions images taken within conflict areas through the human-interest perspective. According to Semtko and Valkenburg, as quoted in Bruce, the human-interest frame “brings a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem” (Semetko & Valkenburg qtd in Bruce, 2010: 5). Peace framing uses the human-interest frame to express a civilian perspective of violence. This is in contrast to the widely used journalistic perspective of conflict framing. Conflict framing “is most often communicated through a focus of present events and political or military leaders rather than on soldiers and civilian victims” (Greenwood and Jenkins: 2013: 210). My photography exposes the human interest, the indigenous population that is subjected to Israeli military violence. Participant observation research connected me to my subject, which is typical when using photography as data. As Brace-Govan argues, “a closeness is constructed between the photographer and the photographed (2007: 741). My visual work also highlights the Israeli soldiers, which supports the claim that it is not only the system that oppresses, but is implemented through militarized labor. The use of photos in this visual ethnography supports the argument within the texts, providing it more depth by expressing what the violence of the occupation looks like as it is being discussed.

Using photos in this dissertation helps to reframe the occupation from the mainstream narrative, which essentially sees Palestinians as violent, to one of Israel as the cause of the violence. Re-framing the narrative is essential when focusing on the Israel/Palestine. Mohamed Elmasry, in his analysis of how two major US newspapers, the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune*, framed the Second Palestinian *Intifada*, highlights of US mainstream media bias towards Israel. In his study he finds that whether a

Palestinian or an Israeli is killed that the news was framed “in such a way as to legitimate Israeli killings by implicitly justifying Israeli violence and assigning more prominence to the Israeli perspective” (Elmasry 2009: 1). Elmasry isn’t the only scholar to discuss the mainstream media bias towards Israel. Amahl Bishara highlights in depth in her book *Back Stories: U.S. News Production and Palestinian Politics*, the methods that are used by western journalists, in collaboration with Palestinian labor, to report on the Second Intifada. She states, “many Palestinians are deeply concerned about how they and their struggle are represented in U.S. and other Western media” (Bishara, 2012: 12). Her subjects feel that they are represented through the lens of the West, both in regards to western values and through mainstream narrative (Bishara, 2012: 12). Due to mainstream media framing of the events that occur in Israel/Palestine, peace framing, and the use of visual injustice symbols, are necessary to support the textual analysis and essentially reframe the narrative to Israel as violent and Palestinian as victim to that violence.

Testimonials were used in addition to photography as another data set. From 2006 to 2013, I conducted in-depth interviews with individuals from various Palestinian communities affected by the Wall since the construction began. I collected narratives from 40 Palestinian residents living inside the Occupied Territory of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and analyzed them to understand the effects of the Wall and the resistance movement against it. I traveled from north of the West Bank in Tulkarm to the South Hebron Hills (the southernmost point of the West Bank) to gather testimonials from residents in both rural and urban environments.

There are a few perspectives absent from this paper, which should be noted. The lack of a strong female voice is not due to the lack of women engaged in the resistance

movement against the Wall. Women have always played a vital role in the resistance against the occupation, and are actively involved in resisting the Wall. As Mary King describes in relation to women's resistance post 1967, "the women's movement that remained in the occupied territories proceeded to put down deep roots and become central to the process of civilian mobilization" (King, 2007: 95). I intentionally searched for women I had personally encountered while participating in the resistance when conducting the first-hand interviews. It should also be noted that there was a large contingent of Israeli activists that are missing from these stories. This was intentionally omitted from my dissertation due to my desire to specifically focus on the indigenous struggle against the Wall. As a solidarity activist, I must give some credit to Israeli groups that did risk their safety in solidarity during the struggle against the Wall, specifically the Anarchists Against the Wall, with whom I traveled with on numerous occasions in the Occupied Territories.

My work in Palestine began late in the winter of 2003, when I first arrived. I attended a "peace conference" in East Jerusalem, where I met a South African solidarity activist. She brought me to the village of Mas'ha, where local women were discussing the Mas'ha Peace Tent and the villagers' struggle before my arrival. That same day, we traveled from the Salfit region village to the Ramallah district, where Budrus village is. When we arrived, a group of international activists were sitting in Ayed Morrar's yard. Morrar, the local village leader, was not present. I then learned that the Israeli military had taken him from his bed the previous night to attempt to suppress the resistance. The following day, the village continued to struggle against the Wall in Morrar's absence, and another local stood in as the leader. I began to document the struggle with my camera,

resisting the Wall in solidarity with the Palestinian people. As the Wall's construction moved south, the other activists and I followed in support of the local communities affected by the Wall. I lived in Palestine until 2005, when I returned to the U.S. to share my photos and the resistance stories.

I returned to Palestine in 2006 to conduct research on the resistance to the Wall for my master's degree. Within three months, the amount of time my tourist visa would allow, I interviewed fifteen prominent activists resisting the Wall. In the summer of 2013, I returned for a three-month period to continue the long-term study of the Wall for this dissertation. I met with several villagers to discuss new events and conducted more interviews to expand my data set. In 2006 and 2013, I hired translators to assist with interviews. In 2013, I also hired a local driver as a guide and for safety. I conducted the majority of the interviews in person in the West Bank and two by way of the telephone and in English. I interviewed Palestinian residents in Arabic to avoid introducing language privilege into the research and limiting the number of people I could speak with. I interviewed a wide range of the Palestinian population throughout the West Bank: the elderly, municipality workers, middle-aged people, mothers, fathers, Muslims, Christians, and even young organizers. In 2006, I recruited most of my first interviewees with the help of the Stop the Wall Campaign. In 2013, the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, a Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization focused on accessing the damages of the Wall, helped me recruit interviewees. On both trips, I interviewed people I knew personally from my years of solidarity work. A lot of the people I spoke with were initially suspicious and asked me numerous questions before they let me interview them. They feared repercussions for speaking on the record about the current situation of

Palestinians. Several shared that as they were targeted after they protested, they feared punishment from the Israeli military. Others wanted those outside the region to know the realities on the ground and willingly shared their stories without concern. Several residents asked me to use their first name only to conceal their identity. Those who I had known from my involvement in the resistance were overjoyed when I returned to their village. Almost all the people I interviewed regarding the resistance to the Wall remembered me from when I took photos, and they eagerly shared both their stories of resistance and the consequences they faced for their actions. I brought compact discs containing numerous images of the struggles to each village for their historical archives. The interviewees were happy to learn that people outside of Palestine were able to see my photographic images of their struggle. They were also very happy that I was continuing to work on this cause in solidarity. I currently use the narratives to inform predominantly American audiences about the ongoing resistance movement.

Overview of Chapters

This dissertation is comprised of three parts that comprehensively examine the occupation of the West Bank, the Apartheid Wall, and the popular, Palestinian led resistance movement. Part 1 contextualizes the occupation, Part 2 overviews the Wall's violence, and Part 3 illustrates the indigenous people's response to the violence through an unarmed resistance movement that has lasted for several years. Part 1 consists of two chapters to contextualize the realities on the ground. Chapter 1 first summarizes pre-Israel, Palestinian history through Ottoman rule. Next, it overviews Israel's colonizing efforts, highlighting several crucial historical events: the 1948 *al-Nakba*, the 1967 *al-*

Naksa, the 1989 First *Intifada*, the 1993 Oslo Accords, and the 2000 Second *Intifada*. These events contextualize the focus of this dissertation and the newest colonial project: the Apartheid Wall. Chapter 1 next focuses on judicial justice and lack thereof, examining two Israeli High Court cases that speak to the dangers of the Wall: the Beir Surik case and the Alfei Menashe case. Chapter 2 illustrates how the violence triangle functions within the contemporary Occupied Territory of the West Bank by discussing its history. Additionally, Chapter 2 details the violence triangle by exploring structural, direct and cultural violence as isolated, yet mutually reinforcing aspects of West Bank violence.

The second part of the dissertation utilizes first-hand testimonies to detail how Israel employs the violence triangle in establishing the Apartheid Wall. Chapter 3 explains how Israel uses the Wall to dispossess the Palestinian people of their lands and resources in order to build and expand Israeli settlements. Illustrating how Israel confiscates Palestinian lands through the construction the Wall, and demonstrating how violence operates through the Wall's path, Chapter 3 stresses the dangers the Wall poses to Palestinians residing in the Occupied Territory. Next, Chapter 3 explores how the Wall's path directly affects each region, from North of the West Bank, to the mid-Salfit region, to the West Ramallah district villages, to the Northwest Jerusalem villages, and lastly to the area near Bethlehem City, Al Walaja village. The chapter showcases narratives from Palestinians affected by the Wall to expose the violence of dispossession through the Wall's establishment. The chapter discusses how Palestinian resisters use court cases to utilize the Israeli judicial system in search for justice, with few positive

outcomes. Chapter 3 concludes by investigating how the Palestinian people were first informed about the Wall on their lands and summarizing the Wall's impact.

Chapter 4 analyzes how Israel uses the Wall and other structural violence implements, such as checkpoints, gates, road closures, and bypass and tunnel roads, to restrict Palestinian movement within the West Bank. This chapter explains how Palestinians experience the effects of restricted movement – access to labor, the costs of time and money, and daily harassment, and how, by constructing the Wall, Israel has unilaterally redrawn the border without political negotiations.

Chapter 5 explores the case of the Jerusalem Envelope, where Israel has implemented an unequal ID system to restrict Palestinians' access to the city and access to services there. This chapter focuses on two major Jerusalem suburbs, Abu Dis and Al Ram. These suburbs are a few miles from Jerusalem, but the Wall disconnects both suburbs from the city. Chapter 5 further explores the structural violence of the checkpoints where Israeli soldiers monitor and limit Palestinian access to the holy city. This chapter examines the revitalized E1 plan to exclude Palestinian-populated areas from the Jerusalem Envelope, while including Israeli settlements, thus transforming the city's demographics. This plan profoundly restricts Palestinians' access to medical care. Chapter 5 argues that Israel uses the Wall in the Jerusalem Envelope as a political strategy to isolate Palestinian claims to the holy city.

The third part of the dissertation (Chapter 6) examines the civil resistance movement that began as a direct response to the violence of the Wall, through an analysis of Wall-resisters' first-hand testimonials. This chapter reviews a brief history of Palestinians' resistance, examining the anti-Wall resistance that took place between 2002

and 2013. The chapter explores the important political formations involved and resistance approaches and tools, such as local popular committees, activists' solidarity with the Palestinian people, and the use of media and nonviolent tactics. Personal testimonies expose resistance methods, the Israeli army's direct violence against activists, and the Palestinian Authority's neglect and dismissal. These are the realities on the ground for the civil actors in this nonviolent resistance movement against the brutal Israeli occupation.

Part 1
Historical Context

It is essential to understand the history of Palestine to fully grasp the ongoing violence triangle that Israel employs in the contemporary Occupied Palestinian Territory of the West Bank. The violence Palestinians experience in the West Bank is a continuation of Israeli aggression, which has lasted over the past sixty years. To maintain control, Israel has utilized the violence triangle to colonize the lands and clear them of the indigenous peoples since it was established as a state in 1948.

Palestine was not an independent state before Israel was established, but Palestinians aspired to statehood when the British departed in 1947. Israel has still not recognized this dream; the extreme violence Israel has continued to employ to maintain total control over the lands and its indigenous people demonstrate this. The violence of colonization began in 1948 with *al-Nakba*, when the nascent Israeli state conquered the majority of Palestinian lands and massacred the local people. In 1967, another colonizing opportunity presented itself to the Israeli state: Israel brought the West Bank and Gaza under its control. This, also known as “the occupation,” brought with it strict military laws applicable to Palestinians residing in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and no opportunities for change coming from the Israeli state. The indigenous Palestinian people

resisted the ongoing Israeli violence two times in an effort to force a change: in 1989 during the First *Intifada*, and again in 2000 during the Second *Intifada*. These uprisings illustrated Israel's lack of total control over the Palestinian people. As a result, Israel increased the ever-present violence triangle to maintain more control over the indigenous people and ultimately maintain its long-lasting occupation without concessions.

Recognizing its loose grip on the Palestinian people, Israel designed and implemented several enhanced and integrated forms of direct, structural and cultural violence to conquer the land and the people. Israel had actively used the violence triangle since the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948, but over time, it enhanced these three forms of violence to escalate its domination over the occupied population. With each oppressive move, Israel improved their use of direct, structural and cultural violence to combat the occupied population, and to further their settler colonial plans. Chapters 1 and 2 explore the historical events that occurred, putting current events into context. It is essential to understand this history of violence in order to better imagine and plan how to work toward an envisioned peaceful future.

Chapter 1

Palestine: A Historical Context

It is imperative to understand the history of modern day Palestine in order to grasp the complexities of the current occupation. For centuries, occupying entities have controlled the indigenous people. Palestinians have never experienced independence as a sovereign nation state. As the occupiers have changed, the indigenous desire for statehood has increased, and varying forms of violence have been used to repress the people. This continuum of control over the land most recently resulted in the settler-colonial state of Israel. Although Israel is not the first occupier of Palestine, the contemporary occupation has been extremely violent in achieving settler-colonial domination.

This chapter will highlight five main historical events to give greater context to the establishment of the Apartheid Wall. I will discuss three moments in history where Israel used varying forms of violence to gain control over the land: the *Nakba*, the *Naksa*, and the Oslo Accords. I will also discuss the First *Intifada* and the Second *Intifada* movements, which were direct responses to Israel's violence, but which utilized different tactics. Each of these events has permanently shifted the realities on the ground. Collectively, these five points in history culminated in the establishment of the Apartheid

Wall. The most recent symptom of Israel's long-lasting domination over the Palestinian people, the Wall has continued the violence to further the colonial endeavors.

Ottoman Rule

Prior to Israel's colonization of Palestinian land, the Ottoman Empire controlled the area. As early as 1516 CE, the Ottoman Empire conquered the entire Middle East. This area was known then as greater Syria. The Ottomans maintained total control of the lands, using Arab clans to perform local governmental duties (Smith, 2001). Then Ottoman rule began to decline, and according to Mazin Qumsiyeh, "The fate of the Palestinians was being drawn elsewhere by politicians who had scant regard for the local population. The British schemed to divide up the Arab world with France under the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916." (2011: 47).

After World War I, in 1917, the Ottoman Empire was conquered and divided by European powers. The European colonial expansion began in the Middle East. France took control of Syria and Lebanon. In what became known as the British Mandate, Britain colonized Iraq, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan. On November 2nd, 1917, Arthur James Balfour, the British foreign secretary, wrote a letter to Lord Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community. The letter declared that the country of Palestine was to be given to the Zionist entity as a new homeland. This letter, which became known as the Balfour Declaration, was a crucial turning point in the history of Palestine (Peretz, 1996). At this time, Jewish communities in Eastern Europe were under attack in pogroms, which Zionists used to leverage their claims to Palestinian land. Balfour's letter declared that the Zionists' interests did not clash with the interests of the indigenous population (Pappe,

2004). The British remained in Palestine until 1948. They eventually left, due to resistance from both Jewish and Palestinian inhabitants. Several Jewish terrorist gangs carried out large-scale attacks, which prompted the British to leave. At this time, Israel dominated the indigenous Palestinian population and maintained control over the land.

al-Nakba

Israel's statehood project began long before the state was instituted. In 1947, strategies to conquer the land were put into action. The British started to relinquish control and the United Nations (UN), only two years old at the time, became involved in the fate of Palestine. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) visited the country and recommended to the UN General Assembly that the land be divided into two side-by-side states. This partition would split the land into one state for the Zionist movement, and one state for the indigenous Palestinians. Jerusalem would be left under the administration of the UN, established as *corpus separatum* (Pappe, 2007). On November 29th, 1947, the Zionist movement accepted the partition plan. This plan is officially known as UN General Assembly resolution 181 (United Nations, 1947). The Arab League declined the plan because the land was being taken away from the indigenous people for the Jewish minority. To accept a small piece of land would undermine Palestinians' self-determination and statehood.

The partition of the land brought forth extensive violence. The British began evacuating the country in February 1947. From December 1947 to May 15th 1948, when the last British soldier left Palestine, numerous indigenous people were murdered. Israel massacred entire communities and exiled the rest. As Israeli historian Ilan Pappé noted,

“By the time the British left in the middle of May, one-third of the Palestinian population had already been evicted” (2004: 131). Israel maintained the violence until the majority of the land was conquered, confiscating more lands than the partition had initially allotted.



The violence prompted the Arab league to advance troops to defend the Palestinians. During April and May of 1948, Zionists put what they called Plan D into action.

Plan D was put into full operation in April and May. It had two very clear objectives, the first being to take swiftly and systematically any installation, military or civilian, evacuated by the British. The second and far more important, objective of the plan was to cleanse the future Jewish state of as many Palestinians as possible. The main military force was the Hagana, which had several brigades. Each brigade received a list of villages it was to occupy. Most of the villages were destined to be destroyed, and only in very exceptional cases were the soldiers ordered to leave them intact. (Pappe, 2004: 130)

On May 14th, 1948, at 4:00 PM, in Tel Aviv, Israel was officially proclaimed a state. Palestinians call this prominent historical event the *Nakba*, (which means “catastrophe” in Arabic), while Zionists call it the War of Independence. This event marked the beginning of the Zionist control over the land and its residents.

The fighting lasted for over a year. In 1949, a cease-fire was declared. Shaul Cohen wrote, “Under the Labor Party, Israel signed the armistice treaties with its Arab neighbors, including the 1949 agreement with Jordan that created the Green Line” (2006: 688). Armistice lines, also known as the Green-Line, were established, separating the land into sections under the Armistice agreement. Egypt would control Gaza and the Trans-Jordan Army would control eastern Palestine, now known as the West Bank (which includes East Jerusalem). The rest of the land was annexed and controlled by the newly formed state of Israel (Peretz, 1996). This division was maintained for twenty years, until more violence erupted and Israel occupied more land.

Naksa/1967 War

Israel maintained control of land conquered in 1948, while Egypt and Jordan continued to control the West Bank and Gaza. Tensions grew in the twenty years following the *Nakba*. The surrounding Arab countries aligned with Palestinian

communities in a new battle with the Israelis. Palestinians refer to this war as the *Naksa*, which translates to “setback” or “relapse,” but the Israelis know it as the Six-Day War.

The *Naksa* began on the 14th of May, 1967. Egyptian forces approached the border of Israel from inside the Sinai Peninsula, due to misinformation from the Soviet Union about a direct threat to Syria along the northern borders. Egypt quickly emerged as a Palestinian ally against Israel and Jordan soon followed. On June 5th, 1967, Israel enacted a preemptive strike to stall any Arab attack. Israeli Air Forces attacked the bases of Egypt, as well as bases in Syria, Jordan, and Iraq (Peretz, 1996). Israeli ground forces attacked Gaza and the Sinai at the same time. Within three days, Israel had seized Gaza and all of the Sinai. Jordan was quickly defeated, leaving Israel to occupy the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. On June 10th the Golan Heights were taken from Syria, and Israel was seen as a dominating force. It took the Israeli army six days to defeat and conquer the rest of historical Palestine. Israel almost immediately began to build illegal Jewish settlements throughout the West Bank and Gaza. The transferring of their population into the areas they occupied is illegal through UN Security Council Resolution 242 (United Nations, 1967). Israel’s plan was to conquer all Palestinian land and colonize it with their settler populations.

Israeli settlements began to flourish inside the West Bank and Gaza, now known as the Occupied Territories. In 1979 all of the Sinai, except for Taba, were returned to Egypt as the result of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Israel maintained control of the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank, and continues to occupy them today. Israel claims that the 2005 withdrawal of settlements in the Gaza Strip represent its return

to Palestinian leadership, yet Israel still controls all access via land and sea and restricts all movement in and out of the area.



First Intifada

Utilizing various methods to oppress the Palestinian people, Israel continued to occupy the territories. The indigenous people within the Occupied Territories responded to the violence of the occupation by organizing a massive resistance movement. In 1987, the First *Intifada* (“shaking off” in Arabic, but loosely translated to “uprising”) broke out. This was the direct result of decades of violent Israeli oppression and the desire for Palestinian representation and statehood. A car accident on December 8th, 1987, in Jabalya, Gaza, triggered the movement. An Israeli military vehicle killed four Palestinians. Mark Tessler recounted,

While there had been predictions during 1986 and the first part of 1987 that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were exhausted and would soon lose the will to resist Israel’s continuing drive into these territories, spontaneous and widespread protest demonstrations erupted in December

1987, showing that Palestinians under occupation had in fact lost neither their political will nor the capacity to challenge Israeli government policies. (1994: 677)

The nonviolent demonstrations were organized as grassroots resistance throughout the streets of Palestine. They spread from the refugee camps of Gaza into the rural areas and towns of the West Bank. The most commonly known mark of the *Intifada* was stone throwing. Young boys symbolically hurled pieces of their land towards the highly weaponized Israeli military. For Avram Bornstein, “The violence created a spectacle, but more significant was the initiation of non-violent mobilization to disengage from Israel. Villages, town councils, labor unions, women’s organizations, and Islamic centers became politicized” (2008: 110). The resistance included numerous forms of nonviolent action, such as mass rallies, general strikes, refusal to pay taxes, confrontations, and civil disobedience. The participants were young and old, urban professionals and rural farmers. All of Palestinian society rose up for a common goal; resisting the occupation of their lands.

The Israeli army, quick to squash the movement, responded with violence towards the unarmed protesters. They shot live ammunition and rubber bullets to deter protesting. The Israeli military attacked entire villages with tear gas and beat and arrested demonstrators. The international media took notice to this uprising, relaying images from the streets of Palestine to the outside world. People were now seeing the casualties of Israel’s aggression and the violence of the occupation. According to Alain Gresh and Dominique Vidal,

A thousand days after the start of the uprising, the statistics were as follows: more than a thousand dead, tens of thousands wounded, nine thousand prisoners—which, with four thousand already in detention, made

a total of thirteen thousand detainees from a population of 1.7 million inhabitants. (2004: 128)

The resistance lasted more than four years. After Israel's failed attempt to crush the ground movement, the need for negotiations was obvious if a cease-fire were to come to fruition.

Oslo Accords

Israel had limited control over the indigenous people throughout the Occupied Territories and recognized the need to negotiate with the Palestinians. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was the representing body for the Palestinian people. Yasser Arafat, who was then in exile in Tunis, led the PLO. Israel began talks with Yasser Arafat in Madrid on October 1991, amidst the resistance. The talks resumed in September 1993 in Oslo, Norway, they are known as the Oslo Accords. By the time the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, 1,162 Palestinians (241 of them children) and 160 Israelis (5 of them children) had been killed. These talks were an important milestone for the future of these two peoples, and this was the first time direct negotiation between the opposing leaders had occurred.

The Israeli left Labour movement and the exiled PLO gathered to discuss the future of the Palestinian people. The talks were based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the PLO recognizing Israel's right to exist as a state in peace and security. Although these talks were seen as a forward step, the accords failed to address the return of the refugees, Jerusalem, the continuation of settlements, or the establishment of a Palestinian state. This was problematic for the future of Palestine and its people. According to Bornstein,

The major issues of contention, such as the right of return for Palestinian refugees, the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, and the status of East Jerusalem, were put on hold in the hope that interim peace would build trust toward future compromise. (2008: 111)

Israel was strategic in postponing these issues for later talks, as these points were the most contentious and Israel did not intend to concede them. Israel's initial aim was to suppress the powerful movement on the ground, not give up more control.

The Oslo Accords were set on a Declaration of Principles (DOP), and the main intention was to set up a Palestinian Self-Governing Authority (PISGA) so that Israel would withdraw from Gaza and the West Bank and allow Palestinian self-governance to occur. This process was planned to take five years to fully implement. In the interim, the areas would be divided into three zones with varying jurisdiction. Area A would be under full Palestinian control, Area B would be under Palestinian civil control and Israeli military control, and Area C would remain in full Israeli control. 62% of the West Bank is located in Area C. With Israeli military control of areas B and C, Israel was able to maintain control over the West Bank and overpower any resistance against the occupation.

Oslo was successful in carving up the West Bank into fragmented enclaves, increasing Israel's domination over the territory. According to Anne Marie Baylouny,

A large portion of Oslo focused on geographic changes, and it is these provisions that were enacted. Geographic and border control measures were deemed especially important for Israeli security by the Israeli military, who had a strong hand in crafting the provisions in Oslo II particularly. (2009: 46)

Oslo aided Israel in prolonging the discussions of the contentious issues and made it harder for future possibility of resistance within the territory while simultaneously controlling more of the land.



The negotiations allowed for some of the provisions from the agreement to be implemented, such as the inauguration of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) and Palestinian control of some of the land. The other aspects of the agreement have yet to be recognized. As Israel still maintains a strong military presence in the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority has partial control over the land. The PA has been tasked with playing a security role for Israel inside Area A, and has little trust from the majority of Palestinians due to their lack of power. Twenty years since Oslo, the West Bank is worse off today than before the First *Intifada*.

The Second *Intifada*

The occupation did not end with the Oslo Accords, as the negotiations had intended. In actuality, more severe restrictions were imposed onto the Palestinian people, creating a more hostile environment. Palestinians within the Occupied Territories were systematically monitored and controlled, while Israel continued to build more settlements

in the Territories. On September 28th, 2000, the Israeli politician, and soon to be Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, entered the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Israeli soldiers and policemen heavily guarded Sharon, anticipating that this move would provoke the Palestinians. This action was the trigger that started the Second *Intifada*. The al-Aqsa mosque is the third holiest Islamic site in the world, and this act by Sharon created outrage amongst the Muslim population worldwide, as well as inside the Occupied Territories. His actions were seen as a mockery to the plight of the Palestinian people and highlighted his power in the region. Clashes broke out on site at the mosque between the Palestinians in the Jerusalem area and Sharon's security forces. Several Palestinian lives were lost in the first day of resistance, and thus began what is known as the "*Intifadat al-Aqsa*" in Arabic, and the "*al-Aqsa Intifada*" in English.

The uprising spread throughout the Occupied Territories. Unlike the First *Intifada* where all the people resisted nonviolently, the Second *Intifada* saw both armed and unarmed resistance against the occupying forces and Israeli civilians. The Israeli army responded to this uprising in the same manner as the beginning of the First *Intifada*: with violence. The fact that some Palestinian factions were armed intensified Israel's violence. Within the first three days, thirty Palestinians were killed, and four hundred were wounded. According to Gresh and Vidal, "During the following month, more than two hundred Palestinians were killed, one-third under the age of 17" (2004: 131). Israel re-occupied the Territories, which it had never actually left – a defiance of the Oslo Peace Accord signed in 1993. As a result, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) declared October 6th the "Day of Rage," urging Palestinians to attack Israeli posts in the Occupied Territories. The Israeli forces, then stationed in the Nablus region, withdrew from their

post guarding the tomb of Joseph. Palestinians destroyed the tomb of Joseph as a form of resistance. This act provoked retaliation by the Jewish community; they destroyed a mosque in the northern city of Tiberias. The violence cycled within both the Occupied Territories and Israel proper. As they were treated as second-class citizens by the Israeli state, Palestinian populations living inside Israel saw this movement as a chance to resist their plight as well. They rose up in response by way of protests, participating in sit-ins and road blockades in Haifa and Jaffa, two heavily populated Palestinian cities in Israel. Israeli police killed thirteen Palestinian citizens of Israel while they protested.

The Second *Intifada* saw an escalation of violence against the occupation forces from extremists groups. By November, groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were retaliating against Israeli forces and Israeli civilians alike. They blew up business establishments and buses heavily populated by Israelis. Reacting to the violence in Israel, the occupation forces retaliated by way of assassinations, large-scale incursions, and daily closures, creating problems for the rest of the Palestinian population. Collective punishment was a tactic Israel used against all people residing inside the Territories. During air strikes, which were meant to kill alleged operatives, Israel killed thousands of innocent Palestinians. Within the first year and a half of the Second *Intifada*, and a month before the construction of the Wall began in March of 2002, the ongoing cycle of violence accounted for 1,442 Palestinian deaths and 400 Israeli deaths (Gresh and Vidal, 2004). The numbers differed considerably with the Palestinian loss of life tripling that of Israelis.

The Oslo Accords had made promises to the Palestinian people that were not kept. For several years, people waited for the occupation forces to grant them more rights, but

with each year came more oppression. There were problems in the “self-ruled” areas due to the lack of economic development and assistance from the international community through the peace accord. The PA was not able to proceed as an independent entity, and those residing in the West Bank suffered due to this. *Al-Jazeera* published an article on December 8, 2003, entitled “The Second *Intifada*,” which stated,

The *Intifada* was – and still is – an expression of a deep disappointment and frustration over the ongoing disrespect and denial of basic rights for Palestinians caused by the occupation – including the right to free access to Jerusalem, security and development, and the refugees' right to return. (2003)

The Second *Intifada* was a direct response to the neglected conditions inside the Occupied Territories and the increased Israeli military violence. In two years, the Israeli army had arrested and interrogated thousands of Palestinians and assassinated dozens of alleged militants.

The Second *Intifada* differed from the First *Intifada* in various ways. When the First *Intifada* occurred, the people had hope for their future and saw resistance as a political partner and a way to secure rights. It was an organized movement throughout the territories. Mass involvement gave it enough power to force negotiations between Israel and the exiled PLO. Besides the mental and emotional differences, there were physical differences on the ground between the First and Second *Intifadas*. The Oslo Accords, which were meant to create a state for the Palestinian people, separated the West Bank land into three fragmented areas. This separation made it extremely difficult to organize resistance using the same methods that were used in the First *Intifada*. As Israel restricted movement between the areas, people could not reach each other. As Israeli journalist Amira Hass explained,

It was only with the outbreak of the current uprising that the extraordinary ingenuity of the “zoning” system, backed by the network of bypass roads, could be fully appreciated: with most of the population living in the scattered islands of A and B, separated from each other by the vast ocean of C lands, hundreds of villages and half a dozen towns could be totally paralyzed by strategically placed barricades and ditches, tanks, and IDF sharpshooters, thereby devastating an entire economy and disrupting all social life. (2002: 9)

Israel was strategically positioned inside the West Bank to prevent another *Intifada*. The resistance of the first uprising forced Israel to negotiate, as they were not able to maintain control over the people. With the fragmentation of the West Bank, checkpoints, and heavy military presence, the Second *Intifada* was more easily crushed by the Israeli military. The Israeli authorities locked down the West Bank and Gaza, and everyone living inside the Occupied Territories was collectively affected. Over the next few years, intermittent violence occurred on both sides, and Israel found a new way to ensure control and security: by establishing the Wall. The Palestinians, on the other hand, had no security or protection against Israel’s violence.

The Wall

Although the Wall’s construction began during the summer of 2002, the concept of the Wall had begun almost a century earlier when the initial Israeli settlers discussed colonizing the land of Palestine. Zeev Jabotinsky, a revisionist Zionist from Russia, published an article entitled “The Iron Wall (We and the Arabs).” According to geographer Shaul Cohen,

Jabotinsky ([1923] 1937) laid the foundation for today’s security fence. He observed that the Palestinian Arabs look upon Palestine with the same instinctive love and true fervor that any Aztec looked upon his Mexico or any Sioux looked upon his prairie. (2006: 686)

Recognizing that the indigenous Palestinian was connected to the land, Jabotinsky knew that they would not readily accept Zionist colonization. Jabotinsky suggested physically separating the Palestinians from the incoming settlers by way of a wall. From his perspective, this would force the indigenous Palestinians to concede to the idea of a future Palestinian state and allow for Israeli expansion without resisting.

This concept of the “Iron Wall” was not proposed again until the 1990s. This was a time period when Israel had implemented various restrictions upon the Palestinian population residing inside the West Bank. Israel used the influx of suicide bombers coming from inside the West Bank, into Israel proper post Second *Intifada*, to attempt to justify to both Israeli citizens and the international community, the concept of a security barrier. The suicide bombers were a form of armed resistance against the occupation. Rather than examine the reasons for armed resistance, Israel implemented more severe forms of violence against the entire Palestinian population.

Palestinian armed resistance created fear amongst the Israeli population and, in 1995, the Labour party Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin commissioned the design of a “security fence” along the internationally recognized Green-Line of the West Bank. By 1996, the Labour party successor Prime Minister Shimon Peres approved the proposal.

Journalist Graham Usher explained,

At the height of the 1996 crisis over the suicide bombings, Peres approved the construction of a two-kilometer wide “buffer zone” along the Green Line comprising fences, electronic surveillance fields, helicopter patrols, and a permanent presence of soldiers and police, all to prevent Palestinian entry into Israel. (2005: 32)

Rabin and Peres’ plans drew on Jabotinsky’s concept of the Iron Wall to separate the populations and limit Palestinian resistance. However, the Labour concept did not come

to fruition. The Likud party that succeeded Peres had their own political concerns around the establishment of a Wall. The Likud party is known for their ideological interests in the expansion of the Israeli state. The Wall would cut off the possibility of overall control over Eretz Israel.¹³ It was not until the Labour party was back in power that Ehud Barak suggested another plan for the Wall at Camp David talks in 2000. This plan was to separate the West Bank into sections concentrated around three main settlement blocs: Ariel in the north, Maal'e Adumim in the centrally located Jerusalem area, and Gush Etzion in the south (Usher, 2005: 32). This plan would have created Palestinian Bantustans within the occupied West Bank, limiting the possibility of a Palestinian state. Former Palestinian President Yasser Arafat rejected the plan during the Camp David talks. Barak's successor, Ariel Sharon of the Likud party, approved a new plan, drawing on both the Peres plan of separating the people, and the Barak plan of creating bantustans. Sharon added to the plans the missing element of erasing the border altogether to control the entire West Bank land. The Likud party had a constituent base of ideological settlers living in the illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank. As building a Wall on the Green-Line would cut them off from Israel proper, this plan was not accepted amongst the settler community. According to Peter Lagerquists,

Most significantly, there was fierce opposition from Israeli settlement groups. Erasing the Green Line had been the main aim of their movement. They feared that a barrier, by interpellating for the first time a physical boundary between Israel and the occupied territories, would isolate them spatially, symbolically, and eventually politically. (2004: 6-7)

Sharon planned to annex more land inside the West Bank, secure the illegal Israeli settlements and include them into Israel proper, while simultaneously stealing Palestinian

¹³ Biblical name for the historic land of Israel, most conservative Jews believe they were given this land by G-D as told in the Torah.

land for the expansion. Sharon's plan would unilaterally define the borders without the need for political cooperation with the Palestinian Authority. The settler movement approved Sharon's plan, and the establishment of the Wall began.



The Wall being constructed. Bethlehem 2004

The Wall was built deep inside the Green-Line, weaving in and out of Palestinian villages throughout the West Bank, annexing Palestinian land, and securing illegal Israeli settlements into Israel. Because the Wall was not built on the Green-Line, it appropriated Palestinian lands for the settler population, increasing colonial expansion. The UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) concluded, “The Barrier’s total length is approximately 708 km, more than twice the length of the 320-kilometre-long 1949 Armistice Line (Green-Line) between the West Bank and Israel” (OCHA, 2011: 4). Israel was able to steal more land and appease its settler base by not building the Wall on the Green-Line. The effects of the Wall on the

Palestinian population inside the West Bank were never a factor when discussing the details of the Wall.

The Wall has several characteristics. The physical aspect of the Wall depends on the location and the nearby populations. According to the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA),

It's a combination of 8m high concrete wall (mainly around East Jerusalem areas), trenches, fences, razor wire and military only roads. There is also a 30-100m wide "buffer zone" east of the Wall with electrified fences, trenches, sensors and military patrol roads and some sections have sniper towers. (2007: 313)

In rural Palestinian areas, the Wall is comprised of a fence; at times the fence is electrified. In highly populated Palestinian areas, the Wall is built of concrete, and is 26 feet high. Buffer zones are situated near the Wall and watchtowers are strategically placed to monitor people near the Wall. OCHA describes the characteristics of the Wall as consisting of, "fences, ditches, razor wire, groomed sand paths, an electronic monitoring system, patrol roads, and a buffer zone (OCHA, 2011: 4). All of the areas around the Wall are considered closed military zones; it is illegal for Palestinians to go near them. If someone is in the buffer zone, the Israeli military employs direct violence, shooting him or her. The buffer zone extends 500 feet from the Wall. Nothing can legally be built on this part of the land, nor can it be used for agricultural purposes. The buffer zone confiscates Palestinian land in the name of "security." In addition to the Wall and the areas adjacent to it, Israel established what it calls the "seam zone": the area between the Wall and the Green-Line. As the Wall dips deep into the Occupied Territory to secure the settlements, the seam zone accounts for a sizable area of the West Bank. As this area

is considered a closed military zone, a permit must be obtained from the Israeli authorities to enter the area. Gabriela Becker described the seam zone:

Already, the areas between the wall and the Green Line – the seam zone or seam administration as it is referred to by the occupation – are de facto annexed, either through their inaccessibility to landowners and farmers, or by the military and court orders that declare these areas closed or demanding permits. (2006: 1239)

Permits to enter a seam zone are difficult to acquire, which helps Israel to maintain ownership over these lands. In several cases, entire villages exist in seam zone areas, and residents must obtain a permit to enter and exit their village. Palestinians are required to have a permit to enter their own villages and lands, while the Israeli settlers are able to build without restrictions on the Palestinians' confiscated lands.



Men sitting in front of their store blocked by the Wall.
January 2004 Abu Dis.


The Wall was built in several phases. Phase I of the construction began on June 16th, 2002, in the north of the West Bank. It was finished in the northern towns and village less than a year later, in July, 2003. According to a 2007 Palestine Monitor fact sheet, “The first stage is comprised of a 145 kilometer long section extending from Salem checkpoint in the northwest Jenin district, through the Tulkarm and Qalqilya governorates, to Masha village in the Salfit area” (2007). Qalqilya city was completely surrounded by the Wall and had only one entry point; it was built on two sides of the town, and a fence was built on the third side.



The Wall in front of the greenhouses. December 2006. Qalqilya.

Massive land confiscations occurred as a result of the Wall’s path in Phase I. 15,000 *dunums*¹⁴ of land were destroyed. According to the Stop the Wall Campaign, “13 villages have been de facto to Israel and some 50 villages are separated from their lands” (2007). Phase I confiscated 72% of Jayyus – a small village in the Qalqilya district.

¹⁴ 1 dunum is equivalent to 1,000 square metres.



In the winter of 2003, Phase II of the Wall's construction began in the northeast section of the West Bank and the area around Jerusalem, known as the Jerusalem Envelope. Human rights organizations have been arguing against the structure since construction began. Amnesty International made a statement regarding the Wall:

Israel is continuing the construction of the fence/wall, with the second phase running even more deeply than the first phase into the West Bank. This is cutting many more thousands of Palestinians off from their land and essential services in nearby villages and towns and further restricting the movements of all Palestinians in these areas. (2003)

The second phase of the Wall in the north connects the existing Wall, which was built in Phase I of the Wall travels east towards the village of Tayaseer on the border of Jordan. This area is roughly 45 km in length. The Wall in the Jerusalem Envelope is the most concerning in regards to its location. As a major Palestinian city, numerous towns and villages rely on the services inside the city. These services are not offered in other areas

of the West Bank, and the Wall completely cut people off. According to Stop the Wall campaign:

The Envelope will annex the Ma'ale Adumim settlement block, to the east of Jerusalem city, annexing 62 km² (just over 1% of the West Bank), 71 km² from Etzion West in southwest Jerusalem, and 31 km² in the Giv'on block northwest of Jerusalem. Altogether this adds up to 237 km². (2005)

Jerusalem is a holy city and people are prevented from accessing the city for religious purposes. Israel states that permits are given to worshipers for the holy month of Ramadan, or to Palestinian Christians to visit the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, but Palestinians are denied entry into Jerusalem.



Boy in Abu Dis playing with his toy car on the Wall. Abu Dis. 2006

The Wall's construction has not stopped since it began in 2002. It will eventually encircle the West Bank, imprisoning all the residents there. The area around Jerusalem is finalized; the Wall will enclose the city. From Jerusalem, the Wall will extend to the Bethlehem region, connecting the constructed portions of the Wall there. From Bethlehem, it travels south to Hebron. Eventually, the Wall will also run along the

eastern side of the West Bank, entrapping the Palestinian population inside while annexing more land for illegal Israeli settlements.

Judicial Justice?

There have been numerous judicial proceedings concerning the Wall, both internationally and locally within the Israeli Court System. Although the judicial system is a likely forum to bring a disputed claim, it has hardly made a difference in the case of the Wall. Those connected to the court system are from the same mindset and community as those who are approving and building the structure. As the Israeli judicial community supported the construction of the Wall, the Palestinian people approached the international community in their search for justice. On December 8th, 2003, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution: A/RES/ES-10/14. The request for the International Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ) would provide an advisory opinion on the legality of and consequences to the construction of the Wall in the Occupied Territories. On July 9th, 2004, seven months after the submission to the courts, the ICJ declared the Wall illegal. The advisory opinion concerning the legal consequences of the construction of the Wall in the Occupied Territories is as follows: The construction itself is contrary to International Law; Israel must stop construction and dismantle what has already been built in the West Bank and in and around the Jerusalem area. Israel is obligated to compensate the communities and the people who had their lands taken for the construction of the Wall (ICJ, 2004: 136). Israel did not view the ICJ decision as a concern, as it was an advisory opinion. Israel is mandated to follow international law as

laid out the in the Fourth Geneva convention, which protects civilian populations in the time of war. The ICJ cites the Forth Geneva Convention when stating in a press release:

Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, have in addition the obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention... (2004)

Although the United Nations and the International Courts have the power to mandate an end to the construction of the Wall, they have merely given advisory opinions. This allows Israel to choose whether to accept the opinion or make their own ruling in regards to the Wall. Israel has maintained that the Wall is a security concern and continued to build it long after the ICJ opinion was declared. The Palestinian communities affected by the Wall continued to reject the status of the Wall and aimed their judicial grievances to the Israeli High Court, where decisions would be obeyed.

The Case of Beit Surik

Around the same time the ICJ was contemplating the verdict for the Wall, a local case was being heard in the Israeli High Court. The western Jerusalem villages took the case of the Wall to the Israeli court system in hopes to stop the Wall. This case was known as the HCJ 2056/04, Beit Surik Council vs. the Government of Israel and the Commander of the Israeli military in the West Bank. The case was heard in the Israeli Supreme Court under the High Court of Justice. The case began February 29, 2004, when the construction of the Wall started in the area. Numerous proceedings were held in the courts for this case before the verdict came in on June 24, 2004 (Jewish Virtual Library, 2004).

The villages in the case were Beit Sourik, Biddu, El Kabiba, Katane, Beit A'anan, Beit Liqia, Beit Ajaza and Beit Duku. The petition ordered that the land seizure was illegal and the route should be changed, due to its harm to plaintiffs. It is estimated that 42,000 *dunums* of Palestinian land is affected by the structure. It continued to state that the Wall would pass over 4,859 *dunums* and would therefore separate people from 37,000 *dunums* of their land. 26,500 of this land is agricultural and had been cultivated for generations. After numerous proceedings, the Wall's route would change in a few of the locations in the northwest Jerusalem area. Although the construction had halted during the court case, the land had already been paved in numerous areas. The agricultural resources, which the village relied on, were already destroyed. Construction soon began for the newer portions of the rerouted Wall, enclosing the western villages into the West Bank.

The Case of Alfei Menashe

Another High Court case began in the middle region of the West Bank, in the Salfit area. The Wall was securing Alfei Menashe, an Israeli settlement near the Palestinian city of Qalqilya. The settlement is located illegally within the West Bank. The Wall was built around Alfei Menashe in August of 2003, connecting it to Israeli proper. The Wall surrounds the entire area, enclosing five Palestinian villages. The Israeli military claims that they are complying with the needs of the population, stating on their website: "The IDF (Israel Defense Forces) issued 'permanent resident cards' to the residents of the villages, which allow them to live in the enclave and travel from it to the rest of the West Bank and back, through a number of gates in the fence" (Israeli Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, 2005). This statement was found to be inaccurate; the residents stated that they were not allowed to access their lands. In collaboration with the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, the residents of the isolated villages brought the case into the legal arena against the Israeli state. The petition asked for the Wall to be moved to the Green-Line and included the judgment from the Beit Suriq case. The petition expressed that this route also creates great harm to the residents inhabiting the northern area. The villages submitted a petition, HCJ 7957/04, and on September 15, 2005, the court ruled that the Wall was not to be moved to the Green-Line, but it was rerouted. The villagers had demonstrated that the route caused injury to the communities in its path.

The new route causes injury to all residents of the West Bank. The route of the Wall in total is imprisoning the Palestinian population while stealing Palestinian lands and securing illegal Israeli settlements. The rerouting of the Wall would not have occurred if the villagers had not taken the case of the Wall to the Israeli High Court. The people were not able to stop the Wall through legal channels, but they did save time and cost Israel more money.



West Bank Barrier Update- Overview of changes to the route

July 2006

On 30 April 2006, the Israeli cabinet approved a revised route of the West Bank Barrier. The previous map was issued on 20 Feb 2005.

The revisions include:

The Emanuel and Ari'el settlement groups are split into two "fingers".

Together these "fingers" surround more than 25,000 Palestinians on three sides with one access route on the east side of the Barrier.

The Ari'el finger encircles three villages: Deir Ballut, Rafat and Az Zawiya.

The Alfe Menashe settlement is reduced in size. Sections of the completed Barrier will be dismantled and rebuilt placing three Palestinian villages and some of their adjacent lands on the east side of the Barrier.

The route is moved approximately one and a half kilometres further north from Road 465 and incorporates fewer olive groves and land from Rantis village.

The route is closer to Ofarim settlement, allowing 'Abud village residents to remain connected to their olive groves.

The new route removes Beit Iksa village and its surrounding lands from the Jerusalem side of the Barrier and places it within the Biddu/Beit Surik group of West Bank villages. This area is surrounded by the Barrier on three sides and Road 443 to the north.

Al Walaja village will be encircled by the Barrier. The route will incorporate most of all the village infrastructure, however, it will isolate the village from its farm land.

Al Jaba' will be in the Gush Etzion settlement group.

Several sections of the route that were planned to be on the Green Line have been moved north, inside the West Bank.

The "bubble" created by the Barrier around Eshkolot settlement is reduced; the quarry will remain on the West Bank side of the Barrier.



Although communities affected by the Wall brought the issue to the courts to find a solution, they found that the Israeli judicial system is not meant to support the occupied,

only the occupiers. The other cases were not as successful as the two main cases mentioned. The route of the Wall remains deep inside the West Bank, affecting numerous villages and towns. Stop the Wall campaign has been following the issue of the Wall:

According to Israeli military officials, the Wall's total length will be some 810 km. The cost of the Wall is now estimated at \$2.1 billion, and each km costs approximately \$2 million. In addition, the Occupation has spent 2 billion shekels to construct alternative roads and tunnels. (2015)

The Wall's route has created numerous enclaves and ghettos around Palestinian villages, towns and cities. It continues to dip deep inside the West Bank, severely affecting every aspect of life of those residing there.

Chapter 2

Violence Triangle in Contemporary Palestine

Israel utilizes several forms of violence to maintain control of the Palestinian people and further their aim of colonial domination over the land. Johan Galtung's "triangle of violence" theory surpasses the mainstream definition of violence, extending our understanding of violence into a three-point model (1969). The triangle of violence incorporates the interrelated forces of direct, structural, and cultural violence, which all work together to oppress. This framework is essential to understanding the contemporary occupation of Palestine.

Johan Galtung, one of the fathers of peace studies, developed the triangle of violence theory over several decades in two stages. He initially defined violence as a two-part model of direct violence and structural violence (1969). For Galtung, direct violence is visible physical abuse committed by social actors. Structural violence is invisible and is ultimately more harmful than direct violence, due to its ability to affect countless people at the same time. Structural violence creates inequality within society, limiting certain social groups' potential while establishing more for others. Social actors use direct violence to enforce structural violence. In essence, according to Galtung, "Violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations" (1969: 168).

Decades later, Galtung extended his theory of violence to account for cultural violence, creating the violence triangle (1990). Like structural violence, cultural violence is invisible and affects numerous people at the same time. It is symbolic and encapsulates how cultures are viewed within social systems. For Galtung,

By “cultural violence” we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence. (1990: 291)

Cultural violence makes both direct and structural violence seem normal (Galtung, 1990: 291). Cultural violence is used as an excuse to use physical abuse and legal and social inequalities. Israel has successfully used the violence triangle to repress the Palestinian people since initial colonial conquests. The goals are to gain more control over the land and to exile the indigenous people through creating systemic inequalities and limiting Palestinian potential.

Historical Timeline of Violence Triangle

The triangle of violence in Palestine began before the state of Israel was established. Cultural violence was present when the European colonial powers were deciding how to rule over all of the Arab lands after World War 1. Edward Said highlights cultural violence in his book *Orientalism* (1979). He explains that the British viewed Arabs as inferior to themselves and as unappreciative of the colonial occupation (Said 1979: 33). Said describes how Arthur James Balfour, a key participant in the handover of Palestine to the Zionists, discussed what he called the “native problem” in Egypt. Balfour’s opinion of the Arabs was clear in his June 1910 speech:

First of all, look at the facts of the case. Western nations as soon as they emerge into history show the beginnings of those capacities of self-government ... having merits of their own.... You may look at a whole history of the Orientals in what is called, broadly speaking, the East, and you never find traces of self government. (as cited in Said, 1979: 32)

Balfour saw the indigenous Arabs as an inferior Eastern culture and unable to govern themselves. This perspective helped the Zionist entity gain more rights over Palestine. The Zionists leaders used their shared, recognizable, European identity to persuade the British to give them more shares of Palestinian land. As Mazin Qumsiyeh highlights, “Many British officers were far more comfortable working with English-speaking European Jews than trying to understand and deal with the local inhabitants” (2011: 50). Although the indigenous Palestinian people were the demographic majority on the land, the European Zionists orientalized their identity to dispossess them of their land.

This cultural violence laid the groundwork for direct violence, which the early settlers exacted on the indigenous Palestinian people. In 1947, the British relinquished the rights of the land to the Zionist leaders, and the direct violence campaign began. The *Nakba* (catastrophe) occurred in 1948: the Israelis massacred the indigenous Palestinian people and displaced millions. The aim of the *Nakba* was to transform the demographics and gain control over the land. Palestinians who survived the massacres were expelled to other lands or internally displaced within the West Bank and Gaza. Numerous Palestinians were ousted from their familial lands inside Israel proper and forced to live away from their native villages. They were not permitted to visit their homes again. The Palestinians who continued living inside Israel proper from 1948 onward are considered citizens. They experience ongoing structural violence within the Israeli socio-legal

system. They are denied basic rights, compared to the Jewish Israelis, and are treated as second-class citizens.

Israel utilizes direct violence as a tactic to enforce both structural and cultural violence. Like in 1948, Israel utilized direct violence again in 1967 during the *Naksa* to conquer the remaining Palestinian lands from Jordan. The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza began and the violence triangle made its way to the lands that had not been conquered in 1948. Structural violence implements were immediately established to maintain control over the territory. An ID system was devised to differentiate between Israelis and Palestinians and between different groups of Palestinians. Israel also began to transfer their population inside the Occupied Territory, constructing settlements.

Israel's ID system was established to separate Palestinian people, categorizing them by residence. As Tawil-Souri explains, post-1967 identity cards in the Occupied Territories were based on a color system to differentiate people:

Palestinian Territories (OPTs), but not East Jerusalem, were issued orange ID cards. Any Palestinian from the OPTs barred from entry into Israel (usually, but not always, a person with a previous arrest record) was issued a green card. (2011: 72)

Palestinians living in East Jerusalem were given a blue identity card. Although Israeli citizens also carry a blue ID, they are not the same. Israeli citizens, including Palestinians who have lived in Israel since 1948, are issued blue Israeli ID cards declaring their citizenship. East Jerusalem blue ID holders are viewed as residents of Jerusalem, but not citizens. This distinction allows Israel to revoke residency from Palestinians who relocate to other countries or live inside the West Bank. However, Israelis who live abroad become dual citizens.

Structural violence was vital for Israel to maintain a colonial project inside the West Bank. Israel began settlement construction shortly after occupying the territories and began to transfer the Israeli population into the West Bank and Gaza. Legal inequalities between the settlers and the indigenous people were created as soon as Israel started occupying the territory. A dual system of rights between the indigenous Palestinians and the settlers were devised, substantiating structural violence. The settlers living in the West Bank are considered Israeli citizens by Israeli civil law. Indigenous Palestinians, as occupied people, live under Israeli military rule. Israeli settlers continued to move into the Occupied Territories, building their communities on government-sanctioned land confiscated from Palestinians. The initial stages of the occupation relied on the imbalanced rights of the two populations. Israel was able to further dominate the land and the people, through structural violence implements.

The various forms of structural violence Israel employed in the early years of the occupation required the use of both direct and cultural violence to maintain it. The Palestinian people resisted Israeli colonial rule and the violence triangle implements throughout Israel's conquests. Combating the violence triangle is a decolonial strategy. For Frantz Fanon, "Decolonization, therefore, implies the urgent need to thoroughly challenge the colonial situation" (1963: 2). Decolonization of Palestine was most feasible in the late 1980s, during the First *Intifada* of 1989. The unarmed, nonviolent, civil resistance campaign created an unstable situation for Israel. The movement started within the Occupied Territories, and Israel's triangle of violence was no longer able to function in the same ways it had previously. Palestinian organizers resisted with marches, sit-ins and strikes, and they created an alternative system that could not be controlled by Israel's

structural violence. As Mazin Qumsiyeh notes, “In addition to the well-known forms of resistance, there were many other novel forms. As Israel blocked roads to the besieged cities and towns in the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians reverted to old methods to transport over mountainous tracks on donkeys and mules” (2011: 142). When the Israeli military closed the schools, Palestinian people resisting Israeli structural violence established new schools in makeshift spaces. The internal system created an alternative way of living outside of Israel’s grasp. The use of unarmed methods combatted the cultural violence. International news represented Palestinians’ resistance as legitimate. Israel used direct violence to attempt to squash the powerful movement, yet the people endured it in masses. The resistance to the violence triangle weakened Israel’s grip on indigenous Palestinians.

Combating the triangle of violence forced Israel to make concessions. The byproduct of the resistance was the 1993 Oslo Accords and the return of the exiled Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The negotiations did not decrease the triangle of violence; rather, it increased structural violence under the guise of a “peace agreement.” The newly established Palestinian Authority (PA) was now acting as the security guard for the state of Israel. The PA had little power to combat the occupation and a great desire to create an independent state. Israel essentially used the “peace agreement” to create the façade of Palestinian control while dominating the territory. The Accords solidified Israeli control and colonial objectives, while limiting future possibilities of resistance or a Palestinian state. The West Bank was split into three categories, creating Bantustans, which restricted Palestinian movement throughout the West Bank. Area C, which consisted of over 60% of the West Bank, was now under full

Israeli control. Area C is where most settlements are being illegally constructed. Palestinians living in Area C are required to access permits to build on the land. The Palestinian Center for Human Rights reported:

IOF (Israeli Occupation Forces) require Palestinians to obtain building permits in East Jerusalem and areas located near Israeli settlements and bypass roads, but prolonged and complicated procedures must be followed to obtain such licenses, which are only granted in very rare cases. (2010: 74)

Oslo accelerated the apartheid system in the West Bank by increasing structural violence, through, for example, the permit system for Palestinians. After the First *Intifada*, checkpoints were established to track Palestinian movement. All entrances to and exits from the West Bank became more restricted. The ID system permitted some to travel through the checkpoints, while denying others. The Bantustanization of the West Bank made resistance against the occupation impossible. The triangle of violence was stronger than before the First *Intifada*. The Palestinian Authority worked with the Israeli government to streamline the structural violence. The PA provided a bureaucratic system to disburse travel and construction permits to Palestinians. After Oslo, the PLO leadership issued those residing in the West Bank Green ID cards instead of the previous orange (Tawil-Souri, 2011).



West Bank residents using a Green ID to travel to Jerusalem to pray. Qalandia Checkpoint, July 2013

The structural violence implements increased opportunities for direct violence to occur. The Palestinian people inside the West Bank endured daily acts of direct violence from the Israeli soldiers. They experienced this violence when traveling through the checkpoints and when the Israeli military conducted periodic village incursions and arrests. The direct violence was coupled with the structural violence of the continued construction of illegal Israeli settlements. Post Oslo, the Israeli settlers maintained more rights in the West Bank than prior. The settlement expansion confiscated more Palestinian land and resources inside the Occupied Territory than before. The triangle of violence, once limited in its aims during the First *Intifada*, had gained strength through the so-called “peace accord,” and further dominated the indigenous people for the sake of the settlers.

Israel's use of the violence triangle continued to oppress the Palestinian people, and another uprising intending to achieve the same aims as in 1989 was initiated. In 2000, the longing for the elimination of the violence triangle began through the Second *Intifada*. The ongoing direct and structural violence, the failed Oslo agreement, and the instigation by then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon brought forth this next Palestinian resistance. This partially armed movement resisted both structural and direct violence. Israel used Palestinians' armed resistance tactics to label all Palestinians as "terrorists," increasing cultural violence and portraying the Palestinians through the lens that they had always viewed them. The cultural violence was so strong that it obscured decades of direct and structural violence that Israel had imposed on the Palestinian people.

Israel maintained their propaganda campaign of cultural violence, which made the direct and structural violence look justified. This campaign consisted of labeling all of the Palestinian people as potential terrorists. The attacks on Israeli civilians by armed Palestinian factions who blew up buses and cafes in major Israeli cities scared the majority of Israeli citizens. Israel used this image as a base for their cultural violence campaign. The reaction from the Israeli government was to implement more direct and structural violence onto the entirety of the Palestinian populations residing inside both Gaza and the West Bank. Checkpoints multiplied throughout the territory, and Palestinian people were constantly tracked and harassed when traveling between the territories. Palestinians of all ages were arrested in large numbers throughout the territories. Countless were tortured and killed. Israel also increased the settlements, stealing more land from the Palestinian people to secure the illegal Israeli communities inside the West Bank. Ultimately Israel decided the best way to secure the Israeli people from the

“violent” Palestinian was to build an open-air prison to keep the entire population locked up. The Apartheid Wall was viewed as necessary in the eyes of most Israelis – a “security measure” cultural violence.

The establishment of the Apartheid Wall in 2002 enhanced the triangle of violence in the West Bank. The Wall integrated direct, structural, and cultural forms of violence to maintain the occupation. The violence triangle both controls the indigenous population inside the West Bank and restricts future resistance. Israel has utilized the violence triangle to segregate the Palestinian people in the West Bank from the incoming settler movement, while also repressing them. Structural violence maintains the occupation; in the case of Palestine, structural violence is at the pinnacle of the violence triangle, supported by both direct and cultural violence.



Sign at the entrance of Hebron, located in Area A. Hebron, July 2013

Structural Violence in the West Bank

Structural violence is invisible and built into the structure, creating vast inequalities between the settler Israeli population and the indigenous Palestinians living on the same land. Within the West Bank, structural violence takes numerous forms, dominates the Palestinian people, and enhances settler quality of life. The majority of structural violence inside the West Bank started soon after Israel began to occupy the territory, and has been used to maintain the overall occupation. Israel began to confiscate Palestinian land and water, taking the resources for the newly established settlements. Israeli-only bypass roads were also built, creating ease for Israeli settlers to move freely from illegal West Bank settlements into Israel proper, and heavily restricting Palestinian travel. Checkpoints are situated throughout the territory to track Palestinian movement. East Jerusalem is separated from the rest of the West Bank, and travel in and out is not permitted for Palestinians with the green West Bank ID. Numerous Palestinian people are arrested and detained, without charge, often for several months at a time. As a result of these processes, the Palestinian economy is unable to thrive, and Palestinian labor is exploited. These structural violence implements have increased with the establishment of the Wall. The Wall ultimately sealed the Palestinian people into the West Bank, enabling Israel to more easily control the West Bank population. They stole more land, restricted more movement, and isolated Jerusalem from the West Bank population.



Israeli soldier denying a Palestinian resident access. Hebron. March. 2004



Israeli soldier watching as Israeli settler children walk through Hebron. March 2004

Israel had begun to implement structurally violent tactics after the *Naksa* in 1967 to control the land. Since then, the confiscation of land and water resources has been the most detrimental for the Palestinian people. Israel's overall plan when conquering the territories was to maintain control of all the land between the Jordan Valley and the Mediterranean Sea. Once they began to occupy the West Bank in 1967, they quickly began to establish state rights over the land by building illegal settlements. Currently, there are 247 settlements and settlement outposts inside the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (B'Tselem, 2011). Settlements are Israeli-authorized, built-up areas located inside the Green-Line and on Palestinian land. Settlement outposts are built-up areas that have not yet received Israeli authorization. Although outposts are illegal within the Israeli legal system, these communities typically become sanctioned Israeli settlements with time. Israeli settlements occupy large areas of Palestinian land, but only a small portion of this land is under settlement construction.

Israel confiscates Palestinian land for the settlements and as a security measure. According to the Palestinian Center of Human Rights:

The other portions of land are devoted to the creation of buffer zones around settlements, establishing bypass roads for the transportation of settlers, and for future strategic expansion. Palestinian civilians living in communities located near Israeli settlements area are subject to severe Israeli practices, which seek to force them to leave their land, especially as IOF have continued to construct the Annexation Wall in the West Bank, which has seized large areas of Palestinian land. (2006: 28)

The Wall confiscated more Palestinian land, zigzagging around the settlements to secure more land for settlement expansion. The land that was seized for the site of the Wall was Palestinian land. Israel's claims of "security" permitted the government to steal Palestinian land for settlement expansion, by-pass roads, and the buffer zone. In phases 1 and 2, according to the 2003 Palestinian Human Rights Report:

Israeli occupying forces had appropriated lands from 26 Palestinian communities in Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Salfit following the issuing of military orders, and effectively confiscated areas of land from 18 other communities for the purpose of the construction of the wall. Israeli occupying forces confiscated approximately 40,460 dunums of Palestinian public land, mostly in Jenin, and 124,323 dunums of privately owned land, mostly in Jerusalem. Much of this land was cultivated, and thus land owners/farmers also lost valuable income. (2004: 24)

Each year, more land was stolen from Palestinian farmers to build the Wall and to expand the Israeli settlements. In 2010, 13,149 *dunums*, in 2011, 20,987 *dunums*, and in 2012, 28,000 *dunums* were confiscated from Palestinian communities (20% of which were in East Jerusalem). In 2013, 10,800 *dunums* of Palestinian land were confiscated, 198 *dunums* of which were in East Jerusalem (Palestinian Center for Human Rights, 2003; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014). These numbers add up to a vast portion of West Bank land forcibly being transferred from the indigenous people to the settler population.



Elderly woman collecting water from a well outside of her village. South Hebron Hill. 2004

The structural violence of transferring valuable resources from the Palestinians to the Israelis also occurred with underground resources. Water usage has differed between Israelis and Palestinian since the Oslo Accords, heavily exacerbating the inequality. According to the Israeli Human Rights organization B'Tselem:

The Oslo Accords perpetuated the discrimination in allocation of water between Israel and the Palestinians. They allotted 80% of the water pumped from the mountain aquifer – one of three underground water reserves shared by Israel and the Palestinians – to Israel and only 20% to the Palestinians. (2014)

The Oslo Accords solidified Israel's domination over the West Bank's underground water resources, creating a double standard for water usage between the two communities living in the West Bank. The indigenous Palestinian people were capped at using 118 million cubic meters (mcm) to wells that existed before the signing of the Accords, and 70-80 mcm to new wells drilled since the 1993 Accords (B'Tselem, 2014). The Israeli settler community's water usage was not restricted. The difference in water rights is visible; Israeli settlements are lush and green, while the nearby Palestinian villages are

dry and barren due to the lack of water. The structural violence of the land and water confiscation is irreversible and affects the current and future existence of the Palestinian people.

The 1967 occupation and the settlement building brought forth a need for Israeli-only infrastructure inside the West Bank. Israeli-only roads were built to connect the settlements to each other and to Israel proper. These roads harmed Palestinians. They were forbidden from using them and their lands were taken to construct them. The road was built to aid settlers in avoiding Palestinian villages and towns when entering or exiting a settlement. They essentially “bypassed” the indigenous people when traveling through a territory. The settler population desired to live on the land inside the Green-Line without having to encounter indigenous Palestinians. Israel began to build the new roads in the 1980s, but it was not until the Oslo Accords that the construction of the new road system was intensified (B’Tselem, 2004). The Israeli military had an increased presence because Israel maintained military control over Areas C and B. The roads cut off Palestinian areas from each other and Palestinian lands were confiscated for their construction. These roads that Palestinians used to travel on became major highways within the West Bank. Only Israelis and those with yellow Israeli license plates, not Palestinians with green license plates, were allowed to use the roads. According to B’Tselem, “In March 2015, there were 60.92 kilometers of roads in the West Bank that Israel had classified for the sole, or practically sole, use of Israelis, first and foremost of settlers” (2011). The roads ease Israeli travel through the territory they occupy and colonize. They also harm Palestinian communities through the loss of land and routes and the extra travel time it takes to move through the territory.

The Wall closed the bypass roads off to Palestinian traffic. New roads were built for Palestinian use, yet the new roads were not direct routes from Palestinian towns, and therefore travel took longer. The new Palestinian roads were also situated underneath the by-pass roads, as tunnel roads, with checkpoints along the route. The separate road system exposes the structural violence within the West Bank. The indigenous Palestinians were forced to concede land and travel farther and longer, while Israeli settlers built direct routes from the communities that were displacing the local inhabitants.

Israel has been strategic in how it implements structural violence. The checkpoint system greatly benefited their aims of collectively controlling the Palestinian people. Shortly after the First *Intifada*, in 1987, Israel devised a permit system, requiring Palestinians to obtain permission to travel between the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, and from either of the Occupied Territories into the city of Jerusalem. Checkpoints were soon established and were largely situated along the Green-Line. Along with checkpoints, roadblocks and dirt mounds were created to prevent Palestinian travel outside of the designated areas. As time passed, internal checkpoints within the West Bank were constructed to track Palestinian travel. Post the Apartheid Wall's construction, more travel restrictions occurred. As documented by the Palestinian Center of Human Rights, in 2006, there were 528 obstructions to travel, consisting of roadblocks, dirt mounds, fixed checkpoints, and flying checkpoints (2006). As the years passed, the number of barriers increased and, by 2008, there were 630 obstructions to travel (Palestinian Center for Human Rights, 2008). The numbers varied each year, and by 2011 there were 522 travel barriers. (Palestinian Center for Human Rights, 2011) Although the numbers decreased in 2011, the numerous checkpoints and barriers still existed, but they were not

staffed by the Israeli military. The Wall had successfully sealed in the communities. The Israeli military was not present at each checkpoint, yet the established checkpoints were ready to use by the Israeli military and not dismantled. According to B'Tselem, in April of 2015, there were 96 fixed checkpoints in the West Bank. Of these, 57 of them were situated inside the West Bank and not on the Green-Line (B'Tselem, 2015). The checkpoints inside the West Bank were situated close to the settlements as a way to “protect” the settler community from the Palestinians. The separation continued throughout the territory, securing the illegal settlements and the settlers from the indigenous people.



Azariya checkpoint into Jerusalem. December 2006.

The structural violence inside Jerusalem allows Israel to disregard Palestinian claims for East Jerusalem to be their future capital. The Wall was not only used as a method for settlers to dominate the land; it was also used to prevent Palestinians from entering the city of Jerusalem. The Wall cut off access to West Bank ID holders, aiming

ultimately to transform the demographics of the city. As the Palestinian Center of Human Rights notes:

IOF have continued to restrict access to occupied East Jerusalem for residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As a result, Palestinians have been denied access to advanced medical care only provided by hospitals in East Jerusalem, to family, education, to work places and to religious sites in the city. The construction of the Wall around East Jerusalem will establish a permanent barrier for Palestinians seeking to enter occupied East Jerusalem. (2005: 9)

Israel cut off access to Jerusalem for West Bank ID holders, isolating them from the services only available inside the city. It also disconnected the people from the holy sites of the city, disregarding the religious aspects the city offered.



Wall in Abu Dis under construction. Abu Dis. January 2004.

The structural violence of the Wall around Jerusalem also attempts to push Jerusalem ID holders out of the city and into the West Bank. The path zigzags between neighborhoods, forcing residents to move deeper inside the city or stay in their homes on the West Bank side of the Wall. If Jerusalemites are unable to provide documentation of

current residence inside the city, they lose their rights. For those who are able to stay, Israel has established different rights for Israelis and Palestinians inside Jerusalem, in terms of laws, regulations, and discrimination policies. Permits are needed to build inside the city. Palestinian homes are destroyed, yet no permits are given to them for building. In contrast, Israelis are free to build, just as in the case of Area C in the West Bank, with few instances of retribution by Israel. The Wall has essentially encircled the city, isolating Palestinian neighborhoods into the West Bank as a way to physically move the Palestinian population out of Jerusalem. Israel has successfully transformed the demographics and designed the city to only serve Israelis.

Direct violence is connected to every aspect of structural violence within the West Bank as a way to enforce it. Israel arrests Palestinians at an alarming rate to control the population. The majority of those arrested are held under the administrative detention law. This law allows Israel to arrest without charges and to detain without a defined time limit or the right of counsel. Israel claims that those who are arrested are a “security threat,” using cultural violence in an attempt to justify direct and structural violence. International law approves administrative detention, but only when there are no other avenues to take. International law is only to be used in extreme cases to prevent danger. Israel violates this stipulation, arresting numerous Palestinians under this law, including children and the elderly, by classifying all Palestinians as a security threat. According to Addameer, a Palestinian human rights organization focused on prisoner issues, in the single month of February 2015, 454 Palestinians were held in Israeli prisons in administrative detention. In that same month, there were 6,000 Palestinians locked up in Israeli prisons defined as political prisoners; of those 6,000, 163 were children between

the ages of 13-16 (Addameer, 2015). Israel also defines children as a security threat; the institutions that enact the cultural violence does not differentiate between ages, but includes all those oppressed. As PCHR states:

Administrative detention has been used by IOF to arrest and detain Palestinians without charge or trial for long periods. Current administrative detention orders permit for periods of detention of up to six months that are indefinitely renewable without reference to charge or trial. These orders are issued by Israeli district military commanders in the West Bank Administrative detention violates Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibits the use of this measure as a form of punishment rather than as an exceptional measure for "imperative reasons of security." (2005: 38)

Although this use of administrative detention is illegal under international law, the Israeli government claims the arrests are essential to keep Israel safe. In 2002, at the height of the Second *Intifada*, Israel held 1,500 Palestinians in administrative detention alone. The number varied each year, decreasing to 650 in 2003, up to 850 in 2004, 700 in 2005, 750 in 2006, and down to 214 by 2010. The Wall has aided Israel; with the imprisonment of an entire population in this open-air prison, it is no longer necessary to individually house Palestinians. The Wall holds, as the Israeli government see its, all “potential terrorists” inside; neither age nor gender matters for Palestinians.

Inside the West Bank, as work options were limited; Palestinian people were dependent on the Israeli labor market for their income. Post 1967, Israel was lenient on Palestinian travel from the West Bank to beyond the Green-Line. Between 1967 and 1987, the period known as the “open-bridges” years, Palestinians could easily travel into Israel work as day laborers. Employers treated Israeli workers and Palestinian workers differently, denying Palestinians insurance, paying them lower wages, and abusing them.

When the permit system began in the late 80s and increased in the 90s, travel became stricter, but Palestinians still found ways into Israel to work.



Palestinian Grocer. Hebron. March 2004

Structural violence inside the West Bank gravely affected the Palestinian economy. It was extremely difficult for Palestinian merchants to compete with the Israeli market. As PCHR notes: “Military checkpoints are an obstacle to the movement of cargo. This increases the cost of transportation, which is consequently reflected in the prices of goods, and adds to the financial hardship of consumers” (2006: 28). With a non-existent economy in the West Bank and the obstacles to employment in Israel, Palestinian unemployment rates were very high. In 1999, the West Bank had an unemployment rate of 19.9%, but by 2003, when the travel restrictions had increased and the Wall was being constructed, the unemployment rate in the West Bank rose to 32% (B’Tselem, 2011). Palestinians who were able to maintain a work permit inside Israel would have to stay at their work sites for days at a time, away from their families. The travel to work was long

and expensive, and the hassle of passing through a checkpoint was avoided if possible. Structural violence harmed the Palestinian economy and maintained the Israeli economy through Palestinian labor exploitation and forcing Palestinian dependence on Israeli products.



Closed shops in downtown Hebron. Hebron March 2004



Shops closed in downtown Hebron. Hebron. March 2004

Structural violence implements directly affected every West bank village and town. The lack of opportunity was enhanced through the restriction of movement, confiscation of land, and limitation of a future. Structural violence is only possible when direct violence is present to enforce it. In the violence triangle, direct violence is one of the legs keeping structural violence standing.

Direct Violence in the West Bank

Direct violence occurs when an actor physically harms another. This violence can also be employed by a group of actors, such as an army. Unlike cultural or structural violence, as direct violence is visible, it is clear when it occurs. In the Occupied Territory of the West Bank, direct violence is used to exert force and maintain structural violence. Direct violence in the Occupied Territories works together with structural and cultural violence by maintaining repression through physical tactics. In the West Bank, these different forms of violence combine in negative checkpoint interactions, destruction of Palestinian property, arrests, curfews, incursions, sieges, beatings, abuse, murder, and the imprisonment of the Palestinian people behind the Wall.

Direct violence against Palestinians is ongoing in the West Bank. Both the Israeli military and the Israeli settlers enact this violence. The Israeli military use violence to maintain the status quo and limit resistance amongst the Palestinian people. Although direct violence has always been used to repress the Palestinian people, since the Second *Intifada* in 2000, violence towards the Palestinian people by the Israeli forces has increased. According to B'Tselem:

Violence against Palestinians by Israeli security forces is not new; it has accompanied the occupation for many years. With the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada, however, a significant increase in the number of beatings and instances of abuse has occurred, in part because of increased friction between Palestinians and Israeli security forces. (2011)

Friction occurs when Palestinians resist Israel's oppressive actions. For Edward Said, the "unappreciative Arab" under British colonial rule in Egypt is more of "the agitator [who] wishes to raise 'difficulties' than the good native who overlooks the 'difficulties' of the foreign domination" (1979: 33). Israel uses Palestinian disobedience as an excuse to

increase direct violence. Israel uses direct violence as a way to maintain the structural violence of the occupation. With the establishment of the Wall, direct violence has increased. The Wall forces Palestinians to interact with the Israeli military more frequently.



Soldier throwing a stunt grenade at Israeli Protestors. Budrus 2004



Soldier reloading tear gas canisters into the gun. Budrus 2004

Humiliation is one direct violence practice that the Israeli military uses to repress the Palestinian people. Humiliation and harassment typically occur during daily travel through checkpoints. Because checkpoints are situated throughout the West Bank, it is impossible to avoid an Israeli soldier when moving through the territory. According to The Palestinian Center of Human Rights. “In 2002, Israeli occupying forces escalated such practices. Israeli soldiers at military checkpoints and roadblocks forced some young Palestinian men to take off their clothes and remain in their underwear for long periods of time” (2003: 24).

The meeting of direct and structural violence is dangerous. Traveling through mandatory, structurally violent checkpoints to reach any part of the West Bank makes

Palestinians more vulnerable to direct violence. B'Tselem investigates abuse at checkpoints, noting, "Most cases involve a 'small dose' of ill treatment such as a slap, a kick, an insult, a pointless delay at checkpoints, or degrading treatment. These acts have become an integral part of Palestinian life in the Occupied Territories" (2011). These acts of aggression occur during daily travel, sometimes several times a day, and accumulating "small doses" amount to a great deal of daily harassment. The humiliation and harassment prevent Palestinian people from traveling. They attempt to avoid the direct violence. People remaining in their homes and not on the roads traveling are doing exactly what Israel needs to maintain an occupation, a complacent and fearful society, and essentially good "natives." Staying home is logical in the face of such continual violence; it is dangerous for Palestinians to travel through these various structural violence implements. Palestinians experience continual harassment by both the Israeli soldiers and settlers, in which they encounter along their travel routes, and attempts to avoid this abuse is understandable. Although it is clear why people choose to stay home, this act unknowingly cooperates with Israel in the project of controlling and harassing travelers.



Palestinian drivers being stopped and checked by the Israeli military. Salfit, 2005

Investigative entities collect data to show the direct violence to the Israeli authorities, in hopes to stop it. B'Tselem collects incidents of ongoing abuse and attempts to use the information within the Israeli legal channels. "From September 2000 until the end of 2011, B'Tselem reported 473 cases to the law-enforcement authorities in which B'Tselem's investigation raised the suspicion that security forces used violence against Palestinians." As these 473 cases account only for those incidents of violence reported to the Israeli authorities, this number does not represent the ongoing, daily abuse that goes unreported. Palestinians have no internal body to notify, and without an Israeli intermediary, they are not able to confront the abuse and be heard. Although B'Tselem heavily documents the abuse and notifies the Israeli authorities, there are rarely consequences for the direct violence. The courts are part of the structural violent system that B'Tselem is working against. The army and courts work within the same system and serve to maintain the occupation. Controlling the Palestinians for security measures is the

main aim of both of these entities. Cultural violence extends from the West Bank into the court system, which essentially legalizes the physical abuse.



Resident of Shuhada St in an enclosed Balcony. Settlers threw stones at her window, she was unable to go onto the balcony until the protection was built. Hebron, June 2013

Israeli settlers use direct violence as a way to maintain control over the areas they are colonizing. According to B'Tselem, “Israeli civilians have perpetrated various forms of violence against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, damaging their lands, their persons and their property” (2011). Israeli settlers face no repercussions for shooting Palestinians or running them over with their cars. In October of 2014, a five-year-old child, Einas Khalil, was run over and killed by a settler when walking near a by-pass road outside of her village with a friend (2014). These attacks are not isolated. In 2013 alone:

PCHR documented 291 attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinian civilians in 2013. These attacks resulted in wounding 29 Palestinian

civilians, including 8 children, while 30 others, including 8 children, sustained bruises and glass shrapnel wounds. Moreover, 10 sheep died, 75 Palestinian vehicles' tires and windows were damaged and 3,535 trees were cut off and burnt. (2014: 55)

PCHR reported that since the outbreak of the Second *Intifada* in September of 2000 and until the end of 2012, Israeli settlers killed 63 Palestinians, including 14 children (2013). Like the army, the settlers are rarely punished for this behavior, and in most cases the Israeli military will protect them and punish the Palestinians. Although Israeli settlers are invading Palestinian lands, cultural violence is so strong in the settler communities, that even these killings are viewed as security measures.

Destroying Palestinian property is another form of direct violence that is sanctioned by the Israeli authorities. Palestinian homes are demolished as punishment for those who are “wanted” by Israel. This practice is meant to deter others from using violence against the occupation. In some cases, the person wanted by the Israeli Authorities might already be in custody or killed, yet the home of their family is still demolished as punishment, leaving innocent people homeless. B'Tselem explains:

The official objective of the house demolition policy is deterrence, based on the assumption that harming the relatives of Palestinians who perpetrated, or are suspected of involvement in, attacks against Israeli citizens and soldiers would deter others from carrying out such attacks. Since this constitutes deliberate harm to innocents, it is clear that even if house demolition had the desired deterrent effect, it would, nevertheless, remain unlawful. (2011)

In 2005, the Minister of Defense in Israel halted this punitive practice, but during the summer of 2014, when three yeshiva students were kidnapped, it was used against the suspect's family homes. Four homes were demolished, leaving 27 people homeless, 13 of them children.

In addition to threatening suspects, this direct violence tactic is also used against families who build homes without the proper permits issued by Israel. Palestinians living in Area C are not permitted to build additions to their homes or structures for their agricultural needs without approval from Israel. They are very rarely issued permits. Israel claims that it is state land designated for natural parks, nature reserves, firing ranges, and the expansion of Israeli settlements. Palestinians are forced to live in basic conditions if denied a building permit. Palestinians who choose to build without the permit risk the demolition of their home. Homes are not always demolished during the construction phase, but in several cases long after the structure has been completed and the family has moved in. This is a risk that families take while building. They do not have varying options. “From 2006 until 15 Dec. 2014, Israel demolished at least 817 Palestinian residential units in the West Bank, causing 3,956 people – including at least 1,925 minors – to lose their homes” (B’Tselem, 2011). In Jerusalem, these numbers are much higher, due to Israel’s political aspirations to change the city’s demographics. The direct violence enforces the structural violence of unequal building rights. The goal is to displace the Palestinians and increase the number of Israeli residents. Building restrictions for Palestinians inside Jerusalem started in 1967, when the occupation began. Although there are building laws inside the city, Israelis living there continue to break these laws without the threat of home demolition, whereas Palestinians who break the law do experience the demolition of their homes. “The Jerusalem Municipality enforces the building laws on Palestinians much more stringently than on the Jewish population, even though the number of violations is much higher in the Jewish neighborhoods” (B’Tselem,

2011). In numerous cases, Palestinians are forced to demolish their own homes to avoid the municipal charges of demolition and the attached fines.

In addition to individual and family levels of victimization, direct violence is also exacted on entire communities. Israel imposes curfews and incursions, which are forms of collective punishment that affect every person in the area. According to PCHR:

In 2003, Israel controlled part of the West Bank town of Hebron, where at least 45000 Palestinians live, and had been under curfew for 130 days. The curfew sometimes continued for a period of several weeks. Such restrictions clearly affect every area of life; workers were not allowed access to their work places; traders were not able to open shops; approximately 13000 school children were not able to attend classes; patients were denied access to medical services. (2004: 31)

Collective punishment is illegal under the 4th Geneva Convention, but Israel does not follow the guidelines of international law. For example, international law allows force when under threat, but Israel uses direct violence to maintain the structural violence of the occupation. B'Tselem highlights:

Israeli law, like international law, allows security forces to use reasonable force in self-defense and for duty-related purposes such as dispersing rioters, arresting suspects resisting arrest, and preventing a detainee from fleeing. The law does not, however, allow beatings, degradation, or ill-treatment of persons who are not rioting, resisting arrest, or fleeing. (2011)

Israel violates international law by continually using direct violence on the Palestinian people. Using direct violence supports their goals of repressing the society through physical harm.



Israeli soldiers pushing a Palestinian man. Beit Ula. November 2004

Direct violence is used to uphold the structural violence of the occupation. Each component of structural violence is enforced through the use of the numerous direct violence implements previously discussed. The Wall is one form of direct violence that imprisons the entire West Bank population. Although the structure itself is a form of direct violence, visible as an open-air prison, the effects of the Wall manifest various forms of structural violence. The violence triangle is enforced by way of direct violence and justified through the “security façade” of cultural violence.

Cultural Violence in the West Bank

Cultural violence is ingrained within the language, religion, and ideology of Israeli society. Israel was established as a Jewish state, promoting Jewish inhabitants over any other, including the indigenous population. The Law of Return grants Jewish people in diaspora the right to relocate to Israel and gain citizenship (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1950). In contrast, Palestinians who were exiled from their homes in 1948 are

rarely permitted to visit the country. Religion is often used as a way to differentiate superiority. In the eyes of the majority of Israelis, being Jewish is a superior status. Palestinians are largely Muslim, but there is a thriving Christian Palestinian population. Palestinians typically emphasize their Palestinian identity over their religion. Israelis typically identify first and foremost with their Jewish faith, whether or not they are currently practicing. Prioritizing Jewish identities over all others inhabiting the land provides the basis of cultural violence. Structural and direct violence are used to enforce rights based on identity.

Differentiating between the two populations shapes every aspect of Israeli society. To ensure that structural and direct violence are not questioned, a cultural violence campaign is essential for Israel. Israeli rhetoric of Palestinians as “terrorists” supports the use of direct and structural violence as “security measures.” This thought process is built deep within Israeli society. Cultural violence creates an “Israeli as victim of Palestinian violence” narrative. This widespread perspective helps Israel in their attempt to justify to their citizens, and the international community, the need to control Palestinians. Israel exports dehumanizing propaganda to the global community to absolve the state of any responsibility for Palestinian lives. The website Jewish Virtual Library has a section on “Palestinian terrorism,” which claims that the obstacles to peace lie with the Palestinian side and fails to discuss the Israeli role or Israeli violence. This is one example of how Israel figures anti-Palestinian violence as a form of self-protection. The website suggests that the Palestinian governing body teaches hatred and violence in their community, stating:

The culture of hatred cultivated by the Palestinian Authority (PA) against Israel undermines the chances for peace between Israel and the

Palestinians. Incitement has continued unabated for many years and despite the current negotiations between Israel and the PA that began on 30 July 2013. (2014)

For the majority of the global Jewish community, Palestinians are the obstacles to peace. This propaganda campaign erases the violence Israel has committed since its inception in 1948. The campaign has successfully positioned Israelis as the sole victims. The website continues to discuss the “terrorism and violence” within the larger Palestinian community. Importantly, the website claims that Israeli children want peace but that Palestinians are taught hate from a young age: “Incitement and peace do not go together. When the next generation of Palestinians is educated for peace and coexistence – as Israeli children already are – the chances for true peace will increase” (Jewish Virtual Library, 2014). This claim justifies Israel’s imprisonment and killing of Palestinian children. All Palestinians, regardless of age, are viewed as a product of their “violent” society and potential terrorists. This kind of propaganda is maintained in Israeli schools (Peled-Elhanan, 2012) and in pop culture and mainstream media. Politics and mainstream news portray Palestinians as violent people who want to “throw all the Jews into the sea.” This form of cultural violence encourages mainstream Israelis to hate Palestinians. These representations are dehumanizing and both attempt to excuse and obscure the everyday, directly violent, anti-Palestinian abuses and the larger system of structural violence.

This cultural violence also stems directly from the Israeli government. The state claimed that the Wall, which they called the “security barrier,” was needed to limit suicide bombings inside Israel. Before the Wall was constructed, militant Palestinian factions utilizing armed resistance against civilians completed numerous suicide bombings. *Electronic Intifada* journalist Ben White analyzed UN and Israeli government

statistics and found that the bombings decreased after the Wall's construction began; however, he argues that the Wall was not the deterrent (2014). The number of attacks were as high as 55 in 2002 and then decreased to 25 in 2003, when the Wall was first being constructed, and continued to decrease over the years to 1 attack in 2007. White argues that various components and not the Wall created the decline of suicide bombings. First, the Wall was only 20% complete when the declines first began. The numbers dropped from 55 in 2002 to 14 in 2004, when there were still opportunities to more easily access Israel and perform an attack. He also noted that the numbers dropped drastically after the Hamas ceasefire in late 2004 (White, 2014). White essentially argues that the Wall was not the sole reason for the decline, and the militant group halted the attacks, which subsequently coincided with the construction of the Wall. However, Israel still used the armed Palestinian resistance as their motive to building the Wall. Although they claimed the Wall would secure the Israeli public, they did not build it on the Green-Line, the internationally recognized border, but deep inside the Occupied Territory. This demonstrates that Israel was not intending to build the Wall for security, but to obtain more land for the illegal settlements and colonial endeavors.

Vilifying Arabs is a theme beyond the establishment of the Wall. In the 2015 Israeli elections, Benjamin Netanyahu, the incumbent and newly elected Prime Minister, based his campaign on protecting the Israeli public from the "Arabs." He urged his fellow Israelis to get to the polls and vote or the Arab takeover of the "democracy" would occur. He stated, "The right-wing government is in danger. Arab voters are heading to the polling stations in droves" (Zonszein, 2015). This statement reflected the Israeli government's perspectives and fears of the indigenous people.

Cultural violence positions one group as superior to another group. In Israeli media, Palestinians are commonly constructed as subhuman and therefore inferior. The newly appointed Deputy Defense Minister in Netanyahu's 2015 elected right wing government expressed this view. Eli Ben Dahan, who leads the Israeli military's Civil Administration in the West Bank, stated in a 2013 interview, "To me, they [Palestinians] are like animals, they aren't human" (Pileggi, 2015). Dahan was appointed to a position where he is in direct control over the West Bank's infrastructure in Area C and travel permits for Palestinians. Dahan, who thinks Palestinians are subhuman, is tasked with allocating them rights within the territory. His views explain the direct connection between how the Palestinians are viewed and how they are treated within the territory.



Palestinian woman lying on the ground unconscious, while the Israeli ambulance was on site, yet unwilling to take her due to being Palestinian. Nil'in 2004

Conclusion

The violence triangle has been used inside the West Bank since Israel began occupying the territory. Structural violence has been the tip of the triangle, maintaining the ongoing cultural violence campaign and enforcing daily direct violence. Israel intensified this violence triangle, using more violence against the Palestinian people each year. The Wall, a structural form of violence, enhanced the triangle of violence to increase vulnerability to harm and inequality.

The Wall's construction intensified inequalities between Israelis and Palestinians. Israelis are able to travel freely and find gainful employment, while Palestinians exist in bantustans surrounded by a concrete Wall and an electric fence. Palestinian lands and livelihoods are being confiscated for Israeli settlements. Travel costs more money to Palestinians, as they have to use separate roads. Israelis have options for their medical care whereas Palestinians are limited to the few main hospitals and clinics located inside the West Bank. The Wall completely limits Palestinians' use of Jerusalem. The Wall exacerbated the violence that already existed, leaving no options for people to thrive. The violence triangle in the Occupied Territory of the West Bank has been successful for Israel. The ongoing culturally violent propaganda campaign has made the direct and structural violence seem normal and deserved by the majority of Israeli citizens, as well as the international community.

Part 2

The Wall's Violence

Israel has demonstrated a history of violence against the Palestinian people, ultimately aiming to conquer the lands and in turn dominate the indigenous people. Although Israel successfully employed the violence triangle for several decades, with each popular Palestinian uprising, an escalation on violence was required to maintain its occupation. In 2002, as a direct response to the Second *Intifada*, Israel began to establish the Apartheid Wall to monitor and control Palestinians in specific areas. The Wall traveled throughout the Occupied Territory of the West Bank, affecting not only the villages and towns that were in its direct path, but also those at a distance. The Wall essentially erased the Green-Line through the implementation of the violence triangle.

The violence triangle was enacted through the establishment of the Wall for several political purposes. Part 2 of this dissertation is split into three separate chapters to discuss the use of the Wall by the state of Israel. The Wall's violence is discussed throughout these chapters in descriptive detail to expose Israel's use of the violence triangle. This detail is intentional as a way to explicitly highlight the numerous ways in which Israel uses violent against the Palestinian people, thus reframing the narrative. Each chapter in this section explores the effects of the Wall on the indigenous Palestinian people through first-hand accounts of dispossession, restricted movement, and the

Jerusalem Envelope. As the Wall impacted numerous aspects of social and political life for Palestinians, the chapters are divided into topic areas. However, as the distinct issues the chapters cover are also interrelated, the chapters analyze the complexity of the violence that the Wall imposes onto the occupied population. Focusing on each aspect of the Wall's violence facilitates a thorough examination of how Israel utilizes the violence triangle in its persisting occupation. This analysis lays bare Israel's true intentions in establishing the Wall.

The dispossession of lands and resources exists in all areas where Israel constructs the Wall. This enables Israel to conquer more of the land in its colonizing efforts. Chapter 3 specifically focuses on the dispossession of Palestinian lands in the West Bank, analyzing the establishment and construction of the Wall for the expansion of Israeli settlements. Investigating the dispossession of land and resources makes clear that Israel's objective in the building of the Wall is not for security, but to extend its long-lasting colonial plans. The path of the Wall weaving deep inside the West Bank around, between, and often directly through villages demonstrates Israel's aim to dissolve the Green-Line and secure settlements into its expanding state. This route has enabled Israel to grab ever more Palestinian lands and resources, annexing them to the Israeli side of the Wall, and further creating an unequal environment for the two populations residing in the West Bank – indigenous Palestinians and the settler Israelis. The court cases that Palestinian villages and towns affected by the Wall brought forth to the Israeli military courts in the search for justice in this unjust environment illustrate the violence triangle in the form of the Wall and its related systems and practices of surveillance and control. The ways Israel informed the local Palestinian populations affected by the Wall of the

construction and the dispossession of their lands and thus their diminished livelihoods also illustrate the violence triangle. Part 2 investigates these issues to demonstrate that the triangle of violence is essential for Israel to utilize in their colonial endeavors as a means to dominate the lands and the occupied Palestinian population residing inside the Wall.

The Wall's path is strategic in not only in confiscating Palestinian lands, but also as a means of control over the people. Chapter 4 examines how Israel uses the Wall to restrict Palestinian movement within the West Bank, essentially creating an open-air prison to track and monitor the occupied population. To accomplish this goal, Israel has developed enhanced structural violence implements, such as checkpoints, gates, road closures, and bypass and tunnel roads. Some of these implements have been in use since the occupation began in 1967, while others have been constructed in conjunction with the construction of the Apartheid Wall. These implements track and limit Palestinian movement within the West Bank and beyond the Wall, and they also directly prevent the Palestinian people from accessing labor, ultimately increasing the time and money it takes to travel inside the West Bank. The Palestinian people encounter daily harassment while traveling through these structurally violent implements, which pushes them to remain in their homes. The restriction of movement directly affects the possibility of collective action against the Israeli occupation, which is a political aim of Israel. They not only suppress the Palestinian people through the structural violence implements, they have also created an environment where it is difficult to collectively resist the occupation. This in turn allows room for individual violent resistance rather than collective nonviolent resistance. Through the path of the Wall, Israel has been able to unilaterally

dissolve the border, which further disconnects the Palestinian people from both their envisioned future state and the holy city of Jerusalem.

The issues of dispossession and restricted movement are compounded in the area around Jerusalem, which is known as the Jerusalem Envelope. Chapter 5 explores the special case of the Jerusalem Envelope, where Israel has implemented an unequal ID system to further repress the local Palestinian population in an attempt to deport them into the West Bank. This measure also limits the access of those who reside in areas that were Palestinian suburban areas before the establishment of the Wall to services and medical care inside the city. The Wall affects the demographics of the city of Jerusalem. This is a visible result of Israel's use of structural violence as a means to settle and colonize. Chapter 5 examines how in the Jerusalem Envelope, Israel enhances structural violence implements to transfer the local Palestinian population residing in East Jerusalem into the Palestinian side of the Wall in the West Bank. In turn, the Wall around Jerusalem includes the built-up Israeli settlements located inside the West Bank into the city and considers them to be Jerusalem suburban areas, transforming the city's makeup. This separation, and the use of the violence triangle, has turned to a boiling point for Palestinians and Israelis within the city. In Jerusalem, collective nonviolent action is difficult due to the ongoing violence triangle, and the minority of Palestinians within the city. The structural violence has resulted in individual acts of Palestinian violence towards Israelis, and direct violence enacted onto the Palestinian people at large by Israeli mobs as a byproduct of cultural violence. The Jerusalem Envelope exposes how the use of the Wall has produced more direct violence, and supported by the use of increased structural and cultural violence.

Part 2 of this dissertation uses personal testimonies to trace how Israel has used the Apartheid Wall to continue dispossessing the Palestinian people of their lands and resources, rendering the Green-Line obsolete with the aim to expand the settler colonial Israeli state. Examining these first-hand accounts shows that Israel has dealt with the “Palestinian problem” by trapping Palestinians inside the Wall to strategically employ structural violence implements, using both direct and cultural violence to control them. It is clear from the Palestinian perspective that Israel is executing a political strategy around the city of Jerusalem by establishing the Wall to isolate all Palestinian claims to the holy city as an envisioned future capital, further disconnecting the Palestinian people from their dreams of self-determination.

Chapter 3

Dispossession from the Wall

The Apartheid Wall is a form of structural violence: it dispossesses Palestinian people of their lands to expand the illegal Israeli settlements for further Israeli domination of the Occupied Territory. The Wall's path intrudes far beyond the Green-Line into the Occupied Palestinian Territory of the West Bank, essentially dissolving the 1947 Armistice Line. The Wall annexes land and underground resources, and transfers them to the other side of the Wall, utilized by the Israeli settler populations. The triangle of violence enables the confiscation of Palestinian land by way of the Wall. Although Israel has always employed the violence triangle to maintain their occupation, the Wall introduces new implements of direct, structural and cultural violence. Interpreting the Wall's dispossession through the framework of the triangle of violence supports the reframing of the mainstream narrative from "Palestinian as the aggressor" to one of "Palestinian as victim to Israeli violence". Reframing is accomplished through exposing Israel's use of violence to dominate the land and the Palestinian people for political purposes.

This chapter focuses on the dispossession of Palestinian land and resources for the construction of the Apartheid Wall as a means to highlight Israeli violence and reframe the mainstream narrative. Land dispossession is a form of structural violence that Israel

performs to expand their control. By stealing Palestinian land, Israel robs the indigenous population of their potential for the political aspirations of expanding the Israeli state by dissolving the Green-Line. While Palestinians suffer land and resource losses, the settler populations in the West Bank thrive. The triangle of violence has increased with the establishment of the Apartheid Wall to ensure this divide. Although the Wall is stealing Palestinian land, this is not the first time in history that Israel has confiscated Palestinian land for their colonial endeavors. By exposing Israeli violence, and reframing the narrative, activists' communities have the potential to resist Israeli violence with additional international support.

One purpose of the Wall is to isolate the Israeli settlements from the Palestinian areas that they are built on. The triangle of violence reinforces the establishment, and the preservation, of the Wall. The settlements started in 1967, when Israel began to occupy the West Bank. As the decades passed, Israel began to implement the violence triangle to repress the occupied peoples, and give more freedoms to the settler communities inside the West Bank. This established an inequality between the indigenous people and the settler population. This inequality is a form of structural violence. Structural violence is invisible, yet its effects are long lasting. In the case of the West Bank, the Israeli settler population has benefited by exploiting the Palestinian population. This inequality creates a disparity between the overall life chances of these two groups (Galtung, 1969: 168). It is significant to acknowledge the Israeli government's positioning of Israeli settlers over the indigenous Palestinian residents through structural violence. This inequality increases hostility towards the other, and has the ability to develop into armed struggle.

Structural violence does not exist alone; it works in conjunction with direct and cultural violence to create the violence triangle. In the West Bank, a highly militarized army controls the Palestinian population. The Israeli army, situated throughout the West Bank, use direct violence towards the Palestinian people to dominate them. Physically harming the indigenous people is strategic for the Israeli military. The Palestinian people do not willingly accept the numerous forms of structural violence imposed on them, and have utilized resistance tactics against Israel's triangle of violence. As a response, Israel employs direct violence to generate fear and coerces the Palestinian people to submit to the structural violence. Cultural violence reinforces direct and structural violence; it is used as an excuse by Israel to collectively punish the Palestinian people. By using Palestinian cultural attributes, and framing them as negative, Israel demonizes the Palestinian culture as a way to dehumanize the people. Thus, the Israeli government labels the Palestinian people as "dangerous terrorists" and position themselves as the victims. This propaganda enables Israel to implement various forms of structural violence in the name of security. Combatting this culturally violent false narrative is essential to support ongoing resistance.

In the West Bank, structural and cultural violence meet to oppress the Palestinian people through contrasting governance. Identity-based legal rights differentiate how Palestinians and Israelis are able to live. These two groups also live under different judicial guidelines. For example, a Jewish settler residing inside the Occupied Territory is bound by Israeli civil law while indigenous Palestinians are subject to Israeli military law and Palestinian Authority law. These two populations essentially live in an apartheid system. In an apartheid system, structural violence works in accordance with cultural

violence, attributing more rights to one group while limiting the rights of the other. Apartheid systems also use direct violence to ensure the oppressed group obeys the structurally violent orders. Israel's use of apartheid supports their control over the Occupied Territory, and further agitates the oppressed population, who are living in the midst of extreme inequality.

The Wall is a continuation of the violence triangle within the West Bank; it continues to confiscate Palestinian lands for Israeli colonial aspirations. By virtue of the Wall, Israel steals Palestinian land in the name of "security." Israelis refer to the Wall as the "security Wall," framing it as a form of safety for the Israeli people. This narrative positions the Israeli population as victimized by the Palestinian people. However, a more accurate name for the barrier is the Apartheid Wall. By reframing the name, and the purpose of the Wall, it is clear that it is a form of structural violence, and affects the Palestinian people in long-lasting ways. Acknowledging the Wall as a form of Apartheid reinforces the overall reframing of the narrative, highlighting Israel's use of the violence triangle to allot rights to Israeli settlers while dispossessing Palestinians. The Wall was not built along the internationally recognized Green-Line, but encroaches deep into Palestinian villages and towns, well within the Green-Line, confiscating Palestinian land and resources, and securing Israeli settlements. The Wall takes from the Palestinian, limiting their potential for the benefit of the Israeli settler. As Galtung notes, "If insight and/or resources are monopolized by a group or class or are used for other purposes, then the actual level falls below the potential level, and violence is present in the system" (Galtung, 1969: 169). The Apartheid Wall is an extreme form of structural violence,

stealing land from indigenous Palestinians, and unilaterally transferring it to Israel to expand their settler colony.

Dispossession in the West Bank

Structurally violent land confiscation has been a policy since Israel became a state, and continues to shrink the Palestinian Territories. This has had long-lasting effects on the indigenous people, for whom land is a significant component of their cultural identity. Histories of a land inform its future. Palestinian studies scholar Beshara Doumani highlights the connection the Palestinian people have towards their land.

In rural areas, to give but a small example, every noticeable geological marker—whether a boulder, hillside, or spring—and every significant manifestation of human labor on the land—whether a garden, terrace, or olive grove—possessed a name that was passed down the generations. These named markers are sites of memories that anchor durable, discrete, and interlinked social spaces (especially in the hill areas) where individuals and communities are constituted. (2007: 53)

Most Palestinians can narrate stories about their land, referencing their ancestors and their history. It was essential for the settler-colonists to break the indigenous people's bond to their lands to successfully conquer them and to establish the state of Israel in 1948. To accomplish this, Israel utilized direct violence tactics to physically remove the Palestinian people from their lands. This period was the beginning of land confiscations in service of the expanding settler colonial state.

Dispossession of Palestinian lands, through the triangle of violence, was an integral historical strategy for Israel's colonial project. The Palestinian people refer to the initial destruction of their land as the *Nakba* (catastrophe). The Palestinian inhabitants of the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea experienced calculated

forms of direct violence. They were forced out of their homes, massacred, exiled, and internally displaced into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Lands within Israel proper were annexed and the state of Israel was established on this land, erasing all aspects of Palestinian origins. Lands within the Green-Line, the internationally recognized border, known as the West Bank, were controlled by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan from 1948 until 1967. During these twenty years, Palestinians maintained control over their lands inside the West Bank. Records of land ownership were rarely kept under the Hashemite rule due to high taxes. In 1967, Israel conquered Jordan in the ‘Six Day War,’ also known as the *Naksa*, and began to occupy the West Bank and Gaza. Once Israel began to occupy the Palestinian territories, the triangle of violence was used to dominate the indigenous people, prefacing the long-standing practice of violence to maintain the occupation. Israeli settlers began to move into the territories, illegally establishing their own communities on the land. To secure these communities, Israel began to steal Palestinian lands, claiming the land as state land (Matar 1981: 101). Once settlements were constructed, by-pass roads were built to allow Israeli settlers direct pathways from their settlement communities, inside the West Bank, into Israel proper. The road system was devised to separate the settler population from the Palestinian communities they were dispossessing. An imbalanced system was developed, allotting rights to the settler community while exploiting the Palestinian people. Structural violence grew over the next several decades. To maintain the divisions, Israel positioned the Israeli military throughout the West Bank, with a heavy presence near the settlement communities. The Israeli military utilized direct violence techniques against the Palestinian people to get them to conform to the structural violence implements. Within the Israeli state, an

ongoing cultural violence campaign against the Palestinian people was underway. Palestinians were demonized, producing an excuse for the ongoing structural and direct violence occurring inside the West Bank. The presence of the military further exacerbated the frustrations Palestinians were feeling while living under the violence triangle of the occupation.

The Wall's establishment intensified Israel's long history of land appropriation and the implementation of the triangle of violence was used as a means to confiscate more Palestinian land. The Wall disrupted the connection between the indigenous Palestinian people and their lands. It officially sealed the Palestinian people inside the Occupied Territory, leaving their lands on the other side to be conquered for the expansion of the settler colonial state of Israel. The Wall, the most contemporary aspect of ongoing structural violence, is disastrous for agricultural communities situated along the path. The majority of Palestinian villages in the West Bank relied on their lands as a source of income. Losing their land has hindered these villages' growth and farmers' livelihood. Israel's colonial, continual, land confiscation has further displaced the Palestinian farmers from their history and their future. The indigenous inhabitants of the West Bank are striving to remain on their lands in the face of continued Israeli settler colonial violence, and its newest problem: the Apartheid Wall. As indigenous studies scholars Alfred and Cornassel explain, "It is this oppositional, place-based existence, along with the consciousness of being in struggle against the dispossessing and demeaning fact of colonization by foreign peoples, that fundamentally distinguishes Indigenous peoples from other peoples of the world" (2005: 597). The Palestinian people did not allow Israel to steal their land without a confrontation. This act of dispossession

prompted the Palestinian farmers to mobilize against the ongoing confiscation. The Wall has ultimately stolen land and livelihood from the indigenous Palestinian people for the Israeli settler population. The transfer of land and resources generate structural violence, which is upheld through Israeli and settler direct violence. The Wall was not built in the name of security, but as a continuation of Israel's land grab. The path of the Wall provides ample proof that Israel's intention was to claim more Palestinian land for the settler colonial state.



The Wall next to houses. Azariya 2006

The Violence of the Wall's Path

Although Israel has declared that the Wall is a security measure, its route exposes how “securing” the West Bank was not the goal, which directly draws attention to Israel's violence. The Wall was not built along the Armistice Line (Green-Line), which is recognized internationally as a border. However, the Wall is located deep inside the Green-Line, weaving in between Palestinian villages and towns. If security were Israel's intention, the route would not snake into settlement enclaves to include them into the

“Israeli” side of the Wall. The Wall’s route is the newest phase of the Israeli government’s unilateral dispossession of Palestinian land. The aim is to use the Wall to take more Palestinian land and expand the settler communities within the West Bank. As Catherine Cook points out,

Israel argues that the wall is being constructed for security reasons, but the structure's meandering path betrays underlying territorial ambitions. In places, the barrier dips over three miles into the West Bank, leaving on the "Israeli" side settlements, fertile Palestinian land and valuable water resources. (2003)

The path of the Wall weaves in and out of Palestinian areas, isolating the people from their land, which is confiscated on the side. The use of the triangle of violence, in the dispossession of Palestinian lands, signals Israel’s overall political aims of expansion.

Using the Wall’s route, Israel has implemented a dangerous form of structural violence to colonize more Palestinian land, stealing it from Palestinians and transferring it to Israeli settlers. The land seized for the Wall was used for daily needs, such as personal food supply and livelihood. The West Bank lacks economic opportunities due to the occupation and the loss of land cannot be supplemented by additional work. Several villagers I interviewed stated that working the land has been the main source of income for farmers residing in West Bank villages. The Palestinian farmers who lose their lands are unable to make a living, forcing them into poverty. The Wall attempts to remove the Palestinian people from their lands, preventing them access to it, which affects their future potential. While the Wall limits Palestinians’ ability to prosper, it has increased the opportunities for the Israeli settlements. The settlements are expanding daily, growing the communities. The Wall is used to separate the Palestinian areas near the settlements for expansion purposes. The inequality of land usage is long lasting and affects every

Palestinian community residing within the West Bank. The violence of the Wall has affected all the villages and towns throughout the West Bank, trapping them inside the Occupied Territory into an open-air prison. Those villages situated in closer proximity to the Green-Line have not only been trapped into cantons, they have also experienced the dispossession of their lands for the construction of the Wall.

The triangle of violence not only supports the land grab, and the erasure of the Green-Line, it also attempts to further restrict the Palestinian people's future. The Wall's construction separates the villages from their lands, isolating them, and restricting their access to harvest, thus limiting their economic potential. Villages that are located in the radius of the Green-Line have been the hardest hit. In the north of the West Bank, the agricultural lands were seized for the site of the Wall. These lands were the most fertile in the West Bank. In the middle region of the West Bank sits the Ariel settlement bloc. The Wall dips deep into the West Bank, into the Salfit region, to secure the settlement bloc into Israel, and separates it from the Palestinian villages in the area. Villages in the west Ramallah district, northwest Jerusalem district villages were dispossessed of their lands for settlement expansion. In the Bethlehem area, the Wall zigzags, cutting through the village of Al Walaja to illegally secure more Israeli settlements. The Wall extends all the way down the Green-Line, past the city of Hebron, running both parallel to the Green-Line, as well as interjecting deep into Palestinian areas within the Occupied Territory. Each region in the West Bank has experienced loss of land due to the path of the Wall. The detail in which each area is discussed exposes the violence of the Wall within a peace frame, giving a human-interest perspective to the effects of the Wall. Emphasizing these areas, and using the testimonies, investigates individual dispossession from the

Wall's. Examining these areas as a whole highlights the Wall's purpose: to dispossess Palestinian villages and to foster Israeli settlements' prosperity.



The zigzagging of the Wall. Abu Dis 2013

The North

The history of the Wall started in the north, where the themes of the Wall's dispossession originated. The Wall's structural violence began in 2002 in the north, where it confiscated the most fertile Palestinian land. The Wall has greatly affected the economic needs of all areas in this region. It took land from the farmers and prevented them from harvesting, and in turn profiting, off of their lands. The stolen lands were used for the site of the Wall, the buffer zone, the army patrol roads, and ultimately to expand the settlements. The Wall weaves in and out, around the Israeli settlements, and in some cases isolating Palestinian villages into seam zones, areas located between the Wall and

the Green-Line. The path forced the people in the north into enclaves, imprisoned into their towns and villages. Farmers still cannot work their lands in the same way they did before the Wall was constructed. To reach their lands on the other side of the Wall, they must gain access through militarized entry points. The direct violence of the military is always present to enforce the regulations around the Wall. The Wall has changed every aspect of life for the people in the north, forcing them to adapt to the dispossession of their lands for the site of the Wall.

The Wall affected the income of Palestinian farmers, and enforced a dynamic where people were without their basic needs. It cut through the north, confiscating the farmers' lands, which were used for food supply and livelihood. The north is highly fertile, and agriculture is the main industry for resident Palestinians. The people in the northern region relied on their agriculture for income, including their green houses and citrus fruits, which the Wall seized. In Tulkarm, the farmers sold their products to Israelis because they offered a better price than the Israeli market, and were close to the Green-Line and a major Israeli highway. Fayez from Tulkarm stated, "You can sell your vegetable direct to the Israeli side, big number from the Israeli people would come and buy my vegetable with good price, now nothing."¹⁵ With the building of the Wall, the two populations were physically separated, leaving the farmers in the north selling their produce only to their own town, which consisted of numerous other farmers. Fayez explained that before the Wall, he would be able to sell a box of eggplant for 35-40 Israeli shekels and never had to leave his farm. Now he sells one box for 12 shekels inside his town, he is competing with all the other farmers who also lost their business

¹⁵ Interview with Fayez. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

due to the Wall. He now has costs of transporting his produce to the market in town and hiring an employee to sell it while he continues to harvest the remaining land. These costs diminish his income. The Wall has created a dire economic situation for the farmers of the north.

To be more thorough about the Wall's violence in the north, I will discuss two towns to emphasize how specific Palestinian areas were affected. The northwest area consists of two major towns, Tulkarm and Qalqilya, and numerous villages that utilize the services of the towns. The Wall's construction started in the town of Tulkarm in the spring of 2002. Tulkarm is located near the Green-Line. The Wall was built on the Green-Line but confiscated Tulkarm land to create a buffer zone in the area. As Tulkarm is located near the Green-Line and is densely populated, a 26-foot tall, concrete Wall was constructed to isolate the area. This concrete Wall permanently separates highly-populated areas from Israel proper and settlements. The construction of the Wall in Tulkarm took over a year to complete, and was finished in August 2003. In Tulkarm the Wall was built along the Green-Line, yet as it traveled south it began to dip deep inside the Occupied Territory.



The Wall in the farmlands of Tulkarm. Tulkarm. August 2013

The meandering path of the Wall from Tulkarm to Qalqilya incorporated various villages, introducing them to the structural violence of land seizure. The construction of the Wall traveled in both directions from the town of Tulkarm, confiscating land to secure the illegal settlements. Fayez explained the Wall's path from his town. "It started from Tulkarm and started to go to Jenin north and Qalqilya south, and after that continued to go to the south more, to Salfit, west Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron."¹⁶ The Wall continued to move south from Tulkarm, sealing in the villages as it began to be constructed in the Qalqilya district. The Qalqilya district consists of mostly farmers. Agriculture is the main industry for a large community living there. In June 2002, a few months after the construction started in Tulkarm, the bulldozers began to work in the town of Qalqilya, and the nearby, small, agricultural village of Jayyus. The Wall eventually travelled 100 meters into Jayyus lands, isolating residents from their lands. In this area, the Wall is an electric fence, with a buffer zone on each side. The people of Jayyus were unable to cultivate their lands due to the path of the Wall, and have

¹⁶ Interview with Fayez. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

been economically affected since it was constructed, with few work opportunities. This lack of economic prospects positions Palestinians as below their potential, and is a direct form of structural violence.

When the Wall arrived to Qalqilya it introduced the highly populated town to structural isolation from their agricultural lands. Qalqilya is a big town, yet the residents still rely on their lands as a source of livelihood. Numerous people in the town of Qalqilya own land outside of the urban center and in the larger district of Qalqilya. Mohammed, a resident of Qalqilya, described when the Wall started in his town. “They started building it around Qalqilya in June 2002, during the military operation that they called ‘Security Fence Operation,’ and they finished building it in one year.”¹⁷ At this time, Mohammed was working in the municipality with several organizations, such as the Red Cross. He explained how he worked to find solutions to help farmers with their land because the Wall encircled them. He shared,

As an employee for the [Qalqilya] district, I follow the cases in terms of damages in statistics that have been done by building the Wall, and the problems that the residents face. We try to help, and support with the help of lawyers, and other concerned governmental institutions, the Red Cross too, to reach out to people who are suffering from the Wall, and see what kind of services they need.¹⁸

The path also personally affected Mohammed; all of his land is now behind the Wall. According to him, the most important aspect of his work is farming, the Wall has directly affected him.

¹⁷ Interview with Mohammed Abd el-Raheem. Qalqilya, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.


¹⁸ Interview with Mohammed Abd el-Raheem. Qalqilya, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.

The structural and cultural violence made it nearly impossible for Palestinians to gain assistance around the dangers of the Wall. The Israeli legal system was in accordance with the Wall's vision. The Palestinian identity was viewed as the aggressor by way of cultural violence, and this excuse for the Wall limited prospects of accessing support. The Wall in Qalqilya is built completely around the town of Qalqilya, isolating it into an open-air prison. On one side, the Wall is built on the Green-Line, and on the other two sides the Wall intrudes into the West Bank, encircling Qalqilya into a concrete enclave. The Wall's path secured two Israeli settlements: Alfe Menashe settlement, southeast of Qalqilya, and the Zufin settlement, in the northeast. The Wall strategically dips into the West Bank, connecting these two settlements into the larger state of Israel. Trapping Qalqilya benefits these settler communities. As a Palestinian, Mohammed has no rights, even in regards to his own land. Ultimately the occupation does not listen to the complaints of the occupied. Israel justifies the Wall as a security measure; therefore, Mohammed and his colleagues have no authority to combat the land grab, and are forced to find ways to live in this open-air prison and off of less land.

The structural violence of the Wall's path trapped some villages in the north into the seam zone. The Wall was built on three sides of Jubara village, isolating the village from the rest of the West Bank. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights explains the seam zone:

On 2 October 2003, the Israeli military commander in the West Bank issued a military order declaring all areas located between the wall and Israel's 1967 border in the north of the West Bank "closed areas." According to the order, Palestinians are not permitted to enter the area. With regard to Palestinian civilians living in these areas, their entry into, and presence in the area would be conditioned by obtaining permits from the Israeli military commander (2004: 25).

The people situated in the seam zones were not only isolated from their lands, they were also physically trapped inside their villages. To access the West Bank, they needed approval from the Israeli military, who kept a constant presence outside of their village. The path of the Wall in the north isolated people into enclaves. It confiscated farmers' lands, limiting their potential. The violence of the Wall continued as the construction invaded the villages south of Qalqilya. Israeli settlements were deeper inside the West Bank, and the Wall extended to ensure they were secured into Israel.



Salfit Region

Highlighting each section of the West Bank ensures the violence triangle is not seen as an isolated case, but widespread devastation for the Palestinian people. The Wall continued to appropriate Palestinian land for Israeli settlements in the Salfit region. Located in the middle of the West Bank, the Salfit region is comprised of numerous Palestinian villages. The Wall in this area encroaches deep into the West Bank, securing the Ariel settlement bloc into Israel. In addition to the Ariel settlements in the mid section, it also weaves in and out of Palestinian villages to include more settlements near the Green-Line. By June 2003, the construction of the Wall began in the village of Mas'ha to secure El Qana settlement, eventually isolating Mas'ha.

The Wall injures each Palestinian that is in close proximity, as well as those who are in distance due to the restrictions it causes. With that said, there are some situations that are more extreme than others. The case of the Amer family illustrates the violence of the Wall. When the Wall approached their house, Israeli authorities told the family to move. The family refused, and the Wall was built anyway, imprisoning their house between El Qana settlement and their village of Mas'ha.



The Amer house across from the piece of the wall in front of their house. The road is for military use only. Mas'ha. August 2005.

The Amer family had lived in their house for decades and had already been displaced during the *Nakba*. Their patriarch was not willing to forcibly be moved again. Hani Amer and his wife Maniera blatantly refused to self-transfer their family. Israel responded by imprisoning the family between a concrete Wall, gates, and fences. Their home was completely surrounded by structural violence implements to limit their movement, which restricted their overall abilities to prosper. Mas'ha is a rural area, but instead of erecting an electric fence along the path, the Israeli authorities constructed the Wall directly in front of Hani's home and connected it to the electric fence on both sides, inhibiting access to the village and obscuring any view of it. A patrol road for the army was also built through Hani's front yard along with the Wall. By utilizing a constant army presence (direct violence), and forcing the Amer family inside a confined space (structural violence), Israel pressured them to move. Hani describes how this decision affected him and his family.

When they built the Wall, they started implementing their plan against me, which is trying to force me out of the house, pressuring me psychologically. One of the things they did was sending people from the

intelligence to jump over the Wall, between my house and the settlement, into my house and ask me forcibly to open the gates for them so that they can pass through, in order to catch me in act that I let people through and use it against me as an excuse to kick me out of my house. I wasn't lenient with them and I kicked them out many times, and I told them that I know who they are. Now they stopped that plan and started something new, there is a road between my house and the settlement. The settlers started coming to that road, about twenty or thirty settlers, and started swearing and throwing stones at us round the clock, sometimes at six in the morning or at midnight, sometimes at noon or at nine o'clock at night.¹⁹

This case shows how Israeli military soldiers and settler populations collaboratively used direct violence to coerce Palestinians into abiding structural violence. El Qana settlers exacted direct violence against Hani and his family for not obeying the Israeli military orders to move and both settlers and soldiers constantly harassed the family. They imposed several forms of violence onto the Amer family, pressuring them to move, in an attempt to steal their land. Hani's case is severe, but using direct violent to isolate Palestinians from their land is a common Israeli military practice. Hani did not give in to this direct violence from the settler community located near his house or from Israeli military soldiers. The Wall in Mas'ha was completed within five months, by October 2003. The Amer family remained on their land, but it has not been easy for them. Hani's oldest child is now thirty and has moved to the main village; his youngest child of fourteen has grown up behind the Wall over the past eleven years. Hani and his family still live in the house isolated by the Wall. This decision has been costly in various ways, but they have gained notoriety for their steadfastness.


¹⁹ Interview with Hani Amer. Mas'ha, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.



Boy with the paved route of the Wall in the background. Deir Ballut . December 2006

Most villages in the Salfit region have experienced some form of dispossession due to the Wall cutting through this area for the expansion of the Israeli settlement blocs. The path intrudes so deep into the West Bank that villages situated away from the Green-Line are also affected. This deep intrusion into the West Bank provides more evidence that the Wall was not a security measure, yet it was a land grab. South of Mas'ha, Deir Ballut village planned to build a school in 2003, but the Israeli authorities informed the village municipality that it would be in the Wall's route, and could not be built. This conflict led to a court case in the Israeli high court, which delayed the Wall's construction in Deir Ballut. The ruling in September 15, 2005, approved the Wall's construction, but changed its route. The Wall was going to take most of Deir Ballut's land from the west, yet the court moved it further west towards the Green-Line; it is still not situated on the Green-Line. The Wall on the west side of the village was completed in March of 2006, a year after the construction started. The speed that Israel completed the Wall in the beginning inhibited knowledge sharing about the structure, and thus widespread dissent. The south of Deir Ballut village is currently under construction. To the east construction

has not begun, yet there is a planned route, which will secure the large settlement of Ariel into Israel. The Wall's construction has not stopped since it started in Tulkarm. It sealed in some areas completely, while others were left partially completed. The Wall moved south, and the construction eventually resumed.



West Ramallah District

Detailed accounts of the Wall's violence, as it traveled south, provide a theme of Israel's use of violence in each region. The West Ramallah villages were exposed to the concept of the Wall from the northern villages, and this knowledge sharing supported them to defend their lands. Situated between the Green-Line and the main Palestinian city of Ramallah, the West Ramallah villages are small. Traveling south, the Wall arrived in Budrus village in November of 2003. Budrus sits very close to the Green-Line, and one side of the Wall was built along the Green-Line, due to high resistance against the Wall in the initial construction phase (for further discussion, see chapter 6). After several

months of construction in Budrus, a section of the Wall was complete. The construction stopped in Budrus and continued in areas to the south, only to return to Budrus in September of 2004. The construction was ultimately completed in Budrus in a few months. Israel strategically constructed portions of the Wall at different times, arriving in new areas, uprooting trees, paving lands and returning when people least expected it.



Farmer standing in front of a bulldozer that is paving land for the site of the Wall. Budrus. September 2004

The violence of the Wall was unpredictable and did not travel in a successive route. The path could bypass an entire village only to return at a later date. The village of Nil'in was able to push off the construction far longer than the other villages in the area. In February of 2004, after several months of construction in Budrus, the Wall's construction started in the adjacent village of Nil'in. In this location, the construction lasted for only a few days. The civil resistance movement in Nil'in compelled the Israeli authorities to move further south and return to Nil'in later. On May 17, 2008, construction workers returned to Ni'lin village to finish uprooting the trees for the site of the Wall. On May 21, 2008, the construction officially started from the village of Midya,


to the west of Ni'lin, towards Deir Qaddis to the east, passing the village of Ni'lin along its path and completing the area. Workers completed the Wall in the Nil'in village in 2010, taking two years to completely seal in the area.



Mehatyahu settlement on the other side of the Wall of Bil'in. Bil'in August 2013

Israeli settlement expansion has been one of the aims for the path of the Wall, continuing the fallacy of security. The Wall is a form of protection for the settler communities, illegally residing in the West Bank, as it steals Palestinian lands for their settlement expansion. In the West Ramallah villages, the large Israeli settlement of Modin Ilit determined the Wall's path. Modin Ilit is located deep inside the Green-Line in the Occupied Territory, with direct access to Israel proper. Residents of Bil'in, a village near Modin Ilit, learned about plans to build the Wall on their lands in the spring of 2004 for the expansion of the settlement. They were aware that the construction would begin, and had learned from residents of other villages about the Wall's damaging impact, long before it arrived on their lands. The Wall's construction began in Bil'in during the spring of 2005. Abdulla, a resident of the village, explained, "It means all of the land behind the Wall, they are planning to fill it with a big settlement there. For this

we start to think to be or not to be, it means, if they built the Wall to build a settlement and we will lose all of our land from there.”²⁰ The village of Bil’in appealed to the Israeli High Court, and construction stopped in the area while the case was being reviewed. The court ruled to move the Wall, but sustained that it must be built for Israel’s “security” concerns. The Wall was completed in 2011 in the village of Bil’in for Modin Illit settlement.



²⁰ Interview with Abdulla Abu Rahma. Bil’in, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

Northwest Jerusalem Villages

The Wall did not only restrict access to Israel proper or settlements; it also isolated villages from other Palestinian areas of the West Bank, exposing the myth of security. The separation of Palestinian areas limits connection between Palestinian residents, and supports Israel's control through this form of structural violence. The Northwest Jerusalem villages are situated near the Green-Line, between the city of Ramallah and the city of Jerusalem. The Northwest Jerusalem villages were in a precarious situation due to the Wall's path. The people living in this region were completely cut off from the Palestinian areas around them. The Wall was going to strategically isolate all the villages. Biddo was the first village in this area where construction workers paved land to prepare for constructing the Wall. During February of 2004, they began to uproot village land for the path of the Wall. The construction also began in the neighboring villages in the area, including Beit Duqu, Beit Suriq and Beit Liqia. These villages were the first to appeal to the Israeli High Court and receive a decision before the Wall was built in an attempt to disrupt the structural violence. Various villages in the area and nearby Israeli neighborhoods collaborated in order to make the case. The Palestinian villages involved included Qatana, Beit Suriq, Beit Iqsa, Beit Duqu, Beit Ijza, Beit Liqia and Biddo. The Wall's construction stopped around Biddo for five months during the court proceedings, but resumed in 2005. According to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights,

On 30 June 2004, the Israeli High Court decided to stop the construction of 30 kilometers of a section of the Wall in the villages located to the northwest of Jerusalem: Beit Diquq; Beit Ejza; Biddu; Beit Sourik; Qutna; Beit 'Anan; Um al-Lahem; and al-Qebia. The Court demanded that IOF redraw the route of the Wall in these villages taking into consideration the

"humanitarian needs" of the Palestinian population, while at the same time keeping "security" interests (2004: 27).

The Beit Suriq court case successfully rerouted the Wall. However by the time the decision was made, most of the trees were uprooted and the land had been paved for the original route. The farmers were unable to harvest the trees, as they were confiscated for the initial site of the Wall.


In 2006, the new route of the Wall was completed, enclosing the entire area and trapping the villages into a large ghetto. The Wall confiscated land from Beit Duqu, Biddo, and the neighboring villages for the Israeli settlements of Giv'at Ze'ev and Giv'on Hahadasha. Although the court did not put the Wall on the Green-Line (as it did not intend to protect Palestinians), it aimed to demonstrate support for Palestinian interests. However, the court's approval of building the Wall on Palestinian lands demonstrated its main concern: settlements' interests.



Giv'at Ze'ev settlement on the other side of the winding fence and by-pass road. Beit Duqu, August 2013



The settlement of Giv'on Hahadasha on the other side of the fence. Biddo, August 2013



Al Walaja/Bethlehem

Bethlehem and Jerusalem are known for their spiritual histories, and include spiritual sites where Israeli's are able to visit, such as Rachel's Tomb, but Palestinian are prohibited. The Wall's construction started in Bethlehem in 2004, constructing a concrete barrier between the two holy cities. In 2010, construction started northwest of Bethlehem in the village of Al Walaja. Al Walaja residents and experts brought twenty-two cases to the Israeli High Court to show the impact of the Wall and gate system on their land. They argued that contractors should build the Wall on the open and empty valley next to the village rather than inside it. This discrepancy laid bare the fact that the Wall was meant to secure Israeli settlements. Omar, a local from Al Walaja whose land was in the path of the Wall, made it clear that Israel could have put the Wall in the valley, but instead they

planned for it to go through the middle of the village. The court decided to change the Wall's path, but not for the good of the village. Palestinian injury as a result of the Wall is not of importance due to Israel's cultural violence. The Wall was rerouted as a byproduct of international well being in the area, highlighting how structural and cultural violence oppress Palestinian people.


Structural violence is achievable when cultural violence makes it seem normal, which is why Palestinians experience such high doses of structural violence. Structural violence on communities where cultural violence is not present draws attention to the structural violence. This detail provides more proof that Israel uses indiscriminate violence onto the Palestinian people where they would not wish to use it on another. For example, the internationals at the nunnery in the area of al Walaja were aware of the Wall's violence, and made a claim to Israel about its harm to them and their visitors. It would limit their movement and trap them. Residents at the Cremisan nunnery up the road from the village of Al Walaja objected to the path of the Wall, anticipating that it would impede travel and visitors. Omar shared, "The nunnery wanted a street direct into Jerusalem for their visitors."²¹ Nunnery residents were clearly more concerned about their visitors' access than the Palestinian villagers' situation. The route was changed to place the nunnery in Jerusalem's side of the Wall, highlighting the cultural and structural violence at play. Road systems were also designed to ease Israeli travel from settlements into Israel proper by confiscating Omar's and Al Walaja's land. According to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights,

On 03 October 2011, IOF started the implementation of bulldozing activities in farms and uprooting of trees in targeted lands in Ein al-Hadfa

²¹ Interview with Omar. Al Walaja, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

area, Khellet al-Samak area and Ein Jweiza area in al-Walaja village. These bulldozing activities were aimed at preparing infrastructures for the construction of a new part of the annexation wall and for the extension of a road along the annexation wall in the west and northwest of al-Walaja village (2004: 60).

The Wall was completed in Al Walaja during the winter of 2012-2013. A tunnel road and an electric fence now separates Omar's house from the rest of his village. The Wall in the Bethlehem area took several years to complete, and construction is still ongoing. Israel's ongoing establishment of the Wall, and the use of the triangle of violence in each region of the West Bank, needs to be noted if the reframing of the narrative is to be achieved. These profiles are evidence that the Wall is dispossessing the Palestinian people of their lands for Israeli settlements, and not security. Palestinian villagers have tried several conventional routes to halt the Wall, even attempting to penetrate the structural violence upholding the occupation, the Israeli legal system.



Court Cases

Several Palestinian villages have taken the issue of the Wall to the Israeli High Court in an attempt to infiltrate the Israeli legal system and stop the Wall. The High Court is structurally violent, working for the well being of Israel, and viewing the Palestinian through the cultural violence lens as the aggressor. These cases provide evidence that Palestinians were attempting to utilize the mainstream channels of the legal arena to stop the Wall, even if confronting the violence triangle. In 2004, northwest Jerusalem villages worked with the Israeli neighborhoods in the area to bring the first case against the Wall to the Israeli High Court. The work was halted on the Wall for a few months while the courts were reviewing the case. Ultimately, the Wall's route was re-routed. In 2005, the Salfit area brought the Alfe Menashe case against the Wall, rerouting the Wall. In Bil'in, the rerouting of the Wall saved hundreds of *dunums*²² of land (Stop the Wall Campaign, 2003). As Abdulla states, "When they put the Wall in our land, the plan of the Wall, they will confiscate in the beginning, in 2005, they will confiscate 2,200 *dunums* from 4000. It means 58% of our land will be behind the Wall."²³ Bil'in's land remained behind the Wall, until the court case ruling in 2010. Eventually 650 *dunums* of Bil'in land was on the other side of the Wall, saving nearly 1600 *dunums* of land. Although these villages won cases against the Wall and the settlements, the only successful impact of the cases was the rerouting of the Wall. Several villages learned about the Wall too late or could not afford to go to court. The villages that went to court got the Wall rerouted, but they were not able to stop the larger project of the Wall.

²² 1 *dunum* is equal to 1/4 acre, or 1,000 square meters.

²³ Interview with Abdulla Abu Rahma. Bil'in, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

A village's location played an important role in court decisions; the perception of defense was essential for how Israel responded to each case. Due to the narrative that the Wall was a form of security, and in turn there was a need to support the cultural violence agenda of painting all Palestinians as terrorists, the proximity of the village to major Israeli cities or settlements was seen as a threat to the Israeli's living in them. Al Walaja village sits close to Jerusalem. They unsuccessfully attempted to save their lands by using the court system. The location of the village made it more difficult to make a claim through the courts. In the seam zone, Jubara village took their case to the courts in 2003, when the construction started. It was not until 2011, eight years after the initial construction of the Wall, that the court ruled to destroy the Wall around Jubara. In this case, villagers proved that the checkpoint and the forced living situation of those existing within the seam zone were violent and limited their potential. If the people of Jubara had left the area due to the inhumane living environment they experienced, the structural violence would have been successful. The case took several years because the goal was to rid the area of Palestinian people and take the land. The Israeli authorities tore down a section of the Wall and rebuilt it in another location closer to the Green-Line. Mohammed, a local from Jubara recalled, "The people here complained to the court, to the Israeli court, to the military court."²⁴ To secure the area, Israel decided a new Wall would need to be built. The new Wall would allow the village access into the West Bank. Mohammed explained, "The new Wall started in 2011, and they finished completely in 2013. At the time they finished the new Wall they started removing the old Wall. And

²⁴ Interview with Mohammed. Jubara, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

they opened it for us in 2013 June.”²⁵ The old part of the Wall was removed, and the checkpoint, the only entrance point to the seam zone was also removed. This example of success is due to the resilience of the Palestinian people in Jubara in the face of the violence triangle. The people of Jubara endured eight years of imprisonment in their village, and then they waited two more years for the new Wall to be constructed, to restore their basic freedom of movement into the Occupied Territory. For ten years, the people of Jubara waited to regain access to the West Bank. The Wall was moved to a new location, yet it still remains on Jubara land. Although Israel enacted structural violence to push the Palestinian people to self-transfer, Jubara village resisted.

The Wall as a case in the Israeli High Court was not an avenue for justice; the court was an extension of the occupation, which needed the triangle of violence to function. Although a few of these cases have been successful in moving the route of the Wall, Muhin from the PLO expressed his concern about this method of going to the High Court. He stated, “Even if this court has a small decision to changing the path of the Wall it looks at it according to the benefits of the Israeli occupation.”²⁶ The occupation relies on structural violence to maintain itself and the courts aim to uphold the government’s agenda. The Israeli legal system ruled to move the Wall in a few cases, but rerouting creates a false sense that the Israeli authorities work for the rights of Palestinians, when in reality, courts instate Israel’s interest. As Muhin explains, no matter where the Wall is, it is illegal for the Palestinian people: “The legal courts, even if they move it, it is not accepted. The Israeli court is another hand of the Israeli occupation that makes the Wall

²⁵ Interview with Mohammed. Jubara, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

²⁶ Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

accepted.”²⁷ Although Israel claims the Wall is for security, it is clear that if this were true then the Wall would have been built on the Green-Line. The Wall’s path dips deep into the Occupied Territory to secure the illegal settlements into Israel, even if this means isolating Palestinian villages and stealing their lands. The Wall’s path was intended to make life more difficult for the indigenous Palestinian people without the concern of their well-being.

The theft of Palestinian land is not a new concept for Israel; they stole Palestinian land in 1948, and again in 1967, utilizing the triangle of violence. The Wall is merely the newest method to exploit Palestinian lands. Structural violence proved useful for the occupation forces, taking from the Palestinian people for the benefit of the Israeli settlers. This allocation of land substantiates my claim that Israel did not intend the Wall to be a security measure, but as a means for colonial expansion through the use of the violence triangle. Utilizing cultural violence, and blaming Palestinians for their plight, Israel excused their egregious land grab, making the structural violence look acceptable. The Wall’s construction has lasted over a decade, and is still actively uprooting Palestinian trees for new sections of the Wall. Starting in 2002 in the north, the Wall continues to dispossess the Palestinian people of their lands. The Wall is currently situated along the western portion of the West Bank, and runs from Jenin in the north, to the Hebron Hills in the south. An internal eastern portion of the Wall is planned to dispossess more Palestinian villages of their lands. As the Wall is built far into the Occupied Territory, any village located in the West Bank is at risk. Structural violence is one aspect of the

²⁷ Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

Wall's violence, yet the methods employed by Israel through cultural violence are also important to note in regards to the Wall.

Discovering the Wall's Violence

Cultural violence permits Israel to view the Palestinian as inferior to them, and due to their belief of superiority, combined with their military authority, Israel began destroying Palestinian lands without informing the landowners. The building of the Wall is random, and the Palestinian people are not informed of when the Wall will arrive in their village or town. For Israel, this is a unilateral move, and the Israeli governments culturally violent perceptions of Palestinians as lesser to them cast the Palestinian as unworthy of this information. Israel does not discuss the timing of villagers' lands' confiscation with them, as the aim is to avoid dissent. This objective was proven ineffective, as shown in Chapter 6, through Palestinian resistance against the Wall's construction.

Cultural violence is an excuse for the Wall, but structural violence is the process wherein the Wall was established. This was apparent in the town of Tulkarm, which was the first to encounter the violence of the Wall. The initial construction of the Wall was a complete surprise to the town, especially the farmers who were going to lose their lands. The construction started in April of 2002, and as the Second *Intifada* was still looming, the people in Tulkarm assumed that the military presence on their lands was a response to the Second *Intifada*. The Israeli military presence during the construction of the Wall aimed to intimidate the villagers, threatening direct violence if people were to resist. The town of Tulkarm could not fathom another reason for the Israeli military to be present on

their land other than to show force against the *Intifada*. Fayez, a farmer from Tulkarm, describes when his town learned there would be a Wall.

April 2002, one morning we were hearing the microphone from the Israel's' jeeps. They were speaking to the people of Far'un village. Far'un is only 2 kilometers from my home. It's very close to us. We were hearing the Israeli army telling the people there that no one can go outside from their house. Our belief, the first minute that we hear, is that it's about the occupation, about the *Intifada*, but a short time after, we understood why a big number of Israeli bulldozers stood between the farm. They started to uproot a number of the trees.²⁸

The Israeli authorities put the people of Tulkarm and the neighboring villages on a mandated curfew. Curfew, another form of direct violence Israel used against the towns and villages, limited villagers' opposition during Wall construction. According to Adam Hanieh, reporting for the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), curfew is when,

Israeli tanks, military jeeps and snipers patrol the streets of Palestinian towns confining residents to their houses. Anyone seen outside their home can be shot dead or arrested. The streets are eerily quiet, there is no movement of cars, no one can get to work or school and every shop is closed (2002).

In this way, the Israeli military forced the people in Tulkarm into their homes while the work began on the Wall. Fayez explained that when the curfew was lifted two weeks later, he went to the site where the Wall was going to be constructed and found letters attached to trees and on the ground. The letters stated that the land would now be confiscated for the site of the Wall. Fayez recalled, "They uprooted trees and we found a letter and a map from the Israeli army, sometimes near the stones, and sometimes they put it on the trees. They write to the people that they need to take our [Palestinian] land to

²⁸ Interview with Fayez. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

build the Wall for security to help [Israeli] people.”²⁹ No formal discussion occurred around the confiscation of Palestinian land for the site of the Wall. The methods the Israeli military used to inform the villages of the land confiscation clearly demonstrates the Israeli military’s culturally violent view of Palestinians as inferior. For the Israeli military, there was no need for a formal discussion about the land grab. The letters were the only form of information that the people in Tulkarm were given, and they were tasked with figuring out what this meant for them, as villagers and as farmers, all within the domain of structural violence.

As the Wall moved south, Palestinian farmers continued to discover Israel’s plans to confiscate their lands. In the case of Jayyus, the Israeli military left letters in the village streets, posted them on the stores, and delivered them to the municipality building to inform the residents that their land would be confiscated for the site of the Wall. The notices stated that the Israeli authorities have the right to confiscate parts of the land in order to build the Wall and protect the borders of Israel. The people of Jayyus searched for outside support, hoping the identities of others could assist them with gaining information due to the cultural violence they experienced. Israelis, Europeans and Americans have higher status than Palestinians in the eyes of Israel, and the people of Jayyus thought this avenue of support would help them learn more. Adwan, a local from Jayyus, shared, “We were confused, asking a lot of questions and started contacting a lot of people about what was going on. We contacted human rights organizations in Israel, and human rights organizations in Europe and the States. We even contacted Israeli

²⁹ Interview with Fayez. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

military officials just to find out what was going on.”³⁰ The uncertainty about the Wall's construction left people living inside the affected villages feeling aggravated; this was a result of the extreme structural violence that limited their chances of transforming the situation.

Structural violence limited access for debating the Wall or land confiscation because the decision was unilateral for Israel's “security concerns,” which prioritized cultural violence allegations over the true harm that the Wall caused. Detailing numerous cases provides sufficient testimony of how Israel used the triangle of violence in various Palestinian areas. Just as in Tulkarm, the people in Jayyus did not know what was happening, whom to talk to about the situation, or how much of their land would eventually be taken for the Wall. The construction in Jayyus did not start immediately. The letters here warned villagers to prepare for the future destruction to their land. Most villagers initially assumed that the fliers might just be a threat, another form of Israeli military harassment. Two months after the orders were given, the Israeli military came back to the village and began putting up markers. Adwan described how his village was affected during the construction: “Every day something new would come up, a new military mark, new bulldozers rolling in, and it remained unclear what exactly was going to happen in our land, in our village.”³¹ Once the markers were on the land, people knew that it was no longer a threat; the construction of the Wall had begun and structural violence was being implemented. The initial construction was extremely difficult for the farmers of the village. They were forced to watch helplessly as their lands were paved for the site of the Wall. Adwan described the construction: “The cutting of trees, the

³⁰ Interview with Adwan Shamasna. Jayyus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. May 2007.

³¹ Ibid.

destruction of land, and the separation of people from their land.”³² Adwan explained how the destruction of the land was the hardest for the elderly in the village, for whom the land had great significance. The elderly were emotionally affected by the confiscation, as they cultivated this land with their parents and children for generations and saw the passing down of the family land as an integral part of their indigenous family history. The construction of the Wall made passing down family lands impossible, dispossessing the Palestinian people of their land rights. Israel not only took the history with the establishment of the Wall, they eliminated the prospect of a future for the Palestinian people within the 1967 borders.



Uprooting of olive tree. Biddo 2004

Israel did not make a formal announcement indicating where the Wall would be built or when villages should expect it, so Palestinian villages shared with each other what was occurring. This information sharing was a form of resistance to the Wall,

³² Interview with Adwan Shamasna. Jayyus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. May 2007.

enabling those living further south to mentally prepare for the land grab. This act of information sharing was part of the collective resistance the people affected by the Wall employed. Budrus village did not learn about the Wall through letters; they were woken up with the sounds of the bulldozers plowing their land. A local from Budrus, Safiyah, recounts her family's experience learning about the Wall on their land:

When they came to uproot the olive trees, they told my husband that they wouldn't uproot the trees if we were able to bring the *tabbo*³³ from Ramallah; this was 20-40,000 olive trees that we used to make olive oil from. My husband is alone, he doesn't have any brothers but has nine sisters, so we decided that next morning he will go to Ramallah to bring the *tabbo*. In the morning he left to go to Ramallah at around 6-6:30 am. He heard the sound of bulldozers, he went to look and he found out that the bulldozers were uprooting the trees, all of them; apparently they were working at night. He tried to go down to see but they didn't let him, but he refused to not go down to the land, he didn't know what to do. They already uprooted everything. We all followed and we started fighting with them, my brother went under the tractor and told them to uproot him with the trees. We are better dead because now living and dying are the same. We have nothing left; they took our land and our olives.³⁴

Land was the main source of income for the farmers. Losing their trees symbolized the death of their futures. For Palestinian identity, land was part of their historical ancestry. The uprooting of the trees was an extension of the trauma their families had suffered over decades under Israel rule. Safiyah's husband immediately recognized the destruction the uprooting of his trees meant for his future. The documentation of his land ownership was no longer enough to save his land. The *Tabbo* was a binding document that was issued during the Ottoman period to show land ownership, and it was recognized during the Jordanian rule of the West Bank. Israel claimed land from farmers in 1967 as "state land"

³³ *Tabbo* are official documents that clarify the owners of the land dated from the Ottoman period.

³⁴ Interview with Safiyah Khalaf Ismael Awad. Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. January 2007.

because they did not pay the Ottoman taxes; therefore, there was no paper trail of their ownership. In constructing the Wall, Israel did not concern itself with proof of ownership because it was stealing lands for security. With no way to save lands from the Wall, the people were awakened to the destruction of their future.

Israel continued to wake up villages with the sound of bulldozers, uprooting their trees for the establishment of the Apartheid Wall. In early February of 2004, the Israeli military came into the Nil'in village without warning, uprooting trees for the site of the Wall. As Budrus and Nil'in were in constant communication in their collective resistance, Nil'in villagers knew that sooner or later, their lands would be destroyed as well, but they did not know when it would happen. They responded to the destruction by sitting on the land with the recently uprooted trees. Knowing the land would be taken was very different than seeing it get destroyed. This act was a form of resistance to not only the structural violence of the Wall, but also as a symbolic resistance to the cultural violence. Palestinians connected with their land, and they would be uprooted too if their land were to be lost. Their bodies on the site where the trees were cut symbolized this loss of their history, and their future.



Villagers sitting near the newly cut trees for the site of the Wall.
Nil'in. March 2004.

Israel did not want Palestinians to actively resist the destruction of the lands, and tried to bypass this through strategic means. In an attempt to avoid the villagers and get more land paved without dissent, Israel began uprooting trees early in the morning on February 26, 2004. The bulldozers started working in the village of Biddo at 5:00 am. In Bil'in, the same tactics were used. Abdullah described, "On February 20, 2005, the bulldozers started to uproot our trees and destroy the land here."³⁵ Bil'in had learned about the Wall coming to their land in late 2004, and therefore had several months to prepare. The early morning wake-up call by Israel was how they learned the Wall had arrived on their land.

³⁵ Interview with Abdulla Abu Rahma. Bil'in, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

Israel made a unilateral decision to where the Wall would be situated as the occupying power and the employer of the violence triangle. Landowners who had land in the path of the Wall were left with little control over their lands. The power imbalance between Israelis and Palestinians, through a structurally violence governing system, caused Palestinians to feel helpless. Very few people sold their lands to Israel secretly, and this act was seen as collaboration with the occupying forces and not tolerated by the majority of the Palestinian population. The majority of Palestinians experienced land seizure and had few options to change the situation. For Saleh, “The strategy of the Zionists has been to obtain land for settlement either by seizure, expropriation, or by purchase” (1990: 342). Marian, a landowner from Beit Duqu explained that she learned from people in the village that Israel was coming to take the land for a settlement. She stated that she had not sold any piece of her land; Israel stole it from her. Marian lost over 100 *dunums* of her land, which produced olives, grapes, and figs for her family. Throughout the path of the Wall, the Palestinian people learned of their fate through the violence already occurring on their lands. Structural violence, by way of land confiscation, is part of the political aims of Israel to steal from the Palestinian, all the while treating them as the aggressor.

The Result of the Wall’s Dispossession

Israeli land confiscation was not new to Palestinian villagers, but the establishment of the Wall cutting them off from their lands was something they had never experienced before. It left the Palestinian people economically destroyed as a byproduct of structural violence. The structural violence was enforced through the Israeli military by way of direct violence. According to Saleh, “Expropriation has generally been carried

out by the army, which simply closes off Arab cultivated lands, either for its own security purposes or for subsequent conversion to a civilian settlement” (1990: 344). Every town and village along the path of the Wall experienced the land appropriation. The confiscation of Palestinian lands limit the prospects of a future Palestinian state, the Occupied Territory is constantly shrinking through the establishment of the Wall. In Jayyus, 9,000 *dunums* were stolen for the site of the Wall, including 8,000 olives trees. As the majority of Jayyus relied on agriculture as their main livelihood, 1,000 of the 3,500 people inhabiting the village were farmers, and the Wall’s destruction gravely affected them economically. The economic effects of the Wall are a form of structural violence.

Structural violence forced Palestinian populations to live in small areas, without the option to expand, while Israeli settlers expanded their settlements on Palestinian land. Mohammed of Qalqilya explained that the city used to reach out all the way to the sea, until the *Nakba*, in 1948. This was when Qalqilya initially lost around 49,000 *dunums* of their land in the first round of land dispossession. Mohammed continued to discuss the more recent land grab for the site of the Wall, stating that the city lost 70% of their remaining agricultural lands for the Wall.³⁶ The path of the Wall limits Palestinian growth, confining communities into tight spaces, with little room to expand. The settlements surrounding Qalqilya, such as Zufin and Alfe Menashe, are built on Qalqilya’s land. Qalqilya had 7,000 *dunums* stolen for the site of the Wall, out of the 12,000 in that area, leaving 5,000 *dunums* for the city of Qalqilya. 4,000 of the remaining *dunums* were left in an area where residential building was not allowed, leaving only

³⁶ Interview with Mohammed Abd el-Raheem. Qalqilya, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.

1,000 *dunums* for future expansion of the city. The security buffer zone also limited some of this growth, so that only 500 *dunums* of Qalqilya land could be used to expand the city. In the end, Qalqilya lost 7,000 *dunums* for the site of the Wall, and 30,000-40,000 *dunums* to the other side of the Wall. Similarly, in Beit Liqia, due to the Wall, residents cannot build on their lands or expand their town. Beit Liqia's population of 11,000 has been condensed into two kilometers of space. They have more open lands near the Wall, but it is illegal to build on the agricultural lands due to its location near the Green-Line and Israel's "security" concerns. The people in Beit Liqia are forced to live in a confined space without the option to expand the city. This form of structural violence is evident throughout the Occupied Territory. Through the use of the Wall, Israel blocks Palestinians' access to their lands, confiscating it and prohibiting them from using the little land that is left to build on. Comparatively, in Israeli settlements, there are looser restrictions on building. This disparity creates a distinct inequality between the two peoples.

Israel had not only been stealing Palestinian land since it began occupying the West Bank, it also immediately started confiscating Palestinian resources and allocating them to the settlers. During the Oslo Accords, Israel was able to continue their exploitation of water rights within the West Bank, restricting Palestinians' but not Israelis' water access. As Ibrahim Matar explained, "The Israeli colonization process in the West Bank has not been restricted to land seizure. It has also involved the exploitation of the scarce underground water resources by the Israeli occupation authorities who have been drilling deep-bore holes and installing powerful pumps in all areas of the West Bank" (1981: 102). Israel has prevented Palestinians from building new wells and has

restricted via meters the amount of water they could pump from existing wells. If Palestinians go over their limit they are penalized. In contrast, Israeli settlers are permitted to drill new wells and to access water without restrictions.

The Wall's path has exacerbated the exploitation of water rights between the indigenous Palestinians and the Israeli settlers through the usage laws. Israel used the Wall to steal the underground resources, controlling these resources for the Israeli population and further limiting Palestinians' usage. The Wall facilitated a new level of Israeli domination over the underground resources. The Wall enabled Israel to steal Palestinian land and confiscate underground resources, enforcing Palestinians' dependency on Israel, which enabled Israel to maintain more control over the Palestinian people. Controlling Palestinians inside the West Bank through dependency supports Israel's colonial conquests. They are able to profit off of the resources that they are stealing, and use them for free for their own communities while simultaneously repressing the occupied population.



Farmer harvesting his land in front of the Israeli military. Budrus 2004

Several areas of the West Bank were directly affected by structural violence through the theft of resources, and are detailed within this section to provide context to Israel's capacity to steal underground resources. The north of the West Bank is highly agricultural because of their underground water supply. Within the first phase of the Wall's construction in the north, thirty wells, which accounted for 50% of the water in the West Bank, were taken.³⁷ In Jayyus alone, the path of the Wall enabled Israel to seize five water wells. The underground water resources and the wells to access the Water were taken to the Israeli side of the Wall. The Wall's construction continued the discriminatory policy. Ahmed, from Deir Ballut, shared, "80% of drinking water in Israel comes from Ras el-Ein area, which is 3-4 km away from the Wall, it is like an underground lake of drinking water."³⁸ Ahmed illustrated here how Israel has appropriated resources from Palestinian areas, while restricting Palestinians' use of these resources – a form of structural violence.

Various areas of the West Bank provided aquifer capabilities, and Israel sought to confiscate them all by way of the violence triangle. The north was not the only area in the West Bank with plentiful underground resources. Underneath Beit Liqia lies an underground aquifer. Palestinian people who live in this area are not allowed to use this water supply. Mahmoud Asi from Beit Liqia stated, "A third of the water storage is in these villages for the West Bank, but Israel named these village Atron villages."³⁹ Although the water supply sits underneath Beit Liqia, the Israeli kibbutz on the other side

³⁷ Interview with Adwan Shamasna. Jayyus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. May 2007.

³⁸ Interview with Ahmed Mustafa. Deir Ballut, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.

³⁹ Interview with Mahmoud Asi. Beit Liqia, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

of the Green-Line controls it. Mahmoud Asi asserted, “We had three wells here, but they closed them. We are not allowed to dig a well, or try to take the water.”⁴⁰ The water from this area is sold back to Beit Liqia by the Palestinian municipality located in Ramallah. The Palestinian Authority works with the Israeli Authorities to grant Palestinians access to their own water supply, yet the nearby kibbutz is able to freely utilize the water supply.



Mahmoud Asi showing the fence, the green land in the distance is the Israeli side of the fence. Beit Liqia, August 2013

The structural violence of water usage affects numerous aspects of Palestinian life that limit Palestinian potential, while Israeli settlers thrive. Villages with an underground water supply are restricted from using their own underground resource. Biddo villagers were gravely affected by the confiscation of water resources under their village. Mohammed Mansour from Biddo recalled, “We had eight water springs that we used to use for the lands, now it’s behind the Wall, no water for the farmers.”⁴¹ Due to the lack

⁴⁰ Interview with Mahmoud Asi. Beit Liqia, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

⁴¹ Interview with Mohamed Mansour. Biddo, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

of water, some of the farmers in Biddo sold their animals, as they could no longer pay for outside water resources to continue herding their sheep. Showers are limited, crops are dry, and drinking water for livestock is non-existent. The lack of economic opportunity also makes it extremely difficult for people to pay for the water. The restrictions on water usage coupled with the seizure of wells for the Wall left the Palestinian population inside the West Bank dependent on Israel to access their own water supply underneath their villages.

Conclusion

Israel has effectively utilized the triangle of violence to dispossess the Palestinian people of their lands and resources. Israel's use of the Wall not only transfers land from Palestinians to Israeli settlers, further violating Palestinians structurally, the route also dissolves the Green-Line. This undertaking directly affects the future of a Palestinian state. Building the Wall allowed Israel to unilaterally dominate more lands since the occupation began in 1967. The path of the Wall encroaches deep into the West Bank, securing the illegal settlements and creating more room for their expansion. The route of the Wall vanishes the Green-Line, making it obsolete. This land theft is a component of the Israeli strategy of settlement expansion and control of the West Bank. According to Catherine Cook of MERIP, "By carefully tailoring the path of the wall to place existing settlements on the "Israeli" side, Israel can effectively maintain control over much of the land, resources and, subsequently, the population and economy, of the West Bank" (2003). This land grab further robs Palestinians of their land, while Israeli settlers prosper illegally within the West Bank. For Muhiin, "The Wall is the most dangerous project that

Israel established. Whatever the name, or the excuse of building it, it is a colonialist project, and it is the most dangerous colonialist project that Israel started to build in our land.”⁴² From the PLO’s perspective, the path of the Wall prevents the Palestinian people from building an independent state on the land that resides within the 1967 borders. From the farmer’s perspective, they are trapped within their villages and their form of livelihood is destroyed.

The increase in the violence triangle, through the establishment of the Wall, was the tipping point for villages initially experiencing the Wall’s wrath. Palestinian farmers did not allow Israel’s triangle of violence to steal their land without contention. Land is an essential part of Palestinian identity; thus Israel’s dispossession of Palestinian land inspired a nonviolent movement in an attempt to save the dispossessed lands from Israel’s violence triangle. Although Israel established protocols to limit Palestinian dissent, as was proven within this chapter, the act of uprooting Palestinian trees, and confiscating their lands motivated the indigenous people to rise up. As previously discussed, the loss of land was the loss of part of the Palestinian identity. Uprooting the trees left Palestinians with the reality that their identity was being attacked through the destruction of their villages and towns. Even in the face of this large-scale Israeli aggression, Palestinians continued to look for conventional avenues to transform their plight, as proven throughout this chapter. Through the focus of dispossession of Palestinian land, as a result of the Apartheid Wall, I have provided detailed accounts of Israeli violence from the north of the West Bank down to the Bethlehem area. Numerous Palestinians affected by the Wall expressed through their personal stories that Israel’s

⁴² Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

claim of security is a false narrative. Using the framework of the violence triangle I was able to detail various aspects of Israeli violence to support my claim that Israel is the source of the violence. These testimonies demonstrate that Israel is the perpetrator of the violence, and not the Palestinians, as is commonly assumed. The images throughout the chapter also support this statement by visually exposing Israeli land confiscation, thus enhancing the need to reframe the narrative of Israel as the aggressor utilizing violence to repress the Palestinian people.



Uprooting trees for the path of the Wall. Biddo, February 2004

Israeli violence extends beyond the dispossession of land, this is merely one aspect of how the triangle of violence functions to oppress the Palestinian people. The path strategically controls the entirety of the Occupied Territory, and the people inhabiting it, and is far more dangerous than the egregious land and resource confiscation. Muhin affirmed that, “Building the Wall is a strategic plan for them [Israel], maybe the individual affects for the farmers, workers, it is the less issues, because the most

dangerous issue is the strategic issue that Israel planned to gain from the construction of the Wall.”⁴³ The path of the Wall confines the indigenous population into enclaves, imprisoning them in their towns and villages. The isolation from their lands limits their ability to thrive, and destroys the already ruined economy. The Wall’s initial violence is stealing the land and disconnecting the Palestinian communities from each other, which has been detailed throughout this chapter. Once the Palestinian people have been dispossessed of their lands, Israel has maintained total control over the West Bank population by restricting Palestinian movement. The structural violence implements Israel uses are situated throughout the West Bank, and they prohibit Palestinian movement, further dominating the occupied people with the violence triangle. Structural violence is essential for Israel to maintain control over the land, and the people, affecting each individual Palestinian, as well as the indigenous population as a whole.



House with a watchtower above it. Azariya 2006



House near the Palestinian side of the Wall. Al Ram 2006

⁴³ Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

Chapter 4

Restricted Movement

A network of Israeli structural violence implements are employed in the West Bank to monitor and control Palestinian movement, ultimately as a means to maintain the ongoing occupation and dominate the Palestinian people. Integrated into the establishment of the Apartheid Wall, these implements have created an open-air prison for the Palestinian inhabitants, whereas the Israeli settlers are not confined to them. The restriction of Palestinian movement supports the argument that the Wall was not built for security, as Israel has claimed, but for Israel's to control the Palestinian people and steal their land. To move within the West Bank, Palestinians must move through this interconnected system, which is controlled by the heavily armed Israeli military. Not subject to these implements, the Israeli settler population moves freely throughout the Occupied Territory, exposing the structural violence enacted between the two populations. This disparity in movement harms the Palestinian populations' potential, while benefiting the settler population. Israeli violence is demonstrated by emphasizing the use of the violence triangle to restrict Palestinian movement within the West Bank. Detailing the various forms of violence used to dominate the Palestinian residents supports the argument that the Wall is not for security, and is employed for Israel's political interest. This evidence can be used to transform the mainstream narrative from 'Palestinian as aggressor', to one of 'Palestinian victim to Israeli violence'.

Maintaining control over the occupied population has been integral for Israel, and to accomplish this the violence triangle has been active inside the West Bank since Israel began to occupy the territory in 1967. Structural violence at the apex of the triangle has slowly formed a network to control the Palestinian people. The Wall has joined these existing mechanisms, incarcerating the West Bank. Israel's intention is to utilize the violence triangle to remove the indigenous population and gain control over all in the land. The violence triangle produces an environment so devastating, that the people affected are forced to evacuate to survive. Structural violence works slowly and is invisible, yet it causes more damaging and long-lasting harm than direct violence. Structural violence is engrained within the system, creating unequal life chances and injuring the entire population (Galtung, 1969: 168). Direct violence is used to enforce the tools of structural violence. As structural violence is part of the system, it is viewed as normal, whereas direct violence is identified as harmful. Cultural violence is employed to demean the oppressed population and render both direct and structural violence acceptable. Israel's cultural violence frames the narrative, permitting the Israeli government to employ structural violence throughout the Occupied Territory without widespread opposition from mainstream Israelis or American media outlets. Israel has deemed all Palestinians as aggressors, and potential terrorists, and thus excuses the continual surveillance through structural violence implements. Restricting Palestinian movement through structural violence enables Israel to isolate the indigenous people from the settler population. The exclusion of Palestinians from various areas of the West Bank aids Israel in redistributing the land to their settler population, hence eliminating the 1967 Green-Line for colonial domination.

Israel's network of structural violence occurs through various elements connecting, and further dominating the Palestinian inhabitants, by way of the establishment of the Wall. Checkpoints and gates are situated throughout the structure of the Wall to limit movement. These implements are the only means to access the other side of the Wall and are controlled by the Israeli military. Checkpoints are also situated deep inside the West Bank to control the Palestinian population, exposing the fallacy that the structural violence implements are constructed to secure the West Bank from Israel proper. The Israeli military utilize direct violence when encountering Palestinians at the checkpoints and gates. As Palestinians pass through, they are thoroughly inspected and must produce an ID and an Israeli-issued permit if attempting to access the land beyond the Wall. However, although permits are required for Palestinians to enter their lands on the other side of the Wall, the Israeli bureaucratic system impedes the process for Palestinian seeking access through the checkpoints or gates. This use of structural violence is intended to restrict Palestinians from their lands, and other areas of the West Bank, including Jerusalem. Israeli settlers are not bound to these same rules; they travel freely throughout the territory, never encountering barriers to their movement. To advance the colonization of the West Bank, Israelis travel on a separate road system than Palestinians. Bypass roads were developed as direct routes from settlements inside the West Bank into Israel proper. To further the segregation, another road system was created for the Palestinian people. Palestinians are forced to travel on tunnel roads, which are built underneath the bypass roads. Israel's use of cultural violence, viewing Palestinians as beneath Israelis, is enacted in the physical nature of the structurally violent road system. Palestinians are literally forced to travel underneath Israeli roads, while Israeli

roads and settlements are situated on higher grounds, enforcing more surveillance onto the indigenous people. Palestinians are not permitted to travel on the Israeli road system inside the West Bank. This blatant inequality limits Palestinian health, employment, education, and overall quality of life. Without the violence triangle of the occupation, Palestinians would have the ability to develop, and not be limited by the structural violence implements that dominate their existence.

Structural violence works in accordance with cultural violence to reinforce systemic inequalities, and without a strong cultural violence campaign by Israel, the structural violence would be viewed as violence and not “security”. Israel classifies Palestinians as probable terrorists to be controlled and occupied. Although the entire Palestinian population inside the West Bank is subject to Israeli military rule, the settler populations there are subject to Israeli civil law. Geographer Shaul Cohen reiterates this point when stating, “Those within the West Bank who are not Israeli citizens —that is, all of the territory’s residents except the settlers – are beyond Israeli civil law, subject instead to the military occupation and/or to the nascent and limited Palestinian administration” (2006: 690). The variances in regulation enable Israel to extend the colony into the occupied lands. Cultural violence assists Israel with framing the narrative, and differentiating between the two populations, segregating them in the name of security, all by way of structural violence implements.



West Bank residents sneaking into the Israeli side of the Wall before it was fully constructed. Abu Dis. 2006

The structurally violent implements are strategically placed in the meandering path of the Wall, fragmenting the land into enclaves and further disconnecting the indigenous people from each other. The path of the Wall forces people to utilize the implements to move between enclaves. This structurally violent settler colonial domination is a technique to detach the indigenous people from their lands. As Alfred and Cornassel observed, “The instruments of domination are evolving and inventing new methods to erase Indigenous histories and senses of place” (2005: 601). The expansion of the state of Israel relies on arresting Palestinian claims. The disjointed enclaves create Bantustans, or small homelands, of Palestinian areas. The Palestinian sense of place is increasingly being erased with the Bantustanization of the West Bank. As Palestine studies scholar Leila Farsakh describes, “By institutionalizing the contradictory processes of societal separation and territorial integration that Israel created between 1967 and 1993, the Oslo process has actually paved the way for the "Bantustanization" of the WBGS (West Bank Gaza Strip)” (2005: 238). The separation of the Bantustans enforces compliance with structural violence. During the initial stages of the Wall, then Prime

Minister Ariel Sharon referred to the differing Palestinian homelands inside the West Bank, which Usher Graham highlighted:

His Bantustan plan at the time, since it concentrates the Palestinians into three disconnected enclaves or “homelands”: Jenin and Ramallah (with a corridor to Jericho); Bethlehem and Hebron (with no connection to East Jerusalem); and Gaza (with no land corridor to the West Bank). (2005: 35)

The Wall surrounded the Bantustans in the West Bank, intensifying the structural violence and solidifying the Apartheid system. Israel used the structural violence of the Wall to continue fragmenting the already disconnected West Bank, creating an easier environment for them to monitor the Palestinian people under the guise of security. Separation of people from land has been a strategic move for Israel to limit the possibility of a future Palestinian state, while simultaneously expanding the state of Israel.

The structural violence that manifested after the establishment of the Wall created a more oppressive situation for the Palestinian people. The Wall’s violence does not account for the harm imposed onto the Palestinian people as they are viewed as the source of violence through cultural violence. For Jamal Juma from the Stop the Wall Campaign,

The “apartheid” security wall, with its coruscating effects on Palestinian life and land, is not an isolated policy stand on the part of Israel, it is but part of the long-standing Israeli settlement policy, and the creation of a Jewish only infrastructure based on a comprehensive scheme for colonial domination and conquest. (2005: 356)

The path of the Wall is strategic in unilaterally eliminating the borders, and controlling the inhabitants within the Bantustans. The numerous direct, structural, and cultural violence tools employed in the West Bank oppress the Palestinian people and support Israel’s political objectives. The Wall erases the Green-Line, while simultaneously repressing the occupied population by removing them from the majority of the West

Bank. Restricting Palestinian movement is an essential tool for Israel's domination over indigenous Palestinians, and is accomplished through structural violence implements.



Elderly woman sneaking into Jerusalem. Abu Dis 2006

Structural Violence Implements

Thoroughly examining the numerous structural violence implements used to repress the Palestinian people is imperative for reframing the narrative. Stressing the processes in which Israel uses these instruments demonstrates the violent nature of them, which makes them seem less required and more oppressive. Israel utilizes countless mechanisms to restrict Palestinian movement throughout the West Bank. These implements aid Israel in controlling the occupied population. Checkpoints, gates, road closures and tunnel roads are the only means of passage through the West Bank Bantustans. Palestinians must conform to the system or experience direct violence consequences from the Israeli military. If Palestinians resist these implements they are marked within the mainstream narrative of “terrorists,” therefore to ensure their own safety they must conform to the violence triangle as a means of self-preservation.



Bethlehem checkpoint in 2004

Checkpoints

Israel utilizes various methods of structural violence to ensure dominance over the occupied Palestinian people; checkpoints are a common means of surveillance, and with the establishment of the Wall are impossible to by-pass. Checkpoints are mandated stations throughout the West Bank that allow passage for Palestinian travelers. They are used to monitor and control the Palestinian people as they move through the Occupied Territory. Checkpoints started in the early 1990s as a result of cultural violence concerns. The Gulf War was starting, and due to the Arab link and the recent uprising, implements to monitor the indigenous population were developed as a way to combat the Israeli fear that another Palestinian uprising would spawn from the regional crisis. The checkpoints were central entry points for the newly cut-up Bantustans. As Leila Farsakh highlighted, “The essence of the Bantustans has been to create territorially demarcated and politically autonomous areas for the indigenous population while controlling their mobility through a complex system of pass permits and security control” (2005: 238). To move through the checkpoint system into Israel proper, an Israeli-issued permit must first be obtained. The

permit informs Israel that the Palestinian in question is not a threat to the state, i.e., has expressed no dissent against living under occupation. To obtain a permit, through the avenues of structural violence, the level of “threat” is questioned, reinforcing the cultural violence.

Israel enforced more structural violence as a means to limit dissent, and control the occupied population. Direct violence is exercised within the structural violence implements to ensure that dissent is not appealing for Palestinian travelers. As Israel’s occupation continued, more methods to control the indigenous people developed. The number of checkpoints throughout the West Bank rapidly increased. According to the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem, “In February 2014, there were 99 fixed checkpoints in the West Bank. 59 are internal checkpoints, located well within the West Bank” (2014). Checkpoints are used not only as a way to track Palestinian people entering Jerusalem City or Israel proper, but also to monitor movement within the territory itself, refuting the assumption that structural violence is used for security concerns. In actuality, the checkpoints inside the West Bank are established for Israel to expand their authority over the Palestinian people. Israel positions the numerous checkpoints around heavily populated Palestinian areas, and areas near the settlements and the Green-Line. The Palestinian Center on Human Rights reported several checkpoints:

In the Bethlehem district, for instance, Israeli forces have 41 checkpoints, observation points and barriers; including the Container checkpoint, northeast of the town, checkpoint #300 and Rachel Tomb, north of the town, al-Nashash, al-Walaja, Wad Foukin, Beit Jala DCO and Gush Etzion checkpoints. (2011)

Palestinians are forced to move through the checkpoints to access all areas inside the West Bank. Israel uses the checkpoints to not only track the people, but also to intimidate them and deter them from traveling. Incidents of direct violence are highest at checkpoints. Israeli soldiers routinely harass Palestinians there, forcing them to stand in long lines and sometimes shutting the checkpoint in spite of the traveler. The use of direct violence, in combination with the structural violence of the checkpoints, inhibits Palestinian potential by trapping them inside their enclaves. Countless Palestinians do not travel, as it can become very dangerous to encounter an Israeli soldier.

As a means of total control, the Wall's construction has integrated the checkpoints into its path, serving as the only access point through the Wall, thus prohibiting alternative travel. Villagers located in the seam-zone must travel through a single checkpoint to access their homes. In Jubara village, a checkpoint was established when the Wall was constructed in 2003. The checkpoint was the only entrance point between the village and the rest of the West Bank. The people who reside in Jubara could not leave their village without an Israeli-issued permit to travel through the checkpoint. As reported by Human Rights Watch, "Palestinians may enter the seam zone only with special permits from the Israeli military, which must be renewed and are granted only to persons who can prove "permanent residence" in the area" (2010: 15). This permit system isolated the people of Jubara in their village and restricted visitors. The structural violence created a very difficult situation for those residing in the village, including the children of the village. The children of Jubara were forced to travel daily through the militarized checkpoint to reach their school in the adjacent village. Several residents of the village contemplated moving. They experienced daily direct violence through

harassment from Israeli military soldiers that staffed the checkpoint. Travel through the checkpoint also took more time; it was extremely difficult to trek from the village to the rest of the West Bank. Mohammed, a resident of Jubara, explained how he was denied entry into his own village and had to sleep at the checkpoint until the next morning when he was allowed passage through. He also highlighted how transporting anything into the village through the checkpoint was difficult, sharing:

Nobody is allowed to go sometimes outside or inside. Luggage for people, even if you want to bring anything you are not, until they allow you [to go] through. Sometimes you bought some chicken, 3 or 4, and they oppose them, they don't let them inside. You are not allowed to bring anything for your home even, even furniture for your home is not allowed.⁴⁴

Palestinians vacating their villages to move to other areas of the West Bank would serve the interests of the Israeli authorities, as the seam-zone areas were significant to Israel's colonial plans. The goal was to push the indigenous Palestinian populations into smaller Bantustans, while incorporating more of their land into Israel. However, the people of Jubara remained in their village, and through a successful court case, they were able to have the checkpoint removed and the Wall rerouted. This has allowed the villagers easier access to the West Bank and, more importantly, a safer environment for children. With that said, the people of Jubara still experience the violence triangle by nature of being Palestinian living under occupation.

As a result of cultural violence, the Israeli authorities are not concerned about the harms the checkpoint system exacts on Palestinians because they deem them as the reason for the checkpoint. Israel blames the Palestinian for needing an enhanced violence triangle due to the fact that the indigenous Palestinian is not willing to accept the ongoing

⁴⁴ Interview with Mohammed. Jubara, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

violence of the occupation. Rather than focusing on the violence that the occupation inflicts, the Israeli state enforces more structural and direct violence in an effort to repress the Palestinians into obedience. Not all of the checkpoints are currently staffed, yet they can be utilized at a moment's notice to ensure full control over the population. As PCHR reported,

While many checkpoints are now open for free passage, the infrastructure of many checkpoints has been left in place, allowing for their reactivation on short notice. In addition to these checkpoints, which are intermittently manned, 15 permanently manned checkpoints remain in place throughout the West Bank, in addition to 16 checkpoints, which restrict the movement of Palestinians in the centre of Hebron. (2014: 37)

The checkpoints are designed to track and monitor Palestinians. This aids in separating Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Israelis within Israel proper from the Palestinians, who are viewed as the dangerous element of the occupation through heightened cultural violence.



Children of Jubara walking freely past the site where the old checkpoint and Wall were located. Jubara, August 2013

Gates

Israel does not rely on one form of structural violence to impose restrictions onto the Palestinian people; they have integrated several different aspects of structural violence throughout the Wall as a means of control. A gate system was positioned through the structure of the Wall, primarily to reach confiscated land. Israel utilizes both direct and structural violence to maintain the gates. The Israeli military mandate who can access the land and when they will be allowed through. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the United Nations Refugee and Works Agency (UNRWA) divided up the gates by category: seam zone, agricultural, seasonal, and military gates. The heavily militarized gate system is the only means to pass through the Wall. It is used by Israel as a measure to displace the Palestinian people from their lands and confiscate them for the Israeli settlements. Detailing each type of gate within the system supports my argument that Israel uses the violence triangle to maintain the occupation, and control the Palestinian people.

The first set of gates that will be discussed are within the seam zone areas. These locations have specific gates to enter what Israel calls a “closed military zone.” These gates, also referred to as “closed area community checkpoints,” separate villages from the rest of the West Bank and are not open at night. The gate in Mas’ha is the only entry point for the Amer family house. The Amers live between their village and a settlement in a seam zone. The one gate near the Wall is the only method for the Amers to enter their home. The Israeli military check people who come to visit the Amer family and they often prevent people from coming through the gate. The location inside the seam zone is considered a closed military zone. For years, the Amers could only gain access into their

home if the soldiers were present to open the gate. After several years of international exposure, they were given a key to open the gates on their own. Cultural violence inhibited the Amer's claim to receive a key, but the exposure of the Amer case to an international community coerced the Israeli military to provide a key, thus intending to limit the perception of Israel as violent.



Mas'ha fence and internal gate, with settlement behind it. Mas'ha December 2005



Close-up sign on the fence in front of the Amer house. Mas'ha. December 2006

Seam zones gates are positioned in every area in the West Bank, and the structural violence of the gate limit Palestinian travel to the other side of the Wall. Hableh gate in the north allows entry to the seam zone area, yet due to the soldiers' unpredictability, farmers in the area typically choose to access their lands by way of the Alfe Menashe road and checkpoint instead. As the 2004 PCHR report states,

IOF have established special iron gates along the Wall to control the movement of Palestinian civilians to and from the areas located between the Wall and the Green Line. IOF often close these iron gates for long periods, denying Palestinian civilians their right to freedom of movement. (2005: 26)

Israel calculatedly creates barriers for Palestinians attempting to move through the gate system in an effort to deter them from travel. The more difficult it is to reach their land, the less likely people will continue to try, and then the land gets transferred to Israel.



Maniera Amer opening the gate for her son. Mas'ha August 2005.

Another form of gates used within the interconnected structurally violent system are the agricultural gates, which are the majority of the gates within the Wall. These gates are situated along the path of the Wall for Palestinian farmers usage. Israeli issued permits are required to enter through them, and they are only opened a few times a day for short periods of time. As reported by the PCHR,

In January 2007, IOF declared that they would decrease the hours of opening of the gate at the entrance of Jayous village, northeast of Qalqilya, from 12 to 3 hours daily. According to Palestinian farmers, this short period is not enough for them to go to their agricultural lands. (2008: 61)

Entering through the gates is at the discretion of the soldiers and farmers are often still denied entrance to their lands, even with a valid permit. Mohammed from Qalqilya expressed his own plight as a farmer: “My entire land ended up behind the Wall. My permit says, ‘a permit to enter and stay in a closed military zone.’”⁴⁵ The permit lists the farmer’s name, ID number, and location of residence. It shows how long it is valid (one or two years) and states access times: 5:00 AM to 7:00 PM. The permit also lists the exact gate that can be used by the permit holder to access the land. Children under twelve years old are the only ones allowed to accompany the permit holder; any older person needs their own permit due to the risk of them being a possible terrorist and needing to be vetted by the Israel. Mohammed explained, “If I want my children to go with my brother to the land they are not allowed to, I have to be with them.”⁴⁶ Only the children of the permit holder are allowed to work the land. Even if land is family-owned, relatives are not allowed to take another person's child to assist them with working the land, limiting the possibility of harvesting. Permits stipulate:

1. You are not allowed to enter the area for any purpose other than what is clarified on this permit, which is for working the land.
2. The owner of this permit has to have the permit on him all the time.
3. If you lose the permit, you have to notify the police.
4. When the permit expires, you have to return it to them in order to get a new one.⁴⁷

The most noteworthy aspect on the permit is the following statement: “This permit is not proof of legal rights, including ownership or residential rights.” This statement delegitimizes Palestinian land ownership on the other side of the Wall. Local people think

⁴⁵ Interview with Mohammed Abd el-Raheem. Qalqilya, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Ibid

the permits are Israel's attempt to appear like the state is not forbidding people from going to their lands, or that they are not using structural violence against them. People in the villages feel that Israel can say people are living and working on their lands if the structural violence is contested by Israeli or international audiences. The Palestinians I interviewed refuted this claim; they asserted that at any minute, on any day, Israel could declare a closure of the gates and the entire area. The people in the northwest Jerusalem villages were told they would receive permits to access their lands, but never received them. Marian from Beit Duqu stated, "We lost our source of living; the land is ruined. They don't want to give us permits to work our land."⁴⁸ Although Israel officially produces permits for farmers to work their land, Mariam disagrees; she has been completely cut off from her land through the structural violence of the gates, and the permits.



Marian Jamil and granddaughter, showing a newspaper photo of her defending her land. Beit Duqu, August 2013

⁴⁸ Interview with Marian Jamil. Beit Duqu, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

The restrictions on Palestinians' ability to access their land through the gates limit the extent they are able to work the land, which affects their economic potential. Beit Liqia's farmers also have issues accessing their land on the other side of the Wall. Mahmoud Asi, a local of Beit Liqia, described the difficulties of moving through the gate system. He asserted, "If they open the gate, I am not allowed to bring any car or any animal, so I have to pick the olives, I will only take a little bit."⁴⁹ Due to Israeli regulations, farmers are forced to be alone on their lands; this limits the amount of produce they can harvest. The farmers find it hard to profit from their lands when there are numerous regulations restricting who can access the land and how they can harvest the land.



An Israeli military jeep monitoring the fence. Beit Liqia, August 2013

A less commonly used gate within the structural violence of the Wall are the seasonal gates, which are opened at specific times of year. These gates are only open a few times a week and allow farmers to reach their lands in the closed military zones on


⁴⁹ Interview with Mahmoud Asi. Beit Liqia, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

the other side of the Wall. Separate sets of seasonal gates are used during the olive harvest season, which runs from October through December. Olives are a Palestinian staple. These gates are opened anywhere from ten days up to eight weeks and at the discretion of the soldiers. OCHA reported that in 2013 there were 74 agricultural gates throughout the West Bank Wall; of these gates, 52 were only opened during the olive harvest (2013). Olive harvest season in the fall is an extremely dangerous time to be working the lands due to the amount of direct violence the settlers and soldiers impose. Palestinians seek outside support to harvest their olives in fear of the direct violence. Without cultural violence, direct and structural violence are exposed as harmful, therefore they are not acceptable. International identity is not attached to cultural violence, therefore when direct violence from settlers or soldiers targets them, violence is revealed. Exposing the violence through solidarity support limits the use of it, and protects the Palestinian people as they work their lands during the olive harvest.

The last set of gates used to control the Palestinian people are for Israeli use only, Palestinians are restricted from accessing them. Israel constructed specific gates for Israeli military access to the Palestinian side of the Wall. Military gates, situated throughout the Wall, are used for military incursions and are direct access points into villages and towns. In Qalqilya, a military gate is positioned near greenhouses within the Wall. Next to the gate is a military tower to monitor Palestinian movement. Army vehicles use the gate to enter Qalqilya to carry out military operations. During the winter of 2005, there was a rainstorm and the gate was closed. All the rainwater was forced onto the Qalqilya side of the Wall, creating a swamp that drowned the plantations, killing 300 *dunums* of crops, two cattle, and chicken farms. Since the Israeli military did not open the

gates, the girls' school, 50 meters from the Wall, was also flooded. The water reached one and a half meters high. The Israeli army are the permitted users of these gates, specifically for their military purposes. These sets of gates aid Israel in their direct violent repression of the Palestinian people.

Throughout the Wall, Israel has established towers as monitoring implements to watch the Palestinian people. In Qalqilya, a tower sits above and within the structure of the Wall near the military gate. Soldiers in the tower frequently shout at people near the Wall to back away from the area, threatening or using direct violence when people are close to the gate. Greenhouses and agricultural lands are located in this area. The soldiers inconsistently enforce the rules near the gate and the Wall. At times, farmers are able to harvest their lands there, but other times are met with direct violence from the Israeli military (OCHA, 2007). The gate system is inconsistent and farmers risk direct violence to be able to work their lands with no other opportunities for their livelihood.



Green House in front of the Wall. Qalqilya, December 2006.

Road Closures

Structural violence encompasses formulating new implements, but also eliminating already established means to limit potential. Palestinian roads within the West Bank were closed by Israel as a security concern. These road closures have prevented movement, obliging people to move through the limited, permitted routes. They restrict Palestinians' direct access throughout the West Bank, inhibiting their quality of life. Road closures in the West Bank are created through two main methods: earth mounds and roadblocks. Earth mounds are made of dirt and obstruct access where roads once were. Pedestrians are able to walk over the mounds, but cars are blocked from entire areas. People with physical disabilities, the elderly, and pregnant women are unable to travel over the earth mounds, increasing the difficulty of their travel in time, distance, and exertion. Emergency vehicles and delivery trucks drive to the earth mounds to be efficient. These vehicles arrive to one side of the mound and retrieve the person or goods, once they travel or are transported over the mound. Roadblocks are also positioned in once-bustling streets and restrict vehicular traffic from utilizing the road. The roadblocks are cement and typically, several are placed in the road to limit mobility. While earth mounds and roadblocks are easily accessible from villages, checkpoints are further away. Transportation over earth mounds and roadblocks are quicker, but numerous vehicles must be involved to be efficient.



Gate in front of Omar house. Al Walaja. August 2013

In several locations, the Wall has closed off roads entirely, prohibiting all access to the other side. These road closures separate the villages and towns from the other side, forcing Palestinians to travel much further to reach checkpoints. In Qalqilya, the Wall blocked the main road in the city, “el Fawakeh (fruits) Street,” named for its high volume of fruit stores. People used to sell their products to Israel on that road because of the close location to the Green-Line. With the establishment of the Wall, numerous greenhouses were destroyed and the road was officially blocked. This main road was an access point for the industrial businesses of the city. Once the road was blocked, the business sector relying on that access point died. The Wall’s path shut down several roads in Bethlehem, which was once a thriving hub. George from Bethlehem explained,

The entrance of Bethlehem, what’s called checkpoint 300, was a very active commercial hub. Even Israeli Jews used to come here to trade, to go to the dentist because it’s cheaper, to buy from supermarkets because it’s cheaper than Israel. Also, we used to go there, there was a discotheque, there was restaurants, now it’s like ghost town over there.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

This entrance point is on the main street of Hebron Road, which connected Jerusalem to Bethlehem. The Wall has blocked the main road; now the only way to access the area is to go through the heavily militarized checkpoint. The once-thriving hub is now isolated due to the Wall, and the area resembles a ghost town. People residing in both Bethlehem and Jerusalem have trouble accessing the area. Clair resides in this area with her family; they owned some of the businesses that were frequented by both Israelis and Palestinians. During the Second *Intifada* in 2001, the IDF blocked off the area, which is also located close to the biblical site of Rachel's Tomb. In 2003, they built the Wall and now all of the shops are closed. The people who lived and worked in the area were forced to shut down their businesses, and the residents moved because people could no longer come there to sustain their livelihood.



Wall during construction in Bethlehem, cutting the main road into. Jerusalem March 2005.



Bethlehem shops that closed due to the Wall. Bethlehem. December 2006.

The structural violence of the road closures affects various aspects of life within the West Bank, including environmental concerns. In Biddo village, three roads were blocked with the establishment of the Wall, leaving only one access point for entering and exiting the villages. This lack of access heavily affected the waste and sewage

removal for the entire area. Mohammed from Biddo explained, “Before the Wall, we used to send the waste outside, but now there is nowhere to send the waste, so it stays in the village and we keep burning it, and this causes disease.”⁵¹ Having only one road has inhibited residents’ abilities to meet some of their basic needs. They are forced to concentrate on the imperative aspects of enduring the occupation, where immediate human needs trump long term health concerns.

Bypass and Tunnel Roads

Structural violence in the West Bank is heightened by the use of cultural violence positioning the Palestinian as dangerous, which the Apartheid road system reinforces. Labeling the road system Apartheid reinforces the argument that Israel uses the triangle of violence to differentiate Israeli settlers over Palestinians, and thus allots rights to the former while repressing the latter. Israel’s Apartheid system is based on identity, one of supremacy over the other. Israel built the Israeli settlers newly paved highways that run from their settlements into Israel proper. Palestinian residents are forced to drive on poorly constructed tunnel roads that keep them underground and separate from the settlers. The damage the road system causes to the Palestinian people is secondary to the convenience it provides to the settler communities.

Israel’s use of the Apartheid road system in the Occupied Territory began to facilitate settlers’ travel from the settlements into Israel proper. Israel calls these bypass roads because their intent is to bypass the Palestinian villages situated in the West Bank, limiting any exposure to the indigenous Palestinian population. Israel’s use of language is

⁵¹ Interview with Mohamed Mansour. Biddo, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

misleading, and enhances their cultural violence accusations. These roads are for Israeli use only; Palestinians are prohibited from using these roads, and if caught direct violence is probable. According to the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem, "In February 2014, there were 65.12 kilometers of roads in the West Bank that Israel had classified for the sole, or practically sole use of Israelis, first and foremost of settlers" (2014). If Palestinians are caught driving on these roads, there are penalties. As Allison Brown explained when discussing movement restrictions in the West Bank, "If a Palestinian is caught driving on a settler road, the car may be confiscated and a fine imposed. Only taxi drivers with Israeli plates and a special permit are allowed to travel on settler roads" (2004: 508). To enforce this form of structural violence, Israel designated separate license plates for the two populations. Israelis, both within the West Bank and inside Israel proper, have yellow license plates. Israeli settlements are viewed as an extension of the state of Israel, so they are issued the same plates as within Israel proper. Palestinians' cars are issued white license plates through the Palestinian Authority. Palestinians in Israel and Jerusalem are able to obtain the yellow plates, but Palestinians within the West Bank are not.

The road system shows the structural violence, which imposes travel restrictions onto Palestinians while allotting more privileges to Israeli settlers. Palestinians are forced to stay on a separate tunnel road system, which they must travel far out of their way to reach. These tunnel roads are the only access points to reach the other Bantustans within the West Bank. In the north of the West Bank, Israel built tunnels between the city of Qalqilya and the southern villages to keep people under ground. To reach the southern area of the West Bank, people must travel through the tunnel road. Next to the tunnel

road, Israel built a fence to restrict the road from the Palestinian inhabitants in the area. The Wall and the roads system work together to keep the Palestinian people isolated from the settler communities, and in several cases, also from each other.



Tunnel Road on the bottom, bypass road on the top. Qalqilya. December 2006.

The road system is not merely for separate travel; the Israeli military use the road system to monitor the Palestinian people as a form of structural violence. The physical aspects of the tunnel roads allow for Israel to execute direct violence towards the travelers at their discretion, without interfering with settler travel. On the Israeli side of the Wall, the land is elevated for the bypass road. Soldiers position their army jeeps up there to watch the indigenous people below. In Biddo, only one tunnel road is an access point for several villages. This tunnel road is easily monitored and often closed by the Israeli military. Mohammed Mansour explained how the system works in his area: “The tunnels connect ten villages, more than 75,000 people, and sometimes the soldiers want

to close the entrance and no one can go through because it is closed.⁵² The Israeli military are able to position an army jeep inside the tunnel and close off the entire area, prohibiting all movement. The closure works as a checkpoint and roadblock. This closure is structural violence; it affects all aspects of village life. Students are restricted from reaching their schools, families are restricted from the city of Ramallah, which is where all the hospitals and services are located, and anyone from the village that works in other areas is restricted from accessing their employment. The unpredictability of a road closure creates anxiety for Palestinian residents attempting to perform daily activities.



The tunnel road to Ramallah with the settler bypass road above it. Biddo, August 2013

The structural violence of the tunnel roads also isolate individual houses to regulate travel underground. Omar from al Walaja explained how the tunnel road was situated in front of his house, instead of a gate system, when the Wall was being constructed: “Before the tunnel, they were planning to put [in] four gates, with limited hours in the

⁵² Interview with Mohamed Mansour. Biddo, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

morning and the afternoon.”⁵³ Omar was part of a resistance movement against the Wall, and activists highlighted his story. As a result of increased awareness regarding his plight to an international audience, instead of the restrictive gate system, a bypass road was built directly in front of Omar’s house, which also prevented him from leaving on the most direct route. A tunnel road was instead built for Omar to be able to access the rest of his village. Both of the roads systems were built on his land, confiscating it and preventing him from moving freely.



Omar and his son in front of their house near the Israeli bypass road. Al Walaja. August 2013.



The tunnel road under the Israeli bypass road. Al Walaja Al August 2013.

The establishment of the dual road system allows Israel more control over the Palestinian population inside the West Bank, limiting any dissent. As people attempt to travel from one fragmented Bantustan to another, Israel is able to track them. The restriction of roads cost the Palestinian people time and money, yet is the only way to move within the West Bank. PCHR reported that in 2011, “Additionally, at least 200,000 Palestinians living in 70 villages are forced to use alternative roads that are longer routes

⁵³ Interview with Omar. Al Walaja, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

and thus have to endure additional financial burdens” (2012: 357). Jamal Juma reiterated this point when describing the overall goal of the tunnel roads system once it is complete:

These will be the only passage points for Palestinians needing to travel from one area or city to another within the West Bank. While providing a facade of maximum contiguity among Palestinian areas to the international community after all, the claim goes, these junctions connect the Palestinian Bantustans with each other – this project is in fact aimed at guaranteeing full Israeli control over the West Bank. (2005: 357)

The fragmentation of the West Bank is regulated through these sporadic access points of tunnel roads. Currently some of the bypass roads are accessible to Palestinians, but once the tunnel road system is complete, Palestinians’ movement will only be permitted on tunnel roads. It is essential to detail the violence triangle, such as the detailed analysis of the checkpoints, gates and road system, as a means to develop a theme of Israeli violence and reframe of the narrative.

Effects of Restricted Movement

Palestinians pay a high price as a result of Israel’s use of the violence triangle. Israel’s structural violence of restricting movement affects every aspect of daily life inside the West Bank. The limitations on moving freely transform the situation on the ground for the indigenous people, limiting their ability to survive. Access to labor is stifled, producing higher unemployment rates. People are without income, yet the costs of travel are higher due to the longer routes people are forced to take. The scarce access points throughout the West Bank force droves of people into the same routes, creating traffic, long lines at checkpoints, and taking more time. In addition, the Israeli military and settlers utilize direct violence and harass the Palestinian people as they move throughout the territory.



Furniture unable to travel into the village due to the checkpoint. Deir Ballut. 2005

Access to Labor

The various implements of structural violence impede the growth of the Palestinian workforce, preventing the economic potential of Palestinian society. The physical restrictions and the amount of time it takes to access employment opportunities affect the local Palestinian economy. Human Rights Watch documented the inequalities within the West Bank, reporting that, “The World Bank noted that movement restrictions on Palestinians contributed to a 60 percent decline in per capita GDP from 1999 to 2008” (2010: 15). Restricted movement after the Second *Intifada* forced numerous families into poverty, with little access to income. The Wall then sealed in the population, making it nearly impossible for workers to access jobs beyond the Wall.

Structural violence limited employment long before the Wall was built, but the Wall exacerbated the issue. Numerous Palestinians inside the West Bank relied on laborer positions inside Israel as their source of income prior to the Wall’s construction. During the “open-bridges” years of 1967-1987, Palestinians were able to travel with ease

across the Green-Line to work. Avram Bornstein explained the open-bridges years shortly after Israel began to occupy the West Bank:

Workers from the Occupied Territories were soon welcomed into the Israeli labor market in undesirable, laborious jobs, such as those in agriculture and construction. By the mid-1980s, about 120,000 Palestinian workers from the Occupied Territories—approximately 80,000 registered and 40,000 unregistered—went to work in Israel every day. (2008: 110)

Working inside Israel was an economic route for numerous families that did not own land or have an education. The Israeli workforce exploited the Palestinian workers during those years. As Palestinians lacked an autonomous economy, they were forced to accept the working conditions to survive.

Characteristics of structural violence flow from one element of violence to another, revealing the interconnectedness of the implements to oppress the Palestinian people. The structural violence of the permit system was devised in the early 1990s, not only making it difficult to reach land, but also creating a barrier for employment inside Israel. As a security concern, the open bridge years were revoked shortly before the Gulf War. Cultural violence regarded all Palestinians as potential terrorists, and therefore the need to restrict them from accessing Israeli communities was implemented. Leila Farsakh described the change for Palestinian laborers: “The permit policy, first introduced in 1991, made entry of WBGS workers into Israel conditional upon obtaining security clearance from the Israeli military establishment and a request for employment from an Israeli employer” (2002: 19). Those who were unable to obtain a permit found other ways to access employment inside Israel, bypassing the structural violence of the permit, and the checkpoints. The restriction on movement, due to the checkpoints, did not deter them from finding alternative routes into Israel for work. The post-Oslo years were more

difficult for laborers to enter Israel and the Israeli military began heavily tracking Palestinian movement through the fragmented West Bank to limit the flow of workers into Israel. By 2000, after the Second *Intifada*, it was nearly impossible to sneak across the Green-Line as an unregistered laborer. Because of increased cultural violence, the Israeli military kept a heavy presence inside the territory to prohibit travel, and utilized direct violence when people were traveling outside of the designated areas.

Palestinian areas located near the Green-Line were more dependent on the Israeli market for work as a result of the historic ease into Israeli proper. Beit Liqia is located further west towards the Green-Line, and the majority of the villagers worked inside Israel. Although these laborers were able to make enough money to sustain their families, they encountered racism and discrimination while working inside Israel. Typically, Palestinian workers make less than their Israeli colleagues in the same positions. They also are given neither vacation time nor health insurance (Doumani, 1989). Palestinian studies scholar Beshara Doumani discusses this point when he chronicled a Palestinian family in Salfit before the start of the First *Intifada*. Doumani explained, “Job opportunities in Israel, no matter how menial or degrading, represented release from a life of extreme poverty for Palestinian villagers-cum-city workers” (1989: 30). The Wall disconnected Palestinian laborers from accessing their employment inside Israel, creating an economic crisis in these areas.

Once the Wall was established, the restriction of movement interrupted Palestinians’ dependence on the Israeli market. Prior to the Wall, numerous workers that did not have Israeli-issued permits were able to walk through the fields to avoid the checkpoints and access their jobs inside Israel. It has been nearly impossible for day

laborers to continue to access Israel to work since the Wall. Bornstein described how workers now manage to work inside Israel: “Workers who once snuck around a checkpoint early in the morning and returned at the end of the day now travel long distances, stay in Israel for a week or two or more, and live hidden at construction sites and factories” (2008: 123). Israeli businesses still exploit Palestinian labor and the laborers are forced to endure dangerous and difficult travel to maintain a living. Hassan Saleh explained how, “The majority of jobs in question—unskilled construction labour, agricultural work, and service jobs such as cleaning, working in restaurants, garbage disposal and so on—do not present any real threat to the wage structure of organized labour” (1990: 346). The employment that most Palestinians are able to gain inside Israel is undesirable; they are viewed as inferior to the Israeli worker. The Palestinian labor pool is vulnerable to exploitation due to the lack of opportunity inside the West Bank.

Working within the structurally violent system, and obtaining an Israeli-issued permit does not relieve workers of long, difficult travel. From 1967 to 2003, those who had permits could access their work fairly easily. Once the Wall was constructed, laborers with permits were obligated to go through specific checkpoints to reach the other side of the Green-Line. Mahmoud Asi from Beit Liqia explained this lengthy process of moving through the checkpoint: “They wake up very early to be in the line. There is a long process at both Qalandia and Macabim [checkpoints].”⁵⁴ The laborers throughout the West Bank are using the same few permitted checkpoints. Mahmoud Asi stated, “The people go at 3:00 AM, from Beit Liqia and all villages, and Nablus too, 10,000 workers

⁵⁴ Interview with Mahmoud Asi. Beit Liqia, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

are going through the checkpoints.”⁵⁵ The heavy traffic through the checkpoint creates a dangerous situation. He continued to explain that people are very tired, waiting for hours in line, and this can bring clashes amongst them as they are in confined conditions. PCHR reported that workers with permits are subject to abusive situations when crossing through checkpoints into Israel:

Palestinian workers who work inside Israel are subject to humiliating measures at border crossings between the West Bank and Israel although they have valid official permits. They have to obtain special magnetic cards, on which their fingerprints are placed, before being able to obtain work permits. (2008: 46)

Mahmoud Asi feels the economic impact is one of the biggest effects of the Wall on Palestinians who relied on work inside Israel.

The triangle of violence restricted movement and increased the unemployment rate in the West Bank. People who relied on work inside Israel became unemployed, and as a byproduct impoverished. In Beit Liqia, the unemployment rate increased greatly since the construction of the Wall. Countless people are out of work, as they lack the permit to access their old jobs. PCHR reported, “As a consequence of the total closure imposed on the OPT, unemployment has mounted to 40% and the level of poverty has increased to 73%” (2008: 46). Mahmoud Asi explained that because people relied on the work inside Israel, they did not focus on their education or trades, and so now they are suffering economically. His own son is now driving a taxi in Ramallah because he can no longer work inside Israel as a laborer.

⁵⁵ Interview with Mahmoud Asi. Beit Liqia, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.



Young men selling bread at the checkpoint. Qalandia, July 2013

Structural violence has affected all sectors of the Palestinian economy through the restriction of movement. Professionals inside the West Bank are also prohibited from accessing their employment. As PCHR reported,

The most significant problem highlighted in the report is the suffering of teachers who have to cross to the other side of the wall to reach communities where there are no schools. These teachers are subjected to humiliation by Israeli forces on a daily basis. On most days, they are denied access under a variety of pretexts. Teachers attempting to pass through the checkpoint in the annexation wall near the entrance of Barta'a village in Jenin are regularly denied permission to cross. Teachers are regularly delayed at checkpoint gates for hours before being denied access to the village, during which time they are subjected to profane language and body searches, especially on female teachers. (2013: 20)

Teachers are inclined to move beyond the Wall, as schools are often separated from villages. Restriction of movement inhibits the growth of Palestinian students, which ultimately affects the future of the economy. Various professionals are restricted from accessing their employment due to the numerous checkpoints, road closures, long lines, and the daily harassment from the soldiers. They are prevented from reaching their jobs, which exacerbates the gross poverty rate.

Time and Money

Structural violence is invisible, and the cost of the occupation onto the Palestinian people is rarely acknowledged as a form of violence. The structurally violent implements that restrict Palestinian travel cost them time and money. The checkpoints, gates, blocked roads, and tunnel roads have increased the amount of time it takes to move through the West Bank. Lost time is one of the most costly aspect of the restricted movement. People wait in long lines to access areas they once were able to reach quickly. Palestinians are forced to wait in long lines to move through each checkpoint, and on most routes they encounter several. The Israeli military detain people for as long as they want under the guise of security. This affects the rest of the people waiting and creates an unpredictable situation for all Palestinian travelers. If people attempt to access the West Bank via an earth mound, they must get rides to the obstructed road, disembark from the vehicle they are traveling in, and walk to another vehicle on the other side of the mound. This takes more time and money to reach each destination. The road system forces people to drive out of their way to access permitted routes.



Palestinian taxis waiting in traffic near the Wall. Qalandia 2007

The structural violence of time is lost when people move through the gate system to reach their lands. For example, the Amers still own a small parcel of land near the village of Kufr Qasam on the other side of the Wall, where they were originally from. The land, which should take a few minutes to reach, now takes thirty minutes to an hour to get to, due to the multiple barriers between the Amer house and the land. After getting through the first gate constructed outside their front door, there is another one separating them from their crops; this creates more difficult and longer travel. Hani shared,

The problem in getting to the land is how much time it takes to get there and the way that we have to use in order to reach it. Many times they give us hard time on the way. We are behind a wall and the land is behind another wall. We have to go through a gate in the Wall, sometimes it's opened and sometimes it is closed, sometimes they keep us there for ten minutes at the gate and other times for three hours, and even when we get there they follow us and ask for our IDs, and ask us why are we there, and what we are doing there.⁵⁶

The Israeli military utilize the structural violence implements to enforce more forms of direct violence. Detaining and harassing people are methods used by Israel to deter

⁵⁶ Interview with Hani Amer. Mas'ha, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.

people from accessing their lands. The numerous obstacles and the amount of time it takes to travel have inhibited people from moving throughout the territory.

The structural violence implements, such as the permit system, are designed to take more time away from Palestinians. Obtaining a travel permit entails numerous steps in navigating the bureaucratic system, taking a lot of time. This system is strategic to deter the people from attempting to obtain the necessary documents to move beyond the Wall. Israeli journalist Amira Hass refers to this as the “theft of time.” She stated,

Time was wasted filling out forms and obtaining supporting documents, standing in line in PA offices that acted as conduits for the Israelis, making desperate phone calls ten times a day to check whether the permit had arrived, casting around for people who might know someone with some pull with the Israelis, and so on. (2002: 10)

The various forms of structural violence have aided Israel in their attempt to create a submissive Palestinian population. Daily obstacles require travel planning and strategizing. The risks of travel are more than most Palestinian people can endure. The longer routes, long lines, extra costs, and potential for harassment reinforce a distressed society. However, those who do travel resist the occupation’s objectives by not surrendering to the violence.



Boy watching as the Israeli military patrol his neighborhood.
Abu Dis 2004

Harassment

Israel employs the violence triangle by way of direct violence to ensure the Palestinian population inside the West Bank is obedient to the structurally violent implements. Both Israeli soldiers and Israeli settlers employ the direct violence of harassment. The aim is to control the Palestinian population. Israeli settlers physically abuse Palestinians in attacks referred to as “price tags.” The origin of this term stems from an incident in 2008. The head of the settler struggle was quoted in the *Ha’aretz* newspaper as saying that there will be a high price to pay after the Israeli police dismantle their outpost inside the West Bank. The settler movement views the Palestinian people through the lens of cultural violence, demonizing and dehumanizing them due to their cultural identity, and positioning them as inferior in comparison to Israeli cultural

values. Because of this view of the Palestinian as subordinate to them, settlers target Palestinians with direct violence. The statement in the popular Israeli newspaper informed the larger settler movement that these “price tag” attacks would be seen as a form of good citizenship (B'Tselem, 2011). An example is the situation of the Amer family. They have been experiencing daily harassment from the settlers living in El Qana settlement near their house. Hani said that the settlers threw stones at the house and broke all the glass on the solar heating system on multiple occasions. Besides throwing stones at the house, the settlers, who ranged in age from twelve years old to the mid-twenties, exposed themselves to the Amer family as a way to coerce them to move. Settlers’ “price tag” attacks are common in villages that are located close to settlements. These acts are used to coerce the indigenous population to relocate or stay away from settler areas, although settlements are built on Palestinian land. Settlers do not experience repercussions for these attacks because Israel frames anti-Palestinian violence as self-defense due to positioning the Palestinian identity as a form of violence. It is clear to Hani that the Israeli military and the settlers are working to expel him and his family by any means possible.

Cultural violence exists outside of mere settler perspectives of Palestinians. The Israeli military also view Palestinians as inferior, subordinate, and a rightful target of direct violence. Although international law, under the IV Geneva Convention (ICRC 1958: 21) mandates that the Israeli army protect the people they are occupying, they tend to ignore the settler attacks on Palestinians. “In some cases, rather than restricting violent settlers, Israeli security forces impose restrictions on the Palestinians” (B’Tselem, 2011).

The Israeli army also participates in the harassment of Palestinians. Hani highlighted the Israeli military harassment he has faced while living in his home,

We also face problems from the soldiers. They started coming at night, when the children are sleeping around nine or ten o'clock at night. They surround the house as if they are going to a military base with their guns pointed at the house, and us, and ask us to leave the house. Around thirty soldiers make us go outside, whether it is cold or rainy they don't care they make us leave. Then they go inside the house, God only knows what they are doing there. They claim that they are looking for something, what they are looking for we don't know, there is nothing to be searching for in the house. It happened many times already, and we understood that the purpose of it is not searching the house but terrorizing us and to force us to leave the house, and to exhaust us, and the children psychologically. Aside from this, every time we bring something home, they search through it, what we bring in or out of the house, they investigate everything."⁵⁷

The Amers have experienced extreme forms of direct and structural violence from both the Israeli military and settlers, for refusing to leave their home to the settlement. This harassment extends to people who visit the Amer family. At times, soldiers have come into the house to force visitors to leave. In the summer of 2004, a group from the U.S. called Break the Silence Mural Project came to Mas'ha to paint a mural on the Wall. The aim was to disguise the ugliness of the Wall, which separated the Amer house from the rest of the community. In August of 2005, the group returned to continue painting on the Wall with the Amer children. When people were painting on the Wall, the soldiers came to the area and forced everyone to leave, stating it was a closed military zone. Hani's house is located between the Wall and the settlement, which positions it into a seam zone. The Israeli military first asked Hani to make everyone leave, but when he refused to tell his guests to leave, the Israeli military removed the group. The Israeli authorities utilize

⁵⁷ Interview with Hani Amer. Mas'ha, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.

direct violence as a byproduct of the underlying cultural violence, which defines the occupation.



Break The Silence Mural Project. Mas'ha, August 2005.

The Israeli military uses harassment as a method of direct violence to control Palestinians who do not comply with structural violence. The Israeli authorities visited Omar in Al Walaja on numerous occasions and harassed him to get him to sell his land and house for the site of the Wall. The Israeli authorities showed him a map depicting where his house would be on the Israeli side of the Wall, separate from his village. Omar saw this as another threat and attempt to get him to sell his land for the site of the Wall. Omar was not willing to sell his house, no matter how much intimidation he experienced. In 2010, the Israeli authorities threatened to take away his work permit if he did not sell his land. Omar was still unwilling to budge, and in the end he kept his land and work

permit, though he is trapped near the Wall and Apartheid road. Harassment is used in this way to pressure Palestinians to conform to structural violence. As the cases of Hani and Omar illustrate, resisting structural violence results in direct violence. Direct violence is often used to oppress the indigenous people as a mode of control. Inside the Occupied Territory, resistance is viewed as any behavior that does not conform to the structural violence of the occupation.



Young boy near the Wall. Mas'ha 2005

Dissolving the Border

Israel has used the Wall for their political aspirations, placing the Wall deep inside the West Bank, disregarding the 1967 borders, and expanding the Israel's territorial claims. The violence triangle has been successful in unilaterally dissolving the borders and confiscating more Palestinian land. Integrated forms of violence (checkpoints, gates, tunnel roads, and the Wall) trap the Palestinian people inside Bantustans within the West Bank. The Wall creates the impression of a new border; thus establishes the illusion of entering a different country when moving from the Palestinian

side, to both the Israeli settlements and inside Israel. Gabriela Becker describes this as a way for Israeli politicians to evade the need for official border recognition stating,

The policy of "final borders" through the construction of the apartheid wall, without the need to make declarations since the wall and the Israeli occupation's infrastructure (settlements, bypasses and checkpoints/terminals) serve the goals of stifling, controlling, confiscating and eradicating. (2006: 1239)

These structurally violent implements were designed to dissolve the Green-Line borders outside of negotiations. The new "borders" ultimately track and control all Palestinian movement throughout the territory and limit the prospects of a Palestinian state. The new borders' purpose is to concentrate highly-populated Palestinian areas into smaller enclaves and separate them from Israeli settlements. Israel has successfully disappeared the borders inside the West Bank without negotiating with the Palestinian Authority or international mediators. The new borders expand beyond the Green-Line, essentially erasing the 1949 Armistice Line, and including Israeli settlements. The state of Israel has ultimately expanded their borders as a result of the disappearing Green-Line. This move by Israel minimizes the land for a future Palestinian state. For Jamil Dakwar, "The result is that Israel's borders are being demarcated on the basis of a unilateral land grab and the contours of illegal settlements rather than in accordance with Security Council resolutions, in particular Resolution 242" (2007: 67). Israel did not withdraw from the Occupied Territories in 1967; they actually maintained a heavier presence inside the West Bank through direct and structural violence, utilizing the triangle of violence to steal Palestinian lands and expand their colonial state.

The unilateral division of territory through the establishment of the Wall is not only used to dissolve borders with Israel; it has separated Palestinians from other villages

within the West Bank and disconnected a unified Palestinian entity. Jubara village was separated from the rest of the West Bank to erase the border. Mohammed, a resident of Jubara, shared, “It is near the Israeli border [Green-Line]; they consider it their land.”⁵⁸ The idea was to move the boundary closer into the West Bank. Jubara’s population is small: only 300-400 people reside there. The people of the village believed that the Israeli authorities assumed that closing off their village from the West Bank would prompt them to relocate and allow the land to be reclassified as belonging to Israel. Mohammed stated, “They [Israel] want during these ten-years that these people will leave this village and they will take the land.”⁵⁹ The people of Jubara feel that they were being put in a difficult living situation so they would leave their village. This would enable Israel to annex their land and prove the violence triangle successful, this however was not the case.

The location of the Wall creates a new boundary between the Palestinian villages and Israeli settlements, weaving around and inside villages and isolating them. This path separates houses and positions them near the so-called “border”. This occurred in Mas’ha, as was discussed in the Amer family case, and in the village of Biddo as well. In Biddo village, a family’s house was also in the way of the Wall. When the homeowner was unwilling to move, Israel’s solution was to literally build the Wall around her house. The settlement was expanded on the other side. The family in the house is completely surrounded by the Wall and a gate was installed as their only access point to enter into the home. The gate positions them into a tiny seam zone, where the new “border” is in their backyard.

⁵⁸ Interview with Mohammed. Jubara, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

⁵⁹ Ibid.



Palestinian house surrounded by the fence, and an Israeli settlement on all sides. Biddo, August 2013

The unilateral dissolving of the Green-Line officially minimizes the West Bank territory and extends the colony of the Israeli state, creating long-lasting political implications for the Palestinians. George Rishmawi, an activist in Bethlehem and Beit Sahour, explained that in Bethlehem, the Wall affects people in the same ways as the other villages in the West Bank, but unlike the villages, unless a person’s land is taken, people do not see the Wall. George stated, “As an average Palestinian, in your daily life in Bethlehem, you don’t see, physically, the Wall very much, in the line of sight, except for those who live close by.”⁶⁰ Although the Wall is not visible, George highlighted that the effects are the same in Bethlehem as they are in the other villages. The Wall psychology affects all people residing inside the West Bank. As George explained, “On a psychological level we started to feel that this is the border of Palestine. This one of the main goals of the Wall that Israel has set, to make a mindset that this is the border, for

⁶⁰ Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

Israelis and Palestinians.”⁶¹ According to George, Israel wants the Palestinian people to feel that the other side of the Wall is a foreign land, one that does not belong to them, and one they cannot reach without permission by Israel to access the structural violence implements. George continued to describe the effects of the barrier in the Bethlehem area. “Because of the Wall now, and the settlements, Beit Sahour has borders with Jerusalem. This never happened, Beit Sahour is a small town, then you have Bethlehem, then there is this Talpiyot area, and then you have Jerusalem.”⁶² The Wall seals in Bethlehem, isolating it and becoming the unilateral “border” between Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Becker explained how these “final borders” are determined by Israel: “We see that the Palestinian ‘majority’ resides in the area within the ‘final borders,’ which is overwhelmingly demarcated by the apartheid wall” (2006: 1238). Bethlehem is populated with Palestinians, whereas West Jerusalem, located a few minutes away from Bethlehem, is populated with Israelis. The Wall created a barrier between them, isolating the majority of Palestinians inside the Wall. According to George, people are finding the conditions living behind the Wall too difficult due to the various restrictions and separation, and are thus leaving the Palestinian side to move abroad, when possible. This evacuation aids Israel, limiting the number of Palestinians residing on the land while populating it with more Israelis. The demographic decrease of Palestinian inhabitants supports Israel’s claim over the land.

Israel utilizes various structural violence implements to redefine their new “border”. Israel has begun renaming checkpoints “border crossings” to create an illusion

⁶¹ Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

⁶² Ibid.

of entering a new country when moving from the Bantustans and through the Wall.

PCHR reported that,

In the last week of 2005, IOF declared the transformation of Qalandya checkpoint, south of Ramallah, into a border crossing between Jerusalem and Ramallah. IOF are currently establishing a similar border crossing at Za'tara checkpoint, south of Nablus in the northern West Bank. The operation of these two crossings will divide the West Bank into 3 separate zones and add additional restrictions on the movement of Palestinian civilians. (2006: 41)

Transforming checkpoints into “border crossings” is extremely dangerous for the future of the Palestinian people. Israel’s unilateral move to dissolve the border of the Green-Line not only has political implications, it also restricts all movement beyond the Wall and further isolates the Palestinian people from each other.



Hizma Checkpoint, the “border crossing” into Jerusalem. June 2013

Conclusion

The use of the violence triangle to restrict movement creates a fragmented Palestinian society. Israel utilizes the violence triangle to repress the Palestinian people, restricting their movement to gain more control over them and access to their lands. The structural violence implements are only of consequence when direct violence is used to enforce them and cultural violence is exploited in an attempt to excuse them, as has been proven throughout this chapter. The violence of the Wall has long-lasting affects for the Palestinian people, and inhibits a future Palestinian state. Muhin, speaking on behalf of the National Committee to Access the Damage of the Wall, has been clear that the purpose of the Wall is to separate and control the Palestinian people. He stated,

It was established to create cantons for the Palestinians. Separated from each other and controlled by Israelis when they want to open and close it whenever they want. It is to show the Palestinians that their rights can be given, or taken, by the Israelis.⁶³

The checkpoints, gates, and tunnel roads work in collaboration with the Wall to imprison the Palestinian people. These implements cost time and money to move through. They expose the Palestinian people to more direct violence from the Israeli military and the settlers. Palestinians are subjected to control by way of these access points, not sure if they will be able to move through them each day. Jamal Juma from the Stop the Wall Campaign reiterated this point when he stated, “The only future envisaged for the Palestinian people is a life to be lived in ghettos and Bantustans, under permanent Israeli control, domination, and humiliation” (2005: 357). The aim of the Wall is ultimately to control the Palestinian people through the various structurally violent implements.

⁶³ Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

Through this integrated network, Israel is able to maintain control of the West Bank and all of the people residing within it. Israel has forced the Palestinian population into unlivable conditions with the hopes of Palestinian relinquishment of the land to Israel. Muhin described the emotional toll that people experience when they choose not to leave: “The other effect of the Wall is the emotional and psychological that isolate people from each other, and affect their spirits. We cannot separate the Wall issue from the whole Zionist project in how it was established and how it’s looking for the future.”⁶⁴ Muhin adamantly expressed that, “The future of the Palestinians will be related to the occupation all the time.”⁶⁵ Israel’s use of the violence triangle successfully dissolved the Green-Line in an attempt to establish a new border, preventing the possibility of a Palestinian state. This unilateral move imposed a Palestinian dependency on the colonizing state and further exploited the indigenous people.

Israel has employed the violence triangle, through the establishment of the Wall, throughout the West Bank to dominate the Palestinian people. Structural violence implements are used throughout the structure, enforced by direct violence, ultimately to collectively imprison the Palestinian people. Cultural violence frames Israel’s narrative that Palestinians are violent, and this enables the process of violence within the West Bank. The Wall created an illusion of securing Israelis by inhibiting Palestinian violence through a false culturally violent narrative. For mainstream Israelis, all Palestinians are guilty by way of their cultural identity; therefore they must be caged as a form of protection, or security. My detailed analysis of Israel’s triangle of violence, through the structurally violent apparatus within the West Bank, invalidates this assumption,

⁶⁴ Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

revealing the cause of the violence to be Israel. Israel restricts Palestinian movement for their own colonial interest, and thus the narrative should be reframed from 'Palestinian as the aggressor' to one of 'Palestinian as the victim to Israeli violence'.

Chapter 5

The Jerusalem Envelope

The Wall in the Jerusalem area, known as the Jerusalem Envelope, is the most dangerous current political strategy used by the state of Israel to sustain the triangle of violence. The Wall is a tool Israel uses to depopulate the city of its Palestinian residents and to annex more land. The path of the Wall weaves around Palestinian towns, pushing entire communities into the side of the Wall that borders the West Bank. Palestinian Jerusalemites, living in the suburban areas, are forced to make the difficult decision of staying in their homes and losing their Jerusalem residency, or relocating to expensive, smaller residences inside Jerusalem to maintain access into the city. Israel uses structural violence in the Jerusalem Envelope to relocate Palestinians from the city, altering the city's demographics. In contrast, the Wall annexes Israeli settlements in Jerusalem and in the West Bank into the city. Israel uses cultural violence to preface Palestinian Jerusalemites as violent, allocating rights to Israelis over Palestinians through structural violence, and creating inequality throughout the city. The Wall enables military, border patrol, and police to enforce numerous forms of structural and direct violence against Palestinian residents. The violence triangle in the Jerusalem Envelope aims to limit the Palestinian population residing in the city, and to increase the number of Israelis and Israeli settlers. By deterritorializing Palestinians, Israel works to prevent East Jerusalem from becoming the capital of a future Palestinian state. This aids Israel in maintaining full

control over the holy city. This chapter specifies the violence triangle within the context of the Jerusalem Envelope to argue Israel's use of the violence for political purposes. The Wall in the Jerusalem Envelope has long-lasting political implications, displacing the indigenous Palestinian people while expanding control for Israel's ongoing colonial aims. By identifying the violence triangle in the case of the Jerusalem Envelope, the narrative is transformed, and Israel is unmasked as the perpetrator of the violence.

The Wall implements the triangle of violence to transform the demographics of the city, eliminating Palestinian claims. Although Jerusalem is a shared city, resident Palestinians are subject to numerous forms of structural violence, while Israelis living there are not subject to structural violence and benefit from the inequalities of the system. The structural violence imposed onto Palestinian residents has existed since Israel began to occupy the city. One way that inequality manifests is through residential segregation. Palestinians reside in East Jerusalem, whilst Israelis mainly live in West Jerusalem. Post 1967, Israel began building settlements inside Palestinian areas of Jerusalem, populating East Jerusalem with Israeli residents. According to B'Tselem, in 2012 there were 300,150 Palestinians living in the Jerusalem municipality, and 815,310 Israeli Jews, which also accounts for the settler population inside East Jerusalem (2015). Palestinians are already a minority within the city; the settler population inside East Jerusalem is compounding this issue. Israel established restrictions for Palestinian residents with building laws and the ID system that lists identity and residency. Israelis living in Jerusalem are recognized as citizens of Israel, but Palestinians there are given a resident status. Numerous Palestinian Jerusalemites moved to the suburbs to afford larger residences and still maintained a close proximity to the city, without consequence. The Wall has strategically

pushed the suburban Palestinian communities into the West Bank, rescinding their rights inside the city.



Girls from Al Ram walking towards Jerusalem before the Wall was finished. Al Ram, November 2006

This chapter explores how Israel uses the Wall and the violence triangle to transform the demographics of Jerusalem and maintain more control over the holy city. Examining the Wall's route, I argue that the Wall's path strategically pushed the densely populated Palestinian areas into the West Bank side of Jerusalem. Several structural violence implements, such as the ID system, checkpoints, medical disparities, and the E1 plan demonstrate how Israel utilizes the violence triangle to control the Palestinian people. Stories from two Palestinian suburban areas, Abu Dis and Al Ram, illustrate how the Wall has gravely affected the local communities. Palestinians view the Wall around the Jerusalem Envelope as the most dangerous aspect of the ongoing occupation. The Wall, supported through the violence triangle, works to limit the possibility of a Palestinian state and dislocates the indigenous people from the holy city of Jerusalem.

Structural violence mechanisms are employed by Israel as process to transfer Jerusalem's Palestinian residents into the West Bank. Checkpoints are the only access points through the Wall and into Jerusalem for Palestinian residents. The checkpoint system limits West Bank and Gaza residents from accessing Jerusalem entirely. In 2004, when the Wall was still under construction around Jerusalem, the Palestinian Center of Human Rights reported:

IOF have continued to restrict access to occupied East Jerusalem for residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As a result, Palestinians have been denied access to advanced medical care only provided by hospitals in East Jerusalem, to family, education, to workplaces and to religious sites in the city. The construction of the Wall around East Jerusalem will establish a permanent barrier for Palestinians seeking to enter occupied East Jerusalem. (2005: 9)

As a major city, Jerusalem provides various services not found in other areas. Palestinians residing in the Occupied Territories find themselves in fatal situations when they face restricted access to the advanced medical care in this city. These restrictions are not only aimed at West Bank and Gaza residents; the purpose of the Wall is to isolate all Palestinians from the city. To do this, Israel tracks people as they pass through checkpoints located throughout the Wall. Jerusalemites residing in the West Bank suburbs risk losing their Jerusalem IDs when moving through the checkpoints. The constant travel into Jerusalem is tracked, and they must prove their Jerusalem residency to keep their IDs. If they are caught residing outside of the city limits, their Jerusalem IDs are revoked, and they face more restrictions on access into the city. The Wall in the Jerusalem Envelope prevents Palestinians from prospering and intrudes on their lives as individuals and as a community. This violence is not exacted onto Israeli residents; they

benefit from the Wall. Israeli settlers residing in West Bank settlements outside Jerusalem are considered city residents through the reinvigorated E1 plan. The violence triangle displaces the Palestinian population out of Jerusalem and into the West Bank, while including Israeli settlers and maintaining full Israeli control over the city.



The Wall winding around Abu Dis. Abu Dis December 2000

Structural Identification

Structural violence exists when one group's potential is limited from their overall ability, prioritizing another groups who in turn benefits from that exploitation. Israel's establishment of an ID system enables the differing rights allotted to Israelis versus Palestinians. Israel used the ID system to separate people and prioritize Israelis over Palestinians in the West Bank, including Jerusalem. This system allocated rights and privileges by Israeli or Palestinian identity. Structural violence started in the Occupied Territories, including the Jerusalem area, once Israel began to occupy the West Bank, but the ID system was established soon after state formation. In 1949, all Jewish people

entering the lands were given citizenship and a blue ID card. This system is still in place.

As Tawil-Souri notes:

All Jews born or residing in Palestine prior to the establishment of the state of Israel or arriving from elsewhere were given Israeli citizenship and national ID cards in 1949. This is still the case. Today, all Jewish-Israeli citizens hold blue ID cards whether they live in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, a settlement, or an outpost in the West Bank. (2011: 71)

Prior to Israel's occupation, all Palestinians inside the West Bank and inside Jerusalem were given Jordanian passports. In 1967, immediately after Israel began occupying the West Bank, they implemented an ID system to differentiate between Palestinians residing in the West Bank and in Jerusalem. Palestinians residing in the West Bank were issued orange ID cards, unless they were flagged as a risk to Israel, in which case they were issued a green ID card. In 1994, post Oslo, once the PLO returned to the Occupied Territories, the newly formed Palestinian Authority (PA) provided green IDs to all residents of the West Bank. In 1967, Israel issued Palestinians from East Jerusalem a blue ID card. Although they are considered Jerusalemites, and their blue ID card recognizes their residency in the city, they are not citizens of Israel. As Craig Larkin explains:

Since Israel's de jure annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Palestinian inhabitants of the city have been conferred "permanent residency" status but not citizenship. Instead they are provided with Jerusalem ID cards that entitle them to live, travel, and work in Israel and receive social services and health insurance benefits. (2014: 139)

The blue ID comes with some social privileges and the freedom of movement. In contrast, the West Bank ID prohibits travel into Jerusalem without an Israeli-issued permit, which imposes a structurally violent process to obtain. As Israeli journalist Amira Hass points out, this separation of West Banker movement into Jerusalem after the 1967 occupation only became stricter for people holding green IDs:

Ever since that time, the Palestinian cultural, religious, institutional, economic, and commercial capital has been encircled, with ever-expanding bureaucratic measures and regulations forbidding or “thinning” Palestinian entry into the city. At first, only men under forty needed permits, then women as well, and finally everybody of all ages required them. (2002:8)

The permit system prohibits travel from the West Bank into Israel proper and into East Jerusalem. Before the establishment of the Wall, West Bank ID holders could access the holy city either with the Israeli issued permit or through alternative routes where the Israeli military was not stationed.



Palestinian man pleading with an Israeli soldier to let him into Jerusalem to pray for Ramadan. Qalandia, July 2013

Prior to the occupation, an Israeli ID system did not exist for West Bank and Jerusalem residents, allowing Palestinians to live together as a unified people. Families from Jerusalem built houses in the surrounding suburban areas. Post 1967, Jerusalemites with blue IDs continued to live in these surrounding suburbs, which provided larger living spaces and allowed residents close access to the city and its services. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “East Jerusalem Palestinians could and did move to these areas in large numbers, without requiring exit permits and compromising their permanent resident status” (2011: 22). During the “open

bridges” years between 1967 and 1987, Palestinian Jerusalemites traveled freely between the suburbs and Jerusalem. They were also issued entry and exit travel documents known as the *laissez-passer*, which permitted travel over the bridge into Jordan and to Ben Gurion airport in Tel Aviv. Travel for Palestinians with blue permanent residency cards was relatively easy, until 1988, when the Israeli High Court issued a law that required all Jerusalemites to have a central residence inside the city. Under this new law, their IDs could be confiscated if they were unable to prove that they lived within the city limits. The law applied to both Jerusalemites living inside the West Bank suburbs as well as those who had moved abroad. It required Jerusalemites to periodically return to update their IDs. The Jerusalem ID is used to ensure this transfer, and during the summer of 2013, another change was made. The blue ID now displays the word *muqim*, meaning “resident,” whereas before, it stated *muwattan*, which means “living.” This linguistic change specified that Jerusalemites must have a place to live inside the city to maintain their legal status, or else lose residency inside the city of Jerusalem. This change works to displace Palestinian Jerusalemites that choose to stay in their homes on the other side of the Wall. Jewish Israelis are not subject to this ID system; as their blue ID provides them with citizenship, they may live inside the West Bank or abroad without having to relinquish their ID.



Palestinian American showing his US passport, and his current visa to pass through the checkpoint. Qalandia. July, 2013

Structural violence increased after the First *Intifada* and 1988, due to heightened cultural violence fears from within Israel. Travel regulation became stricter for all Palestinians attempting to move either within the West Bank or into Jerusalem. From 1988 to 2003, Palestinians who held green West Bank IDs and Jerusalemites holding blue IDs were permitted to access the city via checkpoints. West Bankers were required to provide an Israeli-issued permit to access the holy city, but if they did not have a permit, there were numerous ways to enter the city around a checkpoint. In 2003, construction began on the Wall around Jerusalem, and by 2004, several areas had been sealed off. This restricted the access of all West Bankers whom Israel had not issued a difficult-to-obtain permit. Jerusalemites continued to live in their homes in the surrounding suburbs of Abu Dis and Al Ram, passing through the checkpoints situated in strategic locations throughout the Wall to access the city.



Women checking for soldiers before passing into Jerusalem
Abu Dis. October 2004



Girls from Abu Dis being checked for blue IDs before being allowed to enter Jerusalem.
Abu Dis. October. 2004.

Suburban Isolation - Abu Dis

The intent of the Wall in the Jerusalem Envelope is to push Palestinians in the vicinity deep into the West Bank. The Wall's structurally violent implements isolate the suburb of Abu Dis from Jerusalem, regulating their travel into the city. The construction of the Wall around Abu Dis began in 2003, and today the entire area is sealed off from Jerusalem. Checkpoints are the only way into the city. The Wall was built within the town of Abu Dis, splitting a street and pushing the majority of the town into the West Bank's side of the Wall. Ibrahim and his brother built houses next to each other in Abu Dis in 1967. In late 2003, the construction of the Wall began directly in front of their houses. The Israeli authorities informed Ibrahim that part of his house and balcony would be appropriated for the path of the Wall. He was also informed that one of their family

houses was going to be taken to the other side of the Wall, which would cut off all access to it. Ibrahim shared that he argued with the Israel army, saying that they could not take his house and land for the Wall. Due to his complaints, the construction stopped between his house and an abandoned hotel at the top of the hill for four months, but continued in other areas of Abu Dis. Ibrahim explained, “The cement was on the ground for four months. They stopped here but they continued to work on the Wall.”⁶⁶ As Ibrahim waited to hear the decision around his home, the construction around Abu Dis continued to seal the suburb in. Although the construction eventually began again in front of Ibrahim’s house, he resisted and was able to save his balcony. As the Wall is now mere feet away from his home, it blocks his view. Ibrahim and his brother remember the views of Jerusalem from their homes, which are impossible to see through the 26-foot concrete barrier that is currently isolating them from it.



Wall construction in front of Ibrahim’s house. Abu Dis. January 2004.



Ibrahim on his porch nearly 10 years after the Wall has been constructed. Abu Dis August 2013

⁶⁶ Interview with Ibrahim. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

Structural violence from the Wall in the Jerusalem Envelope also annexed the surrounding areas, along with Abu Dis, into the West Bank side of the Wall. The Abu Dis area contains several small towns, including the historically religious town of Bethany. In 2003, the Wall around Abu Dis was being built, sealing Bethany in. The establishment of the Wall around this town, which relies on tourism, has made it difficult for religious tourists to visit. Noura, a local from Bethany, shared how the Wall has impacted her community in numerous ways. “The Wall has affected many things, both spiritually and in reality.”⁶⁷ The Wall cuts off all access to Bethany, interrupting spiritual tours in the area. The completion of the Wall around Abu Dis forced residents to travel further distances to Ramallah city to access services they once utilized in Jerusalem. The people throughout the area are cut off from previously accessible schools and work in Jerusalem.

Suburban Isolation - Al Ram

Palestinian areas surrounded Jerusalem as part of suburban sprawl; the Wall’s violence affected them all. The Wall isolated Palestinian neighborhoods from Abu Dis to the east, to Al Ram in the north, two of the biggest suburbs around the Jerusalem Envelope. The Wall’s construction started in Al Ram in 2004, which was over a year after it started in the Abu Dis area. During the first year of construction, it enclosed the city, sealing it off in several locations. During the construction, a single checkpoint (“Al Ram checkpoint”) was the only entry point for residents to access Jerusalem. This checkpoint and the Wall were situated on a major traffic route known as highway 60. This highway, historically the main road from Ramallah to Jerusalem extended south. In

⁶⁷ Interview with Noura. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.

2004, when the Wall was finished, the gates in the Wall that allowed residents access to Jerusalem were shut, and the Al Ram checkpoint was dismantled. Fadwa, a resident of Al Ram, explained that when the Wall was under construction, the Israeli authorities told the residents of the town that two gates would be created for an accessible and direct route into Jerusalem through the Wall. Fadwa explained: “Accessibility to cross to Jerusalem from the gates, but it never happened. It had never happened. We are in 2013 now and nothing happened. The one in the southern gate, facing Dahiyat el Bared, it didn’t open, not once.”⁶⁸ A children’s nursery called Farah Nursery was located near the south gate of the Wall. Parents faced extreme difficulties retrieving their children from the nursery once the Wall was completed. At times, soldiers had to assist in transporting children through the Wall, which was traumatic for both the children and their parents. The Wall sealed off all access to the Jerusalem side of the Wall for the families in the area, creating a difficult situation.



A house in Al Ram next to the completed Wall. Al Ram July 2013

⁶⁸ Interview with Fadwa Khader. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

The structural violence of the Wall disconnected Palestinian families from schools, limiting the educational opportunities for Palestinian children residing in Al Ram. Mariam, a resident of Al Ram who has lived there for over twenty years, proclaimed:

When I heard about the Wall, I said, “I want to move to Jerusalem,” but they told me, “No, you will be on the other side of the Wall, the Jerusalem side.” But I was surprised that the Wall came just right in front of my house, surrounded my house.⁶⁹

People waited to see if their homes were to be positioned on the Jerusalem side of the Wall, but the majority of Al Ram was pushed into the West Bank. Anticipating the imminent barrier, the neighbors took the issue of the Wall to the Israeli High Court. Mariam highlighted the way the families in her area responded: “All the neighbors went to the court, and we put so much money because we said that this Wall is affecting us, affecting our daily life, it’s affecting our life, but we lost it.”⁷⁰ Although some West Bank cases succeeded in rerouting the Wall, this case did not. Numerous families were left with the decision to stay in their homes in Al Ram, or to relocate to Jerusalem city. Mariam’s family stayed, due to financial reasons; moving to Jerusalem meant renting a costly apartment there. Mariam explained, “We have Jerusalem IDs and wherever we look it’s the Wall, and it’s making so many problems for us because we feel suffocated.”⁷¹ Having IDs grants Mariam and her family an element of privilege, but the necessary continual travel through the Wall poses persistent risks.

⁶⁹ Interview with Mariam. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.



The Wall in Al Ram separating the town, before it was completed. Al Ram. August 2005

Route of the Wall Around Jerusalem

The path of the Wall around Jerusalem, a form of structural violence, enables Israel to dominate the city by pushing Palestinian areas into the West Bank. The violence triangle aids Israel in unilaterally annexing Jerusalem land and transforming the demographic makeup of the holy city. The Wall inside the West Bank and around Jerusalem is not built on the 1949 armistice line (Green-Line), thus dissolving the border. The Wall throughout the Occupied Territory restricts movement and steals Palestinian land for the expansion of the Israeli state, and this is continuous around the Jerusalem Envelope. In 2005, after much of the Wall was erected in the Jerusalem area, the Palestinian Center of Human Rights reported, “The Wall currently under construction in the West Bank reflects the largest single manifestation of Israel’s ongoing policy of annexation of Palestinian lands” (6). The Wall around Jerusalem is dangerous because it prevents the Palestinian people from accessing the contested city, leaving Israel with sole rights over it.

The violence triangle, through the establishment of the Wall, eliminates the need for negotiations around the contested city, and grants Israel total control. Jerusalem is the envisioned capital for both Israelis and Palestinians, making it a controversial issue during negotiations. As a way to maintain control over the city, Israel began implementing the violence triangle in 1967, when the occupation of the West Bank began. Settlements were developed inside East Jerusalem and Israelis began to occupy the city in entirety. According to the UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs:

Since 1967, the Government of Israel has constructed settlements within the extended municipal boundary of East Jerusalem and in the wider metropolitan area beyond, despite the prohibition, under international law, of the transfer of civilians to occupied territory. (2011: 10)

The settlement expansion continues to grow inside Jerusalem and its surrounding areas. The Wall is the most recent form of structural violence in Jerusalem (since 2003) and has aided in securing the settlements inside the city of Jerusalem. The route of the Wall has dissolved the borders, eliminating the need for future talks by unilaterally annexing the East Jerusalem into Israel.

Structural and direct violence are both exposed visually around the Jerusalem Envelope, weaving around Palestinian homes and annexing Palestinian lands in an urban setting. The Wall literally moves in between houses to push Palestinian neighborhoods into the West Bank. Muhiin, from the Palestinian National Committee to Access the Damage of the Wall, described the physical nature of the Wall around Jerusalem: “It is like a snake between houses, dividing buildings. We don’t need more of an explanation to

tell the people; a picture is enough.”⁷² The settlement growth and the Wall displace the local Palestinian population and restrict access to the city. For Peter Lagerquists, “Over 90 percent of the post-1967 Palestinian Jerusalem district will be swallowed by the fence and absorbed into Israel, representing some 40 percent of the urban population of the West Bank” (2004: 15). The path of the Wall directly affects two major Palestinian suburbs of Jerusalem. Abu Dis and Al Ram have been completely isolated from the city. The construction started in Abu Dis in 2003 and in Al Ram in 2004. By 2005, both cities were completely sealed into the West Bank and away from Jerusalem by the Wall. Palestinians that relocated or remained inside Jerusalem city found themselves living in extremely high priced, small dwellings to maintain their ID cards, while all other Palestinians were isolated behind the Wall.



The Wall encircling Abu Dis and separating it from Jerusalem. Abu Dis October 2004

The economy is directly affected through Israel’s use of the Wall, structurally disadvantaging the Palestinian people, especially in the suburban areas. Residents from

⁷² Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

the Palestinian suburbs are isolated from employment opportunities they once accessed before the establishment of the Wall. In Al Ram, countless Jerusalemites reside in the town, as it is closer to Jerusalem. In Abu Dis, the majority of the city residents hold West Bank IDs. Khalid Abu Hillil, a local from Abu Dis, worked for the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions and was a member of the executive committee. He was also the chairman of the Hotel Restaurants and Tourist Services workers' general union in Abu Dis. Khalid observed that since Oslo, the closures and checkpoints in the West Bank and Gaza worsened workers' situations.⁷³ Wall construction, which began in 2003, limited all access into Jerusalem for workers. After the Wall, only 10% of the Abu Dis residents were allowed to continue working inside Israel, due to the green IDs they carried. Khalid shared, "Jerusalem is important for all workers who used to work in Al Quds [Jerusalem] and inside the Green-Line."⁷⁴ A checkpoint was stationed outside of Abu Dis to check all people as they passed into Jerusalem, to ensure that no green ID-holders entered. Khalid recalled, "10,000 people worked in East Jerusalem; 850 from this teachers."⁷⁵ After the Wall, only Jerusalem ID-holders were able to access work, which led to high unemployment inside the suburban towns. This issue of accessing Jerusalem based on ID was also relevant inside Al Ram. For Fadwa, a local from Al Ram:

Specialist from Al Ram, or the West Bank, and holding West Bank IDs: they can't [continue to travel into Jerusalem]. For education information, or scientific information, for the Jerusalem students [travel is difficult]. So also Jerusalem is lacking specialists.⁷⁶

⁷³ Interview with Khalid Abu Hillil. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.


⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Interview with Fadwa Khader. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

West Banker ID-holders are restricted from accessing Jerusalem. The limited travel has heavily affected access to employment for all professionals attempting to reach their work inside Jerusalem.

The Wall's violence also affected business and trade within the towns near Jerusalem as a result of the travel restrictions Israel imposed. Most Abu Dis inhabitants generated income in the business sector, but the Wall caused business to dwindle there. The Wall made the situation in this area much worse than any time since 1967, according to Khalid. By 2006, more than 70% of the people in Abu Dis were unemployed because it became a closed area. Khalid described, "10,000 families in the area, and more than 70% under the poverty line because of the Wall."⁷⁷ Women now provide for their families, due to the financial hardships caused by the Wall. Before the Wall went up, 90% of the people in the Abu Dis area were dependent on Israel for work, which leaves those with green IDs unemployed and with few prospects for work.



Young Boy getting money from an unknown person on the Jerusalem side of the Wall. Abu Dis. December 2005.

⁷⁷ Interview with Khalid Abu Hillil. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.

In addition to the structural violence of restricted access to and from Jerusalem, the Wall also separated local West Bank trade from the suburban areas of Jerusalem. Before the Wall, a drive between Al Ram and the villages of Beir Nabala, Aljib, Biddo, Qatana, Beit Duqu, and Beit Iqsa took five minutes. Fadwa from Al Ram explained:

We used to buy from our own local markets vegetables and fruits, very healthy fruits and vegetables, because it's an agricultural area. But after the establishment of the Wall you could rarely see one of them because it became very costly to pay for transportation crossing the western villages, to Ramallah, and coming back to Al Ram.⁷⁸

Before the Wall, trade flourished between the town of Al Ram and the village farmers in the northwest area. Trade halted when farmers encountered multiple barriers in attempts to reach Al Ram.

Structural violence affected commercial exchange between the suburban Jerusalem areas with the local farmers within the West Bank. Produce and services were traded between Al Ram and its surrounding villages. Western village inhabitants regularly visited clinics and businesses in Al Ram. However, the Wall sealed off direct access. It was constructed on the main highway 60, separating the town into two. When asked why Israel would put the Wall in the major business hub of Al Ram, Fadwa replied, "If you look geographically, you will find out that the most population of this location in Al Ram is located on the eastern side of the Wall; what was left from the western side was very few buildings."⁷⁹ She observed that splitting Al Ram in this way strategically isolated Palestinians in the West Bank and limited the number residing inside Jerusalem: "Annatta became out, Abu Dis and Azariya, Bethany became isolated

⁷⁸ Interview with Fadwa Khader. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

too, so those are the highest populations in the suburbs of Jerusalem.”⁸⁰ Now, there is only one route to the western villages from Al Ram: through Ramallah city. This has ultimately stopped direct trade, creating an economic crisis. Al Ram suffered when the Wall was built in the business hub and travel from the highly populated western villages decreased. Numerous businesses closed. Villagers were forced to sell their produce in Ramallah, where they faced intense competition from all the other agricultural villages also affected by the Wall. This decreased their profits.



The Wall in Al Ram before it was completed, splitting the town into two. Al Ram August 2005

The structural violence from the Wall’s establishment separated families holding differing Israeli issued ID’s as a way to depopulate Jerusalem of Palestinians. According to Khalid, by 2006, there were 2,500 broken families in the Abu Dis area, including his. Broken families are marriage partners who hold differing IDs. In these situations, the Jerusalemite must make a tough decision: keep the blue ID and not live with a spouse, or give it up and lose access to social services and Jerusalem. Khalid is a West Banker with

⁸⁰ Interview with Fadwa Khader. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

a green ID, and his wife holds a blue Jerusalemite ID. Because of this, she can travel from the West Bank into Jerusalem through checkpoints. However, all of her travel is tracked to force her to give up her blue ID and become a West Banker with restricted access.

Israel uses various structural violence tactics to coerce Palestinian Jerusalemites to leave Jerusalem and move deeper into the West Bank. This coercion is a component of Israel's strategic plan to transport the population outside of Jerusalem into the West Bank. Health insurance is one thing that pushes families into the West Bank. Khalid's wife's health insurance was cut because she is married to a West Banker. Mariam lives in Al Ram, yet holds a blue ID. She lost her health insurance in Jerusalem because her family does not have a residence inside the city. However, her family is not financially able to get a residence inside Jerusalem. Mariam explained, "The other option is for me to live in Jerusalem and pay one year in advance [for insurance], because you need one year to approve for them, and pay lots of money, and then take your medical insurance."⁸¹ Most families must leave their homes in the suburbs and move into Jerusalem to keep their blue Jerusalem IDs. Yet not all families are financially able to make the move. Families that can afford it do make the move to Jerusalem; they want to avoid the risk of losing the blue ID and its privileges. Fadwa from Al Ram explained, "Many of the Palestinians who hold the blue ID left their assets, their buildings, their flats and they moved to Jerusalem. They live in very small apartments, some of them in one bedroom for around seven persons, imagine this, one bedroom for seven persons."⁸² The homes these families own in the suburbs provide them with larger spaces, but they are

⁸¹ Interview with Mariam. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

⁸² Interview with Fadwa Khader. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

forced to leave them empty to keep their Jerusalem status. Mariam cannot pay for the move and has lived in her house for over two decades, raising each of her children there; therefore, it is difficult for her to leave. If a family with a blue ID is caught not residing in Jerusalem, Israel will confiscate their ID. Mariam and her family limit the number of times they pass through checkpoints, for fear of having their blue IDs revoked. As time passes, she and her husband will need to finally decide where to live permanently, as one cannot live inside the Wall and still be considered a Jerusalemite.



A family from Bethany passing around the Wall to get to the Jerusalem side. Abu Dis August 2005

Tracking Movement

Tracking movement is vital for Israel to transfer the Palestinian population from the city of Jerusalem into the West Bank, and several structurally violent checkpoints are positioned around the city as central component to achieve this. Families with blue IDs

residing in the suburbs still must pass through militarized checkpoints to access the city. As children have been psychologically affected by the continual militarization of the checkpoints, families opt to limit their travel beyond the Wall. Fadwa described the exposure numerous children have experienced when attempting to reach Jerusalem through a checkpoint from the West Bank side of the Wall:

Imagine that you have your own kids, and big soldiers and security persons highly equipped with weapons are coming to you in the vehicle window or the bus. The children don't understand what is going on; their faces are horrible, terrifying them and so on.⁸³

The Wall has forced Palestinian Jerusalemites to make the extremely difficult decision of whether to stay inside suburban towns and limit travel through the checkpoint, or to relocate to Jerusalem to avoid accessing the military checkpoint's violence.

As the process of the Wall developed, Israel decreased the access points into the city of Jerusalem, forcing all Palestinians traveling from the West Bank to use the few checkpoints that remained. Before the Wall, there were several entrance points into Jerusalem from the West Bank. Once the Wall was completed, only two checkpoints led to Jerusalem city. Israel began tracking IDs as people passed through the checkpoints to discern those staying inside the Wall so they could confiscate Jerusalem IDs. Tracking Jerusalem IDs at checkpoints enabled Israel to claim that the ID-holder lacked the proper residence status inside Jerusalem to maintain their status.

⁸³ Interview with Fadwa Khader. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.



Qalandia checkpoint in 2004

The cost to Palestinians traveling into the city of Jerusalem is high in both the stakes, and the financial burdens. Traveling through the checkpoints is extremely difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. The drive from Abu Dis to Jerusalem, which was once ten minutes, now takes over an hour. To reach Jerusalem from Abu Dis, one must travel north, deeper into the West Bank, around a settlement, and then south, through Hizma checkpoint. Noura, a Bethany local, once took her children to Jerusalem for school. Now, they are forced to do all their daily activities behind the Wall, as they cannot enter Jerusalem. Noura explained, “The purpose was to separate all areas and it worked. I feel bad about it because it affects everything.”⁸⁴ The majority of residents inside the suburbs utilized numerous services offered inside Jerusalem. Their IDs and the checkpoints that are connected to the concrete Wall imprison them inside the West Bank, isolated from the city.

⁸⁴ Interview with Noura. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. December 2006.



The Wall in Al Ram, Qalandia checkpoint is on the other side. Al Ram. July 2013

Time is another excessive cost to those traveling from the West Bank side of the Wall into Jerusalem. Structural violence around the city forces Palestinian Jerusalemites to travel longer distances to reach the city from these various suburbs. Al Ram, which is six miles away from Jerusalem, is centrally located between Jerusalem and the city of Ramallah. It used to also take ten minutes to drive to Jerusalem, but now it takes over an hour with the checkpoints. Qalandia checkpoint is the main entry point in the area from Al Ram. Residents with permits and proper IDs must travel north, in the direction of Ramallah, to pass through the checkpoint. Once through Qalandia checkpoint, they travel south, on the other side of the Wall from Al Ram.

Israel established two main checkpoints for Palestinians to access Jerusalem as a way to monitor all movement into the city. Israel built another checkpoint for inhabitants of Al Ram and Abu Dis. Hizma checkpoint is northeast of Al Ram. Residents must first travel east, then south, to bypass Newe Ya'akov settlement, which the Wall secures into Jerusalem. Both Qalandia and Hizma are heavily crowded on a regular basis, as numerous people must travel through them. If one of these checkpoints is shut down, it

creates a travel nightmare for the entire area. Ramallah is only five miles into the West Bank from Al Ram, yet it could take an hour to access the city with the high traffic around Qalandia checkpoint. Marian explained the difficulties while traveling around the Wall: “When we need to go to Jerusalem, we have to go through Qalandia, which is even more trouble for us.”⁸⁵ A trip that once took ten minutes for Mariam and her family, now takes at least an hour. For example, it took Mariam’s children one minute to walk to school before the Wall was built. It has literally cut the family off from the other side, restricting access to the services and the school. The children had to travel through Qalandia checkpoint each morning, which meant traveling north to access the checkpoint, and then back south to the other side of the Wall. This could take up to two hours at that time of day due to the high volume of people accessing the checkpoint. Although the children preferred this school, Mariam decided to take them out and have them study inside Al Ram to avoid the checkpoint and the travel time.

⁸⁵ Interview with Mariam. Al Ram, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.



Boy on his way home from school watching the Wall being constructed. Al Ram, August 2005



Students walking back from school on the Jerusalem side of the Wall before it was sealed. Al Ram, December 2006

The structural violence of the Wall is compounded in the Jerusalem Envelope; Palestinian families in the area are finding it more difficult to remain resilient in the face of such extreme violence. Structural violence aims to move Palestinians from East Jerusalem deeper into the West Bank. The Wall's path and checkpoints have created a nightmare for travelers along the routes into Jerusalem. Those attempting to enter Jerusalem and those traveling into the West Bank have endured various structurally violent barriers, which cost them time and money and make them vulnerable to losing their residency status. Jerusalemites risk losing their IDs by staying in the suburbs, but countless have relocated into the city, living more difficult lives to maintain their residency status and the privileges that come with it. As the services in Jerusalem are higher quality than those in the West Bank, families find that although financial costs are

higher and homes are smaller in Jerusalem, their medical needs outweigh these drawbacks.



Men denied entry into Jerusalem pray for Ramadan at the checkpoint. Qalandia, July 2013

Medical Disparities

Structural violence creates inequalities between Israeli and Palestinian populations in the Jerusalem Envelope, including medical care, causing Palestinian fatalities due to restricted access. The suburbs of Jerusalem relied on the medical facilities inside Jerusalem; they were the closest in distance and provided the best care. The Wall cut the entire suburban population off from Jerusalem area hospitals, and in several cases, this caused fatalities. Dr. Abdulla Abu Hilal, who has resided in and practiced medicine in Abu Dis for several years, described the medical situation changes:

Before the wall, even in 1992, it was very easy for anyone to go to the hospital. In 1993 [Oslo], they started to give people permits to go to Jerusalem and they put one checkpoint in Ras al Amud. People managed

to find other ways to go to Jerusalem. When they finished building the Wall, it became impossible to reach Jerusalem.⁸⁶

Before the Wall, the only medical facility in Abu Dis was a small clinic. Because Abu Dis was so close to Jerusalem, there was no need to build an alternative medical facility, such as a hospital or medical center. According to Dr. Hilal, a specific process was developed to enable people to access the hospitals in Jerusalem after the Wall was built. First, they needed to apply for a medical permit, which required completing a several bureaucratic processes within the Palestinian government's District Coordination Office (DCO). The request would next go to the Israeli authorities, who would check to see if the applicant is on an Israeli list barring them from entering Jerusalem. There are two types of permits: one for emergency cases and one for what is known as "elective" cases. Dr. Hilal explained how doctors work within this system to provide medical care:

For elective cases, we send a paper to the hospital and the hospital sends us a special form. The patient takes this special form to the Palestinian side. The Palestinian Authority takes all these papers/forms to the Israeli side, and the Israeli side checks if he is allowed to get a permit or not. If he is they give this person the permit.⁸⁷

It usually takes about four days to complete the process of obtaining a permit for an elective case. Chronic illness cases, like cancer, use the same process as an elective case. Some people have been denied access to the only cancer center in the country inside Jerusalem because they lacked an Israeli-issued permit. This permit system is a form of structural violence that limits the potential of Palestinian life, and in several instances, results in death.

⁸⁶ Interview with Dr. Abdulla Abu-Hilal. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

Palestinians physicians in Abu Dis attempted to alleviate the structural violent effects of Israel's occupation by establishing a facility to counter the shortage of medical services. As way to limit the fatalities, in 2010, the people inside Abu Dis built a small emergency department in the existing medical clinic to provide needed services. Residents from the entire area, including surrounding villages and Bedouin camps utilize the center and rely on it for emergency situations. A different permit process is used for emergencies. The layers of bureaucracy required in this process make it very stressful. Dr. Hilal described how an emergency case is typically handled:

If they need an urgent referral to the hospital, we call the hospital [in Jerusalem]. We give the hospital the name of the patient. The hospital calls the Israeli side, the Israeli side checks to see if he [patient] is allowed to get a permit or not. If he is allowed to get the permit the Israeli side calls the hospital again. The hospital calls us and tells us that it's ok. Then we call the ambulance, and the ambulance comes from Jerusalem and takes the patient and goes through Zion checkpoint. At Zion checkpoint they check his name, and look everywhere inside the ambulance, and then he goes to the hospital.⁸⁸

This process can take two hours if everything goes quickly. As things do not usually go quickly, women have given birth or died while waiting for approval to get to a hospital inside Jerusalem. People do not utilize the hospital in Ramallah because it is always full; it is the main hospital for the various towns and villages inside the West Bank. It is also very far from Abu Dis; it can take well over an hour to travel to Ramallah, while the city of Jerusalem is only twenty minutes away. Israelis are not subject to this form of structural violence; they may travel and utilize all services inside Jerusalem. This imbalance of rights is a clear form of structural violence. Palestinian communities living inside Jerusalem city are able to utilize both Israeli and Palestinian health care systems, if

⁸⁸ Interview with Dr. Abdulla Abu-Hilal. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.


they have the adequate insurance, which is difficult to obtain in some cases. Palestinians residing in the suburbs, on the other side of the Wall, are unable to access necessary medical care due to various structural violence restrictions.

Transforming Demographics Through the E1 Plan

The violence triangle's main aim is to limit Palestinians' claims to Jerusalem by transferring the local Palestinian population out of the city and into the West Bank while simultaneously including Israeli settlements. The Wall has successfully isolated Palestinians from each other, limiting their travel into Jerusalem, and tracking those who have Jerusalem privileges in an effort to revoke them. These measures are all part of a larger strategy to control Jerusalem. Craig Larkin describes this shift of populations:

Beginning work in 2002, Israelis have constructed in six phases a wall now extending over 142 kilometers in length. Its serpentine route envelops the West Bank Israeli settlements of Giv'at and Pisgat Ze'ev, Ma'ale Adumim, Gilo, and Gush Etzion (referred to as "the Jerusalem Envelope") while simultaneously severing the Palestinian neighborhoods of Bayt Hanina, al-Ram, al-'Izariyya, and Abu Dis from East Jerusalem. (2014: 138)

The Wall is Israel's strategy to control the city and ultimately change the demographics – a long-standing plan.



The structural violence of transfer was a concept long before the Wall's establishment; the Wall enabled this plan to come into fruition. In 1990, Israel devised the E1 plan. The Wall reactivated it. This plan was a play off the Drobles plan. According to Hassan Saleh:

The Drobles Plan articulated the settlement strategy of the Likud and Gush Emunim. The settlement policy was defined by Drobles on the basis that settlements should not be isolated, but should be collected in blocks or belts, which could serve as security points as well as a reliable barrier against any threat from the Arab eastern front. (1990: 339)

These settlement blocs were viewed as part of Israel and strategic in colonizing more Palestinian land while also controlling the Palestinian population. Settlements inside Jerusalem were also used to gain more control over the city. Ibrahim Matar highlights the purpose of the settlements inside Jerusalem:

The residential fortresses that form a ring around the Palestinian population of Jerusalem have clearly been strategically placed: to prevent the physical expansion of the Palestinian population of Jerusalem; and to create a psychological feeling among the Palestinians of living in a ghetto, in order to demoralize the Palestinians and encourage them to emigrate and consequently facilitate Israeli control of the city. (1981: 94)


This plan aimed to construct new Israeli settlements inside of Jerusalem and connect them to existing Israeli settlements inside the Occupied Territories. OCHA reported that, “Over one third of the area within the extended boundary of East Jerusalem has been expropriated for the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements” (2011: 10). The E1 plan also includes the Israeli settlements near Bethlehem. Dr. Hilal described the E1 plan:

E1 project is project where Israeli government plans to connect all settlements with each other, Ma’ale Adumim with Jerusalem, Khaddar 1 and Khaddar 2 with Bethlehem settlements. So this will destroy the two states solution. They will cut the road from north and east, it will be a barrier, north of Palestine and south of Palestine.⁸⁹

The E1 plan will eventually create an uninterrupted, built-up area between the Ma’ale Adumim settlement, the settlements surrounding Bethlehem, and those inside Jerusalem (OCHA, 2013). The intention is to connect the settlement blocs inside the West Bank with those inside the city of Jerusalem. This would officially transform the demographic situation, ensuring that there are more Israeli residents within the Jerusalem district, while expelling the indigenous Palestinians into the West Bank. Muhin, from the PLO, described the Wall in Jerusalem as a strategic plan in regards to the question of Jerusalem: “They established the Wall and planned it in order to exclude where the

⁸⁹ Interview with Dr. Abdulla Abu-Hilal. Abu Dis, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

majority of the Palestinians live, and also include the [Israeli] settlement area.”⁹⁰ Connecting Israeli settlements creates a large Israeli suburban area sprawling out from Jerusalem city. The Wall around Jerusalem secures the E1 plan and pushes Palestinians into the West Bank. This move strategically enables Israel to maintain control over the city and to continue to displace Palestinians. The E1 plan aids Israel’s in transforming the demographics and limiting Palestinian claims to the holy city as their future capital.



Young boy riding his bike near the constructed Wall. Abu Dis January 2005

Conclusion

The Wall enables Israel to use the violence triangle to transform the demographics of the city, supporting their political objective of Jerusalem as an Israeli city, and not shared. Israel has planned the path of the Wall to push the densely populated Palestinian areas into the West Bank, while simultaneously including Israeli settlements through the E1 plan. The Wall’s route dips deep into the Green-Line and renders it obsolete. Israel uses structural violence implements to transfer and limit the Palestinian population. One

⁹⁰ Interview with Muhin. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

implement, the ID system, divides the larger Palestinian population into smaller categories, allocating different rights to groups based on residence. Jerusalem ID-holders now must move from the suburbs into the city or risk losing their ID and the privileges that come with it. Israel checks Palestinians' residence as they travel through checkpoints in the Wall, as well as within the city proper, threatening to confiscate IDs. The Jerusalem Envelope is viewed as the most strategic and dangerous location of the Wall because of its effects, the E1 plan, and the threatened displacement. The case of the Jerusalem Envelope reveals Israel's use of the violence triangle for explicit political ambitions. The detailed analysis of the Wall around Jerusalem highlights the root of the violence, and reframes the narrative, posing Israel not as the victim, but as the offender.



Family waiting at Qalandia checkpoint lines. July, 2013

The objective of the violence triangle is to control the Occupied Territories, but Palestinians resist the various forms of violence as they continue to live within Israel's violent system. As Craig Larkin explains, "For Palestinian Jerusalemites, resistance focused on navigating shrinking urban spaces distorted by concrete barriers and checkpoints, breaching holes in the wall, and performing the tasks of daily life within the city" (2014: 141). In the West Bank, including Jerusalem, Palestinians resist the Wall's violence on a daily basis through the resilience of remaining in the Occupied Territories under such duress. Palestinians stay on their lands, and in their houses, finding alternative routes and ways of existing under Israel's violent occupation, not allowing forced displacement as a form of resistance.

Part 3

Resistance to the Wall's Violence

This dissertation has traced how Israel has exacted extreme violence via the violence triangle onto the Palestinian people to maintain its occupation. However, this analysis does not fully describe life in the Occupied Territory of the West Bank. The Palestinian people have demonstrated their determination to exist as a liberated population and have continued to resist Israeli violence as a means to that end. Countless times in Palestinian history, the indigenous Palestinian people have utilized various methods of resistance with the aim of working toward self-determination. Some of the resistance tactics have brought them closer to their goal, while other tactics have pushed them further back from achieving their dreams. As Israel's use of the violence triangle continues to grow, so does the need for enhanced resistance tactics on the part of the Palestinian people.

Part 3 of this dissertation explores methods of Palestinian resistance against the violence triangle of the Apartheid Wall. Chapter 6 examines the Palestinian popular, nonviolent, civil resistance movement that began as a direct response to the various forms of violence enacted by virtue of the Wall. Briefly summarizing the history of Palestinian resistance over the past several decades contextualizes the resistance to the Apartheid

Wall, which took place from 2002-2013. A detailed analysis of first-hand testimonials from numerous Palestinian people who actively resisted the Wall exposes the various facets of the ongoing movement. Local popular committees and solidarity activists used media and nonviolent tactics in the resistance. These first hand accounts illustrate how Palestinian nonviolent resistance functioned in the face of extreme Israeli violence. The resistance movement against the Wall disrupts the typical framing of Palestinians as aggressors and Israelis as victims by showing Israeli violence against Palestinian victims. Thus, Part 3 of this dissertation charts Palestinians' nonviolent resistance strategies against the multiple forms of violence employed by Israel to squash Palestinian dissent.

Chapter 6

Resistance Against the Wall

2002-2013

Israel's establishment of the Apartheid Wall utilized the triangle of violence to oppress the indigenous Palestinian people and steal their lands. For the Palestinian people, the act of uprooting their trees and imprisoning them into their towns and villages was the catalyst for another phase of Palestinian resistance. The popular struggle against the Wall initiated as a response to the Wall's violence. Palestinian activists used nonviolent tactics against Israel's military in the hopes to stop the Wall and save their lands. Unarmed tactics enabled Israel's violence triangle to shine through, and reframed the narrative from "Palestinian as terrorist perpetrating the violence", to one of "Palestinian as victim of Israeli violence." Reframing the narrative is essential for ongoing Palestinian resistance to be effective; it weakens Israel's cultural violence campaign, which ultimately creates an imbalance in the violence triangle.

Israel uses the violence triangle as a means of repressing the indigenous people, and the violence of the Wall is an extension of that violence. The identification of the violence triangle through the establishment of the Wall proves that Israel is the source of the violence. In addition to Israel's use of violence, the Palestinian response to the violence aids in shifting the mainstream narrative. In the face of extreme violence Palestinian activists have remained nonviolent in their dissent against the Wall. This

chapter will examine the ongoing, unarmed popular resistance movement against the newest form of structural violence: Israel's Apartheid Wall. I will first contextualize the Palestinian resistance movement against the Wall in light of the First and Second *Intifadas*. Next, I will overview the historical development of Palestinian resistance to the Wall. This chapter will focus on particular villages that played a key role in the struggle against the Wall; several other villages resisted the Wall than are covered here. I conducted numerous first-hand interviews with resisters throughout the West Bank and photographed the movement from 2004-2006. The experiences of local participants and organizers of the struggle against the Wall illustrate how separate actions together form an important part of a larger movement. Residents I interviewed within the Occupied Palestinian Territory of the West Bank referred to the Apartheid Wall as the Third *Nakba* (Catastrophe) on several occasions. It was stated that this is due to the Wall posing a great threat to the indigenous people's future on the lands. In this context, locals define the popular struggle against the Wall as the Third *Intifada* (Uprising), as resisters in various areas in the West Bank have mobilized to rise up against the Wall. The Palestinian civil resistance movement, which began in 2002, interrupted its construction and today continues to disrupt Israel's persistent land grab. The Palestinian popular struggle against the Wall is a model of how to use a history of resistance, and develop a new movement based on the ever-changing realities of Israel's triangle of violence.

Histories of Violence and Resistance

Israel has implemented the triangle of violence as a way to ensure total domination over the Palestinian people. Israel, as a settler colonial state, has remained

violent towards the indigenous Palestinian population as a way to gain more control over the land and resources. The violence triangle assists Israel in systematically colonizing the people and the land. However, the ongoing violence has not deterred the Palestinian people; their existence relies on their continued struggle to remain on their lands. The overall aim of the Palestinian struggle is self-determination. As Taiaiake and Cornstassel discuss in *Being Indigenous*:

The struggle to survive as distinct peoples on foundations constituted in their unique heritages, attachments to their homelands, and natural ways of life is what is shared by all Indigenous peoples, as well as the fact that their existence is in large part lived as determined acts of survival against colonizing states' efforts to eradicate them culturally, politically and physically (2005: 597).

In addition to remaining on their lands, indigenous Palestinians resist Israeli colonial rule daily by actively utilizing resistance tactics against the Israeli state. Mazen Qumsiyeh explored the historical timeline of Palestinian unarmed resistance in his book, *Popular Resistance in Palestine*, noting: "colonizers always use violence because it is the only way to remove people from the land, while those being colonized can choose to resist by other means" (2011: 8). Palestinian resistance has encompassed armed resistance techniques, which are widely known, due to mainstream media interest, and unarmed tactics. Armed resistance by the colonized is limited and must be "carried out in clandestine operations under constant threat of infiltration and liquidation by the colonizers" (Qumsiyeh, 2011: 9). Armed resistance also entails more "logistical support (arms etc.), secrecy, killing of armed combatants, difficulty in establishing geographic areas for armed control, and much more" (Qumsiyeh, 2011: 9). Armed resistance has framed the narrative, positioning the Palestinian people in total as the source of the violence. In contrast, unarmed resistance, or popular struggle, as I will call it in this

dissertation, is a transparent movement that allows for numerous activists to become involved. Although popular struggle does not use arms to resist colonial rule, it is still extremely dangerous for those involved. For Qumsiyeh, “popular resistance can in many situations be more dangerous than armed resistance (after all, we have only our bodies and willingness to suffer). In fact, in many ways, it is reliant on willingness to suffer by people” (2011: 9). Mainstream media has not covered unarmed resistance as this does not fit into the narrative that is being sold.

The Palestinian people have nonviolently resisted Israel’s colonial plan since before state formation. Palestinian people living under the Israeli occupation resist nonviolently on a daily basis through remaining on the lands. By remaining on their ancestral lands, they are subjected to Israel’s triangle of violence through the dispossession of their lands, and the restriction of their movement. Besides existing, Palestinians have actively resisted the Israeli state, utilizing both armed/violent and unarmed/nonviolent tactics. Both the First and Second *Intifadas* were direct responses to Israel’s triangle of violence, but contrasting tactics resulted in different outcomes.

The First *Intifada* provided valuable lessons for the resistance against the Wall, and the Palestinian activists attempted to emulate the success of the previous movement. The First *Intifada* was a large-scale, Palestinian-led, unarmed struggle against the occupation in 1989. In this uprising, the Palestinian people organized a campaign against the occupation using nonviolent tactics. As Dudouet explained, “The intifada is not a well-recognised case of civil resistance, although it has been quantitatively assessed that at least 90% of its methods of insurrection were nonviolent (Sharp 1989), spreading across Sharp’s three categories of nonviolent action” (2008: 13). During the First *Intifada*

stone throwing was present from the *shabab* (boys), which for principled nonviolence practitioners is a form of violence. This tactic disregarded the First *Intifada* as an exclusively nonviolent movement. The organization of the First *Intifada* was an aspect of the resistance that supported its success. Different local committees, such as the agricultural relief committees, medical relief committees, health work committees, cultural work committees, and numerous un-affiliated locals throughout towns and villages in the West Bank and Gaza were involved in organizing the resistance. The people worked together to resist the occupation using nonviolent methods. The First *Intifada* successfully put pressure on Israel, resulting in the Oslo Accord negotiations, which ultimately stopped the struggle's progression. Oslo brought with it numerous setbacks for Palestinian self-determination. Anne Marie Baylouny detailed some of the difficulties around negotiating space in the West Bank after the Oslo negotiations, "Fundamental to this process is the fragmentation of the Territories, the prevention of all forms of opposition, and the continued control of exit points by Israel" (Baylouny, 2009: 51). Oslo brought forth new implements of control, intensifying the triangle of violence the Palestinian people had already experienced. The Israeli reaction to the First *Intifada* aimed to stop the resistance before Palestinians achieved self-determination and to create an environment where the same resistance tactics were impossible.

Palestinian resistance did not stop post First *Intifada*, even with Israel's increased violence triangle. After several years of increased restrictions, a façade of "negotiations," and failures to attain autonomy, the Palestinian people again began to resist the occupation. As the Second *Intifada* began in 2000 in the (post Oslo) fragmented West Bank, it was nearly impossible for protesters to utilize tactics used in the First *Intifada*.

Israel had strategically created cantons, which posed challenges to collective resistance actions throughout the Occupied Territory. According to Baylouny:

The first consequence of Oslo was the inability of previously active groups to mobilize and protest. While prohibitions and harsh penalties for organizing were present in the first intifada, Oslo added a new element. It increased the geographic difficulties of convening meetings, networks, and stage protests. (2009: 52)

People were scattered in different areas throughout the West Bank, separated by numerous checkpoints. Limited travel made sharing information nearly impossible, which made organizing ineffective. Each Palestinian who passed through a checkpoint was tracked, and Israel labeled those who were active in the First *Intifada* “activists,” viewing the word as negative through cultural violence. Israel heavily monitored these activists as they traveled throughout the West Bank. This separation made it extremely difficult for the masses to get involved in a new struggle. For Baylouny, “The limitations on mobility imposed by the Oslo accords have contributed to the increasing difficulty of collective protest, which, contrary to divide and conquer axioms, worked to increase, not decrease, violence” (2009: 40). The lack of organized mass protest left few people willing to participate. As a result, the Second *Intifada* consisted of small, marginalized groups that largely utilized armed tactics against the occupation.

The use of armed resistance against the occupation is not an excuse to use cultural violence and frame Palestinians as dangerous terrorists. Armed resistance is legal in international law; according to United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/3246 (XXIX; 29 November 1974), those living under occupation are legally permitted to use arms against their occupying colonial powers. The resolution states that the General Assembly “Reaffirms the legitimacy of the peoples' struggle for liberation

from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation by all available means, including armed struggle” (United Nations General Assembly, 1974). Where international law permits armed tactics against colonial domination, it refers specifically to military targets, not civilian populations. Several times, armed Palestinian factions targeted Israeli-populated cafes and buses and Israelis themselves; this is not permitted under international law. The Second *Intifada* failed due to the use of armed tactics against civilian targets, and the lack of popular participation. The few that resisted were quickly defeated, and the Second *Intifada* ended not long after it began. By 2002, the armed resistance of the Second *Intifada* (especially the suicide attacks on civilian populations) provided Israel and its allies an excuse to increase the use of cultural violence, and exact more violence on the Palestinian people through the Apartheid Wall.

Israel’s use of the violence triangle through the establishment of the Wall was not envisioned as a direct result of the Second *Intifada*, this had been a political aspiration of Israel’s since the 1967 War, and was known as the Allon Plan. Over the years, various Israeli politicians used this plan in their campaigns, reiterating: “good fences make good neighbors” (2004: 6). In 2000, then Prime Minister Ehud Barak sold the idea of the Wall to the Israeli public, making adjustments to previous plans to increase settler support. He perpetrated cultural violence, and informed the Israel people that constructing the Wall would keep the Palestinian people contained and unable to perform violent attacks, creating safety for the Israeli people. Cultural violence was the foundation for the structural violence of the Wall, and Israeli politicians used this propaganda to put fear into the Israeli people and excuse their intended violence. For Israel, it was a “security measure”, but for Palestinians, it was collective punishment and an open-air prison.

Israel's triangle of violence has maintained the occupation, and the Palestinian people explored ways to resist. The Wall, as a form of violence, was a resistance opportunity for the Palestinian people. Ayed Morrar, a First *Intifada* organizer in Budrus, described the reason the Palestinian people started resisting the Wall:

The popular resistance does not just belong to the Wall. The Wall was the best opportunity for us to put a popular struggle, as a live example, on the ground. We didn't aim, or target just the Wall in our struggling against the occupation. We recognize the Wall as part, or as a component from the occupation, or as a symbol of the occupation, and we have to resist it for that reason.⁹¹

People who were directly affected by the Wall instantly began to organize, learning from the previous uprisings. They also built new forms of resistance to address the new realities on the ground. As civil resistance against the occupation was not new, the resisters to the Wall built from what previously worked best: the nonviolent tactics of the First *Intifada*. Several of the local organizers had also participated in the First *Intifada* and saw this popular struggle against the Wall in the spirit of the First *Intifada*.

The triangle of violence invoked the struggle against the Wall, which occurred in numerous villages throughout the West Bank, and lasted over a decade, continuing today. The resistance officially started in April of 2002 in the town of Tulkarm, north of the West Bank. The farmers directly affected by the confiscation of their land responded immediately. Fayez, a farmer from Tulkarm, described the first reaction the farmers of the village had when they learned that their land would be taken for the site of the Wall:

We started to ask [questions]. I wrote two messages, two letters. One to the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC), they had been strong to (support) our life (as farmers). The second message, I sent it to

⁹¹ Interview with Ayed Morrar, Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

the Palestinian Authority. I wrote the same question, what happened?
What's going on?⁹²

The farmers did not get a response from the Palestinian Authority explaining why the Wall was being built on their land. PARC, however, did respond to the farmers. PARC was a member of the Palestinian Environmental NGO's Network (PENGON), a larger agricultural network, and they had numerous resources to support the budding movement against the Wall. The farmers decided the next immediate step would be to actively resist the construction of the Wall. Their primary aim was to stop the construction on their lands and save their crops and their livelihood. The farmers started resisting with their bodies, and soon, people living in Tulkarm and nearby villages joined them in physically obstructing the bulldozers from building the Wall. Shortly after Wall construction began in Tulkarm, it also started in the nearby village of Jayyus. As much land north of the West Bank was agricultural, the farmers in both areas initiated the resistance to the Wall. The residents in Jayyus also started looking for answers. They took their concerns to human rights organizations in various places, such as Jordan, Europe, and inside Israel. They attempted to get outside support to stop the Wall knowing that the cultural and structural violence they experienced as Palestinians would limit them if working alone. The people of Jayyus went as far as contacting the Israeli military to ask what was happening on their land with the construction. The response was minimal, and after a month of watching soldiers seize their land, the people decided that to stop the Wall in their villages, they needed to also actively resist its construction with their bodies as their only weapons. Organizers in Jayyus began to protest against the Wall. The first protest began there during the summer of 2002, a few months after the resistance in Tulkarm.

⁹² Interview with Fayez. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

Human rights workers, international activists, and local journalists participated in this protest. They aimed to send a message from Jayyus to the Israeli military. Adwan Shamasna, a local activist from Jayyus, explained that the people of Jayyus would not allow the Wall to continue to destroy their land and imprison their village without a fight.⁹³ The people of Jayyus also wanted those living outside the area to see what the Wall's violence was doing to their village, so they invited solidarity activists to join them. The first three protests were successful; people marched to the land that was being confiscated for the Wall, and then returned to the village. They were able to stop the construction. The fourth protest was not the same. The Israeli military behaved violently toward the protesters to stop the resistance by using direct violence. This use of direct violence mobilized more resisters to join in the struggle. The organizers held meetings to discuss nonviolent tactics, which they continued to use to resist the Wall. As the construction continued to travel south, the resistance movement followed, with each village learning from the Jayyus and Tulkarm experiences.

The resistance to the Wall was a collaborative and organic venture that attempted to include all corners of Palestinian society, unifying Palestinians against Israel's violence triangle. PENGON used their resources and network to address the organizational needs. PENGON was comprised of committees that were actively involved during the First *Intifada*. Jamal Juma, the coordinator of the Stop the Wall Campaign, which stemmed from PENGON's involvement in the resistance, shared that "the main figures and organizers in this campaign was very active in the First *Intifada*."⁹⁴ PENGON facilitated the first meeting against the Wall. 150 villagers from the north were

⁹³ Interview with Adwan Shamasna. Jayyus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. May 2007.

⁹⁴ Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

invited to attend the meeting in the Salfit area to discuss organizing against the Wall.

Jamal Juma explained the main objectives of the first Salfit meetings:

Its main aims was for three major things; one to mobilize the communities to stand up against the bulldozers, against the destruction of the land, against building the Wall. Second is documenting day to day, and every single violation that they [Israel] are doing against them [Palestinians]. The third important dimension, which is the main one besides the work on the ground in the popular resistance, is the international outreach.⁹⁵

PENGON oversaw all of the organizing in the initial stages of the resistance. The efforts later formed a separate organization called the Stop the Wall Campaign, which continues to work solely on the Wall's violence today. This split happened when the movement grew beyond the environmental framework of PENGON's mission into a Palestinian national concern. The Stop the Wall campaign relied heavily on village activists to document and resist the Wall. Juma described how previous relationships between the activists and local committees accelerated the organizing process within the villages against the Wall: "We had the connections, and these organizations helped a lot. They provide us with all the possibilities; they provide us with volunteers, with places to coordinate, and that gives us really the strong starting point."⁹⁶ The villagers directly affected by the Wall's construction took the lead in resisting the Wall. Fayeze from Tulkarm noted that the Israeli army's reaction to the resistance was to speed up construction in the area.⁹⁷ The Wall was completed in Tulkarm during the summer of 2003, a little over a year after Israel started construction. After the Wall was constructed in Tulkarm, it moved to the areas between Tulkarm and the surrounding villages, and

⁹⁵ Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Interview with Fayeze. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

then south. The activists from Tulkarm began to travel to neighboring villages to support them in organizing efforts. Fayez explained how the farmers worked with other villages to resist the Wall. “We [would] go to the other villages to teach them how we started to build our [popular] committees here. And we can resist, and how we can have contact to be all together.”⁹⁸ The resistance continued south to the Salfit area, where the Wall’s construction had started.

Israel continued to use the triangle of violence to pave Palestinians lands for the site of the Wall, what they did not expect was for the resistance to follow them as they moved through the Occupied Territory. In the Salfit area, the resistance to the Wall was largely concentrated in the village of Mas’ha. On the 28th of March, 2003, activists raised two tents on village lands, marking the beginning of what was known as “Peace Tent.” Ra’ad Amer, a local Peace Tent organizer, explained why the people chose to struggle for their land: “The idea was initiated by farmers to stay and defend their lands, and supported by PARC with tents being supplied, and contacts made to internationals and Israelis.”⁹⁹ The Peace Tent was an act of resistance to the Wall, and the locals invited Israeli and international activists to join them in the tent’s activities. This initiative was a direct response to a notice given two weeks earlier to the village residents about the Wall. Farmers found a confiscation order in their fields informing them that their land would be taken for the construction of the Wall. Israeli law allows one week to appeal, yet the people of Mas’ha did not trust that the Israeli legal system would work for them, as it had not been successful in past cases. The villagers decided to follow the north’s example, and they started to resist the Wall.

⁹⁸ Interview with Fayez. Tulkarm, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

⁹⁹ Interview with Ra’ad Amer. Mas’ha, Occupied Palestinian Territory. June 2007.

The successful resistance tactics to the Wall violence was essential for the life span of the movement, and resistance tactics were shared from village to village. The activists from the north shared their knowledge with the villages that came after them about how Israel employed the violence triangle, and how the people actively resisted. The organizers from Mas'ha learned from those who resisted before them how to build a campaign against the Wall. Ra'ad Amer, a local organizer from Mas'ha, explained that the people saw only two options: react to the situation, or leave and help their people relocate.¹⁰⁰ Ra'ad explained that the Peace Tent was popular in attracting solidarity visitors: "In the first two months, 6,000 people visited the camp, and over 8,000 within five months."¹⁰¹ The tents were moved into different locations during the months of the camp. They first sat in the northern part of the village, and then moved closer into the village as a strategy. They wanted to be able to access the wireless Internet, which was another way to share information with those outside of Mas'ha village. The tents' main purpose, at that time, was to establish a media center for exhibitions, talks, and workshops. Ra'ad stated how he personally benefited from the Peace Tent: "The camp was an interesting school to be at; [there were] politics and different forms of activism."¹⁰² The tent offered a way for the residents of Mas'ha to engage with Israeli and international activists and build a social movement, eliminating the cultural violence that was so pervasive within Israeli society. Camp participants organized three main protests. The first was to officially establish the camp in the month of March. The second protest, on May 3rd, 2003, involved 300 Israelis, 60 Internationals, and 300 Palestinians. This

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Raad Amer. Mas'ha, Occupied Palestinian Territory. June 2007.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

protest was designed as an educational event to talk about the Wall's dangers, such as human rights and environmental issues. The village women's group, established by the camp, held the third protest on the 15th of May, 2003 (*Nakba* commemoration day). The local women organized the last protest at that site, which primarily consisted of speeches. On August 5th, 2003, the tent was moved to its third and final site in Mas'ha: the land in front of Hani Amer's house. This area was where the Wall would eventually separate the Amer family's house from the rest of the village. It was a strategic move by the protestors to physically take up this space with the tent, as this was where the Wall was going to be constructed. Before the move to Amer land, the camp was only used to raise awareness; the major focus was on the media. On August 9th, 2003, Israeli military orders forbid anyone besides the Amer family to enter the area where the house was located and deemed it a closed military zone. The protestors risked arrest by continuing to participate in the Peace Tent, and all activities were eventually halted. In October 2003, the Wall was finished in front of the Amer home, officially separating the house and family from the rest of the village.



Resisting the construction of the Wall. Budrus. February 2004.

The Wall continued to travel south, and the next village it arrived to made the biggest impact in penetrating the violence triangle through civil resistance techniques. Budrus, a small village in the Ramallah district of the West Bank, next faced the Wall's destruction. By the time the Wall arrived in Budrus on November 9th, 2003, 170 km had already been constructed in the north of the West Bank. Like others before them, herders found notices posted on olive trees informing the people of Budrus that they had two weeks to send a complaint to the Israeli court, the body that had approved land confiscation. Although the letters stated a two-week deadline, the next day, the bulldozers started uprooting the trees for the Wall. As the construction had already begun, the villagers decided that going to the structurally violent Israeli court would not prevent the land from being completely destroyed before their complaint would be heard. As they urgently needed to halt the construction and knowing about the resistance in the northern

villages, Budrus villagers decided that demonstrating was their only option to combat the Wall. As they viewed the Wall as a problem for Palestinians, the villagers decided it needed to be an all-Palestinian resistance. Budrus made the Wall a community concern, and as the village was small, nearly every household participated in the resistance. Between 100 -150 Budrus villagers took part in the first demonstration. There was no media coverage and the protesters did not get much outside support. The villagers requested loudspeakers from the Palestinian Authority, but as the villagers reported to me, they were denied. No camera was present to document that first action, limiting all claims to personal experience. One villager wrote an article about the action and sent it to a Palestinian newspaper, but the paper chose not to publish it. The resistance to the Wall was not yet newsworthy, including in Palestine, and village struggles were isolated from each other. Eleven demonstrations were held in Budrus without any international or Israeli solidarity presence. On December 30th 2003, the Israeli military injured 70 Palestinian villagers of Budrus; cultural violence removed any concern for the Palestinian well being. In eight months of resistance, 55 demonstrations had been organized against the Wall in Budrus alone, which included solidarity activists. As a response to the resistance, Israel decided to move the route of the Wall onto the Green-Line. Budrus' unarmed civil resistance movement had saved more than 90% of their land and olive trees. 56 *dunums* were confiscated out of the 1200 that were in the initial plan. Budrus was a high point for the resistance movement, later viewed by outside practitioners as a successful model of resistance using nonviolent methods. In the fall of 2004, the resistance returned to Budrus, and although the Wall was re-routed, Israel was still building it in another area on their land. The people of Budrus did not see the Wall apart

from the occupation, and the village maintained their resistance as long as the construction continued on their land.

The violence of the Wall continued to destroy Palestinian land as it moved from village to village, eventually arriving in Nil'in, a village neighboring Budrus. Nil'in held only two anti-Wall demonstrations in early March of 2004 before Israel stopped the construction. Once the first tree was uprooted, the villagers of Nil'in immediately went out to demonstrate. No internationals were present at the first demonstration and numerous villagers were injured as a result of direct violence being indiscriminately used. Cultural violence excused Israel to not ignore Palestinian harm. Immediately, the organizers in Nil'in called Ayed Morrar from Budrus on the telephone. They informed him that construction workers had begun cutting down trees. The following Friday, a few days later, Nil'in villagers planned another demonstration to pray on the land near the newly cut trees on a Friday – a holy day for Muslims. Ayed from Budrus called solidarity activists, who went to Nil'in to join the demonstration. Ayed also invited Budrus villagers to go to Nil'in and support the people there in the second demonstration. This collaborative strategy increased the number of activists present in Nil'in. Nil'in villagers, who were known for their strong First *Intifada* resistance, understood the destruction through the triangle of violence of the Wall, and were committed to resisting it. Jamal Juma described the resistance in Nil'in: "Demonstrations in Ni'lin started massive, big, and people [there] are angry. Even the [Palestinian] Authority was worried from Ni'lin experience."¹⁰³ After the second demonstration, the Israeli army left Nil'in village for four years because a lot of activists participated. This proved that a high number of

¹⁰³ Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

activists made a strong resistance against the Israeli army, and was effective. Mohamed Abdelqadar from Nil'in shared the reason he believes that the army stopped working in Nil'in: "It was like *Intifada*; kids, women, men resisting. It was high resistance."¹⁰⁴ Nil'in was successful for some time, but on May 17th, 2008, the Israeli military returned. They responded heavily with their weapons, shooting an international activist from the U.S., Tristan Anderson, in the head. He survived, yet continues to deal with brain damage as a result. Due to Tristan's American nationality, his incident with Israeli direct violence was broadcast to a larger audience, whereas Palestinian activists have also been injured and are ignored due to the function of cultural violence. Mohamed from Nil'in explained that because the resistance was so strong in his village, it was easier for the army to go to other areas and leave Nil'in for a later date.¹⁰⁵ The Wall was finished in 2010 in Nil'in; it took one and a half years to complete there. Mohamed observed that the resistance extended the amount of time and money it took Israel to build the Wall in that area, in that regard, the resistance in Nil'in was successful.

Israeli violence persisted, and the resistance withstood the violence triangle, keeping a presence at each site where the Wall was being constructed. The resistance began to gain momentum during the winter of 2004. Budrus' success in moving the route, and Nil'in's success in forcing the Israeli military to stop, motivated other villages. The villagers in the northwest Jerusalem area were well-prepared to resist the Wall once it arrived in their villages. In February 2004, the construction officially began in Biddo and Beit Suriq villages. To keep a constant presence in both locations, solidarity activists split

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Mohammed Abdelqadar. Ni'lin, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

up between the villages. The resistance there was Palestinian-led. Shortly after the construction started in Biddo and Beit Suriq, paving of the land for the Wall began in other neighboring villages: Beit Duqu and Beit Anan. This simultaneous construction in multiple areas at the same time was a tactic Israel used to slow down the movement. It hindered activists' ability to have high resistance numbers at each demonstration.



Women stopping the construction of the Wall. Beit Duqu. March 2004.



Gathering at the site of the Wall before the construction. Beit Suriq. March 2004.

The realities on the ground forced the local movements to quickly respond to the changing violence triangle, therefore the use of solidarity activists differed in each village. The Northwest Jerusalem villages had a higher population than Budrus, but they relied heavily on solidarity activists' participation for strong demonstrations. Construction simultaneously occurring in multiple locations at the same time made it very difficult for the solidarity activists to spread themselves between the five villages. Israeli bulldozers kept a constant presence at the site of the Wall, working from the early morning hours until 7:00 or 8:00 pm. It was illegal to move into the area where the bulldozers worked, called the "red line." Israel enhanced direct and structural violence to

inhibit the resistance movement to gain momentum or power. Activists who tried to move close to the bulldozers were shot at with rubber bullets and tear gas. During the construction in Biddo, Israel set up a checkpoint outside of the village to restrict solidarity activists from entering the area as a means for structural violence implement to deter the activism. The army used this checkpoint to regulate when and if people from the village passed through to the other areas in the West Bank.

Structural violence was penetrated through the court systems, and the Biddo area was able to suspend the construction for several months while attempting to use the legal route. The civil resistance in the Biddo area lasted for three months in the beginning, from February 2004 to April 2004. It eventually ended during a court case this group of villages brought forth. They took the case of the Wall to the Israeli High Court. After several months in the legal system, the court decided to reroute the Wall. The Wall was moved away from one farmer's land, and positioned on another's farmer's land a little farther out. The villagers did not believe that the legal system was the only solution, but they wanted to stop the construction and attempted every route that was possible. Mansour Mansour, a local organizer from Biddo, explained: "If I want to complain, who do I complain to? I'm complaining against whom, against another soldier?"¹⁰⁶ As the court system is another arm of the occupation, both using structural violence to maintain the occupation, the people in Biddo feared that the Israeli legal system would not prioritize their interests. Israel framed the Wall as necessary for security through cultural violence, not taking into account how it would affect the Palestinian population inside the

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Mansour Mansour. Biddo, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2007.

West Bank. The people inhabiting the northwest Jerusalem villages felt that their civil resistance coupled with the legal resistance would allow them more time to save their lands. The construction did stop for several months and the Wall was eventually re-routed. The construction continued in Biddo for the new site during the summer of 2004, and there was little resistance. The local people were unable to resist daily because they needed to get back to work and they no longer had the energy to withstand the violence the Israeli army exacted upon the demonstrators. After the Hague court decision in July 2004, the people all across the West Bank hoped that the international community would stop the destruction of Palestinian land for the Wall, and allow the people to re-enter their lands on the other side, but this did not happen.



The uprooting of a tree for the site of the Wall.
Biddo. April 2004.

Israeli violence, through the construction of the Wall, altered as a reaction to the resistance, creating low points and high points of activity within the movement's life span, essentially ebbing and flowing. In December 2005, a high point of the resistance materialized in Bil'in village. Nasir, a member of the local popular committee in Bil'in, explained the situation in his village: "Bil'in is separated into two parts: the eastern, where people live, and the western (the agricultural land), which are stolen by the Wall. Where the settlement is built."¹⁰⁷ Markers were put up in Bil'in to show the where the construction would occur, and one bulldozer started building the Wall. The people of Bil'in went to speak with the Israeli army on the land. They marched as a large group to express their condemnation of the Wall on their land. Due to this confrontation, the work stopped for two months, until February 2005, when the army returned with more bulldozers to continue construction. The village began demonstrating almost every day for roughly six weeks; they then slowed down the momentum to only demonstrate on Sundays and Fridays. Like the villages before them, when construction began there was a sense of urgency, but that momentum stopped, as people were exhausted, burnt out, and physically and emotionally affected by the construction of the Wall. Bil'in continued resisting the Wall, but only on Fridays. They also took the case of the Wall to the Israeli High Court to legally resist. During the court proceedings between 2005 and 2007, the construction stopped, but the villagers continued to protest every Friday. In 2007, the court declared that the route of the Wall was not merely for security concerns. This outcome surprisingly combatted some of Israel's own cultural violence through the security myth, and the Wall was re-routed as mandated by the court. The portion of the

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Nasir Samara. Bil'in, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2007.

Wall in Bil'in that was rerouted started construction in February 2010. In Bil'in, the resistance continues today. Each Friday, new solidarity activists and local villagers demonstrate against the occupation using the same tactics that were used against the Wall's construction.



Protestors in Bil'in being pushed by the Israeli military. Bil'in August 2005.

Small successes against the Wall did not deter Israel from using the violence triangle as they continued construction. Moving south, passing Jerusalem and connecting to the Bethlehem area, the Wall continued to damage Palestinian lands. The villagers of Al Walaja, situated between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, started resisting once the construction began. Omar was one of the main organizers in Al Walaja village. His house was in the path of the Wall and would be separated from the village. The people of Al Walaja resisted the Wall for nearly three years, using the same techniques that were utilized the in previous villages. The last demonstration in the village was in January 2013. Omar had an infant son when the resistance started, and due to the close proximity of his house to the Wall's path, his baby son could not leave their house until the

construction was finished. Israel often enacted direct violence by throwing stunt grenades and tear gas. Omar explained how his youngest son only started playing in their yard in February 2013, when he was already four years old. This was after the construction had officially ended. His house was eventually isolated from the rest of the village and situated next to the Israeli bypass road, with a tunnel road for his family's use.



Palestinian protester during a demonstration against the Wall. Beit Ula. November 2004.

Israel's use of the violence triangle through the Wall continued past Hebron to the southernmost point of the West Bank, destroying lands and imprisoning Palestinian communities in its path. As the Wall moved south, the resistance followed to show that the Palestinian people did not accept Israel's violence. Techniques used in the First *Intifada*, such as mass protests and information sharing, enabled Palestinian resistance to the Wall to be more effective. The affected villages communicated with each other and unified against the construction of the Wall. The new geographical barriers post Oslo made it difficult for Palestinian activists to travel easily to other areas, but with the

support of international and Israeli activists who had the privilege to travel within the West Bank, undeterred by the structural violence implements, there was always a presence on the land that was under construction. The villagers from all areas knew the Wall was going to be built, but the resistance would not let it be built without a fight.

Organizing Strategies

Resistance to the Wall was well organized, and the methods the Palestinians activists used in combatting the Wall supported the small successes of the movement, namely reframing the narrative by combatting cultural violence. Understanding how Israel used the violence triangle with the establishment of the Wall enabled the local activists communities to use techniques learned from the First *Intifada*, and include new forms of resistance to effectively respond to the realities on the ground. Highlighting four main organizing strategies; popular committees, solidarity activism, alternative media, and nonviolent tactics, I express how the reframing of the narrative was accomplished through the popular struggle against the Wall.

Successful resistance tactics were borrowed from the First *Intifada*, which proved useful in reframing the mainstream narrative. An organizational aspect of the First *Intifada* that supported movement's success was the establishment of local popular committees throughout the Occupied Territories. Local Popular Committees against the Wall were also established, starting in the northern villages early in the movement. There was a need for an organizing body in the resistance. According to Beshara Doumani:

Harnessing the tremendous political energy of Palestinian communities and their supporters worldwide requires the establishment of a representative entity that can clearly articulate what the Palestinians want and why, and can define the parameters for strategic action. (2007: 62).

Popular committees were not a new concept that began with the resistance to the Wall. They formed during the First Intifada as a technique for organized resistance. For Dudouet:

Sectorial popular committees were set up in each community to address the daily needs of the population: medical relief, food distribution, strike forces, agriculture, trade, public safety, education, information, solidarity with families of martyrs and prisoners. (2008: 14)

Learning from the First Intifada, organizers formed popular committees against the Wall in a similar manner. Referencing First Intifada's organizing methods, Joe Stork observed that, "The most organized villages seemed to be those where at least two and often all four of the major organizations have a presence in just about every case going back several years before the uprising" (1988: 7). The resistance to the Wall took this form, strategically including various village bodies in the popular committees. According to Jamal Juma, by late 2002, there were already 54 popular committees against the Wall in the West Bank.



Sign made by the Anti-Apartheid Wall Committee in North West Jerusalem. Beit Suriq, February 2004.

Popular committees functioned both hierarchically and horizontally, placing those within the popular committee in control of the protests against the violence triangle, yet still along side the villagers in confronting Israeli violence. Palestinians involved in the popular committees became the demonstration leaders. They organized actions and were the point people for the solidarity activists and the media. Juma described how people were invited to join the local popular committees against the Wall:

In the village we [would] call everybody to come. We asked the activists to have a call in the mosque. The local councils joined, organizations in the village, political activists from all parties. Even that time Hamas was, not as Hamas, not political parties as their political parties.¹⁰⁸

Members of specific political parties, such as Hamas, Fatah, or PFLP, joined the popular committees, regardless of their political affiliations. Each member joined as an individual Palestinian affected by the Wall. The issue of the Wall was seen as a national concern, and it was important to have a sense of national unity against the Wall.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.



A member of the popular committee addressing the demonstration in Beit Awa. February, 2005.



A popular committee member organizing the demonstration. Beit Awa. February, 2005

The resistance to the Wall encompassed First *Intifada* tactics, yet they also varied methods due to the changes on the ground through the violence triangle. The popular committees played different roles than in the First *Intifada*. They focused on the resistance to the Wall and on those that came to support their villages. The members of the local popular committees organized the demonstrations and documented the struggle against the Wall on their land. They also coordinated with and received the solidarity activists and the media and communicated with the lawyers regarding court cases against the Wall. They were the leading political element of the resistance to the Wall. Membership into the local popular committees was voluntary. It was grassroots-based and only Palestinians could participate. Anyone from the village that wanted to join the local committee was welcome, although it mainly consisted of men. The committees

were made up of municipality members, people from different political parties, and members from youth clubs and schools. Each local popular committee worked for their village's needs. This committee work was unpaid, and several times, activists requested but did not receive financial support from the Palestinian Authority. Stop the Wall campaign (or PENGON in early years) provided some materials for banners, flags, and other important items. Budrus had a very effective popular committee; the villagers established it in early 2003, before Wall construction began. This prepared them to resist construction. Other popular committees formed as a direct response to the Wall's construction. The way the popular committees organized and when they began resisting depended on where the village was located in the path of the Wall.



Ayed Murrar, from the Popular Committee in Budrus, addressing the demonstration. Budrus. February 2004.

Popular committees functioned to strategically combat the violence of the Wall, and to do this they sought outside assistance in the struggle against the Wall. Once they formed, committee members contacted international and Israeli activists to join them in solidarity against the Wall. The solidarity activists and villagers aimed to fill the demonstrations with masses of people. The resistance was stronger when more people participated in the movement. According to Baylouny:

Through numbers, protesters compensate for their lack of resources. This amassing does several things. First, it can compensate for lack of resources. Second, it gives the group publicity, and third, it promotes solidarity among the group, convincing them that they are indeed part of a cause with large numbers of committed members. (2009: 46)

Resisting became an important part of village life, but popular committee members knew that organizing the demonstrations would become dangerous. Participating in the resistance against the Wall was dangerous for all participants, and each demonstration put people in the path of Israeli violence. The organizers of the actions personally paid a high price as leaders in the movement. For example, Abdulla Abu Rahmeh of Bil'in was convicted in an Israeli court for his role in organizing the resistance in his village. As *Ha'aretz* reported, "An Israeli military court convicted on Tuesday a prominent Palestinian activist for incitement and organizing illegal demonstrations against Israel's separation fence in the West Bank" (2010). Abu Rahmeh spent sixteen months in an Israeli prison for his role in the unarmed resistance movement. Palestinian popular committee members took this risk. They knew that if they did not organize against the Wall, it would be built on their lands, imprisoning their communities. Resisting the Wall was a way to intervene in Israel's colonial project. Indigenous Palestinians could resist their occupiers, interrupting this new move of the occupation. The unified, anti-Wall

struggle worked toward self-determination and an end to the occupation. The popular committees were leading the struggle within their villages, and the internationals and Israeli activists came into the West Bank in support and solidarity.

Solidarity activism was a major part of the resistance against the Wall, and identity privilege was used as another tactic against Israeli violence. From Jayyus and continuing today, activists from abroad and from inside Israel have been welcomed into the villages to support the resistance movement in solidarity. George Rishmawi, an activist from the Bethlehem area and one of the founding members of ISM (International Solidarity Movement) has worked with international solidarity activists since the Second *Intifada*. During that time, solidarity activists supported Palestinians by escorting ambulances to their intended destinations. On numerous occasions, the Israeli military refused ambulances access or targeted them, and the presence of solidarity activists enabled the ambulances to provide emergency services. The lack of cultural violence towards internationals supported the Palestinians in the midst of Israeli violence. As a result of this, solidarity activists also kept a constant physical presence where there was increased Israeli violence towards Palestinian communities, which was intended to minimize harm. In essence, solidarity activists used their privileged identities to help Palestinians obtain their rights. Harm to internationals or Israelis would have garnered media attention, but harm to Palestinians would not have due to cultural violence. Rishmawi describes this phenomenon as “using the racism of the system against

itself.”¹⁰⁹ This use of solidarity activism exposes Israel’s blatant cultural violence of prioritizing international bodies over Palestinians’.



International and Israeli solidarity activists stopping a bulldozer with a Palestinian farmer. Budrus. September 2004.

The notion of solidarity flourished with the establishment of the Wall, activists were eager to support the ongoing anti-Wall movement. Solidarity activists came to support Palestine in late 2000 and continued to work there once the Wall’s construction began. In 2002, Jayyus was the first village to invite solidarity activists to join them in their struggle. Adwan Shamasna, a local organizer from Jayyus, shared why his village invited solidarity activists to join them:

The reason for that was that we figured that it would be hard to face the Israelis [army] just by ourselves. To face the military forces without any kind of protection, without anyone that can protect us. After all, people coming from Europe, the States, or Israel, have the privilege to do things we can’t do. Like talking to the soldiers and going and standing in front of a bulldozer.”¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

¹¹⁰ Interview with Adwan Shamasna. Jayyus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. May 2007.

It was clear to Shamasna that Palestinians would not be safe from Israeli violence if they were to protest alone. Villages incurred increased violence when they resisted the Wall. Mica Pollack describes this use of privilege: “The movement capitalizes upon the racialized privileges attendant to internationals’ predominant physical appearance as people of European, rather than Palestinian, descent” (2008: 231). Solidarity activists from the US, Europe, and Israel were racialized differently than the dark skinned Palestinians. The majority of the protesters coming in to support the Palestinians in their struggle were also Jewish, which is another form of privilege many solidarity activists held. Israeli soldiers treated these activists differently from the local Palestinians, and clearly showed their racist nature.



International solidarity activist getting arrested. Bil'in. August 2005

Israel's use of the violence triangle was so severe and heavily embedded into the system to maintain the occupation, that international and Israeli presence was not enough to stop the violence. With that said, the presence of solidarity activists at the demonstrations did not prevent Israeli military violence, but it did decrease. The Jayyusi

people began to communicate more with the international community, which meant that the English speakers from the village were in contact with solidarity activists. In 2002, when the Wall's construction began, ISM activists were situated in various regions of the West Bank. Shamasna explains the collaboration between the internationals and the locals inside the village: "At that time, we were all cooperating and building ideas on how to resist the Wall, because we were hoping that we could be able to stop the Wall."¹¹¹



Israeli activists being separated by the IDF. Budrus. December 2004.



An Israeli activist being beaten by the IDF before arrest September 2004.

As a result of the lack of cultural violence towards solidarity activists, they were able to use their privilege to perform resistance techniques that would not be permitted for Palestinians due to cultural violence labeling them terrorists. Solidarity activists started working in the north with the villages resisting the Wall, and as the Wall traveled south, they joined other villages. The Mas'ha Peace Tent was a turning point for the collaboration. At this, point numerous Israeli activists were traveling into the West Bank

¹¹¹ Interview with Adwan Shamasna. Jayyus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. May 2007.

in solidarity with the Palestinian villagers. The tent held several activities in the village. In the eight months of the tent's existence, the solidarity activists coming from abroad and from Israel became very close with the local Palestinian activists that participated in the initiative. On December 26th, 2003, Israeli activists organized a direct action, the last action for the Peace Tent. This action did not include internationals or Palestinians. Their Israeli privilege enabled them to perform this action. They returned to Mas'ha to cut the area of the fence near Hani Amer's house. This act was a direct response to the fence isolating the Amer house from the village. They successfully cut the fence and the army reacted, opening fire with live ammunition. One of the Israeli activists was shot in the leg. This violent response from the Israeli army towards the Israeli protesters became news inside Israel, and the group was given the name Anarchists Against the Wall. If Palestinians had cut the fence, it would have been more dangerous and would not have garnered this type of media attention. The Israeli activists used their privilege to gain media attention around the issue. The Anarchists Against the Wall continued to support the Palestinian-led resistance movement as it moved through various villages over the next several years.



Women's demonstration in Biddo with solidarity activists. Biddo. May 2004.

The Wall and the resistance continued south, and as new solidarity activists traveled into the West Bank they located the movement to join the struggle. After the Peace Tent, international and Israeli activists were committed to struggling with the local Palestinian villages against the Wall. Budrus, a village that followed in the resistance after Mas'ha, invited all the solidarity activists to join their local struggle against the Wall. Ayed Morrar from Budrus explained:

The Palestinian people must rise up to resist the Wall, but we appreciate anyone who wants to support us through our struggle. We appreciate the Israeli and International solidarity, and we have a good relationship with them, but this is our problem and this the Palestinian people must rise up.¹¹²

Budrus held several demonstrations without the support of solidarity activists. Once support came, the village's cause became more widely known. Morrar expressed how the village felt about the solidarity activists coming to Budrus to participate in the demonstrations: "We need the Israelis to be with us, and many of them are against Zionism and the occupation. We aren't against Jews or Israelis, we are just against the

¹¹² Interview with Ayed Morrar, Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. January 2007.

occupation, and I think that the majority of the Palestinian and Israeli people want peace.”¹¹³ The connection between the Israeli activists and the local Palestinian villages did not exist on this level before the resistance to the Wall. When Palestinians encountered Israelis, they were usually the Israeli military or the settler population. The resistance to the Wall brought left-wing Israelis into the West Bank in struggle against their own government’s agenda.

Cultural violence was noticeable when Palestinians attempted to resist the Wall without the support of solidarity activists. When they ventured out to nonviolently resist the Wall, Palestinians saw the use of extensive force through direct violence. For example, in 2005, four men from Deir Ballut village walked with their livestock towards the site where the Wall was to be built on their land. The Israeli “Wall security” opened live fire on the group, injuring them all. Although Israel injured these Palestinians with impunity, were international or Israeli activists there, media would have been interested, which is not desirable for Israel’s public relations. Palestinian life is viewed as inferior to Israel, and resisting the Wall without support, or visual proof of the violence, creates a dangerous situation for Palestinians facing the violence triangle.

¹¹³ Interview with Ayed Morrar, Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. January 2007.



Women crying on the bloody land where their relatives were shot. Deir Ballut. April 2005

Proving Israel's violence towards the Palestinian people is vital for the movement's success. Alternative media coverage was an essential tool for activists on the ground to use to share information with their communities abroad and within Israel. Sharing the realities of Israeli violence helped gain support for the Palestinian cause as it reframed the narrative. At the height of the resistance between 2003 and 2005, the movement aimed to use civil disobedience to save land. In the movement's early stages, mainstream media were not present at the demonstrations against the Wall. Local villagers and solidarity activists documented the struggle via still and video cameras. My visual ethnography initialized during the beginning of the resistance to the Wall. I followed the movement from village to village, and captured the struggle to show Israeli

violence, and Palestinian unarmed resistance, to a larger audience in the hopes to build the movement.



Solidarity activists filming a soldier. Kharbatha. 2005

Using alternative media supported the reframing of the narrative by visually exposing Israel's violence triangle. It was important for solidarity activists to use their privilege of mobility to share the struggle against the Wall to newer audiences. Still and video cameras were used to capture the violent Israeli land grab and the unarmed, civil resistance. Jamal Juma explained that documenting the resistance was essential because there was so much bloodshed from the Israeli violence, which would otherwise not be seen outside of the villages that were resisting.¹¹⁴ The direct actions within the villages were very dangerous. Although the protesters were using nonviolent methods, the Israeli army was very violent towards them. Israel maintained direct violence as a means to deter people from resisting. Documenting the struggle with a camera was the only way to record the extreme Israeli violence, and in some occasions having a camera in front of a soldier limited the use of direct violence.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.



Solidarity activists filming a protest against the Wall. Budrus, February 2004.

The mainstream narrative was difficult to transform in the early years, the regional crisis of the Iraq War coincided with the establishment of the Wall, limiting access to media outlets, which were already not interested in an unarmed Palestinian struggle. Although the locals resisting the Wall anticipated that the media would be less interested in their cause than the Iraq invasion, they still wanted to find a way to get their story out. Ra'ad Amer from Mas'ha explained the reasoning behind the 2003 Peace Tent, and the desire for media attention: "The main aim was to raise our voices to the media because we knew we weren't going to stop the construction."¹¹⁵ Internationals, Israelis and Palestinians spent time in the tent, even sleeping there, to keep a constant presence in the absence of media attention. After ten days, the Israeli media reported the story of the Peace Tent on Channel 2, a popular Israeli television station. As this was the first time a coalition against the Wall involved Israelis, it was newsworthy. A listserv was created as a way for the Peace Tent participants to communicate with each other online. Media was

¹¹⁵ Interview with Raad Amer. Mas'ha, Occupied Palestinian Territory. June 2007.

essential to get information out to the public, but it was the activists that shared the information with media outlets; media sources did not come to them.

Local media inside Palestine were also slow to cover the resistance movement due to other aspects of Israel's ongoing violence triangle, which they were focused on. This made it very difficult for local villagers because other areas inside the West Bank were unaware of the struggle, limiting local support. Iltezam, a local from Budrus, felt disconnected from other Palestinian people and neighboring villages in the West Bank because they were not aware of the ongoing resistance. Iltezam shared, "In Budrus all your life started to become about the Wall, and the protests, and you go to Ramallah, people have no idea."¹¹⁶ In Budrus, Arab media outlets came to cover the story in the beginning, but with time, the village became isolated in their cause against the Wall. If media had covered the movement it could have increased Palestinian participation, and not forced the local communities to resist Israeli violence alone.



Ayed Morrar being interviewed by Arab journalists. Budrus. February 2004.

¹¹⁶ Interview with Iltezam Morrar. Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

Reframing the narrative took time, but the momentum of the resistance movement throughout the years attracted media to the struggle, supporting the shift in the narrative. With time and the movement's growth, outlets started to report on the resistance. The fact that it never ended, only moved from location, and so many solidarity activists were involved, enticed media's interest. Bil'in village used the media attention to share their story when they started resisting in 2005. By this time, people were aware of the ongoing struggle due to the numerous activists that had participated against the Wall. Bil'in was able to use the common knowledge of the ongoing resistance movement to push their local cause forward. Abdulla Abu Rahma from the Bil'in Popular Committee described how initially, they used the same tactics as the villages before them, marching to the land with the slogans, trying to stop the bulldozers. "We found after one month, two months, it's the same. No media, no more people with us."¹¹⁷ This is when the village of Bil'in transformed their strategy to keep the solidarity activists and the media involved in their demonstrations. Bil'in relied heavily on Israeli and international participation within their struggle as a way to keep media attention, and to establish a safer environment to resist. Abu Rahma described why it was important to change their resistance strategy:

We are thinking about a new strategy to force the people to be with us, to encourage the volunteers, or activists, to be with us. To encourage the media to come, we know it's important for the media at that time, and now if we protest every day and no media no one hear about your case.¹¹⁸

George Rishmawi from Bethlehem explained how Bil'in village resisted for eight months before Al Jazeera covered the movement. The lack of media attention made it difficult for information about the ongoing struggle to spread, even within the West Bank. Once the

¹¹⁷ Interview with Abdulla Abu Rahma. Bil'in, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

movement was being televised, people inside the Territories began to recognize the importance of the resistance against the occupation's triangle of violence, but at that time, much of the Wall was already constructed. Bil'in aimed to share information outside of the West Bank. They wanted to create awareness about the Wall, and they were successful. In 2011, the film *5 Broken Cameras* was released. A collaborative venture between Israeli and Palestinian directors, the film focused on the resistance in Bil'in. It was nominated for an Oscar and gained international attention, bringing the struggle against the Wall into the international arena. The struggle in Bil'in focused on the media as their main method of resistance. Iltezam Morrar explained how the resistance transformed over the years: "The aim [of the resistance] became about the internationals and the media."¹¹⁹ She expressed how in Budrus, as well as some of the other earlier villages, the resistance consisted of villagers attempting to save their land. Media were absent and few cameras were present. It was an organic indigenous struggle over land rights against the colonizer. According to Iltezam, now, protests in the current struggling villages, such as Bil'in or Nabeh Saleh, consist mostly of leaders, a few villagers, and numerous international activists with numerous cameras all documenting. The difference between the early resistance movement, in contrast to the struggle now, is that awareness of the Wall's violence was initialized through the villages resisting from 2002-2005 and shared with a larger audience. The current villages resisting Israeli violence, in an effort to reframe the narrative, are now capitalizing on that attention.

Palestinian unarmed resistance is a difficult sell to international audiences; it transforms the dominant narrative, showcasing Palestinian oppression and Israel as

¹¹⁹ Interview with Iltezam Morrar. Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

aggressor. Activists with cameras do not have the same power as the mainstream media because their audiences are limited. George Rishmawi from Bethlehem explained that it was difficult to spread the information about the resistance because “We know that you don’t see immediate impact of nonviolence.”¹²⁰ Organizers relied on local faith in the movement because the success was not visible, which made it difficult to build the movement in the beginning. This lack of visible success also made it difficult for media to learn about and become interested in the movement. Jamal Juma experienced this issue when he was invited to a nonviolent resistance conference where there were a lot of international and local journalists. He asked the journalists to come on a tour to cover the Wall and the popular resistance. Several of the international journalists informed him that this was not the route they would take in the region. Richard Falk explains this situation:

The media focus almost exclusively on violence, especially Palestinian violence, without taking into account the highly problematic relationship that has evolved over the years between the occupying state and the occupied people. At issue is the substantive question of the right of a people living for decades under such oppressive circumstances to act in opposition. (2002: 20)

The media made it clear to Juma that they follow bloodshed and not a nonviolent campaign, as a way to profit off of the mainstream narrative. Juma reportedly responded to the media while at the conference in a hostile way, saying to them: “So the people have to be killed in these demonstration for you to come to cover it?”¹²¹ As a local of the West Bank, heavily invested in the unarmed resistance, Juma was upset that the Palestinian struggle for basic rights was not newsworthy unless the people were murdered while resisting.

¹²⁰ Interview with George Rishmawi. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. July 2013.

¹²¹ Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

The mainstream narrative had been established for decades, and the media reported that narrative, focusing solely on the ongoing violence between the marginalized, armed, Palestinian factions, and the Israeli army's response to that violence. This only reinforced the false narrative of Israel as the victim to Palestinian violence. The unarmed movement was outside of typical discourse around these two populations, reporting on the unarmed movement would require a shift in understanding around Israel's occupation, which could create an imbalance in the violence triangle. As media representations shape Israel's public image, shifting the narrative could transform the situation. As Richard Falk explains:

The media, especially in the United States, shape public awareness on such matters by insidious and consistent deference to prevailing power structures, thereby distorting analysis of competing claims and shaping public opinion in a manner prejudicial to Palestinian claims. (2002: 20)

As mainstream media outlets were not interested in stories of resistance against the Wall, journalists would not financially profit from covering them. Mazen Qumsiyeh described this aversion to sharing Palestinian nonviolence with audiences abroad:

Palestinian nonviolent resistance is not exposed in the West as something happening, it's not even allowed on mainstream media. It's a taboo subject. Because the western media – the mainstream media – is dominated by Zionists, editors, and owners, etc. They have a product to sell the world. The product is rather simple. Israel is good at defending itself, and they are the victims and Palestinians are the aggressors. The Arabs are the aggressors, they are the violent terrorists. This is the message; it's a beautiful short message. It sells. There's the white hats, the black hats, the good guys, the bad guys. People connect to it.¹²²

Although mainstream news stories do not reflect the realities on the ground, the Palestinian people continue to resist Israeli violence with unarmed means. The

¹²² Interview with Mazen Qumsiyeh. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

indigenous Palestinian people have hopes that international communities recognize their plight, existing under a brutal violence triangle, and condemn Israel for their abuse of power.

The specific use of nonviolent tactics supported the resistance movement against the Wall in both increasing participation within the movement, and combating the cultural violence, allowing Israel's violence triangle to shine through. The popular struggle against the Wall did not research nonviolence theory to develop the movement; their response against the Wall was organic and practical. Although they did not plan to take lesson from theoretical approaches of resistance, their techniques did lay within the framework of pragmatic nonviolence, where nonviolence is used as a plan, not as an ideology, as in principled nonviolence. There are numerous methods of pragmatic nonviolence. I discuss eight specific forms of nonviolent resistance used in the resistance against the Wall to highlight the use of pragmatic nonviolence tactics against Israel's violence triangle. I will examine protests and persuasion, nonviolent intervention, and political non-cooperation to analyze the popular struggle against the Wall and its ability to penetrate the violence triangle.

The first approach of pragmatic nonviolence I discuss is protests and persuasion, which involve various acts of resistance against Israeli violence. Activists resisting the Wall used formal statements, symbolic public acts, processions, withdrawal and renunciation at each demonstration from the northern villages to the Hebron area to make visual declarations against the occupation. These acts of resistance combat cultural violence, emphasizing the Palestinian identity as a form of resistance. Israel's cultural violence campaign emphasizes Palestinian identity as inferior to Israelis. Using protests

and persuasion Palestinian activists transform this thought through resistance techniques, highlighting several cultural attributes and sustaining them throughout each demonstration.

Palestinians are expected to be obedient to the Israeli military, cultural violence positions them as subordinate, and voicing any dissent could lead to direct violence. By using formal statements, Palestinian activists regain control from the soldier and preserve their dignity. Activists used formal statements at each demonstration before or during the action on the construction site to inform the Israeli military of the local condemnation about the Wall. Public speeches were made to connect the demonstrators to the action. Typically, a local leader from the Popular Committee Against the Wall made a speech. Adwan from Jayyus shared how formal statements were made in his village: “We used to go and tell the Israelis [soldiers] that we refuse and reject what they are doing in our land. The soldiers would ask us what we wanted them to do, and our answer would be that we want them to leave our land and let us live on our land.”¹²³ The soldiers often replied that they were only following orders and could not challenge the government’s Wall project. Although formal statements did not interrupt the Wall’s construction, they motivated the activists and communicated the reason for the resistance, where in other spaces of Israel’s violence triangle this could result in death.

¹²³ Interview with Adwan Shamasna. Jayyus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. May 2007.



Political flags were used in Budrus as symbolic acts. Budrus. February 2004.



Various flags were used in the demonstrations as a sign of unity. Budrus. September. 2004.

Cultural violence resistance through symbols is extremely important in combating the violence triangle. Symbolic public acts, such as flags, portraits of those martyred, prayer, and worship, were commonly used at each demonstration against the Wall as a means to show Israel that these cultural attributes of Palestinian identity are not violent, thus reframing the narrative. This was a form of cultural resistance against cultural violence. The Palestinian flag, which was illegal to fly before the Oslo period, was always present at each demonstration. The Palestinian flag represented the movement's aim for self-determination. In addition to the Palestinian flag, banners and other flags with political colors were present. Political flags in Hamas green, PFLP red, and Fatah yellow demonstrated Palestinian unity against the Wall. In addition to flags, villagers held portraits of relatives imprisoned in Israel or killed by Israeli violence. Visual displays of the martyred connected memories of them with the ongoing movement.



Men praying on the land that is going to be seized for the Apartheid Wall. Beit Ula. November 2004.



Men praying on the land. Beit Ula. November 2004.

Israel uses the Muslim religion as a form of cultural violence, the resistance against the Wall incorporated religion as a component of the movement to expose the nonviolent nature of Islam, thus reframing the narrative. Activists used prayer and worship, another type of symbolic public act, at numerous demonstrations and each Friday throughout the Occupied Territory. As the majority of Palestinians are Muslim, demonstrations were often held on Fridays, a holy day in Islam. During the Friday demonstrations, the Muslim participants prayed on the land where the Wall was being built, instead of in the Mosque. This type of action was symbolic, as it connected the religious faith of many of the participants to the land that Israel was seizing. Im Ilabed, from Deir Ballut, who used prayer to resist the Wall in her village, shared that she left her house for a demonstration with her body cleaned. She had showered thinking she would die that afternoon, knowing that the Israeli army had shot her relatives days before. While

marching to the site where four local men had been shot, she was separated from the rest of the demonstrators; the Israeli soldiers had prevented them from continuing to the site using direct violence. Im Ilabed shared that, as she was alone at that point, she felt like she was in the hands of God. She continued towards the land, kneeled to the ground, and prayed while crying. In that moment, she thought she was going to be killed, as numerous soldiers were surrounding her. As the prayer finished, she got up without harm. She peacefully left the area and went back to her village, knowing she had culturally resisted in the face of the Israeli army for her people, her family, and her home.



Im Ilabed praying on the land. Deir Ballut. April 2005.

The next two forms of protests and persuasion combat both cultural violence, and structural violence, as a means to resist the violence triangle Activists used processions as forms of protest and persuasion to physically gain access to the land where the Wall was being constructed. The local popular committees organized the marches to the land, in which locals and solidarity activists participated. Marches started at the local mosque in the village or near the Baladiyah (municipality building). After issuing a formal

statement, the participants marched with their flags and banners toward the land under construction. While marching, they chanted protest slogans and sang nationalist songs as a form of cultural resistance. Protests' durations ranged. If it was safe enough to remain on the land without encountering extreme Israeli direct violence, the people stayed and chanted. The leader of the protest, a popular committee member, would determine when the march would turn back to the village. Marching to the lands attempted to pass the red line, and reach the area where the bulldozers were uprooting the trees. This act placed the activists in the path of Israeli direct violence, which made resisting the Wall dangerous, even if unarmed.

Israel utilized structural violence as a way to repress the Palestinian people, and maintain control over them. Withdrawal and renunciation in the form of walkouts is another method of protest and persuasion that activists used to resist structural violence. During the resistance to the Wall, Israel put Palestinians on curfew. With the participation of Israeli and international solidarity activists Palestinians under curfew disobeyed orders and left their homes, in defiance of the curfew, to resist the Wall. As the Israeli army was often violent towards Palestinians defying their orders due to cultural violence, solidarity activists' collaboration facilitated this resistance.



A march to the land. Beit Awa. February 2005.

As a means to combat the structural violence of the occupation, Palestinian activists incorporated various forms of nonviolent intervention to force the Israeli army to stop constructing the Wall. This included physical intervention, nonviolent occupation, and alternative communication systems tactics. These methods were employed simultaneously with protests and persuasion techniques at each demonstration to encompass various forms of resistance against the violence triangle of the Wall.

Physical interventions, such as sit-ins, non-violent interjection, and nonviolent obstruction, were important methods in the movement to oppose the construction of the Wall. Activists sat and/or stood in front of the bulldozers to stop them from working. In some cases, protesters lay in front of working bulldozers as a form of nonviolent obstruction, risking their lives. Protestors also set up a blockade to prevent Israeli army jeeps from entering the village. They placed large rocks and burning tires strategically to physically restrict the Israeli army from raiding the village and arresting protestors. By obstructing Israeli activity from occurring, activists prolonged the time it took Israel to build the Wall.



Demonstrator blocking a bulldozer. Beit Awa. February 2005.

Another form of nonviolent intervention that increased the time it took Israel to build the Wall was nonviolent occupation. The Peace Tent started in Mas'ha and continued in Deir Ballut, and later, a structure was built in Bil'in. Peace Tents were a way to reclaim the stolen land and keep a constant presence through a counter-occupation. Nonviolent occupation was a successful method; it created space for solidarity activists to play another role in the resistance. For example, activists staying at the Peace Tent in Mas'ha, which was positioned in front of Hani Amer's house, organized a direct action as a form of physical intervention. The first direct action there, on August 4th, 2003, aimed to stop the bulldozers from constructing the Wall. Of the 50 people there, 40 were international solidarity activists. One August 5th, at 5:00 AM, hundreds of Israeli soldiers and police arrested the 43 people at the tent. Three of them were Palestinian. One of the arrested Palestinian men stayed in jail for three days and two of the arrested internationals were deported. The next day, the protesters tried again to stop the bulldozers, and again, the Israeli army arrested them. 26 of these protesters were Israeli activists, and all were

released from jail that evening. The only Palestinians present in the tent were Hani Amer and Ra'ad, and they were not arrested. The Israeli army confiscated the tents and declared the area a "closed military zone." The use of nonviolent occupation forced the Israeli military to work harder to utilize more resources while constructing the Wall.

Sharing information was vital for the movements aim in reframing the narrative, and was used as a nonviolent tactic due to the lack of media attention in the early years. Alternative communication is another form of nonviolent intervention, and was extremely useful in sharing the realities of the grassroots movement. The photographers and filmmakers that joined the struggle visually shared the events on the ground with a larger audience. Information was also shared via the web. Activists started personal websites, created online list serves, and used technology to spread information about the resistance against the Wall. This form of nonviolent resistance aided with exposing Israeli violence, which was essential to build the movement.

The last form of pragmatic nonviolent that was used in the resistance against the Wall was political noncooperation. Activists practiced civil disobedience to protest the Wall, which proved to be the most dangerous form of resistance and resulted in Israeli direct violence. This form of resistance was the most prominent in Budrus, where, in November of 2003, 13 year-old Iltezam Morrar jumped into a bulldozer to stop it from working. The people of Bil'in were also known for their creative acts of civil disobedience. During one action there, local activists and solidarity activists chained themselves to olive trees as a form of resistance. They went very early in the morning, before the soldiers arrived, to protect the bulldozers. Abu Rahmeh, from Bil'in, explained why this action was so important: "If you uprooted the olives trees you kill us, you

destroy our life.”¹²⁴ This symbolic civil disobedience action received a lot of media attention and shared this action with a larger audience. The Arab media outlets *Al Jazeera* and *Al Arabia* made numerous calls to local leaders to cover the story. Activists realized that the way to inform those outside of the West Bank about the struggle against the Wall was to be creative with their civil disobedience.

These numerous nonviolent tactics supported the Palestinian people to include more activists into their grassroots struggle, gain media attention to share their struggle with a wider audience, and expose Israeli violence. Demonstrators used these similar tactics to protest the Wall throughout the Occupied Territory. Using the same techniques helped activists organize effectively to build a strong movement. According to Gene Sharp, “To have the best chance of success, the nonviolent actionists must stick with their chosen technique” (2005: 110). Activists used pragmatic nonviolence methods for various reasons. First, they created space for outside people to join the movement and they minimized the amount of violence the protestors experienced. Although the tactics were nonviolent, direct violence from the Israeli army was always present at the demonstrations against the Wall. As Mazen Qumsiyeh observed, “the term ‘nonviolence’ obscures the violent nature of the occupation/colonization that is intrinsic to their function.”¹²⁵ As the triangle of violence facilitates every aspect of the occupation, violence is always present under occupation. Demonstrators who utilized unarmed tactics did not assume that the Israeli military would stop using violent methods. Pragmatic

¹²⁴ Interview with Abdulla Abu Rahma. Bil’in, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

¹²⁵ Interview with Mazen Qumsiyeh. Bethlehem, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

nonviolence practitioners strategically chose to not use violence, understanding it would be forced upon them from their opponent.

Israel's Increased Violence Against the Resistance

Israel implemented the violence triangle to maintain the occupation, and increased direct and structural violence against activists resisting the Wall in an effort to deter them from progressing their movement. Participating in unarmed resistance exposed activists to higher levels of direct, structural, and cultural violence. Palestinian civil resisters were aware of the risks involved in resisting the occupation, but they continued to resist, as they needed to transform their futures by challenging the violence triangle. All Palestinians who resisted the occupation were targeted by the Israeli military, whether they utilized unarmed or armed resistance methods. As Anne Marie Baylouny explained, “Advocates and organizers of non-violent activities end up in jail alongside those engaging in violence, even members of organizations uniting Israeli Jews and Palestinians” (2009: 55). Although Palestinians who utilized nonviolent resistance tactics were targeted as “threats” to the Israeli state, the direct and structural violence they experienced was less severe than that their armed resistance counterparts faced, and cultural violence was unable to function in the same manner.



Palestinian protestor being carried away by the Israeli military. Beit Ula. November 2004

The triangle of violence is used as a way to maintain control over the occupied population, dissent limits Israeli control, therefore Israel uses excessive direct and structural violence in an effort to gain back the lost control. Civil resistance against the Wall and the occupation are ways the indigenous Palestinian people could participate in realities on the ground. As Israel does not wish for the Palestinian people to have a stake in their own outcomes, it employs more violence against the activists in an attempt to squash the movement. In the face of the violence, the popular struggle against the Wall has flourished, moving through the West Bank from village to village. Israel has utilized various methods of direct and structural violence to combat the unarmed resistance movement. Soldiers have put entire villages under curfew, arrested numerous Palestinians without charge, and used various dispersal techniques to suppress the resistance. I will discuss components of the direct, structural and cultural violence Israel uses against the resistance to the Wall, highlighting their perceived threat of Palestinian self-determination through unarmed means.



Mohammed Khatib from Bil'in showing injuries. Bil'in April 2005.



Israeli soldiers attempting to disperse the crowd from close range. Beit Awa, February 2005.

Structural violence, an important aspect of the ongoing occupation, is a central force in Israel's effort to control the Palestinian population by isolating them. As a way to control Palestinians resisting the Wall, Israel implemented structural violence by way of a mandated curfew. This allowed the Israeli military to continue the construction of the Wall without the people's intervention. Curfew legally imprisons communities inside their homes. If Palestinians break curfew, they risk arrest. Tulkarm was the first village where curfew was enforced during the resistance to the Wall. Residents did not fully understand the Wall's effects in the first weeks, as they were forced to remain in their homes. When they were able to leave their homes after two weeks under curfew, they witnessed Israel's massive land destruction for the site of the Apartheid Wall. Jayyus was also put on curfew. Thousands of people living there were imprisoned in their homes, due

to their resistance to the Wall. In response to the curfew in Jayyus, the popular committee organized an action to defy the curfew order as a form of resistance. Jayyus residents waited for solidarity activists to join them before risking breaking curfew to ensure their safety. Cultural violence influenced which actions locals performed alone, and which ones they relied on solidarity activists for. The day the village broke curfew, 50 internationals were with them. Although the army had threatened physical harm against anyone who broke curfew, the people did it anyway to resist the Wall. Six locals from Jayyus were arrested for defying curfew. Israel continued to threaten other villages with curfew, but they too strategically invited solidarity activists to join them in this action. Every act of resistance by a Palestinian was a great risk, as when they were arrested, they were not treated the same way that international or Israeli activists were as a result of cultural violence, and the assumption by Israel that they were terrorists.



Palestinian protestor getting arrested during a demonstration against the Wall. Beit Ula. November 2004.

Structural violence met direct violence throughout the West Bank, and Palestinian Wall-resistors were targeted by the Israeli army and arrested as a way to deter them from participating in civil resistance. In the early years of the resistance movement, when Palestinians were arrested, they were usually released from jail after a few days. As the struggle developed, demonstrations became more dangerous for Palestinian participants. The Israeli army targeted activists, especially organizers, who often spent years pleading their case in Israel's courts. As Israel intended to end the movement, soldiers arrested numerous Palestinians protesting the Wall to discourage other activists from participating. Since Palestinian participants were utilizing unarmed means, there were few offenses to charge them with, and they were placed in jail under administrative detention. Administrative detention allows for Palestinians to be held in Israeli prisons

without charge or judicial process for up to six months at a time as a form of structural violence. The Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem described this:

Administrative detention is detention without charge or trial that is authorized by administrative order rather than by judicial decree. Under international law, it is allowed under certain circumstances. However, because of the serious injury to due-process rights inherent in this measure and the obvious danger of its abuse, international law has placed rigid restrictions on its application. (2014)

All activists participating at the demonstration risked arrest, but due to cultural violence, their sentencing varied. Palestinians were placed under administrative detention with the possibility of extension after the six-month period ended. International activists, if arrested, were deported from the country and prevented from returning. Israeli activists, due to their identity privilege, were fined. The fear of arrest led several Palestinian activists to hide. Between 2006 and 2007, the Israeli military often sought out young boys in Budrus to charge them with stone throwing. Fearing repercussions, boys slept away from their homes, as the Israeli army typically collected the boys in the middle of the night. Once, the army came to arrest a boy who was at home after a demonstration. The women of the village resisted this arrest and took on the heavily armed Israeli military to save the child.



A woman from Budrus getting beaten by an Israeli soldier for attempting to save a young boy from arrest. Budrus. September 2004.

Active participants in the movement experienced higher doses of Israeli direct and structural violence as a result of their organizing. Specifically, popular committee members were targeted for organizing demonstrations against the Wall. Abdulla Abu Rahmeh, from Bil'in, who was well known as an organizer, was arrested several times while nonviolently resisting the Wall, and in December 2009, the Israeli court sentenced him to two years in prison for his activism. He was charged with stone throwing, incitement, and organizing illegal protests. He spent a year in prison for his role in the demonstrations against the Wall. This case emphasizes the function of the legal system as an extension of the occupation with structural violence maintaining it. Mohammed of Nil'in was also targeted for his role in organizing in his village. The Israeli army arrested him at a demonstration. Mohammed understands Hebrew and heard soldiers discussing

how they targeted him. In his first arrest, he was held for six hours. When they arrested him, they covered his eyes and handcuffed him while they detained him. He was fined 3000NIS to be released each time, even if he was not charged with a crime. Israel also targeted Omar of Al Walaja for his role in organizing. The Israeli authorities threatened to take away his permit, his only access to his work in Jerusalem, hoping that exerting more structural violence would deter him from resisting the Wall. Omar replied by referencing the Torah. He countered that God offered bread. He asked the man arresting him, “Who gives the bread?” The man replied, “God does.” Omar then stated, “Ok, God will give me the bread, take your permit.” The Israeli authority representative told Omar, “No, someone will come take it from you.”¹²⁶ Organizing demonstrations was very dangerous for the leaders of the movement in their villages, they risked increased direct and structural violence, but they took the chance in an attempt to stop the Wall.



A local from Bil'in getting arrested from undercover Israeli police. Bil'in. April 2005

¹²⁶ Interview with Omar. Al Walaja, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

In an effort to stop the movement, the Israeli military and the Israeli Border Patrol enforced collaborative structural and direct violence in an attempt to control the resistance. It was not unusual for the Israeli authorities to plant undercover agents in the protests as an excuse to impose direct violence. These Israeli agents were darker in skin color to mimic Palestinians and wore street clothes in disguise. This type of action is a form of cultural violence, impersonating the other in a negative way, and then excusing the use of direct violence as a result. The under cover agents threw stones at the Israeli army as a provocation and to enlist the *shabab* (young boys) to also throw stones. The Israeli army used stone throwing to legitimize using direct, violent force against the demonstrators. Aiming to disperse the crowds near the construction site, they used several forms of direct violence. The Israeli army did not attack protestors during three demonstrations in Jayyus, but did during the fourth, shooting tear gas, rubber bullets, and stunt grenades at the demonstrators. The protesters retreated back to the village, knowing that future demonstrations would become more dangerous for all those involved. Protesters experienced direct violence at each demonstration against the Wall. According to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights:

In 2010, Israeli forces continued to use excessive force against peaceful demonstrations organized by Palestinian civilians to protest settlement activities and the construction of the annexation wall in the West Bank. Peaceful protests have been organized weekly in the villages of Bil'ain, Ne'lin and Nabi Saleh near Ramallah, al-Ma'sara village near Bethlehem and Beit Ummar town near Hebron. (2011: 42)

The rubber-coated bullets and tear gas were dangerous, and those participating in demonstrations were aware of the extreme risks of participation.



Man suffering from tear-gas inhalation. Beit Awa. February 2005.



Protestor being rushed out of a demo on a stretcher after getting injured during a demonstration. Biddo. April 2004.

The Wall is a form of structural violence, and Israel utilized direct violence in an attempt to halt the resistance movement, causing numerous injuries for participants. In April of 2005, four young, Palestinian men from Deir Ballut village went to their land to stop the bulldozers from uprooting their trees, just as they typically did in bigger demonstrations with solidarity activists. They were a small group, and the Israeli Wall security responded extremely violently, shooting these young men with live ammunition as a form of crowd dispersal. The men bled from their wounds and after hearing the shots from the village, their family members ran to the scene and took them away to safety. Then, the nearby settlement police came to take statements from other villagers. One of the boys who was shot in his torso was taken to Ramallah and eventually recovered. Samer, another victim, who was shot in the leg, rode on a donkey with his brother to the neighboring village of Bidya. He had to ride a donkey for transportation because he lacked a permit to exit the checkpoint in the front of the village. Another victim was shot from his shoulder through his back. The last man was shot through his back to his groin,

which caused him permanent disabilities. These four boys survived, but not all Palestinians resisting the Wall are as lucky. As Ayed shared, in the early years of the resistance, “400 inhabitants from Budrus had been injured by rubber bullets, two were injured by live bullets, and one killed in Budrus.”¹²⁷ Unarmed protestors in the northwest Jerusalem villages sustained 600-800 injuries. Injury is extremely common for resistance participants. Israel’s soldiers fire tear gas, stunt grenades, and bullets at the crowds to disperse the civil resistance activities near the Wall. As injuries are expected, demonstration organizers prepare by inviting Palestinian Red Crescent medics, who provide on-site care.



Israeli soldier aiming at stone-throwing protesters. Beit Liqia. March 2004.

Unarmed resistance against the structural violence of the Wall was very dangerous; Israel increased the direct violence to such a degree that fatalities were likely. According to Jamal Juma, “About 26 martyrs have been killed on the Wall since 2002. Most of them are young and have been shot, killed either by live bullets or tear gas cans,

¹²⁷ Interview with Ayed Morrar, Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. January 2007.

and some of them shot with tear gas.”¹²⁸ The first killing near the Wall happened in 2003 in Jenin. In 2004, four boys were killed in Biddo and Beit Duqu while nonviolently resisting the Wall. On February 26th, two days after the first demonstration in Biddo, the Israeli forces killed three young men: two from Biddo and one from the neighboring village of Beit Duqu. On the sixth day of resistance in Biddo, the fourth person was killed, and one month after the struggle against the Wall began, another local from the village was murdered. In the first month of anti-Wall resistance in the northwest Jerusalem area, five young men were killed. In 2008, five boys were killed in Nil’in within six months. Some youth who were killed were not resisting but were “collateral damage.” Ahmed Mousa was ten years old when the Israeli military killed him on July 29, 2008. Within six months, Yousef Amira, who was 17, was also killed. Two other boys, Mohammed and Arafat Huwaja, were killed near the main road near the settlement. In June, 2009, Akin Sroua was killed in Nil’in. Two residents of Bil’in and one resident of Nabeh Saleh were also killed while nonviolently resisting the Wall. Israel uses indiscriminate violence against Palestinian activists resisting the Wall, still attempting to position them under the negative perspective of cultural violence. Due to the increased numbers of activists coming into the West Bank in support of the resistance, and the exposure to the violence triangle, this attempt proves futile in regards to the unarmed resistance movement.

¹²⁸ Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.



Israeli soldier aiming at a women's demonstration. Biddo. May 2005

Direct violence from Israel does not only target those who actively engage in the struggle against the Wall; it has also caused fatalities for Palestinians in their villages and homes, under attack by the Israeli army, and unable able to escape. The Israeli army killed two boys from Beit Liqia who were with their sheep near Wall construction. Another ten year-old boy from Nil'in was killed while sitting under a tree after a demonstration. A 70 year-old man and a 36 year-old woman from Bil'in died from tear gas poisoning that engulfed their village. According to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights:

Ms. Jawaher Ibrahim Ahmed Abu Rahma, 35, suffered from extreme difficulties in breathing and fainted. She was evacuated to the Palestine Medical Compound in Ramallah. At approximately 09:30 on Saturday, 01 January 2011, she was pronounced dead. (2012: 31)

At the time of this writing, the most recent death was a young boy who was killed in Budrus in 2013 near the site of the Wall. Israel has punished neither the Israeli army nor the Wall security for killing Palestinians near the Wall. Instead, Israel justifies the use of force against the activists, claiming that they threw stones and retribution was necessary. Although Israel claims this, often no stones were thrown, yet Israel still uses direct violence against the demonstrators. The rubber bullets and tear gas that the Israeli army uses in response to the stones have killed numerous Palestinian activists. The excuse of stone throwing is not a valid argument for murdering Palestinians, but the Israeli lens frames the stone as a weapon, attempting to justify the shooting of the stone throwers.



Boy jumping back from tear gas canister. Biddo. April 2004.



Tear gas canister falling into the yards of homes. Bil'in March 2005.

Palestinian Authority's Role in the Resistance

The Israeli violence triangle is so influential that the entity designated to govern the Palestinian people, the PA, is powerless to reduce it. The international community's

silence around Israeli violence has allowed the violence triangle to intensify over time. The PA has a limited leadership role, and Israel does not permit it to oppose Israel's aggression. Lacking the support of an autonomous political entity, the Palestinian people cannot effectively attain a conventional political resolution. According to Beshara Doumani:

The central dynamic or iron law of the conflict over Palestine, since it began in the late nineteenth century, has been the adamant refusal by the most powerful forces in this conflict—the Zionist movement (later the Israeli government) and its key supporters (first Great Britain, later the United States) either to recognize or to make room for the existence of Palestinians as a political community. This non-recognition has made it possible for the twin engines of the conflict—territorial appropriation and demographic displacement of Palestinians from their ancestral land to continue operating largely unabated, as they have for over a century. (2007: 50).

Although Israel accepted the PA's role as a governing body over the Palestinian people, the Palestinian cause for self-determination was left to the people.

Israel has strategically used the PA to control Palestinian resistance, and unbeknownst to the PA, increased the violence triangle. To suppress the First *Intifada*'s resistance, Israel negotiated with the exiled Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) during the 1993 Oslo Accords, and as a result, the PA established itself in the Occupied Territories. Although the PA was tasked with representing the Palestinian people, there are strict limitations on what it can do and they are forced to work within the guidelines of the Israeli government and its allies, such as the United States. If the PA deviates from the political frameworks that Israel demands of them, the entire Palestinian population is collaterally punished. Functioning under Israeli control, the PA is unable to work for the Palestinian people's best interests, restricting its power as an independent representative. According to Amira Hass, an Israeli journalist:

With time, what had originally been an ad hoc military-bureaucratic measure crystallized into a fully conscious Israeli strategy with a clear political goal: separation between the two peoples with an appearance of political separation, but with only one government—Israel—having any effective power to shape the destinies of both. (2002: 18)

Neither Israel nor its supporters have recognized the Palestinian people or their governing representatives as viable partners in a resolution to the “conflict.” Israel maintains control over the PA, maintaining control over the land. This lack of PA power has encouraged the Palestinian people to participate actively as political actors, and Intifadas (uprisings) have proven more effective than official political negotiations. The Palestinian people have thus been their own representatives, actively resisting Israeli violence and fighting for self-determination.

Israel controls the PA to maintain control of the ongoing occupation, threatening economic resources if the PA does not perform a security role in the West Bank. If the PA moves too far outside their appointed role, Israel imposes collective consequences onto the entirety of Palestinians inhabiting the Occupied Territories. The PA also aims to maintain the limited control they do have over the people. However, the PA was largely absent in the struggle against the Wall. As was stated to me from locals in Tulkarm, they wrote to the PA at the beginning of the Wall’s construction but received no reply. Ayed from Budrus stated that in January, 2004, Budrus activists travelled to Ramallah to request three things of the PA: an official position recognizing the Wall as a national enemy and taking a political stand against it; visible solidarity, such as Palestinian politicians’ attendance at village marches to demonstrate their support of the people; and assistance with a project to help the people resist the Wall.¹²⁹ As Budrus residents

¹²⁹ Interview with Ayed Morrar, Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. January 2007.

reported to me, the people there received no help from the PA and continued to resist the Wall with the help of PENGON. From 2002 to 2005, the local popular committees organized independently, maintaining control over how they organized demonstrations. During the time people were protesting in Budrus, the PA offered money, but with conditions attached. Ayed Morrar of Budrus rejected the money, as he saw money becoming the movement's focus and splintering grassroots efforts and the spirit of resistance. According to Ayed: "You want to kill a revolution, drown it with money." Countless activists claimed that the PA had its own agenda and did not want the movement to disrupt ongoing official political negotiations with Israel. Several activists thought that the PA also wanted to maintain power over the people, which this money could provide. In 2005, the PA gave money to the movement, allowing it to regulate the popular struggle. Jamal shared that the PA finally putting the Wall on its agenda affected the already thriving movement. "The Authority woke up in 2005, where they start to make us problems. They wanted to form their committees because they feel this is a movement that can go out of control."¹³⁰ Jamal opposed the PA's involvement for various reasons:

First, we have to have our space because our ceiling is much bigger and wider than the PA, which is limited to the Israeli. The second thing is that we don't want the influence, to be on the committees, to use them by remote control for their purposes, and to control it.¹³¹

The PA suppresses demonstrations in Area A, the area in PA limited control. As 70% of the West Bank population lives in Area A, the PA in this way aimed to keep resistance

¹³⁰ Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

¹³¹ Ibid.

outside of these areas to ensure the Palestinian people did not rise up in opposition of their governing body.



Prisoner demonstration inside Ramallah, in Area A. July 2013

The PA found an opportunity to include themselves in the movement, and their involvement created changes in its structure of the organizing, which limited the effects the movement had on the violence triangle. In 2005, the Stop the Wall campaign started to form district committees, in an attempt to avoid fragmenting the already split popular movement. At that time, the Wall had been already been completed in numerous villages, and as the resistance was in a slow period, it focused on Bil'in. The district committees sent representatives to Stop the Wall meetings to discuss the situation around the Wall and the next steps for the struggle. As Jamal noted, “We have ten committees in the West

Bank that we are in direct connections, and they have their own plans.”¹³² Salam Fayyad, a PA representative, was the primary politician to focus on the Wall. Jamal shared, “Salam Fayyad called for a meeting, for us the whole activists, two times in 2007, and his whole proposal was to open bank accounts for each committee, and to give them 6000 NIS a month.”¹³³ Stop the Wall adamantly opposed this plan. In Jamal’s opinion, money would take the focus away from the grassroots work and would eventually corrupt the movement. Both Ayed and Jamal forecasted destruction the PA money would bring to the grassroots movement. However, Salam Fayyad succeeded, and now the popular committee members are paid employees. As a result, the movement focuses on some villages more than others, which has created inequality within the movement and its ability to combat the violence triangle in multiple locations. With that said, those who are being paid by the PA are in need of the support, and they continue to struggle daily on their lands against Israel’s occupation.

The resistance to the Wall changed over the years due to the transforming violence triangle, and the involvement of the PA was merely one aspect of that change. The PA has effectively splintered the movement from where it once was, to how it function today. This change in dynamic has limited the movement’s power against Israel, and it is used as a public relations vehicle. Bil’in is a well-known village in the anti-Wall resistance, largely due to their creative means of resistance and the media attention they received. Although the Wall is completed in their area, Bil’in villagers continue to demonstrate against the Wall. In Bil’in, local popular committee members are now paid employees and members of the new Popular Struggle Coordination Committee. This

¹³² Interview with Jamal Juma. Ramallah, Occupied Palestinian Territory. August 2013.

¹³³ Ibid.

committee is a formal entity and an official NGO registered with the PA. Bil'in became a PA focus because they worked on joint struggle – Israelis and Palestinians working together – which fit within an acceptable conventional model for their political gains of showing how Israelis also want to end the occupation. I was informed from several activists that the PA wanted to show this joint struggle activity off to both Israel and the international community for their own political agenda.

The Popular Struggle Coordination Committee now controls the movement, and the organic, reactionary approach is no longer present due to the Wall already being established. The villages involved only demonstrate on Fridays, and largely as a media campaign, not an anti-construction campaign as the Wall has been completed in most areas. A number of the original activists are on the payroll, but they are few compared to the vast numbers who participated in the entire movement. For Dudouet:

Since its inception, the Palestinian Authority has proceeded to build centralised, bureaucratic, and often ruthless mechanisms that have fostered dependence and crushed most grassroots initiatives, resulting in a “demobilisation” of the population and its deepening alienation from political action. (2008: 20)

By the time the resistance arrived in Nabeh Saleh in 2008, the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee was running every aspect of the resistance, taking a governance approach. With that said, the activists in Nabeh Saleh continually face a highly militarized army when they go to their lands to resist to occupation. Palestinian activists from the early years of the movement feel that the PA's involvement killed the spirit of the movement. For Ayed Morrar, it was not the PA's role to lead the people in this movement. Ayed shared, “If you are looking for struggle, don't look for money, or don't look for the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian Authority they are our life manager, not

our struggle leaders.”¹³⁴ As evident from the interviews, in the early years the PA had expressed little interest in supporting the villagers in the struggle against the Wall, when support was most needed. As the movement gained media attention and focused on a joint model, the PA became involved for what is most likely for political reasons, and not to stop the Wall nor to secure self-determination through unarmed resistance.



Elderly man from Beit Awa during a demonstration. Beit Awa February 2004

Conclusion

Israel meets all resistance against the occupation, whether armed or unarmed, with the Israeli triangle of violence. All Palestinian resistance is viewed as a threat to the Israeli state; therefore Israel frames those who resist as terrorists through cultural violence. Israel views resistance acts as threatening attempts to destabilize the colonial plans. For Beshara Doumani, “The Palestinians discovered that the closer they came to finding their own voice, the more they were perceived as a destabilizing force” (2007: 53). Israel aims to conquer the land and control the indigenous Palestinian population by any means possible, and the use of the violence triangle is essential to this plan. Israel

¹³⁴ Interview with Ayed Morrar, Budrus, Occupied Palestinian Territory. January 2007.

considers Palestinians to be embodying a political identity through their mere existence, and does not permit their resistance. Frantz Fanon explains this fact in *Wretched of the Earth*: “The colonized, underdeveloped man today is a political creature in the most global sense of the term” (1963: 40). Palestinian resistance is political action not permitted by Israel, and unarmed resistance is the biggest threat due to its ability to weaken cultural violence and transform the narrative.

Activists used nonviolent tactics in the popular struggle against the Wall to include more participation and combat cultural violence. More Palestinian people and solidarity activists joined the movement, and fewer injuries or killings were likely in unarmed struggles, in contrast to armed resistance. The tactics inspired solidarity activists to join in the struggle, increasing the numbers of those resisting the Wall. The tactics also created a more sustainable movement than those used in armed resistance. For Dudouet, “It is argued that the results achieved through NVR are likely to be more permanent and satisfactory than those achieved through violence” (2008: 18). Armed struggle enhances Israel’s use of cultural violence, enabling direct and structural violence to continue. The use of unarmed means against the occupation lasted for over ten years and continues today, reducing the power of cultural violence and creating an imbalance in the violence triangle.

The civil resistance movement against the Wall has maintained a presence, spanning the West Bank and gaining notoriety within activist communities over the years, increasing the movement’s strength. Although the movement has actively engaged in unarmed resistance, over the past ten years, it has not been able to obtain large-scale international attention or sway mainstream opinions away from the false narrative Israel

has exported. Nevertheless, the movement, scholars, and global activists have brought attention to the cause. Although the struggle against the Wall did not stop its construction or settlement expansion, it did successfully combat Israeli cultural violence through nonviolent means and by sharing information outside of affected areas. The mass participation in the popular struggle over the past ten years exposes Israel's triangle of violence and shapes the movement's next steps.



Women's demonstration. Mas'ha. April 2004

Israel imposes more direct and structural violence onto the Palestinian people as a result of the resistance to the Wall. A shift away from grassroots, on-the-ground tactics was essential for the continuation of Palestinian popular resistance. The struggle against the Wall successfully resisted Israel's cultural violence with unarmed methods, ultimately exposing Israel's violence triangle to international and Israeli communities. This shifted the narrative from "Palestinian as terrorist perpetrating the violence" to "Palestinian as victim of Israeli violence." The shift in narrative aided the next unarmed struggle against Israel's colonial violence: the decentralized, Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign.

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have analyzed the violence triangle in the extreme contemporary situation of the Apartheid Wall. By focusing on the Wall, I highlighted the various ways in which Israel uses the violence triangle in their efforts to maintain the occupation. The detail in which I analyzed the Wall throughout this dissertation supports the claim that Israel built the Wall for two distinct political reasons, and not for security. First, the construction of the Wall erases the Green-Line, rendering it obsolete, which has in turn allowed Israel to seize more Palestinian lands for the expansion of Israeli settlements, thus limiting the prospects of a future Palestinian state. Second, the Wall limits collective action against the violence triangle by separating the indigenous people from each other in an attempt to control them and deter dissent. These political implications emphasize the need to resist the triangle of violence. For grassroots civil resistance to effectively resist Israeli violence, all aspects - structural, direct, and cultural - of the violence triangle must be addressed. In particular, a grassroots effort to initially combat cultural violence will facilitate a shift in the mainstream narrative, positioning Israel as the aggressor and the Palestinians as the victims to Israeli violence. Reframing the narrative will shift the power of Israel's cultural violence. This shift will build the

civil resistance movement by engaging with a larger audience, thus enhancing the effectiveness of the movement against the violence triangle.

Although Israel has attempted to use the violence triangle for their political aspirations of colonizing more Palestinian land through the establishment of the Wall, all the while prefacing the Wall as a security measure, my dissertation provides ample evidence to successfully combat these claims and expose Israeli violence. The construction of the Wall exposed an international activist community to the violence of the Israeli state. This created an opening for grassroots movements to combat the dominant discourses circulated by the Israeli state. In other words, grassroots movements can transform these dominant narratives, a form of cultural violence in themselves, by transforming the narrative from "Palestinian as terrorist perpetrating the violence", to one of "Palestinian as victim of Israeli violence." My dissertation provides a comprehensive study of the intertwined forms of Israeli violence enacted by the Wall, and it will be an invaluable resource for ongoing nonviolent Palestinian resistance movements. Nonviolent resistance, in order to be effective, requires mass participation. By combating the cultural violence of Israeli state narratives, grassroots movements can expand their base of support, thus enhancing the larger nonviolent resistance campaign for Palestinian self-determination.

This dissertation makes several distinct interventions into the fields of peace studies and Palestine studies. I bridge the gap between activism and academia, which is a valuable resource for activists/scholars, making this dissertation a model on how to use participatory research methods within social movements and communicate this knowledge through academic disciplines. The use of such detailed first-hand accounts to

analyze the Wall provides a comprehensive study outside of human rights reporting. Palestine as a case study is not a new concept in academia, yet through the numerous testimonials; this dissertation brought the voice of the Palestinian people affected by the Wall into conversation with each other from a grassroots approach. These robust narratives support my claim in reframing the narrative. The testimonials expressed throughout this dissertation contradict the U.S. mainstream narrative, and expose Israel's violence triangle.

The use of photography throughout this dissertation has reframed the narrative. As Brace-Govan highlights, "Although images are unavoidably subjective, they also open up new spaces for discussion, exchange, collaboration and interpretation that are not necessarily easily accessible" (2007: 744). The photos represent a visual ethnography, the documentary fieldwork extending over a decade. These images visually reveal the initial violence of the Apartheid Wall. The nonviolent resistance movement, in opposition to the Wall's construction, and the completed structure throughout Palestinian towns and villages are also exposed through these images. Photography, as an alternative means of data, is a beneficial technique for exposing violence; the images make it more difficult to disregard the realities on the ground. As Olesen notes, "photographs claim an analogical relationship with reality" (2013: 6). The images are in direct conversation with the text, and position the image within the political realm of the analysis. Using photography and testimonial narratives together, the "photograph is potentially transformed from an "object" with no associated meaning to a symbol with universalized meaning" (Olesen, 2013: 6). Incorporating these photos enhanced the argument, and in collaboration with the text, exposed the violence triangle in a graphic manner.

With such a powerful opponent of cultural violence, the use of a mixed data collection assisted in the reframing of the narrative from Palestinian as the aggressor to one of victim to Israeli violence. Violence used by the colonizer is not a new concept for colonial aspirations, as Frantz Fanon highlights,

“It is not enough for the settler to delimit physically, that is to say with the help of the army and the police force, the place of the native. As if to show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence of evil. Native society is not simply described as a society lacking in values. It is not enough for the colonist to affirm that those values have disappeared from, or still better never existed in, the colonial world. The native is declared insensible to ethics; he represents not only the absence of values, but also the negation of values” (Fanon 1963: 32).

In essence, Fanon argues that the colonizer not only uses direct violence to oppress the colonized, but the use of cultural violence is also present through the presentation of the native in society as not having values. Israel, as the colonizer, has used cultural violence against the indigenous Palestinian people as a means to justify their structural and cultural violence in their settler-colonial goals. Mixed media supported my argument that Israel uses the violence triangle for colonial objectives, and not through their cultural violence discourse of security.

Cultural violence was employed by Israel to such an extreme extent that it also penetrated throughout the U.S. society. Mainstream media narratives supported Israel’s claims of security, while Israel was continually utilizing the violence triangle against Palestinian civilians, as proven throughout this dissertation. Galtung argues that cultural violence, through the “culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us into seeing exploitation and/or repression as normal and natural, or into not seeing them (particularly -not exploitation) at all” (Galtung, 1990: 295). Palestinian activists, and

Palestine solidarity activists, are challenged with the task of resisting cultural violence as a means to reframe the narrative and engage a larger audience. If Palestinian or solidarity activists were to merely confront direct or structural violence, Israel's cultural violence campaign would increase, positioning the resistance as terrorism, even if nonviolent means were utilized. Israel, recognizing the power of the nonviolent movement against the Wall, enhanced direct and structural violence on the ground to repress the movement. Combating cultural violence, through knowledge production regarding Israeli violence, supports the expansion of the anti-occupation movement, thus limiting Israel's authority over the narrative.

The theoretical framework used to argue the violence of the Wall, and ways to combat the violence triangle with unarmed resistance, is beneficial for social movement scholars. Galtung's theory of violence is critical for nonviolent social movements attempting to transform extreme violence into peace. The goal of resistance is to eliminate the violence triangle in total, yet this eradication of violence is a process. Although the violence triangle is enforced differently within each cultural setting, initially focusing on cultural resistance will support the reframing of the mainstream narrative. The use of nonviolence, or unarmed resistance, as a means of struggle strengthens the success of the movement. It is essential to expose the violence, and not provide counter violence as the focus. By exposing the violence triangle to activists' communities, cultural violence capabilities are weakened, and larger audiences are willing to join the struggle. This model targets the roots of the violence through identification of the triangle, thus enhancing resistance techniques and effectiveness.

Histories of Palestinian Resistance

Resisting the violence triangle with nonviolence is not isolated to the anti-Wall movement. The Palestinian activists within the struggle against the Wall were products of a long history of resistance against the violence triangle. Historically, Palestinians resisted occupying forces since the early 1800s. Resistance was not a new practice during the Wall's construction. Qumsiyeh illustrated how Palestinians resisted foreign dominance as early as the Ottoman Empire (2011: 36). Palestinians' struggle for self-determination continued when Israel colonized their land. However, as their context changed over time, Palestinians' resistance methods also transformed. In contemporary struggles, Palestinian protestors utilized various tactics to work toward self-determination. Certain tactics brought the Palestinian resisters closer to their goals than others. The two *Intifadas* shaped the popular movement against the Wall, posing both obstacles and lessons. Those who lived in the path of the Wall learned from previous struggles against the occupation, incorporating unarmed tactics that proved successful for the First *Intifada*, and objecting to the armed tactics that failed the Second *Intifada*. Palestinian anti-Wall Activists hoped to use nonviolent coercion to leverage their power, as had proven successful in the First *Intifada*. The Palestinian people transformed some realities on the ground by disobeying Israeli structural violence. For Johansen, "These types of power can be influenced by changing the level of cooperation" (2007: 149). The activists that participated in the resistance to the Wall incorporated various unarmed resistance methods to combat the structural violence of the Wall in an all-inclusive movement, inviting solidarity activists to participate. This was an important tactical decision; Israeli cultural violence was so pervasive that Palestinians struggling alone

against the Wall could have turned fatal, as was proven in several cases where solidarity activists were not present. The use of unarmed methods in the First *Intifada* reframed the media narrative, and this was a goal for the struggle against the Wall.

Examining the two *Intifadas* shows how the use of resistance tactics frames the narrative, and how the struggle against the Wall learns from the previous movement. The anti-Wall resistance needed to develop tactics to support the reframing of the narrative to one of Palestinian as victim to Israeli violence, and build from the previous resistance movements, such as both the First and Second *Intifada*. The First *Intifada* was a successful, grassroots, anti-occupation movement. Due to mass participation, and the use of nonviolent tactics, the movement was strong enough to reframe the narrative, coercing Israel into the Oslo Accords negotiations, which Israel otherwise would not have participated in. Unwilling to relinquish control, Israel used this “peace” agreement as a guise to enforce and enhance violence within the Occupied Territories. These negotiations enabled Israel to enforce a larger presence in the West Bank and heavily monitor Palestinians with a set of structural violence implements. The enhanced violence triangle, a result of the Oslo Accords, suffocated those living under occupation. Frustrated by the failed attempt at self-determination, the Palestinian people resisted Israeli violence another time, yet with different tactics.

Armed resistance benefits Israel in framing all Palestinian people as “terrorists”, collectively employing more cultural violence, and thus overshadowing the ever-present violence triangle. As we saw from the Second *Intifada*, cultural and structural violence were increased as a result of armed tactics. The Second *Intifada* took place in a new context, shaped by the Bantustans under Israel’s constant surveillance. Activists of the

Second *Intifada* utilized varying tactics. Although some used unarmed resistance, most resisters used armed methods, which shaped the struggle's outcome, resulting in numerous deaths and fewer Palestinians engaged in the movement. This approach was not sustainable as an anti-occupation resistance movement. With the ability to enhance cultural violence, Israel created the Wall to respond to the Second *Intifada*. This added strength to the violence triangle by introducing a large-scale form of structural violence, and further discouraged mass participation against the colonial forces. Once again, the landscape shifted, impeding activists' abilities to organize. Those living outside of the areas affected by the Wall were unaware of the dangers it would cause, while Palestinians living in areas affected by the Wall were compelled to resist. The communities along the path of the Wall were forced to either resist the continual land grab or exist in an uninhabitable environment.

The use of unarmed tactics is essential for movements to be effective in resisting cultural violence, especially in the case of Israel's occupation. Israel's triangle of violence consistently escalated over time, especially during the resistance to the Wall. Due to heightened direct and structural violence, the anti-occupation struggle could not combat the violence triangle in total. By focusing on cultural violence, the resistance movement was able to penetrate the violence triangle and weaken it. Although Israel used direct violence against the nonviolent protestors, Israel could not stop the resistance movement from penetrating the cultural violence, and weakening it. The use of nonviolent pragmatic techniques exposed communities outside of the West Bank to Israel's ongoing violence triangle through information sharing. Those who joined in solidarity reported back to their communities about the layers of violence the Palestinian

people were experiencing. As a result, more solidarity activists, especially those from the Israeli left, attended the demonstrations. As Gene Sharp states, “By combining nonviolent discipline with solidarity and persistence in struggle, the nonviolent actionists cause the violence of the opponents’ repression to be exposed in the worst possible light” (Sharp, 2005: 657). Israel was violent towards Palestinians long before solidarity activists were on the ground to witness it. The fact that the world became interested after information circulated internationally about Israel’s violence exposes the subtle cultural violence within leftist communities inside Israel and abroad.

Through their positions of privilege, solidarity activists spread the news of Palestinian civilians subjected to Israeli violence through alternative media outlets. In a pragmatic nonviolence framework, this is termed “nonviolent intervention.” For Johansen, “These are actions in which some form of direct involvement from someone who originally was not part of the conflict takes place” (2007: 149). Palestinians’ reports of their daily encounters with Israeli violence are largely ignored as “normal,” while reports from individuals who do not directly experience Israeli violence are regarded as important. Nevertheless, through solidarity activists’ disseminating information, larger audiences were exposed to Israeli violence. Through the support of international and Israeli activists sharing information, reframing the narrative was possible. This is an through the support of, and an essential part of the nonviolent resistance movement against the Wall.

Detailing the violence triangle through the case of the Wall highlights the political significance of the Wall as an Israeli tool, unilaterally dissolving of the 1967 Green-Line through the path, seizing Palestinian land, while simultaneously inhibiting any Palestinian

dissent. This dissertation has demonstrated that Israel is the source of the violence, and thus a shift begins in the narrative from one of security to one of land expropriation. U.S. mainstream media positions Israel as the victim in need of “security,” reproducing this false narrative. Activists’ communities have the ability to use the evidence produced throughout this dissertation in their quest to reframe the narrative.

Political Implications of the Wall

The Apartheid Wall exemplifies how Israel’s triangle of violence functions to oppress the indigenous Palestinian people to steal their land. This dissertation has emphasized, through the development of the chapters, how Israel uses the Wall as a tool to conquer more Palestinian land for Israeli settler-colonial aims, ultimately dissolving the Green-Line. I historicize the triangle of violence within the Occupied Palestinian Territories in part one to argue that the triangle of violence is not a new outline for Israeli political objectives. Rather, direct, structural and cultural violence has been employed throughout Israeli history as a method of suppressing the Palestinian population. By providing this context in the beginning of the dissertation, I expose the longstanding use of violence in Israel’s initial movement for statehood in 1948, and its use of intertwined forms of violence as a method to maintain overall control of the land, and the indigenous population, throughout the successive years. The focus on Israeli aggression exposes the reader to Israel’s capacity to continuously violate the occupied civilian population. This historical overview reinforces later claims of Israel’s ongoing violence in regards to the Wall violence, initially introduced in Chapter Three. The testimonies expose the use of the violence triangle by Israel to conquer Palestinian land. The photos added throughout

the texts support the evidence that Israel utilized extreme violence in the dispossession of Palestinian lands and resources. The dispossession of Palestinian land is thoroughly discussed to lay claim to the extreme loss the Palestinian people experienced through the establishment of the Wall. By detailing the Wall in such a way, it is clear that the path was not for security, as Israel claims, but to steal more Palestinian land. This land is used for settler expansion, and reinforces the Apartheid system within the West Bank. The most important part of the results of the Wall's path is that it unilaterally dissolves the Green-Line. Palestinian aspirations for statehood appear grim due to the violence triangle of the Wall separating the land into numerous enclaves. This dissertation provides sufficient evidence that the Wall was a political strategy for colonial aspirations, and thus needs to be exposed to reframe the narrative.

The Wall curbs collective action, which is necessary for nonviolent resistance. As a result violence is deemed the only possible response against the triangle of violence.

Collective action had proven fruitful for Palestinians resisting the violence triangle during the First *Intifada*, when the realities on the ground were accommodating. Israel increased the violence triangle to enforce limitations on dissent, as we see from the Second *Intifada*. The lack of widespread collective action was in part due to the armed tactics, but the fragmentation of the Occupied Territories played a role in the use of tactics employed. The establishment of the Wall increased the separation of Palestinian communities, and structural violence implements were increased through the integrated network, as was detailed in Chapter Four. The triangle of violence enabled the establishment of the Wall; Israel's cultural violence campaign was effectively used to legitimize the Wall to the Israeli public, all through the guise of a security measure, while

Israeli settler and soldiers enforced direct violence to repress the Palestinian people. The continued use of fragmenting the Palestinian people, all the while utilizing extreme violence upon them, reduces the prospects of an end to armed Palestinian resistance.

As seen in the case of the Second *Intifada*, dissent was still present but it was also more dangerous. The case of the Wall compounds this relationship of opportunity for collective nonviolent action and resistance methods. As Wendy Pearlman addresses,

When a movement is cohesive, it enjoys the organizational power to mobilize mass participation, enforce strategic discipline, and contain disruptive dissent. In consequence, cohesion increases the possibility that a movement will use nonviolent protest. Inversely, when a movement is fragmented, it lacks the leadership, institutions, and collective purpose to coordinate and constrain its members (2011: 2).

Pearlman is arguing on behalf of internal fragmentation within movements, yet I see this as an important factor in regards to the physical landscape. The structurally violent implements restrict Palestinian movement; hence restrict future opportunities for widespread nonviolent collective action. The strength of nonviolence is having large numbers of activists collectively resisting against a common opponent with a specific message. In the case of the Wall, stopping the construction was the initial aim, and with time the resistance asserted an end to settlements. Without the opportunity for collective dissent, a reliance on sporadic violent resistance is regarded as the only response for Palestinians seeking to counter to the violence of the occupation. Confining Palestinians into the West Bank through the establishment of the Wall will not “secure” Israel, but rather will merely cage the indigenous people through the violence triangle, of which these sporadic reactions will occur. These acts will work towards the advantage of the

Israeli state, maintaining their efforts of cultural violence and maintaining their false narrative.

In the case of the Jerusalem Envelope, sporadic acts of violent resistance against the violence triangle have enhanced the mainstream media narrative, even if the claims were not verified as correct. Mainstream media narratives position Israel as the victim, all the while not recognizing the existence of the Palestinian residents in Jerusalem living under the violence triangle. As described in Chapter Five, Palestinians are systematically being pushed out of East Jerusalem, while Israeli settlements are flourishing. The use of the violence triangle is exacerbated in this area, settler communities encroaching on Palestinian homes, while Palestinians are targeted as potential terrorists through each move they make, and essentially expelled out of the city through structural violence. This direct, cultural and structural violence, which is experienced on an ongoing basis by the Jerusalemites, came to a head throughout the fall of 2015, when several Palestinian youth were murdered for stabbing Israelis. Sporadic acts of Palestinian violence, as a reaction to the continued Israeli violence triangle, have been at the forefront of the U.S. mainstream media. This framing attempts to maintain the narrative of the aggressive Palestinian without exposing the historical and ongoing triangle of violence that motivated these isolated acts. My work contributes to fields of activism and research by exposing the realities of Israel use of the violence triangle onto the Palestinian people. The significance of my work is that the application of the violence triangle, in regards to the Wall, participates in shifting the dominant narrative. This fear, this cultural violence, of the “potential Palestinian terrorist” has resulted in the murders of several unarmed Palestinians in suspicion of terrorist activity, with whom several were exonerated after

death. Ali Abunimah wrote an article for the *Electronic Intifada* on October 4, 2015 entitled “Death-Chanting Israeli Mob Rejoices as Palestinian Teen is Executed”. This article exposes the mob mentality that exists within the Jerusalem Envelope as the result of rampant cultural violence. As Abunimah explains in regards to the video of a young Palestinian man being shot, “celebratory voices are heard shouting, “Yes! Yes! Son of a bitch!” and “Wow!” and “He’s an Arab!” “Death to the Arabs!” others shout” (2015). The perpetrators of the violence in this video are Israeli settlers and the Israeli police, who take the word of the settler mob, and shoot the Palestinian teen before knowing if he had even committed a crime. This provides more evidence to the ways cultural violence facilitates direct violence towards Palestinians, and how this is exacerbated in the Jerusalem Envelope. These incidents are an increase in direct violence by both the Israeli settlers and soldiers throughout the West Bank, and have exacerbated the cultural violence throughout Israeli society. There is a need to change popular narrative; my work could serve as a resource for this. By analyzing the violence of the Wall in such depth, I challenge the mainstream narrative with the objective of reframing it. Understanding the context to which Palestinians live at the mercy of Israeli violence reinforces the claims for resistance in a nonviolent manner, thus supporting the Palestinian solidarity movement. This study will allow international and Israeli activists communities to identify the violence triangle, and therefore Israeli cultural violence against Palestinians becomes ineffective.

Looking Forward

The newest phase Palestinian resistance is not restricted by the violence triangle in comparison to the struggle against the Wall. Palestinian resistance continues to grow with each struggle; each *intifada* provides lessons for the next in the quest to combat Israeli violence for the goal of self-determination. The struggle against the Wall did not eliminate the violence triangle, but it did develop a strong base of activists, and reinforced the reframing of the narrative. This in turn successfully combated cultural violence against Palestinians within activists' communities, and enlarged the movement. A larger collective of Palestine solidarity activists has proven useful for the next phase of Palestinian anti-occupation resistance, the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) campaign. The BDS movement began on July 9, 2005, and was founded exactly one year after the ICJ decision, which declared the Wall illegal. This is an important, symbolic date, it is apparent that the Wall is a form of Israeli violence that the Palestinian people unite around. It was clear to Palestinian civil society that the resistance to the Wall and the international courts could not combat Israel's Apartheid Wall, or achieve "positive peace," which is the absence of the violence triangle. The limitations of the grassroots movement against the Wall decelerated the resistance aims on the ground due to enhanced Israeli violence. Direct and structural violence repressed those that attempted to continue to struggle on the ground. The Wall was eventually established and actively imprisons the population located in the West Bank. BDS offered an alternative nonviolent resistance movement that Israel could not penetrate using the similar violence. Through the use of large-scale, third party intervention, the BDS campaign relied on the international community to join this new phase of nonviolent struggle. The organizers of

the movement realized that unless Israel was forced, it would never relinquish control over the indigenous Palestinian people or, importantly, their land.

The triangle of violence lacked the ability to impede the BDS movement, as a global structure, direct and structural violence were ineffective. Emulating the successful anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa, this new movement aimed to create a new, global campaign focusing on Israeli apartheid. As it was a continuation, BDS took lessons from the previous resistance movements. BDS recognized the First *Intifada*'s successful economic boycotts, which challenged Israel's economic stability. In the First *Intifada*:

The Palestinian strategy of unlinking the West Bank and Gaza strip from their dependency on the occupier through economic self-reliance had some negative effects on the Israeli economy. For instance, the boycott of Israeli goods resulted in a 40% decline in exports to the occupied territories in 1988, and a \$300 million loss for Israeli businesses (Dudouet, 2008: 16).

Boycotts were largely free of direct and structural violence, though not completely, and effectively coerced Israel into transforming their violence. In addition to lessons from the First *Intifada*, the BDS movement, unlike the anti-Wall struggle, was free of geographic constraints. Direct and structural violence were more difficult for Israel to enforce when the majority of activists resisted outside of Israel's grasp, in international and Israeli communities. Israel did harass prominent Palestinian BDS leaders, but in much more subtle ways.

In accordance with the anti-Wall struggle, and to develop a movement free of internal cultural violence, the Palestinian civil society established BDS as a Palestinian-led movement. According to Omar Barghouti in his book, *BDS: The Global Struggle for Justice*:

More than 170 Palestinian civil society groups, including all major political parties, refugee rights associations, trade union federations, women's unions, NGO networks, and virtually the entire spectrum of grassroots organizations, recalled how people of conscience in the international community have "historically shouldered the moral responsibility to fight injustice, as exemplified in the struggle to abolish apartheid in South Africa," calling upon international civil society organizations and people of conscience all over the world to "impose broad boycotts and implement divestment initiatives against Israel similar to those applied in South Africa in the apartheid era (2011: 5).

Palestinian self-determination is first and foremost a Palestinian cause. Those in solidarity must respect Palestinian leadership as well as their desired goals. As solidarity activists, we must not recreate the violence triangle within the anti-occupation movement, or assert our privilege. Solidarity activists have an important role in the BDS movement, utilizing the myriad of skills, within the context of their communities, strengthens the movement and thus it becomes more effective as a global anti-occupation movement.

As Israel intensifies the violence triangle, the media cannot ignore Israeli violence. Even if the narrative is falsely framed, a larger audience is introduced to Israeli violence, and countless find their way to participate in the BDS campaign. Activists draw their activities from a Palestinian body inside the Occupied Territory, known as the Boycott National Committee, which is the central command of the decentralized resistance movement. The committee has created guidelines for the thousands of global activists supporting the Palestinian people's struggle. As the movement is decentralized and global, and international solidarity activists play a vital role remotely, violence triangle implements do not control the BDS movement. Solidarity activists in various countries demonstrate as they wish in various cultural contexts in partnership with BDS and their guidelines. BDS has operated for over ten years, maintaining the struggle with

increased momentum. In fear of the BDS movement's power, Israel has enlisted its allies to enforce restrictions on the BDS movement, with no success. The use of nonviolent tactics within the BDS movement supports the resistance, and assists in reframing the narrative, which is what Israel is most concerned about. As Israel escalates violence against the Palestinian people, more solidarity activists join the BDS movement. This style of resistance enables those outside the region, and in Israel proper, to engage in a nonviolent struggle for justice and freedom.

In summary, this dissertation has discussed in depth the violence triangle through the establishment of the Wall, and the resistance movement against the Wall from 2002-2013. Israel's use of the violence triangle has aided their political aims of conquering more land, and repressing the Palestinian people, but resistance is still active, Israel has not been able to defeat the Palestinian nonviolent movements. The BDS movement aims to end the occupation and establishing freedom and equality, and as it stands, has the power to do so. The reframing of the narrative has been successful thus far, cultural violence is weakened daily and activists' communities continue to expose Israel's violence. This dissertation will provide them with more authority to do so. However, the end of the occupation is not the end goal. BDS, the struggle against the Wall, and each movement that preceded them, aims for self-determination of the Palestinian people.

Moving forward, the realities on the ground, through the violence triangle, inhibit the prospect of a Palestinian state next to an Israeli state, known as the Two State Solution. This is a direct result of Israel rendering the Green-Line obsolete through the establishment of the Wall and embedding Israeli settlements throughout the West Bank. The first hand experience of living in a structurally violence system underscores to the

Palestinian people located inside the Occupied Territory that two states, in this manner, is not sustainable. As Ali Abunimah notes in *One Country, a Bold Proposal to End the Israel-Palestinian Impasse*,

“The disparities between those with rights and those without become more glaring every day, ordinary Palestinians are being pushed by their own experiences to view the conflict more in terms of individual rights than national rights - and this is more noticeable in the countryside than among Palestinian opinion makers” (2006: 63).

Palestinians have been seeking statehood for several decades, and nationalism has been the impetus for the resistance movements. Israel’s use of the violence triangle has transformed the discussion, and has inadvertently assisted activists on both sides of the Wall in their desire for one democratic state for both the Israeli and Palestinian populations. With no longer a need to maintain an occupation, by way of the violence triangle, one binational state would alleviate the majority of the violence currently experienced. This one-state would eradicate the concept of a state based on religious privilege, but a state based on peace.

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