UAB

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

PhD Thesis

The agency of migrant associations: analysing the variation of migrant influence across transnational processes

Míriam Acebillo-Baqué

Supervised by Eva Kristine Østergaard-Nielsen

PhD Programme in Politics, Policies and International Relations

Institut de Govern i Polítiques Públiques (IGOP)

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Barcelona, November 2018

Abstract

Migrants and migrant organisations are civic and political actors of increasing interest in social science and policy forums as well as in governmental and civil society settings. Yet, at the academic level, there is still a theoretical and empirical challenge concerning how to tackle an analysis of the power hierarchies in which migrants are embedded. Indeed, this is particularly the case when considering migrant collective agency within transnational perspectives. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to these debates by analysing to what degree organisations from the same migrant groups have different levels of agency when performing translocally. The thesis shows that tendencies to think about (civic and political) agency as a function of place and policy structures tends to disregard other internal dimensions that affect the collectives. The main questions that this research addresses are: Which institutional factors and migrant assets underpin the agency of migrant associations? How does the agency of migrant associations change across transnational processes?

The agency of migrant associations is operationalized as having two dimensions: a) presence: the legitimacy and visibility of migrant associations; and b) weight: the capacity to influence the governance of civic and political affairs. The research adapts power frameworks from development studies to the analysis of migrant agency in order to analyse the relations between structure and agency factors affecting migrants. Thus, while migrant transnational engagement has been looked at in studies of transnational politics, this thesis seeks to contribute to our understanding of the agency of migrants by drawing on concepts of power and agency from development studies. I contend that the agency of migrant associations is an outcome of migrant associations' assets and (formal and informal) institutions affecting these associations in co-development processes.

To answer these main questions, the research draws upon co-development processes linking Senegalese migrant associations and localities in Catalonia and Senegal (in Kolda and Dakar). The research focuses on this extreme case to unpack regional variations in policy environment, and differences within the Senegalese community, in order to see how these factors relate to the agency of migrant associations. In accordance with this design, three main arguments guide the research.

First, I argue that policy environments affect how the agency of migrant associations changes across localities within the same region and translocally. Different findings support this argument. Regarding localities in residence, results suggest that even though nurturing co-development may be a strategy to overcome more exclusionary local contexts regarding migrant civic engagement, this type of policy approach does not necessarily lead to more visibility of migrant associations. In the context of the country origin, it is found that – consistent with approaches that show awareness of the problems state penetration can have at local levels in Senegal, hometown transnationalism may be 'under the radar' when observing regional and municipal dynamics. Moreover, the findings show contrasting perceptions of the legitimacy of migrant associations in localities of residence or (rural) origin. Overall, migrant

associations have less presence in Kolda than in the other localities at the municipal level.

The second argument is that the assets of the migrant associations (human, organisational and financial) influence their presence in origin and residence contexts. The analysis of assets uncovers the civic and political presence of migrant associations in Kolda that remained invisible when analysing formal institutions at municipal and regional levels. The findings support the importance of factors such as level of education or gender for migrant transnationalism. However, research shows how the informal institutions affecting societies in Senegal - such as allegiance/nobility systems, chieftaincy and kin systems - traverse assets and consequently affect the agency of migrant associations.

The third argument of the research is based on an analysis of the relationship between assets and weight of migrant associations in origin. According to the results, I argue that although co-development processes do lead to presence of migrant associations in origin - expressed either through more formal or assets-based mechanisms, at different governance levels including the village - it is rare for them to challenge social inequalities.

The theoretical framework helps reveal these dynamics, and opens the possibility of analysing the agency of migrant associations in different groups and contexts. By bridging empowerment and agency frameworks of analysis with structure-agency debates in migration studies, the framework aims to enhance the dialogue between these fields of knowledge.

Resum

Les persones migrants i les organitzacions de migrants són actors cívics i polítics de creixent interès en els fòrums de ciències socials, així com en entorns governamentals i de la societat civil. Malgrat això, a nivell acadèmic, encara suposa un desafiament teòric i empíric com abordar una anàlisi de les jerarquies de poder en què estan integrats els migrants. En particular, aquest és el cas quan es considera l'agència col·lectiva migrant des de perspectives transnacionals. L'objectiu d'aquesta tesi és contribuir a aquests debats tot comprenent fins a quin punt les organitzacions d'un mateix grup de migrants tenen diferents nivells d'agència quan actuen translocalment. La tesi mostra que les tendències a pensar en l'agència (cívica i política) com a funció del lloc i de les estructures polítiques poden ignorar altres dimensions internes que afecten als col·lectius migrants. Les principals preguntes que aborda aquesta investigació són: Quins factors institucionals i actius de migrants sustenten l'agència d'associacions de migrants? Com canvia l'agència de les associacions de migrants en els processos transnacionals?

L'agència d'associacions de migrants s'operacionalitza en dues dimensions: a) presència: legitimitat i visibilitat de les associacions de migrants; i b) pes: capacitat d'influir en la governança dels afers cívics i polítics. La investigació adapta marcs de poder d'estudis de desenvolupament a l'anàlisi de l'agència d'associacions de migrants per estudiar les relacions entre estructura-agència que els afecten. Per tant, tot i que el compromís transnacional dels migrants ja ha estat estudiat considerat en estudis sobre política transnacional, aquesta tesi vol contribuir a la comprensió de l'agència dels migrants a partir de conceptes de poder i d'agència treballats en estudis de desenvolupament. Sostinc que l'agència d'associacions de migrants és conseqüència dels actius de les associacions de migrants i de les institucions (formals i informals) que afecten aquestes associacions en els processos de codesenvolupament.

Per respondre a les preguntes principals, es prenen processos de codesenvolupament que vinculen a les associacions de migrants senegalesos i les localitats a Catalunya i Senegal (a Kolda i Dakar). La investigació se centra en aquest cas extrem per cercar variacions regionals en l'entorn polític i diferències dins de la comunitat senegalesa, per tal de veure com aquests factors es relacionen amb l'agència de les associacions de migrants. D'acord amb aquest disseny, tres arguments principals guien la investigació.

En primer lloc, sostinc que els entorns de polítiques afecten la forma en què l'agència d'associacions de migrants canvia en les localitats dins de la mateixa regió i de manera translocal. Diferents troballes donen suport a aquest argument. En relació a les localitats de residència, els resultats suggereixen que encara que el codesenvolupament pot ser una estratègia per superar contextos locals més tendents a l'exclusió respecte al compromís cívic migrant, la política no necessàriament du a una major visibilitat de les associacions de migrants en comparació amb els contextos locals que són, en general, més inclusius. En el context del país d'origen, es troba que, en coherència amb enfocaments que mostren els problemes en la penetració de l'estat senegalès al nivell local, el transnacionalisme local pot quedar desapercebut en observar dinàmiques a nivell regional i municipal. A més, les troballes mostren percepcions contrastades pel que fa a la legitimitat de les associacions de migrants a

les localitats de residència o origen (rural). En general, les associacions de migrants tenen menys presència en Kolda que en altres localitats a nivell municipal.

El segon argument és que els actius de les associacions de migrants influeixen en la seva presència en contextos d'origen i residència. L'anàlisi d'actius mostra presència cívica i política de les associacions de migrants a Kolda que romangué invisible en analitzar les institucions formals a nivell municipal i regional. Els resultats donen suport a la importància de factors com ara el nivell d'educació o el gènere per al transnacionalisme migrant. No obstant això, la investigació mostra com altres institucions informals que afecten les societats al Senegal, com els sistemes de lleialtat/noblesa, de caps tradicionals i els sistemes de parentiu, travessen actius i, per tant, també afecten l'agència d'associacions de migrants.

El tercer argument de la investigació es basa en una anàlisi de la relació entre els actius i el pes de les associacions de migrants en origen. D'acord amb els resultats, sostinc que encara que els processos de codesenvolupament porten a la presència d'associacions de migrants en origen, no sempre aquests processos desafien desigualtats socials.

El marc teòric ajuda a desemmascarar aquestes dinàmiques i obre la possibilitat d'analitzar l'agència d'associacions de migrants en diferents grups i contextos. En proposar una mirada que complementa marcs d'anàlisi sobre l'agència i l'empoderament, amb debats sobre estructura i agència en els estudis de migració, el marc apunta a millorar el diàleg entre aquests camps de coneixement.

Resumen

Las personas migrantes y las organizaciones de migrantes son actores cívicos y políticos de creciente interés en los foros de ciencias sociales, así como en entornos gubernamentales y de la sociedad civil. Sin embargo, a nivel académico, todavía supone un desafío teórico y empírico cómo abordar un análisis de las jerarquías de poder en las que están integrados los migrantes. En particular, este es el caso cuando se considera la agencia colectiva migrante desde perspectivas transnacionales. El objetivo de esta tesis es contribuir a estos debates comprendiendo hasta qué punto las organizaciones de un mismo grupo de migrantes tienen diferentes niveles de agencia cuando actúan translocalmente. La tesis muestra que las tendencias a pensar en la agencia (cívica y política) como función del lugar y de las estructuras políticas pueden ignorar otras dimensiones internas que afectan a los colectivos migrantes. Las principales preguntas que aborda esta investigación son: ¿Qué factores institucionales y activos de migrantes sustentan la agencia de asociaciones de migrantes? ¿Cómo cambia la agencia de las asociaciones de migrantes en los procesos transnacionales?

La agencia de asociaciones de migrantes se operacionaliza en dos dimensiones: a) presencia: legitimidad y visibilidad de las asociaciones de migrantes; y b) peso: capacidad de influir en la gobernanza de los asuntos cívicos y políticos. La investigación adapta marcos de poder de estudios de desarrollo al análisis de la agencia de asociaciones de migrantes para estudiar las relaciones entre estructura-agencia que les afectan. Por lo tanto, aunque el compromiso transnacional de los migrantes ya ha sido estudiado considerado en estudios sobre política transnacional, esta tesis busca contribuir a la comprensión de la agencia de los migrantes a partir de conceptos de poder y de agencia trabajados en estudios de desarrollo. Sostengo que la agencia de asociaciones de migrantes es consecuencia de los activos de las asociaciones de migrantes y de las instituciones (formales e informales) que afectan a estas asociaciones en los procesos de codesarrollo.

Para responder a las preguntas principales, se toman procesos de codesarrollo que vinculan a las asociaciones de migrantes senegaleses y las localidades en Cataluña y Senegal (en Kolda y Dakar). La investigación se centra en este caso extremo para revelar variaciones regionales en el entorno político y diferencias dentro de la comunidad senegalesa, a fin de ver cómo estos factores se relacionan con la agencia de las asociaciones de migrantes. De acuerdo con este diseño, tres argumentos principales guían la investigación.

En primer lugar, sostengo que los entornos de políticas afectan la forma en que la agencia de asociaciones de migrantes cambia en las localidades dentro de la misma región y de manera translocal. Diferentes hallazgos apoyan este argumento. En relación a las localidades de residencia, los resultados sugieren que aunque el codesarrollo puede ser una estrategia para superar contextos locales más tendentes a la exclusión con respecto al compromiso cívico migrante, la política no necesariamente lleva a una mayor visibilidad de las asociaciones de migrantes en comparación con los contextos locales que son, en general, más inclusivos. En el contexto del país de origen, se encuentra que, en coherencia con enfoques que muestran los problemas en la penetración del estado senegalés en el nivel local, el transnacionalismo local puede quedar desapercibido al observar dinámicas a nivel

regional y municipal. Además, los hallazgos muestran percepciones contrastadas en cuanto a la legitimidad de las asociaciones de migrantes en las localidades de residencia u origen (rural). En general, las asociaciones de migrantes tienen menos presencia en Kolda que en otras localidades a nivel municipal.

El segundo argumento es que los activos de las asociaciones de migrantes influyen en su presencia en contextos de origen y residencia. El análisis de activos revela presencia cívica y política de las asociaciones de migrantes en Kolda que permaneció invisible al analizar las instituciones formales a nivel municipal y regional. Los resultados apoyan la importancia de factores como el nivel de educación o el género para el transnacionalismo migrante. Sin embargo, la investigación muestra cómo otras instituciones informales que afectan a las sociedades en Senegal, como los sistemas de lealtad/nobleza, de jefes tradicionales y los sistemas de parentesco, atraviesan activos y, por lo tanto, también afectan la agencia de asociaciones de migrantes.

El tercer argumento de la investigación se basa en un análisis de la relación entre los activos y el peso de las asociaciones de migrantes en origen. De acuerdo con los resultados, sostengo que aunque los procesos de codesarrollo llevan a la presencia de asociaciones de migrantes en origen, no siempre estos procesos desafían desigualdades sociales.

El marco teórico ayuda a revelar estas dinámicas y abre la posibilidad de analizar la agencia de asociaciones de migrantes en diferentes grupos y contextos. Al proponer una mirada que complementa marcos de análisis sobre la agencia y el empoderamiento, con debates sobre estructura y agencia en los estudios de migración, el marco apunta a mejorar el diálogo entre estos campos de conocimiento.

Ackowledgements

I have often regretted how solitary I have found the completion of this doctoral thesis. But, despite this, the process is proof of the fact that it is very difficult to do worthwhile things without people accompanying us on the way. This document is the result of a long process, which has only been possible thanks to the support of many people. That support has been given to me in many different ways and in many different places.

First, I must thank Eva Østergaard-Nielsen for having travelled along this road with me, without allowing me to lose hope that I would one day finish the thesis. With her I have learned a great deal about what it means to undertake research and what kind of analytical and ethical processes this involves. She has a wonderful capacity for critical and rigorous analysis. She has been a dedicated, demanding and detailed supervisor, who has got to the bottom of the important issues. Since this work has also taken time and life has moved on for us both, I must thank you, Eva, for listening, caring and supporting these changes and, above all, on a personal level.

During the field work in Catalonia and Senegal, many people participated and gave me access to their time, to information, and even to their home. To the representatives of associations, to the assemblies of the villages in Kolda, to workers and representatives of local governments, to the *Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament*, representatives of civil society, and to academics and experts involved in the processes studied: many thanks to all of you for your generosity. Given the challenges involved for me in doing field work in southern Senegal, I want to offer special gratitude to Bourahima Diao. He was a key person who helped me carry out the field work in Kolda. I could not have undertaken as many things as I did without his logistical and technical support.

To Patricia Landolt, who welcomed me during a stay at the University of Toronto from March to September 2014, I would like to say thank you so very much.

The IGOP has been a warm place in which to study and learn. In addition, during these last months, it has also been crucial in helping me finish the thesis. In the IGOP there are bonds of solidarity that are migrant-based and women-based in nature. I am honoured to have been able to weave a part of this web. Alejandra Peña, Carolina Muñoz, Yuni Salazar: you are the next, so let's stand up! The support of Lara Maestripieri has also been key. Thank you.

I would also like to thank the comments from two external reviewers, Domenica Farinella and Francesco Della Puppa. You have known my circumstances and you have given me prompt answers. Mike Aiken has also made my thesis much better by correcting my English.

For most of the time that I was undertaking the thesis I have been linked into other projects. For example, I worked until 2013 at the School for Culture of Peace of the UAB. It has been a pleasure to be able to see friends and colleagues often, in corridors, these recent months. Cécile Barbeito and Marina Caireta: thank you very

Agraïments

Sovint he lamentat com n'és de solitària la realització d'una tesi doctoral. Però, tot i així, el procés és prova de que és molt difícil fer coses que mereixen la pena sense que hi hagi gent que ens acompanyi. Aquest document és fruit d'un procés llarg, que ha estat possible gràcies al suport de molta gent. Els recolzaments m'han estat brindats en diferents formes, i llocs.

Primer, he d'agrair a l'Eva Østergaard-Nielsen que hagi recorregut aquest camí amb mi, sense fer-me perdre l'esperança que un dia acabaria la tesi. Amb ella he après molt sobre què significa investigar i quin tipus de processos analítics i ètics comporta. Té una capacitat meravellosa per a l'anàlisi crítica i rigorosa. És una supervisora dedicada, exigent i detallista, que ha anat al fons de les qüestions. A més, com això ens ha dut temps i la vida ens ha passat entremig, vull agrair-li que hagi sabut escoltar, cuidar, recolzar canvis, també (i sobretot) a nivell personal.

En el treball de camp a Catalunya i al Senegal, moltes persones han participat donant-me temps, accés a informació i fins i tot accés a casa seva. Als representants d'associacions, a les assemblees dels pobles a Kolda, a treballadores i representants de governs locals, al Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament, representants de societat civil, acadèmiques i coneixedores dels processos estudiats: Moltes gràcies a totes per la vostra generositat. Donat el repte que va suposar per a mi el treball de camp al sud del Senegal, vull mostrar una gratitud especial a en Bourahima Diao. Va ser una persona clau per poder dur a terme la recerca a Kolda. Sense el seu suport logístic i tècnic no hagués pogut fer tantes coses com vaig fer, sense cap mena de dubte.

La Patricia Landolt em va acollir en una estada a la Universitat de Toronto des de març fins al setembre de 2014. Moltes gràcies.

L'IGOP sempre ha estat un lloc càlid en el que estar i aprendre. En aquests darrers mesos, a més a més, ha estat crucial per ajudar-me a acabar la tesi. A l'IGOP he conegut llaços de solidaritat migrant i de dones. Em sento honorada d'haver pogut teixir una part de la teranyina. Alejandra Peña, Carolina Muñoz, Yuni Salazar: vosaltres sou les següents, així que, estem en posició vertical! El suport de Lara Maestripieri també ha estat clau. Gràcies.

M'agradaria també agrair els comentaris de dos revisors externs, la Domenica Farinella i en Francesco Della Puppa. Heu sabut comprendre les meves circumstàncies i m'heu donat resposta amb rapidesa. En Mike Aiken també ha fet que la meva tesi fos molt millor en haver corregit el meu anglès.

Durant la major part del temps que abasta la tesi he estat vinculada amb altres projectes. Per exemple, vaig treballar fins al 2013 a l'Escola de Cultura de Pau de la UAB. Ha estat un gust poder veure-us sovint, en passadissos, aquests darrers mesos. Cécile Barbeito i Marina Caireta: moltes gràcies per facilitar-me el treball de tesi (per exemple durant el treball de camp del Senegal). També per ser-hi sempre.

Dedication

To people moved by hope.

Per al Bernat.

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

PART I. INTRODUCTION, THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

1 Introduction

People who are born in Senegal are the most numerous group of citizens from Sub-Saharan countries in France, Italy and Spain[1]. These countries, taken together with Ghana, are the top destinations for Senegalese international migrants (ANSD, 2014; UN/DESA, 2015). The background and migration paths of these Senegalese citizens in France, Italy and Spain are different, and have resulted in different associational ecologies. However, despite this fact, the research shows the extent to which the Senegalese migrant organisations in all three contexts have been highly involved in co-development (Datola, 2014; Grillo and Riccio, 2004; Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016).

Catalonia is currently an autonomous community (also called a region, in this dissertation) and part of the decentralised Spanish system. It was one of the first places in which Senegalese settled when they arrived in the country. Since 2000, around 30% of all Senegalese-born people that live in Spain reside in Catalonia. The region displayed similar trends to those encountered in Spain during 2000-2010. Thus, in terms of migration, 2,9% of the Catalan total population was foreign born in 2000, while that percentage had changed to 15,95% in 2010[2]. Meanwhile, local governmental bodies had a devolved competence to undertake international development during this period. The overall spending on foreign development assistance increased until the spending cuts, due to the economic crisis, were felt dramatically at regional and national levels. In this context, during the period under study, which was mainly from 2000 to 2014, Catalan local co-development practices

---

[1] According to the UN estimations, in 2010 there were 108.986 Senegalese in France, 84.901 in Italy, and 56.348 in Spain. In 2015, there were 117.870 Senegalese in France, 84.815 in Italy, 49.383 in Spain (UN/DESA, 2015).
[2] Data from the Catalan Institute of Statistics, Idescat: https://www.idescat.cat/poblacioestrangera/?b=0 [last accessed 07/November/2018].

were probably the most structured attempts in Spain to tackle a policy area that was still weak at the national level when compared to France. At the same time, in spite of processes of co-optation and migration control examined in other regions of the country (Cebolla-Boado and López-Sala, 2015), the Catalan governments both at the regional and local level have aimed to connect co-development policies to aspects of citizenship and migrant incorporation (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011).

In parallel to the importance of international migrants' economic remittances, international Senegalese migrants were being courted by their national government of origin. Indeed, two overall trends in Senegal are highlighted within the frame of this research. First, the on-going decentralisation process in Senegal increased incentives for citizens (and also migrants) to participate at the local level and run for local elections. Moreover, this research shows, how, in some regions, there were also governmental outreach approaches directed at migrants. Second, since 2000, there has been an increase in governmental approaches to tackling how Senegalese emigrants can participate politically at the national level. The national initiatives have recently attained new levels. Hence, after the 2016 referendum that allowed direct representation of the Senegalese abroad, the 2017 legislative elections to the assembly added 15 seats for members of the country's diaspora, bringing the total size of the chamber to 165 representatives.

Therefore, during the period under study migrant Senegalese who lived in Catalonia have been embedded in contexts where there was some degree of outreach to migrants, both in the sending and host countries. At the same time, despite their relative vulnerability in residence contexts, some migrant associations have been able to navigate the institutional context and become visible at a civic and political level. Nevertheless, they have done so to different degrees.

The assumption that migrants play a role in the development of their countries of origin is discursively played out within understandings of co-development. Indeed, the policy perspective has been praised as a mechanism by which governments in host-countries can enhance the capacities of migrants to become development agents. Co-development emerged in the European context during the 1990s, within the framework of an optimistic phase of the migration and development nexus, and is

seen as the quintessential public policy approach to linking both migration and development (de Haas, 2010a; Ewijk and Nijenhuis, 2016; Faist and Fauser, 2011; Grillo and Riccio, 2004; Lacroix, 2009; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011).

However, academically, there have been questions raised about the power dynamics operating in those settings in which migrants and migrant associations are embedded and – especially in cases where they are acting transnationally – there is still a need for further exploration concerning the degree to which these transnational practices reproduce or challenge established hierarchies of power (Goldring 2002). This research aims to contribute to this comprehension by addressing how migrant associations influence civic and political affairs in what are, from now on, referred to as contexts of origin and residence[3]. Thus, this research takes co-development processes as the point of departure to explore how migrant associations deploy their agency while navigating institutional contexts relating to settlement and origin. It does so by studying the extreme case of Senegalese migrant associations operating as actors in co-development processes that link Catalan and Senegalese localities.

The approach taken to the investigation in this thesis was to focus on the local level and to take a comparative perspective. The main argument of the research is that migrant associations' agency (among the same national group) varies across localities within the same settlement region and also within the regions of origin. Thus, the agency of a given migrant association varies translocally. The agency of migrant associations changes not only due to the fact that the policy context and formal institutions are different, but also because the weight and expressions observed through the assets of migrant associations changes with place of location as well.

The focus of this research is placed on first generation migrant associations – most of them hometown associations – that are funded by local governments in the country of residence. I have chosen to study five co-development processes that link: local origins (for example, localities in the Senegalese regions of peripheral Kolda and central Dakar) and residence contexts (represented in four Catalan localities).

---

[3] Throughout the dissertation, I use the expressions 'origin' and 'residence'/'settlement'/'host' (even if sometimes ambivalent and referring to different situations) to refer to the contexts where migrant Senegalese were born and to the places outside Senegalese borders were they are settled.

Examining the processes in these different sites represent a key feature in the research design. Moreover, the analysis is fed by literatures that examine both migrant political transnationalism and the civic and political engagement of migrants in host countries. I aim to contribute to understandings in these strands of research by engaging, first with the debate on structure and agency in migration studies and, second, by adapting frameworks to provide an analysis of empowerment processes elaborated within contemporary development studies.

In the following parts of this chapter, more detail is given regarding the basic pillars of this research. Thus, the next part (section 1) delimits the topic of the research, its research questions and main concepts. Section 1.2. introduces the main debates addressed by the research which will be expanded in chapter 2. Then, section 1.3. outlines the methodological approach of the research, and presents the main characteristics of contexts and actors at the centre of the stage. To conclude, section 1.4. explains how the remainder of the dissertation is organised.

1.1 Topic, research questions and core concepts

1.1.1 Topic and research questions

This research explores how migrant associations exert influence across transnational processes. It is framed by the dialogue in the literature that aims to understand the relationship between migration and development, and, thus, engages with the so-called migration and development 'nexus'. This nexus has oscillated between pessimistic and optimistic views over the past five decades, and even though we might be in transition towards a pessimistic new phase at the policy level, the phenomenon researched here can be framed within the optimistic discourse (de Haas, 2010a; Faist, 2008; Skeldon, 2008). Irrespective of whether we are in a pessimistic or optimistic phase, the failure to link the more descriptive field of migration within more general theories of development and social change, as detected more than fifteen years ago by authors in the field, seems to be still on-going (de Haas, 2014; Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002). In relation to this, there are claims for locating either the migration-development debate or migration theories in broader perspectives of social transformation or social change (Castles, 2010; de Haas, 2010a).

Migrants, either individually or organised as transnational collective actors, have emerged as significant development agents in the above debates, especially during the last decade of the emerging nexus that involves migration and development. The policy-making arena has tended to claim that migrants have a strong potential for the development of their countries of origin[4], and remittances or circular migration have been at the forefront of the debate concerning how to make migration work for the development of the Global South (de Haas, 2010a; Faist, 2008; Portes, 2009). The research in the field takes a more nuanced stance to the on-going processes of migrant participation in the development of societies of origin and residence.

Regarding this topic, and framed within the literature that will be explored further during this chapter and the next, the main research question that this project seeks to address is:

How do migrant associations exert influence, in residence and origin contexts, within transnational (co-development) processes?

The research sub-questions are:
- Which institutional factors and migrant assets underpin the agency of migrant associations?
- How does the agency of migrant associations change across co-development processes?

Exploring these questions entails looking for the key issues behind the variation of the influence of migrant associations across various localities which are, in turn, linked through co-development processes (understood as transnational processes) but also across migrant associations. The influence of migrant associations is exerted

---

[4] In fact, this idea is still present in the newest international and multilateral debates such as those reflected in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted on 2015 and in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants adopted by the UN General Assembly on September 2016. The latter statement recognises, for instance, 'the positive contribution made by migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development' (The UN General Assembly, 2016, pp. 1–2). In article 46, the declaration expands the point and states that the signatories would like migrant contributions to development 'to be more widely recognized and indeed, strengthened in the context of implementation of the 2030 Agenda' (The UN General Assembly, 2016 art.46).

through them exercising their agency. The next subsection gives a definition of the main concepts entailed in this research.

1.1.2 Definition of core concepts

Key concepts in this thesis are 'co-development processes', 'migrant associations' and 'agency of migrant associations'. These are now examined in turn.

In a primary, broad approach, co-development processes refer to transnational practices and policies aiming to link migration and development (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011). In this dissertation, from a more operationalized perspective, a co-development process is appraised in two main and complementary ways. First, co-development is problematised as a public policy area, involving localities in countries of residence and origin, that aims at an outcome from the interaction between migration and development. On the other hand, it is also understood as a practice encompassing transnational projects and activities that aim to have an impact on development (within which migrants are intended to play a role) and that are (partially or totally) funded by public government institutions in host countries. Because co-development is funded with public monies – in the form of grants – and aims to foster development goals, these type of practices follow the criteria of what is called official development assistance, or official aid[5].

To define migrant associations, I will first delineate the meanings of 'migrant' and 'association' respectively. It is important to recognise, when using the term 'migrant', that there is an array of context-dependent inequalities that are related to occupying a subaltern position in host societies. However, the word is also used to refer primarily to those who are foreign-born as this is their main difference in comparison to the

---

[5] The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines Official Development Assistance (ODA) as those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients which are:
'i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and
ii. each transaction of which:
a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and
b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).'
(…) 'ODA can flow directly from a donor to a recipient country (bilateral ODA) or be provided via a multilateral agency (multilateral ODA).'
From: http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/intro-to-oda.htm [last access March 9 2018]

native-born in terms of legal status and access to formal membership through citizenship (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a). Meanwhile, an association is understood here as an organized named group that is non-profit in nature – and to a certain degree autonomous from the market and the state spheres – whose members join on a voluntary basis with a common aim based on a particular or general interest. Following this definition, drawing upon the work of Fennema, an association is 'migrant' (he calls it 'ethnic') when, at a minimum, about half of its members or half of its leadership is of migrant origin, including first and second generations (Fennema, 2004, p. 440). Migrant associations are an expression of migrant civil society, which refers to migrant-led membership organisations or public non-governmental institutions (Fox and Bada, 2008, p. 443). Hometown associations (widely called HTA in the literature focused on this type of actors), is a type of migrant association which is locality-based (Moya, 2005). Some authors also call HTA topophilic associations or organisations, as they are formed by people from the same community of origin (Fox and Bada, 2008; Iskander, 2015). Many of the migrant associations studied in this research are hometown associations.

The definition of migrant associations used in this research does not include associations mainly devoted to work with, or for, migrants when these associations are mostly composed and led by citizens born in the residence country (Spaniards, in this case). All of the associations studied here have accessed local assistance funds from Catalan municipalities. This entails a bias, first, towards formalized organizations (normally, accessing local funds implies, or at least, being registered in local municipal registers) and, second, towards associations that have among their aims the intention to work transnationally with their contexts of origin.

The agency of a migrant association is defined as: *the capacity of a migrant association to exert some degree of influence on civic and political affairs*. The comprehension used here is informed by accounts on the relationship between structure and agency, and relational views on empowerment and empowerment frameworks proposed by development scholars (Alsop et al., 2006; Kabeer, 1999; Sewell, 1992). The agency of migrant associations interacts with structures that are defined as formal and informal institutions as well as migrant associations' assets. These can be understood as financial, organisational or human assets. I observe the

effects of this 'action in origin' and 'action in settlement localities' by looking at two components related to civic and political stratification of organisations as outlined in Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad's work. These components are, namely, the 'presence' and 'weight' of migrant associations (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a, pp. 19–22). On the one hand, 'presence' is understood as the visibility and legitimacy of migrant associations in civic and political affairs. On the other hand, 'weight' refers to migrant associations having actual influence on civic and political affairs. Thus, I differentiate between potential and actual performance of migrant associations. The theoretical underpinnings and operationalization of the concept are discussed in chapter 2.

The next subsections sketch the main debates to which the dissertation aims to contribute.

1.2   Main debates addressed by the dissertation

1.2.1   Structure-agency debates as a pluralist approach to the migration and development nexus

Migration and development studies are both multidisciplinary branches of social science that have been courting with each other since the last century. Scholars dealing with the faces and nature of the migration-development nexus have established different historical revisions (de Haas, 2010a; Faist, 2008; Nyberg Sørensen, 2012)[6]. These works reveal the need to, first, contextualise the debate as a function of time and, second, support the idea that shifts on the migration-development nexus are correlated to shifts in development ideology. But, these ideas also consider the risk of exploiting a buzzword without bearing in mind previous accounts (de Haas, 2010a). Moreover, scholars have highlighted that, even though the debate has been on the political and academic desk throughout the post-war years in Europe, over the last fifteen years we have been living in a period of renewed interest in the migration-development nexus at the academic level.

---

[6] For further discussion regarding the historical evolution of the theoretical foundations of the migration-development nexus, de Haas classifies the different 'optimistic' and 'pessimistic' academic contributions concerning how migration affects development in the following terms: structuralist approaches (gathering pessimistic views to migration such as Neo-marxist, Dependency theories); functionalist approaches (overall optimistic perspectives, such as Neo-Classical, Developmentalist theory); and pluralist approaches of social theory (de Haas, 2010a). Pluralist strands will be expanded upon later in the text.

The last optimistic phase in the relationship between development and migration within the policy field can be situated in the 90s (Faist and Fauser, 2011; King and Collyer, 2016). However, authors locate the boom in research relating to this the field as between 2001-2002 (de Haas, 2010a; Faist, 2008). According to the literature, there are many arguments that may underlie this higher attention to the relationship between development and migration. Firstly, the security concerns after the 9/11 2001 attacks can be considered. These events resulted in the strengthening of migration control and development aid (Faist, 2007; Nyberg Sørensen, 2012). Secondly, there is a belief in conventional policy discourses that remittances – understood here, generally, as flows of money, knowledge and universal ideas – carry an important potential for what is called development of developing countries[7] (de Haas, 2010a; Faist, 2008). This idea implies that financial remittances are seen as playing a substantial role in poverty reduction, notably from the view that they represent larger flows of economic resources than Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries. Thirdly, besides financial remittances playing the leading role in policy and academic fields concerned with this subject, scholars have explored in the literature the potential positive effects of social and human transfers (usually referred to in terms of capital, or social and collective, remittances) (Goldring, 2004; Levitt, 1998; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011). This is consistent with policy-making claims stating that migrants have a strong potential for the development of their countries of origin (de Haas, 2010a; Faist, 2008; Portes, 2009). In this vein, co-development policy-making is inserted into this optimistic round of the migration and development nexus within a phase that started in the 90s (Faist and Fauser, 2011).

Nevertheless, a shift towards more negative conceptions at the policy-field level is identified within scholarship (Haas, 2012; King and Collyer, 2016)[8]. Indeed, taking

---

[7] Developed vs. developing countries is a contested expression but often used in the policy documents and academic scholarship. I will also refer to Global South countries.
[8] We will be entering a Fourth phase of thinking around the migration and development nexus. The previous stages being: First (1950s-1960s), a focus on the policy side on migration for covering labour gaps in the North with migrant workers, and an optimistic potential attributed to remittances and return of migrants. Second, (1970s-1980s), from a dependency approach, migration was leading to underdevelopment (there were concerns regarding the 'brain drain' characterise in this perspective). Third, (1990s-underway?), a positive role of financial remittances and migrants, is envisaged with return and circular migration and a 'celebration of transnational circulation' (Faist and Fauser, 2011).

into account recent visible processes – such as the European migrant and refuge crisis since 2015, or Trump's approach towards migration since he assumed the USA presidency in 2017 – hegemonic policy discourses may reflect the fact that there is a change of tendency underway. As Nyberg-Sørensen sensed as early as 2012:

> 'It may be that the international development discourse has shifted from development to curtail migration, to migration in support of development, but as more powerful actors – in particular, international security organizations and private surveillance companies – have entered the scene, it is very likely that the pendulum soon will swing back the other way.' (Nyberg Sørensen, 2012, p. 72).

From a theoretical perspective, one can identify diverse critiques and explanatory problems relating to both optimistic and pessimistic approaches towards the development and migration nexus. Notably, 'optimistic' views encompassing functionalist or neoclassical perspectives are blind to power relationships and neglect the context-specific nature of the processes studied (de Haas, 2010a). Moreover, 'pessimistic' structuralist accounts are weak in grasping the new relationships brought by globalisation. Both views share the weakness of assuming pre-modern societies as immobile and isolated. They also share the assumption that there is a unique path towards development, to be followed by all countries (de Haas, 2010b, p. 13).

Nevertheless, empirical work in the 1980s and 1990s started revealing the 'heterogenous, non-deterministic nature of migration impacts on development' and the need to work through a comprehension beyond the binary optimistic vs. pessimistic positions (de Haas, 2010a, p. 241). Thus, migration and development is currently seen as linked by non-linear but complex relationships, and authors such as Castles highlight the need to understand both phenomena through a social transformation perspective (Castles, 2010).

These last views signal the fact that, instead of aligning to grand schools of thought, current debates on the migration and development nexus involve more hybrid strands. Some scholars call these current approaches as 'integrative', and include perspectives such as the New Economics Labour Migration (NELM); systems; networks; and cumulative causation theories (Bakewell, 2010, p. 1692). Others use the expression

'pluralists' (de Haas, 2010a) to describe various processes – which includes NELM, livelihood approaches (extensively discussed in development studies and development policymaking) and transnational perspectives as contributing to the analysis of the nexus. Within this current period, some scholarship think that in parallel to the impossibility of having unique migration theory, the selection of analytical approaches depends on the context in which they are applied (Castles, 2010).

The pluralistic strands share the view that recognises the importance of simultaneously analysing both structure and agency when comprehending migration-development relations. Indeed, some authors claim that focusing on how structure-agency intertwine is a mechanism to better grasp the heterogeneity of the nexus (Bakewell, 2010; Castles, 2010; de Haas, 2010a). Some contributions from migration studies use middle-ground perspectives (mostly represented by Giddens, Bourdieu, Archer accounts) on structure-agency (to understand why people move) that are well-worked out at the theoretical level (Bakewell, 2010; Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Morawska, 2001). In this vein, other authors have focused on a structure-agency approach to explore the plural cultural or communicative embedding of transnational migrants (Kelly and Lusis, 2006; Lacroix, 2014). Notwithstanding these contributions, I argue that migrant political transnationalism is still under-explored by means of the theoretical devices of structure-agency debates in social sciences. The present project aims to contribute to this gap. A wider exploration on the structure-agency debate is undertaken in chapter 2.

1.2.2   Transnational perspectives and political transnationalism

<u>Transnational perspectives</u>

Major accounts of transnational perspectives to migration started emerging in the 1990s (Basch et al., 1994; Levitt, 2001; Portes et al., 1999). They are located within pluralist or hybrid approaches to the comprehension of the migration and development nexus (de Haas, 2010a). One of the fundamental contributions of transnational perspectives to migration studies is that migration happens to be understood as a social process linking together countries of origin and destination.

Thus, the approaches of transnationalism towards migration could be characterised as moving away from a binary comprehension of the phenomena whereby migrants are either seen as immigrants or emigrants (Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002, p. 14). Therefore, by questioning dichotomies such as origin/destination, or categories such as 'permanent', 'temporary' or 'return', transnationalism has challenged assimilationist approaches to immigrant integration, 'as well as the modernist political construct of the nation-state and citizenship' (de Haas, 2010a, p. 247).

The present project is concerned with transnationalisation and the transnational perspective to migration. In fact, I consider that international development processes constitute, generally, a transnational activity. The concept of transnationalism can be defined as referring to 'occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation' (Portes et al., 1999, p. 219). Another more relational definition understands transnationalism as 'sustained cross-border relationships, patterns of exchange, affiliations and social formations spanning nation-states' (Vertovec, 2009, p. 2). Bearing in mind these two previous definitions, migrant transnationalism refers to those transnational practices, social relations or structures initiated/led by migrants (Goldring, 2002). Besides this, transnationalisation involves processes where not only states, but also non-state actors, maintain 'cross-border ties, events and processes across the borders of several national states' (Faist, 2010, p. 1668).

There are objections directed to transnational accounts because, when analysing the relationship between migrant agency and transnational social structures, these accounts tend to neglect how this agency is embedded in governmental public institutions. Therefore, they lean towards looking at processes as detached from the state, and thus transnational perspectives are being used mostly 'to characterise social systems that were closed around themselves, finding the resources to reproduce themselves in the areas of informality, dubious legality and avoidance of national legislation' (Lacroix, 2009, p. 1666). In the case of this dissertation, transnational processes are participated in, modified by and created by, not only migrant actors and non-migrant civil society, but also by governments and especially at the local level. This interest can be connected to the concern for finding evidence on whether

transnational ties and formations can produce institutional change at local, national and international levels of transnational spaces (Faist, 2010, p. 1666).

Meanings of political transnationalism

Work undertaken on civic and political engagement of migrant collectives and migrant transnationalism feeds into this research. This subsection focuses on comprehensions of migrant political transnationalism that emerge from the literature. In chapter 2 the focus is placed on strands of various sets of explanatory factors that are related to migrant transnationalism by existing scholarship.

Scholarly accounts derived from Europe and North America have different traditions regarding the subject, and therefore have examined these dynamics from different angles (Martinello and Lafleur, 2008; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a; Portes, 2015). For instance, there has been less research and attention to the transnational dimension of politics in Europe than in America, and even less has arisen from a comparative analysis of dynamics in origin and host contexts of migrants. Yet, in Europe, the debates have been mainly focused on immigrant political participation, referring to political participation in host countries. Also, post-national citizenship debates and the connections of immigration to state regimes have been more predominant in Europe than in North-America (Bloemraad et al., 2008; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a; Portes, 2015).

In this research, comprehension of the agency of migrant associations and migrant political transnationalism are closely linked. What then is migrant political transnationalism? There is some discussion regarding the scope of the concept. I differentiate two main threads of literature. On the one hand, some authors defend the utility of taking a narrower definition of political transnationalism, based on electoral participation and influence of electoral processes or politics (Morales and Pilati, 2014). On the other hand, there are works that take a broader stance to migrant political transnationalism, covering both electoral and non-electoral forms of participation in civic and political realms (Goldring, 2002; Iskander, 2015; Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a). Within this latter type of contribution, migrant practices aiming at the development of contexts in origin countries are within the boundaries of migrant political transnationalism. Following

this understanding, in this research I understand political transnationalism in a broad way, and thus the study is not mainly focused on electoral politics or electoral processes.

Indeed, the afore-mentioned research shows that, by undertaking development projects, migrants and migrant associations interact with local governments and have a role in, and capacity to, influence local politics. In particular, North-American scholarship has put more focus on exploring migrant transnationalism performed through hometown associations and the impact that these activities have on countries of origin. In this regard, there has been an important array of findings that are related to research on Mexican hometown associations based in the USA. This literature accounts for a range of different context-dependent cases, and shows how migrant involvement in their communities of origin through hometown activities often encompasses conflictual dynamics between both sides of the transnational process. In fact, the research accounts for the sometimes blurred boundaries between civic and political migrant practices, and for the evolution of migrant organisations from social and kin-based to political organisations (Fox and Bada, 2008; Goldring, 2002; Guarnizo et al., 2003; Iskander, 2015; Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008). In this regard, European ethnographic accounts have, a bit later in time than the US-based literature on similar social phenomena, begun to focus on migrant political transnationalism related to development interventions by finding different ways by which kin, lineage or traditional authorities intersect with migrants and migrant associations in countries such as Ghana, Northern Senegal and Nigeria (Kleist, 2011; Lampert, 2014; Lavigne Delville, 2010; Marabello, 2013).

Concerning the capacity for social change of migrant transnationalism, the literature has moved between initial views picturing migrant transnational political actors as challenging power structures in origin and the status quo, to more nuanced views showing the rather limited scope of migrant involvement in transnational politics, and the way it is often co-opted by governments at different levels (Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008, p. 667). Even so authors have pointed to the potential capacity of migrants to subvert power-relations in origin, although this should not be overstated (Goldring, 2002; Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a). Regarding migrant transnational practices, their influence is often measured in terms

of exporting values and democratisation. Some of the observed processes related to democratisation are: exchange of social and political remittances; increased participation; procedures to take decisions; incorporation of new issues in the official agenda; higher degrees of openness; and greater transparency and accountability in countries of origin (Goldring, 2004; Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008; Levitt, 1998; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a).

Apart from this, when undertaking an analysis of the role played by diasporas in homeland politics, problems are raised with regard to the representativeness and lack of efforts to be accountable that arise from these attempts (Bakewell, 2009; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a). Moreover, the development ideology that migrants may sustain is questionable, as is the extent to which co-development can challenge current practices and views (Bakewell, 2009; Marabello, 2013; Nijenhuis and Broekhuis, 2010). Other research focused on development interventions in Nigeria by migrant organisations in the UK stresses the relevance attributed to internal migrants by local communities in origin, rather than international migrants, in the development of communities (Lampert, 2014)

Another important finding of research assessing the relationship between migrant transnationalism and incorporation in destination countries points to the constructive, positive interaction between the two processes (Bermudez, 2010; Lacroix, 2009; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a; Portes et al., 2008). However, the research also shows civic and political stratification of migrant communities and organisations in host countries, and migrant transnationalism (Cebolla-Boado and López-Sala, 2015; Guarnizo et al., 2003; Morales and Jorba, 2010; Morales and Pilati, 2014; Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008b). The concept of civic and political stratification points to the idea that not all migrants and migrant collectives engage with public and political institutions, and transnationalism, in the same way and intensity. In this sense, chapter 2 reviews the different explanations posed by scholars regarding how external and internal factors relating to migrant collectives shape these organisations' transnational practices.

Regarding the latter, for the purposes of this research, it is of special interest to understand the debates on, first, how migrant collectives become civic actors

engaging with sub-national governments and, second, what processes lead to public officials recognizing immigrants as targets of public policy and thus being eligible actors to manage public funds (de Graauw et al., 2012; Fennema, 2004; Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008b). For this reason, particular attention in this research is given to the framework that accounts for the components of civic and political stratification affecting migrant organisations proposed by Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008). Hence, even though their definition of civic and political engagement is quite open and their study is only focused on host contexts, they propose comparing resources of organisations, their presence, and weight in order to measure civic and political stratification (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a, pp. 19–22). The dimensions of presence and weight are adapted for the operationalization of migrant association's agency in this research.

To sum up, while the reviewed literature contributes greatly to the comprehension of migrant transnationalism, there are three weaknesses that this present research attempts to address. First, it is worth recalling that the engagement of migrants in organisations is often shown in the literature as a key element for understanding civic and political engagement at an individual level in host countries (Eggert and Giugni, 2010; Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001). Besides, ethnographic accounts show how the axes of social stratification that are prevalent in countries sending migrants are also structuring migrant actions in residence and at transnational level[9]. Nevertheless, the literature on migrant political transnationalism and migrant civic and political engagement in host countries does not often question if, and how, these cleavages may affect the internal power configurations of migrant associations and migrant civic and political engagement in origin and settlement. In this respect, in the case of Sub-Saharan migrants in Europe, research shows the extent to which certain cleavages are worth being explored further when analysing migrant political transnationalism (Bierschenk et al., 2010a; Daum, 1998; Grillo and Mazzucato, 2008; Grillo and Riccio, 2004; Kleist, 2011; Lampert, 2014; Lavigne Delville, 2010; Marabello, 2013).

---

[9] For instance, regarding Sub-Saharan migrants, scholarship has discussed how gender (Baizán et al., 2014; Sinatti, 2014; Toma and Vause, 2014; Vives and Silva, 2016); ethnic systems and religious membership (Diedhiou, 2015; Riccio, 2011, 2008); allegiance/slavery systems (Pelckmans, 2013); chieftaincy (Kleist, 2011); or kin and gender (Sinatti, 2014); are all renegotiated or influenced by migration.

Second, in connection to the latter point, while North American based scholarship has given attention to local political dynamics and organisational-related dynamics of migrants in sending countries, European scholars have still plenty of scope to address this related phenomena using data collected from the perspectives of sending countries. Moreover, overall, when research concerning migrant political transnationalism in sites within the Global South is undertaken, it is geographically inclined towards South America, Turkey and Morocco. Yet, even if there is an increasing research interest in these aspects, there remains less political interest from scholarship concerned with Sub-Saharan migrants.

Third, the literature has tended to disregard local institutional political structures in contexts of origin and how migrant transnationalism interacts with it. Moreover, I contend that, at least in the case of Sub-Saharan sending contexts, a view on political participation or institutions– that is uniquely based on conventional Western categories and cleavages – may not be able to grasp the range of dynamics with which migrants interact. The main reason for this difficulty is due to the specific post-colonial state configuration and its uneven penetration in peripheral contexts (Beck, 2001; Kleist, 2011; Mamdani, 1996).

1.2.3 Co-development at stake

During the 20th century, migration and development have been explored in the policy arena of European states in different ways, depending on the period. After the oil crisis of the 1970s, when a paradigm based on 'border closure' gained ground, some authors refered to the emergence of the French approach to co-development. This linked to a subsequent policy shift at the beginning of the 1980s where – taken together with a limitation on immigrant access – integration policies, or the reformulation of ways to cooperate with origin countries, became new lines of intervention (Giménez Romero et al., 2006, p. 41). Later on, in 1997, Sami Naïr connected migration and international development cooperation in the expression 'co-development'. Therefore, as reflected in the expression's coinage, co-

development was mainly attached to the policy sector of international cooperation and aid[10].

Co-development enters the academic and policy sphere as inherently attached to policymaking, migration management, the comprehension that migrants are development agents of their countries of origin, and the simplified idea that more development in origin implies less migration flows. Further, co-development has been a predominant perspective regarding the comprehension of the nexus in both academia and policy spheres. This has been especially so during the third phase of the relationship between migration and development, which has been marked as optimistic and also been influenced by the neoliberal socio-economic turn that characterised the 1990s onwards (Faist and Fauser, 2011).

Co-development policymaking is predominantly a European affair.[11] However, co-development practises are not widespread throughout the EU. The literature reveals examples of this approach from France, the UK, The Netherlands, Italy and Spain (de Haas, 2007; Faist, 2007; Grillo and Riccio, 2004; Lacroix, 2014; Nijenhuis and Broekhuis, 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011; Piperno and Stocchiero, 2006). However, the research shows that at a policy level, co-development has been heterogeneously developed. At national level, the more structured and old approach is found in France (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014; Datola, 2014; Grillo and Riccio, 2004). In Spain the perspective influenced international development policy-making at national level until around 2012 (according to interviews), but the approach has mainly been developed at a local level (Cebolla-Boado and López-Sala, 2015; Centre

---

[10] Some say Sami Naïr coined this term when he was the responsible for the French *Mission interministérielle pour le Codéveloppement el la Migration Internationale (MICOMI)*. In the report elaborated by this *Mission*, which aimed to recommend orientations to the French government in relation to migration policies, co-development is presented as a new way to theoretically and methodologically rethink French cooperation and foreign policies to address the management of migrant flows. This flow management is sought in order to foster [my translation] 'legal immigrants' stabilization, social integration, control of access to France, respect towards residence normativity' (Naïr, 1997, p. 2).

[11] In this regard, it is worth recalling that well-known programmes such as the 3x1 Program for Migrants do not conform to the definition of co-development used in this research because it is led by migrants' sending country. I.e., in the case of the 3x1 Program, it is a national social spending program in which the Mexican local, state, and federal government matches HTAs' collective remittances to improve public services through cross-border public–private partnerships) (Fox and Bada, 2008; Iskander, 2015).

de Cooperació per al Desenvolupament Rural et al., 2010; Giménez Romero et al., 2006; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011; Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016).

Co-development is contested as a concept and a policy field to the extent to which it is linked to migration management, voluntary return and control of migrants. However, empirical evidence provides more nuances to the dynamics involved. For instance, experiences at some regional and local levels in Spain show that co-development policies have been increasingly intended to develop migrants' countries of origin but also to work upon migrant's incorporation into their new localities. In this vein, co-development policies are interrelated to deepen local citizenship (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011).

Apart from this, there is also research on why migrants and migrant organisations get involved in development projects. Thus, empirical studies stress that migrants do co-development projects for reasons such as a facilitation of circulation and the legitimation of the status of 'in-betweenness' (Lacroix, 2009, p. 1674), or a way of bringing something back to the community at home (Nijenhuis and Broekhuis, 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2009). In addition, evidence from the US and Europe suggests that transnational practices, such as the political transnational practices of migrants, occur simultaneously with activities in the residence countries (Bermudez, 2010; Lacroix, 2009; Morales and Jorba, 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a; Portes et al., 2008). Hence, critiques of the motivation and rationale of policymaking towards the fostering of migrant transnational activities do not exclude the fact that migrants themselves may be appropriating and signifying those initiatives for collective and individual purposes. Here, it is worth stressing that migrant transnational development activities did not start with Naïr's report.

Whatever the motivations underpinning the actions of migrants and governments, co-development interventions as a modality of international cooperation collect optimistic and pessimistic opinions. The most significant are now pointed out. Positive views defend co-development as a way of better connecting projects and development programmes to the needs of origin contexts. Migrants speak local languages and sometimes donors and other development agents have to deal with weak institutions, which may configure migrants as better interlocutors (Bakewell,

2009; Nijenhuis and Broekhuis, 2010). Co-development has bestowed upon it the potential to function as a 'bottom-up' approach to development and thus, its development activities are conferred with a higher legitimisation (Nijenhuis and Broekhuis, 2010). At the same time, co-development can potentially strengthen transnational social networks, which are also considered as contributing to sustainable development (Nijenhuis and Broekhuis, 2010). Besides, functionalist views perceive co-development as a tool to foster economic development, controlling illegal immigration, increase access to remittances (for sending countries) and the return and circulation of workers (Weil, 2002).

At the same time, scholars and practitioners raise important concerns related to the field of co-development. First, the assumption that a stronger, more knowledgeable relationship between migrants and the 'homeland' is fostered by co-development remains contested (Bakewell, 2009). In part, this is also connected with views questioning the validity for the responsibility of development being placed upon the 'agency of migrants rather than on institutional structures' (Skeldon, 2008, p. 14). Second, there are concerns about to what extent co-development enhances development activity from a supply driven perspective rather than from a true interest arising 'from below' (either in origin or settlement contexts). Third, co-development policies are observed as mechanisms to co-opt migrant's associations representatives and, by extension, the rest of the community (Cebolla-Boado and López-Sala, 2015). Fourth, co-development is also criticised for not challenging current power relationships in the development aid system. This last set of critiques would include, for instance, the relatively small budgets linked to co-development or the migrant's exclusion in decision-making processes (Nijenhuis and Broekhuis, 2010).

Overall, from the above-critiques, one issue stands out in the context of this dissertation. That is, namely, that co-development needs to be framed within broader debates affecting the governance of 'international aid' and conceptions of development. Hence, it is not surprising that co-development as policymaking is contested when considering how much the policy area surrounding development is itself questionable. Hence, taking the aftermath of WWII as the beginning of the official aid system, as it is now understood, then there are numerous explanations and analyses unravelling the connection of aid to questions such as: colonialism;

imperialism; international relations and realpolitik; control over resources; and the promotion of donors' own socio-economic and cultural interests (see, as a selection of contributions, Cornwall and Eade, 2010; Duffield, 2001; Escobar, 1988; Rist, 2008).

Moreover, 'development' is a highly contested concept (even if migration is also subject to contestation, it is beyond the scope or purpose of the dissertation to discuss this in more detail). Any attempt to speak about development involves making a connection with certain conceptions of the future, and this inevitably involves normative associations in relation to what living a good life means. In the Western world, development has also been intimately linked with the idea of progress. The field study of development, was largely put on a level with economic development and, basically, there were only economists populating the field (Sen, 1998). In parallel to the theoretical trends seen when discussing the various migration development approaches, one could also classify classical views on development as optimistic or pessimistic perspectives. These views, in turn, are broadly based on functionalist or structuralist theories (Hunt, 1989) and cohabite alternative postmodern views, which question the very significance of concepts such as progress or development throughout history (Rist, 2008).[12]

In this regard, this research avoids ultimately engaging with the deconstruction of policy narratives of development and, instead, connects with anthropological critical analyses of development interventions that pay 'closer attention to development's routines, practices, and subjectivities' (Mosse and Lewis, 2006, p. 6). These types of accounts apply the idea of brokerage in the analysis of international development. Particularly developed by French Africanists, these contributions identify brokers as those social actors that are key in the management of development funds, and, by doing so, become political actors who intermediate between donors and local populations within post-colonial states (Bierschenk et al., 2010a; Mosse and Lewis, 2006). Within these accounts, for instance, research has explored the dynamics of

---

[12] In relation to discourses adopted by multilateral institutions and official donors, conventional conceptual and policymaking views equating development basically with economic growth were challenged in the 1980s by what can be identified as two perspectives: the Sustainable Development and the Human Development paradigms, which have in turn been integrated at great length into official development discourses, and often overlap (Rist, 2008).

Senegalese migrants involved in development interventions in Northern Senegal (Lavigne Delville, 2010).

In sum, in this research the question on whether the ODA has been successful in providing development (Faist, 2007) is not centre stage, as the responsibility is not bestowed upon migrants to make the international aid system work. Rather, co-development is seen, in the analysis, as the background by which we can observe migrant political transnationalism and the civic and political engagement of migrant associations.

1.3 Methodology and case study: the relevance of Senegalese migrant associations as transnational actors

1.3.1 Overview of the methodological approach

This research is framed within interpretivist traditions to knowledge (Della Porta and Keating, 2008). To address the research questions, I focus on a case-study and use qualitative approaches towards methodology and methods. Thus, I argue that Senegalese migrant associations' involvement in Catalan co-development processes fit under the comprehension of what Gerring calls an extreme case (Gerring, 2007). Moreover, in the research design the case is populated by 'within' cases, or subcases, that refer to five co-development processes led by Senegalese migrant associations linking Catalan and Senegalese localities. Consequently, five migrant associations are studied in more detail: four of them are directly or indirectly connected to hometown transnationalism in the region of Kolda, while a fifth migrant association examined is quite different from the others. Namely, this latter organisation is a federation of migrant associations that engages principally with Dakar.

Using this approach in the research analytically, I take three main steps. First, I observe the agency of migrant associations in their dimension of presence through *the variation of formal institutions* across localities in contexts of origin and settlement. Second, the dimension of presence of migrant associations' agency is appraised in origin and residence *through the variation of assets of migrant associations*. Furthermore, I contend that this variation of assets is affected by what I call informal institutions. Third, the analysis on assets of migrant associations supports *assessing the dimension of weight of migrant associations' agency in origin*.

The table below summarises major features of the research design. Next, the following sub-sections explore some of the main aspects that characterise and justify the selected case-study.

Table 1.1. Summary of the operationalization of variables and other research design's characteristics

MIGRANT ASOCIATION's AGENCY (adapted from Alsop et al. 2006; Kabeer 1999; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008) *Capacity of migrant associations of being present and exerting some degree of influence on civic and political affairs.* Broadly, I define influence as the capacity of an actor to produce effects on the actions of others or on a system's functioning. The influence of migrant associations has two different dimensions, i.e. **presence and weight**: • **Presence:** visibility and legitimacy of migrant associations in civic and political affairs. Observed through: Visibility. Observed through analysis of formal institutions and analysis of assets of migrant organizations: 1. Access to formal spaces, policy definition processes. 2. Access to local authorities in origin, and as alliances and connections of migrant associations at different levels. Legitimacy: 3. Degree to which other social/political actors see migrant associations as valid players in residence and origin. • **Weight:** actual influence on civic and political affairs. Capacities of migrant associations: 1. To shape civic or political realm through the creation or formalisation of civic organisations 2. To include disadvantaged groups in co-development processes. 3. To include local communities in co-development decision taking.	**INTERACTION**

MIGRANT ASSOCIATION's ASSETS
• Human, organizational, financial assets
STRUCTURES/FORMAL INSTITUTIONS
Affecting migrant associations within co-development processes: • M&D Policy environment in Catalan and Senegalese Localities
STRUCTURES/INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS
Affecting migrant associations within co-development processes: • Informal rules affecting the local community in origin: nobility/allegiance system-caste system, patriarchy, customary law, kin system.

Unit of analysis: Co-development processes between Catalonia and Senegal (defined as a transnational practice and public policy) and the main actors connected to them. That includes: Senegalese migrant associations, non-migrant civil society (Local NGOs, community-based associations) and local/regional governments.
Level of analysis: Localities in residence and origin, 'administrative/political' regions in country of origin and residence.
Time frame: Mainly, 2007-2014 is the period covered regarding the policy environment in residence, while 2007-2012 is the period covered in origin. Nevertheless, past processes related to the cases are followed, and the limit of the research's scope is the last municipal elections in Spain (2015) and the last municipal elections in Senegal (2014). More intense fieldwork was undertaken in 2009-2010, 2012 (in Senegal), 2014.

1.3.2 The national contexts in which co-development processes take place

The national contexts in which the case study is embedded are very different at a socio-economic level. Some important information is now provided about each of them.

<u>**Senegal**</u>

Constitutionally, Senegal is a secular Republic with a presidency. It gained its independency from colonial French rule in 1960, which was followed by four decades under the rule of Léopold Sédar Senghor's political party (the Socialist Party). After Senghor, from 1981 to 2000 the second president was Abdou Diouf. The change occurred when Abdoulaye Wade and his Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) ended Abdou Diouf's presidency in 2000. Later on, in 2012, Senegal held presidential elections amid a contested process. Finally, in March 2012, Macky Sall from the party Alliance for the Republic won the second round of the presidential election. Later on in that year, in July, the legislative elections were held. The fieldwork for this research took place during the summer of 2012, and, therefore, the feeling of change (and, for some, the hope brought by it) was still very fresh. The next presidential election is due to be held in 2019.

Located in West Africa, Senegal became an important migratory crossroad from its independence in 1960 (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014; Lessault and Flahaux, 2013). In balance, it was a host country before it became a country of emigration from the early 1980s with the former colonial power France as the main attractor. Between 1960-1980 Senegalese emigrants in France were primarily employed in industry, the French automotive industry recruiting heavily in the Senegal River Valley, in the region of Tambacounda and Casamance (they were basically people from Soninke, but also Toucouleurs and Manjack ethnic groups) (Lessault and Flahaux, 2013, p. 61). According to the analysis of the literature realised in the context of the MAFE project,[13] following the oil crisis of 1973 and increasingly tougher migration control policies in France, by the beginning of the 1990s Senegalese emigrants in Europe started going to two new destinations (to Italy, first, and in the mid 90s, to Spain)

---

[13] The Migrations between Africa and Europe Project started in 2005 with the objective of collecting and analysing data on migration between Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. They produced open datasets: http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/en/ [Last accessed /July/2016]

(Beauchemin et al., 2014; Lessault and Flahaux, 2013, p. 62). Nevertheless, those dealing with migration demography and migration flows signal problems in consistency and lack of systematised historical data (Flahaux and De Haas, 2016; Lessault and Flahaux, 2013). As a result of this, the number of recorded Senegalese emigrants fluctuates. Fall (2014) states that the number of those living abroad, often named *modou-modou*,[14] is estimated between a range of around 600.000 and 2 or 3 million people, which for him proves the challenge of systematising and bringing this type of data up to date (Fall, 2014).

Regarding the international community, Senegal is generally depicted as a 'reliable' regime by Western countries, occupying, for instance, a place as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2016-17. Multilaterally, it also has a special relationship with the EU, which can be illustrated by the arrangements of the African, Caribbean and Pacific region and the EU (known as ACP-EU) Partnership Agreement that replaced the Lomé conventions, also known as the 'Cotonou Agreement', signed in 2000 and revised every five years. This agreement plans cooperation between the EU and partner countries in development, political and economic and trade areas. It is also the framework for funding instruments such as the European Development Fund.

At a bilateral level, it is worth highlighting Senegal's close relationship with France due to their common colonial past. The bond with the Spanish central government, as the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation reports, has been far less intense (Oficina de Información Diplomática, 2016). The connections have increased since the summer of 2006, when there was an in-flow of 30.000 people with irregular status accessing the Canary Islands, which was called the 'Cayuco crisis' (Oficina de Información Diplomática, 2016). Consequently, the link between Spain and Senegal

---

[14] Modou-modou derives from the Wolof language, and is an abbreviation of Mamadou-Mamadou. Together with other groups such as baol-baol (coming from the Baol region, in Northern Senegal), the expression initially identified those people from rural areas, from Wolof ethnic group and the Mourid brotherhood, ¨who only know how to trade but nevertheless manage to earn enough money abroad and come back showing off new houses, clothes, big weddings and the symbols of success¨ (Riccio, 2005, p. 105). In the beginning it was used with pejorative purposes, but it has ended up by being positively applied to all emigrants, regardless of their ethnic or territorial belonging (Fall, 2014; Riccio, 2005). Fall also recalls that the first people undertaking labour migration (that is Halpulaar and Soninke, ethnic groups known as 'people form the valley'), 'were called *Francenabè* because of their migratory inclination towards France' (Fall, 2014, p. 22).

has been strongly influenced since then by migration and control of national borders. In fact, Spain adopted its first 'Plan África' in 2006 for the 2006-2008 period. The second plan, for the period 2009-2012, had the goal of encouraging cooperation between Spain and some African countries to regulate migration flows and combat human trafficking. For some authors, 'Plan África' hides the instrumentalisation of the ODA for security and control purposes by the Spanish central government (Kabbanji, 2013, p. 421). It can also be framed within the EU's evolution under the so-called Global Approach towards a more appealing migration and nexus paradigm that can make third countries more willing to collaborate on border controls and readmission agreements (Kabbanji, 2013, p. 417).

Catalonia within Spain

Spain transformed from an emigrant country to an immigration country in the 1980s. Nevertheless, this transformation intensified in the 2000s. In that period, according to national statistics,[15] the foreign-born population in Spain never ceased to increase between 1998 (38.8 million total population in Spain, where 1.7 foreign born) and 2012 (40.5 million total population in Spain, 6.7 foreign born). However, it peaked between 2000 and 2009, when the foreign-born population quadrupled from 1.47 million to 6.46 million. During that period of time, Spain was the country receiving the most immigrants in the European Union, and the second among members of the OECD (Arango, 2016, p. 3). A main driver of the immigration in-flows was economic growth between 1995-2007, at rates above the EU average, particularly in sectors with high indexes of lower skill occupations such as construction (López-Sala, 2013, p. 40).

Catalonia followed similar trends. Thus, demographically the region of Catalonia experienced a sharp rise in foreigner population during the 2000s: while in 2000 the 2,90% over the total population registered in Catalan municipalities had a foreign nationality (the total population in Catalonia was 6.261.999 in 2000). In 2005 there were 11,42% of foreign nationals among the population or over 6.995.206 total residents. In 2010 the share of people of foreign nationality reached its highest point of the period (15,95%). After 2010, the foreign population has had a decreasing

---

[15] Data from *Instituto Nacional de Estadística*, INE, database, www.ine.es [access October 12, 2016]

tendency that may change from 2017 onwards. In 2017, 13,78% of the total population municipally registered were foreign nationals.[16]

To quickly contextualise the country migration-related policy-making at an international level, it is worth considering that in 2014 Spain ranked number 11 out of 38 countries in the combined Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). However, the country scored lower in the indexes related to health, political participation and access to nationality and antidiscrimination.[17]

1.3.3 Senegalese migrants in Catalonia: not very large collective, vulnerable in terms of rights

Socio-demographic description

Bearing in mind the general migration flows towards Spain described above, Senegalese-born are, comparatively, not a large migrant group in the country. At the same time, although the Senegalese form the largest group of people originally from Sub-Saharan Africa now living in the country but, overall in Spain, but also in Catalonia, Moroccans are the largest community of citizens born in African countries. Moreover, according to National Statistics, in the period 1995-2015 in Spain, Moroccans have been in the top three of foreign-born immigrant collectives in terms of population.

Focusing on the distribution by autonomous community of those born in Senegal residing in Spain, National Statistics shows, first, that during the period 2000-2016 most of the Senegalese in Spain lived in Catalonia (more than a 30% since 2005)[18]. Second, migration in the period has been mainly undertaken by men, being that the Canary Islands is the autonomous community with the highest percentages of women of the total Senegalese residents (above 35%). In the case of Catalonia, when

---

[16] From *Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya*, Idescat, data from municipal registers, www.idescat.cat [last access November 3, 2018]

[17] The highest scores being for family reunion, labour market mobility and permanent residence. The lowest score (unfavourable) being for education. See: http://www.mipex.eu/spain [last access 11 January 2018]

[18] According to INE database, the number of Senegalese born citizens residing in Catalonia (the proportion over the whole Senegalese born citizens in Spain) was: 1.929 in 2000 (27%), 10.284 in 2005 (35%), 20.166 in 2010 (33%), 20.160 in 2016 (32%). Andalucía, the second autonomous community with the highest number of Senegalese born in the period, has received, in numbers, approximately half of those living in Catalonia. E.g., for instance, 10.096 Senegalese born were living in Andalucía in 2010 (source: www.ine.es).

compared to other foreign groups, the community has a high ratio of male migrants. The data from July 1 2017 points to the Senegalese as the foreign group with the highest percentage of men (74,7%) over women (25,3%), being followed closely by the Pakistani nationals.[19] Apart from the fact that a large majority of the Senegalese population residing in Catalonia are men, they are also quite young: the Generalitat of Catalunya reported that 49,5% of Senegalese residents in Catalonia were within the range of 30 to 44 years old,[20] in 2016.

The territorial distribution of the Senegalese in Spain can also be explained in the light of their migration background in the country. Still, as regards to the evolution of Senegalese-born citizens in Spain, there is a lack of official data concerning the number of Senegalese residents there before 1990. They were a very small collective at that time, and they were often put in the generic box of 'Sub-Saharan immigrants' (Jabardo Velasco, 2006, p. 25). Another reason behind this lack of data is connected to the fact that in that period, due to Senegal's government restrictions and a more facilitative approach in Gambia, many young people of Senegalese origin arrived to Spain with a Gambian passport[21]. Therefore, tracing back Senegalese immigration often entails considering Gambian residents. This is also why different researchers within Spain used 'Senegambian' as an adjective of place to refer to this collective when they started investigating it (Jabardo Velasco, 2006, p. 25).

Even though the bulk of Senegalese arrived to Spain from the 2000 onwards, and this goes hand in hand with the overall rising in-flow that is particular to the first decade of 2000, a 2001 survey showed that 27% of Senegalese had arrived to Spain before 1991 (Jabardo Velasco, 2006, p. 25). According to researchers, Catalonia (specifically the county of Maresme, and overall the coastal part of the region) was among the first places where Senegalese settled Spain at the beginning of the 1980s

---

[19] Other selected data related to non-EU citizens are: 54,7%men/45,3%women for Moroccans; 71,3%men/28,7%women for Pakistani; 28,1%men/71,9%women for Hondurans; 42,2%men/57,8%women for Bolivians. Data elaborated by the Generalitat de Catalunya: http://treballiaferssocials.gencat.cat/web/.content/03ambits_tematics/05immigracio_refugi/perfils_dem ografics/PERFIL_Paisos.pdf [last access 21/12/2016]

[20] Data elaborated by the Generalitat de Catalunya: http://treballiaferssocials.gencat.cat/web/.content/03ambits_tematics/05immigracio_refugi/perfils_dem ografics/PERFIL_Paisos.pdf [last access 10/12/2016]

[21] Gambia and Senegal, besides sharing non-colonial languages and ethnic systems, were under the same sovereignty between 1765-1779 and 1982-1989 (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2011, p. 1)

(Jabardo Velasco, 2006; Sow, 2005).[22] Originally, they came mainly from the departments of Kolda and Velingara (both departments are configured nowadays within the region of Kolda, which is object of study in this research) (Jabardo Velasco, 2006, p. 27), but it is worth recalling that a proportion of them moved to Spain from France or Italy.

Besides this first flow of migrants originally from Southern Casamance − with Sarakole (also called Soninke), Halpulaar (also called Fula), or Manding backgrounds and more linked to the agricultural sector − researchers identify another flow integrated by Wolofs who had come to the capital (Madrid), Las Palmas (Canary Islands) and important coastal and touristic cities in the Mediterranean as operational sites for their trading or street vending activities (Jabardo Velasco, 2006, p. 28; Sow, 2005). This second group of Senegalese is mainly identified as arriving in the 1980s and beginnings of 1990s and was organised using religious brotherhoods, notably Mouridism. In the case of Spain, according to Jabardo, Mouridism and the Wolof ethnic group had a stronger visibility partly based on the fact that they had among its members the most qualified Senegalese migrants and because the first Immigrant Association of Senegalese emerged from that collective (Jabardo Velasco, 2006, p. 29).

Nonetheless, even though people with Gambian nationality were the collective number 5 in terms of number of residents in Catalonia in year 2000,[23] their relative position has changed over time, and, in fact, the Senegalese is not an especially large foreign national group in Catalonia (they were the 16th in 2010, the 12th in 2015, the 15th in 2017, according to Catalan Official Statistics: Idescat). The highest increase in the number of Senegalese living in Catalan localities took place in 2004, when Senegambian municipally-registered citizens grew by 41,3% (more than 3.000 people) (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2011, p. 2). The quantity of Senegalese residents

---

[22] Even in 2016, Maresme's capital, called Mataró, is the municipality with the highest absolute number of Senegalese-born in Catalonia (1.456 inhabitants). Data from municipal register at 1st of July 2016, elaborated by the Generalitat de Catalunya from Idescat http://treballiaferssocials.gencat.cat/web/.content/03ambits_tematics/05immigracio_refugi/perfils_dem ografics/PERFIL_Paisos.pdf [last access 10/12/2016]

[23] Since 2000, the first foreign-born collective in Catalonia were Moroccans (33,46% of foreign-born population in 2000, 20,84% of foreign-born population in 2015), while Senegalese had a share of 1,06% of foreign-born population in 2000, and 1,93% of foreign-born population in 2015). Data from: http://www.idescat.cat/poblacioestrangera/ [last access March 8, 2018]

grew in Catalonia until 2013, year in which the total number slightly decreased until 2016. Territorially, they are not present in all Catalan municipalities (in 2010, only 43% of Catalan municipalities had a resident of either Senegalese or Gambian origin) (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2011, p. 4). In the northern coastal areas, the municipalities surrounding the capitals of Girona and Lleida have higher concentrations of Senegalese residents (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2011, p. 4).

Vulnerability in rights

Concerning social and economic rights, and according to Jabardo, Senegalese migrants were a socially and politically 'invisible' collective working most often irregularly. At the central government level, they were socially invisible until the first Immigration Law 7/1985 and the subsequent policymaking (such as the first Integration National Plan of 1994, that is, the *Plan para la Integración Social de Inmigrantes*). At the same time, they were largely considered as 'illegal' during the period between the 1985 law and the first regularisation process in 1991.[24] Africans had to be recognised as immigrants to obtain worker status. Family reunification and the increasing presence of women after 1991 created migrants as social services subjects (Jabardo Velasco, 2006, pp. 104–106).

It is worth recalling, though, that Jabardo's analysis of the Senegalese in Spain was published before the global economic crisis that hit the country from 2008 onwards[25]. Regarding unemployment rates per national origin in Catalonia, according to 2015 data, in absolute numbers Senegalese was number six among those foreign groups with more unemployed people registered at the Catalan Occupation (public) Service (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015, p. 9). Besides, Moroccans and Senegalese share the highest rates of unemployed people with only primary studies or less (51,4% and 51,9%, respectively) (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015, p. 9). From a household

---

[24] When the first regularisation process of 1991 took place, the 80% of the total regularisation demands in Spain came from those who were officially Gambian citizens in Barcelona and Girona, both Catalan provinces directly connected with the selected migrant associations under study (Jabardo Velasco, 2006, p. 27).

[25] The Spanish situation represents an extreme case within the context of 'developed' countries: in 2009 the unemployment rate doubled the rate in the EU-15, and in that year it 'only' reached the 18,8% of people the labour force unemployed (Medina et al., 2010, p. 37). The highest unemployment rate during the crisis to date was reached during the first term of 2013, when the unemployment rate in Spain was 24,98%. In that same period Catalonia also reached its highest unemployment rate of the period (20,84%) (data from INE website). Unemployment affected most of all low-skilled sectors, young people and immigrants (Arango, 2016; Miguélez et al., 2014).

perspective, governmental data from 2014 about the number of households with all their members unemployed, and without social benefits, locates the Moroccan group in first place (with almost a 30% of households with all active members unemployed and no social benefits) and Senegalese in second place (almost 25% of households with all active members unemployed and no social benefits) (Pinyol-Jiménez, 2016, p. 23).

As regards to national citizenship, currently the majority of Senegalese or Gambians citizens were born in their countries of origin (in 2010, 84% of Senegalese or Gambian in Catalonia were born in Senegal or Gambia) (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2011, p. 2). Senegalese citizens cannot vote (nor be elected) in Spanish elections unless they have Spanish nationality (in which case they are considered as naturalised)[26]. Generally, as is written in the Spanish Constitution (Art.13.2), the right to vote and to stand as a candidate is exclusively reserved for Spaniards apart from municipal elections, where the right can be granted by treaty or by law according to a criteria of reciprocity – which signifies that people from 39 nationalities – approximately the 55% of the foreign population registered at municipal level – had this right granted in 2015 (Bermúdez and Escrivá, 2016, p. 304).[27] In this vein, the Spanish naturalisation scheme means that Senegalese, or Moroccans, unlike Latin Americans, have a more difficult path towards naturalisation[28]. Consequently, the access of Senegalese and most African-born citizens living in Spain to basic political rights is not easily gained. Given the difficulties of the Spanish naturalisation scheme, it is considered a highly discretional and discriminatory process, and one of the most negative towards immigrants comparing to the UE-15 (Pinyol-Jiménez and Sánchez-Montijano, 2015, p. 2).

---

[26] Between 2004 and 2009, a total of 2,516 Senegalese citizens obtained Spanish nationality, which meant the 60,9% of the naturalizations granted to the collective over Spain in the period (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2011, p. 2).
[27] In the municipal elections of 2015, only twelve bilateral reciprocity agreements had been signed between Spain and other non-EU countries to allow foreign citizens on Spanish soil to vote (but not to be elected) in municipal elections. And there is only one African country among the twelve countries with which agreements have been signed, Cape Verde. Besides, all those non-EU foreign nationals willing to participate in local elections have to fulfil a form that is inscribed in the CERE (*Censo de Extranjeros Residentes en España*), and this is mentioned by many experts and migrant associations as a barrier to electoral participation (Bermúdez and Escrivá, 2016, p. 306).
[28] The Spanish naturalisation scheme, is considered highly discretional and discriminatory, and one of the most negative towards immigrants when compared to the UE-15 (Pinyol-Jiménez and Sánchez-Montijano, 2015, p. 2).

Concerning other discrimination factors such as those based on ethnic background or colour of skin, there is research (for there is no official data regarding this subject) that focuses on police stops, searches, and identifications by ethnic profiling investigations, based on two surveys. Thus, according to this research, there is higher number of identity checks carried out by the security bodies in Spain when compared to other countries. Moreover, in comparing the share of those individuals identified when compared to the national Spaniards, a very high proportion of those searches are targeted towards individuals of ethnic minorities and migrant foreigners of certain nationalities (García Añón et al., 2013). The research is consistent with claims made by human rights' NGOs, for some time. For instance, the NGO called SOS Racism has published an Annual Report on Racism in the Spanish State since 1995. The last available issue, focused on the Catalan case, and sustains the argument that most often discrimination is suffered by Sub-Saharans, and those individuals expressing having suffered discrimination pre-eminently signal abuses from police and private security forces (SOS Racisme Catalunya, 2017).

1.3.4 Senegalese (and Sub-Saharan[29]) migrant associations explained by the literature

In the case of Spain, a range of studies focused on autonomous communities (regions) or cities provides evidence of the phenomenon of migrant or ethnic organisations according to group-based characteristics. In this regard, in terms of the amount of associations, there is evidence of Sub-Saharan migrant associations having a higher density of number of associations per population than other migrant collectives in the country. [30] Thus, when pondering the total associations' number with the number of people in each national group research shows that there are, on average, 129,57 Sub-Saharan associations for each 100.000 municipally registered Sub-Saharan people, ahead of the 29,38 associations (the second largest relative number) per 100.000 municipally registered Asian individuals, or 15,10 Latin American associations (the

---

[29] Despite the fact that some of the following studies do not tackle Senegalese migrant associations 'per se', but Sub-Saharan migrant associations, the findings regarding Sub-Saharan migrant associations are considered as applying to those of the Senegalese too (most of the population from Sub-Saharan countries in Spain are from Senegal and Gambia).

[30] For instance, the overall study by Aparicio and Tormos, analyses the official national registers of the Barcelona province, and those of the autonomous communities of Madrid, Murcia and Valencia and found that in absolute numbers migrant associations from Latin America or Sub-Saharan Africa are more numerous than those from other national origins (when the study was undertaken there were 150 nationally registered Latin American migrant associations and 126 Sub-Saharan migrant associations) (Aparicio Gómez and Tornos Cubillo, 2010, p. 52).

third largest relative number) (Aparicio Gómez and Tornos Cubillo, 2010, p. 52). A set of complementary hypotheses are put forward to explain these differences, such as the weight of social or clan culture in each region of origin; the influence of the native society's migrant stereotypes which may increase the likelihood of those more disadvantaged collectives creating groups; or the fact that some migrant collectives have a longer presence in the country (Aparicio Gómez and Tornos Cubillo, 2010, pp. 53–54).

Besides, research focusing on the transnational performance of Senegalese, shows that at an individual or household level, transnational migrant practices and transnational families seem to be common among Senegalese residing in main European countries of settlement France, Italy and Spain (Baizán et al., 2014; González-Ferrer et al., 2014; Sinatti, 2011; Vives and Silva, 2016).

Additionally, the literature focusing on Senegalese migrant associations in France (mainly, see for instance, Lavigne Delville, 2010) and Italy (Riccio, 2011, 2005; Sinatti, 2014) shows how informal institutions such as customary authorities, kin or caste-based systems (including nobility/allegiance-based systems) are renegotiated across migration processes and affect migrant gatherings. In the case of Spain, there is evidence that the informal institutions just mentioned in the previous sentence are present in Senegalese migrant gatherings (Crespo Ubero, 2006; Solé Arraràs, 2014; Sow, 2005).

At the same time, it is important to contextualise the extent to which transnational practices are widespread among Senegalese associations. Indeed, as other studies suggest is the case in the US (Guarnizo et al., 2003), migrant associations' transnational activities are not generalised among migrant associations settled in Spain. And when migrant associations engage with transnational practices, most often they do so by undertaking more than one type of activity (Garreta Bochaca and Llevot Calvet, 2013; Morales and Jorba, 2010). In particular, considering the overall aims and activities mentioned by migrant associations, and consistent with Morales and Jorba's findings, Garreta and Llevot find that co-development activities are not among the most spread out among the African migrant associations studied, as they

are mentioned in 26% of cases.[31] (African) migrant associations combine these type of transnational activities with others more focused on settlement localities (Garreta Bochaca and Llevot Calvet, 2013; Morales and Jorba, 2010).

Even though transnational practices are not the most common among the African migrant associations, transnationally, they seem to be the most active migrant collective. Indeed, research focused on transnational migrant associations' practices encounters higher degrees of transnational activity and formation of associations among Sub-Saharan migrant associations when compared to other national origins. Two main studies are mentioned subsequently that support the latter statement. First, the study of migrant associations' transnationalism in three Spanish cities (Barcelona, Madrid, Murcia), undertaken within the framework of a larger European Project called LOCALMULTIDEM, found that 'associational formation is not necessarily strictly proportional to the relative size of a certain migrant collective in a city', moreover 'non-Moroccan African organisations are also much more numerous than would be expected from the size of the populations in all three cities'. Subsequently, they conclude that this fact might be due to 'relevant differences in organisational capacity depending on the regional and national origin of migrants' (Morales and Jorba, 2010, p. 276).

Second, taking a closer look at how active the Senegalese collective is in co-development processes in Catalonia (over the whole territory, or at the local level), similar patterns emerge by analysing the extent to which the associations access public funding targeted towards international development at municipal level. Thus, the analysis of the distribution of local funds across different migrant groups reveals that, 'by far the largest share of the funds is being allocated to Sub-Saharan (largely Senegalese and Gambian) migrant associations followed by North African (largely Moroccan) associations' (Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016, p. 376). It is worth noting that, despite the number of Sub-Saharan citizens being smaller than those originally from North Africa or Latin America, the number of associations

---

[31] Garreta and Llevot's research is based on African associationism. Their findings are based on a survey to migrant representatives from Catalonia, Valencia Country and Navarra. The associations are divided between North-African, Mixt (African associations with members from other national origins, most frequently Spanish citizens) and Sub-Saharan (Garreta Bochaca and Llevot Calvet, 2013).

accessing to local official development assistance from Sub-Saharan countries is higher than those from the other two locations[32].

According to the literature, given that Sub-Saharan associations are more dense in comparison with other migrant collectives in Spain, higher degrees of civic presence and political presence of the associations are expected among government officials (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a, p. 21). Moreover, the literature on civic communities relate density with political participation and trust at local level (Fennema and Tillie, 1999).

Furthermore, Senegalese collectives settled in other countries such as France or Italy are also preeminent actors in co-development schemas (Spain is the third country in number of Senegalese citizens after France and Italy) (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014; Datola, 2014; Grillo and Riccio, 2004; Riccio, 2011). Therefore, this evidence backs up the idea of Senegalese migrant associations being active in co-development despite the diversity of national environments and migration structure in each settlement country. Additionally, the diversity of policy environments results in different associational ecologies for Senegalese citizens in France, Italy and Spain (Lavigne Delville, 2010; Lessault and Flahaux, 2013; Riccio, 2011). This is in line with the hypothesis that, regardless of the place of settlement, there is a different capacity for transnational performance of migrant associations' depending on the regional and national origin of migrants proposed by Morales and Jorba (Morales and Jorba, 2010, p. 276).

In fact, this trend highlighted by the case of Senegalese migrant associations is at odds with some of the explanatory factors found by research explaining transnational migrant practices at an individual level (Guarnizo et al., 2003). Indeed, socio-demographic characteristics related to literacy and education levels of migrant Senegalese in Catalonia point to a collective with very low literacy level.[33]

---

[32] According to the study, in year 1999, there were 4 Latin American migrant associations, 3 from Northern Africa, and 13 Sub-Saharan migrant associations that had accessed local ODA funds. In 2008 the numbers changed to: 20 Latin American migrant associations, 10 from Northern Africa, and 33 Sub-Saharan migrant associations having had access to local ODA funds (Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016, p. 377).

[33] In fact, as regards as migration, according to the last and second *Agence National de la Statistique et de la Démographie* (ANSD) census survey (from 2013), the majority of Senegalese emigrants did not

To sum up, three main points are to be underlined. First, this section has shown that Catalan localities were the first destination of many Senegalese that first arrived to Spain in the 1980s. Even if it is not the most numerous foreign national group in Catalonia, most of the Senegalese residing in Spain now live in this region. Even though there is no aggregated longitudinal data vis-à-vis Senegalese migrants' localities of origin, studies in the 2000s and interviewees identify the importance of Halpulaar and Soninke groups coming from Southern Senegal in terms of numbers and first arrivals. Together with the fact that, the majority of Senegalese-born people residing in Spain are men, the characteristics of the study's units of analysis in terms of localities involved, the ethnic background of the migrant associations' and the gender configurations are not surprising. Indeed, in the present research most of the migrant Senegalese connected to the selected units of analysis defines themselves as Fula (Pulaar, Halpulaar are also ways to name the ethnic-linguistic group) and Soninke people.

Second, the section reveals data showing the social, economic or political rights' of migrants. The data gives a statistical approximation to the vulnerability and precarious situation of Senegalese-born citizens in Catalonia, especially during the period when interviews and fieldwork were held (in different rounds between end of 2009 until 2014). This description helps us to grasp the potential implications at the associative level. In this regard, the fieldwork and interviews support the idea that the degradation of labour market and labour conditions, and that the strategies described to confront this degradation – such as mobility across municipalities – have affected Senegalese migrant associations. At the same time, there is no systematised data regarding the extent to which those previously Senegalese (who have now been naturalised) participate in Spanish electoral processes. Nevertheless, the social vulnerability of migrant collectives and their comparative discrimination in accessing basic political rights are put forward by many Catalan local governmental interviewees in this research as a key factor that has motivated the implementation of co-development policies.

---

have any school instruction level before leaving (45,5% of them). Those who, when they left, only had elementary education are the next biggest group, accounting for a 18,3% (ANSD, 2014, p. 250).

Third, the chapter shows the extent to which, when considering associations (overall) and migrant associations regarding transnational activities, Senegalese collectives stand out as associative actors. Indeed, studies in Spain reflect a higher tendency to create associations than other collectives. This could be connected to a stronger social structuration in the community when compared to other collectives (Aparicio Gómez and Tornos Cubillo, 2010, p. 77; Morales and Jorba, 2010). Also, it is likely that the associations in Catalonia are more consolidated than in other Spanish regions. Besides this, the collective shows an important degree of structuration across informal axes. That means, on the one hand, there are informal associations or gatherings that are sometimes coexisting with formal associations. On the other hand, social stratification is affecting how associations are internally organised (by kin, ethnic origin, age, gender…) (Crespo Ubero, 2006; Garreta Bochaca and Llevot Calvet, 2013; Sow, 2005).

Fourth, the chapter also echoes research showing that, when comparing the Catalan regional and local government levels, the increasing number of migrant associations that are noted actually parallels the trend followed by other non-migrant actors accessing funds. This is the case, even if – comparataively speaking – migrant associations are less numerous and access funds to a lesser extent than the autochtonous actors). At the same time, the visibility of Senegalese migrant associations is sharper, and they have similarities (in terms of special engagement) to processes experienced in France or Italy (which represent examples of other European countries that have pursued co-development).

By way of closing, and before the next sub-section, it is useful to highlight a few points. The literature on Sub-Saharan and Senegalese migrant associations settled in Catalonia or Spain suggests the relevance of what I call informal institutions in some migrant associations. This also suggests that there are political dimensions and consequences arising from these informal institutions that are in play within migrant associations and in origin localities. These represent under-researched areas in this field. This research disentangles some of the ways in which these informal institutions work and are still affecting migrant lives and localities in origin. It thus draws attention to the importance of considering the influence of these type of institutions on migrant associations' agency. In this vein, academic research based in

North America and Europe shows the extent to which local institutional dynamics in settlement countries are relevant in shaping migrant associationism and outcomes such as civic and political presence or visibility. Hence, it is plausible to consider that this relationship may also be important in origin.

I argue that, bearing in mind the above-mentioned dynamics, Senegalese migrant associations operating within co-development processes provides a relevant case for exploring the variance of migrant associations' agency in settlement and origin localities across transnational processes.

1.4 Structure of the dissertation

In chapter 1 the main characteristics of this research, which is framed within the debate about the relationships between migration and development, have been outlined.

Chapter 2 addresses the main theoretical debates that inform this research. It tackles core explanatory factors dealing with migrant political transnationalism and migrant political and civic engagement in host countries, namely political opportunity structures and group-based factors. It then goes on to explain the discussion on structure and agency in migration debates. I argue that these debates can be enriched by conceptualising the agency of migrant associations through frameworks of analysis of power relations discussed in development studies.

Chapter 3 elaborates on the methodology adopted in this research, which is mostly based on an extreme case method and qualitative approaches to collecting data.

Chapter 4 presents the main features of the policy environments of co-development processes. The chapter highlights how the approach taken towards Catalonia and Senegal varies. Hence, concerning the Catalan case, the chapter focuses on giving an idea of policy evolution through an estimation of the amount of funds that may have been mobilised and by explaining co-development rationales and the main actors in the region. In the case of Senegal, the chapter first stresses the increasing power gathered by international migrants as represented by their economic remittances. It follows this up by explaining the development at a national level of strategies for

reaching out to Senegalese international migrants. Later on, the focus is put on the decentralisation process and on authorities and structures which are key to understanding the local level in rural regions such as Kolda.

Chapter 5, 6, 7 present three dimensions of the analysis of the agency of migrant associations in co-development. Chapter 5 explores the variation of the agency of migrant associations through its dimension of presence, across localities in origin and localities in residence. It does so by looking at formal institutions (understood as migration and development policy environments in the localities).

Chapter 6 focuses on the observation of the agency of migrant associations through the analysis of how assets of migrant associations (which are also related to informal institutions through structuring processes) affect the presence of migrant associations in origin and residence. Therefore, a new set of dynamics, complementing those seen in chapter 5, is revealed.

Chapter 7 follows the analysis initiated in chapter 6 by observing the dimension of the weight of agency held by migrant associations, in origin localities. It considers whether, and in which ways, migrant associations have attained actual influence over civic and political affairs is questioned.

Finally, chapter 8 concludes the dissertation with a discussion on the main findings and on how they contribute to the literature.

I hope you enjoy the journey.

2 Theoretical framework

In the previous chapter, I framed the research within the discussion regarding the migration and development nexus and transnational perspectives. There I suggested that an analysis of the agency of migrant associations across co-development processes could contribute to academic claims that advocate for a better understanding of the power hierarchies in which migrants are embedded. In this vein, I argue that the concept of agency brings power in to the debates on the political transnationalism of migrants and their civic and political engagement.

Theoretically, so far there is a tendency to consider migrants' civic and political actions in host and origin contexts as being either shaped either by political opportunity structures or by the variation of migrants' characteristics and resources. Both approaches make important contributions to the understanding of migrants' political participation and migrant transnationalism of a given national migrant group across different national contexts. In addition, they also aid our understanding of how different national migrant groups fare on these dimensions within the same context. However, I argue that these approaches are ill equipped to aid our thinking, from a comparative perspective, about how the actions of migrant associations develops and varies in origin and settlement contexts; and across different localities within these contexts. Principally, both approaches tend to conceptualise migrant collectives from the same national origin as homogenous and free of internal power relations. Moreover, by examining the theories on the relationship between structure and agency, we can see that both approaches have shortcomings in relation to explaining the ways in which migrant social action may be constrained and enabled by structures.

On the other hand, the main areas of concern within the literature of development are focused on economic remittances, the diaspora, and migration of skilled people (Bakewell, 2009; King and Collyer, 2016; Skeldon, 2008). Nevertheless, migrants as social actors, and with transnational perspectives, have been overlooked within the literature in development studies. In parallel, there are strands of literature dealing with power relations in development interventions that remain of interest for the phenomenon under study. These debates have pre-eminently taken the form of

empowerment conceptualisation and what is entailed within measurement frameworks to assess those concepts. Furthermore, agency, which is closely linked to empowerment in these bodies of literatures, is increasingly being operationalized in the field.

Consequently, I propose conceptualising the agency of migrant associations through middle ground adaptations to structure and agency approaches and to incorporate the discussions on power relations within development processes undertaken through empowerment frameworks of analysis (Alsop et al., 2006; Kabeer, 1999; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008b; Sewell, 1992). With the framework of analysis explained in this chapter I attempt to contribute to the debates reviewed here in a variety of ways. The most significant approaches will be discussed subsequently. First, I aim to contribute to institutional and group-based explanations of civic and political transnational migrant practices by (1) understanding civic and political engagement in terms of agency, that is a process resulting from the interaction between formal and informal institutions and assets of migrant associations; (2) incorporating relational perspectives on development and power regarding whether, and how, development actions may challenge inequalities. In addition, I contribute to empowerment-based frameworks of analysis of agency (1), by proposing an operationalization for the observation of the agency of social (collective) actors; (2), by introducing into the analysis the comprehension of development as a transnational practice. In turn, I suggest accommodating in the analysis the structuring process by which axes of social stratification are reproduced or transformed in migrant transnational action. In this way I intend to enrich both of these frameworks.

The chapter is structured in the following way. First, section 2.1. tackles the main explanatory approaches to migrant transnationalism. It offers a revision of frameworks and findings relating to institutional-based factors and group-based factors. In addition, it discusses how certain axes of social structuration that are key in Senegalese societies are adapted or maintained through migration. Thus, the aim of this approach is two-fold. On one hand, it seeks to show how migrants adapt these social differentiation axes through migration. On the other hand, it highlights other findings showing the dynamics in origin related to social differentiation. Following this, section 2.2. revises structure-agency debates in migration studies and

frameworks of analysis relating to empowerment and agency which have emerged in development studies. The examination of these two aspects feed into the analytical framework of the research that, together with a brief synthesis of the chapter, concludes in section 2.3.

2.1 Localising political transnationalism: The relationship between migrant civil society and the local

2.1.1 Factors behind migrant transnationalism: external institutions and the importance of the local level

<u>Localities embedded in multilevel governance</u>

External, institutional factors at different governance levels are often used to explain migrant transnationalism. However, there is a prevalence of scholarship pointing to the importance of the national level when gauging how far these institutional factors are linked to migrant action. Hence, first, policies and political regimes in countries of origin and settlement; second, the internal relationship between National governments in origin and minorities or, third, the politics of National governments with their citizens living outside the National borders are all taken as elements that underpin migrant transnationalism (Goldring, 2002; Lacomba, 2016; Lacomba and Boni, 2008; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2016).

However, the significance of the national level has been nuanced by two complementary trends. On one hand, it is mainly European scholarship that has stressed that studying the connection between migrant transnationalism, public institutions and non-migrant actors requires an acknowledgement that migrant transnational practices are influenced by the particular configuration in origin and settlement that arise from multilevel governance (Faist, 2010; Lacroix, 2014; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003a). Moreover, multilevel governance is also considered within analyses connecting migrant transnationalism and the scalability of cities, processes of globalisation, and neoliberalism (Fauser, 2014; Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2009).

At the same time, a range of researches based in North America and Europe have focussed on the relevance of the local institutional level when observing the phenomenon of migrant transnationalism. It is the case, for instance, when enquiring

into economic transnationalism and economic development between the USA and Latin American countries such as El Salvador, where localities on both sides 'constrain the character of transnational activities and outcomes' (Landolt, 2001, p. 237). This is also the case when attempting to understand policy approaches promoting migrant transnationalism in host countries. Accordingly, in a context such as Spain, research focused on Catalonia alone – or investigations that draw comparisons with other autonomous communities or localities – have also proved the extent to which differences on the subnational and local level are relevant to explaining processes such as migrant incorporation or citizenship (Fauser, 2014; Morales and Jorba, 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011; Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016).

In this research the concept of locality is understood as a concrete space where broader political and social dynamics are constituted (Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2009, p. 177). Hence, locality is considered to range from a global city like Barcelona to a small rural village in the peripheral Senegalese region of Kolda. Further, following Glick & Çaglar (2009), when engaging with locality, conceptual barriers grounded on methodological nationalism can prevent scholars from theorising about this aspect. In particular, those authors highlight that much of the transnational migration literature tends to extrapolate conclusions derived from the research undertaken in specific settlement or sending localities to the entire receiving or sending state. Thus, Glick Schiller and Çağlar critique both transnational migration theorists and migration scholarship because of their 'consistent blurring of the units of analysis in transnational migration research' (Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2009, pp. 185). For them the confusion is due to the fact that either 'transnational community' or 'transnational social space' refers to a set of relationships that is not clearly bound by a communal or national identity, even though it may be linked transnationally. By doing so, such approximations can neglect the extent to which localities may shape migrant transnational networks (Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2009, pp. 185–186).

Moreover, beyond the level of governance, other threads of discussion – regarding transnational practices as embedded in institutional frameworks – point to the need to acknowledge that 'institutional bridges' linking migrants with their home countries neither appear overnight and nor are they detached from the settlement context

(Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002). These concerns share similarities with Lacroix's statement saying that transnational perspectives to migration have been inclined to downplay the role of institutions (Lacroix, 2014). In this vein, Faist's problematizes the linkages between transnational social spaces and the institutional framework within different governance levels of a given object of study (Faist, 2008). Analogously, Castles calls for developing migration theory that is linked to the analysis of social transformation processes based on 'an awareness of connectivity between localities and mediations between levels' (Castles, 2010, p. 1583). This thesis does not deal with the theorisation of place, but the first step in the research design relies on the study of the variation of place in order to partially understand the agency of migrant associations. Consistent with this above-mentioned work, the project retains the concern of studying migrant transnational practices as being dependent on the localities in which they are intertwined. These localities are, in turn, embedded in multilevel processes of governance.

The comparative study of locality across settlement and origin is a key approach of this research, however, it is worth recalling that the study of migrant transnationalism from a comparative institutional dimension represents a stronger tradition in the US-based scholarship when compared to European approaches (Portes, 2015). In Europe, previous research on political transnationalism has most often dealt with analysis of migrant collectives across Western European cities (Cebolla-Boado and López-Sala, 2015; Fauser, 2014; Morales and Jorba, 2010; Morales and Pilati, 2014; Riccio, 2008). However, there are very few studies that comparatively explore the variation of migrant political action of the same migrant national collective across the origin and settlement country (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003b). Further, there are even fewer studies that take migrant organisations as the unit of analysis (Portes and Fernández-Kelly, 2015).

Migrant transnationalism rooted in formal institutional approaches

Institutions have been connected to migrants organising collectively for some time in migration studies. For instance, Soysal states, from studying Britain, Sweden and Germany, that 'the organizing principles and incorporation styles of the host polity are crucial variables in accounting for the emerging organizational patterns of migrants' (Soysal, 1994, pp. 85–86). Concerning the broad array of literature that

tackles migrant political and civic engagement based on institutional explanatory factors, I identify political opportunity structure (POS) approaches as main strand of scholarship that deal with pathways of migrants' political and civic participation across transnational processes (see, Koopmans, 1999 for a definition and further debate on the strenghts and weaknesses of POS).

This strand has strongly influenced the research focused on migrant integration. The approach is dominant in the field of study of migrant mobilisation and in cross-national comparative research, and has long established approaches to considering which settlement countries influence migrant collective action (see, for instance, Giugni and Passy, 2004; Koopmans et al., 2005). In a fundamental study, Koopmans et al. examine the effects of models of citizenship over political claim making. They define 'exclusionary citizenship models' as those putting up 'high barriers to migrants' access to the political community' drawing from their research on the exclusionary models in Germany and Switzerland (Koopmans et al., 2005, p. 143). According to their research, exclusionary models are associated with higher rates of transnational claim making (Koopmans et al., 2005, pp. 126–127). In a study examining the regional and city levels in three countries (Germany, the Netherlands and the UK), the subnational level follows the above-mentioned pattern even if there is room for variation across the local level. Therefore, according to this research, it would be expected that in inclusive political contexts[34] 'migrants play a more important role in the public debate on issues concerning them' and they are 'much less oriented toward the politics of their homelands' (Koopmans, 2004, p. 467).

Later, Morales and Pilati, following the aforementioned body of scholarship, observed the political transnationalism of Ecuadorians living in Milan, Madrid and Barcelona. They narrowed the notion of political transnationalism to an electoral dimension. Their conclusions were that Ecuadorians in Milan confirmed the expectation that political practices are more common in that city 'because of the more 'closed' POS in this city' (Morales and Pilati, 2014). On the other hand, research on

---

[34] The research design included the following as independent variables: naturalisation rates; the type of public discourse towards migration; ethnic relations; and the share of votes that went to the Christian Democrats. Therefore, a high naturalisation rate, favourable discourse environment towards migrants and voting for left-wing parties are factors associated with inclusive political contexts (Koopmans, 2004, pp. 455–456).

Toronto and Boston that was not focused upon the analysis of migrant transnationalism but on immigrant organisations, showed that nurturing policy contexts (Canada/Toronto) promote organisational capacity (number of associations) among immigrants to a greater extent than in the United States/Boston (Bloemraad, 2005). The policy context in the case of Toronto includes funding, technical assistance and normative encouragement.

These two studies show that observing migrant transnationalism and its relationship with local governments may have more dimensions than the work by Koopmans et al. suggest. In my view, when considering the dynamics within Spain, there is an apparent oversimplification when considering that non-inclusive institutional contexts at the local level make migrant transnationalism more likely. These accounts also need to take account of the diversity of experiences at regional and local level. Indeed, co-development policy making has promoted migrant transnationalism in Spain at a local level within an otherwise exclusionary environment that limits access to naturalisation and political rights. Further, the phenomenon of some local governments in Catalonia (and in other regions, at subnational level) enhances migrant transnationalism through local funding (Cebolla-Boado and López-Sala, 2015; Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016). But, at the same time, in this context, inclusive local policy environments may promote migrant capacities through transnational practices. Hence, within a national exclusionary context, the range of approaches at local level towards migrant inclusion may give support to transnational migrant practices across residence and origin countries in different ways. These different forms are related to different degrees of migrant's civic and political presence. Migrant transnationalism in this research is a phenomenon that is not a reactive migrant response to an exclusionary environment in residence, but the scenario that constrains or promotes migrant associations' agency.

In this vein, and to conclude this subsection, it is fair to state that institutional approaches have some shortcomings. Three main sets of critique are now synthesised in what follows.

First, these approaches are ill equipped to explain how different migrant communities engage civic and politically differently in the same institutional context. Indeed, this is the case when studying migrant transnationalism, and collective-based factors are in fact proven to be important in understanding migrant transnational practices (Guarnizo et al., 2003; Morales and Jorba, 2010; Portes, 2015). Additionally, there appears to be a good reason – according to the literature – to expect variation between migrant association agency across national origin and residence contexts (Koopmans et al., 2005). However, I argue that drawing on formal institutional factors does not give enough refinement when analysing how a same-migrant national collective performs in settlement and in origin localities. I also claim that the research based on POS related to migrant political transnationalism has tended to overlook political structures in contexts of origin.

Second, transnational migration scholarship also challenges institutional explanatory factors because they often take a very limited definition based on claims from an otherwise broad array of transnational practices, and fail to incorporate transnational resources and structures into the analysis[35]. Moreover, as was set out above, current European migration research based on POS has not been focussed to the same degree on countries such as France, Italy and Spain when compared to other countries that have received – from Anglo-Saxon scholarship – more attention. Indeed, those three countries are the ones pre-eminently involved in co-development (which has received some more attention from French scholarship, overall, according to Grillo and Riccio, 2004). A country like Spain has also become a destination country quite recently without a systematic policy towards migrant integration (Cebolla-Boado and López-Sala, 2015). Thus, compared to other countries in Europe, the Spanish national context has received less attention from POS researchers in cross-national perspectives (Koopmans, 2010). Likewise, the priority given to the phenomenon of hometown transnationalism towards Latin America (and, in particular, Mexico) from North American scholarship contrasts with the European approach.

---

[35] Nevertheless, more recent work such as that undertaken by Morales et al. makes a thorough attempt to incorporate into a POS analysis an all-encompassing comprehension of transnational practices (Morales and Jorba, 2010; Morales and Pilati, 2014).

Third, the focus on institutional factors tends to overlook the importance of the agency of social actors in migration-related processes. This last critique is connected to making the case for better theorisation of the relationship between structure and agency in migration research (Bakewell, 2010; Lacroix, 2014; Morawska, 2001). Moreover, in questioning deterministic interpretations of social phenomena, this type of structure-agency analysis aims to disentangle how migrant, or migrant organisations, reproduce and transform structures in different situations.

The next section examines how group-based factors contribute to an understanding of migrant transnationalism.

2.1.2 Factors behind migrant transnationalism: variation within migrant groups

The examination of internal characteristics of migrant collectives in settlement contexts provides another main approach to throwing light on migrant transnationalism. Subsequently, I classify the contributions of the scholarship that has adopted a focus on the internal characteristics of the collectives into two main categories. These are, namely, those focusing on migrant's individual explanatory factors contrasted with approaches that adopt a collective approach (by studying civic, ethnic organisations; relative geographical distribution; size and collective migration; and the historical background).

Hence, the use of individual factors is overall focused on socio-economic migrant indicators, ethnic and national origin-related factors. Classical studies of political science based in the US have already established that income and formal education – but also aspects of ethnic belonging such as language or religious affiliation[36] – are linked to 'political participation' (Verba et al., 1993). Political participation can be defined as a 'mechanism by which those needs and preferences are communicated to political decision makers and by which pressure is brought to bear on them to

---

[36] Subsequent analysis addresses this religious affiliation and underscores the effect of 'associational membership in general, and religion in particular, on political participation' (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001, p. 766). This line of argument echoes the findings of well-known studies such as Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (1835-1840), *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* by Almond and Verba (1963), and Putnam's *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (1993). In Europe, research points to the positive relationship between migrant membership in voluntary associations and political participation. See, for instance, the study on Italians, Kosovars and Turks in Zurich (Eggert and Giugni, 2010).

respond' (Verba et al., 1993, p. 455). This type of research suggests that it is not only class that is a driver for political participation among different social groups enjoying full citizenship rights.

The study of the migrant transnationalisms of Colombians, Dominicans and Salvadorans residing in the USA provides a range of factors that are related to the individual transnational involvement of migrants (Guarnizo et al., 2003). The authors operationalize transnational electoral and non-electoral participation as:

> '…membership in a political party in the country of origin, monetary contributions to these parties, and actives involvement in political campaigns in the polity of origin. Transnational non-electoral politics includes membership in hometown civic association, monetary contributions to civic projects in the community of origin, and regular membership in charity organizations sponsoring projects in the home country' (Guarnizo et al., 2003, p. 1223).

Their findings suggest that migrant transnationalism involves mainly married males, due to gender effects playing a very strong role. Education (high school or college graduation) is positively related to migrant political transnationalism. In their research, a hypothesis related to significant effects of the urban versus the rural over migrant transnationalism is not supported by the data. This makes the authors infer that migrant transnationalism is not working as compensatory mechanism 'for migrants most affected by the traumas of adaptation to urban life or those suffering from status loss' (Guarnizo et al., 2003, p. 1229). Therefore the authors point, as other studies do, to the constructive relationship between migrant transnationalism and incorporation, both in Europe and the USA (Guarnizo et al., 2003; Lacroix, 2009; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011; Portes et al., 2008). Migrant transnationalism is also dependent on the national origin of the considered collectives. Differences are explained by the importance of the different contexts and experiences of exit, reception and settlement (Guarnizo et al., 2003, p. 1232).

Another set of factors, linked to migrant political and civic engagement in Western countries, point to ethnic-civic organisations and ethnic communities as vehicles for the political and civic incorporation of migrants (Eggert and Giugni, 2010; Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a). For instance, Fennema and Tillie, influenced by Putnam's work (1993), explain political participation and trust in

the political institutions of Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans in Amsterdam through gauging the strength of civic communities across the ethnic groups (Fennema and Tillie, 1999). They therefore observe structural network characteristics framed within an inter-organisational analysis. They do so in a context where all non-EU foreigners, provided they have been previously registered during a specified period of time, are able – since 1985 – to vote in local elections. The authors define civic community as configured by 'many voluntary associations that are related to each other by way of overlapping membership and interlocking directorates' (Fennema, 2004). In particular, interlocking directorates contribute to measuring the strength of the ethnic community as 'persons who are simultaneously members of more than one board create interlocks among boards that contribute both to the cohesion of the ethnic elite and to the horizontal communication among ethnic organisations' (Fennema, 2004, pp. 441–442). According to this research, the higher density and connection of a civic community relates to better communication and cohesion of ethnic elite and leaders (Fennema and Tillie, 1999).

The work edited by Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad explore different types of variation (by place, across ethnic groups and by type of organisation) to explain civic and political stratification among organisations (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a). Among different findings, the authors suggest that despite the fact that immigrants participate in a variety of organisations, they have low levels of visibility and influence in the political system of settlement. It is in this sense that they speak of civic and political stratification of organisations and groups in the US, 'a stratification that also seems apparent, though perhaps along slightly different lines, in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands' (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a, p. 32). Accordingly, it is expected that the agency of migrant associations would be lower in residence than in origin localities. Nevertheless, the basis of this variation across localities and associations within the same national collective provide a main focus of study in this research.

To conclude this section, it is worth highlighting that collective and individual perspectives to migrant transnationalism provide explanations of how and why different migrant collectives develop transnational practices, especially within same national contexts. Nevertheless, in the framework of this research, two aspects remain

to be strengthened in the literature. First, there is research on the relationship between: belonging to civic or political organisations; migrant transnationalism; and migrant political engagement at an individual level. However, in European scholarship, migrant transnational collective practices remain underexplored in terms of the comparison of contexts of origin and settlement. Indeed, at the level of analysis, the 'individualistic focus' prevails in the study of migration and development (Portes, 2015).

Second, collective-based factors tend to treat same-national origin groups as homogenous, being often oblivious to internal power relationships. However, different axes of social differentiation affect them when acting either: individually and collectively; or in origin and settlement localities. This idea has two implications. The first is that, when observing localities within the same national context, a same national group may develop different migrant transnational practices. The second implication relates to the existence of power relations, within a same migrant national group, on the local dynamics in origin. Indeed, some of the literature on hometown associations already points to the complexities that these type of migrant associations have, stating that hometown associations 'rather than being freestanding civic organizations, are in fact well-trodden arenas of contestation, where migrants, state officials, and local communities on both sides of the United States-Mexico border wrestle over questions of identity, belonging, political power, and resources' (Iskander, 2015, p. 113).

Moreover, in relation to migrant transnationalism, for the purposes of this research it is important to consider: research in Latin America on hometown associations; ethnographic accounts about migrant publicly fund co-development between Italy and Ghana; migrant Nigerians undertaking development interventions in Nigeria from the UK; and the migrant Senegalese's collective action impact on Northern Senegal. These all unveil specific and differential dynamics (Iskander, 2015; Lampert, 2014; Lavigne Delville, 2010; Marabello, 2013). These research studies show, and particularly those focused on migrant Sub-Saharan contexts, how those local configurations of power in origin that affect migrant transnational practices may unfold within post-colonial states.

In this vein, socio-economic factors explaining migrant transnationalism do not consider certain cleavages – that reveal aspects related to class, to social position, or that go beyond income or education – but that might have an impact on the civic and political engagement of migrants. To better grasp the civic and political engagement of migrant associations – including, how and whose voice is being heard, and how these groups are structured – I argue that the axes of social stratification affecting migrant collectives in origin need to be taken into the analysis of migrant agency and migrant transnationalism. More detailed understandings of these axes of social structuration, and the framework of analysis used are introduced in the next section.

2.1.3   Social stratification in origin and migrant civil society: kin, gender, ethnic, religious and caste-based systems

The previous studies on group-based factors that are used to explain migrant civic and political engagement reveal how cleavages such as gender, education or age may affect migrant transnationalism or migrant political participation. However, these studies seldom go beyond these axes and problematize power relationships within migrant collectives from a same national background. My argument is that acknowledging two crucial aspects (namely, on what ground power hierarchies within migrant collectives are based upon and in which ways these structures are reproduced across transnational processes) needs to be kept in mind to explain differences between the agency of migrant associations. Later in section 2.3., where I explain the framework of analysis used in this research, I connect this argument with the incorporation of informal institutions into the analysis of migrant transnationalism. In fact, this concept of informal institutions, makes reference to Bordieu's notion of 'habitus', which is discussed in the field of migrant transnationalism by different scholars (Kelly and Lusis, 2006; Vertovec, 2009). Thus, habitus refers to the idea that the value of the sources of power (capitals, in Bourdieu's terms) is socially and spatially-dependent (Kelly and Lusis, 2006). In sum, the above-argument echoes claims by scholars stating the importance of social factors such as kinship, allegiance, religion, traditional authorities, or patriarchy for understanding migrant transnationalism, particularly in the case of Africa (Grillo and Mazzucato, 2008; Kleist, 2011; Lampert, 2014; Lavigne Delville, 2010; Marabello, 2013; Riccio, 2005; Vives and Silva, 2016).

To delve further into this discussion, the next paragraphs briefly address how kin-based, gender-based, religious affiliation and caste-based social configurations may affect migrants and migrant organisations.

Kin-based, gender-based and religious-based axes of social stratification

There is research that unveils how kinship interacts with migration at the levels of the individual and the household and this arises, for instance, within transnational mothering strategies or the family reunification approaches of Senegalese migrants (Baizán et al., 2014; Vives and Silva, 2016). Other research compares Ghanaian and Senegalese West-African communities in Italy to find that even if kin relations are a basic pillar of social organisation they have 'different family, generational and gender relationships within the transnational space' (Riccio, 2008, p. 231). In fact, these ethnographies can give us an approximation of the type of influence these linkages may have in migrant associations. Hence, families operate as 'an economic system of welfare and exchange: it is along the lines of extended family bonds that distribution and redistribution of wealth is organized' (Sinatti, 2014, p. 219). Indeed, as in other Sub-Saharan societies, the Senegalese traditional family is larger than Western families (Baizán et al., 2014; Vives and Silva, 2016).[37] Families do not only include parents and siblings, but also grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, nieces, nephews, etc. Further, the difference between kin from strangers 'is also a matter of self-perception' and 'the extended family may also include significant others who are not related through blood and kinship' (Sinatti, 2014, p. 219). One can find a family living in the same compound with several nuclear households. Besides, within Senegalese households, regardless of the ethnic group, power distribution tends to follow age and gender axes: the oldest man is the head of the household, and his mother, in case that she lives there, also holds much authority (Vives and Silva, 2016, p. 4).

---

[37] According to the last census, on average, households have 8 members in Senegal (ANSD, 2014, p. 301). The household size is partially explained by the fact that polygamy is quite common: the 2013 census showed that 35.2% among the married people in Senegal are polygamous (41.9% in the region of Kolda, 26.4% in the Dakar region (ANSD, 2014, pp. 280–283). But, apart from polygamy, there are other combining factors to take into account to explain the size of family structures, such as early marriages or the coexistence of different generations in the same household, including biological but also 'fictive kin' (Vives and Silva, 2016, p. 4).

Scholarship also discusses how gender norms apply, are renegotiated or influence migration, often within the context of family and transnational families (Baizán et al., 2014; Riccio, 2008; Sinatti, 2014; Sow, 2004a; Toma and Vause, 2014; Vives and Silva, 2016).[38] Two aspects revealed by the literature are worth highlighting. On the one hand, Toma and Vause, while studying gender differences in international mobility from a comparative perspective, point to differences across countries of origin (Senegal and Congo). The differences in the extension of networks used by women, or on whether women lead or follow already opened migratory destinations, are related to Senegal having more rigid 'patriarchal norms restricting female autonomy' in relation to mobility and economic activity than in the Congo (Toma and Vause, 2014, p. 993). At the local level in rural Senegal, research also shows how gendered governance structures are at work. Through the analysis of Senegal's forest governance history, Bandiaky-Badji argues that male dominated political institutions at local and national level such as political parties, legislature or rural councils have failed to tackle inequity and the exclusion of marginalized groups (mainly women) from land and forest governance (Bandiaky-Badji, 2011). In the context of Kolda, Fanchette also highlights women and young people being underrepresented in Rural Councils (Fanchette, 2011, p. 239).

On the other hand, Sinatti applies an intersectional perspective on masculinity to reveal how migration is affected by an understanding of male and female roles. Her work shows, also, that 'gender identities are fluid and multifaceted, as breadwinning transnational migrants experience and renegotiate their role as men within their families' (Sinatti, 2014, p. 224). In the case of migrant men from Senegal, playing their assigned role as male often implies a feeling as being exploited like milk-cows for the wealth of the family in origin (Sinatti, 2014, p. 222). Migration as a means for men to provide economic resources for the extended family, coupled with the pressure felt by migrants because of these expectations, have been put previously raised by other anthropologists such as Riccio (Riccio, 2005). Both studies are centred on Wolof people from Northern Senegal.

---

[38] See, particularly, Sinatti (2014) for a review of scholarship on gender relations within transnational perspectives and migration studies.

Religious affiliation, as mentioned by the literature, is also an important factor defining power relations at different political levels in Senegal (Babou, 2016; Beck, 2001; Fanchette, 2011).[39] Four Muslim brotherhoods play an important role in articulating social and political life, the main authors being Mouridism and Tijanism (both are Sufi orders).[40] The orders have been signalled as participating in a service exchange system within the state in post-colonial Senegal, sometimes in very visible ways, such as when Mourids leaders have publicly asked for the vote to be directed to a certain political party (Babou, 2016; Beck, 2001; Mamdani, 1996).

In migration studies, religious brotherhoods, principally Mouridism among Wolofs, have been the object of attention as transnational social spaces and networks supporting the migratory experience (Diedhiou, 2015; Riccio, 2011, 2008). Also, there has been an interest in studying international dahiras (youth organisations based on Mourid affiliation) as having the potential of being the diaspora's drivers of change through financial and social remittances (Diedhiou, 2015).

Caste and nobility-allegiance dynamics inserted in ethnic systems

Overall, this dissertation takes a constructivist approach to ethnicity, understood as a social category that is the product of the interaction and constant internal and external negotiations between groups, and not as an essential classification inherent to humans (Keating, 2008). Very often in Africa ethnic identity differs from national identity (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2015), and this is also linked to debates about how, or whether, ethnic groups should be visibilised. For instance, the construction of a Senegalese National identity can be seen as colliding with ethnic reaffirmation. Moreover, putting emphasis on ethnic belonging can be perceived as a burden of colonial domination. In fact, these different views reflect academic debates on the contradictory character of ethnicity (Mamdani, 1996, pp. 183–189). The research on Senegalese migrant transnationalism often points to ethnic belonging as a group-based characteristic, and not as an explanatory factor for individual behaviour.

---

[39] Senegalese are mainly Muslim (according to the National Statistics Agency, 96% of the population is Muslim, (ANSD, 2014, p. 300)).

[40] Mouridism was born in the second half of nineteenth century in Senegal under the leadership of Cheikh Amadou Bamba. Touba, in Northern Senegal, where the caliph or Grand Marabout resides, is the core town, or holy city, of Mouridism. Tijanism, or Tidianism, was born in Northern Africa in the eighteenth century. In Northern Senegal, Tivaouane is a core place for Tijanism, where the leader El-Hadji Malick Sy was established in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Medina-Gounass, in Velingara (region of Kolda) is also an important site for another Tijanism's branch.

Whereas ethnicity in this research draws on the previous idea, it is also addressed in two complementary ways. First, it is an asset of migrant associations to the extent to which it reveals how social and village configurations in origin are translated in migrant associations' structures and interlocking directorates. This dimension is further explored in chapter 4 -where ethnic configuration in Senegal and its relation with governance at a local level is tackled.

Second, ethnicity is evaluated to the extent to which a social system is connected to caste systems. This dimension is presented subsequently. Caste systems are very common among many ethnic groups in Western Africa (notably within Wolofs, Fula, Toucouleur, Soninke and Manding, among some others) (Tamari, 1991).[41] They are associated with socio-professional categories defining social-status and rank within a group (Fanchette, 2011; Kamara, 2000; Mbow, 2000; Ngaïdé, 2012; Pelckmans, 2013; Sy, 2000).[42] Therefore, the afore-mentioned ethnic societies are structured generally by different orders configuring a social hierarchy that may have been in place since before colonialism. Even though the classification varies across and within ethnic groups, and that caste institutions evolve through time, by considering Tamari's research one could say that in the West African societies where they are found 'castes form one of three social categories'. The other two main categories are 'nobles' or 'freeborn' and the 'slaves' (Tamari, 1991, p. 223). The upper group ('nobles', 'free persons') gather collectives such as marabouts, livestock farmers, fishermen, warriors. In addition, there are 'caste' professions associated to artists and artisans (such as metalworking, leatherworking, woodworking). Finally, at the lowest social level are located ancient slaves and their descendants.[43]

---

[41] According to Tal Tamari's work focused on West Africa, Manding, Wolof, Fulani have highly developed caste institutions. The historical and sociological data shows terminological borrowing and cross-cultural influences across ethnic groups in the development of caste institutions. The author argues that castes 'appeared among the Malinke no later than 1300, and were present among the Soninke and Wolof no later than 1500' (Tamari, 1991).

[42] Pelckmans (2013) and Fanchette's (2011) works are mainly focused on Fula communities. Mbow (2000) is centred in Wolof societies, Kamara (2000) in Toucouleur, while Sy (2000) in Soninkes. The mentioned studies encompass communities from Senegal, but also Mauritania and Mali.

[43] I have provided Tamari's perspective as the author covers a larger geographical area (West Africa), however Abderrahmane Ngaïdé speaks of only two main social categories working in the Fuladu. They are the nobles (in Pulaar *Dimo*, *Rimbe* in plural form*)* and slaves *(maccube* or *jiyaabe,* the second concept has a more tolerable meaning, due to historical reasons) (Ngaïdé, 2012, pp. 69–100).

As is the case with ethnic constructions, which are not homogenous across the same group and may involve interchanges *between* orders but also *between* ethnic groups, there are different interpretations and contradictions in the domination-allegiance dynamic. However, overall the noble status has more prestige and is dominant over the other two ranks. In some cases this is connected to access to political power. Both slaves and artisans are 'dominated' by nobles, even though the latter remain allied to the powerful (Sy, 2000, p. 8; Tamari, 1991). Hence, ethnicity and caste systems provide the settings to insert slavery ideologies and practices in African societies (Lecocq and Hahonou, 2015; Mbow, 2000; Sy, 2000).

In 2000, the French anthropologist Roger Botte considered African slavery as having been largely amputated from scientific research (Botte, 2000).[44] Notwithstanding this, the works dealing with the subject show that, despite slavery having juridically and politically disappeared in countries like Senegal – and despite slavery systems being more widespread in the past than nowadays – the categories of slave/master still prevail. They also have contemporary uses and provide reasons behind social mobilisations of contestation throughout the continent (Botte, 2000; Lecocq and Hahonou, 2015; Pelckmans and Hardung, 2016; Rossi, 2015). Moreover, the domination-allegiance systems are recreated, often subtly, 'in the liminal space between the pluri-legal, the illegal, the legitimate, and the informal' norms in which the social groups and the individuals are intertwined (Lecocq and Hahonou, 2015, p. 186).

Regarding its definition, for the purposes of this dissertation, 'slavery is not simply a lack of individual freedom to negotiate one's labor', it is broadly related to the lack of 'capacity to control social relations' (Lecocq and Hahonou, 2015, p. 182). According to these authors, post-slavery deals with 'the discursive and cultural practices that

---

[44] Botte edited an issue of the Journal des Africanistes called *L'ombre portée de l'esclavage. Avatars contemporains de l'oppression sociale* enterily dedicated to the discussion of the subject (Botte, 2000). Fifteen years later, the situation has improved but it largely remains a taboo subject, still (Pelckmans and Hardung, 2016; Rossi, 2015). The reasons behind it are to be found in a mixture of guilt and assigned responsibilities for human trafficking; slavery in the American islands; colonialism; and post-colonialism. Botte also mentions a research context singularly difficult due to North-South relationships. At the same time, there is an on-going debate on whether the term slavery is an anachronism to refer to current practices, there are questions concerning what post-slavery or emancipation actually means, and there are questions about the differences between the uses of these concepts in America and Africa (Lecocq and Hahonou, 2015).

uphold slavery' and to 'the continued ideological speech and all notions of inequality it brings with it' (Lecocq and Hahonou, 2015, p. 184). Hence, the phenomenon is introduced in this research from this post-slavery perspective.

Besides, Rossi warns us about the prejudices and over-simplification that the expression 'slave' recalls to 'Westeners' compared to the subtleties and different situations the word may be denoting in different contexts. The use of the term 'slave' to refer to slaves' descendants is common in African societies, 'but this does not mean that the people thus labelled live in conditions comparable to enslavement'. For her, it is important 'to distinguish analytically between actual slaves and classificatory slaves, that is, persons and groups who do not live like slaves, but are classified as such in their societies' (Rossi, 2015, p. 323). Indeed, following Rossi's comprehension, when in this study some interviewees or myself discuss slaves, we are accounting for this classification, or the consequences of this stigmatisation and discrimination.

In the context of inter-African migration, the extent to which slavery systems have structured the Senegalese territory is historically explored by different scholars (Fanchette, 2011; Ngaïdé, 2012; Rodet, 2015; Sow, 2011). Concerning contemporary international migration, Pelckmanns' work shows how the freeborn elites from Mali, Mauritania or Senegal recreate their high status when they migrate internally (to Bamako) or Paris (Pelckmans, 2013). Sy illustrates how marriage norms (the impossibility for a noble to marry a 'slave' woman, for instance) are enforced from Paris, and the ways used by migrant nobles to punish families in origin villages when the norms are broken (Sy, 2000). Daum's study of Malian associations in France, undertaken almost 20 years ago, shows how hometown associations' had transformed the way they elected their representatives. According to the census undertaken by this author, there was an emergent process of choosing HTA board leaders based on their capacities and dynamism, which implied a way for slave descendants to overcome servility structures (Daum, 1998, p. 19). As another example, a very interesting ethnographic account of Senegalese migrant associations in France gathering people from Halpulaar and Soninke villages from Northern Senegal, explains how

allegiance-nobility systems and age systems are contested and renegotiated in settlement localities (Lavigne Delville, 2010).

In a study of masculinities among Wolof migrants, Sinatti finds that 'migration can become a means to break through social categories such as caste or class' (Sinatti, 2014, pp. 220–221). From her own work and the items reviewed, I conclude that servility/nobility systems and categorical slavery stigmatisation may be transformed, but they may also remain. Hence, even though slavery is not constantly brought to the table in the daily lives of all migrants, 'migrants often do relapse temporally into hierarchical forms of relating with families of freeborn status', and this 'demonstrates how categorical slavery is a very real aspect of these (migrant) communities, also in urban contexts' (Pelckmans, 2013, p. 60). Besides, as Lecocq and Hahonou express it, post-slavery relations 'exist as contextualized and relationally between individuals (or groups) who know each other' (Lecocq and Hahonou, 2015, p. 186).

Thus, French-based ethnographies have explored in detail how these social categories are enacted in hometown Senegalese associations of mainly Soninke-speaking migrants from the Senegal River valley regions of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal based in France (such as Lavigne Delville, 2010; Pelckmans, 2013; Sy, 2000). Yet, in Spanish scholarship, these aspects have either not been treated at all, or dealt with in an indirect form when studying Senegalese (Sub-Saharan) migrant associations. Indeed, some of the mentioned social categories, such as those related to nobility/allegiance systems, are not mentioned. For instance, Crespo distinguishes between registered associations and those that are non-registered (he calls them 'own' Senegalese groupings). The latters are governed by an axis of social and geographical stratification that are not mutually exclusive such as kinship, locality of origin, ethnic group, region of origin, nationality, religion. According to the author, these groupings are crucial nodes of networks that are 'invisible to the receiving society', which connect the members of the immigrant community with each other and with the society of origin and show the collective dimension of African migrations (Crespo Ubero, 2006, p. 133). Moreover, this collective dimension would be a hierarchically organised, where 'each person occupies a place, have a function, and have rights

depending on different factors such as age' (Crespo Ubero, 2006, p. 134 my translation from Spanish).

Sow contributes to the knowledge of Senegalese migrant associations in Catalonia by mapping and classifying them with a taxonomy of ten categories that cover the array of the most influential Senegalese migrant associations in Catalonia (in terms of visibility and type of actions they undertake in Catalonia or between Catalonia and Senegal) (Sow, 2005, pp. 43–58). Sow's classification identifies formal and informal gatherings that sometimes clearly overlap (for instance in associations undertaking international cooperation, or co-development), even though this overlapping is not explored explicitly in these works. Particularly of interest are what Sow identifies as widespread practices, notably, ethno-community based associations and cultural associations, where there are hierarchies based on cleavages such as clan, lineage, age, gender, structure the organisations.

Bearing in mind these works, it can be said that more ethnographies focusing on Senegalese migrant associations in Spain need to be undertaken. This research does not, however, contribute to filling this gap. However, I argue that accounts drawing on POS and group-based factors face difficulties in explaining civic and political engagement of same national groups because they fall short of incorporating social axes of structuration affecting migrant collectives such as those introduced above. The next section presents the framework of analysis for this research.

2.2 Power, structure and agency: contributions from migration and development studies

2.2.1 The structure and agency debate in migration studies

Main contributions to the structure-agency debate from migration and transnational approaches

Concerning the need to root the debate on migration and development (or social transformation) within broader social science debates, this project aims to contribute to the calls for further research on whether transnational practices reproduce or challenge established hierarchies of power (Goldring 2002). The study of the interplay of power that takes place between multi-sited actors is undertaken in this research by tackling the discussion on the agency-structure relationship.

The discussion about the relationship between structure and agency (or human action) is fundamental, and broad, in social science. Theoretically, and aiming to be synthetic, the approach to the structure-agency relation can be pursued from structuralism, neo-classical views and also from middle ground perspectives such as the theory of practice (Bourdieu), the theory of structuration (Giddens) or critical realists' approaches (Archer).[45] As with other works dealing with migration, this project takes middle ground adaptations to the relation between structure and agency (Bakewell, 2010; Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Kelly and Lusis, 2006; Lacroix, 2014; Morawska, 2001). The framework of analysis of this research adapts some of Giddens' (Giddens, 1984) and Bourdieu's main concepts (Bourdieu, 1984).[46]

The fields of migration studies and transnationalism have recently undertaken some examination of the structure-agency debate. For instance, in relation to the subject, Bakewell makes an extended review of scholarship framed within migration studies and argues that 'theories of migration have tended to skirt around the problem of structure and agency, despite its importance' (Bakewell, 2010, p. 1690). He contends that Archer's critical realism is a good way to overcome a major weakness of Giddens' structuration theory: the notion of the duality of structure. That refers, essentially, to the idea that 'the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the social practices they recursively organize' (Giddens, 1984, p. 25), and this makes the relationship between structure-agency impossible to be researched in practice. According to Bakewell, Archer argues that rather than the duality of structure, 'we must acknowledge an analytical dualism between structure and agency, which recognises that they operate over different time periods' (Bakewell, 2010, p. 1696). Whereas the discussion dealing with whether Archer's morphogenesis contributes to improve Giddens' approach is beyond the purposes of this research,[47] the ideas that agency and structure are connected in an iterative way,

---

[45] To revise the different conceptualisations of agency across social science, since the Enlightenment, see (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). Besides, Sewell reviews the concept of structure in Giddens' work (Sewell, 1992).

[46] Both authors have produced a vast amount of work, which I have covered only partially. I rely also on the work of other scholars that discuss or apply their theories (Alsop et al., 2006; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Kabeer, 1999; Sewell, 1992; Vertovec, 2009).

[47] For a review of the debate, see Bakewell (2010). Indeed, he recalls that there are strands of literature discussing whether critical realist's perspectives represented by Archer really challenge structuration approaches.

and that structure exists regardless of whether the agent is interacting with it, inform the framework of analysis taken.

There are other significant contributions to the debate on structure-agency and migration from middle-ground theoretical accounts. For instance, Goss and Lindquist apply the theory of structuration to overcome the separation between macro and micro levels of analysis that result from structural perspectives and functional theory approaches to international labour migration in the case of the Philippines (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). Morawska understands international migration as a structuration process, and follows Emirbayer and Mische's proposal (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998) to improve Massey's et al. work on international migration by, among other things, clarifying the 'theoretical status of symbolic formations and their causal significance in shaping the flows, purposes, and strategies of international migration' (Morawska, 2001, p. 50). Besides, in a working paper, de Haas argues for the need to incorporate notions of structure and agency in migration theory 'by linking migration to development theory through conceptualising migration as a function of (1) capabilities and (2) aspirations to migrate'. He therefore defines '*migration capabilities* as the social, human and material capital individuals are able to mobilise in order to migrate' (de Haas, 2014, p. 16).

However, the latter works illustrate that, most often, the study of the structure-agency relationship with migration is tackled to theorise people's movement (that is, basically, who moves and why). Notwithstanding this, there are newer accounts – even if fewer of them – that speak more specifically to the type of phenomena that this research is interested in. Of importance is Lacroix's work in seeking to seize the social mechanisms of transnational engagement of hometown associations motivated by the idea that 'there is something about transnationalism that is not context-dependent and that remains to be captured' (Lacroix, 2014, p. 2 and 4). Aiming to explain the motivations underpinning hometown associations' initiatives, he takes structure-agency's perspectives combined with Habermas' theory of communicative action and pluralistic visions of role-set and actor-network theories. Following the discussion of this author, 'transnational engagements of migrant associations are best understood as a form of agency resulting from the plural embedding of their members' (Lacroix, 2014, p. 17). The research studies Algerian and Moroccan

Berbers in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and Indian Punjabis in the United Kingdom (U.K.). It also includes field visits in Punjab and Southern Morocco.

In his analysis, the author bridges macro and micro levels of analysis. At a micro level, his analytical framework focuses on the communicative dimension of migrants' transnational engagement. By recognising that an array of studies show that collective remittances 'are the outcome of the dual embedding of their members at the local level' – and looking at the communicative dimension of this embedding – hometown associations' development practices are considered as a 'rational'[48] activity both by actors in origin and residence countries.

Social reproduction of structures and multiple embedding of migrants: habitus and intersectionality

Approaches such as Lacroix's and Morawska's attempt to fill an alleged weakness of structure-agency theory. That is, the constraint that does not bring in an analysis of the cultural dimension and situated identities of migrants. Thus, Lacroix states that 'current theories do not account for the pluralization of social roles and the bearing they can have on migration/transnational processes' (Lacroix, 2014, p. 14). Moreover, it is often neglected that aspects such as moral norms, or migrant resources are context dependent. Besides, Morawska acknowledges that culture and normative practices have not been investigated by sociologists in international migration (having been primarily explored by historians and anthropologists, instead). Her model incorporates 'local differences in sociocultural milieus' of transnational migrants (Morawska, 2001).

There are other sophisticated contributions dealing with this subject. I refer here to, first, Bourdieu's habitus in its interrelation with structure-agency debates. And, second, I want also to mention the debates tackling intersectionality. Dealing first with habitus and structure-agency debates, Sewell's attempt to overcome some of the problems of the theories tackling structure in social sciences by considering Giddens' structuration theory and Bourdieu's habitus is of interest to this dissertation. Some

---

[48] According to the author, while criticising the Weberian model of rationality in which 'action is intended to achieve personal ends with available means within the limits of a moral framework', Habermas coined the term 'communicative rationality'. This is posited on the idea that 'an action requires the mediation of an external observer to be acknowledged as rational. It cannot be purely assessed as an internal relation between personal ends and available means' (Lacroix, 2014, p. 20).

clarification of major concepts is needed beforehand. Thus, according to Giddens, structures are composed of schemas or rules (generalizable procedures) and resources (human and non-human, they can serve as a source of power in social interactions) (Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992). In turn, structures empower and constrain social action and tend to be reproduced by that social action.

Habitus is the process by which the mutual reproduction of Giddens' schemas ('mental structures' in Bourdieu's terms) and resources taken together result in durable dispositions or propensities (Sewell, 1992). Thus, habitus, which is internalised by individuals along with their life experiences and in relation to their social positions, would refer to the tendency of these individuals to reproduce structures (sustained, as said, by rules and resources) (Sewell, 1992, p. 19). Regarding the extent to which these ideas can be applied to collective actors, habitus is considered as a structuring mechanism that operates within agents and is not in itself a conduct determinant. Hence, as individuals can act collectively, social action can reproduce structures, but also transform them (Sewell, 1992).

As regards to habitus, whereas Lacroix contends that Habermas's communicative theory is better fitted to grasp a conception of a plural social agent, others argue the opposite. Thus, for instance, Vertovec reviews different works that have dealt with the concept from transnational perspectives, and contends that it may be a useful concept to 'better appreciate how dual orientations arise and are acted upon' (Vertovec, 2009, p. 69). For instance, even though the concept might be elusive to analytical definition (as it is vaguely defined both in terms of space and with respect to axes of social differentiation) there are authors who use the concept as a 'thinking tool' by which to analyse migrant transnational practices (Kelly and Lusis, 2006).

Second, growing from feminist scholarship, the contributions in intersectionality[49] are increasingly being advocated as an approach able to grasp migrant transnational experiences (Anthias, 2012; Bermudez, 2016; Fathi, 2017; Purkayastha, 2010; Sinatti, 2014). The concept has been explored in the understanding of inequalities

---

[49] The term was coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in a seminal work examining the problems derived from applying a one-dimensional approach to antidiscrimination law (Crenshaw, 2015). She claimed for a more complex and multidimensional analysis of how race, gender, class-based discriminations combine to understand the exclusion of disadvantaged groups.

through its interrelation to class[50] position and construction of belonging (Anthias, 2012; Fathi, 2017). Yet, the relationship between intersectionality and structure-agency is (still) under-theorised. Nevertheless, intersectionality is an interesting paradigm to escape from an essentialised focus on identity that reveals the importance of paying attention to the multiple axes of difference affecting migrant lives and reproducing inequalities. In this vein, 'intersectionality argues that it is important to look at the way in which different social divisions inter-relate in terms of the production of social relations' (Anthias, 2009, p. 10). Following Anthias' comprehension, I use intersectionality in this research as a heuristic device; it is a valuable approach to identifing ways in which migrant associations' practices are related to different forms of positionality. Indeed, it is in the conceptualisation of positionality that structure-agency debates are linked to intersectionality. Anthias defines positionality as the 'space at the intersection of structure (social position/social effects) and agency (social positioning/meaning and practice)' (Anthias, 2009, p. 12). Moreover, 'translocational positionality' refers to the specific positionality in which those social actors are facing a multiplicity of contexts (Anthias, 2009, p. 12). It emphasises the context-dependent character of social axes of differentiation.

To sum up, beyond the richness and strength of the theoretical debates regarding the relationship between agency and structure, it is fair to say that one of the main criticisms to be made towards adopting a structure-based approach are the difficulties that arise in the practical operationalization of the research (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Sewell, 1992). In this sense, I suggest in the next subsection that frameworks of analysis used to measure empowerment in development interventions can be valuable tools for the empirical operationalization gauging structure-agency in migrant transnational processes.

Despite this criticism, I see also advantages in framing transnational migrant practices within this type of analysis. First, taking agency as a main concept of analysis supports measuring power dynamics when migrants exert civic and political practices. In this sense, there is also a challenge in conceptualising migrants' agency,

---

[50] For a summary of social sciences' approaches to class and their shortcomings when accounting for migrant lives and narratives, see Fathi (Fathi, 2017).

both within development processes (Lacroix, 2014; Muniandy and Bonatti, 2014) and in the academic discussion on citizenship and migration (Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 169). In particular, the approach taken is informed by the need to understand migrant agency beyond its economic dimension[51]. In this sense, the project also weights the importance, when discussing agency, of bearing in mind not only the position migrants display in a network of relationships, but also the power they actually can exert in development (Muniandy and Bonatti, 2014, p. 5).

Second, while there are works that combine a dovetailing analysis of POS and group-based characteristics (Morales and Pilati, 2014; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008b), I am arguing in this chapter that these accounts fall short of attending to how the social stratification of migrant collectives is related to civic and political engagement in origin and residence contexts. Therefore, habitus and intersectionality are used as devices to grasp how axes of social stratification in contexts of origin influence the agency of migrant associations both in origin and settlement. Notwithstanding, some of the civic and political stratification components exposed by Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, are incorporated in the framework of analysis as ways to seize the dimensions of presence and weight of agency. Third, considering the debate of structure-agency helps in avoiding the determinism entrenched in theoretical contributions such as Marxist and French structuralist conceptions (Sewell, 1992). Consequently, in the context of this research while the agency of migrant associations, according to the literature on structure-agency, may tend to reproduce structures, it is also capable of transforming them.

To conclude, I want to define agency at this stage of the discussion. Thus, agency is understood primarily in Sewell's terms. Accordingly, 'to be an agent means to be capable of exerting some degrees of control over the social relations in which one is enmeshed, which in turn implies the ability to transform those social relations to some degree' (Sewell, 1992, p. 20). Also, according to Sewell's interpretation, agency is 'the actor's capacity to reinterpret and mobilize an array of resources in

---

[51] Lacroix also argues that considering a structure-agency perspective in migration studies 'offers an alternative to the dominant economistic framework for understanding migrants' decisions' (Lacroix, 2014, p. 29).

terms of cultural schemas other than those that initially constituted the array' (Sewell, 1992, p. 19).

2.2.2   Agency through empowerment frameworks

<u>**Clarifying the difference between empowerment and agency**</u>

The incorporation of agency into development studies has come from the debates on power [52] and empowerment. In the following passage, in order to explain the comprehension of agency used in this research, I need to first focus on debates regarding what is empowerment and about how it can be measured.

Within the fields of both development practice and studies, the analysis of power relations gained ground in the 70s. This emergence can be principally grounded on the influence in development discourse of social sciences' academic debates about power that characterises the period, but also on the incorporation in official and scholarly discourse of more 'bottom-up' approaches represented by Freirian perspectives to popular education and feminist movements (Batliwala, 2010). In 1995, in the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing, the concept was endorsed at global level, and is seen by some authors as a key moment underpinning its expansion (Drydyk, 2013).

The meaning of empowerment was linked, in its beginnings, with an interest in how power relations are transformed. Researching empowerment, that is, whether there is a shift in power relations, and how to assess this within development processes, has been of growing interest to scholars over the last 20 years, beginning from feminist accounts (Batliwala, 1997; Kabeer, 1999; Rowlands, 1997). This interest was paralleled with the institutionalisation of the idea, insofar as donors have backed both discursively and economically the incorporation of the concept in their policy-making agendas. Critical scholars speak of the process by which, being removed of any real attempt to change the 'status quo', concepts that are based on collective and rooted struggles of the excluded are co-opted and depoliticised (Cornwall and Eade, 2010) Therefore, words like empowerment and participation are denaturised by official

---

[52] For a review on the different approaches to power influential in development studies see the contributions by John Gaventa (Gaventa, 2006; Gaventa and Cornwall, 2008).

development agencies (bilateral and multilateral donors and development banks) and become empty buzzwords.

Nevertheless, the academic debates surrounding empowerment and ways to evaluate changes in power relations remain very much alive and of interest for the purposes of this research. However, the definition of empowerment still remains contested. There are different meanings at hand, and the studies differ in the dimensions that are selected to explain it[53]. Overall, while Amartya Sen's capabilities approach[54] has had a major influence in different strands of the literature, I distinguish here works that stress the focus on choice, and others on the expansion of capabilities. Hence, on the one hand, views relate empowerment with positive changes in the array of available, and exercised, choices of previously disempowered people (Alsop et al., 2006; Kabeer, 1999). Alsop et al., for instance, define empowerment as 'the process of enhancing an individual's or group's capacity to make purposive choices and to transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes' (Alsop et al., 2006, p. 1). On the other hand, some contributions relate empowerment to the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people, stressing the unequal institutional relations within which powerlessness is embedded (Narayan, 2005, p. 5). As in the previous understanding, Ibrahim and Alkire draw upon Amartya Sen's work and consider empowerment as an expansion of agency (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007).

The connection of agency and empowerment is realised by many of the scholars within development studies, and in some cases, as Ibrahim and Alkire mention, they overlap (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007). Drydyk, from a capabilities approach, discusses

---

[53] For a comprehensive account of different empowerment definitions, and approaches to measuring it used in the literature, see Alsop et al. and Ibrahim and Alkire (Alsop et al., 2006; Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007, pp. 6–7).

[54] The Capabilities Approach has been broadly used in empirical endeavours within development studies. One of the central strengths of Sen's framework is that it is flexible and shows 'a considerable degree of internal pluralism': the list of capabilities is not fixed or definitive, as it depends on personal value judgements; the focus can be broaden to include 'agency' as action for common good; it has also been fine-tuned to include questions such as inequality, social justice or rights. Nevertheless, it does not provide a complete theory of justice or development and can not always be adapted for assessment objectives (Clark, 2005, p. 5). The Capabilities Approach has been criticised broadly. Predominantly, one set of critiques refers to the extent to which it can be made operational. Other highlights the difficulties to make inter-personal comparisons. However, most importantly, Sen's general comprehension of development beyond economic growth, as expansion of capabilities to foster (agent) people attain their own conception of what development is, provides a heterogeneous comprehension that is consistent with the purposes of this dissertation.

the conceptual gaps underpinning the conception of empowerment as an expansion of agency, contending that 'while empowerment entails expanded agency, it is not reducible to expanded agency, because empowerment has a conceptual link with well-being that agency cannot have' (Drydyk, 2013, p. 250). Following this discussion, the analysis undertaken puts its main focus on migrant agency's aspects, and less so on dimensions of 'choice', which have cognitive and more subjective connotations (Drydyk, 2013; Kabeer, 1999). Having a cognitive dimension refers to the idea that different strands of literature highlight the importance of pondering aspects such as 'increased confidence, greater autonomy, feeling more valued and respected, and motivation' when analysing empowerment (Hanmer and Klugman, 2016, p. 239).

Thus, to the extent to which co-development processes can be understood as development interventions, I argue that the literature on empowerment and agency can bring insights to how migrants may exercise power. At the same time, there are criticisms and shortcomings to bear in mind that are associated with the literature. First, this literature analyses development processes without a focus on transnational perspectives. Moreover, migrants are seldom an analysed social actor in the research on agency and empowerment. Second, besides the lack of communication between migration and development fields of knowledge, the conceptual debates on agency are quite recent in development studies, while they have been present for decades in social sciences (Drydyk, 2013; Hayward and Lukes, 2008). In this vein, development researchers acknowledge a tendency to use oversimplified applications of the concept of power, which are oblivious to structuralist or post-structuralist debates (McGee, 2016).

To deepen the relationships between agency and empowerment, the following lines explain contributions of two main strands of research related to the appraising of empowerment and agency. I classify them according to the categories of relational views and structure-agency-based views. I should also say that often structure-agency-based views could fit into a broader category that connect empowerment and agency to individual socio-economic indicators and econometric models (see, for instance, Hanmer and Klugman, 2016; Mahmud et al., 2012; Thapa and Gurung,

2012). Nevertheless, as this type of research does not fit the phenomenon under study nor the research design, I will not expand on it.

Agency and relational views on empowerment

Many aspects of this type of approaches to empowerment and agency are based on the insights from feminist conceptual grounds undertaken during the 80s and 90s. At that time, empowerment approaches had less focus on individual 'self-assertion, but on the structural basis of gender inequalities' (Cornwall, 2016, p. 344 see the paper, also, for a historical review on empowerment). The array of accounts that can be located under this strand pre-eminently understand empowerment as a relational process, and also as a process that cannot be imposed by outsiders, although external support can foster it (Batliwala, 2010; Cornwall, 2016; Rowlands, 1995). Therefore, thinking of empowerment as a relational process implies two main ideas. First, a focus on transforming power relations implies being concerned with oppression and how it is internalised, and with building critical consciousness (Freirian *conscientisation*) (Cornwall, 2016; Rowlands, 1997). Moreover, these approaches, by analysing gender relations, show that access to economic resources is not univocally conducing women to having more power. Second, it suggests that empowerment cannot be measured, at least not in the way in which some positivist or post-positivist approaches to knowledge attempt to do. Hence, relational approaches are fundamentally underpinned by an interpretivist perspective, and often rely on ethnographic and participatory approaches to research (Bell and Payne, 2009; Cornwall, 2016; Harvey, 2010; Jupp and Ibn Ali, 2010)[55].

When reflecting upon the measurement of women's empowerment, social economist Naila Kabeer, whose work in the area has been very influential, highlights important aspects to bear in mind. In her view, empowerment is related to expanding people's ability to make strategic life choices, particularly in contexts where they are deprived of this ability. In consequence, focusing on empowerment entails being interested 'in possible *inequalities* in people's capacity to make choices rather than in *differences* in

---

[55] As a broader example of the type of approach and research I am referring to, see https://pathways-of-empowerment.org [Last accessed 20/October/2018]
The programme Pathways of Women's Empowerment is an international research and communications programme established in 2006. Strongly influenced by the work of Naila Kabeer and Andrea Cornwall, it spans research in 21 countries and shows an array of methods of enquiry.

the choices they make',[56] therefore, the researcher needs 'to disentangle differentials which reflect differences in preferences from those which embody a denial of choice' (Kabeer, 1999, p. 439). She uses Bourdieu's concept of 'doxa' (encompassing the limits of what is thinkable and sayable) to justify asking ourselves, as researchers, 'whether other choices were not only materially possible but whether they were *conceived* to be within the realms of possibility' (Kabeer, 1999, p. 442). The author also proves that the equivalence between 'access to resources' and empowerment is misleading, as access to resources can be related to a '*potential* rather than actualized *choice*' (Kabeer, 1999, p. 443). Besides, while 'control' is a frequently used mechanism to bridge this problem (often related to decision-making), its definition, Kabeer argues, is as difficult as it is to define and measure power. Hence, it is a challenge to operationalise 'control' 'except in the purely formal and legalistic sense' (Kabeer, 1999, p. 445).

By applying a middle ground adaptation of the structure-agency debate to empowerment, she proposes thinking about empowerment in terms of three interrelated dimensions. These are resources (acquired through a multiplicity of social relations conducted in different institutional domains, she sees them as pre-conditions); agency (that she defines as 'the ability to define one's goals and act upon them'); and achievements (understood as outcomes).

She also exposes problems both of inferring agency based on inadequate information about the processes involved and of inferring outcomes based on restricting understandings of agency. These problems can be overcome by the triangulation of the previously mentioned structures, agency and outcomes. She also highlights recognising, as researchers, that agency is context-dependent. This latter is especially significant given the danger of a value-bias towards what the analysts think are the appropriate choices to be made by any given collective. Besides, by using the expressions of *effective agency* and *transformatory agency*, Kabeer points to the need to evaluate the outcomes of empowerment on the basis of their *transformatory significance*, that is, 'the extent to which the choices made have the potential for

---

[56] Italics are in the original text.

challenging and destabilizing social inequalities and the extent to which they merely express and reproduce those inequalities' (Kabeer, 1999, p. 461).

These approaches have exposed a number of findings regarding factors that are connected to empowerment processes. The issues to be highlighted here include: engaging people to reflect on their own circumstances (individually and collectively); considering the importance of those who are intermediaries or implementers of project interventions to be themselves 'agents of change'; and the importance that not only income-based or other material resources have, but also symbolic or social resources (Cornwall, 2016). Another set of findings can be connected to how development interventions are designed and implemented. Therefore, for instance, interventions that acknowledge (gender) inequalities may ignore women's contribution or potential contribution. They may also overlook gender-related constraints on women's capacity to participate (Kabeer, 2010). These type of findings inform, first, the way agency is observed in the research – especially when appraising in origin what I call the dimension of weight of migrant associations' agency – and, second, the operationalization of this weight according to ideas of participarion and ownership of the development agenda.

Structure-agency-based approaches to agency

There is an array of work committed to building up frameworks that support the comparative and cross-national analysis of empowerment (Alsop et al., 2006; Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007; Narayan, 2005). Alsop, Alkire and Narayan have all led projects aiming towards this goal, with the support of official development agencies.[57] Some of them are explicitly contributing to the set up of quantitative and qualitative indicators to internationally measure and compare the degree of empowerment of disadvantaged collectives (Alkire et al., 2013; Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007)[58].

These works (particularly Alsop et al's and Narayan's, as Alkire et al. are conceptually based on Amartya Sen's work) explicitly assume empowerment as an

---

[57] Notably, Ruth Alsop et al. and Deepa Narayan works are supported by The World Bank.
[58] Perhaps the most well known is the Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) which measures the empowerment, agency, and inclusion of women in the agricultural sector. It was developed in the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Institute (OPHI), centre led by Sabina Alkire.

outcome emerging from the intertwining of agency and structure, and hence apply middle ground adaptations to the relationship between structure and agency. Besides, the application of these frameworks to observe shifts in power relations are supported by a diversity of methodological views, ranging from qualitative to quantitative or mixed approaches. Moreover, with regard to the findings that this type of research has obtained, they depend on the definition attributed to empowerment, the studied actor, and the domain of life where the research is focused on. According to this diversity, explanatory factors related to empowerment vary (Alsop et al., 2006; Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007; Narayan, 2005; Samman and Santos, 2009). Thus, education; political and civic rights; political regimes; employment; access to financial resources; civil law or customary frameworks related to marriage or property; are all variables underpinning changes in empowerment. Furthermore, the range of outcomes that are attributed to empowerment processes are diverse, such as more access and influence of previously excluded collectives in decision-making spheres of governance at different levels; stronger civil society; better transparency and accountability of institutions; more equitable access to markets; increased capacity to decide on sexual and family planning; changes in household decision-making; and higher rates of child survival. Still, even though empowerment is regularly argued to be a necessary process for achieving development outcomes, 'often these claims have been put forward without the benefit of a large and well-established body of empirical research' (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007, p. 30).

Even though Alkire and her team have contributed to the reflection and operationalization of empowerment and agency, her approach is seen as less suitable for the purposes of this research. One of the main reasons is the focus on individuals as the main units of analysis (Alkire et al., 2013; Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007). In contrast, Alsop et al and Narayan build a framework where groups and social actors, can be analysed in relation to the development outcomes through which empowerment can be seized. Both approaches understand empowerment as an outcome of the relationship between opportunity structures and agency (Alsop et al., 2006; Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005; Narayan, 2005, pp. 3–26). Of particular interest is the way in which Alsop et al. define opportunity structures, as they are measured through the existence and operation of formal and informal rules, what allows the incorporation of the mechanisms by which social stratification is reproduced (Alsop

et al., 2006; Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005). On the other hand, the other framework gives more prevalence to public and governmental institutional factors when defining opportunity structures (Narayan, 2005).

Both approaches connect agency to assets and therefore use assets-based approaches to the measurement of agency. For instance, Alsop et al state that 'in terms of both measurement of and action to enhance empowerment, a person or group's agency can be largely predicted by their *asset endowment*.' (Alsop et al., 2006, p. 11). At this point, then, it is of importance to clarify the contribution that asset-based approaches can bring to the understanding of migrant associations' agency instead of other conceptions more commonly used in migration studies.

Indeed, in theorising what are the power sources of social actors, the field of migration studies has used the concept of social, economic, and collective remittances to comprehend what migrants, or migrants as collective actors, are bringing in (Goldring, 2004; Levitt, 1998; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011). The concept of remittances, though, can be comprehended as more focused on what migrants are 'sending', that is, on what it is that is being transferred. Therefore, I argue that the concept is ill equipped either to account for what individuals (or collective actors) 'have', or to reflect upon the extent to which these resources are being modified by their social context. Moreover, other scholars claim an interest in incorporating Sen's capabilities approach when analysing migration and development processes (de Haas, 2014, 2010). However, as mentioned previously, the operationalisation of the capabilities it is not considered suited for the purposes of the dissertation, as its conceptualisation and the attempts aimed at its empirical application are mainly focused on the analysis at the individual level (Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007).

Asset-based approaches were initially introduced in development studies to account for poverty measurement and poverty coping, at individual but also at livelihoods or more collective levels (Moser, 2006, 1998). Drawing from these approaches, assets are 'stocks of resources that equip actors to use economic, social and political opportunities, to be productive, and to protect themselves from shocks' (Alsop et al., 2006, p. 11). It is argued, in this project, that this approach is better suited to analyse the agency of groups such as migrants associations than the concept of remittances.

At this point, before concluding the section, I sum up some of the key contributions of the reviewed approaches and criticisms towards them. First, concerning the relational approaches, they configure and bring together important contributions to have a process-based and more complex picture of the mechanisms behind the transformation of unequal social relations. Moreover, they are also helpful in thinking about the problems and contradictions that are often found in external interventions aiming for the development of the excluded (empowerment approaches have been especially concerned about women, and the 'poor'). However, in my view, the approach fails when accounting for the interrelationship that institutions and, overall, structures, have over agency and empowerment. As seen in last section, there is broad theorisation in social science about the complexity by which structures can enable or constrain social action. Besides, the comparative scope of the approach is limited, as it is principally committed to unveil subjective an internal processes of social actors.

In contrast, structure-agency approaches aim to cover the latter gap and put the institutions into the analysis by referring to opportunity structures. To this extent, I suggest that it is possible to establish an empirical and methodological dialogue between structure-agency approaches for measuring empowerment and agency, and the abovementioned structure-agency debates towards understanding migration and political participation. Likewise, I also suggest that these attempts to operationalize the shifts in power relations are worth exploring in the field of migration studies. Nevertheless, there are a number of critiques to bear in mind. One of these that is worth highlighting comes from relational approaches and claims that, even though initially the approach was informed by Naila Kabeer's comprehension, trying to standardise measures of empowerment structure-agency approaches that have been lost in the analysis of the relational nature of empowerment. Hence, this type of approach is not accounting for shifts in consciousness (Cornwall, 2016, p. 345).

There are also two comments, positive and negative, that can be made to both approaches. A negative comment is that even if it is clear that empowerment relates to a cognitive, subjective dimension, approaches have a blurred conceptualisation of the boundaries between agency and empowerment. For instance, on one hand, Alsop et al. states that 'agency is defined as an actor's or group's ability to make purposeful

choices—that is, the actor is able to envisage and purposively choose options'. While, on the other, empowerment is linked to 'effective' choices (Alsop et al., 2006, pp. 10–11). In the framework of analysis of this research I suggest referring only to agency, distinguishing between potential (presence) and effective (weight) dimensions of this agency. Moreover, a strength, and as such, a positive aspect of the debate on empowerment in development studies, is that it gives insights not only into appraising how the influence of migrant associations change, but also about what is the quality of this influence in origin contexts.

2.3   Synthesis of the analytical framework and research design

<u>Synthesis of the literature review</u>

By tackling the fields of migration studies and development studies, this chapter aimed to review the existing theoretical frameworks relating to migrant political transnationalism and power relationships within development interventions.

From the debates already presented, several ideas stand out. First, even though migrant action is discussed within the literatures of political participation and migrant transnationalism, migrant agency is scantly conceptualised in migration-related studies. Comparatively, it is more applied at individual and group level in development studies. Yet, (i) in development studies its conception often blurs and is undistinguishable from empowerment, and further (ii) migrants are seldom considered as actors to study. Moreover, even if development perspectives roll up their sleeves and come up with applied frameworks to observe agency, often their discussions seem to ignore social science's historical academic debates and theoretical advances into relation between structures and agency.

Second, so far there is a tendency to think about (civic and political) migrant practices as a function of place and policy structures. Indeed, most often, in order to explain transnational migrant associations' practices the literature tends to focus either on the context of migrant activities (for instance, on the political opportunity structures where they develop), on the structure of the associations themselves, or on the individual socio-characteristics of their representatives. However, ethnographic accounts and development studies have focused on giving a more complex and multi-

layered view on power relations at play in development processes. At the same time, the transnational character of these practices is generally not taken into account in development studies.

Overall, the goal of this chapter was to identify relative strengths and weaknesses of both fields to bridge them in an analytical framework supporting a comparative analysis of the agency of migrant associations in contexts of residence and origin that focuses in across localities in each context. This framework is explained in the next subsection.

Analytical framework

In order to discuss the research questions set out in the previous chapter, I draw on the different debates introduced in this chapter to operationalize the main research concepts and the analytical framework that is introduced subsequently.

Thus, this project adapts Alsop et al's and Kabeer's conceptions of agency (Alsop et al., 2006; Kabeer, 1999) within the frame of middle ground comprehensions of the relationship between agency and structure (Sewell, 1992). Therefore, the agency of migrant associations is the outcome of the interaction between institutions and the assets of migrant associations. The considered sets of institutions and assets of migrant associations constitute structures that enable and constrain migrant associations' action (see Figure 2.1. below).

Institutions have two dimensions. **Formal institutions** (1) are defined as sets of official rules, and the migration and development policy environment in origin and residence localities. They are observed by looking at modes of engagement with co-development (1.1.), that is, specific co-development activities undertaken by local governments within the context of multilevel governance. This is also undertaken, by appraising the existence of consultative devices where civil society can formally meet and the overall participation rationale (or inclusiveness) of each government (1.2.). Besides, **informal institutions** (2) are unofficial rules that structure incentives and govern relationships. These unofficial rules are appraised by analysing in which ways axes of social stratification in origin are reproduced and have an effect on assets. In practice, in this research, this idea translates into observing how the axes of social

differentiation such as gender, lineage, nobility/allegiance systems are reproduced thanks to the structuring mechanism called habitus.

Regarding the assets of migrant associations (3), I adapt Alsop et al. definition to establish that **assets** are those resources related to different dimensions of migrant associations' characteristics that equip them to use economic, social and political opportunities, to perform development actions, and to adapt to or transform civic and political realms (Alsop et al., 2006, p. 33; Moser, 2006, p. 26)[59]. I consider three dimensions in assets. Human assets relate to the capacities and attributes of the associations' representatives or leaders (3.1.). Organisational assets (3.2.) are those resources or attributes that can be linked to the overall associations' members, and general characteristics of associations. Financial assets are those economic resources available to migrant associations (3.3.).

In addition, the agency of migrant associations is defined in chapter 1 (Introduction) as *the capacity of migrant associations of being present and exerting some degree of influence on civic and political affairs*. Broadly, I define influence as the capacity of an actor to produce effects on the actions of others or on a system's functioning. In an operationalized way, drawing upon Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad comprehension of the civic and political stratification that can operate at the level of organisations and ethnic groups, the agency of migrant associations is observed in two different dimensions: presence and weight (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a, pp. 19–22). The first one, **presence (a)**, is understood as the visibility and legitimacy of migrant associations in civic and political affairs. Visibility (a.1) is operationalized in different terms depending on whether I am analysing formal institutions or assets. When analysing formal institutions, visibility refers to access to formal spaces, including policy definition processes. When analysing assets, visibility is measured as having direct access to local authorities in origin, and as alliances and connections of migrant associations at different levels. In turn, legitimacy (a.2) is defined as the degree to which other social/political actors see migrant associations as valid players

---

[59] The other types of assets, such as those referred as psychological, informational and material by Alsop et al. (Alsop et al., 2006, p. 26) – and as physical capital, social capital and natural capital by Moser – are not considered for different reasons. This is either because of the difficulties in obtaining some of the data given the scope of this dissertation, or because, as is the case of Moser's 'intangible asset' social capital overlaps with other categories used (Moser, 2006, p. 26).

in each context. **Weight (b)** is only assessed in origin contexts and relates to migrant associations having actual influence on civic and political affairs. It is operationalized in three different capacities of migrant associations: to shape civic or political realm through the creation or formalisation of civic organisations (b.1), to include disadvantaged groups in co-development processes (b.2), and to include local communities in co-development decision-taking (b.3).

Lastly, the difference between the potential and the actual performance is of importance in measuring agency, and is respectively captured by the different dimensions of presence and weight. The dimension of presence of agency within migrant associations organisations is observed in residence and origin contexts. However, as has been previously said, the dimension of weight is only observed in origin. Weight, is therefore a way to evaluate whether migrant association's agency can be connected Kabeer's *transformatory significance* of migrant associations' agency (Kabeer, 1999).

The next chapter discusses further the research design and methodological approach of the project.

Figure 2.1. Conceptual Framework

Source: Own elaboration from (Alsop et al., 2006; Kabeer, 1999; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008b)

3 Methodology

This chapter makes explicit the research design of this project and explains the methodological procedures by which the research goals were attained. The contents are organised as follows.

Section 3.1. presents the overall approach to the research. After explaining the methodological perspectives that have a major influence on the research, I explore the potentialities of undertaking a case study approach, based on an extreme case, by following Gerring's analysis of case study methods (Gerring 2007). Subsequently I explain the analytical steps taken to address the research questions. The final part of this section clarifies aspects such as the type of actors studied and the time-frame of the research.

Section 3.2. explains the criteria relevant to the final selection of the cases for analysis, while the next subsection 3.3. gives information regarding the methods employed throughout the research, as well as setting out the challenges presented by fieldwork in Senegal and Catalonia. Finally, there is a debate on ethical considerations and my positionality as a researcher (section 3.4.).

3.1 Approach of the research

3.1.1 About ontology, epistemology, and methodology of the research

Ontologically and epistemologically, the present research is influenced by interpretivist traditions to knowledge. Hence, I aim to comprehend the meanings and implications of human and collective action 'rather than relying on universal laws external to the actors' (Della Porta and Keating, 2008, p. 24).

There are three main methodological approaches that inform the research, and all of them rely on qualitative methods as a way of acquiring data. These are discussed subsequently. First, even though the research does not include in-depth ethnographies, the research draws on insights from ethnographic approaches in the sense that it is sensitive to the nuances of human and social behaviour, and is self-reflexive as regards to who I am as a researcher (Bray, 2008). In particular, some accounts relating to political anthropology have informed the research approach. I

refer here to debates about how to analyse power relations and the (post-colonial) state that go beyond the domination and resistance paradigms and Eurocentric assumptions (Gledhill, 2000). Within what Gledhill calls the new anthropology of the state, there is less focus on culture and more attention to studying practices and social relations constructed and reshaped in contexts of practice. He identifies the influence of the work undertaken by anthropologists of development and the nature of the post-colonial state (such as Ferguson, or Escobar) (Gledhill, 2000). Also, Gledhill locates within these new anthropologies of the state the contributions of Mosse and others in relation to the anthropology of international development (Mosse, 2013, 2011; Mosse and Lewis, 2006). Hence, rather than taking it as a category of analysis, development is understood as a category of *practice* that is produced and reproduced. At the analytical level, this involves at least bringing into question, the idea of whether development is 'self-evidently an orchestration of power with known effects' (Mosse, 2013, p. 230).

Second, the research adapts Grounded Theory approaches as a way of thinking and conceptualising data with the aim of going beyond 'thick' description and, rather, attempting to reach more theoretical explanations (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin and Strauss, 1990). These are explored in more detail below when explaining data analysis.

Third, from transnational perspectives to migration, I am also concerned about the problem, associated with the so called methodological nationalism, of wearing 'ethnic lenses' (Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2009). In short, this problem refers to cases where the study of migration is undertaken through a compartmentalisation of groups of migrants according to national or ethnic categories of shared culture with closed boundaries (Wimmer, 2007). In this vein, even though I do study how a given national group navigates different contexts, in the research I problematise the homogenisation of the national collective itself. I do so by observing the actual practices of those migrants embedded both in localities of origin and host localities.

3.1.2   A case study approach based on an extreme case

I tackle the research questions by focusing on a case study. Research shows the extent to which Senegalese migrant associations' involvement in Catalan co-development processes presents an extreme case[60] (because it exemplifies unusual values[61] within the units of analysis of the variables in which I am interested. This is particularly the case with regard to the relationship between institutions and migrant associations' assets and agency) (Morales and Jorba, 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016).

The case study approach to research may be understood 'as an intensive study of a single unit or a small number of units (the cases), for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units (a population of cases)' (Gerring, 2007, p. 37). A single case study is predominantly a 'single example of a larger phenomenon'. In comparison to cross-case methods with a large-N, the strength of the case study does not lie on its reliability to confirm or disconfirm hypothesis (and thus is not used for hypothesis testing). However, the use of a single case provides an important tool for generating new hypotheses and conceptualizations (Gerring, 2007, pp. 37–43). Regarding the validity of the approach, the single case study may score lower on representativeness between sample and population (external validity) than large-N cross cases. However, its internal validity can (although not always) make it 'easier to establish the veracity of a causal relationship pertaining to a single case (or a small selection of cases)' (Gerring, 2007, p. 43).

As regards to causation, case studies are not at the top of the list for estimations of causal effects (Della Porta, 2008; Gerring, 2007). However, the identification of causal mechanisms (understood as a causal pathway from X-factors of special theoretical interest to Y-outcomes of interest), the observation of how X and Y

---

[60] In fact, even though the processes for internal validity are quite similar, Gerring – in his thorough study of the case-method approaches – distinguishes between deviant or extreme cases, with the degree of deviance streams for cases that 'are poorly explained by the multivariate model' used, or, in other words, the important point being that the degree of deviance can only be assessed 'relative to the general (quantitative or qualitative) model employed' (Gerring, 2007, p. 106). Given the character of this research, it is not very relevant to decide whether the case fits into one or the other description.
[61] An extreme value is an 'observation that lies far away from the mean of a given distribution' (Gerring, 2007, pp. 101–102).

interact, or also, testing the causal implications of a theory, may be better understood through case studies[62] (Gerring, 2007).

Overall, the case study approach is better equipped to hypothesis exploration and generation than hypothesis testing; and it is also more useful when internal validity is preferred over external validity and when the population of cases is heterogeneous rather than homogenous. Indeed, these aspects inform the application of the case study approach used in this research. The following section develops the case study's design as used in this investigation.

3.1.3   Analytical steps of the research

To address the main question of the research, and the research sub-questions introduced in the first chapter, I consider the same national migrant group comparatively across localities in the same context of origin and settlement, and across two national contexts. The aim is to focus in on the interrelationship between migrant associations and localities in order to unpack both local differences and differentiation within the 'same' migrant collective. I assess the outcomes of this interrelation in terms of the agency of migrant associations.

I take the case of co-development processes between Catalonia and Senegalese regions and consider the co-development processes as units linking localities in origin and in residence. Thus, I assembled a case-study with units of analysis (5 co-development processes) that can be considered cases 'within' the case. They encompass five Senegalese migrant associations, four Catalan localities and five Senegalese localities. I establish different types of comparison: across localities of origin (in Kolda and Dakar) and residence (Catalonia) to which co-development processes are linked, and within migrant associations. I explore the extent to which is it possible to attribute outcomes, based on residence and origin, resulting from formal and informal institutions, and the assets of Senegalese migrant associations.

In order to further unveil the epistemological potential of the research's design, following Gerring's systematisation, I have undertaken an exercise to discern how the

---

[62] Following Gerring's argumentations, the use of the notation X/Y does not entail adhering to a positivist approach in the research. The aim is to support thinking about the strength and grounds of the analytical design of the research (Gerring, 2007).

case could be framed within an experimental template (Gerring, 2007). Accordingly, regarding whether I see variation in time or through space, in this case, observation and the main data collection cannot account for the longitudinal variation undergone within the co-development processes. That is because in most of the cases 'I am not there' when the change affecting the outcome occurred. I am mostly interested in the different outcomes that can be observed spatially and, hence, the analysis through a temporal dimension loses importance, for it is difficult to attain. Considering these factors, according to Gerring, the design can therefore be identified as the archetypical single case study with spatial variation (see Table 2).

Even though this research is more focused on seeking to understand complex relationships than on establishing generalised relations between variables, the application of an experimental template towards this case helps us discern the type of X/Y relationships that the design allows us to realise. Thus, I take the variation of cases in origin and residence in order to explore the outcome of interest (Y) that in this case refers to the agency of migrant associations. In each context, because of the type of questions and units of analysis this project is dealing with, there are factors of special theoretical interest (X, that is, formal and informal institutions, assets) that vary. Nevertheless, in all the units of analysis or sub-cases, migrant-led co-development is occurring, it is 'there'. In other words, despite what the archetype would indicate, there is not a 'control' group of cases that have *not* undergone (or revealed) any evidence of migrant-led co-development. The agency of migrant associations is supposedly affected by variations in the localities in which these migrant associations perform. Further this difference is measured by considering the variations between formal institutions operating in relation to migration and development *and* by the variation of the assets of the associations, whilst other background factors stay 'unaltered' (Gerring, 2007, p. 71).

Table 3.1. Case design used in the research (empirical template)

Case	Spatial Variation	Temporal Variation	Type of case	Variables
Co-development processes involving Senegalese migrant associations N=5 (co-development processes between Catalonia-Kolda / Dakar localities)	Yes Catalonia-Kolda/Dakar localities	No	Single study with spatial comparison (synchronic)	Y=Agency of Senegalese migrant associations X_1=Formal institutions, informal institutions and assets of migrant associations X_2=other background factors staying 'unaltered'

Source: Own elaboration by adapting the tables in p.28, 153, 155 (Gerring, 2007)

Having explained the general approach to the case-study, according to the conceptual framework set out at the end of last chapter, the analytical process undertaken throughout the research can be divided into three steps. First, I observed how the variation of formal institutions in localities of origin and settlement interacts with the dimension of presence of the agency of migrant associations (see Table 3). This step is developed across chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 sets out the main trends that characterise the national and regional policy environments, while chapter 5 explores in more detail the four Catalan, and five Senegalese, localities studied.

Table 3.2. First step of the analytical process, variation of formal institutions in residence and origin, and presence (developed in chapters 4, 5 of dissertation)

Spatial Variation	Factors of special theoretical interest	Outcome of interest: Agency of migrant associations
Residence	Formal institutions. Operationalized as: • Modes of engagement with co-development (neutral/nurturer in residence, centre/peripheral in origin) • Existence of consultative devices and participatory rationale	Presence: visibility and legitimacy of migrant associations in civic and political affairs. Operationalized as: Visibility: • Access to formal spaces, policy definition processes. Legitimacy: • Degree to which other social/political actors see migrant associations as valid players in residence and origin.
Origin	Formal institutions. Operationalized as: • Modes of engagement with co-development • Existence of consultative devices and participatory rationale	Presence. Operationalized as: Visibility: • Access to formal spaces, policy definition processes. Legitimacy: • Degree to which other social/political actors see migrant associations as valid players in residence and origin.

Source: Own elaboration

Second, although these formal institutions are not, of course, 'unaltered', for the purpose of the analysis I look at them as such in this step. Hence, I do so in order to explore how the variation of migrant associations' assets is interlinked with the dimension of presence of migrant associations, particularly in relation to their visibility in residence and origin contexts (see Table 3.3.). In this step, the variation of migrant associations' assets across residence and origin is grasped indirectly by examining how those informal institutions, that are relevant in their origin settings, interact with them.

Table 3.3. Second step of the analytical process, variation of migrant associations assets and presence in residence and origin (developed in chapter 6 of dissertation)

Spatial Variation	Factors of special theoretical interest	Outcome of interest: Agency of migrant associations
Residence	Informal institutions. Operationalized as: • Ethnic belonging/'Terroir', Gender, nobility/allegiance, kinship/chieftaincy axes of social stratification	Presence. Operationalized as: Visibility: • Alliances and connections of migrant associations at different levels.
Origin	Assets of migrant associations. Operationalized as: • Financial assets • Organisational assets • Human assets	Presence. Operationalized as: Visibility • Direct access to local authorities in origin. • Alliances and connections of migrant associations at different levels.

Source: Own elaboration

Finally, there is a third step (see Table 3.4.) where the focus is put on how the analysis of migrant associations, through an assets-based approach, interacts with the dimension of the weight held by the agency of migrant associations. In this case, agency is only observed in origin contexts.

Table 3.4. Third step of the analytical process, variation of migrant associations assets and weight in origin (developed in chapter 7 of dissertation)

Spatial Variation	Factors of special theoretical interest	Outcome of interest: Agency of migrant associations
Origin	Informal institutions. Operationalized as: • Ethnic belonging/'Terroir', Gender, nobility/allegiance, kinship/chieftaincy axes of social stratification Assets of migrant associations. Operationalized as: • Financial assets • Organisational assets • Human assets	Weight. Operationalized as: Capacities of migrant associations: • To shape civic or political realm through the creation or formalisation of civic organisations • To include disadvantaged groups in co-development processes. • To include local communities in co-development decision taking.

Source: Own elaboration

Lastly, concerning the comparability of the studied sub-cases – and hence to aid an understanding of what extent heterogeneity or homogeneity within them affects inference of knowledge – the current design has some strengths and shortcomings. Thus, focusing on co-development processes between Catalan and Senegalese localities allows strong heterogeneity within cases when comparing origin and residence contexts overall. Nevertheless, whereas the heterogeneity within units of migrant associations is sought actively in the selection of cases, there is a bias in favour of the number of migrant associations and localities connected to the region of Kolda in comparison with the number of associations connected to Dakar. Also, the unit of analysis finally connected to Dakar region is quite different in relation to the other sub-cases. Nevertheless, the inclusion of Dakar and the previously mentioned migrant association is maintained for different reasons as is explained in section 3.2.

3.1.4 Definition of the units of analysis, considered actors and time

This brief section deals with the definition of some key aspects of the project. These are, namely, to consider what are the main objects and the levels of analysis that are given attention in the research. Also, I dedicate some space to making clear the types of social organizations and structures considered in the study. Finally, I make some small comments regarding the period of time which this research would encompass.

<u>Units and levels of analysis</u>

As already explained, the research's main units of analysis are: co-development processes; and Senegalese migrant associations. In chapter 1 (Introduction) I have defined co-development in two ways. First, as translocally linked practices involving migrant associations that are (partially or totally) funded by public government institutions (in residence countries). Second, as a public policy area involving localities in countries of residence and origin.

These two interrelated dimensions stress the fact that in the context of this dissertation co-development implies some degree of participation both from governments and migrant associations. The dissertation considers co-development both as a policy instrument – navigated by migrant associations – *and* as a development practice. In this sense, while I have already commented on the debates to which the research seeks to engage as regards to considering development as a

practice, the importance of the policy instruments 'to the conceptualization and the understanding of changing forms of governance' informs the choice of the unit of analysis (Le Galès, 2011, p. 143). Under this conceptualisation, policy instruments are conceived as most often non-neutral, in that they are a form of exercising power. In this vein, looking at the different ways in which co-development has been understood and implemented by local governments is an analytical strategy to see how the policy instrument orients (and/or re-orients) the relationships between the governmental sphere and civil society. Thus, different co-development orientations are related to different kind of relationships between governments and migrant associations.

The level of analysis of the research is focused on localities in residence and origin, but also on the 'administrative/political' regions in the country of origin (Kolda and Dakar, in Senegal) and residence (Catalonia, in Spain). However, it is also worth highlighting that these regions are not detached from the national contexts to which they belong. They are neither decontextualized from discourses and practices at the international level of migration nor from the governance of development. As regards to the 'local' sphere, this work engages with the study of translocal processes, that is 'local to local relationships across state borders' (Faist, 2008, p. 28). These localities, deriving from Glick & Çaglar (Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2009, p. 177), are concrete spaces connected to co-development processes and embedded in regions that cannot be isolated from the current globalisation and neoliberal streams going through them (even though some of those in origin contexts are, indeed, in a very peripheral position).

Actors: associations, civic and ethnic communities, and governments

The considered actors (namely, migrant associations, non-migrant civil society and local/regional governments in origin and residence) are the main players considered in this study. Associations populate civil society and can also configure civic communities when they relate 'to each other by way of overlapping membership and interlocking directorates' (Fennema, 2004, p. 433). In this research, communities from the same ethnic origin are seen as heterogeneous, with respect to power relations based on categories such as gender, class, age, spatial distribution and so on that operate across them. Moreover, it is assumed that in the residence case 'ethnic

communities are, by definition, confronting a dominant 'national' majority' (Fennema and Tillie, 1999, p. 705). It is also assumed that there is a social stratification and hierarchy within, and between, ethnic belongings in the country of origin.

In the introduction (chapter 1) I have defined 'association' and 'migrant association'. In the research, the designation of a given group as 'a migrant organization' is based on the organization's name; interviews with different actors and phone calls to municipalities; information on aims and mission found through web research and examining municipal or regional registers. Considering the migrant associations studied, they are mostly configured by first generation Senegalese migrants, at least when observing their representatives and founders.

In this project, migrant associations are differentiated from the concept of an NGO. According to Haque's definition, an NGO is an organization 'characterized by a certain legal basis of existence, a durable formal structure, hired and paid (non-government) staff, a private status with the purpose of serving the public interest, autonomy from the state and the private sector, a non-profit orientation, and the promotion of humanitarian goals' (Haque, 2011, pp. 332–333). I use the term Local NGO to refer to those NGOs originating from – and operating in – either the Global North and South 'to serve local people and communities in each nation, whereas international NGOs (mostly from developed nations) operate in many countries, have worldwide networks, and are often connected to local NGOs' (Haque, 2011, pp. 332–333).

Following the jargon of development, while a community-based organization is 'engaged in addressing problems or serving the interests of their own members within a local community', the NGOs usually aim to serve an overall society (Haque, 2011, pp. 332–333). Thus, a migrant organization, per definition, could be an NGO, but generally NGOs are more professionalised and usually have different attachments when compared to migrant associations in the countries where they are operating. The expressions 'non-migrant association', 'autochthonous association' or 'autochthonous NGO' are indistinctively used to refer to Local NGOs originated and sited in countries where migrants reside or from where migrants originate

'Community-based organization' is used in this dissertation to refer to the organisations attached to the considered co-development processes in countries of origin that are not NGOs (because of their scope and degree of professionalization).

When in this research I refer to 'partner organisations' I identify either community-based or local NGOs that participate in a co-development process from the origin context. Donors granting funding from Global North localities often require NGOs and migrant associations to be working with partner organisations in the contexts where the projects are being implemented.

Time frame of the research

Regarding the time-scope covered in this research, two main comments are important to be highlighted. First, even though the analysis of this research is not longitudinal, policy environments are traced historically at a national level. There is, in particular, more detail concerning the description of the policy environments approach with regard to migration and development across time in the following years: it was mainly 2007-2014 in residence, while mainly 2007-2012 in origin contexts.

Second, as explained in more depth later, there were three rounds of more intense fieldwork in the research; overall the rounds of fieldwork were undertaken within the period (end 2009-March 2016).

3.2 Selection of the units of the analysis: Co-development processes between Senegalese and Catalan localities led by Senegalese associations

3.2.1 Background of the research

When this research was at a more embryonic stage, I wanted to observe different migrant groups. Nevertheless, in different research projects the Senegalese migrant associations in Catalan's co-development emerged very strongly. That is, I was confronted with the fact that they were a very active group in co-development. In comparison to the other migrant collectives, they were highly connected in the field of international development with Catalan local governments.

This evidence about the Senegalese associations caught my interest. Initially wanting to undertake a comparison between Moroccans and Senegalese, my own resources and context finally brought me to establish the comparison, spatially, between host and origin localities and Senegalese migrant associations. In the summer of 2012, I had the opportunity to access Senegalese fieldwork thanks to a consultancy I undertook in Dakar. I extended my stay and went from Northern Senegal to Kolda, Casamance. Before leaving, I had explored and had, 'under the radar', noted a set of co-development cases of interest. After the fieldwork in Senegal, I chose the units of analysis to be explored in more depth.

In parallel, I was interested in mapping and comprehending – with a broadened geographical scope, and by means of a quantitative approach – the local dynamics between local governments in Catalonia and migrant associations. This interest has remained with me throughout this research process. In November 2012, the *Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament* (Fons-Català) gave us access to the data regarding the development projects funded by local governments to NGOs and associations. With Fons-Català's documents, together with other aggregated data obtained from National and regional statistics based on census data, it was possible for myself and Eva Østergaard-Nielsen to build up an original database. The data covered a longitudinal section 1998-2008 that was explored jointly with descriptive and analytical statistics. From this work we were able to publish a paper (Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016).

In sum, the selection of the main case study and the within-case scenarios discussed in more depth later was informed by this work. The next sub-section explains the main criteria that, together with data collection that was accessible, resulted in the final selection of cases for analysis.

3.2.2 Selection dimensions

The selection of the within-case examples of co-development processes were chosen with the aim of observing a strong link between the dimensions of interest (X and Y) and a useful variation on the relevant parameters that can help reveal different aspects of the interaction between them. They were selected to explore the relationship between variances among the structures and the agency of the migrant associations.

Within-case selection was not done randomly. This was due to several factors. First, there were an extensive number of cases that fitted the definition of co-development process and that, secondly, were also occurring between Senegalese and Catalan localities in the period considered before doing fieldwork to Senegal (2004-2011). There were also a number of cases that fitted the dissertation's aims, and it was impossible to undertake an in-depth study of all of them. Thus, use was made of Gerring's (2009) principle to guide the selection of co-development processes. That author argued that an important aspect was 'to isolate a sample of cases that both reproduces the relevant causal features of a larger universe (representativeness) and provides variation along the dimensions of theoretical interest (causal leverage)' (Gerring, 2008, p. 645).

Localities in Catalonia

Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Mataró were the localities in Catalonia attached to the selected co-development processes. Several dimensions were taken into account for the selection. These were, namely, the different ways in which local government had undertaken their approach towards migration and development while including their relationship with important regional actors such el Fons-Català; and also taking into account the historical background regarding the relationship of local governments towards civil society in general. Therefore, the four localities were representative of different modes of engagement with co-development (for instance, Lleida's local government has been very active and has had a distinctive approach, while co-development in Girona has been more dependent on the activity of local civil society).

Besides, according to a quantitative study, the capacity of Sub-Saharan migrant associations with access to local development funds in Catalonia 'increases with more local presence of Sub-Saharan migrants in the locality' and decreases with the overall population of the locality (Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016, p. 377). Therefore, at a socio-demographic level, the share of Senegalese-born over the total population was also taken into account (Mataró, Girona, represent historical nodes of Senegalese migrants in the region). At the end of this section 3.2. there is a table with a synthesis of localities characteristics (Table 8).

Senegalese regions to which the co-development processes are connected: Dakar and Kolda

The mapping of co-development practices showed that there are co-development practices funded by Catalan governments around several regions in Senegal. Mostly, they involve the area of Casamance (which is an historical region in Southern Senegal, not an administrative area, and is divided into the current administrative regions called Ziguinchor, the recently created Sédhiou, and Kolda) and the Dakar region (the capital of Senegal has the same name and its located within this region). The selection of Kolda and Dakar as regions of origin, where the practices are connected, is based on seven different factors that are now discussed.

First, Casamance is a historical and important source of outflow of migrants residing in Catalonia as was discussed in the introduction. At the same time, both regions have relatively different shares of outflows when accounting for the overall flow of Senegalese international migrants. In the last and second ANSD[63] census survey (from 2013), households were asked whether a member had been abroad at least during a six month-period in the previous five years. Hence, almost 165.000 people (1,2% of total population) had emigrated.[64] The distribution of emigrants per region points to Dakar as the region with the highest share of emigrants (30,3% over total population). The region with the second highest number of Senegalese who had moved abroad for a six months period or longer was Matam (13,8%). Kolda is further behind in the ranking and had a percentage of 5,1% emigrants (ANSD, 2014, p. 250)[65].

Second, both regions were in sharp contrast with each other. To begin with, Kolda was a peripheral region which was difficult access. Dakar was the region at the centre Senegal. In terms of socioeconomic configuration, only some indicators are given to show evidence of the trends. Figure 3.1. takes the Monetary poverty index data from

---

[63] ANSD stands for *Agence Nationale de la Statistique et la Démographie*, Senegalese National Agency for Statistics and Demography.

[64] According to the survey, the majority had left to Europe (44,5%), West Africa (27,5%) and Central Africa (11,5%). A share of 2,3% went to America. France (17,6%), Italy (13,8%), Mauritania (10,0%) and Spain (9,5%) were the four first destination countries (ANSD, 2014, pp. 248–249).

[65] In addition, the survey also reveals that, before leaving, the majority of Senegalese emigrants did not have any level of instruction (45,5%). Those who, when they left. only had elementary education were the following biggest group, accounting for a 18,3% (the rest of data being: Medium level 9,4%, Secondary 10,2%, Superior 10,7%, 'Doesn't know' 6,0%) (ANSD, 2014, p. 250).

Table 3.5. to show Senegalese inequalities at the regional level: Northern Senegal was richer than the Southern part of the country, whereas Kolda was the poorest while Dakar was the richest region. Regarding literacy rates, the best rates were registered in urban areas, and the data showed that the percentage of adults aged 15 and over that can read and write at least in one language had generally improved over the decade. In rural areas, where it reached 23.3% in 2001-2002, the rate increased to 38.9% of those who could read and write in 2011. In addition, general literacy rate masks significant disparities by gender. It appears that in all residential areas, men are more literate than women: 79.9% against 58.7% in urban Dakar, 75.9% against 50.4% in other urban centers and 54.1% against 27.2% in rural areas (ANSD, 2013, p. 46). When looking at regional level, Kolda, can be considered to be a rural region and had an average of 43.7% of adults aged 15 and more that could read and write (see Table 3.5.). From a more historical and state formation point of view, the differences between Northern Senegal and South reflect inequalities in the formation of the Senegalese state, its power structures and internal conflicts.[66]

---

[66] In fact, the Kolda region was created in 1984 soon after the *Basse-Casamance* uprising and conflict. It was an attempt by the state not only to delete the name of Casamance but also to politically split the Casamance territory apart (Fanchette, 2011).

Figure 3.1. Regions of Senegal. Monetary poverty index (2011, in %)

Source: Image modified from an ANSD (2016) webpage's capture (open data)

Table 3.5. Regions of Senegal. Projections of total population for 2016, monetary poverty index (2011) and general literacy rate (2011)

	Regions	Total population (2016)	Monetary Poverty Index (in %)	General Literacy rate (%)
1	**Dakar**	**3.429.370**	**26,1**	**68,6**
2	Diourbel	1.641.350	47,8	35,1
3	Tambacounda	756.588	62,5	35,0
4	Saint-Louis	983.032	39,7	53,2
5	Thies	1.941.549	41,3	53,8
6	Fatick	787.037	67,8	45,8
7	Kaffrine	632.023	63,8	42,0
8	Kaolack	1.053.535	61,7	50,2
9	Kedougou	166.907	71,3	35,0
10	**Kolda**	**725.690**	**76,6**	**43,7**
11	Louga	950.102	26,8	36,4
12	Matam	630.703	45,2	28,4
13	Sedhiou	500.064	68,3	47,3
14	Ziguinchor	601.929	66,8	65,0

Source: Own elaboration. Monetary poverty index and General literacy rate data from ANSD/ESPS-II: Enquête de suivi de la pauvreté-2011 (ANSD, 2013); Total population data from ANSD 2016 projections (obtained from ANSD website)

Third, these locations were different as regards to the number of practices involved and the amount of official development assistance channelled during the period, with Kolda being the region with the higher number of projects detected in 2011. Fourth, overall, the number of Senegalese migrant associations in Catalonia detected as operating in Dakar do so in a different types of localities than those encountered in Kolda. Thus, whereas most often the associations that were connected in Kolda do so in smaller localities and seem more influenced by kinship/ethnic belongings, those connected to Dakar do so in much bigger localities. Fifth, Kolda, unlike Dakar, was a priority region for the Catalan government development's agency (DGCDAH/ACCD, 2013).[67] Sixth, the ethnic configuration of the regions was different: Dakar was diverse but mostly inhabited by Wolof while Wolof is also the most spoken language. Kolda was predominantly dominated by Pulaar, which refers also to the main language used in the region.

It is worth saying that the revision of literature shows that Kolda (and, by extension, the Casamance) is understudied by migration scholars (Lessault and Flahaux, 2013). In fact, other researchers highlight the scarcity of studies from social sciences dedicated to the *Haute-Casamance* (Upper Casamance, that is, Kolda and Séddhiou regions) (Fanchette, 2011).

---

[67] Since the first Catalan Development Plan in 2003, Senegal has been singled out as a priority country for the Catalan regional government (in the plan of 2003-2006 there were 15 priority countries, the next plan 2007-2010 had 11 priority countries, meaning that policy-making and funds were prioritised in those countries). The specific plan proposed targeting Catalan International Cooperation in Senegal with Kolda as the priority region to work within the whole country (DGCDAH/ACCD, 2013).

Table 3.6. Kolda and Dakar spatial selection: comparative similarities and differences

Comparative dimensions	Kolda	Dakar
1. Migrant outflows to Catalonia	Important	Important, but difficult to discern the extent to which this is the origin context of Senegalese migrants in Catalonia
2. Socioeconomic configuration	Peripheral, poorest region; agriculture-livestock based economy	Centre, richest region
3. Type of co-development practices	Many, small projects	Few, bigger projects
4. Type of localities	Smaller localities in residence; more influenced by kinship/ethnic belongings?	Bigger localities in residence, co-development processes less influenced by kinship/ethnic belongings?
5. Priority region for Catalan donor	Yes	No
6. Ethnic configuration	Mostly Fula	More diverse, but mainly Wolof

Source: Own elaboration

Project-based selection criteria

Other aspects, that needed to be kept in mind when discussing the selection criteria, were connected directly to the projects and actors funded. That is, these criteria refer directly to the definition of co-development used in this research. Thus, the selected projects needed to conform with the conditions that follow.

First, the local government's public funding needs to be given to a migrant association. In some cases, the funding went through an intermediate NGO working with migrant associations in Catalonia. However, the funding needed to contribute to an overall strategy that would be migrant-led. Thus, projects defined as doing co-development but the funds of which were granted to other types of non-migrant NGOs, would not be considered.

Second, there was a sustained commitment from Catalan local governments in terms of funding towards the migrant association. The migrant associations had received funding from local governments in competitive calls more than once during the period 1999-2011. This condition sometimes involved the project being funded changing (because the project may be developed in different phases). In other cases, in a period of several years, one association may have been funded to undertake

different projects. In some other cases, but not always, the decision on the ODA allocation came from the association of municipalities Fons-Català.

Migrant associations' selection criteria

The final co-development processes also mirror some internal variation according to main taxonomies reviewed in the literature. This variation was according to several important axes: topophilic orientation (hometown associations)/other dimensions considered included: religious/non-religious, ethnic based/mixed-National based.

3.2.3 Selected co-development processes: different localities in origin and residence

There was an exploration of the database, secondary sources, contacts with experts (Senegalese migrant representatives, Fons-Català officers) and municipal officers, together with interviews during fieldwork. After this process, there were 18 (3 in Dakar, 15 in Kolda) projects complying with the above-mentioned criteria that were still in progress and not closed during the fieldwork in Senegal (during Summer 2012).

Not all of these projects were visited. For instance, in the region of Dakar I only visited one project. Finally, in Kolda I visited five, but only four appear in Table 8 below. There were other experiences related to other associations or civil society in origin that are mentioned during the analysis because they are important for the purposes of the dissertation even if they are not in the final selection. In some cases, some of the representatives were interviewed. Other unexpected questions – that were related to how the fieldwork actually occurred – affected the collection of data entailing the visits to villages, but this is discussed later on.

Overall, the cases are representative of the type of Catalan municipalities likely to fund migrant associations through co-development projects (Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016). The Figure 3.2. shows the location of the selected process. As can be seen in the figure, the name of the villages, to which the projects in the region of Kolda are linked, are not mentioned for reasons of confidentiality's (different hometown associations have their corresponding village's name in their organisation's name). Below, Table 3.7. synthesizes the type of projects and main

characteristics of the localities linked to the chosen co-development processes in residence and origin. Within the selection there are: three hometown associations (Girona, Lleida and Mataró migrant associations, signalled as HTA); one religious migrant association (a Tijani brotherhood that I call Girona religious migrant association); and a federation of Senegalese associations (I call it Barcelona migrant association).

Populations in each municipality are a visible indicator of the extent to which the case associated to Barcelona's migrant association, at first sight connecting Barcelona and Dakar, is different to the others. All of them link medium-size towns in Catalonia to small villages in the region of Kolda. The main differences between Barcelona's migrant association and the others are that, first, Barcelona's migrant association is a federation (it gathers associations at a regional level in Catalonia, and not individuals). Second, the projects that Barcelona's migrant association has undertaken with the support of Barcelona city council aim to either: respond to Senegalese citizenship that want to migrate to Europe from around the country or to structure Senegalese abroad (by promoting an umbrella organisation for the Senegalese diaspora). Therefore, whereas Barcelona's migrant association plays out and imagines its actions at a multilevel scale, the other associations' projects (basically focused on the agricultural sector) are pre-eminently conceptualised in a narrower territory.

Besides, apart from the importance of Barcelona's migrant association within the sphere of migrant associations (not only in Catalonia, but also at national level in Senegal (mostly) and Spain) the main reason to retain this association in the sample was the possibility that it might unveil the very different dynamics entrenched in central and urban Dakar and peripheral and rural Kolda.

Figure 3.2. Selected localities and co-development processes between Catalonia and Senegal

Source: Own elaboration with Google maps.

It is also of interest to highlight that the localities in residence all share similar percentages of foreign population (the lower being Mataró, with a 16,62%) but the weight that Senegal-born citizens have in each of them is quite different (see Table 3.7.). Thus, despite Mataró being a smaller town compared to Barcelona, it had, in 2010, almost the same number of Senegalese residents as in the capital of Catalonia, accounting for the 7% of total Senegalese living in the region. In fact, Mataró and Lleida are localities with proportionally bigger shares of a Senegalese community. In terms of population, the Senegalese in Mataró represent the third foreign group, while they are the 5th largest in Lleida. In contrast, the numbers of Senegalese in Barcelona and Girona are quite low with regards to how numerous they are in comparison to other foreign groups. Indeed, by number of residents, they are ranked in positions number 40 and 18, respectively, when compared to other immigrant groups. As mentioned, this variation, in terms of the proportion of migrant Senegalese within the total population, confirms the dynamics found in previous research (Østergaard-

102

Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016, p. 377). The demographic data in residence refers to 2010, a year taken as a mid-point in the studied period.

Two aspects are worth mentioning if we look at the last three columns of the Table 8. First, that the related villages in Kolda are very small and official data regarding the number of people residing in one has not been available for the other studied cases. It only has been possible to access the population counted at the rural community level (i.e. at the municipality level). In some cases, interviewees gave the number of households living in the village (as the measure they use for the size of the community). The second point is that the ethnic configuration of villages in the selected cases are different. In three of them the majority are Fulas and, in one of them, the majority is Soninke. Finally, the map also helps us in visualising that the two selected co-development processes in Girona are both linked to villages in the same *commune* or municipality which, at the time of the fieldwork, was a Rural Community (*Commonauté Rurale* or CR, that is, rural municipality). The project of the religious migrant association in Girona was focused on a village only, while Girona migrant association had a wider scope, and covered the commune (or municipality, which is configured by villages).

Before concluding the section, it is worth highlighting that the choice of migrant associations provides special insights regarding certain dynamics. Nevertheless, some of the research findings were obtained by observations undertaken beyond the specific chosen migrant associations. This is the case, for instance, in the analysis of the policy environments of the chosen Catalan localities in residence. Similarly, in origin contexts, I also note when there are processes that are attributed to the overall migrant associations' collective (and not only to one in particular).

Table 3.7. Main demographic characteristics of localities linked to units of study in residence and origin

Migrant association involved	Description of project(s)/ co-development processes	Locality in Residence	Population municipality of residence*	Top two foreign nationalities (position of Sen.)*	Total Sen. in munip. of residence *	% Foreign population over total population in munip. *	% Sen. over total foreign pop. in municip.*	% over total pop. from Senegal in Catalonia*	Locality in origin, Administrative division	Population in locality of origin**	Main Ethnic group in origin
Barcelona migrant association	Structuration of Senegalese diaspora. Services to Senegalese emigrants in origin	**Barcelona**	1.619.337	Italy, Ecuador, (40)	1.076	20,97%	0,38%	5,34%	**City**	1.056.009^	Mixed
Girona religious migrant association	Creation of a cereals' depository	**Girona**	96.236	Morocco, Honduras, (18)	293	21,88%	1,48%	1,45%	**Village**	no data (12 households) / CR Saré Colly Salé 61 villages, 18.755 (2010)	Fula
Lleida migrant association /HTA	Creation of a cow farm and alfalfa farming for the livestock	**Lleida**	137.387	Romania, Morocco, (5)	1.098	21,12%	3,81%	5,44%	**Village**	100 aprox in Sinthiang Fodé (7 households) / CR Thietty 37 villages, 1.579	Fula
Mataró migrant association /HTA	Construction of a water well, water distribution and agricultural production	**Mataró**	123.868	Morocco, China, (3)	1.425	16,62%	6,80%	7,07%	**Village**	no data / CR Kandia has 75 villages, 22.582	Soninkara
Girona migrant association /HTA	Agricultural development in a rural municipality	**Girona**	96.236	Morocco, Honduras, (18)	293	21,88%	1,48%	1,45%	**Commune**	no data / CR Saré Colly Salé 61 villages, 18.755 (2010)	Fula

Source: Own elaboration. *Data from Idescat, data from 2010, excepting municipal GDP (from 2012). **Data from Local Development Plans and fieldwork, excepting ^ from UN data.

3.3 Methods throughout the research process

3.3.1 Methods for data collection

This research, basically, takes qualitative approaches to research methodology and data collection. In this regard, Grounded Theory methods and approaches to mid-range theory building have influenced the research (Charmaz, 2001; Corbin and Strauss, 1990). Notably, the principle of concurrent data collection has been followed, in the sense that the 'sample' in this research was not closed from the beginning, nor was it dependent upon having first established a theoretical proposition. Moreover, the sampling was theoretical, meaning that sampling was not dependent on having random individuals (populations) represented, but was based on the aim of looking for patterns of actions and interactions among various types of social units (i.e. the analysed actors) (Birks and Mills, 2011).

Hence, after designing a first plan that established the main actors being sought and the type of information that was needed, I used snowball sampling that combined the principle of saturation or repetition to obtain the final sample (Birks and Mills, 2011). In order to avoid biases introduced by informants and myself, I followed triangulation strategies (Della Porta and Keating, 2008). Thus, I contrasted the data obtained through different methods, namely, the analysis of documents, observation and the interviews. The diversification of informants, the different sites in which I obtained information (in origin and residence, and across different localities in each context) supported the idea of gaining a diversity of perspectives.

The main sources of information were primary documents, and interviews. The interviews were of different types. They covered informal conversations, exploratory interviews and semi-structured interviews. Most of the interviews were semi-structured. The visits to the villages could conform to some definitions of focus groups or group interviews. That is, they were collective conversations that were actively encouraged by the researcher in order to yield data on the meanings that rested behind group assessments, group processes and normative understandings involved in co-development (Barbour, 2007; Bloor et al., 2001; Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 2011).

The type of actors chosen to interview were pre-eminently stakeholders in co-development processes (migrant associations' representatives, local communities in the localities of origin, governments decision-makers connected to migration and development policies at different levels, civil society representatives related to the processes in origin and residence). The sample also includes secondary actors that have supported or followed closely co-development processes between Catalonia and Senegal (Dakar and Kolda). This implied interviewing key informants such as scholars, representatives of international organisations, and also civil society members in Senegal that had a connection with the reality of international development sector. This was also a way of avoiding silencing discordant views on the processes under study. At this point I have not included a full list of interviewees because some informants wanted to remain anonymous.

I understood fieldwork, in this context, as time spent collecting data in a certain socio-political and geographical site (Scheyvens and McLennan, 2014, p. 4). During the overall research process I define three periods of fieldwork in Catalonia or Senegal. Although they are mentioned throughout the following parts, their main characteristics were: when the fieldwork was undertaken; the type of actors that were in the sample; the number of semi-structured interviews undertaken; the number of visits to villages or conversations to relevant actors. These are summarised in the table below (Table 3.8.).

Table 3.8. Fieldwork phases during the research, type of actors, and number of semi-structured interviews undertaken

Fieldwork	Time	Who (where)	Nr of int.
First In Catalonia	Sep.2009-Feb.2010	Local councillors in government (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida)	6
		Technicians in local government (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida)	7
		Senegalese migrant associations representatives (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida)	6
		Other civil society relevant actors	2
		Total interviews in first fieldwork	**21**
Second In Senegal	Jun.2012-Sep.2012	Telephone calls or meetings to prepare the fieldwork in Senegal (15 people)	..
		National government's representatives (Dakar)	2
		Other key informants	3
		Spanish and Catalan donors (Dakar)	2
		Partners of the associations' projects (Dakar)	2
		Regional government's representatives (Kolda)	5
		Partners of the associations' projects (Kolda)	6
		Other Senegalese civil society (Kolda)	4
		Senegalese migrant associations' representatives (Kolda)	1
		Catalan donor representative (Ziguinchor)	..
		Other key informants (Kolda)	2
		Visits to communities in 5 villages (focus groups)	..
		Total interviews in second fieldwork	**33**
Third In Catalonia	June 2014	Catalan donor	2
		Local government representatives (Lleida, Girona, Calella, Mataró)	4
	Oct. 2014	Senegalese migrant associations' representatives	6
	Apr. 2016	Other key informants	1
		Total interviews in third fieldwork	**13**
		Total semi-structured interviews	**62**

Source: Own elaboration

Primary documentary sources collection and content analysis

Some parts of the research relied extensively on documentary analysis. Thus, I collected and examined migration and development legal frameworks (at National and Regional level); and International Development Master Plans alongside other relevant documents from local governments development agencies and the association of municipalities (Fons-Català). I also read and retrieved information from webpages of local governments, and regional and national institutions.

I undertook content analysis of relevant documents concerning the considered co-development processes. Apart from this, I also analysed: documentation related to local development plans in origin; webpages associated with the analysed actors; definitions and reports of the different co-development projects; and documents

containing substantial dimensions of the relevant local governments' comprehension of the relation between migration and development.

It is also worth saying that the collection of primary data in origin locations was usually based on direct contact with officers, as digitalisation and internet access is not as widespread in Senegal than in Spain.

Fieldwork and semi-structured interviews in Catalonia

Key actors and practices in Catalan local co-development policymaking were identified and mapped out. Some of the most relevant representatives were those interviewed in relation to a project on migrant incorporation in Catalan cities that was funded by the Catalan government and directed by my supervisor[68]. This first aspect of fieldwork was centred on the dynamics of relationships between migrant associations and local governments within the four provincial capitals in Catalonia. The interviews were undertaken from September 2009 until March 2010. Local political representatives, migrant representatives from Moroccan, Ecuadorian, Senegalese and Romanian associations, made up a sample of 56 interviews. I undertook 36 out of those 56 interviews, which involved travel to different cities in Catalonia. From these 36 interviews, 21 out are used in the dissertation. Among these 21 interviews, there were 13 people dealing with migration and development policymaking that worked as elected representatives or officers in local governments (from the cities of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida); six representatives from Senegalese associations in Barcelona, Girona and Lleida; and two representatives from other relevant civil society actors (migrant association in Barcelona and non-migrant charity in Girona).

After fieldwork in Senegal, a third round of fieldwork was done across Catalonia in June 2014, and April 2016. The aims were, first, to contact migrant associations and local government representatives from the considered co-development processes in order to contrast these with the results of fieldwork in Senegal. At this stage, I had incorporated two new localities within the units of analysis (Mataró and Calella, although the latter was not included in the final set of units of analysis) that were

---

[68] Access to the webpage of the project: http://pagines.uab.cat/translocalcat/ [last accessed 31st October 2018]

systematically analysed, they were used to inform and complement the data obtained in previous phases. Second, migrant associations' representatives and key technicians participating in co-development policy-making were interviewed. Despite these rounds of interviews, the biggest challenge regarding fieldwork in Catalonia was related to how long the research had taken until completion, as I felt that I should have been in touch with migrant participants and local governments more often to keep track of their situations and the evolution of projects since 2014 onwards.

In Catalonia, due to my activity as the representative of the platform of Catalan NGOs of peace, human rights and development in the period 2013-2017, I had occasion to speak with key informants regarding co-development, and the immigration and development (mostly) policy-sector (that is, representatives of civil society, and local and regional governments).

Fieldwork and semi-structured interviews in Senegal

During the month before my trip to Dakar[69] (I left Barcelona on the 16th of July) I met in person people from Fons-Català, migrant representatives, and scholars in Barcelona. Moreover, I phoned municipalities and migrant associations' representatives in other localities to verify which were the projects that still evidenced some kind of activity. As explained previously, I decided to take Kolda as a research region mainly because it was the area receiving the biggest amount of co-development funds and had the highest number of co-development projects in 2010. In addition, it was important that because Kolda was the origin region of many Senegalese migrants residing in Catalonia.

When I arrived to Dakar I visited and interviewed officers working as expatriates in the Spanish development agency and in the Catalan development agency. I had maintained contacts by mail, but previous to my stay in Kolda I spent three days in Ziguinchor (in Casamance, near the sea) where the Fons-Català's expatriate lived. Initially, the first motivation for including Dakar was because of the importance of

---

[69] I went to Senegal also in the context of a consultancy. For this I undertook 21 semi-structured interviews with National policymakers and civil society representatives; I undertook short journeys to Northern Senegal, and I was able to share the work ambiance of a Senegalese organisation not located in the common places where Western NGO 'live'. These experiences were very useful ways to gain access and immerse myself into the Senegalese context.

one project located in the capital involving Barcelona's municipality and crucial members of the Senegalese diaspora in Catalonia and elsewhere. However, I had also scheduled visiting two other projects around the Dakar region. Nevertheless, weather conditions and the final development of the fieldwork in Kolda, necessitated changing some of the projects originally considered. Indeed, it was the rainy season and floodings made access very difficult during the week when I had planned visiting other projects in Dakar.

During the fieldwork I undertook semi-structured interviews (see third fieldwork visits on the Table 9 above) in Dakar to representatives of the National government, Catalan and Spanish donors' expatriates, one scholar and one key informant. Regarding Kolda's regional government, I arranged semi-structured interviews with the director and a technician of the Regional Agency for Development in Kolda (*Agence Régionale de Développement de Kolda*), and with the General Secretary of the Regional Council of Kolda (*Conseil Régional de Kolda*). I also had a meeting (not an interview) with the Kolda's Governor. Finally, I undertook an interview with a public servant who was head of the 'spatial planning' unit.

On the subject of civil society, in Dakar I arranged two interviews with representatives related to the project and a diaspora organisation being developed there; in addition with an interview with the the head of an international organisation closely linked to co-development experiences. In Kolda, I undertook six interviews with members of civil society organisations and key informants, and five interviews with local NGO's (Senegalese) that had been partners to co-development processes with Catalan localities and migrant associations.

During the whole visit to Senegal (overall it was two months) I recorded all semi-structured interviews. The visits to the villages were rather more challenging in terms of data collection: I recorded the audio of the collective meetings, but I also collected data obtained during informal conversations which I recorded in my journal while I was being shown around the village. Indeed, I kept a diary with my experiences, non-verbal information and main impressions after the interviews. Notes were taken by hand, and, later, every night, I wrote the comments, emerging questions, and

expanded on information in digital form. During the period of fieldwork in Kolda my partner was with me. After asking permission, he took some pictures of the visits.

Fieldwork in Senegal involved several challenges. Most of these were related to the fact that I had limited time in an unknown context. Also the specific conditions in which the majority of people lived and worked, and the scarcity of resources presented problems. I experienced the poverty every day in aspects such as infrastructure, in the continuous power cuts, in the difficulty to gain access to some places, and in the conditions in which officers had to work. At the same time, participants were extremely kind and welcoming.

In Kolda, access to some villages was particularly complicated because I needed 4x4 cars and also roads could be inaccessible. In Kolda, the support of the director of a local NGO, whom I contacted thanks to the expatriate of the Catalan Development Agency in Dakar, was key to helping me logistically, to plan and undertake the visits to the villages. The person put at my disposition a 4x4 car and a driver who knew where the villages were. I contacted translators thanks to this Senegalese person living in Kolda and from an anthropologist from Barcelona who was undertaking ethnography in Kolda.

In addition, even if I tried to tie up interviews beforehand with local elected officials and the association's partners representatives, the visits were principally a matter of taking part in a village assembly. I prepared a guide with the main subjects I wanted to discuss but the final results varied. As every visit to a village had a strong factor of unexpectedness, my experience as a group facilitator and educator was really helpful.

During the visits (which I undertook with a local woman, who was working in development and who took on the role of translating between Fula and French) I subsequently transcribed the French parts after recording some of the dialogues. Overall, translation had different implications. For instance, I lost opportunities for secondary conversations, chatting, and more informal conversations. In one case, I disregarded a whole visit because a Senegalese migrant residing in Catalonia took over the role of translator instead of the woman who was with me. As a result, I felt

that the translation was compromised and too biased towards this migrant perspective.

Given the time and the previous experience in the region that I had, I was happy with how the fieldwork went in Senegal. Many things happened and I worked very intensively. However, it would have been fantastic to have had more time, to have visited the villages more than once and to have been able to use participatory techniques to discuss the processes. In addition, I would have liked to contact further local government representatives in Kolda, interview a representative from the Regional Development Agence in Dakar and undertake the already planned visits to more projects in the Dakar region.

Non-participant observation of migrant activities

Apart from the (limited) participant observation that was entailed in fieldwork, since 2009 I had tried to compile and attend, where possible, activities organised by migrant associations with explicit objectives dealing with co-development, diaspora or the migrant and development nexus generally in Catalonia. Of particular importance to the purposes of the dissertation were the seminars organised by Senegalese associations. They allowed me to discover the subjects of interest, approaches used by the actors and also enabled me to map the main collective's representatives. I kept hand written notes in my notebook and saved information (brochures, flyers…) regarding the activities in digital or paper formats.

In sum, the Table 3.9. below synthesises the array of methods used throughout the research. It also shows the periods of time when I most intensively worked on the different tasks that the research techniques involved.

Table 3.9. Summary of the main methods used throughout the research process

Methods	When
Content analysis of primary sources: migration and development legal frameworks (at National and Regional level), Master Plans from development agencies and the association of municipalities (Fons-Català), webpages of national and Regional institutional organs.	Jan.-Jun.2010 Oct.-Nov.2012 Aug.2014; 2016-17
Descriptive statistics from budget and public calls in Catalonia, Spanish ODA, Catalan and Spanish migration flows.	Sep.-Nov. 2012 Aug.2014 2016-17
Fieldwork and semi-structured interviews in Catalonia	From Sep.2009-Feb.2010 Jun.2014 and Mar.2016
Non-participant observation	Nov.2009-Mar.2017
Fieldwork, visits to villages and semi-structured interviews in Senegal	Jul.2012-Sep.2012
Content analysis of primary sources: local development plans in origin, webpages associated to the analysed actors, definitions and reports of the different co-development projects, documents containing substantial dimensions of the considered local governments comprehension of the relation between migration and development are compiled and examined.	Jun.2012-Sep.2012 June 2014

Source: Own elaboration

3.3.2 Data analysis

The amount of data collected was organised systematically in digital folders and Excel spreadsheets. The analysis of policy documents and primary data from webpages has been based on content analysis. According to different variables or dimensions, I have built tables in Excel to systematise the analysis obtained from the data.

The analysis of interviews has been more challenging. First, there was the question of processing the data for the subsequent analysis. Almost all the registered interviews were completely transcribed. The raw audios are in five languages: Catalan, Spanish, French, Pulaar and Soninke. I could gain external help for the transcriptions of some of the audios, others I undertook myself. Only audio materials, or parts thereof, that were in Catalan, Spanish and French were transcribed. For some months, I tried to find people who could translate from Pulaar and Soninke to French or other languages. These are the local languages of the visited villages. My aim was to triangulate and avoid as much as possible any bias of the person who was the translator that had accompanied me on the visits. It would have been desirable to also

transcribe these parts but, finally, it was not possible because of the lack of resources and difficulty in identifying relevant transcribers.

Second, the analysis of qualitative interviewing and fieldwork notes relied on Grounded Theory methods, with the support of the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) called Atlas.ti. I started establishing constant comparisons between incidents found in data through systematic coding procedures. The approach to coding, which is essential in Grounded Theory methods, combined inductive and deductive approaches (Friese, 2012; Lewins and Silver, 2007; Saldaña, 2013). Thus, I combined the application of a code-system with the pursuit of emergent themes within the data by creating new codes (Charmaz, 2001, p. 677). The coding process was an iterative, cyclical one that I systematised throughout the whole analysis. It involved the repeated consideration of data. For instance, after the fieldwork in Senegal I re-analysed and recoded older interviews to see if I could find patterns and build up certain categories that had emerged during my stay in Kolda and Dakar. I have observed properties such as the number of quotations assigned to a certain code, and how this was distributed across different actors to make inferences.

Atlas.ti was also used for basic analytical procedures such as creating memos, searching the database and the coding schema, retrieving data according to different logic operations (for instance, asking the software to retrieve data coded with certain categories only across a particular type of actor). In order to ensure the traceability and accountability of the research and the inference process, I also tracked the different processes of category building and the retrieval of data.

Regarding the final output of the coded interviews, I have included a selection of quotations in the results' chapters. They are used to provide evidence of the type of dynamics found and discussed in the analytical process. It is worth mentioning that many conversations that are displayed in the dissertation were held between people who were speaking a language that was not their mother tongue, and in some cases (when interviewees did not speak French) we were being translated. Thus, in these cases I opted to show a piece of the whole conversation. My dialogue with interviewees is also shown when I consider that having a broader context of the conversation is needed for accurate interpretation of the meaning.

3.4   Ethical considerations

3.4.1   Do no harm

Research ethics is concerned with moral behaviour in research contexts (Wiles, 2013, p. 4). In this respect, I have tried to be respectful towards the communities and people with whom this research is concerned and to whom it could be potentially connected. I have also tried to be honest and open about the aims and research steps undertaken. Indeed, as a researcher I feel that I have a duty to care towards the people that participated in this project (and responsibility for ethical practice towards the university).

During the whole research process, I have been confronted with ethical challenges that have led me to make reflections on this dimension of the research. In the following paragraphs I will explore how I have tackled, in practice, specific concepts that are used in discussions about ethical research practices (Iphophen, 2009; Wiles, 2013; Wiles et al., 2008). These concepts are: harms and benefits, informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality and compensations.

As regards to harms and benefits of the research, during the research the process I have tried to assess the potential risk of harm and to minimise it (Iphophen, 2009). Notably, to counter potential misperceptions of the research purpose and false expectations of any likely gains to participants. I have tried to always be clear about who I am and about the research purposes. However, this has been specially challenging in origin contexts, notably in Kolda. On the one hand, while contacting and interviewing people in this impoverished remote town, some representatives from local NGOs saw me as a donor or potential person for accessing international donors. On the other hand, in the small villages in Kolda sometimes the differences between participants' environment and reference points and my own were enormous. I felt, on some occasions that we were having very different perceptions about the level of my power and the purposes of the visit. Hence, whenever I had the opportunity I repeated the aims and my role as many times as I thought were necessary. A particular piece of evidence on this is that, before visiting one village, I was told by stakeholders in Catalonia (migrant association representative, local donors) that given that I was there I had to explain to them what they were doing wrong about the co-development

process. In that case, I did not do what I was asked. I felt this would entail some degree of scolding. However, during the conversation I tried to explain the expectations that donors had regarding international development projects, and the type of criteria a migrant association had to follow to manage public funds.

At another level, during fieldwork in some cases I have been confronted with very sensitive information such as abuse and discrimination along to different social axes (such as gender relations), or misuse of funds. I have tried to be sensitive towards these people, but to not be judgmental. I have often questioned myself about the purpose (and theme) of the research. I have been very careful to not disclose delicate information and to maintain confidentiality, but I followed some of the issues through the research process when I thought I was a pertinent actor to question it.

Regarding benefits, I would have liked to start the project with more participation from the research participants. Nevertheless, I have disseminated the project and intermediate findings to Senegalese migrant associations and local government organisations. I foresee sending the final dissertation, and disseminating the final results, with actors in Catalonia.

As regards to informed consent, I have always provided participants with clear information about what participating in this research project involved and gave them the opportunity to decide whether or not they wanted to participate. However, the agreement has always been verbal. Before scheduling the interview and before starting the actual interview I explained my aims, the fact that it was my personal academic project, and discussed issues of anonymity and confidentiality. In this regard, identifiable information about individuals collected during the process of research is not disclosed. Besides, specific information provided in the process of this research has not been used at all if the participant made this request. I have not disclosed 'off the record' comments, even if in some cases they may have contributed to the interpretation of certain dynamics. Making participants, migrant associations and small villages in Kolda anonymous has been one way to protect research participants from the accidental breaking of confidentiality. Nevertheless, due to the qualitative character of the research, it is problematic to assure confidentiality when, as a researcher, I have to explain processes to justify and contextualise inferences.

The capacity of the communities in villages to offer consent, given how they were planned and the different worldviews, is problematic. However, I have always asked permission first from migrant representatives. In fact, they informed the communities and arranged my meetings with them before my arrival. Once I had arrived to the village, I tried to ask permission, and offer the right for people to withdraw.

Participants have not received monetary recompenses in this research. To the extent to which research dealt with publicly funded projects, principles of transparency and accountability were generally prevalent in the interactions with all the participants who were directly engaged with the co-development processes I studied. There was an exception where one person did want to get paid to contribute. I discussed this with the donor to which this person was related and I also discussed with the person concerned the reasons for not paying. Nevertheless, I have done everything possible so that participation in the research will not actually cost the participants money. During the visits to villages in Kolda I was accompanied with a driver, and a translator. Thus, translation services, gasoline and food, were all reimbursed.

I have been careful about keeping the entire set of files safe, using internal codes to avoid identification, under password protection. However, the type of data collected has a limited capacity for harm. Permission has always been asked when taking photographs (this was done during the visits to villages in Kolda). Nevertheless, as I have not agreed upon their wider use, the dissemination of these will be limited.

3.4.2 Positionality of the researcher

Attention to reflexivity and awareness of my positionality have been important considerations for me throughout the research process. There is a vast, and increasing, literature regarding how to address the implications of undertaking research among migrants (Nowicka and Ryan, 2015), and also about ways of conducting research in development contexts, when coming from the Global North (Chambers, 2006; Kapoor, 2004). To narrow the exploration of positions occupied across the research, I would say, in a nutshell, that the way I was seen by others doing fieldwork in Catalonia and fieldwork in Senegal had specific challenges.

In Catalonia, I did not share social markers such as gender; linguistic; racial; religious; or social class attributes with migrant collectives and representatives. In this regard, I have tried to be respectful of social norms where I was aware of them and ask and re-ask on certain matters to avoid miss-interpretations. Being a researcher while I was also the representative of the biggest Catalan federation of NGOs dedicated to international cooperation (2013-2017) preoccupied me, mostly because I was afraid that informants could have prejudices about how I might assess their practices. In general, I did not explain this facet of my activism to migrant representatives (few people outside Barcelona knew what this organisation was). At the same time, it did play out as a source of acceptance and power in some cases, in the sense that it facilitated my access to certain information or made the sharing of experiences or information with informants easier.

In Senegal, the differences in power relations between researched and researcher were more acute. When I was introduced in some villages, by migrant representatives, as connected to donors (or projects being funded by donors) gave me a degree of power. Moreover, being white facilitated my research in communities, as I felt it was generally taken as a surprise or a novelty – and in a friendly manner – in small villages where they were not used to seeing white people. Being a non-French researcher was also an asset, in the sense that I was not associated with the colonial power (I had spoken about this in Dakar). Overall, I was attentive in the professional relations within which I was embedded.

A longer analysis would entail reflecting upon my role as a translator researcher, and as a researcher writing in her non-native language. In this regard, I have been conscious of the idea 'that researchers translating data are often forced to make significant choices about how to represent their informants in writing' (Gawlewicz, 2016, p. 38). Thus, I have tried to be faithful in my interpretation of the participants' message, and sometimes I have had to balance the language competences of my informants, as I have done with my own competences in French and English (in this sense, I am conscious that I need someone to proof read what I write in English).

Finally, I have had been attentive to theoretical concerns in not wishing to rely only on Western-based sources and seeking to not be too biased towards Eurocentric

(Anglo-Saxon) perspectives. Therefore, I have made efforts to ask about, and access, Senegalese-based research created by Senegalese when this was possible and accessible.

PART II. FINDINGS: RESEARCH RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

4 Policy environments in Catalonia and Senegal

This chapter describes policy environments related to migration and development both in Catalonia and Senegal. In both cases, the main aim is to be able to grasp the overall governance dynamics in which the agency of migrant associations and localities take different expressions during the period under study (mostly between 2007-2014).

The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 considers co-development as a particular policy-mechanism resulting from intertwining policies of migrant incorporation and citizenship and migrant transnational practices (E. Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011). It discusses policy-making on migration and development in Spain, and, particularly, in Catalonia. Thus, the 'size' of co-development policymaking is appraised by looking at official development assistance flows over the period. In this sense, an analysis of migrant associations' access to municipal official development assistance can help in depicting the evolution and relative importance of the policy in Catalonia, at municipal level. Before concluding this subsection, there is a more substantial analysis of co-development in order to show governmental actors' rationale for its deployment.

Regarding Senegal, in section 4.2. economic remittances are connected to the increasing weight international Senegalese migrants have acquired domestically since the 2000s. In addition, by exploring institutional arrangements at a national level this section shows the mechanisms by which Senegalese migrants can formally influence their 'in origin' policies and politics. Also, by acknowledging Senegal's decentralisation process, the section highlights the local governance arena within which migrants and other actors in localities play a role. Examining this institutional arena entails taking into account the existence of customary authorities. Moreover,

the axes of ethnicity and village belonging are presented as socially structuring factors at the local level in the region of Kolda.

Regarding the methodological dimension, the chapter relies on the analysis of relevant scholarly literature, but also on sources such as policy documents, official databases, news items, and governmental sites. Interviews and fieldwork also inform the chapter's approach, and a few quotations are provided to show the relevance of considering some of the dimensions for the analysis that were introduced into the research design.

4.1 The policy-making of migration and development in a decentralised system: Co-development in Catalonia as a policy response to the social transformation of local landscapes

4.1.1 An overview of migration policies in Spain and Catalonia

In the 1990s, Spanish immigration policy 'was reactive and ambivalent, allowing informal access to the territory despite the measures established by law', and to such an extent that the Spanish model during that period was labelled as 'tolerated irregularity'[70] (López-Sala, 2013, p. 40 citing Izquierdo 2008). During the 2000s, the incremental growth of the foreign-born population went hand in hand with the broadening (and increased complexity) of Spanish immigration policy-making, at different governmental levels. At the same time, the particular distribution of power within the Spanish state meant that different governments and administrations (at national, regional or/and local and autonomous community levels) contributed to the array of policy responses deployed. In this respect, there are three important ideas that are worth highlighting.

First, it is important to consider the role played by municipal and regional levels in immigration policymaking. Hence, during the 90s and the first half of 2000s, it is important to take into account that it took more than a decade to move from an integration policy approach based on 'partial measures' to far more planed

---

[70] To exemplify the expression, once the first Foreigners Law was enacted in 1985 - and its correspondent regulation in 1986 - it meant that since 1986, more than one and a half million workers in an irregular situation could legalize their status by legalizations that were periodically launched both by right-wing and left-wing central governments (in the years 1986, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005) (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011; López-Sala, 2013).

instruments favoring migrant participation and social equality at upper governance levels. Hence, researchers have highlighted the crucial role played by officials at the local level in dealing with the challenges posed by inmigration. In fact, different authors underscore the point that up until 2004 the elaboration of integration policies occurred at the regional and local level because, until then, the central government's main focus was on a labour-based approach towards inmigration (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011; López-Sala, 2013; Treviño and González Ferrer, 2016). It is also stressed that 'the sub-national level became the locus of integration policymaking as a consequence of the division of tasks between levels' established in the system of autonomous communities (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011, p. 308)[71].

Regionally, the Catalan regional government (*Generalitat de Catalunya,* in Catalan) was quicker in defining settlement and integration policies than the central government.[72] Therefore, in the mid-1990s Catalonia was a pioneer within Spain in defining a policy approach to migrant integration while at the same time municipalities at local level (around Spain) were promoting policy approaches to the immigration phenomenon that would become mainstream by the beginning of the 2000s, at a national level and also in other autonomous communities (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011; Martínez de Lizarrondo Artola, 2009). In practice, the array of ways in which immigration challenges were managed at the municipal level was broad. This miscellany of approaches has also been connected to an inequality of both treatment and access to rights that remained dependent on the municipality of residence. The research shows that this was specially the case in regions such as those in Catalonia, which received an important share of total in-flows (Miret i Serra, 2009; Nadal et al., 2002; Treviño and González Ferrer, 2016).

---

[71] The national policies defined in 'Plan GRECO' (*Programa Global de Coordinación y Regulación de la Extranjería y la Inmigración,* 2000) and the first PECI (Plan Estratégico de Ciudadanía e Inmigración) 2007-2010 approved in 2007; the second PECI 2011-2014, and the last initiative that, so far, was published in 2011) would later support what had been the 'de facto' distribution of responsibilities towards local and regional levels for the policy measures involved in integration (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011).

[72] Indeed, while the first Plan for Social Integration of Immigrants launched at national level was pushed by civil society and subnational level governmental actors in 1994 (preceding the GRECO Plan), some authors indicate that in fact this plan 'was inspired by – if not patterned upon - the 1993 Catalonian Plan' (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011, p. 309).

Second, within the frame of Spain-Catalonia historical relationships, authors have shed light on the use of immigration policy-making at the regional level as a mechanism to build up a Catalan national project (Domingo, n.d.; Gil Araújo, 2006). Since the beginning of the democratic period after Franco's dictatorship, often the complexities of this relationship can be observed in the power grounded in the distribution of competences between governance levels. At the time of writing this dissertation there was a deep constitutional crisis affecting political public institutions in Catalonia and Spain[73]. Despite this, during the period in which this research mainly focuses on, the New Statute of Autonomy (approved in 2006) represented a 'significant qualitative leap forward in terms of legal recognition of competence on immigration' (Miret i Serra, 2009, p. 60 my translation). In the New Statute of Autonomy the *Generalitat de Catalunya* is defined, for the first time, as a government with exclusive competence in the field concerning first reception of migrants; in the 'development of the policy of integration'; and with the competence to legislate and govern for the 'social and economic integration of migrants as well as for their social participation' (Miret i Serra, 2009, p. 60 my translation). Notwithstanding these developments, more than ten years after this New Statute of Autonomy was approved, some commentators still consider that a lack of clarity remains between the Spanish central government and Catalan regional government in relation to which body is the competent body in relation to some issues (Markus González Beilfuss in Pinyol-Jiménez, 2016, p. 51).

Two important policy documents can be seen as arising from both the new statutory context in 2006 and the historical background of immigration policymaking in Catalonia. First, there was the signing of the National Agreement for Immigration (*Pacte Nacional per a la Immigració*) in 2008, after a broad participatory process initiated in 2007 to debate and formulate this document. Second, there was the approval on May 7, 2010 of the 'Law on welcoming people immigrating into and

---

[73] This major crisis started after the Spanish right-wing party Partido Popular challenged the new version of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. The Statute had been agreed by the Catalan Parliament, the National Parliament and the Senate. Subsequently it was aproved in a referendum during June 2006. There was a subsequent legal judgment and curtailment issued in 2010 by the Constitutional Court. In this light, the crisis of refuge and asylum politics in Spain was widely contested in the Catalan public and political sphere during the first half of 2017, in what can be understood as an expression of wider contestation of issues through migration policy-making.

returning to Catalonia' (*Llei d'acollida de les persones immigrades i retornades a Catalunya)* hereafter referred to as the Welcoming Law. This law, together with its set of rules, was approved in 2014 (Decree 150/2014, of November 18) and was concerned with the reception services of immigrants and those returning to Catalonia.[74] The Welcoming Law gives a legal framework and competences to foster migrants' civic participation at the local level, especially for those municipalities with more than 20.000 inhabitants.

Third, when analysing migration policy-making in Catalonia and Spain, there are gaps between the policy discourse and the actual measures implemented when it comes to consider how integration purposes and civic and political rights interrelate. In this respect, as Østergaard-Nielsen found when analysing citizenship models in Spanish and Catalan migration policy documents (covering the period 2005-2010), there are two main characteristics of both governmental approaches. These are, 'first, the promotion of a civic citizenship, where migrants are encouraged to participate actively in political and social affairs; and second, that this active incorporation takes place in the local context' (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011, p. 26). At the same, the author also noticed that promoting a 'localized civic membership' when it cannot be accompanied by local voting rights is fundamentally flawed (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011, p. 26).

Moreover, bearing in mind that for the Catalan regional government integration policies have been put into practice with a sharp focus on the consideration of language (Catalan) as a key tool towards social inclusion, there have been critical voices. Hence, some have argued that this prioritisation has been at the expense of other aspects that are related to integration, such as citizen participation, or that democratic values or equal opportunities would be expected to be shared (Pinyol-Jiménez, 2016, p. 52).

---

[74] Besides these documents, the Catalan government has defined six plans related to migration, integration or citizenship since 1993. The last plan covers the years 2017-2020. Access to all these plans in: http://treballiaferssocials.gencat.cat/ca/ambits_tematics/immigracio/politiques_i_plans_dactuacio/antecedents/ [last accessed 28 February 2018]

There is one final remark necessary before proceeding to the next subsection. Recent research analysing the local management of immigration by municipalities belonging to the autonomous communities of Andalucía, Catalonia and Madrid undertaken during 2012-2013 shows a reinforcement of the autonomous communities ahead of municipalities. However, this re-autonomisation of the normative side of immigration policy, together with the economic crisis and the decline of migrant in-flows, has been matched by a more peripheral position of immigration management within the administrative structures dedicated to immigration of autonomous communities such as Catalonia (Treviño and González Ferrer, 2016, p. 80). In accepting this finding, and examining these developments from a temporal perspective, it needs to be understood that the fieldwork of this present research took place during a period in which there was a transition of roles in this area. In particular, the leadership at municipal level that had been crucial was loosing strength when compared to other recent periods. The next two subsections deal with the main actors and motivations of co-development understood as a public policy in Catalonia.

4.1.2 Measuring co-development policy-making: the Golden age of co-development in Catalonia (2000-2010)

By looking at the overall public spending context (described as 'size' in this thesis) within which co-development developed in Catalonia, I aim to sketch the evolution of its institutional importance in the region. I often think of 2000-2010 as the 'golden age of co-development' in Catalonia. But 'gold' is in this case a very metaphorical expression indeed, I would say that the amount of funds available have been modest. This idea, which the following paragraphs back up, sits together with the assertion that at a local level there has been an 'intensity' of the co-development phenomenon due to two reasons. First, funding increased during the period in parallel with overall Spanish and Catalan official development assistance (or ODA). Second, Spain is a special case as regards to the proportion of official development assistance streaming from the local governance level (these type of development flows are also called decentralised ODA).

In the Spanish context, the definition of 'co-development' as a policy field has been attached discursively to the policy sectors of both immigration and international cooperation. Among the main governmental institutions promoting it we find the

Spanish central government, and regional governments such as Valencia, Madrid and Catalonia (Giménez Romero et al., 2006; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011). At a state level, measuring the importance of co-development in terms of the financial size of the resources channelled to this type of policy has not yet been undertaken. However, some efforts have been put to systematically quantify the amount of funds that can be attributed to co-development at the local level, for instance in the Catalan case (Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016). Notwithstanding this, and as pointed out previously, when considering the literature related to co-development so far, it is quite plausible to suggest that, in Catalonia and Spain, most of the funds directed to co-development were located under the umbrella of official development assistance.

There are several hindrances underpinning the possibility of assessing the size of co-development. One of them is the fact that 'co-development is defined in a variety of ways, with different actors and documents emphasizing different aspects and priorities' (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011, p. 27). There is another significant problem, partly connected to the latter. When 'co-development' is used by governments to refer to an intervention or priority that is to be funded by official development assistance (such as financial flows to other countries and territories that fit OECD standards) there is no category available to characterise these public funds in a direct, traceable, way.[75]

Moreover, it is worth noting that governmental bodies at different governance levels, not sectorially attached to international relations or international cooperation, can categorise some of their disbursements as official development assistance. This reality makes monitoring more difficult. Bearing the latter in mind, it is important to contextualise the exceptionality, among the global OECD countries, of the Spanish decentralised international cooperation system. Hence, an OECD study published in 2005 identified Spain as the country with the highest official development assistance weight (in absolute and relative numbers) coming from decentralised donors (regions, municipalities) among the 12 European and non-European states considered in the

---

[75] For instance, considering bilateral aid, it is a challenge to know the extent to which funds are supporting interventions connected to migration (the OECD defined sectors are, for example, social infrastructure: education, health, etc.; refugees in donor countries; humanitarian aid; etc.).

study and from which the OECD had obtained information[76] (OECD, 2005). According to this report, in the period 2002-2003, the percentage of decentralised bilateral Spanish official development assistance, on average, was 18% (OECD, 2005, p. 13).

It is also worth noting that up until 2009 the share of Catalan and total Spanish official development assistance, when measured as a percentage of gross national income, continued to grow. However, it was among the first policies to be sacrificed by regional governments and the Spanish central government for austerity's sake. In the period 2009-2015 (when Spain hit 'a historic floor'), the Spanish ODA reduced in size by 73% (CONCORD, 2017, p. 50). At the time of writing, the tendency does not seem to have reversed, or, at the least, it is rebounding very weakly (CONCORD, 2017, p. 11). The OECD's data for Spain sums up the nature of a decentralised ODA. Further, its overall decline is not only due to central policymaking: the Catalan regional government's decisions also contributed to the decrease. This was also true in other regions although the intensity of reductions varies across them. Hence, there was a period of increasing funding up until 2008 when ODA flows from the Catalan Development Agency and the rest of the departments in the *Generalitat de Catalunya* reached a maximum of more than 62.9 milion euros of the executed budget. However, by 2014, the total Catalan ODA funds invested from the regional government was 14.2 milion euros, that is 77% less than in 2008 (see Figure 4.1. for 2007-2014 data).

The crisis and spending cuts in this regard differentially affected international cooperation policies at the municipal level. At this point, it is worth noting that within the Spanish decentralised system, the role played by regional governments and sub-regional local entities as cooperation actors is recognised and regulated. This had occurred since the passing of the first national cooperation law in 1998, which aimed to regulate juridically Spanish policy-making in international cooperation for development. The Spanish Development Agency was also created in 1998. Shortly afterwards, the Catalan law on international development, approved in 2001, also backed sub-regional governments as international development actors. Following

---

[76] The other countries being Germany, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Canada, Portugal, France, Japan, Australia, Greece (OECD, 2005, p. 13).

this, in 2003, the Regional Catalan Development Agency was created. In short, local entities' had the autonomy to formulate their own development policies and priorities.[77] In terms of spending, the local entities' ODA (here the *Generalitat* government is not considered in the expression) diminished from 2008, and particularly from 2011 to 2012, when local entities' ODA were 20,8 milion euros and reached 8 million euros by 2012. In 2014 the total amount had recovered to 12 milion euros (see Figure 4.1.).

Despite the discussion above, it is important to highlight that international cooperation had, relatively, maintained its strength in the municipal budgets (see Figure 4.1.). After 2014, not only in Catalonia but also in Spain, local entities basically kept their commitments betwen 2014 and 2016. In 2016 local entities' ODA decreased by 3,7% compared to the overall local ODA budgeted spending in 2015 (CONGDE, 2017, p. 6). On the other hand, it is also important to examine particular local governments such as Barcelona, Lleida, Girona or Mataró (migrant associations' settlement localities in this research). Here the commitment towards international cooperation can be understood as also dependent on the specific characteristics of each government. Hence, while Barcelona, Girona, Mataró maintained or increased their commitment measured as a percentage of municipal budget, Lleida reduced its ODA funds radically.

---

[77] Despite this autonomy, there was some questioning about this in 2013. When the Law 27/2013, of December 27, on Rationalisation and Sustainability of the Local Administration came into force (called by the acronym LRSAL in Spain), there was a debate within the municipal cooperation sector regarding whether local entities could undertake ODA funded activities. The LRSAL is seen by experts as a consequence of the express modification of Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution in 2011. This change led to the modificacion of the principles ruling the functioning of the Spanish administration (Font Monclús et al., 2014). Thus, within the context of the economic and financial crisis, and the EU intervention in Spain, the new Article 135 required fundamental importance be given to budgetary stability, and the LRSAL was seen as a procedure to diminish the autonomy of the local level governments (Font Monclús et al., 2014). Further, according to Font Monclús et al. (2014), given that international cooperation for development is considered to be under the competence of local entities, and not a delegated competence, those local entities are still in charge of it also in budgetary terms.

Figure 4.1. Evolution of Catalan public donors' ODA (euros, years 2007-2014)
Source: Produced from data downloaded from the website
http://realitatajut.org/analizar-la-ayuda/con-cuanto-se-ayuda [last access March
2018]. Original data from the Catalan Development Agency and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

In this spending context,[78] Table 4.1. shows that the amount of ODA local funds
channelled to migrant associations does not represent a large share of the total local
ODA in Catalonia. However, these local funds almost tripled during the period 1999-
2008 with an especially notable 104% increase between 2004 and 2008. At the same
time, the percentage of ODA directed towards migrant associations over total local

---

[78] The original database draws on 'different statistical sources and data from four consecutive surveys
of decentralised aid practices among local Catalan governments in 1999, 2001, 2004, and 2008. The
survey, carried out by the Fons-Català, is sent to all 946 Catalan municipalities and collects
information on their ODA spending' (Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016, p. 373). At the
time of writing this dissertation, the Fons-Catala's study published in 2009 (with a survey sent in
2008) has been the last published survey.

ODA was over 2% until 2008, when it reached 3,22% (Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016). Also, according to that paper, it is important to note that on average 344 municipalities out of 946 Catalan municipalities channel ODA. Further, in slightly over 10% of these areas migrant associations had accessed a share of those resources and this increased to 19% of municipalities channelling ODA to migrant associations in 2008, or 60 municipalities (Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016, p. 374).

Table 4.1. Local government ODA (in €) directed to migrant associations over the total local government ODA in the considered years (1999, 2001, 2004, and 2008).

	1999	2001	2004	2008
ODA from Catalan local entities from which FCCD has obtained information (1+2):	**13.304.677**	**15.480.412**	**18.835.960**	**28.599.552**
Municipalities (1)	9.951.105	11.694.797	14.222.535	22.784.216
Supra-municipal entities (2)				
Comarcal Councils	30.091	42.193	63.005	155.907
Diputacions (provincial)	2.963.480	3.382.815	4.181.788	5.203.035
Mancomunities	360.000	360.607	368.633	456.394
Subtotal supra-municipal(2)	3.353.571	3.785.615	4.613.425	5.815.336
ODA directed towards Migrant associations	**316.886**	**334.898**	**449.311**	**920.678**
% ODA directed towards Migrant associations over total ODA	**2,38%**	**2,16%**	**2,39%**	**3,22%**
Migrant ODA increase over the preceding year		**5,68%**	**34,16%**	**104,91%**

Source: Based on original research published in (Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016), data elaborated from Fons-Català studies

It is important to recall that, most likely, the above data only reflects a small part of the growing phenomenon of co-development during the first decade of 2000s. First, at the municipal level, the data only shows funds obtained by migrant associations. Indeed, if we were to consider a broader definition of co-development (and not only a narrowed framework, based on migrant associations accessing ODA funding), the figures would probably be bigger. Second, the data only appraises the municipal level, but during that period autochtonous NGOs, and also governments at different levels working directly with developing countries, increasingly explored how to intertwine migration and development.

4.1.3 Co-development in Catalonia: underpinning rationale and main actors

Supramunicipal entity: Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament

The quantitative study mentioned previously found that the involvement of *Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament* (also called Fons-Català in this text to reduce the length of the name) in local ODA decision-making positively affects the probability of funding migrant associations in the period under consideration (Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016, p. 375). Moreover, in trying to understand why it is that the smaller the municipality, the larger the share of ODA funds that may be given to migrant associations, it is important to understand the Fons-Català's role in deciding where municipal funds are targeted (Østergaard-Nielsen and Acebillo-Baqué, 2016, p. 376). Indeed, the result is not surprising when we understand the history of co-development (and, overall, of the municipal's international development policymaking) in Catalonia.

Long before the Catalan (Regional) Development Agency was started in 2003, Fons-Català was created in 1986 in a municipality called Salt (located in Girona's province). It was the first of its kind in Spain.[79] The trigger for its creation was a defining moment in 1981 when an advocacy campaign was launched by a Catalan Christian NGO called *Justícia i Pau* (Justice and Peace) (FCCD, 2011). The campaign was named 'Objective 0,7%' and was the first action at a national level in Spain to demand governmental public support for a minimum share of 0,7% of Gross Domestic Product to be channelled to empoverished countries. Another important advocacy campaign asking for the 0,7% affecting municipals' priorities to be honoured was launched later. In November 1994 many activists camped in the Diagonal avenue, in Barcelona, demanding that the government comply with their international commitment.

Many actors related to international solidarity in Spain and Catalonia refer to this second campaign as a turning point: for some years, it sensitised and influenced many

---

[79] According to their webpages, in the Basque Country, the *Euskal Fondoa-Asociación de Entidades Locales Vascas Cooperantes* was created in 1996 (http://www.euskalfondoa.org/). In Andalusia, the *Fondo Andaluz de Municipios para la Solidaridad Internacional* (FAMSI) was born in 2000 (http://www.andaluciasolidaria.org/). [Last access 16 April 2018].

social and political actors and citizens at the grass roots level, as regards towards the need to support development abroad and counter global injustice[80]. It also backed the creation of governmental structures and mechanisms related to international development, such as the *Consells Locals de Cooperació i Solidaritat (Cooperation and Solidarity Local Councils)*. These are participative spaces at the governmental municipal level, where civil society is supposed to be consulted and have a say regarding areas of policymaking (FCONGD, 2005). After the campaign, in the case of the Fons-Català, the municipal association's membership increased by 30%, and, by 1995 expanded its coverage across the Catalan territory (FCCD, 2011, p. 28).

Even though, in the beginning, NGOs could also be members of the Fons-Català, it is fundamentally an association of municipalities and other supramunicipal bodies (such as *diputacions, consells comarcals* and *mancomunitats*). In 2015 it had 314 members (282 municipalities among them) and covered a territory that represented more than 85% of the total population in Catalonia (FCCD, 2016, p. 15). Among their functions, the Fons-Català represents municipalities in international cooperation-related spaces and jointly manages the financial resources contributed by the associated institutions in order to support development and humanitarian interventions.[81] In addition, depending on the members' agreements with the organisation, the Fons-Català technically supports the international development management and policy-making at the municipal level. That is, if municipalities are small, or lack the resources, Fons-Català would be a mechanism for them to 'outsource' human labour and knowledge.

The Fons-Català has been among the pioneers in promoting co-development as included within an overarching cooperation strategy in Spain. In 1995 the organisation started its collaboration with Senegalese migrant associations (FCCD, 2011, p. 47). Later on, in 1997, the entity opened a new workstream, approved in Fons-Català's assembly, to foster co-development in order to support immigrants as development agents. It hired a person of Senegalese origin to be in charge of the programme and started undertaking periodical training courses to promote migrant associations' capacities. Up until this point, different migrant organisations had

---

[80] Regarding the studied municipalities where the studied migrant associatons are linked in to their country of residence, the years in which local governments explicitly committed to invest a percentage of its budget to ODA were: 1994 (Barcelona, Lleida), 1995 (Mataró) and 1998 (Girona)
[81] See their webpage for more information http://www.fonscatala.org/ [Last access 16 April 2018]

received funds directly or indirectly in connection with Fons-Català (either by receiving funding through Fons-Català's calls or through municipalities connected to Fons-Català). Besides, since Fons-Català started working in co-development, the countries with the highest levels of activity are Senegal, Gambia and Morocco. Around 2010, Fons-Català stated that it supported 44 co-development projects in Senegal, 32 in Morocco, and 25 in Gambia (FCCD, 2011, p. 49). Apart from funding projects in the origin countries of those migrants settled in Catalonia, the organisation has undertaken training courses all around Catalonia. Fons-Català also publishes studies and books related to the work, and organises and participates in conferences. In the past, the Spanish Agency for Development and Cooperation also funded Fons-Català's co-development activities. They are the so-called programmes MIDEL (2004), and Redel I, II, III (Redel started in 2006, and had three phases). These programmes represent the strongest attempt by Fons-Català to connect co-development and migrant economic remittances. However, until now, according to different key informants, this approach has not been very successful.

Fons-Català rationale for promoting co-development – rather than stimulating the relationship between migrants, economic remittances and development of origin countries – seemed focused elsewhere. Documents published by Fons-Català and people working within the organisation emphasised the willingness to counter the lack of (or the insufficience of) civil and political rights by fostering migrant associations' participation at a local level in the host countries. They also stressed the need to promote initiatives geared towards migrants' social inclusion at the local level as underpinning principles behind co-development fostering. For instance, in a publication on the occasion of Fons-Català's 25th Anniversary, the organisation spoke of co-development in the following terms:

> 'In this way [through co-development] a positive relationship is generated between the town hall, the immigrants and the population: The newcomers get organised, they become legally constituted associations and have access and a more fluid and constant relationship with the City Council. At the same time, the councils can see the situation in which these entities are. They can know their concerns as citizens –citizens of both the host municipality and their area of origin. The migrant feels supported by the public administration, has contacts and is heard by it.' (FCCD, 2011, p. 51 original in Catalan, my translation)

An interviewee who witnessed the beginnings of co-development in Fons-Català explained that, during the first years of the 2000s, co-development was an innovative approach. This was because, for example, it fostered migrant associations' participation in the Municipal Councils, and in this was they were deconstructing stereotypes of migrants being a problem to be dealt with:

> Immigration was always seen as a problem. If the immigrants from Mataró (the Soninkes...) could participate in the Cooperation [Municipal] Council, they were already involved as co-participants, they were no longer the 'problem' of Soninkes from Mataró. It was an important step. [Co-development] Especially influenced us during the last decade [2000-2006]. [...] We were pioneers, because many city councils opened the doors, the spaces of the cooperation councils, to associations of immigrants.
>
> *Barcelona, April 2016, translated from Catalan (1-4-P99)*

The informant's emphasis during the interview on co-development as a strategy to work on 'immigrant integration' can be found in documents written by Fons-Català. This can be found, for example, in a book chapter whose author is, according to the research, a crucial thinker in relation to the approach taken, and also responsible for Fons-Català's co-development programme over several years. Hence, the most important aspect of co-development is not put on origin localities, but instead it is fundamentally and politically linked to the visibility of migrants and to citizen participation, and their integration into the host localities (Diao, 2007).

Catalan regional government

The dimension of political (local) participation of migrants sustained by Fons-Català reflects the main characteristic of the Catalan policymaking within the Spanish regional context. Hence, this is consistent with an analysis of co-development in Catalonia understood as an approach to local citizenship, whereby 'co-development policies and initiatives of local governments are related to migrants' local process of incorporation in their country of residence' (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011, p. 20). During interviews, conferences or within the projects' documents justifying the work, co-development actors in Catalonia (and also migrant representatives or actors in the origin localities) rarely justify undertaking co-development from a viewpoint of migration control, returning migrants or fighting against migration. Yet, according to

research, rationales based on control of migration flows, co-optation or clientelism *may* have played stronger roles in other regions such as Madrid or Valencia (Fauser, 2014; Lacomba et al., 2014).

To further substantiate the point, until now, the four Catalan regional international cooperation master plans include co-development as an area of intervention for the Catalan government.[82] The first regional Development Cooperation Master Plan published in 2003, already incorporated co-development as a way to foster 'social integration' of immigrants (Parlament de Catalunya, 2003). In 2009, the policy building of co-development at a regional level reached a tipping point before the economic falling-off when the 'Co-development Strategy of Cooperation for Development' (*Estratègia de codesenvolupament de la cooperació al desenvolupament,* in Catalan) was launched by the Directorate General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Action (DGCDAH) and the Catalan Agency for Development Cooperation (ACCD), under the mandate of the Development Cooperation Master Plan 2007-2010 (DGCDAH/ACCD, 2009). The strategy, which considered itself as a conceptual and action framework with regards to Catalan co-development's policymaking, defines co-development as:

> 'Any attempt or any instrument aimed at harnessing the potential of migratory flows with the objective of development. In other words, any attempt to positively activate the relationship between migration and development, making the first one factor or motor of the second.' (DGCDAH/ACCD, 2009, p. 12 original in Catalan, my translation)

The approach of the strategy of co-development uses co-development processes as opportunities for the promotion and protection of the rights of people, as well as the promotion of transnationalism through the support of networks and alliances. In particular, among its priority goals, one can find references to facilitating spaces and strengthening the capacities of Catalan cooperation actors to work on co-development. This is to be realised both with an active incorporation of migrants and with a reinforcement of their links with the society of origin. The regional strategy

---

[82] The Development Cooperation Master Plan 2015-2018 is in force while writing this dissertation. The other three plans (covering the periods 2003-2006, 2007-2010, 2011-2014) can be found in: http://cooperaciocatalana.gencat.cat/ca/direccio-general-de-cooperacio-al-desenvolupament/pla_director/plans-directors-anteriors/ [last access 29 April 2018]

also backs the role played by governments at local level in the co-development strategy, which in fact entails recognition of what was already in the making. Besides, it also attempts to strenghten the regional coordination of co-development policy-making with immigration policy-making (at that time, the main immigration policy approaches were described in the Catalan Citizenship and Migration Plan 2009-2012) (DGCDAH/ACCD, 2009).

Subsequently, the Development Cooperation Master Plan 2011-2014, approved in June 2010, envisages implementing the co-development strategy (DGCDAH/ACCD, 2010). The document understands co-development as an instrument of cooperation and, beyond this, as a possibility to articulate positive relationships between the migratory phenomenon and development as well as empowering migrant groups. However, with the spending cuts, the Development Cooperation Master Plan 2011-2014 turned into vacuous words. The next strategy document, still in force at the time of writing, was the Development Cooperation Master Plan 2015-2018. This still considers co-development as an area of intervention (but mainly connected to local governments). Equally, the strategy of the regional Catalan cooperation towards Senegal (2013-2017) also identified lines of intervention fostering co-development. However, in the context of a weakened governmental approach towards cooperation – and also the weakened force of civil society actors – the scope of it within the general intervention maintained a very low profile (ACCD, 2015; DGCDAH/ACCD, 2013).

Moreover, the visibility of a co-development approach within immigration policy-making, has worsened during the current term. Hence, there were four previous immigration and citizenship regional plans describing goals and interventions related to migration (including: Migrations and Citizenship Plan 2013-2016; Citizenship and Immigration Plan 2009-2012; Immigration and Citizenship Plan 2005-2008; Immigration Intepartamental Plan 2001-2004[83]). These all mentioned co-development as an area of intervention, or they cited the need to coordinate action together with the international governmental cooperation area regarding the co-development strategy (from its publication in 2009). However, the last regional Migrations and Citizenship

---

[83] As previously mentioned, the first 'Interdepartmental Immigration Plan 1993-2000' was launched in 1993, but I could not access the document. The other documents are available at: http://treballiaferssocials.gencat.cat/ca/ambits_tematics/immigracio/politiques_i_plans_dactuacio/antecedents/ [last accessed 29 April 2018]

Plan 2017-2020 does not mention co-development (Direcció General per a la Immigració, 2014; Generalitat de Catalunya, 2010; Secretaria d'Igualtat, Migracions i Ciutadania, 2017; Secretaria per a la Immigració, 2010). This last document mainly focuses on the phenomenon of forced displacement when referring to international cooperation. In fact, it also echoes the academic evidence stating that development is more likely to stimulate migration rather than the contrary (Secretaria d'Igualtat, Migracions i Ciutadania, 2017, p. 11).

At this point, one can argue that, neither in terms of policy discourse nor in relation to economic resources has co-development policy-making been consolidated at the Catalan regional level. Nevertheless, it is probably the territory within the Spanish state where the approach has been most structured (see the view of a migration and development expert after this paragraph). For different reasons, when compared to the French case – where there are well-developed national approaches such as the programme PAISD (launched in 2005, briefly described later on in this same chapter) – the Spanish case looks to have faded before reaching maturity. It is still to be seen whether the approach will survive or will be rescued if the international cooperation policies are ever reviewed again.

> The interventions are given by the type of accompaniment they obtain. In Spain, the Catalan cooperation aside, there have not been very structured co-development interventions. Nor with a powerful financing, because what Catalonia was doing had a small amount of funding. If you consider the case of France, France have a program that is very broad and in which you work for example to finance structures, and the migrant associations of France, for what I was telling you, because it is older, they have been working for 35 years on issues of co-development. So, maybe what the Senegalese communities of Spain are doing now, in France they did it 25 years ago, and therefore you have 25 years of work and thinking about the projects that are missing [in the Spanish case]. You can go fast, but time exists.
>
> *International organisation representative, Dakar, September 2012, translated from Spanish (2-4-P24)*

Civil society-led processes

Catalan civil society actors have also been engaged in promoting co-development. Thus, civil society has had a role in buiding up and undertaking co-development, and particularly certain migrant associations in alliance with 'autochtonous' groups.

Consequently, substantiating the argument that the incorporation of co-development as an area of public intervention in Catalonia has purely been a 'top-down' process is difficult. There is different evidence supporting the last statement and two sources are now highlighted.

First, it is no surprise that we turn to examine the territory which is the oldest Sub-Saharan community settled in Spain (that is, in the Girona and Maresme's areas). In that area, it is worth mentioning the role played by particular NGOs in Girona (such as the *Grup de Recerca i Actuació amb Minories Culturals*, GRAMC, founded within the organisational structure of the adult and alfabetisation (or literacy) school called Samba Kubally, in Santa Coloma de Farners, in 1988). Further, the coordination platform of solidarity NGOs of Girona and Alt Maresme (*Coordinadora d'ONG Solidàries,* founded in 1994) should also be cited. Both organisations have contributed to supporting and building the co-development approach in Fons-Català and, in fact, the area of Girona is also the craddle of Fons-Català. Besides their role in conceptualising co-development, these organisations have also been engaged with, and supported, Senegalese migrant associations along with other autochtonous NGOs. This is related to the agency of some of the studied migrant associations. It is conceptualised in terms of presence as observed through these Senegalese associations' alliances.

Second, according to the doctoral research of Castellà Josa (Castellà Josa, 2016, p. 134), the above-mentioned Immigration National Agreement (Secretaria per a la Immigració, 2009) gained broad participation by the citizenship and civil society actors mainly because a previous initiative had brought forth different civil society actors. This initiative gathered a network of migrant organisations and other organisations of influence from the immigration sector resulting in the production of the *'Consens Social Sobre Migracions a Catalunya'* (Càritas Diocesana de Barcelona i Comissió Catalana d'Ajuda al Refugiat, 2006). The document represents a civil society plan, built up through a decentralised and participatory process led by civil society organisations. It was launched in 2004, and set out the main approaches and recommendations regarding immigration policy-oriented principles and management. The document was presented to the Catalan Parliament in 2006, influenced the Immigration National Agreement, and was launched prior to the co-development

strategy created by the international development regional governmental area previously mentioned. In fact, it contains an extensive elaboration of co-development as an area of intervention for immigration-related challenges (Càritas and Comissió Catalana d'Ajuda al Refugiat, 2006). Migrant associations, and also organisations such as the above-mentioned GRAMC, participated and influenced the document.

Currently, co-development at the regional institutional level (and also at central level) has little strength. It is a sign of the present times that the use of the expression 'co-development' is not as widespread as it had been. As long ago as 2012, a technical advisor of the Spanish Development Agency explained to me that, instead of 'co-development', the expression 'migration and development' represented the new buzzwords. However, the approach is still alive within Fons-Català and with some municipalities participating in that organisation. After the cuts in public spending and internal evaluations of the programme, the Catalan inter-municipal organisation has decided - since 2012 – to focus on strengthening capacities, both within migrant associations and in partners' associations within localities of origin. These interventions have affected Senegalese actors. Further, according to the interviews, Fons-Català's co-development commission (configured by municipalities) was re-activated in 2014, with internal country-based working groups in Morocco, Gambia and Senegal. Despite the reduction of public resources, civil society members still struggle to maintain co-development capacities. For instance, the NGO platform representing Girona and Maresme is pressing to work in this area of intervention and supports Fons-Català capacity building interventions. Besides, in March 2017 the *Taula Catalana de Codesenvolupament* (Catalan Co-development Table) was constituted. This organisation, which in fact is more like a federation, seeks to attract other associations to join, and aims 'to articulate the different actors in the territory, improve the communication of results and promote a greater recognition of this type of cooperation, which is a differential characteristic of the Catalan cooperation' (author's translation from the website).[84] The Senegalese are represented in the table through the Catalan Senegalese Associations Coordinator platform (a federation of Senegalese associations). They are among the first eight members.

---

[84] See: https://codesenvolupament.cat/ [last accessed 22/September/2018]

4.2 The case of Senegal: migration and development political environment

4.2.1 Economic remittances of Senegalese abroad and national responses from central government to emigration

Economic remittances, overview

As Figure 4.2. below shows, the weight of Senegalese international emigrants is felt through the economic flows streaming from them. Globally, The World Bank has calculated that the economic remittance transfers to developing countries were four times greater in 2010 (US$ 325 billion) than in 2000 (Cisse, 2011). Although the total amount is unknown – because many of these flows are transferred through unidentifiable informal channels – according to the estimates represented in the figure below, Senegal personal remittances accounted for 10,54% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009. In contrast, they represented 6,25% of GDP in 2001. By 2015, migrant transfers were estimated to amount to 14,14% of GDP. Economic remittances, which are mainly assigned to the daily consumer expenditure of the recipient households (in 58.5% of the cases), have become the principal source of Senegal's external financing 'far exceeding FDI (foreign direct investment), external borrowing; and, above all, the ODA which had long been the most reliable and stable source of financing' (Cisse, 2011, p. 224). As regards to the geographical origin of the remittances, data from 2007 shows that 52% stremmed from the EU. The share of remittances from the West African Economic and Monetary Union countries (7%) is lower than the flow from the USA (7.7%) (Cisse, 2011, p. 225).

Figure 4.2. Senegal: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and received Personal Remittances, 1985-2016 (in current US$)

Source: Own elaboration from World Development Indicators database, the World Bank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home [last accessed 9 June 2018]

Who sends this money and how are these Senegalese economic remittances distributed in the country? The last household survey conducted in 2013 by the Senegalese National Agency for Statistics and Demography (ANSD in French) does not provide quantitative data as regards to economic remittances (ANSD, 2013). However, the Migration and Remittances Household Surveys conducted for the Africa Migration Project and jointly undertaken by the African Development Bank and the World Bank deliver related-data for Senegal and five other African countries (Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda).[85] According to this survey, of the total Senegalese international emigrants, 2,74% were residing in Kolda before leaving (CRES, 2011, p. 37). In addition, according to the survey, from the total volume of financial transfers received overall in Senegal, 61,42% had gone to rural

---

[85] Data was obtained in 2009-2010, See the website:
 http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data [last accessed 9 June 2018]

areas (the rest of the share was divided between Dakar and other urban areas) (CRES, 2011, p. 45). On the other hand, regarding gender and education levels of those migrants sending economic remittances, only 14% of them were women, while those without any formal education had sent 56,16% of the total amount of remittances (CRES, 2011, p. 48). The geographic distribution of remittances shows that the Kolda region received 0,9% of the total amount (see Table 4.2. below, whereas the Séddhiou region does not appear because at that time it belonged to Kolda, as the current administrative boundaries were not in place at that time).

Table 4.2. Distribution of remittances in Franc CFA per regions, year 2009

Region	Total amount of remittances (FCFA)	Share (%)
Dakar	101.000.668.120,72	21,02
Diourbel	160.435.838.668,30	33,38
Fatick	8.118.494.088,62	1,69
Kaolack	23.469.125.943,12	4,88
Kolda	**4.334.416.592,29**	**0,9**
Louga	57.099.833.111,23	11,88
Matam	19.625.362.578,58	4,08
Saint-louis	24.126.092.290,35	5,02
Tambacounda	8.962.136.769,50	1,86
Thies	70.865.550.275,51	14,75
Ziguinchor	2.543.293.641,05	0,53
Total	480.580.812.079,27	100

Source: Obtained from data originated by the Migration and Remittances Household Survey 2009, The World Bank (CRES, 2011, p. 46).

Governmental responses at national level to international migration of Senegalese

Jointly with the increased domestic weight of migrants' international remittances, the role of the Senegalese abroad in national politics was also boosted from 2000 onwards. Before winning the presidential election in 2000, Abdoulaye Wade was very aware of the influence of migrants' and the potential role they could play in guiding their family's vote. Campaigning from his French residence before the elections, he sought to mobilise migrants by using their transnational connections 'as voting multipliers' back home (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014, p. 15). In doing so, Wade gave to the Senegalese diaspora the status of political interlocutors. When Wade

came into power, amid different processes (such as the approval of a new constitution in 2001), actions were undertaken to show the commitment of the government towards the needs of Senegal's international emigrants. As a milestone of this new policy-making, and after a symposium with the diaspora held in 2001, one can identify the definition of a Governmental Plan of Action (*Plan d'Action – Nouveau Partenariat avec les Sénégalais de l'extérieur, Juillet 2001*). Further, this obtained a higher institutional rank as the body in charge of Senegalese people living abroad was upgraded to the category of a Ministry through the creation of the *Ministère des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur* in 2003 (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014).

Wade's second term, initiated in 2007, saw the upgrading of the *Conseil Supérieur des Sénégalais à l'éxtérieur,* which had been created by decree in 1995 as a consultative body. It was relaunched in 2010 by another decree (République du Sénégal, 2010). Since then people also refer to it as *Haut Conseil Supérieur des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur*. Following the introduction of this same 2010 decree, after a first General Assembly that took place in 1999, the Council had entered into a 'paralysis'. The Council's main function was 'to advise and make recommendations in connection with the development and implementation of government policy on the management, protection and promotion of Senegalese Abroad' (République du Sénégal, 2010). It has 75 members, 30 of whom are elected by an electoral college consisting of representatives appointed by migrant Senegalese associations. These representatives are recognised by the authorities of the country of residence, and regularly registered with the diplomatic or consular missions covering the geographical area of residence of the Senegalese. The other 45 members are appointed by the President of the Republic. The president elected in 2010 was Mor Kane, a Senegalese living in a city called Burgos, in Spain, who in 2012 campaigned to mobilise emigrant votes for Wade,[86] information that can be understood as evidence of the extent to which this Council is controversial among migrant Senegalese.

Apart from consultative spaces such as the Council of Senegalese abroad, and as regards to Senegalese emigrants' formal political participation, Senegal is now

---

[86] Source: http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/02/24/internacional/1330106164.html [last access 12/May/2016]

among the 31 African countries with legislative or constitutional provisions for external voting. This means that Senegalese citizens can exercise their voting right 'without having to be physically present on the national territory' (Lafleur, 2013, p. 25). In the Senegalese case, the citizens abroad can register and vote in countries of residence where the state has diplomatic representation. Moreover, all Senegalese citizens have the right to vote and be elected, also in local elections (République du Sénégal, 2014a).[87] Senegalese emigrants – besides being able to vote and be elected from, and being visible in, national politics as advisors or Government members – had specific representation in the Senate until that body was eliminated in 2012.[88] In that year the Senate had 100 seats: 35 of them were elected by the departments and 65 by the President of the Republic. Out of these 65 appointed by the President, four seats represented Senegalese living abroad (République du Sénégal, 2007). Lastly, concerning the citizenship of those Senegalese settled abroad, Senegal does not recognise dual citizenship.

In 2012 Macky Sall won the hectic presidential elections, which mobilised with intensity Senegalese emigrants.[89] By 2016, the Government of Senegal was configured into 34 ministries.[90] The Ministry dedicated to the Senegalese abroad was suppressed after the 2012 elections with the related policymaking being included within the so-called *Ministère des Affaires étrangères et des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur*. On the 20th March 2016 there was a referendum which was perceived in the press and media as a motion of confidence in President Macky Sall. Finally, 15 constitutional changes were approved (among them reducing presidential terms from seven years to five, or enhancing local councils' power). Importantly, another one of these 15 changes reflected an old diaspora claim and gave a new status for the Senegalese living abroad in order to let them elect their own representatives in Parliament (Ndiaye, 2016). Some journalists refer to this new constituency as the 15th

---

[87] The Senegalese collective has long been mobilised to pressure the Senegalese Consulate to facilitate the voting rights of emigrants. According to one interviwee in Barcelona, they could vote from abroad since 2003.

[88] Created in 1999, the Senate had already been suppressed during the period 2001-2007.

[89] For instance, as an observant I went to a demonstration in front the Senegal's Consulate in Barcelona, in 2012, where emigrants protested against Wade's third term.

[90] See: http://www.gouv.sn/-Le-Gouvernement-.html [last checked 9/May/2016]

region. The change was implemented in the last legislative elections of 2017, when the National Assembly grew from 150 to 165 seats.[91]

Apart from migrants' political participation, Ceschi and Mezetti identified social protection and economic/entrepreneurial investments as the other main subjects underpinning the relationship between governmental institutions and Senegalese abroad (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014, p. 16). According to the authors, Macky Sall's presidency is especially committed to meeting the demands of the diaspora and seeks negotiation and ratification of conventions on social security in key destination countries such as West and Central Africa and France (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014, p. 16). However, lacking any evaluation of the degree to which this claim has been advanced, it is worth mentioning that crucial government plans such as the *Stratégie Nationale de Développement Economique et Social*-SNDES 2013-2017, or the *Plan Sénégal Emergent* do not explicitly tackle aspects of migrants' social protection (République du Sénégal, 2014b, 2012).

The strategic planning documents from the current presidency (Macky Sall) follow approaches already explored by Wade's government and gathered by Ceschi and Mezzetti under the economic/entrepreneurial investments' category. The general rationale underpinning these approaches is that international economic remittances are too focused on household consumption which, according to the government amounts to, on average, 90% of the economic remittances (République du Sénégal, 2012, p. 10). During Wade's presidency, actions were implemented seeking to promote migrants' use of remittances towards development and productive investment although with a mixed degree of success. As a preeminent example led by the central government, it is worth highlighting a financial mechanism for initiatives organised by Senegalese abroad, called FAISE (*Fonds d'Appui à l'Investissement et aux Projets*) that was created in 2008 (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014). Another plan, the REVA, *Retour des Émigrés vers l'Agriculture,* launched in 2006 by Wade and still economically supported by the Spanish government in 2013, has been a much contested programme underpinned by securitisation and migration control principles which was initially targeted at young people repatriated from Spain (Datola, 2014, p.

---

[91] See: https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-40767291 [last checked 20/September/2018]

60; Diedhiou, 2014, p. 56). There are also two big national programmes – established bilaterally with Italy and France and called respectively, Plasepri[92] and PAISD[93] – that promote co-development and the role of migrant associations within the host country (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014, p. 16).[94] In this vein, neither Spain, nor Catalonia at a regional level, have structured a co-development programme similar to PAISD or Plasepri.

During fieldwork in Dakar and Kolda during 2012, stakeholders very often mentioned PAISD as an example of good practice. Initially called (from 2005-2008) '*Initiatives de co-développement*', PAISD was implemented from 2009 to 2013. PAISD is based on five components: the first is primarily focused on supporting migrants wishing to start entrepreneurial activities in Senegal (it has been mainly targeted at individual migrants, and projects are based in the Dakar region); the second component helps volunteer consultants (the highly-skilled diaspora) to transfer their expertise; the third line of initiatives co-funds infrastructure projects (up to 70% are financed by the PAISD) and are promoted by diaspora associations; the co-funding has a multiplier effect, as 'every euro collected generates 2.3 euros of investment' (Datola, 2014, p. 61). From 2005-2012, 134 projects were funded, with a total investment of 15.4 million euros (4.7 million euros collected by migrant associations) (Datola, 2014, p. 61). This component has been mainly deployed in the Senegal River Valley (regions of Matam, Saint-Louis, in Northern Senegal), to a lesser extent it has also funded projects in the Tambacounda region (Datola, 2014, p. 61). The fourth component aims to involve second generation migrants towards their parents' homelands. The fifth component seeks the promotion of information and communication technologies, although it does not target migrants directly (Datola, 2014, p. 61).

---

[92] Plasepri, which was founded in 2008, is a credit and technical assistance programme developed in an agreement between Italy and Senegal to promote the development of private enterprises in Senegal http://www.plaseprifenase.it/it/il_programma_plasepri.asp [last accessed 5/July/2016]

[93] PAISD was launched in 2005 to promote co-development between France and Senegal http://www.codev.gouv.sn [last accessed 5/July/2016]

[94] Overall, Plasepri allocated 20 Million euro for credit aid and subventions for 3.7. Million euro by Italy and 350.000 by Senegal; PAISD allocated 9 Million euro by France, 745.000 by Senegal (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014, p. 16).

Later, towards the end of 2017, PAISD was relaunched with a financing agreement between the French Development Agency, the European Union and the state of Senegal. According to the EU, this new round of PAISD will co-finance Senegalese diaspora initiatives aimed at the development of Senegal for four years at a cost of 14€ million.[95] In contrast with the previous programmes, the new initiative is expected to work with migrants settled in France, Belgium, Italy and Spain. While this present research did not account for co-development processes covered by the PAISD, the territorial scope of the new PAISD is also larger, encompassing the regions of Tambacounda, Kédougou, Kolda, Sédhiou, Ziguinchor, Saint-Louis et Matam.

4.2.2 Local collectivities: more power over development in a customary and ethnic background

Decentralisation process

Senegal, influenced by the French state model implanted during the colonial time, is administratively divided by departments (*départements*). They are subdivided into districts (*arrondissements)*, municipalities *(communes,* currently including former rural communities or *communautés rurales*), and villages (*villages*). The village or neighbourhood is the basic administrative unit. Local collectivities (*collectivités locales)* are rural municipalities, municipalities and, from 1996 to 2014, also the regions.

Indeed, during the period upon which this dissertation is focused, the administrative and political constituencies within the country were organised according to the 96-07 Law of 22 March 1996, known as the Decentralisation Law. It is beyond the scope of the dissertation to discuss the motivations and results of the decentralisation process experienced by Senegal. This would need to be framed, among other factors, within the decentralisation wave and the state reform pressures placed on developing countries by key donors such as the World Bank since the 1990s. It is important to highlight, though, that this Senegalese law from 1996 resulted in the erection of regions as local governments,[96] and in the transfer of competences related to nine

---

[95]See: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/all-news-and-stories/paisd-un-partenariat-pour-renforcer-la-contribution-des-migrations-au_en [last accessed 22/September/2018]
[96] Local governments refer here to the expression, translated from French: 'local collectivities' (*collectivités locales).*

policy domains to *collectivités locales* (in sectors such as planning, urbanisation, education or health, and social action) (République du Sénégal, 1996). Consequently, there are two options for the administrative management: a deconcentred administration or a decentralized government (ANSD, 2011). In the deconcentred system, the region is under the authority of the Governor, the department under that of the Prefect, the district (*arrondissement)* under that of the Sub-prefect and the village or neighbourhood under the authority of the Chief of the village or district. On the other hand, in the decentralised system, the region is a local authority governed by the Regional Council, the municipality by the Municipal Council and the rural community by the Rural Council (ANSD, 2011, p. 3). These councils are elected every five years by universal suffrage[97] using direct party lists and proportional representation between parties, according to a rural ratio. Subsequently, the councillors elect a president. Therefore, this president is a Mayor (also called municipal council president, or a rural community president - *Président de la Communauté Rurale,* PCR – depending on the local collectivity). The last local elections were held on the 29th June 2014 (the next elections are due in 2019).[98]

In terms of decentralised cooperation competences, already in place before the reform of 2014, local collectivities have autonomy to undertake cooperative actions that lead to agreements with local authorities of foreign countries or international public or private development agencies (République du Sénégal, 2013). In fact, being able to attract foreign investment is very important in a decentralised system with scarcity of resources at subnational levels. After the 2012 presidential elections, state competences over decentralised cooperation moved from a ministry named 'Decentralised cooperation' to the ministry of 'Local Governance, Development and Spatial Planning' (*Ministre de la Gouvernance locale, du Développement et de*

---

[97] The first elections for regional assemblies, rural councils and municipal councils were held in 1996 (Fanchette, 2011, p. 231).
[98] Currently, Senegal is divided into 14 regions. However, after the last administrative, territorial and local reform of 2014 (called *Acte III de la decentralisation*), departments have become local collectivities; rural communities and districts have become municipalities, and regions are no longer a local collectivity (Regional councils and Regional presidents have disappeared) (République du Sénégal, 2013). Therefore, currently, municipalities (554 of them) and departments (42 of them) are the only local collectivities (villages or neighbourhoods configure municipalities). There are, as I write the dissertation, Departmental Councils (elected by direct universal suffrage) with a Department President, and a Mayor in each municipality. Nevertheless, during fieldwork in 2012 and 2014, people referred to Rural Council Presidents (called PCR, standing for *Président de Conseil Rural*) and Rural Councils, and this denomination prevails in the present document even if the rural category is not applied anymore under the law.

l'Aménagement du territoire). Within the former 'Decentralised cooperation' ministry there were contacts and programmes (such as PAISD, Plasepri) mostly with the French government, but also involving the Spanish and Italian governments. The freshly appointed person in charge of the area of Planning, who a few months earlier has been an emigrant in France himself, explained in 2012 how local collectivities were expected to be the sole actor dealing with other subnational foreign governments:

> A: At the level of the ministry, since we support the local authorities, the direction of the decentralized cooperation is suppressed, it no longer exists in the ministry, it has been said that it is the local authorities, themselves, who will directly manage the decentralized cooperation. [Via the Regional Development Agencies?] No, directly. [...]
>
> Q: So development agencies should not be involved in development anymore?
>
> A: It's directly, we only have to support and monitor the management of resources so that there are no diversions, so that there is good governance. But the execution of projects, even the negotiation of projects, is the exclusive domain of local authorities.
>
> Government representative, Dakar, September 2012, my translation from French (1-5-P23)

Despite regional government being eliminated after the 2014 reform, the Development Regional Agencies (*Agences Régionales de Développement*, ARD) still exist. They were envisaged in the 1996 decentralisation law, but were only put in place later on. According to the interviews, the ARD were strengthened when the World Bank fostered the PNDL from 2006 onwards. PNDL stands for *Programme National de Développement Local* (National Program for Local Development, PNDL). Launched in 2006, it involves in the overall policy implementation the Government of Senegal to achieve the objectives of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and those of the Development Millennium (MDGs, but after 2015 named: Sustainable Development Goals). The Development Regional Agencies ensure the implementation of the PNDL at the local level, giving support to local development planning and evaluation of local collectivities. There are seven Development Regional Agencies, among them, one in Dakar and another in Kolda. As we shall see later, in 2012 they were performing in very different ways.

<u>Customary or traditional authority</u>[99]

Post-colonial Senegal, although influenced by the centralist and Jacobite French conception of the state, has been among the first Western African countries to engage in decentralisation processes (Fanchette, 2011, p. 231). The different decentralisation reforms, besides giving more competences to the local level, have increasingly involved greater recognition of local elected people's work in monetary terms. Overall, as a representative of a Senegalese migrant association originally from Kolda but living in Girona expressed it in 2014, the incentives to become a Mayor or a Rural Community President have been augmented during the last years.[100]

> Q: So village chiefs are not elected in elections, the only ones that are elected are the présidents of the communauté rurale (PCR)?
>
> A: Yes. At the beginning of the communautés rurales, these guys [Président du Conseil Rural, PCR] did count for nothing, nobody paid attention to them. Even for the 'naissance' certificate papers, people jumped them and went directly to the 'arrondissement'. And now the PCR has more value than a deputy.
>
> Q: By the law? Or is it because they are much more respected?
>
> A: They are much more respected. And when Wade came to power he paid them well, he provided them with their own vehicle, a 4x4... and everything, everything, everything... And now they have more power than a deputy.
>
> *(Migrant representative, Girona, June 2014 (2-5-P14), own transnaltion from Spanish)*

Figures such as the rural community president (or mayor) have not been promoted in the context of a void in authority: state articulation at subnational levels has to deal with customary authorities, such as village chiefs, that have been embedded in social relationships since before colonialism.[101] In Senegal, the different faces and dynamics

---

[99] Following Sow's comprehension, the use of 'customary' or 'traditional' in this dissertation refers to precolonial social forms, on the understanding that they are not fixed in time, and that in fact these forms are constructed and reproduced under colonial rule (Sow, 2004b).

[100] Notably, in 2005, Wade president multiplied by six the monthly allowances received by Rural Community Presidents (République du Sénégal, 2005)

[101] See Mamdani's exploration of the relationship between colonial rule and how power is organised in contemporary Africa for a deepened analysis (Mamdani, 1996). He argues that contemporary states in Africa cannot be disentangled from the utilisation that colonial power made of precolonial rules. Then, in urban areas colonial power would have assured power through direct rule, but indirect rule was applied in peripheral areas such as the rural quarters. Indirect rule includes the politics of 'customary law' and the attempts to control chieftaincy, other indigenous authorities and ethnic belonging, at the expense of democratisation. 'Decentralised depotism' would be the form of power that emerged by the end of the colonial period. Additionally, Sow's research focuses on 'traditional' political power in

of this relationship have been specially discussed in the literature on land ownership and land management. This research highlights the contradictions beween Senegal's decentralisation's process and the dynamics of state and elites at local level. For instance, authors interested in land ownership, property rights or in the governance of other common natural goods, argue that the decentralisation process hides state penetration over territory to strengthen its control over it, bypassing decentralised governments such as rural councils (Fanchette, 2011; Ribot, 2009; Ribot et al., 2006).

Other more institutional scholars – when analysing the conflictual relationship of the French colonial state, the Senegalese post-colonial state and the decentralised governments at local level – conclude that the 'plurality of formal and informal norms considerably affects local autonomy and prevents decentralisation to fully flourish' (Touré, 2012, p. 822). From this view, traditional authorities in contemporary Senegal are far from being removed from the arena, for they still pressure rural councils in decision-taking processes, while the central state also tries to control local affairs (notably education, planning, land management issues) through its representatives (Touré, 2012, p. 822). Hence, traditional authorities need to be taken into account when analysing how power is organised in Senegal, particularly at the local level.

As was introduced in chapter 2, traditional authority is bestowed upon figures such as elders, marabouts (Muslim religious leaders) or elites within ethnic caste structures. The subsequent focus is put on chieftaincy. Who is a village chief? Officially, the prefect appoints the village chief after receiving a sub-prefect's proposal that is informed after consultation with the village household's heads. The Ministry of the Interior has to ultimately approve the appointment.[102] In practice, in the case of the Fula ethnic group, the eldest from the founding village family inherits the position of village chief, or *jarga* in Pulaar, by genuine right (Fanchette, 2011, p. 82). In the case of Soninkes, dimensions of who is the eldest man in a village and which is the founding clan are both considered when choosing the village chief or *debegume (Sy, 2000)*. In the frame of this study, village chiefs are important actors to be considered

Haut Casamance within the pre-independent Senegal (1867-1958). The author shows how Fula power resists and adapts to colonial administration (Sow, 2011).
[102] From: http://www.servicepublic.gouv.sn/index.php/demarche_administrative/demarche/1/680/4/13 [last checked 2 May 2016]

in relation to co-development processes in the region of Kolda. Either in Fula villages, as this next representative of a migrant association residing in Lleida explains:

> Q: The town is made up of seven families. Do your family have a relationship with the village chief?
>
> A: With the chef de village I have a family relationship but from afar. Because all the Fula are family. [...] So far that I can not even explain it. The village chief is suggested but not voted. He is like the king, inherited but not voted.
>
> Q: In [the village's name] nobody is voted because the village is very small?
>
> A: Even if it was big, village chiefs are not voted. Only the president of the communauté rurale is voted.
>
> Q: Who do you call mayor?
>
> A: To the president of the communauté rurale.
>
> *Migrant representative, Lleida, June 2014, my transnlation from Spanish (3-5-P18)*

Another unit of analysis is also possible in a Soninke village, as the representative of a migrant association reveals. It is worth noting, in contrast to the previous interview, that in this village, it is the village chief and not the PCR, who is the person called mayor. According to this interview, the traditional authority is bestowed with more 'authority' than the one elected through an electoral system, that is the PCR:

> Q: So every Soninkara town has a president, and a president is not a chief...
>
> A: No, the chief is the mayor. (...) But nothing can be done in the town without the permission of the mayor.
>
> Q: But sometimes I suppose that the chief and the president may not have a good relationship.
>
> A: It may be, but the president must always comply with the mayor.
>
> Q: Can it be that the chief and president are the same person?
>
> A: No. The boss is the boss.
>
> *Migrant representative, Mataró, June 2014, my transnaltion from Spanish (3-5-P15)*

As my fieldwork and interviews show, rural councils engage customary authorities such as the village chief not because they are legally obliged to, but for legitimacy's

sake. And what do migrant associations do? To what extent do migrant associations engage in these local political structures? Are these informal rules affecting migrant associations' internal dynamics? Questioning how informal rules may be influencing migrant associations' agency in co-development processes is a key issue of this dissertation. Moreover, the influence of pre-colonial political and decision-taking institutions varies across Senegal. In Fanchette's extense study of Haute-Casamance, the region is identified, according to Benoît's classification of spaces in Africa, as a '*franc*' space. A '*franc*' space, oposed to a '*étatisé*' space, are not well perceived by 'Western' observers because they are farther away from their geopolitical conceptions. *'Franc'* spaces may appear as zones separating '*étatisé*' spaces that have an apparently clearer organisation and structuration (Fanchette, 2011, p. 371). Dakar, therefore, could be considered as a *'étatisé'* space. In turn, Kolda could be considered as a '*franc*' space.

Structuring governance dynamics at local level: Ethnicity

The latter point on chiefs and customary authorities gives rise to the importance of African ethnic structures and pre-colonial institutions in organising social and political spheres. The main contributions on ethnicity and chiefdom have been made in political and anthropological science (Mamdani, 1996 remains a crucial approach to the subject in Africa). Recently, it seems to be gaining pre-eminence in areas such as development economics - see, for instance, the quantitative and geo-referenced approach that shows strong correlations between pre-colonial ethnic institutions and economic development in Africa (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013); or the same authors' analysis of the duality of African states by analysing Afrobarometer surveys (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2015). At the local level, recent works such as those previously mentioned, have focused on land-property rights and show the on-going importance of these structures in places such as Senegal. Nevertheless, from transnational perspectives to migration, the study of its impact on migrant transnational structures and dynamics is still preliminary.[103]

Bearing in mind the constructivist and problematized approach to ethnicity discussed in chapter 2, for the purposes of this dissertation I need to minimally describe ethnic

---

[103] As seen in the conceptual framework, there has been some work done from transnational perspectives (see, for instance, Kleist, 2011).

structures in Senegal. Thus, considering language as an ethnicity descriptor, French is the official language in Senegal, and Diola, Manding, Pulaar, Serer, Soninke and Wolof (together with Arabic), are considered as being sufficiently codified to be introduced at schools (ANSD, 2014).[104] Wolof is spoken by 5,2 million people, almost all of them living in Senegal. Together with French, Wolof is the lingua franca in the country[105]. The Pulaar (also called, for instance, Fula, Peul or Pulaar Fulfulde) is spoken by almost 3,5 million people in Senegal, but also in Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau or Mali.[106] The Soninke has many other names (such as Sarakole) and 2 million speakers (1,8 million of them in Mali, 281,000 in Senegal).[107] The distribution of ethnic groups, as the use of languages shows, is distributed unevenly at the geographical level and most often do not respect borders derived from the colonial Berlin Conference held in 1884-1885. Therefore, Wolofs are mostly concentrated in Senegalese Northern territories, and even though it is dense and very diverse, Dakar would be a region with a majority of Wolofs.

In Kolda, according to 2009 data, more than the 75% of the population is Fula,[108] 7.31% is Manding, 7.22% are Wolof, 1,36% of them are Diola and 1.10% are Serer. Besides this, more than 19 other ethnic minorities or nationalities can be identified in the region, representing 5.55% of the population (neither of them amounting to more than 1%) (ANSD, 2011, p. 17). Therefore, Soninkes are a minority in the region, with almost all of them concentrated in Northern Velingara. Besides, the *Moyenne-Casamance* (region of Seddhiou) is mostly populated by Manding (against whom the Fula rebelled at the end of the XIX century under the leadership of Alfa et Mousa Molo, after a century of Fula submission to Mandings). The Diola are the majority ethnic group in the Basse-Casamance, now the region of Ziguinchor.

For an understanding of power differences within territories in Senegal, ethnic factors may not be those put forward pre-eminently by scholarship. Hence, for instance, while Dakar is a central power pole structuring the country, the *Basse-Casamance* (region of Ziguinchor, where the conflict is mostly circumscribed), and the Moyenne

---

[104] According to the Ethnologue, Senegal has 31 indigenous living languages.
[105] See http://www.ethnologue.com/language/wol [last access 26/July/2016]
[106] See http://www.ethnologue.com/language/fuc [last access 26/July/2016]
[107] See http://www.ethnologue.com/language/snk [last access 26/July/2016]
[108] The Pulaar is known as Peul in French. Those who ethnically considered themselves Fula (in English), or Peul (in French), speak Pulaar (Halpulaar are 'those who speak Pulaar').

and *Haute-Casamance* (Séddhiou, Kolda regions) would not be well inserted into the rest of the Senegalese territory for reasons connected with their weak participation within the peanut economy, and to their late incorporation into the colony (Fanchette, 2011; Toure, 2010).

More materialistic factors – such as access to resources rather than ethnicity – may be behind Senegal's territorial imbalances. Even though this may be true it is also important to consider that, according to research examining the governance dynamics of Senegal at local level, other issues need to be taken into account. This includes, for example, the historical background and relationships of ethnic groups populating a territory, and the social structure of these ethnic groups (Fanchette, 2011; Ngaïdé, 2012; Sow, 2011). For instance, the management within the Casamance region of an administration that is locally perceived as foreign, authoritarian, and dominated by the Wolof,[109] is presented as underpinning their inhabitants' rejection to it (Fanchette, 2011, p. 236). Hence, the dynamics between rural councils and villagers in the late 1980s and 1990s are described as conflictual. This is because of the distrust of populations towards exogeneous governance spaces or processes (for example, they may be seen as co-opted by notables, or political parties, promoted by NGOs… or as state allies, or allies from foreign powers) which all coexist with customary authorities (Fanchette, 2011, p. 236).

Moreover, when looking at the considered migrant associations, ethnicity is put forwards as an axis of structuration, and also defines communities towards whom the projects are intended. In this respect, the previous geographical distribution of languages gives us a certain idea of power structures in territories according to demographic weights and, also, of potential social-cultural affiliation across borders of certain linguistic groups (particularly of Fulas, some of whose associations in Catalonia are explained by migrant representatives as covering people from across countries).

---

[109] In fact this idea is related to the construction of the post-colonial Senegalese state as based on a Wolof-islamic axis (Sow, 2011). In Mouahamadou Moustapha Sow's doctoral thesis, the author revises the historiography of Senegal, in which the Casamance (Kolda is also refered to as High Casamance, or ancient Fuladu) has been considered separately from the Northern Senegal. The High Casamance is, according to some authors, understudied and neglected by Senegalese social scientists (Sow, 2011).

Structuring governance dynamics at local level: Village

At the local level, together with ethnicity, there are other variables underpinning political and social relations in Senegal that are important to consider, namely, the village. The extensive study directed by the geographer Sylvie Fanchette (2011) which focused on the *Haute-Casamance*, shows that, historically, there were no strong political forces able to hierarchichally structure the Fuladu.[110] In the frame of the region, it is the village around which political life has pivoted over more than, at least, 150 years. Villages, then, are basic units of governance. Even though they are often unstable, either in their composition but also in their localisation, the village configures 'a socially, economically, and juridically coherent, quite well defined, unity' (Fanchette, 2011, p. 82). The villages in the region can be ethnically homogenous or pluriethnic. But even in those pluriethnic villages, stratification is often visible through ethnic belonging and age. For instance, Fanchette identifies social organisation in agricultural associations of cotton production, also in pluriethnic villages, according to ethnic groups and sub-groups within ethnic groups (Fanchette, 2011, p. 216). In some cases, when deciding who is in charge of these associations, conflict arises based on how long a certain people have been residing in one place (Fanchette, 2011, p. 216).

Concerning development initiatives, they are often proposed at the village, or group of villages, level.[111] It is seldom that initiatives concern the whole population of a rural community because they are too big, heterogeneous, and traversed with many conflicts (Fanchette, 2011, p. 235). Often, the proposals or dossiers come from villages or grassroots associations (such as cooperatives). Moreover, Fanchette's study refers to the numerous potential sources of conflict between Rural Councils and 'civil society', or grassroot associations attached to villages (Fanchette, 2011, p. 236).

---

[110] Region of Kolda, Haute-Casamance, or Fuladu (after the ancient kingdom) will be used indistinctively. The Fuladu Kingdom emerged in mid-XIX century after old slave (*maccube*) Peuls uprising against Manding power. The boundaries were split between French, British and Portuguese colonial rulers. The kingdom's legitimacy was strongly contested by the nobles (*rimbe*) (Ngaïdé, 2012).

[111] It is worth saying that a municipality, or (rural) community in Kolda can have many villages. For instance, the municipality of Saré Colly Salé has 18.755 inhabitants distributed in 61 villages (2010).

4.3 Synthesis and final remarks

This chapter suggested that there are policy trends both in the settlement and origin contexts of migrant associations' work that can shape the way in which they can exercise and develop their agency. In the case of Catalonia, it is very plausible to consider that the increased interest in co-development as a policy area can be related to two aspects. The first is concerned with the overall Spanish migration trends; and the second is policymaking, and the role played by local governments at the forefront of the administration's social response to migration. In parallel, this increasing interest in co-development processes, and its incorporation as an area of public intervention, cannot be detached from the growth in official development assistance from Spanish and Catalan sources up until 2009. Besides, as regards to the substantial dimension of the policy, one can also detect an evolution in the co-development approach. Therefore, during the decade 2000-2010, the policy rationale shifted from a focus on migration management (return migration), remittances, and control of flows towards a stronger linkage between development and migrant integration (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011, p. 27).

The chapter also shows the importance of the subnational level as regards to international cooperation and immigration policy-making, especially the local and supramunicipal level (where the fostering of a policy actor such as Fons-Català is crucial). In this respect, I argue that co-development policies in the period 1997-2010 emerged as an adaptive response to the transformation of social landscapes due to migration. Therefore, immigration policy was being constructed alongside migrant in-flows in Spain overall. In regions such as Catalonia the architecture of international cooperation in policymaking was already in place and there was an active civil society combined with governmental actors at local level keen to propel migrant inclusion through the empowerment of migrant associations. Certainly, as with many other municipalities in Catalonia and Spain, the four Catalan local governments attached to the five main units of analysis have been engaged with international cooperation mostly since the solidarity movements for the 0,7% precept. Therefore, the cities studied in this research started international cooperation in their policy-making before the intensification of migration in-flows. At the very least, they all had specific economic resources dedicated to it during the second half of the 1990s.

The chapter went on to ilustrate how the national, but also the local, level in origin, are both crucial spheres in which the agency of migrant associations can come into play. Thus, on the one hand, the data shows the potential power migrants hold through economic remittances. On the other hand, since the 2000s the Senegalese migrants settled abroad have held increasing weight with regard to economic remittances and, in paralell, have broadened the formal mechanisms by which they can potentially influence political decicion-making at the national and local level. Indeed, seen from the frame of a decentralisation process that overlaps with customary forms of authority, mayors and chiefs have access to more resources. Moreover, the role played by local governments to raise economic resources has been strengthened. Therefore, Senegalese migrant associations are immersed in an environment where higher power is given to local levels, and there are higher incentives for actors (migrants too) to access it.

Third, the chapter shed light on some of the mechanisms and forms that are most likely to be found when looking at the social structuration of the Senegalese, with the emphasis put on evidence at the local (rural) level. Hence, the axes of social structuration such as the village or ethnicity were reviewed. These axes, together with other social cleavages previously discussed such as age; gender; religion; chieftaincy or caste systems, are considered to be related to migrant associations' assets and therefore to their agency.

In the chapters 5, 6 and 7 which follow, the focus of the research is narrowed to consider five units of analysis. Each of these represents a transnational process between a Catalan and a Senegalese locality. In these settings, it is observed how migrant associations' agency is configured and changes across localities according to different formal institutions, and informal institutions and assets of migrant associations.

5 The variance of localities. Formal institutions and the agency of migrant associations

Chapter 4 set out a scenario of the national and regional political environements in which the five studied co-development processes (which represent the units of analysis) are developing. This chapter aims to inquire into the relationship between formal institutions at the localities level and the agency of migrant associations. Formal institutions are understood as policy environments operationalized as 1) governmental modes of engagement with migrants through co-development; and 2) existence of consultative local organic devices where civil society can formally meet and participate in local affairs (e.g., local councils). In this chapter, the agency of migrant associations is observed through the dimension of presence. Their agency is observed through: (a) their visibility (access to formal spaces and in the process of policy definition) and (b) their legitimacy (understood as the degree to which migrant associations are seen as valid players by others in each context).

The analysis is undertaken in three steps. The first two parts explore their visibility by observing: variance in 1) governmental modes of engagement with migrants through co-development and 2) the existence of consultative local organic devices found in residence and origin settings where civil society actors can formally meet and participate in local affairs. The third step explores the legitimacy of migrant associations. It does so by taking a comparative approach and investigates how the variance of policy environments is affecting actors in relation to their residence and origin. These policy environments are assessed through, 3) governmental representatives and stakeholders' comparative views on migrant associations.

This chapter is organised in the following way. First, residence localities are examined (section 5.1.). The section initially maps the characteristics of co-development policies in the four Catalan localities. Two main forms of engagement with co-development are found: the 'nurturer' and the 'neutral' types. Subsequently, in subsection 5.1.3., there is an exploration of the relationship between these different modes of engagement and the civic participation approach of each government, as well as the agency that is present in migrant associations' localities. The second

section focuses on localities of origin (section 5.2.). In this case, the main forms of engagement with co-development depend on the peripheral or central position of the territory in which migrant associations navigate (that is, Dakar and the region of Kolda). In subsection 5.2.3 a similar process is undertaken to examine residence localities, by discussing how the differences in formal institutions relate to migrant associations' agency. Before concluding the chapter, step three ponders the notion of presence from a comparative perspective by observing differences in legitimacy of migrant associations origin and residence (section 5.3.).

5.1 'Nurturers' and 'neutrals': Catalan localities and migrant associations' engagement through co-development

5.1.1 Neutral engagements to co-development

As chapter 4 indicates, within the same regional context, government responses to migration and development may vary at a local level. In the discussions concerning the research mentioned in chapter 3 – which represented one of the starting points of this dissertation – we differentiated between two ways, or models, by which local governments can engage with co-development. The 'neutral' refers to the cases where co-development is backed by a more reactive policy from local governments regarding migrant associations' incorporation into the field of international cooperation. Thus, based on the liberal international development framework, this model can be linked to a view that suggests migrant associations, as time goes by, mature and become more professionalised and are expected to act like other NGOs. In contrast, the 'nurturing' model identifies more proactive approaches from local governments which explore or enhance the connections between migration and development by taking into consideration the specific situation in which migrants - and migrant associations - are situated. This nurturing model can be crystallised in actions such as defining a specific programme, seeking out migrant associations, designing training processes, or giving specific types of support such as helping migrant associations to formulate project proposals. In the context of this research, under the classification of modes of engagement with co-development, Lleida, Girona are considered as nurturers. In contrast, Barcelona and Mataró are closer to the neutral model, and hence are less interventionist. However, as the table synthesis shows (Table 5.1.), the term 'neutral' does not imply that they are not supporting co-development.

In the afore-mentioned research we also suggested that the diversity between local co-development approaches are connected to the overall philosophies of migrant incorporation within local governments. Indeed, as the second column also summarises (Table 5.1), all four local governments have undettaken different approaches to the participation of citizenship and civil society across time. Thus, Barcelona's approach, as a well-known extreme case of a city, involved searching for, and formalising, ways to foster the participation of citizens, interest groups, and associations' in local governance. Girona has promoted a participatory approach at the level of community centres and in certain neighbourhoods, but the approach has been patchy, not targeted in relation to the overarching municipal sectors and the whole locality. Mataró has been open to civic participation, even though not to the level found in Barcelona. Lleida, in contrast, has seen local governments that are overall less open to promoting civil society participation.[112]

In Table 5.1. below there is an examination of the detailed picture in each city. This mainly reflects information related to the municipal legislatures between 2007-2011 and 2011-2015, that was gathered in 2009-10, and 2014-15 respectively. However, there is also data referring to other terms. The objective here is to consider the overall approach of given local governments in relation to their policies aiming at the connection of migration and development. Specifically, the key question is whether migrants and migrant associations are formally seen as development agents in action plans or other policy documents. Further, it is important to understand whether there are governmental activities that influence the visibility migrant associations may have over the governance of civic and political affairs.

Barcelona's local government has had, over time, an overall perception that migrants are a special group with specific needs but lacking in political rights. In contrast to the other cities considered here, Barcelona has a long history of having specific services targeted to immigrants; formal spaces exclusively dedicated to immigrant

---

[112] The Research project 'TRANSGOB: Transformations of urban governance in the context of the crisis. Evolution and prospects for participative governance in Spain and the UK' has recently published reports accounting for the cases of Lleida (Canal Oliveras and Salazar Marcano, 2016) and Barcelona (Blanco et al., 2016), that support this argument. Access: https://transgob.net/ [last access 3 October 2018]

issues; and the participation of migrant associations'. However, the relative weight that immigration and international cooperation policies have here are very much within the same local government. This is due partly, according to the director of International Cooperation and Immigration services, to the strength of civil society organisations engaged with solidarity and international cooperation:

> This is a very structured associationism, very structured indeed, unlike the immigration one. We come from the famous 0.7% campaign that achieved that the City Council of Barcelona made a very important commitment at the budgetary level for supporting international cooperation. And there is the paradox that the cooperation budget is almost three times bigger than the immigration one because of this political commitment. The relationship with these NGOs is very strong, [...] They are much more structured, with much more capacity for pressure... You only have to see grants' calls. Welcoming [Acollida] has an amount of 450 thousand euros and Cooperation has 5 million euros. Let's say that the number of people who work professionally in cooperation NGOs is very high. They have resources and a good part [of these NGOs] get them from the Generalitat.
>
> *Local government representative, Barcelona, September 2009, my translation from Catalan (1-6-P12)*

The area of International Cooperation has not explicitly worked on migrant incorporation and, even though co-development appeared as a line of work in the International Cooperation Action Plan of 2009-12, few activities have been undertaken along this line. Discursively, during an interview in December 2009, the political director of the International Cooperation area connected co-development with economic remittances, but also saw it as a process related to establishing relationships between places of origin and residence. The subsequent International Cooperation Action Plan of 2013-16 did not mention co-development, and this new team looked at co-development as a policy area with more caution, wanting to have a clearer idea of what to do about it before undertaking any action.[113] This 'quarantine' went in parallel with a period of evaluating co-development policies within the context of the Fons-Català. In the end, with the emergence of this sceptical approach to co-development from the International Cooperation area, during the whole period (2016 was the last checked year of ODA's resolution calls) Barcelona City Hall has funded some projects presented by migrant associations through competitive bidding.

---

[113] Information obtained through a non-structured conversation in October 2013.

However, there were years (2011, 2012, 2015) in which no migrant association received any ODA funding. Further, during the period 2013-2016 only one or two migrant associations were awarded funds and these were always Latin American migrant-based groups.

Mataró provides a different case of a 'neutral' approach to co-development. Similar to the other City Councils considered here, the local government is a member of Fons-Català. However, it is the only one among the four that has completely externalised the management of its competitive calls. This means that once the City Council decides the budget and the amounts that are to be allocated to projects, the economic resources are transferred to the Fons-Català. At his point it is the municipal association that manages the whole cycle of the project work and also the evaluation of their progress. The only person working on the staff in the area of International Cooperation had significant experience in this arena that stretched back more than 30 years. Nevertheless, the decision-making was, still, highly influenced by Fons-Català. Therefore, when migration in-flows started increasing at the end of the 90s, the City Council had the idea of starting to collaborate with Mataró immigrants' countries of origin. This tendency seemed to be led by Fons-Català (as the public office told me, co-development became 'fashionable' among Catalan municipalities in late 90s). They did not undertake special activities regarding co-development apart from supporting those projects selected by the Fons-Català. Later they backed a training targeted to migrant associations developed in Mataró and Girona between 2014-2015[114]. This occurred when the co-development commission within the Fons-Català was promoted (between 2012-13), and after the internal evaluation of the co-development policies already mentioned. The activity was planned under the auspieces of the framework set out by the Fons-Català's co-development commission. It is worth mentioning that this took place after the interviews with migrant representatives.

5.1.2 Nurturer engagements to co-development

Towards the end of 2009, the Girona City Council proposed the policy of not providing specific services for immigrants, but instead offering these to the

---

[114] A second edition of this course took place between 2016-2017, and was held in the Catalan cities of Salt and Manresa. See http://www.enfortintelcodesenvolupament.org/ for the trainings website [last checked March 2017]

citizenship regardless of their national origin. At the same time, this approach began changing internally in 2010, when the settlement policies were revised and improved within the framework of the regional Welcoming Law. In addition, during 2006-07, the council started a pilot project in two neighbourhoods with higher rates of immigrant residents. Among the aims of the project, the council wanted to reach out to migrant associations. In this context in Catalonia, in the city and surrounding counties where co-development was conceived during the late 80s, the elected councillors in charge of international cooperation (during 2007-2011) wanted to capitalise upon the work undertaken in co-development by civil society. Several actions were initiated (diagnosis, creation of a co-development commission, a technician dedicated to co-development etc) but these processes were not fully in place when the next municipal legislature arrived. Hence, cuts in funds and human resources then led to the dismantling of many of the initiatives. Importantly, a 2009 diagnosis unveiled the need to strengthen migrant associations (through capacity building, technical support measures and so on). Apart from this, as the sole staff member working in the international development section explained to me in 2014, a specific call for the co-development projects funding had been in place during the period (2011-14 was the last year this was checked). This was despite the fact that it was a contested initiative within a municipal social services area that did not want to have services that were differentiated according to the national origin of the people. The unfolding of co-development activities must be understood in Girona as closely linked to local 'autochthonous' civil society, represented through the coordination platform of local NGOs. Therefore, rather than being direct actor executing co-development initiatives, I would rather depict Girona City Council as a nurturer of 'native' civil society working in co-development.

Among the considered cases (and probably among many local experiences in Spain), Lleida City Council is the municipality with the most developed co-development framework. The degree of reflexion upon the scope of co-development policy-making undertaken by the international cooperation municipal area and the array of activities the government undertakes directly is more extensive than in other localities. The city has a co-development program that was launched in 2003. In the beginning they worked closely with the Fons-Català. The Lleida City Council's International Cooperation area defined an intervention cycle that included an analysis of the local

migrant civil society (in terms of the viability and capacity of migrant associations) in order to identify potential groups with which it could work. Subsequently, according to the City Council webpage, migrants could participate in training to develop their capacity to act as 'development agents in their community of origin'. Besides, autochtonous local actors working in international development could also attend the course to develop a better understanding of realities faced by of migrants[115] in their communities of origin. Next, there were mixed groups – consisting of migrants and non-migrants – that were formed in order to elaborate, the objectives and scope of a co-development project in conjunction with the partner in the country of origin. Training at this stage was also foreseen. Overall, the programme included continuous training opportunities aimed at strengthening migrant associations. At the end of the cycle, projects could respond to competitive calls in order to get funded. Usually the successful applicants were migrant associations. Since 2009, the City Council started thinking about how to undertake outreach towards younger and/or female representatives. Therefore, mostly since 2010, a specific approach to work with migrant women and their associations has reinforced local skills in, for example, through literacy initiatives, or entrepreneurial courses. In addition, there have been specific municipal initiatives implemented to increase the 'intercultural exchange' between migrants' children or younger migrants and other collectives as well as to involve them as mediators in their communities.

The approach taken by the public officer responsible for international development work by the municipality is clearly underpinned by the awareness that migrant collectives in Lleida suffer from social exclusion and unequal access to rights. According to the elected representative of Lleida City Council in charge of social policies, when she arrived in government (2007) there were no municipal programmes to work with immigration related issues apart from giving grants to third party actors. Thus, it became clear in an interview during 2009 that the recently incorporated unique staff person dealing with immigration only worked in migrant settlement. It was the international development area that had a stronger discourse in relation to the need to work on migrant empowerment and social cohesion. In fact, at

---

[115] Regidoria de Drets Civils, Cooperació i Igualtat, Ajuntament de Lleida: http://www.paeria.es/dcci/pages/Cooperacio/CooperacioDefault.aspx?area=3&idioma=0&id=40&sec=111 [last checked 06/April/2016]

that time it was the only area of local government clearly dealing with migrant incorporation issues.

Before finishing this initial description, it is worth mentioning two points. First, the four municipalities studied were all members of the Fons-Català from the beginning, and they have sat on its board since the municipal elections held in 1999. Regarding co-development policymaking, the interviews show that Mataró, Girona and to some extent Barcelona have coordinated or delegated their approaches to Fons-Català albeit with different intensities. When Lleida city council started promoting co-development it took a distinctive approach. In addition, not all of them participated in the co-development commission promoted in 2012-13. Barcelona, for example, is not a member of this body. According to Fons-Català, Barcelona does not work directly on co-development and has delegated its work on the subject to the municipal association (which is indirectly supported by Barcelona City Council's membership dues). The extent to which Mataró, Girona and Lleida network around co-development as an area of intervention is important. Overall, one can conclude that, even if each of them has their own approach, Fons-Català has been very influential with regard to their perspective on co-development. As has been already mentioned, Mataró is a special case among the three, because they have delegated the whole project management to Fons-Català. Girona manages its own direct cooperation but has also outsourced the management of the so-called indirect cooperation (that is cooperation executed by actors other than government which are preeminently NGOs) to Fons-Català.

Second, there are different approaches taken by these four local governments in some other aspects. For example, one issue is the existence of, and access to, local migrant associations' consultative organic councils where civil society can formally meet. These may provide, depending on the nature of these spaces, places where groups might be informed, or also discuss, or even help define public policies or institutional actions. Despite the fact that all local governments have Municipal Councils that deal with international cooperation, only Barcelona and Mataró (the so-called 'neutrals') have had migrant associations regularly among their members. The organisational arrangements of the Barcelona Solidarity and Cooperation Council formally gives a seat within the meetings to migrant associations. Barcelona City Council also has a

council to specifically deal with immigration issues. Meanwhile, Girona City Council has a Solidarity and Cooperation Council, in which the association of Colombian members has a seat. The city has also a Social Cohesion Council but no migrant associations are member of this body. Moreover, Girona supported the idea of creating a Co-development commission in 2009 and, later on, they also supported the creation of a Rural Council (outside the government) to replicate the structure of Senegalese Rural Councils. However, both initiatives, for different reasons, did not bear fruit. In brief, considering the overall context of the studied localities (not only the selected migrant associations), it would appear that the 'neutral' municipalities had a weaker focus on defining co-development actions but instead focussed on the civic representation of migrant associations. These issues will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

Table 5.1. Migration and Development policy environment in Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Mataró City Councils

City Council	Summary of general approach through time: mode of co-development/participation rationale	M&D related relevant Policy documents	Legislature (parties in government)	Co-development activities	Fons-Català codev. commission	Formal participation spaces (municipal level, not district)
Barcelona	**'Neutral'.** Co-development related to international solidarity. Specific actions on co-development are not considered. Instead, there is a focus on the social, cultural challenges of diversity within the city. Strong participation culture.	• International Cooperation Action Plan (2009-12) with references to co-development • International Cooperation Action Plan (2013-16) with recognition of migrants as development agents and prioritisation according to migrant residents' original territories, but not specific actions (apart from exploring connections with cities in Europe) • *Pla Actuació Municipal of 2008-2011* also considers co-development in its 4th objective, but there is more focus on social services in 2012-15 Diverse and numerous published public policies addressing migrant incorporation: • *Pla Municipal per a la Immigració* 2002 • *Pla Municipal per a la Inclusió Social* 2005-10 • *Pla Director Municipal de Participació Ciutadana* 2010-15 • *Pla de Treball per a la immigració* 2008-11 • *Programa Barcelona Diàleg Intercultural* 2008 • *Pla Barcelona Interculturalitat* 2009.	• 1979-82; 83-87; 87-91; 91-95; 95-99; 99-2003: PSC (The Social Democrats were) the party who gained most votes. They governed in coalition. • 2003-07 Leftist government (Coalition PSC-ERC-ICV EUiA) • 2007-11 Leftist government (Coalition PSC-ERC-ICV EUiA) • 2011-15 Centre-right government (CiU).	Although associations' training has been promoted, there are no specific activities or actions plans defined that would foster it in the area of international cooperation. Funding of migrant associations through competitive calls.	No	• Specific Immigration Council • International Cooperation for Development Municipal Council (creation 1998) • Existence of other Municipal councils where migrant associations are participating.

City Council	Summary of general approach through time: mode of co-development/partici pation rationale	M&D related relevant Policy documents	Legislature (parties in government)	Co-development activities	Fons-Català codev. commiss ion	Formal participation spaces (municipal level, not district)
Girona	**'Nurturer'.** Co-development being led by Civil Society historically (since 80's). Increase of local government's active support through institutional devices mainly in 2007-11. Discursive connection of co-development to social policies and inclusion. Promotion of participation at community centres, certain neighbourhoods.	• Cooperation Action Plan (2008) has references to co-development as an area of intervention. • More general plans such as *Pla de Mandat 2007-2011* includes references to migrant settlement actions, not to co-development. • Subsequent plans (*Pla de Govern 2011-2015*, the Municipal Plan on Solidarity and Cooperation of 2015...) do not include any direct reference to migrants or co-development.	• 1979-82; 83-87; 87-91; 91-95; 95-99; 99-2003: PSC (The Social Democrat party gained the most votes in municipal elections) • 2007-11 Leftist government (Coalition PSC-ERC-ICV EUiA) • 2011-15 Centre-right government (CiU).	In 2009: Diagnosis of co-development concluding that migrant associations' needed more capacitation and training. Creation of a co-development commission. 2011: 1 staff (out of 3) dedicated to co-development. After 2011 elections, only one technician and one administrative staff remained in the area. Local Government working together with NGO's coordination platform to foster it (training, technical support...), targeted for incorporation purposes. In 2014 training events were held (together with Mataró and Fons-Català). Existence of specific competitive calls dedicated to co-development projects from 2010-2014, last checked year.	Yes	• No specific council related to immigration or for migrant assocs. • Solidarity and Cooperation Council (creation in 1995. One migrant association participated). • Social Cohesion Council (created in 2002, 'refunded' again in 2010) • In 2011 creation of a Rural Council (a Senegalese replica) which did not last • Creation in 2009 of a co-development commission that did not last).

City Council	Summary of general approach through time: mode of co-development/partici pation rationale	M&D related relevant Policy documents	Legislature (parties in government)	Co-development activities	Fons-Català codev. commiss ion	Formal participation spaces (municipal level, not district)
Lleida	**'Nurturer'.** Strong purpose and monitoring from the local government (area of international cooperation): co-development as an innovation area led by the local government. Discursively, connected to migrants' empowerment and social cohesion. Weaker participation culture.	• *Pla d'Actuació Municipal 2007-2011*: co-development as a line of work within the cooperation area to strengthen migrant civil society and social cohesion. • Since 2003: Existence of a co-development programme (redefined in 2009). Not subsequent plans found.	• 1979-82; 83-87; 87-91; 91-95; 95-99; 99-2003: PSC (Socialdemocrat) most voted party • 2007-11 (PSC) • 2011-15 (PSC)	From 2003 onwards: Defined an intervention cycle (diagnosis of migrant associations, training, mixed groups defining and following co-development projects, competitive calls...), explicitly targeted to migrant associations, to increase social cohesion and migrant associations' empowerment. From 2004-08: specific competitive calls to fund co-development projects. In 2008 it was decided to re-integrate the funding for co-development into the general call for funding of development projects, because it was considered to be better that the co-development projects compete in terms of quality with the rest of the development projects. The funding call still (2015) explicitly mentions co-development as one of the prioritized areas though. Direct area of investment by the local government.	Yes	Several Municipal Councils. No specific council related to immigration or for migrant assoc, but one called 'Living together' council, where migrant associations are represented. Specific council related to Cooperation: the Cooperation Mixed Council (creation in 1995. With no participation of any migrant association). During legislature 2011-15 these two councils were unified (but the specific work undertaken by the previous entities remained in two commissions).

City Council	Summary of general approach through time: mode of co-development/participation rationale	M&D related relevant Policy documents	Legislature (parties in government)	Co-development activities	Fons-Català codev. commission	Formal participation spaces (municipal level, not district)
Mataró	**'Neutral'.** Co-development incorporated into the policy documents dedicated to International Cooperation with strong influence from Fons-Català. Participation culture at municipal level.	• First International Cooperation Action Plan (2006) and a second issue (2013-16): Specific mention of co-development actions and priority given to migrant origin countries. • *Pacte per a les Polítiques d'Immigració i Integració 2007-11*: Specific mention for the need to contribute through international development to the development of Mataró migrants' countries of origin. • There are no specific mentions to co-development policies in either *Acord Govern 2007-11* or *Pla de Mandat 2011-15*. Organically, in *Pla de Mandat 2011-15* the area of Cooperation is under 'Convivència' (living together) but the relationship between them is not articulated. Immigration policies towards 'newcomers' are under 'Ciutadania' (citizenship).	• 1979-82; 83-87; 87-91; 91-95; 95-99; 99-2003: PSC (Socialdemocrat) most voted party • 2007-11 (Coalition PSC-ERC-ICV EUiA) • 2011-15 Centre-right government (CiU)	Initially supporting migrant associations as a way to support development of the city migrants' countries of origin. Later on, more analysis and evaluation at the Fons-Català level. Participation in the Co-development Commission (Fons-Català). Held trainings in 2014 together with Girona.	Yes	Several Municipal Councils. No specific council related to immigration or for migrant assoc. Specific council related to Cooperation: the Solidarity and Cooperation Council (creation 1996). With participation of migrant associations).

Source: own elaboration from interviews and follow-up phone calls, fieldwork, and analysis of Internet webpages, municipalities and Fons-Català documentation. Part of the information draws on material from a qualitative study of local governments and migrant transnational involvement in co-development in Catalonia in 2009-10[116]. Also from (Acebillo-Baqué and Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011).

---

[116] This study, *Ciutadania local i transnacional a Catalunya: la participació i incorporació política dels migrants a Barcelona, Girona, Lleida i Tarragona* was coordinated by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen and financed by the Research Agency of the Catalan Government, AGAUR.

5.1.3 Formal Institutional approaches and migrant associations' presence in residence

This subsection discusses the relationship between the formal institutional environment in settlement localities of migration and development policies and migrant associations' agency in the context of the cases studied here. To disentangle the analysis, two comments are made regarding similarities between the four studied local policy environments. Subsequently, two other findings account for the differences between the migrant associations' degrees of agency.

First, all local government actions on immigration areas have been mainly focused on social services, settlement and language services. Transnational views on the migration and development connection are normally described, in policy documents, in relation to the international cooperation sector. This occurs on an ad-hoc basis, despite the fact that other transnational activities, such as backing migrants' electoral processes of origin, may have been supported by local governments' immigration sub-areas of municipal governance. This finding is consistent with the idea of co-development as an intervention area mainly handled sectorially by the international cooperation sector. Under this organic umbrella, funding migrant associations in competitive calls and promoting their capacity building are co-development activities shared by the four local governments.

Second, in principle, formally, all local governments recognise the importance of migrant associations being present as civic actors. As such, migrants (regardless of origin) are seen as legitimate actors and are visible in formal documents. Hence, they are formally given the potential to have, in the terms of the framework used in this dissertation, presence. However, the references to co-development in policy documents tend to highlight migrants' role as development agents in places of origin and less in their localities of residence. Moreover, even though all interviewees in the city argue that fostering co-development implies working in social cohesion, this is generally not highlighted in formal documents.

Third, in the sample, while neutral modes of engagement in co-development are connected to migrant associations' presence, the nurturer modes do not. Thus, the

Mataró migrant association is a member of the cooperation council, and the migrant association in Barcelona also participates in municipal councils and in policy definition processes. As we have seen, the nurturer modes of engagement focus strongly on sending the message of co-development as a tool to work on aspects such as social cohesion or migrant associations' empowerment. This is translated, mainly, into capacity building activities (pre-eminently with Lleida City Council) and also support for the formulation of projects and definition of co-development calls (principally Girona City Council). But when their presence is appraised, in terms of how it has been operationalized, we find that the Senegalese migrant associations of Lleida neither participate in the cooperation council nor at any other municipal space. In Girona, only one migrant association was a member during the period considered, but is not one of the selected migrant associations studied in Girona.[117] Moreover, those associations examined in Girona and Lleida were not formally involved in any process related to a public policy definition. During the interviews, those not accessing municipal councils or public policy definition processes did not problematize the fact that they were not represented.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that nurturer modes of engagement have an effect on how migrant representatives feel about themselves. Therefore, if we understand empowerment as a process of expanded agency with a cognitive dimension, migrant representatives (not only the ones attached to the studied migrant association) perceived training opportunities and the whole process of co-development implemented by Lleida City Council as empowering. For example, the next quote illustrates this view. Here a migrant representative expresses what he thinks co-development has offered him. The person refers to co-development activities implemented by the local government as real, specific, actions of support in an otherwise quite tough institutional context.

> That is why I give value to co-development. Co-development is a subject that touches many things. It serves as an integration of oneself. [...] I used to think that an immigrant is going from work to his house, or to a friend's apartment or a friend's party, which is inside a house as well, not in a place that is well-made for a party. Cooperation, co-development has opened doors for me to

---

[117] It is worth noting that this was a migrant Senegalese association, which, according to local officers, is connected to Barcelona's migrant association (a federation).

meet people, to know where I can go to claim something, even if it's a place to hold a meeting, a dinner. I used to feel like a poor black man who was no good at all. Or silly, whatever. I've already realized that it's not like that. [...] Because we, being Africans, are very relational people. Because our house is the jungle, there is no limit to meeting one, the other. What we have there, if we come here, we have to be locked in 100m2 at the most, for so long... It makes you [sad, you're not used to it]. If this goes together with a low self-esteem. [...] [We think that] as much as we stay here, 20-30 years, we will not have value. [...] But when you go out and meet people, you will always have someone with whom you can talk to change this thought. Because it is not good to think like that. Wherever you go keep your self-esteem high. You are a person. These are details that co-development has shown us. That's why, when a person talks about co-development here in Lleida, the person talks about this.

Migrant representative, Lleida, June 2014, my translation from Spanish (2-6-P18)

Fourth, the analysis of findings related to neutral modes of engagement stresses the difference between presence (being visible) and weight (understood as actual influence on civic, political affairs). In fact, the analysis of migrant associations' access to municipal spaces or policy processes gives a nuanced appraisal of presence. For instance, the association from Mataró participates in the cooperation council (there are three migrant associations participating, all of them from Senegalese origin). But officers in charge of Mataró's International Cooperation made it explicit that they realised migrant associations had serious problems to follow the meetings (for instance, because of language barriers, or pre-knowledge of the issues tackled during the meetings). Further, the migrant representatives did not complain about the unequal effort they had to make to achieve being an active member of these spaces.

The interview with the representative of the Barcelona migrant association explained that in the case of this city, given that they are a coordinating organisation at the Catalan level, it is not directly Barcelona migrant associations who is represented in the cooperation council. Rather, it is the association member located in Barcelona who plays this role. The regulations of Barcelona's cooperation council provide four seats to immigrant federations or associations, but until 2016 no Senegalese association had a seat.[118] However, the federated member of Barcelona's migrant

---

[118] Since mid-2016, when after municipal elections of 2015 Barcelona's Cooperation Council started meeting again, the Barcelona's migrant association studied here became a member and atended the meetings.

association participates in the immigration municipal council (which is not the cooperation for international development council). Besides, in 2009 this same federated association was also represented in another council called the Barcelona associations' council. By itself, the studied federation that I call Barcelona's migrant association is represented at regional level in spaces such as the Permanent Commission of the Regional Immigration and Citizenship Council (*Taula de Ciutadania i la Immigració*). The Barcelona migrant association has participated in relevant policy definition processes such as the National Immigration Agreement, a process undertaken at regional level, signed in 2008 (*Pacte Nacional per a la Immigració*). The participation of the Barcelona migrant association in this process is visible in two ways: first, because the representative of an association member (association Planeta, from Mataró) is among the 32 organisations who signed the agreement in December 2008. Secondly, because Barcelona migrant association's itself later adhered to the agreement.

At a regional level, there has been another policy definition process aiming to reach out to migrant associations. The Co-development Strategy (*Estratègia de Codesenvolupament*) elaborated by the *Generalitat de Catalunya* through the Catalan Development Agency,[119] undertook a work session in order to gather views on co-development in five cities (Barcelona, Girona, Tortosa, Lleida and Vic). The actors who participated are mentioned at the end in the final document. Some migrant associations are listed (the majority bring together Senegalese collectives), and all of the associations considered in this research were present in the workshops (only one workshop was held per city, in 2008), apart from Mataró, where the workshop was not undertaken. Therefore, even in localities such as Lleida, Girona and Mataró there is no clear evidence of migrant associations participating in policy-definition processes at local level, there have been initiatives at regional level to reach out to the considered collectives.

All in all, even if this dissertation has not deepened our understanding of the participation processes behind these regional policy-definition initiatives (Co-development Strategy, National Immigration Agreement) other research suggests that

---

[119] Both the Co-development Strategy and the National Immigration Agreement are contextualised in the frame of Catalan regional policy environment in chapter 4.

the influence of migrant associations is not likely to be very strong. Hence, a doctoral dissertation on participation processes in the case of Catalan immigration policy (2007-2014) compares the participation in top-down institutional policy definition processes (such as the National Immigration Agreement), to other bottom-up processes such as the Platform of Mortgage Victims (*Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca*, PAH, emerged in 2009). It also examined a campaign claiming the closure of the Immigrants Detention Centre in Barcelona (*Tancarem els CIE,* arisen in 2014) (Castellà Josa, 2016). According to the research, which focuses on important policy definition cases, one can conclude that migrant associations were not very influential in any of these initiatives. Indeed, bottom-up process, such as *Tancarem els CIE,* fail when it comes to mobilising migrant associations (because of their vulnerability in the economic crisis). The Platform of Mortgage Victims, PAH, achieved migrant empowerment but at an individual (not associational) level (Castellà Josa, 2016).

To close this section, the findings show the extent to which differences across localities, even when initiatives are keen to reach out to migrant associations, can have different outcomes with respect to involving these groups as civic and political actors. The next section focuses on the analysis of policy environments in origin.

5.2 Formal governmental responses to migrants as development agents in Kolda and Dakar

5.2.1 Policy environment in Dakar: swallowed by the national level

The competitive or nurturing models, discussed above, are not useful when observing the Senegalese subnational level or when attempting to organise findings in relation to co-development processes linking localities in Kolda or Dakar to their counterparts in Catalonia. This is explained, first (and partially) by understanding that the comparison *between* the two regions is much more unbalanced than the comparison between entities *within* the Catalan localities. Kolda occupy a peripheral and rural position in comparison to urban Dakar, and governance ecologies are different in each region. Second, in comparison to the Catalan cases, the type of gathered data in Senegal is very different. There is one major difference between this dissertation's analysis of contexts of origin and those of settlement. This is due to the difficulty of travelling to different municipalities within the territory, accessing written documents, and systematised information regarding formal spaces and procedures. In

Senegal, municipalities do not have webpages. Printing or photocopying documents is not always straightforward. Rather, policymaking leave their traces in different ways. These difficulties were compounded by the fact that I only stayed there for several weeks. Therefore, in this research, tracking the general approach of public policies with regard to migration and development was mainly reliant on interviews in Dakar and Kolda and the documents that the Kolda Regional Development Agency provided. Another, and third, important distinction between institutional contexts of residence and origin concerns how migrants are perceived in Catalonia or Senegal. To put it simply, in Senegalese contexts, particularly in small villages, those people who once left the community are always a member of it. Therefore, inclusion of migrants or migrant associations in the public sphere is confronted by other types of challenges.

Regionally, during fieldwork, the role attributed to the Kolda or Dakar Regional Development Agencies was very different. Dakar Regional Development Agency was invisible while the Kolda Regional Development Agency was very dynamic and was perceived, by donors, as one of the most active in Senegal. One of the reasons given to explain these differences is that Dakar is a very dense governance hub where central government, international agencies, certain embassies, and non-governmental organisations are important and highly visible. Therefore, the Regional Agency could easily be overlooked. The Regional Development Agency in Kolda was enmeshed in a very different governance and territory context. Moreover, this agency, created in 2000, had a director who had been in charge since 2007 (there had been 4 directors before him). In addition, this director whom I interviewed, was generally perceived by Spanish and Catalan donors as very efficient. In fact, soon after the interview in 2012, he left the regional agency and, by 2015, was in charge (*Sécrétaire Exécutif*) of the above-mentioned National Programme for National Local Development Programme.

A person in Dakar's office of the Spanish Aid Agency (AECID) expressed it in the terms below. The same person explained the importance of donors being aligned with local development actions and priorities. Traditionally, Spanish Cooperation have worked with Saint Louis region (in the Northern part of the country), Kolda, and Ziguinchor (both in the Casamance, Southern Senegal):

A: In Kolda the representative of the ARD is a very good officer. That technician is trying to make a synergy in the area. There is an appropriation there, there is a leadership. He tells us 'if you come, I present you so and so you can see'. We see what are the priorities of the [Regional Development Agency], who is working in the area and how you can add to the already existent efforts. It is one of the places where I think they are improving because there is a leadership, it is essential. The NGOs know you, even any NGO that comes to ask us for information, we always send them there to talk to them and tell them what the priorities and development strategy are, because it is better to insert them. Because if not then the problems come: there is no sustainability, the determined public institution is not the appropriate one. I believe that public institutions must be strengthened within a development framework. You do not get to Spain, to a town, to a region and do what you want! And here we come and do what we want. That is a concept that we donors have to change. [...]

Q: How about the relationship with the Dakar [Development Agency]?

A: With that one we do not work. We work with the Saint Louis one, with Kolda's and with the one in Ziguinchor. [...]

Spanish National government representative, Dakar, July 2012 my translation from Spanish (3-6-P25)

Regarding the Catalan Aid Agency, it had been closely working with Kolda Regional Agency since at least 2006. It was also in contact with migrants or migrant associations. These two agencies have established collaboration agreements between them at least from 2009. Further, and even though they did not have formal agreements at the time of the fieldwork, the Fons-Català was also in contact with the Regional Development Agency in Kolda. A Fons-Català expatriate was living in Ziguinchor, the capital of the Ziguinchor region, which is the most important town in Casamance. Even though travelling from Ziguinchor it is still difficult to access Kolda, it is much harder to get from Dakar to Kolda.

In the light of these views, I consider that during the years before 2012 (at least since the appointment of the active director in the Kolda Regional Agency), the Kolda subnational government at regional level and others at municipal had an intention to reach out to migrant associations using the the framework of development policymaking. I am, therefore, implying that – as was done in the case of Catalonia – (some) governments were proactive in exploring ways to connect migration and development. We shall see next what types of initiatives were undertaken, even if

sometimes they were at a very preliminary stage. On the other hand, Dakar policy-making at regional level was not perceived as interacting with any of the co-development processes. The processes behind the formal institutional factors that contribute to the migrant association agency being able to link Barcelona and Dakar incorporate a different set of governance scales. These are considered to be driven in Dakar by the existent dynamics at national level involving central government (as explained in chapter 4).

5.2.2 Public responses to 'Migration and development' in Kolda

This subsection aims to describe the evolution of the governmental approach o migration and development in Kolda mostly since 2007 and up until 2012. In addition, the participation and consultation spaces – or other mechanisms that existed at regional and municipal level – will be explained.

According to the fieldwork, the most interesting approaches when looking at the policy-making of positive interaction between migrant collective actions and development in Senegal, are those stemming from decentralised cooperation initiatives. In 2012, the representative of an international organisation highlighted Kolda as one of the most dynamic territories when dealing with migration issues. For this person, the perception of the importance of the decentralised cooperation was partly due to the fact that collective (migrant) investments in rural areas are more visible than in urban ones. In addition, it was also because poverty and lack of access to basic rights was more severe in places like Kolda:

> I believe that Kolda may be one of the regions where the issue of migration is most discussed; [also in] Louga, Matam... more than in Dakar. It is also because the interventions are much more visible at the rural level than at the urban level. [...] So I think collective investments at the level of other regions are more important than at the level of Dakar. And we must also take into account something else which is that public services are more developed in Dakar than in the area of Louga, for example, than in rural areas. And that is also one of the causes of internal migration: people in the regions do not have access to public services. Here [in Dakar] you have more health centers, more access to electricity, more access to the school... that's why the investments of migrants are directed to more basic issues at the rural level.
>
> *International organisation representative, Dakar, September 2012, my translation from Spanish (P24)*

Reflecting on the fieldwork, my view is that, as regards to formal institutions, this perception of dynamism seemed to be more related to internal debates held at regional level among stakeholders (or within the array of actors visiting regularly the Regional Development Agency) than to any systematised approach. Public interventions framed within the migration and development nexus were at their incipient stage at the regional level (e.g. at Regional Development Agency). Besides this they were timid, to say the least, at the level of the regional government (as explained in chapter 4, regional government and the Regional Development Agency cohabited in the region until 2014). For instance, we can consider the views of a person in charge of the local Senegalese NGOs' partnership working in a project funded by the EU. The project aimed to fight against irregular migration by sensitising and giving employment alternatives to young people in the territory. This person identified the main action undertaken by the Regional government: a forum on development. According to the person's point of view, the regional government lacked the strength to undertake interventions. Indeed, later on –as already mentioned– regional governments were suppressed:

> Q: What is the evolution of the policy of the Kolda authorities in relation to the links between migration and development? Is there a policy defined in relation to that?
>
> A: Yes, there is no policy, but people are trying. There have been some actions that have been done, there has been a big forum on the development of the region, organized by the regional council. You know our local governments here, it's different from you: you talk for example about the Government of Catalonia... But here there is no government of Kolda. In reality, it does not exist.
>
> *Civil society representative, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P39)*

One could conclude that, during the the time period under consideration, at Kolda regional level there were more isolated events or activities targeting migration and development issues than defined policy approaches. In fact, different governmental or administration stakeholders highlighted the issue that the regional level did not have competences in migration. Yet, there was policy innovation when considering consultative public spaces. On one hand, almost all the interviewed actors mentioned

the Harmonisation Conference (*Conférence d'Harmonisation*) as a valuable initiative to gather local and international NGO, municipal and regional governments to discuss development in the local context. At the time of fieldwork, the Harmonisation Regional Conference had been held in 2009, 2011 and 2012 in Kolda, organised by the Regional Governor. The aim of the conference was to coordinate international cooperation interventions in the region:

> Perhaps it should be made clear that the issue of migration is managed directly by the Ministry in charge of migration with regard to these external aspects [development]. [Competences] are not decentralized. But still, there was a local response, global. It is not a specific answer, to the migration or to the emigrants' associations, but we initiated in the region, because we saw that it is not specific to migrant associations but there are many stakeholders acting in an uncoordinated way throughout the territory. I am referring to associations of emigrants, but also local associations, partners, the Spanish cooperation, the Dutch cooperation, the French cooperation, the NGOs… Everyone intervenes on a territory while there is no control. We initiated, according to the law, what we call the harmonization conference, where we tried to bring together all the actors.
>
> *National government representative (public officer), Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P49)*

Decentralised meetings of these conferences were also periodically held at more local levels such as in the districts. During fieldwork, it was not possible to gather written data in relation to the actors that participated but, according to the interviews, around 80 organisations attended the conferences. Apart from International NGOs there were local NGOs, some of them working closely with Catalan migrant associations. In addition, in 2012, stakeholders spoke of creating a Virtual Regional Council to allow the participation of the Kolda diaspora in regional affairs. This initiative was unique in Senegal. Below, the director of the Kolda Regional Agency explains the rationale behind the Virtual Regional Council:

> We are in this project to seek to enhance the diaspora by trying to implement in territories where there is a lot of Koldois what is called the regional virtual council. It's like Kolda's regional council. It aims to better involve the diaspora in relation to the development of the territory, but also to better support those who live abroad in two ways: at the organisational level, but especially to identify people who can not stay there anymore to return to the country. (...) Now it has been said that the people of the Kolda region are also the people who are out of Kolda. That is to say that when you want to work

for the development of Kolda, you have to work for those who live here in Kolda, but also for those who live in other countries. We have to enable those who live in other countries to participate in the development of their region. They must be involved in the discussion process; in the negotiation, planning, monitoring and evaluation of development.

Regional government level representative, Kolda, interview held in Dakar, September 2012, my translation from French (P51)

A governmental delegation from Kolda (with the director of the Kolda Regional Agency and a Mayor from a municipality linked to co-development projects) travelled to Catalonia and Bordeaux to explain this proposal and to try to set it in motion. However, according to conversations and interviews discussion later on, once the director left the Agency the initiative did not bear fruit.

What was happening at the municipal level? The Kolda Regional Development Agency and the Catalan Development Agency had a relationship and attempted to become more coordinated (for ACCD, the ARD would be their main entrance to implement development). The municipal level was another story in the sense that there were other planning and consultation mechanisms. Thus, there were an increasing number of processes led by the Kolda Regional development Agency (followed by the Regional Government) to coordinate and supervise development interventions at regional level. However, the truth was that municipalities could establish their own relationships and initiatives at local level. I will now discuss those that were prioritised or visible during the fieldwork, namely, the Local Development Plans and Rural Councils.

Local Development Plans were seen as planning instruments connected to the *Programme National de Développement Local* (National Program for Local Development, PNDL) to achieve the objectives of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). These were often mentioned by governmental representatives as important documents to guide migrant associations' interventions. They were cited as a device to inform migrants of the community needs. Formally, migrants were not expected to participate in the development of these plans. But sometimes, as a migrant in Girona (originally from Northern Senegal and thus not considered in the final units of analysis) explained, this was the case:

Q: In Saint Louis, are there initiatives to see how residents abroad can participate in the area?

A: Yes, there are many things, many initiatives. With the president of the Commounaté rurale, every year, when they make a new plan for local development, they send it to me.

Q: Are you invited to participate?

A: If I'm there, they invite me to participate.

Q: Do you think they do it with other people?

A: I do not know, if they do it with me it's because I'm doing something.

Migrant representative, Girona, June 2014, my translation from Spanish (P16)

On the other hand, migrants and local governments were increasingly being more aware of the role of migrants as development agents, as the representative of an important NGO in Kolda connected to co-development processes in Catalonia, explained. He remarked about the possibility of migrants participating in Rural Councils (being elected in elections) as an important opportunity for them.

At first the emigrants were unaware that they are ambassadors, development actors. They were doing individual actions, they were building houses for them. They were not well targetted to create and develop businesses. But now, little by little, they are well aware. Especially at the level of local communities a lot of possibilities have been opened to them. At the level of the [municipal] council, people elect emigrants. This framework is an opportunity for local development: it is an opportunity that allows them to be present at the local council level.

Civil society representative, Kolda, September 2012, my translation from French (P38)

Once different formal mechanisms have been identified – where migrant or migrant associations' can exert some capacity of influence over governance processes – it is important to discuss the extent to which they are appropriated by the migrant associations attached to our cases. This is discussed in the next sub-section.

5.2.3 Acting behind and in front of regional and municipal curtains: formal context in origin and migrant associations' agency

The discusson that follows examines the relationship of migrant associations with the spaces that they can potentially access: first in Dakar and then in Kolda.

Subsequently, and only limited to the Kolda region, Local Development Plans are revised to provide additional evidence of the presence of migrant associations to show their visibility in policy documents or processes.

<u>Presence at national level</u>

In the case of Dakar, the dynamics are very much marked by central government approaches related to migration and development. The activity of the Barcelona migrant association was focused on two main projects. First, we can consider the project developed in Dakar in order to meet the needs of those Senegalese wanting to migrate. Here the director of the project developed in Dakar, not a Senegalese migrant himself, explained that they did not have a relationship with the Dakar Regional Agency, but they did have contact with the Ministry in charge of the Senegalese abroad even though their connection was weaker than previously. With Dakar City Council they had a less formal collaboration (not based on funding) where they shared meetings and received support to access premises.

Second, we can take the umbrella organisation for the Senegalese diaspora also promoted by the Barcelona migrant association. In fact, the presence of the Barcelona migrant association was often linked to the role and visibility of the diaspora organisation. According to the (non-migrant) Senegalese representative from this diaspora organisation who was himself settled in Dakar, this diaspora organisation has national and international recognition. As evidence of this, a member of this diaspora organisation attended the High Council of Senegalese living abroad (*Conseil Supérieur des Sénégalais à l'éxtérieur*). Apart from this, members of the diaspora organisation were participating in different national and international Forums:

> A: I cannot assess, in principle an assessment... it's a bit more complicated than that. But I know that the first results are recognition [...] We cannot do anything currently by ignoring the [the diaspora organisation]. For example, the High Council of Senegalese living abroad has taken one of our members. There is the center of course, you have the project of Kolda and Matam and everywhere, but also we are researchers, people who write, there are people who intervene everywhere. We are invited everywhere, because I said that Senegal has no policy [regarding migration], but Senegal is also trying to set up a policy, and we are working in this context. For example personally, I participate in many international meetings, I represented the foundation, in the Global Forum on Migration and Development, everywhere, when we are

invited we go there. I did articles, communications at the national level, at the international level. If you see the Philippine World Forum, for instance, every year I represent the [the diaspora organisation] in these different forums.

Civil society representative, Dakar, September 2012, my translation from French (P21)

I have had no access to the list of the members of the High Council of Senegalese living abroad. Therefore, it is not possible for me to state here how many of the members are related to the diaspora organisation and from which locality they orginate. However, the Barcelona migrants' organisation was present among Senegalese stakeholders in Dakar and was able to mobilise Senegalese central government representatives in their activities in Barcelona. Besides, the instability of representatives in central government and the lack of a consistent policy towards emigrants were seen by the representaives of the diaspora organisation as impediments to their goals and needs.

Presence in Kolda

Concerning formal spaces of participation implemented in Kolda, governmental representatives explained that the regional Harmonisation Conference held in 2009 had a representation of emigrants settled in Bordeaux. Moreover, it seems that the group from Bordeaux was the germ of the Virtual Council idea, which was called the 'conseil virtuel' by some interviewees. Besides, even though no Spanish or Catalan migrant association participated in the Harmonisation Conference, a Senegalese NGO from Velingara did attend. This NGO from Velingara (a town and department located in Eastern Kolda region) is associated – by government or representatives of the administration – with migrants in Catalonia. Indeed is attached to migrants in Girona (to the Girona migrant association, considered in one of the cases of study). Therefore, in sum, the Harmonisation Conference was a space where it was anticipated that migrant associations would participate. However, after the first event (with the emigrants from Bordeaux), the second conference did not have any migrant attendance (although one of the attending organisations was linked to a migrant association).

Indeed, the head of the Planning area in the Kolda region (*Amenagement du territoire*) explained that, both in the Harmonisation Conferene and in the meetings

held within the framework of the National Program for Local Development, migrant associations were not always present. This person pointed to the distance, but also to the fact that they were not invited beforehand, as reasons for this low participation. At the same time, he mentioned local NGOs linked to migrant associations through co-development processes as if these could voice migrant interests:

> Because the problem of emigrant organizations is the distance. They can not be in Europe and come to attend meetings without allowances, transport, etc. And often, the lack of professionalism means that we do not take the time to notify people in time. But nevertheless these emigrant associations when they come, they work with people here […]. In Vélingara we have people who work a lot with [local NGO] who were in the conference. We have the [another local NGO] that works here with the Spanish Cooperation […]. We had the association of the citizens of Bordeaux, we also had the association of the students nationals of Kolda who are in Bordeaux, who had even initiated the virtual regional council. I do not have the name of all these associations in mind, but there was enough of them.
>
> *National government representative (staff), Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P49)*

In fact, the representative of the Senegalese NGO mentioned in the previous excerpt, is the Mayor who travelled together with the director from the Kolda Regional Agency to France (Paris and Bordeaux) and Catalonia in 2012. The aim of these visits was to connect with the Senegalese migrant collective living in Europe, discuss the Virtual Council Project, and invite them to the Harmonisation Conference. These visits, in the case of Spain, were only held in Catalonia. In order to organise these initiatives, the Director of the Kolda Regional Agency and the Mayor had the help of the representative from the migrant association in Barcelona studied as part of this thesis. The Virtual Council initiative provoked some controversy. As explained below, even if the dialogue and process was at a more advanced stage in Bordeaux, there were still some important questions to be solved, such as the inclusion of the elders in the idea:

> [Regarding whether migrant associations participated in either one of the two Harmonisation conferences held] Yes, in the first one; the provisional president of the Conseil Régional Virtuel de Bordeaux took part. Bordeux is in a more advanced stage, because it is there that we started. In Catalonia [we promote it] after. And in Bordeaux too there were problems. We went there, we talked with people, we were trying to involve them... But in the virtual council the eder did not participate much. And it is important that they are

there. That's why this year when we went there, before going to Catalonia, we saw the elder, we visited them, with the younger.

Regional government level representative, Kolda, interview held in Dakar, September 2012 (P51)

In the view of government representatives including previous respondent, what underpins the challenge of migrants participating in Regional spaces are aspects such as the lack of structuration and strength of these migrant associations:

This is why we sought to establish a virtual regional council in Bordeaux, and in Catalonia. But it's not going very fast because in both places there are not enough strong associations. So there is a work of animation to do to push the actors to understand each other, to have the same approach as ours so that they agree to work together.

Regional government level representative, Kolda, interview held in Dakar, September 2012, my translation from French (P51)

Migrant representatives' interviewees have different approaches to the role played by bodies such as the Kolda Regional Development Agency. For associations – such as those studied in Mataró, the religious organisation in Girona or migrant association in Lleida – the Kolda Regional Development Agency is seen as far away and unresponsive to their needs. For instance, the following representative says he had asked the agency to mediate and supervise their project in the past but no response had been received. In 2014, by stating that the Catalan Development Agency should directly fund NGO and associations – and not the Kolda Regional Agency – he was implying that the Kolda Regional Development Agency was not of any use to them as migrant association:

A: [About the role that Kolda Regional Development Agency should play] Normally supporting NGOs, associations and the development of the area.

Q: Do not you agree with the Catalan Development Agency giving funds to the Kolda Regional Agency?

A: If you do it right, yes. If you do it right you would see some results from Kolda Regional Development Agency. But nothing is seen.

Migrant representative, June 2014, my translation from Spanish (P18)

Others, such as the Barcelona migrant association or Girona migrant association through its local partner, saluted the increase in coordination and dynamisation of the agency. These two are also the organisations that have benefitted from the Kolda regional agency resources.

Therefore, the Kolda regional agency is distant for some migrant associations. This is reflected in an excel document obtained during fieldwork in 2012, where all the various actors (associations, NGO, companies, agencies…) intervening in the region were mapped. More than pointing to migrant associations' presence, the list gives evidence of the visibility of co-development processes. Hence, those appearing on the list with more direct connections to migrant associations were the Girona migrant association's local partner, and a mix of an (autochtonous-Senegalese) association from a Catalan village called Arbúcies. This latter example is based in a small Catalan town in the region of Girona, of around 6000 inhabitants, closely linked to the origins of Fons-Català and co-development. Both were identified as NGOs, which implies a more professional status than another local association in Kolda closely linked to co-development processes, which is also on the list and is identified as association and not as NGO. The Mayor who travelled to Bordeaux and Catalonia created this latter local association in 2002. It had strong economic support from migrants via an important local NGO and connections with another migrant association not considered in the study, which also has received support from the Catalan Regional Agency (via agreements). The is now an important local NGO, one of the first Senegalese NGO created in Kolda, which grew while executing co-development projects with Catalonia, and it was also cited in the list.

The issue of the distance between Kolda Regional Development Agencies and migrant associations was also raised by Senegalese migrant associations in Catalonia coming from other regions. For instance, the following migrant representative, a man from the region of Saint Louis, settled in Girona stated:

> The [Regional Development Agency] does not coordinate with us. Well, it is a visible actor for the big NGOs, who have programs... [we have specific, more smaller, projects, instead], we do not play the role as we should play.
>
> *Migrant representative, Girona, June 2014, my translation from Spanish (P16)*

Overall, in the frame of this research, few migrant associations (indirectly) scale to/ or are reached by the regional governance level. The governmental level at which all the considered associations in Kolda have the closest linkage is the village. However, their formal presence at the municipal level is scarce. To illustrate this point, two main formal devices are discussed: migrant associations' participation in Rural councils, and the Local Development Plans. The elaboration of these plans included participatory diagnosis and the identification of development actors in the Rural Community. The development of Local Development Plans are framed within the National Program on Local Development as mentioned earlier.

The table below syntheses data about whether the cases considered in Kolda are visible at the regional level (already discussed), or at a more local level (see Table 5.2. at the end of the section). The table reflects, first,[120] whether the origin localities of migrant representatives have related councillors in each concerned Rural Council (see column number 5, called 'Municipal Council 2009-2014'). This is only the case for the Girona migrant associations' local partner, as hometown villages from other migrant associations do not have councillors in the correspondent Rural Council.

Second, the table gathers information about the so-called Local Development Plans. There were critiques made by some NGOs in Kolda pointing that they were either blue-prints and not well adapted to each commune's reality, or that the participation processes behind the documents were not participative enough. Despite these critiques, the Local Development Plans are analysed because they were often mentioned during fieldwork as an important achievement in terms of mapping, systematising local data and development planning. When reading Local Development Plans related to the specific rural communities or villages, it is clear that they were developed by different actors, and that they exhibit differences. They all mention migration flows and the impact of foreign nationals upon the localities. According to these documents, with the exception of the village in the rural community of Kandia, Spain is an important European destination country for

_____

[120] Villages configure communities (or rural communities). For instance, the Rural Community of Saré Colly Salle has 61 villages, with a total of 18.755 inhabitants (2010). As already mentioned, under the 2014 new decentralisation reform, all these rural communities are now 'communes', municipalities. I.e., there is no distinction between the rural ones and the non-rural (see chapter 4).

Senegalese migrants who originate from the other two rural communities. France is not mentioned as a destination country in any of the Local Development Plans associated to the studied localities.

Moreover, the Local Development Plans contain short comments regarding the impact of migration on the population. Thus, the visibility of migrant collective action through migrant associations in a rural community of Velingara, which is 'the ground 0' of co-development in Catalonia, is not explicited. Migrants are portrayed as mainly contributing to the building of homes for their families and supporting them in times of hunger or ceremonies. In the case of Thietty (to which the hometown village of the association in Lleida belongs to), migrants' contribution is connected to decentralised cooperation with Spain. There is a mention of one farm project that does not correspond to any initiative in the village visited (this has prompted me to wonder if this report was mistaken). The local development plan from Kandia (the municipality to which the migrant association in Mataró is linked) explicitly stated that the impact of migrants on the locality is 'small'. In Kandia, the previously mentioned organisation from Arbúcies appears in the Plan as one NGO operating in the territory.

From this analysis, I would conclude that, apart from a local NGO created by a migrant association (which is a migrant association partner), migrant associations actions lurk away from regional and municipal formal institutional devices. As the Executive Secretary of the then existent Regional Government said, even if Catalan or Spanish migrant associations' were active, and in fact, the overall economic flows from Spain were bigger than those coming from France, he could not name any, because they acted behind authorities:

> Absolutely, Spain is mobilizing more resources than France, especially for the Kolda region. We know it. But it's informal. [...] However, it is necessary to specify that [the problem] is within the frame of the [migrant] associations, because in other cases it is very 'clean'. For example, the Catalan cooperation [Regional Agency] works with the region of Kolda, with the [Regional Development Agency of Kolda]. There is no problem! The agreements are signed, and it is all clear: we have the documents, the [Regional Development Agency of Kolda] has the documents, no problem. The problem I'm talking about is about the associations of Koldan people who are based in Catalonia or Spain. This is really the case, it's where there is a total blur. I've been here

since 2009, and I can not tell you any association who has benefited from [co-development funds] and what is it doing with those.

Regional government level representative, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P53)

In the case of Local Development Plans – even if the causes behind their invisibility are not explored thoroughly – addressing this question should also take into account issues such as the process of how these documents are developed. One may think that the Kolda Regional Development Agency, which is the coordinator of Local Development Plans, did not prioritise collecting local data about migration and development dynamics. For instance, during one visit to a village, Local Development Plans were mentioned as a mechanism to inform migrants of the communnity needs. One of the interviewees had participated during the data collection and seemed to know well how the process worked in his rural community. He was also a brother of the interviweed migrant representative of the Girona religious association. Generally, migrants did not participate in the elaboration of their own hometown's Local Development Plan. They were not formally considered as an actor during the diagnosis and collection of data, even if the dialogue below shows that one of them (a member of one of the followed migrant associations) did participate in a meeting because he had become a village chief. Besides, even if they were considered as legitimate actors to participate in these processes, the view during the meeting at the village was that people residing in the villages are those who know better about the reality they are living in:

Q: Do migrants know what's going on here?

A: We give them the PLD [Local Development Plan].

Q: Do they participate in the definition of the PLD?

A (several): They didn't participate but they should have. (...)

Q: In general, the emigrants have participated in the PLDs?

A: [Name of migrant] of [name of village] has participated in the PLD, in the feedback meeting. Because he is now the village chief of [name of village], it is he who inherited when his eldest brother died.

Q: But is it not foreseen that the organizations of the emigrants who belong to the territory have a chair in the discussions of the PLDs?

A: No.

Q: Should it happen?

A: It is not foreseen, the diagnosis was made without the emigrants because they are not present. But the local population was there, because we passed through all the towns [the man who is talking is the one who worked during the data colection]. Those who live here are the ones who know the reality.

Conversation with local partner representatives while visiting a village, Kolda region, August 2012, my translation from French (P72)

To conclude this subsection, it is worth mentioning that, apart from the local partner of the Girona migrant association, the dynamics of developing plans show there are difficulties in finding migrant associations' voice in formal spaces such as Rural Councils or Local Development Plans. Besides, the Barcelona migrant association is represented through the diaspora organisation members in National and International debates, and also in spaces such as the High Council of Senegalese living abroad. In an indirect way, then, the Girona migrant association and Barcelona migrant association are, therefore, those migrant associations that would seem to have attained a higher presence.

In the next section, I will continue drawing this portrait by offering more elements to help understand migrant associations' agency. Hence, following the analysis of ways to engage migrant associations and the existence of formal spaces or procedures that could be accessed by migrant associations, the next subsection takes legitimacy as a formal institution (i.e., in particular whether social actors reckon that migrant associations have a role in local governance). This component of the policy environement aids out comparative analysis of the presence of migrant associations between origin and residence contexts.

Table 5.2. Region of Kolda. Visibility of selected migrant associations in formal spaces and Local Development Plans

Association	Locality (origin)*	Population in locality of origin	Formal participation in spaces at regional	Municipal Council (2009-2014)	Affecting Local development Plan. Mentions to migrants, migrant associations, projects
Girona religious migrant association	Kolda (Region) / Department of Vélingara / District Saré Coly Sallé / **Village**	no data of village / RC** has 61 villages, total 18.755 inh. (2010)	Not participating / Not visible in documents	Not represented	Local development Plan, Communauté rurale de Saré Coly Sallé (2011). **International migration flows to Spain, Libya, Italy, Mauritania.** Migrant contributions identified: 'These emigrants contribute only in the socioeconomic life of their relatives by the construction of buildings and sending money for large ceremonies.
Girona migrant association	Kolda (Region) / Department of Vélingara / **District and municipality**	no data of village / RC has 61 villages, total 18.755 inh. (2010)	Harmonisation Conference / Visible	Not participating. But several members of ADESC in 2009-2014 Municipal Council	Some commendable efforts are noted Diallo Medina because the village has sometimes emigrant resources for hunger periods and during Ramadan.' Projects by the considered, or other, associations not mentioned. Migrant association's local partner ADESC Mentioned.
Lleida migrant association	Kolda (Region) / Department of Kolda / District Sare Bidji / Communauté rurale Thietty / **Village**	100 aprox in the village / RC Thietty 37 villages, total 1.579 inhabitants	Not participating / Not visible in documents	Not represented	Local development Plan, Communauté rurale de Thietty (2012). **Low international mobility, 'notably to Spain'.** Migrant contributions identified: economic remittances and decentralised cooperation 'notably' from Spain. Migrant association from Spain identified as building a farm in the village of Soucoto. Project by the considered association not mentioned.
Mataró migrant association	Kolda (Region) / Department of Vélingara / Communauté Rurale Kandia/ **Village**	no data /RC Kandia has 75 villages, total 22.582 inhabitants	Not participating / Not visible in documents	Not represented	Local development Plan, Communauté rurale de Kandia (2011). International migration flows to **USA, Libya, Angola, Gambia.** Migrant contributions identified: as 'small impact' over socioeconomic life and population. Remittances sent during hunger season and big ceremonies. Identified the following projects: construction of a mosque, health house, and closing of agricultural field in Kaminakor. Migrant association or project not mentioned. Nden Nden Golen mentioned as Local Development 'partner'.

Source: Own elaboration from interviews, Local Development Plans and other gathered data (a project evaluation from Fons-Català, documents from Kolda Regional Agency gathered during fieldwork in 2012). Both migrant associations in Girona, even though attached to different localities, share the same Local Development Plan. *Bold letters indicate whether the locality where the migrant association is a village or a municipality (or community). Names omitted for reasons of confidentiality. ** RC=Rural Community=Community=Municipality

5.3 Formal institutions and migrant associations' agency compared: translocally diverging legitimacies

5.3.1 Senegalese migrants, a cohesive collective by Catalan actors…

The following information is based on semi-structured interviews with officials dealing with migration and development policymaking in the considered residence contexts. The results expose views of interviewees when asked about whether they detected differences in how migrant collectives participated in their respective city. In Barcelona, the interviewee explained that there was a very clear division between those organisations working in immigration and others in international cooperation. In his view, only three associations that he would describe as migrants were at the time able to work in international development. They were Barcelona migrant association studied here; a Moroccan migrant association; and a federation of Latin-American migrant associations. In fact, Barcelona migrant association, often seen as a representative of the whole Senegalese collective, is understood as a transformative organisation – together with the Moroccan migrant association and the federation of Latin-American migrant associations - by people in charge of migration and development in the municipality. Besides, the Senegalese are perceived as a not very large community in Barcelona but very well organised:

> The Senegalese are less but they are very well organized. [...] I see them very critical with us... But I see them well.
>
> *Local government representative, Barcelona, September 2009, my translation from Catalan (P12)*

Nevertheless, a perception of mistrust or uncertainty about the Senegalese associations is translated when considering Mataró City Council. There, the interviewee questioned the information received from migrant collectives because it was seen a kinship-based, and therefore, biased and changing. Moreover, in this person's experience, it was difficult to really get to know whom you are talking to, for there is a problem concerning the spokepeople and their responsibility regarding the development projects. According to the interviewee, this is explained because 'we' (Western, Catalan 'indigenous') and 'they' (the Senegalese) are culturally different.

A: […] With immigrant groups, I doubt about the information that I receive, because it is very biased by the links they have with the kinship community.

Q: How do you see this?

A: Through themselves. Because the one who, according to them, had to save everything, after 2 months does not save you anything. And you wonder, what happened here? [They tell you:] 'It's because we had a quarrel, the other one did this...' I think it is related to the way we [them and us] work. We have a scheme, everything is square… and there, they work in a different way. They do not have the system so squared, with what this supposes of distension. And when you try to organise something, you fail. You never know who is the spokeperson. (...) There are no trained people who say, 'Although I represent a community, with the characteristics that each community has, yes, I am responsible and lead the action'. It is what we always tell them: the person in charge of the project is the one who submits the project [in front of the administration].

Local government representative, Mataró, June 2014, my translation from Catalan (P27)

In the case of Girona, interviewed members of the City Council, compared to other nationalities, perceived the Senegalese as very active when considering co-development. Among other factors, their visibility was connected to their representatives' actions, their cultural characteristics as a national collective, but also their articulation as a community in Catalonia. See, for instance, the view of the interviewee:

Regarding the Senegalese, I believe that it is basically because they have been established in Girona for many years, they know well the functioning, the mechanisms of participation. Besides, I believe that there is a very important figure here that is [migrant representative from Girona migrant association], which has been the pioneer of all these co-development related issues. [This person] lives in Girona and this leaves a footprint in the [city] [...] And he isn't the only one who is active, but there are also groups from other places in Catalonia that are doing things and that there is a very important communication network, which makes them one of the most visible groups. And I suppose also that it is related to their country's characteristics, culturally… The Agency [Regional Catalan Agency] has also paid close attention to Senegal. So I believe that there is a sum of factors here.

Local government representative, Girona, October 2009, my translation from Catalan (P35)

Also in Girona, a representative from a NGO with long experience supporting migration interventions in the area identified the Senegalese collective as the most

organised at the African level, not only in the territory of Girona, but also in Catalan. This was due to the number of Senegalese, but also because of the existence of a coordination platform (Barcelona migrant association):

> [The Senegalese collective] is the best-organized one at African level. Because they are bigger in number, and because there is a coordinator platform of Senegalese [Barcelona migrant association]. [...]
>
> I think that the ones who are more organized and more involved are the Senegalese. Not only at the Girona level. At the Catalonia level are the best prepared ones.
>
> Civil society representative, Girona, October 2009, my translation from Catalan (P29)

Besides, actors representing governments in the Catalan localities of Barcelona, Girona, and Lleida speak of a principle of 'mutual support', solidarity, among Senegalese that underpins their motivation towards co-development. This solidarity echoes *teranga,* a word in Wolof meaning solidarity that is 'a major theme' in Senegalese self-representation (Riccio, 2005, p. 116). See examples of this perception in Barcelona, Girona, and Lleida, in this order, below:

> Well, the Senegalese have this clanic solidarity more developed than the Moroccans, who are more individualistic. […] There is much more solidarity [among them], the concept of family is much wider.
>
> *Local government representative, Barcelona, September 2009, my translation from Catalan (P12)*

> [About how Senegalese build leadership] The truth is that the mechanisms behind them are not very clear to me. I believe that they have a lot to do with the social role they play within the group. They are usually people who have been here for a longer time, which economically have a more settled situation... With the Senegalese, there is a lot of mutual support. From here also comes the desire for co-development. (...) They want to bring something back to their places of origin. I suppose it has to do with the place of origin, with the family from which they come. But these are intuitions.
>
> *Local government representative, Girona, September 2009, my translation from Catalan (P36)*

> Q: You said that the [groups] have different priorities. Could you mention any?

A: For example, a Moroccan entity has its first priority in the religious theme. I speak at a general level, not all of them are the same. And they are preoccupied because they do not want their children to lose their culture and language, they take them on weekends to learn their language. The Senegaleses highest priority is to look after the needs of their group. That is, when someone comes and does not have food, they help. It is related with this mutual support [or help] that they have internalized. Because of this [principle] they may create a small 'alegal' network of condensed milk, for example.

Local government representative, Lleida, September 2009, my translation from Catalan (P59)

Therefore, in three out of four cities, when asked about residing migrant collectives' differences as regards to participation and structuration, officials from the considered local governments in residence contexts construct the Senegalese community positively in relation to other migrant groups. One could interpret these results, as Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad called it, by showing stratification within migrant collectives in residence localities (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a). Thus, when comparing different migrant collectives, this stratification tends to depict Senegalese in Catalonia as a cohesive group, well organised, and with almost an 'essential' sense of solidarity.

5.3.2 … But migrants are perceived as *'villageois'* by Senegalese stakeholders

The original contextual views drawn from governments and civil society representatives, showed a contrasting depiction of migrants or migrant associations as agents of development. I may affirm, too, that there are different approaches depending on the type of migrant association those interviewed actors had a linkage to. Thus, interviewees located in Dakar and connected to the Barcelona migrant association experience, saw the Senegalese collective in Catalonia as organisationally strong. Their views were based on their linkages of solidarity and the capacity of emigrants to adapt to local institutions; and to local languages such as the Catalan. For instance, the person in charge of the Barcelona migrant association's project in Dakar raised these points:

I think that the people who went to Spain still have a strong solidarity. [Thanks to] their experience in Spain, the Senegalese are very strong on the associative level. They have associations but also a capacity for adapting to

the language of the country. There are Senegalese who do not speak neither Spanish nor French but speak good Catalan. So now, the solidarity they have there, is a solidarity which is almost obliged, in a way, because they can not do otherwise: as soon as a Senegalese arrives in Spain clandestinely, the first thing to do is to know or ask where are the Senegalese. Then [the person] is taken care of. They help him until he has a job, an apartment. So, in turn, they have to be in solidarity.

Civil society representative, Dakar, September 2012, my translation from French (P20)

However, interviews and fieldwork undertaken in Kolda showed that first, the identification of migrants as operating collectively was not always evident for some key stakeholders (government and civil society representatives). Migrants were mostly seen as individual actors building homes and bringing economic remittances for their families. The representative of the Kolda branch of the NGOs National coordination platform expressed it quite constructively:

[Migrants] They bring a lot, especially in the region of Kolda. First, in the field of land, construction. They managed to build many houses, in the regional capitals, and in the departmental capitals, they managed to house their families in decent homes, then built houses they rented afterwards. Then as a second factor, in terms of financial resources, each month, they send a large financial mass through the banks, either through agricultural savings associations, or the general banking company, or ECOBANK, or through Wally. So their families, every month, they will collect between 100 and 500.000FCFA [aprox. 1,5-760 euros] to provide for the needs of the family. With this money families buy equipment for agricultural needs. They get to buy tractors, seeds, etc. and are able to cultivate much larger areas, in record time. These are two contributions, which are quite important. And they also manage to buy transport vehicles to give them to their brother, or their cousins. With these vehicles, these family members can become carriers across the roads [axis] Kolda-Pata, Kolda-Velingara, even Kolda-Dakar. So this is thanks to the contribution of emigrants, who are either in Spain, or in Italy, or in France.

Civil society representative, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P45)

The head of an important Senegalese NGO based in Kolda, who has participated in the first co-development experiences in the region, which connected Catalan localities and Kolda, was also one of the few interviewees that optimistically highlighted that, overall, Koldois emigrants were the first donor in the region, either individually or by formal cooperation processes:

First of all, on development aid, the first provider of aid are the emigrants. Either is the more structured, formal aid, like the one is channelled though international cooperation. Either the aid that helps families live. So really you have to give value to the contribution of the emigrants. I am sure that poverty would have been much harder to bear without the help of emigrants. Indeed, we see that in the official figures: what Senegal receives as transfers from its diaspora is greater than what it receives as development aid. So that I think it should be emphasized, and try to value that.

Civil society representative, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P47)

However, there were also many views portraying those who left Kolda to come to Spain with a certain condescension or critique. During interviews migrants were very often depicted as having low literacy level, too centered on their village and family, or as people who were outcast, or not adapted to their context, before leaving their region. The interviewees often use this image as an explanation for the perception of migrants from Kolda as being associatively fragmented, or as lacking the capacities to undertake development projects.

According to the view of the representative of a local association with a long experience in co-development, working with migrants is not easy. In his view migrants, 'per se', are not development agents. However, they can be a positive actor as long as there are opportunities in settlement contexts. 'Opportunities', in my interpretation, are preeminently referring to economic resources, that expresses a not isolated view that links migrants as potentially useful fundraisers:

[...] At the level of management of associations, the majority of emigrants who leave are illiterates. They go to Spain, they have good ideas, but to put that into practice is a problem. The associations that are there are not strong enough.

[...]

Q: What is the added value of emigrant work?

A: Yes, there may be some added value, there are opportunities there [in settlement localities]. If there are no opportunities there, he [the migrant] can not do it, [he cannot] benefit his community. If the population suffers here, while at the town hall there is a possibility of having a dispensary, or a school, but the emigrant himself does not know the importance of education, is he going to do it? If he is not a development agent, he can come back here and

swank. We all know all about that. Nothing is more complicated than working with an emigrant.

Q: An emigrant is not a development agent?

A: Oh no, first of all, he left here to get some job. If conditions were good here, they would not leave to emigrate. Some migrate because of poverty. But it is not necessarily these people who will bring development, let's be clear about that.

Civil society representative, Kolda, September 2012, my translation from French (P38)

Another Senegalese civil society representative from Kolda recalled during the interview the impression he had when travelling to Lleida and Girona and meeting the people behind the projects. Despite migrant associations' acts of good faith or efforts such as those of Lleida City Council, he stressed migrant associations' lack of capacities:

I had the chance to have (even if they were informal) meetings with the two associations [in Girona, and in Lleida].

So, [in Girona] we had a meeting, and I think there were a lot of things they did not know. They have an association, they have a good intention, but the projects as such, or the development issues as such, are not the same concepts. (...) [In Lleida] they were preparing a mission trip to come here. In fact I came to almost the same conclusion: that the intention is very good, there is an effort to organize, and to find a partnership with the communities there, and the organizations here, the communities around here... I know it's all good, but... I saw that in Lleida [municipal government] at least they did efforts to strengthen people's capacities, so that they [migrants] understand the projects. So that was good. It's because at the beginning the first projects are done without the people being really prepared for it. There were good intentions without the preparation. Either at the organizational level, either also on the understanding of development. I think that's a weakness because you have to know who left, who has emigrated. In these associations, you have to see who's in there.

[...]

Things have evolved, obviously. What I say may be that it falls under the first groups of people who left. But the first ones who left are often people who are here and maybe they feel so excluded, or frustrated, or stigmatized as incapable, you see. It's people like that who are determined to leave, especially in the Fulani community. I may not speak of Sarakolés (it's another thing out there, they are pretty organized), but in general people left individually. They took that risk. And that makes a reaction because the guy who was there, who we know can be, under quotation marks, categorised as incapable, the guy he goes one day and then he comes and he builds a big building. Then the others see it and they say to themselves 'we must leave'.

Governmental views in Kolda were consistent at showing a perception of migrant associations in Catalonia as fragmented and village-based. See, for instance, the next representative:

Q: Would you say there is a migrant network out there?

A: No.

Q: Are not they organized? How about Catalonia and Bordeaux...

A: There are no links. Even those who are in Girona... it's fragmented. Everything rather happens at the village level. And in Kolda, how many villages do we have? There are more than 800 villages, [imagine] if we have to reconstitute 800 villages in Catalonia, it's complicated. So relations are more like village relations. That's why bringing together Kolda citizens' associations in Catalonia is very difficult.

Regional government level representative, Kolda, interview held in Dakar, September 2012, my translation from French (P51)

The latter interviewee expresses the view that either in Bordeaux or Catalonia, Senegalese from Kolda lack strong organisational structures. On the other hand, – according to the representative from the Regional Council, below – those who are living in France or Spain have very different profiles and ambitions. Often, those living in Spain only relate to what they are doing in their hometowns in an informal way:

Q: You said that Senegalese emigrants have a very strong sense of the village. Would you say that those [migrants] who are in France do not have this feeling?

A: It's not the same kind of migration. In the beginning the people who migrated to France were people who were going to work as labor workers. But increasingly the migration to France from Kolda is a student migration. These are people who have completed their doctorate and have stayed in France, they are people who have a vision of development (...)

On the other hand, with the Spanish migration, people do not go to Spain to study. They go there to work in unskilled jobs. We are talking about someone who leaves the village and then another person from the same village will follow. (...) And finally we re-create another village in Spain (...) Since I was there in 2009, I'm studying this, and I ask a lot of questions when I meet

someone (in fact, they never come here! I always meet them on the street). I ask them; 'So how are you, it seems you're in Spain'. And they tell me 'you are on the regional council, and we do a lot of things in Kolda and the authorities do not recognise us'. I say 'what do you do for example?. They say, 'We have created a health hut in the village'. And I tell 'but how can we know? The region is wide, it is necessary that you go to the level of the hotel of the region to discuss it'.

Regional government level representative, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P53)

It is also of interest to note how the studied Barcelona migrant association struggles, according to a governmental representative, to mobilise migrant associations' from Kolda or Southern Senegal. Thus, in the excerpt below, the interviewee explains, first, that he thinks that the Barcelona migrant association was predominantly connected to the Fouta-Toro (territory around the Senegal river, in Northern Senegal, populated mainly by fulas and toucouleurs). Second, that he experienced difficulties in reuniting associations because they are different and with different 'horizons'. Again, education is identified as key factor hindering migrant organisational capacities:

Q: Do you think the emigrants in Spain, in Catalonia are well organized, well structured?

A: No. That's the difficulty. Getting them together in Barcelona was a problem. There's [migrant representative] who has a core organisation that's really there. This [core] is well structured. But when you consider this core, you see that it's not configured by people from the Kolda region, from the south of Senegal. They are from the center, the Fouta area. In the Fouta area they are very well organized, we are talking about the area where the first emigrants of the country came from. When you go to Fouta, you see what they are doing; we feel clearly that they are organized. [Migrant representative] wanted all these people in Senegal to be articulated together in Catalonia. But they have difficulties because there are different associations and there are different horizons. For example, you see those who are from Kolda, those from Velingara, those from the Pata area. To bring them together, there is really a problem.

Local government representative, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P50)

Two last views before concluding are related to the lack of visibility of migrant associations around the region. The first quote is from the representative of a local association located in another town, in the region of Kolda. This organisation has

existed since 1996-97 and had worked directly with Fons-Català in the period 2001-2008. He disseminates the view of migrants as having primarily an individual agenda, and that the actions by migrant associations are very isolated. He also states that they do not know any co-development experience in their nearest territory:

> Yes, really here is a migration zone. But the problem, if you look at the history, is that those who left, most are illiterate. So the concept of development, it is not necessarily a concept that they use. And regardless of what it is said, if you are educated you have a deeper analysis of this concept. The absolute majority of emigrants are people who have managed to stand on their own, people who are illiterate, who have an individual development problem. Their aim is to solve their individual problems. Therefore, there is not a community principle inculcated in their spirit.
>
> *Civil Society representative, Kolda region, September 2012, my translation from French (P41)*

The last view is from a Senegalese expert from the region working in a development programme for the African Development Bank. His impression is that there is a difficulty in making visibile the activities of migrant associations. Besides, we can see that he expresses the view that migrant actions are more directed to address migrant problems than problems of origin:

> There is some difficulty in setting up activities that are visible. I'm not at all negative, but very often people here have the impression that the projects coming from the other side are more focused to emigrants' business than to the people's living here. (...) I think that the action of the emigrants who are there will be difficult to see at the local level here, because quite simply, very often these projects do not have a large scale. When a project does not have a large-scale, at first people are with the project but very quickly people get discouraged, they let go of the project. Then the project becomes more or less a project of the associations that are there with very little involvement of the people who are right here.
>
> *Expert, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P48)*

Overall, to conclude this subsection, the fieldwork examining origins shows that, considering legitimacy – and, thus referring to the degree to which a migrant association is seen as legitimate player by others in the civic sphere (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a, p. 20) – migrant associations' role as development agents is contested. At the same time, there are different perceptions depending on whether the

respondant has a stronger linkage to the Barcelona migrant association than to the migrant associations in Kolda. In origin and residence, those who knew the Barcelona migrant association identified it as an example of migrants' capacity to organise themselves. In residence, even though Senegalese migrants in Spain are generally perceived as lacking organisational capacities or having low literacy levels, policymakers mostly see the visible representatives of migrant associations in Barcelona or Girona as educated. However, in origin, the Barcelona migrant association is known by the majority of stakeholders in Kolda, but it is not seen as representing the majority of migrant associations nor migrants in the region of Kolda. Further, the Girona migrant association is also seen as not connected to localities in Kolda, but rather to one municipality therin. In the eyes of policymakers in Catalonia, the representatives of the Senegalese migrant collective in residence are less diversified than what the views in the origin context reflect.

At this point, one needs to bring to the fore the issue of whether this variance according to place of policy environments influences migrant associations' presence. Here, I argue that migrant associations from Kolda (that is, principally undertaking hometown transnationalism) are seen as less visible in municipal or regional spaces and policy processes, and that this is related to the lack of legitimacy of migrant associations. Therefore, migrant associations from Kolda would have less presence in origin than in residence.

5.4   Synthesis and final remarks

Table 5.3. displays a summary of this chapter's main findings. Overall, the exploration confirms that even though all the policy environments offer opportunities to let migrant associations be active in the localities and transnationally, differences among them emerge. Also, the chapter shows how these different approaches to co-development impact on migrant associations' agency. The findings are discussed according to place in the following paragraphs.

Regarding the Catalan localities, the findings show the extent to which local governments involved in co-development take different stances even if they all have been influenced by the trend set by Fons-Català. The main co-development policy paths for reaching out to migrant associations are conceived as activities aiming

towards training, and technical support for migrant associations to help them be able to formulate projects to submit for consideration in competitive funding processes initiated by the municipalities. To distinguish between the array of approaches employed by the municipalities, I apply the classification of 'nurturer' or 'neutral'. The findings show that when co-development is explicitly approached as a way to foster migrant empowerment – by giving close support, monitoring and training to migrant associations – this neither results in associations participating nor leads them towards demand to participate in local affairs in residence. The findings relate to the municipal level, and do not consider either the differences among civil society realities in each locality, or the specific historical background, strengths and weaknesses that Senegalese migrants acting collectively possess in each context. Nevertheless, the dynamics uncovered do suggest that nurturer modes towards co-development might be a compensatory mechanism fostered by sensitised stakeholders when pathways towards civic participation at municipal level in certain cities are more difficult.

In relation to the latter, in Mataró and Barcelona migrant associations are more likely to access consultation spaces and policy definition processes (in the case of Barcelona's migrant association). This finding may also reflect the stronger view that these municipalities have had regarding civic participation over time. For instance, Barcelona has been flagging its participatory arquitecture for some time, and, has been working with migrant collectives outside the international cooperation municipal area. Mataró, on the other hand, seems to have better followed a principle guiding the Fons-Català approach towards co-development: the importance of giving visibility and voice to migrant collectives through cooperation councils. Therefore, I argue that, in residence localities, neutral styles are linked with presence in settlement localities. Meanwhile nurturer approaches to co-development do not necessarily lead to more presence because they do not overcome a weaker inclusive environment towards civil society at municipal level.

It is also worth saying that, according to migrant representatives, the approaches in Girona and Lleida have made them feel empowered. Overall, though, excepting the Barcelona migrant association (the representatives of which tend to communicate

critical political views), the migrant associations do not problematize whether they have, or have not, experienced an underdog role in local governance.

The institutional dynamics in the origin context are different. The research shows the shortcomings in comparing Dakar and Kolda, regionally. Thus, they are two areas where cleavages based on periphery and centred positions can be applied. For the Barcelona migrant association, connection to the capital and aiming to have an impact upon the national sphere from the diaspora's structuration, along with central government policy-making are the main targeted fields. They reach presence in that policy environement, mostly through the fostered diaspora organisation. When considering Senegalese formal institutions in Kolda, the findings show that even though there are initiatives fostered at regional level to reach out to migrant associations (such as the Virtual Council), or spaces and processes where migrant associations could attend (such as the Harmonisation Conference, National Program for Local Development), hometown transnationalism seldom is visibilised. In addition, the analysis at municipal level (villages and counsellors represented in Rural Municipal Councils, the analysis of Local Development Plans) gives similar results. In Kolda, regional or municipal level initiatives towards development seem to happen while migrant associations are working behind the scenes. Therefore, consistent with the literature showing the problems of state penetration at local level in Senegal (Fanchette, 2011; Ribot, 2009; Ribot et al., 2006).

In section 5.3., another dimension of agency was set out when comparing different institutional dynamics in origin and residence. To what extent are migrant associations' perceived as having a role in local governance (and therefore enjoying legitimacy)? In origin contexts, legitimacy is very much dependent, discursively, on the level of studies and social background that is attributed to migrants. In residence contexts, legitimacy is underpinned by the perception of migrant Senegalese as a supportive and cohesive ethnic community. In the residence localities considered here and in the policy-making field of international cooperation, the Senegalese seemed to garner more legitimacy, than other migrant collectives.

However, whereas in residence, formal documents tend to depict migrant associations as development agents in places of origin, their legitimacy is contested in the origin

contexts. Often factors related to education, village-based identity or kin-based projects are suggested as migrant associations' difficulties in becoming 'good' development agents. This tendency could be parallelled to the transformation of international Senegalese migrants from – even if ambivalent – more heroic representations (Riccio, 2005), to more negatively nuanced migrants' social vision argued by Ceschi and Mezzetti (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014). According to these authors, the reshaping of migrants' images needs to be understood by bearing in mind the structural changes brought by the economic crisis at both ends of the mobility process (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014, p. 14). Moreover, the different legitimacy narratives stemming from officials and civil society actors could be interconnected to migrant associations' relative power in origin localities. Furthermore, the lesser degrees of legitimacy accorded to hometown transnationalism could also be linked to the difficulties for governmental stances at regional or municipal level to secure administrative rule and development strategies at lower governance's levels.

In the light of the processes uncovered, I argue that, when comparing policy environments in settlement and origin contexts, migrant associations have less presence (visibility and legitimacy) in Kolda than in the other localities. Assets-based factors such as education of representatives or organisational assets are connected to this aspect it. In fact, when appraising difficulties behind migrant associations' reaching presence, non-migrant interviewees – regardless of whether they are from origin or residence's contexts – point out that the education level or capacity and training available to undertake development projects is a major challenge faced by migrant associations. In these ways education and other factors may be connected to migrant associations' agency. This will be explored in the next chapter.

To conclude, at the end of this chapter, the main question arises: are the dynamics uncovered here saying that village-based migrant associations are powerless in origin? No, this is not what the evidence shows. By adding the exploration of migrant associations' assets into the equation, next chapter illustrates how other contributing elements in migrant association's agency occur at levels below the municipal one.

Table 5.3. Summary of findings: Formal institutions (local level), underpinning mechanisms and appraisal of migrant associations' agency

	Formal institutions: Policy environment towards M&D	Appraisal of migrant associations' agency: presence
RESIDENCE	1) <u>Modes of engagement with co-development</u> - Nurturer model (Girona, Lleida) - Neutral model (Barcelona, Mataró) Governments reaching out to migrant collectives through: - Training, capacitation - Funding through competitive calls - Technical support - Fostering participation in local exhibitions, festivals 2) <u>Existence of consultative local devices. Overall participation rationale of each government</u> - Municipal Councils - Different civic participation cultures	a) <u>Visibility:</u> - <u>Access to formal spaces (Municipal/Regional Councils):</u> Barcelona migrant association (in regional and municipal councils), Mataró migrant association. - <u>Access to policy definition processes:</u> Barcelona migrant assoc. in National Immigration Agreement, all the rest but Mataró's (where this did not take place) in Co-development Strategy workshops b) <u>Legitimacy</u> (perception of an organisation 'having a role in local governance'): - Cohesive community, 'essential' sense of solidarity among Senegalese <u>Difficulties for reaching difficulties for reaching agency:</u> limited political rights, different languages, migrants' literacy level, time/associations' assets. Lack of critical views from migrants to Local Governments, claiming rights
ORIGIN	1) <u>Modes of engagement with co-development</u> Most 'innovative' approaches towards M&D found at the peripheric regional level (Kolda). Dynamics in Dakar dominated by the national governance level. Governments reaching out migrant collectives through: - Contacts in origin, travels abroad - Local organisations linked to migrant associations - At National level, also deployment of governmental devices 2) <u>Existence of consultative local devices.</u> - Municipal Councils - Harmonisation regional Conference - High Council of Senegalese living abroad (central government)	a) <u>Visibility:</u> - <u>Access to spaces/policy debates:</u> Barcelona migrant association indirectly in High Council, national and international debates Girona migrant association (indirectly) in Regional Harmonisation Conference, Rural Council and Local Development Plan 2) <u>Legitimacy</u> (perception of an organisation 'having a role in local governance'): - Fragmented, village-based (in Kolda); solidarity, preparation of migrant representatives (in Dakar) Interest on migrants being 'structured' abroad to mobilise funds at local level <u>Views regarding difficulties for reaching agency:</u> literacy level, being presencially 'there', lack of structuration of migrant collective, view on 'terroir'

Source: Own elaboration

6 Migrant associations' assets and presence in residence and origin: from civic to political

Chapter 5 explored the variance of formal institutions across place and how this affects the agency of migrant associations. This chapter focuses on the analysis of interrelations between the variation of assets and agency. Assets of migrant associations are divided into three main dimensions: human, financial and organisational.

The agency of migrant associations is observed in its dimension of presence. Whereas in chapter 5 both visibility and legitimacy of presence were discussed, in the following discussion I only evaluate visibility. Hence, visibility is operationalized as a) the alliances and capacities of migrant representatives to connect with governments in the host country; b) access to local authorities in the context of origin; and c) visibility of migrant associations in electoral processes in the context of origin. Overall, the assets-based approach reveals how the axes of social stratification introduced in chapter 2 such as ethnic systems; kinship; gender; or nobility/allegiance systems; affect the agency of migrant associations.

The analysis is structured as follows. Section 6.1. disentangles the notion of assets in order to grasp the details of migrant associations' resources. First, the financial assets of the selected migrant associations are presented. Subsequently, organisational assets are discussed, and this is where issues regarding migrant associations' main characteristics and connections come to the fore. Finally, human assets reveal the key attributes and characteristics of migrant associations' representatives. The main focus of this section is put on the five selected migrant associations. In section 6.2. there is an examination of the relation between assets and presence. Therefore, subsection 6.2.1. explores presence in the context of residence by observing alliances established by migrant associations and the capacity of their representatives to operate at the across different governance levels. Then, the following two subsections look at presence in origin contexts. On one hand the relationship with local authorities in Kolda is explored (subsection 6.2.2) while, on the other hand, participation in electoral processes is appraised (subsection 6.2.3). In so doing, the presence of

migrant associations in Kolda, that remained hidden from view during the previous chapter, emerge as entities full of politics. Section 6.3. synthesises the main findings.

6.1 Assets of migrant associations

6.1.1 Financial assets

As chapter 4 shows, it is worth recalling that Senegalese migrants, individually and collectively, are a very important source of economic transfers to their country of origin. Migrants join and transfer resources collectively as well as for solidarity purposes. For instance, different interviewees identified, during fieldwork in Senegal, that migrants abroad collect money to be sent when a village has a problem (for instance due to floods or a loss of harvest). Thus, Senegalese transnational and collective solidarity happens regularly and there are documented examples of financial flows and collective action from those Senegalese settled in Catalonia which is directed towards their places of origin (See, for instance, Crespo Ubero, 2006; Lacomba et al., 2014; Morales and Jorba, 2010; Solé Arraràs, 2014; Sow, 2005). It is less often that this solidarity is undertaken through formal migrant organisations using official development assistance.

Indeed, as already mentioned, all the associations studied were able to access municipal public funds. These are resources that can be considered as fitting the definition of official development assistance set by the OECD. In this dissertation financial assets are defined as financial resources usable by migrant associations. Hence, Table 6.1. displays some of the characteristics of the financial resources accessed by the migrant associations studied here. These are examined in terms of the amounts mobilised at the local level in Catalonia, but also the role access to donors at different governance levels plays and/or connections to different broker organisations. First, the table indicates that the amount obtained by the associations differs, ranging from very small grants (below 20.000€) to larger sums. For example, over several years, migrants from Barcelona and Girona were able to access more than 70.000€). If we presume that most of these have been granted since 2006, the process linked to Girona's migrant association[121] has also been backed, for a

---

[121] To preserve the anonymity of associations' stories and representatives, the organisations are cited only by using the name of their locality of residence.

significant period of time, by public funds. Moreover, the cuts to budgets especially hit policy-making related to cooperation. This is reflected in the fact that migrant associations rarely failed to receive more funds year on year from the studied localities up until at least 2016 (the last year examined). When fieldwork took place in Senegal in 2012, projects had been accepted for funding some years earlier and, in some cases, these funding arrangements remained in place. The fifth column shows that, in accessing some grants, the two associations that received the highest amount of public funds from Catalan municipalities were able to do so in two ways. First, they either used more professionalised 'native' NGOs in which migrant representatives worked. Alternatively, in the case of the Girona migrant association, they also used a local partner association (settled in Kolda's region) which had received public funds from Catalan municipalities. Therefore, these organisations were able to use a 'friendly' organisation with stronger technical capacities and structures than the migrant associations themselves.

Moreover, all of the associations studied had established membership fees, even if they generally complained about the default ratio in relation to their payment. At the same time, although the co-development processes are highly dependent on the funding channelled through Catalan administrations, there are differences. For example, for the migrant associations in Mataró or Lleida, or the religious association from Girona, local public funds were the only source of funding apart from the membership fees. In contrast, the co-development processes of the migrant associations in Girona and Barcelona's involved accessing funds outside Catalan's municipal donors. This was particularly the case with the association in Girona where the local partner's association in Senegal raised funds from other donors, such as the EU. In addition, Barcelona's migrant association also raised support from donors such as International Organisations like the ILO. In both cases, fundraising from donors beyond the local governance level happened some time after receiving support from Catalan municipalities.

Before disentangling the types of assets held by migrant associations', it is important to highlight several factors. Even when considering the smallest amounts, the differences in the purchasing power between euros and CFA francs needs to be acknowledged. In addition, credence needs to be given to the effect of severe cuts in

international cooperation due to Spain's economic crisis. Further, consideration needs to be given to the Senegalese decentralisation process that entailed a serious lack of resources, during the fieldwork period in 2012. Hence, I was told just how important the raising of resources by migrant associations was for actors in origin. Therefore, migrants' capacity to mobilise economic resources through their associations holds a power that should not be equated with the actual amount of resources obtained. Rather, it is important to bear in mind the contexts in which each co-development process develops. At the same time, as the next subsections show, the focus of this research prioritises a demonstration of interconnections between obtaining public funds and resource acquisition from other groups of assets. The next follows up this discussion by presenting the results and analysis of migrant associations' organisational assets.

Table 6.1. Migrant associations' financial assets

Association	Description of project(s)/co-development processes	Catalan ODA funds allocated to the process. Amount's size*	Funding period**	Other 'friend' associations involved in access to funding in residence	Access to other financial resources (own funds from membership fees, other grants…)
Barcelona migrant association	Structuration of Senegalese Diaspora. Services to Senegalese emigrants in origin	Large grant	2006-2009	Yes ('native' organisation where the representative works)	Membership Other grants
Girona religious migrant association	Creation of a cereals' depository	Smaller than 20000	2007-2009	No	Membership
Lleida migrant association	Creation of a cow farm and alfalfa farming for the livestock	Medium grant	2006-2008	No	Membership
Mataró migrant association	Construction of a water well, water distribution and agricultural production	Medium grant	2008	No	Membership
Girona migrant association	Agricultural development in a rural municipality	Large grant	1999-2010 (trough mixed NGO, local partner and migrant association)	Yes ('native' organisation where the representative works, local partner association)	Membership Other grants (through local partner assoc. of origin)

Source: own elaboration from interviews, fieldwork, and analysis of Internet webpages and municipal and Fons-Català documentation. *Large grant when > 70000€ received; medium grant > 50000€ received; small grant > 20000€ received. **2016 last year checked.

6.1.2 Organisational assets

Organisational assets are those resources or attributes that can be linked to: associations' members; associations' general characteristics; scope of the association and scope of the project; and interlocking directorates that enable migrant associations to exert agency within the sphere of development. In contrast, to be clear, human assets, refer to migrant associations' leaders or representatives which are examined in the following subsection.

Table 6.2. syntheses the main dimensions of the organisational assets found that are relevant to an understanding of migrant associations' agency. It is important to bear in mind that these associations are embedded in a broader collective because they share the same national origin in a settlement context. Further, some of the themes relating to their assets can be partially illuminated by reference to European and North American literature discussing migrant civic communities and relations to local governments (Fennema, 2004; Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a).

Migrant associations' age, aims, size

In Table 6.2., we can see in the second column that the associations differ in the terms of how long they have been formal (registered) associations. These range from 1998 (Girona's migrant association) to 2006. It is also possible to understand this range in parallel to the development of co-development policy-making in Catalonia. For example, co-development was first adopted by Fons-Català's assembly at a time when that institution had a privileged view of what was happening in the area of Girona in 1997. Similarly, the deployment of municipal policy-making in Lleida can be seen as affecting the creation of the studied migrant association there. The third column shows, on the one hand, that ethnically all of the associations are quite homogeneous (excepting Barcelona's migrant association). On the other hand, the allocation of one main typology does not preclude the fact that the association may undertake other activities (such as cultural events, or support for the migrant community). Column number three also defines the association's aims by following a taxonomy of Catalan Senegalese organisations defined by Sow (Sow, 2005). Therefore, apart from the last three aspects which are mainly focused on international

cooperation, Barcelona's migrant association is a federation of Senegalese associations in Catalonia, regardless of the ethnic background of the organisations, and Girona's religious migrant association is based on a Tijanism's brotherhood.

Apart from Lleida, the size of the associations is quite similar (column 4 in Table 6.2.). Here is important to notice that Lleida's migrant association was created ad-hoc in the context of Lleida City Council's co-development policy framework. Moreover, during the interviews, many interviewees shared their insight that, in the end, only a small group of people was actively working in the association. It was also widespread, at time of the fieldwork, that the economic crisis had affected membership and participation.

<u>Male associations, mainly focused on 'terroir'</u>

All the associations share the characteristic (column 5 in Table 6.2.) that women generally are excluded from power or management posts. Barcelona's migrant association, however, did state that there was a woman on its board. This result reflects the lack of women-led migrant associations that are able to access the local government ODA. Insights gained from processes of data-base building and fieldwork show that patriarchy is at work in this field. Further, different actors from local governments or autochthonous civil society raised this concern and wanted to empower women to act collectively in public funded co-development. The result also echoes both the demographic structure of migrant Senegalese (a majority of them are males) and Senegalese social structures, where formal or informal associations reproduce cleavages based on age or gender. When asked, a migrant representative explained that women are discriminated against, and that this is partially due to machismo but also to religious custom:

> It is difficult to eliminate the discrimination of women. Africans are a bit 'machistas'. 50% [of the principle for discrimination] is because of machismo. The remaining 50% is because of religion. Because religion does not allow us to come together. For example, [if] we come together here. The women [would be] apart, the men apart.
>
> *Migrant representative, Girona, September 2009, my translation from Spanish (P32)*

During visits to a village in Senegal, I always asked whether they knew migrant women who were organised and/or performing development activities. A migrant settled in Catalonia, who was visiting his hometown and belonged to at least two migrant associations, explained the situation. This person said that women were very well organised and they helped each other. In Catalonia, though, they appear to be involved but in ways that are less structured and more isolated:

> Q: Are the women organized?
>
> A: Here, yes. [In Senegal]
>
> Q: And there? [In Catalonia]
>
> A: Everyone goes about their business, frankly. But here women are very organized, to help each other. There, no. There we, men, are.
>
> *Conversation with migrant while visiting a village, Kolda region, August 2012, my translation from Spanish (P69)*

Generally, when considering the array of interviews with migrant representatives, the lack of women's participation in associations in a settlement context is seldom tackled. Although this may change with younger generations, interviewees pointed to the assumption that women support migrant associations' activities by cooking or taking care of children. At the same time, bearing in mind that almost all projects have a local partner in the context of origin (this is often a formal requirement by donors to assure the project's implementation), in the case of Kolda men are the most represented on local partners' boards.

As regards to the scope of the associations' actions, apart from Barcelona's migrant association, the remainder all implement hometown projects. It is worth noting that the territorial scope (a region, or a rural community) of a certain association cannot be equated with the scope of the project. As we will see, scope is sometimes based on the hometown of (some) associations' leaders. And indeed, in some cases, this turns out to be a source of conflict, as the literature on co-development has also indicated (Nijenhuis and Broekhuis, 2010). Barcelona's migrant association has a regional remit in Catalonia, but their international projects attempt to have national or international influence. Girona's religious migrant association is not, essentially, a hometown association but has been instrumental in encouraging the considered

migrant representative to start a hometown project. Lleida's religious migrant association initially gathered Fula people from different villages, but the project was focused on some migrants' hometown. Mataró's and Girona's associations can be considered to be connected to particular villages. In the case of Mataró, the project takes place within the associations' field of action. In the case of Girona, as long as the association represents a rural community that gathers together several villages, it has to deal with the different hometown-bias of migrant associations' leaders.

In fact, comparing the initiative fostered by Barcelona's migrant association (which, in itself, is a different type of organisation) and the other migrant associations, one can find a strong influence of the territory of belonging upon how associations are structured and the scope of their projects. Different people in Senegal speak of an attachment to 'terroir' by emigrants, a statement that often comes together with a more or less concealed view that emigrants do not have the capacities to overcome this relationship. The next evidence is from a Senegalese working in a Kolda NGO:

> [Regarding the definition of projects led by migrant associations] I could not say that it's a family thing, but above all it's related to the terroir of belonging, because, for example, associations there are also crumbled: they are small groups and the groups have a territorial correspondence here. So that is linkage. With the ACCD [Catalan Development Agency] there was the program with ARD [Kolda Development Agency], which implied a wider intervention. But, overall, co-development projects were based on the association of emigrants there. The project brings together people from the same 'terroir'. This is completely understandable for the level they [migrants] have.
>
> *Civil society representative, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P40)*

In any case, the analysis shows (see, also Lavigne Delville, 2010), that there is a strong focus of Senegalese associations on 'terroir' (as is said in French). 'Terroir' refers to the territory of belonging, that is, a village or group of villages (usually under a rural community) from where migrants originate. Apart from complaints from Senegalese actors about the lack of strength and structuration of migrant associations, as highlighted in chapter 6, the research also noticed development actors in origin (Senegal) problematizing migrants' prioritisation of their territory of belonging. Thus, some views from a context of origin (in Kolda) claim that migrants

would rather be more focused on causes, needs or rights that need to be addressed over the whole territory.

Migrant associations as an expression of civic communities

The column showing interlocking directorates in Table 6.2. (column number 7) gives a description, inferred from the qualitative approach taken in this research rather than from a network analysis, that shows whether the associations' representatives link organisations. Within the civic communities' literature, Fennema and Tillie use the concept of interlocking directorates to measure the structure of ethnic organisations. In their view, 'persons who are simultaneously members of more than one board create [an interlocking] among boards that contributes both to the cohesion of the ethnic elite and to the horizontal communication among ethnic organisations' (see Fennema and Tillie 2010:714). According to this definition, the research shows that representatives from Barcelona's migrant associations are indeed involved in other associations. For example, the representative of Girona's religious migrant association had been involved in the first Catalan–Senegalese co-development NGO and in other associations attached to the Senegalese community. The person interviewed from Lleida's migrant association had also been involved in another association (older than that created in 2006) and was active within the Senegalese network in Lleida. Mataró's migrant association representative remained active in another association, but also within the Senegalese in the Mataró and Soninkara diaspora's network. Meanwhile, in Girona's migrant association, the representatives are also present in other organisations such as Barcelona's migrant association.

Table 6.2. Migrant associations' organisational assets

Association	Formal creation	Typology (Ethnicity)	Size (members)	Women's presence	Scope of association. Type of linkage to the locality where the project takes place	Interlocking directorates
Barcelona migrant association	2003	Federation (Senegalese)	14-20 migrant associations from different Catalan localities	Low, one member in Directorial Board	Not a Home Town Project, Diaspora (led by Barcelona's) project	Yes
Girona religious migrant association	2000	Religious (Mainly Fula)	60 (in 2011)	No women on the Board	Home Town Project (kinship), but not Home Town Organisation	Yes
Lleida migrant association	2006	International cooperation (Fula)	5 approx	No women on the Board	Home Town Project (kinship), but not Home Town Organisation (not all the founders were not from village where it takes place)	Yes
Mataró migrant association	2003 (or 2001?)	International cooperation Soninkara	45	No women on the Board	Home Town Project (kinship)	Yes
Girona migrant association	1998	International cooperation (Fula)	56 (in 2011)	No women on the Board	Home Town Project (kinship)	Yes

Source: own elaboration from interviews, fieldwork, and analysis of Internet webpages and municipal documentation.

6.1.3 Human assets

I define human assets as those resources related to the attributes of associations' representatives that equip migrant associations to use economic, social and political opportunities, in order to perform development actions and to adapt to, or transform, civic and political spheres.

The synthesis of the representatives' assets of the considered associations (see the second column in Table 6.3. shows the posts that the considered representatives hold in the association. All the studied representatives are men, they are settled in Catalonia, and most of them have lived in Spain for more than 20 years. They thus have a stable situation in terms of citizenship (either with a long-permit or Spanish citizenship). These findings are consistent with quantitative predictive models of transnational political participation ('electoral and non electoral activities aimed at influencing conditions in the home country') undertaken by Latin-American migrants in the USA (Guarnizo et al., 2003).

The other results in the table can be understood to deepen the comprehension of migrant representatives' attributes and social ties with those migrants' communities of origin and their involvement in transnational practices. Therefore, the next columns show information about representatives' social status based on nobility/allegiance systems; their kin relations within the co-development process in origin; their education (or development-related training) level; or the representatives' political experience. According to the fieldwork, all these aspects seem to be relevant to an understanding of the dynamics of the migrant association's agency. In consequence, the aspects that need to be outlined regarding each of these dimensions are now explored.

The puzzle of migrant representatives' education level

First, regarding their level of education, all representatives – with the exception of Barcelona's migrant association and Girona's migrant association – have only attained primary education (see column number five of Table 6.3.). During fieldwork, only one out of four representatives with a primary education level said he had followed some kind of project management or development training. This was the

case of the person who had undertaken the municipal training course on co-development organised by Lleida's City Council. Mataró's migrant association representative had followed development training put in place by the Fons-Català and Girona's NGO platform in 2014, but this happened once the project was already defined and had started. The responses from the representative from the religious migrant association in Girona were different in the two interviews undertaken. He said he did not follow any training regarding development or international cooperation projects in one interview but in another he mentioned training undertaken in Girona. My interpretation is that this person was present, or knew, when a training session was held, but he did not follow the sessions consistently. Fons-Català, for example, has undertaken training events around Catalan cities since 1999 or 2000. In contrast, Barcelona's migrant association and Girona's non-religious migrant association had well trained leaders. Further, as in the extracts below, some of the interviewees express the strength and influence that the training experience had exerted on their co-development practices. For instance, the next interviewee, a Senegalese migrant representative, highlights the literacy level of Girona's migrant association founder when mentioning his capacity to foster co-development among the Senegalese collective:

> [Migrants] who came here before were people who had no education... and when [migrant representative's name] came, the guy came from the university! He had more brain than us.
>
> *Migrant representative, Girona, September 2009, my translation from Spanish (P14)*

The next interviewee, an expert on international migration working for an International Organisation, when asked how he would characterise the Senegalese collective living in Catalonia, identified few visible leaders, all of them with post-secondary education. Indeed, the first three of them were also representatives of the Barcelona's migrant association (one of them, more specifically, was behind the promotion of the organisation for Senegalese abroad, while another was the president of Barcelona's migrant association). Finally, the last-named person is considered to be the founder of Girona's migrant association. In short, two of the selected associations have (or have had) representatives that are the spearheads of the Senegalese migrant collective in Catalonia.

In Spain you end up always finding the same of them [migrant representatives]. In Madrid you have 2-3, in Catalonia, we know them all: [the interviewee identify three people]. You have a few that are very good, but let's say there is a majority which has some characteristics more based on land, less literate, less educated, perhaps (with a more popular instruction, we could also say). Maybe I am generalizing, but it is my perception after having seen them for a long time. And Catalonia is a case where they are really well organized with respect to the rest of Spain.

International organisation representative, Dakar, September 2012 (P24)

Hence, as regards to education, whereas quantitative studies such as Guarnizo's et al. found that 'both high school and college graduations lead to significant increases in the probability of political transnationalism' (Guarnizo et al., 2003, p. 1229), the present research on Senegalese migrant associations was not able to shed light on the relationship between migrant representatives' education level and the number of political transnational activities undertaken by migrant representatives within the frame of migrant associations. As explained in chapter 1, the socio-demographic structure of Senegalese citizens living in Catalonia would suggest the hypothesis that it is a collective with high co-development activity and low education level.

The cross-cutting emergence of nobility/allegiance systems

Second, regarding the representative's previous political experience in origin before migrating from Senegal (see column number five of Table 6.3.), representatives differed as to whether they had belonged to political parties or associations in origin. Of course, these associations would not necessarily have been migrant focussed. Interviewees from the migrant association in Barcelona and the religious organisation in Girona stated they were involved in different movements in Senegal when they were younger.

In contrast, other background characteristics – such as the position that the representatives hold within the nobility/allegiance system that they are associated with – emerge as being a far more crosscutting trait. One of the initial motivations of this research was to observe whether there were substantial differences between associations according to their ethnic configuration. Indeed, understanding interviewees ethnic dimension was a part of the research design. However, during

fieldwork in Kolda and through interviews the nobility/allegiance systems arose even though I had not planned for this when I first designed the research and interview guides. In fact, I started asking about this in Catalonia after fieldwork in Senegal (undertaken in 2012). Therefore, as a result of this study, it is worth highlighting that, in the case studies considered, apart from gender (male) or settlement status in residence, the considered representatives shared positions within the nobility/allegiance system (see column number six of Table 6.3.). More specifically, although in some cases this was a taboo subject to raise, I found out – or indirectly inferred – that all the associations' representatives I spoke to, except for one (this association does not appear on the table), are considered to be categorical 'nobles'.

When I had the opportunity to speak openly about this issue with some of the interviewees, the subject was presented as a social marker invisible to those who were either Senegalese – but not native from the local context – or were foreigners. Notice, for instance, how the following migrant association's representative answers the question as to whether he is a noble:

> A: [...] In the rural community of [name of rural community] there are more of these people [slaves] than of us [nobles].
>
> Q: Are you noble?
>
> A: Yes.
>
> Q: How do you know, does your family tell you?
>
> A: You see, you talk, and you know it. There is a difference. If you are not there you can not know.
>
> *Migrant representative, Lleida, June 2014, my translation from Spanish (P18)*

Does this social stratification have any impact on associative dynamics? When it has been asked, Senegalese migrant representatives in Catalonia claim that nobility/allegiance systems do not affect the associations' life. They state that having the responsibility of leading an association is based on motivation, merit and preparation. Some of them affirm that this aspect from their residence context should disappear. Others explain that, because when they meet in Catalonia they do not know each other, nobility/allegiance can be overcome. The next excerpt, from a

migrant association's representative originally from Northern Senegal, reveals some of these puzzles:

Q: And you are noble?

A: That's what my parents tell me.

Q: How does it work?

A: I am noble. On behalf of my mother and on behalf of father [mother Serer and father Fula]. Because in [my area] we are the Boursin, the king of the area. I am a descendant of these.

Q: It's important, I suppose, it's a family legacy...

A: It was important. Yes, it is a family legacy. But now the power... you can not be powerful.

Q: (...) I wonder if the origin of the family of a person from an association in Catalonia has an impact on how this person is perceived in the place of origin (in the project there).

A: No. Because it depends on how the association is created. [For example] My name is XXX I come from Podor, you are from Matam, another person comes from Sant Louis, we are here in Girona, we have affinity, we are friends, we want to create an association. I do not know if you are noble or not.

Q: But what if I introduce myself as noble? [A: No ...]

Q: You do not know it by surnames?

A: No. There are people here who are not noble and are part of a board of directors of an association. They know how to do it. If I am noble and can not write, I can not be secretary or president.

Q: But do you think that if you are noble you are more likely to be on the board of directors?

A: Here in Catalonia, no. […] In Senegal, it depends on the area. In my area, now people do not talk about that. Because [...] [the capacity passes first].

There are places where I have seen a person who is not noble who is mayor ... It is changing. If the nobles do not have a certain level [of capacitation, they do not access positions of responsibility].

Q: But it can also happen that someone who is not noble is mayor but then the chef is noble, the traditional structure coexists with the colonial structure.

A: But time is changing these dynamics, a lot. People have experienced many problems with this issue. But now we have started to change things and it is the capacity that chooses you.

Migrant representative, Girona, June 2014, my translation from Spanish (P16)

In the above-piece of dialogue, the migrant representative argues that nobility/allegiance systems are deactivated in Catalonia because people do not know other members' backgrounds. Indeed, in cases such as the Barcelona's migrant association, nobility/allegiance systems do not seem to be relevant: the overall project and the association gather people from different territories and, mainly, it operates at levels that are beyond rural localities. In another migrant association case, the representative reasoned that all the seven households in the village are from a noble background; therefore, nobility/allegiance systems were not operating here as strongly as in other localities. However, when considering migrant associations connected to a village or to a group of villages close to each other, pre-knowledge and stigma seem difficult to ignore. In the next excerpt, the migrant representative underlines the point that a president of a rural community pleads allegiance to categorical nobles if he is a categorical slave. It is suggested that this is indeed the case in come assemblies in Catalonia:

> Q: If you are a slave, will people respect you less?
>
> A: No, they respect you the same. But the mayor, if he is a slave... [Q: will he feel in a lower level than the nobles?] Yes, yes, yes. They give you respect [if you are a noble, like the interviewee sees himself as being so].
>
> Q: And in the assemblies here in Catalonia?
>
> A: This is not discussed in the meeting, but everyone knows who the other is. Now they [categorical slaves] get more solidarity to overcome things, but it's not that easy.
>
> *Migrant representative, Girona, June 2014, my translation from Spanish (P14)*

In fact, two of the considered cases expose conflict dynamics that can be linked to nobility/allegiance systems. These internal dynamics are detected when there are outspoken conflicts within the association, most often regarding the management of the co-development process and the social, political or material benefits of it. Overall, in Catalonia nobility/allegiance systems seem to affect some of the Senegalese migrant associations' structure in aspects such as hierarchical position within the associations' boards. Also, in some cases it affects the hierarchy across associations within the same collective. This is perceived, for instance, when a president of an association shows allegiance (that is, shows respect or recognises the hierachy)

towards the president of another migrant association representative. This allegiance can be expressed verbally, or can imply, for example, that the lower association refrains from participating in a certain space that 'belongs' to the other association.

As already mentioned, it was thanks to the fieldwork in Senegal that I could have a clearer picture of what was occurring, because nobility/allegiance systems are often unknown by municipal staff in Catalonia. Moreover, this issue is not raised by migrant representatives. In fact, regarding Catalan 'native' interviewees, only the two anthropologists mentioned this issue. The next excerpt shows how one of these people sensed the influence of nobility/allegiance systems. The quote suggests that even if the person states that he/she does not exactly know how this influence operates, he/she senses that migration and access to economical resources linked to international cooperation affect (upwards) the former social position a migrant representative held before in their origin context. The interviewee gives two different examples of this, both connected to two of the selected cases:

> He was noble because of the projects he brought to the Fula community. […] It is the perception that I have. I also know other nobles who are based on gerontocracy, and people do not kiss their hand. But, [with this migrant] I have seen it live. […] When you are less than 50 years old, having someone kissing your hand... This is because you are distributing money from cooperation.

> [...] I do not speak idle talk. You can question me that I do not have evidence, but these are things that I have lived. I have bumped into them. In [studied village in origin] there are two noble ones. They are old people. And I asked, why are there two noble persons? And they told me that one was the one who came from France and the other from Spain. Migration also gives you status. Then, in [studied village in origin], they are divided. There is a man who has been in the metropolitan area of Paris that is a very powerful noble, and the one who comes from [village in Catalonia], is another noble. So, once they have come back home from their migrant foreign location, already old, they are in conflict.
> *Expert, Barcelona, April 2016, my translation from Catalan*

Migrant representatives relationship with chieftaincy

Apart from the nobility/allegiance system, kin relations stand out as driving agency and co-development processes in some of the cases. It is especially important to

understand kinship in relation to village chiefs (see column number seven of Table 6.3. As the table shows, kin linkages are found between partner associations' boards in origin and migrant associations' representatives (at least in Girona's religious association, in those in Lleida's and also from Girona). In two out of these three cases the associations' leaders are directly connected to village chiefs by kinship. It is worth saying, too, that according to Senegalese interviewees, nobility is not univocally linked to chieftaincy. That is, one can be a village chief (because the person's ancestors founded the village) and not be considered to be a noble. This is explained by a migrant representative below:

> A: […] I have two brothers there, the older brother is the village chief. The chief is the [the eldest]. It is as if he were the king, until he dies, the little brothers can not [become chiefs]. This is an old tradition. There will come a day when this will be voted (the government of Senegal is changing things)
>
> (...)
>
> Q: Chief and nobility do not have to go together?
>
> A: No, not at all.
>
> *Migrant representative, Girona, June 2014, translation from Spanish (P14)*

Authors such as the sociologist Kleist have studied the phenomenon of the constant transformation of chieftaincy 'in an era marked by globalization, international migration, and neo-liberalism' by focusing on people bearing traditional authority who return to hometown villages in Ghana as village chiefs (Kleist, 2011, p. 18). Fieldwork revealed that this type of phenomenon was also happening within migrant Senegalese residing in Catalonia. During fieldwork in Senegal, in one related-association (that was not finally selected and therefore not shown in the table) there was evidence that one of these 'return' chiefs was linked to co-development processes financed by Catalan municipalities. Interviewees told me there were also other similar cases. The research did not deal with 'returned' village chiefs, but the final selected cases revealed that, in the configuration of hometown migrant associations linked to co-development, the connection to chieftaincy affects migrant associations' agency. This point is discussed in more depth later.

Therefore, in the next section, after the following synthesis table, there will be further discussion on these processes, particularly by exploring in more detail the relationship that assets have with the presence of migrant associations.

Table 6.3. Migrant associations' human assets

Association	Migrant leader's n years living in residence	Territorial origin/Ethnic group	Literacy (or training) level	Previous political experience	Kin relations within project
Barcelona migrant association	23 years	Northern Senegal/Fula	Higher education	Youth movement or Human Rights Movements (left-wing)	No knowledge of connection.
Girona religious migrant association	30 (or more years)	Kolda/Fula	Primary education	Former active associative member in his village	Brother of village chief
Lleida migrant association	16 years	Kolda/Fula	Primary education (training on development projects in Lleida)	..	Strong. Project coordinator not attached to village chief. But the president of the migrant association is village chief's son.
Mataró migrant association	36 years	Kolda/Soninke	Primary education (training on development projects in 2014)	..	The president grew in another village. Connection to village via mother, brothers live in project's village, but not knowledge of their representation in local partner's board.
Girona migrant association	At least 20 years	Kolda/Fula	Higher education	..	No knowledge of direct connection with chiefs. But strong linkages of the association and projects with family members (also through local partner).

Source: own elaboration from interviews, fieldwork, and analysis of Internet webpages and municipal documentation

6.2 Presence through migrant associations having linkages to sources of political power

6.2.1 Presence in residence, at different governance levels: connected with educational assets

Presence in residence is observed through the connections of migrant representatives and also migrant associations' relationship with other actors (see Table 6.4.). Column number two of Table 6.4. shows that there are differences regarding migrant representatives' capacity to connect to governments between the selected associations. The cases of the representatives from the migrant associations in both Barcelona and Girona stand out as being very able to contact governments at different governance levels (from municipalities to the EU or Senegalese national government). In the first case, the president is widely perceived as a mediator and a spokesperson of Senegalese or migrants in Catalonia. Further, Barcelona's migrant association secretary had been working for a long-time in the Catalan administration. In the case of Girona's migrant association, the founder of the association worked in a Catalan 'native' NGO and also in places like Fons-Català, ACCD or AECID. He is perceived as a key person in fostering co-development policy in Catalonia.

Alliances are considered as further evidence of presence and are measured by looking at whether an association is connected to public institutions at different governance levels (column 3, Table 6.4.) and, also, by observing whether they have had connections with 'native' individuals or 'native' civil society organisations in residence (column 4, Table 6.4.). These two measures, called alliances 1 and 2 in the table, are based on Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad's conceptual framework for assessing civic presence (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a, p. 20). Here, on the one hand, most associations do not often have connections with other governmental actors apart from their municipalities (the exception being Barcelona's migrant association and, during one period when they had more intense activity, in Girona's association). On the other hand, excepting Mataró's migrant association, they had – or are having – contact with native associations or people at some period in their association's lifetime which shows the presence of these migrant associations. This contact contributes to agency in different ways. For example, it can fuel

a motivation to create an association and 'do' co-development with Catalan governments, support the access to local governments, help with writing down and formulating projects to access grants. Furthermore, support of native people or their organisations emerges during conversations as key moments in the migrant association's lifetime.

In addition, the results point to the Senegalese migrant associations considered here as participating in different networks of the same migrant group. Taking into account the relationships the associations claim they are maintaining, and also whether representatives know each other, the cases here suggest that there is a more cohesive network of gathering elites and associations from Girona and Barcelona. Lleida plays a more peripheral role. In contrast, Mataró's migrant association (Soninke) seems to be enmeshed in a network that is functioning in another sphere. The representative, for instance, did not know of the existence of Barcelona's migrant association, an umbrella known by all the other interviewees even when their association was not a member. However, Soninke does belong to an assembly in Mataró (which gathers together the different Senegalese associations), and also to an international network of the Soninkara diaspora.

The analysis of these findings, from an assets-based approach, shows two main dynamics regarding assets and presence. First, there is the migrant representatives' higher education level, larger financial assets, and a greater number of positive connections from their migrant association to other actors at different governance levels in origin and residence. Hence, the two migrant associations that have been able to connect to a multiplicity of actors at different governmental levels (also national or global) share the characteristic of having well educated representatives and founders (this refers to the migrant association in both Barcelona and Girona.

Second, the networks that are horizontal (between Senegalese associations) and vertical (considering governments, or autochtonous NGOs) provide evidence of how the ethnic belonging of migrant associations are intertwined and connected to presence in residence. Thus, the association in Barcelona claims that they are not an ethnically-based organisation. This is despite some claims in Kolda stating that the association mostly represented Senegalese from Northern areas of the origin country, Nevertheless, Fula associations are more likely than the Soninke associations to be connected to the Barcelona

association. Girona and Lleida Senegalese migrant representatives are connected to different degrees with this Barcelona migrant association. Lleida's migrant representative, for instance, explained the possibility of creating a federations' branch in the city in 2014. In Girona, this mode already existed. Being associated to Barcelona migrant association is potentially a vector for presence, as the organisation gives opportunities to its members for potential performance within political and governmental spheres. In contrast to the rest of the studied associations, Mataró's migrant association belongs to ethnic-based horizontal networks (Soninke, at local and international level) and is not linked to the other considered associations (with mostly Fula, Wolof members…). Hence, in comparing Mataró's migrant association with the others, there appears to be a lack of strong pathways connecting it to governments. This, therefore, would weaken Mataró's migrant association's presence.

Table 6.4. Migrant associations' presence in residence: connections and alliances

Association	Governance level connection of representative(s) to governments in settlement	Alliances-1*	Alliances-2**
Barcelona migrant association	Local to European levels	Yes	Strong
Girona religious migrant association	Local level	No	Strong
Lleida migrant association	Local level	No	Strong
Mataró migrant association	Local level	No	Weak
Girona migrant association	Local to European levels	Yes (diminished over time)	Strong (diminished over time)

Source: own elaboration from interviews, fieldwork, and analysis of Internet webpages and municipal documentation. *Alliances 1: Connection of the association to other public institutions at different governance levels in residence. Alliances 2**: Connection of the association with 'native' individuals or associations in residence.

6.2.2 Presence in origin: connection to traditional authorities drives migrant voice in village affairs

This subsection seeks to assess the agency of migrant associations by examining their visibility as operationalized by the access of migrant associations to local authorities in origin. Chapter 5 revealed that the visibility of migrant associations in consultative spaces or in policy documents such as the local development plans were scarce in Koldan origin localities. It seemed that migrant associations were invisible in local level policy-making and decision-taking processes. However, as the description of the associations' human assets shows, it is likely that the paths towards local influence are also to be found in kin relations. Indeed, in some cases migrant associations' boards are directly connected to local traditional authorities like village chiefs and nobles. Therefore, in the case of some associations, by only considering access of migrant associations to formal spaces or policy definition processes in origin, I had overlooked other ways to be present and exercise influence.

Accordingly, regarding our units of study, it is important that I should consider Girona's religious migrant association or those in Lleida, as potentially having more presence in origin than I had previously understood. But my previous assumption would not be sufficient, as an intersectional analysis nuances the power dynamics in each case. If we take Lleida's migrant association, for instance, it is an eloquent case of how chieftaincy and migrant associations' representation may cause friction. Indeed, in the case of this migrant association, the first president of that organisation was the person who first moved on the co-development initiative, who was trained by the Lleida City Council and had fostered the project. Later on, once the grant was given and the project was launched, he was relegated to occupy the position of project coordinator while the village chief's son (also living in Lleida) occupied the presidency. Both the migrant association's president and the local partner association's president in origin were village chief's sons, and, when it came to the project management, communication between the village and the migrant association was not easy. Fights in a residence context, with regard to who is the project's spokesperson in origin, have different impacts. For instance, as the person who was once the facilitator of the project (a Fula woman based in Kolda who moved to the village where the project was taking place for a while) explained, the project coordinator in Lleida and

the president in Lleida gave contradictory messages. This made the management of the process in origin more difficult:

> Something that was discouraging in this project is that there are several voices in the [migrant association of Lleida]. [One] calls me, he tells me to do this. Tomorrow the president [name] calls and tells me do the other. And then I go to the [hometown village] and he called there to say that other things should be done.
>
> *Civil society representative, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P42)*

In the previous example, rank within the migrant association seems mainly to be grounded on lineage and chieftaincy. As has been mentioned, the families in the village above are all from 'noble' origin. In the case of another migrant association studied I am aware there is a direct connection to chieftaincy (the considered migrant representative acted as migrant associations secretary, while also being the brother of the chief where the co-development project developed). Therefore, it is fair to say that within the co-development process the migrant representative had a say in matters because of this connection by kin. However, this was not the case with the migrant association where the migrant representative used the association as a platform to ask for funding in relation to a project but did not involve the association. In this case, then, the migrant representative gained presence in origin in the context of the co-development process, but the migrant association was invisible for the community in the village. In other words, the migrant representative who launched it was directly connected to the village's chief. However, I consider that presence of the migrant association had in the village was undermined.

In turn, to add more factors into the analysis, how are allegiance/nobility systems also affecting the agency of migrant associations? Different dynamics can be described according to the research. Firstly, in relation to origin, the fieldwork displays evidence of how, in some cases, migrant representatives' social status according to caste or allegiance/nobility system are intersecting with chieftaincy. The next piece of testimony, from the region of Kolda, speaks about conflicts between migrant associations attached to a rural community that are based on what he calls the existence of castes and people that are considered as (classificatory) slaves. In fact, in the next dialogue he also expresses how this categorisation works:

A: [Regarding whether ethnic belonging affects the associative dynamic] It does if you are a member of the association. But if you are an employee, it is less visible. But there are caste problems. There were families that were slaves of others and vice versa, there is that kind of problem. In [village], and the emigrants who are there, that is their existence.

[…]

A: There, in that village there are people who are considered as 'slaves', at the caste level. The [representatives of the migrant association] are considered noble. [...] [The family of the representative of the migrant association] is noble, the people you went to visit in [town] are not noble and that is a problem. That is the whole battle.

[…]

A: It's difficult for us. But I say it so that you know, so that you understand. If they do meetings [the caste system affects them] But there are gains, changes, certainly it was difficult at the beginning [for them, as an association].

Q: How do you overcome it?

A: We must have equity...

Q: But how do you do it if someone is identified as a slave?

A: It must also be said that some do not consider themselves slaves, but they are categorized as slaves.

Q: Who categorizes them?

A: The people. They use the names to categorize the slaves. There are some who are slaves from their name too.

Civil society representative, Kolda region, September 2012 (P38)

The description involves associations considered as case studies during fieldwork (even though one of them was finally not included in the presented tables). Indeed, as a researcher, I have been able to observe these tensions even though the nobility/allegiance relationships were left unspoken. In this sense, the quoted interview helped me understand the dynamics I was witnessing. The dynamics affected a migrant association that I will call Y and its relationships with other members of this same association with actors in the region (including one of the studied migrant association). Thus, the core of the conflicts can be simplified as a higher-ranked group having established an association and a lower-ranked group also trying to be involved in co-development within the same territory in origin. The lower-ranked group's representatives are currently managing migrant association Y based in a Catalan village, which is undertaking a project in village X within the same rural community as the studied migrant association. The former president of this lower-ranked migrant association Y is the chief of village X. At the same time, the current

(lower-ranked) migrant association's president (originally from another village close to X, is the son of the first *Président de la Communauté Rurale* to which village X belongs) while its secretary (who is from village X, but I suspect from a lower status in origin than the village chief/migrant/ex-president of the lower-ranked migrant association) were not connected to X's village chief. Therefore, the current president of migrant association Y is very cautious about acting in the village where his father was the first mayor (PCR) because there is another group with a higher rank operating there. And, also, the current board of migrant association Y has problems in X because of their rank within the village.

Therefore, according to these examples of relations within and between associations, the presence of an association is influenced by the nobility/allegiance system in two ways. First, members categorised as slaves may have their voice undermined in decision-taking processes; second, migrant associations governed by 'classificatory slaves' (Rossi, 2015, p. 323) may also have to navigate the expectations and norms of a local origin context where caste-based systems or slavery/allegiance systems are functioning. Besides, overall, hometown migrant associations display strong kin connections with local partners. Indeed, migrant and local partner associations (in origin and in residence) reflect on, and reinterpret these aspects. Hence. power relations based on informal institutions functioning in origin villages maintain an affect.

Secondly, within the residence contexts, different interviewees highlighted that the influence of these types of categories becomes diluted as time goes by, or that they are do not apply in Catalonia anymore. However, it is likely that allegiance/nobility systems may affect presence in residence contexts. In parallel with the social filter that makes categorical nobles more likely to access representative positions within the associations, some migrant associations may also be excluded – by their own same-national-origin community – from accessing social or political spaces in Catalan localities where there is Senegalese migrant density. By 'migrant density' I am referring to the number of migrant associations in a certain locality, but also the probability of encountering people sharing geographical origin. In relation to this, ethnographers have accounted for analogous dynamics in countries such as France (Lavigne Delville, 2010).

6.2.3 Presence in origin: When co-development and running local elections get mixed up

In this section, the presence of migrant associations is observed in origin by assessing the visibility of migrant representatives in electoral processes. As explained in chapter 4 when talking about Senegal's decentralised system, following the 'first alternance' from president Diouf to president Wade in 2000, local governments and authorities were given more power in Senegal. Since then, interviewees explain that the interest in becoming a *Président de la Communauté Rurale* (or mayor; in French, usually called PCR) or a village chief has increased. As people involved in development projects and villagers were describing during a conversation in a village in 2012, the motivation to access elected positions in local governments has also reached migrants:

> Q: Are there political transfers? For example, emigrants who become presidents of rural communities.
>
> A (several): This is frequent.
>
> Q: Migrants who can influence electorally?
>
> A: Obviously. There is the case of X, he lives in Portugal and is the mayor of [village]. Here there is [Catalan migrant]... Now this is frequent.
>
> Q: Why now and not before?
>
> A (1): Before, in Senegal, only the old men were interested in politics. (...)
>
> A (2): There is another aspect that is financial. Since the alternation [Wade, 2000], PCRs have more power. Not only power, but money: there is a salary, there are projects getting to them everywhere. So now it has become something interesting, attractive [Someone else says that village chiefs also have a salary, and now everyone wants to become a village chef, when before it was the people who had an authority... and that has changed a lot] .
>
> *Conversation with local partner representatives while visiting a village, my translation from French Kolda region, August 2012, my translation from French (P72)*

A representative, at that time, of the Kolda Regional government recognised that they were increasingly witnessing migrants returning to become mayors, and connected this dynamic to the enhancement of the local perception of migrants involved in co-development projects. He also stated that the migrant representatives linked to those projects can exert an enormous influence on their community:

A: Since this first alternation [Wade, 2000], rural communities have been valued. Before, the PCR did not have much power. (…) Now, they have an acceptable wage, their vehicle, their council, they have an assistant whith administrative and financial studies… They have some budget. Today what we notice is that those who have left, want to be president of the rural communities, they are numerous.

[...]

Q: Do you think that development projects can be used with political motivations?

A: It's mostly about having influence. It is not related with doing political trading, buying people... no. It's mostly in terms of influence, because when in a remote village there is a development project around an association, often you can have an association's name, but in reality they are only two people. And those two people are hyper-valued. While the project is there they can not be by-passed (…) Everyone listens to them.

Regional government level representative, Kolda, August, my translation from French 2012 (P53)

Another regional governmental representative in Kolda thought that communities' respect for migrants in origin was linked to their economic power (of 'financial assets', in the terms of the framework presented in this dissertation), that subsequently leads to political power:

It can be explained because they have a lot of respect. Because they have economic power, and when you have economic power, you have political power, normally. So the fact that they come back to become village chief, it can be always easy. You know, living in Europe for a villager is always a myth.

Regional government level representative, Kolda, interview held in Dakar, September 2012, my translation from French (P51)

In 2012, only one migrant representative linked to the selected associations had stood for an electoral process in the last local elections of 2009. He had lost. In 2014's round of interviews in Catalonia, the conversations were undertaken few weeks before the 2014 municipal elections. At that point several names of the migrant Senegalese settled in Catalonia attached to associations were mentioned as running for the 2014 elections to agree on becoming the *Président de la Communauté Rurale* (although not all the names and villages have been triangulated).

Among the associations followed in this research, apart from the person mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, there were two migrant representatives that had been proposed to run in the 2014 municipal elections in Kolda. Ultimately, neither of them proceeded.

They told me that they either did not have the time to gather all the necessary paperwork or they had only decided to run when it was too late and could not hope for a higher position on the electoral list. In the following interview, one of them (the representative from Lleida's migrant association) expresses how he feels supported and pushed by the elected people from his territory. In addition (not transcribed below), he also explained that he was going to be involved in campaigning in the next legislative elections (2017). It is worth highlighting that, in an interview held in 2009, he revealed that he was interested in domestic ('home') politics, in general. But at that time he did not express his willingness to run for PCR:

A: [About running for PCR] I almost run this year. Because now on the 29th there will be municipal elections. But since I was late, I had to be a counselor [not a mayor, PCR]. The top political leaders already have representatives in the area (in Kolda), with whom they have strong relationships, and those representatives know that if they take me they lose the elections, because everyone will vote for me as president of the Rural Community [...]

Q: Why do you think they would vote for you?

A: Because they tell me so. I'm sure.

Q: With which party you thought about concurring in the elections?

A: I started with the APR [Alliance pour la République], the one that governs now. [...] I tell you, I've thought about it too late, otherwise… People push you.

Q: Who pushes you? How does this work?

A: I'm pushed by those in the area, by the councilors of the area.

Q: Do they think people will vote for you because you are a respected person?

A: Of course. Respected, hardworking, who wants all the best for his people.

Q: Do you think that from a distance you could act as a president?

A: Sure. It will be better for the area. Because I have access to everyone. Even the president. For me it's easier to claim/ask for things, than for them.

Migrant representative, Lleida, June 2014, my translation from Spanish(P18)

The next transcription, shows a piece of conversation with two representatives of a migrant association (which was not finally selected to appear in the tables). One of these people was also told to run for PCR. He expressed the aspiration that his work as the association leader would give him the capacity to gain resources for the village. He connected his life abroad, and experience of the capacity to build up partnerships for subsequently channelling economic resources, as important qualities. It is said that, if you can gather in

Europe one million CFA Francs, that is, 1.500€, it means a lot of money for communities in Senegal. Both interviewees stress how there is a trend of migrants running for PCR by mentioning the existence of other experiences of Fula people (from Mali, for example). They also referred to a migrant representative that stood but did not win, which for them is an example of people only electing emigrants if they really think they can achieve benefits:

> A1: [About migrants running in local elections] Yes, lately this topic is coming out a lot. He, himself [the president of migrant association who also is in the interview], wanted to run this year.
>
> A2: As I vote here, I had to do all the paperwork... In the area there were many people behind me who supported me to run, but I was not really well prepared. People have come from my town, many people, telling me 'go for it'.
>
> Q: Why?
>
> A2: Well, they have hope. With what I am doing here with the association... Especially in our community, we spent more than two million FCFA this year for social action, it was not self-interest. Because of the well that we [the association] have built. We have built a warehouse. So far we have not disappointed.
>
> Q: Do you think that people trust you because of your performance as agents of development?
>
> A2: Yes, it gives confidence.
>
> A1: They appreciate us. It depends on what you have done. [Q: It depends on if you do it right?] and on how you did it! Because we also have the [migrant representative] that he wants to be elected and people do not vote for him!
>
> A2: For example, during the last two years that I went there, if I had mismanaged, they would have said 'the [president of migrant association] does not need to have so much responsibility'!
>
> Q: And do you think that you can have this kind of position, responsibility, living abroad?
>
> A2: Yes, because this can bring us partnerships. [...] In France, there is an emigration Senegalese collective from Fouta, now they are mayors. They are from there. Because of that, because they are very involved in the development [of their localities]. For example, if I'm not there for 6 months, I'm looking for partners here. One million FCFA [around 1.500€] that we take there is a lot for them! It's very important.
>
> *Migrant representatives, June 2014, my translation from Spanish (P17)*

These dynamics are not exclusively taking place in the Kolda region, but were also reported during an interview with an expert on Senegalese migration in the Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar. He has researched Northern Senegal (the River Valley). Below,

he explained how migrants (or former migrants) take responsibilities at local level, and also stressed that local contexts (cultural belonging, local realities) in origin can influence migrant action:

> We see that in the river valley, where I work [Senegal River Valley, Northern part of the country], most of the association leaders, or even politicians at the local level, are former migrants. The village chiefs, for example, people who are very important. You say that the country of origin can influence the form of migrant action, but also as much the locality in Senegal where the project is installed. Cultural belonging or local realities can influence how the investments of migrants work. Migrant participation follows a different model. In the valley, there is the chief of the village. He is very strong. If the chief of the village says that no one will participate [in some activity, everybody will follow the chief]. [...] It is not the same thing in Dakar , a neighborhood chief, a village chief here [in Dakar], he is not very important, he can not stop people from doing what they want.
>
> *Expert, Dakar, September 2012, my translation from French*

Taking a wider scope, there is evidence that having contact with co-development processes, particularly co-development projects supported by Catalan local ODA, also provides a platform for non-migrant Senegalese people to gain electoral success. For example, there was a case where the mayor of a village near the Gambian border, in the Kolda region, who founded a local NGO in order to work in his hometown. He did this after his experience in the important Koldan NGO (with which he was still involved at the time of the interview). The connections with migrant collectives in Catalonia that this important Koldan NGO maintains, are also key for his own NGO. Later on, after setting up his own local NGO in 2009, he became the PCR of the municipality:

> I have had many contacts with many emigrants too, and my association is called [deleted]. It is an association of producers based in the department of Medina Yéro Foula, which has received the support of many emigrants who are in Catalonia. […] So, the [migrant association based in Catalonia] often obtained financing and that allowed us to achieve some gardening perimeters in the area. [...] Taking into account all these experiences, when the village became a commune [municipality], I was elected at the head of this municipality, thanks to the experience boostering the development of this municipality.
>
> [...]
>
> I am in [this association receiving support from the migrant association] since 2002. I am still in [this association] and I continue to be the president of it. I am responsible for certain actions and for fighting to help grassroots associations to overcome difficulties. Before being [in this association], I was with a Belgian NGO

that gave birth to Foddé [...] I am the general treasurer of Foddé, I am part of the board of directors of Foddé.

Local government level representative, Kolda region, September 2012, my translation from French (P50)

An examination of these strands of information from the interviews above also draws a picture that fits uncomfortably within the depiction of liberal democracies as based on the desirable separation of market, civil society and state arenas which informs many Western views. Notably, many official discourses of international development are underpinned by this construction. When questioned about whether they see any incompatibility in working in development organisations and governments simultaneously, few civil society representatives express critical views. Quite the contrary, these concurrent double engagements are normalised by most of the interviewees. In fact, within ethnographic accounts about the local political arena in African societies, political anthropologists affirm that the co-existence of different and overlapping local political institutions (formal and informal) underpin a weak and patchy-distribution of the regulation of local politics. Therefore, apart from the state having less capacity to impose its rules, the phenomena above also results in the existence of associations or organisations that do not resemble political structures at first sight, but contain members who are also local official representatives (Bierschenk et al., 2010b, p. 10).

Even so, in some cases co-development processes appear to provide a platform for individuals launching political careers. Some of these representatives were interested in politics before migration (but had never worked for governments or run for elections), but not all of them. The representatives of Barcelona's migrant association or Girona's migrant religious association openly talked about their commitment within associations or political parties in origin, before migrating to Europe. But others, such as the representative of migrant associations in Lleida or Girona have become involved later in political activities in origin. Participation in local elections in origin localities, or the perception expressed by migrant representatives that they feel 'pushed' to run for government, may seem to fit oddly with the contested legitimacy of migrants in origin as development agents that was visible in chapter 5. However, political anthropologists working on the subject of brokerage and development have described the changing, and ambivalent nature, of power

relationships that take place when diverse social forms intersect within the 'aid' policy area (Bierschenk et al., 2010a; Lewis and Mosse, 2006).

The afore-mentioned work coordinated by Bierschenk, Chauveau and de Sardan that discusses issues of brokerage within the aid system took different Sub-Saharan cases (Bierschenk et al., 2010a). Lavigne Delville's chapter analysed the role of Senegalese migrant associations in France the members of which were originally from the Valley River (in Northern Senegal, also encompassing parts of Mali and Mauritania) and mainly Soninke and Fula (Lavigne Delville, 2010). Much of what is described by this author resonates with the evidence in this section. Lavigne Delville describes how the idea of development and of realising collective infrastructures serves to legitimate actors in accessing the local political arena. In his study, the control of migrant economic remittances that are invested in the village is crucial, and also, importantly, implies taking power over the village's public affairs and provides an entrance-gate for new leaders to access the village's decision-making process (Lavigne Delville, 2010, pp. 166–167). Social divisions based on gender, age, kin, chieftaincy and nobility are at work across the intersections between migrant associations, traditional authorities (such as chiefs, imams), and boards of local-community development associations in origin. The author gives examples of such dynamics, and concludes that this 'three-player game' ('un jeu à trois') takes an array of very different forms depending on aspects such as the political structure of the village, personal and kin-based linkages that connect the protagonists, or their own personal and political trajectories (Lavigne Delville, 2010, p. 182).

Even though the approach of this dissertation is neither based on ethnographic methodologies nor core anthropology scholarship, the present study gives evidence of the existence of processes researched in the above-literature as being relevant in the case of Catalonia and Southern Senegal. There is a particular trait that migrant transnational activities observed here are almost exclusively publicly funded. This adds to other dimensions, at the very least, when considering the fact that governments and a citizenship in residence have a relationship with the transnational processes. By way of concluding this subsection, it is clear that co-development processes impact on the presence of migrant associations through their engagement in political activities and contacts with authorities in origin. Moreover, the evidence shows how the borders between formal and informal

political activities are permeable and interconnected in origin localities and within migrant associations.

6.3 Synthesis and final remarks

Chapter 5 dealt with the analysis of the interplay between migration and formal development institutions and migrant associations' agency. In that chapter, when discussing the presence of migrant associations, settlement contexts seemed to display more formal devices to observe migrant associations' agency at local level when contrasted with the governments in origin. The findings in this chapter nuance the latter statement. The preceding subsections on migrant associations' assets and presence point to other dynamics regarding migrant associations within co-development processes.

First, regarding assets, several aspects are underlined. Migrant associations access different amounts of funding, and – independently of the quantities – the capacity of a migrant association to channel economic resources is an important source of power when taking into account the destination localities of this money. The associations studied, apart from those in Barcelona, are often structured on an ethnic basis. Indeed, belonging to a certain ethnic group seems to affect the internal functioning of migrant associations less than the conditioning relationships and networks beyond the association level. This can be seen, for example, when observing organisational assets through the interlocking of directorates, or when assessing visibility through alliances).

Furthermore, in analysing assets, the results show the significance of 'classical' or well-known explanatory factors of migrant transnationalism such as the education level of individuals or their gender. Accordingly, women generally are excluded from power or management posts. Moreover, it was found that, in coherence with migrant Senegalese' socio-demographic structure in Catalonia and the views from Fons-Català (who have been training migrant representatives for more than 10 years), there is a prevalence of people, during the considered period of 1999-2012 who are leading co-development projects that rarely have post primary education levels. With regard to this, the selected cases are biased towards an over-representation of educated leaders. Indeed, we find that there are, attached to Barcelona's and Girona's migrant associations, probably the highest educated people (among those most known by governments) in Catalonia.

Yet, the research shows unexpected findings apropos migrants' position as regards to chieftaincy or nobility/allegiance systems. It is when migrant associations' are most directly connected to 'terroir' in forms of hometown associations or hometown projects that social markers such as chieftaincy, nobility and lineage – which are usually invisible to the outsider – emerge. This is consistent with the previously mentioned ethnographic approaches of other scholars showing that, internally, both in origin and residence, social inequalities based on informal institutions are very often maintained in French Senegalese migrant associations, although they are adapted to the migration process (Lavigne Delville, 2010).

Second, there is the observation that there is a higher presence in residence through the visibility of migrant associations – as connections to government officials and alliances (such as 'autochthonous' or government representatives, at different levels of governance) – and this goes together with well-educated migrant representatives. Moreover, findings point to a coincidence between: migrant representatives' higher education level; greater amount of financial assets; and more connections of the migrant association to other actors at different governance levels in origin and residence. In addition to this, ethnic belonging can be a factor related to a lower visibility of the Mataró migrant association.

Third, in relation the different level of access to local authorities in origin, the research suggests other ways to gain presence in local development affairs that connect to informal institutions based on kin and the allegiance/nobility systems. Understanding these dynamics requires taking an intersectional approach between lineage, chieftaincy and nobility/allegiance systems that result in different degrees of presence of migrant associations. The findings also suggest that these axes of social structuration affect the agency of migrant associations in residence. Indeed, it is plausible to consider that the position migrant representatives occupy in power hierarchies (that are structured by allegiance/nobility systems) affects visibility in residence. The latter supposition is based on the fact that, in the research, there were fewer cases of migrant associations being led by people identified as 'categorically' having lower rank. The extent to which this is a coincidence would need further research on the broader field of Senegalese migrant associations.

Fourth, the research also shows that connected to the notion of presence, co-development processes provide a basis for some migrant representatives connected to these organisations to be able to run for politics in origin. The mechanisms behind this individual access to formal politics in the frame of co-development projects are built upon migrant representatives being perceived as brokers between origin localities and residence localities or donors.

The next chapter follows up this discussion of assets and the agency of migrant associations by observing the dimension of weight.

7 Migrant associations' assets and weight in origin: changes on the civil society landscape, but rarely challenging inequality based on social cleavages

The analysis and results concerning the assets of migrant associations that are displayed in the previous chapter supports an assessment in this chapter of the weight that migrant associations exert. The parts which now follow analyse the relationship between the assets and weight of migrant associations. Taken together with presence, weight is a dimension of migrant associations' agency. It expresses whether migrant associations actually have a capacity to exert power within co-development processes. In this research, weight is observed in relation to origin localities, and is operationalized in three elements. They are explained below jointly with the structure of the chapter.

First, weight is understood as the capacity of migrant associations to shape civic and political realms through the creation or formalisation of civic organisations (section 7.1.). Subsequently, the capacity to include disadvantaged groups in co-development processes is also appraised as weight (section 7.2.). Before the synthesis and the concluding remarks of section 7.3., weight is also observed through the capacity of migrant associations to include local communities in the decision-taking of co-development processes.

I want to make two remarks before proceeding to the next subsection. On the one hand, the ownership and participation dimensions of the governance of international 'aid' inform the seizing of weight in the origin localities. By these ideas I refer to development interventions aiming to be inclusive and related to the agenda which is to be set by those who are ultimately the citizens and stakeholders in the localities of their origin. Therefore, what in international development-policy documents is generally called the 'results-based' or more 'effective-based' approaches towards official development assessment is not prioritised in this research.

On the other hand, regarding the contexts of the residence and weight of migrant associations, it is worth stressing that the capacity of migrant associations to actually influence civic and political affairs is confronted by social and political exclusion-related

factors. These are linked to specific barriers they face in representing an economically disadvantaged minority collective. By the same token, in resident localities, migrant associations' presence in development could be considered, by itself, as 'transformatory' (Kabeer, 1999).

7.1 Creation of new associations or formalisation of older ones

The Senegalese migrant associations considered in this research have fostered the creation of associations in origin. Consistent with evidence given in the literature dealing with migrant associations, there are specific views held in different interviews by migration experts in Senegal and also by civil society representatives in Kolda. These accounts speak of a phenomenon involving migrants from France, Italy and Spain who are linked to Senegalese's regional sources of international migration. The formalisation of new structures does not happen in the void. In the case of villages, for instance, social gatherings based on gender, labour or age, are key structuration elements of life in the community, and new organisations often formalise, or are based upon, previous social entities (Lavigne Delville, 2010).

The process of creating new organisations needs to be understood, first, within a context of an overall increase of NGOs in the 1990s that was fostered by international donors embracing civil society as a more efficient actor than public institutions in bringing about development. Second, the increase of non-governmental associations in Senegal is also connected to a breeding ground for socio-political organisations, represented by the existence of Senegalese legal frameworks that are facilitating the creation of associations which have mainly developed since, at least, 1968 (Sow, 2005, p. 41). Hence, in Kolda, according to interviewees, the emergence of migrant associations acting as development agents in the region took place later than in Northern Senegal's emigration regions, and started mainly from the end of the 1990s and through to the 2000s. This emergence is associated with the need for migrant associations of partner associations to fit both international standards of the aid sector and to be a respondent for the projects in origin (that is because having a local partner is often a required criteria that must be fulfilled in responding to public calls for funding).

Considering this research's units of analysis, Table 7.1. shows that there are three migrant associations that have created new structures. All of them are of interest, and can be related to wider relevant processes that are discussed subsequently. The migrant association from Lleida formed a partner organisation in a hometown village. According to data I gathered during the visit to the village, the association was based on an informal sports association that drew together people from nearby villages. This new local development partner association had been perceived as 'challenging'. All the interviewees connected to this co-development process identified problems of origin related to the partner such as: the motivation of those involved; and lack of knowledge of the procedures that a public funded project entailed; and the difficulties of building up a participative structure and board. When I visited this very remote village and had an assembly with the community, the partner association's members expressed contrasting views, for instance one issue was that the partner association expected to have a bigger control over the economic resources of the project, or that conflicts among the emigrant members in Catalonia were disturbing the local dynamics in the Senegalese village.

According to the interview with a woman from Kolda, who was hired by the association in Lleida to facilitate the co-development project's process since the migrant association had begun, there were changes in the social cleavages such as those based on gender or lineage. In this vein, another person from Kolda, who had visited the village in the past and drove us to the remote location because he knew where it was, felt that the structure of the board and the way the assembly developed reflected younger members of the community and by-passed the eldest in the decision-making. Both informants from Kolda thought that, in fact, the younger people were being disrespectful to the elders. This was therefore seen as contrary to social norms that consisted of giving more power in community affairs to older members. On the other hand, as the table reflects, in the context of Lleida's migrant association co-development process, another organisation (a women-based group), was later created. This organisation will be discussed in the next section.

The example of the association created in order to behave as the partner of the co-development process by Lleida's migrant association shows the difficulties of working in official development schemas. Indeed, regarding the creation of local development partners' associations, some interviewees spoke about the difficulties of transnational work

and the troubles some of the associations faced in trying to behave as reliable local partners: civil society representatives of NGOs in Kolda regretted, as they expressed during fieldwork, the enormous capacity problems that very often afflict these structures. The next testimony comes from someone that worked in an NGO in Kolda, who had supported Catalan-migrant-led projects in different villages of the region. He identified the capacity problems of migrant associations (in settlement contexts) that are translated from in origin contexts when they build up their counter-parts in the host country. In saying this, he stated, that he was not criticising the co-development approach, but the actual capacity of the actors involved to bring about change:

> In fact, it is not the schema that is criticized [co-development], it is the actors of the schema. [...] We first saw the question of terroir. People from rural communities in some villages come together [in Catalonia], and they have an association. But development is not just this. It's an interrelation, it's an interdependence of any action with the next one you undertake. I will talk about their respondents here because they [migrants] may have been behind the creation of the structures here. It is not wrong, I do not condemn it, it's good. Because if they want to do a project and there is not a person [a partner] here, it's good to create it [a local partner], but in fact they also [local partners] they have the same weakness [lack of capacity]. [...] It is not only a problem related to the lack of level [preparation], it is that they must understand that they have an association [with what this implies].
>
> *Civil society representative, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P40)*

In fact, as the next expert on Senegalese migration and international cooperation recalled to us, undertaking development projects transnationally is challenging, and it is because of this that even though migrants organise themselves in associations within settlement countries, often transnational practice involves only individual action. It is because of this that working transnationally requires structure and preparation:

> But when it comes to having the link with the country of origin, this is going to happen much more at the individual level. Because you have to have a very solid organization so that you can be working on two different platforms [origin and residence], at a distance. You need to have structure and to have staff .
>
> *International organisation representative, Dakar, September 2012, my translation from Spanish (P24)*

The next two examples speak of other kinds of new structures created under the umbrella of the studied co-development processes. The following example concerns the creation of

an association in origin that has resulted in a quite successful and strong local NGO. The organisation was founded by migrant association members in Girona in 1998 because, as this migrant member of the association explained during a village visit in origin (the person was staying in Senegal during my fieldwork), what previously existed in the village did not work in the way that the Spanish actors required. Contrary to what happened in the preceding example, the very well resourced migrant representative, who was included in this study, moved to the origin locality to put in place the new organisation and invest time to make it work as required:

> Q: Before you left for Catalonia, did these groups exist?
>
> A: There were some groups but they did not work, frankly. For lack of means. There were groups but they did not work as they asked us from Spain, at the formal level, to finance them [...]
>
> Q: Did [Girona's migrant association] found [local partner]?
>
> A: Yes, from there. When we created the migrant association, we tried to create an association here too [in Kolda]. It worked, but, as you know, whenever you have [an organisation], with the distance, is difficult. If we [migrants] do not come, they can not do it alone. Thus, [the considered migrant representative] chose to come, to organize them to do many things that you will see.
>
> *Conversation with migrant while visiting a village, Kolda region, August 2012, my translation from Spanish (P69)*

In this case, there was strong leadership by the migrant representative in constructing the new organisation. In fact, in an assessment developed during the MIDEL's project, undertaken by Fons-Català, it was explicated that the relationship between Girona's migrant association and the local partner was bypassed, and it was led directly by another organisation in Catalonia where this migrant representative worked (Sokpoh, 2005). Over the years, since 1998, the association had transformed, unavoidably, into a local NGO in the region: gradually, it became a priority partner for the Catalan Development Agency in Kolda, and obtained funding from the EU. Actually, according to fieldwork and the documentation given to me by the Kolda Regional Development Agency in 2012, among a whole group of International NGOs operating in the region, there were only two local NGO considered as big or strong enough to execute bigger projects. And both were directly (like the afore-mentioned NGO) or indirectly (like another organisation not discussed within the selected cases) linked to the Catalan co-development processes. The next interview extract provides an example of how local development actors in Kolda

connected Senegalese Catalan emigrants, as well as discussing the considered migrant representative, and the afore-mentioned Kolda NGO:

> The association [name], which controls the project called [name], is almost born from the associations of the emigrants who live in Girona, with [studied migrant representative]. So currently if [name of association] has succeeded in many of his projects is thanks to the associations of emigrants, who are based in Spain. So that's something to encourage, anyway.
>
> *Civil society representative, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P45)*

The third case of the creation of a new organisation stands out as being the only more structured. and wider focussed, attempt to gather the Senegalese diaspora that was encountered during the research. Created in 2008, the honorary president of this diaspora organisation (a 'non-migrant' Senegalese, former coordinator of an International Organization in Senegal) recalls how he was invited to Barcelona for a conference. While he was there, migrants attached to Barcelona's migrant association proposed to him the idea of developing the diaspora organisation:

> The idea of the [name of association] was born in Barcelona, with the [name of migrant representatives]. So they had the idea to organize migrants to intervene in their country of origin, in Senegal. As I was an expert at the [International Organisation], I was called to give a conference, to talk about the problems of migration in Senegal and Africa, so when the first meeting of the [name of association] was held, I was there in Barcelona.
>
> *Civil society representative, Dakar, September 2012, my translation from French (P21)*

The organisation gathered Senegalese diaspora from different countries such as Spain, France, the US or Belgium. The next two testimonies explain that, even though there are federations of migrant associations in settlement countries, they do not know any other organisation that gathers migrants together at a pan-state level. At the same time, the second extract acknowledges some of the challenges that a structure such as this diaspora organisation would face (for example, internal legitimacy; and the amount of work it requires to make it function):

> Let's say that there are federations, organizations of emigrants, groups of emigrant associations, networks and federations, [...] This exists: in Italy, there are many.

Even in Spain there is the coordination platform [considered Barcelona migrant association]. It means that there are organizations that are strong but only within one country. Now, I'm not sure that there is an organization like the [name of association] for emigrants scattered in several countries... It may exist, but something as pretty well structured like the [name of association], I doubt it.

Civil society representative, Dakar, September 2012, my translation from French (P20)

The [name of association] for me in Senegal is the project that can be the most unifying of the different associations and structures. What happens is that the [name of association] has a problem that all federations of associations have, and it is the legitimacy problem. Because, in the end, an association is legitimate because there are a number of people who want that association to work. Because it has a special link with a region (either in destination or in origin). But then the [name of association] would suppose that all those associations that have an intrinsic legitimacy, cede it to a supra-structure, and this is not so evident. And also, creating something like the [name of association] is a huge job, and in the end, there are not so many that pull this project.

International organisation representative, Dakar, September 2012, my translation from Spanish (P24)

These three cases of migrant associations' leading the creation of new structures speak of different outcomes that, very broadly described, are strongly connected to the capacities of migrant actors involved within supportive political contexts in residence. Also, the new structures were created within social realms where there was a lack of organisations to tackle the aims required from the respective migrant associations' transnational activities. In fact, when looking at the other units of analysis, where no new associations were created, one can see that the existing local partners were strong or that there were well-integrated associations within their villages. Overall, this side effect of co-development can be connected to the strengthening of local organisations within the overwhelming power of international NGOs in the aid industry. At the same time, the research shows that public funded co-development processes may be a springboard for the structuring of diaspora at international level.

In addition, the fieldwork shows that the creation of new organisations or spaces change the social arenas in which the different governance levels of the associations are active, but they are not conducive, 'per se', to the inclusion of previously excluded collectives or groups. At the same time, already existing structures, which have not been discussed here,

may have been permeable to new groups during the co-development processes. Aspects related to the inclusion of disadvantaged collectives are discussed in the next part.

Table 7.1. Creation of new spaces or organisations by the considered migrant associations

Association	Creation of new spaces/organisations (names and year of creation)
Barcelona migrant association	Yes, diaspora organisation, gathering Senegalese migrant actors from different countries (2008)
Girona religious migrant association	No, the partner a GIE, was already there (since 1996)
Lleida migrant association	Yes: formalisation of a partner association, formerly a local football group gathering people from close villages (men, 13 villages, 2006). Also, institutionalisation and empowerment of a women association (credit group, women, 2008)
Mataró migrant association	No, the local partner association was already the village association
Girona migrant association	Yes, local NGO (in 1998)

Source: Own elaboration

7.2 Inclusion of gender, caste or kin-based disadvantaged groups in co-development processes

The fieldwork undertaken in this research gives evidence of different dynamics of exclusion within the co-development processes in origin contexts. The first set of dynamics concerns power distribution within local partner associations in origin, and who participates in the decision-making related to the projects. The second is connected to whom is to benefit from the co-development project that is to be implemented. Some examples of how these types of dynamics are reported by interviewees are shown subsequently. To begin with it is important to pay attention to how far boards and membership of migrant associations' counterparts are representative and equitable with reference to existing stakeholders. The next testimony explains how the board of a migrant-created association, which supposedly should represent an array of the zone's villages, is directed by the members of one family only:

> Regarding the board, they took family members to form the association. Therefore, the board of [local partner association 's name] they are all linked by kinship. It is a family almost. […] They are linked by blood ties. The other members are close friends.

Secondly, other statements explain how sometimes certain people or families are excluded from projects either because they do not belong to the local partner association in origin or to the migrant association (in settlement). The next excerpt, from a local international NGO in Kolda that has largely been engaged with co-development projects, reveals the difficulties of undertaking co-development. In the view of the testimony given, migrant members within associations want their families to access the resources brought in by the project. Sometimes, migrants expect the project to benefit only those families that are represented in the migrant association, despite the existence of criteria for distribution depending on needs or poverty. This is a root for conflict when migrants do not want, or cannot become, members of a certain migrant association in settlement context. In some cases, these type of conflicts have led to the creation of new associations:

> [Regarding one of the considered co-development processes] at the beginning we had contact with the emigrants [in Catalonia], but it did not succeed. It was very complicated because they had a lot of problems among them, in Catalonia. In fact, it must be said, there are many difficulties in [this type of] cooperation [co-development]. [...]
>
> Sometimes even at the level of the actors, the organizations. Sometimes the problem they have in [setlement] is transposed here, locally.
>
> For example, consider the associations of emigrants of a certain zone. It happens that, people who are emigrants from the same zone refuse to join the association [in Catalonia]. Then, for example, we as [name of Kolda local NGO] when we intervene in an area, it is to make projects that fight against poverty. So we identify the poorest families, and then we say, here are the families who should benefit from this project. And when we send it [to Catalonia], well, it happens that they say that the member of such family refuses to participate in the associative life [in Catalonia], so his family should not benefit from the project.
>
> [...]
>
> It sometimes has created a lot of friction between us, but it even has created friction at the local level. At the local level people do not have problems, they have problems [in Catalonia] but we have no problems with this family here [in Kolda]. The friction has been so strong in some cases that we have seen [migrant] associations splitting up.
>
> *Civil society representative, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P47)*

Whilst the latter are exclusions based-on lineage or membership to associations, there are other reported ways that may undermine, or maintain, inequalities within the community. These are based on other social divisions, such as those that are gender-based. The next interviewee, who is a specialist on the assessment of development projects, highlights this factor when talking about the lessons learnt regarding one of the research's considered projects:

> [From the evaluations, I learned about] the importance of the role of local agents. Identification is fundamental. Making a project in the [name of village] community just because everyone is from that village can not be a good criteria. In [name of village] we find now the community divided. An oversized well, and people going to find the water with buckets. That is, we find ourselves in a situation just as it was when it started. What happened here? Among many things that have happened, is that men do not let women engage with anything. They take the control sheets, prohibit them from going to meetings... If you do not work first with men… [sensitising them, it is very difficult to have impact]. You have a water project where it is women who pool money to buy water, because water costs money. And men do not pay for the water but have the control of it (as women say there: 'men are ignorant, but they command a lot, they command everything'). So of course, yes, the project is a project that focuses on rights, but women need to be more involved.
>
> *Expert, Barcelona, April 2016, my translation from Catalan*

Therefore, as is also reported by authors like Lavigne Delville (Lavigne Delville, 2010), co-development processes happen in a social and political mesh that affects how these development interventions progress; and about who can decide what, and who can access the resources. Overall, when studying the selected co-development processes, there seem to be few attempts to include into the development initiatives (or their governance) formerly disadvantaged groups. Of course, all the projects aim to change the life conditions of people in Senegal through an array of different strategies including: construction of new warehouses, access to water, access to information, agricultural or livestock strengthening. And they undertake this with more or less success. But there are rare examples of migrant associations' action challenging rooted inequalities that are gender-based or caste-based. The following examples confront social cleavages based on gender and allegiance/nobility systems, but also the kinship influence that is exerted by migrant associations when dealing with public resources.

Although, before going into the examples where migrant associations' agency can be related to social or political inclusion processes, it is worth highlighting that the evidence presented subsequently is based on interviews, visits to villages, and analysis of third-part project assessment reports (these were, unfortunately, only existent for two out of the five considered cases). It was not always possible to consistently gain access to written documents – even where they existed – that were concerned with the formulation of co-development projects, the basic constitutive texts of the associations, or documents explaining organisations norms. Therefore, gender-based, caste-based, or kin-based analysis of co-development processes rely on outcomes that emerged and that could be triangulated through interviews. Let us now plunge into the data.

It is taken as an outcome of agency's weight of Barcelona's migrant association that the diaspora organisation had a presidency held by a woman. The way the interviewees related to the process highlighted this fact, and they also praised the president's capacity. In this case, one could say that assets included, high level of education, sensitivity to gender inequality migrant leaders and members. All these underpinned the possibility of a woman being representative of such an organisation.

Besides, while interviewees in Kolda did not know of migrant women's experiences of undertaking co-development projects, there are accounts of women's empowerment though co-development, mainly through the promotion of mutual credit associations among women. In the case of Lleida's migrant association, the migrant representative, once the public-funded co-development project had started, supported the creation of a women's association that was very successful or, at least, far more successful than the actual co-development project funded by Lleida's city council (according to the migrant representative and women belonging to the association visited during the fieldwork). With regard to this new organisation, the next two quotes, by different interviewees, explain what motivated the idea of establishing it (see first excerpt) and how the migrant representative tackled this (see second excerpt). In his view, having been reflective on, and trained in, development were catalysers of this initiative (second excerpt):

> This association [women's association] was created by [migrant representative]. One year the women of the surrounding village and the women of [hometown village] gathered during the rainy season to make a rice field, that is to grown rice.

They cultivated rice, after they finished growing rice, they sold it, and had a lot of money. When [migrant representative] came on vacation, he saw what the women did and he was interested because they did something good by bringing everyone together around a common project and it gave a lot of fruit. The fact that the women were reunited to work together, the [migrant representative] was amazed. He told them, 'now I'm going to lend you money', and this money has been used to pay for sheep. That's when their association was born. They bought sheep and every woman benefited from something.

Civil society representative, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from Spanish (P42)

When I arrived I told them 'I want you to have your own credit mutuele, I do not want you to go to the bank to ruin yourselves. You can start a bank here, without moving. But I need you to formalise as an association and with willingness. And I also need that each one of you contributes with 1.5€. If we fail, it will cost 1.5€ each. I will take care of arranging the papers as GIE [groupement d'interet economique]. I'm going to propose a way of working, I'll lend you 1500€, give it back to me when you can.' This was a way to start everything. I had so many things in my head about co-development [...] I designed for them a way to work: 'Men have taken the cows, I want you to take the little ruminants' (goats, sheep), they agreed [in fact, generally, livestock is divided according to gender]. 'I'll fix all the papers, the money you gain, put it there. I'll take care of the rest.' (...) I did it in 2008. I knew it was something that had to work well.

Migrant representative, Lleida, June 2014, my translation from Spanish

Moreover, migrant women connected to Girona's migrant association (particularly, the wife of the studied migrant representative), are identified as actors promoting CAFs in the villages. CAF stands, in Spanish, for *Comunidad Autofinanciada*, and it is a finance deposit system fostered in South America to support credit needs in community-based groups:

Q: What is the place of women in the processes of co-development in the host country?

A: Emigrant women participate in the development process. For example, I know that the CAF it's a project that came from Latin America. There were experiences in Barcelona and we decided to develop it here for women in the region. Mostly it was women who were involved. [...] For example, [woman's name], the wife of [migrant representative], she was very active in these issues, they brought us here the model of CAF.

Civil society representative, Kolda region, September 2012, my translation from French (P38)

According to these examples, the capacity of transformation over gender inequality of migrant associations is not so much based on how co-development projects are designed. Rather, this transformation was an indirect outcome that could, on the whole, be connected to migrant associations' human assets (education and/or training level regarding development) and to the alliances built up by the association and other actors. In the case of Girona's migrant association this interrelationship is clearer, for it allows its members access to debates and initiatives supported by other organisations.

On the other hand, regarding allegiance/nobility systems, fieldwork shows that caste divisions are generally not tackled within the considered migrant associations and their counterparts. They remain untold and formally invisible. Only a local partner in Kolda (an association created by the migrant association) showed evidence of having tackled the debate and finally having included in the organisations' strategic planning some principles and measures to confront caste-based inequity within the organisation. Regarding the motivations underpinning this process, I cannot say more than what the interviewee expressed below: the level of internal conflict was so severe, that it was decided that a new approach was needed in order to tackle the problem. It is not possible for me to establish any relationship between this process and the influence of migrant associations. It appears to have been an initiative led by the actors who had managerial responsibilities within the local NGO. Nevertheless, this initiative is highlighted because of its innovative character and as an evidence of the importance of this type of informal institution within some of the considered co-development processes:

> When I came, I came only to do development [when the person took the managerial position within the organization]. In the meeting people came with cutters. It was very serious. It was like a battlefield. But when we came, we opted for a new methodology, a different process. [...] It was written even in the document, in our [current] strategic plan. [he shows to me the document, in paper, and read aloud about the effects of 'clannish barriers and caste barriers' within the association]. We made the diagnosis without complacency.
>
> *Civil society representative, Kolda region, September 2012, my translation from French (P38)*

Finally, as pointed out when dealing with organisational assets, kin and 'terroir' can weigh very heavily in the co-development processes of migrant associations. However, if the

influence of 'terroir' in migrant gatherings or collective action is not, per se, conducive to the exclusion of disadvantaged collectives, the influence of kinship can be more problematic. This is because it opens the door to the accumulation within the family of the resources brought about by the co-development process. This tendency is seen in two (or three, depending on how big the extended family is considered) out of the five considered projects. And different interviewees in origin shared this problem. How some of the considered associations' are able to overcome this tendency is connected, in the frame of this dissertation, to the weight of migrant associations.

Therefore, even though it is not possible to establish a link between the capacity to overcome kinship ties that may lead to unequal distributions of resources and a univocal set of assets or institutions, when considering our case-studies, there are elements identified that help to counter this kin-related influence. First, regarding organisational assets, the scope of the association – and the type of linkage it has to the locality in which the project takes place – may define the boundaries to this type of influence. Thus, in the case of this research, either configuring the association beyond kin terms – or at least creating it so that it is not aimed at developing the hometown of migrant associations' members – seems to act as a safeguard clause against bias towards the extended family. However, it is also important to recall that neither hometown projects nor a strong kin bias in the representation within associations' board are automatically leading factors in providing priority access to resources for kinship. Similarly, in this research there is only one migrant association clearly not configured under a hometown or a kin axis. Hence both the number of units of analysis, and general knowledge about the different forms kin-bias may take, leads me to be extremely cautious about any kind of extrapolation that points to associations that are *not* constructed with a kin basis acting as a safeguard against kin-bias either. Besides, there are alliances with other actors that demand accountability. This can go beyond administrative ways of exercising such responsibilities, hence visits to the origin localities play a role in this respect. Further, acquiring accountability mechanisms that go beyond budget justifications to incorporate criteria to assess kin, allegiance/nobility or gender-based exclusion systems would also be practices to be recommended.

Regarding the above discussion, local partners in origin – as their experience with tackling co-development projects has increased with time – highlight the importance of promoting

taxation perspectives towards co-development resources. For instance, this can include confronting the communities about the fact that the 'money' that is being channelled does not come from migrant pockets. Also, for example, they suggest looking carefully at how migrant families are represented when creating local management committees. In the following two pieces, from different civil society representatives in Kolda that have worked closely with migrant associations, these approaches were expressed. Moreover, the excerpts provide testimony concerning how often migrants present the idea to the communities that the resources raised come from migrants themselves:

> For example, emigrants who come on vacation... It's hard to say, but they do not tell the villagers that the money comes from the Catalan cooperation. They say it's 'our money, our association'. [...] It is true that it was they who undertook the steps, but it is not their money. But it gives them [social] value: that he has traveled, and that he has been able to bring something into the village from where he left.
>
> *Civil society representative, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French (P47)*

> A: For example, an emigrant who comes out of a meeting in Catalonia, he calls his family here to tell them that 'we have a mill'. He parasitizes the system. His family will believe that he sent the mill. We had problems with [migrant association], because of that. [...]
>
> Q: Do you think that there will always be misappropriations of money, as long as the understanding of African society is based on a family that is different from the Western one? Can emigrants be asked to break away from the social reality in which they were educated?
>
> A: It's different, I do not agree, it's not the emigrants' money. We also drew attention to that. It is true that some emigrants are boasters, they want to be seen. Some villagers thought it was the emigrant who took the money out of his pocket to finance the projects but when they knew it was money coming from taxes… [...] If people know that the money is tax-based, that it is not the money of their emigrants, already it is an asset. That's why I say there is a communication problem. [...]
>
> But if the emigrant comes [keeps this misunderstanding], his parents say that it was their son who brought the mill. So they kept the mill. It is just gradually that we have made people understand that the money for projects is not a family property. That's why in the management committees we have removed the members of the families who are represented: to show to them that they have no rights on that.
>
> *Civil society representative, Kolda region, September 2012, my translation from French (P38)*

7.3 Whose development and for what? Contested ownership

An actor who, to some degree, is generally excluded from the co-development projects studied is the actual *community* to which the projects are targeted. In saying this I point to the fact that, when asked who decided the aim of the project – and what was to be built or fostered – migrant representatives of the co-development processes considered that the answer was: themselves. Nevertheless, this was not always the situation. In two cases, the migrant answer contradicted views expressed by the community during visits to a village (see Table 7.2). In the case of Barcelona's migrant association, the observed initiatives undertaken by them targeted Senegalese emigrants or potential emigrants (i.e., the idea was to create a formal organisation gathering Senegalese diaspora, or giving services for those who want to migrate). Nevertheless, there is the fact that who defines the project is also the main participant in it, or is someone who has previously personally experienced migration. This means they may be more likely to bestow knowledge regarding the needs that are important to be met. In the other cases, communities or localities in origin are mainly seen as recipients of aid by migrant associations, but not as agents of development.

Indeed, when speaking with experienced development workers, both in Senegal and Catalonia, this issue was often highlighted as one of the main problems of migrant development interventions. The problem seems to be widespread across the round of co-development projects implemented by Senegalese migrant associations since the end of 1990s and during the first decade of 2000 until the economic crisis hit municipal budgets. As the next interviewee's testimony critically reveals, a person who is an experienced technician in development NGOs and a Senegalese migrant in Catalonia found that, during the training events he taught in 2013 to an array of different migrant representatives, the above approach was quite generalised among Senegalese migrant associations:

> A: In the training we did last November [2013], the first question we asked them was where did the idea of the project come from? They all answered from here [Catalunya], all the people. Ideas come from us [migrants].
>
> A: And they thought that they had to come from them because they know better?
>
> P: That's right.
>
> *Migrant representative, Girona, June 2014, my translation from Spanish (P16)*

The representative of Barcelona's migrant association also identified this point, some, years earlier, during an interview held at the end of 2009. Here, he reflects upon the power migrants have acquired due to their migration experience and the importance of them using this power responsibly. Particularly, for interviewees who do not generally use the concept of power, he also underlined that doing development entrenches power relationships:

> Sometimes it is easy to fall into the stereotype of: I am the person who gives or the one who is facilitating, therefore I have the power. In the cooperation for development there are also power relations. [Through migration] The immigrant has been empowered, having an economic power. This also creates conflicts. I am not one to decide what to do in my town, whether it is me who has taken the NGO or the institution that finances it. The decision must be taken among all, depending on the needs and priorities of the moment. It has happened very often that people who live here believe they have the legitimacy to decide what should be done there. [...]

> We must be able to know what our limits are and know how to use our power not as a weapon for pressure or coercion. But as access to knowledge. This will be possible if there is training, training of the agents. Otherwise we will be confused by believing we are the important ones. [...]

> We should make social capital transfers of that we have learned here and give the possibility of the organizations there to be trained. We need to create more sustainable situations by training associations. We are talking about trained organizations with a participatory role. And when we notice that the project can not be carried out by a small entity, the we should go to an entity with a management structure. This is what should be done. But sometimes we fall into the mistake of confusing our needs with those of them to get recognition. We should not be confused with reality.

> [Regarding projects at village level] When deciding where we bring the project, this is a problem. [...] The project must go to the town that requires it. It must be taken into account that even though I am the president, I can not use my position to obtain personal interests by bringing projects to my people. This can happen if people are not well prepared to distinguish the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the project. They will be incapable of discerning all this [unless they are trained].
>
> *Migrant representative, Barcelona, August 2009, my translation from Catalan (P7)*

Often, as a way to overcome the problems just described concerning the ownership approach, the actors in origin propose increasing the articulation of migrant initiatives

within local and regional plans. Both in origin and in residence, several voices claimed there was a need for increasing the actors' capacities and developing further training. For instance, the first of the above-interviewees emphasized the importance of incorporating participatory approaches to activities that migrant associations undertake. As Table 7.2. roughly shows, the education and training of migrant associations' representatives and members co-occurs with cases where the local communities express the perception that they have defined the project. Thus, this occurs in cases such as Barcelona, Lleida and non-religious Girona. But having either well-educated or trained representative is not a necessary condition. For example, we can look at the case fostered by Girona's religious association as a counter example, where the partner association in origin seemed to be very clear about the role that the migrant representative should play (connected to finding resources, not on deciding what to do). In the case of Barcelona's migrant association, the spokesperson was a very critical (and ideologically progressive) migrant representative who stated that planning and decision-taking should be shared. This was despite the fact that the migrant association had problems when transferring its approach to the whole intervention.

In order to better understand migrant associations' agency it is necessary to examine the iterative relationship between assets and institutions and to broaden the analysis so that factors related to formal institutions and the very core of what official development policy-making involves are included. To illustrate this point, consider the view of the migrant Senegalese interviewee who has been training Senegalese migrant associations in Catalonia on the definition of development projects and participatory approaches through Fons-Català. His approach shows how failures in the conception of co-development projects interlink with the lack of ownership of what development entails for developing countries:

> This is a problem for poor countries: from France, Germany, people think that something is fine for Senegal. This is not going well. We have to change, we have to conform to what people want. The beneficiary must be an integral part of a project.
>
> *Migrant representative, Girona, June 2014, my translation from Spanish (P16)*

Moreover, the next voice, from an experienced (co)development NGO technician in Kolda, expresses that co-development for him, is a modality of intervention. It thus involves a schema involving a migrant association, a donor and a local (origin) organisation (these are termed 'structures' by the person interviewed.). Hence, development, for migrants, is often understood as a mere attempted translation of what they have experienced in Europe or other settlement places:

> So there is a development support scheme that involves the intervention of these different structures [he refers to the co-development schema that he has explained before: migrant association-donor-local structure], but do these structures understand what is development here, today? [...] [Migrants left for different reasons] and their context makes them organize. They have seen things, they think that people can mobilize here, create a dynamic to make it as it happens in Europe, or in their host countries. That's it, it's just that: it's a reaction to what they experienced down there [abroad, Europe].
>
> *Civil society representative, Kolda, August 2012, my translation from French*

After reading the statements-above, we are reminded that the (publicly funded) co-development processes considered here are embedded in migration and development policy documents and discourses. This raises the highly relevant question of how migrant associations can challenge a global aid system that, despite criticisms and attempts at reform, tend to reproduce uneven global and bilateral power relationships. This outlook would be close to positions such as those posed by Bakewell, who questioned the development ideology that migrants may sustain and also the extent to which co-development could challenge current practices and views (Bakewell, 2009). Taking a lateral approach, we could examine the co-development policy arena in more depth. Hence, even if the Catalan municipalities considered might discursively share participatory approaches to development they did not succeed at translating these approaches to co-development interventions. A tentative partial explanation to this might be rooted in the fact that, during the studied period, these municipalities were more focussed on working with migrant associations themselves than on populations living in migrant associations' origin localities.

In sum, knowing that since 2012 onwards Catalan municipalities have changed priorities regarding co-development policy-making. The emphasis is now on empowerment

initiatives based upon capacity building courses (to local actors in origin and migrant associations). In the future new fields may exist for appraising transformative migrant associations' agencies.

Table 7.2. Claimed ownership: different perceptions regarding who set the intervention

Co-development process	Local-respondent/Village's view	Migrant association's view
1 Barcelona - Dakar	Migrants decided the project	Shared decision
2 Girona – Kolda village	Local partner decided the project	Migrant representative decided the project
3 Lleida – Kolda village	Local partner decided the project	Migrant representatives decided the project
4 Mataró - Kolda village	Migrants decided the project	Migrant representatives decided the project
5 Girona - Kolda municipality	Local partner decided the projects (claims at least since 2003)	Migrant representatives decided the projects

Source: Own elaboration from interviews, fieldwork visits and external assessments

7.4   Synthesis and final remarks

By using the analysis from chapter 6 which dealt with migrant associations' financial, organisational and human assets, this chapter has appraised migrant associations' agency by the dimension of its weight. Through this process we have examined whether migrant associations actually exert some degree of influence on civic and political affairs in origin. Several of the highlighted processes can be summarised in the following points according to the operationalization of weight.

First, many migrant associations have socially reshaped their origin contexts by creating new organisations or formalising pre-existing structures. Although in some cases it could be claimed that the creation of new structures or associations in origin contexts is clearly related to the presence of migrant associations, the phenomenon is actually understood as a way to give power to local communities. In the cases considered here, the creation of new associations went hand in hand with the existence of migrants who had higher education levels or specific training in development and support from residence contexts. The success of the new structures varied. It depended on the local particularities in origin (such

as capacity of actors, motivation). However, in addition it was often the case that success implied a close follow up of the new associations by their fosterers (migrants).

Second, while there is evidence of exclusion processes in co-development practice, an indication of the weight of migrant associations over alleged social inequalities deriving from gender, or allegiance/nobility systems, for instance, was not extensive within the region in the studied period. Notwithstanding, there were also changes that can be at least partially related to agency of migrant associations. These were mostly related to women's empowerment through supporting their collective action to save economical resources and realise productive investments. According to the examples, the capacity to tackle gender inequality was connected to the human assets possessed by the migrant associations (education and/or training level regarding development) and presence in residence (through alliances).

In addition, we have seen that, when there is a tendency to prioritise the extended family in the co-development processes (which is not always the case) this is nurtured by various attributions made by some migrants or attributed to migrants. For example, these include the importance of ideas such as not clarifying the public origin of the resources, and also by origin perceptions that migrants may be seen as 'cash cows'. The findings also point to ways to counteract this tendency. They might include assuring participation of the whole community or stakeholders over the control of resources, for instance. Further, it would require communication campaigns promoting the tax view over co-development. In the cases studied, having experience in dealing with these processes is a positive gain factor. In addition, another positive factor is related to the type of alliances the migrant association has because it is often local partners NGOs who act as accountability keepers.

Third, the chapter shows some of the difficulties that reside in transnational practices to bring about development from a distance. These difficulties also illustrate how, by attributing themselves the power to define what development means for a locality, weight – measured as the capacity to include local communities in development-related decision making – is lower. When this occurs, I argue that migrant associations reproduce long-established and often criticised views within the conventional aid system. Overall, from a relational view on empowerment and agency debates, the findings show some of the

challenges and opportunities of development interventions to bring about changes in power relations (Cornwall, 2016).

A broader discussion of the findings in relation to literature that frames this dissertation is undertaken in the next, and last chapter.

PART III. CONCLUSIONS

8 Conclusion

In the context of the debates related to the complex relationship between migration and development, this research has aimed to explore how migrant associations influence local civic and political affairs in residence and origin contexts, across transnational development processes. This aim was formulated as a research question, and, in turn, two sub-questions have guided the analysis. Namely, (1) the institutional factors and migrant assets that underpin the agency of migrant associations, and (2) how the agency of migrant associations changes across co-development processes.

By exploring two dimensions of the agency of migrant associations, presence and weight, we have analised how civic and political stratification of the same national collective happens across localities in origin and residence. Indeed, the research shows that agency is context dependent (Kabeer, 1999). Thus, the studied cases show that structures (formal and informal institutions, assets) can enable and constraint migrant social action, and tend to be reproduced by that very social action.

The aim of the following section (section 8.1) is to summarise the main findings of the research. Section 8.2 then discusses main implication of the research, while the last section suggests some different research threads to follow in the future.

8.1 Discussion of research findings

8.1.1 Policy environments in relation to the agency of migrant associations

The research findings support the argument that different formal institutions - understood as policy environments reaching out for migrants - affect the agency (presence) of migrant associations localities within the same region and translocally. This discussion is mainly maintained in Chapter 5, which focuses on the presence of migrant associations and uncovers different dynamics in residence, in origin localities, and comparatively. In this way, the chapter exposes the particularities of each national context and assesses the

presence of agency through visibility. In addition, the research design also compares localities translocally, observing the presence of agency through the legitimacy of migrant associations. Three main reflections, according to each main type of analytical procedure, are highlighted subsequently.

First, in the context of country of residence, within an overall national context that is exclusionary in terms of naturalisation and migrant access to political rights, I have analysed the differences in co-development policies across four different Catalan local governments. It is also worth pointing out that the analysis of migrant associations' presence has not been limited to the studied five migrant associations. Bearing the latter in mind, several ideas are worth highlighting. Thus, all four cities have funded and worked with migrant associations through policies of co-development. However, I show that a nurturing mode of engagement does not necessarily lead to more presence, although it may well contribute to the organisational capacity of migrants (Bloemraad, 2005). Migrant associations actually have more presence at the municipal level in environments that are neutral towards co-development. Thus, beyond the actual policy making of co-development, the different levels of presence of migrant associations may reflect neutral municipalities' stronger interest in including civil society as a whole in local affairs. These findings do not contradict other research that points to more exclusionary local political opportunity structures fostering migrant transnationalism (Koopmans et al., 2005; Morales and Pilati, 2014). What they suggest, however, is that more exclusionary local contexts may foster some 'autochthonous' stakeholders (such as local officers, and autochtonous civil society actors) to enhance migrant transnationalism. Nevertheless, the research implies that these nurturer modes towards co-development cannot compensate exclusionary dynamics regarding presence that make pathways towards overall civic participation at municipal level in certain localities more difficult.

Second, the findings regarding the agency of migrant associations, taken in the context of the country of origin, reveal different dynamics depending on whether a central or peripheral locality is observed (and thus, in the second scenario, hometown transnationalism is observed). The analysis supports the argument that a study based on opportunity structures delimited by formal, visible rules and municipal levels may not detect civic and political migrant dynamics. Indeed, the studied municipalities in Kolda

have more than 60 villages each and the findings show the extent to which hometown transnationalism may go under the radar when observing regional and municipal dynamics. This idea is consistent with approaches that consider the problems of state penetration at the local level in Senegal (Fanchette, 2011; Ribot, 2009; Ribot et al., 2006). Even though the academic accounts do not refer either to migrant practices nor to migrant transnationalism, they point to villages as primary cores of local governance: places where development decisions are taken.

Chapter 5 compared policy environments through the viewpoints of governmental representatives and non-migrant civil society, in order to appraise whether migrants and migrant associations are considered to be legitimate actors for participation in civic and political affairs. The findings show a contrast between the legitimacy of migrant associations in residence and those in rural origin localities. Whereas in residence contexts and in the centre of Senegal the tendency is to depict migrant associations as development agents of their origin country, hometown transnationalism (at the sub-municipal level) has contested legitimacy. This may have different interpretations. On one hand, it can be understood in connection with the transformation of international Senegalese migrants from more heroic –even if ambivalent– representations (Riccio, 2005), to a more negatively nuanced social vision of migrants brought on by the economic crisis at both ends of the mobility process (Ceschi and Mezzetti, 2014, p. 14). On the other hand, the different legitimacy narratives stemming from officials and civil society actors could be connected to migrant associations' relative power in origin localities. In this vein, connected with the latter paragraph recalling problems of state penetration, the more contested legitimacy attributed to hometown transnationalism could also be linked to the difficulties faced by governmental stances at the regional or municipal level to secure administrative rule and development strategies at lower governance levels.

8.1.2 Presence of migrant associations in residence and origin localities and assets

The research supports the argument that the assets of the migrant associations influence their presence in origin and in residence. Indeed, the analysis, which was dependent on formal institutions, undertaken in Chapter 5 left the impression that migrant associations had less presence in Kolda than in the other localities at the municipal level (either in central Dakar or in Catalan localities). However, in chapter 6, the analysis of assets

uncovered civic and political presence of migrant associations in Kolda that were kept unseen when analysing formal institutions at municipal and regional levels. In chapter 6, the dimension of presence of migrant associations' agency was assessed only in terms of visibility. The following dynamics related to migrant associations' agency and assets of migrant associations stand out.

The results obtained from analysing migrant associations' assets, show the significance of 'classical' or well-known explanatory factors such as the education level of individuals or their gender (Guarnizo et al., 2003). Thus, in residence, the education level of migrant associations' human assets (migrant representatives) relates to higher amounts of financial assets, and more presence in the form of connections and alliances of migrant associations at different governance levels. Nevertheless, when observing hometown transnationalism, the research shows how informal institutions affecting societies in Senegal such as allegiance/nobility systems, chieftaincy and kin systems intersect and affect migrant associations' assets and presence. Two processes that give evidence for these relations are detected and explained in the following two paragraphs.

Thus, while hometown associations are often affected by kin, chieftaincy or allegiance/nobility systems, the research suggests that the agency of migrant associations may be constrained in origin and residence depending on the intersection of nobility or chieftaincy. For instance, migrant representatives from a group in origin which is considered as lower ranking (because of nobility/allegiance systems) may have an weakened capacity to intervene in a locality even though the president of the migrant association is connected by kin to a mayor or a chief in a certain locality. In localities in the host region, it is likely that even if these types of cleavages may be transformed or questioned by the migrant actors themselves, these factors might affect the visibility of migrant associations. That may occur if they filter who has access to representation posts and this may determine which migrant associations have access to stakeholders. Research on Senegalese migrants in other countries (such as France) who are connected to other regions (Northern Senegal) supports this hypothesis (Lavigne Delville, 2010). Notwithstanding, it is worth highlighting that these ethnographies of Senegalese migrants in France do not observe how these axes of social structuration work in interaction with local governments in host countries.

Finally, presence in origin is observed through the visibility obtained by migrant associations as a consequence of their representatives aiming to run for electoral processes in origin. Therefore, migrant associations and/or migrant representatives can be seen as brokers that, by acting as intermediaries between donors and local communities in origin, become political actors (Bierschenk et al., 2010b; Mosse and Lewis, 2006). In addition, this finding can also be connected to strands of the literature that have started unpacking the range of dynamics taking place with regard to the interventions undertaken – by migrants and migrant association's representative – in both development *and* politics in origin contexts (Kleist, 2011; Lampert, 2014; Lavigne Delville, 2010).

8.1.3 Weight of migrant associations in localities of origin and assets

While chapters 5 and 6 discussed outcomes related to the agency of migrant associations that can be connected to potential performance through being visible and legitimate actors in civic and political realms, chapter 7 focussed on the actual influence exerted by migrant associations in origin. That is, it tackled the actual weight of the agency. Research has showed that migrant associations have had real influence in civic and political spheres by shaping civil society through the creation or formalisation of associations. At the very least, this is considered a way of strengthening local communities as regards governing international development and influencing how official assistance funds are accessed and managed, and by whom.

Nevertheless, according to the results, I argue that although co-development processes do lead to the presence of migrant associations in origin –expressed either through more formal or assets-based mechanisms, at different governance levels including the village– it is more uncommon for them to challenge social inequalities. This finding is consistent with previous research on migrant transnationalism that indicates that the potential capacity of migrants to subvert power relations should not be overrated (Goldring, 2002; Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Moreover, seen through relational views on agency and empowerment, the findings suggest that when certain practices that challenge social inequalities do emerge, they had often not been taken into consideration when designing the development intervention (Kabeer, 1999). In the case of this research, the appraisal of whether this potential capacity becomes a real force is carried out by

observing whether the agency of migrant associations tends to include disadvantaged groups in co-development processes, and to involve local communities in co-development decision making.

My findings show that, in some cases, akin to the idea of habitus, migrant associations' actions through co-development interventions tend to reproduce structures and social divisions that are based on gender, kin, age or allegiance/nobility systems, for instance. However, in other cases the power resulting from brokerage within international development interventions may result in development practices with higher degrees of ownership and participation exercised by the local population. According to this research, these practices are linked - but not univocally - to certain assets such as levels of education, training in development, and the extent to which the associations are collaborating with other development actors.

8.2 Implications

At the empirical level, with a specific emphasis placed on the interactions between local governments and migrant associations through co-development processes, this research contributes to scholarship on migrant transnationalism and the civic and political engagement of Sub-Saharan migrants. It also contributes to development studies in the extent to which it highlights transnational migrant practices in the debates concerning development thinking and interventions. In this regard, even though the research design does not allow for a generalisation of findings to other cases, there are three aspects derived from this research that can provide insights for scholarship dealing with migrant civic and political engagement.

The first aspect refers to a suggestion regarding methodology. The framework of analysis developed in the study, which relies on structure-agency debates, may be suitable for exploring power relations between social actors. In particular, the assets-based approach has been proven to be a flexible analytical tool to unpack how migration affects migrant resources and migrant positionality. The separation between assets and formal and informal structures is basically analytical, and we know from agency structures debates that they actually have a close and iterative relationship. In this sense, a shortcoming of the

framework of analysis is related to the complexity of establishing the bases for these analytical boundaries.

In relation to the latter, the analysis performed on migrant associations' assets helps to disentangle some issues about how kin, nobility/allegiance systems, gender or traditional authority intersect with co-development processes. In this vein, the second, more theoretical, suggestion is concerned with the implications of these research findings on the analysis of migrant transnationalism and civic and political engagement of migrants in settlement and origin contexts. An implication of this research is that informal institutions should be taken into account when evaluating the agency of migrant associations and how it may change according to the particular space. In this regard, it is important to note that this research suggests that key (and well known) factors such as education or gender affect the agency of migrant associations. However, in addition, it is also likely that nobility might be a (contested) factor in achieving presence because it might be accepted as a condition for attaining higher positions within power hierarchies in settlement localities.

Third, the two previous points also underline the need for improving the understanding of political migrant transnationalism by incorporating contexts into the analysis which have a stronger link with the local political structures of origin. Furthermore, I contend that, at least in the case of Sub-Saharan sending contexts, a view of political participation or institutions that is uniquely based on conventional Western categories and cleavages may not be able to grasp the range of dynamics within which migrants interact. The main reason for this is the specific post-colonial state configuration and its uneven penetration in peripheral contexts (Beck, 2001; Kleist, 2011; Mamdani, 1996). In this vein, we tend to look at political migrant transnationalism from the viewpoint of national or ethnic characteristics, but, I suggest that there are also aspects related to class that may be challenged by processes of post-colonial social structuration.

8.3 Ideas for further research

The framework of analysis proposed in this research opens up the possibility of further comparative analysis of the agency of migrant associations in different groups and contexts. By bridging empowerment and agency frameworks of analysis and structure-

agency debates in migration studies, the framework aims to enhance the dialogues between these fields of knowledge, and also aims to contribute to overcoming some drawbacks that both of them have. In particular, I have argued that POS and group-based explanatory factors are ill equipped to comparatively think about how the action of migrant associations develops and varies in origin and settlement contexts, across different localities within them. The main reason for this is that both perspectives tend to neglect the heterogeneity of migrant organisations and the power dynamics within collectives. Nevertheless, this present research has some limitations and could be expanded in different ways.

A first course of action would be to introduce into the research design units of analysis involving migrant transnationalism that do not include the participation of governments in residence localities. For example, this would entail involving organisations that are not publically funded. This would allow an analysis of how different institutions in residence relate to migrant associations' assets and agency, and whether they affect dynamics in origin. Another comparative line of research would be to explore Senegalese migrant transnationalism across the national contexts of European settlement countries (France, Italy and Spain). There is a range of research questions and research designs that come to mind. For instance, given that there have been co-development experiences in Northern Senegal that have been promoted by the French state, a comparison between Catalan-based and French-based co-development processes would also set the unveiled dynamics within a broaden perspective. A major difference – apart from migration pathways and background – between those two processes is that the French approach has promoted migrant associations contributing with collective economic remittances as a necessary condition to receive public funds. Besides, according to the news stating the renewal of the French PAISD programme, with a broader scope regarding the type of actors that access to the scheme (Senegalese migrants in Italy and Spain) it is likely that there is room for further analysis on how this approach to migration and development evolves.

Furthermore, the research opens up new lines of questioning to broaden and follow up on some of the processes unveiled. Notably, I am referring here to the need for a further inquiry into the transformation that may occur through the migration experience over the influence and characteristics of informal institutions. Moreover, it is also of interest to

further explore the relationship between these informal instituions and the civic and political engagement of those Sub-Saharan migrants in residence contexts and with a transnational perspective. In this vein, for example, if we focus on the Senegalese context, it is of great interest how the new arrangements regarding migrant participation at the legislative level since 2017 and the new municipal elections expected in 2019 may affect migrant politics.

To conclude, the research shows that there is still, first, some distance to go in order to achieve a better understanding of why some migrant organisations and migrant groups achieve higher positions in the hierarchies of power. In addition, second, there needs to be a greater understanding of what are the underpinning factors that result in some migrant groups remaining at the periphery of local influence. This understanding is connected to the need for a better comprehension of the role institutional actors and autochtonous civil society plays in shaping these hierarchies of power, both in residence and origin localities.

9 References

ACCD, 2015. Pla director de cooperació al desenvolupament 2015-2018. Per un país compromès amb la igualtat de gènere i els drets humans. Agència Catalana de Cooperació al Desenvolupament, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona.

Acebillo-Baqué, M., Østergaard-Nielsen, E., 2011. Local dynamics of codevelopment and migrant incorporation in three Catalan cities. paper presented at the International RC21 Conference 2011, Session number 3: Local Responses to Transnationalism.

Alkire, S., Meinzen-Dick, R., Peterman, A., Quisumbing, A., Seymour, G., Vaz, A., 2013. The Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index. World Development 52, 71–91. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.06.007

Alsop, R., Bertelsen, M.F., Holland, J., 2006. Empowerment in Practice: From Analysis to Implementation. World Bank Publications, Washington, DC.

Alsop, R., Heinsohn, N., 2005. Measuring Empowerment in Practice: Structuring Analysis and Framing Indicators, World Banck Policy Research Working Paper. World Bank Publications, Washington, DC.

ANSD, 2014. Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat, de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage, Rapport Definitif. RGPHAE 2013. Agence National de la Statistique et de la Démographie, Dakar.

ANSD, 2013. Deuxième Enquête de Suivi de la Pauvreté au Sénégal. Agence National de la Statistique et de la Démographie, Dakar.

ANSD, 2011. Situation Économique et Sociale de la Région de Kolda. Année 2010.

Anthias, F., 2012. Hierarchies of social location, class and intersectionality: Towards a translocational frame ,
Hierarchies of social location, class and intersectionality: Towards a translocational frame. International Sociology 28, 121–138. https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580912463155

Anthias, F., 2009. Translocational Belonging, Identity and Generation: Questions and Problems in Migration and Ethnic Studies. Finnish Journal of Ethnicity and Migration 4, 6–15.

Aparicio Gómez, R., Tornos Cubillo, A., 2010. Las asociaciones de inmigrantes en España. Una visión de conjunto, Documentos del Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración. Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, Madrid.

Arango, J., 2016. Spain: New Emigration Policies Needed for an Emerging Diaspora. Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC.

Babou, C.A., 2016. Negotiating the Boundaries of Power: Abdoulaye Wade, the Muridiyya, and State Politics in Senegal, 2000–2012. Journal of West African History 2, 165–188. https://doi.org/10.14321/jwestafrihist.2.1.0165

Baizán, P., Beauchemin, C., González-ferrer, A., 2014. An Origin and Destination Perspective on Family Reunification: The Case of Senegalese Couples. European Journal of Population 30, 65–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10680-013-9305-6

Bakewell, O., 2010. Some Reflections on Structure and Agency in Migration Theory. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, 1689–1708. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2010.489382

Bakewell, O., 2009. Which diaspora for whose development? Some Critical Questions about the Roles of African Diaspora Organizations as development Actors, DIIS Brief. Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen, Denmark.

Bandiaky-Badji, S., 2011. Gender equity in Senegal's forest governance history: why policy and representation matter. International Forestry Review 13, 177–194. https://doi.org/10.1505/146554811797406624

Barbour, R., 2007. Doing Focus Groups. SAGE Publications Ltd.

Basch, L., Glick Schiller, N., Szanton Blanc, C., 1994. Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation- States, 2005th ed. Routledge, London & New York.

Batliwala, S., 2010. Taking the power out of empowerment – an experiential account, in: Cornwall, A., Eade, D. (Eds.), Deconstructing Development Discourse: Buzzwords and Fuzzwords. Practical Action Publishing in association with Oxfam GB, pp. 111–121.

Batliwala, S., 1997. El significado del empoderamiento de las mujeres: Nuevos conceptos desde la acción, in: León, M. (Ed.), Poder y Empoderamiento de Las Mujeres. T/M Editores, Santa Fe de Bogotá, pp. 187–211.

Beauchemin, C., Sakho, P., Schoumaker, B., Flahaux, M.-L., 2014. New patterns of migration between Senegal and Europe, MAFE Working Paper 21.

Beck, L.J., 2001. Reining in the Marabouts? Democratization and Local Governance in Senegal. Afr Aff (Lond) 100, 601–621. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/100.401.601

Bell, S., Payne, R., 2009. Young People as Agents in Development Processes: reconsidering perspectives for development geography. Third World Quarterly 30, 1027–1044. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590902959297

Bermudez, A., 2016. Transnational Migration, Politics and Conflict, in: Bermudez, A. (Ed.), International Migration, Transnational Politics and Conflict: The Gendered Experiences of Colombian Migrants in Europe, Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship. Palgrave Macmillan UK, London, pp. 17–45. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53197-1_2

Bermudez, A., 2010. The transnational political practices of Colombians in Spain and the United Kingdom: politics 'here' and 'there.' Ethnic and Racial Studies 33, 75–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870903125838

Bermúdez, A., Escrivá, Á., 2016. La participación política de los inmigrantes en España: Elecciones, representación y otros espacios, in: Anuario CIDOB de La Inmigración 2015-2016. CIDOB, Centro de Estudios y Documentación Internacionales de Barcelona, Barcelona, pp. 296–317.

Bierschenk, T., Chauveau, J.-P., de Sardan, J.-P.O. (Eds.), 2010a. Courtiers en développment. Les villages africains en quête de projets, Hommes et Societés. Karthala et APAD, Paris.

Bierschenk, T., Chauveau, J.-P., de Sardan, J.-P.O., 2010b. Introduction. Les courtiers entre développment et État, in: Bierschenk, T., Chauveau, J.-P., de Sardan, J.-P.O. (Eds.), Courtiers En Développment. Les Villages Africains En Quête de Projets, Hommes et Societés. Karthala et APAD, Paris.

Birks, M., Mills, J., 2011. Grounded Theory: a practical guide. SAGE Publications Ltd, London.

Blanco, I., Martínez, R., Parés, M., 2016. Towards a new participative model? Institutional participation and grass-roots mobilisation in Barcelona under the crisis (No. 3), TRANSGOB Report Series. IGOP-UAB, Barcelona.

Bloemraad, I., 2005. The Limits of de Tocqueville: How Government Facilitates Organisational Capacity in Newcomer Communities. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, 865–887. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830500177578

Bloemraad, I., Korteweg, A., Yurdakul, G., 2008. Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State. Annual Review of Sociology 34, 153–179. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134608

Bloor, M., Frankland, J., Thomas, M., Robson, K., 2001. Focus Groups in Social Research. SAGE Publications Ltd.

Botte, R., 2000. De l'esclavage et du daltonisme dans les sciences sociales. Avant-propos. Journal des africanistes 70, 7–42. https://doi.org/10.3406/jafr.2000.1218

Bourdieu, P., 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of Judgement of Taste. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Bray, Z., 2008. Ethnographic approaches, in: Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, pp. 296–315.

Bruquetas-Callejo, M., Garcés-Mascareñas, B., Morén-Alegret, R., Penninx, R., Ruiz-Vieytez, E., 2011. The case of Spain, in: Zincone, G., Penninx, R., Borkert, M. (Eds.), Migration Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present. Amsterdam University Press, pp. 291–326.

Canal Oliveras, R., Salazar Marcano, Y., 2016. El encaje forzado de la gobernanza colaborativa en un ayuntamiento presidencialista: El caso de Lleida, TRANSGOB Report Series. IGOP-UAB, Barcelona.

Càritas, CCAR, 2006. Consens Social sobre Migracions a Catalunya. Càritas Diocesana de Barcelona i Comissió Catalana d'Ajuda al Refugiat.

Castellà Josa, C., 2016. Què vol dir "participar" en el canvi d'època? De la governança participativa a les noves estratègies de participació. El cas de la Política d'Immigració a Catalunya (2007 - 2014) (Ph.D. Thesis). Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

Castles, S., 2010. Understanding Global Migration: A Social Transformation Perspective. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, 1565–1586. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2010.489381

Cebolla-Boado, H., López-Sala, A., 2015. Transnational Immigrant Organizations in

Spain: Their role in idevelopment and integration, in: Portes, A., Fernández-Kelly, P. (Eds.), The State and the Grassroots: Immigrant Transnational Organizations in Four Continents. Bergahn Books.

Centre de Cooperació per al Desenvolupament Rural et al., 2010. Migraciones y desarrollo. El codesarrollo: del discurso a la práctica. Anthropos Editorial, Coordinadora d'ONGD i altres Moviments Solidaris de Lleida, Centre de Cooperació per al Desenvolupament Rural, Ajuntament de Lleida, Universitat de Lleida, Rubí.

Ceschi, S., Mezzetti, P., 2014. The Senegalese Transnational Diaspora and its role back home, in: Senegal. Between Migrations to Europe and Returns, The Internatiomal Commentary. Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, pp. 13–18.

Chambers, R., 2006. Poverty Unperceived: Traps, Biases and Agenda, IDS Working Paper. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Brighton.

Charmaz, K., 2006. Constructing grounded theory: a practical guide through qualitative analysis. SAGE Publications Ltd, London; Thousand Oaks.

Charmaz, K., 2001. Qualitative Interviewing and Grounded Theory Analysis, in: Gubrium, J.F., Holstein, J.A. (Eds.), Handbook of Interview Research: Context & Method. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, pp. 675–694.

Cisse, F., 2011. Senegal, in: Mohapatra, S., Ratha, D. (Eds.), Remittance Markets in Africa. The World Bank, pp. 221–241.

Clark, D.A., 2005. The Capability Approach: Its Development, Critiques and Recent Advances (No. 32). ESRC Global Poverty Research Group.

CONCORD, 2017. AidWatch Report 2017. CONCORD Europe, Brussels.

CONGDE, 2017. LA Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo en 2016. Análisis y Valoración de la Coordinadora de ONG para el Desarrollo. Coordinadora de ONGD España, Madrid.

Corbin, J.M., Strauss, A., 1990. Grounded theory research: Procedures, canons, and evaluative criteria. Qual Sociol 13, 3–21. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00988593

Cornwall, A., 2016. Women's Empowerment: What Works? Journal of International Development 28, 342–359. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3210

Cornwall, A., Eade, D. (Eds.), 2010. Deconstructing Development: Discourse Buzzwords and Fuzzwords. PubPractical Action Publishing in association with Oxfam GB, Rugby and Oxford (UK).

Crenshaw, K., 2015. Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. University of Chicago Legal Forum 1989.

CRES, 2011. Enquête Migration et Transferts de Fonds au Sénégal. The World Bank, produced by Consortium pour la Recherche Economique et Social (CRES), Senegal.

Crespo Ubero, R., 2006. Participación y asociacionismo senegalés de la visibiidad a la conexión transcontinental, in: Senegaleses En España. Conexiones Entre Origen y Destino, Documentos Del Observatorio Permanente de La Inmigración. Ministerio de Trabajo y

Asuntos Sociales, Madrid, pp. 132–142.

Datola, F., 2014. The PAISD: an adaptive learning process to the Migration & Development nexus, in: Senegal. Between Migrations to Europe and Returns, The Internatiomal Commentary. Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, pp. 59–66.

Daum, C., 1998. Les associations de Maliens en France: migrations, développement et citoyenneté. KARTHALA Editions.

de Graauw, E., Gleeson, S., Bloemraad, I., 2012. Funding Immigrant Organizations: Suburban Free-riding and Local Civic Presence (Working Paper). Center for Nonprofit Strategy and Management at the School of Public Affairs, Baruch College, New York.

de Haas, H., 2014. Migration Theory: Quo Vadis? (DEMIG project paper 24 No. 100). International Migration Institute (IMI), Oxford Department of International Development (QEH), Oxford.

de Haas, H., 2010a. Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective. International Migration Review 44, 227–264. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2009.00804.x

de Haas, H., 2010b. Migration transitions: a theoretical and empirical inquiry into the drivers of international migration (No. Working Paper n. 24). International Migration Institute, University of Oxford.

de Haas, H., 2007. Turning the tide? Why development will not stop migration. DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 38, 819–841.

Della Porta, D., 2008. Comparative analysis: case-oriented versus variable-oriented research, in: Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, pp. 198–222.

Della Porta, D., Keating, M., 2008. Introduction, in: Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo.

DGCDAH/ACCD, 2013. Estratègia país prioritari Senegal 2013-2017. Direcció General de Cooperació al Desenvolupament, Agència Catalana de Cooperació al Desenvolupament, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona.

DGCDAH/ACCD, 2010. Pla director de cooperació al desenvolupament 2011-2014. Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament de la Vicepresidència, Direcció General de Cooperació al Desenvolupament i Acció Humanitària, Agència Catalana de Cooperació al desenvolupament, Barcelona.

DGCDAH/ACCD, 2009. Estratègia de codesenvolupament de la cooperació al desenvolupament. Direcció General de Cooperació al Desenvolupament i Acció Humanitària, Agència Catalana de Cooperació al Desenvolupament. Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona.

Diao, A., 2007. Codesarrollo y democracia: el papel sociopolítico de los emigrantes. Revista Pueblos.

Diedhiou, A., 2015. Remittances, Transnational Dahiras and Governance in Senegal.

International Migration 53, 171–186. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2010.00669.x

Diedhiou, A., 2014. The Policy Fallacy of promoting Return migration among Senegalese Transnationals, in: Senegal. Between Migrations to Europe and Returns, The Internatiomal Commentary. Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, pp. 53–58.

Direcció General per a la Immigració, 2014. Pla de ciutadania i de les migracions: horitzó 2016. Direcció General per a la Immigració, Departament de Benestar Social i Família, Barcelona.

Domingo, A., 2014. Catalunya al mirall de la immigració. Demografia i identitat nacional, Assaig. L'Avenç, Barcelona.

Drydyk, J., 2013. Empowerment, agency, and power. Journal of Global Ethics 9, 249–262. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2013.818374

Duffield, D., 2001. Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. Zed Books, London and New York.

Eggert, N., Giugni, M., 2010. Does Associational Involvement Spur Political Integration? Political Interest and Participation of Three Immigrant Groups in Zurich. Swiss Political Science Review 16, 175–210. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2010.tb00157.x

Emirbayer, M., Mische, A., 1998. What is agency? American Journal of Sociology 103, 962–1023. https://doi.org/10.1086/231294

Escobar, A., 1988. Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and Management of the Third World. Cultural Anthropology 3, 428–443. https://doi.org/10.1525/can.1988.3.4.02a00060

Ewijk, E. van, Nijenhuis, G., 2016. Translocal Activities of Local Governments and Migrant Organizations, in: Integration Processes and Policies in Europe, IMISCOE Research Series. Springer, Cham, pp. 127–145. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21674-4_8

Faist, T., 2010. Towards Transnational Studies: World Theories, Transnationalisation and Changing Institutions. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, 1665–1687. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2010.489365

Faist, T., 2008. Migrants as transnational development agents: An inquiry into the newest round of the migration-development nexus. POPULATION SPACE AND PLACE 14, 21–42. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.471

Faist, T., 2007. Transnationalisation and Development(s): Towards a North-South Perspective, Working papers. Bielefeld University, Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development (COMCAD).

Faist, T., Fauser, M., 2011. The Migration–Development Nexus: Toward a Transnational Perspective, in: Faist, T., Fauser, M., Kivisto, P. (Eds.), The Migration–Development Nexus: A Transnational Perspective. Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 1–26.

Fall, P.D., 2014. Imagining Europe: Being willing to go does not necessarily result in taking the necessary steps, in: Senegal. Between Migrations to Europe and Returns, The Internatiomal Commentary. Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, pp. 21–26.

Fanchette, S., 2011. Au pays des Peuls de Haute-Casamance. Éditions Karthala, Paris.

Fathi, M., 2017. Intersectionality, Class and Migration: Narratives of Iranian Women Migrants in the U.K. Palgrave Macmillan.

Fauser, M., 2014. Co-development as Transnational Governance: An Analysis of the Engagement of Local Authorities and Migrant Organisations in Madrid. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40, 1060–1078. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.830889

FCCD, 2016. Memòria 2015.

FCCD, 2011. 25 anys, 25 moments: Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament. Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament (FCCD), Barcelona.

FCONGD, 2005. Diagnòstic dels Consells Municipals de Cooperació. Federació Catalana d'ONG per al Desenvolupament, Barcelona.

Fennema, M., 2004. The concept and measurement of ethnic community. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30, 429–447. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830410001682025

Fennema, M., Tillie, J., 1999. Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam: Civic communities and ethnic networks. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25, 703–726. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.1999.9976711

Flahaux, M.-L., De Haas, H., 2016. African migration: trends, patterns, drivers. Comparative Migration Studies 4, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-015-0015-6

Font Monclús, J.A., Gutiérrez Bustillo, J., Sagalés Guillamón, J.R., 2014. Dictamen jurídic sobre la competència dels municipis en matèria de cooperació internacional en el marc d'aplicació de la LRSAL i sobre la justificació de les aportacions econòmiques que els ajuntaments tramiten a través del Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament. Col·legis de Secretaris, Interventors i Tresorers d'Administració Local de Catalunya, Barcelona.

Fox, J., Bada, X., 2008. Migrant Organization and Hometown Impacts in Rural Mexico. Journal of Agrarian Change 8, 435–461. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2008.00176.x

Friese, S., 2012. Qualitative Data Analysis with Atlas.ti. SAGE Publications Ltd.

García Añón, J., Bradford, B., García Sáez, J.A., Gascón Cuenca, A., Llorente Ferreres, A., 2013. Identificación policial por perfil étnico en España. Informe sobre experiencias y actitudes en relación con las actuaciones policiales. Tirant lo Blanch, València.

Garreta Bochaca, J., Llevot Calvet, N., 2013. Las asociaciones de inmigrantes africanos. Organización, proyección y actuaciones. Revista Internacional de Sociología (RIS) 71, 15–38. https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2012.09.01

Gaventa, J., 2006. Finding the Spaces for Change: A Power Analysis. IDS Bulletin 37, 23–33.

Gaventa, J., Cornwall, A., 2008. Power and Knowledge, in: Reason, P., Bradbury, H. (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Action Research. Participative Inquiry and Practice. SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 172–189.

Gawlewicz, A., 2016. Language and translation strategies in researching migrant

experience of difference from the position of migrant researcher. Qualitative Research 16, 27–42. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468794114557992

Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015. Situació laboral de la població estrangera (I part) (No. 16), La immigració en xifres. Monogràfic del Butlletí de la Direcció General per a la Immigració. Generalitat de Catalunya.

Generalitat de Catalunya, 2011. La població de nacionalitat senegalesa o gambiana a Catalunya (No. 10), La immigració en xifres. Monogràfic del Butlletí de la Direcció General per a la Immigració. Generalitat de Catalunya.

Generalitat de Catalunya, 2010. Pla de ciutadania i immigració 2005-2008. Memòria de les actuacions realitzades. Departament de Benestar i Família, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona.

Gerring, J., 2008. Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques, in: Box-Steffensmeier, J., Brady, H.E. (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. Oxford University Press.

Gerring, J., 2007. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge University Press.

Giddens, A., 1984. The Constitution of Society: Outline of Theory of Structuration. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles.

Gil Araújo, S., 2006. Las argucias de la integración. Construcción nacional y gobierno de lo social a través de las políticas de integración de inmigrantes. Los casos de Cataluña y Madrid. Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

Giménez Romero, C., Martínez Martínez, J.L., Fernández García, M., Cortés Maisonave, A., 2006. El codesarrollo en España. Protagonistas, discursos y experiencias. Los Libros de la Catarata, Madrid.

Giugni, M., Passy, F., 2004. Migrant mobilization between political institutions and citizenship regimes: A comparison of France and Switzerland. European Journal of Political Research 43, 51–82. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00145.x

Gledhill, J., 2000. Power and its disguises: anthropological perspectives on politics. Pluto Press.

Glick Schiller, N., Çağlar, A., 2009. Towards a Comparative Theory of Locality in Migration Studies: Migrant Incorporation and City Scale. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35, 177–202. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830802586179

Goldring, L., 2004. Family and Collective Remittances to Mexico: A Multi-dimensional Typology. Development and Change 35, 799–840. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0012-155X.2004.00380.x

Goldring, L., 2002. The Mexican State and Transmigrant Organizations: Negotiating the Boundaries of Membership and Participation. Latin American Research Review 37, 55–99.

González-Ferrer, A., Baizán, P., Beauchemin, C., Kraus, E., Schoumaker, B., Black, R., 2014. Distance, Transnational Arrangements, and Return Decisions of Senegalese, Ghanaian, and Congolese Migrants. Int Migr Rev 48, 939–971.

https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12148

Goss, J., Lindquist, B., 1995. Conceptualizing International Labor Migration: A Structuration Perspective. International Migration Review 29, 317. https://doi.org/10.2307/2546784

Grillo, P.R., Mazzucato, D.V., 2008. Africa < > Europe: A Double Engagement. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34, 175–198. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830701823830

Grillo, R., Riccio, B., 2004. Translocal development: Italy–Senegal. Popul. Space Place 10, 99–111. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.321

Guarnizo, L.E., Portes, A., Haller, W., 2003. Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants. American Journal of Sociology 108, 1211–1248. https://doi.org/10.1086/375195

Haas, H. de, 2012. The Migration and Development Pendulum: A Critical View on Research and Policy. International Migration 50, 8–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2012.00755.x

Hanmer, L., Klugman, J., 2016. Exploring Women's Agency and Empowerment in Developing Countries: Where do we stand? Feminist Economics 22, 237–263. https://doi.org/10.1080/13545701.2015.1091087

Haque, M.S., 2011. Non-governmental Organizations, in: Bevir, M. (Ed.), The SAGE Handbook of Governance. Sage Publications Ltd, pp. 330–341.

Harvey, B., 2010. Learning from Power in Development Cooperation: Lessons from Senegal. Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences 2, 340–371.

Hayward, C., Lukes, S., 2008. Nobody to shoot? Power, structure, and agency: A dialogue. Journal of Power 1, 5–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/17540290801943364

Hunt, D., 1989. Economic Theories of Development. An Analysis of Competing Paradigms. Harvest Wheatsheaf, London.

Ibrahim, S., Alkire, S., 2007. Agency and Empowerment: A Proposal for Internationally Comparable Indicators. Oxford Development Studies 35, 379–403. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600810701701897

Iphophen, R., 2009. Ethical Decision Making in Social Research. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Iskander, N., 2015. Partners in Organizing: Engagement between Migrants and the State in the Production of Mexican Hometown Associations, in: Portes, A., Fernández-Kelly, P. (Eds.), The State and the Grassroots: Immigrant Transnational Organizations in Four Continents. Berghahn Books, New York, Oxford, pp. 111–138.

Itzigsohn, J., Villacrés, D., 2008. Migrant political transnationalism and the practice of democracy: Dominican external voting rights and Salvadoran home town associations. Ethnic and Racial Studies 31, 664–686. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870701784497

Jabardo Velasco, M. (Ed.), 2006. Senegaleses en España. Conexiones entre origen y destino, Documentos del Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración. Ministerio de

Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, Madrid.

Jones-Correa, M.A., Leal, D.L., 2001. Political Participation: Does Religion Matter? Political research Quarterly 54, 751–770. https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290105400404

Jupp, D., Ibn Ali, S., 2010. Measuring Empowerment? Ask Them. Quantifying qualitative outcomes from people's own analysis (No. 1), Sida Studies in Evaluation. Sida, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Stockholm.

Kabbanji, L., 2013. Towards a Global Agenda on Migration and Development? Evidence from Senegal. Popul. Space Place 19, 415–429. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.1782

Kabeer, N., 2010. Women's Empowerment, Development Interventions and the Management of Information Flows. IDS Bulletin 41, 105–113. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.2010.00188.x

Kabeer, N., 1999. Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women's Empowerment. Development and Change 30, 435–464.

Kamara, O., 2000. Les divisions statutaires des descendants d'esclaves au Fuuta Tooro mauritanien. Journal des africanistes 70, 265–289. https://doi.org/10.3406/jafr.2000.1231

Kamberelis, G., Dimitriadis, G., 2011. Focus groups: contingent articulations of pedagogy, politics and inquiry, in: Denzin, N.K., Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research. SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 545–561.

Kapoor, I., 2004. Hyper-Self-Reflexive Development? Spivak on Representing the Third World "Other." Third World Quarterly 25, 627–647.

Keating, M., 2008. Culture and social science, in: Della Porta, D., Keating, M. (Eds.), Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences. A Pluralist Perspective. Cambridge University Press, pp. 99–117.

Kelly, P., Lusis, T., 2006. Migration and the Transnational Habitus: Evidence from Canada and the Philippines. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 38, 831–847. https://doi.org/10.1068/a37214

King, R., Collyer, M., 2016. Migration and Development Framework and Its Links to Integration, in: Integration Processes and Policies in Europe, IMISCOE Research Series. Springer, Cham, pp. 167–188. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21674-4_10

Kleist, N., 2011. Modern Chiefs: Tradition, Development and Return Among Traditional Authorities in Ghana. African Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adr041

Koopmans, R., 2010. Trade-Offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, 1. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830903250881

Koopmans, R., 2004. Migrant mobilisation and political opportunities: variation among German cities and a comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30, 449. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830410001682034

Koopmans, R., 1999. Political.Opportunity. Structure. Some Splitting to Balance the Lumping. Sociological Forum 14, 93–106.

Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., Passy, F., 2005. Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Lacomba, J., 2016. Asociaciones de inmigrantes en la encrucijada. Acción transnacional y riesgos de cooptación. Revista Interdisciplinar da Mobilidade Humana 24. https://doi.org/10.1590/1980-85852503880004703

Lacomba, J., Boni, A., 2008. The role of emigration in foreign aid policies: The case of Spain and Morocco. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 46, 123–150.

Lacomba, J., Boni, A., Cloquell, A., Soledad, C., 2014. Immigrant Associations and Co-development Policies. Among the Opportunities for Strengthening and the Risks of Cooptation in the Case of Valencia Region (Spain). Voluntas 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-014-9491-9

Lacroix, T., 2014. Conceptualizing Transnational Engagements: A Structure and Agency Perspective on (Hometown) Transnationalism. Int Migr Rev n/a-n/a. https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12105

Lacroix, T., 2009. Transnationalism and Development: The Example of Moroccan Migrant Networks. JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 35, 1665–1678. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830903165865

Lafleur, J.-M., 2013. Transnational Politics and the State: The External Voting Rights of Diasporas. Routledge.

Lampert, B., 2014. Collective Transnational Power and its Limits: London-Based Nigerian Organisations, Development at 'Home' and the Importance of Local Agency and the 'Internal Diaspora.' Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40, 829–846. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.782142

Landolt, P., 2001. Salvadoran economic transnationalism: embedded strategies for household maintenance, immigrant incorporation, and entrepreneurial expansion. Global Networks 1, 217–242. https://doi.org/10.1111/1471-0374.00014

Lavigne Delville, P., 2010. Courtiers en développement ou entrepreneurs politiques? Les responsables d'associations villageoises de développement dans un région d'émigration internationales (Mali, Sénégal), in: Bierschenk, T., Chauveau, J.-P., de Sardan, J.-P.O. (Eds.), Courtiers En Développment. Les Villages Africains En Quête de Projets, Hommes et Sociétés. Karthala et APAD, Paris.

Le Galès, P., 2011. Policy Instruments and Governance, in: Bevir, M. (Ed.), The SAGE Handbook of Governance. Sage Publications Ltd, pp. 142–159.

Lecocq, B., Hahonou, É.K., 2015. Introduction: Exploring Post-Slavery in Contemporary Africa. The International Journal of African Historical Studies 48, 181–II.

Lessault, D., Flahaux, M.-L., 2013. Regards statistiques sur l'histoire de l'émigration internationale au Sénégal. Revue européenne des migrations internationales 29, 59–88. https://doi.org/10.4000/remi.6640

Levitt, P., 2001. Transnational migration: taking stock and future directions. Global Networks 1, 195–216. https://doi.org/10.1111/1471-0374.00013

Levitt, P., 1998. Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion. International Migration Review 32, 926–948. https://doi.org/10.2307/2547666

Levitt, P., Lamba-Nieves, D., 2011. Social Remittances Revisited. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.521361

Lewins, A., Silver, C., 2007. Using software in qualitative research: a step-by-step guide. SAGE Publications Ltd, London.

Lewis, D., Mosse, D. (Eds.), 2006. Development Brokers and Translators: The Ethnography of Aid and Agencies. Kumarian Press, Bloomfield.

López-Sala, A., 2013. Managing Uncertainty: Immigration Policies in Spain during Economic Recession (2008-2011). Migraciones Internacionales 7, 39–69.

Mahmud, S., Shah, N.M., Becker, S., 2012. Measurement of Women's Empowerment in Rural Bangladesh. World Development 40, 610–619. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.08.003

Mamdani, M., 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Marabello, S., 2013. Translating and Acting Diaspora: Looking Through the Lens of a Co-development Project Between Italy and Ghana. African Studies 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/00020184.2013.812886

Martinello, M., Lafleur, J.M., 2008. Towards a transatlantic dialogue in the study of immigrant political transnationalism. Ethnic and Racial Studies 31, 645–663.

Martínez de Lizarrondo Artola, A., 2009. La integración de inmigrantes en España: el modelo patchwork. Migraciones 26, 115–146.

Mbow, P., 2000. Démocratie, droits humains et castes au Sénégal. Journal des africanistes 70, 71–91. https://doi.org/10.3406/jafr.2000.1220

McGee, R., 2016. Power and Empowerment Meet Resistance: A Critical, Action-Oriented Review of the Literature. IDS Bulletin 47. https://doi.org/10.19088/1968-2016.170

Medina, E., Herrarte, A., Vicéns, J., 2010. Inmigración y desempleo en España: impacto de la crisis económica. Información Comercial Española, ICE: Revista de economía 854, 37–48.

Michalopoulos, S., Papaioannou, E., 2015. On the Ethnic Origins of African Development: Chiefs and Precolonial Political Centralization. ACAD MANAGE PERSPECT 29, 32–71. https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2012.0162

Michalopoulos, S., Papaioannou, E., 2013. Pre-colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development. Econometrica 81, 113–152. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9613

Miguélez, F., López-Roldán, P., Alós, R., Martín Artiles, A., Molina, Ó., Moreno, S., Godino, A., 2014. Crisis, empleo e inmigración en España. Un análisis de las trayectorias laborales. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Servei de Publicacions, Bellaterra.

Miret i Serra, À., 2009. La gestión de la división de competencias en materia de

inmigración, in: Zapata-Barrero, R. (Ed.), Políticas y gobernabilidad de la inmigración en España. Ariel.

Morales, L., Jorba, L., 2010. The transnational links and practices of migrants' organisations in Spain, in: Bauböck, R., Faist, T. (Eds.), Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods, IMISCOE Research. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, pp. 267–294.

Morales, L., Pilati, K., 2014. The political transnationalism of Ecuadorians in Barcelona, Madrid and Milan: the role of individual resources, organizational engagement and the political context. Global Networks 14, 80–102. https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12018

Morawska, E., 2001. Structuring migration: The case of Polish income-seeking travelers to the West. Theory and Society 30, 47–80. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011081228016

Moser, C.O.N., 2006. Assed-Based Approaches to Poverty Reduction in a Globalized Context: An introduction to asset accumulation policy and summary of workshop findings. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.

Moser, C.O.N., 1998. The asset vulnerability framework: Reassessing urban poverty reduction strategies. World Development 26, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(97)10015-8

Mosse, D., 2013. The Anthropology of International Development. Annual Review of Anthropology 42, 227–246. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-anthro-092412-155553

Mosse, D., 2011. Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development. Berghahn Books.

Mosse, D., Lewis, D., 2006. Theoretical Approaches to Brokerage and Translation in Development, in: Lewis, D., Mosse, D. (Eds.), Development Brokers and Translators: The Ethnography of Aid and Agencies. Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, pp. 1–26.

Moya, J.C., 2005. Immigrants and Associations: A Global and Historical Perspective. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, 833–864. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830500178147

Muniandy, P., Bonatti, V., 2014. Are Migrants Agents or Instruments of Development? The Case of 'Temporary' Migration in Malaysia. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies on-line, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2014.907738

Nadal, M., Oliveres, R., Alegre, M.À., 2002. Les actuacions municipals a Catalunya en l'àmbit de la immigració. Fundació Jaume Bofill, Barcelona.

Naïr, S., 1997. Rapport de bilan et d'orientation sur la politique de codéveloppement liée aux flux migratoires. Mission interministérielle Migrations/Codéveloppement, Paris.

Narayan, D. (Ed.), 2005. Measuring Empowerment: Cross-disciplinary Perspectives. World Bank Publications.

Ndiaye, A., 2016. Sénégal : que disent les 15 points soumis à référendum ? Le Monde.fr.

Ngaïdé, A., 2012. L'esclave, le colon et le marabout: Le royaume peul du Fuladu de 1867 à 1936. L'Harmattan, Paris.

Nijenhuis, G., Broekhuis, A., 2010. Institutionalising transnational migrants' activities: the impact of co-development programmes. International Development Planning Review 32, 245–265.

Nowicka, M., Ryan, L., 2015. Beyond Insiders and Outsiders in Migration Research: Rejecting A Priori Commonalities. Introduction to the FQS Thematic Section on "Researcher, Migrant, Woman: Methodological Implications of Multiple Positionalities in Migration Studies." Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research 16.

Nyberg Sørensen, N., 2012. Revisiting the Migration–Development Nexus: From Social Networks and Remittances to Markets for Migration Control. International Migration 50, 61–76. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2012.00753.x

Nyberg-Sørensen, N., Hear, N.V., Engberg-Pedersen, P., 2002. The Migration-Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options. Int Migration 40, 49–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00211

OECD, 2005. Aid Extended by Local and State Governments. Pre-print of the DAC Journal 2005, Volume 6, No. 4. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Oficina de Información Diplomática, 2016. Ficha país: Senegal. Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, Gobierno de España.

Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011. Codevelopment and citizenship: the nexus between policies on local migrant incorporation and migrant transnational practices in Spain. Ethnic & Racial Stud. 34, 20–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419871003777791

Østergaard-Nielsen, E., 2016. Sending Country Policies, in: Integration Processes and Policies in Europe, IMISCOE Research Series. Springer, Cham, pp. 147–165. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21674-4_9

Østergaard-Nielsen, E., 2011. Codevelopment and citizenship: the nexus between policies on local migrant incorporation and migrant transnational practices in Spain. Ethnic & Racial Stud. 34, 20–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419871003777791

Østergaard-Nielsen, E., 2009. Mobilising the Moroccans: Policies and Perceptions of Transnational Co-Development Engagement Among Moroccan Migrants in Catalonia. JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 35, 1623–1641. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830903165840

Østergaard-Nielsen, E., 2003a. The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Practices. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW 37, 760–786.

Østergaard-Nielsen, E., 2003b. The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices. International Migration Review 37, 760–786. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2003.tb00157.x

Østergaard-Nielsen, E., Acebillo-Baqué, M., 2016. Migration and the Local Transformation of Overseas Development Aid: an Analysis of Migrants' Access to ODA Funds in Catalonia. Popul. Space Place 22, 367–381. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.1940

Parlament de Catalunya, 2003. RESOLUCIÓ 1699/VI, de 19 de febrer de 2003, sobre el

Pla director de cooperació al desenvolupament 2003-2006. Tram. 259-00001/06. Parlament de Catalunya, Barcelona.

Pelckmans, L., 2013. Moving Memories of Slavery among West African Migrants in Urban Contexts (Bamako, Paris). Revue européenne des migrations internationales 29, 45–67.

Pelckmans, L., Hardung, C., 2016. La question de l'esclavage en Afrique : Politisation et mobilisations. Politique africaine 5–22.

Pinyol-Jiménez, G. (Ed.), 2016. Informe sobre la integració de les persones immigrades a Catalunya 2015. Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona.

Pinyol-Jiménez, G., Sánchez-Montijano, E., 2015. El proceso de naturalización por residencia en España: ¿diferencias que discriminan? Documents CIDOB (nueva época) 5.

Piperno, F., Stocchiero, A., 2006. Migrants and Local Authorities for the EuroMediterranean Transnational Integration (Working Paper No. 23/2006). Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI), Roma.

Portes, A., 2015. Introduction: Immigration, Transnationalism, and Development: The State of the Question, in: Portes, A., Fernández-Kelly, P. (Eds.), The State and the Grassroots. Immigrant Transnational Organizations in Four Continents. Berghahn Books, New York, Oxford, pp. 15–25.

Portes, A., 2009. Migration and development: reconciling opposite views. Ethnic and Racial Studies 32, 5–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870802483668

Portes, A., Escobar, C., Arana, R., 2008. Bridging the gap: transnational and ethnic organizations in the political incorporation of immigrants in the United States. Ethnic and Racial Studies 31, 1056–1090.

Portes, A., Fernández-Kelly, P. (Eds.), 2015. The State and the Grassroots: Immigrant Transnational Organizations in Four Continents. Berghahn Books, New York, Oxford.

Portes, A., Guarnizo, L., Landolt, P., 1999. The study of transnationalism: pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field. Ethnic & Racial Stud. 22, 217–237. https://doi.org/10.1080/014198799329468

Purkayastha, B., 2010. Interrogating Intersectionality: Contemporary Globalisation and Racialised Gendering in the Lives of Highly Educated South Asian Americans and their Children. Journal of Intercultural Studies 31, 29–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/07256860903477696

Putnam, R.D., 1993. What makes democracy work? National Civic Review 82, 101–107. https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.4100820204

Ramakrishnan, S.K., Bloemraad, I., 2008a. Introduction: Civic and Political Inequalities, in: Civic Hopes and Political Realities: Immigrants, Community Organizations, and Political Engagement. Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 1–42.

Ramakrishnan, S.K., Bloemraad, I., 2008b. Making Organizations Count: Immigrant Civic Engagement in California Cities, in: Civic Hopes and Political Realities: Immigrants, Community Organizations, and Political Engagement. Russell Sage Foundation, New

York, pp. 45–76.

République du Sénégal, 2014a. Loi n° 2014-18 du 15 avril 2014 abrogeant et remplaçant la loi n° 2012-01 du 03 janvier 2012 portant code électoral (partie - Lois et règlements - Lois et décrets - législative), modifiée.

République du Sénégal, 2014b. Plan Sénégal Emergent.

République du Sénégal, 2013. Loi n° 2013-10 du 28 décembre 2013 portant Code général des Collectivités locales.

République du Sénégal, 2012. SNDES 2013-2017. Stratégie Nationale de Développement Economique et Social.

République du Sénégal, 2010. DECRET n° 2010-241 du 1er mars 2010 abrogeant et remplaçant le décret n° 95-154 du 9 février 1995 portant création du Conseil Supérieur des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur.

République du Sénégal, 2007. Loi organique n° 2007-23 du 22 mai 2007 relative au Sénat.

République du Sénégal, 2005. Décret Ministériel n° 2005-48 du 11 janvier 2005 fixant les taux des indemnités pour frais de représentation allouées aux présidents et vice-présidents de conseil rural, aux présidents et vice-présidents de délégation spéciale.

République du Sénégal, 1996. Loi n° 96-07 du 22 mars 1996 portant transfert de compétences aux régions, aux communes et aux communautés rurales.

Ribot, J.C., 2009. Authority over Forests: Empowerment and Subordination in Senegal's Democratic Decentralization. Development and Change 40, 105–129. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2009.01507.x

Ribot, J.C., Agrawal, A., Larson, A.M., 2006. Recentralizing While Decentralizing: How National Governments Reappropriate Forest Resources. World Development, Rescaling Governance and the Impacts of Political and Environmental Decentralization 34, 1864–1886. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.11.020

Riccio, B., 2011. Rehearsing Transnational Citizenship: Senegalese Associations, Co-development and Simultaneous Inclusion. African Diaspora 4, 97–113. https://doi.org/10.1163/187254611X566828

Riccio, B., 2008. West African Transnationalisms Compared: Ghanaians and Senegalese in Italy,. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34, 217–234.

Riccio, B., 2005. Talkin' about migration - some ethnographic notes on the ambivalent representation of migrants in contemporary Senegal. Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien 8, 99–118.

Rist, G., 2008. The History of Development: from Western Origins to Global Faith, 3rd ed. Zed Books, London.

Rodet, M., 2015. Escaping Slavery and Building Diasporic Communities in French Soudan and Senegal, ca. 1880-1940 *. The International Journal of African Historical Studies 48, 363–II.

Rossi, B., 2015. African Post-Slavery: A History of the Future *. The International Journal

of African Historical Studies 48, 303–II.

Rowlands, J., 1997. Questioning Empowerment: Working with Women in Honduras. Oxfam.

Rowlands, J., 1995. Empowerement examined. Development in Practice 5, 101–107.

Saldaña, J., 2013. Chapter 1: An introduction to Codes and Coding, in: The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 1–40.

Samman, E., Santos, M.E., 2009. Agency and Empowerment: A review of concepts, indicators and empirical evidence. Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), Oxford.

Scheyvens, R., McLennan, S., 2014. Chapter 1: Introduction, in: Scheyvens, R. (Ed.), Development Fieldwork: A Practical Guide. SAGE Publications, London.

Secretaria d'Igualtat, Migracions i Ciutadania, 2017. Pla de ciutadania i de les migracions 2017-2020. Secretaria d'Igualtat, Migracions i Ciutadania; Departament de Treball, Afers Socials i Famílies, Barcelona.

Secretaria per a la Immigració, 2010. Pla de ciutadania i immigració 2009-2012. Secretaria per a la Immigració, Departament d'Acció Social i Ciutadania, Generalitat de Catalunya, Barcelona.

Secretaria per a la Immigració, 2009. Un pacte per viure junts i juntes. Pacte Nacional per a la Immigració. Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament de d'Acció Social i Ciutadania, Secretaria per a la Immigració.

Sen, A., 1998. Teorias del desarrollo a principios del siglo XXI, in: Emmerij, L., Núñez del Arco, J. (Eds.), El Desarrollo Económico y Social En Los Umbrales Del Siglo XXI. BID, Washington, DC.

Sewell, W.H., Jr., 1992. A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation. American Journal of Sociology 98, 1–29.

Sinatti, G., 2014. 11 Masculinities and Intersectionality in Migration: Transnational Wolof Migrants Negotiating Manhood and Gendered Family Roles, in: Truong, T.-D., Gasper, D., Handmaker, J., Bergh, S.I. (Eds.), Migration, Gender and Social Justice, Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 215–226. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28012-2_11

Sinatti, G., 2011. 'Mobile transmigrants' or 'unsettled returnees'? myth of return and permanent resettlement among Senegalese migrants. Population, Space and Place 17, 153–166. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.608

Skeldon, R., 2008. International Migration as a Tool in Development Policy: A Passing Phase? Population and Development Review 34, 1–18.

Sokpoh, B.G., 2005. Codesenvolupament. Catalunya-Senegal: Lliçons de 10 anys d'experiència. Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament (FCCD), Barcelona.

Solé Arраràs, A., 2014. Ritos funerarios islámicos trasnacionales entre Catalunya y Kolda (Senegal). La construcción de la transnacionalidad desde la práctica religiosa y ritual.

Revista de Estudios Internacionales Mediterráneos 0.

SOS Racisme Catalunya, 2017. InVisibles. L'estat del racisme a Catalunya 2016. Pol·len edicions, Barcelona.

Sow, M.M., 2011. Mutations politiques et sociales au Fuladu: la chefferie locale à l'épreuve du pouvoir colonial, 1867-1958. Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar.

Sow, P., 2005. Migracions senegaleses a Catalunya. Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament (FCCD), Barcelona.

Sow, P., 2004a. Mujeres inmigrantes y/o esposas de inmigrantes senegaleses y gambianos en Cataluña (España): entre la vida familiar y la vida profesional. Documents d'Anàlisi Geogràfica 69–88.

Sow, P., 2004b. Senegalesos i gambians a Catalunya (Espanya). Anàlisi geo-sociològica de les seves xarxes espacials i socials. Departament de Geografia, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

Soysal, Y.N., 1994. Limits of citizenship: migrants and postnational membership in Europe. The University Chicago Press.

Sy, Y., 2000. L'esclavage chez les Soninkés : du village à Paris. Journal des africanistes 70, 43–69. https://doi.org/10.3406/jafr.2000.1219

Tamari, T., 1991. The Development of Caste Systems in West Africa. The Journal of African History 32, 221–250.

Thapa, A.K., Gurung, L., 2012. An assessment of factors influencing empowerment levels of females: a case study of Pokhara. Economic Journal of Development Issues 11, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.3126/ejdi.v11i0.6099

The UN General Assembly, 2016. New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.

Toma, S., Vause, S., 2014. Gender Differences in the Role of Migrant Networks: Comparing Congolese and Senegalese Migration Flows. Int Migr Rev 48, 972–997. https://doi.org/10.1111/imre.12150

Touré, I., 2012. Autonomie et démocratie locale en Afrique. Une illustration par le cas du Sénégal. Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives 78, 809–826.

Toure, P.N., 2010. Trajectoires litteraires et filmiques de la migration en Afrique francophone: de l'assimilation aux imaginaires transnationaux (Ph.D.). University of Cincinnati, United States -- Ohio.

Treviño, R., González Ferrer, A., 2016. Gestión local de la inmigración en los inicios de la crisis económica, in: Inmigración y Diversidad En España. Icaria editorial, Barcelona.

UN/DESA, 2015. Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K.L., Brady, H.E., Nie, N.H., 1993. Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States. British Journal of Political Science 23, 453–497.

Vertovec, S., 2009. Transnationalism. Routledge, London & New York.

Vives, L., Silva, I.V., 2016. Senegalese migration to Spain: transnational mothering practices. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 0, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1186531

Weil, P., 2002. Towards a coherent policy of co-development. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 40, 41–55.

Wiles, R., 2013. What are Qualitative Research Ethics? Bloomsbury, The UK.

Wiles, R., Crow, G., Heath, S., Charles, V., 2008. The Management of Confidentiality and Anonymity in Social Research. International Journal of Social Research Methodology 11, 417–428. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645570701622231

Wimmer, A., 2007. How (not) to think about ethnicity in immigrant societies: A boundary making experience (No. 44), ESRC Working Papers. ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford.