




UNIVERSITAT DE  
BARCELONA

## Geopolitical and urban changes in Sarajevo (1995 – 2015)

Jordi Martín i Díaz



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Facultat de Geografia i Història  
Departament de Geografia  
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“Geografia, planificació territorial i gestió ambiental”

## **Tesi doctoral**

### **Geopolitical and urban changes in Sarajevo (1995 – 2015)**

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*Als meus pares i al meu germà.*



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## **Abstract**

During the collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia and amid a concomitant process to ethnically divide Bosnia, Sarajevo suffered through a siege which after three-and-a-half years resulted in a completely new social, political and territorial order. Following the signing of the peace agreement in Paris in December 1995, to end the war in Bosnia, the city simultaneously experienced a transition from war to peace and from socialism to capitalism. This double transition was marked by increasing intervention from the international community, who deployed an administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina to supervise the implementation of the peace agreement. Despite the fact that no specific local peace-building mission was established in Sarajevo, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), in charge of supervising the civilian annexes of the agreement, became particularly involved in the supervision, coordination and even execution of several key processes shaping its urban transformation, in areas such as the management of land, economic transition and the reconstruction of Sarajevo's intrinsic ethnic diversity. Thus, this dissertation analyses the role of the OHR in the urban transformation of the symbolic Bosnian capital during the post-war period with an ultimate focus on the impact of those policies, developed mostly between 1995 and 2003, in the current ethnic and spatial configuration of the city.



# 1. Theoretical and conceptual approach

This dissertation analyses the urban transformation of Sarajevo and considers both the role and the impact of international intervention in its spatial and ethnic configuration from the end of the war in late 1995. A focus on Sarajevo is worthwhile, undoubtedly, it is not of any minor insignificance in urban studies, as the city has long held a symbolic significance in European history for crucial continental events that occurred in the twentieth century but also for having a long tradition of ethnic diversity and coexistence throughout its history. Sarajevo is actually unique, in the sense that common life among people of different religions is an intrinsic feature of the city, and promoted by different governments with few exceptions until very recently. After the Second World War, and during Socialist Yugoslavia, Sarajevo experienced its major urban expansion (acquiring attributes of socialist cities) amid a period of social, cultural and economic burgeoning that culminated in the celebration of the Winter Olympic Games in 1984. For all that, the collapse of Yugoslavia ended dramatically for the city, which has been under international spotlight since April 1992. The SDS leadership, in conjunction with a Serb-dominated JNA, inflicted the greatest attack on human diversity, pursuing the ethnic division of the city.

Encircled, divided and significantly destroyed due to the siege, the city began a process of significant urban transformation following the signature of the peace agreement in December 1995. The international community played a leading role during the post-war period (unlike military passivity during the siege) setting an international administration in Bosnia to implement the peace agreement signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. Indeed, the focus of this dissertation on the international community is explained by the fact that the more important changes affecting the area of Sarajevo during the post-war period were a product of a particularly acute and complex multi-scalar power struggle, understood as a situation in which two or more actors competed for influence. This struggle can be featured, on the one hand, by international organisations who supervised and implemented the liberal peace and aid apparatuses that were responsible for the reconstruction. On the other hand, it may result from local parties that had come to power in the first multi-party elections held in 1990 and who,

after the conflict, consolidated via political means the economic, ethnic and territorial war gains.<sup>1</sup>

The diversity of agendas, within both local and international actors, actually hindered the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in the early stages of the post-war period. The embedded obstructionism of the ruling ethno-national parties, i.e. SDA, SDS, and HDZ, aimed at preventing the transformation of the post-war *status quo* and were only challenged when greater consensus appeared within international actors who were concerned for the civilian implementation of the peace agreement.<sup>2</sup> As a result of this development, international actors became the primary authority for full implementation of the DPA. Furthermore, having acquired executive and legislative powers, the High Representative became its final authority. As a consequence, Bosnia became a sovereign state, albeit a parallel administration, headed by unaccountable international representatives, who effectively had the power to legislate and dismiss elected officials.

In Sarajevo, governance lay in local parties while in theory it was not a locally established peace-building mission, unlike those developed in Mostar and Brcko. Eventually, international organizations dealing with the implementation of the peace agreement intervened through the main functional areas of international administration that were developed in the country. These areas include public order and internal security, the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, civil administration, the building of local political institutions, and economic reconstruction and development (Caplan 2005a). Particularly, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), in charge of supervising the civilian implementation of the peace agreement, became the main international institution directly or indirectly involved in Sarajevo during the period of maximum international intervention developed at local level from December 1995 until 2003. This period commenced with the signing of the peace agreement and concluded when the relevant international actors transferred the

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<sup>1</sup> This struggle must not be understood as a stable binary opposition but rather as two entities with significant cleavages that were in constant evolution.

<sup>2</sup> The three ethno-national parties dominant during the 1990s were formed in 1990 on the eve of the first multi-party elections in Socialist Yugoslavia. These parties were the Party of Democratic Action (SDA, *Stranka Demokratske Akcije*), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS; *Srpska Demokratska Stranka*) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ; *Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica*). All parties respectively represented and mobilised the Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks, the Bosnians Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, achieving a majority of votes in the November 1990 election. A large part of the Bosnian population progressively converted to Islam during the Ottoman Empire, becoming an absolute majority between the sixteenth and seventeenth century in the territory of modern Bosnia and Herzegovina (Malcolm 1994).

management of land and the return of displaced persons to local authorities, as it will be seen in the following chapters.

Importantly, the OHR was heavily involved in the supervision, coordination and even execution of several key processes shaping Sarajevo's urban transformation, such as the transfer of the Serb-held districts of the city, the re-establishment of multi-ethnic institutions in the city, land management, economic reforms geared towards a market economy and strategies for rebuilding the city's ethnic diversity after the war. Such involvement commenced shortly after the signing of the peace agreement. The first High Representative, Carl Bildt, set the management of the transfer of authority of the five Serb-held districts of Sarajevo as the main priority of his Office in order to maintain ethnic diversity in the city. The transfer of authority took place between February and March 1996 and ended with a mass departure of the Serb population to Republika Srpska (RS). Subsequently, the OHR intervened to undo the mono-ethnic institutional reorganization of the city that had excluded non-Bosniak representatives. More importantly, once the High Representative was established as the final authority in the country, in December 1997, the OHR focused on rebuilding the ethnic diversity so characteristic of Sarajevo through the signature of the Sarajevo Declaration in February 1998. The empowerment of the High Representative was actually a turning point for the broader implementation of the civilian annexes of the peace agreement, following which, the OHR enacted legislation and dismissed any authority who obstructed implementation, thereby becoming heavily engaged in issues such as economic transition and land management.

Hence, it should be noted that focusing the transformation of Sarajevo during the post-war period from the sole lens of urban geography may be misleading. Any analysis of change in its urban area requires the consideration of the role of international actors especially after the subsequent development of governmental functions to implement the peace agreement. In order to achieve this, I focus on the role of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), due to its authority in the implementation of the civilian annexes and its crucial involvement in central events and processes which occurred in Sarajevo since the end of the Bosnian war. Therefore, the question leading this research is as follows:

What was the role of the OHR in the urban transformation of Sarajevo during the period of maximum international intervention and how did such a role influence the current ethnic and spatial configuration of the city?

If one considers either fully or partially the post-war period, during the last number of years, several publications have focused on the city in order to analyse its historical evolution (Donia 2006a). These publications include the subsequent waves of modernisation (Carreras and Moreno 2007), its model of development (Zuljic et al. 2015), links to the renaming of many street names in the city and related attempts to establish the state of BiH (Robinson et. al. 2001), the transformation of spaces such as the Marijin Dvor and Trebevic (Borelli 2012), issues regarding the division between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo (e.g. Bollens 2001, 2007; Bassi 2013; Aquilué and Roca 2016), consideration of Sarajevans in terms of a cultural transformation from the beginning of the siege (Steffanson 2007), Sarajevo Serbs who moved to East Sarajevo (Armakolas 2007) and finally, people's subjectivities and the negotiation of their lives in conjunction with a nation and state building process (Markowitz 2010).

Over the last number of years, there has also been a rise in literature produced on local or urban peace-building (e.g. Björkdahl 2013, Moore 2013), specifically, areas of international intervention in Bosnia such as the policy to reverse ethnic cleansing (e.g. Toal and Dahlman 2011) and on literature referencing post-socialist cities (e.g. Hamilton et al. 2005; Stanilov 2007). No work so far, however, has analysed either the role of the international community in Sarajevo's urban changes nor its particular post-socialist transformation, with only very few references covering the specific dimensions of such transition, such as its spatial restructuring (Nurkovic 2016).

Thus, this dissertation aims to make a contribution in these two gaps in the current literature existing on the city. Importantly, both elements are intrinsically interrelated as the international community was the leading force after the war (instrumentally using the OHR) to push and even impose the economic transition. To frame analyses developed in subsequent chapters, and prior to the presentation of the methodology, the following sections address the socialist and post-socialist cities conceptually and theoretically, resulting from analyses explored in relevant chapters on its spatial and functional transformation. Secondly, the production and reproduction of ethno-territorialities is considered in order to discuss the division of Sarajevo's urban area. Finally, international intervention in post-war contexts is explored, which will allow a framework for OHR intervention.

## **Socialist and post-socialist cities**

Understandably, throughout this dissertation, analysis of the post-socialist urban spatial transformation of Sarajevo requires consideration of the urban development produced during socialist times and the subsequent transition towards a capitalist system. Notably, Yugoslavia differed from other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as a distinct economic model was developed from the late 1940's after the country was expelled from the Cominform.<sup>3</sup> Admittedly, the country was more decentralised compared to other socialist states through the development of the self-management system. Also, it approved reforms which worked towards a market economy in the 1960s and 1970s, reforms that implied the abandonment of their unique system and a move towards western-type capitalism. Actually, for many years the Yugoslav economic system appeared to offer a middle ground between capitalism and Soviet central planning, as argued by Saul Estrin (1991).<sup>4</sup>

While acknowledging those specificities in the model of socialism, in terms of urbanisation, former Yugoslav cities could theoretically be considered within the category of socialist cities. As suggested by Alekandra Djurasovic (2016) in her analysis on the evolution of the political, economic and planning system, Yugoslavia developed social programmes following the installation of some capitalist components in the economy. Despite the distinct political and economic evolution, spatial planning was a legislative tool that maintained the core principles of Marxist ideology, seeking to direct and inform society at large, based on the principles of equality, self-management, solidarity and safety.

Socialist cities are defined in this dissertation as those urban areas developed under state socialism or other forms of socialism and where this urban development was featured by the absence of real estate markets and the dominance of public actors in the urban development and production of space. Accordingly, Bertaud and Renaud (1997) argue that it is appropriate to speak of a socialist city whenever urban development proceeds without land markets, and land use decisions are planned and based on social

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<sup>3</sup> Central and Eastern Europe refer to former socialist countries located in the east of Germany and in-between the Baltic Sea and Greece.

<sup>4</sup> The socialist development of Yugoslavia created its own political-economic path, the so-called self-management system, after the Tito-Stalin split in 1948. In 1950, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia passed the "Basic Law on the Management of State Enterprises by Working Collectivities" (Rojek and Wilson 1987). The Worker's Council became the basic unit of self-management system, having managerial responsibility.



needs and norms. Urban land and socially-owned flats lacked a market in Socialist Yugoslavia and, at the same time, planning was a tool that kept the core of Marxist ideology and was based on the principles of equality, self-management and solidarity. In this regard, I have attempted to frame Sarajevo's urban development during the socialist period, based on literature relevant to socialist cities. Socialist economy produced discernible socio-spatial effects in cities, as argued by French and Ian Hamilton in work entitled *The Socialist City* (1979), the first comprehensive contribution of Western geographers to analyse developed cities in Central and Eastern Europe under state socialism. The organisation of cities of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on Marxist premises, aspired to socialist goals and applied socialist theory in their actions and mechanisms, and ultimately created cities fundamentally different to those developed in capitalist or market-economies:

The very high order of control vested in the State over land ownership, land use, the degree and direction of industrialization, capital investment in all sectors, and at all levels of the economy, rents, wages, and even (in certain periods and in certain places) movements of population, means that the State has a power to determine the pace and the form of urban development far greater than that wielded by any Western government, central or local (French and Hamilton 1979, p.5).

Similarly, Ivan Tosics (2005) presents the logic and features of the socialist city-development model in which the planned economy prioritised industry over service activities. The specific political-institutional framework directly shaping urban policy under state-socialism, included public construction land, strong and direct control over land use or administrative limitations on the size and development of major cities, in terms of inflow of population and industrial growth. These features produced a distinct spatial model of socialist cities compared to Western capitalist cities, having:

much higher shares of industrial land use, less land used by public services and much lower shares of residential land use. Due to the absence of economic incentives, population density gradients were very different to the existing Western cities, i.e. very low density of the transitional belt areas close to the centre, in the extremely high density locale of the large housing estates on the urban fringe, and in the sudden decrease of density in agglomerations, immediately beyond the city border (Tosics 2005, p.61).

Such spatial model within cities constituted the most pronounced change compared to Western cities according to Jiril Musil (2005), who offers multiscalar analysis on the urban specificities produced under state socialism, which progressively diminished at a lesser scale. Regionally, as metropolitanisation and suburbanization processes played

reduced roles in shaping urban expansions, cities were generally more compact and had higher densities. At state level, most socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe experienced minor processes of metropolitanisation with major concentrations of population in medium-sized cities and a rapid depopulation of small rural communities.<sup>5</sup>

Indeed, urban specificities under state socialism ensured that both urban forms and urban experiences differed. For Ivan Szelenyi (1996), features that clearly differentiated both urban systems and urban forms in socialist countries included less urbanization (lower proportion of urban population), less urbanism (essentially, socialist cities had less diversity and social marginality) and, also, distinct spatial structure and characteristics. While the focus of the spatial internal features of socialist cities will be considered in chapter six, socialist cities produced greater compact urban areas, visual monotony, grand scale public projects, oversupply of industrial and undersupply of commercial land uses, and, finally, absence of key built forms typical for capitalist cities, such as squatter settlements or upscale suburbs.

Importantly, there is consensus in the literature that cities of the CEE, developed under state socialism, had distinct spatial and social structures. Such widely recognised specificities in the spatial and social structures of European socialist cities appeared due to the distinct mechanisms shaping urban development in socialist systems (French and Hamilton 1979; Enyedi 1990; Musil 2005; Smith 1996; Szelenyi 1996; Tosics 2005). Disagreement, however, appears when assessing whether differences are fundamental in relation to Western capitalist cities or simply a consequence of contextual factors.<sup>6</sup> In other words, there is no consensus on whether state socialism produced a distinct process of urbanisation, which is understood in this research as the socio-spatial process of the agglomeration of population, infrastructure and investment in certain locations. As claimed by György Enyedi (1996), Western and Eastern geographers generally agree that differences identified between socialist and capitalist cities are essential, as seen previously in the work of French and Hamilton (1979).

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<sup>5</sup> Central and Eastern Europe refer to former socialist countries located in the east of Germany and in-between the Baltic Sea and Greece.

<sup>6</sup> Western cities are not considered a homogeneous category. Significant differences exist depending on the degree of public intervention and regulations. Generally, with less public intervention cities develop upon the American city model featured by urban sprawl, while higher public control encourages more compact cities such as the European model. Differences are morphological and functional as European cities have a much higher level of mixing and integration of functions. It is related to cultural and economic differences but, especially, to local regulations, i.e. differences in municipal zoning (Hirt 2007).

Notwithstanding, most contributions to the understanding of the nature of urbanisation in socialist states come from sociologists, which can be grouped either in an environmental or a historical approach. The environmental approach within urban sociology was inspired by Darwin's theory of evolution and has influenced urban studies during several decades since the 1920s. This approach, widely developed by the Chicago School, focused on the creation of a theory regarding the multifaceted dynamics of the new industrial city. It understands the city as a process of urban expansion based on extension, succession and concentration (e.g. Burgess 1925). Focusing on the analysis of urbanisation in socialist countries, environmentalists consider economic growth and industrialisation as the independent variable in the process of modern urbanisation (van den Berg et al. 1982; Enyedi 1990, 1996; Musil 2005; Smith 1996).<sup>7</sup> Leo van den Berg et al. (1982) claim that urban change follows the sequence of urbanisation, suburbanisation and desurbanization and inter-urban decentralization. For these theorists, three successive stages of development produce urban change: (1) the transition from a largely agrarian to an industrial society, (2) the transition from an industrial economy to a tertiary economy and, finally, (3) the growth of the tertiary sector to maturity. As they note:

It is not *a priori* certain that developments in socialist countries have led or rather will lead to cities of a different social, economic, and physical structure than in countries with a market economy. However, it is to be expected that although the general structure may be similar, specific features appear in Eastern European countries more or less often than in Western European countries, depending on the degree to which the government has intervened in actual developments (van den Berg 1982, p. 5-6).

Accordingly, György Enyedi (1990, 1996) and Jiril Musil (2005) consider that state socialism has not produced a new model of urbanisation since urban differences between Western and Eastern countries would simply express the different developmental phases of respective countries. In other words, differences between socialist and capitalist cities, despite distinct economic systems, are mainly the result of delayed development. György Enyedi (1996) argues that industrialisation leads to the same spatial consequences everywhere, such as rural-urban migration, separation of

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<sup>7</sup> Accounts relating to pre-modern urbanisation caused by agriculture surpluses (e.g. Jacobs 1970) or agglomeration of other activities such as market trading activity (e.g. Pirenne 1971) are beyond the scope of this section.

working zones and residences, the suburban development, or the decline of urban growth.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile, critics began to contest the functionalist approach of the Chicago School in the 1960s and 70s. Within a historical approach, neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian contributors considered that industrialisation is a secondary variable in modern urbanisation. Both approaches claimed the need to contextualise urbanisation historically, considering that societies with different socioeconomic orders produce qualitatively different urban conditions. Furthermore, neo-Marxists did not develop a theory of urbanisation under state socialism, despite the production of influential works in urban studies, by claiming the centrality of modes of production in the process of urbanisation (e.g. Castells 1977, original in 1972; Harvey 1974).

Alternatively, the neo-Weberian approach presumed that different socio-economic orders produce qualitatively distinct urban conditions. From this approach, Ivan Szelenyi (1983) provides the main argument in the debate regarding the nature of urbanisation in socialist countries. Szelenyi (1983) firstly hypothesised, that a new emerging pattern of urban development was taking place in cities of the CEE. This new pattern of urbanisation was a by-product of the systemic differences of state socialism, particularly, types of socialist economic and urban planning. Some years later, in the book chapter *Cities after Socialism – and After* (Szelenyi 1996), the author develops a thesis on socialist urbanisation which directly challenged the ecological perspective. Based on the comparison of socialist and capitalist urbanisation in several stages of development, including the beginning of the post-industrial age during the 1980s in some CEE countries, he concludes that socialist countries produced several patterns of urbanization due to historical and political-economic differences. Despite these differences in socialist countries, all patterns of urbanization crucially differed from the urbanisation in capitalist economies at similar stages of growth:

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<sup>8</sup> Actually, Enyedi (1990) circumscribes the impacts related to urbanisation under state socialism to the spatial structure of the city: “The average citizen sets his or her goals in basically the same way whether he or she lives in East Central or Western Europe. After all, these choices express a certain perception of the urban space, which is a part of our common European culture (...) Goal-setting by government in shaping urbanization is different; it serves the purposes of regional and social equalization, the location of industry, or strategic needs. In the event that government and individual urbanization goals conflict, government has the power to constrain the articulation of individual interests, but not to change individual goals and ambitions. The structural features of the society set limits to individual behaviour but does not determine it. Individuals can build up hidden mechanisms for defending their interests, or at least for not following government goals” (Enyedi 1990, p.165).

All socialist societies industrialized with less spatial concentration of population than market capitalist economies. Furthermore, as this phase of industrialization was completed, socialist societies - as long as they retained the hegemony of public ownership and redistributive or central planning - did not 'catch up' with urban population growth. They did not converge with the trajectory followed by Western societies during the 1950s and 1960s. While in their post-industrial phase socialist societies produced new types of regional arrangement (after all, economic growth or stage of industrialization is an intervening variable!), these arrangements were qualitatively different from those observable in the West in the early stages of post-industrialism (Szelenyi 1996, p. 299).

Szelenyi sustains his argument, by claiming, that in capitalist societies there had been parallel growths in industrial employment and population from the late nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century. Yet, this correlation does not exist under state socialism with a faster increase of industrial jobs than a rise of population in urban settlements (Ib.). As he correctly holds, this gap is a product of resource redirection from personal and collective consumption to industrial development, which can only occur in an economic regime that limits private property and where planners can effectively redistribute the surplus.

Analyses conducted so far have addressed whether the widely recognised urban specificities of socialist cities are a consequence of either delayed urbanisation or state socialism. In this dissertation, in line with the neo-Weberian approach, I consider that different socio-economic orders produce qualitatively distinct urban conditions. The collapse of socialist systems and a transition towards a capitalist system inevitably transformed mechanisms of the socialist urbanisation. Framing the transformation of these mechanisms, the urban development of larger cities in CEE countries were subject to distinct changes after the collapse of socialism primarily a result of the "complex interaction of inherited urban structures, market economy ideologies, new state institutional parameters and the general processes of transformation in the economy, politics and society" (Sailer-Fliege 1999, p. 11).

Zoltán Kovács (2014) briefly summarises the two cornerstones of the transition in CEE countries, i.e. the liberalisation of the economy (particularly the land market) and the decentralisation of power. Going beyond, the "laissez faire neoliberal state opened the way to global capital, at the same time large scale privatisation programmes were carried out, and previously repressed inequalities started to grow rapidly" (Kovács 2014, p. 207). Considering the spatial dimension, such economic and political

restructuring has thus implied the introduction of market-based principles in the allocation of real estate investments, also triggering a significant restructuring of the urban space. Thus, particular urban spatial features of socialist cities have undergone intense erosion in CEE cities as claimed by Sonia Hirt (2013) following the analysis of five key elements of spatial composition, i.e. the overall spatial articulation, scale of urban development, functional balance, building typologies, and urban aesthetics. Despite this transformation, Hirt argues that post-socialist cities still differ spatially from their Western counterparts due to the immense legacy of socialism on spatial structures.

While post-socialist cities have been experiencing a significant social and spatial transformation, it is not yet clear that these cities are converging with capitalist ones. This responds to the fact that despite the apparent similarities, there are still some differences in the functioning of markets. Cases such as Moscow (e.g. Pagonis and Thornley 2000) have revealed an unusually strong influence in market contexts of public actors in the production of space. Others realities highlight a weak state that leads to highly informal means of spatial production, typical of developing countries (e.g. Tsenkova 2009). It responds to an uneven transition in CEE countries with differences in terms of intensity of integration into the new global flows and path-dependence, which have resulted in significant regional contrasts. Interestingly, Ivan Tosics presents a categorisation based on the development in post-socialist cities, which in the early 2000s was mostly visible in capital cities. Importantly to frame this dissertation, one of the eight sub-types corresponds to ex-Yugoslav cities, from which Slovenian cities were excluded:

These cities were experiencing a slow transition from the socialist towards the capitalist city-model due to armed conflict in the 1990s, mass refugee movements and destroyed urban centres. Initially there was a limited capital investment that contrasted with substantial individual investments into the illegal or unofficial property market. In addition, there was relatively quick privatization of public housing to sitting tenants at the beginning of the 1990s, but deferred restitution, privatization of enterprises, and other public assets due to the war and unsettled disputes over property. Finally, there has been huge differentiation in incomes between the “formal” and “informal” sectors, and the very slow establishment of new types of public control over the land market, planning, and building processes. The outcome is the parallel process of densification and sprawl through unregulated development, with some elements of the “third world” type of city development (Tosics 2005, p. 73).

Recent literature relevant to post-socialist cities analyse the significant and multiple transformations that occurred in cities from Central and Eastern Europe since the collapse of state-socialism (e.g. Asdrusz et al. 2006; Czaplicka et al. 2009; Hamilton et al. 2005; Stanilov 2007; Tsenkova, et al. 2006). This literature covers changes in the urban form (Hirt 2006, 2008, 2013; Sýkora 2007), the forces producing the transition (Hamilton 2005; Tosics 2005), the rising of the socio-spatial segregation (Marcinczak 2013; Sýkora 2009) or, more recently, the emergence of gated communities as a significant manifestation of such segregation (Hirt 2012; Kovács 2014).

Notwithstanding, the rise of literature in the field of post-socialist cities, especially in the last decade, the urban transformation of cities affected by war has hardly been intensively analysed as mentioned earlier. In these former socialist cities, the transition from state-socialism to capitalism was not the only driving force of urban change nor the most significant one during an extended period. Thus, in order to analyse the urban transformation of Sarajevo it is necessary to broaden the conceptual and theoretical approaches beyond the urban post-socialist scope. I now focus on ethno-territorialisation in order to frame the production and reproduction of the division that took place in the area of Sarajevo, which is central to understanding changes in the ethnic composition of the city.

### **The question of ethno-territorialities**

As Alexander Murphy (2002) notes, a distinctive feature of the modern state system is its territorial character.<sup>9</sup> Unlike feudalism, it presumes a world divided into states that have final authority over the use of force within its boundaries. Despite the fact that territory became central in the construction of the modern and contemporary political system, it was not until the late 1970s and onwards that it received conceptual and theoretical scrutiny in the field of political geography, essentially having been considered in a descriptive sense. With publication of relevant works (e.g. Raffestin 1984, Sack 1983; 1986), geographers shifted from treating territories as something given and static, in which analysis of features prevailed, to a more process-oriented stance focusing both on reasons behind their existence and the various dimensions of social life.

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<sup>9</sup> The modern state system traces its roots to the political-territorial order in Europe at the time of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), when the principle of sovereignty was accepted as a foundation on which interstate relations should be constructed.

The concept of territoriality was at the heart of this reconceptualisation and, in the incipient debate on human territoriality, Robert Sack (1983) placed it in the sphere of human behaviour, departing from the biologists' views that conceived territoriality as an instinct shared with other territorial animals. In his influential *Human Territoriality: its theory and history*, Sack (1986) defines territoriality as a powerful spatial strategy to control people and things by controlling an area. Territoriality involves three elements: a form of classification by area; some form of communication, such as a boundary; and, finally, it involves an attempt to enforce control over access and elements within an area. These three core elements of territoriality explain the logic and potential effects clearly differentiating territory from other kind of spaces:

Unlike many ordinary places, territories require constant effort to establish and maintain. They are the result of strategies to affect, influence, and control people, phenomena, and relationships. Circumscribing things in space, or on a map, as when geographers delimit an area to illustrate where corn is grown, or where industry is concentrated, identifies places, areas, or regions in the ordinary sense, but does not by itself create a territory. This delimitation becomes a territory only when its boundaries are used to affect behaviour by controlling an access within an area (Sack 1986, p.19).

Sack's human conception of territoriality was not unique. Claude Raffestin defined territoriality "as the system of relations of the collectivity or an individual with exteriority and/or alterity by means of mediators" (Raffestin 1984, p.171). For the author, the limits of territoriality are set by mediators, which constitute the conditions for the exercise of power and they therefore define quite precisely the limits to liberty or autonomy of those who use them in their relationships with the exteriority. Rather than simply looking at territoriality as a strategy designed to produce a particular territorial and social ends, Raffestin develops a relational approach. Territoriality is seen as a process produced by a set of relationships that link individuals, groups and both material and discursive environments in which they are situated. Raffestin's relational approach is critical to capturing the territorial ideas and practices of everyday life as these cannot be reduced to simple strategies used to control space. Territoriality is thus a powerful element shaping human associations as well as the institutional organization in space. It is actually a significant cultural artefact that both reflects and incorporates the features of the social order that creates them:

Territoriality, then, is much more than a strategy for control of space. It is better understood as implicating and being implicated in ways of thinking, acting, and being in the world – ways of world-making informed by beliefs, desires, and both cultural and historical contingent ways of knowing. It is as



much a metaphysical phenomenon as a material one. Territory, in turn, informs key aspects of collective and individual identities. It shapes and is shaped by collective social and self-consciousness (Delaney 2005, p. 10-12).

Hence, territoriality is a strategy that goes beyond the control of space and has many individual and collective implications among which there is ethnic dimension. Ethnicity differs from culture as it is a product of individual and group identity produced, reproduced and transformed over time. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (1996) defined features that conform ethnic groups: (1) a common name to identify and express the “essence” of the community; (2) a myth of common ancestry that includes the idea of common origin in time and place; (3) shared historical memories; (4) one or more elements of common culture that normally includes religion, customs, and language; (5) a link with a homeland; (6) and, finally, a sense of solidarity. By taking ethnicity as a group identity based on common cultural affiliation and a belief in a shared ancestry and a common future, Adam Moore (2016) has recently developed a conceptual examination of ethno-territoriality, which he defines as:

the social and political project to establish an explicitly spatial basis for claims involving ethnic identity, cultural rights, and political authority by identifying and constructing certain places or territories as belonging to or appropriate for certain ethno-national categories of people and practice, and by extension displacing other categories (Moore 2016, p. 95).

For the author, ethno-territoriality is enacted through discursive, embodied, material and institutional practices. Hence, one could argue that ethno-territorialisation refers to the process in which several practices are used to produce and reproduce an ethno-territoriality that involves the fusion of territoriality with ethnic claims. As a process that needs to constantly assert control over a territory, ethno-territoriality finds in the creation or acquisition of political structures a central mechanism for its reproduction. Political science has developed a wide classification of political and governmental systems producing numerous regime typologies (e.g. Linz 2000). Until recently, however, it has not developed ethnocratic regimes (Sautman 2004; Yiftachel and Ghanmen 2004; Ghanem 2012; Morje Howard 2012).

An ethnocracy implies a mode of rule linked to a modern statehood that expresses the identity and aspirations of one ethnic group over others in an ethnically divided society. As a consequence, these other ethnic groups are accorded only restrained rights to citizenship. Ethnocracy's *raison d'être* is actually to secure the key instruments of state power for the dominant ethnic collectivity (Sautmann 2004,

p.117).<sup>10</sup> Similarly, Yiftachel and Ghanmen (2004) in the paper *Understanding “ethnocratic” regimes: the politics of seizing contested territories*, argue that ethnocracies are a distinct regime type that prevent ethnic minorities from any feasible path of inclusion through the expansion, ethnicisation and control of contested territories and power structures.

These regimes emerge in a variety of forms but share the features of ethnicisation of politics by a dominant ethnic group. Thus, the logic of ethnocracies in the modern state is capturing the dominant group, capturing the state machinery and subsequently distributing resources and power through ethnic lines, all of which produce a gradual ethnicization of politics (Ghanem 2012). Lise Morje Howard (2012) has also explained ethnocracies as those political systems in which political and social organizations are based on ethnic belonging rather than on individual choice. Interestingly, she defines the main features of ethnocracies as: 1) political parties based foremost on ethnic interests, 2) ethnic quotas to determine the allocation of key posts, and 3) state institutions, especially in education and the security sector, that are segmented by ethnic group.

Taking some perspective beyond ethnocracies, Rogers Brubaker (1995, 1996) analyses the rights of minority ethnic groups and the tendency of nation-states to advance in the project of domination by the main ethnic group. He talks of nationalising states to emphasize a dynamic political position that considers the nation-state as unrealised and disposed to promote language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing or political hegemony of the main national group (1995, p. 114). For Brubaker, the fact that states were even portrayed as models of interethnic harmony conduct nationalising policies and practices, suggests that we must place the focus on how, and, how much states nationalise instead of whether states are nationalising (1996, p. 106). Yet, importantly, the potential path towards the homogenisation of nation-states does not equalise them with ethnocracies. For Yiftachel and Ghanmen (2004) it is the rupture of the notion demos through the marginalisation and exclusion of ethnic minorities that qualitatively differentiates these regimes from most nation-states:

Ethnocratic regimes work ceaselessly to prevent the making of an inclusive demos – a community of equal citizens within a definable territory. Instead, they use a rhetoric of the nation-state, but do not allow minorities any feasible

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<sup>10</sup> Ethnocracies is a modern state phenomenon. In pre-modern times minor ethnic groups existed at larger scales but when considering societies, fragmentation ensured that the elites of one or two of these groups ruled over the others (Mann 2005).

path of inclusion (...) contrary to most nation-states, ethnocratic regimes actually work against the project of universal citizenship. The universal project is of course incomplete in most nation-states, and often involves oppressive policies and practices, such as forced assimilation, discrimination or state-led economic stratification, the state framework, de-jure, still leaves members of minority communities an option of integration. Ethnocracies, on the other hand, annul this inclusionary option (Yiftachel and Ghanmen 2004, p. 656-7).

Such logic under which ethnocratic regimes operate in relation to other ethnic groups substantially conditions the daily life of population in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. Actually, ethnocracies consolidated during the war through violent strategies subsequently became legalised under the peace agreement. Such institutionalisation of these regimes paradoxically constitutes one of the biggest obstacles to the reconstruction of ethnic diversity as will show through the analysis of Sarajevo in subsequent chapters. Finally, another central element to understanding the urban transformation of the city during the post-war period is the one related to international intervention, one which allows the role of the OHR to be framed.

### **Regarding international intervention in post-war contexts**

When analysing the role of the OHR in the urban transformation of Sarajevo, it is necessary to frame peace-building missions and conceptualise peace before discussing other dimensions of the post-war intervention. Due to major accuracy, this section mainly relies on the literature of peace operations produced within the field of international relations. By peace-building, following the definition of the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in *An agenda for peace* (1992), it is understood as the post-conflict action to identify and support structures that tend to strengthen and solidify peace. Thus, peace-building aims at preventing the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples through the construction of a new environment.

Such an understanding of building a new environment, preventing the recurrence of violence, links peace-building operations with a broader concept of peace that is not circumscribed to the absence of violence. In this sense, John Galtung (1969) developed a conceptualisation of positive and negative peace widely accepted in peace and conflict studies. By rejecting the narrow conception of violence that refers to the intentional physical incapacitation or deprivation of health, he broadened violence to those situations in which humans are physically and mentally below their realisations. Thus,

using positive and negative peace, Galtung differentiates between structural and personal violence, “while the absence of personal violence does not lead to a positively defined condition, the absence of structural violence is what we have referred to as social justice, which is a positively defined condition” (Galtung 1969, p. 183).

Going beyond peace and amid the new interventionism of the post-Cold War order, in which the cases of Bosnia and Sarajevo are situated, Robert Caplan (2005a) presents international administrations (in which the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is included) as forms of new interventionism that differentiates from other forms of peace operations even when these have been developed in expanded forms.<sup>11</sup> Importantly, as Caplan argues, political engagement is unavoidable in international administrations, which are more comprehensive in scope due to its interest and authority over governance matters:

Never have peacekeeping operations had the authority to make and enforce local laws, exercise total fiscal management of a territory, appoint and remove public officials, create a central bank, establish and maintain customs services, regulate the local media, adjudicate rival property claims, run schools, regulate local businesses, and reconstruct and operate all public utilities, among numerous other functions. While there are certainly historic precedents for the exercise of such broad power — with, for instance, colonial administration and military occupation — no international peacekeeping operation has ever been vested with as much executive, legislative, and judicial authority as some of the international administrations that have been established in the past decade (Caplan 2005a, p. 2).

Contemporary international administration can be distinguished on the basis of the degree of authority assumed by the international community in each case. In his work on peace maintenance, Jarat Chopra (1999) presents four distinct categories, i.e. assistance, partnership, control and governorship. Therefore, the degree of authority may range from supervision to direct governance. Despite the fact that in Bosnia an international administration was set, with an authority that evolved over time, literature on liberal peace-building is also considered in understanding the nature and impact of contemporary international interventions developed in a post-war context, even in these administrations.

Focusing on the role of international organisations in post-war contexts, Roland Paris (1997) argues that liberal internationalism, understood as the foreign policy that

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<sup>11</sup> When viewed in the context of broader developments since the end of the Cold War, the international administration of war-torn territories can be seen to as part of a larger trend that has witnessed states attaching increased importance to human rights and humanitarian norms as matters of regional and international concern.

promotes liberal principles abroad through multilateral cooperation and international institutions, is the single paradigm guiding international agencies engaged in peace-building.<sup>12</sup> Liberal internationalism orientated to building a sustainable peace is based on the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, which comprises a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy.<sup>13</sup> Importantly, Paris warned against the principal flaw of prescribing market democracy as a remedy for civil conflict without anticipating or limiting its destabilizing effects:

War-shattered states are typically ill equipped to manage societal competition induced by political and economic liberalization, not only because these states have a recent history of violence, but because they typically lack the institutional structures capable of peacefully resolving internal disputes. In these circumstances, efforts to transform war-shattered states into market democracies can serve to exacerbate rather than moderate societal conflicts (Paris 1997, p. 57).

Indeed, the publication, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, Paris (2004), analyses all fourteen major peace-building missions deployed between 1989 and 1999, which shared immediate democratization and marketization as the strategy to consolidate peace. Paris argues that peace-building missions seeking to transform war-shattered states into liberal market democracies as quickly as possible produce unanticipated consequences, undermining the liberalisation process itself and even endangering internal peace.<sup>14</sup> As an alternative, Paris advocates for delaying and limiting political and economic freedoms in order to create conditions for a smoother and less hazardous transition to a market democracy in the long term, in a strategy called "Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation".

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<sup>12</sup> International organisations most committed to market democracies such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), World Bank (WB), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) or International Monetary Fund (IMF), play central roles in peace-building missions.

<sup>13</sup> He terms "Wilsonianism" as referring to Woodrow Wilson (the twenty-eighth president of the US) and the belief that democratisation and marketisation will foster peace in war-shattered states, as he claimed that liberalism was the key to peace and security in both international and domestic politics. Similarly, Oliver Richmond considers the liberal peace framework upon conceptions of liberal-internationalist thought, on liberal-institutionalism, on the democratic peace hypothesis and free trade, on international law and the balance between individual freedoms and regulations, all of which are embedded in liberal thinking and in the state (Richmond 2011).

<sup>14</sup> In the political realm, liberalization means democratization, or the promotion of periodic and genuine elections, constitutional limitations on the exercise of governmental power, and respect for basic civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly and conscience.

In the so-called liberal peace-building literature, both proponents and critics generally focus quite often on the liberal character of peace-building to the detriment of other important elements such as the very peace agreements, which are crucial to end wars and for the subsequent construction of peace. As argued by Jan Selby (2013) liberal peace-building literature overstates liberalism of contemporary peace interventions and misrepresents the enduring importance of strategy, states and geopolitics in the making of peace. While his criticism is based on one empirical analysis, the 1991 peace agreement to end the Cambodian war, he demonstrates that the agreement is rooted primarily in geopolitics and secondly in liberal principles, departing from the so-called liberal peace-building literature that observes the peace accord as liberal in content, causes and aims:

Essentially, peace agreements are mechanisms for the restructuring of power relations, and the attainment of the attribution of political legitimacy, and not liberalisation. They are most obviously mechanisms for the reallocation of power amongst local signatories, using power-sharing (or ‘power-dividing’) formulas that may be semidemocratic or not (Selby 2013, p. 76).

Selby’s more nuanced analysis introduces the geopolitical dimension in peace-making and frames the nature of peace agreements, preventing reductive interpretations of contemporary international interventions in war-torn societies. Precisely, this restructuring of power relations carried out in the peace agreement, pursues a political accommodation that prevents a relapse of violence after the war, by allowing the management of conflict democratically in the political arena. The configuration of political institutions that are more appropriate for ethnically plural states remains unresolved and has become one of the most contentious debates in peace-building literature. Importantly, institutional arrangements have a greater impact in divided societies as the design can structurally favour ethnic, national or religious communities to the detriment of others so it becomes a central issue in the management of differences in a post-war environment. Scholars differ widely on the most appropriate prescriptions in deeply divided societies, such as those emerging from conflict. The two opposing approaches are consociational (also known as power-sharing) and the centripetalist. Both approaches recognise ethnicity and pursue managing their effects of ethnic conflict while accepting the existence of ethnic cleavages.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> The recognition of ethnicity in any political system seeks an effective inclusion and participation of all groups’ representatives in political decision-making while also providing autonomy either territorial or non-territorial to run their own internal affairs.

The main proponent of the consociationalism is the political scientist Arendt Lijphart. For him, countries with deep ethnic or other cleavages, the only way to accommodate the interests and demands of communal groups is through a combination of power sharing and autonomy (Lijphart 2004). Power sharing is the system of governance in which all major groups in a society have a permanent share of power, while group autonomy implies that ethnic groups have authority to run their internal affairs. Autonomy can be either territorial, when communities are concentrated spatially, or non-territorial, when there is heterogeneous spatial distribution. In this case, the proposal of autonomy is that respective groups keep control in the areas of culture and education. More specifically, consociational mechanisms to ensure sustainable power-sharing arrangements usually include: (1) grand coalition governments in which all ethnic groups are represented, (2) proportional representation of different groups based on their numbers in the general community in both legislative seats and in civil service, (3) a power of veto over key decisions by minority groups, and (4) a decentralised ethno-territorial system in societies in which communities are spatially divided.

Initially, for Lijphart (1969), consociationalism was not any particular institutional arrangement but rather the deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilise the system. Importantly, it is based on the assumption that elites understand the perils of political fragmentation and collaborate. A crucial weakness of the approach is that it is rooted mainly on democracies while such elite cooperation is dubious in post-war contexts. Views on whether power sharing promotes compromise and conciliation, the expectation to produce moderation through depoliticisation of ethnicity or the development of a common national identity are based on the transformation of consolidated democracies such as Switzerland, Netherlands or Belgium. It is unclear, thus, whether the success of these systems is a consequence of the consociational model or, contrary, whether the consociational relationship works due to a low intensity of conflict.

Indeed, the situation in stable democracies totally differs from societies emerging from war, in which integrative power-sharing may have counterproductive outcomes. Interestingly, Anna Jarstad (2008) holds that power sharing in war-torn societies entails choices between the promotion of peace or democracy. Some mechanisms of power sharing even condition the prospect of peace, such as the inclusion of warring parties, intergroup contestation, international dependence and the

levelling of power relations between contending groups. Power sharing in a post-war context can also affect democratization negatively in at least four different ways: (1) by the exclusion of moderate elites, (2) by lack of popular support, (3) by external intervention preventing local ownership of the political process, and (4) by freezing ethnic division by group representation. Notwithstanding, and understanding peace agreements as essentially mechanisms for the restructuring of power relations as defined earlier, power sharing is attractive to peace negotiators due to the two-player game logic in peace negotiations, in which conflict is seen as a result of a situation where both parties strive for total political control or one of them demands partition (Jarstad 2001). Under such circumstances, the only solution to manage conflict is joint rule.<sup>16</sup>

The main approach diverging with consociationalist is the co-called centripetalist that has political scientist Donald Horowitz as the main proponent. Precisely, and departing from the regime of ethnic guarantees offered by power sharing, centripetalists seek to place party competition at the moderate centre rather than the extremes, tackling exclusion of moderate elites. The main tool is providing electoral incentives to benefit ethnically based parties by appealing to voters of other ethnic groups. As argued by Horowitz, the underlying mechanism is to address voters of other ethnicities in order to foster the formation of inter-ethnic coalitions so ethnically based parties must demonstrate that they are moderates and willing to compromise on ethnic issues (Horowitz 2008).

Among the different measures used to foster this idea, is that candidates and political parties look beyond their own ethnic constituencies and appeal to a wider audience with the use of preferential voting. Preferential voting are those electoral systems that enable electors to rank-order candidates on the ballot in the order of their choice, i.e. indicating how they would vote if their favoured candidate was defeated and

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<sup>16</sup> This dual character of power sharing in war-torn societies, with positive attributes in negotiations to settle a peace agreement and dubious outcomes for establishing political institutions that foster cooperation and inclusion among ethnic groups highlights the complexity of simultaneously building peace and creating a functional democracy. Since the very institutional structures devised to reach peace may undermine the path towards a stable peace, revision of the peace agreement becomes a useful tool to overcome deadlocks, as expressed by Walter: “the inefficiency, inflexibility, and exclusionary nature of consociational governments often means that this type of system will not be stable over time. Eventually, citizens will demand greater efficiency from their government, and new parties will demand more open, competitive systems (...) A regime that is good at ending a civil war, however, may not necessarily be good at long-term governance. A second transition will almost certainly be needed toward a more liberal democracy as democratic preconditions are established. The ultimate challenge facing civil war rivals over the long term, therefore, is how to transform the inflexible institutional structures that are necessary to convince each of them to sign a settlement in the highly tense post-war environment into more liberal, open institutions that are necessary to bring peace and stability over time” (Walter 1999, p. 143).



they had to choose between those remaining (Reilly 2001).<sup>17</sup> The mechanism involves the transfers of votes when no-candidate gains a wide majority. It is a formula that seeks moderation, as politicians from different parties depend on preference transfers from their rivals. Importantly, in terms of spatial autonomy, centripetalists are wary of granting autonomy in ethnically homogeneous territories as decentralisation of power in these cases, i.e. ethno-federalism, may increase the possibility that alternative nation-state projects challenge the common-state (Roeder 2009).

Mid-level theories presented so far, both in terms of peace-building missions and institutions devised to manage ethnic cleavages, politically highlight the complex and multifaceted character of contemporary peace operations. It is important to point out at this stage, that there is no one causal factor determining the positive or negative impacts of international interventions in the process used to create conditions for a stable peace. Interestingly, Adam Moore (2013) illustrates in *Peacebuilding in Practice: Local Experience in Two Bosnian Towns*, such complexity and multi-causality. The cases of Mostar and Brcko are comparatively analysed, as these became the only two local peace-building missions officially deployed by the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war.

Moore correctly refutes the argument that the significant progress achieved in Brcko was a result of major international resources on the ground (e.g. Doyle and Sambanis 2006).<sup>18</sup> His argument, well grounded empirically, is that a conjunction of four factors explains the contrasting outcomes of both missions. These factors are: (1) the design of local political institutions, (2) the local and regional legacies from war, (3) the sequencing of political and economic reforms implemented by the Office of High Representative (OHR), and (4) the practice and organization of international peacebuilding efforts. For the author, it is the spatial and temporal contingent configuration of these factors that explains the different outcomes of both peace-building missions (Moore 2013, p .7).<sup>19</sup> Moore's compelling work, which also deals with the role of the OHR, has been illustrative for the analysis developed in this dissertation. Despite the fact that the international community did not set a specific peace-building mission for the city of Sarajevo, the focus on the role of the OHR in the

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<sup>17</sup> The three preferential electoral systems are the alternative vote; the supplementary vote and the single transferable vote (see Reilly 2001, p. 19).

<sup>18</sup> Resources in Brcko mission were actually inferior to Mostar in terms of personnel and aid.

<sup>19</sup> Brcko, set as a District in 1999, has become the only multi-ethnic city in post-war BiH. Contrary, Mostar is divided in Bosniak and Bosnian Croat areas.

urban transformation of the capital city of BiH is justified by the significant and broad intervention carried out by this institution, directly or indirectly, in the city.

### **Methodological approach**

This dissertation is a case study analyzing the role of the OHR in the urban transformation of Sarajevo and its impact on the current spatial and ethnic configuration. It is essentially a qualitative research that focuses more readily on the processes rather than outcomes or products. Equally, it has expanded other areas rather than the core features of a qualitative methodology (e.g. Cresswell 2014); these areas include multiple sources of data, inductive and deductive analyses, emergent design, a reflexive and holistic account and the presence of the researcher in the natural setting. Indeed, in this research, I have pursued a holistic account regarding the urban transformation of Sarajevo and identified key factors shaping these urban changes (using several perspectives), as seen in the theoretical and conceptual approach presented.

Essentially, this is a multi-method research that has combined a diversity of empirical evidence to heighten the internal and external validity of the study, enriching the analysis and minimizing its potential limitations. Such a design responds to the holistic approach and high complexity of the analysis conducted, due to the non-linear and multi-sided nature of the urban transformation of Sarajevo, which has involved at least a double transition from war to peace and from socialism to capitalism. This dissertation follows an intensive research design (Sayer 1992, p. 243; quoted in Clifford et al. 2016, p.11), in which the operationalisation of in-depth analysis presents a complex, multi-faced structure, based on thematic and cross-cutting processes, strategies, events and policies developed by the main political actors involved in the urban transformation of Sarajevo (Table 1). This work develops upon the identification, description, examination and interpretation of the multiple and sometimes antagonist relationships existing between the processes, actors, strategies, events and policies that have taken place in Sarajevo after the war. In order to achieve this, in-depth qualitative analysis has been predominant although in some cases the qualitative data collected has been accompanied by quantitative analysis in order to complete the lack of information in other areas. The operationalisation of this multi-method research follows a deductive approach upon the elaboration of three hypotheses:

- Hypothesis 1: the reconstruction of ethnic diversity in Sarajevo was not initially envisioned by the international community and the adoption of the Sarajevo Declaration in February 1998, aimed at making the city a model of co-existence and tolerance for the rest of the country, had a reactive nature that was essentially focused on housing repossession instead of addressing the creation of appropriate conditions for returns.
- Hypothesis 2: the quick process of political and economic liberalisation either internationally pushed or imposed entrenched local ethnocracies and failed to depoliticise the economy and create a self-sustained economic growth.
- Hypothesis 3: impact of the OHR in the urban transformation of Sarajevo was qualitatively much below the broad intervention conducted, being instrumental for a post-socialist production of space but with no contribution to rebuilding Sarajevo's long tradition of ethnic diversity and coexistence.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Territory</i>	<i>Governance</i>	<i>Ethnic structure</i>	<i>Spatial structure</i>	<i>Economic</i>
1995	Ethnic division of the metropolitan area of Sarajevo in the DPA (Bosnian Serbs and Slobodan Milosevic)				
	Handover of the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo to the FBiH and mass departure of Bosnian Serbs (US-SFOR and SDS)				
	Housing policy favouring temporary residents (SDA)				
1996	Mono-ethnic institutional reorganisation of Sarajevo (SDA)				
	Resettlement of Bosniaks in former Serb-held districts (SDA)				
	Project to urbanize an ethnically exclusive Srpsko Sarajevo (SDS)				
	First post-war elections (US-OSCE)				
1997	Protocol on the Organization of Sarajevo (OHR)				
	High Representative's enforcement (PIC)				
	Sarajevo Declaration (OHR)				
1998	Law on Privatization of public assets (OHR)				
1999	Ban on socially-owned land allocated to consolidate ethnic constituencies (OHR)				
	PLIP, Property Law Implementation Plan (OHR, OSCE, UNHCR)				
2003	Law on Construction Land (OHR)				

Table 1 - Operationalisation of in-depth analysis: Thematic and cross-cutting key processes, strategies and events shaping urban change during the period of maximum international intervention.

The steps taken in the realisation of this dissertation have followed the sequence of fieldworks conducted in Sarajevo between 2013 and 2015. During a five-month stay in the Bosnian capital, conducted in 2013 (23 July–20 December), I gathered information regarding the role of primary local and international actors involved in the ethnic and spatial transformation of the urban area of Sarajevo during the post-war period. Subsequently, in spring 2014, I defined both the research question and main hypotheses. More specifically, the research was delimited to focus on the role of the OHR as the main international institution in the civilian annexes of the peace agreement, and for being widely involved in the post-war and post-socialist urban transformation of Sarajevo. Coinciding with this delimitation and the elaboration of the hypothesis, I defined the main events affecting territory, governance, ethnic and spatial structures and economy (presented in Table 1) to operationalise data gathering and comprehensively analyse the urban transformation of Sarajevo and the role of the OHR. These events were circumscribed to the period of maximum international intervention at local level, developed between November 1995 and December 2003, as defined previously.

Subsequently, in the summer of 2014, I conducted two two-week stays in Sarajevo to gather information that is held in the municipal city archive. All of this data was processed and analysed during the final research period spent in Sarajevo in 2015 (1 February–31 July). Similar to news processing, but especially when the analysis and interpretation of any findings was close to completion, the final interviews with participants and other individuals were conducted to complete and validate information. Indeed, for the validation of findings this research has resorted to *triangulation*, having used several methods to collect data on the same topic. Crucially, this validation is not a minor issue in a post-war context, as some of the quantitative data available is considered inaccurate, and often the information provided in interviews is either biased or even undisclosed. Hence, triangulation has not simply been utilised for the purpose of validating information, rather, the use of mixed-methods further enriched the level of knowledge on the object of study, especially when one considers unavoidable data shortcomings in several of the processes and events analysed.

### Information gathering and techniques

Undeniably, fieldwork in Sarajevo was essential for the realisation of this dissertation. As previously mentioned, this research encountered serious difficulties in data gathering due to non-existence or inaccuracy. Thus, compensation was only possible, usually with several limitations, through the use of mixed-methods. Furthermore, limitations were also caused by the dubious accuracy of some of the information provided by official institutions. This is essentially the case with official data published by international organisations on the return of displaced persons following housing repossession (chapter four). This data accumulated returns, after people physically completed the repossession of pre-war homes, but without tracking afterwards, whether repossession turned into real and sustained returns. Due to the nature of these shortcomings, most of the quantitative information, gathered from institutions and organizations on the ground, has been included only in cases in which I could validate it through other techniques.

Thus, in order to carry out this dissertation, it has been necessary to resort to several techniques, most of them only practiced in the city. *Participant observation* has been conducted during research stays in Sarajevo with frequent conversation conducted on a face-to-face basis with Sarajevans on the social and political situation. *Direct observation* was also central for the identification and analysis of the spatial transformation in the surrounding hinterland of Sarajevo. Direct observation employed an empirical approach, which focuses on the morphology and consideration of what people see and do in an urban context (Lefebvre 1970). To overcome any statistical shortcomings, direct observation has allowed the generation of new data such as the database on major new urban projects in the four central municipalities of Sarajevo (chapter six). Furthermore, and as a useful fieldwork technique, wandering without an accurate destination while being carried along by casual meetings, (Petónnet 1987) *floating observation* actually complemented the process of direct observation during two main research periods in the city.

Indeed, a database on the main post-war urban projects was produced through observational fieldwork, the aim of classifying the functions of projects developed or redeveloped, in cases where there was a land-use or morphologic transformation during the post-war period. Undoubtedly, this identification of new urban projects did not produce an exhaustive list, but was sufficiently representative to capture any differences

between a dynamic perspective and a functional perspective during the period under consideration. Moreover, the identification of the temporal patterns of new constructions, facilitated by the website Sarajevo Construction<sup>20</sup> (SC 2016), was also utilised to comprehend the pace of post-socialist spatial urban transformation of the city. Interviews and the consultation of historical pictures of the city from a pictorial bibliography which covered most of the city (i.e. Prstojević 1994), allowed me to contrast and confirm any new urban projects identified during these fieldworks.

*Archival research* was central to this thesis in order to obtain maximum evidence on key processes, strategies and events analysed for the period 1995-2003, (this frames the analysis conducted between chapters three and five). The OHR's website was a primary source of information with significant documentation on legislative and executive performance.<sup>21</sup> Many of the decisions taken by the High Representative are available, along with statements and interviews. Also accessible are reports from different OHR departments, including the series Economic Newsletters and Human Rights Reports. Moreover, documents from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) were also consulted to obtain further details for chapter two, which deals with war and the attempts to divide Sarajevo ethnically. International media such as *The New York Times* or *The Washington Post* were consulted, as they are digitally accessible and extensively covered the early war and post-war stages.

Furthermore, as it was the major newspaper in the Federation of BiH at that time, *Oslobodjenje* was the main local source especially during the post-war period when international media coverage on the city was significantly reduced. The newspaper is not digitally available for the period considered so it was necessary to conduct a physical revision in the local archive of all newspapers covering the period 1995 and 2003. All news relevant to the considered processes and events were pictured and subsequently systematized. Following an initial analysis, (and since my ability in the former Serbo-Croatian language has not reached the level of an independent user), newspapers that provided new and relevant information were translated later to fully and accurately understand the content. Another local newspaper consulted was SRNA,

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<sup>20</sup> [www.sa-c.net](http://www.sa-c.net) (Last access in autumn 2016)

<sup>21</sup> [www.ohr.int](http://www.ohr.int) (Accessed throughout this dissertation)

the news agency from Republika Srpska; this source contains a daily digital news brief in English which covers the period between March 1996 and August 1998.<sup>22</sup>

Essentially, *interviews* were a central technique in order collect and validate any information achieved through other techniques or sources. More than sixty semi-structured interviews – and countless informal interviews – took place during my research in Sarajevo, Barcelona and the Washington DC area. Most of these interviews were conducted during my two research stays in Sarajevo. During the exploratory research visit, I conducted thirty preliminary interviews to gather information on the urban transformation of the city during the post-war period, considering the spatial, ethnic and material dimensions, and the role of important local and international actors. The “snowball technique” was used to identify individuals who could provide information in every field (Farquharson 2005).

Thus, officials from the OHR, the UNHCR or the World Bank were interviewed to frame the international involvement. On the other hand, local authorities and technicians working in the planning and development institutes from the Sarajevo Canton and East Sarajevo were also interviewed to better understand the role and performance of local institutions. Interviews were mostly digitally recorded and subsequently transcribed. After these preliminary interviews and the concomitant observational fieldwork, the focus of the research concentrated on the role of the OHR as the main international institution comprehensively involved in the transformation of Sarajevo. Furthermore, the initial interest and focus on the physical reconstruction and the material post-socialist urban transformation broadened to include the ethnic dimension and the territorial division between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo.

During the second session of fieldwork, having processed any archival work, I conducted sixteen final semi-structured interviews to validate and complete the information obtained through archival research, observational fieldwork and previous interviews. In a number of final interviews, two groups were targeted: (1) local and international actors directly involved with events analysed, this included members of the OHR, civil society, local politicians and officials; and (2) academics or journalists whose purpose was to fill any existing gaps due to the impossibility of contacting some of the main actors or the lack of concreteness from interviewees in some central issues. In cases in which the interviewee did not permit digital recording, handwritten notes were

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<sup>22</sup> <http://www.hri.org/news/agencies/srna/> (Last access in autumn 2015).

collected. Purposely, the use of a digital record captures meta-data, such as silences, evasions or nonverbal signals. Importantly, meta-data is an integral part in the process of data collection and analysis in the context of political violence and other political phenomena (Fujii 2010).

Finally, this dissertation incorporates the human dimension to avoid relegating or erasing people's experiences and everyday understandings of the phenomena under question (Megoran 2006). Thus, during the second research stay, nineteen biographical interviews were conducted with Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs living in Sarajevo (seven) and East Sarajevo (twelve) in an attempt to grasp the lived experiences in its urban area since the late 1980s. These interviews were conducted during the last week of my final research visit in Sarajevo and aimed at procuring further information especially necessary for chapter six, which deals with the current spatial and ethnic configuration in the immediate area of Sarajevo. As the focus of this dissertation is on Bosniak and Bosnian Serbs actors, all biographic interviews were conducted with persons belonging to these two ethnicities. Several informal interviews took place with Bosnian Croats during the course of this dissertation but not in such systematised way.

Thus, the Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs interviewed had distinct socio-economic backgrounds and were thirty five years or older to better capture the full experiences from the entire period under consideration in this dissertation. All the people interviewed from East Sarajevo were Sarajevo Serbs who left the city due to war. These biographical interviews included questions regarding: (1) life before war, (2) life during war, (3) housing repossession or return to Sarajevo, (4) division of Sarajevo, (5) current daily life and spatial practices, and (6) ethnicity. Once again, these were semi-structured interviews, as questions could be slightly modified to incorporate issues that were more sensitive in cases in which there was a rapport with informants.<sup>23</sup> Finally, and for ethical purposes, this dissertation protects and does not publish the material obtained in interviews. Unless any person expressed otherwise, the anonymity of all interviewees is protected. In the case of biographic interviews, handwritten notes were taken in all cases to avoid any discomfort to informants who are generally not used to interviews. In cases where informants could not comfortably converse in English, an interpreter accompanied me in order to create a more favourable environment, easing thus communication and improving my understanding.

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<sup>23</sup> Because of these slight modifications and the relatively reduced number of the sample, data from this type of interview is not processed quantitatively in the dissertation.



## **Structure of the dissertation**

Contextually, this chapter ends with a breakdown regarding the structure of the dissertation, which essentially contains five further chapters and a conclusion. Chapter two contextualizes the historical evolution of the city in terms of its urban expansion and ethnic coexistence prior to addressing the siege and the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which culminated the ethno-territorial division of its urban area. In chapter three, there is an analysis of local ethnocratic practices consolidating the ethnic division in the area of Sarajevo, and the OHR's reactive action(s) to create multi-ethnic institutions and tackle land allocations aimed at consolidating ethnic majorities. In chapter four, it is addressed the early lack of implementation of Annex VII, which recognised the right of people to return to pre-war homes, by both local and international actors. Subsequently, it focuses on the empowerment of the OHR, which became the final authority in Bosnia, and the adoption of the Sarajevo Declaration to rebuild ethnic diversity in the Bosnian capital. Chapter five focuses on international intervention in the political and economic realm, framed by liberal peace-building, with both interventions producing limited and even counterproductive outcomes until the year 2003. Meanwhile, chapter six addresses the impact on the current spatial, functional and ethnic configuration in the area of Sarajevo, of the transition towards a market economy and the division between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo. Finally, conclusions are presented in the final chapter, addressing analyses conducted in respective chapters and in relation to the three hypotheses formulated for this dissertation.

## **2. The destruction and division of Sarajevo**

This chapter contextualizes the profound transformation that occurred in the city of Sarajevo from the early 1990s until the signature of the peace agreement. It does this in order to frame the analyses conducted in subsequent chapters, on the role of the OHR and urban changes during the post-war period. Firstly, it presents Sarajevo's specificity in terms of human diversity and the historical urbanisation of the city. It is followed by analyses on the emergence of ethno-national parties during the demise of Yugoslavia and the subsequent territorialisation campaign by the SDS to ethnically divide Bosnia and Sarajevo. As highlighted in this section, the SDS leadership conceived the city of Sarajevo to be a central priority in the policy to create a Bosnian Serb statelet. Such policy, crucially, found a strategic ally in the West's approach to Yugoslavia in the post-Cold War context. The siege of Sarajevo conducted by Bosnian Serbs is effectively analysed along with the SDA and international performances. Finally, the resolution of the conflict is addressed with a consideration of both the final solution for Sarajevo and the defined role of international institutions in the implementation of the peace agreement in order to develop the role assigned to the OHR within the peace-building mission.

### **Sarajevo: common life and urban expansion until the early 1990s**

Bosnia and Herzegovina is emplaced in an area where historically great religions and great powers of European history overlapped and combined, i.e. the empires of Rome, Charlemagne, the Ottomans and the Austro-Hungarians, as well as the faiths of Western Christianity, Eastern Christianity, Judaism and Islam (Malcolm 1994). Furthermore, both Bosnia and Sarajevo are acknowledged as significant historical territories where, generally, different religious communities have coexisted in significant harmony: sometimes as rivals, sometimes as friends; sometimes as equals, sometimes in relationships of dominance and subordination; sometimes in multicultural harmony, and sometimes in discord (Markowitz 2010). Coexistence implies a common history, with people belonging to the same culture (Andjelic 2003; Lovrenović 2001). As claimed by Ivan Lovrenovic (2001), the essence of the Bosnian cultural identity during the Medieval period was composite integration with the parallel existence of several traditions (Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic and Sephardic-Jewish). The cultural and spiritual life was firmly defined by religion, but at the level of folk culture, people

mostly had a common ethnic origin, speaking one language and having common features regarding mentality:

Our heritage is ambivalent and dialectic, as is our nature: we are a “sum” but we are also a “product”; we have our different cultural and national traditions but we have the foundation on which they are built and their limited interweaving, and this is common tradition. The essence of the Bosnian cultural heritage is the complexity of its civilization, the simultaneity of one shared and three separate traditions (Lovrenović 2001, p.224).

Significantly, Sarajevo has been such a place that better embodies a Bosnian cultural system that historically recognises differences in terms of religion, ethnicity or nationality, but in which toleration and coexistence has been an intrinsic feature.<sup>24</sup> Shortly after its foundation as a city, it brought together people from all monotheist religions. The Bosnian feudal society was essentially multi-religious. The Ottoman Empire tolerated, and even supported, the presence of people from other monotheistic faiths, as seen in the city, by the accommodation of Jews who were expelled from Spain by Catholic Monarchs for their refusal to convert to Christianity in the late fifteenth century (Carreras and Moreno 2007).

Yet, the high degree of tolerance was not circumscribed simply to the five centuries of Ottoman rule. Importantly, as argued by Robert Donia (2006a) in the most compelling work on the historical evolution of the city, Sarajevo is a unique city for its path through history in which human and especially religious diversity has been its hallmark since its very foundation in the fifteenth century. While the tendency of nation-states to advance in the project of domination by the main ethnic group has been discussed in the previous chapter, other cities have certainly experienced diversity and major historical changes in their composition over time but the development of the modern state progressively eroded pluralism based on religion.<sup>25</sup> Sarajevo’s path through history has thus been unique in the sense that the Ottomans, Austro-Hungarians, and South Slavs Socialists have promoted in different ways, and at different extents, common life. Eloquent of the spirit and vision of the existing intrinsic diversity of the city, Sarajevans have traditionally referred to such diversity as common

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<sup>24</sup> Similarly to Lovrenovic, the Bosnian cultural system is defined by Dževad Karahasan (1994) as formed of different traditions linked to each other, by the contrast in which one defines the other, and without losing their primordial nature. These elements become part of the system when acquiring new peculiarities without losing some of the properties already possessed.

<sup>25</sup> These would be the cases, for instance, of Thessalonica, Istanbul and Jerusalem.

life or neighbouring relations instead of multi-ethnicity, which implies the existence of differences but not necessarily intermixing between different groups:

Sarajevans have long used the concept of neighbourliness to express their respect for those different faiths and nationalities manifest in the practices of mutual visitations and well-wishing on holidays as well as everyday cordial relations. Common life is neighbourliness writ large. It embodies those values, experiences, institutions, and aspirations *shared* by Sarajevans of different identities, and it has been treasured by most Sarajevans since the city's founding (Donia 2006a, p.4).

Religious rivalry and violence were not part of Bosnia's heritage (Donia and Fine 1994; Malcolm 1994). Generally, members of the three faiths tolerated each other and religiously motivated wars seldom took place. Bosnians did not fight one another as members of religious sects during the Ottoman period and when rebellions against the Ottoman rule occurred; wars were not perceived as religious clashes between Bosnian groups but against the regime and the social order (Donia and Fine 1994). During the period of Austro-Hungarian domination, religious affiliation progressively transformed into a national consciousness among the Orthodox, which considered themselves Serbs, and Catholics who became Croats, while the substitution of religion for national identity among Bosnian Muslim was more complex.<sup>26</sup> Thus, national or ethno-confessional communities became more distinct and almost all Serbs and Croats were aware of their nationalities based on, and largely congruent, with their religious identity (Andjelic 2003; Donia 2006a).

The first serious rifts among the Bosnian people came into being despite the campaigns of the new Bosnian nationalist parties legalized during the Habsburg constitutional period, between 1910 and 1914. This fundamentally represented elite struggles as co-nationalists in Serbia and Croatia had different goals, i.e. pursuing the inclusion of Bosnia (Donia 2006a). A first episode of violence along ethno-national lines occurred following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, in which Croats and Muslims engaged in violent anti-Serb demonstrations during the evening of 28 June and much of the following day. Subsequently, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes did not ameliorate from such tendencies despite efforts from the Royal authorities. Later, during the Second World War the city was under four years of

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<sup>26</sup> Even during Socialist Yugoslavia, Bosnian Muslims defined group identity principally by religion and not nationality, like Jews. Thus, Muslims could adopt Serb or Croat national identity while participating in public life as Muslims. This changed during the 1971 census, and subsequently recognised in the Constitution of 1974, Muslims could declare themselves ethnically rather than a religious group.

German military occupation and politically integrated in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), the Axis state dependent on German support. Governed through terror and intimidation along ethnic lines, the occupation resulted in the extermination of Sarajevo's Jews, the same harsh repression conducted against Serbs (Malcolm 1994; Donia 2006a).

Liberated on 6 April 1945 by Tito's Partisans, the character of common life once again blossomed quickly during Socialist times. Favoured by a policy fostering interethnic relations, and being a republic with a major diversity, Bosnia and especially Sarajevo reached the highest rate of mixed marriages in the multi-ethnic Yugoslav federation. A choice of generic instead of sectional first names for children and a wide variety of cultural productions transcending, mixing and even caricaturing the constraints of ethnic boundaries, expressed both interethnic tolerance and pan-ethnic solidarity (Markowitz 2010).<sup>27</sup> Sarajevo was indeed much more than an ethnically mixed city and acquired cosmopolitan features, as many people often completely neglected ethnicity or were simply not aware about it, as claimed by Igor Stiks, Bosnian Croat novelist from Sarajevo:

We lived together and we did not know what we were from the point of view of the national identity. For me, my central identity was Sarajevo; citizen of Sarajevo was, of course, and then Bosnia. I didn't truly know which was my ethnicity (and I am not sure yet if I know it, or do I want to know it), but we discovered that when Communism knocked down (Nuñez 2009, p. 69).

### The urban expansion

Similar to previous eras in which common life had been promoted under different means and in varying measures, the city experienced three major waves of urban expansion during the Ottoman period (especially between 1460 and 1600), the period under Austro-Hungarian administration (1883–1914) and during Socialist Yugoslavia (from 1945 until the 1984 Olympic Games). Ottoman authorities founded Sarajevo as a town on the site of the medieval settlements of Tornik and Brodac in the mid fifteenth century and proclaimed it as a city during the early sixteenth century.<sup>28</sup> Historically, the city developed in a particular geographical and environmental setting along the Miljacka River plain, where it subsequently became a cultural, religious,

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<sup>27</sup> As analysed by Tone Bringa (1995), in rural areas there was a sense of sharing a locality and a history with members of the other ethnic groups while being aware of boundaries and differences. When Yugoslavia faced dissolution, those differences that had been innocuous, were politically exploited.

<sup>28</sup> Traces of settlements in the area of Sarajevo date back from the Neolithic Age.

political and commercial urban centre in the Balkans under Ottoman rule (Carreras and Moreno 2007).

Its modern development began in the eastern edge in a narrow river plain and became urbanised following an irregular plan which adapted to contours but with a strict separation of public and private spaces. Meanwhile, authorities planned a functional specialization that differentiated private and public space, i.e. residential areas and other urban functions. In the flat sector the bazaar –named Baščaršija– was built as a typical urban unit of Islamic culture that also combined religious, political, economic, and military institutions (Ib.). On the other hand, the residential areas were developed uphill and were divided into neighbourhoods called *mahalas*. These residential areas comprised between thirty and fifty traditional ottoman houses, known as *Tuka*. All the while following social norms, a peculiarity existed whereby the façade opened onto an inner courtyard that separated the interior and familiar space of the street, and in turn, the patio wall prevented the view of the interior from the outside. The number of *mahalas* grew continuously, reaching over one hundred by the end of the sixteenth century (Donia 2006a).

During the period under Austro-Hungarian rule (1878-1918), the city experienced a significant transformation caused by the introduction of capitalism and a first wave of industrialisation, which resulted in the initial westward expansion alongside the Ottoman bazaar. The urban model implemented by the Austro-Hungarian authorities imitated the European capitalist cities of Central and Western Europe, where there was high urban density and housing in the central area (Carreras and Moreno 2007). These buildings of European design had several floors, were multifunctional and multi-family and along with equipment and infrastructures, reorganized commercial forms and public spaces. Indeed, large avenues which were adapted to the tramway were opened, and the streets became the main public space, replacing the organizational role of *mahalas*.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> More specifically, under the figure of Benjamin Kállay, joint Minister for Finance, Sarajevo rearranged the central urban space inspired by Vienna's Ringstrasse. This large project was conceived in the spirit of romantic historicism and set out during the second half of the nineteenth century to replace the medieval walled fortifications with monumental structures (Donia 2006a). Yet, Sarajevo's geomorphologic setting along the Miljacka River plain and the architectonic legacy, with few medieval fortifications, prevented reproduction of the same encirclement project. Prominent architects such as Josip Vancas thus imitated Vienna's trends on a more modest scale. This reproduction was adapted to local specificities of the Ottoman legacy and diversity of religious communities.

A feature of the urban fabric, well known in the city, is the close disposition of the temples, cultural, and educational institutions of each religious community. Such disposition was established during various Ottoman periods, as demonstrated by the presence of the old Orthodox and Catholic churches in Bascarsija, which subsequently continued during Austro-Hungarian and Socialist Yugoslavia. During Austro-Hungarian rule, and on the initiative of Josip Vancas, any building following the existing architectonic style in the city, i.e. the Bosnian style, was encouraged by financial incentives. With the adaptation of the Viennese models to Bosnian conditions, Vancas aspired to valorise all Bosnian communities by encouraging religion as an alternative to secular nationalism. Thus, after designing the Catholic cathedral and the Regional Government Building – the current Presidency Building located in Marsala Tita– in the late 1880s, he designed several representative buildings including a hall for the Muslim Reading Society, the Hotel Central and a Turkish-style bath named Isabeg Isakovic after Sarajevo's founder. These three buildings were designed in neo-Oriental style, i.e. a variant of romantic historicism inspired by Islamic architectural motifs rather than European historical eras (Ib.).<sup>30</sup>

In terms of urbanisation, Sarajevo was neglected during the inter-war period by the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Inevitably, this was to the detriment of the cities that represented the nations of the first Yugoslavia, i.e. Belgrade, Ljubljana, and Zagreb.<sup>31</sup> The city thus became stagnant due to the economic and political crisis and did not experience any remarkable urban expansion despite increasing its population from 58,000 in early 1919 to approximately 90,000 by 1941 (Donia 2006a). It can be seen, therefore, that a significant material transformation of Sarajevo did not occur until the period after the Second World War, during Socialist Yugoslavia (1943-1992) under Tito's socialist rule which lasted until his death in 1980. Moreover, it was during the socialist period that a profound social and economic transformation took place, promoted and led by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. For example, the rise of the urban population in the whole country which was less than twenty percent in 1949 compared to approximately fifty percent in 1981 (Topham 1990). Furthermore, the urban legacy experienced a deep transformation during the early stage of the Socialist

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<sup>30</sup> The construction of monumental buildings with architectural features of Islamic East was conducted by other Viennese architects as displayed by the subsequent development of the most representative building of Sarajevo, the Vijećnica, which was developed in the eastern edge of the city.

<sup>31</sup> Kingdom of Yugoslavia replaced the official name of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in October 1929.

rule, when the inherited housing stock was nationalised and in some cases subdivided to tackle growing demands. Similar to the Ottoman period, land that could not be privately possessed in urban areas was nationalised. Apparently, authorities had complete power to plan urban development, a key feature of the socialist urbanisation.<sup>32</sup>

The urban development of the city sought to fulfil the socialist principles of egalitarianism in relation to employment and housing; this was considered a fundamental right of any citizen. Rapid industrialisation in Bosnia, following-on from the war, was evident in the industrial sector which was sixty seven percent higher during the first post-war year rather than the same equivalent prior to the Second World War (Andjelic 2003). It triggered a massive rural-urban migration that produced, and was simultaneously a product of, the major process of urbanization in the contemporary history of the Western Balkans.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, the transformation of Sarajevo took place within the profound modernisation of Yugoslavia, which was one of the most rural countries in Europe after the end of the Second World War. Public construction of housing took place mostly in the flat valley bottom through the erection of modernist residential complexes developed westwards in the Marijin Dvor area.<sup>34</sup>

Contextually, Sarajevo experienced the most important period of urban expansion in its history, multiplying several times the territory of the urbanised area built during the previous five centuries (Figure 1). The total urban population grew from 99,000 to 244,000 inhabitants between 1948 and 1975, recording an annual population growth rate of 6.4% which represented the third highest growth in Yugoslavia (Hamilton 1979). As a result of the process of urbanisation under socialism, most areas developed from the late 1940s until the early 1980s. The municipalities of Novo Sarajevo and Novi Grad (in neighbourhoods such as Grbavica, Hrasno, Čengić Vila or Alipašino Polje) were built following the *mikroraion* model in which districts formed a nested hierarchy ensuring a hierarchical provision of services.

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<sup>32</sup> Private property was not prohibited and constituted the main category in rural areas.

<sup>33</sup> Industrialisation ensured that in major fields such as electric energy, coal mining or wood industry, figures doubled or tripled in the 1940s, resulting in the development of several large and successful companies that functioned as monopolies in the semi-planned economy. Bosnia's industry was based on mining, metallurgy and other basic manufacturing industries while Sarajevo's companies such as Energoinvest, Sipad and Unis were usually within the ten largest companies in Yugoslavia and developing significant international activity (Andjelic 2003). These companies competed in international markets especially as a result of the relationships developed with countries belonging to the non-Aligned Movement.

<sup>34</sup> Socialist realism was officially the architectural style of the Communist Party, but not implemented with such rigidity in Yugoslavia. In 1950, the Association of Yugoslav Architects voted to abandon socialist realism as a guiding philosophy for their work (Donia 2006a)






Figure 1. Sarajevo's historical urban expansion. Source: author.

For all that, nationalisation of any inherited housing stock and public development and urban expansion did not mean that private housing disappeared. Actually, private construction in Sarajevo was not unrepresented but, as in other urban centres, the figures for such was below public housing, with a proportion of 46-54% in favour of public housing in 1985 (Urbanistički plan Grada Sarajeva 1990). Private housing was

generally single-family households built at the outskirts of the city or on the slopes surrounding the urban central areas. Socially-owned apartments belonged to the state or a state-owned company that provided housing for employees and was financed from a fund to which every employee was required to make a contribution. The tenant of a socially-owned apartment paid minimal rent and the occupancy right could be inherited by a family member. Individuals living in temporal residences or those with no option to improve their apartments through the housing allocation system built their own apartments to find more practical and secure solutions. Clearly, Sarajevo displays the bounded duality between the urban fabric and functionalism of the socialist period between the high-rise residential buildings on the Miljacka valley, with unique expressions of modern urbanism, and the mainly single-family houses on the surrounding slopes and suburbs, as it will be analysed in chapter six.

The 1970s and 1980s were especially dynamic culturally and the city became dominant in Yugoslavia through film and music production.<sup>35</sup> Sarajevo's urban expansion under socialist rule took a step further in the late 1970s, on the eve of the celebration of the XIV Winter Olympics. The city's administration expanded to ten municipalities in 1977 with the addition of the neighbouring municipalities of Ilijas, Hadzici, Pale and Trnovo (Figure 2).<sup>36</sup> These municipalities were annexed to the city in anticipation of further urban expansion, albeit some of them related to the developments conducted to celebrate the Olympics. All four peripheral municipalities had small urban settlements that were functionally linked to the city, possessing some factories and transportation facilities. In addition, each one had small villages and extensive areas of underdeveloped rural land generally in mountainous terrain. The Winter Olympics brought a modernization of services and infrastructure such as the neighbourhood of Mojmiló, built as the Olympic Village, Zetra Sports Centre, the Unitic Towers and the Holiday Inn Hotel. Following the celebration of the Winter Olympics, the city finally stalled its urban expansion mostly due to the ongoing economic crisis.

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<sup>35</sup> The Yugoslav new wave period, considered the richest of pop and rock music, hit the Bosnian capital and led to the creation of several important groups, such as Bijelo Dugme and Zabranjeno Pusenje. In the district of Kosevo there was the emergence of an urban sub-cultural movement known as New Primitivism, in reaction to the New Romanticism predominant in the UK at the beginning of the decade, in which the film director Emir Kusturica was one of the more regular contributors (for more details on sub-cultural movements in Sarajevo during the so-called Golden Age, see Čengiđ and Martín-Díaz, forthcoming).

<sup>36</sup> Previous municipalities were Centar, Novo Sarajevo, Ilidža and Vogošća. Centar was reorganised in Stari Grad and Centar, and Novo Sarajevo into Novo Sarajevo and Sarajevsko polje (renamed later as Novi Grad).

By 1988, and amid pressure from the IMF for economic restructuring, the Yugoslav economy was in extreme crisis with unemployment higher than sixteen percent, a decline in industrial production (six percent in Bosnia) and an inflation rate that had reached 160 percent (Ramet 1999).<sup>37</sup> Moreover, in Sarajevo, internal economic crisis was accentuated by the international political instability in the Persian Gulf. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait affected many Sarajevans as the construction firm Hydrogradnja had an estimated 2,400 employees working on projects in Iraq. Equally, the large energy firm Energoinvest was owed some \$34 million by Iraqi constructors (Donia 2006a). In early August 1990, inevitably, workers started to return to Sarajevo from Iraq.




Figure 2. Sarajevo's urban administrative composition since 1977. Source: author.

<sup>37</sup> In the early 1980s, in fact, Yugoslavia had already accumulated a high debt of about \$18,000 million. The situation was getting worse (similar to other socialist countries) and by the end of the decade, inflation exceeded 200% and the unemployment rate stood at fourteen percent (Andjelic 2003, p.51).

## **The emergence of political pluralism**

Amid a huge political crisis and tense environment, the fourteenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (most notable the final Congress) took place in January 1990. The Slovenian delegation proposed several motions such as the transformation of the League of Communists, the provision of clear guarantees of dissociation on a constitutional basis and also a condemnation of Serbian economic blockades imposed in December 1989 to their republic. All motions were rejected by the Serbian block, however, without any attempt at negotiation. The Slovenian and Croats delegates withdrew from discussions and subsequently the Bosnian and Macedonian representatives decided it was futile to continue (Ramet 1999).

Hence, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia disintegrated in early 1990 while multiparty elections had been scheduled in other republics. In order to prevent any risks of nationalism, in a territory with an ethnically mixed population, parties organised along ethnic principles were prohibited by law during socialist rule but the ban was overruled by the Constitutional Court in June 1990 when other republics had already celebrated elections (Andjelic 2003). The Bosnian League of Communists that turned into a social-democrat party (SK-SDP), and the Reformists (Alliance of Reformist Forces led by Prime Minister, Ante Markovic) were the only two pan-ethnic parties in terms of programme and support (Cohen 1995). Between May and mid August of that year, even before the ban was lifted and within a context of expanded opportunities for the emergence of new political movements, HDZ, SDA and SDS were founded and respectively represented Bosnian Croats, Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs.<sup>38</sup> By identifying members of a single ethno-national group as their respective constituencies and appealing to them only during elections, all three main nationalist parties more or less contributed to the process of ethno-politicization and ethnicisation of Bosnian society after decades of inter-ethnic policy in Socialist Yugoslavia, illustrated by the slogan so often championed of “Brotherhood and unity”.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> SDA was established prior to the lifting of the ban. Similarly, HDZ had started to set up party branches in Herzegovina from neighbouring Croatia before the ban was dropped (Andjelić 2003). Furthermore, the emergence of SDS was influenced by the formation of SDS in Croatia, with initial conversations taking place in Belgrade in the winter of 1990. Under SDS leader in Croatia, Jovan Raskovic, publically stated the intent to extend SDS into BiH as soon as its ban on ethno-national parties was lifted (Maksic 2014).

<sup>39</sup> As defined by Adis Maksic (2014), the concept of ethno-politicization refers to the activities of ethno-national elites that elevate the political relevance of ethnic affiliations. The politicization of ethnicity at the elite level is mutually constitutive with a more general social ethnicisation so it leads to a

Importantly, all three nationalist parties had different visions on the future of Yugoslavia and the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the SDS party, the prospect of an eventual separation of Bosnia from Serbia was a genuine prospect, amid the increasing political crisis of the Yugoslav federation. On the other hand, Bosniaks in the SDA and Croats in the HDZ generally considered a confederation acceptable, with or without Serbs (Cohen 1995). SDA was the most independent party just as long as SDS and HDZ had respective powerful patrons in Serbia and Croatia. HDZ was actually a descendent of the Croatian HDZ party, with the real power and influence lying in Zagreb, in the figure of Franjo Tudjman (Andjelic 2003). Slobodan Milosevic was rarely observed exercising his influence over SDS but this pattern was similar before the war.

Crucially, the future of Bosnia and its integrity was contested by Serbian and Croatian nationalisms in a context in which several republics pursued a transformation of the Yugoslav federation. In relation to Bosnia, contestation of Bosnia's integrity was illustrated in the famous meetings celebrated in Karadjordjevo and Tikves between late March and mid-April 1991, where the elected presidents of Serbia and Croatia set a framework of negotiations to discuss the division of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia.<sup>40</sup> At that meeting there were no specific agreements but both leaders converged on the idea to divide the central Yugoslav republic resorting to population exchanges and episodes of ethnic cleansing, thereby allowing for an option to create a small Bosnian Muslim state between a Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia (Veiga 2011).

Franjo Tudjman viewed Bosnia as an artificial colonial creation and a source of regional instability and certainly envisioned its partition, in line with the traditional Croatian nationalist vision of Bosnia as a Croatian land and Muslims as Croats of Islamic faith.<sup>41</sup> The Croatian policy to divide Bosnia, however, was considered by its proponents as a possibility rather than a necessity to be realised if events required or

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broader ethnicisation and vice versa. For that purpose, all three nationalist parties created exclusive symbolism without interfering with the symbols of other nationalities (Donia 2006a).

<sup>40</sup> Dozens of meetings at a lower level followed meetings between Milosevic and Tudjman in order to continue negotiations on the future of Bosnia and Croatia. In May 1992, once war had started in Bosnia, further discussion on the division of Bosnia took place, this time between Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban, HDZ leadership having replaced Stjepan Kljuic. Graz's agreement was a continuation of Karadjordjevo's agreement but delimitation of Serbian and Croatian territory was not completely settled.

<sup>41</sup> Bosnia had internally reorganised the historical and significant changes which occurred during Royal Yugoslavia, such as the partition in 1939 with the so-called Cvetković–Maček Agreement.

demanded same (Hoare 1997).<sup>42</sup> Actually, in Bosnia, the HDZ party was led by Stjepan Kljuic, a Sarajevan who was loyal to Tudjman and his leadership but disagreed with his vision and any potential agreement with Milosevic at the expense of Bosnia (Glaurdic 2011). As a result, HDZ members signalled mixed messages during the electoral campaign, which included party leadership calls for the defence of Bosnia integrity even at the price of war and others calls from western Herzegovina advocating for its separation. This diversity of messages revealed conflicting interests and aims between Croat people living in central areas of Bosnia and those living in Herzegovina (Klemencic 1994). Croats of central Bosnia, who generally lived in mixed areas surrounded by the other two communities, usually strongly supported Bosnian integrity while envisioning some sort of reorganisation guarantying their national rights. On the other hand, Croats from Herzegovina favoured more radical solutions, including a substantial degree of autonomy or the secession of areas with a Croat majority.

Fewer differences involved main Serbian political actors both in Serbia and BiH. SDS in Bosnia and Herzegovina held its foundational committee at Skenderija, in Sarajevo on 12 July 1990. Thus, it succeeded the formation of SDS in Croatia in February, three months before Croatian elections. In Bosnia, the party was initiated by a group of distinguished professors from the University of Sarajevo and was also under the guidance of Serb intellectual elites such as Dobrica Cosic, who was heavily involved in its foundation. Radovan Karadzic was nominated President following the refusal of other professors.<sup>43</sup> The cornerstone of the SDS programme was the non-negotiable retention of Bosnia in a federal Yugoslav state or, alternatively, its division for partial incorporation into an enlarged Serbian state.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> While Tudjman argued that a Greater Serbia could modify the boundaries of Bosnia, they could not refuse what historically belonged to Croatia. However, he preferred a diplomatic solution rather than a military solution because of the Serbian and JNA threat.

<sup>43</sup> As analysed by Adis Maksic (2014) in his PhD concerning the activities of SDS BiH on the political homogenization of Serbs in the two years leading up to the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia. Dobrica Cosic (a key figure of Serbia's nationalist revival who became in mid-June 1992 the first President of Serbia and Montenegro) was directly involved in the activities of a Sarajevo-based network of Serb intellectuals and was especially decisive for the constitution of the leadership of future SDS. Early activism on the formation of a Serb party in BiH was mostly initiated by a group of distinguished university professors from the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Sarajevo who shared ethnicised interpretations of Yugoslav politics, such as Milorad Ekmecic, Nikola Koljevic, Vojislav Maksimovic, Aleksa Buha, Slavko Leovac and Radovan Vuckovic, who established a collaboration with a group of like-minded Sarajevo Serb poets.

<sup>44</sup> In the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and policies for its internal reorganisation, remaining in a Yugoslav state would resemble very little of the Socialist federation under Tito's rule, especially after the so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution conducted in late 1980s that allowed the creation of a dominant

The nature of the SDS political project was highlighted in an interview given shortly after the founding assembly. Karadzic was resolute in his opposition to any efforts to separate Bosnia or the Serbs in Croatia from their mother country, Serbia. He had previously alluded to threats of disorder and bloodshed if such an attempt was made (Treanor 2002.). Furthermore, and amid threats of war if the future Parliament opted for anything rather than a federation, Karadzic, in October 1990 just one month before the elections, argued that a future (Greater Serbian) federation would include Serbia and Montenegro, most of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbian populated areas of Croatia and perhaps Macedonia (Sudetic 1990).

Indeed, SDS did not only advocate keeping Bosnia federated to Yugoslavia in a context of dissolution, but pursued a substantial social and territorial transformation. More specifically, the party leadership envisioned the creation of a unified ethno-territoriality that enabled the lives, government and society of the Serb nation (Pejanovic 2004). This vision clashed with the heterogeneous distribution of different ethnic groups along Bosnia's territory. Furthermore, there was widespread support among Bosnian Serbs that they would not be cast adrift or effectively cut off from Serbia in the eventual reorganisation of Yugoslavia. It was thus envisioned that a confederal rearrangement could be established which included Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, a possibility that in 1990 was seen more likely than the independences of Bosnia and Croatia (Cohen 1995).

Between the two visions emanating from Belgrade and Croatia, which contested Bosnia's integrity, SDA found itself in a very delicate position. SDA was the only party among the three main nationalist parties without patronage from any other Republic in Yugoslavia. Equally, Bosniaks perceived Bosnia and Herzegovina as their homeland while their respective links with Bosnian Croats and Serbs meant they considered themselves as the most interested and important ethnic group in the future of the central Yugoslav republic, with a wide majority considering it indivisible. Contextually, the preference of the SDA leadership was to transform Yugoslavia into a confederation. This was considered the best solution, as it facilitated the maintenance of Bosnia integrity and also but crucially continued economic and cultural links with other republics. This was vital as there was a Bosniak community in the Sandzak region which extended between Serbia and Montenegro, and which had been part of the

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pro-Serbian voting bloc within the Yugoslav presidency council after deposing governments allies of Milošević in Montenegro and in the Serbian autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.

Bosnian Pashaluk (a primary administrative division of the Ottoman Empire) until the Congress of Berlin in 1878.<sup>45</sup>

It transpired that the preference of the confederation was contained in the very founding programme of the party, released at the inaugural meeting held in Sarajevo in May 1990, at the Holiday Inn. The founding program of the SDA party defined this preference as a political alliance of the citizens of Yugoslavia who belong to the Muslim cultural community and other citizens who accept the programme and objectives of the Party (SDA 2017). Moreover, the programme and goals of the party further called for maintenance of Yugoslavia as a free union of peoples and emphasised the particular interest in the maintenance of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a common state of Muslims, Serbs and Croats (Hadziomeragic 1991; cited in Hoare 2004, p.27).

These principles were maintained despite the worsening political crisis. Discussions were conducted with regard to proposals for the reorganisation of Yugoslavia in the early months of 1991, between six republican presidents in order to prevent war and find agreement among republics. Thus, Alija Izetbegovic joined Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov in early June 1991 (only a few days before Croatia and Slovenia announced their declaration of independence) in a proposal to transform Yugoslavia into a union of states, virtually a confederation that revived a Slovenian-Croatian proposal of October 1990. Inevitably, this proposal was rejected immediately by Serbian and Montenegro governments. In turn, neither Milosevic nor Tudjman were convinced and at the following meeting on 12 June with the six republican presidents, both leaders actually redirected the conversation to a discussion on a tripartite division of BiH (Ramet 2006).

For Bosniak leadership, advocating for a confederation rather than the independence of Bosnia was motivated by a series of factors. The initial commitment of SDA to the upholding of Yugoslavia can be explained by the strong attachment of the Bosnian Muslims to the Yugoslav idea. Furthermore, it is explained by the specific influence of the pan-Islamist current that was not numerous but influential in the party. This current saw the retention of some aspect of Yugoslavia as a *sine qua non* condition for uniting the whole “historical and cultural Muslim circle” of the Yugoslav space, i.e.

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<sup>45</sup> In 1993, at a Bosniak Congress held in September, Bosnian Muslims decided to officially redefine themselves as Bosniaks in terms of ethnic belonging.



Bosnia and the Sandzak region (Bougarel 1999).<sup>46</sup> Essentially, from a strategic perspective, Bosniak leadership strongly felt that choosing between Belgrade and Zagreb could lead to the dissolution of Bosnia, as argued by Alija Izetbegovic during the election campaign:

The idea of a confederation is more to my taste, but it is not realistic today. It is not time for personal tastes and sympathies, and I am trying to be as realistic as possible... we stand on the position of equal closeness and equal distance from the Serb and Croat centres (Numanovic 1990, cited in Glaurdic 2011, p.104).

While pursuing the integrity of and defending the diversity of Bosnia in its programme, in comparison with other ethno-national parties, SDA also contributed to the process of ethno-politicisation in Bosnia discursively or using Islamic religious symbolism in political meetings. This created tension with the more liberal wings in the party and this materialised in September 1990 when Adil Zulfikarpasic left SDA to create the Bosnian Muslim Organisation (MBO), which adopted an explicitly non-religious programme and pursued a non-sectional politics based on ethnic identity (Malcolm 1994). Alija Izetbegovic explicitly claimed that non-ethnic politics were not a realist possibility in that context in which there was a real danger of war. Paradoxically, his argument showed that in pursuing the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in reality, SDA had to exclusively focus on ethnicity in order to avoid becoming irrelevant.<sup>47</sup> Actually, Bosniak's reaction to pressure from the nationalism of neighbouring republics strengthened their own nationalism by giving greater emphasis to its religious component, the most distinctive element, and fighting for the preservation of Bosnia's unique character as a multi-national and multi-religious republic (Ib.).

Despite the differences among HDZ, SDA and SDS in relation to the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina during campaigns for the November 1990 elections, the three

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<sup>46</sup> The so-called pan-Islamist current came from the Young Muslims organisation, a Bosnian Muslim cultural organisation emerged in 1939 that was formed with the aim of the spiritual, cultural and material progress of Bosniaks in the former Yugoslavia. Izetbegovic was one of the members of the current, which became prominent in the top ranks and exercised high influence in the party as argued by Xavier Bougarel in his different analysis on the party (1997; 1999). Such influence was highlighted by the aspiration of gathering the Bosniak population in Yugoslavia, reflected in a SDA political project that revolved around three main goals: (1) the sovereignty of the Bosnian Muslim nation; (2) the independence, and territorial integrity of BiH; and, (3) the territorial autonomy of the Sandzak region.

<sup>47</sup> More specifically, he told one journalist: "Perhaps in four or five years we shall have passed through minefields to the horizon of civil society. For now, unfortunately, our party must be sectional. The parties that try to represent everyone are small and weak. There is a real risk of civil war here; our main aim as a party is to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina together" (Thompson 1990; cited in Malcolm 1994, p.219).

main nationalist parties manoeuvred between mutual radicalisation and tacit convergence to defeat Social Democrats and Reformists. The parties ingenuously combined moderate and radical discourses displaying a stance of non-aggression and developing an apparently convergent attitude showing willingness to negotiate the terms of a new BiH (Sasso 2015). Such an image of collaboration and model of coexistence, which had actually appeared a few months prior to their foundation in 1990, was strategically deployed before elections.<sup>48</sup> On 4 November, in Konjic, nationalist parties organised the first joint meeting amid claims of peaceful coexistence, in a clear message that they could collaborate and it would not be problematic for them to form a government (Andjelic 2003).

Furthermore, in interviews published by *Oslobodjenje* from leaders of all leading parties, the historical heritage of common life was praised while the prospect of an armed conflict conveniently neglected. Eloquently, Karadzic claimed that “for a civil war there has to be a decision, a will...some goals. To me that is a mad and impossible idea...we can live together; living together has created some eternal values and possibilities of continuing to live together” (Kurspahic 1997, p.59-60). Among other leaders, Kljuic was equally committed to coexistence and merely demanded the same recognition for Bosnian Croats. Meanwhile, Izetbegovic claimed that conditions for a nation-state in Bosnia did not exist unlike conditions in other republics of Yugoslavia; therefore, the only possibility of avoiding war was a civic republic.

Importantly, Karadzic’s claims of coexistence prior to elections clearly revealed a strategy of convergence in order to defeat non-nationalist parties, which should also serve to mobilise moderates within the Bosnian Serb constituency. These statements contrasted with the nationalist propaganda that attacked Bosnian Muslims, commencing when Milosevic rose to leadership in 1987 and equally utilised by the SDS leadership.<sup>49</sup> Discourse moderation was part of a series of decisions within SDS leadership that temporarily pursued obscuring differences with SDA, i.e. when Karadzic instructed activists to portray Muslims in a positive light (Maksic 2014). In point of fact, SDS discourse did not hide its policy positions during the 1990 election campaign but any

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<sup>48</sup> Speaking in Sarajevo at the founding convention of Karadzic’s party in the summer of 1990, Alija Izetbegovic stated that “we were waiting for you; Bosnia-Herzegovina need you” (Kurspahic 1997, p.60).

<sup>49</sup> The bombardment of propaganda from Belgrade began later, by the summer of 1989, and had the effect of bringing Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks together on the same side. Actually, when Tudman’s HDZ was founded in early 1990 in Croatia, its official policy was the maintenance of the Bosnian boundary inviolate (Malcolm 1994).

debate concerning the future of Bosnia was still hypothetical and conjectural at that time, with Karadzic using events in Croatia to mobilise Bosnian Serbs and articulate publicly polity positions (Toal and Maksic 2014).<sup>50</sup>

This collaboration was strategically deployed to defeat non-nationalist parties on the left, i.e. former Communists and Reformists, and allowed the three ethno-national parties to achieve a landslide victory in the elections for Parliament, the Presidency and for local councils. This was observed in results from the highest legislative body, where they won 202 out of 240 seats in both chambers (Andjelic 2003).<sup>51</sup> Nationalism thus became acceptable and credible for broader segments of the Bosnian society in a context of widespread and increasing dissatisfaction, which had included some political scandals that eroded the legitimacy of the League of Communists, such as the Agrokomerc case (Andjelic 2003). Following elections, the three parties formed a governmental coalition with Alija Izetbegovic being elected president of a seven-member multiethnic presidency.<sup>52</sup> The collaboration among nationalist parties before elections was only illusory, however, and essentially disagreement in relation to the status of Bosnia became a heavy burden for the government formed after multi-party elections. The governance of such a difficulty was further complicated by the existence of ultranationalist wings in each party, who took advantage of the context of uncertainty regarding Yugoslavia's future and increasingly raised the prospect of civil war among different ethnic groups (Cohen 1995).

Despite differentiating sensitivities within both the parties and in respective ethnic constituencies, the period after elections could be characterised as a dispute between the Serbs and the two alternative communities, as Bosniaks and Croats were so often in agreement concerning either confederal or sovereign solutions. Quite simply, the Serbs rejected the secession of Bosnia from Yugoslavia while the Bosniaks and

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<sup>50</sup> In Krajina, in 1990, the SDS party in Croatia had already commenced a campaign, which would become a guide for Bosnian SDS, to take control over territories of Croatia with a majority Serb population. Techniques included the radicalisation of the Serb population through misinformation and fear, deployment of guerrilla movements was used to trigger violent responses from Croat police and, finally, to produce violent incidents (prior to JNA involvement acting on behalf of Milosevic and Serbs (Malcom 1995).

<sup>51</sup> In the Chambers of Citizens, they won seventy five percent of seats while in the Chamber of Districts it increased to eighty four percent. Results of local elections had a similar pattern and only in two municipalities, Tuzla and Vares, could non-nationalist parties form government.

<sup>52</sup> A Croat from the HDZ was selected as prime minister; and a Serb from the SDS was chosen to be president of the republic's legislature The Presidency was formed by six more representatives distributed by nationality: Fikret Abdic (SDA); Nikola Koljeic, (SDS) Biljana Plavsic (SDS), Stjepan Kljuic (HDZ), Stjepan Boras (HDZ) and Ejup Ganic (Yugoslav but a SDA member).

Croats were increasingly reluctant to stay in a rump Yugoslavia dominated by Serbs (Klemencic 1994). Unavoidably, the Bosnian government, constituted from the first multi-party elections, was dysfunctional. There was a Bosniak-Croat cooperation and agreement on many crucial issues as while Stjepan Kljuic led HDZ, the party collaborated on the preservation of a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the Serbs boycotted the more important constitutional discussions, thereby blocking the passage of essential reforms. Also, very shortly after establishing the government coalition among the three nationalist parties (with the implication of a distribution of political and administrative positions along ethnic lines) it became evident that the SDS party had a well defined distinct agenda for both Bosnia and Sarajevo.

### **Towards the ethnic division of Sarajevo: SDS's ethno-territorialisation campaign and the international partiality in the crisis**

Indeed, in a meeting organised by SDS in Banja Luka in October 1990, prior to the holding of multi-party elections, the National Council of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina was established as a quasi executive body ready to work within a parallel government (Toal and Dahlman 2011; Glaurdic 2011). While anticipating divergences between other ethnic communities regarding the status of Bosnia, Karadzic claimed that the Council would simply focus on cultural and economic issues if Serbs did not become a minority in the Bosnian Assembly and the Assembly did not pursue changing the republican character of Bosnia. As a national chamber, the Bosnian Constitutional Commission ruled that it was an illegal body and claimed that the establishment of national chambers would lead directly to a disintegration of Bosnia and Yugoslavia (Toal and Dahlman 2011).

Led by Radovan Karadzic, SDS articulated a programme based on the non-negotiable continuity of Bosnia within Yugoslavia or as part of a Greater Serbia. This was a dual-track strategy aimed at holding Bosnia in a federation. Yet, it often resorted to threats, albeit working for its division. Equally important, the political agenda of Bosnian Serb leadership was to be achieved with political, material and logistical backing from Belgrade, and with JNA capacity in any eventual confrontation with Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats (Treanor 2002). Thus, links with Serbia were not constrained to the foundational process but, rather, the project to create an exclusive Bosnian Serb polity was an integral part of the policy to create a Greater Serbia state conducted by the main political Serbian actors in Belgrade.

As explicitly expressed by Milosevic at a meeting of republican leaders in January 1991, if Yugoslavia became a confederation of independent states, Serbia would demand territory from neighbouring republics to bring all eight and a half million Serbs of Yugoslavia into a single new state (Sudetic 1991). Similarly, Dobrica Cosic explicitly announced in 1991 that Serbs would create their own state in their ethnic areas if Bosniaks did not accept a federation of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, already accepting the possibility of a Yugoslavia without Croats and Slovenes (Judah 2000). These claims actually reflected an ongoing process, as a political and military plan was elaborated upon during 1990 in Serbia. Subsequently titled RAM (the frame), the purpose of this plan was the organisation of Serbs in other Republics, consolidating control over the newly constituted SDS parties (in both Bosnia and Croatia), and preparing arms and ammunition for the eventual incorporation of these territories into an enlarged Serbian state (Cohen 1995; Judah 2000). Hence, newly established Bosnian Serb militias were armed as early as 1990 in several regions of Bosnia including the area of Sarajevo, in the mountainous Romanija region that included the municipality of Pale (Ramet 1999).<sup>53</sup>

In conjunction with the policy led by Slobodan Milosevic, namely to create a new Serbian state if Yugoslavia collapsed, the strategy followed steps taken by the SDS local branch in Croatia and was constantly coordinated with Belgrade. As revealed in documents consulted at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, there was regular and frequent communication between Radovan Karadzic, Milosevic and other officials in Belgrade on a broad range of issues, seen in the content of numerous telephone conversations later released (Treanor 2002). Actually, SDS leadership established a client-list relationship with both Milosevic's state apparatus and a Serb-controlled JNA during that time. In May and June of 1991, Milosevic used SDS in BiH to create a network for the disbursement of supplies and weapons to the Bosnian Serbs and to build a governing structure for the projected new Serbian state (Glaurdic 2011).

Indeed, this coordinated policy took a further step in spring 1991 when the so-called regionalization campaign pursued the establishment of an intermediate regional level of government between the republic and the municipalities. Meanwhile, in April and May several new Communities of Municipalities were formed following the

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<sup>53</sup> Other regions included Eastern Herzegovina and the Bosnian Krajina. Likewise, with the National Council of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, these actions took place before elections.

adoption by Bosnian Serbs of agreements where they had a majority or plurality. This establishment was directed or co-ordinated by the SDS Main Board and included both the economic and ethnic composition of the existing or proposed regions (Treanor 2002). The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of BiH recognised the association of municipalities used to promote economic and cultural activities but SDS initiative could not be legally grounded as it was an ethically based unilateral move.<sup>54</sup>

The Communities of Municipalities were progressively enlarged and organisationally strengthened. Afterwards, the process of territorialisation explicitly recognised its ethnic nature when on 7 September 1991 SDS officials adopted a resolution in which the Communities of Municipalities were proclaimed Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAOs).<sup>55</sup> Such a declaration, along with revealing the nature of the regionalisation campaign, placed the majority of these areas outside the control of the central government in Sarajevo and crucially without the participation of any other communities in local government (Klemencic 1994). Notably eager to illustrate the final objective of the process of ethno-territorialisation, SDS functionaries openly stated during the proclamation of the SAO Bosnian Krajina that it was to remain part of Bosnia only as long as Bosnia was part of a joint state with Serbia and Montenegro (Predarovic 1991; cited in Glaurdic 2011). The formation of this illegal political structure, however, allowed a takeover by Bosnian Serb authorities of a significant territory of the Yugoslav republic as the five SAO's altogether incorporated a surface of almost fifty three percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina, containing 1.8 million people out of which only forty six percent were Serbs (Klemencic 1994).<sup>56</sup> Moreover, the small proportion of the Serbian population in some municipalities ensured that local governments in Prijedor, Skender Vakuf and Kupres voted against joining the Community of Municipalities in the spring of 1991.

Importantly, the ethno-territorialisation of Bosnian, conducted by SDS, did not exclude the Bosnian capital as seen with the creation of the SAO Romanija on 17 September; rather it implied a continuation of the Community of Municipalities of

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<sup>54</sup> Out of the 109 municipalities of the Socialist Republic of BiH, SDS achieved absolute majorities in thirty two and relative majority in four.

<sup>55</sup> The decision had a long form: "Decision on the Proclamation of Autonomous Regions as Inseparable Parts of the Federal State Federative Yugoslavia and Integral Parts of the feral Unit Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Well as the Separation of Populated Places from One Municipality and Their Incorporation into Another".

<sup>56</sup> Five SAO's were Eastern Herzegovina, Bosnian Krajina, Romanija, Northern Bosnia and Ozren Posavina, formed in November.

Romanija. Initially, it was integrated via the municipalities of Pale, Sokolac and Han Pijesak, covering an area of 1,600 km<sup>2</sup> (Ib.). As Pale was the only constituent municipality of Sarajevo within the SAO, the founding SAO's authorities declared their intention to include parts of other municipalities of the city with a majority of Bosnian Serbs. For the Bosnian Serb leadership, Sarajevo had a significant position in the process of ethno-territorialisation. The city was seen as a hub connecting the various Serb territories in Bosnia and, as claimed by Radovan Karadzic long before the war, SDS was already conquering areas that would allow the linking of Sarajevo and Banja Luka in a well-integrated territoriality (ICTY 2003).

While the policy of Bosnian Serb leadership was to assert authority over areas of Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs also pursued the expulsion of the non-Serb population in order to ensure cohesive and ethnically exclusive territories. Such a project was visible in Radovan Karadzic's statements, during which he expressed several times in 1991, the desire to either confine or eliminate Sarajevo's Muslims, reflecting his longstanding animosity towards the city's multiethnic character.<sup>57</sup> Effectively, in a private conversation in early September, Karadzic claimed that he intended to allow Muslims the rule of small enclaves, among which half of Sarajevo was included:

Izetbegovic can have the power in half of Sarajevo, Zenica, in half of Tuzla, and that's it...they do not understand that there would be bloodshed and that the Muslim people would disappear (ICTY 2005, p. 19294).

SDS leadership visions on the capital of Bosnia evolved discursively over time and varied depending on the particular audience (Donia 2006b). Harsh words progressively disappeared as Krajisnik advised Karadzic on being watchful in his political statements i.e. to say that only Muslims would die but deliberately say that all would disappear (Ib.). Karadzic, however, produced further inflammatory discourse in the Bosnian Assembly on 15 October in the context of the discussion on the sovereignty of the Yugoslav republic, claiming that Izetbegovic would take Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell if he neglected the political will of the Serb people:

You want to take Bosnia-Herzegovina down the same highway of hell and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia are travelling. Do not think you will not lead Bosnia-Herzegovina into hell, and do not think that you will not perhaps lead the Muslim people into annihilation, because the Muslims cannot defend

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<sup>57</sup> Karadzic, born in Montenegro, by 1971 had already published a poem entitled Sarajevo, in which he threatened his adopted city and "described it as a monstrosity, ambiguously straddling the line between human and nonhuman" (Markowitz 2010, p. 168).

themselves if there is war. How will you prepare everyone from being killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina (ERN V000-0270, 1991).

While admittedly shocked, Izetbegovic calmly responded that his words illustrated in the best way why Bosnia would not likely remain in a rump Yugoslavia under the control of Serbs.<sup>58</sup> Following reactions to the controversial speech, SDS leaders began to use the term separation or territorialisation when referring to the political and ethnic division of Sarajevo into Bosniak and Serbian parts (disregarding other groups).<sup>59</sup> SDS leadership did not only practice discursive violence, but among all three main nationalist parties, it was the leading agent in the process of ethno-politicization in Bosnia thanks to far superior resources (Maksic 2014).

The agenda of the Bosnian Serb leadership to divide Sarajevo ethnically was equally pursued with regard to the process of ethno-territorialisation. In the spring of 1991, Sarajevo's government faced a systematic campaign from SDS to remove municipalities from the jurisdiction of the city (Donia 2006a). During the course of this campaign, rival nationalist visions over the city's future sparked disputes among municipalities over budgetary allocations. Most of SDS's members supported the separation of Serb-inhabited areas from the city's jurisdiction, while SDA and HDZ leaders supported unity. In April 1991, SDS leaders in Pale announced their intention to secede from the city arguing economic reasons. Subsequently, in the autumn of that same year, SDS leadership moved to expand the party's authority in the area of Sarajevo beyond Pale and on 25 September the Sarajevo city board of SDS established a committee formed by at least one representative from the ten municipalities of Sarajevo for the purpose of implementing the so-called regionalisation campaign (Ib.).

Equally, the SDS policy of ethno-territorialisation was strong and coordinated with initiatives from the Bosnian Assembly. In this sense, if there was a failure to reach a parliamentary agreement up the maintaining of Bosnia within the Yugoslav Federation, SDS had foreseen the withdrawal from the Parliament (Pejanovic 2004). Indeed, only ten days after the Bosnian Parliament approved the Memorandum on Sovereignty on 14 October 1991, Serb deputies left the Parliament and subsequently formed the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH. Yet, among all assemblies in the

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<sup>58</sup> Izetbegovic's reply was: "The words of Mr. Karadzic illustrate in the best way why we perhaps will not stay in a rump Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavia that Mar. Karadzic wants – nobody else wants... I solemnly declare that the Muslim nation will not attack anyone. But I also solemnly declare that it will energetically defend itself. Therefore it cannot disappear" (Jergovic 1991; cited in Glaurdic 2011, p.237).

<sup>59</sup> In the 1991 Census, Sarajevo was formed by forty nine percent of Bosniaks, almost thirty percent of Serbs, ten percent of Yugoslavs, 6.6 percent of Croats and 3.6 belonging to other ethnicities.



Bosnian parties, including nationalist (SDS and HDZ) and non-nationalists (former League of Communists and Reformists), SDS was the only major party in the Parliament that rejected the two proposals set by Alija Izetbegovic: firstly, a memorandum of affirmation of Bosnia's sovereignty and secondly, a platform of its possible participation in Yugoslavia if Croatia and Slovenia were also included. This double proposal aimed to display the resilience and independence of Bosnia while, at the same time, exposing those within the republic that were working against it (Glaurdic 2011).

The affirmation of Bosnia's sovereignty was a turning point in both Serbian and Bosnian Serb leadership aspirations. They expected that Bosniaks would eventually succumb to Serb's blackmail and would eventually come to accept the integration of a new Yugoslav state under their control, as detected from intercepts of telephone conversation between Milosevic and Karadzic (Ib.).<sup>60</sup> Fundamentally, it implied activating the creation of parallel institutions at republican level and the timeframe for the Bosnian Serb Assembly was set only a few days later, on 24 October, as the highest representative and legislative body of the Bosnian Serb population (Treanor 2002). The new assembly soon revealed its primary target, at its first meeting in November, it called for a referendum of Bosnian Serbs only, as to whether they wished to stay in a Greater Serbian state integrated by Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem (Begic 1991; cited in Glaurdic 2011).<sup>61</sup> Its foundation was another crucial step in the attempt to consolidate Serbian Autonomous regions into a single polity. On 9 January 1992, the Assembly adopted a declaration on the Proclamation of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, renamed the Republika Srpska in August 1992. It included SAO territories and was declared a part of the remaining Federal Yugoslav state, following the independence of Croatia and Slovenia.

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<sup>60</sup> In previous months, forms of confederation had been explored. Actually, an agreement had been reached in June 1991 amid the process of ethno-territorialisation conducted by Bosnian Serbs. Adil Zulfikarpasic and Muhamed Filipovic, leaders of MBO, a Bosniak liberal founded after having left SDA, negotiated with SDS leadership to reach an agreement on the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the authorisation of the Bosnian government (Ramet 1999). The agreement would maintain the integrity of Bosnia in a confederative association with rump Yugoslavia. It included a special status for the Sandzak region, which would have cultural and administrative autonomy, including self-administration in education, language and culture. Both Milosevic and Izetbegovic accepted the agreement but the later (Alija) finally withdrew. Illustrating the military preparations conducted in Belgrade to create a Greater Serbian state, Milosevic claimed having accepted all demands, and they had prevented a catastrophe when the agreement was reached (Zulfikarpašić 1998).

<sup>61</sup> Both SAO's, i.e. Krajina and Eastern Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srymia were territories of Croatia that were declared by the SDS branch in Croatia in late June 1991, a few months before SAO's were declared in Bosnia.

Prior to the proclamation of a Serb Republic within Bosnia, Bosnian Serb leadership endeavoured to establish control over significant parts of the Bosnian territory. On 19 December 1991, the methodology for the takeover was defined in a document entitled “Instructions for the organization and activity of organs of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina in extraordinary circumstances” (SDS Main Board 1991). SDS leadership instructed municipal boards to establish Serb executive and legislative bodies in most municipalities, through the formation of the “Crisis Staff of the Serb people” and “an assembly of the Serb people.” The Crisis Staff had to assume governmental functions in municipalities during periods of crisis. The composition of staff varied depending on whether Serbs were in the majority in the municipality (Variant A) or not (Variant B). In the first variant, both civilian and military officials, i.e. SDS municipal and Main Board leaders, the Serb police commander, the Serb Territorial Defence commander or the JNA commander of the area formed these bodies. In the second variant, party representatives only integrated the Crisis Staff. Notwithstanding, in both cases the Instruction detailed a second stage in which the Serbian Municipal Assembly had to form a Municipal Executive Board before the mobilisation of police and military units.

The inclusion of Variant B revealed SDS plans to takeover municipalities that were not under the control of SDS but had rejected inclusion into the Community of Municipalities such as Prijedor in the Bosnian Krajina. With the adoption of the Instructions, the primary board of SDS abandoned the voluntary approach to ethno-territorialisation that had previously triggered internal resistance within the party. The adoption of a mandatory approach to the so-called regionalisation produced a further step in the process of ethno-territorialisation; one that also pursued the overcoming of internal resistances. For all that, at the third Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Karadzic and Krajisnik proposal’s, namely, to create parallel municipal institutions wherever Bosnian Serbs lived, i.e. in all municipalities, was objected to by several members. They argued that it could disrupt relations with other nationalist parties and trigger similar actions by Muslims in municipalities where Serbs were in the majority (Donia 2006a).<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> The so-called democratic centralism practiced by ethno-national parties, in which local leaders could debate party policies but were expected to follow their leaders, was illustrated in SDS attempts to overcome internal resistances. As President of the party, Radovan Karadzic coercively used his authority over party members to secure application of leadership decisions. During 1991, Karadzic frequently repeated to SDS local leaders the need to respect party hierarchy and discipline, threatening to fire

This step, as part of the SDS policy of the ethno-territorialisation of Bosnia, was implemented in Sarajevo five days after instructions to municipal boards. SDS leaders from Sarajevo's constituent municipalities formed a crisis staff and the municipal assembly of Ilijas, where Bosnian Serbs who were the main ethnic group, voted to withdraw from the city and join the SAO Romanija (Donia 2006b).<sup>63</sup> A few days later, in early January 1992, SDS municipal leaders created a Serb municipal assembly in Iliđza. In addition, Pale's SDS leaders ensured that their municipality was prepared to become the backup capital for Serb-ruled parts of BiH. Essentially, managed by the Sarajevo Olympic Centar since the Winter Olympics of 1984, Bosnian Serb authorities separated the Ski resort and hotels from their downtown Sarajevo headquarters, thereby creating their own enterprise (Donia 2006a).

Concomitant with the creation of parallel assemblies and the takeover of public companies, Pale municipal police set up checkpoints on roads leading to the municipality. Despite the fact that military activities were more visible in the autumn of 1991, the political manoeuvres of Bosnian Serbs to seize exclusive control over territories regarded as Serbian went hand in hand with military preparations from the beginning of the process of ethno-territorialisation (Cigar 1995; Caplan 1998; Hoare 2004; Donia 2006b). Along with this transformation into a Serb-dominated force, JNA armed Bosnian Serbs with the support of political and military elites in Belgrade who worked in conjunction with General Nikola Uzelac, JNA commander of Banja Luka, from September 1991 to supply arms to Karadzic's paramilitaries (Caplan 1998).

Through the implementation of the RAM plan, Bosnian Serbs were well armed in the summer of 1991 (Ramet 2006).<sup>64</sup> Also, amid political and military escalation, Bosniaks and Croats undertook military preparation well in advance of the declaration of sovereignty passed by the Bosnian Assembly in mid-October 1991 (Hoare 2004). It also transpired that since the autumn of 1990, SDA sponsored the formation of two paramilitary groups; the Green Berets and the Patriotic League. Both groups were

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everyone on municipal boards who did not follow the leadership line (Treanor 2002). Each party formed a main board that became the highest decision-making body in BiH. There was also a city board for Sarajevo and, finally, a municipal board for each of Bosnia's 109 municipalities. Local leaders could actually debate party politics and had real power but their performance should be in line with party leadership decisions (Donia 2006a).

<sup>63</sup> Again, opposition from SDS members to main the board's initiative was obvious from Radomir Bulatovic, president of the municipality Centar, opposing the division of municipalities.

<sup>64</sup> By March 1991, the Serb-controlled JNA had distributed firearms to Serb paramilitaries and SDS (51,000 and 23,000 respectively).

committed to Bosnian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Meanwhile, Bosnian Croats also had parties such as HOS and the Croatian ZNG with the former loyal to the Croatian Party of Right and the latter associated with the Ministry of Interior of Croatia and the HDZ. As displayed, through military preparation and rhetoric, all sides were preparing to resort or respond to violence.<sup>65</sup>

With political and military preparations being conducted simultaneously and in co-ordination, Bosnia was moving toward war in early 1992. Despite the militarisation of all groups, this move was primarily as a result of the Bosnian Serb leadership strategy, directed from Belgrade, which had created the necessary structure and weaponry to wage war (Glaurdic 2011). Military preparations were already apparent in Sarajevo six months before the siege started. The first artillery pieces were placed in the surrounding area of Mt. Trebevic in October 1991 and, the following month, SDS took military control of Jahorina, the ski resort in the Pale municipality. The object of this manoeuvre was to establish the area as the key-control centre of JNA operations while members of Serbian paramilitary militias were already positioning themselves in Romanija (Cigar 1995; Hoare 2004). Other actions involved the replacement of the Muslim commanding officers for the Pale TO with a Serb officer or the transfer of an anti-aircraft battery with 4,000 shells from a warehouse in Zrak (central Sarajevo) to the outskirts of the city, from where Sarajevo would be bombed. The following month, in an article published in the Sarajevo magazine *Slobodna Bosna*, journalists denounced the existence of SDS's detailed plans to besiege and attack Sarajevo and also motions to evacuate Bosnian Serbs from Sarajevo and reallocate them in the surrounding areas that were under their control after the regionalisation campaign (Donia 2006b, p.15).

Western policy favoured this move regarding Yugoslavia (analysed in next section), and the process of the ethno-territorialisation of Bosnia continued its progression in both Sarajevo and Bosnia. Vice President Nikola Koljevic pointed out on the verge of war just how important Sarajevo was for SDS leadership, stressing publicly that the division of the republic in national communities should start in the Bosnian capital (Donia 2006b). Culminating a process that had started in 1990, as seen in the elaboration of the RAM plan, the division of Sarajevo officially became a core political and military goal as soon as war started. In the 16<sup>th</sup> Session held in Banja Luka on 12

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<sup>65</sup> Even Alija Izetbegovic, who in late 1991 still envisioned a federal solution for Yugoslavia along with Macedonian President, Kiro Gligorov, did not discard violence in the Bosnian Assembly a few months earlier when, in February, claimed that he would not sacrifice Bosnian sovereignty for peace (Caplan 1998).

May 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted the “Strategic Objectives of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina” announced by Radovan Karadzic (Case No. IT-05-88-T, 2009). The division of the city into so-called Serb and Bosnian Muslim districts, with the establishment of effective State authorities in both, was the fifth out of the six objectives previously defined. Karadzic underlined the importance of the city in the outcome of war while explaining the fifth objective to the Assembly:

Sarajevo is strategically in fifth place, but the battle in Sarajevo and for Sarajevo, seen strategically and tactically, is of decisive importance.... Alija Izetbegovic does not have a state as long as we have a part of Sarajevo... because the fighting around Sarajevo is decisive [to] the destiny of BiH, and we suspected and said so before that if there was a war it would start in Sarajevo and end in Sarajevo (Donia 2006b, p.24).

In line with political goals, defined since the foundation of SDS, the agenda of the Bosnian Serb leadership to divide the city ethnically was not exclusive for the capital of BiH. All Strategic Objectives highlighted the project of the SDS leadership which was to create an exclusive and ethnically cleansed Bosnian Serb polity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, the first goal defined the separation of the Bosnian Serb population from the two other important Bosnian ethnic communities through the creation of a State border in BiH (ICTY 2010).<sup>66</sup> It soon transpired that these were not simply political objectives to be achieved peacefully. General Ratko Mladic was present at this session and spoke of the need to work on both military and political levels in order to achieve these Strategic Objectives.

Coinciding with his participation, the content of his speech and the warlike environment in which these objectives were approved at the beginning of war revealed their military nature. Such nature was subsequently confirmed by the immediate dissemination of the objectives to military leaders and army members, and their implementation on the ground. There were further evidential issues in the following months, as General Milovanovic stressed that the Six Strategic Objectives were a doctrine rather than a strategic-level document, defining each of the six items as strategic tasks for the VRS, which became the main tool for the expansion and homogenisation of the Bosnian Serb territory in BiH. This idea was soon to be shaped

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<sup>66</sup> Along with the ethnic division of Sarajevo and the separation of the Bosnian Serb population from the two other important Bosnian ethnic communities, other Strategic Objectives included the construction of a corridor between Semberija and Krajina; secondly, establishing a corridor in the Drina River valley effectively eliminating the Drina River as a border separating RS and Serbia; thirdly, setting a border on the Una and Neretva Rivers; and, fourthly, ensuring access to the sea for RS.

with the formation of the Union of Communities. Thus, in its 17<sup>th</sup> Assembly Session which took place in Jahorina between 24 and 26 July 1992, Radovan Karadzic claimed that they had achieved their war goals thanks to JNA and TO, as the VRS had conquered about seventy percent of the Bosnian territory within the first months of the war.<sup>67</sup>

The Western policy towards Yugoslavia: paving the way for the violent ethnic division of Bosnia

It can be seen that international diplomatic intervention formally commenced in mid-1991 when Croatia and Slovenia proceeded unilaterally with their plans to establish independent states by the end of June. Having achieved a three-month moratorium on the independence (the Brioni Declaration), the international community substantially became involved in September when the EC Conference on the former Yugoslavia (ECCY), chaired by Lord Carrington, was established. Western diplomatic intervention during the disintegration, however, cannot be featured as a reactive performance to the declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia but rather followed a policy that in practice favoured Serbian aspirations.

Military preparation in Bosnia, especially intense since the autumn of 1991, did not come as any great surprise to the international community as evidence of the Yugoslav crisis and preannouncements of a path towards violent conflict in the Republic were numerous and already in circulation. As early as mid-January 1991, when already the JNA had become an institution under Milosevic's control, the president of Serbia in a lunch meeting with Western ambassadors announced Serbia's plans to carve out a new state un-restricted to the territory of the Republic of Serbia if Yugoslavia was allowed to break up. In line with the RAM strategy, Milosevic stated that he was ready to let Slovenia go and that Macedonia was still under discussion. Furthermore, it was absolutely clear that Serb-inhabited parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia were to be included in the new state:

His warning to the ambassadors was explicit and clearly implied the use of the army: "If this is not attainable peacefully, one forces Serbia to use the tools of power which we possess but they [the other republics] do not" (Both 2000, p.74).

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<sup>67</sup> For further evidences of the military nature of these objectives, see pages 8-11 in Case No. IT-05-88-T (ICTY 2009).

Despite the context of escalation, an initial response was disapproval of the use of force and the attempts to violently alter the internal border. This response was conducted by the US Ambassador, Warren Zimmerman. However, the Western approach to Yugoslavia did not change substantially during 1991. As argued by Josip Glaurdić (2011) in his well researched account of Western policy towards Yugoslavia, prior and during the dissolution, no individual with any influence on Western foreign policy wished to see Yugoslavia disintegrate and subsequently gave very little or no support to the federation periphery, i.e. Croatia and Slovenia, backing the central government in Belgrade. More importantly, Western foreign policy not only continued to signal their support for Yugoslavia's centre over its periphery well into the war but even continuously tended to satisfy the strong, i.e. Slobodan Milosevic, and push the weak during the succession of early peace negotiations.<sup>68</sup> As Glaurdic suggests, the motivation of Western policy makers, mostly from Britain, France and the US, was simple and influenced by the end of the Cold War:

It was the pursuit of stability in the face of a great upheaval which had engulfed the whole continent. At a time when the Soviet bloc and the Soviet state were crumbling, the fear of greater turmoil overrode the distaste for the lack of Belgrade's democratic credentials. Yugoslavia was simply not to become an example for the Soviet Union because the dissolution of the Soviet state was seen as a dangerous development with potentially nuclear consequences. Such thinking, however, had one crucial error. It mistook the political and military apparatus controlled by Slobodan Milosevic for a willing and able protector of Yugoslavia's unity, when the motivation of the Serbian leader was in fact dramatically different: it was the creation of an enlarged Serbian state on the ruins of the Yugoslav federation (Glaurdic 2011, p.7).

Importantly, Western policy heavily undermined the prospect of a non-violent resolution of the crisis in Bosnia in a context of ongoing war in Croatia. As seen in negotiations on whether to deploy UN peacemaking troops, the weaker side was ignored to the detriment of Milosevic, leaving in practice an easy path in attempts to ethnically divide Bosnia by violent means. Indeed, despite the evidence of Serbian military preparations to commence armed action in Bosnia, the proposal and requests from the Bosnian government to the United Nations for a peacekeeping contingent were ignored.

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<sup>68</sup> Western consensus on the need to preserve Yugoslavia ended with the commencement of hostilities as Germany began to support the cessation of Croatia and Slovenia. Furthermore, it implied the beginning of disagreements in the military and diplomatic field among the principal players over virtually every aspect of Western's policy (Ib.).

On 12 November 1991, Izetbegovic called for the immediate deployment of UN peacekeeping forces to prevent impending violence and, on 20 November 1991, the Bosnian government presented Cyrus Vance's assistant with a plan that envisaged the deployment of 2,000 UN peacekeeping troops (Caplan 2005b).

Amid the increasing insecurity, there were calls from the Bosnian Serb leader to create a Bosnian Serb republic from Bosnia by mid-January 1992 if any member of the European Community dared to recognize it as a state. Meanwhile, on 23 December, Izetbegovic, President of BiH, formally but unsuccessfully appealed to the UN Security Council to deploy prior mid-January peacekeeping forces throughout the Yugoslav republic and along the boundary with Croatia and Serbia, in order to reduce the risk of a serious outbreak of violence and secure peace (Kinzer 1991; Sudetic 1991). In point of fact, intense military preparation, throughout summer and autumn of 1991 with regard to the security situation in BiH had significantly deteriorated due to the war in Croatia. JNA used BiH territory for launching attacks and some border towns became the targets of Croatian artillery. Furthermore, there was the arrival of thousands of undisciplined JNA reservists from other republics, often provoking residents by waving Serbian flags and shouting Serbian nationalist slogans (Maksic 2017). The first death which was attributed to ethnic motivated occurred in Sipovo when a Bosniak was killed by a uniformed member of the Bosnian Serb police (of the SAO Bosnian Krajina). The town was surrounded and fired upon and this triggered the displacement of about 3,000 Bosniaks to Jajce (Cigar 1995).

In that context, Slovenien Prime Minister, Lojze Peterle, sought to persuade the West to push the UN to send a mission to Bosnian in order to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. Finally, he was informed that a peacekeeping mission could not be sent to an area which was still in peace (Ramet 1999). Boutros-Ghali noted in his report to the Security Council on 5 January that UN peacekeeping arrangements in the region already anticipated the deployment of UN military observers to BiH and that 'for the time being' no modification of the UN's original concept was planned. This concept, however, only envisaged the deployment of UN military observers to BiH after the demilitarisation of the UN Protected Areas in Croatia, which in early January 1992 were not deployed yet (Caplan 2005b). The only Western response to military preparations in Bosnia was the general arms embargo imposed by the UN in September 1991, under Resolution 713 of the Security Council, in response to the continuation of war in Croatia (Ramet 1999).



Equally important, the refusal to deploy a small contingent of UN peacekeeping forces was a missed opportunity to prevent the outbreak of what would become a brutal war. The main reasons for the UN refusal included both general unwillingness and the cynicism of high-ranking UN officials to expand their involvement in Yugoslavia as well as misjudgement of Cyrus Vance who was the main negotiator.<sup>69</sup> Vance did not place any pressure on Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leadership to change their minds and deployment UN troops in Bosnia as he did not want to antagonise Milosevic regarding the deployment of UN troops in Croatia. Mistakenly, he considered that Milosevic needed Vance to work on getting Krajina peacekeeping operation 'off the ground' instead of the opposite (Glaurdic 2011).<sup>70</sup> Consequentially, this approach to satisfy the most powerful, i.e. the Serbian block, was also seen in proposals that took place in February and March of 1992, for the reorganisation of Bosnia in order to prevent the outbreak of war. In this sense, proposals from Cutileiro and Carrington encouraged the political ethnic division of Bosnia and made clear concessions to SDS in detriment to positions within the Bosnian Presidency. The essence of West's approach to Bosnia-Herzegovina was captured a few months later in exchanges between Carrington and Izetbegovic in May 1992 (Ib.). Basically, Lord Carrington and his assistant attempted to persuade President Izetbegovic to capitulate and accept considering the military superiority of the VRS. Rather than trying to dissuade Serbs from using force, the two European negotiators used the military capacity of Serbs to pressure President Izetbegovic into accepting unfavourable deals as seen in the negotiations that took place prior to the outbreak of war:

The president's resistance to Cutileiro's pressure, however, was not a real political option. The Portuguese diplomat suggested that the acceptance of the draft was a precondition for the EC recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence. And Carrington told Izetbegovic they had no chance against the military might of the Serbs. As Carrington later explained: "I thought that it was very much in President Izetbegovic's interest to settle on the basis of the Cutileiro plan because it was clear to me that the overwhelming military superiority at that time at any rate was with the Serbs, and they were obviously being helped.... I mean President Milosevic may have denied it, but they were obviously being helped in a big way" (Glaurdic 2011, p.294).

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<sup>69</sup> A high ranking UN official, Shashi Tharoor, claimed, when explaining why Bosnia could not have UN troops that it was firstly it was necessary that war happened and, furthermore, that it would be to their detriment to attract the attention of the international community before a cease-fire and deployment of troops took place.

<sup>70</sup> The cease fire signed on 2 January in Sarajevo, allowed the adoption of the Vance Plan that included the deployment of UN troops in Croatia.

## **The siege of Sarajevo**

In hindsight, western policy in favour of Milosevic and an unwillingness to instigate military action to prevent an outbreak of war on that eve, allowed the Serb leadership on both sides of the Drina River to try and forcefully culminate a policy to create a Greater Serbia in Bosnia, following the international recognisance of Bosnia's by EC countries on 6 April. Active military preparations to besiege Sarajevo had started in the autumn of 1991 and negotiations between various SDS leaders argued that the city could be blocked at any time (Donia 2006b). Yet, initial actions to block the city did not take place until 1 March 1992, at the end of the two days of voting for the referendum for Bosnian independence. Following a recommendation by the EC in early 1992, to determine whether or not independence had majority support among the Bosnian population, the Bosnian Assembly approved the holding of the referendum despite the objection of SDS delegates. Bosnian Serb leadership called for the referendum to be boycotted and, in response, set up barricades which were patrolled by masked and armed men who blocked all roads leading to the city; their alleged purpose was to secure JNA's stay in Bosnia (Donia 2006a).<sup>71</sup>

Further violent incidents occurred, for example, the shooting dead off our people (allegedly by Serbs angered by the referendum) and the subsequent killing of one Serb who was attending a wedding in Sarajevo's old Serbian Orthodox church (Heritage 1992). Meanwhile, the SDS claimed in their public statement that the location of the barricades was for self-defence after the shooting. On 2 March, the crisis escalated as SDA members and supporters erected their own barricades in strategic locations. In turn, citizens responded to the latest crisis as they rallied to demand an end to the obstructions. In further efforts, General Kukanjac summoned SDA, SDS and HDZ leaders to the Presidency building (Donia 2006a). Despite the war in Croatia and the escalation of tensions in Bosnia, (seen with the barricades in the city), few people actually believed that conflict would occur in Sarajevo. The long tradition of coexistence in Sarajevo, strengthened during Socialist Yugoslavia, along with the

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<sup>71</sup> Through the regionalisation campaign and the self-proclamation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian Serbs controlled about sixty percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory at that time and warned that they were ready to defend it with arms (Sudetic 1992).

absence of any ethnic enclave in the urban central areas were powerful elements in the public perception that war was not possible in the city.<sup>72</sup>

On 5 April, in response to the military escalation, thousands of people demonstrated in Sarajevo calling for peace and defending the right of coexistence between ethnic groups. The demonstration proceeded to the Marijin Dvor area, where the main institutions were concentrated, and people gathered in front of the Parliament before moving towards the Holiday Inn, where the SDS leadership was gathered. Armed people patrolling the rooftops of the hotel shot at antinationalist demonstrators on the streets of Sarajevo where a 'peaceful' demonstration was taken place, however, this event claimed the first two victims of the lingering siege. Once again, SDS placed barricades encircling the city and, unlike the previous occasion, these were not removed as the Bosnian Serb political leadership and JNA commanders were unwilling to end the crisis peacefully.

Violence started just before the international community recognised the independence of BiH. Indeed, Bosnia was the only case in Yugoslavia with any correlation between recognition and intensification of hostilities, even though the EC's recognition of new states is often considered a central factor in the aggravation of conflict in Yugoslavia. Essentially, EC recognition was a pretext for Bosnian Serbs to accelerate a process already put in motion, rather than a cause (Caplan 1998). While the SDS brutality in Sarajevo surprised many Sarajevans, this was an additional step in the commencement of military escalation as Bosnian Serbs along with nationalists from Serbia took control of Bijeljina and expelled the Bosniak population on 1 April. Thus, the beginning of the siege of Sarajevo followed a larger scale operation in eastern and southern Bosnia by JNA and paramilitary units from Serbia, for example, Arkan's Tigers and Seselj's Eagles, to capture territories and expel citizens from other nationalities.

JNA's performance was deemed crucial for Pale-Belgrade to coordinate efforts to capture and create purely ethnical territories. Under Serbian rule following the Slovenian and Croat desertions, it was actually the military force who deployed the

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<sup>72</sup> As expressed eloquently by Kemal Kurspahic, the fundamental conditions necessary for a war to break out among Sarajevans did not exist and, if it happened, it would certainly be a dramatic conflict: "look at any of the Sarajevo residential areas, streets, apartment buildings (...) in every one of them there are Muslims, Serbs, Croats and Jews living together. You cannot shoot at "the other" there without shooting at your own people!" (Kurspahic 1997, p.115).

main effort to divide the city of Sarajevo.<sup>73</sup> In early May, General Kukanjac ordered a general attack on Sarajevo in order to capture the Presidency Building and bisect the capital of BiH. While the objective of the military was to divide the city, part of the plan was aimed at forcing the Bosnian government to capitulate (Hoare 2004). JNA's attack included other actions such as the bombardment of the TV relay station at Hum as well as the central post-office and the telephone exchange. Despite approaches made to the Presidency, the JNA attack to divide Sarajevo failed primarily due to the imbalance between besieging forces and the defensive force of the Bosnian Government in and around Sarajevo. The offensive, however, allowed Serb nationalists to gain control of some areas of the city. This was especially significant for the neighbourhood of Grbavica which was located in the centre of Sarajevo.<sup>74</sup>

A second failed attempt to divide the city was conducted by JNA on 16 May which aimed at cutting the city along the Pofalici-Vraca line. Effectively, an attack on Pofalici was launched in order to capture Hum Hill from Vogosca and connect it with the central Marshal Tito Barracks in the Marijin Dvor area, thereby cutting the city along the site of Pofalici and Velešići (next to Army barracks). The military attempts conducted by JNA to bisect the city, sought to force the Bosnian government to capitulate. The first and only significant attempt conducted by VRS to divide the city took place in early June. It was successfully impeded on 8 June by the Bosnian defence of Zuc Hill which resulted in the liberation of Orlic, the highest peak in the northern hills of the city (Hoare 2004).

The inability to conquer Sarajevo and the incapacity to break the siege by the Armija, ensured that the frontline besieging the city, subsequently stabilised. An important element in understanding such stabilisation was the incapacity of the VRS to capture the city, as a result of an insufficient number of troops. Despite superior armoury, due to the transfer of weapons from JNA, Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the

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<sup>73</sup> The Yugoslav Army was in charge during the early stages of the siege until 12 May, when it withdrew from Bosnia. At the time Bosnian Serb soldiers and weaponry were transferred for the formation of the *Vojske Republike Srpske* (VRS; Army of Serb Republic). After the recognition of BiH as an independent state by the European Economic Community and the US on 7 April, Serbia decided to withdraw JNA to ensure that the international community did not consider military activity aggressive. VRS resulted in an army of 80,000 soldiers fully trained and equipped; the remaining budget was covered by Yugoslavia (Silber 1996). In the transition from the JNA to the VRS, most units simply changed their names, retaining weaponry, personnel and commanders. For instance, the Sarajevo-based JNA Fourth Cops became the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the VRS (Donia 2006a).

<sup>74</sup> Military action was followed the same day by the kidnapping of Alija Izetbegovic, Bosnian President, at Sarajevo airport when he returned from peace negotiations in Lisbon.

VRS (in charge of maintaining the siege of Sarajevo) numbered less than 29,000 troops during the year 1992. According to Jovan Divjak, Deputy Commander of the ARBiH's Main Staff until 1994, it was insufficient to conquer a city of about half a million population and more than 35,000 defending troops (Divjak 2001). After unsuccessful attempts to divide Sarajevo, the front lines encircling the city registered few changes during the rest of the lingering siege (Figure 4).

Despite being one of the six Strategic Objectives, statements from SDS leaders during 1992 demonstrated the absence of a defined vision as to where the division of Sarajevo should take place. Biljana Plavsic, SDS Member of the Presidency of Bosnian Serb Republic of BiH, along with Radon Karadzic and Nikola Koljevic, claimed that Bosnians Serbs pursued the seizing of "everything west of the Holiday Inn." That objective would give the Serbs, who accounted for thirty one percent of the city's population before the war, more than half of the city (Burns 1992). In general, leaving Bascarsija and Stari Grad to the Bosniaks was the core element of the plan to divide the city (Donia 2006a). After the huge urban expansion conducted during Socialist regimes, this comprised a very small area, one which constrained the slopes surrounding a narrow Miljacka River plain.<sup>75</sup>

War was not about keeping exclusive control of a territory but also about the homogenisation of areas seized by force and also eliminating traces of coexistence. Two of the Strategic Objectives adopted by the Bosnian Serb Assembly in May 1992 were conducted in the area of Sarajevo, i.e. the movement to separate Serb people from the two other ethnic communities and the division of Sarajevo between Bosniaks and Serbs. The towns of Ilijas, Vogosca and Ilidza, as well as the central neighbourhood of Grbavica, were among those sectors that fell under Serb control in April and May 1992. In these particular areas of Sarajevo, the take-over was followed by abuses from ethnic individuals comprised of other ethnicities. Local Bosnian Serbs and Serbian paramilitary units such as Seselj's men routinely detained non-Serbs or put them under house arrest (264/59380 BIS, p.279). Furthermore, they were often beaten, tortured, raped, forced to labour at the front line or killed. Non-Serb property and cultural monuments were also systematically targeted and destroyed.

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<sup>75</sup> Although no other serious attempts to divide Sarajevo took place afterwards, a divisional line was decided upon in 1993 based on the situation on the ground. Karadzic traced it along the Miljacka River (Research interview, 13 December 2013), with the purpose of consolidating the capture of areas under control of VRS such as the central neighbourhood of Grbavica.




Figure 4. Besieged Sarajevo during the war. Source: author.

It can be seen, therefore, that the conduct of the Bosnian Serb leadership in the area of Sarajevo was part of all overall project to expel other ethnic groups from sectors under their control from the beginning of war in order to secure ethnically homogeneous territories. In Pale, where the SDS leadership set its field of operations and maintained a comfortable absolute majority in local institutions, ethnic cleansing of the non-Serb population took place during the early stages of war highlighting their determination to carve out ethnically pure territories. Bosnian Muslims were fired from the police and administration at the beginning of war and a few weeks later, in May 1992, from all state-owned companies (Vuksanovic 2004). Equally, Bosnian Serb authorities forbade Bosnian Muslims from public spaces and advised them to leave Pale. Meanwhile, an exchange of houses between, for example, Pale and Stari Grad, took place between the Bosnian Serb and Bosniak population. In late June, 400 Serb families from Zenica moved into Pale to fill spaces left by Bosniaks departing for Sarajevo. As in other areas of Bosnia, the Bosniak population often signed documents prior to expulsion saying that they relinquished all claims to their properties. This signature was then used to provide a legal cover for their dispossession while preventing any subsequent return

(“Thousands more Muslim face eviction”, 1992). The threat of mass expulsion in Pale materialised between June and July 1992, when authorities began to bus Bosnian Muslims to Sarajevo. Bosnian Serb authorities finally decided that all Muslims had to leave Pale and the surrounding villages by 5 July (Vuksanovic 2004).

### Deprivation, physical destruction and displacement

The failure to divide the central areas of the city of Sarajevo, due to the limited infantry of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, effected a change in the Bosnian Serb strategy. Bosnian Serb political and military leadership put offensives to bisect Sarajevo on hold and developed a strategy to weaken the city through the maintenance of a siege and persistent shelling from the surrounding hillsides. According to estimates from UNPROFOR and city officials, daily shelling of the city ranged from 200 to 300 impacts on a quiet day to between 800 and 1,000 shell impacts on other days. Until the ceasefire of February 1994, the range of daily shelling activity varied from two impacts on 17 and 18 May 1993 to a high of 3,777 impacts on 22 July 1993 (UN 1994a). The use of constant shelling by VRS had several objectives. Crucially, shelling was linked to political events, with heavy shelling occurring, for instance, on numerous occasions before or during peace conferences. Furthermore, it aimed to progressively destroy strategic areas and buildings, such as institutions, commerce, hospitals and telecommunications.<sup>76</sup> Throughout the course of the siege, the VRS regularly targeted public utilities as well as cultural and religious structures. Coinciding with the disturbance of daily life through the destruction of resources such as electricity, gas, water or food, shelling also aimed to terrorise the civilian population through a random pattern i.e. shelling occurring at different times and without any apparent pattern or specific target in the civilian areas of the city. As a consequence, the built environment of Sarajevo suffered widespread affectation during the siege.

Indeed, the built environment with the greatest value was a target of VRS in an attempt to destroy symbolic heritage either from specific ethnic groups or from the heterogeneous Bosnian culture, which evoked long-standing coexistence.<sup>77</sup> This was

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<sup>76</sup> Some examples were the Bosnian Parliament, the twin UNIS Towers, the Hotel Europe, the Kosevo Hospital, the Sarajevo Radio and Television Stations, the Oslobodenje Newspaper Building or the public transportation system.

<sup>77</sup> This practice was especially illustrative in areas where no combat took place. Such examples included Banja Luka, where all mosques in the city (sixteen) were destroyed between April and

part of the ethno-nationalist programme aimed at eradicating difference, eroding traces of centuries of pluralism and tolerance in Bosnia, just to create and naturalize the idea of separate, antagonistic and sovereign territorial entities (Cowans 2003). The most representative episode of this policy, of targeting urban fabric, occurred in August 1992 when the VRS destroyed Vjecnica, the National Library built during Austro-Hungarian rule in a neo-Moorish architectonic style. The library was bombarded for three days with incendiary grenades whereby the Bosnian Serb military reduced Vjecnica to ruins along with most of its irreplaceable contents. Ninety per cent of its rich library collection went up in flames in what is widely considered the largest single act of book burning in modern history (Riedlmayer 1995).<sup>78</sup>

Shortly after the commencement of the siege, Sarajevans also experienced significant deprivation, occasioned by the scarcity and irregular availability of life-sustaining basics. Life in the city was unbearable by human standards due to shortcomings in food, electricity, heating, running water or lack of places to escape both shelling and sniping, undeniably, this effect of all this could either kill people or drive them to the edge of madness (Kurspahic 1997, p.168). Sarajevans survived by seeking to preserve a sense of normality, coining the expression “imitation of life” to refer to the abnormal life that had been imposed upon them during the siege but which had paradoxically become normal (Maček 2009). Notwithstanding, such resistance inevitably created physical and psychological consequences among the population, which would remain long after the siege, or appear once the daily struggle for survival dissipated as expressed by Boban Minic, former Radio Sarajevo journalist:

La lucha por la supervivencia y el peligro en que vivimos sin pausa nos disparó la adrenalina y las autodefensas, de modo que nos concentramos absolutamente en la pura supervivencia, y en evitar la muerte violenta y salvar a nuestros seres queridos. Las pérdidas materiales y sentimentales las encajamos como algo inevitable sin cuestionar su valor. Pero cuando el peligro por fin cejó, la tensión y la adrenalina bajaron y empezaron a salir a la superficie todos los dolores y las enfermedades acumulados y contenidos. Los guerreros ya no tenían fuerza ni para defenderse a sí mismos. Los primeros meses después de la rutina de la guerra, murieron decenas de ciudadanos de todas las edades de un sinfín de enfermedades. También hubo días que contábamos hasta media docena de suicidios en Sarajevo. La guerra se cobraba así su precio, con intereses y demora (Minić 2012, p.134-5).

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September 1993, and Bijeljina, where Bosnian Serbs blew up six mosques in one night in March 1993 (Riedlmayer 2002).

<sup>78</sup> The National Library had 1.5 million volumes, among which 155,000 were rare books and manuscripts.



The siege produced a massive transformation in the ethnic and cultural composition of the city. During the first days of the conflict there was an initial exodus of Sarajevo Serbs, who argued that the transformation of the social environment essentially occurred due to the nationalist victory in 1990 elections but also amid rising concerns with regard to security (Armakolas 2007).<sup>79</sup> Moreover, the departure of Sarajevans continued during the siege with convoys organised for those who had needs or required safe havens. Prior to and during the first few weeks of the cease fire, agreed before the Dayton negotiations took place in November 1995, the second largest mass displacement took place with an estimation of 25,000 Sarajevans leaving the besieged city (Pomfret 1995b). Undoubtedly, this departure further contributed to the social and cultural transformation of the city of Sarajevo with more intellectuals and skilled people abandoning the city looking for better opportunities, and leaving behind an increasingly uncomfortable political and social environment.<sup>80</sup> By the end of the war, about 130,000 Serbs had left the city while around 60,000 Bosniaks had arrived from areas where they had been expelled (Helsinki Committee 1999).<sup>81</sup> Ironically, by expelling the population from rural areas, who were generally more conservative and less secular, Bosnian Serbs in cities such as Sarajevo, where people took refuge, were significantly reshaped socially, ethnically and culturally. Such a transformation of Sarajevo occurring since the beginning of the war was expressed by Zdravko Grebo, a prominent Sarajevo intellectual, who captured despair and even desertion among Sarajevans:

We lost the war for a multicultural open society, and therefore many people have given up and left. That “multithing” is a special quality. But everyday our number decreases... there are still many people who share our view, but we would be lying if we insisted that we are in the majority (Grebo, see Judah 2000, p.218).

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<sup>79</sup> During interviews with Sarajevo Serbs living in Pale in 1999, Armakolas found the issue of security a central factor in the decision to leave. The perception of insecurity was further increased by rumours of plans devised against Serbs, which were often spread by local SDS activists.

<sup>80</sup> According to official statistics, Sarajevo saw a reduction of engineers and other highly skilled technical professionals from 1,991 members before war to 733 in autumn 1995. Similarly, in the Academy of Arts and Sciences of Bosnia-Herzegovina two thirds of its forty eight members in the city had left in October 1995 (Pomfret 1995b).

<sup>81</sup> The departure of Serbs continued in the early post-war stages. As will be analysed in the next chapter, there was a mass departure of people from the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo before these were reintegrated into the city.

The international response to the siege

An international response to the siege was adopted quickly and contained in Resolution 757 of 20 May 1992, the UN set in motion an operation to deliver humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo (UN 1992a). The resolution defined a specific security zone which encompassed Sarajevo and its airport. All parties reached an agreement on 5 June regarding Sarajevo airport in order to create a secure environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance within the city. Several measures to demilitarise the airport were agreed upon as well as the creation of a corridor under UNPROFOR's control between the airport and the city to allow delivery of humanitarian aid (UN 1992b). The UN operation sought to guarantee certain conditions for delivery of aid to civilians (concessions to Bosnian Serbs). In this sense, the UN had to negotiate the content and size of every aid delivery to Sarajevo. Ironically, by permitting Bosnian Serbs to determine the quantities of any delivery to Sarajevo, more or less made the UN an unintentional accomplice of their policy to besiege the city (Holbrooke 1998).

The UN operation was the most important component of the early international response to the Bosnian War. Such soft initiatives to intervene in the Sarajevo siege concerned both Washington and European capitals, with France equally keen on sourcing alternatives to military intervention. Despite its portrayal as an international success, the UN airlift had immediate political consequences, the most important being the reduction of the prospect of Western military intervention (Andreas 2008). Actually, the insistence on a cease-fire and withdrawal of heavy weapons around the city ceased temporary despite becoming operational. The approval of the airlift had further consequences during the period that would become three-and-a-half years of siege. The airport agreement was a crucial turning point in the transformation of the perception of the Bosnian conflict, from a war of aggression into a complex humanitarian emergency, institutionalising the siege of Sarajevo and making it politically acceptable:

Thus, the airlift made the siege locally manageable and therefore internationally palatable. Making the siege manageable also meant that it would be economically rewarding for those who controlled access to the city, with the UN literally buying access to the city (Andreas 2008, p.37).

Sarajevo was declared a Safe Area on 6 May 1993 in the Resolution No. 824 approved by the Security Council (UN 1993b).<sup>82</sup> Safe areas were conceived as temporary measures, to reverse the use of force, by allowing those displaced to return to their homes in peace, with “the prompt implementation of the provisions of the Vance-Owen Plan in areas where those have been agreed by the parties directly concerned.” The Resolution called for the immediate cessation of armed attacks and any other hostile acts against these safe areas, which were declared free from conflict. The inclusion of Sarajevo also responded to the need of preserving its character and symbolism:

Aware in this context of the unique character of the city of Sarajevo, as a multicultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-religious centre which exemplifies the viability of coexistence and interrelations between all the communities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and of the need to preserve it and avoid its further destruction (UN 1993a).

The Security Council’s resolution provided for the placement of the UN forces in safe areas but with a limited mandate to self-defence and not protection of the areas themselves. Bosnia’s government criticized the plan as a betrayal of the Serbs and a prescription for the creation of uninhabitable “reservations” for poorly armed Muslims forced to leave their homes by Serbian gunmen (Sudetic 1993).<sup>83</sup> UNPROFOR had its mandate extended the following month to ensure the protection of safe areas. In addition to their role defined in September 1992, to participate in the delivery of humanitarian aid, UNPROFOR could then deter attacks, monitor the cease-fire, and promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Bosnian Army (UN 1993b).

International military intervention in Sarajevo was restricted to the protection of humanitarian assistance, with UNPROFOR performing a questionable equidistant role.<sup>84</sup> Furthermore, the UN developed humanitarian assistance very narrowly, with many basic issues excluded from the qualification of humanitarian aid, such as mail or even uniforms to the Sarajevo Fire department. Furthermore, during the course of the siege, UNPROFOR concessions increased the vulnerability of Sarajevans. This included

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<sup>82</sup> This decision succeeded the 819 regarding Srebrenica and included other vulnerable cities such as Žepa, Goražde, Tuzla and Bihac. In cases such as Goražde, Žepa and Srebrenica, people who had survived episodes of ethnic cleansing in eastern Bosnia fled into these three enclaves where the ARBiH had resisted. In Srebrenica, for instance, the population swelled from 9,000 to 42,000 (Hartmann and Vulliamy 2015).

<sup>83</sup> Off the record, Bosnian officials recognised that the Government could only provide safe areas while the UN arms embargo was in place.

<sup>84</sup> UNPROFOR’s role in Sarajevo was expanded before and after the extension of the mandate.

the removal in late 1993 of cargo containers close to the Bosnian Assembly building which ultimately protected the so-called Sniper Alley, i.e. the main boulevard of the city named Zmaja od Bosne and Bulevar Mese Selimovic, from sniper activity. While they sought to build confidence with Bosnian Serbs, UNPROFOR actually opened a gap where many individuals were killed or wounded (Donia 2006a).

To understand international passivity, the existing transatlantic division prevented a more assertive military intervention as allies were unable to agree among themselves on the intervention in Bosnia. Unlike previous consensus on preventing the disintegration of Bosnia, NATO alliance remained divided on many crucial issues once the war began, highlighting different attitudes towards the use of force as well as distinct geopolitical interests and responsibilities, becoming effectively an acquiescence of the siege of Sarajevo and ethnic cleansing throughout Bosnia (Allin 2002). Importantly, the Western powers had developed a division of labour in which the European powers led a search for a solution and America played a supporting role. Since the beginning of wars in Yugoslavia, secession was reproduced in the European deployment of troops to Bosnia with the non-aggressive mandate (Gow 1997; Simms 2001). Yet, American officials refused to send troops all the while criticising European passivity, which resulted in a failed policy of treating the Bosnian war as a humanitarian crisis and not as a regional strategic challenge to the future expansion of both NATO and the European Union (Tuathail 1999).<sup>85</sup> Such transatlantic division and the refusal of the Western alliance and the UN to confront Bosnian Serbs led to a series of military and political disasters for the Bosnian government and also led to a loss of credibility amongst the population, especially within those who had suffered the most. As expressed by Sarajevo's Mayor, Tarik Kupusovic:

People in Bosnia feel betrayed by the Western international community. All the promises that have been made by the West, after all, have never been fulfilled. People are beginning to look at Europe, and themselves, differently (Hegdes 1995).

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<sup>85</sup> The US had left the solving of the Yugoslav crisis with the Europeans, in order to discover if they had the capabilities to actually solve it. The Bush administration, at that time, was involved in a serious rift with some West Europeans, i.e. France, and they argued that Europe needed a separate and independent security identity beyond NATO in the post-Cold War context (Glaurdic 2011).

### SDA performance

Thousands of Sarajevo Serbs remained in the city during the siege and many of them explicitly rejected the SDS policy of ethnic separation, also becoming victims of the Bosnian Serb leadership policy to destroy urban centres. Their stay, after years of ethnic polarisation, perfectly embodied Bosnia's and Sarajevo's intrinsic tradition of mutual respect and coexistence and it clearly had a special meaning as citizens confronted and clearly undermined the ethnically exclusive SDS project, essentially, Radovan Karadzic was counting on their departure from the city (Pejanovic 2004). Yet, at the beginning of war and in a context in which every Serb could be seen as a potential traitor, Sarajevo civilian and military police conducted inspections of Serb homes looking for weapons and jailing those who routinely possessed one, regardless of the conjecture. Furthermore, local commanders of ARBiH, some of them with criminal backgrounds, performed independently, conducting lawless abuses on individuals, especially against Sarajevo Serbs. This resulted in the harassment and killing of many Sarajevo Serbs who remained within besieged Sarajevo. It did, however, increase motives for leaving the city during or after the siege. These episodes of persecution became an especially sensitive issue considering the defence of a multi-ethnic country (from the Bosnian Government in Sarajevo). For all that, there is no evidence that the persecution and killing of Sarajevo Serbs was a product of a systematic policy to persecute them on the part of political and military leadership. In fact, leaders actually conducted activities to try to prevent it (Hoare 2004).

In line with a programme that recognised and defended Bosnia's intrinsic ethnic diversity, and contrary to SDS, the leadership did not envisage any ethnic division of Sarajevo prior to the war. Notwithstanding, once the war advanced and inevitably became more violent, party leadership adopted both a progressive stance and policy that directly or indirectly implied a loss of ethnic diversity or, at the very least, that Sarajevo would ultimately become an ethno-polity ruled solely by one ethnicity. Bosniaks in favour of accepting the division of Bosnia along ethnic lines were particularly visible as the war progressed and further atrocities deteriorated the situation in the country, as both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnia Croats fought for its partition. Furthermore, serious doubts emerged as to the survival of the Bosnian state. In October 1992, after HDZ declared Herceg-Bosna the second para-state in Bosnia (along with the Republika Srpska), a war between ARBiH and the HVO took place lasting until February 1994.

Meanwhile, the declaration of Herceg-Bosna culminated with the creation of ethnical regions by Bosnian Croats, (previously begun in early October 1991) and after the formation of SAO's.<sup>86</sup> These communities were the basis of dispute when Croat-Bosniak relations deteriorated after the outbreak of war. This conflict was the toughest episode in the Bosnian war "for it carried the threat of wholesale violence and the mutual destruction of all major nations" (Pejanovic 2004). Although illustrating the contribution of the international policy that favoured the violent ethnic partition of Bosnia, HDZ leadership decided to start military actions shortly after the Vance-Owen Peace Plan as the ethnic division of Bosnian was not agreed by all sides.<sup>87</sup> Mate Boban suggested that the proposal of three ethnic units was a unique historical opportunity (without international opposition) to conduct ethnic partition and a process of homogenization of Croat territories, identical to the project embarked upon by SDS, implying the final implementation of the agreement between Tudjman and Milosevic on the ethnic partition of Bosnia.<sup>88</sup>

Internal opinions from the Bosniak element concurred with international arguments i.e. to accept the peace agreements even though they created different methods and varying degrees to divide the country ethnically. For all that, the Bosnian president had hoped the West would allow the Bosnian government to defend itself by excluding it from the U.N. arms embargo or come to its aid with military force but those possibilities did not materialise at that time and the West actually increased pressure on Izetbegovic to accept partition (Pomfret 1993). In other words, diplomatic isolation and military inferiority led Izetbegovic to abandon one of the founding principles of the SDA, namely, the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bougarel 1999). As observed by Dzamaludin Latic, the temptation to set up a separate Bosniak entity

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<sup>86</sup> Two Croat Communities were proclaimed, the Bosanska Posavina (comprising 360,000 inhabitants, among which Croats constituted a relative majority with thirty five percent of population) and Herceg-Bosna, with thirty municipalities in Herzegovina and Central Bosnia that included more than 850,000 inhabitants, forty eight percent of which were declared Croats (Klemencic 1994).

<sup>87</sup> The Plan involved the division of Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous regions, three of which were Croat, while Sarajevo was defined as a District. Despite being accepted by Karadzic under the pressure of Milosevic, Dobrica Cosic and international representatives such as the Greek Prime Minister, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, the Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected the ratification of the Plan on 6 May (leaving it open to the approval of Bosnian Serbs citizens in a referendum scheduled for mid May) based on the amount of territory under the control of VRS that would be lost (Owen 1995). There was a negative response to ratify the agreement which increased tension between Pale and Belgrade leadership, this led to positivity to ensure recognition of Bosnian Serb provinces in Bosnia while ending the Serbian embargo.

<sup>88</sup> As claimed by Izetbegovic in that context; "The face of Bosnia used to be beautiful but she's been disfigured with a knife. She has scars, and she's bleeding. This is Bosnia now" (Pomfret 1993).

existed at that time; territorial demands included forty five percent of Bosnian and the Sandzak (Latic 1993).<sup>89</sup> Every statement of partition provoked sharp reaction from the SDA itself and civic parties, who had representatives in the Bosnian Presidency, such as Mirko Pejanovic, following SDS withdrawal at the beginning of war. Yet, the acceptance of division was very prejudicial especially for the Bosniak population:

There can be no doubt, however, that such a division [ethnic partition of Bosnia] would be fatal to the Muslims above all. A Muslim nation would be a posterior justification for the war and aggression on both the Serbian and Croatian sides. What the Serbian and Croatian propaganda machines groundlessly called “preventive reasons” for the war and the establishment of ethnic states would become more convincing. Separatist Muslim nationalist would not only lead to the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina but also to isolation for the Muslim nation. Undoubtedly, an anti-Muslim alliance between Serbia and Croatia would be established for the final division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the consummation of an idea first introduced in secret talks between Franjo Tudjman and Solobodan Milosevic (Obradovic 1994, p.13-14).<sup>90</sup>

Dramatically, the polarisation favoured by the internal evolution of war and international pressure, coalesced in negotiations in the summer of 1993. The Owen-Stoltenberg plan or the Union of Three Republics became the new framework for the subsequent peace talks proposed by Serbs and Croats following the refusal of Bosnian Serbs to accept the provisions of the previous Vance-Owen Peace Plan. This Plan was finally rejected following the holding of a referendum on 15-16 May 1993, which also included a second statement regarding the independence of Republika Srpska.<sup>91</sup> Indeed, the Union of Three Republics suggested dividing Bosnia into a loose confederation of three states and despite Izetbegovic’s previous opposition to proposals on the ethnic cantonisation of Bosnia, he indicated a willingness to accept the confederal solution for Bosnia but the decision had to be taken collectively.<sup>92</sup>

Thus, discussion took place within all Bosniak ranks, who subsequently adopted a conditional acceptance in a case where all territories taken by force were returned. During the debate in an assembly of 350 Bosniaks (formed by politicians, clergy,

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<sup>89</sup> Cited in Bougarel (1999, p.9).

<sup>90</sup> Cited in Fine (2002, p. 21).

<sup>91</sup> Among one million ballots, ninety six percent rejected the Vance-Owen plan and the same percentage approved the declaration of an independent Republic of Serbia in Bosnia. Yet, instead of declaring the independence of the Republika Srpska, Karadzic urged, following the refusal of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, to begin another peace process to reconstitute Bosnia as a loose confederation composed of three independent cantons, i.e. one Serb, one Croat and one Bosniak (Shanker 1993).

<sup>92</sup> In the words of David Owen, he was even “attracted by this option but afraid of a backlash from some of his supporters” (Owen 1995, p.230).

intellectuals and army leaders), Izetbegovic appeared undecided, or uncommitted, on which direction to take, discussing both the virtues of a multiethnic state and also the advantages of a small Muslim republic (Cohen 1995). The decision was later confirmed by the Bosnian Parliament. Muhamed Filipovic, MBO leader who frequently attended the Geneva talks as part of Izetbegovic's delegation, drafted the declaration for the Parliament that was emotionally charged and highly critical of Western powers (Owen 1995).<sup>93</sup>

Furthermore, polarisation strengthened the influence of militant Bosniak nationalists and weakened the more moderate elements in the leadership favouring the creation of a liberal multiethnic state (Cohen 1995).<sup>94</sup> Thus, concomitant with the conditional acceptance of the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, SDA leadership increasingly envisioned and even made preparations for partition. This was seen, for instance, in the evolution of the ARBiH that progressively lost its multi-ethnic character in 1993 and 1994. The *Armija* was increasingly under the control of the SDA and independent of formal state bodies, eventually ceasing to operate as a Bosnian Army but instead becoming a Bosniak Army (Hoare 2004).

Indeed, the SDA reiterated its commitment to a united and multi-ethnic Bosnian territory but progressively turned those territories, held by the transformed *Armija*, into a de facto Bosniak entity (Bougarel 1999). As discussed by Mirko Pejanovic, a Bosnian Serb member of the Bosnian Presidency throughout the war, there was no question that the SDS was by far the most extreme in implementing radical methods and pushing its sympathizers into war crimes in order to achieve the goal of an ethnically pure territory. Croats and Bosniaks, however, ultimately joined SDS in the vicious circle of territorialisation and ethnic division (Pejanovic 2004). This was highlighted in February 1994 when a group of SDA deputies made a proposal to the Bosnian parliament for the proclamation of the Bosniak Republic defined as "the independent and democratic state of the Bosniak nation, with Serbs and Croats enjoying in this state a status of national minorities" (Bougarel 1999, p.8). Equally, in February, the progressive construction of

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<sup>93</sup> Izetbegovic ultimately adopted a declaration with Krajisnik in which the three republics in the union could hold a referendum regards staying in the union or not, two years after, if there was agreement on territorial division between the republics. The main problem for Izetbegovic was the map and required access to the sea at Neum and towns such as Foca, Bratunac, Visegrad, Prijedor, Kozarac and Sanski Most.

<sup>94</sup> Several statements and decisions revealed the increasing influence of most conservative members in the party. SDA Secretary-General, Mirsad Cerman, claimed that mixed marriages should be an exception while endorsing the ban on new folksongs from Serbia taken in September 1994 by Enes Karic, the Minister of Culture (Cohen 1995).



an ethnocratic regime was highlighted as Izetbegovic made clear that loyalty and obedience to SDA, instead of competence and qualification, would be prioritised in ministries and state companies (Pejanovic 2004; Andreas 2008).<sup>95</sup>

Significantly, a political elite was built around Izetbegovic's family connections and the prevailing conservatives in the leadership, as suggested by Adil Zulfikarpasic after he left SDA (Hoare 2004). Having emerged following the November 1990 elections, these elites were substantially empowered both politically and economically during the siege through war profiteering. Interestingly, even people living on the margins of society turned into powerful elites during wartime with close ties to the government and SDA (Andreas 2008).<sup>96</sup> Such elite reconfiguration is central in understanding the urban transformation of Sarajevo after the war as this political and economic empowerment became a central element of path-dependence during the post-war period.

### **Sarajevo's ethno-territorial division in the Dayton Peace Agreement**

During successive peace negotiations to end the war in Bosnia, Sarajevo was often a central issue in the negotiations to reach a peace agreement. During the early stages of the war, a policy titled "Sarajevo first" pursued the demilitarisation of the city prior to any other considerations, i.e. prior to solving other issues (Owen 1995). The proposals of the UN administrations to preserve the ethnic diversity in Sarajevo clearly contrasted with the logic of ethnic division for the rest of Bosnia. Equally, while the UN administration had been the mechanism for resolving this question for over two years, Owen and Stoltenberg argued that the EU should not foreclose the possibility of the parties agreeing a coherent division of the city (Ib.).

Sarajevo continued being a central issue in the Dayton peace negotiations. An agreement on Sarajevo, due to its special history and significance, was one of the four key conditions outlined by Warren Christopher, the US Secretary of State, on 1 November during the opening ceremony. During the early days in Dayton, US negotiators proposed that Sarajevo did not belong to either of the two entities in which Bosnian was to be divided. As the reunification of Sarajevo seemed more and more

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<sup>95</sup> As pointed out by Mirko Pejanovic, a hierarchy of trust was developed in which top officials should be members of SDA. The second level of trust was for Bosniaks and, finally, members of other nationalities.

<sup>96</sup> In Bosnia, economic capital, often accumulated criminally during the siege, was converted into political capital after the war.

difficult to achieve, a proposal was made to reunify the city as a federal polity, i.e. similar to Washington, DC. In this sense, Sarajevo would be an enclave, but unlike the rest of Bosnia, needed to be ruled by all three ethnic groups with a rotational Mayor (Holbrooke 1998).<sup>97</sup>

At that time, Bosniaks sought to have total control over a reunified city but after the federal model, and considering the limited chances that Bosnian Serbs would give up districts of the city under the control of VRS, showed increasing interest in this proposal. Following on from this, the proposal was reduced to a ten-point plan that included a municipal Council with a rotating Mayor, a unified police force and local municipal control over education, cultural and religious activities. Yet, Slobodan Milosevic, who was the main representative of Bosnian Serbs in the peace negotiations, again argued for the Bosnian Serb vision which was to divide the city ethnically, effectively tabling several counterproposals that sought a compromise in a loose unification of the city but left the possibility of an eventual division.<sup>98</sup>

Despite an initial commitment, agreeing to solve the Sarajevo issue, Milosevic finally rejected the DC proposal arguing that his Bosnian Serb colleagues would never accept it (Chollet 2005, p.153). One of his proposals included a model in which all ethnicities had total political equality. Such a solution, however, would be detrimental to any Bosniak advantage in the city so it was disregarded (Holbrooke 1998). Surprisingly, on November 18, Slobodan Milosevic made the important concession on Sarajevo that had become one of the most divisive issues of the peace negotiations. Indeed, Milosevic decided to deliver total control over Sarajevo to the FBiH in exchange for some minor territorial concessions in northwest Bosnia arguing that Izetbegovic had earned the city by not abandoning it:

No “Washington, DC” plan, no ethnically divided city, it’s too complicated, it won’t work (Chollet 2005, p.171).

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<sup>97</sup> The city could be divided into several semi-autonomous municipalities and, like the proposed Bosnian presidency, have a three-person mayoral council whose chairman would rotate among the three ethnic groups (Cholet 2005, p.144-45). The municipal government would be responsible for such citywide services as transportation, utilities, and sanitation, while the local municipalities would control education, cultural services, and local health services. The city would be policed by a multiethnic force, which the international community could help train and monitor.

<sup>98</sup> Krajisnik and other Bosnian Serbs representatives not indicted by war crimes, unlike Karadzic, could be in Dayton but only as members subordinate and passive to the Serb delegation so they played a marginal role. Their authority to negotiate for Bosnian Serbs had been delegated to Milosevic in a ceremony in Belgrade in October in which the Orthodox Church took place.

Milosevic's decision surprised Richard Holbrooke and Christopher. The concession was a pragmatic solution to removing one of the remaining obstacles in order to reach a peace agreement as the Bosnian Serb leadership did not intend on sharing power with other ethnicities, but rather, pursued exclusive control over the essential areas of the city under VRS. This decision was also favoured by the internal dynamics of post-Dayton Serbian leadership and, according to Richard Holbrooke, worked towards weakening the leadership of Bosnian Serbs, especially Karadzic and Krajisnik, in order to preserve Belgrade's power over Serbs in Bosnia (Holbrooke 1998).<sup>99</sup> While Milosevic's unilateral decision on Sarajevo effectively led to progress in peace negotiations, uncertainty remained in relation to its implementation. The decision was seen as a betrayal for the Bosnian Serbs authorities as the division of the city was long envisioned by Bosnian Serb leadership, and was one of the Strategic Goals adopted in May 1992.

Thus, Milosevic's decision to relinquish Serb-held districts inferred a material, economic and symbolic loss for Pale leadership in their efforts to create a Bosnian Serb entity in BiH. Momcilo Krajisnik, as the highest representative of Bosnian Serbs in Dayton, was outraged and rejected to either sign the peace agreement or participate in the ceremony when, instants before, he was permitted to view the final map. Following on from this development, negotiations focused on the delimitation line between entities in the area of Sarajevo, seeking that the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) dividing both entities, namely, the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska, was drawn at the other side of the hills from which the city had been shelled. Thus, in Sarajevo there was no internal division in central urban areas, unlike cities such as Belfast, Berlin, Jerusalem, and Nicosia. Despite this move, a significant area that belonged to the city since its expansion in 1977, and one which had mostly a rural or semirural character, became part of Srpsko Sarajevo (Figure 5).<sup>100</sup> As argued by Scott A. Bollens, Sarajevo

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<sup>99</sup> Milosevic's relationship with SDS leadership had deteriorated since Pale leadership refused to accept Vance Owen Peace Plan in early May 1993. Milosevic and Belgrade elites accepted the Plan that secured an ethno-territorial partition of Bosnia and had to produce an end to the embargo in rump Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro. Since then, Milosevic decreased its role in the Bosnian war (Veiga 2011).

<sup>100</sup> Despite peace calls to avoid another Berlin, i.e. urban division, the idea of partition was not widespread as expressed by wartime Mayor Tarik Kupusovic: "Since only ten percent of the urban part of Sarajevo was held under Karadzic's control, we never accepted that the city was divided. The city was besieged and blocked. We have always believed that the situation was only temporary, and with this signature, the time has come to reintegrate the suburban municipalities into one complete organic city" ("Interview: Tarik Kupusovic: No Sarajevo Without Serbs", 1995).

became since then a frontier city, i.e. an urban interstice between opposing political territories (Bollens 2001).




Figure 5. Sarajevo's division in Dayton between the two entities, the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska. Source: author.

### The DPA and the OHR's mission

The Dayton Peace Agreement took place under a different context compared to previous peace negotiations. Significantly, after three-and-half years of war, there was a balanced military situation on the ground after offensives conducted in the summer of 1995 had resulted in a loss of territory originally controlled by Bosnian Serbs. Western powers, and specially the US, became increasingly engaged from 1994 in an effort end the war. More especially, international pressure increased during NATO attacks on Bosnian Serb positions in August and September 1995. Hence, there was a heavy

involvement of the US with a combination of military and diplomatic offensives since August 1995.

The more intensive international involvement meant that all requirements (actions or omissions) in the policy were performed so as to prepare the way for a sustainable peace agreement. In this sense, the complex territorial reality caused by the existence of the Safe Areas, the pockets surrounded by Bosnian Serbs, were targeted to ensure that territorial partition was politically and militarily less complex. Importantly, recent evidence reveals that the fall of Srebrenica formed part of a policy of the three Western Powers (Britain, France, US) and the UN leadership in pursuit of achieving peace at any price. As claimed by Richard Holbrooke in 2005, on the tenth anniversary of Dayton, initially, he was under instructions to sacrifice Srebrenica, Goražde and Žepa (Hartmann and Vulliamy 2015).

Contextually, amid huge international pressure, especially from the US, negotiations took place among regional leaders. These participants included those such as Alija Izetbegovic, as President of BiH and leader of SDA, and regional leaders involved in war, Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, representing both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. The peace agreement signed in Dayton contained continuity of some of the core elements of previous peace plans. A central element was the division of Bosnian into ethno-territorialities, a measure that in distinct forms had prevailed during the peace proposals. Since the Contact Group Plan, elaborated upon in 1994, moved that a proportional ethnic partition of Bosnia should take place on a 51:49 proportion between Muslim-Croat and Serbian entities. Negotiations began in Dayton's Wright Patterson Base in November 1995 resulting in the culmination of a series of diplomatic initiatives that included conflict prevention in early 1992 and temporal cessation of hostilities once the war began.

Interestingly, successive preventions and peace proposals from international actors misled parties on the logic of ethnic partition. Despite the nuances regarding the territorial organisation of Bosnia in all peace proposals, constitutional proposals displayed a divisive nature. With only the exception of the London Principals, each of the proposed initiatives from international actors embodied, to some extent, the logic of ethnic partition, e.g. devolutions of political power to ethnic majorities and accompanied by spatial arrangements:

Underpinning the agreement are notions which link ethnic identity in a "natural" relationship to territory, notions which matched the understanding

of one party to the conflict (the ethnic cleansers) to the exclusion of the others (the non-nationalists) (Campbell 1999).

The DPA maintained that Bosnia and Herzegovina should remain as a unified state but organised in two entities ethnically based with three constituent peoples.<sup>101</sup> Territorially, Bosnia would be comprised of two distinct entities, the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska, with their own ethnically-organised political structures, controls citizenship and the possibility of establishing special parallel relationships with neighbouring states (OHR 2015). The Constitution, included in Annex III of the peace agreement clearly defined in its preamble the commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with international law.

The peace agreement defined a political system that was largely based on classic consociational prescriptions of power sharing. These prescriptions included grand coalition governments with proportional representation from all ethnic groups, a right of mutual veto among ethnic groups and a decentralised ethno-territorial system where communities are spatially divided (e.g. Lijphart 2004). Indeed, power-sharing was adopted at the state level between all three constituent ethnic groups and in the Federation of BiH between Croats and Bosniaks.<sup>102</sup> As claimed by Belloni (2004), it was widely recognised that such a consociational framework was the only feasible model for a united BiH in 1995, with people arguing a decade later that it was still the only realistic institutional option for the country.<sup>103</sup>

While appreciating the absence of feasible alternatives to a decentralised ethno-territorial system during the last stages of the Bosnian war, this understanding should not hide the fact that other formulas, not based or exclusively based on ethnicity, were earlier abandoned by international actors. As argued by David Campbell (1998), international intervention during the war legitimised exclusivist projects of nationalist parties and made a return to coexistence less imaginable. Indeed, international proposals seeking to end violence paradoxically encouraged it, because of assumptions about ethnic identity, territory and conflict, did not correspond to the reality on the ground at

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<sup>101</sup> Brcko was set as a District later, in 1999.

<sup>102</sup> In 2002 Bosnia became a triple power-sharing system, it was adopted also in Cantons, as in the case of the Federation of BiH and at entities (Bieber 2006). These constitutional amendments followed the Constitutional Court decision taken in 2000 defining the discrimination of Croats and Bosniaks in RS and Serbs in the Federation of BiH.

<sup>103</sup> Power-sharing is an effective tool in conflict resolution, as analysed in chapter one.

the beginning of the war. Moreover, differences between the US and Europeans lay in the conception of this very peace agreement. For the US, the peace agreement was a military operation with some form of civilian annexes while, for the Europeans, political issues and perspectives were the main concern and the support of military measures was required. This vision, however, was the opposite between the Europeans and the Americans as the nature of the peace agreement was inevitably transferred to negotiations and subsequent structures.

Especially important for this dissertation are the differences that appeared with regard to the authority of the High Representative in relation to the civilian provisions of the peace agreement. The major international actors, both in the US and Europe, agreed on the creation of a High Representative to implement the peace agreement at the North Atlantic Council held in September, before the Dayton peace negotiations were conducted.<sup>104</sup> In Dayton, after having accepted the US command on the military side, the Europeans held formal, albeit rare, instruction from the EU Council of Ministers that the civilian counterpart had to be a European. Yet, the Clinton Administration (especially Pentagon officials) did not want a European High Representative to have any control over American military forces on the ground, while the Europeans were adamant that military commanders should not play any role in the civilian implementation (Chollet 2005). Once Washington finally accepted the designation of a European High Representative, the US delegation in Dayton was instructed to work to restrict the authority of the High Representative, modifying the previous agreement as they refused to accept that a civilian had the capacity to make judgements and express views on military issues (Neville-Jones 1996; Bildt 1998).<sup>105</sup>

Virtually, the High Representative was left in a position without any powers in the peace agreement and this explains the limited capacity of the OHR to manifest any influence over civilian annexes during the early post-war stages, as will be discussed in the following chapters.<sup>106</sup> The primary task, conceded to the High Representative, was

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<sup>104</sup> The North Atlantic Council is the principal political decision-making body within NATO.

<sup>105</sup> The peace agreement clearly divided competence of the international community into two realms: the military and the civilian. Annexes 1A, 1B and 2, dealt with military aspects of the peace settlement mandated to the NATO-led implementation force. On the other hand, Annexes 3 to 11 correspond to the civilian issues of the peace-building mission.

<sup>106</sup> The vision of civilian and military cooperation was heavily influenced by the double authorisation conducting military action during the Bosnian War. The so-called dual-key which implied that any use of air strikes required a positive decision from both NATO and the UN, created more problems than it resolved.

monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement while using this function to maintain close contact with all actors in order to foster the full compliance of local parties to civilian issues of the agreement and also to promote a high level of cooperation among international organisations. Such a supervisory role defined in the peace agreement provided very little authority to the High Representative, which lacked any capacity to instruct other international organisations:

The High Representative shall respect their autonomy within their spheres of operation while as necessary giving general guidance to them about the impact of their activities on the implementation of the peace settlement (GFAP 1995).

Indeed, along with a limited authority that prevented the interference of the High Representative in the military implementation of the peace agreement, Washington went beyond in the objective to keep close control over the peace-building mission. In this regard, it refused to accept the appointment of the High Representative through the UN Security Council, as it usually happens in the deployment of international peace-building missions. This created a situation whereby the High Representative, despite informing the United Nations, would not be fully answerable to an uncontested international authority, initially, leaving its operation in an uncomfortable and unconvincing limbo (Neville-Jones 1996). As an alternative to the United Nations, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) was replaced by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which became the *ad hoc* executive committee supervising the High Representative's intervention within the peace-building mission deployed in the country.<sup>107</sup> Initially, the High Representative, whose role was defined in peace negotiations, was not an enforced actor to undertake the huge responsibility of civilian administrator of the peace agreement. Actually, its role was hugely contested with attempts to marginalise it in the early post-war stages, as it will be seen in the following chapter.

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<sup>107</sup> The PIC is still integrated by fifty five states and international organizations involved in the implementation of the peace agreement. It supervises the implementation of DPA and is in charge of appointing the High Representative and giving consent to main policies. The PIC was the successor of the UN International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) while the Steering Board of the PIC, based on G-8 (i.e. Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Germany, Russia, UK and the US), guided and managed implementation (Neville Jones 1996).





### **3. The consolidation of an ethno-territorialised urban area of Sarajevo after the peace agreement**

The division of the urban area of Sarajevo between the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska that significantly modified the siege line ended the long pursuit of SDS leadership to ethnically divide Sarajevo's urban core. This chapter deals with the consolidation of an ethno-territorialised urban area of Sarajevo by local actors after the signature of the peace agreement and, generally, OHR's reactive actions. Firstly, it focuses on the performance of international actors and nationalist parties in the transfer of authority from the five Serb-held districts of Sarajevo that resulted in a mass exodus of Bosnian Serbs. Additionally, policies from SDA and SDS to consolidate the ethno-territorial division of the urban area of Sarajevo are addressed. On the one hand, SDA worked to consolidate a Bosniak population in the city and to assure exclusive control over institutions. On the other hand, and to compensate for the loss of the Serb-held districts, SDS developed a project to urbanise the mainly rural municipalities of Srpsko Sarajevo. The OHR responded to ethnocentric practices conducted by both SDA and SDS, and was directly involved in the remake of multiethnic institutions in Sarajevo and to prevent land allocations pursuing the consolidation of the ethnic division of Bosnia.

#### **The transfer of authority of the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo**

The start of the implementation of the DPA, set on 19 December 1995, marked a ninety day period for the completion of the transfer of authority between entities of those territories exchanged during peace negotiations to meet the 51/49 percent territorial division of Bosnia between entities. This transfer of authority included the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo that had been under the control of VRS during the Sarajevo siege. These districts included the neighbourhood of Grbavica, which was an integral part of the central area of Sarajevo, and four suburbs, Vogošća, Ilidža, Hadžići and Ilijaš. The transfer of authority, also known as the reintegration of Sarajevo (after being military occupied by VRS since May 1992), became the first real test of civilian implementation. It was a symbolic and complex transfer of authority, among Sarajevo

Serbs and Bosnian Serbs, being the only one where a significant population lived at the end of war (estimated at 80,000 people).<sup>108</sup>

The prospect of maintaining a significant number of people in the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo after the transfer of authority was a huge challenge, paradoxically, undermined by the divisive nature of the peace agreement, which had finally legalised the ethnic territorial division of Bosnia. During peace negotiations, Slobodan Milosevic had conceded a special status for Sarajevo that was independently ruled by three constitutive ethnic groups arguing that it would not work, due to the negativity of Bosnian Serb leadership. As a result, the five districts were to be integrated into the Federation of BiH. At the end of three-and-a-half years of siege, such structural change particularly increased the perception for Sarajevo Serbs and Bosnian Serb people that they were in danger. In that context, Carl Bildt, (nominated as the first High Representative in the PIC which took place in London in early December), considered the management of Sarajevo as his highest preference in the first months of his mission, making clear to his staff that the situation in and around the capital city of Bosnia was the only priority (Bildt 1998). Bildt expressed the difficulties of keeping people living in the Serb-held districts once reintegration was completed and warned of the negative implications that a massive departure would have for both post-war Bosnia and Sarajevo.

With responsibility for the civilian annexes, the OHR managed the transfer of authority operating formally through the Joint Civilian Commission on Sarajevo (JCCS), i.e. a body subordinate to the Joint Civilian Commission (JCC) that dealt with a variety of issues related to the civilian implementation of the DPA. The OHR team pursued the creation of appropriate conditions in relation to security and governance for people who wished to stay. Carl Bildt handled the management of the transfer of districts to his Deputy HR, the Ambassador Michael Steiner, former German

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<sup>108</sup> By Sarajevo Serbs it is understood those Bosnian Serbs who had been living in the urban areas of Sarajevo before the war. The urban areas of Sarajevo, as considered in the Urban Plan elaborated in 1986, corresponded to partial or complete areas of the six municipalities of Sarajevo before the urban expansion that took place in 1977, i.e. Stari Grad, Centar, Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, Vogosca and Ilidza. By Bosnian Serbs, thus, I mean people who lived in the peripheral sectors of these six municipalities or in the four municipalities incorporated to Sarajevo, i.e. Pale, Hadzici, Ilijas and Trnovo. Also, in this chapter, Bosnian Serbs refers to other people who moved to the Serb-held districts from other areas of BiH during the war, many of them due to the mobilisation of VRS. Finally, Sarajevo Serbs living in the Serb-held districts must be differentiated from Sarajevo Serbs who remained in the areas under ARBiH control during the siege. Estimations indicated that between 30,000 and 40,000 Sarajevo Serbs had remained in the Bosnian government-held areas of the city throughout the war. Their situation, despite being distinct for not having left, was far from perfect and stable as a result of the absence of status that Serbs had both in Sarajevo and the rest of the FBiH territory.

representative within the Contact Group. Michael Steiner usually chaired the JCCS, integrated two representatives of the FBiH, two others from the city of Sarajevo and three local Serbs from the districts to be transferred (Bildt 1998). The group of local Serbs was led by Maksim Stanisic, president of the Democratic Initiative for Sarajevo Serbs (DISS) and, as a Mayor, coordinator of the various Serb-held districts of Sarajevo. For them, it was very challenging to assimilate an exclusive Bosniak rule so they sought alternatives within the Federation of BiH, thus accepting the peace agreement.

Yet, the OHR was a weak actor in the production of results in civilian annexes, due to the limited authority set in the peace agreement. The US was opposed to a European civilian administrator with enough authority to interfere with the military mission.<sup>109</sup> It implied that the High Representative had a supervisory role with neither a mandate to instruct other actors, nor a guiding process in the civilian implementation of the DPA. Such insignificant authority was increased by the lack of proper funding and insufficient staff.<sup>110</sup> Importantly, the US worked to totally constrain these already limited powers during early post-war stages. In this sense, Washington was instrumental in depriving the High Representative access to all the UN resources reserved for NATO and refrained from providing any single funding (Bildt 1998). Both the limited authority of the High Representative, already conceded in the peace agreement, and US attempts to restrict his role during early post-war stages was highlighted during JCCS negotiations. OHR members had authority only to coordinate and ensure that implementation would take place in the occasion of a consensus. This consensus, however, was difficult to reach, with US representatives usually blocking initiatives, arguing that these were against their policy or interest, which made the decision-making process more difficult (Research Interview 28 May 2015).

Yet, along with the limited authority and constrained role of the OHR imposed by the US, international intervention to keep a significant number of people following the transfer of authority was further undermined by military performance. In Dayton it was agreed to provide IFOR commander's with limitless authority, which overcame UNPROFOR limited authority during war. Actually, it was defined in Annex I of DPA

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<sup>109</sup> As seen in a previous chapter, the US efforts to limit the role of the High Representative started in the peace negotiations, after resignation in favour of Europeans, the position of senior civilian coordinator for implementation of the peace agreement.

<sup>110</sup> It had only ten members in the early stages, which was much smaller than the existing personnel in some embassies (Sell 1999).

that the IFOR Commander had the authority, without being subject to any party, to do all that was considered necessary and proper, including the use of military force. DPA also clarified that IFOR literally had the right to provide military security for areas to be transferred. Crucially, a minimalist interpretation of IFOR's role during the peace implementation was finally adopted with commanders arguing that involvement in non-military issues of the agreement was not their task (Holbrooke 1998).

Despite all of this, the first round of talks to deal with the transfer of the Serb-held districts showed that around fifty percent of people would leave regardless of the conditions in which the transfer would take place (Sell 1999). Generally, people with property expressed a wish to stay but demanded assurances that their own representatives would have a role to play in the local administration after the transfer of authority. In addition, they required the transfer to be strictly monitored by IFOR and IPTF and that Serb police should be allowed to join the incoming FBiH security forces. Negotiations continued to deal with political and practical issues such as police, utilities, or housing. Because of ambiguity with some issues of the peace agreement and the attempt of representatives of local Serbs to find a political solution, negotiations were central for the prospect of Bosnian Serbs to remain after the transfer of authority, as stated by Maksim Stanisic during early talks:

It will depend on these talks a lot. We have got a lot of problems to solve. Heavy fighting has occurred here. Time is needed as well as solutions to a lot of problems in order to have people feel safe and to have a possibility for them to choose, to decide freely, will they stay or go (Daly 1996).

For all that, the challenge in creating conditions for people to stay was undermined by the deadline set in the peace agreement. The lack of definition regarding civilian annexes and the reduced margin for its resolution increased uncertainty and fear on the eve of the transfer. For instance, the final role of Bosnian Serb representatives in the city or security issues was undefined in the institutional organisation of Sarajevo.<sup>111</sup> The three-month deadline to complete the transfer of authority was thus seen as insufficient by DISS negotiators, who required a postponement of the deadline in order to create appropriate conditions for people to decide whether to stay or not (Research interview, 19 May 2015).

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<sup>111</sup> In this regard, as recognised by Western diplomats, the security issue was one of the great gaps in the DPA since it did not clarify the situation in Sarajevo between the period in which Bosnian Serb Army left the suburbs and March 20, when the mostly Bosniak police force would take over (Pomfret 1996a).

More importantly, the prospect of keeping a significant number of people in the five districts after the transfer of authority was further weakened by the performance of local and international actors. SDS leadership contested the transfer of authority from the beginning. Main Bosnian Serb representatives rejected the division of Sarajevo at the outskirts of the urban core because the decision had been taken by Milosevic without their consent. Radovan Karadzic thus responded to the final territorial division of Sarajevo, set in the peace agreement, claiming that the city would be bleeding for decades if the provisions on Sarajevo were not renegotiated (“Bosnian Serb Leader Radovan Karadzic is Demanding that Provisions of the Accord Concerning Sarajevo Be Renegotiated”, 1995).<sup>112</sup>

In this regard, the SDS soon pushed for the modification of the DPA through the orchestration of demonstrations and the celebration of a referendum by mid-December in the five Serb-held districts to be transferred (Sell 1999). SDS pressure continued and UN officials reported a few days later, that Bosnian Serb authorities were blocking people from leaving districts as part of a campaign to make peace negotiators change their minds (Pomfret 1995d). Clearly, SDS contestation to the territorial provisions of the peace agreement on Sarajevo pursued not relinquishing the Strategic Objective of dividing Sarajevo ethnically. In this sense, at the fifth-sixth session of the RS Assembly held on 17 December 1995, the first one celebrated after the signature of the DPA in Paris, RS Assembly President Momčilo Krajišnik forcefully rejected a proposal from Grujo Lalovic to accept the new living conditions of Sarajevo Serbs under the rule of the FBiH. Eloquently, Krajišnik argued that the proposal violated the first Strategic Objective and the very purpose for which the RS had been created:

The mission of this republic and its first strategic goal is for us to divide Muslim and Croats, and no one has the right to create a strategy whereby Serb Sarajevo remains in a common state. Thus any kind of danger or wish for a connection and solution for Sarajevo is excluded, such that we want to stay with the Muslims and Croats. No one is allowed now to create a new solution to stay together (Krajišnik 1995).

Furthermore, he openly recognised that the post-Dayton situation in Sarajevo was not envisioned by Bosnian Serb authorities and required the reallocation of people from areas to be transferred into RS territory to fulfil the goal of dividing Bosnian Serbs from other ethnic groups:

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<sup>112</sup> This type of quotation corresponds to news that lacks the signature of a journalist.

We need time, for this is a surprise, not foreseen in any variant. Therefore we need time for a political solution and a national separation, the best solution is that people leave Sarajevo [the Serb-held districts to be transferred] and locations are found to accommodate them (...) That solution does not lead to establishment of a union but to collapse, for that is our first strategic goal (Ib.).

Furthermore, beyond refusing the creation of conditions for ethnic coexistence in the area of Sarajevo, the Assembly issued a declaration that disputed the Bosniak-Croat authority in areas that would become part of the Federation of BiH. In this sense, the declaration reserved the right of RS to reclaim sovereignty in peaceful ways and through political means to territories defined in the Strategic Objectives (Donia 2006a). The loss of the Serb-held districts under VRS's control during the war did not mean either resignation or withdrawal from the agenda to fully divide Bosnian Serbs from other ethnic groups in the area of Sarajevo. Essentially, SDS leadership continued and was determined to divide Bosnian Serbs from other ethnic groups but, at the same time, it was unwilling to easily concede the Serb-held districts.

Pale leadership thus adopted a strategy in order to gain time, with Momčilo Krajišnik requesting the delay of the reunification of Sarajevo for up to one year during the first visit of Leighton Smith, IFOR's Commander, to Pale in late December (Wilkinson 1995). Delaying the transfer of authority was again one of the three solutions presented by Krajišnik in a letter sent to both Admiral Smith and Carl Bildt. Firstly, Krajišnik proposed to postpone the handover at least until 15 December 1996 to enable new elections in the suburbs, this should secure significant autonomy in Sarajevo and enable the possibility of integration within the RS. Secondly, he required international funds for the construction of new temporary dwellings to resettle approximately 45,000 families on the Serbian side of the IEBL, i.e. in the territory of Srpsko Sarajevo. Finally, in case the transitional period was not extended by 10 January, Krajišnik threatened that all people would leave by mid-March in a chaotic way (Bildt 1998).

In conjunction with political pressure, (ostensibly to maintain authority over areas of Sarajevo under control), Bosnian Serbian leadership, at least until that September, also sought to persuade people to leave districts. On the eve of the 10 January deadline, police special forces were visiting apartments seeking to convince citizens from Grbavica and Ilidža to depart ("Specijalci tjeraju gradjane", 1996). The following day, the departure of people living in Serb-held districts formed a two-mile

caravan of vehicles entering RS in the surroundings of Sarajevo airport (“Bosnian Serbs Flee Homes In Sarajevo”, 1996). According to UN officials, about 12,000 people had left the Serb-held districts by early February 1996 (Pomfret 1996b).

The SDS, however, was not alone in pushing for a mass exodus of people living in the Serb-held districts at the end of the war. SDA also intervened to prevent a majority of Sarajevo Serbs and Bosnian Serbs remained in Grbavica and the four suburbs. In a more subtle performance, SDA increased mistrust on the eve of the transfer of authority, by employing discursive practices and delaying implementation of some provisions of the peace agreement. Even though Alija Izetbegović had invited Sarajevo Serbs to live safely in Sarajevo during the ceremony of the signature of the peace agreement in Dayton on 21 November 1995, reconciliatory statements were shortly afterwards replaced by some frightening claims. In this sense, Izetbegović asserted one week later that women and children would be safe under his control but did not extend the guarantee to their men, with most adult males having served in the VRS at some point during the war (Daly 1995). Muhamed Sacirbey nuanced that heavy statement made by Izetbegović the following day. The Bosnian Foreign Minister claimed, that all civilians within a united Sarajevo, would have their safety guaranteed by the government and only people engaged in war crimes would be persecuted.

Ambiguity over governmental provisions of security, if Bosnian Serbs remained in Sarajevo, highlighted the two contrasting currents in SDA. Crucially, some manifestations prior to the transfer of authority actually revealed that some party members envisioned the division of Sarajevo along ethnic lines. In this sense, further verbal aversion took place in several public statements, such as those asserting once again, that all but Chetniks could rely on the protection of Sarajevo authorities (OHR 1996x). For all that, other party members defended Bosnia’s historical ethnic diversity and only conceived post-war Sarajevo as a city that should keep ethnic diversity and rebuild coexistence among ethnic groups. This was the argument of Sarajevo’s Mayor, Tarik Kupusovic, who was categorical on the importance of Sarajevo Serbs for the future of the city in an interview in December 1995:

There is a huge number of Serbs from Sarajevo, not only here in the centre of the town, but also in Ilidža and Grbavica who will, I am certain, remember that they are true citizens of Sarajevo and not citizens of a Serb Sarajevo. A Muslim Sarajevo does not exist. Sarajevo cannot lose its multiethnic quality, and if it should come to that, we could openly state



that Sarajevo has ceased to exist (“Tarik Kupusovic: No Sarajevo Without Serbs”, 11 December 1995).<sup>113</sup>

Despite calls to overcome division and maintenance of ethnic diversity in Sarajevo, the performance of party leadership did not contribute to soften the environment on the eve of the transfer of authority in the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo. Hence, some measures in the implementation of the peace agreement were temporarily delayed by the Sarajevo Government, such as the enactment of the general amnesty that assured freedom for all people, but war criminals, from arrest and persecution for their activities at the VRS. Delays also occurred in the release of prisoners listed in the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that was scheduled to take place one month after entry into force of the DPA. While finally approved in February, the delay of the general amnesty was justified as a delaying measure until the Republika Srpska approved an equivalent law. As analysed in the following chapter, SDA authorities often used the reciprocity argument to justify non-fulfilment of provisions of the peace agreement.

In a context in which nationalist parties performed more or less openly to prevent a significant number of Bosnian Serbs remaining in Grbavica and the four suburbs, intense negotiations mediated by Michael Steiner continued, and the OHR team which included the US diplomat Louis Sell, finally agreed a proposal for a smooth transition that was acceptable to all participants in the negotiations. The proposal confirmed the reintegration of Grbavica and the four suburbs to Sarajevo and confirmed that all Bosnian Serb authorities, including police, could stay until authority was transferred to Bosnian mayors and administrators (Sell 1999). Interestingly, the proposal for a smooth transfer of authority declared that a transitional power-sharing arrangement would be established until the first post-war elections were held. These measures included Serb representatives chosen in 1990 elections to head local assemblies even if they belonged to the SDS. Other provisions included the possibility of incoming Serbs, who were not indicted as war criminals, joining the police force and the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in local administration or the Serbian curricula in schools.

For all that, these measures had little or no effect for many people at the end of war, following the ethno-territorial division of BiH set at the peace agreement. Moreover, Louis Sell recognised that they had failed to identify the degree of

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<sup>113</sup> Born in 1952 in Sarajevo, Tarik Kupusovic was named Mayor of Sarajevo in April 1994 to replace Muhamed Kreševljaković. Kupusovic was a member of the SDA and was elected to the Assembly of Sarajevo through the list for the Stari Grad municipality.

institutional guarantees needed to make power sharing a reality and to give Bosnian Serbs the status of constituent nation in the capital city of BiH. As he correctly pointed out, it could only have worked as part of a broader arrangement that gave Sarajevo special status outside both the FBiH and the RS (Sell 1999). This special status was the organisation of Sarajevo as a District, which would certainly have contributed to create a favourable environment for the stay of a significant number of Bosnian Serbs in Grbavica and the four other districts. Its realisation, however, was incompatible with the vision of Pale leadership that pursued a Sarajevo divided and ethnically homogeneous. Any formula to share governance in Sarajevo with other ethnic groups was thus ultimately abandoned by Milosevic during peace negotiations. Paradoxically, people's will to count on their own authorities to remain in the Serb-held districts after the transfer of authority had been rejected by the political leadership in both Belgrade and Pale.

Despite the limited impact of these measures in the post-siege context, the OHR proposal for a smooth transfer of authority of the Serb-held districts was actually confronted by international actors. Under the control of the US, the IFOR did not back the proposal, arguing that the clause permitting Bosnian Serb policemen to stay until 20 March implied a modification of the deadline set at the peace agreement. That decision was central for the viability of the initiative, as the civilian mission required military enforcement in the context of high insecurity and fear existing after a long siege in the city, and the amount of bloodshed in the whole country. Admittedly, the US had opposed, during peace negotiations, the creation of a police force with capacity to fulfil agreements and, at the same time, disapproved of the fact that NATO itself intervened (Holbrooke 1998). Moreover, the US strategy to weaken the OHR (mentioned earlier) took a decisive step in early February 1996 when Warren Christopher, the US Secretary of State, did not support Carl Bildt in addressing the increasing difficulties in the imminent transfer of authority. Bildt passed information to him about the most critical issues, among which was the impossibility of obtaining a statement from Izetbegović with an assurance that the Serbs would be safe remaining after the transfer of authority and that their rights would be guaranteed. Bildt's attempt, however, was unsuccessful:

Regrettably, Warren Christopher did not have much to say on the issue. But afterwards it was quite clear to me that Izetbegović and Muratovic had issued his visit to press their maximalist positions, had not met with any real objections from him or those with him, engaged in mostly general

talk, and had then decided to attack my position as hard as they could in the belief that they had the Americans on their side (Bildt 1998, p.187).

The absence of military involvement and Christopher's lack of support for Carl Bildt did not only mean failure to achieve a strong international position in which to address the transfer of the Serb-held districts, but also implied that a weak OHR lost legitimacy in front of local parties in the subsequent negotiations. This transatlantic disagreement was soon exploited by the SDA and turned their initial approval into direct opposition of the proposal to include transitional power-sharing arrangements until the first post-war elections were held (Sell 1999). Izetbegović declared the agreement inconsistent and invalid with Dayton and even Hasan Muratovic, BiH Prime Minister, falsely stated that he had never heard of the agreement. Furthermore, SDA leadership declared their argument that the Bosnian police took over on day forty five after the peace agreement came into force, while the DPA set that all forces had to completely vacate and clear areas to be transferred.

It also triggered the fact that Pale leadership began to sabotage open prospects of an orderly transition with Gojko Klickovic calling for the evacuation of people from the Serb-held districts within forty eight hours (Ib.). Klickovic, (who would become Prime Minister of Republika Srpska in mid-May), was the head of the Operational Staff for the Accommodation of Residents of Serb Sarajevo, and he set up an emergency committee to evacuate people from the suburbs and proceed with subsequent reallocation in RS. Klickovic's call only intensified Pale's leadership push to evacuate people, which had already commenced in January when VRS trucks were used to assist with the civilian withdrawal (Pomfret 1996b). Despite this hostile environment from Bosniak and Bosnian Serbs political leaderships, Michael Steiner continued working to ensure an orderly transfer of authority. In this sense, he presented on 15 February, a plan in which the FBiH police force would finally take over at the end of the transfer of authority, reflecting the ethnic composition based on the 1991 census. Serbian police officers who were not indicted for war crimes could serve within the incoming police force (Mihalka 1996).

#### The Rome meeting and the transfer of authority in the Serb-held districts

Several international conferences took place to define the generic and ambiguous civilian provisions of the DPA and monitor their implementation during the early post-war stages. The objective of the Rome Meeting celebrated on 18 February

1996, was to achieve a compromise of political elites in issues like Sarajevo and the FBiH. As a result of the resolution on Sarajevo, the capital city of BiH was reaffirmed as a united city in which there would be equal treatment and non-discrimination for Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Others,<sup>114</sup> while setting the JCCS as the consultative and coordinating body for this purpose (IFOR 1996a).<sup>115</sup>

This statement meant the approval of all essential elements of the OHR plan, negotiated during previous weeks and boycotted by the US through IFOR's performance. Thus, Bosnian Serbs would have both the opportunity to exercise fully their legal rights with respect to the governance of the city and to participate at municipality level in the supervision of issues such as education, social welfare, Serbian language and Cyrillic alphabet (Sell 1999). The implementation and transition of local structures, including police, had to be completed as scheduled by 19 March and carried out in accordance with the joint Statement that had been issued on 4 February between the High Representative and IFOR Commander after increasing uncertainty about the authority. Thus, until elections scheduled for September, FBiH authorities would act alongside Bosnian Serb representatives (elected in 1990) in the areas to be transferred, which would allow them to participate fully in the governance of the city at municipal level. Furthermore, during that period a plan had to be finalized and implemented to create a multi-ethnic FBiH police force. The IPTF was responsible for supervising and monitoring police force deployment and activities, while the IFOR would monitor overall security in Grbavica and the four suburbs during the period of transition.

Effectively, at the Rome Conference, the transfer of authority was finally defined. It was to commence in Vogošća on 23 February and on a six-day interval. International negotiators had not wanted to publish the timeline of the transfer earlier, in case it changed during last round negotiations in Rome, but this decision only increased the uncertainty of people in the suburbs. Eloquently, international management of the transfer had been highly criticised, even among international officials in Sarajevo, who recognised that the performance had little if any consideration of the fear that people felt in relation to the incoming takeover (Roane 1996a). As will be highlighted shortly, the Declaration signed in Rome had a weak foundation as a result of transatlantic

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<sup>114</sup> The DPA recognised only three constitutive ethnic groups: Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs. Bosnian minorities such as Yugoslavs, Albanians, Jews or Roma, are represented in the category "others" as long as they do not have the status of a constitutive group.

<sup>115</sup> The Declaration was supported by President Izetbegovic, President Milosevic, FBiH Prime Minister Muratovic, FBiH President Kresimir Zubak and RS Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic.

disagreements on international involvement and measures to create a smooth transition favourable for people who wished to stay.

Indeed, the confirmation and definition of the transfer of authority in Rome increased the severity of the SDS performance to prevent people staying on after the takeover. SDS cadres deployed several methods of intimidation and violence to push for the mass departure of people, such as nocturnal visits of extremists, arrests, theft, fires, assaults, vandalism or destruction of equipment (Kurtovic 1997). Furthermore, there was disruption of public services and spreading of fear by both RS media and gangs that were reportedly intimidating people who wished to remain in the districts (“On Thursday, Bosnian Federation Police Deployed to Ilijas”, 1996).

Between the meeting in Rome and the first transfer of authority, OHR members presented a plan defining the take-over of the newly formed FBiH police which had to be formed to include an ethnic representation proportional to that existing before the war. Essentially, the plan contained that the rest of the civilian administration would remain intact until mayors elected in 1990 elections could take over on 19 March (Bildt 1998, p.194). Yet, the response from Bosniak local authorities modified the initial proposal to increase the number of police officers in order to proceed with the registration of all buildings and individuals remaining in the districts, this significantly caused a transfer prior to its beginning and contravened basic human rights.

Increasing manoeuvres from RS authorities to displace people produced the first organized flight of Serbs from the Serb-held districts on 17 February 1996, with the departure of 800 families of Bosnian Serb soldiers killed during the war. This departure occurred amid calls for the mass departure of people from the self-designated RS foreign minister, Aleksa Buha, who claimed that the international community would not ensure the safety of Bosnian Serbs (McDowall 1996). The pressure from SDS leadership intensified and residents were surprised, when a televised announcement on 19 February, stressed that everyone in Vogošća should have departed by the start of the transfer of authority four days later and that transportation, including dozens of buses, would be provided from Pale by Bosnian Serb authorities (Murphy 1996).

Indeed, the transfer of authority started in Vogošća on 23 February with most of the Bosnian Serbs having already departed, highlighting the complexity of the situation and the success of multiple forces propelling a mass departure of people. The small number of people, who remained, most of them elderly, faced further pressure during

the takeover. Actually, a crisis ensued from the outset in the municipal building where about 1,000 people who had not left were gathered:

Sitting in his office the Serb mayor watched the Federation police approach in accordance with the agreed plan. Yet instead of respecting the agreement under which the civilian administration would be left untouched, they intimately stormed into his office and instructed him to leave. On the pretext of searching for concealed bombs they then proceeded to turn his office upside down. It was a brutal exercise clearly designated to intimidate him. He was hardly likely to have bombs in the office that he was going to use over the next few weeks. But the “bomb search” rapidly scared off all that was left of Serbian civilian administration in the municipality (Bildt 1998, p.195).

Vogošća’s Mayor, Rajko Koprivica, criticised both Bosnian Serb authorities for their statements which pushed people out, and internationals for doing nothing to help despairing residents who were fearful of remaining but also overwhelmed by the prospect of moving (Murphy 1996). At that time, Admiral Leighton Smith and Carl Bildt were in Pale talking to Momcilo Krajišnik. They both travelled to Vogošća, due to pressure from Bildt and Smith, whereby Krajišnik hesitantly encouraged people who wanted to stay to do so. Afterwards, he asked for help in the evacuation of people who did not want to stay. It was argued there was no alternative, and based on humanitarian grounds, both Admiral Smith and Carl Bildt authorised Bosnian Serb authorities to send trucks to Vogošća in order to evacuate the remaining people who wanted to leave (Bildt 1998).

Equally important, assistance in the evacuation of people was not restricted to Vogošća. The day after the transfer of authority, NATO and Bosnians Serbs negotiated a plan to allow for the evacuation of people in the four remaining Serb-held districts of Sarajevo. In the suburbs to be transferred, the DPA banned the presence of Serb military personnel and equipment, but the negotiated agreement permitted Serb army vehicles driven by unarmed and un-uniformed soldiers to help in the evacuation of civilians (Kinzer 1996). In practice, the military contributed to the mass exodus of people from the Serb-held districts. In such a frightening environment at the end of war, in which security was a central issue, neither the IFOR nor the IPTF played a proactive role in providing security during the transfer. Despite IPTF’s responsibility in monitoring the takeover, the peace agreement had defined a very limited role that was restricted to monitoring the Federal police. Furthermore, they were understaffed and incapable of dealing with the transfer. The insufficient intervention of police and military

international organisations was highlighted by their role prior to the transfer of authority, which was limited to handing out a list of good reasons for remaining (Roane 1996a).

The difficulty, if not the impossibility, of keeping together a significant number of people in a polity ruled exclusively by another ethnic group shortly after the cessation of hostilities, was well illustrated by people's reaction to symbols. The coat of arms of the Republic of BiH, worn by some of the FBiH police (despite calls to wear red badges with the words of Federal Police), enraged and frightened Bosnian Serbs who remained. According to estimations, about 1,000 people had remained in Vogošća following the transfer of authority ("More Serbs Abandon Sarajevo", 1996).<sup>116</sup> A similar event occurred when the Serbian flag was replaced by the Liljan flag, the official Bosnian flag at that time, which further increased fear within the small number of people remaining (Kuzmanović 1996).<sup>117</sup>

After the turmoil that occurred in Vogošća, a similar fate of mass exodus was anticipated in the rest of Serb-held districts. In Ilijaš, most people had already left when the transfer took place on 28 February. The transfer of authority in the north-western municipality of Sarajevo implied the connection of the territory of Sarajevo to the corridor with Zenica, allowing federal authorities to officially declare the end of the siege of Sarajevo (Barber 1996a). In the transfer of Hadžići, another axis of the complex political and territorial post-war composition was highlighted. It corresponded to Croat-Bosniak relations within the Federation of BiH. Twelve men, thought to be Bosnian Croat police officers, tried to obstruct the transfer by occupying the police station (Hedges 1996a). They complained that no one had consulted them on the ethnic composition of the new federation police, which consisted of fifty Muslims, five Bosnian Croats and fifteen Bosnian Serbs. The occupation, however, was tackled in this case by 100 heavily armed NATO troops.

Prior to the important transfer of authority in Ilidža and Grbavica, in both symbolic terms and population numbers affected, Bosnian Serbs elites ordered citizens to plunder housing upon leaving the city. Equally, intimidation occurred with Bosnian Serbs gangs, who were blamed for burning several buildings and even committing a

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<sup>116</sup> Despite the IPTF promoted registration of people who wished to stay, not everyone did so for fear of being identified.

<sup>117</sup> The coat of arms and the Lilijan flag were the official Bosnian symbols until 1998, when they were modified by the HR Carlos Westendorp after the Parliament of BiH failed to agree a solution. Both had strong resistance from Bosnian Serbs as this was related to Bosnian independence and subsequent war.

murder (“Sarajevo Put To Test; Again Chaos Fanned In Suburbs Before Federation Takes Over”, 1996). Steiner convened a meeting at OHR Headquarter on 10 March to try to persuade the IFOR to act following the lawless activities which took place in the two remaining districts under transfer. It was agreed to increase the presence of the IFOR and IPTF to prevent lawless activities (OHR 1996a) and, concurrently, a new instruction was set in NATO headquarters assisting the civilian implementation of the peace agreement based on a case by case basis (Kebo 1996a). Yet, the meeting, and subsequent new instruction, hardly modified events on the ground and mass departures also took place in Ilidža and Grbavica. Lawless activities were particularly violent in Ilidža where the transfer had to be completed by 12 March. Despite the agreement to increase the presence of military and international police, SDS leadership exploited the passivity of the IFOR who refrained from intervening due to its minimalist approach. IFOR remained passive, which produced astonishing situations, such as the inaction of Italian troops when an elderly couple required intervention to prevent Bosnian Serb gangs blasting their house (Holbrooke 1998).

When the takeover of Grbavica was completed by 19 March 1996, Sarajevo was reintegrated after a painful and lingering siege. Its completion, however, had the cost of further decreasing the city’s ethnic diversity after the mass departure of Bosnian Serbs, before the transfer of authority took place. Of the 80,000 Bosnian Serbs living after the cessation of hostilities in the Serb-held districts, approximately ten percent of people stayed when the transfer of authority was completed, most of them elderly people. The poor involvement of the military, more concerned with avoiding casualties than in properly implementing the DPA, allowed SDS leadership to freely push Sarajevo Serbs and Bosnian Serbs out of the districts to be transferred. Carl Bildt recognised the failure of the international community in the management of the transfer of Grbavica and the four suburbs. Frustrated by the management of the takeover from Bosniak leadership, Bildt stated that international mistakes were only overshadowed by the fact that Alija Izetbegović was responsible for betraying the multi-ethnic city (Bildt 1998, p.198).

Certainly, the performance of the SDA leadership in Sarajevo was not in line with any authority allegedly committed to the preservation of ethnic diversity in the Bosnian capital city. In this sense, their ambivalence regarding the selection of groups of Bosnian Serbs who would get governmental security if they stayed after the takeover, increasingly highlighted the contradiction between the rhetoric of preserving Bosnian ethnic diversity and local performance in Sarajevo, which consolidated a Bosniak



enclave. Notwithstanding, Carl Bildt focus on the betrayal of the multi-ethnic city by Izetbegović which neglected two crucial facts: firstly, SDS leadership actively and comprehensively performed to produce a mass exodus of people in line with the wartime goal of dividing Bosnian Serbs from other ethnic groups. Secondly, the institutionalisation of ethno-territorialities in the peace agreement was both a heavy burden and a very effective mechanism against the preservation of ethnic diversity at the end of war. It actually produced that the departure towards areas controlled by people's own ethnic community became the logical option to feel secure at the end of three-and-a-half years of war.

### The reallocation of Bosnian Serbs in Republika Srpska

This second wave of a mass departure of Serbs from Sarajevo took place in a very different context compared to the first departure at the beginning of war. In interviews conducted for this research, among people who left on the eve of the transfer of authority, all of them expressed the opinion that a mass departure was inevitable due to the existing conditions at the end of war. Most people decided to leave as a result of uncertainty and the impossibility of knowing how they would be treated if they decided to remain. In that context, the decision to leave was often taken on a short term basis and mainly, if not exclusively, driven by emotions. As claimed by one interviewee, he was not concerned at that time for his rights as a Bosnian Serb in the area of Sarajevo but, rather, he simply feared for life (Research Interview, 24 July 2015).<sup>118</sup>

Indeed, at the end of a war fought in the name of ethnicity, and the lingering siege of Sarajevo conducted by VRS, it transpired that remaining in a territory ruled mainly by Bosniak authorities actually persuaded people (paralysed by fear) to try and transfer from this affected districts. Despite claims that Bosnian Serbs should stay, international actors failed to create secure conditions and an institutional framework to foster equality among ethnic groups was absent. This environment of insecurity and uncertainty (as an individual and as a member of an ethnic group) only hindered the prospect of remaining for a significant number of people:

There was fear of a new situation, an unknown situation, yesterday at war and today you have to live together again. That was the situation. There was a lot of fear, as to how people who were your enemy during the war would behave.

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<sup>118</sup> Similar testimonies were found during archive work. A woman, during the transfer of authority in Vogosca, expressed the opinion that "if anyone could guarantee my safety, guarantee that I would not be killed, I would stay. But I am scared to death about what will come" (Roane 1996a).

There was a fear of revenge, a fear of how the minority would be treated by a majority. There were also fears as to whether your physical and psychological integrity would be recognised and protected, and whether economic, national, religious, social, and civil rights would be recognised and secured again. No one guaranteed that (Research Interview, 19 May 2015).

As envisioned by the SDS leadership, a mass exodus of Sarajevo Serbs and Bosnian Serbs living in the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo by the end of war, implied the emergence of homogeneous ethno-territorialities in the urban area of Sarajevo, divided between Sarajevo and Srpsko Sarajevo. As a result of the mass exodus in terms of population, significant concentrations of ethnic minorities did not remain for the whole country. The few thousands of Sarajevo Serbs and Bosnian Serbs who left the districts simply crossed the IEBL to resettle in Pale, Lukavica or Sokolac: SDS leadership could not conduct a mass reallocation to Srpsko Sarajevo.<sup>119</sup> Krajišnik's request to international organisations for assistance for the construction of temporary dwellings to host 45,000 families at the other side of the IEBL, i.e. in Srpsko Sarajevo, did not get any response so the limited housing capacity existing at that time in those mainly rural areas remained.<sup>120</sup> Therefore, many people were accommodated in vacant homes or in refugee centres in farther territories within Republika Srpska, especially in areas of eastern Bosnia that had been ethnically cleansed during the war by VRS and Serb paramilitary formations.

The Operational Staff for the Accommodation of Sarajevo Serbs supervised the departure of people from the Serb-held districts to be transferred, and their subsequent reallocation in RS territory. Bosnian Serb authorities did not provide significant assistance for the displacement of people but focused on orientating their movement.<sup>121</sup> More specifically, Bosnian Serb authorities ordered people's movements into specific areas within the RS, all heads of municipalities receiving information regarding the regions people should travel to after leaving (Research Interview, 19 May 2015). The displacement of people was linked to the reallocation of industry, which had already

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<sup>119</sup> Indeed, a few thousand only crossed the IEBL to resettle in Srpsko Sarajevo. In the summer of 1996, only 15,864 people displaced were living in the municipality of Pale, out of which 5,500 citizens were from the districts transferred to the FBiH (Srna 1996c).

<sup>120</sup> As will be analysed further in this chapter, Projects 1 and 2 were approved only a few months later, in June 1996, and the goal was to build an ethnically exclusive urban enclave in Srpsko Sarajevo through the provision of housing facilities, employment and leisure to Sarajevo Serbs and Bosnian Serbs who had left the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo.

<sup>121</sup> Resources were very limited to move people out, despite permission to use tracks and buses from NATO, many people did not have any support or, when existing, it was only restricted to fuel provisions (Research Interview, 28 May 2015).

commenced from the five Serb-held districts in January 1996, when the transfer of authority had not yet been fixed.<sup>122</sup> Finally, the departure was an achievement within the SDS agenda, dividing the Serbian population from other ethnic groups in Bosnia. Gojko Kllickovic celebrated the mass departure of people from the Sarajevo districts and claimed that by leaving their homes, the Sarajevo Serbs had once more showed that no price was too high for the creation of the Serbian state (Srna 1996b).<sup>123</sup>

### **SDA ethnocratic practices to consolidate domination over Sarajevo during early post-war stages**

The goal of the SDS leadership to achieve an ethnic division of the urban area of Sarajevo after the peace agreement remained immutable but the alleged commitment of the SDA leadership towards ethnic diversity in post-war Sarajevo was in doubt following the performance carried out, prior and during, the transfer of authority. This performance included, among other actions, a succession of frightening claims regarding the security of people who wished to stay in the Serb-held districts. SDA leadership commitment to ethnic diversity was further eroded with ethnocratic practices developed in Sarajevo in 1996 which affected ethnic composition and institutions. In this sense, SDA leadership moved to consolidate a favourable powerbase in the city during early post-war stages, intervening in the housing legislation and conducting ethnic engineering with the reallocation of Bosniaks, internally displaced in the Tuzla region, into abandoned apartments in the former Serb-held districts. Furthermore, party leadership also created an ethnocratic political order in Sarajevo's territory via the institutional reorganisation of the city, which allowed the party to have full and exclusive institutional authority in March 1996.

Focusing firstly on the practices affecting ethnic composition, the SDA intervened in the stabilisation of the wartime population after the cessation of hostilities through legislative procedures. In this sense, the amendment of housing property legislation benefited temporary residents, to the detriment of people who had left

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<sup>122</sup> For instance, these were the cases of Remont and Coca-Cola, who moved from Hadzici to Bratunac. Lasta, a bike and registration plate factory moved from Ilidza to Bijeljina. Thus, mass displacement of people from Hadzici to Srebrenica and Bratunac took place as well as from Ilidza towards Bijeljina and Zvornik. Only in the Bijeljina region, about 10,000 people from the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo had arrived in early March (Srna 1996a).

<sup>123</sup> Such a statement placed the agency of the creation of a Serbian nation in citizens which blurred party performance in the process of ethno-mobilisation and the multiple strategies employed, from persuasion to coercion, on the eve of the transfer of districts to produce a mass departure of population.

Sarajevo because of war. During war, laws regulating property rights in socially owned apartments and private properties were modified and abandoned apartments were subsequently used for the provision of alternative accommodation for people affected by forced displacement, or people from Sarajevo internally displaced, such as people living in the front line. Abandoned apartments were thus temporarily allocated to new tenants under the condition that could be used for one year after the cessation of immediate war danger. Yet, the Bosnian Government, ruled by the SDA, amended wartime property legislation in December 1995 to include clauses that virtually prevented displaced people returning to their pre-war homes.

More specifically, the Bosnian Government adopted a new Decree amending the *Law on Abandoned Apartments* in which a tenant's rights in socially owned apartments was cancelled permanently if the person failed to return in seven days, in cases of being internally displaced, or fifteen days if the person was abroad as a refugee, after the cessation of war danger set on 22 December by the Presidency of BiH (ICG 1998a).<sup>124</sup> In other words, people driven by war who had left their homes had until 29 December 1995, or 6 January 1996, to return in order to avoid losing their apartments. These deadlines were extremely difficult to accomplish and virtually excluded almost all people from keeping tenants' rights, especially in cases of refugees.<sup>125</sup> Even in cases where a return did take place within the narrow deadline, displaced people could lose their rights anyway if temporary residents occupied the apartment. Ombudsmen of the FBiH, Vera Jovanovic, claimed that regulation concerning the expiry of tenants' rights was directed primarily against all civilians who had left the various towns (Peranic 1996a). Importantly, pre-war tenants lost their right as holders, as apartments were

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<sup>124</sup> Other parties like the HDZ, whose potential voters had left Sarajevo in great numbers, had proposed an amendment in the *Law on Abandoned Apartments* that allowed displaced people to repossess socially-owned apartments within seven days or, if temporary occupied, in fifteen days. In this case, temporary users should be accommodated in collective centres or hotels all over the Federation till they return to their own places. The *Law on Housing Relations* regulated occupancy right holders for socially owned apartments, which could be only lost in case of having been left unused for a period longer than six months. The *Law on Abandoned Apartments* was passed in 1992 to regulate abandonment of socially-owned apartments, the main category in Sarajevo, as in other urban areas. The *Law on Abandoned Apartments* dispossessed rights to people who deserted or were in possession of weapons without a proper license. In case of forced displacement, however, authorities could not declare the property abandoned so pre-war occupants kept their rights. Unlike in socially-owned apartments, the *Law on Temporarily Abandoned Real Property Owned by Citizens* suggested that owners retained ownership despite houses being declared abandoned and temporary occupied by displaced persons.

<sup>125</sup> Despite having a further week, returning to Bosnia from other European countries or elsewhere was difficult at the end of war, even if proper information and resources were at the disposal of individuals and families. Almost half of the four million Bosnians had been displaced by war, either internally, about one million, or abroad as refugees, 1.3 million (UNHCR 2010).

declared abandoned and permanently lost without any public hearing. Afterwards, those apartments were assigned new occupancy rights either on a temporary or permanent basis.

Subsequently, housing amendments implied that any persons displaced lost legal grounds to move back into their original homes and were prevented from successfully reclaiming their pre-war homes in favour of temporary residents. In March 1997, after 23,000 had lodged complaints to her office, the Human Rights Ombudsperson for Bosnia encouraged people to continue doing so. Such legislative change prevented returns and impeded the stabilisation of an ethnic structure, now much less diverse due to the mass displacement of population, and the arrival of tens of thousands of Bosniaks internally displaced. Thus, displaced people who tried to return shortly after the end of hostilities found negative responses from authorities, who rejected nearly every petition that the OSCE had issued on behalf of people who had lost their homes, as expressed by Branka Raguz, OSCE's official who monitored human rights violations:

The Government makes no exception for people who were sick, had difficulty coming back or were not informed of the expropriation law. This is nothing more than government-sanctioned robbery (Hedges 1996b).

SDA housing policy was conducted amid discussion on the *Law on Purchasing Housing Units*, this law aimed to transform temporary users into future owners whom, after the purchase, it would be impossible to move or evict from their private real estate. In January 1997 there was a last minute amendment of the *Law on Purchasing Housing Units* at the BiH Federal Parliament. Taking advantage of the absence of HDZ representatives, the amendment presented just before voting in of the law, allowed the approval of further legal provisions benefiting temporary residents and vulnerable groups who were occupying abandoned apartments. In this sense, families of killed combatants or disabled veterans and refugees were permitted to stay for a maximum period of five years until adequate housing was provided for them or until they were able to return to their pre-war homes (Simic 1997).<sup>126</sup>

Significantly, the SDA housing policy during early post-war stages unfulfilled the peace agreement, as Annex VII guaranteed the right to repossess pre-war homes by all displaced peoples. This agreement provided some certainty to individuals who had resettled in Sarajevo expelled from other areas of Bosnia. Extending the period in which

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<sup>126</sup> The privatization of apartments started in the Federation of BiH in March 1998, the context of which amendments discriminating against pre-war tenants were being amended as a result of international pressure to implement Annex VII, as will be analysed in chapter four.

they could remain temporarily in apartments was reasonable in order to avoid new mass displacements of population, reallocations in collective centres and further suffering to people. Certainly, the post-war situation was very complex with the existence of about half of the Bosnian population either internally displaced or a refugee abroad.<sup>127</sup> Yet, providing a certainty to people internally resettled in Sarajevo through the permanent cancellation of the rights of pre-war tenants, leaves serious doubts about the real motivations of Bosniak authorities. The party was the only proponent to include mechanisms in the peace agreement to remake pre-war ethnic composition but during the early post-war stages it acted to consolidate, temporarily or not, wartime population in Sarajevo. SDA housing policy operated in practice by having control over a significant number of socially-owned apartments in urban areas, which in the Sarajevo Canton accounted for fifty six percent of the 80,400 apartments in the 1990s (ICG 1998a).

Indeed, discriminative housing policy towards pre-war residents allowed the distribution of abandoned apartments among a power base favourable to the SDA. The donation of an apartment became the first payoff to future voters who could remain in the city (Peranic 1996b; Cox 1998). Furthermore, it was also a mechanism to consolidate the housing situation in the city by party elites and authorities. In this sense, a great number of abandoned apartments had been distributed among SDA loyal members and their families during war, to increase and improve their housing situation in the city. Such arbitrary reallocation started the so-called multiple occupancy of apartments, as people illegally accumulated more than one apartment in the city.

#### Further ethnic engineering: the reallocation of internally displaced persons to Sarajevo

SDA housing policy, which implied the stabilization of a wide majority of the Bosniak population in Sarajevo at the end of war, was not the only ethnocentric practice conducted by the SDA in the capital city of Bosnia. Actually, the process of ethnic homogenization of Sarajevo's population took on another dimension between the spring and summer of 1996. The HDZ and especially the SDS had been active in resorting to ethnic engineering as a demographic strategy to create and consolidate the process of

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<sup>127</sup> Such complexity was also seen in the case of Sarajevo. People who had left Serb-held districts during the war and were living in Sarajevo were pushed back to their homes in order to empty temporary occupied flats for those who were returning to Sarajevo.

ethno-territorialisation.<sup>128</sup> As seen in the reallocation of Bosnian Serbs in Republika Srpska after the transfer of authority, however, the SDA also performed in an ethnocratic way to turn Sarajevo into a Bosniak city following the mass exodus of Bosnian Serbs from Grbavica and the four suburbs. SDA leadership promoted the reallocation of the Bosniak population from other parts of BiH into abandoned houses. Thus, from May 1996 about 500 Bosniaks were transferred daily to Sarajevo by bus from refugee centres in Tuzla (Demick 1996a). People transferred were internally displaced persons ethnically cleansed from Eastern Bosnia during the war, mostly from Srebrenica and the rest of the Podrinje region. By late July, about 25,000 reallocations had already taken place in the former Serb-held districts of Sarajevo (Stiglmayer 1996).<sup>129</sup>

The driving motivation of the reallocation conducted by the SDA was the consolidation of Sarajevo as a Bosniak enclave in an early post-war context in which all nationalist parties saw the partition of Bosnia as a possibility. Previously, in Sarajevo, a discussion on ethnic partition had been taboo, however, in spring 1997 articles in Sarajevo's mainly Muslim press were exploring such ideas while Muslim leadership circulated a map showing territories that were demanding to be part of a partitioned BiH if the peace agreement failed ("Chop up Bosnia?", 1997). In this sense, *Dani*, an influential weekly magazine, displayed a map of a future Bosnia on its front cover assuming that Serbs would lose territory surrounding Banja Luka. This map was just one of several proposals considered by an all-Bosniak council integrated by eight people and set up by Bosnia's President, Alija Izetbegović.

Renowned local and international figures defined the reallocation as an SDA episode of ethnic engineering to make Sarajevo a Bosniak-dominated city.<sup>130</sup> Importantly, the reallocation was a setback for Michael Steiner's continuous efforts within the JCCS to create conditions in Sarajevo for equal treatment for all constituent

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<sup>128</sup> I define ethnic engineering as the mass displacement of an ethnic group following a political or military plan.

<sup>129</sup> The reallocation of Bosniaks, who had not previously lived in Sarajevo, was not exclusive to 1996 and continued at a slower pace afterwards, with a total of 19,623 people moving to Sarajevo during 1997 (ICG 1998a). Notwithstanding, no evidence has been found in this research to show that the process was driven by the SDA. Actually, considering information found in the archives, the daily transfer by bus of numbers from refugee centres in Tuzla to Sarajevo took place between the spring and summer of 1996.

<sup>130</sup> There were expressions in this line from Michael Steiner, Dušan Šehovac, member of DISS, actively involved in the stay of Bosnian Serbs in Grbavica and the suburbs of Sarajevo, and Srdjan Dizdarevic, president of the Helsinki Committee of BiH. Michael Steiner forcefully criticised the SDA political leadership, accusing the Bosniak-led Government of Bosnia of building an ethnic enclave with internally displaced persons.

nations in BiH. In this sense, Ilidža had integrated fourteen local Bosnian Serbs from municipal institutions when Serb intimidation and reallocation in the suburbs started in the spring of 1996 (OHR 1996d). Contrary to positions which defined the ethnocratic nature of the reallocation, SDA general secretary, Mirsad Ceman claimed, that the reallocation had put SDA in a huge dilemma as it was against the party's general policy of favouring ethnic diversity. He defended the current arrangement whereby a huge number of internally displaced living in collective centres were not prevented to move, at least temporarily, into abandoned housing around Sarajevo (Stiglmayer 1996). Ceman's words highlighted the perseverant efforts to portray the SDA as essentially distinct to other nationalist parties while covering, at the same time, that displacement was a political action driven by party leadership.

The reallocation of Bosniaks in the former Serb-held districts that had been reintegrated to Sarajevo, where housing was available after the departure of Bosnian Serbs, could certainly be justified as a humanitarian attempt to dignify the life of people ethnically cleansed during war. However, Ceman's argument to provide temporarily occupation in Sarajevo to victims of war could only be sustained by neglecting SDA housing policy, which had previously cancelled the rights of displaced peoples to repossess pre-war homes. The fact that the driving motivation of the reallocations was not exclusively temporary occupation was highlighted by Mehemed Kaltak's words, the city official, who was in charge of allocating abandoned apartments:

We have 30,000 people in this city who were forced from their homes in areas of Bosnia now controlled by the Serbs and the Croats. These displaced people have no place to live. These are the people who we must help, not the people who fled Sarajevo during the war. No one expelled people from Sarajevo. Those who left abandoned their homes of their own free will, so they have lost them (Hedges 1996b).<sup>131</sup>

Further evidence highlighted the argument that ethnicity rather than humanitarianism was the driving motivation of the SDA leadership in the reallocation of Bosniaks internally displaced from other parts of Bosnia. Significantly, there was an absence of protection to Bosnian Serbs who had remained in the suburbs when violence against them occurred concurrently during the reallocation of people in the former Serb-held districts. Gangs of demobilized soldiers, and some of the internally displaced persons who were being reallocated within the suburbs, allegedly perpetuated violence and

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<sup>131</sup> His words also revealed the widespread vision at that time among Sarajevans that people who had left the city did not have right to return.



intimidation. According to data from the United Nations, only thirty six Serbs were expelled illegally from their homes in May 1996 (Demick 1996a). The DISS denounced the fact that 3,000 homes had been illegally occupied and over 2,000 buildings burned down and looted by early June. Moreover, it was reported that there were 150 cases of severe threats to individuals, from which twenty cases resulted in serious injuries (Obradovic 1996).

Alija Izetbegović was forcefully criticised for the alleged impossibility of protecting the remaining Bosnian Serbs and, again, for his passivity and non-condemnation of violence (Wilkinson 1996). Indeed, the SDA's leadership role in this violent episode was extremely dubious. The passivity of the police in stopping the intimidation of remaining Serbs had already been denounced following the transfer of authority between February and March (Pomfret 1996c). Significantly, after Izetbegovic sent a letter to the Federal Minister of the Interior, Avdo Habib, in which it was ordered indirectly that anarchy had to be stopped, federal policemen became more active, mobile and efficient overnight (Vukmirovic 1996). No less important, there were cases in which even the authorities directly performed to frighten Bosnian Serbs during the reallocation of Bosniaks internally displaced from Tuzla. Effectively, FBiH police forces in the municipalities of Ilidža, Vogošća and Ilijaš, placed mines in front of the homes of Bosnian Serb figures who had been working to maintain Bosnian Serbs in the districts after the transfer of authority (Kebo 1996b). Violence against Bosnian Serbs was recognised by deputies of Alija Izetbegović in an attempt to downplay these events in the aftermath of war:

We have so many refugees, so many demobilized soldiers who aren't receiving any pay. No police force on earth could keep law and order under these circumstances. Criminals see this situation as an opportunity to steal somebody else's property and they think it is easier to steal a Serb's property, pretending it is some kind of nationalist act when it really is a just crime (Demick 1996a).

There was an expansive ethnic transformation of Sarajevo from the beginning of the war and this was due to the influx into Bosniak city, of internally displaced and departed Sarajevans, with a first wave of Sarajevo Serbs leaving on the eve of war, generally following SDS instructions, or during the siege.<sup>132</sup> The second episode of

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<sup>132</sup> There was also the departure of many Sarajevans from other ethnic groups during the siege, which suggested that the Bosniak population in Sarajevo increased in relative terms during the war. However, the second post-war episode of ethnic engineering conducted by the SDA suggested that the Bosniak population also increased in absolute terms during the spring and summer of 1996. In this sense, UN

ethnic engineering in Sarajevo, by the SDA, occurred during the post-war period, after the SDS pushed for the reallocation of people from the Serb-held districts into the RS, which further increased ethnic homogenisation in both polities. In Sarajevo, the population became predominantly Bosniak while there was an ethnically homogeneous Srpsko Sarajevo, with only a Bosnian Serb population since the early stages of war when the authorities and military expelled Bosniaks from municipalities like Pale.

Moreover, this episode revealed that the SDA leadership, committed rhetorically to a multi-ethnic Bosnia, was equally resorting to ethnic engineering to consolidate Sarajevo as a Bosniak city. Such reallocation of Bosniaks internally displaced to abandoned apartments in the former Serb-held districts of Sarajevo, cemented ethno-territorialisation of its urban area and would also have implications during the subsequent implementation of Annex VII, which guaranteed repossession of pre-war homes as is analysed in chapter four. In this sense, the group most hostile to minority returns were displaced persons of the majority group who feared once again being displaced by the return of the pre-war resident.<sup>133</sup> In Vogošća, for instance, where a significant number of widows from Srebrenica were reallocated, local authorities were especially hostile to minority returns (Cox 1998).

#### The post-war institutional reorganisation of Sarajevo

The mass ethnic transformation of Sarajevo since the beginning of the war and the subsequent policies for its consolidation implied the consolidation of an ethno-territorial order in the capital city of BiH. This consolidation had, in the institutionalisation of a local ethnocracy, a source of power and resources for its subsequent reproduction. Sarajevo would be part of the FBiH after Milosevic rejected the proposal by international negotiators in Dayton to form a District for the joint ruling of the city amongst Bosnian constituent groups. As a result, the Bosnian capital city became one of the Cantons in which the Croat-Bosniak entity was organised and, during early post-war stages, became a Canton exclusively under Bosniak authority because of

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estimations placed Bosniak's population at around 303,000 inhabitants, which represented eighty seven percent of Sarajevo's population (ICG 1998a). This is contrasted with pre-war figures from the 1991 Census, when Bosniaks registered in Sarajevo totalised 252,000 people and represented half of Sarajevo's population.

<sup>133</sup> Minority returns is defined as those persons who return to pre-war homes in a territory controlled by another ethnic group. After the creation of ethnocracies and its legalisation in DPA, it must be considered qualitatively, rather than quantitative, as it has significant political and socio-economic implications.

the reorganisation conducted by the SDA, which expelled representatives from other ethnic groups after failing to reach an agreement with the HDZ.

Despite the centrality of Sarajevo in peace negotiations, its final status was not completely resolved, and a discrepancy existed between the DPA and the Constitution of the Federation of BiH, which had been approved in February 1994 as part of the Washington Agreement to cease hostilities between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. Thus, the Constitution of the FBiH defined Sarajevo as its capital city in Article Fourteen and as a State District in the tenth Article. In this context, an agreement had to be reached in time for the transfer of the authority of territories between entities, i.e. ninety days after the peace agreement came into force. Shortly after the signature of the DPA, negotiations began to define the final organization of the city. A committee for the organisation of Sarajevo was established with core negotiations taking place between the SDA and the HZD as part of Croat–Bosniak relations to jointly rule the Federation of BiH. Because of the DPA, the idea of reorganising Sarajevo as a Canton prevailed. High ranking members of the city had decided that Sarajevo would be organized as a Canton and both the City Commission and the Assembly began to work to adapt the status of the city (Babić 1995).<sup>134</sup>

An agreement was signed in February 1996 by Kresimir Zubak, the Croat president of the Federation, and Ejup Ganic, SDA vice president, to form a joint administration in the capital city. Both parties, however, failed to agree on specific power-sharing measures and the HDZ withdrew from the agreement at the beginning of March (“Croats back out of agreement on Sarajevo”, 1996). Furthermore, the SDA refused to share power in Sarajevo with the Federal coalition partner in a fifty-fifty system (Peranić 1996b). The party was in a very powerful position in Sarajevo after being economically and politically empowered during the siege while HDZ demands did not correspond to that reality, in relation to its ethnic composition, as the Croatian pre-war population in Sarajevo represented less than seven percent. After the SDA rejection, HDZ, holding approximately one third of the power in the Canton, argued logically that they should be entitled to the same level of the power in Sarajevo regardless of the election results, due to their position as one of the three constituent nations in Bosnia (Kovacevic 1996). The offer from SDA was not compatible with

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<sup>134</sup> The creation of a Canton was actually supported by the SDP leadership of Zlatko Lagumdžija and Nijaz Duraković. SDP member of the committee for the Organisation of Sarajevo, Bozo Kljajic, argued that after the peace agreement the establishment of a Canton was more realistic than a District (Kozar 1996).

HDZ requirements i.e. an offer of only two seats on the council of the main Bosnian Croat party (Cerkez 1996).

The arguments used by the HDZ did not differ from the policy of national homogenization as they insisted on the exclusive right to represent all the Bosnian Croat population. Their demands were not motivated by the will to maintain ethnic diversity in Sarajevo but, rather, to reproduce in Sarajevo the territorial logic of ethnicisation. This was highlighted by the alternative, envisioned in case a joint agreement on the governance of Sarajevo was not reached. In this sense, the HDZ was planning to form the so-called “Croat Sarajevo” through the connection of the area of Stup, which is located in the municipality of Ilidža and has been historically claimed as Croat, with Kiseljak and the rest of Herzeg-Bosna. In this context, Croats from Herzegovina were significantly purchasing houses in areas abandoned by Bosnian Serbs during the transfer of authority, such as Rajlovac, Kobilja Glava or Hadžići (Peranić 1996b).<sup>135</sup>

A lack of consensus between the HDZ and the SDA made the constitution of the Canton more difficult and the mayor of Sarajevo, Tarik Kupusovic, postponed the meeting on 4 March after realizing that an agreement between parties did not exist. Thus, the formation of the Transitional Assembly of the Sarajevo Canton was postponed until an agreement was reached within an eight-day deadline.<sup>136</sup> HDZ’s demand for one third of the power was neglected and with no consensus with the main Bosnian Croat party, (who envisaged that the Sarajevo Canton would be established after consultations at FBiH level), councilmen set up in Kupusovic’s absence the Transitional Assembly of the Sarajevo Canton on 11 March (Sucic 1996). This resulted in the exclusion of other ethnic group representatives from Sarajevo institutions as the Canton was set with thirty five Bosniaks out of thirty seven representatives.<sup>137</sup>

The Party leadership, rather than SDA municipal representatives, decided to go ahead with the constitution of an ethnically exclusive Sarajevo Canton. The institutional

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<sup>135</sup> The entrance of Croat police into Hadžići during the transfer of suburbs, analyzed in a previous section, responded to this pattern of asserting control over the areas of Sarajevo claimed as Croats.

<sup>136</sup> The decision was taken after several party representatives mentioned that in most cases there had been some mistake in the selection of the municipal representatives to the Cantonal transitory Assembly (“Kanton na čekanju” 1996).

<sup>137</sup> Non-Bosniaks representatives included one Croat and one Serb. Despite the formation of the Transitional Assembly of the Sarajevo Canton there was a six-month vacuum as the Cantonal parliament did not hold any session between 11 March and 5 October, after the first post-war elections took place. At the party level, the formation of the Sarajevo Canton was followed by purges in the City Committee of the SDA, which was renamed as Cantonal Committee of the SDA and Prof. Safet Halilovic was replaced by Dr. Ismet Gavrankapetanovic as the president (Čalo 1996).

reorganisation of Sarajevo had many political implications that transcended the local sphere and it was due to the supremacy of SDA hardliners within party leadership. The dissolution of the city assembly was not agreed within the SDA, and the leadership imposed their will during negotiations. Actually, among city deputies there were alternative visions. One alternative pursued the survival of the city government formed by 120 members from all ethnicities, with the exclusion only of twenty eight SDS representatives elected in the 1990 elections. Another envisioned an Assembly representing only citizens and not ethnic groups, which should only be represented in the entities and BiH parliaments and would end the reproduction of ethnic dialectics at all institutional levels (Research Interview, 11 November 2013). This move by the SDA leadership thus resulted in the formation of a mono-ethnic institution, excluding representatives from other ethnic groups. In other words, the formation of a mono-ethnic Sarajevo Canton implied the institutionalisation of a local ethnocratic regime under SDA authority during the early post-war stages. Such exclusion was a significant setback for the long standing ethnic coexistence symbolic of the Bosnian capital city.<sup>138</sup>

#### OHR's response to SDA ethnocratic practices

SDA ethnocratic practices during the first half of 1996 were tackled distinctively by the OHR. The housing policy, cancelling the right to repossess homes from displaced peoples, and the episode of ethnic engineering was hardly responded to afterwards due to the passivity of the international community in 1996 and 1997 in relation to Annex VII. As will be analysed in the following chapter, it was not until the empowerment of the High Representative and subsequent signature of the Sarajevo Declaration that international actors turned towards the implementation of Annex VII, which was the main mechanism to try to rebuild ethnic diversity both in Sarajevo and in the rest of BiH.

Prior to the High Representative's enforcement, SDA housing policy favouring temporary residents, was only responded to with calls demanding the removal of legislation that was contrary to Annex VII, i.e. the dispossession of a right conducive to

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<sup>138</sup> The decision was defined by Tarik Kupusovic, whose mayoralty ended due to the dissolution of the City Council to the detriment of the Canton, as short-sighted and pursuant only with the satisfaction of gaining more power in the short term (Guillén 1996).

displaced people in the case of socially-owned apartments.<sup>139</sup> On the other hand, the mono-ethnic institutional reorganisation of Sarajevo was quickly addressed to secure stability within the Federation of BiH, with the OHR moving to find an organisation that guaranteed the inclusion of all ethnic groups. International intervention occurred within the Federation Forum where negotiations on the FBiH took place under the co-chairmanship of Michael Steiner and the US Assistant Secretary of State (Chandler 1999). The US maintained a significant influence over developments within the Federation during the early post-war period after being the architect of the Federation of BiH that halted the war between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats in 1994.

The OHR intervened within this framework and the Deputy HR, who continuously supervised and proposed solutions in Sarajevo within the JCCS, conducted the main task once again. The deputy HR's role within FBiH's affairs was reinforced as chairman in the Federation Implementation Council established in 1996, as one of the most important committees within the Federation Forum. In this context, the organization of the city of Sarajevo was dealt with within FBiH negotiations at the invitation of Michael Steiner a mere fortnight after the SDA's mono-ethnic reorganisation. Both the President and Vice President of the FBiH, respectively Kresimir Zubak and Ejup Ganic, committed to submitting a draft on the reorganization of Sarajevo by 5 April. This resulted in a principle agreement relating to the organizational structure of Sarajevo in the Petersburg Declaration on the FBiH signed three weeks later, on 25 April (OHR 1996c).

The principle agreement comprised the organisation of Sarajevo in three layers; an overarching Canton with its suburban municipalities, a City and a District. The multiethnic reorganisation of Sarajevo took a decisive step six months later when on 25 October the Protocol on the Organization of Sarajevo was agreed between Alija Izetbegović and Kresimir Zubak. The three-layered organization was finally accepted and the Canton would be integrated by: (1) nine municipalities that had remained within the FBiH, equivalent to the territory of the City of Sarajevo since 1977<sup>140</sup> (2) the City of Sarajevo formed as a self-governing unit integrated by the four core municipalities, i.e. Stari Grad, Centar, Novo Sarajevo and Novi Grad, and (3) a State District under the

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<sup>139</sup> The intervention of the High Representative, having been granted legislative and executive authority, is analysed in the next chapter within the framework of the international strategy to rebuild ethnic diversity in Sarajevo.

<sup>140</sup> Stari Grad, Centar, Novo Sarajevo and Novi Grad, Vogosca, Ilidza, Ilijas, Hadzici and Trnovo.

authority of BiH, which corresponded to those buildings of the state institutions (Figure 6).<sup>141</sup>

The Protocol on the Organization of Sarajevo set a power-sharing system that, based on the constituent nations of the Federation of BiH, guaranteed the participation of representatives from minority ethnic groups in all administrative levels. In the Cantonal, administration ethnic quotas were placed in the executive. The President, Vice President, Chairman of the Assembly, the Ministers and respective Deputies in key Ministries, i.e. Interior and Housing, could not belong to the same ethnic group. Moreover, there was an obligation to work together in the process of decision-making, with consultations required before taking important decisions.

Furthermore, the balanced representation of each ethnic group should be extended to all levels of the Cantonal judiciary and executive. In the re-established City of Sarajevo, each group identified in the FBiH's constitution, i.e. Bosniaks, Croats and Others, were guaranteed a minimum of twenty percent of the seats, which in practice benefited SDA and HDZ.<sup>142</sup> Bosniaks and Croats were guaranteed between fifteen and twenty percent of positions within the Government, the same proportion for the third group, the so-called "Others" (OHR 1996e). Furthermore, a mechanism to protect all ethnic groups from sensitive issues was introduced. Culture, education, religion and national monuments were defined as vital to the national interest, so the legislative decisions in the City Council in some of these fields required a majority including at least four Council members of the three constitutive ethnic groups of BiH.<sup>143</sup> Finally, at the level of Municipalities, a representative of the second ethnic group would be the Chairman of the Municipal Council in cases where the group counted at least ten percent of the total population of the Municipality.

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<sup>141</sup> The District was thus not subject to the jurisdiction of either Entity. It was formed by the Presidency of the BiH, Governmental buildings (Council of Ministers), Parliamentary Assembly, Constitutional Court, Central Bank and Commission on Human Rights.

<sup>142</sup> The Constitution of the Federation of BiH did not recognise Serbs as a constitutive group until 2002; during that period they had limited representation within the "Others" marginal category.

<sup>143</sup> The City of Sarajevo achieved competences in city finances, public services/infrastructure, urban planning, local land use, public transport, culture, primary and secondary education, local business, charitable organizations, local radio and television, and local tourism. The City also received authority for all executive aspects of housing policy.




Figure 6. The administrative reorganisation of Sarajevo. Source: author.

For all that, problems regarding the implementation of the Protocol soon emerged. For its fulfilment, it became necessary, within a month of its signature, to amend both Federal and Cantonal Constitutions to introduce basic principles of the new organizational structure of Sarajevo. Furthermore, the adoption of the City Statute was necessary to complete the re-establishment of the City Council. Delays in the implementation appeared and three months after the signature nothing had been done to establish the city government, with Kresimir Zubak seeking Michael Steiner's involvement in establishing the city government ("Uspostaviti gradsku vlast prema protokolu", 1997). On 24 February 1997, Steiner urged Presidents Izetbegović and



Zubak to implement the Sarajevo Protocol immediately and required them to become personally involved, if necessary, to overcome any obstacles in meeting deadlines.<sup>144</sup>

Despite the insistence of the Steering Board of the PIC (OHR 1997b) the implementation of the Sarajevo Protocol experienced continuous delays and shortcomings. The formula to distribute governmental positions among different ethnic groups and parties – Mayor, Deputy Mayors, Council President, and Vice-President – became problematic after elections and the OHR had to intervene, thereby proposing as President, Zeljko Komsic, Croat member of SDP party, who would become elected on 20 January (OHR 1998a). It was not until September 1997 that the assembly of the Canton of Sarajevo unanimously amended the constitution to create the City of Sarajevo.

The City Council was thus finally re-established in February 1998, but Cantonal authorities continuously unfulfilled the implementation of the Sarajevo Protocol. The limited impact of the Protocol was seen in the very poor implementation of the three-layer reorganisation of Sarajevo.<sup>145</sup> More importantly, the three main ethnic groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina once again formally represented Sarajevo, but despite regulations which seemed to give minority groups a strong voice in policy-making, on paper it was not translated in the decision-making process. Power-sharing mechanisms did not develop, in early post-war stages, a governance system promoting cooperation and effective political inclusion of all three Bosnian constituent groups. From a powerful position, the SDA ethnocratic regime was not affected by the three-layered multi-ethnic reorganisation of Sarajevo and the power structure continued under

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<sup>144</sup> In this sense, amendments of the Canton and Federation Constitution had to be approved by the Assemblies by 14 March, while the following day the City Council had to constitute itself, adopt the City Statute and elect the new Mayor of the City of Sarajevo (OHR 1997d). However, two months later, on 26 March, Michael Steiner mediated in the Commission for the Implementation of the Sarajevo Protocol. The Commission, that gathered all parties represented in the Cantonal Assembly –SDA, SDP, HDZ, UBDS and SBiH– agreed drafts amendments of both Constitutions, the Statute of the City of Sarajevo and a Side Agreement on the Implementation of Sarajevo Protocol.

<sup>145</sup> For instance, the City Council remained in a weak position due to the few competencies and resources vested despite being re-established. A year and half afterwards, the Canton had not yet adopted a Law on the City of Sarajevo, preventing the recognition of Sarajevo as a City under the Constitution of the FBiH (OHR 1999c). Periodically, Sarajevo Canton authorities marginalised and undermined institutionally the City of Sarajevo. One example was the exclusion of the Mayor Muhidin Hamamdžić in the twinning ceremony with Barcelona in November 2000, from which the city was excluded to sign the protocol (Omeragić 2000b). Economically, Sarajevo Canton reduced the budget of the city by thirty percent in 2003 in an attempt to reduce the functions of the city (Bakšić 2003). Beriz Belkic, Prime Minister of the Sarajevo Canton between November 1998 and February 2001 defined his reluctance to transfer powers to the City as the biggest mistake of his legislature (Žarić 2002). Such resistance, based apparently on financial reasons, has left until presently, an organization of Sarajevo contrary to the European Charter on Local Self-management.

exclusive party domination until November 2000, when the SDP, for the first time, won Cantonal elections.<sup>146</sup>

### **SDS project to build an ethnically exclusive Srpsko Sarajevo**

In parallel to SDA ethnocentric practices to consolidate power in institutions and a favourable power base in the city, the SDS continued with the plan to ethnically divide the urban area of Sarajevo. The failure to keep authority in the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo after the transfer of authority, implied that only Pale, and other districts with small built-up areas in the municipalities of Stari Grad, Trnovo, Ilidža, Novi Grad, Centar and Novo Sarajevo, remained in Srpsko Sarajevo after the war (Figure 7). Despite containing some facilities before war, such as Energoinvest and the Faculty of Electrical Engineering at the University of Sarajevo, these eastern and southern peripheral municipalities of Sarajevo were mostly rural, which prevented a mass reallocation from Sarajevo to Srpsko Sarajevo. After the failure to ethnically divide the urban core of Sarajevo, and the loss of the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo during peace negotiations, SDS leadership looked for a new strategy to achieve the ethnic division of the city. Thus, Pale authorities planned to compensate the material, economic and symbolic loss of the capital city of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the construction of a new city in the territory of Srpsko Sarajevo.

As referred to earlier in this chapter, the SDS leadership started to contemplate the reallocation of Bosnian Serbs from the Serb-held districts to Srpsko Sarajevo in late December 1995. The project commenced when Momčilo Krajišnik requested that Carl Bildt and Admiral Smith seek funds to build temporary dwellings for 45,000 families at the other side of the IEBL, in Srpsko Sarajevo. The lack of support and funding from international actors, however, did not deter the project and in early March, before the transfer of all five districts was completed, the initial details regarding the project to build a new city in Srpsko Sarajevo were presented. This project, a new Serb Sarajevo, was prepared in forty days by an architectural firm from Belgrade, called Studio, at the request of Momčilo Krajišnik and Radovan Karadzic (Demick 1996b; Perić-Zimonjić 1996). With an estimated cost of \$6 billion for the first ten years, the project had four urban zones in which 145,000 people could live. The main area would be developed around the centre of Pale while administrative, industrial, cultural and housing zones

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<sup>146</sup> Previously, SDA ran in coalition with SBiH in 1998 elections so the executive authority was shared between members of both Bosniak parties.

would be spread over territories from Pale to Lukavica. The coordinator of the project, Vojislav Milovanovic, stated that the construction could start in May and that the project was a guideline for the next decade (Perić-Zimonjić 1996).

This project to urbanise Srpsko Sarajevo, aimed at consolidating the ethnic division of the urban area of Sarajevo with the provision of housing and employment to people who had left Sarajevo. As expressed by the authorities, the project envisioned the transformation of Srpsko Sarajevo which would become “the town for the Serbs who were forced to leave their homes, a town for Sarajevans who were experiencing the international injustice, the town of hope for them” (SS 2002, p.1). Its development was actually seen as a vital and symbolic measure for the survival of Serb people both in the BiH and Serbia. (“The development of the Serbian Sarajevo represents the vital interest of the Serbian people on the both sides of the Drina river”, 1997).

Crucially, two and a half months after the presentation of the project, on 28 May 1996, the Government of Yugoslavia and the Government of RS reached an agreement to urbanise Srpsko Sarajevo. The Protocol, signed on 26 July 1996, confirmed funds to carry out the so-called Project I and Project II (SS 2002).<sup>147</sup> All kind of facilities were planned, such as sports centres, arenas, schools, universities, churches and office buildings. The comprehensive nature of the project envisioned a functional Sarajevo and breaking any dependence of Srpsko Sarajevo with the urban core. For all that, the great expectations generated from the Pale leadership alongside Krajišnik and Karadzic announcements in media, were not met financially. Indeed, the signature of the Protocol guaranteed only a very modest amount of money to fund Projects I and II.


Actually, the budget was only 107 million KM, far removed from the six billion dollars envisioned in the first project presented in Belgrade, which was unrealistic at that time considering the economic context (Figure 7). It is significant to repeat once again the exploitation of elites on the population, poor funding meant that the burden of the project was handed over to companies and households to fund, despite the perception that the project would be publically funded and produced. Indeed, both the public and commercial enterprises had to fund projects to build housing and factories.<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> Document elaborated by the City of Istocno Sarajevo in January 2003 with information on the process of urbanisation. On the eve of elections, it aimed at justifying the slow pace since 1996 due to the increasing pressure from the population.

<sup>148</sup> Sarajevo Serbs now living in Istocno Sarajevo expressed their frustration upon the realisation of the project, which was much below any expectations generated at that time. According to local estimations, about 15,000 people showed interest in the development of the city through applications (SS 2002, p.13).

Generally, loans were provided with a grey period of one year and the start of repayment in three years if companies or enterprises chose to relocate production within the territory of SS.<sup>149</sup> The budget was further decreased by corruption, which would have affected one third of funds (Research interviews, 28 May & 24 July 2015).<sup>150</sup>




**Figure 7. (a)** Ethno-territorial division of the area of Sarajevo; **(b)** features of the division (percentage of population, Cenzus 2016).

<sup>149</sup> Loans were provided with a grey period of one year and the start of payment in three years in the case of companies and enterprises relocating production within the territory of SS.

<sup>150</sup> Also, the Association of Refugees and Displaced Persons of Pale, a group favouring Serb reallocation in the RS, accused SDS functionaries of skimming off funds intended for DP resettlement to build houses for themselves (ICG 2002b).

Despite budgetary constraints, the project went ahead with basic planning documentation adopted in late 1996 by local and entity authorities. The basic direction in the development of the city was defined to concentrate on housing, industry and infrastructures. Project I, planned the reallocation in Srpsko Sarajevo of companies from the five suburbs of Sarajevo, which had been displaced prior to the transfer of authority. A consortium of Yugoslav enterprises was in charge of the design and engineering works while enterprises from the RS carried out its production (SS 2002).<sup>151</sup> Among companies finalised by early 2003, there was FAMOS, the motor factory of Sarajevo built in Lukavica. However, several of the enterprises planned were not yet built in 2003.<sup>152</sup> The project planned a wide distribution of companies between Lukavica (Energoinvest and Sarajevo Gas), Pale (Fabrika Filtera), Srpska Ilidža (Unis MGA), Mokro (Unioninvest holding) or Sumbulovac (Coca Cola) (Figure 9).



<sup>151</sup> The nine Serbian enterprises conforming the consortium were: Investbanka (Belgrade), Jugoport SDPR (Belgrade), H.K. Energoprojekt (Belgrade), H.K. Goša (Smederevska Palanka), H.K. MIN (Niš), MK 14.Oktobar (Kruševac), SARTID 1913 (Smederevo), D.D. Toza Marković (Kikinda), Fabrika Cementa (Biočin). Enterprises from Republika Srpska were: Unioninvest Holding (Srpsko Sarajevo), ODP Stambena Zadruga (Grbavica), ODGP Budućnost (Sokolac), ODGP Vranica (Pale), ODGP Put (Srpsko Sarajevo), GP Podjeda (Srpsko Sarajevo), GP Prostor (Srpsko Sarajevo), GP Integralinženjering (Laktaši), MDP Metalno (Zvornik), GP Rad (Derвента).

<sup>152</sup> The planned economic buildings included some of the largest companies of Bosnia. These were the cases of Energoinvest and Unis, which were within the tenth financially largest companies in Yugoslavia (Andjelic 2003).

	Budgeted, August 1996	Spent, January 2003
Republika Srpska	40	40
Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia	17.5	17.5
Donor funds	22.5	0
Credit Invest Banka	26	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>57.5</b>

**Figure 9. (a)** Towns and villages where companies were to be distributed **(b)** Funding Project I and its economic realisation (in million KM) (SS 2002).

In 1997 and 1998 the project proceeded with the production of twenty six parcelling plans by local authorities, to produce 7,000 housing units planned in Project II (SS 2002).<sup>153</sup> Limitations were more evident in this second project, which significantly reduced Krajišnik's demand for international assistance, prior to the transfer of authority for the construction of temporary dwellings for around 45,000 families. Thus, in the early years, most of the dwellings built were single family houses so the rural character of Srpsko Sarajevo hardly suffered any alteration. The construction of housing commenced in the furthest areas of municipalities in non-construction, socially owned land (SS 2002, p.13). The concept of developing housing was to provide land plots in socially owned land and, at the same time, offer packages with basic materials, including bricks and cement. People received material valued between 5.000 and 7.000 KM to proceed with self-construction (Research Interview, 28 May 2015).

Gojko Klickovic, then Prime Minister of the RS, urged in November 1997, the intensification of construction works in order to secure the continuation of the realisation of Projects I and II (Srna 1997). The SDS-driven project continued its development at a slow pace, mainly, because of economic limitations within households. The power reconfiguration that took place in the RS, which in practice turned the capital city of Republika Srpska from Pale to Banja Luka, had a rather limited impact in the realisation of the project of building Srpsko Sarajevo between 1996 and 2002 as funding was limited in the beginning (Research Interview, 28 May 2015).<sup>154</sup> Equally important, economic obstacles were not the only constraints on the Project to urbanize Srpsko Sarajevo. The construction of housing in socially owned land

<sup>153</sup> These were distributed in the municipalities of Pale (4,500 dwellings), Srpsko Novo Sarajevo – Lukavica area – and Srpska Ilidza (1,500 dwellings), Sokolac and Rogatica (500 dwellings), Srpski Stari Grad and Trnovo (500 dwellings).

<sup>154</sup> In 1997, a rift took place within the RS leadership between Krajišnik, set in Pale, and Biljana Plavsic, in Banja Luka, concerning political authority after the latter had replaced Radovan Karadzic as the RS President. This rift between Pale and Banja Luka factions ended in a split within the SDS and the debilitation of the party at the entity level.

became especially problematic when it began to receive international attention due to the increasing focus of the implementation of Annex VII. Actually, Srpsko Sarajevo was not alone in the policy of land allocation to displaced people, which was widely developed in Republika Srpska to consolidate a majority of the Bosnian Serb population.

Yet, Srpsko Sarajevo was particularly active in building commercial enterprises on formerly owned social land and the many people who benefited from land allocations were SDS renowned members, as claimed by OHR staff (ICG 2002b). In 2002, when about ninety percent of the housing projects were reportedly completed, municipalities in Srpsko Sarajevo were among the highest in the rate of land plots under development in the RS (Figure 4). The three integral projects failed to provide, both an urban environment and a permanent housing solution, to most of the Sarajevo Serbs and Bosnian Serbs who had left the districts. For all that, the project set the foundations for the subsequent process of urbanisation in Srpsko Sarajevo, increased in 2006, when in a favourable economic environment, investments in the real estate sector began to flourish there, as it is analysed in chapter six.

	<b>Land plots allocated</b>	<b>Plots under development</b>	<b>% of plots under development</b>
Bijeljina	3,580	600	16.8
Prijedor	2,600	575	22.1
Zvornik	2,540	956	37.6
Modrica	1,775	790	44.5
<b>Pale</b>	<b>1,037</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>48.2</b>
Teslic	845	175	20.7
Doboj	740	140	18.9
<b>Srpsko Ilidža</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>80.0</b>
<b>Srpsko Novo Sarajevo</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>170</b>	<b>34.0</b>
Vukosavalje	458	319	69.7

**Table 3.** Land allocations in Srpsko Sarajevo (in bold) in the context of Republika Srpska (ESI 2002).

#### OHR's response to land allocations in socially-owned land

As recognised by SDS local authorities, legal uncertainty prevailed in the development of Project II due to the allocation of socially owned land. This practice of distributing socially owned land amongst the population was widespread in Republika Srpska and in areas of the Federation of BiH, controlled by the HDZ, in order to consolidate territories ethnically homogeneous during the post-war period. Significantly, these practices were promoted by Milorad Dodik when he became RS

Prime Minister in January 1998 and held the consent of the international community (Toal and Dahlman 2006). A member of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, Dodik, received strong support from international actors (as it is analysed in chapter five), who sought a more moderate leader in Republika Srpska, not unwilling in theory to implement DPA. In return, the Dodik government modified RS law to facilitate the policy of land allocations with the approval of international actors. The OHR, only suggested two changes to the amendment that allowed municipalities to allocate land free of charge to displaced persons to stay in Republika Srpska, and committed to providing modest construction to those allocated free land plots. Firstly, there should not be allocation of land previously used for residential, religious or cultural purposes. Secondly, the selection of beneficiaries should prioritise people living in properties claimed by returnees under PLIP.

Accordingly, with international actors increasingly focused on the implementation of Annex VII and resorting to the powers vested in the High Representative, as is analysed in chapter four, the allocation of socially owned land to displaced people was increasingly seen as an undermining factor in the right of people to decide whether or not to return to their homes of origin. In this context, the High Representative Carlos Westendorp, enacted a decision in May 1999 that temporarily suspended the right of local authorities to reallocate socially owned land that had been used prior to the war by displaced peoples, for residential, business or agricultural purposes (OHR 1999b). The Decision prohibited transactions of socially owned land to protect the rights of these people. The initial concern of the OHR was to regulate the practice of reallocating minority land use rights to displaced persons to avoid creating a further obstacle to returns and reintegration.

In addition, the decision allowed privatisation or restitution of nationalised property if carried out according to existing legislation.<sup>155</sup> The logic behind this decision resulted from pending reforms of the socially owned property system, and the RRTF claimed that the difficulties emerging on the field could be temporary tackled. The decision to restrict the reallocation of socially-owned land was not supported by all international organizations the OSCE, for instance, considered that the free decision to return had to prevail instead of developing a comprehensive control over land and returns (Research Interview, 14 November 2013). Even within the OHR, there was a

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<sup>155</sup> Restitution was the return to original owners of land and other properties that had been nationalised in early Socialist Yugoslavia.



divide between minimalist and maximalist visions about the OHR's role in Bosnia. Advocates of the maximalist approach took the lead and the OHR's policy on land allocations progressively evolved from the decision to tackle reallocations that hindered the possibility of displaced people returning until opposition any kind of allocation.

Wolfgang Prietrisch, who replaced Westendorp as High Representative, further extended the decision for six months at the end of its validity, on 31 December 1999. Importantly, this was not simply a temporal extension as the new decision dropped the word reallocation. All kind of allocations in the categories defined were prohibited, regardless of whether these had previously been used by people displaced (OHR 1999c). Before the deadline set for 30 June 2000, the High Representative modified the previous concept on land ban allocation in a new decision taken on 27 April. Thus, local authorities of any institution in BiH were prevented from taking any decision regarding socially owned land, i.e. disposal, allocation, transfer, sell or rent. Any operation of socially owned land was considered discriminatory unless proven otherwise. By prohibiting the management of Bosnian authorities, the OHR institution became responsible for dealing with land transactions through a system of granting waivers. The OHR, thus granted a written exemption to the Decision, in case the competent authority claimed that the proposed transaction of socially owned land, was non-discriminatory and in the best interest of the public (OHR 2000a). This new policy continued, it excluded those transactions related to privatisation or to repossession; hence control over land management was aligned with the implementation of Annex VII.

In accordance with the decision of April 2000, the OHR became, in practice, the institution responsible for approving most transactions in cities like Sarajevo as socially owned land was the main existing category in urban centres. The OHR sought to control abuses in the distribution of socially owned land, an exclusive category in urban contexts, by imposing a general ban on the practice.<sup>156</sup> The OHR's role was not solely to act as an appeal body, but to review every single land transaction produced in the 1990s. With new practices set in place, the OHR expanded its power and responsibility in the management of land, which exceeded the existing control of any European country (ESI 2002). This massive intervention and the evolution of the land policy, turning from supporting Dodik's changes in legislation, that favoured land allocations,

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<sup>156</sup> In order to ensure effective planning of socialist cities, urban construction land was nationalised and converted into socially-owned land. There was no urban private construction land.

to opposing them by controlling any land transaction in the country, illustrates the improvisation of the OHR in such an important issue of peace implementation. More importantly, after being empowered, the High Representative could accumulate competences without proportionally increasing its knowledge and resources to ensure enforcement, as occurred in the application of the April 2000 Decision. The OHR had to review all land transactions in Bosnia, except the Brcko District, issuing a waiver in every single case. This constituted a task administratively unviable with regard to the material resources available at the office for that purpose, proving an administrative nightmare:

OHR had no expertise in urban planning matters and no means of acquiring information on proposed land transactions, other than what was supplied by the municipalities themselves. Initially, responsibility for the entire task was taken only by a single human rights officer, dependent on a Bosnian assistant to provide verbal summaries of documents submitted by municipalities. At no stage have there been more than three full-time staff devoted to the task. And the waiting period for a waiver can drag out well over a year. Within a few months, senior OHR officials were warning that the Decision had placed the organization “in a very precarious position; a law has been imposed that we ourselves cannot implement” (ESI 2002, p.3).

The viability of implementing land policy was not only related to the lack of resources and capability. The April 2000 Decision never resolved the basic question of whether the OHR considered public support for resettlement to be legitimate and in the best interests of the public. Instead, the OHR reserved the right to make judgements in each individual case without clarifying procedures for judging the public interest. It inevitably appeared as arbitrary decisions affected the legitimacy of its intervention in this field (ESI 2002). Indeed, the original decision i.e. banning land allocations intended to discourage returns was clearly warranted and precisely targeted. However, later decisions retroactively extending the ban to all allocations, in practice, forced most transactions into informal channels, discouraged legitimate investments and damaged the OHR’s credibility (Williams 2013). Essentially, the OHR’s land policy was ineffective and unable to stop illegal constructions, as local authorities relied on the assumption that international organisations would not destroy houses already built (ICG 2002b).<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> Illegal constructions comprised the development of housing without obtaining the necessary building permit or the illegal transactions of land. These constructions did not only involve land allocations promoted by authorities to consolidate ethnic majorities. As it will be analysed in chapter six, in Sarajevo the impossibility or reluctance of many people to return to pre-war homes and the absence of permanent housing alternatives triggered a wave of self-construction of housing produced by internally

The land-ban allocation of socially owned land was valid until 21 March 2003, after two further extensions in March 2001 and July 2002. The decision on controlling land allocations was considered provisional, and the OHR pursued an integral reform of the real estate market in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also to be analysed in chapter six. Thus, in May 2003, the OHR enacted harmonized Laws on Construction Land in both entities, which fulfilled the Constitutional Court's criteria by dividing socially owned construction land into state-owned and private property, largely based on whether it had been developed by a private actor. The end of the land-ban allocation was supported by a report of the *European Stabilization Initiative* (2002); it assessed the land management at the request of the OHR. The report argued that land allocation had not been a determining factor in a choice between return and resettlement as it had only affected about five percent of the population. In addition, new housing programmes did not represent attempts to defeat Annex VII, as in the early 2000s, it was widely implemented in relation to the process of housing repossession.

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displaced persons in Sarajevo. New constructions were often illegally developed due to budget constraints and were generally constructions adding extra floors onto existing buildings or new single detached dwellings in the suburbs or on the slopes surrounding central areas of Sarajevo.

## **4. The international strategy to rebuild ethnic diversity in Sarajevo**

This chapter focuses on the international attempt to rebuild Sarajevo's ethnic diversity after its urban area had been territorially divided between the two entities in the peace agreement. Firstly, there is an analysis of the changing interest of the international community in relation to minority returns during the first two post-war years. Subsequently, the empowerment of the High Representative in December 1997 culminated an increasing international involvement in the civilian annexes of the peace agreement and in the promotion of minority returns. A direct consequence of the enforcement of the High Representative was the adoption of the Sarajevo Declaration, an internationally devised strategy aimed at remaking the symbolic ethnic diversity of Sarajevo. Finally, the analysis of the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration reveal both SDA obstructionist practices, unless people returned to other areas of the country, and equally a delayed generalised housing repossession that did not turn into a significant return of any peoples displaced, especially in the case of Sarajevo Serbs.

### **International approach to minority returns before High Representative's empowerment**

Violent episodes of ethnic cleansing and campaigns to mobilise population produced a mass displacement of Bosnian population that resulted in the largest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War (Hitchcock 2003), with about half of the 4.4 million Bosnian citizens displaced during the conflict (UNHCR 1999). The peace agreement legalised ethno-territorialities but, at the same time, opened the door for its reversal as Annex VII recognized that all people displaced had the right to freely return to places of origin after reclaiming their home (GFAP 1995). The right to return to pre-war homes, initially included in the London Conference held in August 1992, was incorporated in the Basic Principles set in Geneva in September 1995 before peace negotiations conducted in Dayton. By providing the right to return to pre-war homes (and not only to the country of origin), Annex VII became the main instrument to reverse the outcomes of ethnic cleansing and the legalisation of ethno-territorialities.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> The return to homes of origin constituted a new precedent in international politics (Albert 1997; Rosand 1998). With repatriation programs adopted previously in the peace agreements of Angola,

Hence, a strict implementation would produce the reconstruction of the ethnic diversity existing before the war in both Sarajevo and BiH.

Importantly, Annex VII recognised not only the right to return to pre-war homes, but also recognised in the second article, the creation of a safe environment conducive to the voluntary return and the harmonious reintegration of people displaced (GFAP 1995). Local authorities were responsible for the overall implementation of Annex VII. Paradoxically, main actors of the ethno-territorial division of BiH had responsibility for eroding respective local ethnocracies in favour of a return of people displaced. Further important requirements of the civilian annexes of the peace agreement, included the assistance of international institutions and the supervision of implementation. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was the organisation in charge of supervising the return of people displaced and its mission was to facilitate in close coordination with parties and asylum countries a repatriation plan to allow a smooth and progressive return of refugees and people internally displaced.<sup>159</sup>

However, a significant concern was that if going back to pre-war homes, people displaced would directly challenge the monopoly of power achieved by nationalist leaders in respective ethno-territorialities. Accordingly, by placing authority of enforcement in local actors (in which nationalist parties dominated politically and economically the country ethnically cleansed or significantly homogenised), there was no overwhelming belief that Annex VII would ever be fully implemented or that people would return to areas controlled by another ethnic group (Ito 2001). Equally important, Annex VII argued that early returns were an important objective to settle the conflict in BiH, placing it in a central position within the civilian implementation during the early post-war stages.

For all that, the international community refrained from the very fulfilment of Annex VII as observed when first attempts to return to pre-war homes took place in spring 1996. In this sense, between late April and May there were a number of notable incidents when groups of Bosniaks, encouraged by political authorities, tried to go back to Republika Srpska, resulting in the death of two people and dozens injured (Toal and Dahlman 2011). Violence also occurred in an area of Sarajevo when Bosnian Serbs

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Afghanistan, Cambodia or Tadjikistan, returns were defined to occur to the whole country of origin, to their homeland or to a place of their choice, avoiding in all cases to include the return to “home” (Albert 1997).

<sup>159</sup> Another important organisation was the Commission for Real Property Claim (CRPC), which had the authority to define ownership of properties abandoned during war.

attacked Bosniak vehicles outside Trnovo. The municipality of Trnovo had been divided between the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska but the town was entirely under RS control. Bosnian Serbs showed their determination to keep Bosniaks out claiming that the IEBL was a real border and that they could not live together (Roane 1996b).

The main international organisations, namely the OHR, IFOR, IPTF and UNHCR were quick to respond to the violence generated by initial attempts to return to RS. On 27 April 1996, IFOR's Operation Shortstop was announced. Its purpose was to tackle violence (albeit on a minimalist basis) without changing the concept of military intervention. With IFOR refusing to support returns and engaging in the creation of a secure environment, the Operation restricted or attempted to prevent large-scale movement of vehicles between entities to reduce the risk of incidents. IFOR established its own checkpoints along the line of separation between entities, turning the IEBL into a physical border temporarily. In practice, this operation protected the Republika Srpska from incursions from other ethnic groups and put Annex VII indefinitely on hold (Toal and Dahlman 2011).

Once again, Operation Shortstop was tested as further attempts to enter RS occurred two days later, when Bosniaks displaced gatherings at family graves to celebrate Bajram. Moreover, the presence of IFOR checkpoints did not prevent an incident which caused the death of three Bosniaks when they encountered a mob of Serbs in one village in the area of Dobož. Consequently, NATO called the OHR to negotiate a solution while Operation Shortstop remained in force. Carl Bildt responded by organising a two-day meeting with Hasan Muratovic, Prime Minister of BiH, and Momčilo Krajišnik. The purpose of the meeting was to agree a mechanism to prevent violence while preserving the rights of returnees. At the meeting, UNHCR's proposal regarding organised visits of displaced people between two entities was agreed upon (OHR 1996c).

At this early stage and with disagreement concerning returns, the reallocation of people displaced was the preferred solution from nationalist parties during early post-war stages. Parties sought to consolidate ethno-territorialities through property exchanges and the construction of new housing to accommodate people according to respective ethnic communities (ICG 1998b). Focusing on SDA and SDS, these parties followed distinct post-war territorial logic at state level, as highlighted by early attempts to return permanently or visit pre-war homes. On the one hand, Annex VII was a threat

to the SDS party's foundational goal of creating an ethnically homogeneous polity of Bosnian Serbs in BiH, legalised in the peace agreement with the recognition of Republika Srpska. The right to return to pre-war homes thus challenged SDS political objective, which saw Dayton as the first step to complete separation. Battles against returns actually began in the diplomatic arena during peace negotiations. Arguing that Bosnian Serbs from the Federation did not wish to return to their homes, Serbs hoped to reduce the potential impact of the return of people displaced belonging to other ethnic groups, through the inclusion of the right to compensation in circumstances where properties could not be restored (Cox 1998).<sup>160</sup>

On the other hand, SDA also followed the policy in the territories under its authority, as seen in previous chapter concerning the reallocation of internally displaced persons from Tuzla into former Serb-held districts of Sarajevo. Yet, SDA was distinct to SDS and HDZ in the sense that it was the only party advocating for the implementation of Annex VII and the defence of the right to return to pre-war homes. While this support was driven by political and humanitarian motivations, the SDA also moved to prevent mass returns to areas under its authority, as seen in the previous chapter. The push for the early return of the Bosniak population was based firstly on humanitarian grounds as areas under SDA administration were, in some cases, overcrowded because of mass displacements produced during the war. Ideologically, for many SDA members it also meant the recovery of ethnic diversity. Politically, the return of pre-war Bosniak population throughout the Bosnian territory was a key element in SDA territorial agenda. As Bosniaks constituted the main ethnic group in BiH, mass returns resulted in the SDA regaining numerical parity or even superiority in those territories where the Bosniak population had been violently expelled during war (Ito 2001; Woodward 2001). Thus, the authorities had the potential to exploit returns as a political strategy to erode or reverse the war gains of the two other nationalist parties. Recognisance of the fact that Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat authorities' sought the consolidation of ethnic constituencies within the territories under their control, through the permanent resettlement of displaced persons and the obstruction of minority returnees, prominent

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<sup>160</sup> This clause, also incorporated in Annex 7, weakened the prospect of domicile return as parties could legitimately choose between allowing return and providing compensation instead of return. In the case of the right to return to pre-war homes, the right to compensation had been firstly conceived in the London Principles of August 1992. In practice, however, the right to compensation was largely ignored during the peace implementation because of the concern that the option of receiving compensation would deter people from returning to pre-war homes (Rosand 2000).

Bosniak politicians adopted maximalist stances amid claims that Annex VII could only be satisfied by the physical return of every displaced person. Haris Silajdzic, then president of the Party for BiH, went even further and advocated the use of force if necessary (Onasa 1999).<sup>161</sup>

Despite, the fragile environment, SDA authorities propelled the early return of Bosniaks to places of origin. SDA resorted to several strategies to develop the parties' own political and territorial agenda. These strategies included the provision of financial support and political backing to association's representative of the displaced; direct assistance regarding return movements; and the push for the return of displaced populations, relying on the moral argument that Bosniaks had been the ethnic group most affected by war (Ito 2001). The policy to push for returns was legitimate as it defended the implementation of the peace agreement and could eventually contribute to the recovery of ethnic diversity all around BiH but it was also questionable as people displaced were in part being exploited for political purposes under the guise of poor security conditions.

During the first two post-war years, ethno-territorial boundaries prevailed over the right of displaced Bosnians to return to pre-war homes. The temporary transformation of the IEBL into a physical border through the establishment of checkpoints by IFOR was hindered by local obstructionism, especially from Bosnian Serb authorities, and the lack of support from the main international actors in relation to minority returns. As stressed by Michael Steiner at the end of 1996, Annex VII was only rhetorical as big capitals had other priorities and there was no political support to push for minority returns (ICG 1998b). Steiner had a vision of the overall return throughout BiH, and if minorities returned, the ensuing consequences for the recreation of a pre-war Bosnia. Other international actors who were more conservative argued that it would be a mistake to mix the population again as it could cause further ethnic violence and unrest (Research Interview, 25 June 2015). This absence of political support to foster minority returns remained rather consistent throughout 1996 and facilitated the agenda of obstructionist forces over the wishes of those who aspired to return.

As a result of this lack of interest, the international community addressed returns from a humanitarian perspective, privileging in early stages of the post-war period the

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<sup>161</sup> Quoted in Williams 2005, p.23.



less conflictive situation of the so-called majority returns. Essentially, the UNHCR did not address the inherent political conflict existing from the return of people to an ethno-territoriality ruled by a distinct community. Thus, the repatriation plan elaborated by the UNHCR to allow a smooth and progressive return of people displaced focused only on returns to areas where people constituted an ethnic majority after the war.

As announced in June 1996, the Target Area Return Programme was the first programme for returns, and identified areas where reconstruction of housing and infrastructures could create conditions for return. The fundamental criterion for the selection of those targeted areas was that the return of former residents was feasible from a political and security point of view. Its High Commissioner, Sadako Ogata, reaffirmed such an approach in the PIC (celebrated in Florence in June 1996), when she stated that the UNHCR would continue pursuing returns to areas where people were part of the ethnic majority and where destruction, and not security, was the major obstacle (UNHCR 1996b). Therefore, international performance favouring majority returns during the early stages of the post-war period contributed to the consolidation of the ethnic territorial division of Bosnia. During the year 1996, with more returns from the post-war period, only a reduced number of 11,676 minority returns took place among 252,780 returns.

The policy of promoting majority returns still prevailed in 1997, therefore the UNHCR continued with the Target Area Return Programme (UNHCR 1996c). However, the increasing pressure of people displaced prompted the adoption of early-localised programmes for minority returns during the summer of 1996.<sup>162</sup> This created the Return procedure to the RS side of the IEHL after successful crossovers into five remote villages in the municipalities of Doboje, Zvornik, Kalesija, and Lopare (Toal and Dahlman 2011). To minimise the potential for renewed conflict, the necessary international organisations, i.e. OHR, UNHCR, IFOR and IPTF, drafted guidelines in early July 1996 working to create a phased and orderly return to the RS side of the IEHL (ICG 1997). After a further period, the interior ministries of the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska accepted on 15 October 1996, a plan proposed by international mediators enabling refugees to return to their homes in areas controlled by

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<sup>162</sup> People displaced became increasingly organised. Interestingly, the Coalition for Return was a multi-ethnic movement of displaced persons from all the country formed in late 1996 with the support of the OHR that lobbied authorities to change the political climate for return (ICG 1997). Focusing on strategies for return and repatriation, the Coalition for Return organised during the year 1997 three major conferences in Banja Luka, Mostar and Tuzla.

another ethnic group (Moore 1996). People willing reside in their pre-war homes had to apply to the UNHCR for determination if the applicant had a property in the area. The International Housing Commission, chaired by the UNHCR, subsequently corresponded any decisions to authorities of the receiving entity, which was obliged to issue appropriate documentation to returnees.

Despite majority returns prevailing during 1996 and 1997, the temporary suspension of Annex VII progressively evolved because of local pressure to favour returns and the increasing focus on the civilian annexes of the peace agreement. During the PIC held in Paris on 14 November 1996, the Steering Board concluded that the return or resettlement of people displaced was a priority and requested the implementation of principles for the civilian consolidation of the peace process in a two-year plan (OHR 1996e). The High Representative worked in close consultation with Bosnian authorities and other international institutions which resulted in the production of an Action Plan, approved by the PIC held in London the following month. The Plan confirmed the importance of creating favourable conditions to encourage the free return of refugees and displaced persons to places of their choice (OHR 1996f).

Meanwhile, establishing the principles of the civilian consolidation of the peace process increased the OHR's involvement within the peace-building mission. One of the manifestations related to Annex VII. The OHR took the lead in the coordination of returns and, in January 1997, the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF) was created under the High Representative's chair following a meeting in Geneva between Carl Bildt and Sadako Ogata (Bildt 1998). The RRTF aimed to increase coordination of political, humanitarian and economic reconstruction in the refugee-return process by bringing together the key agencies and organisations dealing with the return of refugees and economic reconstruction.<sup>163</sup> The reconstruction of housing was a crucial point to allow returns. Inevitably during the early post-war stages an accommodation crisis existed resulting from the number of damaged or destroyed dwellings, which accounted for thirty five percent of housing stock in BiH at the end of the war (IMG 1999).<sup>164</sup> Subsequently, at the PIC held in Sintra in May 1997, there was a breakthrough in the

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<sup>163</sup> Beyond the OHR and the UNHCR, RRTF was integrated by the WB, EC, CRPC, OSCE, SFOR or the German and American governments. Originally, established as a forum to coordinate international efforts in support of returns and linking the return programs with the provision of international reconstruction funds.

<sup>164</sup> Often damage was deliberate in order to force out minority populations. Deliberate damage continued after the end of the war as occurred in October and November 1996, when Bosnian Serbs targeted houses in areas of RS where Bosniaks had been repairing or planned to visit (AI 1997).

implementation of Annex VII. For the first time minority returns were established as a priority and due consideration began, which was defined in the DPA, as a central factor in the stabilisation of Bosnia (OHR 1997c). Assistance for housing and local infrastructure was to be included in the acceptance of return and priority was given to those municipalities receptive to minority returns. The progressive involvement of the international community to fully implement Annex VII and promote minority returns was a conscious political decision produced by a conjunction of factors (Ito 2001; Toal and Dahlman 2011).

This progressive involvement in the civilian annexes, neglected in 1996 in detriment of the military, was largely attributable to changes in US foreign policy after Clinton's re-election in November 1996. Significantly, the US government conducted a major policy review in spring 1997 and launched a more determined involvement in the civilian implementation of the DPA. It was highlighted at the PIC held in Sintra, with the Steering Board supporting the more vigorous approach proposed by the US (GAO 1998). This US policy shift in Bosnia was highlighted by SFOR major involvement in supporting civilian aspects of the peace operation, having replaced IFOR's mission in December 1996. Actually, SFOR began to provide general and local security for people returning to their pre-war homes in summer 1997 as a result of NATO's reorganisation.<sup>165</sup> Such a change in relation to the minimalist military approach evident in 1996 was also a result of the increasing awareness that a military mission could not be completed unless conditions on the ground improved and equally, that the strength of nationalist parties could be reduced due to the return of other ethnic group members.

An additional factor shaping the progressive focus on minority returns was the increasing pressure from European countries, mostly Germany, in the desire to repatriate Bosnian refugees. Germany, the country hosting more Bosnian refugees (up to 320,000 people), started their repatriation on 1 October 1996 ("Njemačka šalje

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<sup>165</sup> A key figure in NATO's progressive departure from the minimalist approach was Madeleine Albright, the Secretary for State after Clinton's re-election, who contributed to moving the Pentagon toward a more muscular approach in Bosnia. This shift was strengthened by Clinton's choice of a veteran of the Dayton negotiations, Wesley Clark, to serve as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (Toal and Dahlman 2011). Equally applicable, NATO was also changing in favour of a more strategic approach to the SFOR mission. In the context of preparations of an expansion towards former socialist countries, Javier Solana, NATO's Secretary General, claimed that NATO had turned into a motor of European security cooperation and a catalyst for political change, placing the cooperation in Bosnia as the most visible sign of the new approach of the transatlantic organisation (NATO 1997).

Bosance kući”, 1996).<sup>166</sup> Other EU countries also had plans for repatriation but, unlike Germany, hardly resorted to forced displacements and accepted the UNHCR’s initial principle that people should not be returned against their will to an area of Bosnia that was not their place of origin or where they would form part of a minority community (Black 2002). It was expected that the return of 200,000 refugees during 1997 increased pressure on international agencies dealing with returns. The UNHCR noted, that unless there was a sudden advance in minority returns, the repatriation would result in a reallocation to majority areas considering that seventy per cent of European refugees came from areas where they had become a minority community (USIP 1997), eventually consolidating the ethnic separation of the country and increasing the associated problems derived from the occupation of abandoned apartments.

Contextually, the US policy shift in relation to the civilian annexes of the peace agreement and the increasing pressure of Germany as the country hosting more refugees, led the UNHCR to launch the Open Cities Initiative in March 1997. The Initiative was the first programme in the promotion of minority returns, unlike the previous Target Area Return Programme. However, the Open Initiative did not change the essence of the humanitarian approach adopted by the UNHCR as municipalities would receive reconstruction aid only by declaring themselves open to returns, particularly minority returns, and committing to their reintegration. The limits of fostering minority returns without politically tackling the inherent obstructionism of ethnocratic regimes was highlighted by the subsequent poor outcomes produced by the Initiative. Only 580 people belonging to minority ethnic groups had returned during the first ten months of the programme, falling far short of the 50,000 minority returns targeted by mid 1998 (ICG 1998c).

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<sup>166</sup> Germany was the country hosting more Bosnian refugees and on 1 October ended the temporary protection regime that left about 220,000 individuals vulnerable to deportation by 1 December, 1996. Remaining refugees had their residence or toleration permits revoked and had been served notice of impending deportation. Significant voluntary repatriation took place during 1997 due to the threat of deportation and the suspension or reduction of social benefits (Cox 1998). Authorities and media increasingly reported that conditions had changed sufficiently to allow returns to RS, which ignored declarations from local authorities regarding security threats and discrimination that minority returns would have to face (ICG 1998a). As a response, the Council of Europe also warned member states against repatriating refugees originating from areas where they constituted ethnic minorities until all conditions of safety and dignity to places of origin were guaranteed. According to data from UNHCR, there significant number of refugees from BiH in Croatia (288,000), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (253,000), Austria (80,000), Sweden (61,500), Switzerland (26,700), Slovenia (33,400), the Netherlands (23,500), Denmark (23,000), United Kingdom (13,000), and Norway (12,000). Bosniaks constituted the largest number of the refugees (610,000), followed by Bosnian Croats (307,000), Bosnian Serbs (253,000) and others (23,000). There were about 620,000 refugees from territories in RS and 598,000 from the FBiH (ICG 1997).

The Initiative did not produce any significant rise in the return of people who belonged to other ethnic groups in municipalities that had been included in the Initiative. The promotion of minority returns began internationally without tackling the inherently political obstructionism from ethnocratic regimes to prevent minority returnees or intervention in the field of ethnic reconciliation, often leaving them in vulnerable environments.<sup>167</sup> Moreover, as a result of a lack of a proper selection process and poor supervision of the implementation the number of minority returns in some cases even declined after recognition.<sup>168</sup>

### Early returns to Sarajevo

The progressive focus on the promotion of minority returns did not modify the tendency of people to resettle in areas under control of authorities from their own ethnic group. This process of ethnic consolidation highlighted the serious issue of whether or not people were able to decide freely to return to their pre-war homes, a right defined in the first article of Annex VII. However, this did not exist during the first two years of the post-war period. At that time, return to pre-war homes was often materially impossible due to destruction or occupation of apartments by other people, which conversely had the support of local authorities and a favourable housing legislation. Moreover, in cases in which a return to pre-war homes was physically possible, the social, political and economic environment in the original area had not substantially improved since the conflict ended.

Furthermore, the situation in Sarajevo was not substantially different. As seen in the previous chapter, the SDA housing policy was in favour of temporary occupants. Early petitions of Sarajevans displaced to repossess homes were rejected by the Government and this regime continued during 1997, as is evident by the number of complaints at the Federation Ombudsmen's office for Sarajevo. Eighty per cent out of the 1,118 complaints filed dealt with a violation of the right to repossess pre-war homes,

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<sup>167</sup> DPA displayed ambiguous solutions and inconsistency in relation to ethnic reconciliation. The agreement relied on the return of people to their homes of origin and the enforcement of international human rights standards. It was insufficient in terms of reconciliation, which had to derive from a favourable political context (Albert 1997).

<sup>168</sup> The reduced impact of this initiative and other smaller programs to foster minority returns was illustrated by the results of repatriation from abroad produced in the second half of 1997. About 70% of returns were in the form of resettlement in majority areas (ICG 1998). The Initiative certainly showed the progressive transformation in the conception to promote minority returns as it received in 1998 approximately 80% of UNHCR's funds.

this figure was double the number of complaints received in 1996 (ICG 1998c). It would seem that despite the SDA policy to implement Annex VII and the push for a return of Bosniaks to pre-war homes, there was a tendency within the SDA leadership towards a double standard as it prevented the return of minorities displaced to the city.

Paradoxically, an example of this can be observed from the limited number of returns to Vogošća, declared as one of the six municipalities of the UNHCR's Open Cities Initiative in the Federation of BiH. The declaration of Vogošća as an Open City was controversial and became a very sensitive issue because the municipality hosted about 7,000 displaced, mainly from Srebrenica. Communities internally displaced were the group generally more hostile to the return of pre-war residents of other ethnicities, as they feared displacement once again if repossession of housing was completed. Hostility against returns in Vogošća was highlighted in early August 1997 when about 350 people actively contested the UNHCR-organised visit of fourteen Serbs to pre-war homes (Rožajac 1997). In Vogošća, there were only thirty five minority returns between July 1997 and March 1998 (ICG 1998b), highlighting the limitations of the Initiative which failed to deal effectively with the embedded obstructionism of local authorities.

As previously analysed, opposition to returns existed in Sarajevo, but in the city, unlike other areas of the country, minority returns also existed. Generally ethnic discrimination existed in the city but was less pronounced than elsewhere, especially after the PIC held in Sintra (Research Interview, 25 May 2015). In this regard, with the realisation of a 6.8 million DM<sup>169</sup> program funded by UNHCR to rebuild apartments in neighbourhoods like Dobrinja, Otes and Grbavica, funds were conditioned to the delivery of apartments to pre-war owners or right holders, with local authorities promising that conditions would be met. The UNHCR spokesperson, Kris Janowski, praised the cooperation of the Sarajevo Canton authorities, especially considering that collaboration with authorities in this kind of project did not exist in other parts of Bosnia such as in Republika Srpska. Notwithstanding, problematic cases, in which apartments were not given to pre-war inhabitants after being rebuilt because of ethnicity, were also identified (Kukić 1997). In spite of obstructionism and cases of ethnic discrimination during the first two post-war years, Sarajevo accommodated a significant number of minority returns. In 1998 more than 20,000 minorities had moved to Sarajevo since the end of the war and the city totalised forty four per cent of all

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<sup>169</sup> The use of the Deutsche Mark was quite extended in Bosnia before and during early introduction of the local currency in 1998, the Konvertibilna marka (KM).

minority returns to areas in the Federation of BiH (ICG 1998c). These numbers were much higher than the 3,078 minorities who had moved back to Republika Srpska during the same period. Relative figures clearly demonstrated higher returns to Sarajevo encouraged international actors to start the full implementation of Annex VII in the capital city of BiH after the High Representative was empowered in December 1997.

### **The empowerment of the High Representative**

During the first year and half of the peace implementation, the limited authority conceived in the peace agreement limited the role of a High Representative which was further undermined by the US during early post-war stages. Initially, the High Representative was responsible for monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement through the promotion of full compliance of local actors with civilian annexes and their cooperation with international organisations. Importantly, the High Representative's work was limited to observing the impact of activities developed by other international organisations involved in the civilian aspects, accordingly, it had no authority to interfere in respective autonomies. While initially a weak position, it began to evolve in 1996 when the PIC urged the OHR to issue strong recommendations to local politicians and to advise other international organisations. The High Representative's powers, however, remained limited to making non-binding suggestions (Peter 2008).

It was not until the PIC held in Sintra in May 1997 that the Steering Board authorised the High Representative to take stronger action to prevent political manipulation of the media on the eve of municipal elections. More specifically, the Steering Board "conferred on the High Representative the right to curtail or suspend any media network or programme whose output was in persistent contravention of either the spirit or letter of the DPA" (OHR 1997c). This right permitted the High Representative to adopt a more assertive role in coordination with SFOR. Especially remarkable was the operation carried out in October 1997 to seize control in Pale of the Serbian Radio and Television, the public broadcasting corporation in RS under the control of SDS.

The success of the operation contributed to a transformation of the vision held by the main international actors on the supervision of the civilian annexes of the peace agreement. More precisely, it was acknowledged that the challenge of the political power from nationalist parties was both feasible and appropriate (ESI 1999b). In the PIC, celebrated in Bonn in December 1997, different contributors expressed concern

regarding the update of the two-year civilian consolidation plan (OHR 1997e). Lack of progress in key areas of the civilian annexes, and relative urgency due to the prospect of a gradual reduction of aid, ensured that new mechanisms to advance the peace implementation were approved. Thus, in Bonn the PIC granted the High Representative specific powers to become the final authority on the civilian annexes, as defined in the fifth article of Annex X. In essence, the High Representative was authorized to make any lawful decisions ensuring the implementation of the peace agreement as well as the functioning of public institutions. In other words, the High Representative was given powers to enact legislation and dismiss authorities obstructing the peace implementation.

Indeed, the High Representative graduated from a mere supervisory role of the civilian annexes into a role of crucial political actor with executive and legislative authority. The OHR became an institution that encompassed both elements of international and domestic authorities (Peter 2008). For all that, the enforcement of the High Representative must be seen as a strategic tool at the disposal of the broader post-war international mission in BiH, as the OHR would continue operating within the framework of the PIC and being dependent on the political support of main powers in which the organization coordinated key decisions. Significantly, no explicit limits to the powers were defined in Bonn and the High Representative was allowed to interpret the scope of his own powers. Such extraordinary measures, which could easily undermine the process of democratisation inherent to the liberal peace-building mission, were conceived as temporary and exceptional as pointed by the High Representative in his discourse in Bonn. Carlos Westendorp expressed the need for firm and rapid action to clear away the most serious obstacles since time was limited (OHR 1997d).

At this juncture the empowerment of the High Representative, held by the PIC in Bonn, culminated the increasing focus of the international community on minority returns, which finally became a central goal in the implementation of the peace agreement. The OHR developed into the main organisation to manage Annex VII, taking advantage of the new powers vested in the High Representative. The OHR would operate through the RRTF, which was reinforced with the appointment of the Deputy HR as its head. With these changes, the main international actors finally adopted a political approach to deal with returns, leaving behind the humanitarian approach that had prevailed under the coordination of the UNHCR. Equally important for this research, the PIC also endorsed the High Representative to develop a return strategy for



Sarajevo to deal with the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. Bonn PIC conclusions included a clear statement regarding the importance of Sarajevo for the future of BiH:

Ensuring a multi-ethnic Sarajevo is central to the implementation of the Peace Agreement. The Council expresses disappointment at the failure of the authorities in Sarajevo to encourage and facilitate the safe return of former inhabitants. The Council takes note of recent commitments made by the Sarajevo authorities to encourage and facilitate the safe return of former inhabitants. These commitments are long overdue and must translate into action immediately. So long as Sarajevo remains largely mono-ethnic, its position as the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina will remain impaired (OHR 1998a).

### **The adoption of the Sarajevo Declaration in 1998**

One of the first actions of the High Representative following empowerment was to set the strategy pursuant to the reconstruction of the ethnic diversity so characteristic of Sarajevo. On 3 February 1998, the High Representative chaired the Sarajevo Return Conference held in the Holiday Inn attended by the main local and international authorities.<sup>170</sup> All participants in the Sarajevo Return Conference agreed that due to its status as the capital city of BiH and because of its historical multi-ethnic character, Sarajevo Canton had to take the lead in the unconditional right of every Bosnian citizen to return home (OHR 1998b). This decision, taken in Bonn, to begin the promotion of minority returns in Sarajevo was symbolic of Sarajevo's recognised historic ethnic diversity and coexistence and it was envisaged that this model of coexistence and tolerance should influence the rest of the country in the post-war period.

The decision to develop the new approach in Sarajevo i.e. to boost minority returns was also pragmatic. For international actors, returns to Sarajevo were seen as instrumental to ignite significant minority returns throughout Bosnia. Sarajevo was the biggest city and all international agencies were based there, so the promotion of the return of Sarajevans should subsequently trigger returns elsewhere in the country. Equally important, by developing in Sarajevo the new political approach to returns, the international community transferred responsibility to making Annex VII work, to SDA and Bosniak elites, after their pressure influenced the international community into

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<sup>170</sup> Main participants were senior representatives of the OHR, the UNHCR, members of PIC, the US, the EU, members of BiH's Presidency and other senior State, Entity and Cantonal officials.

opening up minority returns during the two first post-war years.<sup>171</sup> In this sense, Carlos Westendorp, in a passionate discourse urged authorities to take the lead in the new phase overcoming all existing difficulties:

Two years ago this city symbolised hope over despair, decency over barbarism, tolerance over enmity. That is what Sarajevo stood for then. And that is what Sarajevo stands for today. And if there is one message that I want to go out from this conference to this city, to this country and to the world beyond, it is that Sarajevo is indeed a multi-ethnic city, an open city, a tolerant city (...) It is Sarajevo which must take the lead in this business, and it is Sarajevo which is taking the lead. And where Sarajevo leads, I urge others to follow (...) So I guess what I am saying is this: that it is up to you, Sarajevo. You have before you a great opportunity. It is up to you whether you take it. I do not for a moment deny the difficulties involved. I do not downplay either the emotional obstacles, or the physical ones. You will need magnanimity and resourcefulness in industrial quantities (OHR 1998c).

In that context, the participants at the Return Conference agreed the Sarajevo Declaration to create conditions for sustainable returns but also guaranteeing equal treatment for all ethnic groups in both civic and economic dimensions. The Declaration set a comprehensive approach to create appropriate conditions for returns through an intervention in five fields: legislative, housing, public order and security, employment and education. In order to supervise implementation, participants agreed on a several measures and deadlines to meet these obligations. Thus, economic assistance was conditioned to the adequate progress in the adoption of property and housing legislation by the Federation of BiH, the review of the education system, the creation of employment opportunities for returnees, the restructuring of the police force or the return of at least 20,000 minority pre-war residents in 1998 to the Sarajevo Canton (OHR 1998b).<sup>172</sup>

In order to address the inherent obstructionism to returns conducted by nationalist parties, the new political approach to address minority returns adopted by the international community was put in place. The principal international organisations closely supervised the process of implementation through a diffusion of several bodies that combined local institutions involved in the process of return and main international

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<sup>171</sup> Again, pressure was exercised not only by SDA. Furthermore, local pressure was not exclusively politically driven as other NGO's, like the Coalition for Return, the Serb Civic Council and other citizen movements that pushed for returns.

<sup>172</sup> About 228,000 people who had left the Sarajevo Canton had not yet returned by the end of 1997 (ICG 1998a). Ensuring the return of 20,000 Sarajevans belonging to non-Bosniak ethnic groups was a landmark defined to supervise implementation. It was a small proportion of minority displaced but it could only be achieved with a strong commitment from local authorities, this would imply breaking the obstructionism from ethnocentric regimes to the return of people from belonging to other ethnicities.

organisations. Their remit was to supervise, assist and orientate local authorities in the mass return of minority pre-war residents.<sup>173</sup> The main organ was the Sarajevo Return Commission, chaired by Mirza Hajric, advisor of Alija Izetbegović. It included members of other Cantonal and municipal institutions, representatives of displaced persons from all ethnic groups and international organisations, such as the OHR and the UNHCR. The Sarajevo Return Commission also supported the work of sectoral committees, i.e. the Employment and Return Committee, the Education Working Group (EWG) and the Sarajevo Housing Committee (SHC).

However, the multidimensional approach adopted to promote minority returns to Sarajevo did not address a fundamental cause of displacement. As with many other provisions within the peace agreement, the Sarajevo Declaration was structurally undermined by the ethnic partition of the country culminating in the peace agreement. Indeed, the attempt to rebuild ethnic diversity in Sarajevo took place in a city where its urban area had been ethno-territorialised with international supervision two years before. The Declaration certainly aimed at creating favourable conditions for returns but did not dismantle the territorial division; inevitably it implied that the return of many Sarajevans would continue taking place in a polity where they had become an ethnic minority. Such a framework left doubts regarding the suitability of the Sarajevo Declaration to achieve a substantial number of minority returns.

Furthermore, SDA leadership had performed during early post-war stages to consolidate a Bosniak ethnocratic regime in Sarajevo through practices that included the resettlement of internally displaced persons into abandoned apartments. This policy of SDA in Sarajevo would not change unless returns failed to occur elsewhere in BiH. In this sense, and despite being among those participants in the Conference that agreed on the Sarajevo Declaration, SDA leadership was wary of the scope of the Declaration that opened the door to a mass return of displaced Sarajevans. Resorting to the reciprocity argument, Alija Izetbegović cast doubt on fulfilment as he outlined in the Return Conference the implementation of the Declaration but with some compromise from authorities in Republika Srpska.<sup>174</sup> Izetbegović claimed that he was not ready to assume

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<sup>173</sup> These mixed bodies in which local officials hold authority of implementation contrasted with the ones developed in the Brcko District during the same period, where the return of refugees and internally displaced persons was strictly developed by international organisations (see Moore 2013).

<sup>174</sup> The double way return was a reciprocity argument used by nationalist parties to justify absence of implementation of provisions included in the peace agreement. According to HDZ, for instance, Bosnian Serbs should only be allowed to return to their homes in Drvar if Croats were able to return to Kakanj in

the specific obligations set in the Declaration, on the off chance a similar conference was organised to ensure the return of non-Serbs to towns and villages in Republika Srpska (Kebo 1998).<sup>175</sup>

### **The implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration: between local obstructionism and the shortcomings of the international strategy**

During the initial post-war years, housing repossession for displaced people had been obstructed more or less by all nationalist parties. In fact, housing for nationalist parties had become a source of patronage, rewarding people from respective ethnicities, especially in cases of soldiers, invalids or families of soldiers killed in conflict (Cox 1998). Hence, the repossession of housing by the displaced required a consistent legal and political intervention in order to be successfully completed.<sup>176</sup> In Sarajevo, this process was as complex as in any other urban area of the country due to misuses of housing especially in cases of multiple occupancy and the presence of tens of thousands of people internally displaced who occupied often legally abandoned apartments having been expelled from other areas of Bosnia.<sup>177</sup>

After the approval of the Sarajevo Declaration, Cantonal authorities quickly adjusted the strategy to address its implementation, and approved a plan for the return to Sarajevo on 14 February 1998. It was estimated that 182 million KM would be needed for housing and 54 million KM for infrastructure, in order to rebuild 11,400 houses to allow a return of 40,000 people (Bečirović 1998a). Significantly, the plan set limits to implementation through the inclusion of a provision stating that eviction would only take place in cases of multiple occupancies (Bečirović 1998b). This provision was reaffirmed a few months later by the Sarajevo Canton Prime Minister, Midhat Haračić

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FBiH or to Bosanski Brod in RS. Bosnian Serbs also used this argument, claiming that returns to Republika Srpska were not possible without the prior return of Serbs to Croatia (ICG 1998b).

<sup>175</sup> As announced at the Conference (“Danas Sarajevo sutra cijeli Bosnia”, 1998), it became apparent after a series of meeting that the Sarajevo Return Conference became the most effective method to promote return of minorities to their pre-war homes. The Return Conference in Republika Srpska reclaimed by Izetbegović took place on 28 April 1998 in Banja Luka (OHR 1998d).

<sup>176</sup> It was often necessary to evict internally displaced people in favour of returning minorities, and this required the local authorities to disregard ethnic allegiances in the neutral application of the law. Also, it was necessary to address multiple occupancy and other forms of misallocation of housing in which party members or authorities in control of administrative duties were often engaged. On occasion, it was necessary to source alternative accommodation for those who were evicted but could not return to their pre-war homes.

<sup>177</sup> Multiple occupancy is defined as families using more than one apartment after occupation of abandoned apartments. Approximately, 5,000 houses and apartments in the Sarajevo Canton were occupied in double or multiple occupancies by the beginning of the Declaration (ICG 1998a).

(Kalamujić 1998). Consequently, the creation of housing space for the return of displaced people to the Canton was limited to the reconstruction of destroyed apartments and the elimination of cases of multiple occupancies.<sup>178</sup>

Importantly, this plan for the return of pre-war citizens incorporated the guidelines of the SDA in the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration. Despite the multiethnic institutional reorganisation of the city, produced after the adoption of the Sarajevo Protocol, which included power sharing mechanisms at the three levels of governance in the Canton, the SDA continued controlling power structures. During the process of housing repossession, SDA designed and implemented policies despite the presence of HDZ members in key positions of the Canton, such as deputies of the Minister for Housing and the Cantonal Governor. In practice, they did not have the capacity to influence the housing policy performed by the Sarajevo Canton (Bečirović 1999).

Alongside the SDA strategy, the joint local and international committees were created with responsibility for supervising the Declaration and assisting local authorities. Firstly, the High Representative established the Sarajevo Return Commission mid February. Its first meeting was held on 5 March and focused on three of the most critical areas of the Sarajevo Declaration: (1) the adoption of property legislation allowing the repossession for the housing of people displaced, (2) the creation of housing space through elimination of abuses like cases of multiple occupancy, and (3) the creation of a secure environment (OHR 1998e). After the first meeting of the Sarajevo Return Commission, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 9 March to establish the Sarajevo Housing Commission and this worked as a forum to encourage efficient performance from local authorities. Chaired by Mirza Hajric, other members included the Canton Governor, other relevant cantonal and municipal authorities, a representative of the Council of Ministers, the UNHCR and the OHR. Through assistance provided to local authorities who dealt with housing issues, the goal of the Commission was essentially, that both pre-war owners and right holders,

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<sup>178</sup> During the adoption of the Plan, it was emphasised that it did not go against people who had defended the city or were in Sarajevo having been expelled from other areas of Bosnia, essentially, highlighting the complex social environment existing in Sarajevo at the end of the war with many of those internally displaced from other areas of Bosnia.

in cases of socially owned apartments, could legally and physically repossess their apartments.<sup>179</sup>

Along with supervision of respective Committees, the OHR was directly involved in the process of housing repossession through the work of its Human Rights department and the RRTF. Rather than dealing with individual property claims, the Human Rights department took the lead in terms of legislative change and issues at political level (Philpott 2005). Crucially, the empowerment of the High Representative and the clear instructions defined in the Sarajevo Declaration produced results shortly after its adoption. In this sense, the creation of a legal framework for the repossession of property, defined as a priority in the Declaration, was finally achieved in 1998 after two years in which calls from international officials had little impact.

The Sarajevo Declaration set mid-February as the deadline to amend property laws that discriminated displaced persons. After a few delays, authorities of the Federation of BiH finally adopted amendments on 3 April 1998 in a manner that was acceptable to the OHR.<sup>180</sup> Any amendments that dispossessed those displaced (with their right to repossess socially-owned apartments) were removed through the approval of the *Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments*. Within this new law, the Federal Ministry of Urban Planning and Environment drafted an instruction framing the claim procedure. Pre-war tenants whose apartments had been declared abandoned could thus file a claim for housing repossession in respective municipal housing authorities (OHR 1998f). The removal of discriminative housing legislation was fundamental to allow pre-war residents reclaim their apartments. Some amendments removed the primary legal obstacles, but Federal authorities were cautious in setting a legal framework fully supportive of those displaced. Indeed, several clauses favouring temporary occupants were included which made it difficult for people displaced to successfully complete the process of housing repossession.<sup>181</sup> In spite of

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<sup>179</sup> Municipalities were also involved in the process of housing repossession, generally carrying out evictions and working in administrative.

<sup>180</sup> Generally, the F BiH was in charge of legislative issues while cantonal and municipal authorities were more involved in the implementation and operational work.

<sup>181</sup> Among these clauses, there was a six-month deadline after the law was approved in order to file a claim for housing repossession. A decision was also issued stating that pre-war occupant's lost property rights if they failed to return within a year following the granting of the claim. Equally, there was the possibility of allowing temporary occupants to stay in private and socially-owned apartments for one year after the pre-war occupant expressed a desire to return (ICG 1998c).

OHR's calls to modify these provisions, the authorities refused to do so demonstrating once again the lack of progress in the Republika Srpska.

Because of the constraints inserted in the amendments i.e. to allow the repossession of housing by pre-war owners or tenants, the High Representative used Bonn powers to enact legislation in favour of people displaced. For instance, the slow progress in solving property claims forced the High Representative to extend the deadline set for claiming socially owned apartments until April 1999. Ultimately, this extension did not eliminate discriminative clauses in property legislation, therefore, the High Representative set about amending property laws in both entities on 27 October 1999 (OHR 1999a). Importantly, the property legislation package (PLIP) finally ended the differences between entities that were previously a source of tension in the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration, as it will be seen in the following sections. Thus, PLIP enacted a uniform legal structure that harmonised legislation in Republika Srpska with the existing one in the Federation of BiH. Moreover, it defined clear instructions on the process of housing repossession for institutions involved.

The participation of the international community in the supervision of the Sarajevo Declaration to amend laws discriminating pre-war residents of socially-owned apartments was determinant from a legislative point of view. Yet, involved in the process of housing repossession supervised by joint commissions such as the SHC, the various international institutions went beyond the supervisory role, duplicating or triplicating administrative procedures including applications or interviews with potential returnees (Research Interview; 25 May 2015). Instead of proceeding chronologically as people applied for return, international representatives brought cases arbitrarily without any procedure or order, asking the local authorities to deal with them as a priority, but this did not contribute to disabling the potential corruption within the system.<sup>182</sup>

Meanwhile, international intromission did not contribute during the early stages to rationalise a property claim process that was very much affected by embedded local obstructionism. Indeed, obstructionism was a core element preventing any significant progress of the Sarajevo Declaration during 1998, as highlighted by the poor resolution of property claims, with only 528 decisions issued out of 6,557 claims during the first five months of the Declaration (OHR 1998j). Obstructionist practices delayed and made it more difficult for displaced people repossessing pre-war homes, which meant that the

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<sup>182</sup> For instance, some lawyers guaranteed to returnees that their property would be vacated within ninety or 120 days, this was impossible without either local or international connections.

claim process and any subsequent decisions were generally not made within the thirty day period required by law. One of these practices was unnecessary fixing the requirement of hearings with pre-war occupants (OHR 1998f). Other obstacles appeared during the registration of the claim, when officials refrained from issuing necessary documents or they required documents that were not necessary by the law or were impossible to procure. Furthermore, Sarajevostan was charging between thirty and fifty DM for copies of occupancy-right documents and apartment contracts, violating the Article 11 of the Sarajevo Declaration, which ensured full access to all public records without any cost (ICG 1998c).

Poor performance in property claims inevitably affected the rate of returns which fell short of the ambitious milestone set in the Declaration of 20,000 minority returns to Sarajevo in 1998. In the first seven months, only 1,292 non-Bosniaks had returned to Sarajevo (ICG 1998c). This low number of minority returns contrasted with the return to the Canton of more than 5,000 Bosniaks. Among them, there were about 2,500 who had never lived before in the city which implied further occupation of abandoned apartments. Apparently, SDA policy to reallocate a Bosniak population from other parts of the country started in mid-1996 and continued during the early implementation of the Declaration amid claims from the authorities that the slow progress of the Declaration was attributable to the housing shortage.

Despite claims from authorities, obstructionism in the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration responded to the SDA policy to keep a Bosniak majority in the city unless returns took place elsewhere in BiH.<sup>183</sup> Such a policy clashed with the international strategy that challenged Sarajevo to take the lead and serve as an example for the reconstruction of the ethnic diversity in the whole country, as had been reclaimed by the SDA. Eloquently, in October 1998, Izetbegović argued that the implementation of Annex VII was only possible if a two-way return took place. He openly rejected what he (inaccurately) defined as a one-way return of Serbs to the Federation arguing that it would ultimately turn Bosnia into a part of “Greater Serbia” (OHR 1998b). Despite positive claims of the wish to rebuild ethnic diversity in Sarajevo, SDA leadership and local authorities did not contribute to its implementation.

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<sup>183</sup> Several local political opposition figures agreed that local authorities were hindering the process of returning to Sarajevo. These figures included Sejfudin Tokic, President of the Alternative Ministerial Council, Salih Foco, Vice-President of the Liberal – Bosniak Organization, and Strajo Krsmanovic, Vice-President of the Liberal Party (ICG 1998b).



The OHR openly challenged Bosniak authorities to demonstrate in the city their commitment to rebuild ethnic diversity all around Bosnia:

Your objective is to recreate a multi-ethnic integrated BiH. If this cannot be achieved in Sarajevo it cannot be achieved anywhere. By holding back returns in Sarajevo you are preventing the achievement of your own objective (ICG 1999a).

The SDA had the capacity to obstruct implementation of the Declaration through its direct influence on the work of authorities involved in the process of housing repossession. As elsewhere in Bosnia, a patron-client relationship developed in the nomenklatura system due to the system inherited from the socialist regime who previously permitted this behaviour.<sup>184</sup> As officials had the authority to appoint individuals to certain key positions, party patrons cultivated loyalties among people appointed in administration, who followed the ethnic criteria more especially since the war. Indeed, a key element of the power exercised by ethnocracies was their control over public-sector appointments. Through the creation of patronage networks, parties had tight control over public institutions (Caplan 2005a). Officials responsible for the process of housing repossession had thus little independence and this became the primary obstacle in the process of housing repossession.

This dependence of party patrons on housing officials was well illustrated in cases of multiple occupancies, which also revealed the SDA's continuous use of apartments as a source of patronage. The slow pace in solving these identifiable cases, as the only feasible type to proceed with evictions in the Cantonal Plan for returns to Sarajevo, also showed little commitment from SDA leadership in the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration. For solving cases of multiple occupancies strong political commitment was required as a number of powerful figures in Sarajevo or those with close connections to the SDA were among a significant number of these cases. Moreover, housing authorities responsible for the implementation lacked authority to resolve these cases.<sup>185</sup> Contextually, the High Representative Carlos Westendorp and

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<sup>184</sup> In practice, the nomenklatura system eradicated the separation of powers. The dominant party ensured that public institutions were subordinate to the party through their influence over personnel and the maintenance of loyalty and discipline by virtue of the exclusion of any dissenting voices from those in influential positions (ESI 1999b). This resulted in more control over the administration, which was selected by a member's loyalty rather than their competence and aptitude.

<sup>185</sup> As a response, the RRTF developed committees to deal with multiple occupancies in several municipalities. Local officials met with international field officers to identify cases and co-ordinate action. This system was a combination of international pressure and political cover to assist officials in carrying out their responsibilities (ESI 1999a).

the Ambassadors of the Steering Board of the PIC required of Alija Izetbegović in late May 1998 an involvement in the resolution of 261 cases of multiple occupancies. For all that, no significant progresses occurred during the subsequent two months as only twenty six cases had been resolved or were in the process of being resolved (OHR 1998e).

The SDA continued using apartments as a source of patronage even once the evictions started. Early evictions conducted in 1998 served to distribute apartments among people with SDA connections. Apparently, the bulk of early evictions had been initiated by SDA-controlled companies seeking to regain apartments for privatisation. Legal temporary occupants were thus evicted to grant the permanent occupancy right to someone else, reportedly with party connections (ICG 1998c). This practice eroded the argument often used by the SDA authorities, that no evictions would take place to avoid placing temporary occupants ethnically cleansed, in the streets. More importantly, it also contravened the Plan for returns to Sarajevo approved in mid-February by the Sarajevo Canton. In late March 1998, the Ombudsmen brought these cases to the attention of the Cantonal Governor and relevant Ministers before receiving assurance from them that such practice would stop. Significantly, it not only continued but even increased after the *Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments* came into force.

#### Difficulties to implement the Sarajevo Declaration

As claimed by Carlos Westendorp during the Sarajevo return Conference, the city in the Sarajevo Declaration had both a great opportunity and an enormous challenge, one that required magnanimity and resourcefulness in industrial quantities to overcome emotional and physical obstacles. As seen thus far, obstructionism was at the core of poor results from the early implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration, but such slow progress was also a result of the difficult post-war context. It is important to understand that the tough context and the difficulty to implement the Declaration, and the opposition to a mass return of displaced people, were not only political but also social. In post-war Sarajevo an important social categorisation created a division between people who remained in the city during the siege and those who had left, with

the former being considered a defender of the city.<sup>186</sup> Often Sarajevans were unwilling to accept back people who had fled during the siege as it was considered that they had betrayed their city. This resentment against people who left could encompass former neighbours, family members or friends from the same ethnic origin.

The huge challenge of implementing the Sarajevo Declaration was highlighted by the work of housing officials. In the process of housing repossession, the performance of housing officials in delaying or preventing resolutions, should not be reduced to a mere act of ethnic discrimination upon following party instructions, despite the features of power structures defined earlier. Often, delays in property claims hardly differed between minority and majority returns. Essentially, with limited space for alternative accommodation, which was aggravated by misallocation practices, officials also faced the dilemma of having to expel vulnerable groups and other people who stayed and defended the city to the detriment of those who had left. Along with direct political influence, officials were exposed to a tough environment at the end of war. Organisations such as the NGO Association Sarajevo Declaration and the BiH Independent Trade Unions Association lobbied to prevent evictions until people could return to pre-war homes in RS.

Along with social and political pressure, the Sarajevo Declaration faced further difficulties as a result of the international approach. The focus on the Bosnian capital city to trigger returns elsewhere in the country was not only politically exploited by SDA leadership to justify poor implementation, but also became a source of tension within those who were internally displaced. The city was increasingly at a more advanced stage than the rest of the country in terms of housing repossession, as highlighted by an average rate that stood at thirty evictions per week during most of 1999 (ESI 1999a). However, people who resettled in Sarajevo often could not return to their homes of origin once evictions started. It caused dramatic situations as some families moved as many as five times from apartment to apartment in the city (Čengić and Skotte 2010). Such an imbalance could have been ameliorated if alternative housing was built from the beginning of the implementation but funds were not forthcoming from international actors nor did the Sarajevo government develop an ambitious plan of the construction of new housing. Significantly, the lack of housing space in Sarajevo

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<sup>186</sup> A 'defender of the city', did not only include people who were involved in the military but included anyone who stayed in Sarajevo during the siege. Indeed, ethnicity was not the only important social categorisation in post-war Sarajevo. The urban-rural divide was also very important since the beginning of the war due to the massive inflow of people from rural areas.

was further aggravated by the very international presence in the city, as non-Bosnian people working in foreign organisations were occupying large numbers i.e. thousands of apartments (Omeragić 1998b).<sup>187</sup>

This imbalance between Sarajevo and the rest of the country, in the repossession of housing, was contested directly by internally displaced persons resettled in the city. The Association Sarajevo Declaration was very critical regarding differences in legislation between the Republika Srpska and Federation of BiH before the High Representative's amendments in October 1999. It called for a moratorium of property law implementation and the cessation of about 200 evictions until RS property laws were adopted (Omeragić 1998a). Equally, the Association of Trade Unions demanded the immediate stop to evictions until two-way returns took place and sent a critical letter to Carl Bildt, the Sarajevo Cantonal Governor and Mirza Hajric, chair of the Sarajevo Return Commission. The letter stated:

If you truly want everybody to return to their own, do your utmost to make the return two-way, and simultaneous to all areas of BiH. While you are demanding return to Sarajevo only, houses in Stolac are being bombed, returnees are being killed in Tasovcici and in Banja Luka, they are expelling the dead. Mr. Westendorp, stop this! Free return to Sarajevo will become real if it is accorded with return of 74,000 of expellees presently accommodated in Sarajevo (OHR 1998g).

In this context of uncertainty, protests from people internally displaced in Sarajevo targeted the international community. In September 2001, around 200 Bosniak families from Eastern Bosnia who had been evicted from temporary housing in Sarajevo congregated in front of OHR headquarters. They expressed despair with the continuous delays from both locals and internationals and pressured for securing solutions for evictions that occurred but without the provision of alternative housing:

From April 15 we are under tents, they promised us they would build houses but have not done anything yet. I am evicted in the city but cannot go back home. They are evicting us from housing but do not provide any alternative. I live alone and I am alone, my son died in the war. We ask for a delay in any evictions until obtaining an alternative apartment. Sarajevo Canton always says that they will build houses next week but do nothing. All that we asked

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<sup>187</sup> In this sense, during the early post-war stages, Sarajevo hosted the majority of international organisations operating in BiH to such an extent that within the city in 1998, one in eight residents was a foreigner working for international organisations. Indeed, approximately 15,000 foreign civilians were reportedly working in Sarajevo as employees of various international NGOs, members of international multilateral and bilateral organisations, raising pressure on housing stock during the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration (ICG 1999a; Barakat 2003).

of the international community has only been achieved on paper (“Srbi svoje kuce izdaju por kiriju a bosnjacke ne napustaju”, September 4<sup>th</sup>).

The absence of alternative accommodation not only affected people who had not repossessed pre-war homes; it also affected many who simply did not want to return to a place where they had become an ethnic minority and their security was not yet guaranteed. In this regard, there were still some episodes in which minority returnees were violently tackled. For instance, five years after the end of the war, Bosniaks and Croats returning to Republika Srpska could still be subject to physical assaults and extensive destruction of properties (ICG 2001).<sup>188</sup> In addition, difficulties in the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration did not only appear in the process of housing repossession. Alongside its intervention in the housing issue, the Sarajevo Declaration intervened in other areas to create a favourable environment for minority returns.

#### Further shortcomings of the international intervention: the Sub-Group on Textbook

Meanwhile, the intervention conducted in the Sub-Group on Textbooks in 1998 illustrates that the international performance in Sarajevo to rebuild ethnic diversity had significant shortcomings. The Declaration defined education as a central element to support the return and reintegration of the population in the city. The primary aim was to ensure that all children were educated in a manner that promoted tolerance, reconciliation and stability between people of different ethnic groups (OHR 1998j). Furthermore, it sought to reverse the existing discrimination following the establishment of three separate educational systems (based on three different ethnic curricula) in the autumn of 1992 (Pašalić Kreso 2008). This development encouraged many Serb parents in the Sarajevo Canton to send their children to schools in the Republika Srpska or to

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<sup>188</sup> Evidence of the hostility against a potential recovery of ethnic diversity in the Bosnian Serb ethno-territoriality was highlighted by serious riots which occurred in Banja Luka and Trebinje in early May 2001 during ceremonies to start the reconstruction of Mosques in respective cities. The riots resulted in one death and many more injured. These incidents were well organised and aimed at discouraging displaced Bosniaks from returning home. More than 1,000 Serbs broke through a police cordon and attacked people at a ceremony. About 250 Muslims were trapped in the building along with international representatives. One man died due to head injuries and more than thirty were injured (AP 2001; Vucinic 2001). Despite any progress achieved in the return of a displaced minority to Republika Srpska after the year 2000, these incidents were apparently the result of the SDS return to power after the November 2000 elections. Effectively, this ended Dodik’s two-year rule in the Bosnian Serb entity. Crucially, this incidence ensured rising ethnic tensions and also tested the international community’s rhetoric regarding the compliance of Republika Srpska with Dayton obligations (ICG 2001).

the municipality of Kiseljak in the case of Croats, which held a majority of Bosnian Croat population.<sup>189</sup>

A specific milestone set in the Declaration was the implementation of a non-discriminatory education programme in the Sarajevo Canton at the beginning of the 1998/99 academic year. Under the supervision of the Education Working Group, formed as stipulated on 1 March and led by the OHR, it was established that Sarajevo educational authorities should undertake all legislative, administrative and technical changes necessary for its achievement.<sup>190</sup> Initially, in a context of wide obstructionism in property claims, the Sarajevo Declaration was instrumental in the production of most of the positive developments in the Education Working Group, such as the identification of offensive passages in textbooks and other school materials. Such a process to eliminate and modify any materials promoting hatred and intolerance towards other ethnic groups was conducted by Sub-Groups on textbooks. Despite the fact that international representatives were required to act in an advisory capacity, in practice they took the lead with the preparation of reports and submission of recommendations to local educational authorities (Donia 2000).

Yet, the eradication of offensive material from textbooks was not completed as Cantonal authorities failed to implement a number of decisions derived from the Working Group. After reviewing textbooks on History, Literature, Geography, Grammar, Fine Arts, and Nature and Society, one of the guideline documents with the relevant recommendations for amendments was released. It triggered intense and largely hostile media attention to the issue, amid accusations that the international community were attempting to deny the facts of the war (OHR 1998j). Subsequently, and after the Minister for Education referred the matter to the Cantonal Government, they rejected the Working Group's decisions on the basis that the group was not legally established under the authority of the Canton. Importantly, the Cantonal reaction was a response to

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<sup>189</sup> In post-war Bosnia, competence on education lies at the cantonal level in the Federation of BiH while it is highly centralised in the Republika Srpska. Different education systems not only exist in distinct ethno-territorialities but also in mixed Cantons in the FBiH, populated by Bosniaks and Croats (Perry 2003). The concept of "Two schools under one roof" is representative of such segregation on ethnic criteria, despite sharing the same space, students are physically separated from each other and taught separate curricula. Initially, it was seen as an interim solution to ensure that minority returnees could study in a school building, rather than study in unfamiliar surroundings. The absence of a permanent solution suggested that one decade after the ending of hostilities such severe symbols of division still existed with over fifty five cases in the Federation of BiH alone (Pašalić Kreso 2008).

<sup>190</sup> The Education Working Group was integrated by four Sub-Groups, i.e. on textbooks, resources, discrimination and democratization.

a unilateral initiative of the UNESCO Sarajevo Field Office to distribute recommendations in October 1998, which stated and stressed that all teachers were obliged to follow these recommendations (Donia 2000). The hostile reaction was a response to performance but also, and especially, for the specific nature of the material released. Among the proposed changes were some simple but very topical sensitive issues such as one that suggested replacing “crimes” for “errors” in a book of grammar rules for eighth-graders (OHR 1998j).<sup>191</sup>

Although the mandate of the Sub-Group on Textbooks was consistent with the OHR’s immediate objective of facilitating an orderly and large-scale return of minority refugees to Sarajevo, it was based on the false premise that tolerance could be achieved through the superficial eradication of specific terms and passages in Sarajevo’s textbooks, bypassing other more fundamental issues of justice, pluralism and tolerance in education (Donia 2000). Indeed, the work of the Sub-Group on Textbooks reveals some of the limitations of the internationally led strategy in Sarajevo that were incremented by unilateralism and focus on the capital city of BiH. Again, absence of scrutiny in Republika Srpska or in Croat-controlled areas in the Federation of BiH created grievances among Bosniak authorities as international organisations sought an effort from the ethnic community that had been badly affected by the war.

#### International economic sanctions to pressure for the implementation

In spite of difficult contexts, international actors did not hesitate to confront the obstructionism that contributed to the reduced number of non-Bosniak returnees during 1998. As the Declaration granted aid to further implementation, some international actors quickly and unilaterally responded in the form of economic sanctions. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) froze nine million DM for reconstruction while the European Commission inserted a similar clause in three reconstruction contracts with non-governmental organisations for a total of eighteen million DM (ICG 1998c). Economic sanctions were unilateral decisions from donors but the High Representative Carlos Westendorp expressed his support and warned Sarajevo authorities that he would take decisive measures against those who were obstructing implementation (Zivak 1998). Economic sanctions highlighted the new

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<sup>191</sup> The OHR fiercely criticised most local media who they claimed conducted a campaign of disinformation and defamation based on biased, incomplete or simply wrong information in relation to changes.

vigorous approach of international actors to boost minority returns but were insufficient to transform power structures and obstructionism practices. Thus, in April 1999, the US Ambassador warned the Sarajevo Canton that new sanctions would be imposed again if the implementation of the Declaration did not improve (“Opravdano upozorenje Sarajevu”, 1999).

Yet, slow progress in the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration was also favoured by the limited resources available. Admittedly, economic sanctions were tools used for leverage in implementation but this further had a counterproductive outcome which slowed the process of reconstruction. In point of fact, the pressure from international organisations for a quick return of people who had become a minority in the city, was not hand in hand with the appropriate funding for reconstruction to increase the availability of alternative housing (Research Interview; 28 May 2015). Despite the absence of international funds for reconstruction did not cause the low number of minority returns, as argued by the SDA, the increasing requirements for alternative accommodation for evictees was certainly necessary in order to address cases in which a return to pre-war homes was not possible or desirable.<sup>192</sup>

In this vein, and only four months after US and EC decisions, Carlos Westendorp recommended that the European Commission unfreeze economic assistance for the reconstruction projects of the Sarajevo Housing Fund in order to increase the availability of apartments and facilitate the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration (OHR 1998h). Interestingly, this was included shortly after in the decision of the Sarajevo Housing Fund to start the construction of 127 flats in Cengic Vila, a Sarajevo residential quarter, in what represented a change in the housing policy of the Sarajevo Cantonal Government (Alic 1999). The construction of new apartments was a measure that could facilitate the return of those displaced as new apartments would allow the accommodation of vulnerable families who were evicted from temporary accommodations (OHR 1999d).<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> The argument used by SDA authorities to justify the low number of returns was inaccurate and neglected misuse of apartments such as cases of multiple occupancies. Sarajevo certainly had a huge number of apartments damaged after the war but the number of dwellings unavailable for living was relatively low. The destroyed number of apartments that were unfit for inhabitation until they were rebuilt was relatively low in number, having a rate only ten per cent over in the municipality of Novo Sarajevo (IMG 1999).

<sup>193</sup> During the rule of the Alliance for Change in 2001 and 2001, the Cantonal Government worked more ambitiously to start the construction of 15,000 new apartments through a sixty MKM credit from the World Bank (Žarić 2003), which represented ten per cent of the total housing stock of the Canton.



International increasing pressure, progresses in the repossession of housing

Beyond economic sanctions, a significant method at the disposal of the international community, to push for minority returns, was the power granted to the High Representative to dismiss officials who were violating the peace agreement or the terms of its implementation. Thus, in November 1999, SDA Minister of Justice, Jusuf Zafiragic, became the first authority of Sarajevo dismissed by the High Representative for having continuously violated agreements reached in the framework of the Declaration and the amended property laws (OHR 1999e). Clearly highlighting SDA's performance in the repossession of housing, Zafiragic, as Cantonal Minister endeavoured to repeatedly obstruct the process.

Indeed, in a closed session of the Cantonal Government, he overturned agreements at the SHC to improve procedures for the management of socially owned apartments. Zafiragic also repeatedly issued instructions to the judiciary to prevent the execution of court ordered evictions. Moreover, he abolished the Sarajevo Cantonal Housing Department in mid-December 1998 and included an illegal clause withdrawing property rights if people had not returned to their apartments fifteen days after repossession. The abolition of the Cantonal Housing Department and the delay to reappoint a director blocked temporarily the resolution of 17,000 cases, 700 of which were evictions pending only the signature of the Director.

In the context of obstructionism from strategic Cantonal government positions, the OHR not only played a reactive role in the dismissal of officials who unfulfilled the Sarajevo Declaration; rather, along with other international organisations, the OHR pushed for the transformation of personnel working in institutions dealing with returns. Within the SHC, there was strong coordinated political pressure on the Sarajevo Cantonal Government to improve management systems and ensure that housing institutions were staffed with co-operative officials (ESI 1999a). An early intervention in May 1998 affected the Cantonal Housing Department, which replaced the Head of the Housing Department following international recommendations. This change affected the rate of property claim resolution of socially owned apartments from a few cases at the end of June to more than 400 per week in September (ICG 1998c).<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> One of the measures taken by the new director was hiring twenty new employees, some of them minorities, to increase the number of staff to ninety eight.

Other measures were at the request of Andy Bearpark, Deputy HR to the Minister of Housing Affairs, Resul Basic, for the restructuration of the Housing Cantonal Ministry. The demand included the replacement of fifteen inspectors and administrative staff as well as four heads of departments at the housing municipal service. Besides, he also asked for further changes to increase diversity in the ethnic composition of the staff as defined in the Sarajevo Declaration (“OHR traži smjene u općinama”, 1999). Equally, the OHR also looked for cooperation from SDA-moderate members to unblock evictions and returns. Interestingly, coercion was not only performed with the contingency of dismissal but also persuasion. In this sense, OHR members exploited the argument that Bosniak authorities were morally equivalent to SDS and HDZ in the prevention of returns to make authorities more cooperative in Sarajevo (ICG 1999c).

Crucially, these international interventions in the institutional field, within the framework of the Sarajevo Declaration, implied an erosion of one of the features of ethnocracies, which was the tight control of institutions. In this sense, judiciary and administrative authorities responsible for implementing property laws were becoming progressively less responsive to the SDA in the area of Sarajevo (ESI 1999a).<sup>195</sup> Progresses encouraged the High Representative and Wolfgang Petritsch in August 1999 and brought a more invigorate mandate after replacing Carlos Westendorp.<sup>196</sup> Indeed, the number of dismissals increased with the High Representative becoming less reluctant to use Bonn Powers to support minority returns, as seen in Petritsch’s decision to dismiss for the whole twenty two country public and housing officials in November 1999 (Caplan 2005a).<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> During and after the war there was a profound transformation of judiciary personnel, becoming almost exclusively mono-ethnic. Many pre-war judges left or were replaced by inexperienced and underpaid judges appointed on ethnic and political criteria (ICG 1999b).

<sup>196</sup> Shortly after, in March 2000, the European Union became more involved in the country, progressively transforming the role of the OHR, which was increasingly shaped by EU strategies rather than by Dayton itself. In this sense, the High Representative became double-headed as EU Special Representative and increasingly influenced by the prospect of EU enlargement.

<sup>197</sup> Importantly, Bonn Powers not only evolved quantitatively but also qualitatively. Reactively conceived as an extraordinary measure to unblock peace implementation, dismissals were actually used to tackle purposes that went beyond obstructionism to the peace agreement. Between December 1997 and February 2008, the High Representative dismissed about 190 politicians and other officials, and made approximately 850 decisions in all fields (Gromes 2009). Furthermore, the new highly interventionist nature of the High Representative was well exemplified in the dismissal of Mile Marceta, the Mayor of Drvar, in north-west BiH. Despite recognising his great contribution to the return of refugees and displaced people to Drvar, he was dismissed because he could not carry out his duty on a daily basis, due to a physical attack and the continuous threats to his security (OHR 1999e). The progressive qualitative evolution of the role of the High Representative while using the exceptional Bonn powers is eloquently

Furthermore, the international strategy to promote minority returns was progressively expanded beyond Sarajevo, especially after the adoption of the Property Law Implementation Program (PLIP) in October 1999. Established to ensure that all claims were resolved and all citizens of Bosnia could repossess their property, PLIP pursued the argument that repossession of property was treated as a question of the rule of law, turning a highly politicized issue into a simple question of neutral application of law (OSCE 2001). In a strategy that proved to be effective, international organisations dealing with returns such as OSCE, UNHCR and OHR, increased collaboration and resorted to field resources existing at the time to improve supervision.

In the context of increasing pressure and resources to implement Annex VII in the whole country, and the rise of resources for supervision and enforcement, obstructionist practices evolved more towards subtle administrative forms as seen in September 2000 when the High Representative dismissed once again housing officials in Sarajevo. Officials removed included the Head of the Centar/Stari Grad office of the Sarajevo Cantonal Housing Department, Sevala Branković, and the Senior Lawyer of the Centar/Stari Grad office of the Sarajevo Canton Housing Department, Sanja Srna. Both officials were removed from their positions due to their perceived failure to address cases of multiple occupancies, schedules of unnecessary hearings slowing the process of property law implementation or the failure to instruct staff on further implementation of the property legislation (OHR 2000b,c).

The increasing international pressure and the progress in the process of housing repossession did not change into a fully supportive performance from local authorities and resistances to generalised implementation still manifested. Actually, once property claim resolutions began, obstructionism moved from property issues to the implementation of decisions. In this sense, non-execution of eviction orders became another barrier to complete repossession. Local police contributed to the lack of implementation by not attending or not acting in evictions, which violated their legal obligation (OHR 1999d). The greater majority of Sarajevo Serbs, who had left the city and were interviewed in this dissertation, expressed the opinion that eviction of temporary residents could delay up to several months the completion of the process of housing repossession.

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manifested by Knaus and Martin (2003) in their analogy of the situation in Bosnia with the liberal imperialism of the British East India Company in the nineteenth century.

The adoption of PLIP and the subsequent expansion of the international capacity to implement Annex VII beyond Sarajevo was a crucial factor to finally put in motion the mass repossession of housing by pre-war tenants and owners both in Sarajevo and in the rest of BiH. Moreover, the widespread international intervention to achieve full repossession of housing by people displaced was barely affected by political context. The short rule of Alliance for Change since early 2001 in the Sarajevo Canton and in the Federation of BiH contributed to improve the environment but did not cause the rise in housing repossession, which had actually started before the change in government. Furthermore, housing repossession progressed in Republika Srpska despite the return to power of the SDS after the November 2000 elections, which implied a temporal increase in the hostility against returns of minorities as seen in the violence which occurred in Banja Luka and Trebinje in May 2001.

With the vast interventional intervention successfully developed after the adoption of PLIP, property claims and resolutions of pre-war residents since early 2000 dramatically increased. Most of the property repossession in Bosnia took place between 2000 and 2003 when the resolution of property claims rose from twelve percent to twenty one percent in 2000 and reached nearly seventy percent by the end of 2002. Despite beginning earlier, mass housing repossession followed a very similar pattern in Sarajevo and about sixty percent of all repossession was completed in the Canton during the same period, totalizing 77,000 cases (Table 4). It is necessary to point out that this data officially corresponds to the number of returns but I equate it to housing repossession as people often returned to pre-war housing not to live but simply to complete the process before selling or exchanging the property. Such evolution in Sarajevo during the early 2000s was a result of the rise in housing repossession by Sarajevo Serbs. Previously, other ethnic groups achieved high repossession of housing, however, Sarajevo Serbs multiplied between four and six times the repossession rates compared to the early implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration. After years of successful repossession, the supervision of the implementation of Annex VII was transferred to the Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights in December 2003. At that time, ninety two percent of claims had been resolved but there were still about 330,000 people displaced (NRC 2004).

	<b>Bosniaks</b>	<b>Croats</b>	<b>Serbs</b>	<b>Others</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>1998</b>	8,435	2,947	3,562	486	<b>15,430</b>
<b>1999</b>	5,296	1,626	4,144	492	<b>11,558</b>
<b>2000</b>	2,931	1,626	7,491	426	<b>12,326</b>
<b>2001</b>	3,789	1,478	17,949	713	<b>24,073</b>
<b>2002</b>	3,619	1,987	24,493	813	<b>30,685</b>
<b>2003</b>	7,658	918	13,149	349	<b>22,073</b>
<b>2004</b>	4,029	227	2,182	93	<b>6,531</b>
<b>2005</b>	1,706	154	1,248	10	<b>3,116</b>
<b>2006</b>	1,386	230	633	32	<b>2,282</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>38,848</b>	<b>11,328</b>	<b>74,851</b>	<b>3,414</b>	<b>128,441</b>

**Table 4.** Returns registered to Sarajevo Canton between January 1998 and December 2006 (Ministry for Refugees and Displaced Persons 2006).

### **The limited impact of the Sarajevo Declaration on the reconstruction of ethnic diversity**

The repossession of housing was indeed central to the policy of the main international organisations involved in the implementation of Annex VII. It was considered essential that this precondition was implemented for the return of displaced people but the precondition was neither unique nor the most important. Estimations in urban areas actually indicated that in 2003 more than seventy five per cent of housing reposessed was being sold or exchanged (HCHR 2003).<sup>198</sup> Generally, transferring property after the completion of repossession was a phenomenon occurring throughout the country and it was captured in interviews conducted with Sarajevo Serbs who were currently living in East Sarajevo. None of the twelve people interviewed for this dissertation, however, lived temporarily in Sarajevo having completed repossession. Only one among the interviewees expressed an intention to return during the post-war period but this did not actually materialise due to the absence of funds to rebuild the apartment. In point of fact, this issue became a definitive obstacle as families progressively settled in Pale.

In cases where repossession did not take place, the non-development of compensation funds during the peace implementation, despite being included in Annex VII, ensured that housing repossession was both an essential precondition to returning and actively encouraged people to resettle elsewhere. In this sense, people who did not wish to return could stabilise their situation through exchanges or, in cases where their home was sold, they recovered the means to build or buy a property in a new location,

<sup>198</sup> That percentage was higher in cities rather than in rural areas, where people often went back to develop agrarian activities or simply maintained the premises as a weekend cottage.

mostly in territories where they constituted an ethnic majority.<sup>199</sup> Estimations that there was a generalised transfer of property after repossession were confirmed recently when data from the Census held in October 2013, the first one conducted in BiH since 1991, was at last released. Census data confirms that mass repossession did not subsequently turn into a significant and permanent return of displaced Sarajevens to the city. Despite a successful process (admittedly delayed) of housing repossession, Sarajevo's profound transformation of its ethnic structure was hardly altered. The city now contains a wide majority of the Bosniak population, which represents almost eighty one percent of all inhabitants, thirty points higher than before the war (Table 5). The percentage of Bosnian Croats is 4.2 percent of the Cantonal population and Bosnian Serbs only 3.2 percent. From a figure of thirty percent before the war and more than 150,000 inhabitants, the population of Sarajevo Serbs has dramatically fallen in the city, now representing less than four percent both in the City and the Canton.<sup>200</sup>

<b>Municipality</b>	<b>Bosniak</b>	<b>Croats</b>	<b>Serbs</b>	<b>Others</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Centar</b>	41,702	3,333	2,186	7,960	<b>55,181</b>
<b>Novi Grad</b>	99,773	4,874	4,367	9,539	<b>118,553</b>
<b>Novo Sarajevo</b>	48,188	4,639	3,402	8,585	<b>64,814</b>
<b>Stari Grad</b>	32,794	685	467	3,030	<b>36,976</b>
Hadžići	22,120	179	218	1,374	<b>23,891</b>
Ilidža	58,120	3,030	1,600	3,980	<b>66,730</b>
Ilijaš	18,151	382	421	649	<b>19,603</b>
Trnovo	1,376	4	97	25	<b>1,502</b>
Vogošća	24,351	321	542	1,129	<b>26,343</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>346,575</b>	<b>17,447</b>	<b>13,300</b>	<b>36,271</b>	<b>413,593</b>

**Table 5.** Population by ethnicity in the Sarajevo Canton in 2013. Municipalities in bold conform the city of Sarajevo (BHAS 2016).<sup>201</sup>

Hence, the ambitious Sarajevo Declaration devised by international organisations and led by the OHR following empowerment did not create a reconstruction of the ethnic diversity so characteristic of the city before the war. Despite its comprehensive scope, it failed to create appropriate conditions for the mass return of Sarajevans who had departed. Many people had made a new life once housing repossession was completed,

<sup>199</sup> Unarguably, absence of compensation funds meant that even authorities who were opposed to people returning came under pressure to help their own citizens to in reclaiming properties in other parts of the country (Cox and Garlick 2003).

<sup>200</sup> The proportion of Sarajevo Serbs prior to the war was even higher than thirty percent as a significant number declared themselves as Yugoslavs in the 1991 Census.

<sup>201</sup> The category "Others" comprise grouped people who belong to other ethnicities as well as those who failed to clarify their ethnicity or simply did not want to provide that information.

either in other areas of BiH or abroad. Furthermore, even in cases in which there was an intention to return and reside in their pre-war homes, several factors structurally undermined returns such as institutional and economic factors. The logic of ethnocracies structurally undermined the prospect of returning following housing repossession as, undeniably, place of residence is inexorably affected by broader considerations on individual and familiar well-being, i.e. job opportunities, the provision of basic public services such as access to pensions, health care and other social benefits, or children's education.

All or some of these elements were denied to minority returnees in respective ethno-territorialities and this significantly reduced the prospect of a mass minority return. Moreover, issues beyond housing reconstruction and repossession were insufficiently addressed by the international community both in Sarajevo and in the rest of BiH, despite the creation of a safe environment conducive to the voluntary return and the harmonious reintegration of displaced people were recognised in the second article of Annex VII. For example, the Inter-Agency Working Group on Employment recognised that opportunities for returnees had not been given enough consideration by the international community:

Although the 24 May 2000 PIC highlighted the need to foster economic, educational and labour market opportunities for returnees, the actual implementation of these crucial objectives has not yet started (ICG 2002a, p. 15).<sup>202</sup>

Regardless of the availability of pre-war homes, many Bosniaks who had resettled in Sarajevo preferred to remain in the city in order avoid both the uncertainty and the existing disadvantages of living as a minority in an ethnocratic regime controlled by either Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Croats. The adaptation to urban life after years in Sarajevo was also another factor influencing the decision to remain in the city, especially among the younger generations that appreciated more diverse opportunities in relation to employment, education or leisure. Equally important, having lived in many instances through extraordinary experiences of loss, forced displacement and survival,

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<sup>202</sup> Impediments that were not tackled or resolved during the early years following the conclusion of the war could remain unalterable afterwards. Despite some progress, ethnic curricula in education were not substantially modified and as late as 2013, the PIC urged Bosnia's education ministries to reform the school system to end segregation and discrimination (Jukic 2013).

many people simply did not want to return to places where they had been expelled as the life they had known before the war, had gone forever.<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>203</sup> As argued by social anthropologist Hariz Halilovich (2013) for people who suffered forced displacement, those places of humiliation and suffering are at the same time places of desire.





## **5. The international intervention for the political and economic liberalisation**

Analyses from the previous two chapters highlight the attempts of nationalist parties to consolidate an area of Sarajevo that was ethnically divided, and the subsequent failure of the international community to rebuild ethnic diversity in the Bosnian capital city. The legalisation of ethno-territorialities in the peace agreement and the subsequent reproduction structurally undermined the return of Sarajevans who had become ethnic minorities once housing repossession was completed. This chapter addresses the policies of political and economic liberalisation conducted by the international community. It analyses, firstly, the intervention on the political field by focusing on the celebration of early post-war elections, which counterproductively resulted in the consolidation of those ethnocratic regimes that subsequently obstructed peace implementation. After discussing the post-war elections this chapter focuses on the significant international intervention to try and diminish the power of main-stream nationalist parties. Within the economic field, international institutions imposed a neoliberal economic transition despite the potential destabilising affects for the peace-building mission. While analysing the process of privatisation in Bosnia and Sarajevo, it is argued that core prescriptions of the international economic policy quickly implemented without appropriate institutions resulted in manipulation by ruling parties.

### **First post-war elections: the consolidation of ethnocratic regimes**

Elections are usually seen as a positive step in the process of democratisation and normally remain the preferred means of improving governance and conflict management in weak and failing states (Belloni 2007). In post-war environments, however, literature suggests that there is a risk to the consolidation of peace as a result of the quick processes of political and economic liberalisation (e.g. Paris 1997; 2004). As these states are typically ill equipped to manage societal competition induced by liberalisation, its promotion may exacerbate rather than moderate societal conflicts (Paris 1997).<sup>204</sup> The DPA pursued the transformation of Bosnian into a liberal

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<sup>204</sup> In the political realm, liberalisation implies the promotion of periodic elections, constitutional limitations on the exercise of governmental power and respect for basic civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and conscience (Paris 2004).

democracy on the assumption that it would reduce the probability of renewed conflict, as stressed in the preamble of the constitution: “democratic governmental institutions and fair procedures best produce peaceful relations within a pluralist society” (GFAP 1995). Furthermore, the constitution defined Bosnia as a democratic state operating under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections.

In accordance with liberalisation strategy, the main goal of post-war elections is the transfer of power to a democratically installed government with national and international legitimacy (Kumar 1998). Furthermore, foreign actors intervening in war-shattered societies usually see elections as part of their own exit strategy (Carothers 2007). Elections in Bosnia were defined in Annex III and were to be held six months after the DPA came into force, with the possibility of a delay of up to three months in case conditions were not appropriate. The architecture set in the peace agreement meant that its implementation crucially depended on the celebration of the initial post-war election, which was important for both the military and the civilian mission. Indeed, elections in Bosnia marked both IFOR’s withdrawal and the creation of common state institutions, such as the tripartite presidency of BiH, the Council of Ministers and the bicameral parliament. Because of this link between elections and the military withdrawal set in the peace agreement, the US once again played a central role following another diplomatic battle with the Europeans, in this case France.<sup>205</sup> The US Ambassador Robert Frowick was nominated head of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia, which was established as the institution responsible for preparing and carrying out elections.<sup>206</sup>

Unlike the divergence that previously appeared during the transfer of authority in the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo, the relevant authority responsible for the elections for civilian and military missions favoured cooperation between the US and the High Representative, with both agreeing on the need to celebrate the first post-war elections

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<sup>205</sup> Due to its significant influence over elections, the US did not cede to the control of OSCE. Holbrooke argued that the US had disagreed on the ruling of the OSCE because the final terms used in the DPA were so ambiguous that it required a nominated individual of their choice to ensure a maximalist approach on elections (Holbrooke 1998).

<sup>206</sup> In order to do so, the OSCE set and headed the Provisional Election Commission which had the authority to adopt election rules and procedures for the preparation and celebration of elections, which would prevail over all internal laws and regulations (GFAP 1995). Thus, the Provisional Election Commission was responsible for election administration in issues such as the registration of political parties, the eligibility of candidates and voters and the role of domestic and international election observers (Bildt 1998). It was organized via a three-layered structure, with the Local Election Commissions in every municipality and the Polling Stations Committees responsible for the management of polling stations.

within the timeframe set at the peace agreement. The High Representative was also involved in the electoral process and was responsible for supervising the civilian annexes of the peace agreement, having a representative in the Provisional Election Commission, along with OSCE members and representatives from parties. Yet, the OHR focused mainly on the freedom of media, the removal of Radovan Karadzic and the post-election period.<sup>207</sup> Indeed, the OHR was planning during the post-election period, through the creation of new institutions and authorities, to assist the emerging future government. For instance, a memorandum of urgent legislation including economic priorities such as the Quick Start Package had to be negotiated by international organizations as soon as the Council of Ministers was established (Bildt 1996a).

For all that, first post-war elections were important not only for the civilian and military components of the peace-building mission but, considering that half of the Bosnian population had been displaced by war and episodes of ethnic cleansing, these elections were also crucial for nationalist parties to consolidate power in ethno-territorialities created with greater or less intensity during the war. As defined in the peace agreement, the displaced could vote in the municipality registered in the 1991 Census either in-person or by absentee ballot. This issue once again highlighted the distinct territorial logics at the state level by the two main nationalist parties in the urban area of Sarajevo, i.e. SDA and SDS. For the SDS, voting in a different location was a tool which could be used to consolidate their political power in an ethno-territoriality ethnically cleansed during the war. In contrast, SDA advocated for voting in place of residence, which could imply that an erosion of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat ethno-territorialities emerged during the war.

Leaving aside the logic of power, not including the right to vote elsewhere, was controversial from a humanitarian point of view. After the war, it would have prevented people from choosing local representatives in wherever they intended to live, it implicitly disallowed them the right to remake their lives away from where they had been violently expelled after three and a half years of war, a time in which things had undoubtedly and dramatically changed. Disagreements between parties, including the Europeans and Americans, left the issue unresolved so the Provisional Election Commission defined it sometime after. Thus, there were two votes for and two against

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<sup>207</sup> In relation to media freedom, the work with IN-TV consumed a lot of OHR's effort in the months leading up to elections (see Bildt 1998, p. 260-261)

in allowing people to vote in a different location. It transpired that it was Robert Frowick, using his final authority as President of the Commission, who approved the right of people to vote where they intended to live (Kurtović 1996). International organisations presumed that the majority of votes would take place in pre-war municipalities in order to commence the process of reintegration while voting elsewhere would be the exception.<sup>208</sup> The High Representative supported the idea that people should be given the opportunity to re-register in another location in Bosnia if they wished (Bildt 1998).

Despite a number of difficulties, the High Representative was pro-active in preventing any delay of elections. Approaching the deadline, when the OSCE's chairman had to clarify if elections could be held within the timeframe set in the peace agreement, Carl Bildt discouraged any delay, arguing that election was the only mechanism to avoid parallel institutions and the partition of the country. As elections were conditional for the creation of state institutions, he repeatedly campaigned to avoid delays:

To delay the elections is to delay the setting up of the common institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina that are the core of the efforts to overcome the partition of the country. And the longer this is delayed, and the two parts of the country continue to operate as foreign political systems and indeed hostile toward each other, the more difficult and uncertain that process will be (Bildt 1996b).

Bildt's discourse on the need to create state institutions to overcome division was questionable since it blurred the fact that wartime nationalist parties could paralyse the very creation of institutions. A fortnight before elections, the High Representative clearly exposed the fact that the implementation of the peace agreement depended on the capacity of elected representatives to create joint institutions (Bildt 1996c). Indeed, Bildt clearly identified the dialectics between international and local actors in the early post-war stages, simply, the enforcement of the DPA rested on the will of local actors.

The importance of the first post-war elections for the fate of ethnocratic regimes and the subsequent implementation of the peace-building mission did not trigger a robust performance from the main international actors. Rather than focusing on fundamental issues regarding the conditions in which elections should be held, the issue of indicted war criminals dominating political life or the absence of movement and

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<sup>208</sup> Displaced persons who wanted to vote in a different place prior to their 1991 residence had to fill in a P-2 form and, if accepted by the PEC, people could vote in-person on Election Day.

freedom of media, debate on the first post-war elections revolved around technical issues such as the locations of polling stations (Cousens 1997). These initial post-war elections were actually developed by an insufficiently prepared OSCE which, moreover, lacked independence and inevitably responded to pressures to get the peace process underway in Bosnia. Such an absence of independence was seen during the process of certification of elections that took place in June 1996. The decision was controversial as internal reports assessing whether conditions were sufficient to hold elections within the deadline portrayed a dismal picture of efforts by all parties, especially the Bosnian Serbs (Erlanger 1996).<sup>209</sup> These reports, which would have made more difficult the certification of elections by OSCE's officials, were not disclosed.

Equally important, the OSCE's chairman, Swiss Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti, portrayed his annoyance with regard to U.S. pressure on his organization. OSCE officials were under intense pressure from Washington and other European capitals to grant certification and, also, from the head of the Bosnian mission, the US Ambassador Robert Frowick (Gjeltten 1996). Within this context, the PIC meeting held in Florence on 13 and 14 June 1996 discussed whether plans should proceed for the internationally supervised elections in Bosnia within the nine-month deadline set at the DPA. The US and other major European powers proposed to proceed despite the OSCE's summary which concluded that vital conditions for free elections, such as a politically neutral environment, freedom of movement and freedom of association, were not in place (Barber 1996b).

Flavio Cotti finally declared on 25 June that elections in BiH were to be celebrated on 14 September 1996, fulfilling the necessary deadline. Essentially, certification took place amid Cotti's warning that minimal conditions did not exist at that time in Bosnia. He argued that freedom of movement needed to be established, freedom of expression and media, freedom of association, a politically neutral environment and, the most important prerequisite for him, the elimination of direct or indirect influence by indicted war criminals (ICG 1996). More importantly, Cotti urged all parties to increase their efforts prior to elections, he also argued that in if progress was insufficient, elections should not take place as these would lead to further tensions and a pseudo-democratic legitimisation of extreme nationalist power structures,

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<sup>209</sup> For instance, a report in May cited that an assistant of the Justice Minister of the Bosnian Serbs informed an international official that they would not cooperate and furthermore they were creating an independent election commission (Hedges 1996c).

highlighting the inherent risks of celebrating elections too soon in post-war environments.

The OSCE's decision to certificate elections was mainly a response to the considerable US pressure (Paris 2004; Belloni 2007). This pressure did not cease after the Florence meeting during which OSCE's officials had to decide whether necessary conditions were actually met. Ambassador William Crowe, Holbrooke's successor, went to Sarajevo to meet with OSCE's Mission Ambassador Robert Frowick. William Crowe was determined to ensure that elections should take place in September 1996 regardless of conditions on the ground (Research Interview, 9 January 2015). This apparent urgency, namely to prevent any postponement of elections, again responded to US internal politics and aimed at the portrayal of yet another diplomatic victory on the eve of general elections. It could convincingly be argued that elections were equated to democracy and the very act of voting a democratising effect in a non-democratic country. Furthermore, if this was combined with the celebration of a smooth electoral journey within the timeframe scheduled in the peace agreement, it would symbolise the successful US involvement in Bosnia, boosting Clinton's chances of re-election in November 1996.

Certainly, early post-war elections had the risk of entrenching wartime nationalist parties while paralysing the creation of state institutions due to the absence of cooperation among them. These risks did not ameliorate prior to elections but rather increased and were favoured by poor international involvement in the preparation and weak regulations for elections. The international administration was hardly involved to create appropriate conditions for elections as few measures were taken to control the electoral process such as the control of political parties' participation, performance or discourse. Indeed, the international community did not support or promote moderate political parties nor did they impose limitations on radical political parties and hate speech.<sup>210</sup> The OSCE funded registered parties, even if all parties were led by war criminals (Du Pont 1999).<sup>211</sup> Actually, a very sensitive and significant issue such as the

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<sup>210</sup> Such a poor performance in Bosnia contrasted with a subsequent operation in Kosovo, where peace-builders promoted a more controlled political liberalisation process. Preparations for elections included the drafting of a code of conduct whereby parties and coalitions had to comply with the code of conduct in order to be allowed to participate in elections by an internationally run Central Election Commission. In addition, strict media policies were adopted. These required broadcasters and print journalists to comply with codes of conduct that banned the dissemination of material denigrating an ethnic group or encouraging criminal activities (Paris 2004).

<sup>211</sup> Quoted in Bieber (2006).

resignation of Radovan Karadzic as President of Republika Srpska and the indictment of the SDS leader as a war criminal turned a *sine qua non* condition into a very important condition for SDS participation in the first post-war elections (Stegić 1996). Despite Cotti's call to nationalist parties to redouble efforts, conditions deteriorated in many respects after the elections were confirmed. Once the ruling parties realised that elections would take place irrespective of existing conditions on the ground, manipulation and abuse increased:

In a number of communities, government officials have attempted to thwart the development of democratic conditions by discouraging or prohibiting freedom of movement, the return of refugees and displaced persons, freedom of expression and of the press, and freedom of association" (...) Ambassador Frowick warned that "the OSCE reserved the right to invalidate electoral results, including the election of individual candidates, in those towns or municipalities where there is systematic interference with democratic freedoms, including freedom of movement, and gross manipulation of election procedures [until] 14 September, or in the immediate aftermath of the elections (ICG 1996, p.17).

Hence, the first post-war elections were held with very little controls in place in order to reduce inherent risks for the subsequent process of democratisation despite the extremely polarised environment at the end of war. There were significant shortcomings in issues such as the delivery of indicted war criminals for trial and also with regard to freedom of movement and expression (ICG 1996). Poor international intervention was exploited by nationalist parties to secure their hegemony in respective ethno-territorialities, which implied a consolidation of the political and economic power achieved during the war. Favoured by a political system that ensured ethnic proportional representation in legislative bodies in the Federation of BiH, Republika Srpska and at state-level, significant struggles over power took place between the three main nationalist and opposition parties from the respective ethnic constituent groups. The three ruling parties actively performed to prevent opposition parties from gaining access to media and even resorted to violence, with widespread intimidation and attacks directed at parties and figures.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> In the case of Bosniaks there were incidents especially between the SDA and SBiH. There were also incidents in Donja Koprivna and Cazin when SDA demonstrators' disrupted events held by the SBiH. In Cazin, such incidents culminated in one of the most notorious attacks which injured the party leader, Haris Silajdzic, former SDA member and wartime Prime Minister (OHR 1996, Bulletin 10 – July 16). OSCE reports were extremely critical of the HDZ, as within the FBiH areas under Croat control the party had effectively ensured that the climate of fear prevented the evolution of a political alternative (Barber 1996b). In RS the main opposition party to SDS was the coalition Alliance for Peace and Progress (SMP), which was integrated by parties such as the Socialist Party of Republika Srpska (SPRS)



The poor development of the electoral campaign continued in several areas. The voting issue relative to peoples displaced was a crucial tool for nationalist parties in the pursuit of their respective political and territorial agendas. Undeniably, inter-ethnic struggle mainly took place in such an arena. Thus, in late August, the SDA threatened to block elections if the OSCE and Central Elections Commission did not tackle abuses related to the P-2 form. Voting elsewhere was especially exploited by the SDS to consolidate exclusive political control in Republika Srpska having expelled people from other ethnicities.<sup>213</sup> Tens of thousands of Bosnian Serbs (who had never lived in the area) were registered to vote in post-war places of residence or where they intended to live. This practice especially affected areas of Eastern Bosnia ethnically cleansed during the war such as the Podrinje region and Drina valley, where registrations totalled 24,830 people in Srebrenica, 43,720 in Brcko and 13,300 in Bratunac (Kurtović 1996). In practice, SDA encouraged Bosniaks to vote in the Federation of BiH in order to ensure that Izetbegovic would continue chairing the Presidency of BiH.<sup>214</sup>

Despite poor conditions, general elections were not postponed unlike the municipal elections, which were suspended by Robert Frowick on 27 August 1996 due to the gross manipulation of the voter registration in Republika Srpska. Arguing that they did not involve the same conditions, the Provisional Election Commission took the decision to go ahead as scheduled with general elections. Yet, uncertainty over the celebration of elections actually prevailed until a few days before the scheduled date. It was not until 3 September when doubts about a possible blockade of elections were significantly reduced after parties committed themselves to contributing to the celebration (“Svi su za izbore”, 1996).<sup>215</sup>

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and the Democratic Patriotic Block (DPB). Rallies were often interrupted and party members suffered harassment, intimidation, and physical violence. Furthermore, during the electoral campaign several key SRPS members were dismissed from their employment or threatened with dismissal (ICG 1996, p.23-4).

<sup>213</sup> A significant problem arose when the SDA required refugees to vote as only sixty three percent of the 430,000 Bosnians could register to vote at that time due to shortcomings in the organization (Kurtović 1996).

<sup>214</sup> As defined in the fifth Article of the Constitution, in the first term, the tripartite Presidency formed by a representative from each constituent group, would be chaired by the member with the highest number of votes. The eight-month rotation between the three members of the Presidency was introduced after the 1998 elections.

<sup>215</sup> It did not fade completely away. HDZ was still seeking to boycott the elections on 6 September if the contention on the administration of Sarajevo, analysed in chapter three, was not resolved before the elections. Effectively, non-nationalist parties saw elections as the least problematic alternative. In this regard, SDP leader Zlatko Lagumdžija, claimed that initial post-war elections in Bosnia were not free and fair democratic elections but any other alternative was far worse (AP 1996).

However, the election campaign had been dominated by fear, the continuation of wartime rhetoric and the prospect that NATO would leave at the end of the year (Bildt 1998; Bieber 2006). In the prevailing conditions of group insecurity and mutual distrust at the end of war, with no incentive for politicians to appeal beyond their own ethnic constituencies due to the guaranteed representation of all ethnic groups in the power-sharing system, elections predictably turned into an ethnic census (Belloni 2004). The dependence of the peace agreement on first elections was manifested by the argument of non-nationalist parties who were more affected by the polarised environment existing a few months before the end of the war. Thus, elections were viewed by non-nationalist parties as the least negative alternative. SDP leader Zlatko Lagumdžija, claimed that the initial post-war elections in Bosnia were not free or fair democratic elections but the other alternative was even worst (AP 1996).

Finally, as scheduled on 14 September 1996, the three main nationalist parties, HDZ, SDA and SDS, achieved a landslide victory in presidential and parliamentary elections on state and entity level.<sup>216</sup> Nationalist parties took advantage of the absence of significant initiatives to prevent abuses in the election process which allowed them to resort to distinct practices, including fear and intimidating speech and violence, to secure a wide victory.<sup>217</sup> Equally important, the consociational electoral system facilitated their victory but also contributed to the subsequent legitimization of the social and ethnic order that emerged from war and ethnic cleansing:

By granting constitutional guarantees to protect the safety and survival of all three national groups and ensure their representation at all levels of governance, the DPA played into the hands of the ethno-nationalist parties who conducted the war. These parties were quick to take advantage of the post-war electoral process to legitimize themselves and occupy the newly established institutions by democratic means (Belloni 2004, p.337).

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<sup>216</sup> In the Federation of BiH, there were also cantonal elections. In the Sarajevo Canton, the SDA won the majority of seats, twenty eight out of forty five, after achieving sixty percent of votes. HDZ had only three representatives and six percent of votes. SZBiH had six representatives and twelve percent of votes, while the coalition *Združena lista BiH* held seventeen percent of votes and eight representatives in the Cantonal Assembly.

<sup>217</sup> Before and during elections several abuses and irregularities took place. Even in elections, votes exceeded the theoretical turnout with a 103.9% of participation registered (ICG 1996). The entire election process and the OSCE's role were highly criticised as observed in the use of the OSCE's eloquent nicknames circulating in BiH in 1996: "Office for Scandals and Corruption in Elections" and the "Office to Secure Clinton's Elections" (Manning 2004). Indeed, there was a widespread perception in the country that Bosnia had entered an uncertain period after the elections and that the only winners were the US and Bill Clinton. There were also several criticisms over the fact that the consequences of the first post-war elections would be the continuation of war through politics (e.g. Luckin 1996).

As previously predicted by OSCE's chairman Flavio Cotti and many observers, first post-war elections in Bosnia did not make any positive contribution to the consolidation and post-war institutionalisation of the three main nationalist parties, whose role in the war in Bosnia had been decisive. The September 1996 elections did not facilitate greater cooperation amid the development of state institutions due to the poor cooperation of Bosnian Croat and Serb representatives (Paris 2004). Although the aim of the first post-war election to transfer power to a democratically installed government with national and international legitimacy was achieved, paradoxically the implementation of the peace agreement depended, after first post-war elections, on those most likely to sabotage it.

The consolidation of pre-war and wartime nationalist parties continued the following year during the municipal elections which were finally held in September 1997. It transpired that only six percent of local council seats were won by candidates who did not represent the rights of a singular ethnic group. Furthermore, in the second occurrence of general elections held in 1998, the results did not significantly vary from previous elections, the only exception being that SDS suffered a division (Bieber 2006).<sup>218</sup> Despite the emergence of divisions within nationalist parties, their main challenges were to maintain hegemony within respective ethno-territorialities. Elections between 1996 and 1998 served to consolidate main nationalist parties during the post-war period which had a counterproductive impact on the implementation of the civilian annexes of the peace agreement, as seen in the previous chapters.

#### International intervention following initial post-war elections

Shortly after the initial post-war elections, a number of actions were set in place to impede the influence of parties that were considered a threat to the implementation of peace. Loose intervention in these post-war elections, the counterproductive outcome for the development of state institutions, and the implementation of the peace agreement was soon tackled by international organisations as they began to promote more moderate or collaborative alternatives to the dominant nationalist parties (Bose 2002;

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<sup>218</sup> The SDS was significantly weakened after the division between a more radical wing in Pale under the control of Momcilo Krajsnik (Serb member of the Bosnian Presidency), and the president of Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavsic, who founded the Serb National Alliance (SNS, *Srpski Narodni Savez*). The rift between them produced extraordinary elections in the Bosnian Serb entity in 1997, which subsequently allowed the formation of an alternative government led by Milorad Dodik. The split was not exclusive of SDS. Similarly, the Croat member of the tripartite Bosnian presidency, Krešimir Zubak, left HDZ and founded the more moderate New Croat Initiative (NHI, *Nova Hrvastka Inicijativa*).

Hulseley 2010).<sup>219</sup> Such an intervention was notably conducted in Republika Srpska where the international community assisted and encouraged Biljana Plavsic, President of Republika Srpska (having replaced Karadzic), in her defection from the SDS and her coup to relocate the capital from Pale to Banja Luka. Subsequently, the international community based its political strategy in the Republika Srpska and sought to strengthen the anti-Pale coalition Plavsic-Dodik in the Bosnian Serb Assembly and maintain the political isolation of the SDS (ESI 1999). Essentially, international officials campaigned in subsequent elections in support of Plavsic and Dodik explicitly emphasising that international aid would be suspended if the SDS returned to power. Later, Nikola Poplasen (leader of the Serb Radical Party) defeated Plavsic for the Presidency of the Republika Srpska in the September 1998 election. The High Representative manoeuvred to weaken Poplasen, and finally dismissed him.

In conjunction with the promotion of specific candidates and parties, the OHR and OSCE worked to build a legal framework linking participation in elections with compliance on key aspects of Dayton. In this sense, the elaboration of an electoral system that systematically favoured moderate candidates over the nationalist parties began to circulate among internationals in 1997. In the PIC, held in Madrid in December 1998, it was acknowledged that there was a need to develop a new electoral law that promoted democratic and multi-ethnic political process and also held elected officials accountable to voters (OHR 1998m). The draft of the Election Law was prepared internationally, mostly between the OSCE and the OHR. It was subsequently legitimized as a national project through the involvement of an Independent Experts Commission appointed by the High Representative and, secondly, as an internationally sanctioned document following the approval of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, formed by independents, expert in the field of constitutional law (Sahadžić 2009). The draft was rejected by the state parliament in January 2000, who still held a majority of seats from the HDZ, SDA and SDS parties. Nationalist parties rejected the first draft as it was clearly prejudicial to their interests. The first proposal favoured non-nationalist parties as a requirement in the chapter regarding Certification and Candidacy for Elections which stated that parties present reconciliatory platforms or involved

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<sup>219</sup> These were the cases of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD). Led by Milorad Dodik, the party further debilitated SDS hegemony in RS after the split occurred between Pale and Banja Luka factions. The Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) led by Haris Silajdzic was also a counterbalance of SDA for Bosniaks. In the case of HDZ, there was a first split from Kresimir Zubak, who formed the New Croatian Initiative in 1998.

multiethnic membership. The final versions approved in August 2001, in a parliament dominated by the forces of the Alliance for Change, was softened and contained only the uncontested provision that banned indicted war criminals from holding any position.<sup>220</sup>

Despite refusal by nationalist parties in early 2000, various aspects of the draft were included in its provisional rules for the November 2000 elections, such as open lists, multi-member constituencies and preferential voting for the election of the Republika Srpska Presidency. Thus, these elections differed from previous elections that were celebrated under a classical consociational design. Changes included the pursuit of a progression in the process of democratisation and also the promotion of inter-ethnic cooperation. The introduction of open lists and multi-member constituency reforms were sensible and progressive innovations contributing to the democratic development of the country. These changes aimed at incentivising the understanding that elected representatives were responsive to the need of voters, i.e. setting direct accountability and increasing the influence of voters in choosing preferred candidates (Bieber 2006).

In contrast, preferential voting for the election of president and vice-president of Republika Srpska directly pursued fostering moderation and interethnic cooperation. As presented in chapter one, the centripetalist approach regards preferential voting as a key element in fostering moderation in any divided political system. Its inclusion, intended to favour Dodik's candidacy to become president of the Republika Srpska (ESI 2001), followed the logic that he could gain a much higher number of second-preferences among the Bosniak population. The inclusion of preferential voting, however, did not produce the desired outcome as one of the two necessary conditions was not met (Reilly 2001).

Parties competing for each ethnic vote existed in Republika Srpska during this time (SDP party and several Bosniak parties contested elections along with the SDA), but the second premise, i.e. an electoral constituency ethnically heterogeneous, did not exist. The population in the Bosnian Serb entity was overwhelmingly Serb as a result of episodes of ethnic cleansing and the low numbers of minority returns during the post-war period. The reduced numbers did not have the desired effect, namely, to erode the

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<sup>220</sup> The approval of the Election Law ended the significant international involvement in the preparation and celebration of elections thanks to the mandate of the OSCE defined in the peace agreement. The formation of the Election Commission of BiH replaced thus the Provisional Election Commission, headed by the OSCE.

power of the SDS in Republika Srpska.<sup>221</sup> Importantly, the poor results of this integrative measure highlight the fact that the potential advantage of radical electoral integration in Bosnian was structurally limited by the absence of ethnic diversity in the Republika Srpska. Also, it was limited through other constraints that were mutually reinforcing, such as the constitutional structure and the three-way division of the competitive party system (Bose 2002).

In contrast with this failure, international intervention sought to erode contributions in order to decrease the electoral support of main nationalist parties. The evolution of seats at the state level House of Representatives illustrates the reduction of support to three main national parties, which achieved only nineteen seats out of forty two in 2000 while four years earlier, in first post-war elections, they had achieved thirty six seats. In 2000, SDP and moderate nationalist parties won elections and this allowed them to form the Alliance for Change under the tutelage of the international community (ICG 2002a). The loss of executive power in the November 2000 elections further weakened ethnocratic regimes and their control over power structures that were increasingly eroded.<sup>222</sup>

Indeed, despite the control of some sectors, the main nationalist parties not only lost progressive electoral support, but concomitantly suffered an erosion of their power structures, losing hegemony in several sectors, for example, in media. International actors contributed to weaken wartime power structures through dismissals, financial sanctions and the enactment of reforms (Gromes 2009). Initiatives to reform the police, armed forces, secret services, judiciary or the payment system were more or less successful, as will be analysed in the next section.<sup>223</sup> In late 1990s, ethnocratic power structures changed dramatically due to several factors, including political changes in both Croatia and Serbia between 1999 and 2000, which forced the political elites of

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<sup>221</sup> Estimations indicated that only about one out of every six voters in those elections were non-Serbs with voters either voting in polling stations or by absentee ballots, generally from FBiH (Bose 2002).

<sup>222</sup> In this sense, Alija Izetbegović claimed that as long as the SDA kept control over the police, the secret service and the judiciary, the party would continue to remain in power despite the defeat in the November 2000 elections (Caplan 2005a). Izetbegović's words sought to calm cadres but a report of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina the following year confirmed that police officers were loyal to the government rather than being servants of the law. The report raised fundamental questions about how easily a police culture born after four years of war could be transformed. More than a decade after the end of the Bosnian war, the police still did not follow the rule of law and the separation of powers.

<sup>223</sup> Much progress towards an independent judiciary occurred despite the fact that the judicial system was not completely free from political interference.

Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats to reorient themselves towards the international community and participate in the Bosnian state:

The combination of internal stresses, political changes in Croatia and Serbia and determined international action have fatally weakened the war-time structures. A series of arrests of highly placed indicted war criminals, action against illegal repressive structures (paramilitary and intelligence services), sharp reductions in external financing (particularly from Croatia) and a focused international return strategy have not merely improved the atmosphere, but changed fundamentally the nature of political power in Bosnia. The changes are readily apparent in Republika Srpska, where the SDS has been through the critical process of losing power through a democratic election. It is now a very different political animal to the Pale regime of Radovan Karadzic (ESI 2001, p. ii).

Main nationalist parties were back in power in 2002 but in a very different context, as they were heavily influenced by a strong international intervention led by Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative between 2002 and 2006.<sup>224</sup> A transformation that favoured elected Bosnian Serb political leaders, previously very hostile to some core provisions of the peace agreement, became more open to compromise. The SDA started a period of moderation as seen in the third congress celebrated in 2001. Sulejman Tihić became the new SDA leader endorsed by Alija Izetbegović, who resigned from the party and state presidency in October 2000 for health reasons. The party redefined its position from a nationalist to a broadly centre-right affiliation and relabelled itself as a party of the political centre which was open to all citizens of BiH (Jahic 2015). Under Tihić's leadership, he later became a member of the Presidency of BiH, both the SDA and the country as a whole moved in a more progressive direction during the four-year mandate.

This period of political progress, the greatest since the end of war, stalled in 2006 when regression was apparent following the failure to secure approval of the constitutional reform, the so-called April Package (see Hays and Crosby 2006; Sebastián 2007, 2012).<sup>225</sup> Actually, it triggered an ethno-national escalation with mutual

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<sup>224</sup> Elections in October 2002 marked the beginning of the mandate of four years. In November 2005 during his last briefing to the Security Council of the UN as High Representative, Paddy Ashdown claimed that Bosnia was ready to enter a post-Dayton era, outlining developments in the country's path to Euro-Atlantic integration, being close to start negotiations with the European Union on a Stabilization and Association Agreement, thanks to a combination of enlightened local leadership and international pressure (UN 2005).

<sup>225</sup> The April Package was the first attempt to reform the constitution following the publication by the report of the Venice Commission released in March 2005. It advised that if a weak state structure was in place, the country would not be able to make progress towards European integration. Hence, the subsequent negotiations marked, for the first time since the DPA, serious negotiations among Bosnian

recrimination between Haris Silajdzic and Milorad Dodik, which raised fears of a return to war among the population in Bosnia for the first time in years (Bilefsky 2008). Haris Silajdzic, elected as the Bosniak representative in BiH's three-member presidency following general elections held in September 2006, called to abolish the RS while Milorad Dodik, the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, threatened to a cessation of the Bosnian Serb entity from BiH.<sup>226</sup>

### **The economic liberalisation policies internationally imposed**

The second part of this chapter deals with the economic policies promoted by the international community, which are crucial in post-war contexts, as economic factors are at the heart of conflict risk (Collier 2006). Economic liberalisation often endangers internal peace as it increases vulnerability to poverty, crime and persistent social unrest in regions where conflict is endemic or peace is fragile (Paris 2004; Pugh and Cooper 2004).<sup>227</sup> Notwithstanding, liberal peace-building missions deployed in the 1990s did not generally develop a distinct economic approach in post-war environments. Generally, there was little discussion of how economic policy should be adapted to special circumstances of countries emerging from war (Boyce and Pastor 1997).

As a Yugoslav republic, Bosnia had embarked in the late 1980s on reforms to leave behind the self-management system and move towards western-type capitalism. The methods imposed by IFIs to access funds was similar to those implemented in most economies in transition from socialism and focused on macro-stabilization, price and trade liberalization and privatization (Estrin 1991). The transition towards a market economy was resumed in Bosnia after the war in a completely new social, political and territorial order. The constitution of Bosnia which was approved in the peace agreement confirmed such a transition by stating primarily a desire to promote "the

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political leaders about constitutional reform (Hays and Crosby 2006). After months of negotiations the package of amendments represented the consensus of five of the seven parties that began the process. Even though all the problematic issues, as pointed out by the Venice Commission, were not eliminated, the agreement represented a significant step forward since it supported the development of the state based on party lines instead of on entity or ethnic issues. With a majority of two-thirds required in the parliament the amendment failed (only by two votes) on 26 April 2006.

<sup>226</sup> On Dodik's referendum discourse, see Maksic (2009).

<sup>227</sup> Interestingly, the record of unintended outcomes for the construction of peace caused by neoliberal economic prescriptions during the 1990s was not an obstacle for subsequent implementation. In the more recent post-war intervention of Iraq, peace has been subordinated by the US and IFIs in an attempt to impose a neoliberal political economy, having experienced a major setback (Herring 2011).



general welfare and economic growth through the protection of private property and the promotion of a market economy” (GFAP 1995).

Yet, the peace agreement alone did not outline the way in which the market economy should be promoted. Furthermore, international actors defined a neoliberal economic policy for the transition towards a market economy that differed only from the orthodoxy of the 1990s regarding the elaboration of a reconstruction program. Through the Economic Task Force, the OHR played a central role in the coordination of aid for reconstruction and, also, in policies devised for the transition to a market economy. Indeed, the elaboration of a reconstruction program was the main specificity of the international economic strategy. Coordinated by the WB, the Priority Reconstruction of Recovery Program (PRRP) was a comprehensive four-year plan with a \$5,100 million budget to start the process of reconstruction.<sup>228</sup> The PRRP covered a wide range of sectors, from employment generation to landmine clearing. However, absence of funds for the industrial sector, which represented half of the pre-war economy in BiH, revealed a restructuring policy that was in line with the broader neoliberal economic strategy.<sup>229</sup>

Essentially, economic strategy followed the economic prescription of the Washington Consensus and contained all elements of the theory and practice adopted in Eastern European countries in transition (Stojanov 2001).<sup>230</sup> Based on macroeconomic stabilization, price liberalisation and mass privatization, the strategy devised by IFIs contended that economic recovery should rest upon the private sector while the state should diminish and shift its role played in the economy to favour and guarantee private

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<sup>228</sup> Instead of restoring all infrastructures damaged as budgeted when reconstruction in Bosnia required approximately \$42,000 million (Kasalo 1996). One third of the 5.1 billion of the PRRP was in the form of donations while the rest were loans offered under favourable conditions (Simić 2015).

<sup>229</sup> Funds invested in the industrial sector represented only 2.3% of the expenditure of the PRRP despite only ten percent of pre-war facilities operating in 1996 due to war and economic decline since 1980s (Simić 1996).

<sup>230</sup> In Eastern Europe, the architect of the transition, the economist Jeffrey Sacks, proposed to implement the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus as “shock therapy”, i.e. taking advantage of the opportunities emerging after the collapse of socialist regimes. Shock therapy was the concept that the sale of public assets to private actors should take place quickly in periods of crisis to ensure the transition was irreversible (Klein 2007). The Washington Consensus was a thought rather than a paradigm based on the idea of market fundamentalism, i.e. the conception that the introduction of a pure free-market would solve market inefficiencies in developing countries in Latin America. Coined by John Williamson in 1989, the Washington Consensus is a ten-policy recommendation for macro-economic stability that included: fiscal discipline, public expenditure priorities, tax reform, financial liberalization, exchange rate, trade liberalization, foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation and property rights (Williamson 1990). However, the implementation of such premises to trigger market efficiency was questionable as many markets presented structural problems (Godoy and Stiglitz 2004).

economic initiative (WB 1996; Čaušević 2015). As defined in the World Bank document entitled “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Towards Economic Recovery”, the state was urged to concentrate on the maintenance of healthy macro-economic conditions and on the establishment of a relevant legal and institutional framework to allow an uninterrupted functioning of a free market (WB 1996).

For all that, both local and international actors had distinct priorities for the economic transition during the post-war period. The main priority of international actors was to rebuild Bosnia’s economy through neoliberal lines but local nationalist parties failed to cooperate as control over economic assets had become central for ruling parties since the war (ESI 1999b; Donais 2005). Despite the existence of liberal wings within respective parties, nationalist parties had a fundamental interest in preventing structural reforms of public institutions and the economy during early post-war stages in order to avoid eroding political and economic hegemony in respective ethno-territorialities.

Along with structural limitation, the neoliberal development strategy presented several problems for the post-war development of BiH. Firstly, a neoliberal economic policy was inherently incompatible with the goals of any peace-building mission that aimed at ultimately creating a new environment that would not relapse into conflict. Despite the fragility of a post-war context, the effort from international organisations to liberalise and attract private sector investments was not accompanied by any measures which reduced the adverse social impacts of war and the adoption of liberal policies. Poverty, unemployment or industrial policy were either neglected or treated as a kind of unavoidable collateral damage in the mission to make BiH profitable for investors (Stojanov 2001; Pugh 2005).<sup>231</sup>

As pre-warned by a number of renowned Bosnian economic figures, a neoliberal development strategy for the transition towards a market economy could provide nothing other than disaster in the context of both poverty and a fragmented economy after the ethno-territorial division of the country. With a growing awareness of the counterproductive outcomes that those policies could generate due to the existing structural weaknesses at the end of war, they proposed an alternative economic

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<sup>231</sup> Importantly, poverty was not residual in the country in 1998 as pensions and any unemployment compensation was paid late and below minimum, only employees in financial institutions and public administration earned enough to maintain any standard of living above the poverty line (Stojanov 2001). The absence of an employment strategy in Bosnia during the period of maximum international intervention was evident. Even the OHR’s role and Justice Programme, started in 2002, was not a direct employment policy but heavily relied on the operation of market forces (Pugh 2005).

transition emanated from the auspice of the United Nations Development Programme (Stojanov 1997). Grounded from primary economic data on the state of the Bosnian economy after the war, the Economic Development Strategy for BiH subsequently presented, and based on a gradual neo-Keynesianism, was rejected by IFIs.<sup>232</sup>

The refusal to consider an alternative economic transition was highlighted by the unilateral character of the international intervention in the economic field. In practice, and favoured by weak state institutions, Bosnia lacked the power to formulate and implement independent economic policies during the post-war period (Pugh 2002; Stojanov 2012). Once the formation of basic state institutions was complete, implementation of reforms began shortly after the September 1996 elections. Undoubtedly, taking advantage of the exceptional peace-building intervention, IFIs were involved in the economic governance of BiH through the control of different institutions, such as the Central Bank. The Central Bank was created in 1997 initially as a hybrid institution formed by internationals and locals. The DPA defined that the first Governing Board of the Central Bank should consist of a foreign Governor appointed by the IMF and, appointed by the Presidency of BiH, three members of the FBiH and two from the RS (GFAP 1995).<sup>233</sup>

Initially, the international community was determined to ensure that the neoliberal development strategy was quickly implemented by resorting to economic conditionality. Conditioning aid to reforms was thus a tool used to achieve the approval of reforms devised by international actors even though they lacked executive and legislative authority before the High Representative's empowerment. International consensus in the economic field, unlike cleavages that appeared in other civilian areas, made certain that the OHR played an active role since its involvement in 1996. Having prepared the post-election period through the creation of urgent legislation, the OHR in early 1997 presented the economic Quick Start Package at the Council of Ministers. The Package included the establishment of economic institutions, such as the Central Bank of BiH, and basic legislation to establish a stable macro-economic environment and to develop a market economy (OHR 1997f). The approval of the Quick Start Package was conditioned to take place with the celebration of the second Donor's Conference for the

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<sup>232</sup> Keynesian economics had been purged from the IMF and the WB as early as 1982, three years after neoliberalism became the new economic orthodoxy regulating public policy in the US and the UK (Harvey 2005).

<sup>233</sup> The New Zealander Peter Nicholl was the governor of the Bank from its foundation until 2004. Still today there is the presence of international members in the Governing Board of the Bank.

reconstruction. Finally the BiH Parliament adopted the Package on 20 June, meeting the prerequisites for an Agreement with the IMF and the celebration of the Second Donors' Conference (OHR 1998i).

After the approval of the Quick Start Package, international actors continued to push for reforms all the while resorting to new international powers. Following empowerment, the OHR played an instrumental role for IFIs who could use new legislative and executive authority to order to advance the transition towards a market economy. As in other areas of civilian intervention, the OHR worked closely and coordinated with main international organisations. In this regard, the economic department of the OHR was incorporated with representatives of IFIs and the EC. Furthermore, to ensure coordination of the overall economic intervention, the Economic Task Force met regularly under the chairmanship of the High Representative (OHR 1997a). Using the frequent powers vested in the High Representative and also through the imposition of laws, international actors produced the bulk of reforms for economic transition since 1998.

The first laws, enacted by the High Representative in the economic field, responded to the failure of state institutions to approve them. This was seen in the case of the Framework Law on Privatisation, relevant to the Privatisation of Banks and Enterprises, that was imposed by the High Representative on 22 July 1998 after the failure of the BiH House of Peoples to pass the law, due to the resulting negative vote from Bosnian Serb members. Yet, the Framework Law on Privatisation also highlighted a wide interventionist character of internationals in the economic field, as they defined structural reforms but left little margin for modification by local actors. The Draft Law had originally been submitted by the OHR to the Council of Ministers in February 1998 (OHR 1998k) however, at the same time, representatives of the international community pressurised Bosnian authorities to quickly adopt privatization laws according to the model proposed by the WB and the US experts (Simić 1998a).

The absence of a shared vision between local and international actors in relation to the economic policy explains the difficulties experienced by internationals in the transition towards a market economy. In spite of early legislative efforts, international intervention did not produce the necessary economic development in the late 1990s to replace the dependent aid economy. Moreover, the urgency of international actors for the implementation of the economic reform agenda was justified by the need to transform an aid-dependent economy into a sustainable market economy by the end of

the PRRP, when a significant demise of assistance was expected. Therefore, donor spending on projects to rebuild infrastructure fuelled Bosnia's economic growth at the end of war, with a rise of the GDP from 3 billion KM at the end of war to 9.7 billion KM in 2000 (Čaušević 2013). Yet, the transition was rather slow and did not advance in all sectors, as it will be seen in the example of privatisation in the next section. Bosnia's slow pace was primarily a consequence of the resistance of local ethnocracies to implement economic liberalisation. The High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, recognised the slow pace of reforms at the end of the PRRP:

We are definitively not satisfied with development in the economic sphere. This is an open secret. When you look at the country you will see there that things are economically not moving, neither the privatisation - we are behind I would say almost two years - nor in the field of small and medium size businesses, which is actually the backbone of every economy (OHR 1999g).

In this context of slow progress and a reduction of aid, the push for economic reform was increased by Petritsch, who implemented in November and December 2000 a wide-ranging package of laws and amendments fulfilling IFIs' demands (OHR 2000d). These packages included amendments to the Framework Law on Privatisation of Enterprises and Banks, enacted by the OHR in 1998, or the abolition of the payments Bureaux, which was required by IFIs to develop an operational private banking system. Yet, the goal of international organisations was not only furthering economic liberalization but also weakening parallel structures in respective ethno-territorialities as they inherently challenged the authority of the state institutions.<sup>234</sup>

The integral reform of the payment system highlights the dynamic implications of the economic transition in post-war Bosnia. The payment bureaux in BiH descended from the Social Bookkeeping Service of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this payment Bureaux created in the mid 1950's to control and manage socially owned resources through a controlled monopoly of the financial sector. Yet, in Bosnia, during the war the Social Bookkeeping Service which was managed from Belgrade was divided into three separate payment bureaux ensuring that each group had access to funds and control over money flows (USAID 1999). Thus, the payment bureaux was the monopoly institution controlling all public and private financial activity, including payment transactions, savings, tax collection, tax distribution, treasury functions and private and public expenditure.

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<sup>234</sup> At that time there was neither a Bosnian common market nor any level of government capable of implementing the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital incorporated in the Constitution (ESI 2000).

Once again, the High Representative was instrumental in the elimination of payment bureaux as it was in charge of imposing, at the request of the International Advisory Group, those laws and amendments necessary for the integral reform of the payment system (OHR 2000d).<sup>235</sup> The transformation of the payment bureaux had been requested at the PIC meeting held in Madrid in 1998 and finally became a requirement both within the EU Road Map and to in order to qualify for membership of the Council of Europe. Furthermore, the payment system's integral reform displayed the unilateralism of international actors to implement the process of economic liberalisation. In this sense, the whole process to reform the payment system was driven by the international community, which did not accept the substantial changes in the draft presented to the local parties even though these same parties had been involved in the drafting process since the beginning (Zaum 2005).

Indeed, their elimination had both economic and political purpose as it undermined local regimes, which lost a significant source of revenue and a mechanism to control the economy within a respective territory. Such an imbricate relationship between politics and the economy in ethnocracies was seen, for instance, by the fact that the Bosniak payment bureaux funded SDA election campaigns (Pugh 2002). The reform of the payment system was considered beneficial for the BiH economy as it led to improvements in the financial sector and succeeded in weakening parallel structures that controlled and exploited institutions of economic governance for their own benefit. Moreover, and unlike other policies loosely supervised by international organisations (as will be discussed in the following section), most positive outcomes of such reforms imposed by IFIs was explained by a close and determined intervention:

A range of factors have contributed to the success of the reform of the payment system. First, the reform did not just establish new institutions but also provided resources for equipment and training, to strengthen their capacity. Secondly, the international community closely coordinated its efforts through the International Advisory Group for Payment Bureaus and Payment System Transformation. As a result, it could effectively draw on the resources and expertise of the different agencies involved, and could coordinate its responses to the FBiH and RS governments. Thirdly, the international community used a range of elements of its political authority to promote the reform. Thus, it provided expert advice, put pressure on the governments informally through visits and conversations, or formally through

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<sup>235</sup> The dismantling process was managed within the International Advisory Group for Payment Bureaus and Payment System Transformation. Chaired by the USAID, it was comprised of the US Treasury, the WB, the IMF, the EU, the EU-funded Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office, and the OHR.

conditions attached to further aid, and finally used the Bonn powers to impose the legislation (Zaum 2005, p.357).

The dismantlement of the payment bureaux and the reform of the payment system was only one step further in the agenda of international reforms to create a market economy. In point of fact, the economy became one of the priorities of Paddy Ashdown's tenure as High Representative after replacing Wolfgang Petritsch in late May 2002 (OHR 2002b, 2002d). Importantly, the British diplomat was able to devise the strategy of the international community unlike previous High Representatives. This, among other factors, was a consequence of backing from the US in the shift that progressively placed the High Representative under the major influence of the European Union (Research Interview, 15 March 2015).<sup>236</sup> This new leading role of the High Representative, under Paddy Ashdown, ensured that it was not an independent actor making unilateral decisions as measures were continuously informed and agreed within the Steering Board of the PIC.

In this context, Ashdown produced a further major legislative intervention in October 2002 when he enacted twelve laws in what became the last major legislation intervention in the economic field made by the High Representative.<sup>237</sup> Yet, continuous international intervention and the OHR's legislative efforts in the economic field did not produce any substantial economic growth or an increase in job opportunities. By the end of 2002, Paddy Ashdown declared that the economic situation in BiH was simply untenable (OHR 2003b). The official unemployment rate in 2003 was about forty two percent of the labour force, despite estimations claiming that it was lower due to the shadow economy. Equally important, in 2005, the Deputy High Representative, Larry Butler, recognised that after years of reforms, poverty eradication, massive investment and job creation had not been achieved (OHR 2005a). Crucially, the Deputy High Representative failed to mention that the economic policy developed by international institutions was incompatible with these goals. Rather, he argued (albeit it correct for a

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<sup>236</sup> In this sense, the approval in March 2000 of the agenda for EU integration of countries in South Eastern Europe, marked the rise of European involvement in the country affected by the role of the OHR, and became increasingly shaped by EU strategies rather than by the peace agreement. Subsequently, the High Representative played a dual role as EU Special Representative and the EU enlargement process became a central tool to resolve Bosnia's main problems (see Chandler 2005).

<sup>237</sup> There were other economic measures afterwards but not in form of enacting legislation, for example, the Bulldozer Initiative launched in November to tackle administrative barriers. Using a bottom-up methodology to increase public awareness and mobilize the local business community, this initiative aimed at dismantling the legal and administrative barriers to investments by delivering fast results. It delivered fifty reforms in 150 days (Herzberg 2004). Under Phase II and Phase III of the Bulldozer Initiative another fifty reforms were respectively drawn up (OHR 2004x).

limited time period) that Bosnia was not the only country in South Eastern Europe where things got worse before getting better.

Indeed, going beyond the period of maximum international intervention covered in this chapter, the overall reform strategy certainly showed signs of progress in 2004 and 2005 when some economic indicators improved. For instance, the goal of attracting FDI was finally achieved which produced three years of moderate increase, reaching its maximum point in 2007 with 1,329 million euro (FIPA 2012). Such economic growth, however, was embedded in a weak foundation as it was substantially fuelled by the combination of the remaining international reconstruction funds, the international presence and remittances from Bosnians working abroad.<sup>238</sup> Actually, economic growth was abruptly halted in 2008 due to the conjunction of factors such as the global financial crisis and the political regression started in 2006 after the failure of the constitutional reform.

#### The process of privatization of companies in Bosnia

The privatization of companies analysed in this section illustrates that core prescription of the neoliberal economic policy was a goal in itself regardless of producing counterproductive outcomes for the broader goals of the peace-building mission. In this sense, privatisation did not contribute in the short term to other fields of the peace agreement such as the voluntary return and harmonious reintegration of people displaced, which required favourable political, economic and social conditions.<sup>239</sup> Privatisation, as a core prescription of the neoliberal agenda, became a central priority in the economic transition of Bosnia conducted by international institutions. The implementation of the privatisation programme followed the logic of shock therapy, i.e. privatising as quickly as possible taking advantage of a crisis. In this regard, the US ambassador recognised the pursuit of a quick process of privatisation starting in 1998 (Polimac 1998). Such a vision of quick privatisation was not altered by evidence from other countries, in transition from state-socialism to capitalism, such as

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<sup>238</sup> Eloquently, remittances were still higher than FDI. In fact, the weight of remittances in the economy accounted for 12.9 percent of GDP in 2009, while FDI had hardly exceeded six percent annually over the previous thirteen years (WB 2011). These sources provided a basis for domestic consumption, as well as for the stabilization of the incomes of the most vulnerable social categories, such as pensioners, war veterans and the unemployed (Simic 2015).

<sup>239</sup> This section does not aim at judging whether privatisation led by international actors has been successful in the long term as privatisation effects change over time and the analyses conducted here focus on the period of maximum international intervention, extended between 1996 and 2003.



Russia. It was seen that privatisation conducted without appropriate institutions did not contribute to wealth creation but rather lead to asset stripping and the large concentration of wealth in few hands.

Equally, in broad economic transition, privatisation shows the interaction between the external market and the survival of local economic systems in respective ethnocracies. As discussed in previous section, the opposition of local ethnocratic regimes to economic reforms was structural so the process of privatisation was undermined by the existence of opposite agendas between local and international actors. For international actors privatization and the creation of the market economy were non-negotiable conditions of integration to facilitate the foreign entry into former Yugoslav resources and markets (Pugh 2002). However, this vision clashed with the nationalist parties who benefited politically and economically from state assets, becoming thus an important source for both accumulation of capitals among the elites and the reproduction of respective regimes.

Indeed, local parties used public enterprises since the war as an essential source of revenue and patronage. Through donations, a large part of the profit made by state-owned assets ended up in the cashboxes of political parties (Skopljiak 1998). Such a capture of enterprises by parties took place in 1994 when these parties transformed the socially-owned into state-owned under the pretext of the need to protect it from plunder and abuse (Simić 1996). This measure allowed parties to appoint Boards of Management to companies after replacing the self-governing bodies that had prevailed since the self-management economy was implemented in the late 1940s (Fočo 2005). Management Boards were appointed upon a political party principle, as a reward for political activity, obedience and loyalty to the existing government. For instance, in the areas of the FBiH controlled by the Army of BiH, one such condition to become a director was membership of SDA (Simić 1996). However, this manoeuvre, which left Management Boards with huge authority and no responsibility, became the most efficient way of legal abuse and erosion of capital and companies (Fočo 2005).<sup>240</sup>

Privatisation in BiH pursued a quick and mass conversion from public to private companies. Yet, the model of privatisation adopted was flawed to generate economic

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<sup>240</sup> For instance, there was not a single gathering at which any politician demanded an explanation as to who was responsible for the fact that in 1997 greatest losses were registered in state-owned enterprises, such as Zenica steel works, Tuzla coal mines and B&H Electric Company. Often managers, mostly nominated by the parties in power, took the policy and platform of the party as the foundation of their business operation, leading enterprises to ruin (Skopljiak 1998).

growth and job opportunities in the short and mid-term. Based on the already discredited model used in Russia and the Czech Republic, international institutions adopted the voucher-based privatisation program that along with a mass transfer of ownership also allowed the state to liquidate debts to citizens.<sup>241</sup> The model certainly permitted a quick transfer of state assets to individual shareholders and this was seen as the appropriate measure in the absence of capital. However, it was a pivotal mistake from an economic point of view as it simply implied replacement of ownership which *per se* does not represent a benefit. More specifically, voucher privatisation did not include any undertaking of important issues like the restructuring of companies or the maintenance of employment, failing also to capture significant new resources in a harsh context (Research Interview, 10 July 2015).

The High Representative imposed the legal basis for privatization after enacting the Framework Law on Privatization of Companies and Banks in July 1999. This was developed mainly by the USAID, who was in charge of the legislation and establishment of the key institutions involved in the management process of privatisation. The Framework Law set out mass privatisation very generally as it only had seven articles and very little content (OHR 1998b).<sup>242</sup> Furthermore, the problem of adopting a wide framework for privatisation implied that some laws and by-laws were regulating all sectors despite the fact that the complexity to prepare privatisation programs varied significantly depending on sector, type of business and jobs (Research Interview, 10 July 2015).

Early privatisation in Bosnia did not take place in an institutional vacuum rather, there were inefficient institutions underpinning the rule of law, a functioning and well-regulated capital market or an effective banking system (Donais 2002). Furthermore, existing institutions were hardly independent and any privatisation that took place was fragmented. In the Federation of BiH, the Cantonal level developed the creation of thirteen Privatisation agencies, one for each Canton, and another for the FBiH to

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<sup>241</sup> Governments provided citizens with vouchers depending on certain criteria such as age or military service, which could be sold for cash in the black market or used to purchase shares in privatized companies. Unlike privatization approved by the Government of Ante Markovic in 1990, (when a small part of the shares were transferred to employees of enterprises), mass privatization in both entities was based on the use of the coupons. This method, in which stakes in both homes and businesses could be bought, made sense in the context of lack of capital and market structures (FBiH 1998).

<sup>242</sup> In addition, the UK Department for International Development also participated in the financial and technical support establishing the institutions responsible for the implementation, which included the privatisation agencies (Causevic 2015). The OHR once again played a supervisory role and coordinator in the process through the Economic Task Force and the International Advisory Group on Privatization.

manage the privatisation of companies operating in several Cantons. With the existence of local ethnocracies, this fragmented privatisation facilitated the control of the process by the ethnic group dominating institutions.

This control was partially a result of the passivity of international organisations despite their push for quick privatisation and the establishment of an independent commission for its supervision. In this sense, the Privatisation Monitoring Commission's mission was to supervise privatisation and the work of the Cantonal Agencies of Privatisation set by the High Representative in June 1998. Notwithstanding, the Privatisation Monitoring Commission never developed a capacity to exercise the powers given on paper, including the right to inspect the records of state-owned enterprises. Moreover, there were little international resources and commitment to the initiative (ESI 2000). There was only a committee of three foreign experts that did not meet until 1999, and a secretariat of only three professional staff.<sup>243</sup>

The opposition from ethnocratic regimes regarding the loss of control over economic assets ensured that privatisation was hardly implemented during early post-war stages. By the end of 1998, only twenty six out of 1,600 companies in Republika Srpska and 258 out of 1,600 in the Federation of BiH had prepared privatization plans (PSD 1999). Internationals responded to this lack of progress in the privatization process through the cancellation of financial support and the dismissal of obstructive authorities. In this sense, USAID withdrew financial support for the privatisation process in the Federation due to corruption and obstruction practices. As a response, the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GTZ) proposed the establishment of tender commissions to supervise the entire process as large and strategic enterprises had to be privatised through public tenders. These commissions were meant to be independent of the entity and cantonal privatisation agencies, and required international experts to work closely with local officials to prepare and execute public tenders for strategic firms (ICG 2001). Commissions had to oversee all phases of privatization but were in a weak position since they could be overruled by cantonal privatisation agencies at any point in the tender process.

Interestingly, the continuous pressure of the international organisations to privatise companies meant that local ethnocracies changed progressively from opposing

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<sup>243</sup> The International Advisory Group on Privatization replaced the PMC and focused on launching the process of privatisation which related to activities regarding the participation of eligible citizens and the preparation of enterprises, once the privatisation process commenced its implementation phase (OHR 2000d).

the process to attempting to benefit from same. Ethnic privatisation was thus a compromise that emerged when nationalist elites sought to control the process of privatisation, following a co-capitalization model for the redistribution of government and socially owned assets originating in Tudjman's regime in Croatia (Papić 1999). The model involved the creation of shadow boards to take over enterprises prior to privatization to ensure through contractual continuity that existing directors would own privatized firms (Pugh 2002). Indeed, despite the hope that privatisation would keep profits out of the hands of political parties, who often used them for private purposes, reports about the manipulation of the process by nationalist parties soon appeared.

As a result of a model of privatisation, mass privatisation of small enterprises in the short term did not deliver either investments or the knowledge necessary to boost the production and productivity of companies affected by economic crisis in the 1980s and war in 1990s. Rather, results of the first phase of privatisation suggest that nationalist parties succeeded in stripping assets of smaller businesses and maintaining control over profitable companies. A random study of seventeen small companies in eastern Republika Srpska privatised through public auction found that fourteen had ended up in the hands of the previous director or a powerful local member of the SDS (ICG 2001b). In the Federation of BiH a similar pattern took place despite differing techniques of privatisation between entities. Thus, mass privatisation was conducted for the most part on the ethnic principle as the cantonal privatisation agencies were the agents for sale of companies within respective territories (Čaušević 2015).

Importantly, the fact that neoliberal prescriptions for the economic transition imposed by IFIs (with the instrumental performance of the OHR) were counterproductive was not ignored by internationals. Members of the OHR recognised that privatization was entrenching economic positions of nationalist parties and reducing the prospects of ethnic reintegration, rather than setting the foundations for sustained economic growth and recovery. Even the head of OHR's Economics Department, Daniel Besson, claimed that the Bosnian privatization was a case of the cure being worse than the disease and recognised that what they were creating with this type of privatization was worse than what existed before (Donais 2002).

Indeed, privatisation was a goal in itself of the IFIs as a cornerstone of the neoliberal economic model, highlighted by the fact that evidence of manipulation and deficiencies (recognised from the OHR's Economics Department) did not halt international pressure for a mass and quick privatisation. Insistence on privatisation was

argued by IFIs as a requirement to depoliticize the economy and provide the basis for economic recovery and growth but the privatisation process was failing in both issues (Ib.). Surprisingly enough, influential think-tanks like the ICG continued pushing to speed up privatisation despite reporting on the abuses from nationalist parties and recognising the risk that some enterprises fell into unscrupulous hands. The argument, especially immoral in a war-torn society, was that over time privatised assets would end up in the hands of people most capable of maximizing their economic potential (ICG 1999a).

With the resulting abuse from both local and international actors, some local economic figures launched a proposal for an alternative privatization that overcame the existing deficiencies of a quick privatisation in a framework in which institutions were control by ethnocracies. Within the Cantonal Agency for Privatization of Sarajevo, Bosnian economic expertise proposed a new privatisation law in mid 2000 to tackle the shortcomings produced during the previous years (Stojanov 2001). The proposal was only partially included in the High Representative's amendments in autumn 2000 when the privatisation of tender commenced promotion. Their proposal also included the creation of a Privatisation tender Bureau and a Development Fund at state level to link privatisation with broader economic development. Eloquently, some foreign institutions refused to consider any element of the proposal falsely arguing that privatisation was already at an advanced stage (Research Interview, 29 May 2015).

During the year 2000, international pressure intensified to begin the privatisation of large and strategic companies. In May, the High Representative dismissed the head of the President of the Management Board of the Federation Privatization Agency, Stjepo Andrijić, for delaying both the adoption of international-standard tender regulations and insisting on the adoption of an arbitrary and unnecessary deadline of 29 February 2000 for the publication of all tenders. His decisions led to tendering of enterprises without proper preparations and under flawed regulations, resulting in FBiH's suspension of the tender process (OHR 2000d). In order to adapt to the new requirements, the Agency for the Privatisation of FBiH in April 2000 cancelled the sale of 143 large enterprises. It was deemed necessary to form an office to deal with tenders by 21 May and foreign investors took the lead in the privatisation of large companies. Actually, only companies that were not attractive to foreign investors would be offered to local investors or citizens of the FBiH ("Uslovi prodaje preduzeća biće prilagođeni stranim investitorima", 2000).

Within the legislative pack adopted by the High Representative in October, a specific by-law in the Framework Law on Privatisation was introduced to place greater emphasis on tender privatisation. With this change, new management of enterprises and new capital was to be encouraged.<sup>244</sup> Yet, these changes did not trigger privatisation of big enterprises in the short term. Expectations that greater inflow of foreign capital would accompany privatization proved to be unrealistic because of factors such as the absence of a business climate, a harmonized legal system or the high fiscal obligations, in which up to eighty percent of profits had to be set aside for various taxes and fees (Zivkovic 2001). Thus, by May 2002 only seventeen percent of the large-scale companies offered in the FBiH had been fully sold, 175 out of 1044. The situation in RS differed and about fifty five percent of the 648 large-scale companies were considered technically sold.

The end of ethnocratic rule in 2001, especially in the Federation of BiH after the formation of the Alliance for Change, did not speed up privatisation as the new government was involved in the replacement of the Managing Boards of the main public companies that were in line with the previous regime.<sup>245</sup> The short life of the Alliance for Change, despite the instrumental role of the international community in its formation, did not alter the tendency in relation to the privatisation of large and strategic companies, which was still considered a failure in 2005 by international organisations. More specifically, five years after tender privatisation was promoted, the OHR argued that most of the enterprises to be privatised were still public due to the absence of any political will among the Bosnian authorities to adopt legislation on bankruptcy and to proceed with the restructuring of insolvent enterprises (OHR 2005b).

### **The privatisation of companies in Sarajevo**

As elsewhere in Bosnia, obstructionism in the privatization of enterprises had taken place in Sarajevo since the early stages of the post-war period. Cases such as the glass manufacturer Pilkington, Coca-Cola and Volkswagen (see ICG 1999a) were used as examples of the existing difficulties encountered by foreign investors trying to

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<sup>244</sup> This change created the conditions for a more regulated privatisation process with a need for investment and the possibility of introducing conditions to investors. The modification of the law was positive in economic terms and the most successful cases of privatisation (through the process of tendering) subsequently occurred during 2006 (Research Interview, 10 July 2015).

<sup>245</sup> Such a replacement presumably brought a reduction in losses by public companies (from about KM 400 million in 2000 to KM 99 million in 2001) but did not trigger privatisation (ICG 2002a).

purchase companies and start activity. Furthermore, these problems affected companies that had been operating in the area of Sarajevo in joint ventures with local enterprises before the war, such as Coca-Cola and Volkswagen, highlighting a new economic picture emerging from conflict. Poor implementation of the process of privatisation and obstacles to foreign investments followed the logic of maintaining economic assets under party management in order to sustain and reproduce a political-economic structure forged during war. Primarily, due to the SDA rule in Sarajevo, the main Bosniak party exercised political direction over companies since captured by nationalist parties in 1994 after the transformation of socially-owned property into state-owned property. As discussed earlier, this measure allowed parties to appoint Management Boards of companies after replacement of the self-governing bodies prevailing during the socialist period.

SDA administered public companies in Sarajevo through the figure of Edhem Bicakcic, an ally of Alija Izetbegović. During his tenure as FBiH Prime Minister between December 1996 and January 2001, Bicakcic controlled the lucrative public utility companies (ESI 1999b), which became a source of revenue for the party. Removed by the High Representative from his position as Director of Elektroprivreda in February 2002, Bicakcic was accused of abusing the powers vested in the Prime Minister namely to redirect public revenues through a complex and corrupt system of financial diversions, with large sums of money ultimately benefiting SDA. In 2002, the OHR decided to remove him and he was accused of ordering the transfer of 825,000 KM from Federation Current Reserve Funds to the Association of Families and Fallen Soldiers (AFFS), money that was diverted again to further capitalise Sehin Bank. Bicakcic also utilised the Bosnian Embassy in Vienna to transfer a sum of 2.5 million KM to an account held at the BOR Bank in Sarajevo (OHR 2001).<sup>246</sup> Finally, he was accused of the responsibility of the illegal creation of the Federation Employment Agency (FEA), which paid out twenty four million KM in public revenues as short-term loans to the Federation Ministry of Veterans and Invalids without legal authorisation between 1999 and 2000.

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<sup>246</sup> The sum was subsequently disbursed to three different recipients. Firstly, 100,000 KM was paid out to a private television station, a pro-SDA channel named BRT. Secondly, around 700,000 KM was paid into the SDA election fund, through a payment made to Unigradnja, a construction company. Thirdly, through the transfer of housing funds to the Sarajevo Housing Fund, (which undermined the responsibilities of the Minister of Finance in guarantying the implementation of the Budget Execution Law and the control of the financial behaviour of public funds).

Importantly, besides the control and exploitation of economic assets for the reproduction of local ethnocracies, his case also illustrates how dismissal of individuals had limited impact on the transformation of power structures. In this sense, the control of public assets in a nomenklatura system meant that political influence was not derived from official posts as individuals sustained their capacity to influence simply by changing position within the system (ESI 2000).<sup>247</sup> Thus, on 14 March 2003 the High Representative dismissed again Edhem Bicakcic from his new position as General Manager of Elektroprivreda. This position, within one of the largest Bosnian companies, allowed him to manage the portfolio related to the acquisition of new enterprises with significant sums, estimated at 22.6 million KM in 2002 (OHR 2001).

The resistance to lose direct control over sources of revenue and patronage ensured that the SDA continuously obstructed the change of ownership in big and strategic enterprises in Sarajevo (Research Interview, 29 May 2015). The non-adoption of a privatisation programme by directors of companies was a technique used to obstruct the process, illustrating the strategic role that Management Boards played for parties. This technique was generalised and the Sarajevo Canton Privatisation Agency announced in June 2000 that the deadline for public registration of shares would be postponed as ninety four companies out of the 127 included in the privatisation program had failed to adopt the program of privatisation (OHR 2000e).

Beyond the management and redistribution of resources from lucrative public companies and the early general obstruction to privatisation, as with other nationalist parties, SDA aimed at maintaining control over companies after privatisation. The party moved quickly to avoid losing control over companies during the process of privatisation. At the SDA Economic Council that took place in summer 1998, the need to hold Bosniak certificates in one place was highlighted and also the need to invest them in any enterprises of Bosniak national interest (Simić 1998b). The party planned to retain control of strategic assets in Bosniak areas through the Privatisation Investment Funds.<sup>248</sup> For instance, the Fund called SIB-ARINVEST dd Sarajevo was established by the BiH Alliance of Military War Invalids. Alija Izetbegović announced that he would provide the first one million DM of capital and informed Bosniak veterans that it was

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<sup>247</sup> Dismissal of individuals were thus a superficial measure as it did not result in any improvement of the institution nor did it necessarily exclude the individual dismissed from power (ESI 2000, p. 34-36).

<sup>248</sup> Privatisation Investment Funds were an essential part of the voucher privatisation. These Funds managed shareholders' investments on their behalf, providing expertise and saving administrative expenses.



their “patriotic duty” to invest their privatisation vouchers in the Fund (ESI 1999b). Despite offering support to international reform programs, SDA manoeuvred to retain its power over public companies after completing the process of privatisation.

The use of Privatisation Investment Funds to acquire shares in the privatisation of small and medium companies was complementary to the manipulation conducted by institutions in charge of tender privatisation since the early 2000s. In this sense, the Sarajevo Canton Privatisation Agency was responsible for opening balance sheets and preparing the privatisation programs of companies. A director and the Managing Board, formed generally by economic expertise, integrated the Agency. The implementation of measures proposed by the Managing Board in the figure of a director, made it difficult to identify irregularities (Research Interview, 29 May 2015). A team of renowned experts headed the Managing Board of the Sarajevo Canton Privatization Agency between 2000 and 2002. For all that, practices altering the recommendations received from the OHR and the Privatization Monitoring Commission were performed by the director of the Agency to avoid a scenario whereby the SDA lost any advantage over companies during the privatisation process.

The push for tender privatisation since 2000 offered more guarantees but in practice was not free of political manipulation, as seen in several cases in Sarajevo. As will be analysed in the next section, the Holiday Inn appears in the reduced literature regarding the politics of privatisation in Bosnia (e.g. Donais 2005) as a symbolic case of dark and corrupt privatisation where a well-connected local business of the right ethnic group gained control of key state owned assets for a small amount of money. This pattern was also seen in other cases. For instance, the tender for the sale of Konzum was cancelled in April 2000 after identifying a conflict of interest between members of the tender commission. Moreover, the Tender Commission in the Sarajevo Cantonal Agency for Privatisation annulled the tender of the Hotel Europa Garni due to several irregularities from the Hotel, like the non-declaration that it was under mortgage (“Neuspio tender za prodaju hotela Europa Garni”, 2000).

Additionally, the cancellation of the hotel Marsal in Bjelasnica in May 2000 highlights both the capacity of directors to alter the process of privatisation and manoeuvres in order to keep the companies under party control following the completion of a change of ownership. In this sense, the tender was cancelled because the real buyer of the Hotel Marsal was Energoinvest, in this regard, public companies could not participate in the privatisation process (OHR 2000f). Following the

investigation, the Sarajevo Cantonal prosecutor accused the director of the Hotel Marsal, Sefik Dzindo, and Kerim Lucarevic, director of the company Energopetrol, of abusing their positions. Dzindo was accused of falsifying documentation in the preparation of the privatisation, registering the value of the hotel for an amount of 2.4 million KM instead of the real value of 7.1 million (“Džindo i Lučarević će odgovarati zbog nezakonite privaticazije hotela Maršal”, 2001).

Along with widespread obstructionist practices and attempts to maintain control over companies after privatisation, the absence of domestic capital and lack of foreign interest were two other factors that significantly increased the complexity for the privatisation of big companies. Contrary, the privatisation of small enterprises was much faster due to the minor procedural complexity, compared to larger companies. This pattern can be observed from the process of privatisation conducted in the Sarajevo Canton. From 714 enterprises for privatisation, 300 were small, 373 large and forty one strategic, i.e. electricity, transport, water, mining, forest, gambling and banks (WB 1997). Between 1999 and 2001 most of the privatisation corresponded to small companies that were quickly privatised. Out of the 107 small privatisations completed between 1999 and 2013, ninety percent took place during the first three years. Following the approval of the by-law, tender privatisation gained momentum and through this method large companies were subsequently privatised (KS 2013).<sup>249</sup> Interestingly, the quick privatisation of small companies did not mean that main political actors were not interested in the process. In privatisation of small companies, buyers often aimed at obtaining centrality in the city with these purchases (Research Interview, 27 February, 2015). In April 2000, when only a limited amount of privatisation was ongoing, privatisation in the FBiH was progressively turning into a battle for real estate, with enterprises being purchased but with no real intention to continue with the original business (OHR 2000g).

#### The privatisation of Holiday Inn and Sarajka

In order to shed light on the politics of privatisation in Sarajevo and to understand whether privatisation brought a depoliticisation of the economy and also provided the basis for economic recovery and growth, as claimed by IFIs and other international organisations, two of the most important privatisations that took place in

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<sup>249</sup> 257 companies were privatised between 1999 and 2013 through different methods such as auctions, tenders of either small and large companies or public offering of shares.

the Bosnian capital city during the period of maximum international intervention are now analysed. These are the cases of the hotel Holiday Inn and the Sarajka Department Store. As stated earlier, the privatisation of *Holiday Inn* is an illustrative example of how ruling parties manipulated the process in large and strategic companies. The Holiday Inn became the most symbolic hotel of Sarajevo during the siege as it was the only hotel that continued operating. Built in the early 1980s for the celebration of the fourteenth Winter Olympics, celebrated in the city in 1984, the hotel was headquartering SDS leadership prior the start of the siege. Actually, from its roof, people were fired upon despite rallying peacefully in the 100,000 demonstration that reclaimed a peaceful and multi-ethnic BiH on 5 April 1992.

Because of its economic value, the Holiday Inn was an important privatisation. Corruption and cronyism appeared in the sale of the hotel from the very beginning. The group led by Nedim Causevic, a prominent Sarajevo business figure with close connections to Stjepo Andrijić, a close relative of Edhem Bicakcic, paid about five million KM in cash for an asset valued at forty eight million KM (Donais 2005). More precisely, Nedim Causevic and his company Agora and Teleoptica acquired the fifty one percent of the Hotel in March 2000 for a price of fifteen million KM, much below the value of the package to purchase the majority of shares, situated at twenty four million KM. Indeed, Causevic paid only 5.2 million KM in cash –around three million dollars – and ten million KM in certificates, which had been bought for as little as four percent of the nominal value (Omeragić 2001b). The undervalued acquisition of the hotel was not the only irregularity in the privatisation of the hotel. Importantly, the whole process was significantly manipulated to favour Causevic's bid. In the tender procedures, some investors were ignored and the tender finally had only one bid.<sup>250</sup> In this sense, the sale contract included some provisions that hindered the participation of other groups. One such provision was that the owner should take responsibility for all debts appearing after the publication of the tender, a condition that could only be accepted by investors possessing privileged information (Omeragić 2000).

The purchase of the hotel at a much lower price than the actual value aroused suspicions regarding the legality of the sale. Despite involvement in the process as member of the managing board of the Cantonal Agency for Privatisation, the Cantonal Ministry of Economy, Zaim Backović, quickly determined that the sale had been

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<sup>250</sup> In this case, the manipulation to reduce the price was produced in the tender. There was a direct agreement in which investors benefited by buying companies at reduced prices.

legitimate. Later the case was transferred to the Federal Ministry of Finance. By July 2000 the sale had two lawsuits, one signed by the workers and the other by the financial police, and the hotel became the first case reaching the FBiH Supreme Court. After one year of litigation the contract on the sale of fifty one percent of the hotel was cancelled after negotiations between the owner and the Cantonal Agency for Privatisation. The agency had to reimburse Causevic and his company paid out 5.2 million KM in cash, 9.7 million KM in certificates and 190,000 KM in compensation. By law, the Agency could hold the money if the buyer had not met bidding obligations, which in the case of Holiday Inn had to be determined by 8 March. Yet, the cancellation of the contract on 14 February claimed that the obligations were declared unfulfilled, which again benefited Causevic (Omeragić 2001a).

After the cancellation of the sale, the hotel was back in state ownership. In the context of reforms conducted by the Bulldozer Initiative, the Holiday Inn was included within the ten companies to be sold in the second phase of the Initiative (“Na bubnju deset velikih firmi u BiH”, 2003). The tender was opened in May 2003 with the cooperation of USAID and the International Advisory Group on Privatization. The only bidder was the Austrian company Alpha Baumanagement, who having fulfilled all criteria and conditions set at tender by the Sarajevo Canton Agency for privatisation, finally purchased 100% of the state capital of the Holiday Inn for 44.4 million KM (“Austrijska kompanija će kupiti Holidej In”, 2003). Because of the previous irregular sale which was in Causevic’s favour, the second privatisation of the Hotel became the most successful foreign direct investment at that time in the FBiH. Importantly, the privatisation of the Holiday Inn created the opportunity to develop land surrounding the hotel (Research Interview, 7 July, 2016). Alpha Baumanagement envisioned the development of the project called Holiday Inn – Grand Medica Center, which was a new complex that including shopping, catering and casino, through the development of the Grand Media tower (with 22 floors) a covered square between a garage and existing hotel and shopping malls by the restaurant of the existing hotel (SC 2016).

The Holiday Inn was used as an example of one of the successes that were taking place amid the reforms pushed by international actors. The Steering Board of the PIC claimed that this case was rather an exception while defining the pace of privatisation as unsatisfactory due to Entity governments (OHR 2004). Interestingly, the Holiday Inn actually represents the attempts of ruling parties to manipulate the process of privatisation and the fallacy that privatisation and foreign capitals would bring the

most capable hands to maximize economic potential. Indeed, the management of Holiday Inn by the new Austrian ownership collapsed after the abandonment of the Grand Media Center project, leading to a temporary closure in 2013 and the loss of the franchise from the InterContinental Hotels Group (“Privatization of the Holiday Inn: Austrian owners only after paying 630.000KM?”, 2011).

*Sarajka* is the second case considered in analysing the process of privatisation of the strategic companies in Sarajevo during this period of maximum international intervention. Effectively, this case would confirm that the privatisation process in the capital city of BiH was all but an apolitical process technically resolved in tender procedure and serving for the depoliticisation of the economy. *Sarajka* was a department store opened in the mid 1970s in a central location between Bascarsija and Marijin Dvor. Built following the project of architect Vladimir Zarahovic, it was conceived as a new temple of consumerism in a context of economic growth, the strengthening of the middle class and a widespread increase in living standards (“Today is the 40th Anniversary of the opening of *Sarajka*”, 2015).

With such a strategic location in the main street, Marsala Tita, its privatisation offered a great opportunity for further commercial development activity in the ongoing process of tertiarisation of the economy. Soon, international companies showed interest in buying *Sarajka*. In April 2000 negotiations between representatives of the Italian company Benetton and the Sarajevo Cantonal Agency for Privatisation were taking place on the eve of tender publication (“Tender bi mogao objavljen za petnaest dana”, 2000). In October, after months of negotiations and little progress, the Federal Agency for Privatisation who authorised the sale paralysed negotiations with Benetton. It was found that the privatisation was conducted through a small privatisation and that it sold only the building, as requested by both the company and the Sarajevo Cantonal Agency for Privatisation.

In the subsequent months tender was opened twice but no agreement was reached with Benetton to complete the privatisation. The company actually gave up after a second attempt in March 2001 because of the high price requested by the Agency (Omeragić 2002a). In late 2001, interest from different sides pushed the Cantonal Agency for Privatisation to open a new tender. Bosna Bank International (BBI) and the company Inter-Invest from Hercegovina generated bids along with Benetton. None of the three companies offered the entry price of eighteen million KM for *Sarajka*, which included debts. Inter-Invest was offering 12.5 million KM while both Benetton and BBI

offered twelve million KM. The main difference in the tender between companies was in the budget for investment in redevelopment. While Benetton offered an investment of between eighty and ninety million KM, the two other companies offered ten million KM (Omeragić 2002b).

The final resolution of the tender was unusual as BBI achieved the right to purchase Sarajka despite being the lowest offer and after two previous withdrawals from other companies. The owner of Interinvest, Dinko Slezak, withdrawn from the competition and Benetton subsequently found itself in premier position when at the end of April the consortium represented by Raiffaisein Property Invest, Edizioni Property i Rizzani de Eccher was declared winner of the tender (Omeragić 2002c). Surprisingly enough, the representatives of Benetton did not appear in the Agency to sign on 10 June despite having prepared all documentation for completion of the contract. Such a withdrawal permitted BBI to final became the winner despite being third in the tender.<sup>251</sup>

It is argued that the non-purchase of Sarajka by Benetton after being in disposition and ready to complete the process of privatisation, would have been caused by pressure from elites to clear the way for the purchase of Sarajka by BBI.<sup>252</sup> Despite the lack of conclusive evidence, the fact that the outcome in the privatisation of Sarajka was a product of Sarajevo's ethno-national politics is plausible. In this regard, it is important to point out that BBI had become closely intermingled with Bosniak elites. Indeed, the political and religious Bosniak elites efficiently merged within the Bank's structures after the Islamic Development Bank, the Dubai Islamic Bank and the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank founded BBI in October 2000. Thus, Bakir Izetbegović, Haris Silajdžić, Hasan Čengić or Mustafa Cerić were all members of the board of directors of the bank or part of its VIP business club.<sup>253</sup> As noted by Nedžad Latić, prominent journalist and brother of pan-Islamist SDA member Dzermaludin Latic, BBI became the main centre around which the political and economic power of the Bosniak national and

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<sup>251</sup> In early July, BBI purchased Sarajka but needed a few months to effectively control the department store due to the resistance of users to leave the building (Omeragić 2002d).

<sup>252</sup> The conditional is used in this sentence because the information provided in several informal interviews has not been confirmed by the method of triangulation due to the absence of data in this respect.

<sup>253</sup> Bakir Izetbegovic declared that he had earned 30.000 KM for his work on the board of directors of BBI despite being a director of the Construction Institute of the Sarajevo Canton (Buturović 2007). In relation to religious leaders, the head of the Islamic Community at that time, the Grand Mufti Mustafa Cerić, has since become President of the Sharia Committee of the Bank.

religious elite was concentrated. Links were especially close between BBI and four powerful families in SDA, Bukvić, Čengić, Izetbegović and Živalj, all of them former members of Young Muslims (Latic 2011).

Such incorporation of Bosniak elites within BBI was strategic for ideological and economic purposes. Ideologically, in 2000 BBI became the first bank in Europe to operate on the principles of Islamic banking. In its business plan, the Bank defined as its goals the expansion of Islamic banking into South Eastern Europe and, more importantly for this research, the capture of foreign direct investments and particularly Islamic capitals that reverted on the economic development of the area of Sarajevo (Bokhari 2001). These goals were ideologically in line with conservative sectors in SDA. Economically, the privatisation of Sarajka also offered an excellent opportunity for its redevelopment into a modern shopping mall in Sarajevo's main retail axis. Unlike other privatizations, the case of Sarajka certainly brought economic development and job creation during its construction and after the inauguration of BBI Center in 2009.<sup>254</sup>

Importantly, its inauguration was surrounded again by controversy as the shopping centre started its operation following some basic Islamic principles. In its entire surface, it was not allowed the sale of pork and alcohol, with gambling also being prohibited. This project can simply be framed as an economic project that is certainly in line with the nature of BBI, which operates following Islamic banking rules. However, the influence of local politics in the nature of the project cannot be disregarded. The fact that the privatisation of Sarajka and the subsequent BBI Center was a product of Sarajevo's ethno-national politics is not only plausible considering the concentration of powerful families and other influential actors within the Bank but it is also concordant with a production of space in post-socialist Sarajevo that is hugely dominated by political elites, as it is analysed in the following chapter.

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<sup>254</sup> Even though the BBI and the Sarajevo Canton was signed in March 2003 with a protocol to build the new shopping centre which would include space for offices with an investment of 40 million euro, the redevelopment of Sarajka was delayed several times. The agreement was beneficial for the BBI, as it would liberate the payment of tax for the building of public shelters, which corresponded to two percent of the value of the investment, and they would also receive a tax deduction of fifty percent if they used the land in the city. Cantonal authorities also offered to deliver the building without cost while the BBI committed to cancelling the request sent to the Sarajevo Cantonal Court due to the delays in obtaining the building ("Investicija 40 miliona eura", 2003).

## **6. The current ethnic and spatial configuration of the urban area of Sarajevo**

This dissertation analyses the role of the OHR in the urban transformation of Sarajevo and how this intervention has ultimately affected current ethnic and spatial structures. Thus, this chapter analyses the impact on the spatial, functional and ethnic configuration of the area of Sarajevo as a result of the transition towards a market economy and the division between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo. Firstly, it focuses on how the post-socialist urban restructuring has taken place in the city through the consideration of the process of reconstruction and also the parallel intervention of the OHR to liberalise the real estate market. Essentially, such liberalisation ended a period in which land had been a high-value political asset for the consolidation of territories ethnically homogeneous. It is followed by an analysis of the urban spatial transformation of Sarajevo that was similar functionally and morphologically to other European post-socialist cities. Yet, in spite of neoliberal economic reforms, the production of space in Sarajevo is marked by a significant political interventionism from municipalities and political elites. In the second half of the chapter, the evolution of the political and urban division between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo is addressed. Subsequently, visions regarding the division (of East Sarajevo) and coexistence in Sarajevo highlight the rise of cross-entity spatial patterns in recent years, especially in the case of Sarajevo Serbs who moved to East Sarajevo. This has not altered the nature of the division, and is a contribution to keep social relations across ethnic lines below pre-war levels both quantitatively and qualitatively.

### **Reconstruction and urban restructuring**

Cities in the former Yugoslavia represent a distinct sub-type of development in post-socialist cities because of the slow transition towards the capitalist city-model, caused by armed conflicts, mass refugee movements and destroyed urban centres (Tosics 2005). Among the former republican capital cities, Sarajevo was the most affected by the war. The transition from the self-management system to a market economy was especially delayed by the siege and subsequently by the absence of a shared vision between local and international actors in relation to economic strategy. As discussed in the previous chapter, the main specificity of the international neoliberal



economic strategy was the elaboration of a reconstruction programme (the PRRP) that was in line with broader economic strategy.

The reconstruction of Sarajevo was a strategic issue that had symbolic, economic and social implications. This was actually observed during the conflict. Work to rebuild the city commenced in 1994, during an agreed cease-fire and the exclusion zone imposed by NATO to prohibit heavy weapons from the Sarajevo area. In its 900 resolution adopted in early March 1994, the Security Council of the UN sought to appoint a senior civilian official to draw up an overall assessment and plan of action for the restoration of essential public services in Sarajevo (UN 1994b). William Eagleton, named as Special Coordinator for the Reconstruction of Sarajevo, coordinated seven actions groups alongside a local counterpart to assess and set an Action Plan for the restoration of essential services. The Plan, published on 1 June 1994 under the title "Restoring life to Sarajevo", identified 144 projects across fourteen sectors, including electricity, water, gas, energy and heating, civil engineering, health, municipal services and city development, and education.

Initial manoeuvres were encouraging; however, the implementation of the Plan faced serious difficulties particularly due to worsening siege conditions following an agreement on the cease-fire. In this sense, Bosnian Serbs suspended the agreement that had permitted some supplies to reach the city across the airport, shortly after their rebuttal of the Contact Group Plan in June 1994, making difficult the implementation of the projects identified in the Action Plan (Ib.). Notwithstanding, the Plan became the starting-point for much of the reconstruction work in Sarajevo, which was subsequently developed during the post-war period by the World Bank and the European Community. The Office of the Special Coordinator operated until late April 1996 with the remaining functions transferred to successor organizations. Following the signing of the peace agreement, the Office of the Special Coordinator actually assisted the OHR by convening a series of meetings under the framework of the Joint Civilian Commission of Sarajevo to address modalities for reuniting the city in terms of utilities and essential public services.

The priority following the cessation of conflict was restoring Sarajevo's basic infrastructure as the siege had destroyed most of city's telecommunications, roads, electricity supply and water networks, with only a fifth of the city having water and

power (Markowitz 2010).<sup>255</sup> The need for huge reconstruction in Sarajevo was also visibly demonstrated by the devastation of buildings. Three out of the four municipalities of the city, i.e. Stari Grad, Novo Sarajevo and Novi Grad, had rate damages between seventy four and ninety six per cent of its housing stock (IMG 1999). During the early post-war stages, the city was highly dependent on external aid during the process of reconstruction, receiving more aid than any other city or Canton in Bosnia and Herzegovina: over 400 million DEM, out of which eighty million has been spent on the reconstruction of housing (OHR 1998g). During the post-war period the first reconstructed area in Sarajevo was Bascarsija, the famous and traditional commercial area of the Ottoman city (Carreras and Moreno 2007).

Local and international cooperation continued in the process of reconstruction by the end of the siege as Sarajevo embarked on comprehensive reconstruction projects. Municipalities engaged architects and engineers who worked closely with international donors in the process of damage evaluation. Local civil engineers from municipal and cantonal institutions surveyed the degree of destruction and recorded both public and private properties. Subsequently, housing that could be occupied was distributed among persons internally displaced for temporary occupation. Despite direction from local authorities, donors had significant influence when applying conditionality to aid (Research Interview, 10 March 2015).

As in other fields, the process of reconstruction was marked by an important international interventionism and a unilateralism that often relied little on local human resources, goods and services. Generally, the reconstruction of the built environment in BiH followed a top down model based on projects. The international community favoured a contractor reconstruction to the detriment of more flexible forms, for example, self-help reconstruction, which contributed further to the recovery of the local economy as well as the capacities and skills of the local population. As suggested by the Swedish Development Aid Agency, the assumptions used by the international community to justify contractor over self-help housing reconstruction, i.e. speed, employment generation and project monitoring, were disproved by empirical evidence. Essentially, costs were forty per cent less in projects that helped to conduct self-reconstruction (SIDA 2001, cited in Zetter 2010, p.165). Actually, the assessment of the effectiveness of the reconstruction process, considering the total amount of funds

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<sup>255</sup> More than ninety per cent of Sarajevo flats had been reconnected to the heating system in 1999, facilitating an estimated return of about 10,000 refugees (WB 1999).

invested and its impact on the reconstruction and development of the country is not assessed positively (Papic 2007).

Beyond the PRRP, the total international expenditure in humanitarian aid, peace implementation, and economic reconstruction was US\$71-81 billion for the period 1992-2000, including the costs of international activities.<sup>256</sup> As claimed by Marko Papic (2001), international assistance for reconstruction had a low cost efficiency with many resources spent on implementation and not directly used in assisting the BiH. A significant aspect of this inefficiency was caused by corrupt practices. The pushing of money through domestic structures operating as if it were a natural disaster facilitated corruption practices. Repaired homes were often linked to political parties and a vast amount of money for reconstruction went to private pockets and parties. According to an exhaustive investigation by an American-led antifraud unit, a billion dollars disappeared from public funds or were stolen from international aid projects by nationalist leaders in respective ethnocracies. In one case, publicly acknowledged by the Swiss Embassy, ten foreign embassies and international aid agencies lost more than \$20 million deposited in a Bosnian bank (NYT, 17 August 1999).

The model of reconstruction suggested that the international human involvement was substantial. In the aftermath of conflict there was a massive presence of NGOs, UN agencies and other development and relief organisations in the whole country (Barakat 2003).<sup>257</sup> Bilateral cooperation took different forms depending on the agencies involved. Some of them were innovative and produced productive and meaningful local and international relations, such as the one proposed by the Council of Europe. Through the programme of Local Democracy Embassies, it fostered the organisation of a partnership between European local and regional authorities with Bosnian municipalities and Cantons (CE 1997). Local Democracy Embassies were thus the result of a partnership between Bosnian and several other European municipalities. Two were operating during early post-war stages, one in Sarajevo and the other in Tuzla. In the case of Sarajevo, the City of Barcelona was project leader in cooperation with Vienna, Lisbon and

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<sup>256</sup> Estimations respectively placed humanitarian aid for refugees from BiH in asylum countries and the humanitarian aid in the country at \$7-8 billion; military costs of peacekeepers at \$14-15 billion; civil implementation of the DPA at \$3-4 billion; economic recovery and reconstruction, including the PRRP, at \$10-12 billion; and \$5-6 billion for other types of assistance including democratization, development of civil society, media or local communities.

<sup>257</sup> A distinct typology of organisations was involved, including universities. Aid agencies often employed large numbers of local people, who worked side by side with expatriates on the implementation of projects.

Bologna.<sup>258</sup> In this framework, several projects were reconstructed such as the integral reconstruction of the neighbourhood of Mojmiilo (the Olympic village in the Games of 1984); the reconstruction of the Olympic installations of Zetra and the reconstruction of the houses in Kasatići, a village in the municipality of Hadžići (AB 2017).

Despite the main post-war programme of reconstruction had a restructuring nature, the rebuilding of the built environment generally did not imply physical renewal as damaged and destroyed buildings were usually restored materially and functionally. This was controversial as international donors were more willing to participate in reconstruction to update materiality to greater context and needs (Research Interview, 10 December 2013).<sup>259</sup> Hence, reconstruction became another arena of competing visions between locals and internationals, but also with differences between the locals themselves. In this sense, during the process, a large number of voices emphasised the need for preservation of the ruins of some buildings as a memorial of the destruction inflicted during the war. Actually, within the Strategic Plan, Cantonal authorities included a number of buildings that testified to the urbicide that occurred and it was deemed that these building were important for the development of tourism (KS 2000). This debate included the retention of the symbolic ruins of the BiH Parliament (Figure 1) and the headquarters of Oslobođenje, which continued newspaper publication during the siege. Notwithstanding, the ruin-memorial of particular buildings did not materialise due to a shift in the political economy, and this shift eventually cancelled the memorial potentiality of destruction (Bădescu 2015). Indeed, prior to completion, reconstruction was progressively overshadowed by an economic transition that increased the potential for property development or redevelopment once the commodification of urban land took place.

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<sup>258</sup> Intense cooperation between Barcelona and Sarajevo was set in 1992. The celebration of the Summer Olympic Games during the early stages of the siege of Sarajevo (Olympic city in 1984) triggered a significant mobilisation from local institutions and individuals to send aid to the Bosnian capital. This collaboration took on more stable forms during the post-war period. In 1996, Barcelona's Mayor declared Sarajevo as its 11<sup>th</sup> District, setting a framework that allowed the beginning of a series of collaborative projects in which many other Catalan municipalities, NGOs, and organizations were involved. In the Local Embassy in *Barcelona, Sarajevo*, opened under the aegis of the Council of Europe conducted coverage and offered technical and logistical support to many charitable projects throughout the state. The human complicity generated by such cooperation is illustrated in this case by the fact that Pasqual Maragall, Mayor of Barcelona at that time, and Manel Vila, manager of the 11<sup>th</sup> District within the last decade, have been granted the distinction of honorary citizen of Sarajevo.

<sup>259</sup> Despite this, reconstruction could be altered in a subtle way by bringing symbolic messages to the original destroyed building, as happened in some mosques (Bevan 2006).



**Figure 10.** The Bosnian Parliament in 2006 before its reconstruction. Author's picture.

### Towards the post-socialist city

Alongside the process of reconstruction, that included the restoration of the built environment, the transition from a self-management system to a market economy resumed after the war in a context in which a dependent aid economy had to be replaced by a self-sustainable economy. The demise of Socialist Yugoslavia, despite its specificities, brought similar changes to other CEE countries. The collapse of state socialism ensured the transformation of the economic, political and social structures that had shaped the urbanisation of socialist cities. This systemic change affected all countries in transition under different levels of intensity and pace but also increased commodification of the intervention of factors in the production of such space (Hamilton 1995). Thus, important requirements of the socialist urban development were altered, such as the inclusion of main actors in the decision-making process (with an increasing interaction between public, private and other groups) or ownership of the means of production, urban housing and land.

Despite the resistance of ethnocracies to the economic liberalisation imposed by the main international financial organisations, with the High Representative playing an instrumental role, local level Sarajevo municipal authorities moved quickly to define the strategies for the future development of the city with a prospect of ending the siege following the collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia. In this sense, the elaboration of the “Sarajevo Canton Development Strategy until the Year 2015” (Strategic Plan hereinafter) was determined on 2 November 1995 by the local assembly with the beginning of the peace negotiations that eventually concluded with the signature of the DPA. The local Government adopted the document defining the implementation of the Strategy in mid 1998, highlighting how local authorities were to adopt a new orientation for the urban development of the city in order to address the multiplicity of transitions.

The elaboration of the Strategic Plan actually reflects a shift in planning in CEE cities that disfavoured the socialist tradition, in which plans operated more as a horizontal spatial system and brought together sectoral public investment programs (Thomas 1998). In their search for more flexible planning paradigms and approaches after the collapse of socialism, the adoption of strategic plans was embraced in transitioning cities as a way to involve the business community and the broader constituency in the definition of a shared future (Albrechts 2004; Tsenkova 2006). Strategic plans emerged in capitalist cities when comprehensive plans were increasingly difficult to implement because of the increasing uncertainty of the post-Fordist era (Maier 1994). Accordingly, the goal of strategic plans is to resolve the more pressing urban problems by outlining specific and tangible strategies that can be implemented via a combination of spatial and financial means (Hirt and Stanilov 2009). Generally, strategic plans incorporate a shorter time frame (about fifteen years), and are ostensibly less focused on comprehensive analysis and physical planning solutions.

In Sarajevo, shortly after the end of war, the Canton Planning Institute implemented along with dozens of local organisations the Strategic Plan using equivalent plans from other European cities as a reference guide (Research Interview, 19 November 2013). Importantly, its elaboration also illustrates the difficulty of a transition towards a new system by many of the authorities and individuals who had been involved in a distinct system for decades. Ten years later, Salih Fočo (2005) claimed that while socialist ideology had been abandoned, the dynamics of the new ideology were not yet clearly understood, leaving the country lost on its transition path.

The final stage of the transition was defined in the Strategic Plan envisioning the future development of Sarajevo in 2015. The main goals were the creation of a European capital, a profitable business environment and a pleasant living environment (KS 2000). Plans were developed (fourteen points) in which the transition towards a capitalist city was central. The creation of a profitable business environment was based on private ownership and a successful economy that permitted free flow of capital, goods, services and people. To lead the new urban development of the city, the plan also identified the introduction of an urban land market system, the privatization of public assets as well as the strengthening of sectors including banking, finance and those industries acceptable in economic and environmental terms. Despite the fact that the Strategic Plan was not embedded in the planning hierarchy, the actualization of the Urban Plan that took place in 1997 was in line with the vision defined in the Strategic Plan. Hence, the liberalisation of a real estate market was incorporated along with the adaptation of new territorial limits set after the division of the city between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo (Research Interview, 30 September 2013).

For all that, the complexity of the post-war period in Sarajevo, due to the simultaneity of transition and the multiplicity of actors involved, is eloquently manifested in the very process to reform and liberalise the real estate market. Initially, international land policies favoured the promotion of the minority returns during the implementation of Annex VII through the ban on the allocation of socially owned land imposed by the High Representative between 1999 and 2003 (previously discussed in chapter three).

While this ban was temporarily conceived, at the same time the OHR enforced an extension for six months in December 1999, this decision advanced the need for reform of the real estate market in Bosnia. Simultaneously, the real estate property market was operating at two levels: a semi-transparent official market and an unregulated grey market (Rabenshort 2000). This market, a result of the nationalisation of urban land conducted in 1945, was similar to other emerging market economies or developing countries. Thus, in the late 1990s there was a non-established system of valuation based on market principles while investments and transactions often occurred between multinational companies, aid agencies and foreign individuals with access to funding. On the other hand, the unregulated market was generally comprised of low-cost construction and low-value transactions. Participants were limited with regard to

funding or legal protections so generally construction permits were not obtained and transactions were unlikely to be registered.

The OHR sought the elaboration of reports which assessed the reform of the legal framework for a land property market that went beyond conversion of the rights of use over socially owned land, i.e. all urban construction land into full private ownership required a complex reform including property registration systems, property taxation, mortgages and development controls over land use (OHR 1999). The report commissioned by the RRTF in June 1999 also suggested new zoning and planning systems along with the modernisation of the property registration systems or the reform of property and transaction taxes. A second report from USAID published in January 2000 detailed the necessary reforms relative to land records and cadastre in conjunction with market activity regulation (Rabenshort 2000). Thus, land ownership and registration issues were central reforms connected to the liberalisation of the real estate market. The reform and integration of a land registration system, which had been previously defined by local authorities in the Strategic Plan as one of the goals of the land policy (KS 2000, p.19), was a precondition to reach the degree of legal certainty necessary for private investors to conduct property developments.

After a four-year period of land intervention, the High Representative abandoned its attempts to control land allocations and enacted a harmonized Law on Construction Land in both entities in May 2003 (OHR 2003a).<sup>260</sup> The Law culminated the transformation in which land acquired economic value after becoming a high-value political asset as a result of the authorities' use of same to consolidate ethnic majorities in respective territories (Williams 2013). In accordance with this Law, land management reverted back to the municipalities and, finally, it was incorporated into the market and open to mass privatisation: socially owned construction land was divided into state-owned or private land depending on whether or not it had been developed by a private actor (OHR 2003a). More specifically, Article 39 of the Law transformed the permanent right of use of urban land that previously existed during Socialist Yugoslavia into private ownership.<sup>261</sup> The approval of the Law thus implied that urban land was

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<sup>260</sup> The Law on Construction Land was mutually related to several other laws such as the Law on Administrative Procedure, the Law on Expropriation, the Law on Urban Planning, the Law on Land Registry, the Law on Property and Legal Relations, the Law on Transactions with Immobile Properties and the Law on Inheritance.

<sup>261</sup> After nationalisation, urban land in Socialist Yugoslavia had a three-parcel structure of approximately 500 m<sup>2</sup> (each one). The first parcel was automatically privatised. Previously, it contained a right for permanent use with no possibility for inheritance (there was right to inherit). In the second



transformed from an essential resource to a comprehensively managed urban development promoting social equity and it became a commodity that could be freely traded in the market.

Following the creation of a central bank and development of a private banking and financial system, the approval of the Law on Construction Land for the entire country culminated in a series of structural reforms enacted by the High Representative. These reforms created basic favourable conditions for a post-socialist production of space. With the establishment of an international administration in BiH, the crucial role of state institutions in conducting reforms to assure market functioning was developed by international organisations, which created favourable conditions for the private investment of significant amounts of capital in the built environment.

In order to aid greater understanding of the development of new major urban projects in Sarajevo, the Law on Construction land produced a new concept related to land development with the perception that morphology and typology of the built environment was the responsibility of the land owner. This change of perception culminated a process in which the importance of planning and regulations in the modern production of space was diminished. Such an erosion of planning and regulations began during the demise of Socialist Yugoslavia as a rampant economic and political crisis in the late 1980s. As a result the government had less capacity to regulate urban space, and city inspectors had diminished authority with which to control new constructions. Meanwhile, the development of new projects, which disregarded the regulation plan, was highlighted in the notorious case of the gas station in Bembaša, in Stari Grad, at the eastern edge of the city centre (Donia 2006a). Energopetrol began construction of the gas station in October 1989, eight months prior to the granting of the building permit, amid protests from citizens as the location of the huge gasoline reserve tank jeopardised the ruins of the dervish quarter built by Isabeg Ishakovic, the founder of the city, around 1462.

While under socialist rule, planning was a key instrument for the comprehensive development of the city however the situation dramatically changed during the transition with collective values being replaced by individual ones. In post-war and post-socialist Bosnia, political and economic actors dominate urban development and

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parcel, there was a priority right to build (for personal needs only, i.e. growing family) but no right of ownership or transaction. In the third parcel, there was a temporary right to use (Research Interview 3 July 2015).

have a direct impact in planning processes. Local politicians are the main actors in decision-making and local politics, rather than planners, and they significantly shape regulation plans (Djurasovic 2016). When the Law on Construction Land was enacted, land-use regulations in Sarajevo had hardly been modified but the decision making process of public institutions had already been oriented towards private profit. Planning, previously a tool based on the principles of equality and solidarity during the socialist period, was downgraded to the detriment of the private priorities of landowners and local politicians, who became prevalent over existing regulations and the comprehensive vision for the city (Research Interview, 22 June 2015).

Whilst focusing on the production of space, and considering evidence obtained during the realisation of this research, political elites and mayors from the municipalities exercise a higher control and constraint in Sarajevo than in free market economies. Despite the enactment of the Law on Construction Land, these political elites and city officials are still key actors in the realisation of new urban projects. Generally, foreign investments have succeeded in the production of new large urban projects when cooperation with local elites existed. As claimed by Aida Daidžić, architect and consultant for foreign investors, despite the significant amount of Western investors seeking to invest in the city between 2005 and 2008, only a few of them managed to develop projects. With no influential political links, investors had to confront excessive obstacles to obtain licenses and too often failed in conducting the relevant property development (Research Interview, 17 March 2015).<sup>262</sup>

According to a number of people interviewed for this research, once such key actor in the production of space in Sarajevo is Bakir Izetbegović, an architect, and significantly, the son of the first Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegović, and current leader of the SDA. Born in Sarajevo in 1956, he was already influential during the war and served as director of the Construction Institute of Sarajevo between 1991 and 2003. Officials of the OHR and Western diplomats considered him one of the wealthiest and most powerful men in BiH (Hedges 1999).<sup>263</sup> Bakir was operating directly in the real

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<sup>262</sup> The existence of a limited real estate market occurred in countries in transition from socialism to capitalism with political power still playing a dominant role. For instance, the development of major urban projects in late 1990s did not take place in a free market in Moscow. Yuriy Luzhkov, Mayor of Moscow between 1992 and 2010, was a major actor through his control over decision-making and ownership of certain companies (Pagonis and Thornley 2000).

<sup>263</sup> He owned, for instance, fifteen per cent of Air Bosnia, the state airline, and took a cut of the extortion money paid out by local shopkeepers to Sarajevo gangsters, according to diplomats.

estate sector of Sarajevo through his influence over new urban projects and even through his direct investment in a close partnership with architect Sead Golos, who has been responsible for designing some of the main projects developed in the city during the last fifteen years.<sup>264</sup> Some of the main projects designed by Sead Golos include the most prominent shopping centres in the city, the BBI Centre and Sarajevo City Centre. Additionally, he developed the Commercial Centre Merkur, the reconstructions of the Hotel Bristol and Hotel Europe and the construction of Bosmal City Centre, this latter being one of the first condominiums in the Balkans with two residential and commercial towers.

While considering the BBI Centre, its construction highlights an intertwined reality between the main new urban projects and local political elites, as Bakir Izetbegović was along with others a member of the bank's structure. The shopping centre was privately developed by BBI after the privatisation of Sarajka, which apparently took place under the mechanism of a public tender. Yet, as mentioned in previous chapters, pressure from local elites would have resulted in a favourable situation whereby BBI could purchase the bank despite its tender being placed third in the whole process, and with Benetton in second position, having convened the meeting to complete privatisation. The construction of BBI also suggests that even when planning procedures are respected, the process can be fully controlled by the elites involved in the production of space. Thus, in the process for approval of the new shopping centre, architects and authorities formed a committee for the construction of same. However, vital information was hidden, for example, the fact that the project would supersede the five-storey limit set in planning regulations (Research Interview, 30 September 2013). The BBI project was not modified but the Programme for the development of the central core of Sarajevo was changed to fulfil the needs of the new project. In this sense, the height limitation in construction was removed through a subtle modification. The sentence stating that 'buildings could not exceed five floors' was replaced by another one stating that 'buildings would have a predominant height of five floors'. Evidently, the decision to amend the Programme was undertaken by the then

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Furthermore, he has influenced and allegedly made profit from socially owned apartments. People who required occupancy rights had to pay Bakir Izetbegovic \$2,000 as claimed by several individuals affected.

<sup>264</sup> Born in Sarajevo in 1969, Sead Golos graduated from the Faculty of Architecture in Sarajevo in 1994. He established architectural studio GRUPA.ARH in 2001, where he currently works (Oris.hr). In the case of the BBI, Sead Golos finally developed the project despite the fact that architect Slobodan Andjelic won first prize for its construction.

SDA Cantonal Prime Minister, Denis Zvizdić, due to the rejection of Ljubiša Marković, SDP Mayor of the Centar municipality, to issue the urban permit in line with the existing regulations.<sup>265</sup>

Undoubtedly, with the power to grant construction permits, municipalities had a central position in land management after the enactment of the Law of Construction Land by the High Representative. Yet, with an orientation towards profit making, municipalities often do not follow the recommendations set out by the Cantonal Planning Institute and instead modify regulation plans to satisfy investor demands (Research Interview, 14 November 2013).<sup>266</sup> This practice reveals the nature of the post-war and post-socialist urban development of Sarajevo. *Ad hoc* changes in the regulation plans are produced to amend the content in new urban projects, and these amendments often disrespect existing regulations. Such a performance jeopardises the comprehensive vision for the urban development of the city as defined in the Urban Plan and generally involves a densification. Importantly, this performance is a feature of a neoliberal urban development that reveals the devaluation of planning conducted during the transition as it is relegated to adjustments to meet the demands of various actors.<sup>267</sup>

In Sarajevo, political control in the production of space often involves authorities from both the municipality and political elites. For instance, there is a verbal agreement on the construction of a new project but bribery is required to change planning regulations or to simply ensure that the construction permit is granted by municipalities (Research Interviews, 7 November 2013).<sup>268</sup> Such an intervention of political elites in the production of space is highlighted also in the so-called Reket

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<sup>265</sup> Zvizdić is currently the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of BiH.

<sup>266</sup> The Cantonal Planning Institute of Sarajevo continues to deal with the preparation of all plans, including Regulation Plans that are produced by the Planning Institute at the request of municipalities. As occurred during Socialist Yugoslavia, the Institute does not grant urban or construction permits in order to avoid having a monopoly over plan elaboration and its implementation. Rather, it assesses local administrations when new urban projects require technical changes in the Regulation Plan. The Planning Institute provides information to municipalities in relation to whether projects can be developed accordingly by law. When a regulation plan exists and the proposal of a new project is in line with regulation, the municipality gives the construction permit directly.

<sup>267</sup> Planning in the era of neoliberalisation is a mere corrective mechanism, an attempt to introduce changes without formulating an overall policy to regulate new development (Tasan-Kok et. al. 2012, p.11).

<sup>268</sup> In order to start a project several documents are required: an urban permit (including project concept), a construction permit (including main project) and utilization permit (confirming that the building is built in accordance with the main project and required standards). The urban permit is granted by Canton Sarajevo in cases in which projects are bigger than 5000 m<sup>2</sup>, while both construction and utilization permits are granted by municipalities. The main responsibilities of the City Council are the regulation plans in the four municipalities of the cities (Research Interview, 11 December, 2013).

affair. Former director of ASA Group, Nihad Imamović, a distinguished entrepreneur from Sarajevo, was asked for a commission of two million KM to alter the regulation plan for the development of the ASA Prevent headquarters in the Bulevar Mese Selimovica (Research Interview, 13 November 2013). Imamović provided audio evidence in 2009 that the SDP leadership of Damir Hadžić and Zlatko Lagumdžija had requested a bribe from him before they would issue the construction permit.<sup>269</sup>

A further example of this nature i.e. of new large urban projects in post-war and post-socialist Sarajevo, is the case of Tibra Pacific, one of the major housing construction companies in the area of Sarajevo.<sup>270</sup> Tihomir Brajkovic, a Bosnian Croat from Kiseljak who had achieved his wealth illicitly during the war, owns the company that has developed housing settlements in Sarajevo and other areas of central Bosnia (Research Interview, 12 November 2013).<sup>271</sup> One of these projects is located in Stup (Ilidža municipality) at the edge of the central urban area of Sarajevo. The regulation plan determined a maximum height of five storeys but eventually it developed to a height of between seven and fourteen storeys to produce a very dense settlement in a suburban environment. Despite mandatory public discussion of the planned modification, the regulation plan was changed in the municipal council in accordance with what was being built during a very tense plenary session conducted in January 2012. There was conflict between municipal representatives amid allegations of criminality, but the council finally legalised the construction.

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<sup>269</sup> The State Court was in charge of the case but transferred its jurisdiction to the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo, after which the investigation against the influential politicians was terminated (Mehmedic et al 2012; “How the charges against Šarović, Čović, Ivanić...were dropped”, 2016).

<sup>270</sup> ANS Drive, Butmir doo, Lake and Djulevic are currently the other main construction companies.

<sup>271</sup> Allegedly his fraud consisted of buying frozen meat in Germany and Italy to be destroyed and, afterwards, sold in BiH without paying the required import taxes.



**Figure 11.** Construction of multi-family housing by Tibra Pacific in Stup (Ilidža). Source: sarajcity.com


### **The post-socialist urban spatial restructuring**

The slower transition of post-Yugoslav cities as a result of the war has been seen in a previous section displayed by the very liberalisation of the real estate market conducted by the international community, which pursued in setting the legal certainty necessary for local and foreign private property developments. Following on from the last decade, Sarajevo has undergone a significant spatial transformation that reflects the restructuring of its urban economy from a state-managed industrial system to a free market economy (ESI 2004; Pugh 2002). Land acquisition and property development especially since 2004 have played a central role in the urban spatial restructuring of the central urban areas. The Law on Construction Land and the economic reforms conducted in other fields by the international community, such as the Banking sector, converged to produce a short construction boom relative to the size of the city and essentially privately driven.<sup>272</sup> Despite the fact that this relative construction boom was halted in 2008 when the global economic crisis reduced banking loans, development of new large urban projects continued, albeit at a slower pace, highlighting just how important real estate has become in Sarajevo since its liberalisation (Research Interview, 19 December 2013).

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<sup>272</sup> Along with some multi-family housing built by the Sarajevo Housing Fund in order to increase the availability of apartments and facilitate the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration, public administrations have only developed a few of the post-war major urban projects. One of the examples is the so-called Olympic Pool, inaugurated in 2008 (SC 2015).

Since the last decade Sarajevo's central urban areas have experienced a progressive densification and a rise of the functional and morphological diversity so characteristic for other post-socialist cities, such as Sofia (Hirt 2006), Prague (Sýkora 2007), Budapest (Kovács 1994), or Belgrade (Hirt 2008). In order to analyse such an urban spatial transformation in the central municipalities of Sarajevo, a total of 109 new urban projects either developed or redeveloped during the post-war period were identified during this research (Figure 4).<sup>273</sup> Tertiary economic activities are predominant and represent more than seventy percent of the post-war urban projects in the city, considering office real estates, commercial properties (either supermarkets or shopping centres), hotels and mixed-use developments (Figure 5). Multi-familiar housing was especially developed in the last few years with most projects in the central municipalities developed privately, representing approximately fourteen per cent of new post-war projects. Temples and memorials count as fifteen per cent of the new major urban projects identified during fieldworks in the central areas of the city. New temples are generally mosques but there are also examples of constructions of new churches in the municipalities of Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo.<sup>274</sup>



**Figure 4.** New major urban projects in the City of Sarajevo developed or redeveloped during the post-war period. Source: author.

<sup>273</sup>As detailed in the methodology, the data base of these projects was produced during fieldworks through several techniques, such as direct observation and informal interviews and being confirmed through historical pictures (Prstojević 1994). Projects selected were both newly developed or redeveloped after the war, with functional or significant morphological transformation (e.g. BBI Centar, Figure 10). New single-family dwellings developed mostly in the suburbs were not considered.

<sup>274</sup>Some of these projects have often been developed by foreign donors. The King Fahd Mosque and the Istiqlal Mosque, respectively financed by Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, are two examples of new foreign temples breaking with traditional ottoman mosques in the Balkans, i.e. small dimensions and only one minaret. Today in Sarajevo, beyond the Saudi and Indonesian mosques, there are also mosques funded by Malaysia, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan. Some of these new mosques also break the tradition of post-Ottoman development, as mosques were built by local Muslims (Karcic 2011).


The development of new supermarkets commenced in Sarajevo in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This was clearly a manifestation of the post-socialist transformation, as a significant rise of the commercial surface took place in a context in which the city's population decreased. Companies including Interex, Mercator and Robot built supermarkets between 1999 and 2008 with surfaces that reached up to 20,000 m<sup>2</sup> (see Nurkovic 2016). Several of these are foreign direct investments due to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, such as Konzum and Mercator, Croat and Slovenian companies. Yet, the landmark of the economic transition was the introduction of a new retail format with the construction of new shopping centres. The first one was the BBI Centar at the square Djece Sarajeva, in the Marsala Tita Avenue, which helps to maintain the linear continuity of central commercial streets, and the popular tradition of walking throughout the year. The BBI Centre actually became an innovative postmodern shopping centre that was both symbolic and had a tangible economic function (Figure 7).

Focusing on new supermarkets and shopping centres, these developments have taken place both in the central areas of the city as well as the periphery. These new multi-storey commercial buildings have significantly shaped the spatial and functional transformation of Sarajevo. These buildings may include offices of large financial, trading and other companies, and are often built on the site of old industrial companies, small workshops and warehouses (Nurkovic 2016). Such a process of deindustrialisation and tertiarisation reduces the quantitative and qualitative shortcomings in service provision that generally existed in socialist cities because of the resource redirection from personal and collective consumption to industrial development (Hamilton 1976; Szelenyi 1996).

Beyond offering further opportunities for consumption and leisure, these new urban projects have transformed the spatial structure and landscape. These new urban projects, to a less extent located in the urban core of the city, i.e. in Stari Grad and Centar, have been developed mostly in the neighbourhoods that embody the greatest spatial legacy of socialism, i.e. those developed in the municipalities of Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo. New urban projects have thus resulted in both an urban densification and a morphological transformation. In relation to the morphological transformation,




new projects have been mostly developed following post-modernist forms and contrast with the predominant modernist neighbourhoods of Socialist Yugoslavia.<sup>275</sup>



**Figure 10.** New major urban projects in the City of Sarajevo (1996-2015). Source: author.

<sup>275</sup> Socialist realism was officially the architectural style of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia but as it was not implemented with total rigidity some distinctive housing complexes were produced such as the complex in the Ciglane neighborhood.



**Figure 11.** New urban projects developed or redeveloped from the service sector (1996-2015).  
Source: author.



Concentration of projects in Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo is as a result of more land becoming available due to the development of existing inner free spaces in neighbourhoods during Socialist Yugoslavia as well as a more favourable geomorphological setting compared to Centar and Stari Grad, as the Miljacka flood plain widens westwards. These conditions actually ensured that almost ninety per cent of projects identified were built in both municipalities. Novi Grad, the most populated municipality of the city and located at its western edge, has received more than half of the new urban projects identified. In this area the post-socialist spatial transformation is well observed. Along the Bulevar Mese Selimovica, the main longitudinal avenue of the city which runs parallel to the Miljacka River, the pattern of office and commercial developments following the approval of the Law on Construction is eloquently manifested. This has resulted in the succession of new large urban projects in the narrow free land existing between the avenue and the modernist residential buildings, involving densification as well as morphological and functional diversification.



**Figure 12.** (a) BBI Centar, first shopping centre in Sarajevo (2009), author's picture; (b) Robna kuća Sarajka, department store (1975), source: [www.historija.ba](http://www.historija.ba).

The Boulevard is renamed Zmaja od Bosne (the Dragon of Bosnia) in the municipality of Novo Sarajevo. Large new urban projects have been significantly produced in this municipality in the Marijin Dvor area, which was developed as the modern centrality of the city during the second half of the twentieth century. Located in the municipalities of Novo Sarajevo and Centar, Marijin Dvor is a relative wide sector at the edge of the Austro-Hungarian city that allowed the development of political, military and cultural buildings. These include the Parliament, the National Museum, the Museum of the Revolution, the Yugoslav army barracks (former Austro-Hungarian barracks), several faculties of the University of Sarajevo such as Philosophy and Science, as well as the

towers UNITIC and the hotel Holiday Inn, developed during the 1980s for the needs of the Winter Olympics.

Generally, foreign investments have significantly shaped the urban transformation of post-socialist cities during the transition, especially in the creation and recreation of central business districts in the capital cities, which were consolidated and began to resemble those of Western metropolis (Hamilton 2005). In Sarajevo, Marijin Dvor's centrality has been reinforced during the last decade thanks to this form of investment. Foreign investments have developed a significant number of new major urban projects such as the headquarters of Raiffeinsein, the main bank in BiH, and three of the large new shopping centres in the city: Alta Shopping Centre, Importanne Centre and Sarajevo City Centre. Equally, its centrality has also been reinforced politically with the development of the UN House (UNDP headquarters) and two embassies with further political significance for BiH; namely the US and Turkish embassies.

Alongside the arrival of direct foreign investments, new developments in Marijin Dvor once again reveals the logic of production of space in post-socialist Sarajevo, in which planning is relegated to adjustments to meet the demands of various actors. Moreover, the headquarters of the main bank in BiH, the Raiffeisen Bank, were built despite the City Council's refusal to change the regulation plan for its adaptation to the project, which doubled the maximum height permitted. The building project disregarded regulations from the beginning as it was designed to develop ten floors.<sup>276</sup> Despite the granting of building permits, which took place when the proposed development was in line with the approved land-use plan and regulations, Cantonal authorities ignored the building permit to allow the construction (Research Interview, 22 November 2013). The same occurred in the case of the Turkish embassy and Importanne Centre, with both buildings surpassing the plot ratio defined in the regulation plan. The fact that the Turkish embassy was able to overcome this regulation solely for one extra floor acted as the pretext to regularise all buildings that had been developed in the Marijin Dvor area no matter the magnitude or the nature of the irregularity.<sup>277</sup>

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<sup>276</sup> Raiffeisen Bank conducted a silent agreement with the developer that the building would be acquired if the surface required by the bank was met.

<sup>277</sup> Beyond these irregularities, the construction of the US embassy was not free from controversy as it implied the concession of a central area of the Sarajevo University Campus. Inaugurated in 2010 by Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State, the embassy occupies 11,000 square meters and represents the eight largest in Europe ("Hillary Clinton inaugurates new US Embassy in BiH", 2010).



**Figure 13.** Redevelopment of the Marijin Dvor area, with the Sarajevo City Center. Author's picture.

### Urbanisation on the slopes surrounding the central urban area of Sarajevo

While any prior development of new and major urban projects implied a densification of Sarajevo's central municipalities, the city also experienced a process of suburbanisation through unregulated developments in the late 1990s due to the pressure of those internally displaced, and this affected all municipalities (Nurkovic 2016). The Canton of Sarajevo still hosted approximately 72,000 internally displaced persons in 2002 and this represented about eighteen per cent of the post-war population (ESI 2004). Thus, the post-socialist spatial transformation in the central areas of Sarajevo reflects not only the restructuring of the urban economy but also post-war processes such as the huge pressure of displaced peoples after episodes of ethnic cleansing and the subsequent legalisation of ethno-territorialities. New constructions were developed in the suburban areas of Sarajevo and the slopes surrounding the central areas of the city.

Focusing, in this section, on the urbanisation of the slopes in the central areas of Sarajevo, it may be seen as an epiphenomenal process of the urban development of the city. Conditioned by the particular topographical and geological features of the Miljacka valley, urban development has traditionally situated housing at lower gradient sectors

since the very foundation of the city in the Ottoman period (Martín-Díaz et al. 2017). During SFRY this practice continued as people built houses on stable ground on the slopes surrounding the city, whilst being aware of landslides and trying to avoid those areas more exposed to this hazard. The cheaper price of land and a closer proximity to the work place, as the industrial area was located in the flat areas next to foothills, meant that developing housing on the slopes was seen as a more effective option than building, for instance, on the flat areas in the suburbs of Sarajevo.<sup>278</sup>

As analysed in chapter four, the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration did not bring a mass return of those internally displaced in Sarajevo to their pre-war homes. Reluctance to return or the impossibility due to delays or absence of housing repossession, and also absence of permanent housing offer, meant that many people had to look for their own alternatives once evicted.<sup>279</sup> The impossibility of securing permanent accommodation because of high rents and a lack of access to bank loans due to unemployment or temporary employment forced people to turn their attention to the development of single-family housing, despite requiring additional time. Many people then found it necessary to self-construct housing in order to settle in the city and find stability in their lives after war and forced displacement. Hence, finding permanent housing in the post-war period was central for those displaced who, in some cases, had suffered several evictions from temporary apartments during the process of housing repossession (Čengić and Skotte 2010).

Importantly, this new wave of self-construction of housing in high gradient sectors of Sarajevo following socialism took place in a very different environment and

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<sup>278</sup> Despite most of the constructions avoiding sectors with a high gradient, construction on those areas which disregarded urban planning regulations was considered a potential threat to the development of Sarajevo as early as the 1970s (Čengić 2011). Illegal construction was tolerated to a certain point but there were also some serious demolitions. The programme for 'Rehabilitation of housing area on the slopes of the city' was adopted firstly by the administration of the city in 1974 to regulate housing construction in those areas. Based on this program, a Decision for Spatial Planning and the Decision for the Rehabilitation of Illegally Constructed Buildings was adopted afterwards, in 1976, by the administration of the city. The complexity of the intervention and the limited resources produced little impact on the already existing constructions. Actually, economic regression, especially significant in the city after the Winter Olympics held in 1984, and the subsequent war between 1992 and 1995, stalled the construction of housing in Sarajevo during the last fifteen years of the twentieth century.

<sup>279</sup> As seen in the previous chapter, the construction of new apartments by the Housing Fund was substantially below the needs of people who had resettled in Sarajevo. According to the Cantonal Ministry of Veteran Affairs, only 955 new apartments had been built with public funds between 1999 and 2002, including 160 for war invalids and 450 for demobilised soldiers (ESI 2004). The Ministry also donated 750 packages of building material for self-construction of housing to veterans, valued at around 6,000 KM for each one. The self-construction of housing followed a period of progressive building albeit sporadically as money was allocated but this eventually stabilised life for many people after the forced displacements caused by war and equally the high uncertainty during the process of housing repossession.

meant that most of the new constructions were as a consequence of forced displacement which mainly occurred during the war (Čengić 2011). Generally, new constructions were illegally developed due to budget constraints, the development of housing without the required building permit or the illegal transactions relating to that same land.<sup>280</sup> Such urbanisation on the slopes surrounding the central areas of Sarajevo occurred despite the modification of the regulatory regime carried out by the Development Planning Institute of Sarajevo in anticipation of the wave of returns and expected urbanisation (Martín-Díaz et al. 2015). Changes in the regulatory regime were launched in 1997 to control urban development in neighbourhoods of mixed housing types on higher slope gradients. Since then, regulation plans have become mandatory in order to urbanise on the slopes. Accordingly, legal and procedural requirements were implemented for new constructions and the provision of basic services had to be guaranteed.<sup>281</sup> This showed the desire of local authorities to rationally plan for the urban sprawl expected in the city after the war, increasing planning regulations for the most vulnerable areas.

However, it did not prevent the development of several thousands of single-detached houses with some of them taking place on the most vulnerable sites on the slopes of Sarajevo (even in gradients higher than thirty per cent) which implied both a degradation of urban life and a rise of geomorphological risks (Martín-Díaz et al., 2017).<sup>282</sup> Decisions on the legality of constructions built without permission was progressively adopted by the municipalities of Sarajevo after the conclusion reached by the Sarajevo Canton on 25 June 1998. Legalisation favoured the perusal of individual housing built or under construction without permission (up until 1992) and aimed at responding both to the high destruction at the front lines and rewarding people who

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<sup>280</sup> During the socialist period urban land was public and a significant amount on the slopes had the title of “priority right to build”. This title could not be transferred to another person without approval from the municipality. However, the approval of the Law on Construction Land (OHR, 2003), unlocked land transactions and triggered a relaxation of illegality.

<sup>281</sup> Changes also incorporated the statement that the means to assist people to return to their origin places had to be found.

<sup>282</sup> There is no official data on new constructions on the slopes, only vague estimations ranging from 20,000 to 40,000 (Martín-Díaz et.al, 2015). In a recent publication analysing new constructions on the slopes in five study areas, which encompass a total of 7.3 km<sup>2</sup> out of the 141 km<sup>2</sup> occupied by the city of Sarajevo, a rise of housing during the post-war period ranges between eleven and thirty per cent (Martín-Díaz et.al, 2017)



were defending the city in these areas.<sup>283</sup> Yet, legalisation had limited effect as without resources these settlements were kept within the domain of grey spaces despite leaving behind the domain of informality (Legrand 2013). Ironically, successive waves of legalisation had actually encouraged people to continue the illegal constructions.



**Figure 14.** Urbanisation and landslides on the slopes surrounding the central areas of the city. Authors' pictures.

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<sup>283</sup> Later it was extended from individual housing to all illegal constructions. Subsequently, municipalities of Sarajevo contained a common declaration against legalisation claiming that it encouraged further illegal constructions.



### Suburbanisation and development of gated communities

One of the distinct spatial features of socialist cities was that suburbanisation played a lesser role in shaping urban expansions, meaning that cities were generally more compact and had a relatively sharper urban edge.<sup>284</sup> In Sarajevo, the process of suburbanisation highlights the political, economic and social transformation of the city during the post-war period. Along with the numerous self-housing constructions built on the slopes surrounding the central areas of the city (favoured by absence of inspections and countermeasures), new single detached dwellings were also developed in the suburbs of the city as revealed by the increase of the population in the municipalities of Ilidza and Vogosca between 1991 and 2013, despite the significant reduction of population in both the Canton and the four central municipalities that administratively constitute the city (Census 2013).<sup>285</sup>

This suburbanisation which occurred during the post-war period must be seen as an intermingled process, not resulting simply from forced displacements and absence of returns to pre-war homes, but also caused by the collapse of public housing developments. Similarly, it should not be understood simply as a new phenomenon even though it is a process less manifested in socialist cities. In this sense, during Socialist Yugoslavia, as a result of mass rural urban migration multi-family housing developed by socially owned companies that could absorb the huge increase of population in the city, thereby ensuring that self-constructions also occurred in the city, as seen in the previous example of the slopes.

Focusing on the post-war period, this suburbanisation which reflected both post-war and post-socialist processes, has more recently encountered another manifestation with the development of gated communities, which contain the feature of being physically restricted but also legally restrictive as agreements usually tie the residents to a common code of conduct and collective responsibility for management (Atkinson and Blandy 2005). The construction of high-status gated residential enclaves emerged in CEE after the collapse of state-socialism, reflected a growth of the socio-economic

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<sup>284</sup> In spite of the consensus in literature, presented in chapter one, regarding socialist cities, differences in terms of compactness are significantly less accentuated in comparison with capitalist Euro-Mediterranean cities.

<sup>285</sup> Population increased from 67,000 to 71,000 inhabitants in Ilidza and from 24,000 to 32,000 inhabitants in the municipality of Vogosca. Overall, the four central municipalities of Sarajevo lost 86,000 inhabitants. The peripheral municipalities of the Sarajevo Canton, such as Ilijas and Trnovo, have also suffered a loss in population compared to 1991.

polarisation and the degree of socio-spatial segregation. These communities began to spread as new forms of housing around major post-socialist cities in the 1990s and became dominant residential spaces in the urban landscape the following decade (Kovács 2014). Such proliferation is a result of the liberalisation of the housing market and the flourishing of foreign investments (Hirt 2012; Kovacs and Hegedus 2013).<sup>286</sup>

Likewise in other post-socialist cities, foreign investors are the main driving force of the phenomenon of gated communities in Sarajevo, which have mostly taken place in the suburban municipalities of the Canton. This specific spatial manifestation of the economic transition is taking place in a manner expressing the fact that the other transition, from war to peace, has been conducted through the consolidation of ethno-territorialities. In this sense, mostly one particular type of foreign investor from the Persian Gulf, i.e. Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, carry out the production of such privatised residential spaces.

This is seen by analysing the growth of the typology of projects in the last few years. In October 2015, the Sarajevo Resort, after the Gulf Real Estate, became the first project to be inaugurated in the village of Osenik, in the municipality of Hadzici. This enterprise, headquartered in Riyadh with an inversion of over fifty million euro, was designed to provide accommodation for visitors from the Middle East with a capacity of 1,125 people (“Svečano otvoreno rezidencijalno naselje Sarajevo Resort Osenik”, 2015). Currently under construction in the Poljine Village, located in the northern areas of the Centar municipality, the Saudi Al-Shiddi group is building a project called Poljine Hills. It is a gated complex formed of more than 211 urban villas and 255 apartments, intended both for Arabs and wealthy Bosnians. Another project is the development by the Kuwaiti Rawasi Real Estate Company that is building a twenty five million euro residential complex at the foot of the Igman Mountains, near Sarajevo, with 246 housing units (Smajilhodzic 2016). Finally, the main project with these characteristics, called Buroj Ozone is being developed in the municipality of Trnovo, the southern municipality of the Sarajevo Canton. It is a 2.5 billion euro development by a businessman from Dubai. This plan is developing at least 3,000 villas, apartments, a hospital and sports hall, and the aim of the project is that “Arab tourists feel at home in BiH” (“Arabs are coming to Bosnia because of Profit,” 2016).

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<sup>286</sup> Gated communities began to spread as new forms of housing around major cities of post-socialist countries in the 1990s and became dominant residential spaces in the urban landscape by the following decade (Kovács 2014).

Similar to some of the urban projects developed in the central areas, e.g. BBI Centre, Sarajevo City Centre and the reconstruction of the Bristol Hotel (the two later developed by Al-Shiddi Group), these new suburban projects are closely intertwined with Sarajevo's local politics and Bosniak elites, those particularly entrenched within BBI. These projects have been promoted as a policy to prioritise the attraction of foreign investments from the Persian Gulf of the BBI. Equally important, the transformation of ethnocratic regimes in the later 1990s and early 2000s also contributed to a progressive change in the perception of foreign direct investments, which was initially considered a threat to the power of local political parties during early post-war stages. In this sense, the BBI was a central actor in the promotion of this type of investment. As previously discussed, the Bank set out in its business plan the capture of foreign direct investments, and particularly capital from Islamic countries, to boost the economic development of Sarajevo.

The Bank had already started to lobby in order to attract Persian Gulf investments during the city's relative construction boom ("Stvoriti bosanski lobi za agresivniji nastup prema zemljama Zaljeva", 2007). Significantly, in a context of mass real estate development in these countries, the capture of this type of investment became an official part of the development program for the FBiH in April 2008 during a meeting between BBI's founding banks and local government officials in Sarajevo ("Ulaganje islamskog kapitala u razvojne programe FBiH", 2008). The attempt to attract foreign direct investments from the Islamic world went further in 2010, when the celebration of the first Sarajevo Business Forum was organised by BBI. This event brought together international investors from over forty countries and a significant representation of financiers from Arab countries as well as Turkey. Referring to the arrival of Gulf tourists and investors, the chief executive officer of BBI, Amer Bukvic, explained that during the inauguration of the Sarajevo Resort in October 2015 this was only the first of type of investment as long as stability was preserved (Smajilhodzic 2016).

Importantly, in relation to BBI attempts to strengthen ties with the Islamic world, Amer Bukvic argued that it was not part of an ideological project but simply a pragmatic way to address the difficult economic situation of Bosnia. These economic links were actually presented as a continuation of the connections that had been established by members of the Non-Aligned Movement during the times of Yugoslavia ("BiH bi trebalo naci put do istocnih trzista", 2011), which were especially fruitful for

Sarajevo's main companies as seen in Chapter two. Bukvic's discourse is coherent from an economic perspective but neglects the great political and ethnic transformation of Bosnia and Sarajevo since the beginning of war. There is certainly no evidence that the BBI lobbying practices used in an attempt to capture Gulf capital in the area of Sarajevo is part of a policy utilised by Bosniak elites. However, Bukvic's discourse could be an attempt to de-politicise these practices. It can be seen that economic ties with Persian Gulf countries in post-war Bosnia totally differs in terms of politics and meaning with the ties that previously existed during Socialist Yugoslavia. Moreover, BBI had become a main centre around which Bosniak national and religious elite concentrated, including members that pursue a greater rise of the public presence of Islam in areas of the country that have a Bosniak majority, such as the case of Sarajevo.

Finally, yet no less crucial, this type of real estate project from the Gulf is concomitant with tourism development from these countries as seen in the recent increase in the number of visitors travelling from these countries.<sup>287</sup> Because of the upsurge of tourists from Gulf countries, voices in favour of and against have risen up among local people, especially from suburbs that are most affected, including Ilidza. Their presence is also seen in central areas of Sarajevo. Often they sleep in Hotel Bristol and move around the centre, especially in the Sarajevo City Centre, both owned by the Al Shiddi-Group and operating, like the BBI Centar, in line with basic Islamic principles. People in favour of this regime see economic benefits especially considering that these are the tourists with greater money to spend in the city. For all that, such an increase is especially prevalent by the frequent use of burqas and niqabs, which is worrying for some people. The local Muslim population, generally more secular, have already expressed doubts on their presence and eventual influence on new generations if they stay (Smajilhodzic 2016).

Reservations about their stay are fuelled by the fact that Arab tourists are significantly acquiring real estate in both the city and the Canton. The Bosnian market is economically attractive for middle class buyers who want to vacation outside the Middle East but cannot afford other European cities. Furthermore, people from the

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<sup>287</sup> For instance, tourists from the United Arab Emirates increased substantially in the last seven years. In 2010, there were only sixty five registered visitors while in the first seven months in 2016 they had increased by 13,000, actually doubling the register from the previous year ("Bosnian businesses welcome Arab real estate investments", 2016). Bosnia's statistics agency counted further increases in overnight stays in Bosnia by Kuwaitis from 29,060 in 2014 to 37,039 in 2015. Meanwhile, overnight stays by tourists from Saudi Arabia leapt from 11,494 in 2014 to 21,946 in 2015, and 29,362 in the first eight months of this year alone (Rose 2016).

Persian Gulf countries are attracted to the area by the beauty of nature, the presence of Islam and the warm contact of the Bosnians, as claimed by Tarek Al Khaja, an emirate businessman owning a real estate agency in Sarajevo (Smajilhodzic 2016). Meanwhile, there are concerns as to the consequences of this recent upsurge of visitors from the Gulf, investment in real estate and constructions of luxurious gated neighbourhoods in the suburban areas of Sarajevo. Recently, debate on the potential negative consequences of land acquisition by Gulf visitors, the effect it may have in the delicate religious balance in Bosnia and, especially in the area of Sarajevo, have been raised by Sarajevo academics such as Esad Duraković (2015), Arabist from the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Sarajevo.

### **The evolution of the division between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo**

Effectively, the division of Sarajevo between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo which began in 1991 legalised the SDS policy of ethno-territorialisation. This partition of the urban centre of Sarajevo was one of the six Strategic Goals, such achievement required by the military. During peace negotiations held in Dayton, the Bosnian Serbs refusal to establish a District for Sarajevo (that allowed sharing governance with other ethnic groups) resulted in the division of the city at the southern and eastern limits of its central urban area. This was as a result of Milosevic's decision to hand over districts of Sarajevo, occupied by the VRS, to the Federation of BiH. Ultimately, it ensured that Sarajevo's urban system which was defined in the Urban Plan of 1986 was partitioned. In this sense, the Urban Plan enacted in 1990 sought an urban system that balanced the central municipalities and the four peripheral municipalities incorporated into the City of Sarajevo in 1977.

Thus, the IEBL became a political boundary that split its incipient urban functional space between the two entities. With such a division and the subsequent episodes of ethnic engineering previously analysed in chapter three, Sarajevo became an ethno-territorialised urban area with homogeneous populations. The IEBL suffered lesser adjustments in the Dobrinja neighbourhood and these adjustments did not modify substantially either the form or the area of the division between Sarajevo and East

Sarajevo.<sup>288</sup> The territorial division between the two cities progressively materialized in several fields with both cities dealing separately with urban development.

A political boundary has thus affected the development of Sarajevo and the planning processes involved as the division was translated into new plans, including a new political territorial reality both in Sarajevo and East Sarajevo. The Spatial Plan of the Sarajevo Canton (2003-2023) subsequently approved in 2006 (KS 2006) only considers the territory of the Canton, excluding Pale but exclusively including sectors within the FBiH of those municipalities split by the IEBL, i.e. Stari Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Ilidža and Trnovo. Similarly, the division of East Sarajevo has been continuously implemented from the perspective of urban planning as seen in 2008 when its Spatial Plan was published. The plan ratified the city as a combination of small urban centres and villages (between approximately 1000 and 20,000 inhabitants) that totalised almost 65,000 inhabitants (Aquilué and Roca 2016). More recently, the regional plan of the Bosnian Serb entity reaffirms the existence of East Sarajevo and equates the new city constituted during the war with the five other cities of the Republika Srpska, i.e. Banja Luka, Bieljina, Doboj, Prijedor and Trebinje (Bassi 2013).

Furthermore, an absence of coordination in terms of planning since the actual division means that Sarajevo and East Sarajevo developed independently as two different urban systems. Crucially, the division has not prevented both cities from cooperating in mutual projects. Thus, joint projects have been developed between the two cities in the last few years such as the Trebevic cable car, the European Youth Olympic Winter Festival (now scheduled for 2019 having failed to secure the holding of same in 2017) or in tourist development and infrastructure. Quite simply, cooperation is restricted to specific works and has not altered the institutional division. Despite the economic potential for the development of East Sarajevo, which is one of the economies least developed in the Republika Srpska, the idea of reintegrating Sarajevo and East Sarajevo has been constantly refuted by authorities from East Sarajevo, as claimed in 2012 by its mayor, Vinko Radovanovic:

Mi ne želimo kao mali da se utopimo u nešto veće i izgubimo identitet. Srbi bi izgubili neku svoju autonomiju. Pored toga, ne odgovara nam da ulazimo

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<sup>288</sup> The Arbitration Award for Dobrinja I and IV was resolved in 2001 by the OHR, setting the precise sector where the IEBL divided the neighbourhood

kao manje brojan narod. Ne bismo imali tu snagu u odnosu na Bošnjake koji su znatno brojniji (“Srbi nikad neće ući u Distrikt Sarajevo”, 2012).<sup>289</sup>

Equally important, cooperation in some projects was favoured by an OHR initiative launched in 2000 with regard to a partial reintegration of the area of Sarajevo. The initiative pursued the functional reunification of Sarajevo by including all municipalities forming the city before the war, plus Kiseljak and Kresevo.<sup>290</sup> As expressed by Morris Power, OHR member and head of the RRTF, they were trying to boost socio-economic links in Sarajevo’s pre-war urban area through the creation of economic regions (Kebo 2000). Thus, the Sarajevo Economic Regional Development Agency (SERDA) was established in 2004. Funded generally with European funds, SERDA economically integrated the two cities, Sarajevo and East Sarajevo, along with some other municipalities of the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska (in total thirty two and thirteen respectively). The potential positive impact of regionalisation on functional reintegration was observed as SERDA gained prominence, for example, the connection of Sarajevo and East Sarajevo in Lukavica through the extension of the trolleybus was strongly promoted at that time, yet no concrete steps were ever taken in this regard (Research Interview, 23 July 2015).

The Plan, to set an integrated framework for regional economic development, was not limited to just an area of Sarajevo but included the formation of five new economic regions (Banja Luka, Mostar, Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica). These macroeconomic regions were similar to the four regions defined in the 1981 Spatial Plan of the Socialist Republic of BiH (Žuljić et al. 2015).<sup>291</sup> The spreading of regionalisation all around BiH with the creation of five regional economic agencies aimed at progressively eroding the weight of entities through economic reintegration of the country. This initiative contributed to the increase of human and material flows between entities during the 2000s since its serious erosion after the war. Yet, difficulties emerged in some projects and, overall, the strategy to reintegrate BiH economically

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<sup>289</sup> “We do not want to drown in something bigger and lose identity. Serbs would lose some of their autonomy. In addition, it does not suit us to enter as a lesser national group. We would not have the same power in relation to the Bosniaks, who are much more numerous”. This declaration was a response to Presidency Chairman Bakir Izetbegovic, who suggested that both Srebrenica and Sarajevo should be districts with a special regime. Izetbegovic, at that time Chairman of the Presidency of BiH, claimed that the SDA proposed the expansion into a District including the ten pre-war municipalities (“Izetbegović: Srebrenica i Sarajevo – distrikti”, 29 July 2012)

<sup>290</sup> Municipalities ruled by HDZ and under control of HVO during the war

<sup>291</sup> These four regions (Banja Luka, Mostar, Sarajevo and Tuzla) were operating on a chamber of commerce level from 1986

through the recovery of macroeconomic regions was significantly eroded shortly after because of political regression triggered by the failure of the April Package in 2006. It transpired that the RS Prime Minister, Milorad Dodik, directly tackled involvement in economic regions of municipalities in the Bosnian Serbian entity by stating that those getting funds from SERDA, and other regions, would not be eligible for RS funds.<sup>292</sup>

As analysed in chapter three, the SDS-driven project to build a city in East Sarajevo certainly failed in the short and mid-term to provide either housing solutions or an economic foundation for the thousands of Sarajevo Serbs who had left the city. Despite such limited development in the late 1990s and early 2000s, urbanisation progressively continued reaching momentum in 2007 when private developers built multi-familiar housing in the areas of Lukavica and Pale. Beyond the political and territorial dimensions, such subsequent progressive urbanisation of East Sarajevo has reinforced the ethnic division of the area as Serbs who refused to return to Sarajevo having completed housing repossession progressively moved, generally, to Pale or Lukavica.

Thus, East Sarajevo is today a polycentric city composed of small urban centres dispersed in a large territory that is mostly comprised of mountains and agricultural land. The intensity of urbanisation in East Sarajevo decreases with distance from Sarajevo. Urbanisation took place especially in Lukavica and Pale, which are twenty five km from each other. From a population of 61,516 recorded in the 2013 Census, these two areas incorporate sixty four percent of the population of East Sarajevo. The area of Lukavica has a compact urbanisation with a density of 424 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> and contains thirty five per cent of the population of the city (Mutabzija 2016). The municipality of Pale has twenty nine per cent of the city population and a lower density of forty five inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> but like Lukavica it allocated some institutions of Republika Srpska with differing degrees of importance at local, regional, entity and state level. The establishment of the Kasindo Hospital (this had previously been a sanatorium) was the first step in introducing a functional hierarchy in one sector (Ib). Subsequently, there was the establishment of the University of East Sarajevo in Pale and Lukavica, where eight out of sixteen faculties of the University are located along with other institutions.

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<sup>292</sup> No organic changes have taken place in SERDA since then. However, pressure from the RS government means that municipalities remain silent (Research Interview, 13 October 2013)



For all that, the fragmentation of East Sarajevo and its insufficient urban facilities and economic activity produced weak nodal-functional links within the city. Limited urbanisation of East Sarajevo means that, despite the comprehensive, exclusive and divisive nature of the SDS project, the city still has some functional dependence on Sarajevo in areas like culture, employment and health. Such dependence is seen in the case of the Kasindo hospital whose infrastructure has remained in a very dilapidated condition due to underinvestment by the RS government. Such a situation forces hundreds of citizens from East Sarajevo to travel daily to Sarajevo in order to be treated at the Clinical Hospital Centre in Koševo.<sup>293</sup> Moreover, while limitations to built East Sarajevo were initially related to the insufficient budget of the project, agreed in 1996 between the Republika Srpska and Serbia, the subsequent limited urban development of East Sarajevo is related to internal political dynamics within the Republika Srpska, which started with the split within the SDS in 1997 relating to Pale and Banja Luka nuclei.

Consequently, weak integration in a limited urbanised East Sarajevo has led to the strengthening of the functional links, especially between the ten former municipalities of Sarajevo; such links were especially strained during the siege and early post-war stages. The division of East Sarajevo and the urbanisation of some of its semirural sectors have inevitably produced a substantial modification, compared to the pre-war situation, of existing flows in the urban area of Sarajevo. Such a transformation is well illustrated in the urban centre built in Lukavica, which has spatial continuity with the Dobrinja neighbourhood (Map 9). The urbanisation of Lukavica started at the end of the war and after the agreement reached between the Republika Srpska and Serbia to build a new city, i.e. the SDS project. It can be seen that Lukavica, having essentially an important military function before the war, has substantially increased the centrality in the urban area of Sarajevo because of the concentration of people and facilities. Today, out of 100 strong local community centres within the system of city centres in the urban area of Sarajevo, Lukavica is among the twenty highest centres at the level of attractiveness, with people from East Sarajevo and Sarajevo travelling here during their free time (Čengić and Hodo 2016).<sup>294</sup>

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<sup>293</sup> Despite the fact that Kasindo hospital was in a worse condition, in 2011 the RS government approved a loan for the reconstruction of the hospital in Bijeljina and Banja Luka (“Srbi nikad neće ući u Distrikt Sarajevo”, 6 August 2012)

<sup>294</sup> Local community centres (*mjesna zajednica*) are a form of local self-government within municipalities. These results were obtained from 2,178 interviews and 8,870 answers to questions such as



**Figure 14.** Multi-familiar housing developed in Lukavica (a) and Pale (b). Author's picture.

From physical border to boundary: spatial practices across the IEBL

A boundary, by delimitating an area, constitutes a central element in making and reproducing territorialities that aim at affecting people, phenomena and relationships (Sack 1986). The impact of the ethno-territorial division of the area of Sarajevo in daily life shaped for a long time after the war spatial practices across the IEBL. The boundary delimits the partition between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo, between the Federation of

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daily and occasional shopping, cafes and restaurants, use of low and high end services, culture and arts, and recreation – behavioural patterns are indicators of urban centres (Čengić and Hodo 2016)

BiH and the Republika Srpska. In the case of divided cities, when physical barriers are removed, the psychological effect from long periods of violence generally prevents people from occupying formerly insecure or forbidden areas (Calame and Charlesworth 2009).

Having moved to semirural areas, the power of the boundary as a central element in a territoriality is especially illustrated in the case of Sarajevo Serbs who moved to East Sarajevo at the beginning or after the war. Among those interviewed who lived in East Sarajevo during the post-war period, some of them spent several years without crossing the IEBL to go to Sarajevo. Mobility was thus marked since the beginning of the post-war period by fear. In spite of the progressive dismantling of checkpoints during the early post-war stages of the peace implementation, as well as the unification of car plates by the OHR in 1997, crossing the IEBL to go to the territory of the Federation of BiH was rather an exception. After the three-and-half years of siege inflicted by the VRS, the IEBL was especially powerful in the area of Sarajevo and occasional incidents were still repeated in the late 1990s to further influence mobility after physical barriers disappeared:

Stories about violent incidents involving people found in the ‘wrong’ territory circulated, and this did much to maintain the symbolic power of the boundary separating the two entities. The recent killing of a driver from the Republika Srpska in Sarajevo was often mentioned as an example of how Serbs were not safe in the Federation (Armakolas 2007, p.92).

Despite such powerful symbolism, people at some point needed to return to Sarajevo and initial visits often took place to address important issues such as the necessary paperwork to repossess housing. Emotions during the first visits were especially high with uncertainty, discomfort and fear being predominant. Insecurity was especially felt by males who had been enrolled in the VRS as they were fearful of the police controls and also reactions in their former neighbourhood due to military involvement (Research Interview, 24 July 2015). People were also extremely concerned about meeting old acquaintances or pre-war friends due to the uncertainty of people’s reactions, which was often progressively eroded after the first meeting with such acquaintances:

My first time in Sarajevo was in 2001 or 2002, I was afraid of reactions if I met people I had known. I had no idea what to say. I was shopping with my girlfriend and one lady came and recognised me. Nothing happened and that feeling progressively disappeared (Research Interview, 27 July 2015).

Once people re-commenced visits to Sarajevo and not having any bad experiences while there, generally, their attitudes improved and were more positive. As a result, there was

a reduced level of fear experienced by the individual but this was also aided by the reduction of political tension in the early 2000s. Over time, daily spatial practices were less conditioned by the separation and the IEBL evolved from a border during the war and early post-war stages to a symbolic (but still powerful) boundary that progressively reduced the emotional burden related to violence and conflict. Indeed, despite its increasing porosity the boundary dividing Sarajevo and East Sarajevo did not become meaningless following the ethnic division of the country. Nationalising practices constructed and reproduced territories for certain ethno-national categories of people (and by extension displacing other categories) in order to consolidate the ethnic realities which emerged from the war.



**Figure 15.** The sign of the IEBL dividing Sarajevo (Canton) and East Sarajevo in Dobrinja neighbourhood (with complaints against the US). Author's picture.

Importantly, the Republika Srpska is considered a particularly strong nationalising state for making use of its relative ethnic and political homogeneity to engage in nationalising practices. In contrast, the FBiH is dominated by two competing nationalisms, the Bosniak and the Bosnian Croat, creating an opening for a culture and discourse inspired by the goal of an overarching Bosnian identity (Touquet 2012). It stands to reason that place names, flags, national anthems, national dress and national emblems, such as banknotes and stamps, are capable of evoking powerful emotions and of cementing individuals' identification with a group.

Along with the visibility of institutions such as the police or the naming of the territory, especially powerful in the case of Republika Srpska, the existence of marks in the urban landscape and its surroundings ensured a clear visibility while crossing the boundary and entering into a different territoriality with a distinct ethnic composition and meaning. These marks are related to a different alphabet (Latin in the Federation of BiH and Cyrillic in Republika Srpska), distinct colours in road signs, anthems or flags, don't simply denote an aesthetic choice but are capable of evoking powerful emotions and cementing an individual's identification with a group. Similarly, these symbolic marks implicitly contribute to strengthening links between space and ethnic categories while, at the same time, excluding the counterpart (Bassi 2015).<sup>295</sup>

Along with these practices sharpening a sense of place along ethnic lines, the rise of the mobility to Sarajevo by former Sarajevo Serbs, which took place amid a tendency in which polarisation progressively faded away, was significantly influenced by the limited urban development of East Sarajevo. Daily or periodical mobility to Sarajevo was related to employment, administrative issues, consumption, leisure or visits to family. All these activities and the increasing mobility across the IBEL highlighted the fact that the functional integration of the area of Sarajevo remained in place despite being progressively altered because of the formation of ethno-territorialities and the subsequent development of new small urban centres in East Sarajevo. As captured in interviews, employment and consumption became the two central factors increasing the periodic mobility to Sarajevo. In the field of retail, differences between the two cities even increased with the opening of big supermarkets from the late 1990s and the subsequent development of new shopping centres. As expressed by an interviewee, new supermarkets triggered his regular visits to the city during the post-war period and these visits increased over time:

New shopping centres have increased how often we go but it started in first Mercator. It was first reason to go, I saw many Serbs from Pale there (Research Interview, 27 July 2015).

During this period there still remained people who did not commute. However, the opening in 2009 of the main shopping centres, with the development of post-socialist flagships like BBI Centar, Importanne, Alta or more recently the Sarajevo City Centre, increased the mobility from East Sarajevo to Sarajevo. However, while malls have been

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<sup>295</sup> The Cyrillic has been used as a marker of Serb national identity in BiH (Sen 2009). A different alphabet, spatially, it is particularly effective in clearly differentiating the Bosnian Serb entity from the rest of the Bosnian territory

developed in both Pale and Lukavica in the last few years, e.g. Tom, they offer fewer opportunities for consumption with more limited diversity of brands and products. Eloquently, the fact that the two main shopping centres, i.e. BBI and SCC, are operating following some basic Islamic norms has not produced any restriction in their pattern of visits. Most of the people interviewed were aware of this fact and had experienced some of the limitations, like the impossibility of buying alcohol, people did not react negatively and rather showed indifference:

What irritates me in BBI and SCC is going to each boutique with my daughter. It is not a problem for me that it is been built following sharia principles. It offends me more that someone greetings me saying *merhaba* (Research Interview, 18 April 2015).<sup>296</sup>

Clearly, for Sarajevo Serbs living in East Sarajevo the impact of these projects is simply economic. These projects are thus essentially affixed to modernity and new options of entertainment and consumption, rather than any disturbing element of the transformation of the city. Another interviewee highlighted such indifference regarding the religious inscription within civilian projects. Going once a week to Sarajevo to visiting friends and go shopping, the interviewee felt that BBI was like any other shopping centre and complained about the development of mosques temples, which for him made the city look like Saudi Arabia (Research interview, 22 July 2015).

Spatial patterns among people living in Sarajevo are substantially different, especially in relation to the cross-entity practices relevant to entering East Sarajevo. Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats living in Sarajevo have also increased spatial practices to East Sarajevo since the end of the war once polarisation decreased and flows resumed. However, most of the Bosniaks interviewed who go periodically or frequently to East Sarajevo live in Dobrinja or Ilidza, which are closest to Lukavica. As one interviewee explained, crossing the IEBL started shortly after checkpoints were removed, in order to go to Sarajevo through Vraca, and this frequently continues in place for shopping in sectors of Dobrinja that belong to East Sarajevo (Research Interview, 22 July 2015).<sup>297</sup> People living in other areas of Sarajevo rarely go to East Sarajevo because essentially they have no need to do so, and the much richer urban experience existing in Sarajevo.

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<sup>296</sup> Merhaba is a Turkish greeting, Arabic in origin, which like other Oriental words was increasingly used during the war (Maček 2007). Merhaba had been abolished from the official language during Socialist times (but kept in fine literature) and is one example of the large number of Turkish loan words in the Bosnian variant of the former Serbo-Croatian language.

<sup>297</sup> From Dobrinja neighbourhood it is possible to go to the central area of Sarajevo crossing Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo or through a road in the side of the Republika Srpska, which crosses the slopes and allows entry to Sarajevo via the neighbourhood of Vraca.

Thus, the spatial patterns of many people living in central urban areas in terms of work, friends, family, consumption and leisure, bring them to different places within the city or in some municipalities of the Sarajevo Canton, meaning that crossing the IEBL from the Federation of BiH is generally less frequent.

### Visions on the division of the urban area of Sarajevo

As defined in chapter one, territoriality is indeed as much a material phenomenon as a metaphysical phenomenon that has many implications for a population, in terms of thinking, performing and in both collective and individual identity. Certainly, changes in the spatial patterns across the IEBL especially from East Sarajevo do not imply that the division between both cities has essentially been transformed in the representation of people. Focusing once again on the Sarajevo Serbs who moved to East Sarajevo, for them living in Pale and Lukavica represented a significant regression as it meant leaving a city that had generally very good living standards before the war to go to a semirural area. This process of ethnic counter-urbanisation has resulted in some sort of urban identity which has remained in former city residents.

Eloquently, people interviewed in East Sarajevo expressed nostalgia by often claiming that they missed urban life and, in some cases, that they somehow regretted having left Sarajevo for Pale or Lukavica. This nostalgia for a previous life in Sarajevo and fascination for the city is not hidden by former Sarajevo Serbs but, at the same time, they show themselves detached from post-war Sarajevo by pointing to the essentially distinct character of the city and its inhabitants. Urban identity for the Sarajevo Serbs living in East Sarajevo continues to exist under the enormous weight of ethnicity regardless of spatial patterns. Actually, nostalgia for the city remains fully compatible with the defence of the Bosnian Serb entity, something that has remained rather stable for a prolonged time in many cases which is shown in the observations of Ionannis Armakolas in his research about experiences and identities of Bosnian Serbs from Sarajevo living in Pale in 1999:

Nostalgia for old Sarajevo is perfectly compatible with the conventional versions of recent history in the RS, be they strongly radical or more flexible: in brief, pre-war peaceful coexistence, happiness and prosperity changed when the other ethnic groups decided they did not want to live united in one state [Yugoslavia]. Unaware of this, one could be shocked by the way in which ex-Sarajevan Serbs nonchalantly switch from nostalgia for a multi-

ethnic Sarajevo to ‘never again together’ talk and other powerful separatist messages and back (Armakolas 2007, p.90).

Interestingly, the fact that Sarajevo is not an internally divided city, as the partition took place at the outskirts of the central urban areas, means that the perception on the division differs significantly between people from different ethnicities and place of residence. In this sense, it has been identified a clear dichotomy regarding visions on the division between residents from Sarajevo and those from East Sarajevo in interviews conducted for this research. In East Sarajevo, there was consensus that the city was divided from political and ethnic perspectives. The fact that the division was the very purpose of war was claimed by several interviewees, as in the case of a public employee in administration, who complained about the name when talking about the construction of Srpsko Sarajevo after the war:

The decision to build the city was great despite having problems later for its development. Name was not good. It is difficult to explain that there are two cities; people think it’s the same because of the name (Research Interview, 24 July 2015).

Some Sarajevo Serbs living in East Sarajevo complained that the people in Sarajevo often did not recognise division and claimed more separation. Indeed, the interviewees from Sarajevo did not categorically consider the city divided and often nuanced answers unlike the responses from Sarajevo Serbs. In this regard, Sarajevans often argued that Lukavica, the closest urban sector of East Sarajevo, was simply a suburb of the city when discussing the division. In cases in which division was recognised, emphasis was put on the fact that Sarajevo is not a typical example of a divided city:

Of course, it is divided. It is an administrative-political division but it doesn’t have roots in logic or urban science. We don’t feel it is divided, we used that space before. We have that political pollution but real life doesn’t work like that. Real life doesn’t feel like that. I feel the whole BiH division is only in human minds (Research Interview, 27 July 2015).

The vision regarding the division is from above, considering East Sarajevo as a village, a fake city. It is accepted as it is and becomes more present in discussions or in specific events such as celebrations in Lukavica for some basket championship of Serbia (Research Interview, 23 July 2015).

Crucially, the recognition of division especially by Sarajevo Serbs, albeit taking place at the outskirts of the central urban area, is a partial success for SDS leadership in their longstanding aim to divide the city ethnically. Further significant achievements were related to the process of separating the Bosnian Serb population from the two other main Bosnian ethnic groups. It included the non-return to Sarajevo having completed



housing repossession and, in the long term, the acceptance of and non-confrontation of such division by former Sarajevo Serbs. Thus, ethno-politicisation during pre-war stages, war and subsequent reproduction of territorialities ethnically homogeneous has inevitably transformed visions on ethnic coexistence and eventual reintegration:

My choice was not living in Sarajevo. A double standard is living in Sarajevo and sending kids to East Sarajevo. No reintegration, Muslims over there and Serbs here (Research Interview, 26 March 2015).

Yet, despite the prospect of reintegrating Sarajevo and East Sarajevo, Sarajevo Serbs living in East Sarajevo often complained about the impossibility and convenience of maintaining such a division due to difficulties in living together, regardless of any positive common experience of life before the war. Even in cases in which daily positive interethnic interactions have resumed, it has not produced any significant alteration in visions relative to the division. In this sense, an encounter with people from other ethnicities in Sarajevo, either Bosniaks or Croats, is common in professional contexts and positive experiences have been praised in interviews. However, these experiences may have no any essential impact on any such ideals connected with the division:

I started to go to Sarajevo daily because of work in 2008. I feel great being there like I feel being here [Pale]. I was very accepted at work, no problems. There are eight employees from other nationalities. I did not try to live in Sarajevo after the repossessing of my home. It is OK going out but not living. You can live there but it is not the same feeling. There aren't specific problems but living in FBiH is rather a psychological issue. I wouldn't live elsewhere, I consider that my home is in Pale (Research Interview, 27 March 2015).

Evidently, there is a sharp distinction between visiting Sarajevo and living there. The fear of travelling to Sarajevo disappeared in all cases a few years after the end of war, unfortunately, discourse changes when it comes to the personal impact of living in East Sarajevo and the prospect of an eventual return to Sarajevo. Such an acute distinction was discursively identified in the majority of the twelve people living in East Sarajevo who were subsequently interviewed. Certainly, most of them claimed that they felt good and safe in a mono-ethnic environment and explicitly rejected an eventual return to Sarajevo, highlighting the powerful effect of nationalising practices constructing and reproducing ethnicised territories and spaces. Often, this argument of such insecurity in Sarajevo justified a refusal to once again live in the city:

I would not be safe now in Sarajevo, it is related to newcomers and gangs, nothing related to war (Research interview, 26 March 2015).

In the preceding argument, there is an explicit rejection that the comfort of living in a mono-ethnic environment is a consequence of war. However, such reasoning is essentially based on ethnicity, and this categorisation became prevalent during pre-war stages and cemented during the war. East Sarajevo is thus wrongly portrayed as a secure place that is free from gangs and newcomers while Sarajevo is considered the opposite. Equally important, people often complained about the nepotism and war profiteering of their own politicians but, at the same time, supported and justified leadership performance. A differentiation between the social and political functions of their leaders, between their individual behaviour and their role as head of the state, is the best illustration of the success from the Bosnian Serb leadership in an effort to create an ethnically exclusive polity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armakolas 2007).

Finally, in relation to the preservation of the IEBL, differences were again visible between people from Sarajevo and East Sarajevo. While the former were not greatly inconvenienced and generally agreed on an eventual removal of the boundary, the later in most cases opposed the removal as it provided security for them. Significantly, some interviewees cited Brcko as an example of conditions under which they would accept the changing current status on division. A varied configuration of institutions was observed in these cases as an element to ensure they would once again feel safe and comfortable in the city:

I am afraid, of not feeling safe in front of authorities (police, politicians, etc). I am a war veteran and my card could cause me problems. When the police are half Serb / half Muslim you feel free and secure. It is a problem that the administration is mono-ethnic. A lot of us are hoping that Sarajevo someday will be like Brcko, we will then return. If it was like Brcko I would be back like lots of other Serbs. We have talked with this about friends. The installation of ethnic police with various degrees of hatred means there is no security (Research Interview, 27 July 2015).

#### Common life in post-war Sarajevo

The ethno-territorial division of the urban area of Sarajevo legalised in the peace agreement and the subsequent episodes of ethnic engineering consolidated a huge loss of ethnic diversity in Sarajevo (approximately eighty per cent of the Bosniak population in 2013) and a rather homogeneous population in East Sarajevo (ninety four per cent of Bosnian Serbs).<sup>298</sup> Ethnic separation inevitably reduced encounters and socialisation

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<sup>298</sup> Bosnian Serbs represented sixty nine percent of population in Pale before the war

between people of different ethnic backgrounds as manifested in indicators such as the reduction of mixed marriages in the city.<sup>299</sup> Notwithstanding same, many Sarajevans continue to encounter and enact practical interethnic socialisation in their daily lives, even as governmental practices and cultural hegemony combined to reinforce national purity as morally right and politically desirable (Markowitz 2010). Included in the number of Serbs and Croats who did not leave the city, there were some of the most respected cultural, intellectual and political leaders of the pre-war city. In the aftermath of the war, they have joined with many others of a Bosniak majority to continue the tradition of common life in the city (Donia 2006a). Alongside these individuals, common life after the war has been fostered from national cultural societies such as the Serb Civic Council, the Croat National Council and the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals. All of these organisations have suffered disputes and have also come under criticism from more extreme nationalists and other nationalities.

The promotion during the post-war period of common life confronted bloody campaigns to divide ethnic groups and political structures inherited from the peace agreement which illustrates the special character of the city. Examples of transcending ethnicity in social relations in post-war Sarajevo reserve a special significance in the case of Sarajevo Serbs. Of all the ethnic groups that live in the city, their circumstances are more critical and that have become a minority qualitatively and quantitatively since the end of the siege (e.g. Pejanovic 2004), as they are viewed by Bosniaks as the major aggressors due to the siege inflicted by VRS.<sup>300</sup> While Sarajevo Serbs face difficulties in negotiating new relationships during the post-war period, those who stayed in the city are not subject to the suspicion of their pre-war Sarajevo friends, neighbours and colleagues, who know their wartime pedigree unlike people who left the city (Sorabiji 2006). The departure of people was always a sensitive issue in Sarajevo but it was especially sensitive in the case of Sarajevo Serbs. Regardless of the personal motives for which they left, people saw them as siding with the enemy, who shelled from the slopes and worked to divide people along ethnic lines. Furthermore, Bosniaks who left the city could be viewed as cowards but in the case of Serbs, their departure in practice

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<sup>299</sup> During Socialist Yugoslavia, the closely intertwined life of people from all ethnicities ensured that Bosnia had the highest intermarriage rate of all Republics, peaking at 12.8% in 1983. In the FBiH, 6.9% of all marriages were mixed in 1998 and the percentage fell to 4.7% by 2006. In Sarajevo a decrease during the post-war period has also occurred, dropping from 9.8% in 2001 (Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine 2008)

<sup>300</sup> Blaming Serbs is not consistent all over BiH. There are changes depending on the local dynamic of war. In Mostar, for instance, Bosniaks consider Bosnian Croats as the major aggressors

contributed to both the achievement of SDS political goals and to bolster their propaganda machine, which claimed that rather than attacking Sarajevo, Serb forces were merely defending against Bosniak persecution.

In terms of socialisation within pre-war circles, the daily lives of Sarajevo Serbs who continued to live in the city did not necessarily suffer a dramatic transformation if they departed. This is claimed by a forty two year-old Sarajevo Serb who returned to the city in June 1996 after staying in Belgrade during the war to escape military mobilisation, his circle had not suffered a dramatic change in spite of war:

In terms of friendship there have been little changes in my life though we don't talk with the same freedom about some topics as it was before war. The situation is pretty similar in my circle; we live somehow in a bubble, a safe area that is very related to pre-war inhabitants and sharing of values. Establishing relations with newcomers is possible but generally these relationships are superficial (Research Interview, 23 July 2015).

Despite the examples of Serbs, whose role is not questioned by other Sarajevans, living in an ethno-territoriality produced major constraints not only in terms of negotiating new relations but also in negotiating daily life. Many people in the city, especially ethnic minorities, found for instance limited employment opportunities (in a country with high rates of unemployment) as in the large public sector jobs are still very much linked to ethnicity and party connections. Paradoxically, Sarajevo Serbs living in Sarajevo are discriminated in terms of employment compared to Sarajevo Serbs currently living in East Sarajevo. In this sense, only people living in Republika Srpska are eligible to be employed in common institutions located in Sarajevo, and a number of Sarajevo Serbs actually moved to East Sarajevo in order to be eligible.<sup>301</sup>

The situation of Sarajevo Croats in the city is less difficult both politically and socially compared to Sarajevo Serbs. Ultimately, Bosnian Croats were not considered aggressors in the city, as war between ARBiH and HVO did not take place in Sarajevo, and live in the Federation of BiH. Consequently, they were generally less distrusted and they secured, until 2002, more recognised rights than Sarajevo Serbs when the OHR amended the Constitution of the Federation of BiH to fulfil the Constitutional Court decision taken in 2000. This was required to ensure the full equality of the three constituent peoples of BiH in both entities.

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<sup>301</sup> It is estimated that 4,000 Bosnian Serbs are employed in common institutions (Dedić 2012)

Efforts to maintain a normal life and practice cannot obscure the fact that the urban soul of post-war Sarajevo is distinct and that ethnic discrimination exists, unlike the pre-war situation. It is seen especially during interviews conducted in a sector living in predominantly single-family housing at the outskirts of the urban centre of Ilidža, one of the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo that was reintegrated into the city in March 1996 and subsequently received internally displaced Bosniaks. As expressed by a Sarajevo Serb living in the municipality and heavily involved in keeping Bosnian Serbs in the city after the transfer of authority, the environment has not significantly improved:

Often you are not allowed to obtain employment; it is not likely that you will be able to start a private business. There is no equal treatment in the police station, neighbours don't salute you or they share rumours about Serbs as nation, considering everyone as war criminals, chetniks and aggressors. That's the climate that makes people leave (Research Interview, 24 May 2015).

This harsh description also reveals that ethnicity currently shapes neighbouring relations. The elite practices used to increase the political relevance of ethnic affiliation (started before the war and continuously reproduced afterwards) still impact the social field. Consequently, such ethnicisation of the Bosnian society and the loss of the ethnic diversity so characteristic of the city have significantly reduced both the opportunities for interethnic interactions, the quality of socialisation and daily life for individuals who have become ethnic minorities.

As analysed during this research, the urban area of Sarajevo experienced an ethnic and territorial partition during the post-war period. However, coexistence should be considered in a more multidimensional way, not only from the lens of ethnicity. The city also experienced a profound social and cultural transformation caused by forced rural-urban migration, the departure of many Sarajevans at the beginning of the war and afterwards, especially Sarajevo Serbs, as well as the emergence of a criminalised new political and economic elite. Urban life was forcefully reshaped into something new from the beginning of the siege that made many Sarajevans feel uncomfortable in the city. The fact that such a transformation is related not only to ethnicity is illustrated in the powerful distinction between locals and newcomers that is still very present in the city. Many Sarajevans feel uncomfortable with the existing socio-cultural gap between them and any newcomers who have arrived since or after the war. This view is reiterated by one such Sarajevo Serb interviewee, who claims relations with newcomers occur but are generally superficial. Evidently, such differentiation transcends ethnic

categorisation and responds to a cultural superiority of people from the city. On the one hand, Sarajevans are featured by relative wealth, high levels of education, cosmopolitanism, 'Europeanness' and low levels of religiosity. In contrast, people from countryside are depicted as rural, poor, primitive, traditional, religiously radical and 'non-cultured' (Steffanson 2007).<sup>302</sup> The city has thus experienced a profound social and cultural transformation during the war and the post-war period that goes beyond the ethnic dimension. For many Sarajevans, Sarajevo is not and will hardly become again what it was before the siege, regardless of whether they presently or not constitute an ethnic majority within the Bosnian capital city.

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<sup>302</sup> As Anders Steffanson (2007) argues, the three central socio-cultural dichotomies in Sarajevo are local/newcomer, urban/rural and 'cultured'/'non-cultured'. These are interconnected in such a way that, ideally, locals are opposed to the rural newcomers with inferior cultural habits and knowledge. Such interrelated stereotypes are not post-war phenomena as these were already very present during socialist times because of the mass rural-urban migration in Yugoslavia triggered by the process of industrialisation during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (e.g. Simic 1973).



## Conclusion

This dissertation has analysed the role of the OHR in the urban transformation of Sarajevo during the post-war period and the impact that the intervention, a central part of the international administration deployed in Bosnia after the war, had in the urban transformation of Sarajevo, with a special focus on its ethnic and spatial structures. Assessing the urban changes that occurred since the signature of the peace agreement requires a previous contextualisation of what Sarajevo was before the war and from which position the city departed in December 1995. As presented in *chapter two*, Sarajevo experienced three periods of urban expansion; during the Ottoman rule, under Austro-Hungarian authority and during Socialist Yugoslavia. Urban development was particularly intensive in Socialist Yugoslavia meaning that the city acquired particular attributes of socialist cities, both socially and spatially. Sarajevo, however, is a special city in the sense that human religious diversity, toleration and coexistence, are intrinsic features since its foundation in the fifteenth century by Ottoman authorities.

An alliance questioning the foundation of ethnic diversity that involved actors from neighbouring republics and local political parties flourished during the collapse of Yugoslavia between the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was especially active and assertive in the case of Serbian and Bosnian Serb leadership, after the formation of the SDS party on BiH in 1990. A very clear policy, politically and militarily coordinated, was devised to create a new Serbian state in which there should be a partial incorporation of Bosnia if Yugoslavia disintegrated. Such a policy included the collaboration of Western powers. As in the post-Cold War context, they prioritised preserving the unity of Yugoslavia and backed the centre over peripheral republics before and even after the beginning of wars in Croatia and Bosnia. In that context, Western policy makers satisfied the central government in Belgrade, despite the pursuit of Serbian leaders' to create an enlarged Serbian state on the ruins of the Yugoslav federation.

The Western response to the Yugoslav and Bosnian crisis was biased and extremely poor in the non-prevention of war. Firstly, there was no approval for a UN peacekeeping contingent, following a request from the Bosnian President in November and December 1991 in a context of advanced military preparations by JNA in the central Yugoslav republic, and the high risk of war since the beginning of conflict in the summer of 1991 in Croatia. Alongside that passivity, European diplomatic intervention



encouraged the political ethnic division of Bosnia, making clear concessions to the SDS, and pressured the Bosnian President to accept divisive proposals. Indeed, Western powers tended to satisfy the central government in Belgrade through an ethnic reorganisation of Bosnia during early diplomatic involvement in February and March 1992, prior to the beginning of the war. Subsequently, the West's approach to Bosnia-Herzegovina was to bring pressure on President Izetbegovic to capitulate and accept unfavourable deals, using the military capacity of VRS as a tool.

In April 1991, the Bosnian Serb leadership instigated a process of ethno-territorialisation in a specific project to create a Serb statelet in Bosnia, and to eventually incorporate the statelet into a rump Yugoslavia, if Bosnia refused to comply. In this process of ethno-territorialisation, Sarajevo had a central position. For Bosnian Serb leadership, the city was seen as a hub, connecting the various Serb territories in which Bosnia had to be divided. At that time, the Serb territories envisioned by the party leadership were ethnically mixed and even the SDS pursued political domination in creating a territorially continuous statelet in areas where the Bosnian Serb population was in a minority.

With the failure to sustain Bosnia in a rump Yugoslavia, exclusively controlled by Serbs well in advance of the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, the city, in April 1992, experienced one of the greatest attacks inflicted on its ethnic diversity and common life when the Bosnian Serb leadership along with JNA besieged the city on the eve of the international recognition of the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ethnic partition of Sarajevo was defined as one of the six Strategic Goals by the Bosnian Serb Assembly in May 1992. The failure, however, to divide the city militarily, firstly by JNA and subsequently by VRS, produced a stabilisation of the siege for three-and-half years, favoured and perpetuated by international unwillingness to militarily intervene and uniquely deploy a humanitarian mission to ensure that Sarajevans did not suffer the rigours of starvation.

During the siege of Sarajevo, tragically, the city suffered a profound social and ethnic transformation as a result of a progressive loss of ethnic diversity with the departure of Sarajevans from all ethnicities, but especially Serbs, and the influx of ethnically cleansed Bosniaks mostly from other areas of Bosnia. Concomitantly, in the context of diplomatic isolation and war against VRS and Bosnian Croats, in 1993, the SDA leadership abandoned the foundational principle of the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and accepted its ethnic partition. No peace plan was agreed

until 1995, when a discussion on the Union of Three Republics took place, and party leadership adopted a policy of building an ethnocratic regime that progressively turned the territories held by the *Armija* into de facto Bosniak entities.

In a different context, following a heavy involvement of the US with a combination of military and diplomatic offensives in the summer of 1995, negotiations to end the Bosnian war took place in November in Dayton, in the US. Amid huge international pressure, negotiations took place between the President of BiH, Alija Izetbegovic, and the regional leaders involved in war, i.e. both Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, who respectively represented Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. During peace negotiations, the urban area of Sarajevo was divided between the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska amid the partition of the country in these two ethnically based entities. In line with the policy of ethnic division, Bosnian Serb leadership refused to share governance in Sarajevo with representatives from other ethnic groups, and this triggered Milosevic's decision to deliver Serb-held districts of Sarajevo to the Federation of BiH. As a result, the district proposal that included direct involvement of the international community in issues such as training and supervision of a multiethnic police force was abandoned and Sarajevo's symbolic ethnic, economic and physical reconstruction did not include any specific provision and international participation in the peace agreement.

In the absence of any specific status for the city, the international community did not initially envision a reconstruction of the ethnic diversity in Sarajevo as seen in *chapters three and four*, which respectively focus on the consolidation of an ethno-territorialised urban area of Sarajevo after the peace agreement and on international strategy to rebuild ethnic diversity in Sarajevo. The transfer of authority of the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo in the winter of 1996, which resulted in a mass exodus of population, was the first major challenge of the civilian annexes of the peace agreement and clearly highlighted the fact that main international actors did not work for ethnic diversity. Importantly, Carl Bildt's statement on the importance of the stay of Bosnian Serbs and Sarajevo Serbs in the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo for future implications, both in the city and the country, did not reflect any international consensus to maintain ethnic diversity in the city at the end of war. Rather contrary, many international actors considered that ethnically mixing the population could cause further violence and unrest. Eloquently, the OHR's work to create favourable conditions for the stay of population after the takeover was not internationally supported. Actually, the initiative

was confronted by the IFOR and the US, which continuously undermined the OHR in the early post-war stages to the detriment of the military provisions and priorities.

The transfer of authority of the Serb-held districts reveals two key elements that largely prevented maintaining and remaking ethnic diversity in post-war Sarajevo. Firstly, amid huge international pressure to reach peace, the division was unilaterally taken by Slobodan Milosevic to unblock negotiations without any consultation with SDS leadership in Dayton. Secondly, the ethno-territorial division of the area of Sarajevo fundamentally undermined the prospect that a meaningful number of Sarajevo Serbs and Bosnian Serbs would remain after the transfer of authority. While the DPA had silenced weapons, by forcing peace and legalising the ethno-territorial division of Sarajevo and Bosnia, it retained the fertile ground for a continuation of policies, proactively or reactively, shaping the ethnic partition of the country.

Thus, since early post-war stages, both the SDS and SDA continued to resort to distinct ethnocratic practices in order to consolidate homogeneous ethno-territorialities, both ethnically and politically, in the area of Sarajevo. The SDS actively confronted peace agreement provisions on Sarajevo, either trying to change the territorial solution or, as alternative, securing funds to accommodate people in East Sarajevo, Srpsko Sarajevo at that time. The signature of the peace agreement did not mean relinquishing two of its Strategic Objectives, defined at the beginning of war, i.e. the ethnic division of Sarajevo and the separation of the Bosnian Serb population from other ethnic groups. Actually, through coercive and violent means, the SDS tackled the stay of population in the five districts, once pressure from Pale leadership to change the peace agreement was finally abandoned. Having pushed people out from the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo before the takeover, and redirecting them into the Bosnian Serb entity, in the first episode of ethnic engineering of the post-war period, Pale leadership negotiated with Yugoslavia for funds to build a new city in East Sarajevo that allowed a new urban division from the semirural areas that were before the division, administratively and increasingly functionally, an integral part of the city.

In a more subtle performance, the SDA continued the policy started in 1993 to consolidate power and ethnic majorities in Bosniak territories. At the end of the war, and despite being the only nationalist party advocating the inclusion of mechanisms in the peace agreement to rebuild ethnic diversity in Bosnia, the party took steps to consolidate their domination in Sarajevo. Thus, the SDA made clear preparations to turn Sarajevo into a Bosniak city in a context in which there were doubts about the state's

viability. The party reactively deployed ethnic engineering to resettle Bosniaks in abandoned housing in the former Serb-held districts, having dispossessed with the right of housing repossession to displaced peoples, unfulfilling Annex VII. Institutionally, and after failing to reach an agreement with the HDZ in the framework of the governance in the Federation of BiH, it reorganised political institutions, excluding representatives from other ethnic groups with the formation of a mono-ethnic Sarajevo Canton, in a step that locally institutionalised Sarajevo as an ethnocratic regime. Through these distinct practises, the SDA secured exclusive control of Sarajevo and a favourable Bosniak constituency during the early post-war stages.

Importantly, the OHR intervened reactively to these ethnocratic practices albeit with limited impact. Sarajevo's multi-ethnic reorganisation put in place power-sharing mechanisms that did not alter governance in the city and decision-making process, dominated by SDA leadership. Furthermore, and after being granted executive and legislative authority in December 1997, the OHR indirectly tackled the project to urbanise East Sarajevo through the prohibition of allocating socially-owned land in the whole country. This practice was performed essentially by Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb authorities, who sought to consolidate ethnically pure territories by distributing land to people of respective ethnic constituencies, often used by refugees and displaced persons before the war, either for residential, business or agricultural purposes, becoming a direct impediment for their return.

Land-ban allocation correctly tackled a policy of leading ethno-national parties which prevented or made much more difficult the return of those displaced. The OHR's decision was coherent with the new policy promoting minority returns but in practice not very effective. Resorting to extended authority, however, the OHR ineffectively expanded its responsibility in the management of land, a task administratively unviable for the available resources and without the clarification of procedures needed to make judgements. In practice, the OHR was not able to restrict illegal constructions and transactions moved within informal channels while discouraging legitimate investments and damaging the OHR's credibility. Importantly, in order to understand such limited outcomes, is the fact that even after the OHR became the final authority in Bosnia, the effectiveness of deployed powers and policies, crucially, still depended on the willingness of the local authorities as they could object in different ways or simply disregard legislation enacted by the High Representatives. Therefore, by confronting

nationalist parties, the international community found different forms of resistance that inevitably, but not exclusively, contributed to the shortcomings of its intervention.

Any limited outcomes achieved by the international community in the civilian annexes of the peace agreement, after the High Representative's empowerment, were again repeated in the field of minority returns, analysed in *chapter four*. Initially, the right of displaced persons to return to pre-war homes, recognised in Annex VII was not supported internationally as a consequence of the narrow military approach and unwillingness to ethnically mix the population. Thus, the return of a people who had become a minority was obstructed, more or less vocally at local level, by all nationalist parties to avoid the erosion of favourable ethnic constituencies following the collaboration of the international community. Indeed, prioritising security issues, and driven by the IFOR's minimalist approach, the international community temporarily limited mobility across the IEHL, placed Annex VII on hold and worked on the return of people to areas where they constituted an ethnic majority, contributing to the consolidation of ethnically homogeneous territories.

Yet, it was only in 1997 that internationals progressively focused on people who had become an ethnic minority, both quantitatively and qualitatively, after forced displacement and legalisation of ethno-territorialities. Thus, minority returns came to be seen as a tool for eroding the power of ethno-nationalist parties in a context of pressure from European countries to repatriate Bosnian refugees, i.e. Germany, internal pressure from those displaced and a US foreign policy following Clinton's re-election in November 1996, which in the spring of 1997 involved a major policy review that strengthened the civilian implementation of the DPA.

While the ethnic diversity of Sarajevo and the spirit of resistance of the city during the siege had been praised internationally throughout the war, it was not until the empowerment of the High Representative that a political approach to the reconstruction of the ethnic diversity so-characteristic of the Bosnian capital city was devised with the adoption of the Sarajevo Declaration. The Sarajevo Declaration was actually a pragmatic and strategic decision aimed at exploiting the city's symbolism to jump-start minority returns for the whole country, placing the responsibility for the early implementation of Annex VII on the SDA as the only nationalist party advocating for minority returns. Crucially, the adoption of the strategy to trigger minority returns in Sarajevo was realistically not in agreement with the main local actors as seen with Alija Izetbegovic's contestation from the celebration of the Sarajevo Return Conference on 2

February 1998. Thus, the approach of internationals to focus initially on Sarajevo produced a fundamental tension with the SDA, who adopted a policy to obstruct the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration returns were implemented to other ethno-territorialities violently formed during the war.

Ultimately, this new internationally developed political approach to address minority returns was successful in ensuring that individuals who were displaced repossessed their pre-war homes. Setting up joint bodies of competent local institutions and international organisations to supervise implementation, any widespread obstructionism during the process of housing repossession by the SDA was progressively eroded due to increasing international pressure and a series of proactive and reactive actions. The High Representative was crucial in this regard through the dismissal of officials who did not fulfil the Sarajevo Declaration, ensuring that housing institutions were staffed with co-operative officials and, along with coercion, attempted to persuade Bosniak authorities to fulfil implementation. The adoption of the Property Law Implementation Programme (PLIP) in October 1999, which treated repossession of property as a question of the rule of law, progressively expanded housing repossession beyond Sarajevo. The considerable interventional intervention amid increasing collaboration of international organisations dealing with returns, and optimisation of field resources, dramatically increased the resolution of property claims between the years 2000 and 2003, culminating in a widespread repossession of housing both in Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia.

Most certainly, the High Representative was instrumental in progressively overcoming the embedded obstructionism of local authorities in the repossession of housing but, crucially, the international community neither addressed the ethno-territorial division of Bosnia, which structurally prevented mass minority returns, nor intervened to any great extent in supporting returns socially and economically. Despite establishing a comprehensive strategy to create conditions for sustainable returns through intervention in employment, education, security and housing, the internationally-devised strategy to remake Sarajevo's ethnic diversity had serious shortcomings in design and implementation in addressing the enormous challenge of generating minority returns after the war.

All these shortcomings were well illustrated in the tension which emerged during the work of the Sub-group on textbooks conducted in 1998. It was a unilateral performance with little local engagement and both superficial and inappropriate amid an

ethnically polarised environment. Furthermore, issues beyond housing reconstruction and repossession were rather neglected by the international community. Economic, educational and labour market opportunities for returnees had not been given enough consideration by the international community neither in Sarajevo nor in Bosnia when the peak of repossession took place, despite PIC warnings in May 2000.

Therefore, the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration and overall Annex VII in Bosnia following the adoption of PLIP did not produce meaningful returns simply because the appropriate conditions for mass minority returns did not exist when people repossessed housing. The international return policy in Sarajevo was insufficiently conceived and implemented beyond property issues for the purpose of rebuilding ethnic diversity in a divided country, leaving most of the burden, connected with returns and reconstruction of ethnic diversity, on individuals and families. Essentially, by linking housing repossession to returns, internationals did not tackle directly or sufficiently the fundamental causes of displacement. All this, in conjunction with international unwillingness to maintain ethnic diversity or mixing the population in 1996 and 1997, seen both in the takeover of the Serb-held districts of Sarajevo and initial non-implementation of Annex VII, validates the first hypothesis formulated for this dissertation in which *the reconstruction of ethnic diversity in Sarajevo was not initially envisioned by the international community and the adoption of the Sarajevo Declaration in February 1998, aimed at making the city a model of co-existence and tolerance for the rest of the country, had a reactive nature that was essentially focused on housing repossession instead of addressing the creation of appropriate conditions for returns.*

Indeed, the insufficient focus on the creation of appropriate conditions for returns, especially in the economic field, is significantly captured in analysis conducted in *chapter five* which has addressed international performance in the political and economic arena, two core elements of the liberal peace developed by the international administration set in Bosnia after the war. Despite the inherent risks of prescribing market democracy as a remedy for civil conflict, without anticipating or limiting its destabilizing effects, and for not being ready to manage the competition induced by the process, leading international actors generally imposed economic and political reforms with little if any consideration on the local context, as seen especially in the first post-war elections and the process of economic liberalisation.

Importantly, these initial post-war elections resulted in an entrenchment of nationalist parties who were willing to obstruct the peace agreement, that they had in general reluctantly signed included with a legitimization, favoured by the electoral system, of the social and ethnic order emerging from the war and also ethnic cleansing. Certainly, the specific architecture of the DPA meant that, crucially, its implementation depended on the celebration of the first post-war election, which marked both IFOR's withdrawal and the creation of common state institutions. As a result, delaying the election until conditions were appropriate, as often proposed, was possibly not the best alternative considering Dayton's design. Such dependence necessitated that the High Representative, along with the US, worked to prevent any delay, downplaying any absence of appropriate conditions, arguing that election was the only mechanism to avoid parallel institutions and the partition of the country.

Furthermore, the election was crucial for legitimatising exclusive ethnic authority in the respective ethno-territorialities, to ensure that people could chose to vote from where they had left due to the war. Despite its importance for peace implementation and the fate of ethnocracies, international performance prior to election was very questionable and did not contribute in facilitating subsequent efforts on peace implementation. Based on internal politics and the existing link between first elections and military withdrawal, the US pressured the OSCE to validate the election within the timeframe set in the peace agreement regardless of conditions on the ground. With the absence of measures fostering moderation or controlling parties' participation, performance and discourse, the election went ahead despite incidents and abuses in voting registration.

In order to overcome subsequent obstructionism, which in the formation of state institutions came mostly from Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croat representatives, shortly after, the international community engaged in open promotion, especially in Republika Srpska, with candidates showing increased willingness to cooperate. This was seen with the active and determined performance favouring Dodik's candidacy to the detriment of the SDS or, subsequently, in the involvement of the creation of the Alliance for Change, a broad coalition in the Federation of BiH which after the November 2000 election was formed between the SDP and moderate nationalist parties such as the SBiH. The promotion of specific candidates and parties that incorporated the workings of the OHR and OSCE prepared an electoral system that favoured moderate candidates over the nationalist parties. Thus, the preparation of an Election Law sought both a progress in



the process of democratisation and also the promotion of inter-ethnic cooperation. Eloquently, a centripetalist measure that was incorporated to foster moderation and inter-ethnic cooperation was the preferential voting for the election of the Republika Srpska Presidency in November 2000. Yet, the elections did not produce positive results, highlighting, paradoxically, the international limits to electoral integration having promoted and ultimately accepted Bosnia's ethno-federal division in ethnically homogeneous territories or with the absence of significant ethnic diversity.

Despite the risks of political liberalisation and the early post-war election in the aftermath of war, the process of democratisation, ultimately, during the last stages of the maximum international intervention, contributed to diminish the position of mainstream nationalist parties and respective powers structures, tackled directly or indirectly by the High Representative through dismissals, financial sanctions and the enactment of numerous reforms, including the process of economic liberalisation. Erosion of their hegemony forced them to moderation as subsequently highlighted in the case of Bosnian Serb political leaders, who became more open to compromise in state issues, withdrawing hostile opposition to core provisions of the peace agreement during early post-war stages.

In the economic field, the international community imposed a neoliberal economic transition that was especially inappropriate in a country ethnically divided and emerging from war. It actually failed in generating a self-sustained economic growth during the period of maximum international intervention. Thus, in late 2002, and after dozens of laws enacted by the High Representative, the economic situation was actually untenable, with a high unemployment rate, persistence of poverty and absence of significant investment and job creation. A neoliberal economic transition had serious shortcomings for the economic development of Bosnia in a context of poverty, institutional weaknesses and political division. In the long pursuit to liberalise and attract private sector investments, the effort from international organisations was not accompanied, despite the fragility of the country, by any measures which reduced the adverse social impacts of war and the adoption of liberal policies, with poverty, unemployment or industrial policy being either neglected or treated as a collateral damage of the long transition.

Importantly, reforms were once again not consistent with local actors. The neoliberal economic transition had a non-negotiable character for the international community, as seen with the refusal to consider and include adjustments proposed by

local expertise, aware of the risks that such model transition could have for the future of Bosnia. While clashes were inevitable, local parties structurally opposed economic liberalisation reforms to preserve economic and political hegemony in respective ethno-territorialities. This was seen in a refusal to accept the reform of the payment system and the process of privatisation.

Privatisation, a cornerstone of the neoliberal strategy was a goal in itself. It was implemented in the form of shock therapy despite previous evidences in post-socialist countries that during the early stages of transition could result both in asset stripping and concentration of wealth in few hands. The process convincingly illustrates both counterproductive outcomes of conducting liberalisation without neutral and appropriate institutions and the power struggle so often developed between local and international actors during the post-war period. Following the nationalisation of socially owned companies during the war, nationalist parties were fundamentally interested in preventing privatisation as companies were a source of revenue and patronage. This pattern was also observed in Sarajevo, as the SDA ethnocratic regime maintained control over public companies through Edhem Bicakcic, who was in charge of redirecting revenues through a complex and corrupt system whereby large sums of money benefited the party. Effectively, Bicakcic was dismissed twice by the High Representative in an illustrative example of the limits of dismissals in a nomenklatura system, in which political influence was not derived from official posts.

Indeed, the implementation of the privatisation programme followed the logic of shock therapy with the adoption of a voucher model of privatisation that essentially and conveniently allowed a quick and mass transfer of the ownership of companies and apartments. Furthermore, there were simply basic regulations, such as the approval of a Framework Law on Privatisation, and an absence of effective institutions supervising respective privatisation agencies, contained within a process that was fragmented in different ethno-territorialities. Favoured by the context of poor supervision, ethnocracies interfered easily in the process of privatisation. This was displayed in detailed analysis which was conducted on the privatisation of the Holiday Inn and Sarajka, as well as other cases mentioned, such as the Energoinvest attempt to buy the Hotel Marsal. In these cases, privatisation was hugely manipulated with companies being sold cheaply to businessmen who were close to party leadership, and also to companies with relevant SDA members or the attempt of acquisition by other public companies.

Despite evidences that companies continued in the hands of previous directors following privatisation, or ended up in the hands of local party members, internationals continued to push for privatisation, with only minor changes, arguing the need to depoliticize the economy and provide the basis for economic recovery and growth. Furthermore, members of the OHR recognised that privatization was entrenching the economic positions of nationalist parties and reducing the prospects of ethnic reintegration, thus failing in both dimensions, i.e. in terms of depoliticisation and economic growth. Poor results in the process of privatisation contrasted with other interventions of the international community in the process of economic liberalisation that certainly contributed to erode the pervasive control of ethnocracies on the economy, both for the private benefit of elites or for the reproduction of exclusive regimes. It was especially highlighted in the reform of the payment system that dismantled the Payment Bureaus, which was an important source of revenue for parties as the institution controlling all public and private financial activity. Success from a liberal stance of such an initiative was a consequence of close and determined international intervention that not only established new institutions but also provided resources to strengthen their capacity.

Therefore, the political and economic liberation implemented in the framework of the liberal peace-building produced uneven and counterproductive results but which, at least in the mid-term, tended to erode ethnocracies and their hegemony in respective territorialities. Clearly, pushing for liberalisation as quickly as possible without appropriate legal or institutional frameworks did not contribute to achieving the goals publicly defined of depoliticisation of the economy and economic growth, as seen in the process of privatisation. With such counterproductive outcomes in the economic field and the progressive erosion of ethnocracies due to liberalisation in other areas, the second hypothesis elaborated for this dissertation is only partially validated in relation to economic failure, as it states that *the quick process of political and economic liberalisation either internationally pushed or imposed entrenched local ethnocracies and failed to depoliticise the economy and create a self-sustained economic growth.*

In *chapter six*, analyses on the spatial, functional and ethnic configuration have been conducted to assess the impact of the OHR intervention. In the decision to approve the Sarajevo Canton Development Strategy until the Year 2015, i.e. the Strategic Plan, it defined an urban development of the city in line with the transition into a market

economy, also illustrating a shift in the planning paradigm after the collapse of socialism. The Strategic Plan must be seen as the determination of local authorities to adopt a new orientation for the urban development of the city to address the multiplicity of transitions. In practice, however, the logic of the economic transition, in which nationalist parties obstructed the process of liberalisation to maintain political and economic hegemony in respective ethno-territorialities, meant that the international administration set in the BiH, coordinated by the OHR in the civilian issues, conducted those structural reforms for the participation of private and foreign investors in the real estate market.

Having focused on dealing with land transactions, setting a system of granting exemptions, if projects were not discriminatory, the High Representative finally enacted a harmonized Law on Construction Land in both entities in May 2003 that culminated the liberalisation of the real estate market and the privatisation of socially-owned construction land. Reforms enacted by the High Representative have significantly contributed to create conditions for a post-socialist production of space, which has turned into a commodity. The Law on Construction Land was seen as a significant step forward in the provision of legal certainty necessary for private investors to conduct property developments. Importantly, these reforms also significantly contributed to produce a new concept related to land development. In this new concept, planning and regulations for the modern production of space were both downgraded to the detriment of any private priorities of landowners and local politicians, who became prevalent over existing regulations, and the comprehensive vision for the development of the city.

In this sense, and considering projects such as the BBI Centre, the ASA Prevent headquarters, the case of Tibra Pacific or the headquarters of Raiffeinsein Bank, it is revealed that major new urban projects have been produced disregarding regulations, with subsequent modifications of regulation plans to adapt them to new realities on the ground. Sarajevo's urban development has acquired neoliberal features, as planning has become a corrective mechanism to satisfy private investors and detached from an overall policy of urban development. Yet, as in other areas of economic liberalisation pushed or imposed by international actors, reforms without an in-depth and fundamental transformation of institutions and how that power is exercised have resulted in a hybrid model as suggested by evidence found during this research. In other words, the development of major urban projects are apparently not taking place in a free real estate market due to significant political control in the production of space exercised by either

political elites, well illustrated in the figure of Bakir Izetbegovic, or municipal authorities. This is actually a feature of post-socialist cities in countries where political power played or continues to play a dominant role during the long economic transition which, despite having less resources compared to the international administration developed in post-war Bosnia, was often equally shaped with different forms of conditionality by international financial institutions.

The impact of the Law on Construction Land enacted by the High Representative is seen when analysing the production of new major urban projects. Actually, the convergence in 2003 of the Law and broader economic reforms, such as the development of a private banking system, created a favourable environment that triggered the greatest construction boom in the city since the end of the war. It was a turning point in the spatial restructuring of the central urban areas of Sarajevo that reflects the restructuring of its urban economy from a state-managed industrial system into a service economy.

Urban central areas have since then undergone a significant spatial transformation that has led towards a progressive densification of urban central areas and a rise of the functional and morphological diversity so characteristic of other post-socialist cities. Predominantly, new major urban projects are commercial and tertiary developments, such as the emergence of shopping centres and large-scale office developments often constructed on former industrial land. Manifesting as a process of deindustrialisation and tertiarisation, new major urban projects have been reducing the quantitative and qualitative shortcomings in service provision that generally existed in socialist cities, caused by the redirection of resource from personal and collective consumption to industrial development.

Therefore, Sarajevo has experienced a functional and morphological transformation in line with other post-socialist cities, albeit slower due to war, initial limited capital investment, essentially directed towards reconstruction, and slow liberalisation of the real estate market. Yet, the specificity of Sarajevo as a post-socialist city does not lie simply on an urban spatial restructuring, compared to other post-socialist cities, occurred one decade later. Rather, it lies in the fact that the urban spatial restructuring imbricates dimensions that have economic and ethnocentric nature. This is seen in two spatial processes, i.e. the construction of housing on the slopes or in the suburbs developed by refugees in Sarajevo and, more recently, the construction of gated neighbourhoods.

On the one hand, constructions on the slopes and suburbanisation commenced in the late 1990s due to the pressure of those internally displaced who were unwilling or could not return to pre-war homes. The international pressure to allow the repossession of housing without tackling ethno-territorialities resulted in a process of self-construction of housing due to an absence of alternatives for a stable housing solution. Such limitations triggered the development of self-constructions even on high gradients on the central slopes of the city, illustrating the needs of those who were forcefully displaced, to attempt to stabilise and dignify their lives, following war and forced displacement.

On the other hand, another manifestation that reinforces the process of suburbanisation, is the recent development of gated communities which could be a manifestation of both the economic transition towards capitalism and foreign investments, eloquently highlighting the rise of socio-spatial segregation in the city, integration into the new global flows and the fusion of these global capitals and local political ideologies in an ethno-territorialised urban area of Sarajevo. While conclusive evidences have not been discovered with regard to such fusion, these projects have been developed mostly by foreign investors from the Persian Gulf amid a BBI lobbying campaign, with the main Bosniak elites entrenched in bank structures, to promote these particular types of investments in the area of Sarajevo. This is a process concomitant to tourism development from these countries and their investment in real estate. Hence, these spatial manifestations, analysed to date, are with more or less clarity, a result of the new order which emerged after the war which in the case of Sarajevo, and unlike other post-socialist cities, involves both economic transition and ethno-territorial partition. This is effectively a new political and socio-economic order that is producing qualitatively distinct urban conditions as argued in relation to the debate on socialist and post-socialist cities.

Finally, and in terms of the ethnic division of Sarajevo, a crucial element in understanding the low number of minority returns, as presented earlier in *chapter four*, was the division of the area of Sarajevo traced at the outskirts of the urban central areas. The evolution of the political division between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo reveals the limited impact to erode such division of an OHR initiative that officially pursued a process of functional integration that ultimately reduced the weight of entities. From an urban perspective, the initially underfunded SDS-driven project to build a city in East Sarajevo, failed in the short and mid-term but created the basis for relative subsequent

private urbanisation, which progressively accommodated a few thousand of Sarajevo Serbs who had left the city. Such subsequent urbanisation of East Sarajevo, despite being limited, has reinforced the ethnic division of the area of Sarajevo beyond the political and territorial dimensions.

Yet, the fragmentation of East Sarajevo and its insufficient urban facilities and economic activity have implied that despite the comprehensive, exclusive and divisive nature of the SDS-driven project, the city still retains some functional dependence on Sarajevo. This partial functional dependence of East Sarajevo with Sarajevo has favoured that, among Sarajevo Serbs who moved to East Sarajevo during or after the war, there has been progressive increased mobility across the IEBL. Employment and consumption became the two central factors that further increased mobility among people from East Sarajevo to Sarajevo in recent times. In the field of retail, and despite urbanisation in East Sarajevo, differences between the two cities has stood stable and even increased with the opening of big supermarkets in Sarajevo from the late 1990s and the subsequent development of several new shopping centres since 2009.

However, visions regarding the division confirm that these cross-entity spatial practices in the area of Sarajevo have not at all altered the ethnocentric nature of the division between Sarajevo and East Sarajevo, pursued since 1990 by the SDS leadership. Even in cases in which former Sarajevo Serbs have recovered and praised the daily interethnic socialisation in the city, common in professional contexts, it has not produced any significant alteration in visions relative on division. Eloquently, among former Sarajevo Serbs living in East Sarajevo, it has been identified a clear dichotomy between visiting Sarajevo and living there. Such a sharp distinction highlights the fact that ethno-territorialities, and nationalising practices reproducing the ethnicised meaning of those spaces, are both material and metaphysical phenomenon that shapes identities and feelings of individuals in terms of security and comfort and consequently affects decisions such as place of residence, even among those former Sarajevans who show nostalgia for their former city.

Therefore, development of major urban projects in central municipalities of Sarajevo as well as construction on slopes, suburbanisation and development of gated communities are all manifestations of the new socio-economic order in which the OHR has been significantly involved both in the economic transition but also in terms of housing repossession, which triggered new constructions in Sarajevo once evictions started amid a divided country. On the other hand, there has been a consolidation of the

ethnic division in the area of Sarajevo despite the Sarajevo Declaration and Annex VII, seen in the absence of returns, prevalence of visions on division regardless of increased mobility across the IEBL and inter-ethnic social relations that stand significantly below pre-war levels both quantitatively and qualitatively. All this, validates the third hypothesis of this dissertation which states that the *impact of the OHR in the urban transformation of Sarajevo was qualitatively much below the broad intervention conducted, which was instrumental for a post-socialist production of space but did not contribute to rebuilding the ethnic diversity and common life in the city.*





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