



UNIVERSITAT DE  
BARCELONA

## Forging nation from exile: International recognition, political alignment and ideological constraints in Basque nationalisms (1956-1977)

Aurora Madaula i Giménez

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UNIVERSITAT DE BARCELONA  
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BARCELONA

**Forging nation from exile: International recognition,  
political alignment and ideological constraints in  
Basque nationalisms (1956-1977)**

**Doctoranda: Aurora Madaula i Giménez**

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TESI DOCTORAL

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A tu, Agustí.



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## **Abstract**

This research focuses on the evolution of Basque nationalism in exile during the period 1956-1977. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent establishment of Franco dictatorship, forced the Basque Government and the Basque nationalists to flee in exile. The exile becomes refuge and framework for the conservation and development of Basque nationalism. The influence of the exile conditions the international relations, the recognition of the Basque cause and ideological constraints. Through Manuel Irujo, member of the Basque Nationalist Party and the main ideologue of nationalism in exile during the period studied, we see how exile transforms, conditions and protects the political nation imagined.

## **Resum**

*Aquesta investigació està centrada en l'evolució del nacionalisme basc a l'exili durant el període 1956-1977. L'esclat de la Guerra Civil espanyola i el posterior establiment de la dictadura franquista, van obligar el Govern basc i els nacionalistes bascos a fugir a l'exili, que es convertirà en refugi alhora que marc per a la conservació i desenvolupament del nacionalisme basc. La influència de l'exili condicionarà les relacions internacionals, l'homologació de la causa basca i els referents ideològics. A través de la figura de Manuel Irujo, membre del Partit Nacionalista basc i principal ideòleg del nacionalisme a l'exili durant l'etapa estudiada, comprovarem com l'exili transforma, condiona i protegeix la construcció de la nació política imaginada.*





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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

In the writing of this dissertation it has been decided to use the acronyms in the original language.

ANV - Acción Nacionalista Vasca (Basque nationalist action)

BA CBE – Basque Archive Center for Basque Studies

CFEME – Consejo Federal Español del Movimiento Europeo. (Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement)

CISC - Confédération internationale des syndicats chrétiens (International Confederation of Christian Unions)

CVFE – Consejo Vasco por la Federación Europea (Basque council for the European Federation )

CNT – Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (National Confederation Labour)

EBB – Euskadi Buru Batzar (Basque country central Office)

EGI – Euzko Gaztedi Indarra (Basque Youth Force)

EI – Eusko-Ikaskuntza

EEC – Economic European Community

ELA-STV - Eusko Langileen Alkartasuna-Solidaridad de los Trabajadores Vascos (Basque solidarity workers)

ERC- Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Catalan Republican Left)

ETA – Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom)

FEVA-EABA - Federación de Entidades Vasco Argentinas – Eusko Argentinari Bazkun Alkartasuna (Federation of Basque-Argentine Associations)

FET y de las JONS - Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juventudes orgánicas nacional socialistas.

IR – Izquierda Republicana (Republican Left)

LIAB – Ligue Internationales des Amis des Basques (International League of Basque's friends)

NARA – National archives and Records Administration

PCE – Partido Comunista de España (Spanish Communist Party )

PSOE – Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish socialist workers' party)

EAJ-PNV – Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque nationalist party)

UFD – Unión de Fuerzas Democráticas (Union of democratic forces)

UGT – Unión General de Trabajadores (General Union of workers)

UR – Unión Republicana (Republican Unity)

UE – Unión Española (Spanish Unity)

*Assume that exile is a calamity, as the multitude declare in speech and song. So too, many foods are bitter and pungent and irritate the taste; but by combining them certain sweet and pleasant ingredients we get rid of the disagreeable savor. There are colors to, painful to the sight and, and when we confronted with them our vision is blurred and dazzled by their harshness and unrelieved intensity. Now if we have found that we could remedy this inconvenience by mingling shadow with them or turning our eyes aside and resting them upon something of a greenish and pleasant shade, the same can be done with misfortunes as well: they can be blended with whatever is useful and comforting in your present circumstances: wealth, friends, freedom from politics and lack of none of the necessities of life.*

Plutarch, A.D. 96

*El exilio es un plebiscito permanente por medio del cual, los hombres y mujeres que viven en el destierro se manifiestan contra el régimen imperante de su país.*

Manuel Irujo, 1959

*Los afiliados de París que llevamos gran parte de nuestra vida en el exterior nos hemos formado de Euzkadi una imagen idealizada ya que ha sido contrastada con el acontecer cotidiano de los países más adelantados. Se trata pues de una aportación modesta, pero no exenta de interés, al tratar de encontrar el futuro del pueblo vasco.*

Asamblea Extraterritorial París, 1977

*El exilio es actitud frente a un régimen impuesto por la violencia, que no reconoce la libertad vasca ni los derechos humanos: alguien debe mantener esa actitud mientras hechos tangibles y reales no la hagan cambiar.*

Manuel Irujo, 1977





# 1. PROPOSALS FOR THE THESIS AND HYPOTHESIS

I am Catalan—I have nothing to do with the Basque Country or the Basques, despite the fact that they are the main subject of my study. In my academic life I had never studied anything about Basque history until I finished my Master’s degree in Historical Studies. Since then, my intellectual focus has been turned towards nationalism, the Basques, and the exile.

When I was a teenager I really liked football soccer. I was an enthusiastic fan of Football Club Barcelona, and I was lucky enough to see matches of one of the best soccer teams in Football Club Barcelona. They began to win titles in Spain, Europe, and the whole world, going beyond what the club could imagine, and for that reason the team came to be called the “Dream Team.”

Whether coincidence or not, the regular “starting eleven” was made up of 7 Basque players out of 11. One of them, José Mari Bakero, was my favorite and—as the teenager that I was—I knew everything about him. And it was there and then that I began to doubt about everything I had learnt before. Bakero spoke using the Basque language, he had been the captain of the Real Sociedad, Donostia’s football team, and he was a *pelotari* before he had gone into football, but he was born in Navarre, not in the Basque Country. How was it possible that he was considered Basque, if he was not even born *in* the Basque Country? That was my starting point as regards the Basques, and the trailhead of my interest in the history and culture of the Basques. Even until today.

The study of Basque nationalism cannot be carried out as if it were a static object, neither in ideological nor in geographical terms. When studying Basque nationalism and its influences (which was my first interest when I did the research for my Master’s thesis), it is important to highlight the influences it has received in and from the exile. That’s how the exile became one of the main parts of my study of Basque nationalism, and that was also the reason why with the help of one of my thesis advisors, Dr. Joseba Agirreazkuenaga, we established the chronology for my study to between 1956 and 1977.

The exile obviously conditioned this chronology, but although the Basque exile that was occasioned by the Spanish Civil War began in 1936, we decided to set the starting point for my research in 1956, because that was the year of the Basque World Congress in Paris that marked the abandonment of the Atlantic strategy of *Lehendakari* Aguirre, as well as the consolidation of the European strategy. And we established 1977 as the end, which was when most of the

exiles who were forced to flee during the Spanish Civil War returned to the Basque Country, closing the period.

Another reason for establishing this period of time as the chronology for my research on Basque nationalism in the exile was the lack of studies about that period as a whole. Most of the studies on Basque nationalism in exile focus on the period between the first exile in 1936/1937 until 1960, the year when the first *Lehendakari* José Antonio Aguirre died.<sup>1</sup> For the following years, and until the return of the Basque government to the Basque country in 1979, there are studies that deal partially with the politics that were developed or with the congresses in which Basques participated, but no single study about Basque nationalism as a whole during that period focuses its research especially on the development and transformation of Basque nationalism in the exile, which is the goal of this work.

Most of the studies that have been done so far on the Basque exile—due to the importance of this in terms of figures, but also because of its consequences on Basque society—are determined by the country of origin of the exile (and exiles). In this regard we can highlight the works of Koldo San Sebastián, who did extensive research on the Basques in America.<sup>2</sup>

But among many other things, if anyone conditioned the chronology of this research, it was Manuel Irujo Olló. If the exile and the evolution of Basque nationalism during this period can be given a name, that must be Manuel Irujo.

Irujo, who was a critical, loyal<sup>3</sup> Basque nationalist, is present throughout all this dissertation because he was a good example of a Basque nationalist who lived in exile during all of the chronology studied here, and because of the importance of his thought for Basque nationalism.

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<sup>1</sup> IRUJO, Xabier, 2012, *Expelled from motherland. The government of President José Antonio Aguirre on exile, 1937-1960*. Reno: Center for Basque studies. University of Nevada; ANASAGASTI, Iñaki, and SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, 1985, *Los años oscuros : El Gobierno vasco. El exilio 1937-1941*. San Sebastián : Txertoa; LÓPEZ ADÁN, Emilio “Beltza,” 1977, *El nacionalismo vasco en el exilio, 1937-1960*. Editorial Txertoa: San Sebastián.

<sup>2</sup> SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, 2015, *Basques in the United States : A biographical encyclopedia of first-generation immigrants*. Reno: Center for Basque studies- University of Nevada; (2014) *El exilio vasco en América*, 1st ed. Vitoria-Gasteiz-Gasteiz : Servicio Central de publicaciones del Gobierno vasco; (1991) *The Basque archives: Vascos en Estados Unidos (1938-1947)*. San Sebastián: Txertoa; (1988) *El exilio vasco en América, 1936-1946: La acción del Gobierno: Política, organización, propaganda, economía, cultura, diplomacia*. San Sebastián: Txertoa; AJURIA, Peru, and SAN SEBASTIÁN, 1992, *El exilio vasco en Venezuela*. Gasteiz: Eusko Jaurlaritzaren argitalpen zerbitzu nagusia.

<sup>3</sup> RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, “Manuel de Irujo. Lealtad crítica. (1960-1975),” *Vasconia*, 32, 2002, pp. 155-168.

We decided to follow his political biography in order to carry out a prosopography study on the evolution of the Basque nationalisms in the exile—but not a biography of Manuel Irujo, whose life history has been brilliantly exposed in the biography *Manuel Irujo. Un hombre vasco* by Arantzazu Amezaga Iribarren.<sup>4</sup>

Although he occupied political positions in the Spanish Republican government, he was never a member of the Basque government, except for the brief period of the Basque National Council<sup>5</sup> following the *Lehendakari*'s disappearance—and yet his voice was always listened to and appreciated, when not countered, and not only by his colleagues from the PNV but by all of the political and cultural sphere in the exile.

Irujo was famous for his tireless work, which left behind for us a huge archive full of personal correspondence, treaties, studies, reflections, congresses' minutes, cards, reports, etc. that help us figure out how the life of a Basque nationalist in the exile might have been, and show the immense efforts that this man from Navarre had to spend in order to engage in a dialogue with everybody so as to attain the common goal of freeing the Basque country.

Through the leading figure of the exile Manuel Irujo as one of the main ideologists of traditional Basque nationalism, we can analyze several different personalities as political subjects placed on different levels, so that the subjectivism of the individual is mixed up with the national ideology and culture, whether atheist or Christian, and we can see the influence of both the external and the internal exile on them.<sup>6</sup>

Following such personalities as Irujo, the Etxebarrieta brothers, Telesforo Monzón, Federico Krutwig or José Luis Álvarez Enparantza “Txillardegí,” we can analyze the different nationalisms from the point of view of their subjectivities and from the different views that the exiles created. But the exile was also present in the inside, in what we call “internal exile”, and it was related with the new generation of Basque nationalism, from which we can highlight José Antonio Etxebarrieta who, together with Txabi Etxebarrieta, his brother and first martyr

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<sup>4</sup> AMEZAGA IRIBARREN, Arantzazu, 1999, *Manuel Irujo. Un hombre vasco*. Bilbao: Sabino Arana Fundazioa.

<sup>5</sup> JIMÉNEZ DE ABERASTURI, Juan Carlos, 1991, *Los vascos en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El consejo Nacional vasco de Londres (1940-1944). Recopilación documental*. San Sebastián: Cuadernos del Centro de Documentación de Historia contemporánea del País Vasco.

<sup>6</sup> ZULAIKA, Joseba, 2014, *That Bilbao Old moon. The passion and resurrection of a city*. Reno: Center for Basque studies.

of the Basque revolutionary nationalism of ETA, deployed a new subjectivity under the dictatorship.

Manuel Irujo was both an untiring reader and an open-minded person. His nationalism was not narrow, but open, and the high level of his democratic principles brought him to exchange ideas with anyone who could dialogue reasonably. A respectful man like Irujo was capable of exchanging letters and holding meetings with those young Basque nationalists from the new generation that had been born under the dictatorship, inside the internal exile, as well as with the Basques from the diaspora, and with any politician who could help the Basque cause. Because of that, and also because of his capacity to question even the decisions of his own party, Manuel Irujo gained respect from everybody and his positions were highly appreciated. Through such a personality, we can analyze the development of Basque nationalism in the exile, its political patterns, its ideological constraints, and the international contacts deployed in order to externalize the Basque cause.

Irujo was on many occasions the link of connection with all of the political tendencies in the Basque exile, and so he was also in contact with the young nationalists who formed the revolutionary Basque nationalism of ETA—which is why his archive is tremendously useful when doing a comparison of Basque nationalist tendencies and establishing the importance of the trends and patterns adopted, especially when considering the block policies developed during the Cold War, were the different tendencies of Basque nationalisms would take separate paths.

The starting point of our research, the 1956 Basque World Congress, showed the importance that the exile had in the development of Basque nationalism. After almost twenty years of exile, the Basques were debating on the convenience or not of keeping the Basque Government alive, whether to forge the nation from outside the nation, or how to develop nationalism once having realized that a nation is not determined by a territory but by the will of people. The exile, in that sense, became both object and subject. The non-place that an exile could be, a space which cannot be defined as rational, historical, or concerned with identity,<sup>7</sup> was to be turned into a place that was relational, historical, and full of identity thanks to the development of Basque nationalism. From within the exile, the development of Basque nationalism was seen not only

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<sup>7</sup> AUGÉ, Marc. 1995. *Non-places. Introduction to an anthropology of supermodernity*. London-New York: Verso. pp.77-78.

as a necessity to keep a people united, but as an obligation, even a salvation for Basque nationalism itself, safe from the spirit of destruction of the Franco dictatorship.

My study of the development of Basque nationalism and its efforts to forge the nation in exile follows three main different axis of analysis: the exile(s), the international recognition given to Basque nationalism(s), and the political patterns that were developed by Basque nationalism(s), from Christian Democracy to socialism.

Is it possible to forge a nation while being in exile? In the study of Basque nationalism it is essential to analyze the importance of the exile as a determining factor, but also as a subject of study. Nevertheless, the Basque case is not an isolated one—the Kurds, the Jews, or the Palestinians, they all built their nation from the exile, or even ignoring the exact geo-political boundaries of their nation.

Nation, and its relationship with the exile, is one of the axis of this study. The nation—the Basque nation in this case—was something that they took with them on their exile, the exiles carried their own nation and built it, transformed it, during the period of time that they spent far away from home.

Exile is always a forced situation, it is not voluntary—at least not in most cases—but it is seen as a possibility of survival.

The Basques were forced into exile when the carlist and fascist were winning the war in the Basque Country and Spain, right after the first Basque Government had been formed, on October 1<sup>st</sup>, 1936. Although an important part of the exile settled in the Basque portion of France, within the three “*herrialdes*” (territories) that are in cultural terms considered to be part of the Basque Country according to its political national imaginary, the sense of being expelled from the motherland was nevertheless present in all of the exiles.

The presence of the exile in Basque history is reflected in its language. An ancient language like Basque provides us with important directions that let us follow the history of the Basque people; when it comes to the exile, the words *erbeste* and *atzerri* are used (in some cases since the 18<sup>th</sup> century) to describe a situation of forced stay outside the Homeland, which is *Aberri* in Basque. Yet the Basque language uses a different word, *diaspora*, to refer to the 1937 exile,

having, in that case, a special meaning that refers to the “Basque Country outside the Basque Country”—that is, the “Eighth province.”<sup>8</sup>

In early 1970 the diaspora concept became common in academic terms and it was applied for the Basque case by the *Instituto Americano de Estudios Vascos* and by Jon Bilbao at the Basque program Studies in Reno, at the University of Nevada. One cannot talk about the Basque diaspora without referring to the extensive and illustrious work *Basque migration and diaspora. Transnational identity* by Gloria Totoricagüena Egurrola<sup>9</sup> who updates the studies of the Basque communities abroad and analyzes their identity.

The awareness of being a nation was stronger than the fact of having been expelled from their territory. The first step was to realize that they were a nationality regardless of whether they lived or not within a marked-out land<sup>10</sup>—and the Basques were aware that they did, and they also knew that they were a nation. The geographical boundaries of the nation might change but, in fact, since a nation is a living concept, borders can indeed be displaced. With these concepts in mind, can we not define the exile as the 8<sup>th</sup> province of the Basque Country?

Yet the exile is something that should not to be explained in the singular, but in the plural: the exiles. There are many different exiles within the exile, with the only condition for talking about an exile being the presence of the aim of returning, the hope of coming back to the homeland, or the necessity of keeping the nation alive.

In the Basque exile there are two main different exiles: the exile of those who are living abroad, inside the borders of foreign countries, and the exile of those who live in internal exile, remaining within Basque soil. When the exile is studied, often the internal exile is ignored, forgotten, and, because that, the resistance to the dictatorship becomes blurred.

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<sup>8</sup> IRUJO, Xabier. 2012. IRUJO, Xabier. 2012. *Expelled from motherland. The government of President José Antonio Aguirre on exile, 1937-1960*. Reno: Center for Basque studies. University of Nevada. p.20. An extended research on that question is published by the same author in Basque in “Euskal erbesteak eta erbesteak” in *Gurengandik: Revista del Centro de estudios Arturo Campion*, 4, May 2008: 66-100.

<sup>9</sup> TOTORICAGÜENA EGURROLA, Gloria. 2005. *Basque migration and diaspora. Transnational Identity*. Reno: Center for the Basque studies.

<sup>10</sup> GREENFELD, Liah. 1993. *Nationalism. Five roads to modernity*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. P.31

When in exile, *anomie*, a concept first developed by Emile Durkheim, gives us the idea deployed by Liah Greenfeld,<sup>11</sup> according to which anomie plays an important role in the development of nationalism. The isolation of the subject or, in this case, of the community in a society that does not belong to them, where they cannot fit in, gives them the opportunity to flourish as a nation.

In the Basque case, the combination of anomie and exile allowed the Basque people to develop nationalism instead of becoming assimilated. Anomie alone would have allowed them to preserve their uniqueness, but the combination of it with the forced situation of the exile enabled them to keep their political structures, develop new trends and discussions, and even maintain and promote Basque culture and language; whereas in the politically “recognized” Basque country, mainly under the Franco regime, Basque language and Basque nationalism were persecuted.

Exile is present throughout our investigation, analyzed from different point of views and at different periods in time. Exile conditions the evolution of nationalism, and even the concepts, strategies, and ideologies developed. We can find differences between the exile abroad and the internal exile in the development of political strategies both before and during the World Basque Congress (1956), as well as in the Conference in Munich in 1962, but these differences will accompany Basque nationalism all along the way of political exile until the return of democracy.

In this respect, exile becomes a protection against dictatorship, not only in the real sense of what De Baets<sup>12</sup> defines as “a blessing in disguise”—since the exiles abroad are living and enjoying the freedom of living in democracies despite the fact of having been expelled from the motherland—but also in the sense of being a keeper of democracy, especially among those internal exiles who suffered during the Franco regime, striving to keep their nation alive, to keep up the hope and return to the democratic system where they would be able to develop without fear.

To that effect, according to Zulaika’s vision, the development of a violent political subject defended by ETA is a product of the Franco regime, although seasoned by the influence of

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<sup>11</sup> For Greenfeld, when *Anomie* is related to nations, the isolation, in that case of a nation, becomes the possibility of developing nationalism as part of identity. GREENFELD, Liah. 2005. “Nationalism and the mind”. *Nations and Nationalism*, 11 (3). pp. 325-342.

<sup>12</sup> BAETS, Antoon de. 2011 “Plutarch’s Thesis: The contribution of refugee historians to historical writing, 1945-2010” in *In defense of learning*. British Academy. p.211-224



philosophers of the likes of Nietzsche or Sartre, and the lecture of Dostoyesvski's works.<sup>13</sup> The development of an internal exile, restricted by its own "internal" nature, produced a radical nationalism that saw as a natural consequence the revolutionary use of violence.

Apart from the theories and experiences that were developed while in the exile, we will also study it as a whole, as a subject of study. The Basque community has scattered throughout the world in the course of history, and the survival of these communities abroad has developed into a diaspora. Here we have to differentiate between emigrants and exiles, since while emigrants have fled from the Basque Country due to political reasons and are not willing to return to the Basque country (or, at any rate, it is not their main goal), exiles have been forced to flee because of political reasons, and these communities are keen to go back home.

Among the Basque, the exile holds a special position as a single block, as can be seen in the Basque World Congress of 1956, where the special section "Vascos en el Mundo" singled out the exile as a subject in itself. It is true that this section received some criticism because the adjective "world" was being reduced to refer to the Basques in South America, but that does not diminish the importance of the fact that a group of Basques in exile had organized themselves as if they actually were the 8<sup>th</sup> province of an imagined *Euzkadi*. The development of a federation like the FEVA, the importance of being listened to as a whole at the World Basque Congress in 1956, the weight that the Basque community's opinion in South America exercised on the developing of policies and strategies of the Basque Government—all of this endows the exile with the category of subject that makes it worth the effort analyzing.

The exile gave Basque nationalism the opportunity of contacting new agents and interacting with certain circles that could help the Basque cause to be recognized, and this gets us to the second axis of our research: the international recognition of Basque nationalism, or what they called "the Basque cause."

One of the multiple problems that beset nations without a State of their own is not being recognized by the international community. In a world after WWII, where national borders, especially in Europe, had been redefined and an iron curtain was blocking the hopes of so many peoples, nationalism was not experiencing its moment of highest popularity. Extreme ethnic and collective nationalism, i.e. fascism, was considered to have been the cause of the war; and the slightest detail that might resemble it, even if it were only due to the use of the words

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<sup>13</sup>ZULAIKA, Joseba. 2014. *Op. cit.*, pp. 57-59.

“nation” or “nationalism” as part of the vocabulary, could put at risk the group of people that had been identified with it.

Yet the involvement of the Basque battalions that fought jointly with the French and British armies during WWII, and the collaboration of the Basque services with the American Department of State, gave Basque nationalism the opportunity to get its national cause recognized and expect some help in return. The American strategy (also called Atlantic strategy) drove Basque nationalism to collaborate with the American secret services since the early 40’s and until the late 50’s, and opened the door to Basque presence in international institutions such as the UN or UNESCO, where the Basque voice was listened to.

The relations of the Basque Government-in-exile with the American Department of State are the object of a deep study in David Mota’s work *Un Sueño Americano. El Gobierno vasco en el exilio y Estados Unidos (1937-1979)*.<sup>14</sup> This study details the strong relationships and deep hopes that the Basque Government had placed in the American Administration, especially after *Lehendakari* Aguirre expressed his opinion on the matter. After his death, and having already veered towards a European-oriented strategy, American relations lost intensity—but they were never severed, due to the importance of maintaining good relations with such an influential country.

On the international relations and the actions taken by the Basque government to spread the Basque cause, especially during the first years of the exile, there are some works that detail the *Basque services*—one of the most controversial nets of information which was active mainly during the 40’s. *Al servicio del extranjero: historia del servicio vasco de información. De la Guerra Civil al exilio. (1936-1943)* by Juan Carlos Jiménez de Aberasturi is one of the most complete and recent studies on these international relations, although it is also worth consulting an article on international relations written by Xose Núñez Seixas which, again, talks about the international Basque activities until *Lehendakari* Aguirre’s death. On the international relations of Basque nationalism previous to the exile, one can consult Alexander Ugalde Zubiri’s work “*La acción exterior del nacionalismo vasco (1890-1939): Historia, pensamiento y relaciones*

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<sup>14</sup> MOTA ZURDO, David, 2016, *Un Sueño Americano. El Gobierno vasco en el exilio y Estados Unidos (1937-1979)*. Vitoria-Gasteiz-Gasteiz : Instituto vasco de administración pública. Another recent publication by the same autor, but much more specific on the Basque government delegation in New York, is: MOTA ZURDO, David, 2015, “A Orillas Del Potomac. Pedro Beitia y las labores de lobbying de la Delegación del Gobierno vasco en Washington DC (1958-1963).” *Intus-Legere Historia* 9 (1): 89–113.

*Internacionales,*” which mixes different disciplines in its research of the international relations.<sup>15</sup>

If during the first part of the exile the Atlantic strategy was the main goal for Basque nationalism and for the Basque Government, the year 1956 and the Basque World Congress in Paris saw a reassessment of the situation and a redefinition of the strategy of international recognition. The Congress itself was designed to show to an international audience the unity of the Basques and their commitment with the free world and with democracy, and it was to that purpose that some international politicians were invited—but, as already mentioned, the Congress also meant the declaration of the new political strategy of Basque nationalism, focusing on European federalism.

Although Basque nationalists had been involved in the European Federal movement from its very inception—by being present at the foundation of the *Nouvelles Équipes Internationales* (NEI) in 1947, The Hague Congress of 1948, or the Consejo Vasco por la Federación Europea (1951)—from 1956 onward the strategy was focused on Europe, while the American way was gradually abandoned. Basque nationalists would use their presence in European institutions and congresses to turn international attention towards their cause, an instance of which will be seen later on, when we go over the tactics employed by the Basques during the IV Congress of the European Federal Movement in Munich in 1962.

The European strategy of Basque nationalism, focusing on the paper of the PNV during the exile, is analyzed in a comprehensive and very detailed work by Leyre Arrieta, *Estación Europa. La política Europeísta del PNV en el exilio (1945-1977)*,<sup>16</sup> which gives us

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<sup>15</sup> JIMÉNEZ ABERASTURI, Juan Carlos, 2009, *Al servicio del extranjero: historia del servicio vasco de información. De la Guerra Civil al exilio. (1936-1943)*. Boadilla del Monte: Antonio Machado Libros. By the same author it is also worth consulting a previous work, focusing on the Basques and WWII: (1999) *De la derrota a la esperanza: políticas vascas durante la segunda Guerra mundial. (1937-1947)*. Oñati: Instituto vasco de administración pública; NÚÑEZ SEIXAS, Xose M., “Relaciones exteriores del nacionalismo vasco. (1895-1960),” in DE PABLO, Santiago (Ed.), *Los nacionalistas. Historia del nacionalismo vasco. 1876-1960*, Gasteiz, Fundación Sancho el Sabio, 1995, pp.381-417; An earlier work that caught my attention in the early stages of my research was one that focuses on the Congress of European Nationalities: NÚÑEZ SEIXAS, Xose M., 1995, “¿Protodiplomacia exterior o ilusiones ópticas? El nacionalismo vasco en el contexto internacional y el congreso de nacionalidades europeas (1914-1937),” in *Cuadernos de sección. Historia-Geografía* 23. Donostia: Eusko-Ikaskuntza, pp. 243-275; UGALDE ZUBIRI, Alexander, 1996, *La acción exterior del nacionalismo vasco (1890-1939): Historia, pensamiento y relaciones Internacionales*. Bilbao: Instituto Vasco de Administración pública.

<sup>16</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre, 2007, *Estación Europa. La política europeísta del PNV en el exilio (1945-1977)*. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos.

considerable information not only about the use of the Europeanist movements as a way to obtain international recognition for the Basque cause, but also as an ideological constraint.

In this respect, the European Federal Movement will be Irujo's position during the whole length of the exile in connection with being recognized in Europe as a nation, but Christian Democracy will be the ideological option for traditional Basque nationalism in Europe.

The birth of ETA in 1959, and its development during the 60's and the 70's, broadened not only the international focus but also the goal of recognition. If the traditional Basque nationalism of the PNV, the ANV, and the Basque Government had concentrated on the European Federal Movement as the political movement through which to receive international recognition, the new revolutionary Basque nationalism represented by ETA would turn its focus on the non-alignment movement, reinterpreting the position of the Basque Country and of Basque nationalism in Cold War politics. In a world divided into blocks, the different tendencies within Basque nationalism—in this case what we have defined as “Traditional” and “Revolutionary” —took different paths in the block division.

ETA caused a shock within Basque nationalism, especially because these young Basque men were distancing themselves from the traditional Basque nationalists, who believed that they were the original, genuine nationalists.

The new revolutionary Basque nationalism redefined the relationship between Spain and the Basque country by turning to the anti-colonialist movement in their struggle against the occupation of the Basque Country by France and Spain—but what they redefined, above all, was the answer to that occupation.

In that respect, the Basque revolutionary ideology of the young members of the new Basque generation of ETA members is broadly studied in Gurutz Jáuregui's work *Ideología y estrategia política de ETA. Análisis de su evolución entre 1959 y 1968*, as well as in the works by Robert Clark, focusing especially on the use of violence linked to a national vindication.<sup>17</sup>

When in 1956 Federico Krutwig took part in the Basque World Congress in order to defend the use of violence for achieving the freedom of the Basque Country, some Basque nationalists

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<sup>17</sup> JÁUREGUI BERECIARTU, Gurutz, 1981, *Ideología y estrategia política de ETA. Análisis de su evolución entre 1959 y 1968*. Madrid: Siglo XXI; CLARK, Robert, 1984, *The basque insurgents. ETA, 1952-1980*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press; CLARK, Robert, 1987, “The legitimacy of ethno-nationalist insurgency,” in *The legitimacy of political violence? The case of western Europe*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts.

like Manuel Irujo stood up in precaution, since the idea of violence had been discarded by Basque nationalists a long time ago. But the young nationalists were looking for new answers, and the anti-colonialist movement, combined with the violence and the theoretical basis extracted from Krutwig's book *Vasconia* (1966), had created a new international scenario for Basque nationalism. The Brest Charter of 1976 aligned the Basque revolutionary nationalists with the Irish Sinn Fein, the Bretons, or the Welsh Cymru Goch (among others), and it marks the culmination of that strategy within our chronology. The young Basque nationalists had set up a new international web, in which being recognized did not imply resorting to Federal Congresses or the traditional allies, but rather to the Europe of the peoples and of minorities, aided by the Third World movement.

While it cannot be said that ETA or revolutionary Basque nationalism profited from the Europe of the peoples as a real way for internationalizing the Basque cause, the use of violence did achieve some of its goals, and the Basque cause found an echo at international chancelleries, especially after the Burgos trial of 1970, in which Franco's regime wanted to send 16 Basques to death in what was considered to be a political trial against the Basque Country.

Of course, the emergence of ETA has an impact on our third axis of analysis—the political patterns followed by Basque nationalism.

The exile and international recognition helped Basque nationalists to get acquainted with different political patterns and, whereas the traditional Basque nationalism of the PNV remained upright in favor of Christian Democracy throughout all the period under study, the revolutionary Basque nationalism of ETA evolved from the non-alignment movement to socialism and communism.

If violence signified a hard blow for the nationalism of Basque Christian-Democracy, alignment with the communist theses meant an even harder knock, difficult to cope with. The Basque nationalists who had expelled the PCE from the Basque government and fought alongside the USA, aligning themselves with the western part of the Iron Curtain, received the socialist tendencies of their young Basques with incredulity, first, and then with indignation.

As to the analysis of the intellectual references for the revolutionary Basque nationalism of ETA, these references vary due to the different tendencies present within nationalist ideology and its external conditioners, but also because of some tragic episodes related to violence.

Since in this research it is not our objective to explain the evolution of a party like the PNV or a movement like ETA—nor the evolution of Basque nationalism, its conditioners, its patterns,

and the impact that the exile had on it—we have elaborated our analysis bearing in mind the axis of our research and, especially, following the prosopography axis of Manuel Irujo, who will guide us among the convergences and divergences of Basque nationalism in the exile. Therefore, the events here developed are studied following our center of interest, which consists in explaining the development of Basque nationalism far away from the homeland, as well as its ideological and political patterns, and its efforts to be recognized by the international community.

This research has been divided into 5 different chapters, taking as reference events that can either explain or help explain the axis of our research.

The first chapter focuses on the Basque World Congress held in Paris in 1956, highlighting the differences between the exile and the inside, and the different views on what Basque politics during the exile were supposed to be, especially when it comes to the unity debate that was held among the Basque forces. Although the Basque Government edited and published the minutes of the Paris Congress for its 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 1983, there is no other complete analysis dealing with what the Basque World Conference had meant after the first 25 years in exile. We can rely on an article that was defended in the Congress, *Eusko Jaurlaritza eta Catalunyako Generalitatea: Erbestetik Parlamentuen eraketara arte (1939-1980)*, by Asier Madarieta, which focuses, precisely, on the unity of the Basques, with an exhaustive research of the minutes and the repercussion of the Basque Congress—it does not, however, stress the factor of the exile.<sup>18</sup>

But what did the World Basque Congress mean for the evolution of Basque nationalism? Was the Congress in Paris a significant change in the international strategy of Basque nationalism in exile?

The second chapter analyzes one of the main options that Manuel Irujo had for attaining international recognition: the IV<sup>th</sup> Congress of the European Movement in Munich. The Congress held in Munich in 1962 marks an internal evolution in traditional Basque nationalism, not only because it was held only two years after the loss of the first *Lehendakari*—meaning

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<sup>18</sup> MADARIETA, Asier, 2007, “El último grito de unidad en el exilio. El Congreso Mundial Vasco de 1956,” pp.123-157, in AGUIRREAZKUENAGA, Joseba; SOBREQUÉS, Jaume (Eds.), *Eusko Jaurlaritza eta Catalunyako Generalitatea: Erbestetik Parlamentuen eraketara arte (1939-1980)*. Oñati: Instituto Vasco de Administración Pública; EUSKO JAURLARITZAREN ARGITALPEN SERBITZUAK- SERVICIO CENTRAL DE PUBLICACIONES DEL GOBIERNO VASCO, 1983, *Euskal Batzar Orokorra. Congreso Mundial Vasco. 25 aniversario*. Bilbao.

therefore a big challenge for the strategy—but also because of the point of view of Basque nationalism and its representation in European organizations.

On the other hand, the Congress of Munich, better known as “El contubernio de Munich,” was seen as a direct challenge to the Franco dictatorship from the Spanish democrats, and for that reason the publications we can consult on this topic are all focused on that challenge which, for some of them, meant a national reconciliation and the beginning of a new period among the Spanish democrats. We have works written by members who attended the congress, like the work edited by Joaquín Satrústegui, *Cuando la transición se hizo posible: el «contubernio de Múnich»*; and an interesting book by Jordi Amat has been lately published, *La primavera de Múnich. Esperanza y fracaso de una transición democrática*,<sup>19</sup> which is important for us because it is mostly based on the experience of Manuel Irujo and gives us a vision of Basque nationalists from the other side, from the relations that he had with the Spanish resistance in the exile, as well as his interest in the vindication and defense of the Basque nation.

But was the Congress in Munich such a success for Basque nationalism? In this research we will try to explain what the Congress and the resolution adopted there really meant.

Moreover, an important part of the chapter—important because it is an original research never explored before—deals with the relationship of Manuel Irujo with the Congress for Cultural Freedom. The connection of this Congress with the American Secret Services and its anti-Soviet aim, makes this part especially interesting, not only because it connects again with the axis of the international recognition of the Basque cause through that institution, but also because of what participating in such an institution means, and the ideological position of Basque nationalism.

The third chapter gives us the opportunity of comparing the two main Basque nationalisms of those days, by focusing on a heated debate which took place in the exile between Elías Gallastegui and Manuel Irujo. Taking as our starting point an article written by Irujo on the revolutionary Basque nationalists, and a long letter in response by Elías Gallastegui, we will follow mostly the evolution of Basque revolutionary nationalism and the incidence of the exile

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<sup>19</sup> AMAT, Jordi, 2016, *La primavera de Múnich. Esperanza y fracaso de una transición democrática*. Barcelona: Tusquets Editores; SATRÚSTEGUI, Joaquín [et.al.], 1993, *Cuando la transición se hizo posible: El Contubernio de Munich*. Madrid: Tecnos.

on its ideology. Was the exile an essential factor in the development of the ideology and the political patterns?

The fourth chapter analyzes revolutionary Basque nationalism from the point of view of traditional Basque nationalism, and the debate taking place in the exile. The trial of Burgos in 1970 will serve as the background for a chapter that presents one of the most controversial features of Basque nationalism: the use of violence.

The Trial of Burgos was indeed one of the main ways in which the international recognition of Basque nationalism was obtained, although, at the same time, it created a fierce division among Basque nationalists.

As a consequence of the international repercussion of the trial, there exist a huge variety of works on the subject, most of them published right after the trial and featuring important international participations, such as: *Le procès de Burgos* by Gisèle Halimi, with a prologue written by the philosopher Jean Paul Sartre, *Burgos: Juicio a un pueblo*, published by Equipo Hórdago, or the detailed legal book written by Miguel Castells and Francisco Letamendía (lawyers in Burgos) under the pseudonym Kepa Salaberri, *Sumarísimo 31-69. El proceso de Euskadi en Burgos*.<sup>20</sup>

In our research, however, we will focus on the international recognition acquired by Basque nationalism through violence, and the evolution of the ideological constraints on revolutionary Basque nationalism.

The last chapter of this research concentrates on the end of the exile. Based on Manuel Irujo's life as the central axis, the chapter deals with the return of the Navarrese to the Basque Country, and with the holding of the General Assembly of the PNV in Pamplona in 1977.

Did this return mean the end of the "eighth province"? The return of the exile takes place at the same time as traditional Basque nationalism is redefining its features. Was the exile somehow influencing this updating of traditional Basque nationalism? Was there a difference between the exile and the inside in the redefinition?

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<sup>20</sup> HALIMI, Gisèle, 1971, *Le procès de Burgos*. París: Gallimard; SALABERRI, Kepa, 1971, *Sumarísimo 31-69. El proceso de Euskadi en Burgos*. Paris: Ruedo Ibérico.



To conclude, one of the main hypothesis we work on in this thesis, is about which is the influence of the exile on the forging of the Basque political nation in the second half of the XXth Century.

Exodus, Diasporas and exiles contribute to forge and reformulate debates in nations without State. In the Basque exile, the Basque Government articulates the making up of the political nation, but at which point is the exile reshaping the result?

The influence of Manuel Irujo on the ideological and political strategy of traditional Basque nationalism is proven and evident; and the analysis of the years in exile, following the trail of his personal experience, gives us a comprehensive and wide-ranging outlook on how Basque nationalism had evolved far from the homeland, yet forging the nation from the exile.

## 2. METHODOLOGICAL PATH

Passats quatre anys d'investigació, ara és el moment d'explicar quines han estat les meves opcions metodològiques i els arxius i fonts en els quals m'he basat.

Vaig centrar la primera part de la recerca a ampliar i reforçar els coneixements que ja havia adquirit en la realització de la tesi de màster titulada *Les influències àraboisraelianes en el conflicte basc*. Amb el bagatge adquirit amb aquella recerca, que d'altra banda va ser molt ben valorada pel tribunal que va jutjar-la, vaig prendre consciència que havia obert una via d'investigació que podia ser ampliada, com així ha estat. Vaig reprendre la recerca, per tant, pel principi: per ampliar la bibliografia i per rellegir la que ja havia utilitzar en l'anterior investigació.

En emprendre aquests nou viatge intel·lectual, es va fer evident que calia ampliar els objectius i els actors investigats. Em calia anar del general al particular. Vaig començar la investigació a l'arxiu de la Fundació Sabino Arana. L'Eduardo Jáuregui i l'Iñaki Goigogana, dos dels arxivers de la Fundació, em van ajudar a trobar les fonts que cercava per donar sentit a les hipòtesis que m'anava plantejant. Cal dir que la seva ajuda va ser inestimable.

Si a la tesina m'havia centrat en les influències àrabs i israelianes sobre el nacionalisme basc, ara em calia ampliar el focus i resseguir quines influències internacionals havia rebut el conjunt dels nacionalisme basc i fer-ho, sobretot, a partir de l'estudi de l'exili.

Des de la primera visita a l'arxiu de la Fundació Sabino Arana, a Bilbao, vaig poder comprovar que una de les influències exteriors que va acompanyar el PNB durant tot el període estudiat és la pertinença del partit a la Democràcia Cristiana internacional, un moviment que el PNB va ajudar a crear i que li proporcionà un vincle internacional molt important. La pertinença a la Democràcia Cristiana internacional va ajudar el PNB a reflexionar des de l'exili sobre la ideologia i l'estratègia que sostenia el partit. A Bilbao, vaig consultar la correspondència entre el democratacristià italià Luigi Sturzo i els seus homòlegs bascos, sobretot amb el lehendakari Aguirre, Alberto Onaindia i José Ignacio Lizaso.

Als arxius del PNB vaig tenir notícia per primer cop de l'existència d'uns serveis secrets bascos i la relació que mantenien amb la Gran Bretanya, França i, especialment, amb els Estats Units. Vaig poder consultar el *Boletín de Información*, els núm. 1-10, de l'any 1937, i vaig enllaçar després amb el *Diario 1941-1942*, de José Antonio Aguirre, en una magnífica edició a cura d'Iñaki Goigogana, i que vaig poder consultar gràcies a la seva amabilitat. En la introducció

d'aquests diaris, Goigogana explica el periple del lehendakari des de la França ocupada pels nazis fins als Estats Units i ho farceix amb notes a peu de pàgina que ajuden a contextualitzar la situació i a comprendre els esdeveniments.

A Bilbao també vaig poder consultar la correspondència personal entre diversos membres del govern basc a l'exili, com ara el lehendakari Aguirre, Manuel Irujo, Lizaso, etcètera, la qual està dipositada en el nou Arxiu Històric d'Euskadi, que ha recuperat i digitalitzat milers de documents del govern basc al llarg de la seva història. Per bé que molts d'aquests documents es poden consultar online (malgrat el caòtic cercador, també cal dir-ho), un gran nombre encara no i per això vaig haver de tornar a Bilbao per consultar la documentació sense digitalitzar de govern basc a París i, també, per consultar l'arxiu de Beyris i la documentació inèdita dels lehendakaris Aguirre i Leizaola.

L'etapa següent d'aquest viatge que ha representat fer la tesi doctoral em va portar als Estats Units. Seguint les passes del lehendakari Aguirre, vaig participar en un congrés sobre nacionalisme a la Columbia University, a la mateixa universitat en la que van fer-hi classes el lehendakari i el malaguanyat Jesús Galíndez. Hi vaig presentar una comunicació sobre ethnosimbolisme i l'arbre de Gernika i una altra sobre la influència Algeriana en la lluita armada d'ETA.

L'estela de la presència basca a l'exili va portar-me a consultar l'arxiu de la *New York Public Library*. Allí vaig garbellar documents de l'època del primer exili basc, com ara el document *Autonomous Government of Euzkadi: Report on the Administration of Justice in the Basque Country during the Civil War*, escrit per Jesús María Leizaola el 1938, o el recopilatori *Tres discursos del presidente Aguirre*, publicat a Mèxic el 1937, després d'una de les gires per les Amèriques del lehendakari.

A més, a la biblioteca de Nova York vaig aprofitar per consultar algunes fonts secundàries que són difícils de trobar a Barcelona, entre les que cal destacar *The Making of the Basque nation*, de Marianne Heiberg, o *Ideology, mobilization and the nation: The Irish, Basque an Carlist national movement*, escrit per M.K Flynn.

Però el que realment va ser profitós per a la investigació va ser quan vaig recalcar al *Center for Basque Studies* (CBS) de la Universitat de Nevada, a Reno, ciutat on van instal·lar-se a finals del segle XIX una comunitat de pastor bascos que perdura. Al CBS vaig conèixer qui ha esdevingut el codirector, juntament amb el Dr. Jordi Casassas, d'aquesta tesi, el Dr. Joseba Agirreazkuenaga. L'estada a Reno amb ell em va ajudar a definir millor la recerca que volia

fer. El professor Agirreazkuenaga em va proposar que utilitzés Manuel Irujo com a fil conductor de la investigació sobre els canvis estratègics i polítics dels nacionalisme basc, sobretot perquè Irujo havia estat cabdal a l'hora de redefinir el nacionalisme tradicional basc a l'exili i perquè Irujo va poder interactuar amb els altres nacionalistes bascos, els que es desprendrien del PNB, millor que cap altre dirigent. La tesi no és exactament una biografia de Manuel Irujo, sinó una anàlisi prosopogràfica del nacionalisme basc a l'exili.

Per indicació del professor Agirreazkuenaga, finalment vaig modificar la cronologia de la investigació. Vaig escurçar-la per dos motius principals: per treballar intensament un període de l'exili basc que havia estat poc estudiat i perquè volia centrar-me en el període durant els qual el nacionalisme basc va maldar per obtenir un reconeixement internacional. Així doncs, el període a estudiar va acabar essent el comprès entre el 1956 i el 1977. Arrencar al 1956 es justifica perquè aquell any va tenir lloc a París el Primer Congrés Mundial Basc, que reuní representants de pràcticament tots els moviments socials i polítics del món basc a l'exili. Al cap dels primers vint anys d'exili, aquell congrés volia imprimir una nova dinàmica. Vam decidir fer el tall final al 1977 perquè aquell any va suposar la tornada de l'exili de la majoria dels exiliats bascos, la reorganització nacional d'Euskadi en clau democràtica i, sobretot, el retorn de Manuel Irujo a Navarra.

Al CBS de Reno vaig consultar bibliografia especialitzada en nacionalisme basc a l'exili, normalment publicada en anglès per la Universitat de Nevada, així com diversos arxius amb documentació personal de personalitats basques i bascoamericanes. Entre la documentació que vaig consultar destaca la correspondència entre el lehendakari Aguirre i Manuel Irujo amb Jon Bilbao, l'home fort dels bascos nord-americans i que va ocupar diversos càrrecs de responsabilitat en les delegacions que tenia el govern basc a Amèrica.

A banda de poder examinar la bibliografia i l'esplèndid arxiu amb fonts primàries que es conserven al CBS, a Reno també vaig poder establir contacte amb investigadors residents o *visiting scholars*, el debat amb els quals em van ajudar molt a centrar la investigació i a repensar i plantejar nous enfocaments per millorar-la.

Seguint el meu viatge als Estats Units, sortint de Reno em vaig traslladar a un dels arxius més concorreguts d'arreu del món: El *National Archives and Records Administration* (NARA), a College Park, Maryland. La voluntat d'analitzar les relacions internacionals del nacionalisme basc m'havia portat a indagar sobre la via americana (o atlàntica) conduïda pel lehendakari Aguirre, el que va comportar bastir la relació dels bascos amb els serveis secrets nord-

americans. Per aquesta raó era necessari consultar els arxius del NARA, a College Park, als suburbis de Washington DC, on es conserva tota mena de documentació administrativa. Són unes instal·lacions d'alta seguretat del govern nord-americà on no és permès entrar bolígrafs o blocs de notes però sí tota mena d'aparells electrònics. Vaig centrar la meua recerca en la consulta dels informes que les autoritats nord-americanes feien sobre els bascos.

La consulta d'aquesta documentació s'ha de fer sota el control exhaustiu dels treballadors de l'arxiu i de vegades costa desxifrar el complicat sistema americà de classificació arxivística. Finalment, vaig centrar la recerca en les informacions que tant l'ambaixada americana a Madrid com el consolat de Bilbao rebien dels seus informadors bascos i en els informes que el personal de l'ambaixada o del consolat elaboraven i enviaven al Departament d'Estat dels EUA a Washington.

D'aquesta manera vaig consultar els documents referits a la cronologia (1956-1977), classificats en els registres:

#### Record Group 59

- Bureau of European Affairs
- Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
- Intelligence Records
- State Department

L'estada als EUA va ser profitosa i en tornar a casa vaig anar destil·lant la informació que havia recaptat, cosa que em va portar a reflexionar sobre la vessant teòrica del que volia que fos aquesta tesi doctoral, analitzant la influència de l'exili en la definició de l'imaginari nacional d'aquell grup de persones forçades a viure fora del seu territori original. Des de l'exili també es podia recrear la comunitat imaginada, per dir-ho a la manera de Benedict Anderson. Per tal de treballar el marc teòric sobre què podia representar l'exili en la redefinició del nacionalisme basc, però també en un sentit més general, vaig contactar amb una de les grans especialistes en l'estudi del nacionalisme, la Dra. Liah Greenfeld. Vam simpatitzar de seguida i ella em va oferir l'oportunitat d'optar a ser *visiting researcher* a la Boston University durant el segon semestre del 2015.

Però abans de viatjar als EUA havia de tornar als arxius del País Basc. De nou a Bilbao, vaig centrar els meus esforços a treballar els nous objectius acordats amb el Dr. Agirreazkuenaga, començant pel Congrés Mundial Basc. Vaig consultar-ne les actes originals dipositades a la Fundació Sabino Arana, així com els dietaris de Jesús Solaun. Vaig aprofitar l'estada per fer el buidatge de les publicacions essencials de l'exili i el nacionalisme basc. En aquest aspecte, cal destacar la utilitat de l'arxiu online de l'Hemeroteca de la diàspora vasca (<http://urazandi.euskaletxeak.net/>), la qual, amb més de 180.000 pàgines online, classificades per anys, lloc de publicació i ordre alfabètic, posa a disposició de l'investigador l'extensa i intensa producció basca durant els cent anys del període 1877-1977.

En aquest arxiu online he pogut consultar les revistes publicades a l'exterior com ara *Aberri* (Caracas, 1958-1962), *Euzkadi* (Caracas, 1972-1975), *Euzko Gastedi* (Caracas, 1948-1977), *Frente Nacional Vasco* (Caracas, 1960-1968), *Gudari* (1961-1973) *Irrintzi* (1958-1962) o *Zutik en Tierras Americanas* (Caracas, 1960-1975). Malgrat el tresor documental que representa aquesta hemeroteca, malauradament no conté totes les publicacions necessàries per a la meua recerca. Per exemple, *Alderdi* (1947-1974), el butlletí oficial del Partit Nacionalista Basc, que només està disponible a la Fundació Sabino Arana, a Bilbao, on sí que vaig poder fer-ne el buidatge. Per consultar alguns números de la publicació del Govern Basc, *Oficina de Prensa de Euzkadi* (OPE), el millor és acudir a la xarxa a <http://ope.euskaletxeak.net/>.

A Bilbao també vaig consultar les actes, els retalls de diari, les invitacions i alguna correspondència relacionada amb el IV Congrés del Moviment Europeu a Munich, que després va ser conegut com a "Contubernio de Múnich", i que em va servir per fonamentar el segon capítol de la tesi. Seguint amb la temàtica europeista, a la Fundació Sabino Arana també vaig consultar les resolucions de la 27a. Assemblea ordinària de l'assemblea parlamentària del Consell d'Europa de 1974 i les ponències presentades per Irujo al Congrés del Moviment Europeu que va tenir lloc a Brussel·les el 1976, incloent les invitacions i la documentació acreditativa del dirigent navarrès.

Instal·lada de nou als Estats Units, aquest cop a Boston, la meua feina va consistir a treballar sobre el nacionalisme des d'una perspectiva teòrica. Amb l'ajuda de la professora Liah Greenfeld vaig poder llegir, debatre i reflexionar sobre les diverses teories del nacionalisme, l'exili i com l'exili podia influir en l'evolució de les teories nacionals elaborades des de l'interior en moments de normalitat. Amb la Dra. Greenfeld vaig aprofundir en conceptes definits per ella mateixa, com ara "nacionalisme ètnic", "nacionalisme cívic", "anomia", o bé la relació entre el nacionalisme i la violència o el nacionalisme i la democràcia.

L'estada a la Boston University em va permetre familiaritzar-me amb bibliografia sobre el nacionalisme. Primer llegia els llibres que m'indicava la professora Greenfeld i després en debatia el contingut amb ella en unes llargues i profitoses sessions de treball. D'aquesta manera em vaig introduir en el món d'Edward Shils, Raymond Aron, David Landes, Joseph Ben David, Daniel Bell, Emile Durkheim o March Bloch. Tant va ser així, que en tornar a Barcelona vaig preparar, juntament amb el professor Agustí Colomines, l'edició del llibre *Pensar con libertad. La humanidad y la nación en todos sus estados* (Arpa editores 2016), que conté una sèrie d'articles de la professora Greenfeld i una llarga introducció nostra per tal de contextualitzar el diàleg crític que ella ha anat construint amb la seva, diguem-ne, "família intel·lectual": Karl Marx, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Joseph Ben-David, Edward Shils, Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell, Ernest Gellner y Benedict Anderson.

De nou a Barcelona, vaig capbussar-me en el Fons Manuel Irujo, que és d'una importància cabdal per fonamentar molt del que es diu en aquestes pàgines. És un fons que està dipositat a l'Eusko Ikaskuntza de Donostia i que tanmateix es pot consultar online a través de la plataforma Eusko Media Fundazioa (<http://www.euskomedia.org/>). El fons conté un material valuósíssim que és la base que sosté la meva recerca i la meva anàlisi. Són més de 20.000 pàgines agrupades en 4.380 documents, el que permet fer-se una idea de la importància d'aquest fons.

Manuel Irujo, advocat de formació i historiador de vocació i d'intenció, va conservar tota mena de documents. En aquest treball he citat puntualment els documents consultats, amb el seu corresponent enllaç electrònic, però la relació completa de caixes i documents és tan llarga que és difícil fer-ne aquí una relació completa. Això no obstant, els documents consultats podem agrupar-los per blocs:

- Escrits de Manuel Irujo : Articles, còpies de cartes enviades, reflexions, apunts, escrits per a la radiodifusió, etc.
- Correspondència: Correspondència entre Manuel Irujo i centenars de personatges de l'exili i l'interior entre ells: José Antonio Aguirre, Jesús María Leizaola, Juan Ajuriaguerra, Mikel Isasi, Jesús Solaun, Telesforo Monzón, Gonzalo Nárdiz, Fernando Valera, Pedro Turullols, Josu Hickman, Jesús Galíndez, Rodolfo Llopis, Alberto Onaindia, Salvador de Madariaga, Diego Martínez Barrio, José María Gil Robles, Josep Tarradellas, Julio Just, Jose Luís Álvarez Enparantza "Txillardegui", Elías Gallastegi, Federico Krutwig, Victoria Kent, Alberto Elósegui, etc...
- Documentació sobre el Moviment Europeu.

- Correspondència amb Euskadi Buru Batzar .
- Documentació al voltant d'ETA.
- Documentació al voltant de la llengua basca.
- Documentació sobre el Consell Nacional Basc.
- Documentació activitats de les Delegacions del Govern Basc en especial Londres i París.
- Documentació al voltant del tractament i la història de Navarra.

Aquest ha estat el gran viatge que he hagut de fer per copsar qui era, què feia i amb qui es relacionava Manuel Irujo. Si parlem del moviment europeu, és important la correspondència, força abundant, entre Manuel Irujo i Julián Gorkin, l'antic dirigent del POUM, la qual em va fer descobrir la col·laboració del navarrès amb el Congrés per la Llibertat de la Cultura, moviment fundat a Berlín el 1950, amb presència basca, però dinamitzat des de París per Gorkin i Salvador de Madariaga, el diplomàtic liberal exiliat el 1936. Moltes de les cartes que es creuen entre ells donen pistes de la col·laboració i l'interès d'Irujo a utilitzar aquesta plataforma politico-intel·lectual per tal d'internacionalitzar la causa basca. Va utilitzar la revista del Congrés, *Cuadernos*, per fer-ho.

En el Fons Irujo hi ha tan sols uns quants exemplars de *Cuadernos*, per això vaig haver d'anar a trobar la resta a l'arxiu del Pavelló de la República de la Universitat de Barcelona. Les eficients arxiveres de la UB, Fuensanta Marmolejo i Judith Montserrat, em van ajudar a localitzar els exemplars de *Cuadernos* que em faltaven i també el *Boletín de prensa del Congreso por la Libertad de la Cultura*, editat en espanyol, y el *Boletín informativo del Centro de documentación y Estudios*.

En el mateix arxiu subterrani del Pavelló de la República, que sembla gairebé un búnquer, vaig consultar els fons relacionats amb el procés de Burgos de 1970. L'arxiu disposa de diversos fons donats per Xavier Vinader o Antoni Batista, entre d'altres, que contenen documentació i entrevistes amb l'entorn d'ETA i amb la resistència franquista, així com també bibliografia especialitzada i molt diversa sobre el nacionalisme basc, que van actualitzant gràcies al conveni de col·laboració que aquest arxiu de la UB té amb diversos arxius del País Basc.

A l'arxiu del Pavelló de la República vaig consultar fulls volants, manifestos, cartells, declaracions, informes, etcètera, produïts per la resistència catalana per donar suport i promoure el moviment antifranquista i les mobilitzacions davant el judici de Burgos. També



hi vaig poder escoltar l'enregistrament sonor de la declaració de Mario Onaindia en el procés, que va ser gravada i distribuïda clandestinament per donar suport a la causa basca i convertir aquell judici en un acte de propaganda política, a l'estil d'altres judicis polítics que tenien lloc en països en vies de descolonització o entre les guerrilles d'arreu del món.

El darrer tram del meu viatge per arxius i biblioteques em va portar novament a Bilbao. Gràcies a la borsa de viatge que va acompanyar al premi que atorga l'Institut d'Estudis Catalans, en col·laboració amb l'Eusko Ikaskuntza, i que vaig guanyar, vaig poder tornar al País Basc. Aquesta ha estat l'única vegada que he rebut una ajuda monetària per fer la tesi que ara vostès tenen a les mans. El premi, i per tant la beca, em va permetre fer una estada de tres mesos al País Basc. Vaig aprofitar-ho per visitar de nou la Fundació Sabino Arana i l'Arxiu Històric d'Euskadi, a més d'anar a fer consultes al Centre Koldo Mitxelena de Sant Sebastià i a la Fundació Benedictina de Lazkao.

A la Fundació Sabino Arana, i gairebé per sorpresa, vaig poder consultar un dels pocs fons de Manuel Irujo que no estan dipositats al fons de l'Eusko Ikaskuntza. Conté material molt valuós, sobretot de l'última etapa del seu exili, i que relaciono seguidament:

- Articles periodístics (1957-1965)
- Documentació diversa (1963-1977) (Correspondència amb Victòria Kent i articles per a la revista *Ibérica* de Nova York.
- Correspondència amb l'EBB (1965-1976)
- Declaracions del PNB: 1949, 1960, 1966, 1962, 1968, 1971, 1976.
- Documentació sobre el Moviment Federal.
- Informes sobre els refugiats bascos a *Iparralde* .
- Articles sense publicar .
- Documentació relativa a Constitucions, classificades per estats: URSS, Iugoslàvia, Itàlia, EUA i Argentina.

La segona visita a l'Arxiu Històric d'Euskadi va donar més fruits que la primera i que les infructuoses recerques a la base de dades del servei *dokuklik* del sistema nacional d'arxius del País Basc (<http://dokuklik.snae.org/>), que no acaba de funcionar i que sovint fa difícil accedir als documents. Amb l'ajuda dels arxivers vaig consultar documentació no digitalitzada —i sovint inèdita— sobre el govern basc a l'exili.

En el fons Leizaola vaig consultar les caixes que relaciono a continuació:

- Correspondència amb Jesús Solaun
- Correspondència amb ETA
- Correspondència amb Indalecio Prieto
- Correspondència amb Manuel Irujo
- Correspondència Ramon Agesta
- Correspondència Lucio Aretxabaleta
- Correspondència Fernando Carranza
- Correspondència Gonzalo Nárdiz

Al fons especial Beyris les caixes consultades són:

- Deportats, presos, condemnats, exiliats.
- Documentació ELA-STV.

En el darrer tram del meu itinerari investigador, a Sant Sebastià, vaig tornar a visitar l'increïble arxiu benedictí de Lazkao, al qual només hi havia pogut fer una fugaç visita en una anterior ocasió. El fons que guarden sobre l'esquerra *abertzale* és impressionant. Guiada per Miren Barandiaran i l'entranyable *aita* Aguirre, vaig fer el buidatge de les revistes i el fons documental dels moviments nacionalistes revolucionaris. Les revistes que vaig consultar són les següents:

- *Zutik*
- *Hautsi* 1972-1978
- *Kemen* (1977)

A Lazkao també vaig consultar la documentació generada pels nous partits nacionalistes d'esquerra que aparegueren durant els últims anys de la dècada dels 70, en especial EHAS, HASI i EIA.

Al Centre Cultural Koldo Mitxelena, sostingut per la Diputació Foral de Guipúscoa, vaig remenar els documents relacionats amb Telesforo Monzón, atès que n'hi ha molts d'inèdits, com la correspondència i bibliografia especialitzada.

L'explicació sobre les fonts i la metodologia que sostenen aquesta tesi no seria completa si no esmentés l'ús que he fet de la història oral, el que m'ha permès escoltar de primera mà les vivències i els records d'alguns dels protagonistes d'uns fets que analitzem empíricament mitjançant fonts primàries i secundàries. Sóc conscient que la memòria no és la història, que la memòria és una recreació personal dels fets viscuts per cadascú a la seva manera, però són un indicatiu, un indicatiu més, que ens ajuda a transitar cap a l'arxiu o a buscar més proves sobre allò que ens han explicat verbalment.

D'aquesta manera, en els darrers quatre anys he sumat noves entrevistes a les que ja havia fet per a la meua recerca anterior, per a la tesi de màster. Llavors vaig entrevistar diverses persones i sortosament he pogut aprofitar per a l'actual investigació alguns dels fragments de les llargues converses amb Julen Madariaga, membre fundador d'ETA; Eneko Irigaray, també membre fundador d'ETA; Sabin Atxalandabaso, cap de relacions internacionals d'ETA i ETA-PM; i Xabier Kintana, membre de l'Euskaltzaindia, l'Acadèmia de la Llengua basca. Per a aquesta tesi he entrevistat específicament Iñaki Anasagasti, membre del PNB i exdiputat i exsenador, i Ramon Sota, membre del PNB i exsenador, tots dos molt relacionals amb l'aparell internacional dels nacionalistes bascos.

El viatge que vaig emprendre ara fa quatre anys no acaba aquí. Més aviat comença. Les fonts primàries i secundàries consultades i les fonts orals són com el matxet que m'han permès transitar per l'itinerari iniciàtic a la recerca històrica que és escriure la tesi doctoral. Visitar arxius és descobrir emocions amagades, vivències perdudes i persones que potser han caigut en l'oblit però que de ben segur m'acompanyaran tota la vida i em permetran continuar investigant. “Doctor” ve del verb, d'origen llatí, “docere”, que significa “ensenyar”, el que vol dir comunicar a algú (una ciència, un art, coneixences, una habilitat, etcètera), donant-li'n lliçons, explicacions, fent demostracions o fent-li realitzar exercicis pràctics. El camí per esdevenir doctora, que és el que he desitjat des que vaig començar la carrera d'història, ha estat això: un itinerari per aprendre l'ofici d'historiador.

### 3. THE BASQUE WORLD CONGRESS

#### a. The harsh reality of exile. Legitimacy and *realpolitik*

After almost two decades in exile, the idea of returning to the Basque country in a democratic Spain was still awake: “Este será el último manifiesto de Gabon y Urtebarri que os dirijo desde América. Quiera Jaungoikoa que el próximo sea allá, donde reposan nuestros muertos esperando la hora de la justicia y la libertad.”<sup>21</sup> President Aguirre was confident and determined to change the situation of the Basque, as well as the Spanish, exile.

The Basque exiles had become experts in the art of watching Francoist Spain and the ways in which the regime was affecting what the Spanish Republic and the Basque Statute of Autonomy had built in the Basque country. The exile provided them with a *privileged* view of the political affairs of the Francoist regime and, what was even more important, of the international political relationships established, but it also gave them the opportunity of building their own international relationships. The *privilege* of being away from the dictatorship was confused with the sorry that was felt for those who remained in the Basque country. The exile became a double-edged sword of relief and discomfort.<sup>22</sup>

Yet the harsh reality of exile, being away from both home and homeland, was not an impediment for deploying some sort of international politics on the part of the Basque government, especially focused on building bridges with the democratic forces and strengthening bonds of collaboration and cooperation with the allies that could help the Basques in their efforts to defeat the Franco regime.

On the other hand, the bridges and bonds established by the Basque government configured the orientation of its international politics but also portrayed the nature of the nation they were forging from their exile—imagining a community, dreaming up the nation, forgetting about the political boundaries that had expelled them into exile and which did not recognize the Basque nation. The geographical concept, the geopolitical borders of the nation on the landscape, is a secondary process that occurs after the identification of the group as a nation. Thus, the construction of the symbolic imaginary of nationalism, the setting of geographical boundaries

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<sup>21</sup> AGUIRRE, José Antonio. 1981. *Obras completas*. Donostia: Sendoa. Vol.II., pp. 575.

<sup>22</sup> KOLAKOWSKI, Leszek. 1990. *Modernity on Endless Trial*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 55.

for the nation, occurs after a group of people identify themselves as a nation, and, therefore, the boundaries may vary and do not matter.<sup>23</sup>

Since the Basque government was led by a nationalist Basque political party, the existence of the nation was not questioned, although some of its politics were, as we will get to see in this chapter.

The Basque government in exile was struggling both to survive and to be recognized, a venture by no means easy, since the Basque Statute of Autonomy of 1936 was beginning to get blurred in the memory of the Spanish democrats in exile, especially within the Spanish Republican government, whose political memory was crumbling down along with its very existence.<sup>24</sup>

The importance of recognition was not only an issue for the Basque government but also for the Spanish Republican government. The legitimacy of the democratic elections was no longer something to be considered in a world divided into two different fronts by the Cold war, where democracy or legitimacy were words relegated to the back of international political relations in favor of others such as capitalism or communism.

## **b. Approaching the Spanish Republican Government-in-exile**

The Basque government had launched a campaign of approaching the Spanish democrats in exile in order to join forces and be seen as a well-structured opposition to Franco, as announced in the 1945 Christmas message of President Aguirre.<sup>25</sup> The Second World War had ended and it was high time to be remembered by the Allies, who had recently announced a meeting between the United States, France, and Great Britain to determine the position to be taken with regard to the Franco Regime. Aguirre thought it convenient to be united with the rest of the Spanish Republican opposition, following the “*Pacto de Bayona*”<sup>26</sup> signed on March 31<sup>st</sup>, 1945 by Basque political forces and unions, so as to be prepared when the allies would help them depose the Franco Regime. President Aguirre felt strong and reinforced after that gesture of

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<sup>23</sup> GREENFELD, Liah. 1993. *Nationalism. Five roads to modernity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 31.

<sup>24</sup> MOTA ZURDO, David. 2016. *Un Sueño Americano. El Gobierno vasco en el exilio y Estados Unidos (1937-1979)*. Vitoria-Gasteiz : Instituto vasco de administración pública., p. 193.

<sup>25</sup> AGUIRRE, José Antonio, *op. cit.*, pp. 565-575

<sup>26</sup> The “Bayonne’s pact” was an agreement by the Basque political and union forces (formed before the Spanish Civil War) signed in Bayonne on March 31st 1945 ratifying the legitimacy of the Basque government, following the 1936 Basque Statute of Autonomy. MORÁN, Gregorio, 2003, *Los españoles que dejaron de serlo*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta., pp. 256-257; MOTA ZURDO, David, 2016, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

trust that had been the agreement with the Basque forces, and it was because of this, together with the confidence inspired by his contacts in the American administration, that he led the efforts to join the Spanish democratic forces, even though that strategy generated some disagreements within the PNV.

The strategy was understood as an acceptance of the Spanish Republic and its legality, which, despite including the Basque Statute of Autonomy, implied an abandonment of the longing for independence of the Basque Country.<sup>27</sup>

Participation in the Spanish government invariably generated controversy within the Basque government and within the PNV, especially from the Euskadi Buru Batzar members. Even Manuel Irujo, one of the Basque nationalists who had become involved in Spanish governments on several occasions, showed doubts about the participation, although his loyalty to President Aguirre and to the Basque government led him to participate:

*“Fui opuesto a nuestra participación directa con responsabilidad política en el Gobierno de la República, marcando mi oposición con excesiva violencia, explicable sólo por singulares y penosas condiciones de todo orden – no solo políticas, sino personales – que en mí recaían a la sazón. Hoy creo que no estaba acertado en mi discurso. Acepté el puesto que me fue designado y lo mantuve con todo el tesón de que soy capaz, mientras creí que, con mi presencia en el gobierno, podía servir a la causa que allí me había llevado.”*<sup>28</sup>

Despite the controversy and difference of opinions regarding the participation in Spanish institutions, it was clear that Manuel Irujo and President Aguirre had a broader plan on their agenda that involved participating in the Spanish Republican bodies. Yet this involvement in the Spanish government was to be on behalf of the Basque people and the Basque government:

*“Para que no existieran equívocos sobre este particular recordé entonces los acuerdos de Nueva York por los cuales el Gobierno rogaba a cuantos ostentaran cargos extravascos a ponerse al servicio del Gobierno de Euzkadi, como será desde el primer*

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<sup>27</sup> DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago. 2015. *La patria soñada. Historia del nacionalismo vasco desde su origen hasta la actualidad*. Madrid : Editorial Biblioteca nueva., p. 314. LÓPEZ ADÁN, Emilio. 1977. *El gobierno vasco en el exilio. 1937- 1960*. Donostia: Txertoa Ed., pp. 21-22. MOTA ZURDO, David, 2016, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-202.

<sup>28</sup> Letter from Manuel Irujo to Jesús María Leizaola, December 28th, 1944, London. GOIGOGANA, Iñaki; IRUJO, Xabier; LEGARRETA, Josu. 2007. *Un nuevo 31. Ideología y estrategia del gobierno de Euzkadi durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial a través de la correspondencia de José Antonio Aguirre y Manuel Irujo*. Bilbao: Sabino Arana Fundazioa., p. 781.

*momento la actitud de Irujo – les dije- en cuyo caso al dar sus instrucciones el gobierno vasco y obrar de acuerdo con él el titular, representará al pueblo vasco en su conjunto en todo aquello que no sea interés particular de su organización política.*’’<sup>29</sup>

Participation in the Spanish government formed part of a broader plan. The exile had given President Aguirre a wider view of world politics and of the importance of being present in them. Basque nationalism had not been born to be local but rather for more universal aims. The politics carried out with the Spanish Republicans and the efforts for the Galeuzca<sup>30</sup> agreement did not hinder the international contacts with the Americans, the British, or the French, highlighting that European feature of the Basque Government which would later on be developed in its full extension.<sup>31</sup>

The agenda was clear, and at that moment Aguirre was the political leader to make it possible. The President felt confident, and he placed his trust in the international aid against the Spanish government, especially from the Americans, the allied force that the Basque government trusted the most, due to their bilateral relations and their rapports in that direction as shown in the writings of Anton Irala,<sup>32</sup> and based also on the American impressions about the Franco Regime.<sup>33</sup>

Perhaps it was the efforts made by Aguirre, and the high hopes deposited in international politics and the allies, that confused the Basque President, who announced the opening of conversations with France, Great Britain, and the United States to evaluate the Spanish situation “*tal vez con exagerado optimismo,*” as José Félix Azurmendi<sup>34</sup> states in relation to the President’s mood. In fact, not only President Aguirre but all the Spanish republicans in exile trusted the brand-new United Nations to intervene in the Spanish situation and regarded with hope the progress of the international body. Although the United Nations condemned the Franco Regime, and the Spanish government was excluded from the table at the UN, the

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<sup>29</sup> Letter from José Antonio Aguirre to Manuel Irujo. September 17th, 1945. New York, *ibid.*, p. 826.

<sup>30</sup> “Galeuzca” was the name given to the several nationalist agreements and the nationalist movement between Galicia, Euskadi and Catalonia beginning from 1923. ESTÉVEZ, Xosé. 2009. *Galeuzca, la rebelión de la periferia. (1923-1998)*. Madrid: Cyan Ed. See the Declaration of Galeuzca principles, statutes and drafts on the Galeuzca project in GOIOGANA, Iñaki; IRUJO, Xabier; LEGARRETA, Josu, *op. cit.*, pp. 740-759.

<sup>31</sup> GOIOGANA, Iñaki; IRUJO, Xabier; LEGARRETA, Josu, *op. cit.*, pp. 817-837.

<sup>32</sup> Anton Irala was the founder and first delegate of the New York delegation of the Basque government from 1938 to 1949, when Jesús Galíndez replaced him. GOIOGANA, Iñaki. 2009. “Antón Irala y la primera delegación del Gobierno vasco en los Estados Unidos,” in *Hermes*, 31, pp. 85-86.

<sup>33</sup> AZURMENDI, José Félix. 2013. *Vascos en la Guerra Fría. ¿Víctimas o cómplices? Gudarís en el juego de los espías*. Donostia: Editorial Ttartalo., pp. 43-45. MOTA ZURDO, David, 2016, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-204.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 50.

Tripartite Note signed on March 4<sup>th</sup>, 1946 by the United States, Great Britain, and France extinguished all hopes for an international intervention against the dictatorship:

*“The government of France, the UK and the USA have exchanged views with regard to the present Spanish government and their relations with that regime. It is agreed that so long as General Franco continues in control of Spain, the Spanish people cannot anticipate full cordial relations with those nations of the world, which have by common effort brought defeat to German Nazism and Italian fascism. There is no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Spain. The Spanish people themselves must in the long run work their own destiny. The three governments, are hopeful that the Spanish people will not again be subjected to the horrors and bitterness of civil strife. They hope that Spaniards will soon find the means to bring about a peaceful withdrawal of Franco.”*<sup>35</sup>

The UN would not accept the nature of the Spanish regime, France was closing borders and withdrawing ambassadors, but the note and every other statement issued by the UN in 1946<sup>36</sup> with respect to Spain gave no doubt as to the non-intervention decision. Nevertheless, the Spanish republicans in exile, perhaps caught up in Aguirre’s boost and optimism, understood the note and the UN declarations as a diplomatic step forward in the reestablishment of a democratic government in Spain. Although the decision of non-intervention was disappointing, the answer to it was the “*Manifiesto a los Españoles*”<sup>37</sup> from Paris, signed by *Lehendakari* Aguirre, the Spanish president in exile José Giral, and the Catalan president Josep Irla, in which they stated their determination to return republican democracy to Spain.<sup>38</sup>

The immediate decision included the participation of the Basque nationalists in the Spanish government. Manuel Irujo, an important adviser in Aguirre’s team and a Basque nationalist

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<sup>35</sup> GÜELL AMPUERO, Casilda. 2006. *The Failure of Catalanist opposition to Franco: 1939-1950*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones científicas., p. 164-165

<sup>36</sup> United Nations’ resolutions on Spain in 1946:

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/10\(1946\);](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/10(1946);)

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/7\(1946\);](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/7(1946);)

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/4\(1946\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/4(1946)) . Consulted on October 20th, 2016.

<sup>37</sup> *Manifiesto a los españoles*, Paris, February 23rd 1946. LÓPEZ ADÁN, Emilio, 1977, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

<sup>38</sup> There are many different causes that might explain the decision of non-intervention, but authors consider the geostrategic situation of Spain, along with the “red scare,” the fear of the advent of a new communist State, to have been the main cause. Despite the mistrust of the Truman administration regarding the Franco government, the danger of creating a new Soviet satellite on the western side of the newly-established “iron curtain” was decisive. AZURMENDI, José Félix, 2013, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-53; DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, 2015, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-316; MOTA ZURDO, David, 2016, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-207. ROMERO SAMPER, Milagrosa. 2005. *La oposición durante el franquismo. El exilio republicano*. Madrid: Ediciones Encuentro, pp. 272-283.



well known by the Spanish politicians, was chosen as Minister of Justice for the Spanish Republican Government in exile from February to August, 1947<sup>39</sup> as part of President Llopi's government.<sup>40</sup> Despite the efforts to fix the madhouse that had become the Spanish Republican government in exile, and despite even the offer from Spanish politicians to Aguirre to become President of the Spanish government,<sup>41</sup> the Basque government refused to join the executive, and the 1947 government was the last time they took part in the Spanish government.

Nevertheless, during this last brief spell when the Basque government participated in the Spanish Republican government, President Aguirre was the alma mater of the international relations activities, and his natural optimism, compounded with the lobbyism in the United Nations, as well as the Basque delegation in New York, would give the "Spanish case" the relevance it needed. As Ludger Mees states: "*Aguirre abarcaba todo. Fue él, quién, más o menos a la sombra, mandaba en la política del exilio español.*" Both Aguirre and Irujo dazzled the Spanish politicians, especially the President of the Spanish Republic, Diego Martínez Barrio, who was the person who had offered President Aguirre the presidency of the Spanish Government several times, without success.<sup>42</sup>

Participation in the Spanish Government was indeed a strategy that strived to get the "Spanish case" into the international arena and, notwithstanding the suspicions that might arise among Basque nationalists, President Aguirre highlighted that their collaboration was for a greater cause:

*"Nuestra lucha no se ha circunscrito al área vasca. Ayudamos, y seguimos ayudando, a la democracia española en sus legítimos afanes de liberación. Contribuimos en su día a restablecer el orden dentro del campo republicano, poniendo en ejercicio normal las instituciones de la República, asegurando con la restauración del Gobierno*

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<sup>39</sup> Manuel Irujo was a member of the Spanish Republican government in exile twice: during José Giral's Government (August, 1945- February, 1947) and then in Rodolfo Llopi's Government (February-August 1947). During the first government, Irujo was a Minister without portfolio, and in the second he occupied the post of Minister of Justice. During the Republican Government (1931-1936), Manuel Irujo was also a Minister without portfolio from September 1936 to May 1937, when he was appointed Minister of Justice until December 1937, at which date he resigns, yet continues again as Minister without portfolio until August 1938, when he abandons the government.

<sup>40</sup> Rodolfo Llopi Ferrandiz was president of the Spanish Republican government in exile from February to August, 1947. SÁNCHEZ CERVELLÓ, Josep. 2011. *La Segunda República en el exilio (1939-1977)*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, pp. 99-117 / 456.

<sup>41</sup> DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, 2015, *op. cit.*, p. 316; MEES, Ludger. 2006. *El profeta pragmático. Aguirre, el primer lehendakari. (1939-1960)*. Irún: Alberdania, p. 139.

<sup>42</sup> This great feat was all the more considerable given the Spanish nationalism of Martínez Barrio and his clear support to Lerroix's doctrines. MEES, Ludger, 2007, *op. cit.*, pp. 135 and ff.

*republicano las ventajas de una representación coordinada que llegó a ser reconocida por varios países y fue recibida ante el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas.*”<sup>43</sup>

The pragmatism, “*pactism*,” and gradualism that is often attributed to Aguirre’s policy<sup>44</sup> had a greater objective, which began with the recognition of the Spanish Republican government by the international institutions and, through it, the automatic recognition of the Basque bodies and rights. During this last government when the Basques were directly involved with the Spanish parties, the international recognition and the possibility of defeating the Franco regime had to be necessarily the result of a strong Spanish Republican government—with an emphasis on the “Republican” part of the meaning, since in 1946 Aguirre was sure that democracy could not be defended side by side with the Monarchists.<sup>45</sup> “*Concibes que vayamos con los monárquicos? Creo que basta de bromas, no te parece?*”<sup>46</sup>

The situation of exile and Cold War called for a broader approach to politics, and Aguirre again employed his pragmatism and tactics so as to become involved in every possible kind of alliances in order to defeat the Franco dictatorship. Rumors had spread of the possibility of an alternative Spanish government that would come from the Monarchists with the endorsement of the British and the Americans. José Ignacio de Lizaso, the Basque delegate in London, sent Manuel Irujo a letter in February 1947 to warn him about the increasing rumors that the Monarchist option was becoming more and more popular in Great Britain. The British Public Radio, the BBC, had broadcasted a piece of information from the Reuters correspondent in Paris stating:

*“Señor Martínez Barrio, president of the Spanish Shadow Republican government in exile, told me today that Spanish exile leaders were increasingly convinced that there was no chance of overthrowing the Franco regime without the “active cooperation of the still influential monarchists in Spain.” President Barrio, (...) added: “The exile leaders are also strongly of the view that the anti-Franco movement must lean heavily*

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<sup>43</sup> *Lehendakari* Aguirre’s speech on the 11th anniversary of the Basque Government. October 1947. AGUIRRE, José Antonio, 1981, *op. cit.*, Vol.II, p. 733.

<sup>44</sup> MEES, Ludger, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

<sup>45</sup> It was probably due to that pragmatism, which Ludger Mees considers one of the main features of Aguirre’s policies, that the *Lehendakari* probed the Monarchist option in order to assess the possibilities of success. With the objective of creating an alternative to the Franco regime, Aguirre contacted the monarchists several times in 1945 and 1946, although the members in the Basque Nationalist Party, especially Manuel Irujo, did not agree with and did not trust the Monarchist option. *Ibidem*, pp. 161-168.

<sup>46</sup> Aguirre to Doroteo Ziaurritz, president of the Euskadi Buru Batzar (EBB), 1946, *ibidem*, p. 136.

*on Britain and the United States if it is ever to become effective.” All this leads to envisage the restoration of a constitutional Monarchy with favour.”<sup>47</sup>*

Of course, it was shocking that Martínez Barrio, president of the Spanish Republic in exile, should make such declarations in favor of a Monarchy, but what motivated the letter was the credibility with which the BBC endowed the news.

From the letter, it was possible to infer the doubts harbored by the Basque nationalist in London, since the Basque government had been responsible for developing the reconstruction of the Spanish Republican government in exile, yet, as we have already stated, Aguirre was after something bigger than the mere satisfaction of Basque nationalism. Considering the international implication and endorsement that the news and rumors associated with the Monarchist strategy, President Aguirre could not ignore the proposal.

In fact, the Monarchist alternative was led by the socialist Indalecio Prieto,<sup>48</sup> who showed a strong opposition to the Republican government, and whose popularity increased as he took advantage of the Republican crisis. The Socialist-Monarchist plan also included conservative members from the CEDA,<sup>49</sup> as well as an intense degree of anti-communism that was very much liked by the Americans and the British.<sup>50</sup>

Although the Basque nationalists had been loyal to the Republic, and Aguirre and Irujo in particular were devoted to the reconstruction of a decent anti-Franco opposition, the voices within the PNV weighing in favor of the Monarchist alternative were increasing, primarily those that came from the always controversial Telesforo Monzón, who considered that the Republican was a wrong and unsuccessful path, even though it did include such high personalities as the Vice-President Jesús María Leizaola or the Minister of Governance, José María Lasarte.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Letter from Lizaso to Irujo, London, February 21st, 1947. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 34, File 3. <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/12422.pdf> (Consulted on December 4th, 2016.)

<sup>48</sup> Indalecio Prieto was a politician, member of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), Minister in the governments of 1931 and 1936, and Minister of Defense during the Spanish Civil War. In 1946, Prieto became leader of the monarchist option when he struck conversations with Don Juan de Borbón in order to reach a provisional government, the nature of which was to be decided through a plebiscite. LÓPEZ ADÁN, Emilio, 1977, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

<sup>49</sup> CEDA: Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas.

<sup>50</sup> DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, 2015, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

<sup>51</sup> Telesforo Monzón was Minister of Governance and Security of the Basque government during the Spanish Civil War, and Minister of Culture during the exile. In the 1950's he decided to abandon the PNV, due to disagreements with the executive, but never filed the petition. Jesús Maria Leizaola was Minister of Justice and Culture of the Basque government, Vice-President during the Aguirre administration, and President of the

Telesforo Monzón summarized the goals that the PNV was pursuing as follows:

*“El Gobierno de la República y todo lo que gira a su alrededor ha terminado para mí. (...) Fortalecer nuestra causa y esperar debe ser por hoy nuestro programa. Hay que echar a Franco con otra mentalidad y actuación. Debemos desvincularnos de todo lo que suene a corneta republicana. (...) Si se trata de echar a Franco, hoy sólo hay una postura seria. Apoyar la monarquía. (...) Mi programa no es la monarquía, pero si hay que echarle a Franco no hay otro camino, y para mí el socialismo está con la monarquía. (...).”<sup>52</sup>*

Caught in the middle of the crisis of the Spanish institutions in exile, the PNV and the Basque government were divided between the decadent Republican forces that had approved the Basque Statute of Autonomy, and the growing Socialist-Monarchists, Catholics, and anti-Communists, but also some well-known Spanish nationalists and irascible anti-Basques: *“A Prieto le conocemos todos, visto desde el ángulo vasco y del español, en lo que tiene de generoso, de nacionalista español, de demagogo y de orgulloso.”<sup>53</sup>*

Despite not being President Aguirre’s option, the broader objective of overthrowing Franco might be possible, and it implied the international involvement that he had always strived for. That change of strategy began by the second half of 1947, and had its zenith in the aforementioned October speech, where Aguirre, despite reasserting the importance of the Republic, left the door open to the constitution of a monarchic government after holding a plebiscite involving the international institutions referred to in the Tripartite Note.

Indeed, President Aguirre was a great tactician, and the Monarchist solution, as he explained, did not involve the dissolution of the Republican government, but the constitution of a Caretaker government, a transitional one prior to the reestablishment of democracy.<sup>54</sup> After all,

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Basque government since the death of President Aguirre and until the end of the exile in 1979. José María Lasarte organized the Basque secret services, established relations with America and some European states, and was Minister of Governance (1946-1952) of the Basque government. More biographical information on the members of the Basque government can be found in: GARRIDO YEROBI, Iñaki; LEKOUNA ILUNDAIN, Aitziber, 2006, *Las raíces del árbol en el exilio. Las biografías de los consejeros del primer gobierno de Euskadi*. Oñati: Instituto Vasco de Administración pública. A comprehensive dictionary of the Basque Members of Parliament, in this case until 1939, is: AGIRREAZKUENAGA, Joseba (Ed.) [Et. Alt.], 2007, *Diccionario biográfico de los parlamentarios de Vasconia. 1876-1939*. 3 vols. Vitoria: Eusko Legebiltzarra.

<sup>52</sup> Words of Telesforo Monzón recorded in the document “Reunión entre Dionisio, Axpe, Víctor, Ángel, Barazar, Jon y Teles,” 1948, DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, MEES, Ludger and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 1999, *El Péndulo Patriótico : Historia del Partido nacionalista vasco*. Barcelona : Crítica. Vol.2., p. 162.

<sup>53</sup> Declarations of Manuel Irujo. *Ibidem*, p. 161.

<sup>54</sup> MEES, Ludger, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

Prieto's anti-communism feature would find favor in the USA and France, and that in turn would provide the anti-Franco democrats with more options.

As can be seen, President Aguirre acted in the interests of furthering the international recognition of the "Spanish cause" by resorting to Spanish institutions, even if that did not imply a Republic in itself, and probably getting too deeply involved, which earned him trouble with Basque nationalism. But international politics were not easy and, on the other hand, the international intervention that he wanted the most never arrived.

In his Christmas message of December 1947, President Aguirre began to show signs that he mistrusted the influence and will of the international bodies with regard to democracy. In his annual speech to the Basque people, Aguirre recalls and retells how Basque nationalism has been loyal to peace and democracy ever since these were forced out of Euskadi on account of the Spanish Civil War:

*"Arrojados de la Patria, apoyamos a las fuerzas aliadas a partir de 1939 dentro de nuestros cortos medios en todas las partes del mundo donde existían vascos, mientras Franco prestaba ayuda a los submarinos alemanes, corrompía Sudamérica con su propaganda, ocupaba Tánger, enviaba la "División Azul" a los campos de la URSS, e insultaba jactanciosamente a las potencias democráticas."*<sup>55</sup>

Aguirre wanted to believe in the international bodies and allies that the Basque had worked with, but the Tripartite Note had left in him a bitter aftertaste, although the politician tried to hide it.

The Cold War was beginning to divide the world into two different spheres, where communism was the opposite of the western democracies, but where totalitarian States such as the Franco regime and some South American regimes were tolerated in order to stop the advance of communism: *"(...) rechazamos el criminal dilema de "Franco o comunismo" por ser falso e interesado."*<sup>56</sup>

The Basque president had been travelling in South America during 1942<sup>57</sup> as a form of collaboration with the USA for controlling the spread of communism in those lands, and he

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<sup>55</sup> Christmas' and New Year's Eve speech by José Antonio Aguirre in 1947. AGUIRRE, José Antonio, 1981, *op. cit.*, p. 742. (Vol.II)

<sup>56</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>57</sup> The collaboration with the American Department of State regarding South America was done through Mr. Laurence Duggan, adviser on political relations at the Department of State. In his diary, President Aguirre wrote about the progress of the meetings starting in January 1942; and in Iñaki Goigana's edition we can read an

knew that the tepid condemnation of the Franco Regime by the UN in 1946 could turn into an acceptance of the dictatorship for the sake of calmness. The world was tired of war, and the strategy of the western powers was to stabilize societies and governments.

The need to present the alternative to Franco's Regime as an organized, democratic, and united movement was the reason, in Aguirre's words, for closing ties with each and every group within the Spanish democratic resistance in exile. After all, democracy and the wills of a democratic people should dictate the return of all the democrats to Spain, without exception: "*Al mismo pretendiente, Don Juan de Borbón, le reconocíamos en la locución antes recordada, su derecho a defender las banderas de la monarquía y sus pretensiones al trono de España para someterlas al pueblo, no para imponerlas.*"<sup>58</sup>

Aguirre considered himself a Republican, but a Republican in the sense of being a defender of the Republic as a political system<sup>59</sup>—because, for him, the future lies more in the republican way than in the restoration of the Monarchy—yet, above all, President Aguirre was a defender of the Basque interests and a democrat. The calm that was needed in order to appear trustful in the eyes of the international bodies and achieve the union of the democratic forces could come from that strange coalition with the socialist-monarchists, and yet it would be nothing more than a political tactic to keep hold of the wills of the Basques. Probably because of a lack of trust in the Monarchists or the Monarchy itself, or perhaps because the "Plan Prieto" was the only plan remaining since 1946 and the Tripartite Note, we can see, from his documents, speeches, and letters, that his natural optimism had begun to waver, even though he never gave up his enthusiasm for returning to a democratic Basque country.

Still, the PNV and the Basque government were not the only ones playing tactics: the candidate Don Juan de Borbón also negotiated with Franco a possible return to Spain.

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extract of a memorandum by the Department of State where the collaboration is defined as: "*proposal of help by Basques in other American republics to create an attitude more sympathetic to the democracies.*" The collaboration included economic funds to increase the distribution of *Euzko Deya* and for the establishment of a Basque information service that would control politics, economy, Church, consulates, embassies, Falangist centres or other centres, aristocratic circles, and the merchant navy, according to Aguirre's letter. The details of the project and Aguirre's impressions on it can be found, as aforementioned, in: AGUIRRE, José Antonio; GOIOGANA, Iñaki (Ed.), 2010, *Diario, 1941-1942*. Bilbao: Sabino Arana Fundazioa. Part of the speeches given during the tour were published in: AGUIRRE, José Antonio, 1944, *Cinco conferencias pronunciadas en un viaje por América*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Vasca Ekin. An analysis of the South American tour can be found in MOTA, David, 2016, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-154.

<sup>58</sup> AGUIRRE, José Antonio, 1981, *op. cit.*, p. 747. (Vol.II)

<sup>59</sup> MESS, Ludger, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

In 1947, the Franco Regime called for a referendum to approve the “*Ley de Sucesión en la Jefatura del Estado*,”<sup>60</sup> which would turn the regime into a *de iure* Monarchy, since the law established in its first article that “*España, como unidad política, es Estado católico, social y representativo que, de acuerdo con su tradición, se declara constituido en Reino.*”<sup>61</sup>

Nevertheless, execution of this article was subject to compliance with the second: “*La Jefatura del Estado corresponde al Caudillo de España y de la Cruzada, Generalísimo de los ejércitos don Francisco Franco Bahamonde.*”<sup>62</sup>

Franco was trying to get some international recognition by presenting the referendum as a democratic feature of the regime, while at the same time designating the figure of Franco as a permanent regent legitimated by the referendum and the law.

But the “*Ley de Sucesión*” was not a good deal for the candidate Don Juan, who, despite holding a private meeting with Franco on his boat “Azor” in San Sebastian, had signed an agreement with the socialist-monarchists in San Juan de Luz. The return of the exile was drawing closer, not only geographically but also politically, with speculations about the possibilities of overthrowing Franco. But the political border, and the Franco regime, were still strong enough to keep the anti-Franco democrats in exile for several decades, and Don Juan was not an exception. The “Pacto de San Juan de Luz” was unclear as to the juridical status of the transitional government prior to the establishment of the Monarchy, and it deliberately ignored both the historical nationalities and the Statutes of Autonomy. Given such conditions, the EBB could not accept the agreement, however much the monarchist sector might be growing in importance.<sup>63</sup>

### **c. The 1949 Declaration of the Basque Nationalist Party**

After some internal debates that resulted in no clear decision regarding the Monarchist option, and with a serious divide taking place within the party, the EBB appointed a special

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<sup>60</sup> Ley de Sucesión en la Jefatura del Estado: <http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1947/160/A03272-03273.pdf>  
BOE: Consulted on 10/16/2016.

<sup>61</sup> <http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1947/160/A03272-03273.pdf>

<sup>62</sup> <http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1947/160/A03272-03273.pdf>

<sup>63</sup> DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, MEES, Ludger and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 1999, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-168.

commission to take charge of elaborating an official document that would drive the political orientations of the party and put an end to the disagreements between its members.

Members in favor of Prieto's alternative took part in that commission: Leizaola and Lasarte, Júlio Jáuregui, promoter of the Republican way, and Juan Ajuriaguerra, a member who came from the Basque countryside and who clearly mistrusted the monarchy. Joseba Rezola and Ramón de la Sota Aburto<sup>64</sup> joined the commission under the decision of Leizaola.

In March 1949, the committee presented the "*Declaración política del Partido Nacionalista Vasco*,<sup>65</sup>" which would become the political program of the PNV, and especially of the Basque government during the exile. According to Koldo San Sebastián, this was the first major declaration of Basque nationalism in the postwar period, and it was highly important because: "*En la misma se actualizaría la doctrina sabiniana. La declaración tiene una importancia política extraordinaria, al consagrarse la autodeterminación "como única fuente jurídica del status político vasco."*<sup>66</sup> The document confirmed the importance of the Basque government, despite the exile and the unusual situation of a government-in-exile, and at the same time gave a unique legal status to the government and to the sovereignty of the Basque people: "*El Partido nacionalista vasco reconoce el Gobierno de Euzkadi como única representación legal del pueblo vasco, cualesquiera que sean las situaciones de hecho actual o venideras.*"<sup>67</sup>

Increasingly pressed upon by the exile, the Spanish relations, and the international politics, Basque nationalism was being forced to reinvent itself and to nail its colors to the mast.

The declaration was intended to solve several issues. First and foremost, the PNV had to make clear its position regarding Prieto's way, and, on the other hand, the committee should take the opportunity to smooth out the differences between the different sectors in the party that had arisen with the Monarchist debate—but whose roots reached deeper—based on the political tactics employed by the nationalists.<sup>68</sup> The exile was taking its toll on Basque nationalism. The "privilege" of watching the Franco dictatorship from the exile, a "blessing in disguise," in the

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<sup>64</sup> Joseba Rezola was Vice-President during the first Basque government and Head of the Basque resistance movement during the exile. Ramón de la Sota was a Basque industrialist and well-known Basque nationalist who supported the PNV and the Basque government in exile.

<sup>65</sup> LÓPEZ ADÁN, Emilio, 1977, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-132.

<sup>66</sup> SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, 1995, "El PNV durante el primer franquismo (1937-1953)," pp. 145-167, in DE PABLO, Santiago (Ed.). *Los nacionalistas. Historia del nacionalismo vasco. 1876-1960*. Vitoria-Gasteiz: Fundación Sancho el Sabio, p. 163.

<sup>67</sup> Declaración política del Partido Nacionalista Vasco, EBB, 1949, AN, IRUJO-0071-C2.

<sup>68</sup> DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, MEES, Ludger and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 170.



words of Antoon de Baets,<sup>69</sup> had turned into an upsetting situation for Basque nationalists on both sides of the political *muga*<sup>70</sup> that the Pyrenees had become. The political tactics and decisions adopted by the PNV were especially questioned by the Basque nationalists within the Basque country, subject as they were to the Spanish dictatorship. Back then, the Basque government had been working for more than 20 years on behalf the Basque people and on behalf of the power of the Institution of the Basque country—but from afar. The repression of the dictatorship, intensified by the activities carried out by the Basque nationalists since the referendum, the strikes organized in 1947, or the demonstration in which *Ikurrinas* were hung or Spanish flags were burned, sent dozens of Basque resisters to prison.<sup>71</sup> The spirit began to grow weak and the differences between the inside and the exile became more acute.

The Political declaration of 1949 reaffirmed the fight against the Franco regime, as well as the defense of the Basque nation and its institutions and rights. The Basque nationalist party reinforced its Christian-Democratic trait and linked its own nature to the European Federalist movement:

*“El Partido Nacionalista Vasco apoya las iniciativas en curso para la puesta en marcha, sobre principios de libertad y democracia, de una organización europea, que tiene por objetivos la paz mundial y el bienestar económico-social de las poblaciones; se muestra partidario de las concepciones federalistas que han de permitir la creación de los Poderes europeos sin mengua de la plena personalidad de cada uno de los pueblos – incluido el vasco – que han de ser comprendidos en la nueva estructura ; y propugna por la organización mundial correspondiente basada en los principios enunciados.”*<sup>72</sup>

Through this declaration, the Basque nationalists reinforced their commitment with the international cause, and particularly with the construction of a Federal Europe, a political movement that had begun in 1948 at the Hague conference,<sup>73</sup> and in which the PNV had been

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<sup>69</sup> DE BAETS, Antoon, 2011, “Plutarch's Thesis: The contribution of refugee historians to historical writing, 1945-2010,” in *In Defense of Learning*, British Academy, p. 211.

<sup>70</sup> “Muga,” as well as being the Basque word for “border,” is also an important concept in the symbolical universe of Basque nationalism.

<sup>71</sup> LÓPEZ ADÁN, Emilio, 1977, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-74.

<sup>72</sup> Section IV of the “Declaración Política del Partido Nacionalista Vasco,” 1949, *ibidem*, pp. 131-132.

<sup>73</sup> Although the pro-European Movement had begun to be organized some years before, as we will see in the next chapters, The Hague Conference held between 7th and 10th May, 1948, is seen as the boosting of the European Union process. ARRIETA ALBERDI, Leyre, 2007, *Estación Europa. La política europeista del PNV en el exilio (1945-1977)*. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, pp. 66-70.

present from the beginning. Basque nationalists were claiming their position both in international politics and in Europe. Basque nationalism did not want to play local, but global. On the same level, the declaration reserved its last item to a reinforcement of international politics, as well as to highlighting the need for boycotting the Franco regime in order to promote democracy.

*“El Partido Nacionalista Vasco llama la atención sobre la improcedencia de cualquier medida internacional de tipo político o económico que pueda interpretarse como ayuda a ese régimen, y considera un deber de los países democráticos conjugar su acción con la de las fuerzas antifranquistas, lo que constituirá una garantía de la pacífica y rápida liquidación de la dictadura franquista.”<sup>74</sup>*

The international recognition of Basque nationalism had to be achieved through international institutions, and through the involvement of these bodies in the problematic Basque situation. The PNV was letting its democratic trait show through, rather than its nationalist feelings. The objective in 1949, in the postwar period after a world war in which nationalism had become associated not only with brutality but also with totalitarianism, the strategy of Basque nationalism was to prioritize its democratic values and to contrast them with the totalitarian State that was ruling Spain.

Efforts were constant to link and emphasize the relationship of the Franco regime with the German Nazis and the Italian fascists, both condemned by the international institutions that emerged from the horror of the Second World War.

*“Hoy hace doce años fue destruida Gernika por los aviones de Hitler al servicio del general Franco. La destrucción material del santuario de la tradición vasca tendría relativa importancia si todavía no continuara hoy el secuestro moral y físico del pueblo sometido a la dictadura totalitaria del general Franco.”<sup>75</sup>*

Despite it being clear that the 1949 Declaration was a reference to the politics of the PNV, it did not solve any of the two main questions.

The socialists considered that the Declaration was indeterminate as regards the defense of the Monarchy, although the document included a defense of the Bayonne pact (1945), in which

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<sup>74</sup> Section IV-c of the “Declaración Política del Partido Nacionalista Vasco,” 1949, *ibidem*, pp. 132.

<sup>75</sup> President Aguirre’ speech in the 12th Anniversary of the Gernika bombing.

the Republican feature of the agreement was inherent. As a matter of fact, what the PNV was defending and promoting was the Basque government and its existence, even though it knew that it was strictly related to the Republican institutions. The political strategy of the Basque nationalists was to defend the Basque government, although the defense of democracy was a feature that was even more important from the very beginning. The war could not have cut short the democratic objective of the Basque government, nor the will to keep the institution. *Lehendakari* Aguirre defended democracy and the Basque government as a whole, holding on firmly to the idea expressed in the “Trucios’ Manifest” of 1937, while he was fleeing from Bilbao to Santoña, where the President stood up for democracy, invited the allies to intervene in Spain against fascism, and declared that his fight had just begun: “*El gobierno vasco sigue en su puesto, lo mismo en Euskadi que donde quiera que se encuentre. (...)*”<sup>76</sup> In 1937 the exile had already begun, and ideas were fresh and clear, but by 1949 the idea remained the same: keeping alive the Basque government as the manifestation of the sovereignty of the Basques. Flirting with both republicans and monarchists was part of the strategy to maintain the Basque government, sometimes put into question by the Spanish politicians and by the unusual situation of the government-in-exile. Nevertheless, upsetting the socialists might have compromised the Basque government and the stability that Bayonne’s pact had attained, and, right after the Declaration, a discussion paper entitled “*Bases para una situación transitoria vasca*”<sup>77</sup> came out, not without controversy, in which a plan was set forth to reestablish democracy in Spain; and though it did include the recognition of the Basque country, it did so through an institution called “General Council” that would diminish the political competences of the Basques, generating serious discrepancies among the PNV, especially between the members in inland Spain and the members in exile.<sup>78</sup>

The distances between the inside and the exile were not only geographical but also political, and sometimes ideological. Although Juan Ajuriaguerra was part of the aforementioned commission in charge of writing up the 1949 Declaration, the PNV members from inside Spain did not feel represented—but neither was the declaration fully accepted by all the members in exile. The exile was starting to take its toll, President Aguirre was beginning to feel worried about a situation that had been imagined as transitory and now ran the risk of becoming a long

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<sup>76</sup> “Manifiesto de Trucios” published in Euzko Deya, Paris, July 4th, 1937.

<sup>77</sup> “Bases para una situación transitoria vasca,” July 22nd, 1949 in AN, EBB, 79-16.

<sup>78</sup> DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, MEES, Ludger and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 1999, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-177; MEES, Ludger, 2007, p. 207.

transition. The repression of the 1947 General Strike and the failure of Prieto's plan were just two of several disappointments that the generation of Basque nationalists who had fought in the Spanish Civil War had a hard time coming to terms with. Exhaustion was becoming a regular travel companion in the exile trip; President Aguirre and some Basque nationalists began to show signs of fatigue<sup>79</sup>—but the fighting spirit was not that easy to defeat.

The differences in opinion regarding the agreements to be struck with the Spanish democrats (whether republicans or monarchists) were still alive despite the Declaration—the debate was open—but not everything was negative. Basque nationalism was making progress despite the difficulties of the exile and the controversial political decisions that the Basque government was about to take; the process of keeping the institution alive allowed them the possibility of modifying and adapting the goals. The acceptance of the document “*Bases para una situación transitoria vasca*” can be seen as a diminishment of the goals from within Basque nationalism in order to guarantee at least the Basque Statute of Autonomy;<sup>80</sup> but as a political strategy it would give importance to some other national aspects, no less worthy of being considered.

The 1949 Declaration, as well as the document “*Bases para una ...*,” brought up the issue of Navarre and also the possibility of its annexation to the Basque country: “*Determinación de las condiciones con cuyo cumplimiento se considerará acordada la eventual voluntaria incorporación de Nabarra al régimen del País Vasco.*”<sup>81</sup> By means of this item, the PNV was furthering Basque nationalism and the “Laurak Bat,” making the situation tense on both sides, as Manuel Irujo expressed in a letter to Ajuriaguerra after the publication of the declaration:

*“Yo no creo en el pacto monárquico-socialista ni en nada que del mismo provenga, pero eso no obsta para sacar de cada situación el máximo partido posible. Prieto está situado contra toda integración de Euzkadi con Navarra y esa situación no es ciertamente de hoy: es de siempre. (...) Pero nosotros estamos aquí para buscarle la vuelta. Vd. Me dijo que los socialistas navarros son antiprietistas, y que Pepe Sevilla tiene entre ellos prestigio.”*<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> MEES, Ludger, 2007, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-207; SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, 1995, p. 164.

<sup>80</sup> DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, MEES, Ludger and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

<sup>81</sup> Declaración política del Partido Nacionalista Vasco, EBB, 1949, *op. cit.*

<sup>82</sup> Letter from Manuel Irujo to Juan Ajuriaguerra, Paris, 11/10/1949, EI, IRUJO-38-Sig.J-228.

Manuel Irujo was giving a lesson in *realpolitik*, using politics to build nation and nationalism, from the exile and without resources, yet focusing on the objective—to keep the nation alive. Nevertheless, it is also true that the defense of the Basque Statute of Autonomy became a subject that in its turn had to be defended as part of the Basque government,<sup>83</sup> probably more so than the idea of full sovereignty through independence, although that change need not be seen as a renunciation to the independence of the Basque country, but rather as an adjustment to the new circumstances, possibilities, and languages:

*“Somos una democracia activa. Debemos aspirar a merecer cada vez más esta denominación. No es menguado lo que nuestros métodos han evolucionado a partir del 18 de Julio de 1936. (...)Y quizá se encuentren aún en el día de hoy honorables patriotas y excelentes amigos que añoren el momento en el que, reintegrado el país a una normalidad funcional, el Partido Nacionalista Vasco pueda retirarse a las posiciones que ocupaba el 18 de Julio de 1936 o a las que sustituyan a aquéllas en el orden político que resulte vigente. A estos amigos quiero repetirles, como criterio propio, lo que decía Van Trich al iniciar sus conferencias: “Eso no es la vida, eso es una vana ilusión”<sup>84</sup> and then continues to say: “Debemos hallarnos dispuestos a participar en gestión y responsabilidad de orden aún más amplio y extenso que aquel que fue preciso aceptar el 1936. (...) La elasticidad en la adaptación tiene tan sólo los mojonos de la decencia. Los pueblos grandes y poderosos llegan a veces a la victoria por su fuerza. Los pueblos pequeños solamente pueden merecer el triunfo por su constancia y fidelidad a los principios de la moral. Los vascos constituimos una democracia. Sólo medios demócratas deben ser aceptados al servicio de Euzkadi.”<sup>85</sup>*

Manuel Irujo in his article highlighted the importance of democracy among all the other features, but made it clear that the Basque People were not going backwards, they were just adapting themselves to the new situation. The defense of democracy and the rejection of violence would prove to be constants in Irujo’s manifestations, and increasingly so since violence was becoming a new feature of Basque nationalism.

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<sup>83</sup> “El Estatuto vasco” by Manuel Irujo, in Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 52, File 2, 1953. <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/4350.pdf> (consulted on December 10th, 2016).

<sup>84</sup> “El signo de nuestra hora” by Manuel Irujo, published in *Alderdi*, n.24, March 1949, in IRUJO, Manuel, 1981, *Escritos en Alderdi*. Vol.I. Bilbao: Partido Nacionalista Vasco., p. 11-14.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

The adaptation to the new situation would include thinking of the Basque Statute of Autonomy as a way of being sovereign in the new world (after the Second World War):

*“En el Valle de Aosta se acusó la existencia de un sentimiento separatista, con alguna base francesa, en cuanto tuvo lugar la liberación del país. Respondiendo a este hecho, el 19 agosto 1945 fueron aprobados dos Decretos por el Gobierno Italiano estableciendo un régimen de autonomía que de hecho ha estado en vigor sin interrupción. (...) por el art. 14 del mismo, el Valle se constituye en zona libre; por los art. 7 y 11 se le otorga concesión por 99 años de todas sus aguas y minas.”<sup>86</sup>*

Irujo was a lawyer, and for that reason he had studied the different political and legal systems that could be used in the Basque case, always trying to learn and incorporate new solutions and, while in exile, learning from the experience:

*“«Il Popolo» publica un mensaje dirigido por Luigi Sturzo<sup>87</sup> a la «Asamblea Regional» de Cerdeña. Sturzo ha publicado un libro sobre Regionalismo en Italia, que no he leído. Pero sus ideas se encuentran recogidas en la alocución dirigida a los electores sardos. Y no deja de tener interés para los vascos su conocimiento. (...).”<sup>88</sup>*

The idea of Christian Democracy as an alternative to fascism or totalitarianism is endorsed in this article, and is presented as a good solution for the national problems within a State, along with the need of what is called “*autonomía regional*” for achieving the complete decentralization of the State: “*La libertad autonómica (...) es base necesaria para la libertad nacional.*”

Manuel Irujo believed that after the Second World War autonomy within States was a good solution, one that should be combined with Christian Democracy in order to fight fascism. By

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<sup>86</sup> “Estatutos de autonomía en Italia” by Manuel Irujo, in *Alderdi* n.26, May 1949. Published in IRUJO, Manuel, 1981, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-23.

<sup>87</sup> Luigi Sturzo was an Italian Catholic priest and politician, considered one of the founders of Christian Democracy. He was forced into exile in 1924 due to the rise of fascism in Italy, first to London and ultimately to the USA, where he met President Aguirre at some meetings held by the “Catholic Association for International Peace” to promote an American Christian Democracy. Some of the meetings are described in Aguirre’s diary: AGUIRRE, José Antonio; GOIOGANA, Iñaki (Ed.) 2010, *op. cit.* President Aguirre, José Ignacio de Lizaso and Alberto Onaindía exchanged letters on Christian Democracy and the Basque situation, published in: BOTTI, Alfonso, 2012, *Luigi Sturzo e gli amici Spagnoli. Carteggi (1924, 1951)*. Modena: Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino Editore. More on Luigi Sturzo and Christian Democracy: KAISER, Wolfram, 2007, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press; ZANCA, José, 2013, *Cristianos antifascistas, conflictos en la cultura católica Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.

<sup>88</sup> “Las elecciones de Cerdeña y el Caballo de Troya (Mensaje de Sturzo),” *Alderdi*, n. 27, June 1949. Published in IRUJO, Manuel, 1981, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-27.

resorting not only to the Italian example, but also to many others, such as the North Irish, the Sudanese, or the Tunisian,<sup>89</sup> it was possible to explain the Basque situation and the importance of having, at least, an autonomous government in a democracy. Although Irujo had been responsible for creating the Basque National Council in 1940 at the time of the disappearance of President Aguirre, with a clear pro-independence aim,<sup>90</sup> in the post-war era preserving the Basque autonomous government seemed to be the best solution for the Basques, who were in favor of an autonomous region, nationally defined, and within a federal Europe, as we will see in later chapters. Nevertheless, Irujo considered that the Statutes of Autonomy were an opportunity for achieving the full sovereignty of peoples and nations:

*“Los sudaneses entran en el disfrute de una autonomía como periodo transitorio para la adopción de la fórmula definitiva de su constitución nacional. Podrán optar entre las tres soluciones debatidas: Independencia absoluta, domino británico o unión con Egipto.”*<sup>91</sup>

Always aware that comparisons are not easy, Irujo defends in his articles and speeches<sup>92</sup> the possibilities that the Statutes bestow on nations such as the Basque, and he points out how autonomous systems receive support in Republics and meet resistance and confrontation in Monarchies.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> “Lo que vale una autonomía” (on the autonomous system of North Ireland), in Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 52, File 13.1952. <http://www.euskomedia.org/fondo/225?idi=en> (consulted on December 10th, 2016); “Gran Bretaña, Egipto y el Sudán,” in Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 52, File 3. 1952. <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/3175.pdf> (consulted on December 10th, 2016); “El Estatuto de Autonomía de Túnez,” in *Alderdi*, n. 99, June 1955. Published in IRUJO, Manuel, 1981, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-240. Later on, Irujo will continue with his analysis of the Statutes and his comparisons with the Basque case with the examples of Kurdistan: “Los kurdos y nosotros,” in Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 53, File 4B, 1966, <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/14756.pdf> (consulted on December 10th, 2016), the Swiss and the Mizo: “Los jura y los mizo,” in Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 53, File 4B, 1966, <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/14790.pdf> (consulted on December 10th, 2016), or the case of Gibraltar: “El Estatuto de autonomía de Gibraltar,” in Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 53, File 5B, 1969, <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/14637.pdf> (consulted on December 10th, 2016).

<sup>90</sup> MORAN, Gregorio, 2003, *Los españoles que dejaron de serlo*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, p. 255.

<sup>91</sup> “Gran Bretaña, Egipto y el Sudán,” 1952, *op. cit.*

<sup>92</sup> Irujo used to take part in some radio transmissions on Radio Euzkadi, and some of the aforementioned analyses are drafts for preparing the broadcasts.

<sup>93</sup> Manuel Irujo was always a declared republican, he only defended the pacts with the monarchists when the situation forced him to do so for the sake of the Basques, although he understood that monarchies were incompatible with a democracy. Nevertheless, Irujo distinguished between the northern European and the British monarchies, as well as some others, such as the Eastern monarchies. In that regard, he considered the situation of the Kurdish and the Basques as similar: “*La diferencia entre los monárquicos y los republicanos para los Kurdos, como para nosotros, es la misma: los monárquicos no pueden ser demócratas, aunque lo proclamen en alta voz y con música, porque a los monárquicos les interesa la corona real y a los pueblos, hoy, ya no les interesa la corona real ni nada que se le parezca.*” Again, Irujo talked about the possibilities of full sovereignty made available by the Statutes of Autonomy: (...) *Los kurdos, como nosotros, al enfrentarse con la*

*“Nuestros problemas no son los mismos que los del Sur de Italia, ciertamente. Y nuestra posición no puede acomodarse con exactitud al pensamiento del gran italiano Sturzo. Pero no deja de ser significativo el consejo que da a Cerdeña, al señalar los enemigos de la autonomía, llamando a la monarquía «el caballo de Troya».”<sup>94</sup>*

#### **d. The Basque international politics before the Conference. The American friend.**

Jose Antonio Aguirre was one of the key players in the relations with the United States, yet he was by no means the only one. Relations between the American administration and the Basque government were not new, but the situation of exile and the Second World War had given them a boost.

Although the exile offered opportunities and some kind of refuge to the Basque government, it also meant the division of the Basques—and that division was not only geographical, but also ideological and tactical, as we have begun to sense but will get to see more clearly in the next chapters.

The Basque society is not an isolated society—it never has been. Migration and exile are constants that are present throughout Basque history, and that is why we find that Basque communities have gone into exile or migrated throughout history, but especially so since the 19<sup>th</sup> century and to America—both South and North.<sup>95</sup>

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*realidad actual, opuesta a que se creen nuevas fronteras y nuevas aduanas, y nuevos ejércitos y nuevos hogares y pugnas estatales, en lugar de proclamar la independencia proclamaron la autonomía, lo cual les da derecho a disponer de su país, a gobernarlo, a enseñar su idioma, a mantener sus costumbres, a mantener vivo su genio civil, a ocuparse del orden público, a aplicar las leyes sociales, a construir sus vías de comunicación, tener su política de construcción de edificios, y, en una palabra, disponer de todos los derechos de gobierno de carácter nacional, dejando en poder de los gobernantes de Irak los derechos de orden puramente estatal: representación internacional, comercio exterior y defensa militar.”* In “Los kurdos y nosotros,” 1966, *op. cit.*

<sup>94</sup> “Las elecciones de Cerdeña y el Caballo de Troya (Mensaje de Sturzo),” *Alderdi*, n.27, June 1949. Published in IRUJO, Manuel, 1981, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>95</sup> On Basque migrations, there are several books written by Navarre historian José Manuel Azcona Pastor: 2011, *El ámbito historiográfico y metodológico de la emigración vasca y navarra hacia América*. Vitoria: Servicio central de publicaciones del gobierno vasco; 2004, *Basque Emigration to Latin America (s. XVI-XX)*, Reno: University of Nevada; 1992, *Los paraísos posibles, historia de la emigración vasca a Argentina y Uruguay en el siglo XIX*, Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto. A broader analysis can be found in AZCONA PASTOR, José Manuel (Ed.) 2015, *Identidad y estructura de la emigración vasca y navarra hacia Iberoamérica (siglos XVI-XXI). Redes sociales y desarrollo socioeconómico*. Pamplona: Thomson Reuters Aranzadi. A complete analysis of the Basque diaspora and identity is found in a work by Gloria Totoricagüena: 2005, *The Basque Diaspora: Migration and Transnational Identity*. Reno: Center for Basque Studies. University of Nevada.



The existence of these Basque communities (what has been called “the Basque diaspora”) would prove helpful in facilitating the organization of the Basque exile during and after the Spanish Civil War, especially after 1939. The Basque government had taken charge of organizing the exile from the beginning of the conflict, managing the departure of exiles who sought refuge across the Pyrenees on French soil. It did so in collaboration with several organizations, among which the LIAB (International League of Friends of the Basques) stands out, created in Paris in 1938 by the Basque-Philippine Manuel Intxausti and the French Bishop Clement Mathieu. The LIAB was divided into two main action fronts: the Assistance Committee for Basques, headed by Mathieu and intended to channel aid to the refugees, and the Committee of General Interests of the Basque Country, whose basic purpose was to make known the demands of the nation and spread the Basque culture.<sup>96</sup>

The Basque communities that were already established abroad also facilitated the evacuation of exiles, especially those who were fleeing to America, but it is worth not forgetting the proactive role played by the Basque delegations that were opened by the Basque government even before the outbreak of the war.<sup>97</sup>

But the broad network of Basque delegations was established during the war, when, apart from its offices in Madrid and Barcelona, the Basque government established delegations in Paris (1936), Bordeaux (1936), Mexico (1936), Bayonne (1937), London (1937), Brussels (1938), New York (1938), Buenos Aires (1938), and Caracas (1940), among others.

The Basque delegations were the result of the international relations agenda carried out by the Basque government, and although its activity cannot be considered as “diplomatic” activity, since the Government and its delegations were bound by the Spanish Republican laws and formally depended on the Republican government, yet its political objectives were not too far

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<sup>96</sup> On LIAB, see: IRUJO, Xabier. 2012. *Expelled from motherland. The government of President José Antonio Aguirre on exile, 1937-1960*. Reno: Center for Basque studies. University of Nevada., pp. 70 and ff.; LARRONDE, Jean-Claude, 1997, *Exil et solidarité: La ligue Internationale des amis des basques*. Villefranche: Bidasoa.

<sup>97</sup> In fact, according to some references, we can talk about “Basque delegations” even before the constitution of the Basque government, for example the offices that were opened in Mexico in 1936, mainly for commercial purposes, but which later on, and under the supervision of the Basque government, would become an important base for the Basques in America. On the Basque delegations, see: SERVICIO CENTRAL DE PUBLICACIONES DEL GOBIERNO VASCO, 2010, *Delegaciones de Euskadi (1936-1975)*. Vitoria-Gasteiz; SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, 2014, *El exilio vasco en América*. 1st ed. Vitoria-Gasteiz: Servicio Central de publicaciones del Gobierno vasco., pp. 97-123; SORULAZE, Andoni de, 1980. “Delegaciones vascas en América y quiénes han sido los delegados del Gobierno Vasco en 40 años,” in *Euzkadi*, no. 206; 1980, “Delegaciones de Euzkadi en una de sus épocas y sus delegados,” *Euzkadi*, no. 209.

from the demands that any government of a State might have set, as José Luis Castro and Alexander Ugalde assert in their study on Basque foreign affairs:

*“Del análisis de las actividades efectuadas se deducen los principales fines perseguidos. Primero, la defensa en el campo internacional de la legalidad republicana y de la recién lograda autonomía vasca y sus instituciones. Segundo, atender a las necesidades básicas de la población, lo que se tradujo en un sesgo de internacionalidad de muchas actividades gubernamentales (comercio exterior, abastecimiento, transporte marítimo y aéreo, evacuación civil, etc.). Tercero, dar a conocer a la comunidad internacional que Euskadi era una región autónoma en el marco del Estado español, con un gobierno fundamentado en la legalidad republicana, respaldado mayoritariamente por las fuerzas políticas y legítimo representante del pueblo vasco. Cuarto, articular la proyección exterior vasca en los más diversos ámbitos, caso del político y cultural. Y quinto, obtener el reconocimiento internacional del Gobierno Vasco, sino con caracteres plenamente diplomáticos, sí al menos político y con fórmulas oficiosas, pues el Presidente, consejeros y delegados efectuaron contactos, intercambiaron informaciones, suscribieron acuerdos, etc., con otros gobiernos, diplomáticos y representantes de organizaciones internacionales.”<sup>98</sup>*

Although the European network was the most important—with the Basque delegation in Paris being the most prominent, and housing the Government during almost the entire exile—the delegations in America were also of great importance, not only because of the help they gave to the exiles forced to move to America, but also because of the financial aid that the Basque government received from the American delegations and the Basque communities in exile.

The exile of the Basque government happened to coincide with the aftermath of the Second World War and, of course, the breakdown of the Government of the Spanish Republic in exile. The financial situation of the Basque government was defrayed in the first place by the Basque communities in exile; then by personal loans from important Basque citizens, as well as companies created by the Basque government; and, finally, by the Spanish funds obtained by the Spanish Republican government, according to a report presented at the Basque world conference in Paris (1956) by José María Lasarte.<sup>99</sup> Although the report did not mention it, the

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<sup>98</sup> CASTRO RUANO, José Luis de; UGALDE ZUBIRI, Alexander, 2004, *La acción exterior del País Vasco (1980-2003)*. Oñati: Instituto Vasco de Administración Pública., p. 50.

<sup>99</sup> SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, 2014, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-150.

relationship between the “Basque services” and the United States government also provided a great source of income that would help (among other things) in “*the conversion of the pre-established Basque delegations into Basque nationalism.*”<sup>100</sup>

The Basque diaspora was no less heterogeneous than the first Basque Government: they were not all Basque nationalists<sup>101</sup> and, therefore, not all of them agreed with the Basque government nor with Aguirre’s agenda for the exile and the international relations that had been established.

Jon Bilbao<sup>102</sup> warned President Aguirre about the differences between the political exiles and the emigrants: “*El emigrante no es político, al contrario huye de toda política*”<sup>103</sup>. In 1954, when the letter was written, President Aguirre and the Basque government had developed an international strategy that would include collaboration with the British services and the American CIA—and certain activities in relation to South American dictatorships caused commotion among the Basques living in America. Jon Bilbao tried to explain the reactions to the president’s relationships: “*Ya algunos cubanos que nos quieren y le quieren a usted, como Portes Vilá, García Pons, Arango, etc. Muestran alguna extrañeza sobre su visita a Venezuela, país dictatorial.*”<sup>104</sup> Such a statement might seem in contradiction with the previous one, where Bilbao asserted that Basque migrants were not into politics, but by the end of the letter, Bilbao analyzes the situation of some Basque delegations in Central and South America and reveals

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<sup>100</sup> According to Ramon Sota, whose father was one of the Basque nationalists who used to work for the USA through the Basque services, the funds received from the American government were used by the Basque government to spread Basque nationalism among the Basque communities in America, who were not particularly nationalist. Statements made in an interview carried out in November 2016. On the “Basque services” and the activities developed in America, see: UNANUE, Manuel de Dios, 1999, *El Caso Galíndez: los vascos en los Servicios de Inteligencia de EEUU*. Tafalla: Txalaparta; AZURMENDI, José Felix, 2013, *op. cit.*, pp. 61 and ff.; JIMÉNEZ DE ABERASTURI, Juan Carlos, 1999, *De la derrota a la esperanza. Políticas vascas durante la II Guerra Mundial (1937-1947)*, Bilbao: Instituto Vasco de Administración Pública. pp. 423-500; JIMÉNEZ DE ABERASTURI, Juan Carlos, 2009, “Al servicio del extranjero: historia del servicio secreto vasco de información de la Guerra Civil al exilio. (1936-1943).” Boadilla del Monte: Antonio Machado Libros; CASTRO RUANO, José Luis de; UGALDE ZUBIRI, Alexander, 2004, *op. cit.*, pp. 56 and ff.; IRUJO, Xabier, 2014, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-126; SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, 2014, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-349.

<sup>101</sup> According to the information revealed at an EBB meeting in 1937, the Basque diaspora was divided between “*carlistas y nacionalistas.*” MOTA, David, 2016, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

<sup>102</sup> Jon Bilbao fought with the Basque army during the Spanish Civil War and was named sub delegate of the Basque government in Boise, Idaho, after being one of the first members of the Basque delegation in New York. In 1944 he returned to New York and collaborated with several Basque publications. For more on Jon Bilbao, see: <http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/14146> (consulted on December 15th, 2016).

<sup>103</sup> Jon Bilbao to José Antonio Aguirre, La Habana, February 23rd, 1954, BA CBS, Jon Bilbao Archive, BSQAP 0177 1939-1958.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

what feature had taken shape there (especially at the Cuban Basque center): “*No es más que un centro regional español,*” controlled, according to Bilbao, by non-nationalist Basques.

But the aim of spreading Basque nationalism among the diaspora in order to make the Basque problem more visible was something that President Aguirre had announced from the very first moment that he set foot in America. When Aguirre reappeared in America in 1941, and especially after he settled down in New York, he reorganized the Basque government and stated what the aim was in international politics: to reinforce and develop the presence of the Basques and their international relationships through the promotion of culture (mainly the establishment of the Basque press office in 1947 and the fostering of Basque publications), but also by improving the political awareness of the Delegations through participation in international bodies and the fight against Nazi and fascist influence, especially in South America, as well as maintaining the cooperation with the Spanish Republican government.<sup>105</sup>

The exile was a problem, not a failure, for Aguirre, who led the Basque government and focused on continuing to work for the Basque people. His optimism was one of his main traits; it could turn issues into possibilities, even when the international situation was not the most favorable. The Spanish Civil War was not an isolated war episode—right after it, the breaking out of the Second World War forced the Basques and all the exiles from Spain to look for new solutions in a new war situation.

The presence of President Aguirre in the United States meant that the Basque Government was establishing its headquarters in New York and, therefore, the New York Basque delegation became one of the main delegations.

### **Working with the USA. The Basque government in the USA**

The evolution of the Second World War and the entry of the USA in the European war changed international politics and the focus of Basque diplomacy: the American strategy was backed, and the collaboration was sealed through a cooperation agreement with the Office of Strategic Services OSS (which in 1947 became the CIA) in 1942.

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<sup>105</sup> SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo. 1991. *The Basque archives: Vascos en Estados Unidos (1938-1947)*. San Sebastián: Txertoa, p. 55; IRUJO, Xabier, 2012, *op. cit.*, p. 122

The agreement with the Americans resembled the one signed by the Basque National Council in London under Manuel Irujo's leadership—except it was not a political agreement but a military collaboration to halt Nazi propaganda in Europe, the Philippines, and especially Latin America. As Xabier Irujo states, “*This provoked a heated debate between Irujo and Aguirre.*” One can deduce that the American agreement was possible thanks to the many contacts and agreements of collaboration signed years before with the British Services, and thanks also to the contacts made by Irujo and the Basque National Council in London—and for Irujo, the new agreement had to include the political Basque objective of national Independence if it was to make worth the effort.

Nevertheless, not everyone in the government thought the same as Irujo, and in particular the *Lehendakari* believed that the collaboration had to be made without asking for anything else in return, just for the sake of fighting for democracy and freedom.<sup>106</sup>

President Aguirre believed in Manuel Irujo and his loyalty, but above all Aguirre thought strategically, and after his reappearance he had had to handle certain awkward situations that could affect the strategy of the Basque government or even damage the image of union.

“*Comienzo el estudio sobre todo del conflicto de Londres. Quiero enterarme bien para tomar determinaciones radicales. No podemos nosotros dar espectáculos parecidos a los de los españoles riñendo y provocando escándalo por todas partes.*”<sup>107</sup> Aguirre expressed his concern about what had happened during his absence, and the issues are pointed out (in this case in connection with the administration of the Continental Transit Shipping Company) in his diary entry of November 8<sup>th</sup>, 1941. His political concern was to keep the Basque government united and to work together for the creation of a suitable environment in international politics that would help to improve the image not only of the Basque nationalists, but of the Spanish Republican democrats themselves, who wished to become important enough to be considered by the Allies for inclusion in their pacification agenda.

We have already seen that democracy and the fight against fascism were two of the main objectives that Aguirre and the Basque government had to fit inside their international relations agenda, and Christian Democracy in America would play an important role in helping to reach their goals.

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<sup>106</sup> IRUJO, Xabier, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-126.

<sup>107</sup> AGUIRRE, José Antonio; GOIOGANA, Iñaki (Ed.), 2010, *op. cit.*, p.

As we have also already seen, Christian Democracy was at the core of the basic corpus of the PNV, and thus their contacts with European supporters, as well as their relations with the founders of the political movement, such as Luigi Sturzo, were constant, even in the exile, where Aguirre and Sturzo met to promote Christian Democracy in America. In general, American society had sympathy for the Spanish Republican cause, and during the Spanish Civil War public opinion supported the Republican front. Nevertheless, the Catholics were divided, especially because of the Catholic propaganda of the Franco front that turned the Civil War into a defense of the Catholics against atheism and communism.<sup>108</sup> One of the goals of Basque nationalists in exile was to change the vision that associated the Spanish Catholics with order and peace—and therefore with the Franco troops (and later on, with the Franco regime)—by showing that Christian Democracy was an alternative of peace and order associated with the truly peaceful regime that was democracy.

The agreement of collaboration with the OSS facilitated the development of Christian Democracy in America, especially in South America, headed by Basque nationalists. In an area like Latin America, where the Catholic Church was very influential, the Basque nationalists, as Catholics, were very important—above all because neither the Americans nor the British were Catholic. The Basque services would resort to the influence of Basque centers, associations, priests, and even Bishops (Basques and non-Basques) to spread the ideas of Christian Democracy and to put a stop to Nazi and fascist propaganda.

In Latin America, democracy was weakening in favor of some neo-fascist governments, such as the Argentine regime of Juan Perón, linked to the Spanish regime, and President Aguirre believed that the promotion of Christian Democracy would help to stop and depose those regimes. Despite the fact that Christian Democracy parties were marginal in Latin America (except in the cases of Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela), the Basque nationalists did a good job of promoting the Christian-Democrats' ideas, especially through the work of Pedro Basaldúa with the journal "*Orden Cristiano*" in Argentina. The idea of strengthening bonds with the European Christian Democracy by means of an American union was one of the goals pursued by Basaldúa, and this meant that trips and conferences were held by President Aguirre and some members of the EBB such as Manuel Irujo beginning right after the signature of the collaboration agreement with the OSS in 1942.

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<sup>108</sup> MOTA, David, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

To judge from the creation of new Christian-Democrat parties in South America and the holding of the First International Conference of Christian Democracy in Santiago de Chile in 1955, we can gather that the efforts paid off.<sup>109</sup>

The arrival of President Aguirre in New York in 1941 was to turn the Basque delegation in that city into the headquarters of the Basque government until 1946.

The Basque delegation in New York had been founded in 1938, following the American strategy conceived by José Antonio Aguirre of spreading Basque national propaganda and helping to promote Christian Democracy,<sup>110</sup> as mentioned before. Once again, the Basque-Philippine Manuel Ynchausti,<sup>111</sup> who had wealthy businesses and relationships in America, helped the Basque government in organizing the Basque delegation, choosing Manuel de la Sota Aburto and Ramon de la Sota McMahon to work there in view of their experience abroad, under the supervision of Anton Irala, who was appointed delegate.<sup>112</sup>

## e. The end of the American dream

After a trip to South America in 1954, José Antonio Aguirre announced a Basque conference to put together the ideas and reflections of nearly 20 years of Basque Government, almost the entire time of the exile. In fact, the exile itself had an especial importance at the Conference that would be held in Paris in 1956. The politics followed by the Basque government in Paris were not always accepted by the Basque nationalists inside Spain and, as we have already seen,

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<sup>109</sup> SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, 1988, *op. cit.*, pp. 392-395; IRUJO, Xabier, 2014, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-126. Five of the conferences held by Aguirre during his trips in 1942 were published in: AGUIRRE, José Antonio, 1944, *Cinco conferencias pronunciadas en un viaje por América*. Buenos Aires: Ekin.

<sup>110</sup> David Mota also refers to the need of finding funds as one of the objectives of the presence of Basque nationalists in America, and, again, the dichotomy between the exiles and the emigrants with regard to the Basque national sentiment posed an issue in achieving their goals. MOTA, David, 2016, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

<sup>111</sup> Manuel Ynchausti had been responsible for getting contacts for the Basque government in different countries and was in charge of obtaining the passport and visa to the USA for President Aguirre. Ynchausti was not only one of the most loyal friends of the *Lehendakari*, but also his financial supporter, sometimes through personal loans transferred either to Aguirre or to the PNV, or through the payment of Aguirre's stipend at Columbia University—a detail that Aguirre never found out. TOTERICAGÜENA, Gloria, 2003, *The Basques of New York*. Vitoria-Gasteiz-Gasteiz: Servicio central de publicaciones del gobierno vasco.

<sup>112</sup> On the Basque delegation in New York: MOTA, David, 2016, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-65 and 87-100; ORDAZ ROMAY, M<sup>a</sup> Ángeles. 1995. “La delegación vasca en Nueva York, una década bajo el punto de mira del FBI (1938-1947),” in *Estudios de historia social y económica de América*, No. 12., pp. 179-198; SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, 2014, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-215; ANASAGASTI, Iñaki and ERKOREKA, Josu, 2013, *A basque patriot in New York : Jose Luis de la Lombana y Foncea and the Euskadi delegation in the United States*. Reno: Center for Basque Studies.

the controversy was especially acute among Juan Ajuriaguerra and the members of EBB. The internal exile—which was where the Basque nationalists living in Spain were stuck—was not helping them to agree with some of the decisions taken by those who were living thousands of kilometers away from the Franco dictatorship. Democracy was a blessing for the exiles, despite being forced to live abroad—but the freedom of choosing, comparing, and learning from other experiences in the fight against Francoism sometimes collided with the lack of freedom of those who were suffering and struggling against the Franco regime in the streets of *Hegoalde*.<sup>113</sup> Political strategies and even national ideas were seen differently from both sides of the political border that the Pyrenees were, and after twenty years of exile the differences began to grow deeper.

*“La labor que hace el Gobierno Vasco es insuficiente en alto grado. Es más, el G.V. no existe. No existe como fuerza colegiada o como cuerpo colegiado. Los componentes son completamente inactivos. Las reuniones son de nulo valor. Ni toma direcciones ni coordina acciones.”* Such were the tough words addressed to *Lehendakari* Aguirre in person by Ajuriaguerra at an EBB meeting in October, 1950. It was not only the decisions taken by the Government that were questioned, but the Institution in itself. The view of a lack of legitimacy of the Basque (and Catalan) Government in the eyes of the Spanish republicans in exile was now also shared by members of the PNV, in that particular case, from within the Basque country, thus deepening the geographical divide of the exile itself.

*“A Franco se le va a tirar desde el Interior. Si en el Interior no se trabaja intensamente en este sentido, nada hay que hacer tampoco. (...) Tenemos que deshacernos de dos creencias: No se debe esperar que el Exterior tire a Franco, ni de que tome ninguna iniciativa que produzca su caída. (...) Tenemos que actuar en el Exterior ofensiva y no defensivamente, en que esta asfixia continúe y aumente.”*<sup>114</sup>

Things were perceived very differently on both sides of the Pyrenees, and the exile itself was becoming that eighth province defended by Basque nationalism. The exile (and the Basque diaspora) was becoming empowered with different opinions, creating its own alternatives and disagreeing on certain positions.

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<sup>113</sup> “Hegoalde” is a word in Basque meaning “South of the country” and is used by Basque nationalists to refer to the Basque country inside Spain.

<sup>114</sup> Meeting of EBB with President Aguirre, October 2nd, 1950. In MEES, Ludger, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-310.



The international politics deployed by the Basque government in exile had not succeeded in the goal of provoking a military intervention, although the objective of making the Basque conflict more visible at several national chancelleries had achieved its point, and even in the United Nations the Spanish question had been debated. But declarations, statements, and proclamations of intentions were not enough.

The strategy followed by President Aguirre of collaborating with the American Department of State in order to receive help for beating the Franco regime was not well received by all the Basque nationalists, nor by the Spanish democratic resistance, and, despite the natural optimism of Aguirre, even he began to doubt the strategy. Ludger Mess points to 1951 as the turning point of Aguirre's optimism with respect to the "American friend," especially after the concerns he expressed in the correspondence maintained with Jesús Galíndez,<sup>115</sup> delegate in New York between 1946 and 1956.

The activities of collaboration with the American Department of State facilitated the relationships established by the Basque nationalists in the United States—not to forget the positive image that *Lehendakari* Aguirre had carved for himself in the United States since the publication of the English edition of his book "Escape via Berlin," which boosted his image as a promoter of democracy<sup>116</sup> at the end of the 40's, an era in which democracy had been defeated and the ideas of freedom needed to be reinvented. Aguirre was seen as a democrat by the Americans, and his Christian-Democracy alternative began to be listened to in the cultural and political forums.

For achieving the goals of international recognition of the Basque cause (along with the recognition of the Spanish democrats and the anti-Franco political movement) by making use of the brand-new international institutions that had been created under democratic principles, the defense of democracy was emphasized when a proposal was made before the United Nations to ban credits to Spain in 1947, and again when a UN resolution was proposed where the application of the Marshall Plan was to be conditioned to a future democratic Spain.<sup>117</sup>

Anton Irala and Jaume Miravittles had worked together in the report-proposal that would be delivered by Albornoiz to the president of the United Nations and to the delegates of the

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<sup>115</sup> Jesús Galíndez was one of the most well-known members of the Basque government in America, notoriously because of his ultimate disappearance under unclear circumstances. We will look at his case later on in this chapter.

<sup>116</sup> SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-219.

<sup>117</sup> MEES, Ludger, 2006, *op. cit.*, pp. 264-283.

different countries, in an effort to strike political alliances based on the spirit of democracy and using a new argument that would not reach the goals desired: anticommunism.

In the international geopolitical arena, Aguirre and the Basque nationalists were fully aware that if the world were to divide into two blocks between the USA and the USSR, the geostrategic position of Spain and the fears of a possible advance of communism in the south of Europe would become a hard-to-play card for the interests of the Spanish democrats in exile. International politics would again turn their backs on the anti-Francoism democrats, preferring to take positions for the Cold War, and gradually:

*“la postura de rechazo, crítica y marginación hacia el antiguo aliado de Hitler y Mussolini fue erosionada por el lento goteo de gestos, declaraciones y actividades que por separado carecieron de significado político, pero que en conjunto constituyeron una muestra poderosa de lo que estaba ocurriendo.”<sup>118</sup>*

Democracy had been an instrument that had been used to build up international institutions which, despite their international and universal spirits in favor of a better world, were driven by local national interests.

Even confronted by the evidence of the resolutions taken against the democratic proposals, approved in the UN<sup>119</sup> with American votes, Aguirre did not give up his hopes for American aid—although these would not last much longer.

The Atlantic strategy upheld by Aguirre was based on the promotion of democracy, the unity of the Spanish republican resistance, and the anticommunism that the PNV would develop later on, although the latter would mean fighting against a part of Basque nationalism, as we will see in forthcoming chapters. The hope in international institutions, and especially in the political interests in a democracy, might seem naïve in view of the lack of results that that strategy had brought to the interests of the Spanish democrat, but if one analyzes the situation in the post-World War II era, it actually shows an extraordinary political vision on the part of Aguirre and his government, who were positioning the Basque cause and its democratic vindications in the world, proving that small nations could have a role in making a better world.

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<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 275.

<sup>119</sup> In a 1950 UN session the 1946 Tripartite Note was formally revoked and some western ambassadors (included the American) were resent to Spain. *Ibid.*, p. 272.

The democratic cause was the card to play given the atrocities caused by totalitarian governments before, during, and after WWII—even the political interests of nations endowed with a State might overcome the democratic interests.

The American administration turned out so contradictory in the Spanish case that it did not give up on its strategy. Although the correspondence with his men in America was warning Aguirre about the direction things were taking at the American administration,<sup>120</sup> he believed that the Americans would not support a dictator if the Spanish resistance could only offer a united democratic alternative.

The Basque government supported the 1947<sup>121</sup> strike, demanding and emphasizing the need for UN intervention and their own allegiance to the democratic causes:

*“(...) hemos ayudado en todo el mundo al triunfo aliado con eficacia y sacrificio cuando aquí era un crimen apoyar la causa aliada. Recordamos que vascos y españoles murieron en Narwick, en África, en Italia y en la liberación de Francia. Pedimos ahora esa misma libertad para nosotros. Libertad para expresar nuestra voluntad y regir conforme a ella nuestros destinos.”<sup>122</sup>*

1947 could have been a turning point for Basque nationalists with regard to anti-Francoist activities and resistance from the inside, but the disagreements between the parties and trade unions participating in the strike, as well as the unexpected duration of the strike, revealed some inside difficulties within the organization of the resistance.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Jesús Galíndez warned President Aguirre in 1951 about the possibility of future economic agreements between Spain and the USA, and his suspicions turned out real when the American administration promoted two Franco supporters: John Foster Dulles, appointed new Secretary of State, who had worked as attorney of the Banco de España during the Spanish Civil War; and the new American Ambassador in Madrid, James Clement Dunn, who was one of the supporters of American non-intervention policies. *Ibid.*, p. 290 and p. 293.

<sup>121</sup> The Basque government signed a joint manifest entitled “*A los vascos de América*,” published in *Euzkadi*, 49, Caracas, July 1947. Also in [http://www.lehendakariaguirre.eu/pdf/Mensajes/11\\_01.pdf](http://www.lehendakariaguirre.eu/pdf/Mensajes/11_01.pdf) (Consulted on December 25th, 2016.)

<sup>122</sup> President Aguirre’s declaration, in JIMÉNEZ ABERASTURI, Juan Carlos; SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo (Ed.), 1991. *La huelga general del 1º de Mayo de 1947* (articles and documents). Donostia: Eusko Ikaskuntza. He also showed his support in a declaration published in OPE, 12-5-1947, p. 1 under the title “*Un mensaje del Presidente Aguirre al pueblo vasco.*”

<sup>123</sup> The causes and effects of the 1947 strike have been widely studied; a good example of this is the aforementioned collection of documents compiled in *La huelga general del 1º de Mayo*, or the interesting article by Maria Luisa Garde-Etayo, “ELA en 1947: de la esperanza a la represión,” published in *Memoria y civilización*, 15 (2012): 211-227, in <http://hdl.handle.net/10171/34935> (consulted on December 25th, 2016).

Nevertheless, what holds more importance for my study is the international impact of the strike and the subsequent repression that ended up with between 2000 and 4000 people detained.<sup>124</sup>

The 1947 strike, although it was organized both by political parties—basically the PNV and the Socialists—and trade unions—such as ELA-STV, UGT, and CNT—came as a result of having assessed the mobilization of people in the previous *Aberri Eguna* (April 6<sup>th</sup>), the Anniversary of the Republic (April 14<sup>th</sup>), and the bombing of Gernika (April 26<sup>th</sup>).<sup>125</sup> The success of these previous popular demonstrations encouraged the democratic resistance to organize a strike on May 1<sup>st</sup>, but the fact that it was even more successful and that the strike lasted for more than eight days showed that they were not well-prepared to hold the protest.

The international repercussion of the strike was huge, and the press conference held by President Aguirre caused a real impact on the French, British, and American press, as well as being spread by Radio Euzkadi and other international radios, generating doses of optimism about the end of the regime.<sup>126</sup>

The repression of the Franco regime against the strikers was at least as huge as the press repercussion of the uprising, and it served to mobilize the Basque government in a campaign to raise funds for the workers that had been fired and for those who after several months were still in prison.

In the Basque government-in-exile's declaration *A los vascos de América* mentioned before, the executive directly asked the delegations in exile to take part in the fundraising, and the importance of this is given by the fact that the declaration, as Koldo San Sebastián states, gave political authority to the Basque delegations in exile to engage in activities.<sup>127</sup>

The exile's delegations, especially the American, organized multiple fundraisings which collected a significant amount of money from Argentina, Venezuela, and Mexico mostly. But this reveals the increasing importance of the delegations in exile—the exile as a whole, the creation of the “eighth province” that we have already mentioned—the furnishing of political opinion and the intention of participating in the making of the Basque country in exile. That political participation would be shown clearly in the World Basque Conference in 1956.

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<sup>124</sup> DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, MEES, Ludger and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 194.

<sup>126</sup> GARDE-ETAYO, M<sup>a</sup> Luisa, 2012, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-221.

<sup>127</sup> SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, *op. cit.*, 2014., p. 395.

Despite the considerable success of the 1947 strike, the American friend was still in the *Lehendakari*'s mind, and that was the reason why Aguirre and some of the Basque nationalists opposed the nature and development of the 1951 strike, since they considered that the social unrest might upset the Americans if these popular movements were to be used by the communists.<sup>128</sup>

After that decision, Aguirre and the exile clashed again with the internal exile and with the direction of the *Junta de Resistencia* (Resistance Council), under the control of Juan Ajuriaguerra.

In a report signed in Paris on May 31<sup>st</sup> by the political commission (probably written by Manuel Irujo),<sup>129</sup> the impact of the strikes was studied and analyzed, as was also the division between the inland and the country in exile, as well as the difficulties and hopes of reaching an agreement:

*“La división entre INTERIOR y EXTERIOR corresponde a una realidad, pero no alcanza a todos los temas, y por lo tanto, no es posible mantenerla para todos los enunciados, sin forzar a que se produzcan de manera necesaria, la invasión del uno al tratarse el otro. Existen muchos asuntos en los cuales, el interior y el Exterior son meros accidentes; y lo accidental no debe ser base de separación.”*

The report is a seventeen pages long document that highlights the importance of the exile, vindicating the activities developed by the exiles and their relationship with the situation in the inland: *“No encuentro diferencias sustanciales entre el EXTERIOR y las ACTIVIDADES INTERNACIONALES. (...) Yo hubiera redactado el temario en este orden: POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL, POLÍTICA EUROPEA, POLÍTICA PENINSULAR, POLÍTICA VASCA.”*

Attached with the document were some letters and other reports received by Manuel Irujo that dealt with the relations with the Spanish exiles, the repercussion of the 1951 strikes, and the relations with the Spanish Federalists within the Federal European Council (CFE), as well as the need of creating a Basque council.

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<sup>128</sup> Aguirre was probably influenced by the reports sent by Anton Irala after the 1947 strike in which he alerted about its consequences, since international politics were plunging into a profound anti-communist stance, and the Spanish protest could be identified with socialism. DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, MEES, Ludger and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

<sup>129</sup> In Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 32, File 2. <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujio/13128.pdf> (consulted on December 25th 2016.)

As regards the strikes, the report analyzes their nature and—although this is not a clear rejection—the report states that the strikes, since they are political strikes named as such by the Franco regime,<sup>130</sup> have to be well-organized if they want to take advantage of the damage inflicted on the regime and show the clear unity and solid organization of the anti-Francoists, so that their position will be made clear to the exterior and to international bodies:

*“Insistir en que se produzcan huelgas me parece una necesidad. Soy contrario a quienes puedan mantener otro criterio. Sé bien el peligro que encierra una situación de huelga endémica. Pero, no tenemos opción. El mundo internacional nos estimará en tanto en cuanto podamos probar con hechos que Franco no es el amo de España. (...) La idea de dotar a las huelgas de una dirección política es una necesidad. (...) Si nosotros no lo hacemos, nos exponemos a que alguien lo haga. Y el peligro no son tan solo comunistas o monárquicos.”*

An international battle was clearly in the mind of the Basque nationalists in exile: whether to gain recognition and help in order to stop the Spanish regime, or to receive aid from the other Basque exiles. The exile was stretching longer than desired (all exiles are), but the ultimate goal of the Basque nationalists was to come back home and build a sovereign nation—and using their international relations to do so was one of the possibilities.

But during the decade of the 50's the international arena was immersed in the creation of the Cold War, and on that huge board the Basque people once again came to be seen as something useless, especially by the same American administration that the Basque had placed their trust in.

## **f. The Pacts of Madrid and the shifting of the helm back to Europe**

After World War II, the fascist and neofascist groups that the Basque services were helping the US to wipe out were no longer of interest to the USA and, as announced, anticommunism began to be the issue they most worried about. Communism had escalated positions to become the top fear for the American administration, and, even though President Truman did not quite

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<sup>130</sup> The 1951 strike, unlike that of 1947, had as its basis the social protests and discontent due to life conditions. However, the 1951 strike was organized in the interior by the Resistance council, although neither the results nor the development of all the resulting riots were linked to political resistance, but to social unrest. DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, MEES, Ludger and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 1999, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-201.

agree, in 1950 and 1951 the American Congress approved several grants and loans to be given to the Franco regime, based on the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, in order to stop communism in Europe.<sup>131</sup>

When the American loans were approved, Aguirre still had some hope, but his reserves of natural confidence in the “American friend” were about to be depleted.

Aguirre was wrong when in 1952 he asserted at a meeting with the EBB: “*La postura franquista de esperar algo del cambio de actitud después de las elecciones es absurda, pues gane quien gane, la postura será la misma.*”<sup>132</sup>

With the access of the Republican administration to the White House in 1953, Spain was included formally in the defense strategy for Western Europe: the signing in September of the Pact of Madrid, an economic and military agreement, after being included in the UNESCO (the UN body for an Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization), would eventually lead to the admission of Spain in the UN on December 15<sup>th</sup>, 1955.<sup>133</sup>

The letter sent by Félix Gordón Ordás, President of the Spanish Republican Government-in-exile, emphasizing the UN resolutions of 1946 in which the Franco Regime had been defined as “*el régimen franquista es un régimen fascista, copiado del modelo de la Alemania de Hitler y de la Italia fascista de Mussolini, e instituido en gran parte gracias a su ayuda*” and adding that “*Luego es evidente para todo juicio sano y para toda conciencia recta que no se puede otorgar la calidad de Miembro de la ONU al gobierno usurpador de España, sin conculcar con el sentido inicial de la interpretación auténtica de la Carta fundacional de San Francisco,*”<sup>134</sup> had little impact in the United Nations, where the Republican government, although legitimate, was not recognized.

The end of the “isolation” that had kept Spain away from international institutions was further rewarded with the signature of the Concordat with the Vatican on August 27<sup>th</sup>, 1953, after a short series of feeble agreements, which, although they rewarded both sides, were a harsh blow for those Basque nationalists who were devoted Catholics and who trusted the Holy See would

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<sup>131</sup> IRUJO, Xabier, 2012, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-146.

<sup>132</sup> MEES, Ludger, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

<sup>133</sup> IRUJO, Xabier, 2012, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-148.

<sup>134</sup> Letter from the President of the Spanish Republican Government to Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld, Secretary General of the UN, February 8th, 1955. EAH-AHE, Archivo gobierno Vasco, Fondo especial Beyris, C-134/1-7.

never consent to having formal relations with a dictatorship, nor, much less, appoint Francisco Franco Knight of the Militia of Jesus Christ.

Although the progress in the slow but firm path to the international recognition of Spain was something that the Basque government tried to ignore or undervalue, its members were fully aware of the importance of the pacts. Right after the Pact of Madrid, Ajuriaguerra returned to the inland and Irujo started a series of contacts with the Basque delegate in London, Josu Hickman, in an effort to resume contacts with the British, as the American strategy had been given up for lost.<sup>135</sup>

Besides, Irujo reinforced the campaign against the Concordat, which he had initiated in 1952 with articles and speeches on Radio Euzkadi—normally under his alias “Javier de Iranzu,” which Irujo frequently used when he talked about religious topics—together with an Anti-American campaign that produced dozens of articles written by Navarre’s tireless pen.

Examples of these articles are “*Franco en UNESCO*”, “*Los hogares cristianos*,” or “*La civilización del trabajo*,” written in 1952 and in which Irujo criticizes the Franco regime and the way the Catholic Church was being manipulated in Spain.

A sign that the American agreements were expected to happen can be found in articles also written in 1952, such as “*La Miseria de España*,” where Irujo, under his Javier de Iranzu alias, writes the following after London’s journal “The economist” has published information on the possible Spanish-American agreement: “*España ha venido a ser otro caso más de la guerra fría. La intervención de Estados Unidos es cada vez más tangible en la política de Occidente.*”

Irujo used the information that Hickman would send daily to make Javier de Iranzu speak. With that information, the campaign against the USA and in favor of the British began to take shape during 1953, with articles in defense of the British policies such as “*El Pensamiento Navarro en Kenia*,” published in *Alderdi*, no. 78, September 1953, where Irujo defends Great Britain and Europe as the birthplaces of democracy, although forcing his demagogy in defense of British colonialism.

After the shock of the Pact of Madrid, both the articles by Irujo and those by his alias, Javier de Iranzu, focused their efforts on defending Great Britain and Europe from the American administration, this time without reservations. Irujo defends the European Federal Movement

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<sup>135</sup> AZURMENDI, José Félix, 2013, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-118; IRUJO, Xabier, 2012, *op. cit.*, pp. 147.



after the London Economic Conference (also known as Conference of Westminster) in *Alderdi*, no. 83, February 1954: “(...) *crear un bloque económico integrado por Europa y la Comunidad Británica, defendido por condiciones preferenciales, para poder concurrir compitiendo adecuadamente con los Estados Unidos, y restituir de tal manera las relaciones económicas internacionales y el equilibrio del que disfrutaban durante el siglo XIX, bajo la dirección de Londres.*” and he does the same with the speech “*La Conferencia económica europea de Londres*” for Radio *Euzkadi* as Javier de Iranzu.

In a final attempt to condemn the Pact of Madrid, Irujo writes the article “*La jerarquía católica de los Estados Unidos y los derechos del hombre,*” published in *Alderdi*, no. 84, March 1954, where he fearlessly states: “*A El Pardo han llegado bendiciones del Vaticano y dólares de Norteamérica,*” clearly expressing the failure of the Basque strategies, both with the Catholics and with the Americans.

But the Christian-Democrat movement was far from detaching itself from the Basque nationalists’ ideology, and, after the creation of the NEI, the link between the Christians and democracy was strengthened with the European movement. The strategy of Irujo of shifting Basque interests towards Europe and Great Britain was focused on vindicating democracy, as defended by Aguirre, and that is why at every meeting of the European movement the Basque delegates were insisting on the necessity of putting on the same level the countries that were not represented in the European council, likening in this way the countries of the Eastern Block to the Western authoritarian regimes of the likes of Portugal or Spain.<sup>136</sup>

Such a strategy would have amounted to modifying the strategic ground that had become the United Nations, as it would have been forced to admit several countries in order to balance the two blocks the world had been divided into.<sup>137</sup>

After the Pact of Madrid, the natural optimism of Aguirre was not taken seriously by the members of the Basque government who were in touch with the President, and, as Mees

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<sup>136</sup> The articles signed as Javier de Iranzu can be found at the Eusko Ikaskuntza’s archive within the Manuel Irujo fund, signature J, Box 52, Files 1-3. They can be consulted in their digital version at: <http://www.euskomedia.org/bilatu?q=Javier+de+Iranzu>

<sup>137</sup> Resolution S/RES/109(1955) accepted the admission of several countries, such as Albania, Jordan, Portugal, Ireland, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Hungary, or Laos regardless of whether the governments of these states were dictatorships or democracies. The strategy of faith in the UN as a guardian of democracy had been overridden by the great divide of the Cold War which, more than dividing the world politically, had at its base economic reasons for the division between capitalism and communism. <http://hdl.handle.net/11176/184644> (consulted on December 27th, 2016.)

states,<sup>138</sup> although he did not accept the defeat of the American strategy—because that would have been like accepting a personal failure—in fact, his strategy was shifting towards a European strategy, always with the aim of internationalizing the Basque cause.

As I mentioned before, the Basque nationalists who were in touch with the *Lehendakari* were not as optimistic as he was with respect to the American strategy, and, although some of them, like Galíndez, had already manifested their doubts, by 1953 the opposition was clear:

*“(…) faltan los programas para el mañana, la reconstrucción de nuestra doctrina y planes a la vista de las necesidades actuales”* wrote Jesús Galíndez in January 1953, in an article in *Alderdi* entitled *“Lo que importa es el future,”*<sup>139</sup> which reflected about the future of the Basque Country but also criticized the Basque strategy and Basque nationalism. Galíndez, probably sick of his lack of communication with Pedro Beitia, an unofficial Basque delegate in Washington DC, a situation that was complicating the contacts, management, and relationships between the Americans and the Basque administration in exile,<sup>140</sup> denounced an absence of ideas within Basque nationalism and the need for renovation:

*“No basta el patriotismo, hace falta acción social. (...) Esos hombres, aunque hace una o dos generaciones no fuesen vascos, hoy lo son; es otra verdad que no podemos ignorar,”* and he adds: *“la única manera de enfrentarse al comunismo es ofreciendo mejores soluciones; nosotros, podemos darlas; precisamente porque podemos basarlas en la tradición de un pueblo que hasta ahora vivió bastante bien, y entre nosotros la evolución puede evitar la revolución. A base de la libertad.”*

These statements were not a direct critique to Sabino Arana, but they implied a certain demand for the renovation ideas and a shift in nationalist Basque policies in order to gain more presence among the “new Basques” (in reference to those who were emigrating from other parts of Spain and moving into the Basque country), focusing the policies on the social needs and, in that way, preventing a further loss in popularity.

The example that Basque nationalism had set in the 50’s began to grow tiresome, and the great shake-up that was needed was the furious reaction of Ceferino Jemein<sup>141</sup> to Galíndez’s article

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<sup>138</sup> MEES, Ludger, 2006, *op. cit.*, pp. 295-296.

<sup>139</sup> “Lo que importa es el futuro,” in *Alderdi*, 70, January 1953, p. 15.

<sup>140</sup> MOTA, David, 2016, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-277.

<sup>141</sup> Ceferino Jemein, a member of the “old guard” nationalists, was president of the Federation of *Mendigozales* (Basque nationalist mountaineers) when the Civil War broke out. Jemein was famous for his defense of the orthodoxy of Sabino Arana’s ideas, which caused him to engage in heated debates with Aguirre, Irujo, and Eli

in the following issue of *Alderdi* with the articles “*Rojos-separatistas*” and “*Pasado, presente y futuro de Euzkadi*,”<sup>142</sup> which he signed with his alias, *Bachiller Belandia*. Jemein made a frontal defense of Arana’s ideas and orthodoxy: “*Recordar las efemérides vascas y patrióticas e instruir sobre el pasado, es mantener inextinguible el fuego pasado del hogar, cuya llama un día purificará a la Patria en JEL*,”<sup>143</sup> as an answer to Galíndez’s demands for renewal.

But Galíndez was upset with the direction American politics were taking, and probably disappointed with the decisions taken by the international bodies which they had placed their trust in: “*La consigna parece ser no atacar a Franco y nuestra sola persistencia clama sin dejarse ahogar.*” Shocked by the international strategy that was leaving the Basque democrats to fight on their own against the fascism represented by Franco in order to stop the advance of communism in Europe, Galíndez finally openly criticized American politics and aired his fears, which had already shown in his exchange of letters with President Aguirre. Galíndez was beginning to realize that the spread of anticommunism was a political strategy, and that, with it, the chances of receiving any help to overthrow the Franco regime were becoming increasingly limited. So his strategy was to put Franco on the same level as communism with regard to lack of freedom:

*“No se puede luchar contra el comunismo solo con cañones, no se puede admitir cualquier aliado que se proclame “anticomunista.” A la agresión hay que responder con la fuerza, de acuerdo. Pero los problemas perduran y hay que resolverlos. O los resolvemos nosotros o regalamos su bandera a los comunistas. La mayor diferencia entre los comunistas y nosotros es que ellos carecen de libertad. Pero con libertad tenemos que llevar a cabo la necesaria obra de justicia social. Y sin libertad no es posible hacer nada.”*<sup>144</sup>

Very gradually, though, President Aguirre was changing his opinion about the American strategy and was firmly coming to terms with the fact that the Atlantic option was over, so that he shifted the helm back towards Europe and the European federation.

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Gallastegi, among others. More on Jemein, at: <http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/63966> (Consulted on December 27th 2016.)

<sup>142</sup> “*Rojos-separatistas*” was published in *Alderdi*, 71, February 1953, pp. 13-14; and “*Pasado, presente y futuro de Euzkadi*,” in *Alderdi*, 72, March 1953, pp. 8-9.

<sup>143</sup> “*Pasado, presente y futuro de Euzkadi*,” *ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>144</sup> Jesús de Galíndez in “*Parece que estamos solos*,” published in *Alderdi*, no.73, April 1953.

It is worth mentioning that Aguirre had never forgotten Europe altogether—he followed closely the activities that his men were carrying out in Europe, especially Francisco Javier Landáburu<sup>145</sup> and, later, Manuel Irujo. In June 1947, Aguirre and Landáburu became founding members of the *Nouvelles Équipes Internationales* (NEI), the federation of the Christian-Democrat parties, in which the Basques were the only Spanish representatives until 1965.<sup>146</sup> Their committed involvement in the European movement led them to take part in The Hague conference of 1948, which was the starting signal for the European Federal Movement and where Manuel Irujo would be vice-president of the *Consejo Federal Español del Movimiento Europeo* (CFE), created in 1949 at the headquarters of the Basque government in Paris.<sup>147</sup>

The European shift was set forth in one of the longest letters that the president sent to his delegate in New York,<sup>148</sup> a document entitled “*Orientaciones sobre el problema de la unidad Europea*,” written in October 1953, and in which, although not quite losing his faith in the Americans, he transfers his democratic hopes to the future European Union:

“(…) uno de los artículos del Proyecto de Constitución política prevé nada menos que aquel Estado que vea atacadas sus instituciones democráticas o parlamentarias podrá llamar en su auxilio a la organización supra-nacional con el fin de restablecer la situación. No hace falta discurrir excesivamente para darse cuenta cuán importante es solamente esta disposición para todos.” The idea of the European Union as a substitute for the classic States, where peoples will have a space of their own because it will be formed by nations, not by States, would be developed as part of the European strategy, as we will see in the ensuing chapters.

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<sup>145</sup> Francisco Javier Landáburu was appointed political representative of the LIAB by the end of the Spanish Civil War, and Basque delegate in Paris after the Second World War. As President Aguirre’s loyal collaborator, he helped create several international and European organizations. He was appointed Vice-President of the Basque government after *Lehendakari* Aguirre’s death, although he himself passed away three years later, in 1963, while he was writing a biography of President Aguirre, “*José Antonio Aguirre, forjador de la nación vasca*,” which would be published posthumously. He is considered as one of the ideologists of the PNV, focused primarily on Christianity and Europeanism. More on Francisco Javier de Landáburu in ARRIETA, Leyre, 2009, “Landáburu, el alavés europeísta,” in *Sancho el Sabio*, 31, 199-220; UGALDE, Alexander, 2008, *Xabier de Landaburu: bizitza osoa Euskal Herriaren kausarentzat: 1907-1963 = Xabier de Landaburu: una vida dedicada a la causa del pueblo vasco: 1907-1963*. Bilbao: Sabino Arana Fundazioa; SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, 1981, “En torno a dos obras de F.J. Landáburu,” in *Muga*, 12, pp. 108-112.

<sup>146</sup> MEES, Ludger, 2012, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 321-324. We will see more about the Federal movement in greater detail in the chapter about the IV Conference of the European Federal Movement in Munich, 1962.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 325-326.

With his usual optimism, Aguirre appears here again placing his hopes on the future Union, as a democratic answer for the Basque people to beat Francoism:

*“El conjunto de estas instituciones en función nos servirán para demostrar ante nuestro pueblo, el pueblo español y también ante Europa nuestra situación de indigencia y el derecho que nos asiste a ser europeos y a pertenecer, por lo tanto, a la unión continental y a recibir de ella los beneficios consiguientes. El obstáculo es el régimen dictatorial del General Franco. Nuestro programa democrático tendrá entonces una razón de ser interior y exterior que será entendido por todas las personas razonables pues no será difícil entonces oponer argumentos basados en supuestos peligros comunistas y otros de índole parecida, puesto que precisamente la Autoridad supranacional constituirá la garantía más firme contra todo intento antidemocrático.”*

With that document, Aguirre was sealing his shift towards the European alternative: *“Nosotros damos aquí primordial importancia a esta línea política en la que he de insistir en manifiestos y en mensajes futuros.”*<sup>149</sup>

## **g. Paris, September 23 – October 1: *Euskal Batzar Orokorra***

### **i. Governing what, and how? Differences between inland and exile.**

Aguirre’s natural optimism and his American strategy did not please everyone around and, as we have already seen, some Basque nationalists expressed their concerns about the politics of the Basque government. The long exile, the lapse of so many years away from home, in short, the passage of time had taken a toll, and the Basques who were fighting against Franco’s dictatorship began to speak out their opinions about some of the decisions taken by the Basque Government-in-exile, and even about Aguirre’s ideas.

The differences of opinion regarding the decisions of the Basque Government were increasing, while at the same time the financial situation was getting worse—especially since the beginning of the 50’s, with the gradual decrease of the Basque services done for the American

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<sup>149</sup> EAH-AHE, Archivo Histórico del Gobierno Vasco, Fondo del departamento de presidencia, File 91. Also at: [http://dokuklik.snae.org/badator\\_zoom.php?cdc=001&cdd=00548#](http://dokuklik.snae.org/badator_zoom.php?cdc=001&cdd=00548#)

Department of State—which forced the Basque government to find other sources of funding, a task for which the Basque diaspora became essential<sup>150</sup>.

Moreover, the increasing importance of the Basque communities abroad was instilling in them the idea that they were contributing to create Basque politics from the exile, and this strengthened their involvement in the changes that Basque nationalism would come to experience.

Aguirre received the inputs from the exile, and he tried to understand their needs in an effort to keep the Basque community together and pulling in the same direction.

*“Pretendo hoy como ayer reunir a todos los vascos alrededor de una causa noble sin pretender, además, que todos piensen en todas las cosas de la misma manera. Pero sí en lo fundamental, como es el sentido de la libertad y la lealtad a nuestras tradiciones, sin lo cual no se concibe la manera de ser de ningún vasco. (...) Además, no sé por qué mucha gente de nuestra colectividad creo que desea mi visita para restablecer un poco el espíritu de las gentes y las posiciones un poco difuminadas de los últimos tiempos”.*<sup>151</sup>

Aguirre expressed himself in this way in a letter to John Bilbao sent in January 1954, when he was preparing for a tour to America. The trip would include visits to Venezuela, Cuba, Mexico, and the United States, with Aguirre’s intention being to keep his contacts alive and, once again, not without some little hope in his American friend: *“En Washington tengo desde ahora entrevistas interesantes a realizar pues la situación no sólo no ha cambiado para nosotros, sino que estoy por decir que el aspecto de relación política personal ha mejorado”*. In the USA, the 1953 election had raised General Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Presidency, giving the Basques a new chance to keep on believing in the American ally. And yet we can make out the new airs in Aguirre’s international intentions, which are turning indeed toward Europe:

*“Escribí a Galíndez diciéndole que explorase el ambiente con objeto de que pudiera aprovecharse mi estancia en La Habana para dictar algunas conferencias en la*

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<sup>150</sup> The income received as a result of the agreement with the US government had been one of the main financial sources of the Basque government, and the end of the collaboration with the Americans forced the Basques to create a new financing system. The Basque Diaspora would lend money to the Basque government, and the earnings made from the interests of that money would create a source of income. Even if the new way of financing was pretty new, it is worthwhile remembering that the fundraising campaign had begun in 1947 with the aforementioned declaration *“A los vascos de América.”* IRUJO, Xabier, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-163.

AZURMENDI, José Félix, 2013, *op. cit.*, pp. 79 and ff.

<sup>151</sup> Aguirre to Jon Bilbao, Paris, January 26<sup>th</sup>, 1954. BA CBS, Jon Bilbao Archive, BSQAP 0177 1939-1958.

*Universidad y en algún otro Centro Cultural. Los temas que proponía eran los referentes al problema de la unidad europea, que en general desconocen totalmente por esas latitudes y constituyen en estos momentos un asunto vital para Europa y para nosotros”.*<sup>152</sup>

Bilbao had warned Aguirre about the need to reorganize certain politics, and Aguirre was receptive, but the plans were not as easy as Aguirre would have thought. The exile was also receptive but—as we have already commented—not every Basque in the exile was a nationalist, and the Cuban community was special in that particular sense. Besides, concerns were focused on the political visit that Aguirre would pay to Fulgencio Batista<sup>153</sup>, President of Cuba after the military coup of 1952, who was backed by the US government. Indeed, Aguirre and the Basque government had established relations in Central and South America with governments politically close to the USA that were not always accepted by the Basques living in America, as Bilbao points out in his answer to Aguirre:

*“Ya algunos cubanos que nos quieren y le quieren a Vd., como Portés Vilá, García Pons, Arango, etc. muestran alguna extrañeza sobre su visita a Venezuela, país dictatorial. (...) La visita de vs. a Batista, aún en visita privada, le crearía un vacío en los elementos intelectuales incluyendo los periodistas”.*<sup>154</sup>

It is difficult to understand how it was possible that Aguirre, who always defended democracy as one of the main objectives in his political career, had no reservations as to what the visits to the Central and South American dictators could imply for his image.

In fact, in 1954 the Basque community in Cuba was more worried about their local businesses there than about the development of the Basque nationalists’ politics. As Galíndez and Bilbao had warned Aguirre, the Basques in Cuba could be defined as emigrants who had settled in the island, and although they kept attending the Basque Center (the same Basque Center that, in Bilbao’s words, had turned into a “Spanish Regional Center”), most of them were Basque-born

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<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>153</sup> Fulgencio Batista ruled Cuba during different periods after the 1933 Revolt of the Sergeants that overthrew the authoritarian government of Gerardo Machado. From 1952 to 1959, he made Cuba into a dictatorship with the aid of the USA, until the Cuban Revolution led by Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Guevara took over power. More on Fulgencio Batista in: GELMAN, Irwin, 1973, *Roosevelt and Batista: Good Neighbor Diplomacy in Cuba, 1933-1945*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press; ACOSTA RUBIO, Raoul, 1977, *Cuba, todos culpables: relato de un testigo: lo que no se sabe del dictador Batista y su época*. Miami: Universal Ed.

<sup>154</sup> Jon Bilbao to Aguirre, Cuba, February 23rd, 1954. BA CBS, Jon Bilbao Archive, BSQAP 0177 1939-1958.

citizens who had raised their children in Cuba and were not interested in politics or in going back to the Basque country.

The journal *Gordejuela*<sup>155</sup>, published in Cuba from 1943 to 1956 by Basque descendants of José Arechabala, who was native to Gordejuela, a town in Biscaia, is a good example of what they were interested in: business, maintaining good relations with the USA, and keeping the catholic community alive. The references to politics, the Basque country, or the visits of the *Lehendakari* or any other Basque nationalists to Cuba held no interest for this publication.

The Basque community in Cuba was so well-integrated into the Cuban community that, while it was even possible to find older publications on Basque topics, such as *Laurac Bat* (1886-1896) or *Beti Jai*<sup>156</sup> (1906), by the 50's any trace of Basque nationalism, or even interest in Basque topics, had completely vanished.

On the other hand, the European strategy was fully prepared, and the Basque press felt confident about this new strategy. *Alderdi*, in September 1954, entitled its editorial *Razones de nuestro sentimiento Europeísta*, focusing all eyes on the European strategy as a way of vindicating democracy and, therefore, an attempt to isolate the Franco Regime:

*“Solamente los que cumplen consignas totalitarias y los partidos retrasados de los viejos prestigios de los Estados nacionales se siguen oponiendo a la constitución de una autoridad política supranacional cuya base ha de ser, por acuerdo unánime, una asamblea elegida por Sufragio Universal, directo y secreto, emitido por los ciudadanos de los pueblos europeos. (...). Lo que interesa a los pueblos europeos, y muy especialmente a pueblos como Euzkadi, es una organización europea firmemente democrática en la que no tengan cabida los gobiernos que no representan la voluntad libre de esos pueblos”*.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>155</sup> *Gordejuela* was a weekly publication until 1950, when it went on to be monthly. It was published from Cárdenas, in Cuba. The issues can be consulted in the Hemeroteca de la diáspora vasca: <http://urazandi.euskaletxeak.net/vol1/dvd06/CUBA/Gordejuela/htm/index.htm> (consulted on January 3rd, 2017).

<sup>156</sup> Some issues of these publication are also found in Hemeroteca de la diáspora vasca, <http://urazandi.euskaletxeak.net/vol1/dvd06/default.html> (consulted on January 3rd, 2017).

<sup>157</sup> *Alderdi*, Euzko Alderdi-Jeltzalia' ren deya- Boletín del Partido Nacionalista vasco, Bayonne, n.90, September 1954.



In his trip in America, Aguirre also highlighted the importance of the international bodies, but above all, the importance of a democratic world rule, which he emphasized in order to put a distance between the democratic system and the totalitarian regimes that were often tolerated:

*“(…) Pero a todas estas instituciones o a todos estos propósitos de unidad, así como al propio Pacto del Atlántico, cuya finalidad de defensa de la libertad democrática es evidente, como consta en su propio texto, les faltó, sin embargo, lo que yo llamo el control democrático. Les faltó un mecanismo efectivo y práctico que garantizara el ejercicio y salvaguardara en consecuencia los grandes ideales de libertad y democracia que se proclamaban en sus textos fundacionales. Refiriéndome al Pacto del Atlántico, preguntaba yo hace poco tiempo, apenas hace un par de meses, a un político británico, que perteneció al Foreign Office: ¿Por qué han admitido Vds. a Portugal en el Pacto del Atlántico? Es una dictadura, atemperada si usted quiere, (...) pero una dictadura al fin.”.*

Aguirre turns his interests and hopes towards a European Union where democracy will be one of the main features of the union, and where the rights of the peoples will be defended by the institution:

*“El primer artículo del Tratado a que vengo refiriéndome se ocupa de la naturaleza y carácter de esta Comunidad política europea y dice que «está fundada en la unión de los pueblos y de los Estados, en el respeto a su personalidad y en la igualdad de sus derechos y obligaciones»”.*

Aguirre is again hopeful that, now that the American strategy and the intervention in Spain are no longer an option, his hopes will find shelter in the European Union, although he still warns that unity is needed in order for that enterprise to succeed, probably remembering the criticism and different opinions within Basque nationalism, but also referring to the union to the Spanish Republicans:

*“Hemos permanecido siempre al lado de las instituciones de la República. La razón? Entre otras, la que damos al referirnos a la Comunidad de Europa: Porque no hay alternativa.”<sup>158</sup>*

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<sup>158</sup> These statements referring to the 1954 American trip are taken from a speech given at the Ateneo Español de México on May 10<sup>th</sup> 1954. In [http://www.lehendakariaguirre.eu/pdf/Discursos/478\\_01.pdf](http://www.lehendakariaguirre.eu/pdf/Discursos/478_01.pdf) (consulted on January 3rd, 2017).

For Aguirre, the unity of all the democrats who had been forced to leave Spain due to the Civil War was essential, regardless of the national goals they pursued, but it was often something more related to the international image, always with an eye to the possibility of international aid, than a fraternal intention. Strategy above all.

Democracy and Europe would be the new strategy to follow for the recognition of Basque nationalists in Europe and the world. As we have already seen, thanks to Basque diplomacy and its relations, the Basque cause had been listened to and recognized by several international bodies, such as the UNESCO or the UN, where the Basques had managed to make their voice heard, especially through their men in the US, Jesús Galíndez and Pedro Beitia<sup>159</sup>, and also with the collaboration of the Spanish resistance in exile and the Catalans—for instance, when in 1953 they joined in protest against the economic-military agreement between Franco and the US.

However, since it came to happen that the world institutions (with the favor of the USA) ignored the Basque and Spanish demands, the new Europe under construction, in whose bodies Basque nationalism had participated from its very inception, seemed a good alternative for the nationalists' wills. The national vindication of the Basques would be fulfilled and granted within a supranational structure such as the European Union, based on the European Federal movement, of which the Basques had been founding members.

*“Europa tiene un enorme interés para los pueblos pequeños, sean o no actualmente naciones jurídicamente reconocidas. (...). En el terreno social, en el cultural, en el económico, la organización europea abre a esas colectividades un inmenso campo de seguridad inmediato y de desenvolvimiento futuro.”<sup>160</sup>*

The State—the vindication of the State—is itself a kind of nationalism<sup>161</sup>, but if a new Europe was to be built as a modern State, the old boundaries could become blurred in a supranational Europe where the peoples would be the protagonists:

*“Para las nacionalidades que tienen conciencia de sí mismas y que luchan por su libertad, toda organización europea, aunque sólo sea por el momento de carácter supraestatal, les crea una nueva instancia por encima de esos Estados a la que podrán*

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<sup>159</sup> IRUJO, Xabier, 2012, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-150; MOTA, David, 2016, *op. cit.*, pp. 253 and ff.

<sup>160</sup> Alderdi, Euzko Alderdi-Jeltzalia' ren deya- Boletín del Partido Nacionalista vasco, Bayonne, n.90, September 1954.

<sup>161</sup> GREENFELD, Liah, 2005, “Nationalism and the mind” in *Nations and Nationalism*, V, 11:4, pp. 325-342.

*recurrir en caso de persecución, de agresión, de genocidio de cualquier clase, ya sea físico, ya sea espiritual. (...) Mucho tenemos que esperar los vascos y todos los pueblos europeos en general, de una organización democrática de Europa.*"<sup>162</sup>

But the “Europe of the peoples” was far from being created separately from the nature of the States, as the Basques had yearned for—and this was something they should have realized after the experience of the creation of the European Federal Movement in 1948, when they were forced to create the *Consejo Federal Español del Movimiento Europeo* (CFE) in order to be admitted into the European meetings, despite being founding members.

It was precisely that subordination to the Spanish that made Telesforo Monzón burst out against European policy. For Monzón, one of the members of the Basque Nationalist Party who was closest to Aguirre, the anti-Franco political strategy was taking precedence over the Basque nationalist strategy: “*Mi vida no es para el antifranquismo. Franco es un incidente. ¿Tenemos mejores medios para ser universales que ser hijos de nuestro país? Los fundamentos de la civilización occidental son las almas de los viejos pueblos de Europa.*”<sup>163</sup>

Telesforo Monzón had been very critical about the alliances with the Spanish resistance throughout the exile because he considered that the Basques should look after themselves as a nation, yet, loyal to his dear *Lehendakari*, he supported the Basque government’s decisions up until 1951, when he finally presented his resignation at a meeting of the Basque government<sup>164</sup>.

Although Monzón’s resignation was hushed up in order to keep the calm among Basque nationalists—which was made easier by the fact that Monzón kept collaborating with them—it was clear that something was going on within Basque nationalism. After listening to the opinions of his closest collaborators and writing down his impressions about the trip in America, aware of an international political situation of increasing anticommunism, and probably disappointed with the American betrayal in relation to the economic agreements signed with the Franco Regime, Aguirre decided to call for a World Basque Congress in Paris in 1956.

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<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>163</sup> MEES, Ludger, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

<sup>164</sup> DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, MEES, Ludger, and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 1999, *op. cit.*, pp. 213 and ff.

The Congress was supposed to be a catalyst for Basque nationalism,<sup>165</sup> which was showing signs of tiredness due to the long exile and the lack of hope. The generation that had fought in the war had by then been almost 20 years in exile, and alienation was becoming too popular a travel companion. The Spanish political situation became stagnant, and the exiles began to lose hope in returning to the homeland. It was a pessimistic outlook from the exile, but also from the inland, that drove the Basque exiles to consider putting the cards on the table and taking stock of the situation. For Basques, the starting point of internal balance would be the Basque World Congress.

## ii. *Gabon*, 1954. Organizing the Basque World Congress.

After returning from his trip in America, Aguirre had decided on doing something. Once having checked the mood in the exile and gotten to know the discrepancies among the Basque nationalists, it was necessary to issue a wake-up call to discuss all the strategies, confront the different opinions, and defend the Basque government and the institutions that looked after Basque interests.

*“Quiero que este Mensaje termine con un anuncio que espero os ha de agradar: Me refiero a la convocatoria del Congreso Mundial Vasco que, en nombre del Gobierno de Euzkadi y debidamente autorizado por él, convocaré próximamente en París para celebrarlo, si es posible, en el transcurso del próximo año de 1955. Un Libro Blanco de nuestras actividades gubernamentales, desde nuestra proclamación en Guernica, resumirá nuestra labor en el País, en la guerra y en el exilio y servirá de útil guía a cuantos participen en nuestras tareas. El Congreso reunirá a los vascos del mundo entero, que acudirán a él en su diversa capacidad representativa y las tres grandes secciones política, cultural y social-económica en que, en principio, estará dividido, serán presididas y dirigidas por nuestro Gobierno”*<sup>166</sup>.

The announcement of the Basque World Congress was made during the traditional Christmas message, when the criticism about the usefulness of the Basque government made by

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<sup>165</sup> MEES, Ludger, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

<sup>166</sup> Christmas message by President Aguirre. January 1955. AGUIRRE, José Antonio, 1981, *op. cit.* Vol.II, pp. 881-887 and also in [http://www.lehendakariaguirre.eu/pdf/Mensajes/34\\_01.pdf](http://www.lehendakariaguirre.eu/pdf/Mensajes/34_01.pdf) (consulted on January 3rd, 2017).

Ajuriaguerra was still echoing in Aguirre's mind; the message addresses directly the Basque resistance in Spain, "*Comprendo bien las dificultades con las que tropezaréis quienes vivís bajo la amenaza y el temor constantes, pero sé cuál es vuestro espíritu para poder deciros las cosas con la claridad y la fe de quien os conoce,*" in an effort to gain recognition for the cause, but also to cheer up the entire Basque community—a clear reflection of the pessimistic mood that Aguirre was also perceiving.

The division between the exile and the inland, between freedom and dictatorship, is altogether undeniable:

*"Allí donde los vascos viven en libertad, como en los países de Europa y de América, se unen y se organizan siguiendo nuestras banderas y participando en nuestra lucha. ¿A qué obedece esta unanimidad, que es en sí el argumento de más peso para todo observador juicioso que quiera saber cómo piensan los vascos? La respuesta es que estos compatriotas mantienen vuestro espíritu, piensan como vosotros, sufren y se alegran con vosotros; y como no podéis expresaros con libertad, lo hacen por vosotros."*

Aguirre is vindicating the work that the Basque community is doing in the exile—alongside the Basque government—and thus he is turning the exile into a country without geography<sup>167</sup>, a space where the nation, the Basque nation, is developing and defending its rights, regardless of whatever boundaries one may be surrounding with.

The date chosen for the Basque Congress was not arbitrary; Leizaola, Irujo, and José María Lasarte had in mind the 20<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the constitution of the Basque Government when they each, separately, suggested the idea of the world Basque meeting to President Aguirre<sup>168</sup>.

José María Lasarte, a former member of the Basque government (who resigned in 1952), had been the founder of the OPE (Oficina de Prensa Vasca) and been responsible for the information services in America, particularly in New York, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. It is important to highlight that the idea of organizing the Basque Congress came from him, a

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<sup>167</sup> GHOSH, Devleena, 2008, "Coda. Eleven stars over the last moments of Andalusia," pp. 277-289. In ALLATSON, Paul; Mc. CORMACK, Jo (Eds.), *Exile cultures, misplaced identities* (Critical Studies. Vol. 30). Amsterdam – New York: Rodopi Editions.

<sup>168</sup> MADARIETA, Asier, 2007, "El último grito de unidad en el exilio. El Congreso Mundial Vasco de 1956," in AGUIRREAZKUENAGA, Joseba; SOBREQUÉS, Jaume (Eds.), *Eusko Jaurlaritza eta Catalunyaako Generalitateak: Erbestetik Parlamentuen eraketara arte (1939-1980)*. Oñati: Instituto Vasco de Administración Pública.

former member of the Government who was strongly linked with the communities in exile and was responsible for the development of Basque culture in America, promoting important cultural events like the *Semana Vasca de Montevideo*<sup>169</sup>.

Although the announcement of the World Basque Congress was welcomed warmly by the Basque nationalists, especially those Basque-American communities that had been informed beforehand, the Basque Congress was not addressed exclusively to Basque nationalists, but rather to all Basques. The cause of the announcements, to judge from the Gabon message and the General Instruction sent to Basque delegations, groups, organizations, etc. can be divided according to two different main purposes: a call for the union of all Basques, and a defense of the Basque government.

The union of all Basques made reference to the need for all Basques to unite, no matter what their ideology might be—so that would include all Basque nationalists who were critical of the Basque government, but also all Basques of whatever ideology:

*“(...) tratamos de reunir en él representaciones de los vascos de todos los matices, de todas las ideologías, de todas las clases y profesiones, residan actualmente en la patria o en cualquier país del mundo donde los hayan llevado la emigración política, bien por motivos distintos y tal vez anteriores de orden económico o de carácter privado”*<sup>170</sup>.

Such interest in including all Basques, not just nationalists, gives us an idea of what the ambitions were in the World Congress; the objective, very characteristic of President Aguirre, was reaching the unity of all Basques.

Moreover, by referring to all Basques, he was not only pointing to the existence of political differences and geographical differences, but also to the fact that the need for union included also the necessity of a good understanding between the exile and the inland.

*“(...) Por otra parte la dispersión que ha producido el exilio, la inactividad impuesta forzosamente a nuestros compatriotas que viven en Euzkadi y la separación física de estos con los del exterior, aconseja con urgencia la celebración del Congreso, donde se compulsen experiencias de los que viven dentro del país con las de los que residen*

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<sup>169</sup> More on José María Lasarte at <http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/87008> (consulted on January 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>170</sup> Instrucción General, Paris, January 1955. Published in *Alderdi*, n. 96, March 1955.

*en el extranjero, a fin de obtener útiles conclusiones que permitan continuar en la inteligencia más perfecta el camino común.”*

It was clear that something was happening, that things were not being analyzed and seen the same way on both sides of the Pyrenees—but the Basque government, the institution that was calling for the Congress, was fully aware of that, and it was trying to correct the differences and find a joint solution for the main objective of all Basques: returning home, going back to the Basque country, and for that goal, unity was necessary in order to defeat Francoism.

The General Instruction, by giving such importance to the differences between the exile and inland, was acknowledging the concerns and expressing the determination regarding the attendance of Basque representatives from within Spain: “*Las opiniones de nuestros hermanos de Euzkadi que, por vivir allí, nos dirán lo que existe, lo que falta y lo que es necesario sustituir o restaurar*”, but also highlighting the experience of the exiles: “*la experiencia de los que han vivido en el exterior será entonces mucho más útil porque la confrontación de ideas y de propósitos será efectuada sobre realidades vividas en el propio país*”.

The differences with the *Consejo Delegado* (CD) and the EBB arose here once again, but the experience and work of the exiles needed to be vindicated. Such vindication leads us to the second main purpose of having called for a World Basque Congress: the defense of the Basque government.

It was somehow difficult to defend a government-in-exile when that institution and its legitimacy were derived from a legality no longer in existence. As we have already seen, the Republican Government in exile had been discredited, despite all the efforts of President Aguirre, and the international institutions were accepting the Franco regime as the legitimate government. In order to keep the nation alive, and the imagined community awake, in the words of Benedict Anderson, the Basque government as the institution of the Basques had to be defended. From the exile, and lacking a definite geographical vision of the nation, which was still under construction (Navarre, Iparralde, Laurak Bat), the Basque government was the representative of the Basque nation, and as such was responsible for its defense and, most importantly, for the process of its construction.

When the Basque government called for the World Basque Congress, the three different lines of action were: past, present and future.

Twenty years after the constitution of the Basque government, with the need to defend itself from the critics who condemned the activities and strategies of the Basque government as

inefficient, the Basque government, through the General Instruction and under the leadership of the *Lehendakari*, announced that it was preparing a White Book where the Basque government's activities since the Gernika oath of 1936 would be detailed. The past, and the activities of the Government, would be laid out in the White book, but with the understanding that the work done would receive recognition. In absence of any Parliament or elections, the World Congress would serve as a debate chamber for making a balance and assessing the activities of the Government. In absence of a territory in which to develop Basque politics, the activities developed during the Civil War, “*la organización de todos los servicios gubernamentales, desde el ejército y su composición hasta sus servicios auxiliares de intendencia, sanidad militar, industrias de Guerra, aprovisionamientos, etc. (...) la sanidad civil y la asistencia a la población propia y a la refugiada; el trabajo, la industria civil, la agricultura, los transportes; la Marina Mercante, la flota pesquera; la cultura, con todos los establecimientos incluida la Universidad Vasca,*” as well as the activities carried out by the Basque delegations worldwide, “*toda la labor realizada en las delegaciones de Barcelona, Madrid, Bayona, París, Londres, etc. en muchas materias referidas y más tarde en las múltiples delegaciones del exilio, referente a nuestra organización de asistencia en refugios y hospitales, instituciones escolares, en colonias de niños acogidos en el extranjero (...)*”<sup>171</sup> would be detailed in the White Book in order to make a balance of those 20 years of Government, and to back up its activities.

As for the present, some problems were revealed in relation to the lack of freedom, with a special mention of the new generation of Basques who were growing up in a dictatorship:

“*(...) los males que la situación actual trae al país, traducidos en una falta de libertad que deseduca al pueblo y principalmente a las generaciones jóvenes sumidas en una atonía espiritual perniciosa, carentes de los estímulos morales que el diálogo favorece y la noble competencia de las ideas pone de manifiesto instruyendo a las masas populares.*”<sup>172</sup>

The exile, seen as a blessing in disguise<sup>173</sup>, an opportunity for freedom and cooperation that the young generation were deprived of, was an excellent occasion to organize all the Basques in the world to cooperate in solving the problems within the Basque country, especially “*la*

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<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>173</sup> BAETS, Antoon de, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 211.



*desvasquización del país,*” a task in which the Basques from America were to contribute in a prominent way.

The young generation living under the Spanish dictatorship were taken seriously during the Basque Congress and for years after. Somehow, the generation of Basques who had fought in the war and been forced to flee—therefore in exile—thought that the new generation were distancing themselves from Basque politics; and their motives could not be well understood by them, who, rather than suffering war, were suffering peace.

The discussion on the future of Euzkadi is probably the most interesting part of the Congress (and also the most relevant for my study), since the working out of a future is an exercise in the building up of a nation—and, of course, that exercise would be carried out from outside “the geographical nation”. The General Instruction describes the study of the future as “(...) *la opinión de todos por medio de trabajos bien meditados sobre los múltiples temas y problemas que debe atender un pueblo que quiere restaurar la libertad y, con ella, su propio gobierno,*”<sup>174</sup> with the starting point being the Statute of Autonomy, underlining the importance of the legality of the Statute as the agreement from which Basque sovereignty is derived.

The Congress was divided into three different sections based on the General Instruction (an additional section would be included later, called *Vascos en el mundo*<sup>175</sup>) to help present the debates and the papers correctly. The three different sections were: Political section, Socio-economic section, and Cultural section. Given the nature of our investigation, we will focus on the political section, since that section was devised as a proposal of new kinds of nationalist political strategy, with new ideological constraints within Basque nationalism, and it implies an evolution of the national policies:

*“La sección política que se ocupará no sólo de las modalidades de nuestra lucha democrática por la restauración de la libertad, sino que estudiará, mirando al futuro,*

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<sup>174</sup> Instrucción General, Paris, January 1955. Published in *Alderdi*, n.96, March 1955.

<sup>175</sup> The section “Vascos en el Mundo”, as we have already commented, was a vindication of the Basque communities in the world, with a preeminence of the South American communities, where different Basque delegations exposed their situation. It is interesting to point out the aim of these communities to contribute in the Basque development in the exile, like Pedro Basaldúa, Basque delegate in Argentina highlighted: “Con este espíritu comprenderéis señores congresistas las posibilidades que se ofrecen a que las Entidades vascas sean algo más que un club social o un departamento que está fomentando y viviendo de un simple folklore artístico pero frío. No, en estos centros vascos se está elaborando cultura vasca. Y se está desarrollando y vigorizando el espíritu patriótico profundamente y son centenares las conferencias que se dan en estos Centros (...).EUSKO JAURLARITZAREN ARGITALPEN SERBITZUAK- SERVICIO CENTRAL DE PUBLICACIONES DEL GOBIERNO VASCO, 1983. *op. cit.*, p. 443.

*la ordenación interior del país y su relación con las entidades superiores estatales o supra-estatales cuya regulación consta tanto en el articulado estatutario como en otros proyectos que amplían la materia.*"<sup>176</sup>

According to the bylaws of the Congress, the event was organized in order to fulfill three main objectives: presenting the work done by the Basque government since its constitution; confronting the criteria and opinions expressed by the congressmen regarding the present situation, as well as the general lines for the future organization of *Euzkadi*; and adopting the recommendations, including initiatives and guidelines, concerning the present and the future of the country, which would be transmitted to the Euzkadi government<sup>177</sup>.

### **The organization of the World Basque Congress**

The assignment given by the President was taken up by the Basque government, who began the organization of the Congress by sending a questionnaire along with the invitations to the event.

The Congress was not open to all, but only to the people personally invited by the Basque government, owing to a strict commitment with the delicate situation of the Basques from inside Spain who would attend the Congress.

The full members of Congress were there: the President of the Basque government and his ministers; the president of the Delegated Council and the Basque Resistance Committee; the president and members of the Basque Consultative Council; the former counselors of the Basque government; the representatives of the Basque Country in the Spanish Parliament (the Republican Parliament) and those who had served previously; the former deputies of Araba, Gipuzkoa, Navarra, Bizkaia; the elected mayors; the representatives of the Basque political parties and labor unions; the delegates of the government of Euzkadi abroad; the delegates of the International League of Friends of the Basques and of the Basque communities and associations of all countries; and all those Basque citizens who had registered for the Congress on an individual basis (in possession of a personal accreditation).<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>177</sup> *Reglamento Interior*, Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 48, File 4 (consulted on January 12<sup>th</sup>).

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*,

Since the Congress was not an organic institution, according to the Basque government laws, its nature would only be consultative; nevertheless, an executive committee composed of representative members of different political parties, trade unions, Basque associations, and organizations was organized as follows: Jesús Solaun (PNV), Gabriel Goitia (ANV), De Pablo (Socialist Central Committee of Euzkadi in France), Herrán (ELA-STV), José Campos (Central Committee of the UGT of Euzkadi), Aransaez (CNT), Alberto Buj (UR), J. López Angulo (IR), Pedro Basaldúa, representative of the Federación de Entidades Vasco Argentinas – Eusko Argentinar Bazkun Alkartasuna (FEVA-EABA), Pedro Aretxabala and Santiago Zarranz, the Basque organizations in Chile and Juan Bautista Lasarte, the Basque center Euskal Erria of Montevideo and the Basque delegation in Uruguay.<sup>179</sup> The idea with all these representatives was to cover, as far as possible, all the different political tendencies and trade unions, associations and organizations of Basques from all over the world—especially those from South America, as noted—with a special treatment for those representatives who came from the inside, whose opinion on the current situation of the Basque country was determining, and who would have to go through various troubles for attending the Congress.<sup>180</sup>

The sent questionnaire was also published in different Basque newspapers, including *Euzko Deya* in Buenos Aires in May 1956<sup>181</sup>, so as to cheer up the debate, and the questions were divided into the three aforementioned future sections of the conferences (Political, Socio-economic, and Cultural); but it also included a new area that would become a new section of the Congress: the special section “*Los vascos en el mundo.*”

When analyzing the political section (which is the most important for this study), the questions have been divided once more in order to focus on the present situation of the Basque country and study the problems and the possible future solutions.

With regard to the then current situation of the Basque country under the Franco dictatorship, the organizers of the Congress were particularly interested in the opinion of the young Basques, the generation who had not fought in the war and who had been born without freedom:

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<sup>179</sup> IRUJO, Xabier, 2012, *op. cit.*, p. 202; Documentación referente al Congreso Mundial Vasco. Incluye: programas, instrucción general, cuestionario y reglamento interior. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 48, File 4. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/10224.pdf> (consulted on January 12<sup>th</sup>).

<sup>180</sup> MADARIETA, Asier, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

<sup>181</sup> *Euzko Deya*, Buenos Aires, May 31<sup>st</sup>, 1956. Fundación Indalecio Prieto. 2. Concha Prieto. General. PNV. AFIP/2.1/ Folder 189/ Subfolder 4. Also in: [http://dokuklik.snae.org/badator\\_zoom.php?cdc=283&cdd=0108](http://dokuklik.snae.org/badator_zoom.php?cdc=283&cdd=0108) (consulted on January 12<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

“Refiriéndose a los jóvenes: ¿cuál es su reacción ante el pasado? ¿Lo conocen? ¿Lo comentan? ¿Cuál es su reacción ante el futuro? ¿Sienten la falta de la libertad? ¿Cuáles son sus aspiraciones? (...) ¿Saben que el Gobierno Vasco elegido hace 20 años bajo el Árbol de Gernica está en pie aglutinando la lucha de los vascos por la libertad? ¿Saben que los partidos políticos vascos mantienen sus cuadros actuando con firmeza? ¿Conoce la labor del Gobierno vasco y de los exiliados vascos? (...) ¿La juventud conoce nuestra historia de libertad? ¿Conoce nuestro antiguo derecho u nuestras leyes? ¿Conoce nuestra historia reciente?”<sup>182183</sup>

The opinion of the new generation is a constant worry in the questionnaire, because the Basque Government was afraid that something might happen with the new generation of Basques, who had never had direct contact with the Basque government and could feel nothing for Basque institutions. But in the background of that concern about the young generation, what the Basque government was really afraid of was the lack of legitimacy. Twenty years after the first and only elections to choose the Basque government, the institution might begin to be questioned—as indeed it was, by the Socialist representative, Indalecio Prieto, when he declined the invitation to the Congress, arguing that the Basque government should not organize events that were beyond the control of the Government of the Republic—as if it were a clash of political competences between the autonomous and the central government—yet other voices within the same political party, such as Paulino Gómez Beltrán, did agree on holding elections and participating in them, so that, in the end, the CCSE (*Comité Central Socialista de Euzkadi*) took part in the Congress.<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> *Congreso Mundial Vasco. Cuestionario*. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 48, File 4. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/10224.pdf> (consulted on January 12<sup>th</sup>).

<sup>183</sup> The questions listed here are only those that are most representative and of interest for this study, and those that are related to the fields that were developed in the communications sent to the political section (the object of our study here). The complete questionnaire can be found in the following reference: *Congreso Mundial Vasco. Cuestionario*. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 48, File 4. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/10224.pdf> (consulted on January 12<sup>th</sup>), and also in the minute's book: EUSKO JAURLARITZAREN ARGITALPEN SERBITZUAK- SERVICIO CENTRAL DE PUBLICACIONES DEL GOBIERNO VASCO, 1983, *Euskal Batzar Orokorra. Congreso Mundial Vasco. 25 aniversario*. Bilbao, pp. 21-32.

<sup>184</sup> IRUJO, Xabier, 2012, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-202; MENDIETA, Asier. 2007. “El último grito de unidad del exilio. El Congreso Mundial Vasco de 1956,” pp. 129-130. In AGIRREAZKUENAGA, Joseba; SOBREQÜÉS, Jaume, 2007, *Eusko Jaurlaritzaren eta Catalunya Generalitatearen Erbestetik Parlamentuen eraketara arte (1939-1980)*. Bilbao: Herri-Ardularitzaren Euskal Erakundea. The full letter sent by Indalecio Prieto on August 4<sup>th</sup>, 1946 from Mexico as well as some other documents are found in EAH-AHE, Archivo gobierno Vasco, Fondo del Departamento de Presidencia, Congreso Mundial Vasco, Correspondencia-Aguirre. File 360, Bundle 02. Also in: [http://dokuklik.snae.org/badator\\_zoom.php?cdc=001&cdd=01313](http://dokuklik.snae.org/badator_zoom.php?cdc=001&cdd=01313) (consulted on January 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

Emigration and immigration to the Basque country was another concern found in the questionnaire, and something that would come up in the communication, as we will see later on: “*La emigración ha producido una variante al desplazar a muchos vascos a tierras de fisonomía y hasta de lenguaje diferente. ¿Cuál es el efecto producido por la dispersión obligada de los vascos? ¿Cómo mantienen su espíritu en el país donde viven? ¿Se mantiene viva allí la unión entre los vascos?*”<sup>185</sup>

The Basque diaspora, and the migrations that the Basque country was suffering, with people from Spain arriving mainly in the industrialized areas of the Basque country, were a topic of discussion among Basque nationalists, and caused heated discussions on the development of Basque nationalism as a political theory.<sup>186</sup>

With reference to the future solutions for the Basque political problems, the questionnaire asked about another of the main concerns of the Basque government and, in particular, of the Basque nationalists: the question of the political agreement with the rest of the Basque forces (non-nationalists), but more particularly in relation with the union with the Spanish Republican forces—and here again we find a constant worry about the legitimacy of the Basque government:

*“¿Cuáles son las medidas políticas de urgencia que, desde ahora, aún antes que pueda producirse una situación diferente de la actual, deben ser adoptadas en nuestro pueblo? ¿En qué plano procede adoptar estas medidas, en el interno vasco, en el español, en el internacional?”*

*(...) El Gobierno Vasco representa la última voluntad libre de Euzkadi. Ha reiterado constantemente que no desperdiciará medio alguno para que la libertad política contenida en el Estatuto de Autonomía sea restaurada en todo su vigor. Es además el programa de las fuerzas democráticas vascas, que ratificaron esta posición en 1945, añadiendo el compromiso de acatar y sostener la voluntad que el pueblo vasco exprese libremente en su día. (...) ¿Puede servir el Gobierno Vasco no sólo de bandera de reivindicación sino también como plataforma de unión mayoritaria democrática vasca?*

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<sup>186</sup> Ethnic nationalism—using the origin of the Basques to include them or not within the Basque nationalist imagery—will be a part of our analysis that we will see in later chapters.

*Establecida la necesidad de la unión de las fuerzas democráticas vascas, ¿cómo debe perfeccionarse la relación actualmente existente?*

*¿Qué extensión debe tener la coalición democrática que sustituya a la dictadura en el País Vasco? ¿Qué fuerzas deben merecer la calificación democrática?*

*¿Cuáles son las relaciones que deben establecerse con las fuerzas democráticas españolas y qué condiciones y forma?”*

One of the old nationalist Basque debates on the nature of the political form that the future Basque country should take—would it be a Monarchy or a Republic? —also crops up in the questionnaire:

*“Consideración del problema monárquico. La Monarquía impuesta por el poder dictatorial. El plebiscito como modo de determinación de la forma de gobierno del Estado. La forma de gobierno del Estado y la Autonomía de Euzkadi. Si conviene, ¿Cuál debe ser la participación vasca en los gobiernos de transición si éstos se constituyen?”.*

The Basque government, the organizer of that Congress, based its legitimacy on the Government that had been born within the Spanish Republic, so its principal law was the Statute of Autonomy—that is why the Statute would be the starting point of each and every one of its political and national vindications. It is interesting to highlight that the future Basque country they were asking about was based on that same Statute of Autonomy in many ways, although without restricting its extension:

*“La supervivencia del Gobierno Vasco actual facilita el cumplimiento de estas disposiciones o de aquellas que las circunstancias impongan en cumplimiento de los que es fundamento de las mismas? ¿Debe mantenerse con firmeza hasta rendir mandato ante la legítima representación popular? Llegado el momento, ¿Debe ensanchar su base representativa para lograr el máximo apoyo popular? (...) Consideración especial de la situación de Navarra en relación con el período transitorio. Medidas a seguir, de acuerdo con Navarra, para que la unidad y la libertad política se extiendan a todo el país mediante su incorporación voluntaria.”*

The question of Navarre shows the strong influence of Manuel Irujo on the elaboration of the questionnaire: as president of the political section and tireless Basque nationalist, Irujo worked in the organization of the Congress from the very beginning, helping the Basque government not only with the political section as a president, but also with the invitations and bookings,

and even visiting the meeting rooms where the Congress would be held, and working long hours to add to, modify, and debate the communications that the Basque government were receiving.

### iii. The Communists' *Reconciliación Nacional*, Landaburu's *La causa del pueblo vasco* and the Americans: A Cold War mess.

In relation to the idea of a unity with the Spanish political forces, bearing in mind that by the time the Congress was held 20 years would have elapsed since the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, the questionnaire contains some questions regarding its adequacy: “¿Siente como base de carácter moral, civil, político y social la necesidad de una amplia reconciliación nacional que liquide la era de la lucha, rancor y crimen que ha caracterizado la época dictatorial?”

*Reconciliación Nacional* was the slogan and the political strategy followed by the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) since the declaration of the same title was presented in June 1956, when they decided that something must be changed with regard to the policies followed by the Communists until that time in order to defend the unity of the Spanish democrats, who had been separated since the Spanish Civil War.<sup>187</sup>

Nevertheless, it seems that the Basque nationalists also made use of the “national reconciliation” that same year:

“(…) Also enclosed is a quotation cited in the same reports from the close of a book which is said to have been published recently in Paris by ex-deputy Javier de Landáburu under the title «La Causa del pueblo Vasco» (The Basque People's cause). The

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<sup>187</sup> The *Reconciliación Nacional* was a very famous strategy deployed by the Spanish Communist Party, who had not recognized the Franco Regime until that time and still maintained armed militias (the Maquis) mainly in the Pyrenees. The declaration was published in PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE ESPAÑA. COMITÉ CENTRAL, 1956, *Declaración del Partido Comunista de España: por la reconciliación nacional por una solución democrática y pacífica del problema español*. Publishing place unknown: PCE. There is an important amount of bibliography and resources on this topic, since it generated controversy among the communists and the Spanish resistance. The following are some of the most representative studies. For an internal view of the issue: PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE ESPAÑA, 1958, *La lucha de clases y la política de reconciliación nacional*. Madrid: PCE. And for an external view, where the change of strategy can be seen: MORÁN, Gregorio, 1986, *Miseria y grandeza del partido comunista de España. 1939-1985*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta; ESTRUCH TOBELLA, Joan, 2000, *Historia oculta del PCE*. Madrid: Temas de Hoy; ESTRUCH TOBELLA, Joan, 1982, *El PCE en la clandestinidad*. Madrid: Siglo XXI.

quotation is vaguely reminiscent of the “national reconciliation” theme expounded by the Communist Party of Spain (enclosure No.1) but nevertheless reflects the attitude of the organizers of the Basque World Congress that has just taken place.”

The above lines are taken from the Confidential Report no. 29 written by the American Consulate in Bilbao on October 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1956, right after the Basque World Congress<sup>188</sup>. Although the relations with the Basque services had been broken, the American Department of State was following closely the development of Basque and Spanish politics. The report, written as a brief analysis of what the Basque World Congress had been (just one day after its closing ceremony), shows the anticommunist focus of the American strategy and, maybe due to a mix of information, draws some mistaken conclusions.

The dedication of the book reads:

*“En recuerdo de todos los vascos muertos durante la guerra fratricida causada por la sublevación de 1936: los que cayeron en cualquiera de los frentes bajo las banderas vascas o de las dos Españas, los que fueron asesinados en sus retaguardias, los que murieron en cama, en su casa o en el exilio, acongojados por la pena de los males de la patria y sin comprender aquella catástrofe cruel e innecesaria. GOYAN BEGOZ.”*<sup>189</sup>

Perhaps this dedication, which purported to recognize the victims on both sides of the Spanish Civil War, was what drove the American to think of comparing Basque nationalism with the communists.

Apparently, “a British Vice consul who lives in Bilbao” had picked up the Communist propaganda issued in Paris in June, which contained a “*listing of the proposals made therein by the Communist Party of Spain for «national reconciliation» among opponents of Franco Regime.*”

The report was referring to the aforementioned “*Reconciliación nacional*” document issued by the PCE, and it explained the change of strategy of the Spanish communists, considering it “*fairly widespread popular (...) in view of the emphasis on a “peaceful” revolution in Spain.*”

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<sup>188</sup> Confidential Report No. 29, October 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1956. NARA, General Records of the Department of State. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. Records of the Spanish and the Portuguese desk officers. 1942-1958. NND887210 RG59 Box.8

<sup>189</sup> LANDABÚRU, Javier, 1956, *La causa del Pueblo Vasco*. Paris: Cuadernos Alderdi, p. 2.



The PCE had been taking positions and was now looking for fresh insights with which to approach the new generation of Spanish. The exile and its 20 years had gone by for everybody, not only for Basque nationalists, and the young people who had not lived the war became the main focus for the entire democratic resistance.

In a letter from Josu Hickman, Basque delegate in London, to Manuel Irujo sent on January 19<sup>th</sup> 1955, Josu attached some Communist propaganda: “*Adjunto una hoja comunista, de los que luchan por la PAZ, para ser ellos los dueños del mundo,*” to which Irujo replied on March 21<sup>st</sup> 1955 with information on the movements that the communists had taken:

*“Comunistas: Por correo aparte le envío las declaraciones y discursos abundantes de esos caballeros. El congreso que dicen haber celebrado se redujo a la reunión de docenas de personas en Toulouse. Como usted verá, los comunistas son partidarios de mantener la subvención y presupuestos del culto y clero y patrocinar la restauración Monárquica.”*<sup>190</sup>

In those days, the monarchists in Spain were also taking positions, faced with the possibility of a change in the nature of the state under the Franco Regime, as rumors were increasing that Franco was preparing a Monarchy.

The First Secretary-Consul in Madrid, Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell,<sup>191</sup> invited Mr. Vicente Pinies, member of the Monarchist party Unión Española, to talk over lunch about the possibility of a Monarchy being tolerated by Franco:

*“Pinies also said that Franco had tried to get the Council of State to agree that the age for candidates for the Spanish throne should be lowered from 30. He did this with an eye to having Juan Carlos become king. The Council of State replied that since the Law*

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<sup>190</sup> Letters between Manuel Irujo and Josu Hickman, 1954-1956. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 35, File 1. Also in <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/4123.pdf> (consulted on January 14<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>191</sup> Stuart W. Rockwell, who was fluent in different languages, including French, Arabic, German, and Spanish, worked for the American Foreign Office in several positions between 1946 and 1979. He was second secretary-consul in Ankara, 1946-48; officer-in-charge for Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs, 1948-50; political advisor to the Secretary of Air Force, 1950-52; first secretary-consul in Madrid, 1952-55; principal adviser to U.S. members of the U.N., present at the Palestine Conciliation Commission, 1949; political adviser for the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, 1949, 1950, and 1951. In 1988, when the Library of Congress interviewed him, he talked about his career. <https://cdn.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004roc01/2004roc01.pdf> (consulted on January 14<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

*of succession had been subject to referendum, any changes would also have to go through the same procedure. Franco did not dare to undertake this.*"<sup>192</sup>

As the rumors seemed to be true that Franco might be thinking of reintroducing the Monarchy in Spain, the possibility upset the Falange and forced the different political forces to adopt a position.

According to a report made by Pinies, the Socialist party (referred to as PSOE-UGT in the American memorandum) "*recognized that it had been a mistake to support the Republic. The Socialists were willing to give their support to a constitutional Monarchy.*"<sup>193</sup>

The monarchists were preparing for a possible restoration of the Monarchy, but if that were to be the case, then Pinies was thinking of Don Juan de Borbón as King of a Constitutional and Democratic Spain.

Vicente Pinies, Jaume Miralles, and Joaquín Satrústegui (initially) would form the Unión Española (1957) as a political movement, and they took part in pro-democracy political movements against the Franco Regime even though some of them had supported Franco during the Spanish Civil War<sup>194</sup>.

The Americans were expectant as to the possible changes that might occur in Spain and, with a view to stopping the advance of Communism, the Monarchy could be a possibility if the Franco regime were to come to an end. The emergence of a communist system after the fall of Franco was a possibility the Americans wanted to avoid, and a transition to a Monarchy seemed a good solution. According to Pinies, the moves made by Franco with respect to the Monarchy were not motivated by any sincere desire to indoctrinate the Spanish people for the future, but rather the reason might be that either Franco was really ill and his end was drawing near, or he was concerned about the future of his child and grandchildren and a pact with the Monarchy would mean an easy future for them.<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> Memorandum. From Mr. Rockwell to Mr. Byngton. March 16<sup>th</sup>, 1955. NARA, General Records of the Department of State. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. Records of the Spanish and the Portuguese desk officers. 1942-1958. NND887210 RG59 Box.6

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>194</sup> MIRALLES, Jaime, 1996, "La acción política de Unión Española," pp. 133-140. In FONTÁN, Antonio (Dir.), *Los monárquicos y el régimen de Franco*. Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

<sup>195</sup> Memorandum. From Mr. Rockwell to Mr. Byngton. March 16<sup>th</sup>, 1955. NARA, General Records of the Department of State. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. Records of the Spanish and the Portuguese desk officers. 1942-1958. NND887210 RG59 Box.6

*“El Jefe del Estado ha concedido audiencia, en el Palacio de El Pardo, a Mr. Fulton Lewis, Jr. uno de los más destacados periodistas norteamericanos de la radio 1 y la televisión”*<sup>196</sup>, announced ABC as proof of the good relations between the Franco Regime and the American Administration, in the days of the welcoming of the new American Ambassador, Mr. John Davis Lodge, in Madrid in March 1955—but the American administration wanted to be ready in case there was a change in El Pardo.

Mr. Rockwell again invited Mr. Pinies to lunch on June 20<sup>th</sup>, 1955 to find out what was going on at the Monarchist front, since the presence of the Royal family in Spain had been confirmed, lectures were being organized by the Monarchists, and La Falange seemed to get more and more nervous by the day.

Rumors that an interview to Prince Juan Carlos would be tolerated by Franco were echoed in a Confidential Memorandum from R.D. Mc. Clelland to Mr. Rockwell on March 18<sup>th</sup>, 1955, where Mc. Clelland speculated that Franco’s objective with that interview was to have it published in *Arriba*, Falange’s official newspaper, half of whose members were absolutely anti-Monarchy.

In fact, the Monarchists were organizing several events, such as a lecture by Mr. Roberto Cantalupo, an Italian Monarchist deputy, within a regular series of talks on “Tendencies in European thought,” sponsored by the Minister of Information, Mr. Pérez Embid. In that lecture, Mr. Cantalupo defended the idea of a “Fascist Monarchy”: *“his central thesis appeared to be the advocacy of a kind of federation of monarchies, or possibly a return to the Holy Roman empire.”*<sup>197</sup>

Mr. Pinies confirmed the information that Mr. Rockwell already had; the Monarchists were divided into two fronts: *“There is now a sharp division between the non-collaborationist and the collaborationist Monarchists.”*<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> ABC, March 18<sup>th</sup>, 1955, p. 5.

<http://hemeroteca.abc.es/nav/Navigate.exe/hemeroteca/madrid/abc/1955/03/18/005.html> (consulted on January 15<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>197</sup> “Lecture of Italian Monarchist at Ateneo Last night.” From R.D. Mc.Clelland to Mr. Rockwell. April 19<sup>th</sup>, 1955. NARA, General Records of the Department of State. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. Records of the Spanish and the Portuguese desk officers. 1942-1958. NND887210 RG59 Box.6

<sup>198</sup> Confidential Memorandum. From Mr.Rockwell to Mr. Byngton. June 20<sup>th</sup>, 1955. NARA, General Records of the Department of State. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. Records of the Spanish and the Portuguese desk officers. 1942-1958. NND887210 RG59 Box.6

The possibility of a violent transition was observed by the Americans: “*The biggest problem for the Monarchists was to find men of confidence to maintain order in the provinces when the day of the take-over arrives. This is going to be a very dangerous moment indeed, and must be handled very carefully.*”<sup>199</sup>

Monarchy and succession became a real possibility, even the Falange was taking positions before the “*problem of continuity in relation to General Franco’s successor as Chief of State and Leader of the Falange.*”<sup>200</sup> In a speech delivered by Raimundo Fernández-Cuesta, Minister-Secretary General of the Movement (“F.E.T. y de las J.O.N.S.”), on the occasion of the 18<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the fall of Bilbao during the Spanish Civil War, the leader of Falange expressed concerns about the future and advocated for measures to strengthen the Movement, according to the American Consulate’s Report: “1) Obtain the enthusiastic adherence of the youth of Spain; 2) Clarify the Movement’s principles and goals; 3) Undertake organizational reforms; 4) Seek legal as well as political guarantees of the Movement’s future; 5) Continue striving to perfect unity of the Movement.”

Again, the youth of Spain were the focus of the political movements, as well as the hope for a change in one way or other.

The Communists also had focused their interest on the youth, as Manuel Irujo stated in a letter to Josu Hickman on September 14<sup>th</sup>, 1955: “*Le incluyo un sobre puesto en Badajoz, con la propaganda comunista dirigida a la juventud de estudiantes católicos de San Sebastián*”.<sup>201</sup>

The PCE was one of the clandestine political movements that made more efforts to organize the anti-Franco movement inside Spain and, as we will get to see in the next chapters, its hegemony posed a problem for Basque nationalists.

By the end of 1955, and in 1956, when the Basque World Congress was held, Communism was seen as a threat by the American authorities, who believed, according to their reports, that a controlled Monarchy was one of the best options in case the Franco regime fell. There was a possibility of a “*transition to the Monarchy (that) would be fraught with peril*” but “*there*

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<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>200</sup> Report No. 36. American Consulate. Bilbao. June 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1955. NARA, General Records of the Department of State. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. Records of the Spanish and the Portuguese desk officers. 1942-1958. NND887210 RG59 Box.6

<sup>201</sup> Irujo to Hickman. Paris, September 14<sup>th</sup>, 1955. Letters between Manuel Irujo and Josu Hickman, 1954-1956. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 35, File 1. Also in <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/4123.pdf> (consulted on January 14<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

*would not be much bloodshed if Franco keep his head. Six or seven persons might die, (...) but no more.*”<sup>202</sup>

Javier Landaburu’s book—the one that the Department of State refers to in Report no. 29—was also a direct letter to the youth. The new generation born under the Dictatorship constituted the hope, the future, for a Basque nationalism that was tired of being in exile and tired of seeing years go by as the date figures kept piling up. The strikes of 1947 and 1951 had shown that, in the inland, the interior exile (under which the opposition to a dictatorship lives) could actually give a boost to the destruction of the Franco Regime and open the way for Basque nationalism to return home.

*La causa del Pueblo Vasco* has an entire first part that addresses directly the young Basque generation. Under the title “*Un requerimiento de los jóvenes vascos,*” Landáburu explains the history of the Basques and the political situation of the Basque nationalism in exile by giving an answer to a certain demand:

*“Este libro que quiere probar la justicia y la honestidad de nuestra causa está dirigido muy especialmente a la juventud de Euzkadi. Es un libro encargado por esos mismos jóvenes, niños en 1936, que, en sus visitas a París o en sus entrevistas en Euzkadi Continental, o en sus cartas, nos acucian a mis compañeros de exilio y a mí, a que les expliquemos las razones de nuestra actitud que ellos comparten intuitivamente, y las posibilidades que el futuro ofrece a la causa vasca. A los 20 años de franquismo, muchos de esos jóvenes se nos acercan para pedirnos un poco de ideal que anime la juventud, porque no lo han encontrado en la doctrina del dominador que sólo ha construido el vacío.”*<sup>203</sup>

The importance of the youth and the dichotomy between the inside and the exile for Basque nationalism are also present in this book. The Basque World Congress had strived to unite the exile and the inside, as we will see later on. We have already seen how different points of view had arisen between the inside and the exile, but the new generation of Basques also had their own different points of view with respect to the strategic politics that Basque nationalism was

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<sup>202</sup> Memorandum. From Mr. Rockwell to Mr. Byngton. March 16<sup>th</sup>, 1955. NARA, General Records of the Department of State. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. Records of the Spanish and the Portuguese desk officers. 1942-1958. NND887210 RG59 Box.6

<sup>203</sup> LANDÁBURU, Javier, 1956, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

deploying. That is the reason why Landaburu had addressed them—and their presence was especially looked forward to at the Basque World Congress.

Most of the ideas explained in Landaburu's book came up again in the development of the Paris Congress, and they defined the new features of Basque nationalism that would be developed after the Congress.

Although Landaburu states in his book that he is not thinking in terms of a collectivity (a government or political party),<sup>204</sup> the truth is that the ideas developed there are the same that Basque nationalism would afterwards agree with and promote—therefore it is important to briefly take a closer look at the book in order to understand what the doubts were and where Basque nationalism was heading.

The book, as it was edited by *Alderdi* after the first edition, was divided into three parts: “*Razones de una actitud. Posibilidades de actuación,*” “*La nación real y el concepto evolutivo del Estado,*” and “*La libre determinación nacional y las condiciones de un Estado habitable.*”

Despite not being against the American strategy altogether, Landaburu was one of the men who, along with Irujo, worked for the European Federal movement and somehow helped to change from the American to the European strategy. In 1951, after a meeting of the European federal movement in Berlin, he wrote to Manuel Irujo:

*“Estuve en Alemania con el Lehendakari. Tres días de congreso y de turismo. Los boches siguen siendo de «cuidau», como las vacas del pueblo y los guardias de asalto. Se dejan querer y se irán con quién más les dé. Claro es que la perspicacia yanqui nos salvará de esas y otras angustias. Le leí al jefe tu carta, apoyando aquello de “¡me c... en los gringos!”. Y le gustó. Creo que él lo había hecho varias veces. (...) Sin embargo, en honor a la verdad, no se ve que la nueva etapa americana le haya dado todavía a Franco más que buenas palabras. Todavía Europa pesa y hasta nuestro amigo el boche de Schuman disimula sus fervores franquistas.”*<sup>205</sup>

The American strategy was coming to an end, and although President Aguirre maintained good relations with the Americans, Basque nationalism was looking for a new strategy based on Europe and the European federation.

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<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14

<sup>205</sup> Javier de Landaburu to Manuel Irujo, Paris, September 25<sup>th</sup>, 1951. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 38, File 3. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/1648.pdf> (consulted on January 17<sup>th</sup>).

In Landaburu's book, after a theoretical part in which he tries to modernize the concept of nation, the future strategy is built on the unity of the "Iberian peoples," achieved by way of the free will of self-determination under a federation or confederation. Such confederation of peoples is seen as the best solution after the Franco dictatorship: "*¿Cómo ha de ser el Estado que surja de ese período Constituyente? Democrático. Confederal. Internacionalista.*"<sup>206</sup>

The idea of renewing the relationship with the State has to do with the differences perceived between the various peoples of Spain:

*"Hoy el criterio de la reconstrucción del Estado no puede ser ya el de la uniformidad de los ciudadanos y de los pueblos. Hoy el Estado es, además de los individuos, Cataluña, Galicia, Euzkadi, acaso Portugal – si esa cuestión se plantea sin prejuicios, sin apetencias, ni resabios – y todos los demás pueblos peninsulares. Quien desaproveche la ocasión de unirlos, no de unificarlos, acaso pierda la oportunidad que no volverá a darse."*<sup>207</sup>

Democracy and confederation were the basic pillars for a new State in Spain, but alongside them was the support (and this was probably against the Americans' interests) to the Republic before the threat of a Monarchy:

*"Si la Monarquía ha de reunir las condiciones apuntadas más arriba, no hay inconveniente en que un rey presida la confederación peninsular. ¿Habrá un rey de tradición española dispuesto a serlo así? Dados los antecedentes que conocemos, creemos sinceramente que no. Sin desconocer las ventajas que en cierto orden asegura una Monarquía democrática preferimos sinceramente una República que también lo sea."*<sup>208</sup>

The idea of a confederation of peoples is the same idea that the Basques were defending with relation to the European federation, since the Federation of States did not guarantee the rights of the nations—but Landaburu introduced in his book a new idea that was quite interesting. Given the division into Blocks that had ensued from the Cold War, Landaburu defended the European Federation as a moderator that would dampen the shock between the two blocks and

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<sup>206</sup> LANDABURU, Javier, 1956, *op. cit.*, p. 10 (part III).

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14 (part III).

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15 (part III).

endow Europe with an idiosyncratic feature that would prevent it from becoming either a Slavic or an American colony:

*“Europa tiene personalidad independiente y debe tener fuerza bastante para ser el elemento moderador que al mundo le hace falta hoy, y le va a hacer falta tal vez durante siglos, para evitar el choque entre esos dos bloques que nunca llegarán a una coexistencia verdadera si la ponderación del espíritu europeo y la fuerza de una Europa organizada faltan en el Mundo.”*<sup>209</sup>

The European federation fulfilled the needs of Basque nationalism, since the Federation that Landaburu was advocating for was a federation of the peoples, which gave the State-Nation precedence over the Nation-State. When the sovereignty of a people must be transferred to a supranational body: that is what makes a federation like the European, one which can warrant the democratic protection of small nations. In his new conception of the Basque nation and its relationship with the Federation, Landaburu defends Schelling’s idea of the organic nation, the nation as a living being, thus making Basque nationalism approach Catalan nationalism as it was defended by Prat de la Riba early in the 20th century<sup>210</sup>. Probably aware of the nature of Catalan nationalism, Landaburu believes that the Basques and the Catalans, the only European peoples inside Spain, show a clear tendency towards the European continent.<sup>211</sup>

A democratic Europe will act as warrant for small nations like the Basque, yet not only for them, but also for Spain. According to Landaburu, the process of democratizing Spain should be carried out under the protection of the European federation, which would also control the abuses of the State:

*“El federalismo es la protección democrática de la nación en el Mundo y es de tesis federalistas que el federalismo es integral, que no hay uno para fuera y otro para adentro, como practican muchos Estados actuales, no hay un federalismo interno y otro externo, sino un solo federalismo. El federalismo no tiene más enemigo que el Estado-nación, que es lo contrario de la nación-Estado.”*<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18 (part III).

<sup>210</sup> JARDÍ, Enric, 1983, *El pensament de Prat de la Riba*. Barcelona: Alpha Ed., pp. 93 and ff.

<sup>211</sup> LANDABURU, Javier, 1956, *op. cit.*, p. 25 (part III).

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.



The Franco Regime seemed to have reached some kind of crisis, and even though Franco's health was not as bad as had been thought—“*Franco has a prostatic condition but is not acute,*” as was determined by a memorandum<sup>213</sup> on November 8<sup>th</sup>, 1955—the Monarchic option of renewing or somehow changing the regime was a good and secure option.

iv. The imagining/making up of the nation from the exile. Differences between Telesforo Monzón and Manuel Irujo, with the spirit of Galindez still hovering about.

A five-hour speech by *Lehendakari* Aguirre officially opened the Basque World Congress in Paris on September 24<sup>th</sup>, 1956, at the Hotel Palais d'Orsay.

Despite the efforts made<sup>214</sup>, the White Book was not completed and the participants of the Congress received only a partial edition of the book, along with a promise from the President that it would be finished.

In his long speech, Aguirre took stock of the 20 years of Basque Government, detailing the efforts done during the Spanish Civil War, the creation of the Basque army, the toils of supplying food, the management of the harbors, or the aid to the refugees. The exile, of course, had an important section, where the President explained his flight and had some thankful words for the Basque National Council created by Manuel Irujo in his absence. Their legitimacy as leaders of a Government, when there was not even a land to run, gave them the possibility of creating the Consultative Council and receive inputs from organizations and political parties.

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<sup>213</sup> “Interview of Spanish Pretender with Mr. Pinay.” From Mr. Jones to Mr. Elbrick. November 8<sup>th</sup>, 1955. NARA, General Records of the Department of State. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. Records of the Spanish and the Portuguese desk officers. 1942-1958. NND887210 RG59 Box 6.

<sup>214</sup> The Basque government and President Aguirre himself asked for the documents justifying the activity of the Basque government during those 20 years. In the archives of the Basque Government we can find, among the correspondence, those documents that were asked for in order to fulfill all the information requirements: documents on the elaboration of the Statute of Autonomy, from the Department of Agriculture, from the Basque delegations, etc. In EAH-AHE. Archivo Histórico del Gobierno Vasco. Fondo del Departamento de Presidencia. Also at:

[http://dokuklik.snae.org/badator\\_sencilla\\_result\\_nivel.php?archivo=01031890010&nomarchivo=Euskadiko%20Artxibo%20Historikoa%20-%20%20Archivo%20Hist%C3%B3rico%20de%20Euskadi&fondo=001&nomfondo=Archivo%20Hist%C3%B3rico%20del%20Gobierno%20Vasco.%20Fondo%20del%20Departamento%20de%20Presidencia&nivel=11&nomnivel=Unidad%20Documental](http://dokuklik.snae.org/badator_sencilla_result_nivel.php?archivo=01031890010&nomarchivo=Euskadiko%20Artxibo%20Historikoa%20-%20%20Archivo%20Hist%C3%B3rico%20de%20Euskadi&fondo=001&nomfondo=Archivo%20Hist%C3%B3rico%20del%20Gobierno%20Vasco.%20Fondo%20del%20Departamento%20de%20Presidencia&nivel=11&nomnivel=Unidad%20Documental) (consulted on January 21<sup>st</sup>, 2017).

The longest part of his intervention was mostly a kind chronicle of the work done by the Basque Government, but *Lehendakari* Aguirre also had in store some words of complaint about international aid.

Aguirre recalled the participation of the Basque government in European politics, highlighting the creation of the *Nouvelles Équipes Internationales* or the Spanish Federal Council and, on the other hand, regretting not having received aid to fight against the Franco Regime. He also had some aggrieved words to address to the international bodies, in whom Aguirre had trusted the most, such as the UNESCO or the UN, assessing the relationship with them as a failure.

Interesting to highlight is the answer given by the President to the increasing rumors about the Franco regime's negotiation with the Monarchy. If in the past Aguirre had played politics with the Monarchists, in 1956 the message was downright:

*“Ah! Si tuviesen inteligencia los monárquicos. Si fuse monárquico, yo diría a don Juan: «Señor, la gente que os rodea, ni conoce al Pueblo ni lo entiende ni os quiere». (...) Y si yo fuera Monárquico, le diría también «Señor. Existen pueblos con voluntad propia, pueblos como el nuestro, el vasco que no están de acuerdo en que porque existan en el resto del Estado o en el resto de la península pueblos que no tienen quizás nuestra educación política, estemos permanentemente sujetos, como niños indefensos o gentes a quienes hay que poner tutelas, a un paternalismo que nuestra historia repugna y nuestra dignidad no admite. ¿Por qué no pactáis? ¿Por qué no habláis con estos pueblos? ¿Es que la monarquía no es capaz de entender esto?». Hasta ahora no”.*<sup>215</sup>

The attendance was pretty full, with 366 congressmen; 45 of them had come from inside the Basque Country, 217 were individuals, 58 belonged to parties and associations, 5 were observers who had no right to vote according to the internal bylaws.

The Basque government had invited political parties, such as ANV, IR, UR, PSOE; trade unions: ELA-STV, UGT, CNT; organizations: Junta de Resistencia, Consejo Consultivo, Organización de Mendigoxales, etc.; as well as congressmen, ministers or former ministers of the Basque Government, mayors or former mayors, and Basque delegates. All the Basque political parties were invited, exception made exclusively of the Communist party: “*Conviene,*

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<sup>215</sup> *Veinte años de gestión del Gobierno vasco (1936-1956)*. EUSKO JAURLARITZAREN ARGITALPEN SERBITZUAK- SERVICIO CENTRAL DE PUBLICACIONES DEL GOBIERNO VASCO, 1983, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-98.

*a este efecto, tengan Uds. en cuenta a qué personas se entregan los carnets, entregas que no tienen otro límite sino la exclusión de los totalitarios sean comunistas o fascistas. Así fue acordado, en su día, por el Gobierno Vasco, y se mantiene hasta hoy tal disposición.*”<sup>216</sup>

The invitations, with the accompanying questionnaires, were sent to more than 2000 individuals in 20 different countries (Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, USA, Cuba, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Philippines, Australia, France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, Portugal, Ireland, England, and Germany), and 500 invitations and questionnaires were delivered to Basques inside Spain.<sup>217</sup>

The guests were asked to send back communications asking about or debating around the questions presented in the questionnaire. Out of the 144 communications received in Paris, 66 dealt with the social-economic section, 24 with the political section, and 44 with the cultural section.<sup>218</sup>

We will focus on the political communications, which are the most important in regard to the development of Basque nationalism, as can be gathered from the words of Joseba Rezola, who stated during opening the political section:

*“Creo que esta reunión de hoy tiene una excepcional importancia porque a mi juicio la Sección Política es la clave de las otras dos secciones. Si no se resuelve el problema político no hay solución para el problema económico y social, ni para el problema Cultural.”*<sup>219</sup>

The communications had already been debated by the commission of the Congress in the months previous to the Congress, and a document had been agreed upon and elaborated.

Manuel Irujo was not only one of the members of the political section, but also its President, and through his archive we can see the evolution of the proposals, the debates, and the final agreed document that was presented, as well as the required amendment.

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<sup>216</sup> Aguirre to Santiago Zarranz in Chile, April 25<sup>th</sup>, 1956. MENDIETA, Asier, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 134. The full letter and other letters and documents for the preparation of the Congress are found in EAH-AHE, Archivo gobierno Vasco, Fondo del Departamento de Presidencia, Congreso Mundial Vasco, Correspondencia-Aguirre. File 360, Bundle 02. Also in: [http://dokuklik.snae.org/badator\\_zoom.php?cdc=001&cdd=01313](http://dokuklik.snae.org/badator_zoom.php?cdc=001&cdd=01313) (consulted on January 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>217</sup> EAH-AHE, Archivo gobierno Vasco, Fondo del Departamento de Presidencia, *ibid.*

<sup>218</sup> MENDIETA, Asier, 2007, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-135.

<sup>219</sup> EUSKO JAURLARITZAREN ARGITALPEN SERBITZUAK- SERVICIO CENTRAL DE PUBLICACIONES DEL GOBIERNO VASCO. 1983. *Euskal Batzar Orokorra. Congreso Mundial Vasco. 25 aniversario*. Bilbao, p. 149.

Aside from the debate in the Congress, what is more important for my research is the political draft that was prepared by Irujo and sent to the members of the Basque government by the end of 1955 for modification, since the documents, the amendments sent, and the debate that took place show us the interests of Basque nationalism, its convergences and its divergences.

The draft of the political paper is a long document spanning 36 pages where Manuel Irujo sets out the problems of the Basque Government<sup>220</sup>, dividing the explanation into different sections where he analyzes the Basque code of laws, the Basque Statute of Autonomy, the present situation in the Basque Country as regards the law, the attitude before the future, and the Conclusions.<sup>221</sup>

In the draft we can see Irujo the lawyer and historian, aware that he is writing a legal document yet sure of the necessity of it:

*“Las tesis tratadas en esta ponencia, su fundamento y desarrollo, sin desconocer la realidad, son de orden histórico-jurídico principalmente, pues que, la historia es trasunto del pasado y el derecho es la expresión jurídica – y política – del presente. No estamos libres que alguien califique nuestro trabajo de mera exposición académica que no convence a aquellos cuya conciencia – influida solo por la preocupación del progreso –, no se halla abierta a la historia.”<sup>222</sup>*

Although it was intended that the Congress should receive recommendations<sup>223</sup>, the work done by Irujo, and later on by the members of the Government and the political parties that contributed their amendments, shows the importance that was given to the event itself, and the necessity of achieving an agreement.

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<sup>220</sup> Although my research leads me to focus my attention on the nationalist features and nationalist policies of the Basques, the document and the Basque Congress itself were prepared and organized by the Basque Government, and therefore were arranged according to the interests of all the different political parties that were part of the Government.

<sup>221</sup> *Anteproyecto de la ponencia política dirigida al Congreso Mundial Vasco*. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 48, File 4. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujio/10249.pdf> (consulted on January 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>223</sup> In the letter from Indalecio Prieto to Lehendakari Aguirre, Mr. Prieto argues “La circunstancia, según usted apunta, de que en el Congreso Mundial Vasco se llegará a recomendaciones (no acuerdos) y a una posible Declaración, en nada disminuye la responsabilidad de quienes las adopten.” EAH-AHE, Archivo Gobierno Vasco, Fondo del Departamento de Presidencia, Congreso Mundial Vasco, Correspondencia-Aguirre. File 360, Bundle 02. Also in: [http://dokuklik.snae.org/badator\\_zoom.php?cdc=001&cdd=01313](http://dokuklik.snae.org/badator_zoom.php?cdc=001&cdd=01313) (consulted on January 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

Irujo followed the General Instruction's guidelines in writing the Political Paper, filling it with some of the recommendations included in the communications received from Basques from all over the world.

The Basque Statute of Autonomy and the Basque government hold a central position in the paper, and they give rise to three main aspects: the Basque code of laws, the question of legitimacy, and the unity of the Basques. These were the three subjects most developed upon by the questionnaires sent back and the communications received and, as we shall see, they were also at the core of the debates during the Congress itself.

The political paper's draft defends the Basque Code of laws as the basis of Basque sovereignty, and therefore as the basis of the Basque Government and the Basque Statute of Autonomy:

*“El primero responde a la tradición foral de libertad, que encontró en aquel instrumento, ya que no satisfacción plena, sí al menos solución transaccional correcta y honorable, aunque fuera parcial. Este aspecto no guarda relación directa, objetivamente considerado, con el régimen dentro del cual fue otorgado. Obedece a un sentimiento de continuidad en el espíritu foral y en las ansias de reintegración de aquellas libertades, ansias que son comunes a todos los vascos y que el Gobierno suscribió por unanimidad el 25 de Octubre de 1936; y une a aquella tradición el sentido de unidad orgánica vasca que el estatuto significa (...) Si se diera el caso de que las instituciones dentro de las cuales nació con existencia legítima, fueran definitivamente canceladas, tal resolución no afectaría en cuanto a este primer aspecto a la subsistencia del Estatuto y del Gobierno Vasco.”<sup>224</sup>*

In the same direction, when Irujo describes the legitimacy of the Basque Statute of Autonomy, he first describes it as *“una ley otorgada por los poderes legítimos de la República Española (..),”* but owing to the origins of the Basque institution its legitimacy would be permanently linked to it: *“Es la legitimidad – legalidad- de su origen, hecho que, ya de por sí, le imprime un carácter, que no habrá de desaparecer aunque dejen de existir las instituciones dentro de las cuales tuvo su nacimiento a la vida jurídica”.*

By recalling the *Tradición foral* (the old Basque Code of Laws), Irujo is approaching primordialist nationalism when he quotes the 1839 law that abolished the Basque Code of

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<sup>224</sup> *Anteproyecto de la ponencia política dirigida al Congreso Mundial Vasco.* Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 48, File 4.

Laws, but he quickly returns back to the Spanish Republican legal system that links the Basque Statute to the Republican legality. Nevertheless, the Statute and its permanency in the draft was one of the first disagreements expressed against Irujo. Joseba Rezola, in a letter sent to Irujo on May 11<sup>th</sup>, 1956, highlights the importance that was given to the Statute:

*“Se le da en ella demasiada importancia al Estatuto, presentándolo como fundamental para nosotros. (...) Creo más acertado que las desventajas se expongan en el mismo plano que las ventajas, para que se vea, las renunciaciones que los nacionalistas y los propugnadores de una amplia libertad, hemos tenido que hacer en aras a la unión y la paz”.*<sup>225</sup>

Although the Statute of Autonomy was always presented by the Government as a warranty of freedom for the Basque people and as the basis of the Basque Government, some Basque nationalists, as we have seen, believed that such a vindication was too much linked to the Spanish institutions and did not reflect a negotiation of equals between the Basque and the Spanish governments. Joseba Rezola, member of the Basque resistance council, was a representative of the other point of view, that of the inside, which is reflected in the amendment that excluded any mention of the Resistance council: *“(...) me ha producido una enorme decepción al ver que en él, no se dice ni una palabra de Resistencia, ni Junta de Resistencia, no de lo que ha hecho ni de lo que tiene que hacer, ni nada”.*<sup>226</sup>

Again, the differences between the exile and the inland were evident. The concept of resistance and the work done by the Basque nationalists inside Spain were not being taken into consideration, since the draft did not specify who it was that organized the 1947, 1951, or 1956 strikes (it did not even mention these), and the relations with the Spanish government in exile meant that there was a completely different opinion about Basque legitimacy and sovereignty as opposed to the ideas harbored by the resistance inside Spain.

The third topic of the draft was the question of Basque unity. It was one of the subjects that was long discussed and developed during the meetings previous to the Congress, as well as during the Congress itself. Irujo reflected on the concept of Basque Unity in the part entitled *“Nuestra actitud ante el futuro”* (pages 26-34 of the draft), appealing to the necessity for Basque unity to succeed in politics, as well as for the resistance against Francoism. Irujo

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<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*

believed that Basque unity had been born and grew up under the unfavorable circumstances of the Civil War, was strengthened with the exile, and stood out during the strikes against Francoism. The unity of the Basques was indispensable in order to succeed with the national goals, and it was a sign of mature national responsibility in harmony with the Basque government.

But there was another version of the topic of unity, and that was the unity with the Spanish democratic political forces. President Aguirre and Manuel Irujo were great promoters of the agreements with the Spanish republican forces, and therefore of the unity of the Republican resistance in exile, as we have already seen, but that was a matter that was not accepted by all Basque nationalists; and if the agreements with the Spanish democrats had been the object of disagreements in the past, the Basque World Congress would be yet another episode of such divergences within Basque nationalism.

The unity with the democratic resistance in Spain led Irujo to a topic we have already discussed, which would become a trend in the following years: national reconciliation.

*“De guerra hartos, buscamos en la paz la solución a nuestros problemas y la paz es la libertad en la justicia según los libros santos y llama a la reconciliación y a la concordia.”<sup>227</sup>*

Here, the idea of national reconciliation is the urge to fight against Franco and the Franco regime, whose intention had been to divide the democrats. For all his highlighting the importance of unity with the Spanish democrats, Irujo believed that the national vindication of the Basques was the first and foremost essential condition for success:

*“Esto solo puede darse si la unión vasca se mantiene, y no nos cansaremos de repetir que ello depende de la continuidad de nuestro gobierno. En su ausencia y sin la atención y desvelo que requiere, es lo regular que los grupos integrantes se inspirarán en intereses particulares, los cuales no tardarían a llevarnos a la hostilidad de la que a tan alto precio nos hemos redimido. (...) ¿Cómo habríamos, pues, de consentir que, invocando la unión de los demócratas españoles, se destruya la que los vascos venimos manteniendo sin interrupción?”<sup>228</sup>*

The draft ended with 11 itemized conclusions that had been written, modified, removed, and reordered according to the received inputs, paying particular attention to the amendments made

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<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*

by Rezola, Gonzalo Nárdiz, and the *Lehendakari* Aguirre. The draft was modified and reoriented by Irujo several times after discussing the amendments and clarifying the ideas with the members of the Basque government, particularly with Gonzalo Nárdiz, who had exchanged diverse opinions in several letters with Irujo. But since the document caused controversy, in the end it was removed from the negotiation meetings<sup>229</sup>.

On August 28<sup>th</sup>, 1956, the Political Commission of the Basque World Congress met at the Basque Delegation in Bayonne in order to discuss the communications that had been received, and to agree on a political paper that would be presented at the Congress together with the papers sent by the political parties.

The participants at that meeting were the members of the different political parties of the Basque government: Republicans, Socialists, members of ANV and PNV, and the President of the political section, Manuel Irujo. During two days, the participants read and debated the communications that had been received, and then went on to agree on the document that was to be presented and defended at the Congress—although, as we can see from Irujo’s archives, some more amendments were made after that meeting, especially with regard to Rezola’s considerations about the resistance and the references to the “Spanish people” made by the socialists.<sup>230</sup>

Although Irujo was a hard-working Basque nationalist, he was upset at the amendments and ultimate rejection of the draft, as he explained to *Lehendakari* Aguirre in a letter right after the Bayonne meeting which sheds some light on the tense political atmosphere within the Basque government:

*“Yo retiré la nuestra (the paper), tan expandida y expresivamente rechazada. (...) los socialistas han estado mal: reticentes, españoles patriotas de manera innecesaria y expresiva. Lasarte se ha colocado en postura calculadamente agresiva, que ha producido efecto saludable. Nárdiz ha atacado a Paulino duramente (...). La ponencia socialista contiene el programa del Partido Socialista, el Pacto de Bayona, los*

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<sup>229</sup> Different versions of the draft can be found in Manuel Irujo’s personal archive, along with the letters containing the amendments sent by Joseba Rezola and Gonzalo Nárdiz, as well as an unsigned but very detailed document which includes some amendments that were applied in the next versions of the draft. Owing to the hardworking nature and extreme tidiness of Manuel Irujo, today it is possible to see and compare the different versions of the draft and get an idea of which aspects were more controversial. *Anteproyecto de la ponencia política dirigida al Congreso Mundial Vasco*. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 48, File 4. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/10249.pdf> (consulted on January 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>230</sup> Ibid.



*acuerdos del Congreso socialista del año pasado u la doctrina del socialismo integral, con ocupación del poder por el proletariado y la liquidación de la sociedad capitalista. (...) Lo más constructivo presentado es una propuesta de Nárdiz redactada con mucha fortuna, breve, expresiva, que dice poco, pero lo suficiente, que no compromete a nada y que permite salir del paso, de manera que sigamos en el Gobierno Vasco unido en apariencia y demos esa sensación al Congreso y al mundo.”<sup>231</sup>*

Irujo admitted that the Basque government was going through an internal crisis, so the goals of Basque nationalism were superseded by the needs of the Basque Government and the political strategy. Unity became one of the main objectives, and it was highly important to appear united, even though that was not entirely true.

On September 25<sup>th</sup>, the day of Manuel Irujo’s 65<sup>th</sup> birthday, a summary of the communications that had been received, as well as the full text of the communications of the four members of the political parties of the Basque government, were read aloud during the regular session of the political section.

For the interest of my research, I will focus on the demands of the Basque nationalists and the features that somehow modified Basque nationalism.

There is one topic which is common to the communications received from both the exile and the inside, and which will become one of the main features of Basque nationalism in the coming years: the language.

Although the vindication of the Basque language had been part of Basque nationalism from the start, the vindication of the language as an essential part of the Basque nation above other classic features, such as the ethnic origin, became an important part of the development of Basque nationalism.

Federico Krutwig, a young philologist living in Germany, had sent one communication that expressed a radical vision of the importance of the Basque language and its relation to the creation of the Basque nationality: “*Sin Euzkera no puede haber Euzkadi. La violencia es necesaria para realizar el hecho nacional vasco.*”<sup>232</sup> On reading the summary, Irujo did

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<sup>231</sup> Letter from Manuel Irujo to *Lehendakari* Aguirre. Donibane Lohitzune, August 28<sup>th</sup>, 1956. *Ibid.*

<sup>232</sup> *Comunicado n°10 “El hecho vasco, el Euzkera y el territorio de Euzkadi.”* EUSKO JAURLARITZAREN ARGITALPEN SERBITZUAK- SERVICIO CENTRAL DE PUBLICACIONES DEL GOBIERNO VASCO, 1983, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.

mention Krutwig's ideas about violence, but, given his personality as a man who had always defended peace, even in times of war, Manuel Irujo introduced a personal comment:

*“Añade que él es partidario de la no violencia, pero que está demostrado que a los pueblos pequeños como no peguen tiros y pongan bombas, no les oye nadie. Lo dice con tanto vigor que me considero obligado a repetirlo, aunque ya comprendo que aquí no hemos venido a preparar trilita ni ningún otro sustitutivo de destrucción.”*<sup>233</sup>

Krutwig made a direct link between the existence of the Basque nation and the Basque language, and this is particularly important because his communication was not sent to the cultural section but to the political section. The idea of the Basque language as a building factor of the nation was determinant, and it went beyond ethnic origin: *“Sin Euzkera no hay vascos. Es más importante el Euzkera que el factor rh. de los grupos sanguíneos.”*<sup>234</sup>

With the government in exile, the diaspora of Basque people, and a Basque society under the boot of a dictatorship that was trying to erase Basque culture<sup>235</sup>, the language came to represent the geographical boundaries of the nation, replacing the Rh factor of ethnic origin.

Although the cultural section was almost entirely devoted to the Basque language and to defend it from Basque nationalism, it is important that we highlight this here, because the issue was raised and included as a feature belonging to Basque nationalism, and its protection was considered as part of the responsibilities of the Basque government.

The geographical conception of the nation is another of the topics developed in the communications, with a clear inclusion of Navarre within the imagined Basque community.

As already stated, defining the geographical boundaries of the nation is a second step after the recognition of the nation by the people, and the defense of the *Laurak bat*, the *zazpi bat*, or

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<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 152

<sup>234</sup> *Comunicado nº10 “El hecho vasco, el Euzkera y el territorio de Euzkadi.”* EUSKO JAURLARITZAREN ARGITALPEN SERBITZUAK- SERVICIO CENTRAL DE PUBLICACIONES DEL GOBIERNO VASCO, 1983, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.

<sup>235</sup> The conclusions of the political draft that was ultimately removed said in one of its items: “Llama la atención del Gobierno y de sus integrantes acerca del hecho político-social que puede ser calificado como de máxima preocupación nacional para un vasco. La política genocida seguida por el régimen vigente se endereza a la rápida extinción del euzkera como lengua viva.” Anteproyecto de la ponencia política dirigida al Congreso Mundial Vasco. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 48, File 4. Also in:

<http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujofund/10249.pdf> (consulted on January 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

even the *zortzi bat* (the inclusion of the exile as part of the Basque country) would be developed and vindicated by Basque nationalism.

Federico Krutwig and *Izquierda Republicana* defended that the limits of the “historical Navarre” were part of the Basque country, not through forced annexations, but owing rather to a confederation not unlike the Swiss. The defense of Navarre as part of the Basque country is also included in the communications sent from Mexico by Mr. Villanueva and Mr. Esnaola, who appeal to the Basque Statute of Autonomy to include Navarre, although adding that it could also form part of a confederation<sup>236</sup>.

The communication by the ANV that was read aloud defended the legitimacy of the Basque government, and mostly reproduced the political draft written by Irujo and ultimately dismissed, including the idea of a genocide committed against the Basque people, expressed in the conclusions, and a defense of Basque unity,

*“unidos en los frentes como en la retaguardia, en las cárceles como en el exilio, y siempre en íntima comunicación con el Gobierno, que la colectividad vasca puede presentarse ante propios y extraños, como entidad nacional de madura responsabilidad y firmeza de voluntad, a cuya consideración nadie puede sustraerse”*.<sup>237</sup>

As for the PNV, its communication was a ratification of the 1949 declaration, which meant, as we have already seen, a total defense both of Basque unity and of cooperation with the Spanish Republican institutions, an anticommunist declaration, and a statement of the principles of Christian-Democracy and its political strategy of European federation.<sup>238</sup>

After all the communications of the Basque parties had been read aloud, Mr. Julio Jáuregui, who had been the Basque delegate in Mexico (1942-1946), proceeded to read out the political conclusions that had been approved<sup>239</sup>:

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<sup>236</sup> EUSKO JAURLARITZAREN ARGITALPEN SERBITZUAK- SERVICIO CENTRAL DE PUBLICACIONES DEL GOBIERNO VASCO, 1983, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-123;128;152.

<sup>237</sup> The ANV communication contains parts that are exactly the same as the draft of the political paper written by Irujo. Irujo had already informed Aguirre about this in his letter of August 28<sup>th</sup>, 1956, because Gonzalo Nárdiz had told him of his intentions of using it, given that he completely agreed with the Navarrese. EUSKO JAURLARITZAREN ARGITALPEN SERBITZUAK- SERVICIO CENTRAL DE PUBLICACIONES DEL GOBIERNO VASCO, 1983, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-177.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 177-179.

<sup>239</sup> In it are described the main factors driving the seven approved items. The full text can be found in: EUSKO JAURLARITZAREN ARGITALPEN SERBITZUAK- SERVICIO CENTRAL DE PUBLICACIONES DEL GOBIERNO VASCO, 1983, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-182.

*“PRIMERA: Reiterar de modo solemne el sentimiento de gratitud del Pueblo vasco a los pueblos y Gobiernos que des hace veinte años acogieron en sus territorios y facilitaron el establecimiento de los refugiados vascos, y de modo especial, a Francia, Bélgica, Gran Bretaña, Venezuela, México, Argentina, Chile y Uruguay, confiando que el gran homenaje que les es debido pronto pueda ofrecerse bajo el Árbol de Gernica, símbolo de las libertades vascas.*

*SEGUNDA: Fiel a la tradición de paz, de justicia y de libertad, y recogiendo el sentir del pueblo vasco y de los vascos residentes en todo el mundo, el CONGRESO MUNDIAL VASCO, hace un llamamiento en favor de la Paz, ideal permanente de todos los pueblos de la tierra, de la cual serán sólidas garantías; el reconocimiento efectivo del derecho de todos los pueblos a gobernarse por sí mismos; el respeto por todos los Estados de los derechos fundamentales de la persona y de la dignidad humanas; el cumplimiento de la palabra dada en convenios y tratados internacionales; la integración de Naciones y Estados en Órganos superiores como Europa o las confederaciones Americanas; el mejoramiento de las condiciones de vida de los trabajadores de todos los países, y la ayuda substancial y desinteresada a los pueblos insuficientemente desarrollados, cultural y económicamente.*

*TERCERA: EL CONGRESO MUNDIAL VASCO, consciente de los graves peligros que amenazan la subsistencia del viejo grupo humano de Euzkadi, si continúa sometido a la actual dictadura totalitaria franco-falangista, lanza un apremiante llamamiento a la conciencia de los vascos del mundo entero, en demanda de la ayuda y de la acción vigorosa, necesarias para que el pueblo vasco recobre su libertad y con ella, quede asegurada su propia vida.*

*(...) El Congreso, que reconoce el Gobierno presidido por el Sr. Aguirre como la autoridad legítima del Pueblo Vasco, le proclama como instrumento apropiado, para seguir dirigiendo las tareas conducentes a la liberación del País.*

*(...) El congreso proclama el Estatuto de Autonomía como bandera de unión vasca, de lucha y de reivindicación insoslayable.*

*El Pacto de Bayona constituye garantía de la unión vasca pactada y de la cordial solidaridad en el empleo de restablecer sobre sólidos cimientos la libertad y la democracia.*

*CUARTA: Ante la amplitud que van alcanzando en el interior los movimientos de opinión contrarios al régimen totalitario y visiblemente expresados en las huelgas de trabajadores, protestas de estudiantes, manifiestos de intelectuales, (...) el Congreso les expresa su calurosa solidaridad y simpatía y recomienda al Gobierno de Euzkadi, a los partidos políticos y a la opinión pública vasca, que apoyen y cooperen con el Gobierno de la República y la Generalitat de Cataluña, con los partidos democráticos y con aquellos sectores del interior que por su decisión y seriedad merezcan suficientes garantías, a toda acción inteligente que tienda a acelerar la caída del régimen franquista y establecer sobre las bases de la reconciliación y concordia un régimen democrático en el que los pueblos de España, libremente y con las debidas garantías, puedan expresar su voluntad política.*

*QUINTA: El Congreso recomienda no exacerbar pasiones que pudieran empañar la amistad de los vascos demócratas y aflojar sus lazos. (...) El mayor interés de este Congreso va vinculado a la idea de ofrecer una total y absoluta reconciliación (...).*

*SEXTA: Si Navarra decide incorporarse al País Vasco autónomo, podrá hacerlo cumpliéndose en tal caso lo determinado en la disposición adicional del Estatuto plebiscitado. (...)*

*SÉPTIMA: (...) El Congreso declara que el régimen autonómico propugnado no implica prescripción extinta de los derechos históricos del País, cuya plena realización cuando las circunstancias lo deparen, estriba en la restauración de íntegra de su Régimen Foral.”*

The conclusions of the Congress called for a recognition of the resistance inside Spain and also of the exile, and also defended appealing to international bodies in a petition for the Basque cause to not be forgotten.

The Congress achieved one its objectives, which was to reaffirm the unity of the Basques and the legitimacy of the Basque Government and the Basque President, by defending the Basque Statute of Autonomy but without dismissing a restoration of the old Basque code of laws and the right of self-determination of the peoples.

Although explicit mention was made of national reconciliation, the communists (a movement that was counted among totalitarianisms) were ruled out, recalling in this case the expulsion of the PCE from the Basque government in 1948.

The debate which came after the reading out of the conclusions was followed by the participation of the attendees, some of whose amendments were admitted, such as the proposal to expand the Consultative Council in order to allow the Basque Government to get closer to the people, and the explicit recognition of the role of the Basque resistance in the organization of the 1947, 1951, and 1956 strikes—both proposals being petitioned by Joseba Rezola. But the debate that created the greater controversy, in terms of the heated conversations it sparked and the purport of the speaker, was the intervention of the always-convincing Telesforo Monzón.

As we saw before, Mr. Monzón resigned from the Basque Government in 1951, although, as he himself admitted, almost nobody noticed. Monzón's discrepancies were the very same that led him to resign; he considered that Basque nationalism was linked too closely to the Spanish institutions: *“no se puede adscribir para siempre la vida de nuestro país, la solución de nuestro problema a un determinado caso, a una determinada solución del problema político español en este momento representado por lo que se llama República de las Instituciones.”*<sup>240</sup>

In his speech, Monzón talked about the youth and about how tired the Basque people were of waiting for a solution to the Franco regime, which, according to Monzón, the Basque Government could not provide. By referring to that demand, Monzón was revealing the difficulties that Basque nationalism was encountering in trying to strike a chord with the new generation, whether inside Spain or in the exile, as we will see further on. A new generation was growing up, and the traditional politics as developed by the Basque government were not enough to fulfill their goals.

The defense of the Spanish institutions—one of the conclusions of the political section—seemed unacceptable to Monzón, because it would mean a dead end for the Basque problem:

*“Pero por qué vamos a adscribir necesariamente la solución de nuestro problema después de 20 años, por qué lo vamos a seguir adscribiendo irremisiblemente a una situación que se está viendo que no tiene fuerza en el exterior para imponerlo por una acción de las Cancillerías, que no es viable y que además es el como que Franco sabe perfectamente manejar para decir: ¿Queréis que me vaya? Pues mirad lo que viene. (...) ¿Pero creéis que después de 20 años queriendo hacer algo Nuevo, viendo la*

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<sup>240</sup> EUSKO JAURLARITZAREN ARGITALPEN SERBITZUAK- SERVICIO CENTRAL DE PUBLICACIONES DEL GOBIERNO VASCO, 1983, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

*juventud con ideas nuevas, pensando que los ríos van para adelante, que no van para atrás...?”*<sup>241</sup>

The speech was met with a heated response from Mr. Irujo, who defended the conclusions arguing that they were based on the 24 communications received from the Basque communities around the world, and he accused Mr. Telesforo of being a demagogue.

Despite Irujo's enraged answer, revealing a misunderstanding of Monzón's vindications, what Monzón was actually trying to show was that the Basque government and Basque nationalism were stalled with respect to the policies carried out for achieving the freedom of the Basque people. The fact that a re-edition of the 1949 declaration was sent by the PNV as its communication for the Basque World Congress serves to confirm this, and communications such as that of Federico Krutwig or the debate of Telesforo Monzón are just two examples of what was cooking inside traditional Basque nationalism.

Telesforo Monzón, much as Krutwig had done in his communication, took the example of nations like Cyprus, Morocco, or Tunis to explain that there were different ways to achieve national freedom apart from the classic channels used by Basque nationalism, which passed through international institutions that, as Monzón recalled, were ignoring the strength of the Spanish Republican legitimacy.

v. International repercussions with the spirit of Jesús de Galíndez still hovering around.

If President Aguirre intended the Basque World Congress to serve as a propaganda platform for the Basque cause<sup>242</sup>, the fatal disappearance of Jesús Galíndez contributed to that.

The Basque delegate in New York (1949-1956), Jesús Galíndez, vanished after having taught a class at Columbia University on March 12<sup>th</sup> 1956. Having returned to his apartment at 30 Fifth Avenue, he was abducted and sent to Santo Domingo, in the Dominican Republic, where

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<sup>241</sup> EUSKO JAURLARITZAREN ARGITALPEN SERBITZUAK- SERVICIO CENTRAL DE PUBLICACIONES DEL GOBIERNO VASCO, 1983, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

<sup>242</sup> MENDIETA, Asier, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

he was tortured by henchmen of the dictator Leónidas Trujillo before being killed and thrown to the sea.<sup>243</sup>

The Galíndez case has been studied in depth,<sup>244</sup> and his disappearance had a great impact on the Basque community in America, and great repercussions in the media: “«*New York Times*», «*Diario de Nueva York*», «*New York Post*», «*Herald Tribune*», «*Ibérica*», «*España Libre*», «*Life*», «*Time*», y «*The Daily Spectator*» de Nueva York se han ocupado del caso. (...)”, related Manuel Irujo in *Alderdi* in August, 1956.<sup>245</sup> Five months after the vanishing of the Basque delegate, the case was not even close to being solved. Although Galíndez had collaborated with the American intelligence services (OSS, CIA, and FBI) on several occasions, the case did not receive too much attention from the Americans until December 1956, when Gerald L. Murphy, the pilot who supposedly flew Galíndez to the Dominican Republic, was murdered by Trujillo’s men.<sup>246</sup>

Galíndez had been abducted just after delivering to the Columbia University committee his PhD dissertation on Trujillo’s regime, *Trujillo’s Dominican Republic*, a study on the 25 years of this regime in the Dominican Republic, in which he denounced the atrocities committed by Leónidas Trujillo and the lack of freedom and absence of democratic features of the regime. Although almost all theories agree on Galíndez’s attacks to Trujillo as the cause for the murder, his PhD investigation was not the first contact Galíndez had had with the Dominican Republic. Galíndez had lived in the island between 1941 and 1946, when he worked for the Department of Labour and Economy and at the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, and he began to get interested in the country’s politics. Back in New York, Galíndez had also had contact with some members of the Dominican community, as he explained to Irujo in November 1952:

*“Por aquí andamos metidos en misterios. Hace un mes asesinaron a un amigo mío, dominicano antitrujillista; andaba en tratos con el consulado desde dos meses antes para sacar a su madre y hermana del país y estaba dispuesto a quebrantar su promesa y seguir publicando un*

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<sup>243</sup> This is the most accepted version of Galíndez’s disappearance, that was followed by the investigation firstly open by the New York Police, although as for today, part of the documentation related with the investigation carried by the American Department of State is still confidential. MOTA, David, 2016, op. cit., p. 284.

<sup>244</sup> These are some of the most representative works on Galíndez’s case: UNANUE, Manuel de Dios. 1999. El caso Galíndez: los vascos en los Servicios de inteligencia de EEUU. Tafalla: Txalaparta; BERNARDO URQUIJO, Iñaki. 1993. Galíndez: La tumba abierta. Los vascos y los Estados Unidos. Vitoria-Gasteiz: Eusko Jaurlaritzaren Argitalpen Zerbitzu Nagusia; BASALDÚA, Pedro. 1956. Jesús de Galíndez: Víctima de las tiranías en América. Buenos Aires: Mac-Co.;

<sup>245</sup> Galíndez. *Alderdi*, no.112/113, August, 1956.

<sup>246</sup> MOTA, David, 2016, op. cit., p. 288.



*periódico antitrujillista tan pronto salieran*”. And, he added, he was already aware that he was in danger: “*Todos los que nos hemos permitido decirle algo al Benecifato*<sup>247</sup> *tenemos que andar asegurándonos por la calle de que nadie nos sigue.*”<sup>248</sup>

The articles he had written against Trujillo and his contacts with the exiled Dominican community had turned him into a target.

Galíndez had a passion for writing, in common with Irujo, and he was also a very hard-working person who found time for writing books (such as his *Historia de la civilización hispanoamericana, política y cultural*), novels, and articles, besides organizing floral games, performing his duties at the Basque delegation, and teaching at Columbia University.

His work was recognized by Irujo, who, in February 1955, opened a letter to Galíndez appreciating the personal success of his intellectual career, and calling to his attention that he should contribute a communication to the Basque world congress.<sup>249</sup> From the letters exchanged between Irujo and Galíndez we can infer that their relationship was considerate but personal. Their long letters were full of political discussions, but Galíndez would express to Irujo his moods and his personal fears and hopes.

Their relationship through letters got more and more personal, but they also had some very interesting debates on politics that provide evidence for a development in Basque nationalism that holds interest for this research.

As we have already seen, Galíndez was one of the men closest to *Lehendakari* Aguirre who had first criticized the trust placed in the American administration and the international institutions, since he had been the Basque man in the American secret services and he had set one foot in the UN and the UNESCO for defending Basque interests.<sup>250</sup>

In 1955, Galíndez was already an expert in international politics, and he was looking for examples from New York to follow in America, always from a position of Christian Democracy and of growing anti-communism, although he concealed this under a democrat's

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<sup>247</sup> Referring to Trujillo.

<sup>248</sup> Jesús Galíndez to Manuel Irujo. New York, November 9<sup>th</sup>, 1956. Euskomedia. Irujo Fund. Signature J, Box 56, File 2C, p. 21.

<sup>249</sup> Manuel Irujo to Jesús Galíndez. February 15<sup>th</sup>, 1955. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>250</sup> The ups and downs of Galíndez's relationship with the UN is related in several chapters, such as “Galíndez y la ONU” (pp. 163-200), “La Guerra ya no está en las Naciones Unidas” (pp. 225-239), and “De la esperanza a la desilusión” (pp. 285-320), in BERNARDO URQUIJO, Iñaki, 1993, *Galíndez: La tumba abierta. Los vascos y los Estados Unidos*. Vitoria-Gasteiz: Eusko Jaurlaritzaren Argitalpen Zerbitzu Nagusia.

dress.<sup>251</sup> Euskadi was his objective and, in a world each day increasingly divided into two blocks, Christian-Democracy was the option for Basque nationalists. Besides, democracy had brought national recognition for the Basque Country, whereas a totalitarian regime was bound to erase it.

Galíndez defended the right to self-determination of the Puerto Ricans, as well as their new Constitution (1952), comparing the latter with the Basque Statute of autonomy:

*“(...) recuerda mucho al Estatuto de Autonomía para Euzkadi aprobado durante la II República Española. En algunas materias (...) sigue legislando y gobernando el Estado norteamericano; en las demás materias de régimen interno, legisla el Congreso insular y administra el Gobierno insular; les falta aquel tipo de materias intermedias en que la legislación correspondía al gobierno central y la ejecución a los Gobiernos autónomos vasco y catalán.”*<sup>252</sup>

In this article, Galíndez affirms that the option of a Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a new option, was the best when talking about independence in the 50's: *“Es decir, a mediados del siglo XX están caducando las fórmulas antiguas de independencia y Soberanía y caminamos hacia Federaciones continentales. Lo que importa es la autodeterminación de los pueblos, aunque sea con fórmulas nuevas.”*

The idea is along the same lines as Irujo's article included in the same *Alderdi* issue, “El Estatuto de Autonomía de Túnez”,<sup>253</sup> which insists that the importance of Basque rights lies mainly in the Statutes of Autonomy as a platform for full self-determination—a vindication that we will see being developed later on during the Basque World Congress.

In a post-WWII situation, where borders had drastically changed and extreme nationalism was wielded to occupy and devastate countries and peoples, a political policy of national vindication that would not involve a political fracture of the established borders seemed a more plausible solution.

The second idea, that of a continental federation, was also developed by Basque nationalism, as we have seen, through the defense of the European Federal Movement; and the idea

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<sup>251</sup> The articles published in *Alderdi* no.95, February of 1955, “Triunfo de la democracia en Costa Rica” or *Alderdi* no. 98, May of 1955, “Los vascos somos demócratas” (which was the conference he gave at the 2nd Christian-Democrat Congress held in New York on April 15<sup>th</sup> -17<sup>th</sup>, 1955) are good examples of this.

<sup>252</sup> “Puerto Rico y Euzkadi. Fórmulas parecidas de autodeterminación,” in *Alderdi* no. 99, June, 1955, pp. 11-12.

<sup>253</sup> *Alderdi* no. 99, June, 1955, pp. 8-9.

developed by Galíndez was used by Irujo as a posthumous contribution intended to be experienced by the exile:

*“Haga usted el favor de tomar en sus manos Alderdi número 107 (...) En él encontrará usted un artículo de Galíndez titulado «Necesitamos un Organismo Internacional Vasco». (...) Me permite sugerir a usted que proponga a la FEVA que, hacienda suya la sugestión formulada por Galíndez en ese artículo, sea la propia FEVA la que suscriba una comunicación al Congreso Mundial Vasco, en la cual se mantenga aquella iniciativa (...).”*<sup>254</sup>

The article that Irujo was referring to included a proposal for an “International Federation” of Basque centers, taking as its starting point the Argentinian Federation, the FEVA, but with the broader spirit of the LIAB.<sup>255</sup> The idea is interesting for two different reasons: because it proposed the unity of the Basques in a Federation, and because it included the initiative of promoting an NGO to be representative of the Basque people at the UN, like the Jewish people had done in 1947.

“Estoy pensando en una Federación internacional, o como se llame el Organismo, que pueda ser reconocido por la Secretaría General de las Naciones Unidas como Organismo No-gubernamental Consultativo. (...) Tenemos ya un precedente en que Organismos de este tipo ayudaron eficazmente una causa política, una causa nacional: la causa de pueblo judío”.

Galíndez, with a good knowledge of the operating system of the United Nations, was looking for a way to be recognized as a people—and therefore as a cause, without being a State—especially after Spain had been admitted into the international organization.

For Galíndez, the national Basque cause had to be defended by an international organization in parallel with the Basque Government, as other peoples had done before: *“Un Congreso Mundial Vasco permanente como tenían los judíos, una Federación de Sociedades Vascas de carácter internacional como tenían los irlandeses, pude ayudar en un momento álgido de lucha nacional como tuvimos en 1936-1937 (...).”*

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<sup>254</sup> Manuel Irujo to Pedro Basaldúa (Basque delegate in Argentina), June 12<sup>th</sup>, 1956. *Euskomedia*. Irujo Fund. Signature J, Box 56, File 2C. Source Sig. 88-89. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujto/12839.pdf> (consulted on January 25<sup>th</sup>).

<sup>255</sup> “Es necesaria la Federación Internacional, sea sólo de Centros vascos, sea aún más amplia como antaño se proyectó la Liga Internacional de los Amigos de los Vascos.” Galíndez in Alderdi no. 107, February 1956, pp. 16.

The image of Israel had become a model for nationalisms without a State since the country was founded in 1948—and the Basque was no exception. Israel was a successful example of a nation that had won for itself an independent State that was fully recognized by the international organizations. From the time of the exile until the return to the Basque country, the Basques and the Jewish established relationships at different levels which in one way or another had an impact on the construction of Basque nationalism, and the ideological influences affected not only traditional Basque nationalism but also the revolutionary nationalism of ETA, as well as the political construction of the nation.<sup>256</sup>

The example of Ireland was another good source of inspiration for Basque nationalism, but its prominence would be developed—before those days, and mostly after—in relation to radical positions, especially among *Jagi-Jagi*, *Comuni3n Nacionalista Vasca*, and ETA.<sup>257</sup>

The idea of a “continental Federation” conceived by Galíndez is similar to the idea of the European Federalism that the PNV would found its strategy on, especially after the World Basque Congress.

Although Galíndez was not able to deploy his strategy, or even discuss his ideology with his colleagues, his spirit was still hovering about in the Congress. His disappearance was no minor incident, and although the trust in the “American Friend” apparently had become blurred,<sup>258</sup> the Congress still decided to send a petition to the American government urging the investigation of his disappearance:

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<sup>256</sup> Israel was a great influence for Basque nationalism from the very beginning; for instance, *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun*, by Menachem Begin, first published in 1952, was one of the reference books of the Basque nationalists in the Paris Delegation, and later on for the young members of EGI. The relations between the Basques and Israel have been documented in several studies and books, such as: BATISTA, Antoni, 2007, *Madariaga. De las armas a la palabra*. Barcelona: RBA; LISBONA, José Antonio, 2002, *España-Israel. Historia de unas relaciones secretas*. Madrid: Temas de Hoy; SELLARÉS, Miquel, 2008, *Un pas endavant. La hist3ria dels Mossos que mai no s'ha explicat*. Barcelona: L'Arquer;

<sup>257</sup> On this subject the following can be consulted: UGALDE, Alexander, “Nacionalismo vasco y relaciones Internacionales,” in *Hermes*, Bilbao, Fundaci3n Sabino Arana, no. 11, 2004, pp. 34-39; CONVERSI, Daniele, “Dommino effect or internal developments? The Influyente of International Events and Political Ideologies on Catalan and Basque Nationalism,” in *West European Politics*, 3, 1993, pp. 245-70; NÚÑEZ SEIXAS, Xosé M., “Relaciones exteriores del nacionalismo vasco. (1895-1960),” in DE PABLO, Santiago (Ed.), *Los nacionalistas. Historia del nacionalismo vasco. 1876-1960*, Gasteiz, Fundaci3n Sancho el Sabio, 1995, pp. 381-417; NÚÑEZ SEIXAS, Xosé M., “El mito de Irlanda: la influencia del nacionalismo irlandés en los nacionalismos gallego y vasco (1880-1936),” in *Historia 16*, no.199. 1992. pp. 32-44.

<sup>258</sup> In a letter from Hickman to Irujo dated April 6<sup>th</sup>, 1956, the former declared: “Es posible que los americanos, me refiero a la policia, no den muchas noticias del caso por la raz3n de que el Estado Americano es el que sostiene a Trujillo.” In Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 35, File 1. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj0/4123.pdf> (consulted on January 31st, 2017).

*“Después de escuchado un homenaje emocionado que el Presidente del Gobierno dirigió a la persona del delegado que fue en los USA, Jesús de Galíndez desaparecido en Nueva York el 12 de Marzo del año corriente, en circunstancias que los vascos han interpretado unánimemente, fue decidido que una Delegación entregara personalmente en la Embajada de los EEUU un despacho dirigido al Presidente de dicha República solicitando de las Autoridades americanas la más rápida y total investigación sobre la trágica desaparición de nuestro eminente compatriota”.*<sup>259</sup>

The Basque Government had done everything to find out what had happened to its delegate: *“Beitia está haciendo todo lo posible,”*<sup>260</sup> informed Hickman to Irujo on April 11<sup>th</sup>, 1956, but in June his disappearance seemed all but permanent and fatal.

Columbia University had reported his absence during the Doctoral ceremony in June, and in August Irujo wrote an extensive article in *Alderdi* without any hope for his re-appearance.<sup>261</sup>

The press in New York, especially the *New York Times*, covered Galíndez’s disappearance, but with some criticism for the passiveness of the FBI in front of the alarm that the case had created: *“It is no exaggeration to say that his case has aroused hemispheric alarm and indignation as nothing of its kind has ever done before. There has been a feeling that the authorities – especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation – are not doing enough”.*<sup>262</sup>

The press became interested in Galíndez’s case after a note was found in his apartment which was written by him (in 1952), addressed to the police, and pointing a finger to the Dominican Republic should anything happen to him.

Although the Basque Government, and even the Spanish Republican Government, urged the American Government to investigate Galíndez’s disappearance, the answer of the authorities was mostly vague. In the NARA archive, within the Department of State’s fund, there is a folder named “Galíndez” containing several newspaper clippings and correspondence of and

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<sup>259</sup> EUSKO JAURLARITZAREN ARGITALPEN SERBITZUAK- SERVICIO CENTRAL DE PUBLICACIONES DEL GOBIERNO VASCO, 1983, *op. cit.*, p. 478.

<sup>260</sup> Hickman to Irujo, London, April 11<sup>th</sup>, 1956. In *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 35, File 1. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/4123.pdf> (consulted on January 31st, 2017).

<sup>261</sup> On the Doctoral ceremony at Columbia University, see *Alderdi*, no. 111, June, 1956, p. 4; and for Irujo’s article see *Alderdi*, no. 112, August, 1956, pp. 10-15.

<sup>262</sup> “The Galíndez case,” *New York Times*, April 28<sup>th</sup>, 1956. We also find other articles and news on Galíndez in the *New York Times* of April 5<sup>th</sup>, May 11<sup>th</sup>, 14<sup>th</sup>, 24<sup>th</sup>, and 30<sup>th</sup>, July 12<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup>, and also in 1957 and 1958.

about Galíndez with the Department of State,<sup>263</sup> which comes to show the interest that the case had for the American administration, but also the lack of interest in solving the matter.

A letter sent by Mr. Jacob D. Beam, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (1955-1957), and Mr. Fisher Howe, Director of the Executive Secretariat, acknowledged receipt of the petition from the Basque World Congress to solve the disappearance of Jesús de Galíndez, and the answer given by Fisher on the day after showed their intentions very clearly: “In order to avoid embarrassment in our relations with Spain, it is suggested that no reply be made to this communication.”<sup>264</sup>

The US administration had taken position with regard to the Spanish conflict, and Galíndez was a collateral damage. The Spanish regime, even without being asked to, also took position. The First Secretary of the Spanish Embassy, Ángel Sagaz Zubelzu, reporting to the American administration in May, 1957, stated that despite the efforts that were still being carried out by the Basque Government, the Spanish Government was not interested in the Galíndez Case: “(...) despite Sr. Galíndez’s Spanish nationality, his Embassy has no interest in the widely-discussed case of his disappearance.”<sup>265</sup>

Galíndez’s case was never solved—and even though the Basque government and Basque nationalists like Irujo kept working on the case, his body was never found.<sup>266</sup>

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<sup>263</sup> The folder can be found in: NARA, General Records of the Department of State. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. Records of the Spanish and the Portuguese desk officers. 1942-1958. NND887210 RG59 Box.8

<sup>264</sup> *Basque World Case Resolution on Galíndez case*, Letter from Mr. Beam to Mr. Howe, October 19<sup>th</sup>, 1956, and *Basque World Case Resolution on Galíndez case*, Memorandum signed by Fisher Howe, October 20<sup>th</sup>, 1956, in NARA, General Records of the Department of State. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. *Ibid.*

<sup>265</sup> Washington Visit of Sr. Aguirre, President, Basque Government-in-exile. Confidential report, May 13<sup>th</sup>, 1957. *Ibid.*

<sup>266</sup> There is a folder containing the activities that the Basque Government carried out between 1956 and 1963 in connection with Galíndez’s case, especially (but not only) with respect to his will and the difficulties they had in making it effective, as well as the undertakings and the diplomacy carried out; all these are on display in: EAH-AHE, Archivo Histórico del Gobierno Vasco. Fondo del Departamento de Presidencia. Secretaría General (Paris). Gobierno. Delegaciones del Gobierno de Euzkadi Delegaciones en América. File 79, Bundle 02. Also in: [http://dokuklik.snae.org/badator\\_zoom.php?cdc=001&cdd=00499](http://dokuklik.snae.org/badator_zoom.php?cdc=001&cdd=00499). Manuel Irujo made all the efforts he could—as was usual in him—in order to clear up the mysterious disappearance and, apart from some letters, already mentioned and quoted, he kept an eye on the investigations and followed up on the news about Galíndez. In 1958, he sent some letters to a newspaper with the intention of clearing Galíndez of the accusations of being a communist. Some letters and articles that he collected in 1958 can be consulted in: *Euskomedia*. Irujo Fund. Signature J, Box 56, File 2-D; and also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/12806.pdf>. Irujo furthermore acted as a lawyer in the resolution of Galíndez’s will in 1962: *Euskomedia*. Irujo Fund. Signature J, Box 56, File 2-B; also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/12886.pdf>.

The case of the disappearance of the New York Basque delegate had turned the eyes of the Americans and even the Dominicans<sup>267</sup> to the Basque World Congress from the beginning—even before it was held—and probably on account of that the repercussions in the Congress reached some international tabloids that otherwise would not have taken notice.

In the OPE (Euzkadi Press Office), the words of the *New York Herald* were highlighted, recalling that Aguirre had been the Basque President since 1936.

The OPE and *Alderdi* published the conclusions of the Basque World Congress, together with some articles on it by Irujo, Landáburu, and Leizaola, as well as reflections by some Basque nationalists from the exile and from inside the Basque Country.<sup>268</sup>

The general opinion on the Basque World Congress was positive. The Basque nationalists felt that the Basque Congress had reinforced the Basque Government, the unity of the Basques against the dictatorship and in favor of democracy, and the defense of Basque-specific features, above all the Basque language.<sup>269</sup>

The Basque World Congress gave the Basque government the legitimacy it needed after 20 years of exile—and it did so without the power of democratic elections. *Lehendakari* Aguirre saw his figure as leader reinforced; and as to the political objectives, the vision of unity of the Basques that was given was one of his personal wills.

Although the PNV lost the opportunity of updating its 1949 declaration during the Basque World Congress, the Christian Basque nationalists gave to Manuel Irujo and Xabier de Landáburu the assignment to act in favor of a renovation of Basque nationalism in Europe and to reinforce the campaign in the inside. *Lehendakari* Aguirre expressed his optimism for the new year of 1957, as well as for the strategy, not only of the Basque government, but also of the Basque nationalists, in his letters to Manuel Irujo:

*“Tenemos en vista una campaña a realizar de suma importancia para impedir que Europa sea una versión más de la ONU. Cuáles son tus propósitos y planes? Queremos tener listo entre este mes y el que viene el libro del Congreso, publicación que espero*

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<sup>267</sup> The Dominican authorities tried to prevent the Basque World Congress from being held in Paris, because they were sure that the Basques would make use of the Congress to demonstrate against Trujillo's regime. BERNARDO, Iñaki, 1993, *op. cit.*, pp. 485-486.

<sup>268</sup> The repercussions of the Basque World Congress were published specifically in OPE nos. 2290- 2296, and in *Alderdi* nos. 115-119.

<sup>269</sup> *Euzko Deya* devoted an entire issue to the World Basque Congress after its closing. *Euzko Deya*, Paris, no. 400, October, 1956.

*sea bien recibida entre nuestra gente, principalmente en Euzkadi. A este propósito de reparto de textos, te anuncio que en las semanas próximas vamos a inundar Navarra con el libro de Xabier en su formato reducido que confeccionó ahí Ricardo de Leizaola. No va a quedar boticario ni secretario, ni cura ni “gente principal” que no lo reciba. Con esto iniciaremos el envío de otros temas y textos conforme a aquel plan que aquí discutimos”.*<sup>270</sup>

The political decisions taken since October of 1956 were endorsed by the Basque World Congress. Aguirre refers to the Congress in his 1956 Gabon message, and his speeches and interventions during 1957 are constantly harking back to the Congress in Paris, the anniversary of the Basque government, and Galíndez’s disappearance, but they are also full of a new-fangled activism and hope, focusing on the fight inside the Basque country and in Europe.<sup>271</sup>

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<sup>270</sup> Aguirre to Irujo. Paris, July 13<sup>th</sup>, 1957. *Euskomedia*. Irujo Fund. Signature J, Box 30, File 5; also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/12524.pdf> (consulted on January 31<sup>st</sup>, 2017).

<sup>271</sup> The Gabon messages and the speeches given by Aguirre in 1957 can be consulted at: <http://www.lehendakariaguirre.eu/ppal.php> (consulted on January 31<sup>st</sup>, 2017).





## 4. MANUEL IRUJO IN MUNICH. THE IV CONFERENCES OF THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT. THE “CONTUBERNIO DE MUNICH”

### a. Recovering from the loss. From Aguirre to Leizaola.

*“Todos los vascos hemos perdido a nuestro Presidente. Yo he perdido, además, al amigo, amigo con el cual había llegado a esa situación, máxima prueba de Amistad, en la cual pueden mantenerse posiciones coincidentes o discrepantes. Conformarse o discutir y discutir acaloradamente, sin dejar de ser amigo.”<sup>272</sup>*

Manuel Irujo wrote these lines in an article for *Alderdi* after the decease of the first *Lehendakari*, José Antonio Aguirre, on March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1960.

The unexpected decease of *Lehendakari* Aguirre was not only a shock for Basque nationalists because of what the Basque President represented for them; it was also a stumble for the Basque government, and even for Basque and Spanish politics. The charisma of Aguirre’s personality was unrivalled, and, as we have already seen, his leading figure was respected by political leaders all over the world. Aguirre had been able to create bonds with almost everyone he got in contact with, and diplomacy and determination were two well-known features of him that everybody who knew him could confirm.

His funeral chapel was arranged at the Basque Government’s headquarters in Paris on March 25<sup>th</sup>, after his body was exposed before his closest friends and family at his home. Sometimes, the way a person receives his or her last respects shows how important he or she was in life. That was the case with *Lehendakari* Aguirre. The president received his last farewell as the Head of State that he was.

With the *Ikurrina* covering his coffin, the members of the Basque, Spanish, and Catalan governments took turns holding vigil throughout the night. Dozens of wreaths kept arriving from the Basque delegations, the unions (CNT, UGT, ELA-STVA), the Spanish political

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<sup>272</sup> “Los últimos momentos de José Antonio. El primer presidente de Euzkadi,” in *Alderdi*, no. 157/158, May, 1960.

parties (PSE, *Movimiento Republicano Popular*), the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (French section), Basque language promoters (*Euskal Etxea* Paris, *Eskualzaleen Biltzarra* Paris, *Euskalduna* Paris), and dozens of Basque nationalists' families (Hickman, Maruri, Jauregibeitia, Garate, Arriola, etc).

At Aguirre's funeral, the spirit of unity that he promoted among the members of the Spanish Democratic resistance had several representatives: Mr. Gordón Ordás (from the Spanish Republican Government-in-exile), Republican Ministers like Mr. Just, Mr. Valera, or General Herrera; Mr. Joan Sauret (Catalan Parliamentary, member of ERC), Mr. Josep Tarradellas (President of the Catalan Government-in-exile), as well as some former Spanish Republican MP's and Ministers, were present at the funeral.

The exhaustive international diplomacy Aguirre had carried out during his 24 years in the Presidency is visibly reflected in the international representatives who paid respect to the Basque President. If we follow the list of the people attending the funeral, we can trace out his policies and strategies, especially those in the exile: Mr. François Mauriac (LIAB's Honorary President), Ernest Pezet (LIAB), M. George Bidault, Maurice Schumann, Edouard Depreux, Léi Hamon, M. Robert Buron (French Minister of Public affairs), M. Joseph Dumas, Alain Poher (President of the Christian-Democratic group at the European Council), Alfred Coste-Floret (Secretary General of the NEI), Ambassador Zerega Fombona (Permanent Delegate of Venezuela at UNESCO), Gaston Tesier (Honorary President of CISC ), etc.

Apart from this, the Basque government received dozens of expressions of sympathy and condolence from the international community, in the form of notes of condolence sent by personalities that included the American Senator Charles O. Porter, the Vice-President of the French Council of State Mr. René Cassin, the director of the Musée d'Art Moderne in Paris Mr. Jean Cassou, the Nobel Literature Prize winner François Mauriac, who wrote a condolence note in the journal *L'Express*, or the writer Pierre Dumas, who sent a writing to *Euzko Deya*.

The death was covered by the media, and, of course, the Basque nationalists' publications dedicated long articles and editorials to it in newspapers like *Herria*, *Tierra Vasca*, or *Euzko Deya*, but it was also reported in international media like *Peuple* (Brussels), *France Observateur*, *El Nacional* (Caracas), *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires), *El Tiempo* (Bogotá), *Momento* (Caracas), *L'Avenir* (Bretagne), *Le Monde* (France), *The New York Times*, or the *BBC*. The

Spanish Republican media also covered the news in *El socialista Español*, *El Boletín de Acción Solcialista*, *Política*, or *Tribuna*.<sup>273</sup>

The official funeral service was held on March 26<sup>th</sup> at the church of Saint Pierre du Gros Caillou, in Paris, officiated by the Basque canon Alberto Onaindia and the priest Larre, who read the epistle and the Gospel in Basque language. The service was a vindication of Basque nationalist symbols, including a Basque choir and the chanting of the Basque *Euzko Gudariak* (an unofficial Basque government anthem, originally used by the Basque army during the Civil War) and the *Euzko Abendaren ereserkia*<sup>274</sup> (the official anthem of the Basque government), among other Basque songs.

The President's body was brought to *Iparralde* in a funeral procession that was followed by dozens of cars hoisting the *Ikurrina*, especially after having passed through Adur. In Donibane Lohitzune, the committee led by Telesforo Monzón—a close friend of *Lehendakari* Aguirre's despite their political disagreements—had organized a reception that included the presence of members of the Emakume Abertzale Batza, who led the funeral procession to his house, transformed into a funeral home, where the coffin of President Aguirre was covered with the ensign of the Sasaeta Basque battalion.<sup>275</sup>

Under a heavy rain, Jesús Maria de Leizaola was sworn in as *Lehendakari* of the Basque Government on March 28<sup>th</sup>, 1956:

*“Ante ti José Antonio Aguirre y Lekube, Lehendakari que el pueblo vasco elegí al constituirse el gobierno de Euzkadi.*

*Conforme a los acuerdos del mismo Gobierno y de las organizaciones políticas y sindicales democráticas del país que han sostenido la causa de éste en la Guerra, en la post-guerra, en la patria y en el exilio.*

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<sup>273</sup> *Alderdi*, no. 156, March, 1960; *Alderdi*, nos. 157-158, May, 1960; OPE 3123, March 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1956; OPE 3124, March 28<sup>th</sup>, 1956; OPE 3125, March 29<sup>th</sup>, 1956; OPE 3126, March 30<sup>th</sup>, 1956.

<sup>274</sup> “Euzko Gudariak” means “Basque fighters/soldiers” and “Euzko Abendaren ereserkia” means “Anthem of the Basque ethnicity.”

<sup>275</sup> The Battalion was named after Major Cándido Sasaeta, who was responsible for organizing the Basque militias of the PNV, and later on became commander of the Euzko Gudarostea (Basque army). More on the Sasaeta battalion in: *Gudaris y rehenes de Franco (1936-1943)*. *Diarios de José Antonio Mendizábal, José Luís Lasa y Fernando Aguirre*. Irún: Alberdania, pp. 52-53. More on the Basque army: SAGARRA, Pablo et al., 2015, *Gudaris: Euzko Gudarostea (Ejército Vasco) durante la Guerra Civil (1936-1937)*. Madrid: Esfera de los libros.

*Para consagrarme a las tareas de la liberación y hasta que el pueblo vasco libre pueda elegir sus autoridades legítimas.*

*Asumo las funciones que te fueron encomendadas como Presidente, las cuales poniendo sin reservas mi voluntad y esfuerzo, cumpliré siguiendo tus enseñanzas y tu ejemplo, mientras Dios me preste vida.*

*Y juro, como tú lo hiciste en Gernika, ser fiel a ellas y al pueblo vasco según hasta la muerte lo has cumplido tú, con tanta ejemplaridad y celo.”<sup>276</sup>*

The wood of Gernika’s tree had been turned into the wood used for the *Lehendakari*’s coffin, before which the new Basque President was sworn in.

The suddenness of the death forced the Basque government to make a decision over whom to name as successor, now that the legitimacy of the Basque government had been confirmed by the Basque World Congress. It was the prospect of a protracted exile, with a Government that had been called into question, and without a President, that made them decide to stay with Leizaola as President. In fact, Leizaola had been acting as vice-president of the Basque government—a position that was not even described in the Statute of Autonomy. The circumstances of exile had granted legitimacy to this position, which Leizaola had filled satisfactorily by working alongside the President.

On March 24<sup>th</sup>, 1960, in an emergency meeting in Paris, the EBB, together with Juan Ajuriaguerra, decided to give continuity to the work of the Basque Government: “*hemos sufrido una pérdida enorme; tenemos todos que redoblar nuestro esfuerzo patriótico para llenar ese vacío. La patria lo exige.*”

A few days later, the new Basque government had been formed with the following members: *Lehendakari* Jesús María de Leizaola, Vice-President Francisco Javier Landáburu (PNV), Paulino Gómez Beltran (PSOE), Gonzalo Nárdiz (ANV), Ambrosio Garbisu (IR).<sup>277</sup>

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<sup>276</sup> The oath was read in both Spanish and Basque. It can be consulted in: OPE 3126, March 30<sup>th</sup>, 1956. Also at: <http://ope.euskaletxeak.net> (consulted on February 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>277</sup> MOTA, David, 2016, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-315; ANASAGASTI, Iñaki, 2007, “El Gobierno vasco presidido por Jesús María de Leizaola. Transición política y disolución. 1960-1979,” pp. 162-168. In AGIRREAZKUENAGA, Joseba; SOBREQÜÉS, Jaume, 2007, *Eusko Jaurlaritzaren eta Catalunyako Generalitatearen Erbestetik Parlamentuen eraketara arte (1939-1980)*. Bilbao: Herri-Ardularitzaren Euskal Erakundea; DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, MEES, Ludger, and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 2001, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-238, 250.

## **b. The PNV Declaration of 1960 and the Basques. A new *Lehendakari* for a “new” Euzkadi.**

The sudden death of *Lehendakari* Aguirre also forced the PNV to write and publish a Declaration stating the direction that Basque nationalism would take.

The 1960 declaration<sup>278</sup> recalled the traditional “*Jaungoikoa eta Lege Zarra*,” reaffirming its Christian nature, probably as an unconscious response to the non-religious trend that was invading the political arena all over the Basque Country, especially among the young. On the other hand, the vindication of the “*Lege Zarra*,” the old Basque code of laws, invoked the historical rights of the Basque nation and called for a reclaiming of the Basque territories within the Spanish State.

At the same time as it cited the traditional motto of the PNV, the 1960 declaration was also vindicating its connection with the future: “*somos un movimiento formado por hombres del presente con aspiraciones para el mañana. Trabajamos sobre la opinión vasca para hacer de la futura Euzkadi una nación de vanguardia en todos los terrenos*,” defending its European spirit but also the right to self-determination, making a nod to the processes of independence that were taking place those days: “*Como estuvimos presentes desde el principio y lo seguimos estando en los trabajos por la organización de Europa y en todos los esfuerzos por la paz mundial. Como asistimos con plena simpatía a la emancipación de las naciones jóvenes*.”<sup>279</sup>

Looking for a connection with a young generation that was growing increasingly upset in the Basque Country, the 1960 PNV declaration let the door open to the possibility of going forward with the self-determination process of the Basque Country, based on the Basque Statute of Autonomy, “*El Partido Nacionalista Vasco, sin renunciar a ninguno de los derechos imprescindibles de la nación vasca (...)*,” and leaning on the internal need of promoting the Basque language against the “*desvasquización*.”<sup>280</sup>

It is important to highlight this feature that the PNV was acquiring, because, slowly, the Basque language and culture were becoming the center of the “*supervivencia de nuestras características nacionales*,” with precedence over ethnic origin, erstwhile one of the pillars of

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<sup>278</sup> “Manifiesto del EBB ‘Al pueblo Vasco’”. *Alderdi*, no. 156-157, May 1960. pp. 2-8.

<sup>279</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.*

traditional Basque nationalism. Gradually, Basque nationalism was moving from an ethnic nationalism to a civic nationalism.

The declaration called for the union of all Basques in order to honor the memory of *Lehendakari* Aguirre and give an answer to the adversary, but it also suggested the need for discipline in relation to the decisions taken by the authorities, placing a special emphasis on the young.

The PNV knew its own weaknesses—and it was trying to mend them. Traditional Basque nationalism was in need of a renovation, because the generation leap was causing a breach that was very difficult to close. The young were interested in politics and in Basque nationalism, but they were moving quite apart from the traditional nationalism represented by the PNV. For them, unity was the only solution that could solve a gap that was not geographical but ideological.

As one of the closest men of President Aguirre, Jesús María de Leizaola had been with him from the very beginning and until his death.

Leizaola accepted the charge and responsibility of becoming *Lehendakari* in the wake of a man who would be forever considered the “First *Lehendakari*.” He knew it was not going to be easy: Aguirre’s charisma as a leader was a very cumbersome legacy to cope with, and the situation of Basque nationalism was not at its best.

Although the World Basque Conference of 1956 had created a breathing space of unity and legitimacy for the Basque government, the situation with the young Basques had not improved.

The internal exile was crying out for a new strategy, and, in some cases, also demanded that further protagonism be granted to the mainland.

Things were getting agitated inside the Franco regime, as strikes, protests, and some boycott activities were driving people to jail and torture, and detainees and new exiles were becoming usual with Basque nationalism.

The young nationalists considered that Basque nationalism was employing unsuccessful strategies, and they wanted to be able to act more autonomously. The youth branch of the PNV, EGI (*Euzko Gaztedi Indarra*), levelled fierce criticism against the Services and the GBB from 1954 onwards, and they organized some protests and violent activities (which included burning flags or hanging out *ikurrinas*) without the control of the Party. Although President Aguirre and some other *jelkides* had tried to convince them of the necessity of staying united, life in

the inland was troublesome, and the breach between the inside and the exile was only aggravated by the generation leap.

The process of industrialization, affecting the entire territory of the Basque Country (the four provinces within Spain: Navarre, Araba, Gipuzkoa, and Bizkaia), brought about not only an economic but also a social change. During last years of the 50's, the Basque country would receive an important number of immigrants from the rest of Spain, such that the density of population was altered and the Basque economic system shifted from the primary economic sector (agriculture, and also the weight of the *Baserri* in the socioeconomic imaginary) to the secondary economic sector. The total population of the Basque Country was almost 50% larger in the 70's, when the process came to a halt.<sup>281</sup>

Basque society also changed with the arrival of those immigrants, and a revival of the interest in Basque culture occurred in the 60's; the promotion of Basque culture and language was more necessary than ever and, despite the restrictions of the Franco dictatorship, the *Euskaltzaindia* (the academy of the Basque language) and some *ikastolas* (Basque schools) were promoted, paving the way for the birth of *Ez dok amairu*, a cultural movement created in 1965.<sup>282</sup>

In July 1959, the members of EGI-*Ekin* (a scission of EGI created in 1958) presented a new organization that was meant to avoid frictions within Basque nationalism: Euzkadi Ta Azkatasun, ETA.<sup>283</sup>

This new organization was not entirely against the PNV or the traditional postulates; rather, it updated the wills of the nationalists, especially in the eyes of those who, like them, belonged to a young generation who had not suffered the war but were suffering the repression of the Franco Dictatorship.

In its foundational document, ETA divided its postulates into two, in keeping with its own name: Basque Country and Freedom. From this starting point, they described themselves as

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<sup>281</sup> For more on Basque immigration and economy between 1950-1970 see:

<http://www.usc.es/revistas/index.php/rips/article/viewFile/106/87>; and <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFAnlt/vasconia/vas01/01325350.pdf> (consulted on February 7<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>282</sup> *Ez dok amairu*, which means "There is no thirteen" in English, was a cultural movement that sought to renew Basque culture mainly through songs, by including social and political critique against the dictatorship, although it also relied on other disciplines. More on that movement in:

<http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/43522/31445> (consulted on February 7<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>283</sup> Several studies differ on the exact date of the foundation of ETA, but this is a subject that will be addressed in the following chapters.



“apolítico y aconfesional,” which, especially as regards the non-religiousness feature, was a long way from traditional Basque nationalism.

The second axis, based on freedom, defined the new organization as a group of democrats and workers fighting for the freedom of the Basque country.<sup>284</sup>

ETA was not initially against the Basque Government, nor against the *Lehendakari*, nor against the work being done by the Basque Government, especially in relation with the means of surviving in the exile. As a matter of fact, a group of exiles in Venezuela, which became ETA’s first cell in the exile, began publishing in 1960 *Zutik en tierras americanas*—an exiles’ version of the official publication of ETA, *Zutik*—and its first issue was devoted to none other than the figure of José Antonio Aguirre.<sup>285</sup>

Although over the years the relationship with the Basque government and the PNV was to change, at its early stages ETA supported the Basque government without hesitation. In the no. 3 issue of *Zutik in Tierras americanas*, it became specifically clear that the will of the organization after the death of *Lehendakari* Aguirre was to keep up the fight for reestablishing the Statute of Autonomy. In fact, in the editorial it was claimed that the Statute of Autonomy was but the first step, the starting point for the Basque people. It was stated that, after the reestablishment of the Statute of Autonomy, it would be necessary to move on to the “*Unificación nacional*,” since the starting point was too partial and not enough: “*Navarra no entraba en el Estatuto de Autonomía de la República. Pero no puede haber otro: Partiremos de ahí. Partiremos de la autonomía.*”<sup>286</sup>

It was clear that the Basque youth needed something else and—as can be inferred from its founding document—politics was not the only way to achieve freedom for the Basque Country; but during those days ETA tried to maintain good relations with the Basque government and Basque nationalists. On May 15<sup>th</sup>, ETA wrote to the new *Lehendakari* offering its support:

“*Reunido en esta fecha el Comité Nacional de Coordinación de Euzkadi ta Azkatasun (ETA), ha acordado por unanimidad transmitir a V.E. un respetuoso saludo, poner en su conocimiento la adhesión total de la organización al Gobierno de Euzkadi que V.E. ha pasado a presidir, y*

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<sup>284</sup> DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, MEES, Ludger, and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 2001, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-236.

<sup>285</sup> EQUIPO HÓRDAGO (Ed.), 1979, Documentos Y. Vols. 1-16. Donostia: Lur. Vol. 1, pp. 432 and ff.

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 436.

*reiterar nuestra oferta de colaboración para las labores resistentes que el Gobierno planifique.*<sup>287</sup>

Although the new organization was devoted to the Basque government and recognized its authority as keeper of the Basque people's will, the emergence of ETA signaled the manifestation of certain irreconcilable positions within Basque nationalism.

The efforts to keep unity were in vain, but the youth were not the only factor of disconformity: soon, the critical opinions within Basque nationalism grew louder. Nevertheless, the differences between the ideas of the EBB and the politics that the Basque government was developing from the exile were nothing more than the normal and logical internal disputes. The exile (internal and external) was taking its toll on a generation that was tired of living under pressure and sometimes in poor conditions. The unexpected loss of the leader was the straw that broke the camel's back. The poor economic situation, the repression from the Spanish regime in the interior, the rebellion of the young Basque nationalists, and the lack of a leader accentuated the differences and contradictions within traditionalist Basque nationalism.

Some voices were louder than others, and in the meetings held by Leizaola in Bayonne he received some criticism censuring the political management of the Basque Government—but these critiques did not affect political strategies, and they did not modify the ideology within Basque nationalism. The only disagreement that did affect Basque nationalism was the one expressed by the youth who had created ETA—and that is the reason why this research is focusing on them, rather on than the internal conflicts within traditional Basque nationalism.<sup>288</sup>

Of course, the exile affected the development of change within the Basque government. Aguirre had enjoyed the legitimacy that had been granted to him by democratic elections—but Leizaola did not. Although in general terms Leizaola was accepted, some of the Basque

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<sup>287</sup> ETA to *Lehendakari* Leizaola. Euzkadi, May 15<sup>th</sup>, 1960. EHA-AHE, Fondo Leizaola, Box. 32, C-32/15.

<sup>288</sup> During the years we are analyzing in this chapter, and especially after the disagreement of Monzón in the Basque World Conference, Manuel Irujo received criticism from certain members of the EBB. As has already been explained, the internal conflicts that did not affect the development of Basque nationalism are outside the scope of this research, but the following may serve as proof and example: Jesús de Solaun wrote some letters to Jesús de Leizaola complaining about the handling of the Basque detainees who had been prosecuted by the Franco regime in 1961, and accusing Manuel Irujo of outright incompetence. When Irujo wrote back, he gave all kinds of explanations about the actions that the Basque government had taken in order to help the detainees and, of course, made use of irony to disarm Solaun's accusations. The letters are a good example of the disagreement and tensions between the inside and the exile, and of the somewhat frequent lack of coordination between Paris and Beyris. Letters from Solaun to Leizaola can be found in: EAH-AHE, Archivo Histórico del Gobierno Vasco. Fondo del Lehendakari D. Jesus María de Leizaola. C33/11. Letters from Irujo to Solaun: Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 39, File 1. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/14142.pdf> (consulted on February 7<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

delegations, especially those from South America, as well as some politicians, showed their reservations about the new President.

*“Examinando el caso desde el punto de vista legal, la sustitución parece imposible porque sólo José Antonio, sin que pudiera delegar en nadie, tenía otorgada, aunque con defectos impuestos por una anormalidad circunstancial, la representación del País.”* These were the words written by Indalecio Prieto, member of the Spanish parliament, in an article honoring *Lehendakari* Aguirre after his death, and the same words that were repeated to *Lehendakari* Leizaola in a letter from June, 1960.<sup>289</sup>

He had been in politics during an important part of his life, but in the exile, as Prieto defended, *“(…) que en el exilio no debía haber ningún Gobierno, ni nacional ni regional, sino Juntas mucho más flexibles, sin estorbos constitucionales, presididas por las personalidades más representativas.”*<sup>290</sup>

As we have already seen, the exile became a frame in which the Spanish government lost its legitimacy and where the different members and parties of the government fought over its control.

The criticisms against Leizaola’s election as *Lehendakari* did not only come from Spanish politicians; the decision also raised some critiques and doubts among Basque nationalists. The exile had a significant weight on this, since the fragile financial situation—defrayed for the most part by the Basques in exile—gave them room to be more creative and form their own opinions, and sometimes even employ different political strategies, in the debates. Nevertheless, Leizaola received enough supports to carry on with the responsibility of being the “vice-president acting as President,” which was the initial denomination agreed upon in order to refer to the decision of having a new President despite the Basque Statute of Autonomy’s not envisaging the possibility.

*“En estos momentos más que nunca nos debemos unir todos alrededor del Gobierno para auxiliar decididamente y con fe a nuestro Vice-presidente en funciones de Presidente.”*<sup>291</sup>

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<sup>289</sup> Letter from Indalecio Prieto to Jesús M<sup>a</sup> Leizaola, June 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1960. EAH-AHE, Archivo histórico del gobierno vasco, Fondo del Lehendakari D. Jesus María de Leizaola. C33/8.

<sup>290</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>291</sup> Letter from Miguel José Garmendia (future president of the Basque extraterritorial council in Mexico) to Manuel Irujo. Mexico, April 1st, 1960. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 3, File 8. <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/8493.pdf> (consulted on February 5<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

In his letter, Garmendia also refers to the crowded funeral service that was organized in memory of *Lehendakari* Aguirre, where among the attendees—which included members of the Mexican government and the Spanish and Catalan Republican Governments-in-exile—Garmendia noticed the absence of Indalecio Prieto:

“(…) *a Prieto se le invitó personalmente, y a pesar de sus enternecimientos y en algunas ocasiones lagrimitas, en acto repito de gran equivocación política para él, y feliz para nosotros, no asistió.*”<sup>292</sup>

Prieto was upset with the Basque Government ever since his plan for a Monarchy failed, and, although they continued having some relations until he passed away in 1962, Manuel Irujo never forgave such lack of respect.

The exile, as aforementioned, was developing its own features, and the possibility of what has been described as *Tropicalization*<sup>293</sup>—the retreat of Basque nationalism, increasingly replaced by a local identity—was beginning to worry some traditional nationalist Basques, who pointed toward the crisis as the main reason for the fatal death of the President. Right after the previously mentioned letter, having learnt the decision of choosing Leizaola as President, and adopting the title, Garmendia again wrote to Irujo:

“(…) *Como sé que después de pasarse el momento intense de la pena por la pérdida de José Antonio (q.e.p.d.) van a principiar las discusiones, etc. quisiera que me dieras argumentos de tipo legal y político para defender la posición adoptada por vosotros, posición que equivocada o acertadamente estamos dispuestos incondicionalmente a defender.*”<sup>294</sup>

Since the strategy of the Basque government had focused on defending the Basque Statute of Autonomy, and there was therefore not a trace of any regulation to legally adopt such a decision, Garmendia suggested that the Delegates in exile be consulted in order to legitimate the election of Leizaola.

The same letter also includes a reflection on the exile and its capacity to transform Basque nationalists:

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<sup>292</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>293</sup> DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, MEES, Ludger, and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

<sup>294</sup> Garmendia to Irujo. Mexico, D.F., April 4<sup>th</sup>, 1960. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 3, File 8. <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/8443.pdf> (consulted on February 5<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>294</sup> Ibid.

*“Con el exilio se crea nueva mentalidad a los patriotas, y por el deseo de hacer, se pueden causar trastornos, y hombres que por su valer, preparación y patriotismo pueden ser los pilares de la organización, por nerviosismo, quizá “futurismo” o simplemente deseo irrefrenable de demostrar que son más patriotas que los demás, pueden originar antipatías muy definidas y en un momento determinado quedar anulados con grave prejuicio (sic.) para nuestra ideología.”*<sup>295</sup>

The exile was an important part of Basque nationalism, and it was becoming an entity with an opinion of its own and, on some occasions, the will to interfere with the decisions of Basque nationalists. The exile had been organized by the PNV mainly into extraterritorial councils in Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, and México, the most important center of the exile at that time being the Basque Center in Caracas.<sup>296</sup>

Even though Jesús María de Leizaola did not possess the same degree of leadership as Aguirre had, he was still able to develop a political strategy that aimed to strike a balance between the activities of the exile and those of the inside.

In September of 1960, Leizaola travelled to America; however, although the American hope was alive once again, Leizaola did not make a stop in Washington to visit the American Administration like Aguirre used to do.

The possibility that the Democratic Party would win the American elections in November gave the Spanish democrats—as also the Basque—some hope to believe once again that Americans would interfere in Spain to overthrow the Franco Regime.

Ajuriaguerra expressed his optimism to Irujo over a dinner in Biarritz in August, 1960: “(...) *los demócratas llevan en su programa la necesidad de variar la política exterior norteamericana, de manera que sea demócrata, no solamente en el interior sino en el exterior, acabando con dictadores y tiranos, así se llamen Trujillo, Franco, Somoza o lo que sea.*”<sup>297</sup>

By the end of the Eisenhower administration, some American senators also showed a positive stance towards the Spanish democratic resistance, and the Senators J. William Fulbright and Frank Moss had expressed their reservations about the Franco regime, joining previous critics

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<sup>295</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>296</sup> DE PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago, MEES, Ludger, and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

<sup>297</sup> Letter from Irujo to Leizaola. Leigh-on-Sea, August 16<sup>th</sup>, 1960. EAH-AHE, Archivo histórico del gobierno vasco, Fondo del Lehendakari D. Jesus María de Leizaola. C-32/24.

like Porter and Church. Nevertheless, the change in international relations that was projected by the American administration of J.F. Kennedy was more a matter of form than a matter of political praxis.<sup>298</sup>

In fact, and despite the great expectations raised by the American embassy, the relations, as well as the answers received by the Basque government to the petitions made through the Basque delegates Beitia and Juan Oñatibia—and even through pro-Basque senators—remained ever the same: Spain was a “strategic corner in Europe,” their strategy merely responded to US interests, it did not constitute a US approval or endorsement of either the governments or the manner in which they dealt with their internal political affairs.<sup>299</sup>

Although it was true that Leizaola did not stop in Washington as Aguirre used to, and that he was unable to meet Porter in Paris because he had left for Bayonne, as he explained to Irujo in a letter after the Navarrese urged him to pay more attention to international relations<sup>300</sup>, it is still also true that he tried to establish a dialogue with the new American Administration in face of a possible crisis within the Franco Government. Leizaola sent a letter to the American State Department on May 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1961 wherein, following the strategy initiated by *Lehendakari* Aguirre, the Basque government offered an alternative and stable government in Spain in conjunction with the rest of the Spanish democratic forces: “*The Government of Euzkadi, which maintains relations with the Spanish Republic-in-exile and with the Spanish and Catalan democratic and free trade union groups, is already today, and will be more so, an effective and irreplaceable instrument in any section toward the re-establishment of democratic normalcy in Spain.*”<sup>301</sup>

International politics in 1961 were hatching a more complicated world every day, where Europe was one of the hot spots of the Cold War, but where Latin America also had its own significance. In his letter, Leizaola refers to the network of the Basques in the exile, from Cuba to Spain (the latter being referred to as the Iberian Peninsula), and offers his connections with the Basque exile to help overthrow any dictatorships and change them into democracies, having

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<sup>298</sup> MOTA, David, 2016, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

<sup>299</sup> These reflections were made in *Speculation on form and nature of a Post-Franco Government*, Madrid, September 11<sup>th</sup>, 1961, and Letter from Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary, to Congressman William Fitts Ryan, Washington DC, February 16<sup>th</sup>, 1962. NARA, General Records of the Department of State. RG 59. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. 1960-63 General Decimal File. Box, 1808.

<sup>300</sup> Letters from Leizaola to Irujo, Paris, September 19<sup>th</sup>, 1960, Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 3, File 13. <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/9943.pdf> (consulted on February 7<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>301</sup> NARA, General Records of the Department of State. RG 59. Bureau of European Affairs, Records of the Office of Western European Affairs, 1953-1962, Box, 7.

in mind the words spoken by Kennedy while campaigning to the effect that he would give clear support to democracies over dictatorships.

The *Lehendakari* mentioned the threat posed by the North African decolonization, which had been sparked by the war in Algeria (still being fought when the letter was written), presenting it as a real threat to the Franco Regime, and he offered the services of the Basque Government to help control and secure the transfer of power in the Basque Country in case of an emergency, upholding the principles of the Western world, in a clear sign that they would contribute to put a halt to the Communist bloc.<sup>302</sup>

In the envelope containing the letter sent to the State Department, a written note was attached that read: “Attached letters from the Basque and Republican Governments in Exile are being filed without reply in line with standing policy.”<sup>303</sup>

The Kennedy Administration was not going to change a thing.

### **c. The European Movement and the Basques**

*“La “independencia” de antaño se ha trocado en “interdependencia”  
y “federación”. Por eso a la Europa de tal guisa concebida se le  
denomina “Unión Federal Europea”, “Estados Unidos de Europa”, y  
de otras maneras siilares”.*

Manuel Irujo, 1965.

In order to set forth the change of strategy, at least the European strategy of Basque nationalism, Irujo was asked to write an article about President Aguirre and his relationship with the European Movement, to be published in *Alderdi*.

In that article, Irujo explained how it was the exile that had allowed them to move closer to Europe and approach the idea of a united Europe, something that had first been experienced by the Basques through the “*Unión cultural de los países de la Europa Occidental*,” founded in London in 1942.<sup>304</sup>

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<sup>302</sup> Ibid.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>304</sup> “El Presidente Aguirre y el Movimiento Europeo,” *Alderdi*, no.168, March, 1961.

This organization, a cultural union founded by the Basque and French national councils in exile, signed the constitution act on October 8<sup>th</sup>, 1942, at the French Institute, under the Presidency of the French professor and director of the French institute in London, Denis Saurat. The cultural union was formed after the political alliance had failed, “*La política de Confederación Occidental, como el propio concurso vasco en la modalidad del convenio franco–vasco, tropezaron con los intereses de la Política británica a la sazón,*”<sup>305</sup> its objective being to promote the culture of Occidental Europe as based on Greek Civilization and Christianity.

Manuel Irujo gave much importance to this cultural union because it was the germ of the European Federal movement, and because it served as an example of how Europe had always stood as an opportunity for the Basques and for any people who did not have a State to back them. In its second article, the foundational Statute of the Cultural Union states: “*Europa debe ser constituida en un todo orgánico, es decir, compuesta de unidades culturales que laboren conjuntamente por el bien de todas ellas y del mundo,*” and goes on to talk about the nature of the States that make up Europe: “*Estos estados contienen a su vez unidades como Bretaña, Alsacia y Flandes, y grupos nacionales renacentistas como Cataluña y Euzkadi, que deben poder desarrollarse en colaboración entre ellas y con los Estados.*”

The collaboration between Basques and Catalans was obvious in the cultural union, with the forcible amendment whereby Catalans and Basques were recognized along with other European peoples without a State.<sup>306</sup>

In previous meetings held at the “Casal Català” in London, the differences and discussions about nationalities became a precedent of what would be reproduced in the European Federal Movement, concretely within the CFEME, the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement, created in 1949 after The Hague Conference, which had been the door to the creation of the European Federal Movement, as already mentioned.

The disagreements between the Catalans, the Basques, and the Spanish (led by Salvador de Madariaga) welled up during the meetings organized at the Casal Català, where Carles Pi i

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<sup>305</sup> IRUJO, Manuel, 1958, *La comunidad occidental europea y los vascos*. VII Congreso de Estudios Vascos. Biarritz. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFAnlt/congresos/07/07259281.pdf>.

<sup>306</sup> Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 58, File 1, p. 88. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/7170.pdf>. The file is made up of 242 pages comprising letters between Irujo, Saurat, Madaraga, and Pi i Sunyer, invitations to the Meetings, foundation documents, and some other important documents on the Cultural Union.



Sunyer, Josep Maria Batista i Roca, Mr. Ordeig, and Mr. Perera, for the Catalans, and José Ignacio Lisazo, Ángel Gondra, and Manuel Irujo, for the Basques, had long and heated discussions on Basque and Catalan nationalism and the importance of keeping specific points of reference regarding their own cultures.

*“El Señor Madariaga nos invita a manifestarnos con franqueza y lealtad. Yo voy a usar ambas. Los vascos educados en tesis nacional no sentimos el patriotismo español. Nuestra patria no es España, sino Euzkadi. Nuestra cultura no es la de castilla, la de España, sino la vasca. Nuestra historia no es la que nos une a Castilla, sino la que nos une y la que nos separa de Castilla. Nuestra voluntad nacional está por encima de todas las incidencias históricas. Aspiramos a la vida nacional de Euzkadi con historia, sin ella o contra ella. El idioma castellano no es el nuestro. Queremos devolver al euzkera el dominio de la tierra que ja perdido y fundar nuestra cultura en el genio de nuestra raza, en el euzkera y en las instituciones históricas vascas.”<sup>307</sup>*

These few lines express in a nutshell what the discussions were about. The national issue was questioned, as was also the Christian nature of the Spanish democracy, denied as it was by Madariaga,<sup>308</sup> and it was the differences between the Basque and Catalan nationalities that led Madariaga to withdraw from the project, which was signed in the end without the presence of the Spanish Republican Democrats, and which allowed the Basques to have their own Basque group within the union starting from the time of its approval on October 25<sup>th</sup>, 1942. All Basques were invited, regardless of political affiliation, since it was a cultural and spiritual union.<sup>309</sup>

A letter signed by all the Basque participants in the group was sent to the Basque refugees in London—although with an eye on the Basque communities in America, mentioned specifically—in an effort to spread and develop Basque culture.

It is interesting to note that this Cultural union was guided by the same tenets of unity that José Antonio Aguirre had defended throughout the exile, as well as by the nationalist and Christian

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<sup>307</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>308</sup> “En la primera sesión a la que asistió, mantuvo el criterio (Madariaga) de que, la democracia española no era cristiana, o era anti-cristiana, por lo cual, parecía paradójico que, los demócratas españoles estuvieran representados en una institución de orientación cristiana,” *ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>309</sup> “No queremos terminar sin repetir, que esta asociación no es política, sino cultural y espiritual, no admitiendo de principios políticos, más que los ideales cristianos y la democracia, dentro de cuyas normas se ha de desarrollar sus actividades,” *ibid.*, p. 108.

vindications of Basque nationalists that would eventually drive them to participate in the creation of the European Movement, based on the same principles.

The European relations developed by the Basque nationalists in the exile basically followed two different paths, sometimes overlapping: the Christian democrat movement, canalized through the NEI (Nouvelles Equipes Internationales), and the European Federal Movement.

The aim of the European relations was based on what has come to be called Aguirre's doctrine, that is, the vindication of a free Basque country within a Federal Europe made of nations.<sup>310</sup>

Although not part of our chronology, it is important to highlight that the Europeanism of Basque nationalism was not something that appeared with and because of the exile, but rather a feature already found in Basque nationalism at the beginning of the 20th century as a solution for peoples without a State, or with a State confronting them, as Luis Eleizalde<sup>311</sup> declared in 1914: "*Hemos de llegar a que la Nación vasca pueda presentarse (...) en la asamblea de los pueblos*"<sup>312</sup> (of Europe). The development of Basque nationalism in the 20's exceeded the narrow boundaries of Biscayan primitive nationalism, since it strived to present Basque nationalism as another nationalism among many in the world. Eleizalde based his ideas on the principle of nationalities, and he believed that Basque nationalism could fit in a world made up of nationalities that wanted to be masters of their own destiny.<sup>313</sup>

The goal of internationalizing Basque nationalism was achieved thanks to the Basque participation at the III Congress of the Union of Nationalities, held in Lausanne in 1916, and Woodrow Wilson's discourse on national self-determination provided Basque nationalists with the theoretical basis they needed to recognize their own Basque cause in other similar causes.<sup>314</sup> During the Spanish Republican period (1931-1936), Basque nationalists developed their

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<sup>310</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre, 2008, "Red de relaciones europeas del PNV (1945-1977)," in *Cuadernos de historia contemporánea*, Vol. 30, p. 315. Also in:

<https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/CHCO/article/viewFile/CHCO0808110313A/6738>.

<sup>311</sup> Luis de Eleizalde was a well-known Basque language scholar and promoter. His reflections on nationalism are disclosed in a bilingual (Basque-Spanish) biography: AMÉZAGA, Elías (*et. al.*), 1999, *Koldo Eleizalde: Gizona, euskaltzalea/ Luis de Elizalde: El hombre, el vascólogo*. Donostia: Eusko-Ikaskuntza. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFAnlt/lankidetzan/08/08001523.pdf> (consulted on February 10<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>312</sup> CASTRO RUANO, José Luis de; UGALDE ZUBIRI, Alexander, 2004, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

<sup>313</sup> NÚÑEZ SEIXAS, Xosé M., *op. cit.*, p. 387; ELORZA, Antonio, 1992, "Euzkadi-Europa. La cultura política del nacionalismo vasco y los referentes europeos," in *XI Congreso de Estudios Vascos*. Donostia: Eusko Ikaskuntza, pp. 218-219.

<sup>314</sup> The activities—*protodiplomatic* activities, according to the author—developed and carried out by Basque nationalism in an international context previous to the exile are analysed in NÚÑEZ SEIXAS, Xosé M., 1995, "¿Protodiplomacia exterior o ilusiones ópticas? El nacionalismo vasco en el contexto internacional y el congreso de nacionalidades Europeas (1914-1937)," in *Cuadernos de sección*. Historia-Geografía 23. Donostia: Eusko-Ikaskuntza, pp. 243-275.

Europeanism and made their nationalism universal through a “*fórmula de interdependencia federal*,” to use Landaburu’s words; and with the first use of *Euzkadi-Europa* as a motto for the 1933 *Aberri Eguna*, Basque nationalism made official its interest in federalism and in Europe as a path that would allow Basques to fit within an international structure that recognized the Basque difference.<sup>315</sup>

The interest in Europe was articulated in an article written by Irujo in *Euzkadi* on April 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1933 in which, drawing from his knowledge on legal matters, he reformulated the Versailles peace treaty of 1919, adding the Wilson doctrine and mixing it with Gandhi’s ideas, to defend self-determination as a natural right of the nations, in search of an international space that would fit in not only the Basques, but the whole of Galeuzka.<sup>316</sup> Nevertheless, and despite the efforts, the PNV did not send anyone to represent the Basques at the IX<sup>th</sup> Congress of European nationalities held in Bern in 1933, where Galeuzka was recognized, but which became sadly famous due to the confrontation between the Jewish and the German nationalities. The priority for Basque nationalism was the defense of the Basque Statute of Autonomy, not yet achieved in 1933, and all efforts were being focused on it, while international relations and Europe were forgotten. The European movement could wait.<sup>317</sup>

The PNV was a confessional Party—and so were most of its representatives—therefore it should not come as a weird surprise to find out that during WWII they established contacts with the French Christian Democrats through Ernest Pezet (representative of the Parti Démocrate Populaire, PDP), and with the Italian Christian Democracy through contacts with Democrazia Cristiana (DC) (Sturzo), as I have already mentioned in a previous section. But probably one of the most important achievements of Christian Democracy’s international policies was the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI), since the PNV took part in its foundation.<sup>318</sup>

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<sup>315</sup> CASTRO RUANO, José Luis de; UGALDE ZUBIRI, Alexander, 2004, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

<sup>316</sup> NÚÑEZ SEIXAS, Xosé M., 1995, “Relaciones exteriores del nacionalismo vasco. (1895-1960),” in DE PABLO, Santiago (Ed.), *Los nacionalistas. Historia del nacionalismo vasco. 1876-1960*, Gasteiz, Fundación Sancho el Sabio, p. 405.

<sup>317</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>318</sup> Leyre Arrieta thoroughly analyzes the NEI and its relations with the Christian Democrats’ parties in (2007) *Estación Europa. La política Europeísta del PNV en el exilio (1945-1977)*, pp. 85-90; 110-116; 126-143; 210-219; 285-298.

## i. Nouvelles Equipes Internationales (NEI)

The founding congress was held in Chaudfontaine, close to Liege, in 1947, and *Lehendakari* Aguirre was appointed member of the Honor Committee, while Francisco de Landaburu became member of the Steering Committee in representation of Euzkadi.<sup>319</sup>

The links with the Christian Democrats were not only important as links to an association of democrats or a political organization, but also because they opened the possibility of making visible the Basque question—the possibility of changing Franco’s perspective on the Basque question, transmitted through the Spanish Catholic organizations that were faithful to the Regime. The NEI meetings were considered of high importance, and the PNV tried always to send representatives, although the Cold War and the economic situation contributed to make the NEI less effective and important.

The Basque nationalists succeeded in having their own nationalist group, as members from the Basque nationalist Party were being directly represented in the NEI, with Francisco Javier de Landáburu and José María Lasarte as members of the PNV, and Iñaki Errenteria and Iñaki Aguirre representing Euzko Gaztedi.

Having its own representation within the NEI gave Basque nationalism a direct option to intercede in European spheres without the need to be represented by a Spanish group, thus furthering the idea of a Europe of peoples, of nations, rather than a Europe of States.

The NEI was organized through conferences and meetings that had a considerable importance and repercussion both in Europe and within the European movement, especially until 1950. The congresses held by the NEI were normally yearly, or bi-yearly, and involved talking about politics, social problems, and religious or economic issues, as well as developing topics related to national minorities, autonomies, human rights, and freedom of expression. The Basques were taking part in the construction of a better Europe, rising from poverty after the devastation of the Second World War. It was a good opportunity to spread the Basque cause in international spheres; and the *Lehendakari* Aguirre and Landáburu, with European vocation, were the

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<sup>319</sup> Within the Honor Committee, Aguirre was accompanied by important personalities of the Christian Democrat movement, such as Luigi Sturzo (Founder of the Italian Popular Party, that we have already mentioned), Marc Sagnier (Member of Parliament and Honor President of the Mouvement Républicaine Populaire), P.J.S.. Serrarens (Secretary General of the International Confederations of Christian Trade Unions), Joseph Escher (President of the Swiss Conservative Party), Emile Reuter (President of the Luxemburg Chamber of Deputies). *Ibid.*, pp. 135-137.

regular Basque representatives at the NEI meetings, accompanied by Lasarte, Leizaola, or Irujo, among others, from 1947 to 1966.<sup>320</sup>

In the II<sup>nd</sup> Congress of the NEI, held in Luxembourg from January 30<sup>th</sup> to February 1<sup>st</sup>, 1948, the Basques, Aguirre, and Landáburu were able to exchange impressions on the European policies, especially focusing on studying the German situation, the development of its economy, and the progress of peace with the help of American aid.<sup>321</sup>

Apart from the official and annual congresses, the NEI also organized other meetings, one of which was held at the Basque Government Headquarters in Paris on March 21<sup>st</sup>, 1948, where the final statutes of the NEI were set down and the Basque delegation saw the approval of its proposal of promoting the veto against giving the Spanish Dictatorship access to the Marshall Plan and the development of the European reorganization.<sup>322</sup>

Although few achievements were attained, the Basques continued to support the NEI and took part in the transformation it underwent in the 60's when the NEI changed its name to be renamed as *Unión Europea de Demócratas Cristianos*. After 1950, and under the influence of the new international politics in a context of Cold War—that is, the growth of anti-communism in Europe and the application of the Marshall Plan—the relevance of the NEI began to decrease. The fear of communism led to a toleration of totalitarian regimes, including the Franco regime, seen as the lesser of two evils, so that the objectives of the PNV were focused on maintaining the smear campaign against the Franco Regime, profiting from the advantage of being a founding member.<sup>323</sup>

The reorganization of the Spanish Christian Democracy in the later 50's and early 60's, with the creation of *Democracia Social Cristiana* (José María Gil-Robles) and *Unión Democrática Cristiana* (later *Izquierda Democrática Cristiana*) (Manuel Jiménez Fernández and Jesús Barros de Lis), stirred a problem within the PNV.

Manuel Irujo, together with José M<sup>a</sup> Lasarte and Julio Jáuregui, was at the head of a faction that thought it would be convenient to converge in a single Spanish Christian Party, eliminating

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<sup>320</sup> There are three tables complete with dates, places, and Basque attendees in Arrieta's book. *Ibid.*, pp. 348-350.

<sup>321</sup> "Les NEI dans le Congrès de Luxembourg," *Euzko Deya*, February 15<sup>th</sup>, 1948, p. 5.

<sup>322</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre, 2007, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140.

<sup>323</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre, 2008, "Red de relaciones europeas del PNV (1945-1977)," in *Cuadernos de historia contemporánea*, Vol. 30, pp. 313-331. Also in: <https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/CHCO/article/viewFile/CHCO0808110313A/6738>, pp. 319-320.

all previous ones, in order to form a strong pro-democratic front; whereas others, like Joseba Rezola or Juan Ajuriaguerra, were contrary to the idea because, they argued, with the creation of such an organism Basque identity could become blurred and Basques might even lose their autonomy within the NEI.<sup>324</sup>

In the end, the PNV joined the Spanish Christian Democrats, albeit maintaining a separate team until 1963, when they agreed to form a team together with IDC, DSC, and UDC. The “Spanish Team” was finally accepted by the European Christian Democrats in 1972.

In Arrieta’s view of that joining campaign, *“Esta política de cooperación en la esfera democristiana responde a la estrategia a largo plazo que, con los ojos puestos en un futuro período de transición democrática, el PNV aplicó a partir de los años sesenta.”*<sup>325</sup>

The fact is that within the PNV there was a crisis around the decision of joining the Spanish forces to present a Spanish democratic front. Again, recalling the discussion between Monzón and Irujo during the Basque World Congress, the strategies were seen differently by those who wanted to continue with Aguirre’s spirit of unity and those who thought that Basque freedom should be attained without any interference from the Spanish forces. Nevertheless, the crux of the problem lay in the hardening of the anti-communist campaign embraced by many European countries, for whom the Franco regime could serve as a way to stop the advance of the communism and build a Europe based again on states rather than on nations and peoples.

## ii. The European Federal Movement.

*“The Basque Nationalist party supports ongoing initiatives for implementation on principles of freedom and democracy, a European organization that aims for the world peace and economic and social welfare of populations; is in favor of the federalist concepts that will enable the creation of the European powers without diminishing the full personality of each of the peoples - including Basque - which are to be included in the new structure, and calls for global organization appropriate based on the principles announced.”*<sup>326</sup>

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<sup>324</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 320.

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>326</sup> *Euskomedia*. Irujo Fund. Signature J, Box 55, File 5. Also in <http://www.euskomedia.org/fondo/11174> (Consulted on February 14<sup>th</sup>, 2017)

That is what the PNV's political declaration was stating in 1949. *Lehendakari* Aguirre was a declared pro-European—and so was Manuel Irujo, who took up the European policies in the exile after Aguirre, together with Javier de Landáburu, Joseba Rezola, and Jesús de Solaun.

The Europe of the peoples, a concept fully developed by Javier de Landáburu during the 60's,<sup>327</sup> was the concept of a Europe in which it was possible for the Basque country to fit. The Basque nationalists knew that the freedom of Euzkadi as a nation was far from being possible within a State, or at least within the concept of nation-state as developed until then. The Second World War, with the terrible example of the German Nazis, and some other radical and ethnic nationalisms, forced the nations without a State, such as the Basques, to imagine and build up a new concept of freedom and sovereignty. As we have already seen, the Basque Government had founded its legitimacy on the defense of the Basque Statute of Autonomy, intended to preserve their people's rights within Spain, but when the time came to imagine a new Europe and the possibilities it entailed, the Federal concept of Europe was the idea that Basque nationalism chose to defend and develop.

We mentioned at the beginning of the present section that the Cultural Union, created in London in 1942, was an institution that preceded the union of the Basques with the Europeans, showing clearly that the Europeanist aim was shared by all Basques, not only nationalists, being as it was a feature of Basque nationalism. Manuel Irujo had been a firm promoter of the European Union, especially through the Federal Movement, and the peculiar characteristics of his view can be read in his article “Federación occidental Europea,” written for *Alderdi* in 1949.<sup>328</sup> Taking Bernard Delesalle and his work *Sauvegarde de l'Occident* as example, Irujo explains that a Federal Europe is necessary in order to maintain peace and national values in a Christian and occidental Europe. The concepts he employs here are “Regions,” “Confederation,” and “Subfederation,” recalling the efforts done by Basques and Catalans in the Cultural Union and the Comité pro Comunidad Ibérica de Naciones (created in 1944), which agreed with the strategy imagined by Delesalle of dividing Europe into Regions according to the different peoples and nations. The European Federation was seen by Irujo as the best option that the Basque country had if it wanted to preserve its laws and sovereignty, a concept that would evolve into becoming a fierce defense of the Basque language as the essence

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<sup>327</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre. ARRIETA ALBERDI, Leyre, 2009, “Landáburu, el alavés europeísta,” in *Sancho el Sabio*, 31, p. 215-216.

<sup>328</sup> “Federación Occidental Europea,” *Alderdi*, no.25, April, 1949. Published in IRUJO, Manuel, 1981, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-15.

of the Basque country, and the idea of a Federal European Union as warranty of an equidistance between the two blocks during the Cold War, as we will get to see further on.

The development of the Pan-European sentiment, or the Federal Movement, after the Second World War was channeled through the agency of private movements, including the aforementioned Cultural Union of Occidental Europe or the *Movimiento Federalista Vasco*: the latter, created in 1947, belonged to the European Union of Federalists, and although it was supported by the Basque Government (not only by Basque nationalists) and was fully developed in the exile,<sup>329</sup> with the growing importance of the Federal Movement some activities would cross the border and the European sentiment would settle in Francoist Spain.<sup>330</sup>

The participation of the Basques in European federal movements, as well as their commitment with European Christian Democrat associations like the NEI, or their attendance to international meetings on law, like those held by the Universal Union to foster international law and peace, or in the field of trade unions, with the efforts done by ELA-STV in the Congresses of the CISC (Confederación Internacional de Sindicatos Crisitanos) or the CIOSL (Confederación Internacional de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres), were all part of the strategy of international recognition developed by the Basque Government,<sup>331</sup> but at the same time they defined a political alignment that traditional Basque nationalism (PNV and ANV) would never give up again.

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<sup>329</sup> UGALDE ZUBIRI, Alexander, 2007, *Eurobask*, no.12, July, 2007, p. 94.

<sup>330</sup> Although the European movement was not fully developed and lacked organizations due to the dictatorship, there was a considerable and growing European sentiment, especially in Catalonia, where the pro-European activities and tendencies of certain personalities were well known. There is a confidential report, called “*Situación del Movimiento Europeo en España*,” which details the European activities carried out within Spain. Some of the personalities that are referred to in that report as “interested persons” are: Lluís Duran i Ventosa, Juan Estelrich, Josep Maria Ainaud de Lasarte, and Joan Triadú. (undated, probably 1952) <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/14034.pdf> (consulted on February 14<sup>th</sup>, 2017). In a radio intervention, probably on Radio Euzkadi in 1955, Manuel Irujo talks about the Federal Movement and its success among Catalans, both in the exile and in the inside, quoting musician Pau Casals as one of the highest representatives of the European Federal Movement among the Catalans, and criticizes the absence of Federal Movement activities among the Basques in the inside. In this intervention, Irujo refers to certain federal organizations within Spain, in Madrid and Seville. *Euskomedia*. Irujo Fund. Signature J, Box 53, File 1<sup>a</sup>. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/13205.pdf> (consulted on February 14<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>331</sup> UGALDE ZUBIRI, Alexander, 2001, “El Consejo Vasco del Movimiento Europeo (1951-2001). La aportación vasca al federalismo Europeo/ Europako Mugimenduaren Euskal Kontselua (1951-2001).” Vitoria-Gasteiz: Consejo Vasco del Movimiento Europeo/ Europako Mugimenduaren Euskal Kontseilua, p. 77-78. Also of interest is the answer, probably written by Manuel Irujo, to a questionnaire sent by the NEI in 1950 about the PNV. This answer, 19 pages long, explains the federal European sentiment of the Basque Nationalist Party, the history of Basque nationalism, and the participation in Federal and European movements. In *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, PNV Section, Signature J, Box, 38, File 2. pp. 37-54. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/13553.pdf> (consulted on February 14<sup>th</sup>, 2017).



From May 7<sup>th</sup> to 10<sup>th</sup>, 1948, the *Movimiento Federalista Vasco*—with Aguirre as Honorary president and Irujo effectively chairing the movement<sup>332</sup>—was present at the Conference of The Hague, where more than 800 personalities of different and diverse political tendencies,<sup>333</sup> from socialists to Christian Democrats or Liberals, attended the event with a common objective, according to the official resolutions of the congress:

“(...) *The urgent duty of the nations of Europe to create an economic and political union in order to assure security and social progress.*”

The Hague Congress was divided into three different Committees—political, economic-and-social, and cultural—and some of the resolutions approved included the defense of “*establishing progressively a democratic social system,*” highlighting that the defense of human rights meant that the Union or Federation resulting from the Congress “*should be open to all European nations democratically governed and which undertake to respect a Charter of Human rights.*”<sup>334</sup>

In this regard, the resolutions immediately excluded Spain from the movement and from the possible future European Union until it became a democracy, something that Basque nationalism had been striving for at every international event they could participate in, as part of their international strategy.

On the other hand, although the European Movement was moving forward—and given the fact that the Basques were founding members of the *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales*, one of the organizations within the organizing “International Committee of the Movement for European Unity”—the European Federal movement that was being formed was not the idea of a Federation that the Basque had been looking forward to.

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<sup>332</sup> Aguirre was the Honor president (as President of the Basque Government), and Irujo was the Chairing president (acting on behalf the PNV); Juan Carlos Basterra (ANV), Laureano Lasa (PSOE), and Ramon María Aldasoro (IR) (until his death in 1952) were vice-presidents; Landáburu was the Secretary and José María de Lasarte, José Ignació Lizaso, Ángel Gondra, and Jesús Galíndez were members and delegates, representing the broad Basque community.

<sup>333</sup> Among others, Winston Churchill, Léon Blum, or Paul-Henry Spaak were some of the international politicians who attended the Congress. From Spain, it is important to highlight the presence of Salvador de Madariaga, who chaired the cultural committee, and Josep Trueta; and on behalf the Basques, the representation was trusted to Aguirre, Landaburu, and Basterra, as well as Indalecio Prieto. A complete list of the bureau of the Congress can be found in the official program in: Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 45, File 1. pp. 77-78. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujofund/14037.pdf>.

<sup>334</sup> “The Hague. Congress of Europe. Resolutions,” *ibid.*, pp. 7-16.

A report entitled *Razones de nuestra presencia en el Congreso*, probably written by Landáburu, explains the difficulties faced by the Basques in the Congress and the negative of the European Union of Federalists to accept the *Movimiento Federalista Vasco*.<sup>335</sup>

According to what Irujo states in the already quoted *Alderdi* article, “*En la Haya se proyectó la nueva formación Europea, partiendo de la base jurídica de los Estados. Reunidos los Sres. Aguirre y Madariaga con los restantes que les acompañaban fue acordado constituir el Consejo Federal Español del Movimiento Europeo (CFEME), del que podrían formar parte, con propia personalidad, los grupos catalán y vasco.*”<sup>336</sup>

Irujo was a firm defender of the democratic federal movement, since he considered it the best way to defeat Franco’s dictatorship, and that is why he did not even reject collaborating with other Spanish pro-democratic forces, but instead eased the cooperation, in the same way as President Aguirre had done. The idea of presenting a united block of Spanish democrats against the Franco regime before the eyes of the Federal Movement was the objective.

This explains why the Basques were far from collapsing after they were refused the chance of becoming their own representatives and forced to be represented, once again, within the Spanish group—instead, they even offered the headquarters of the Basque government in the Rue Marceau to establish a base for the *Consejo Federal Español del Movimiento Europeo* in 1949.

The Basque federalists saw their efforts rewarded with the inclusion of Manuel Irujo and José María Lasarte in the first Executive committee, of which Salvador de Madariaga was President. The Executive committee had four vice-presidents, one for every founding group: Rodolfo Llopis (PSOE), Julio Just (Liberals), Carles Pi i Sunyer (Catalans), and Manuel Irujo (Basques). José María Lasarte was the Secretary General.

Initially, the CFEME included four different branches, representing the different groups of founders: Grupo Español del Movimiento Socialista por los Estados Unidos de Europa (MSEUE), Grupo Español de la Unión Liberal Europea, Consejo Catalán, and Consejo Vasco.<sup>337</sup>

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<sup>335</sup> The report can be found in the aforementioned Irujo Fund file, pp. 55-65; and a detailed analysis of the obstacles that the Basques encountered can be read in: UGALDE ZUBIRI, Alexander, 2001, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-89.

<sup>336</sup> “El Presidente Aguirre y el Movimiento Europeo,” *op. cit.*

<sup>337</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre, 2007, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-118; UGALDE ZUBIRI, Alexander, 2001, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94.

Collaboration with the Spanish pro-democratic forces was a tricky question for the PNV from the very beginning, as we have already seen on many occasions, since not all the representatives agreed on this issue; however, *Lehendakari* Aguirre and some other Basques like Irujo did, because they considered it was essential to join forces with all the Spanish democratic parties and associations in order to attain the goals of the Basques.

Some of the disagreements with the decision had to do with the belief that the Basque movement should have tried in some way to be accepted by the European movement—as a country or as a nationality, not represented in any other way—instead of joining the Spanish Federal Movement; and other critics, in this case from the PNV, censured the lack of communication between the EBB and the *Lehendakari*'s group. Some other Basque nationalists, like Juan Ajuriaguerra, believed that if the Basques did not have their own group the Basque nationality would become blurred and the representation of the Basques would be left at the mercy of the Spanish interests.<sup>338</sup>

*“Nos habíamos hecho el propósito de silencio antes de jugar a política con el dominador. (...) No serán las palabras, sino los resultados lo que le dirán el daño que ocasiona a la Causa nacional el lanzarse a “conquistas efectivas por medio de la colaboración,” aun cuando se hagan afirmaciones y protestas de “no renunciar a nuestro derechos de Libertad nacional.”*

Such tough words were part of an unsigned document called “*Al pueblo Patriota Vasco,*” written in 1950 and sent to the PNV in Paris as a protest against the decision of joining forces with the CFEME.<sup>339</sup>

The participation of Basques in the study sessions of the CFEME in May 1950<sup>340</sup> would not have pleased certain Basque nationalists, who believed that the activities carried out by the Basques in Europe and related to the Federal movement were linked to Spanish interests, and therefore blurred Basque nationalism. The document was not a letter against the European Federal Movement, but a critique against the activity that Basque nationalism was carrying out in conjunction with the Spanish CFEME: “*¿Dónde aparece nuestra Euzkadi? ¿Dónde nuestra representación nacional vasca? ¿Dónde el puesto legítimo que nos corresponde como primeros europeos? ¿Estas son «nuestras actividades como vascos» y nuestras participaciones*

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<sup>338</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre, 2007, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-119 ;UGALDE ZUBIRI, Alexander, 2001, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-96.

<sup>339</sup> *Al Pueblo patriota Vasco*. Unsigned, 1950, *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Section PNV, Signature J, Box, 38, File 1. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/fondo/2348> (consulted on February 14<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>340</sup> OPE 756 (03/05/1950), OPE 757 (04/05/1950), OPE 758 (05/05/1950).

*como tales en esa futura Federación Europea? ¿Estos son nuestros avances «de veinte años acá»?»*

The sessions caused a stir within Basque nationalism, some of whose members could not come to terms with the idea of participating in an event that was “*marcadamente españolista*,” as stated by the president of the Paris council, Félix Irizar, or by the heated criticisms of Ceferino Jemein, a self-appointed protector of Sabino Arana’s essences.<sup>341</sup>

In view of such criticism, Irujo took charge of writing a report describing the resolutions and the advantages for Basque nationalism of participating in the sessions under the wing of the CFEME, highlighting the impact that this would have on the international community and the recognition of the nationalities “*de los pueblos peninsulares*,” mentioning the declarations and even helping organize the meeting at the Basque government’s headquarters in Paris. The report that was later prepared by the PNV in June 1950, based on Irujo’s words, defended the participation with the CFEME under the condition that it would be itself a federal body, in such a way as to allow the Basque group to develop its own personality.

Following these precepts, on February 1<sup>st</sup>, 1951 the Consejo Vasco por la Federación Europea (CVFE) was officially constituted and included within the CFEME, although the Basques had already been acting as a separate group informally since 1949.<sup>342</sup>

In this Basque Council were represented the international bodies that the Basques took part in: *Nuevos Equipos Internacionales*, *Movimiento socialista vasco por la federación europea*, *Unión Europea de Federallistas*, *Consejo Federal de Minorías y regiones Europeas*, *Unión liberal Internacional*, *Movimiento federalista Vasco*, *Juventudes Federalistas*, *Trabajadores cristianos por la Europa unida*, and the *Sección de jóvenes de los NEI*.

Reservations continued to be expressed by some Basque nationalists for several years, especially coming from Julio Jáuregui (PNV) and some other members of ELA-STV and ANV, who put pressure on the Basque representatives in the Federal Movement to include the concept of “Nation” instead of the more indeterminate concepts of “Regions” or “Minorities.”

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<sup>341</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre, 2007, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120.

<sup>342</sup> Based on the different documents that refer to a Basque council or a Basque group, Alexander Ugalde argues that the Basque Council already existed before its official foundation. UGALDE ZUBIRI, Alexander, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 107. The CVFE has been widely studied and its activity analyzed in the aforementioned book, which describes the activities carried out and the changes suffered in the CVFE since 1951 and until 2001.

The only conference in which the PNV was able to participate on its own was the “Small Europeans Nations Conference,” held in Bern in April 1962.<sup>343</sup>

#### **d. The 60’s: A new Era of Hope?**

Although Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s crimes at the XX PCUS Congress in 1956,<sup>344</sup> the Eisenhower administration (1953-1961) still believed that nothing had changed in the Kremlin, and continued with the anticommunist policies initiated by the well-know House Un-American Activities Committee, functioning from 1939 until 1975. The war in Korea (1950-1953) contributed in maintaining the climate of anticommunism, and despite the fact that the use of nuclear weapons was reinterpreted by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles as *massive retaliation* in case of Soviet aggression, the strategy followed by the US during this period of Cold War was to provide economic and military help to countries in order to stop the advance of Communism.

In this regard, Europe, especially the occidental part of Europe, was a key territory that lay between the USSR and the interests of the “free world” as represented by the US. It was important to take part in the international scene, and the Basque nationalism of the PNV was willing to do so on behalf of democracy and the free world, fighting against totalitarian systems like fascism, and even communism, but without hoisting the anticommunist flag.<sup>345</sup>

In a Cold War world, the political alignment of the Basque nationalism of the PNV was on the side of democracy and freedom, condemning all totalitarianisms, no matter what color, whether fascism or communism. The Basque nationalists kept insisting that the Franco Regime was nothing more than a totalitarian regime, of the same nature as that being developed by the USSR, and that Basque democrats (together with the rest of Spanish democrats) were ready to

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<sup>343</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 328

<sup>344</sup> Khrushchev served as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964, after the death of Josef Stalin. In February of 1956, at the XX PCUS Congress, Nikita Khrushchev gave a speech, entitled “Secret Speech,” denouncing Stalin’s purges and repression. Despite his intentions of ushering in a less repressive and conflictive policy into the Soviet Union, his administration was forced to deal with the “Cuban Missile Crisis,” one of the tensest episodes of the Cold War. One of the latest and most interesting biographies of Khurshev is: TAUBMAN, William, 2004, *Khrushchev: The Man and his Era*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. The full *Secret Speech* can be read at: <http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1956khrushchev-secret1.html> (consulted on February 17<sup>th</sup>, 2017). Among all the books on the Cuban Missile crisis, I would like to recommend the memories written by Robert F. Kennedy, (1969) *Thirteen days. A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

<sup>345</sup> IRUJO, Manuel, 1956, “El fondo religioso de la vida y el comunismo,” *Alderdi*, no.116, November, 1956.

take charge of the government when Franco fell. The idea of an international (American) intervention that would help the Spanish democrats overthrow Franco had been dismissed a long time ago, although the evident military presence of American troops in Europe, with bases in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the Mediterranean, ensured that the Spanish issue was not an international problem anymore. As increasing episodes of national awakening forced the disintegration of the last remaining pockets of empires in Africa (Algeria, Nigeria, or Ghana, to give some examples), and with UN resolutions backing them, the Basque nationalists warned and reminded about the national-oppressor nature of the dictatorship that had been installed in Spain since 1939, denouncing that, as in the case of the Hungarian Revolt of November of 1956, a totalitarian regime had been imposed with the help of foreign armies.<sup>346</sup>

Having received help from nobody, Manuel Irujo and the Basque nationalists, together with the rest of the Basque government, and even with the collaboration of the Spanish democrats in exile, still strived to be remembered, and to change the situation of the thousands of exiles who had been expelled from their motherland due to a fascist regime and were now stuck in the middle of a Cold War that had turned Europe into geostrategic field to stop the advance of communist USSR.

The movements and interventions on both sides of the Cold War were disgusting to Irujo, who remembered Maquiavelo in his articles:

*“Vivimos una crisis moral política. Maquiavelo no produciría en la actualidad la reacción a que su «Príncipe» dio lugar, «yendo al fin sin reparar los medios» (...) Hoy, a los pocos años de la monstruosa Guerra universal saldada con medio centenar de millones de víctimas inmoladas en defensa de la democracia, Trujillo y Somoza se llaman amigos de Norteamérica; éste pacta con Franco y le mantiene; (...) Y por si no era suficiente, Trujillo, Somoza y Franco han Ganado la condición de defensores de la libertad.”<sup>347</sup>*

The side effects of the Cold War were visible to the Basque nationalist, who, although not defending communism, could not support the American strategy either. Europe, and especially

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<sup>346</sup> Manuel Irujo wrote some articles on the Hungarian Revolt and human and national rights, having watched closely the movements of the Cold War and the situation of nationalities without a State in “the free World.” Examples of this can be found in the articles: “Los húngaros y nosotros,” *Alderdi*, no. 118, January, 1957; “Los crímenes contra la humanidad,” *Alderdi*, no. 119, February, 1957; “La agresión de Hungría,” *Alderdi*, no. 120, March, 1957.

<sup>347</sup> “Los Crimines contra la Humanidad,” *op. cit.*

the Basques, were at the center of the Cold War conflict, and a European unity under the Federal movement was the way to exit the situation.

The European federal movement became the strategy for Basque nationalism, whose belief it was that a strong Europe could stop the interferences of the Russians and Americans.

*“Soy muy partidario de sacrificar mucho por la paz universal y hasta creo en los beneficios mundiales de una coexistencia, a condición de que el acercamiento de los dos bloques no aplaste a los que quedamos en medio. Por eso he sido y soy también europeísta muy ferviente. Desde hace algún tiempo, va resultando más peligroso hacer de jamón de bocadillo entre dos medios panes. De ese peligro sabemos bastante los demócratas en general, y los nacionalistas vascos en particular.”*<sup>348</sup>

Javier de Landábru described in this way the situation of Basque nationalists before the international political situation; and looking ahead to Khrushchev’s visit to Paris, feeling trapped between dictators, and calling for the unity of democrats, he stated: *“Jacques Maritain, antes de la Guerra de 1939 decía que el triunfo del totalitarismo era consecuencia de la debilidad de los demócratas. De su falta de unión. Es una gran verdad.”*<sup>349</sup>

The European movement and Federalism, part of the international strategy being followed by Basque nationalism, had been consolidated after the death of Aguirre and were combined with Christian democracy and a strict defense of democracy, especially since repression of the Franco regime had hardened after 339 Basque priests wrote a document of protest and denunciation in May 1960, and later on, in 1962, two priest were judged for accusing the police of inflicting tortures on Basque protesters.<sup>350</sup>

These social changes were explained by Irujo in articles like *“En España empieza a amanecer,”*<sup>351</sup> where the author describes the situation in Spain and the differences between 1939 and 1962. He states that during the war the clergy had been with Franco, except for the Basque and Catalan clergymen, who defended the Republican democracy. According to him, in 1962 there was no priest under 45 who defended Franco; they were all clearly positioned with the workers on strike and supported their protests.

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<sup>348</sup> LANDÁBURU, Javier, “...Comunismo tampoco,” *Alderdi*, no.156, March, 1960.

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>350</sup> The repression against Basque priests and Basque nationalism by the Franco Regime and its international repercussion will be studied in next chapter.

<sup>351</sup> IRUJO, Manuel. “En España empieza a amanecer,” *Alderdi* , August,-September, 1962, nos. 84-185. The title also was an ironic reference to the lyrics of *Cara al Sol*, the anthem of the Spanish Falange party.

Basque nationalism, and the opposition to Franco in general, suffered a more repressive policy in the decade of 1960, which sent hundreds to prison, torture, and death sentence. The exile—the so many times recalled exile, linked with the old guard of Basque nationalists who had fled into exile in 1939—was news once again. A new generation of Basques were being forced into exile, running away from the harshening conditions of a “*Terrorist regime*”<sup>352</sup> that was nevertheless giving the impression of being on its last legs, as it was faced with protests from the Church, Falange, Opus Dei, workers’ and students’ strikes, etc., and yet was responding by reverting to its oldest and cruelest version, calling to mind the hard postwar days, as if nothing had happened after more than 20 years of dictatorship.

## e. The “*Contubernio de Múnich*”

### i. The Spanish democrats have an idea.

The possibility of arranging a meeting between the Spanish pro-democracy exiles and members of the anti-Francoist resistance from inside Spain was articulated in words for the first time by Enric Adroher, “Gironella,”<sup>353</sup> who met with *Lehendakari* Leizaola, Xabier Landáburu, and Manuel Irujo to explain Salvador Madariaga’s idea, described in a report filed by the Basque government:

*“Nos refiere seguidamente un plan de Madariaga, (...) y que consistía en reunir dentro de unos ocho meses una asamblea de ciudadanos españoles del interior y del exilio. El número de asistentes sería de unos 200, y el objeto de la asamblea, al menos el objeto aparente, sería la de estudiar conjuntamente la relación entre España y la Europa que se está formando.”*<sup>354</sup>

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<sup>352</sup> The leading articles in *Alderdi* grew more and more aggressive before the situation of the Basques living in the “Peninsular Basque Country.” “*Regímenes terroristas*” was the editorial written in *Alderdi*, no. 163, 1960, denouncing the use of war decrees by the Franco regime, including death sentences and increasing numbers of prisoners suffering tortures since May 1960.

<sup>353</sup> Mr. Enric Adroher i Pascual was a well-known anti-Franco activist who was a member of the CNT, the UGT, and the POUM. He lived in exile until 1976 and participated in the European Movement. More on “Gironella” in: <http://www.fcampalans.cat/arxiu/uploads/publicacions/pdf/separata30web.pdf> (consulted on February 19<sup>th</sup>, 2017), and PUIG, Lluís Maria de, 1999, *Gironella, la izquierda europeísta*. Madrid: Fundación Españoles en el mundo.

<sup>354</sup> *Entrevista del Sr. Gironella con el Lendakari (Sic.), Irujo y Landáburu*, Paris, June 20<sup>th</sup>, 1960. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Section CFE, Signature J, Box 28, File 6.



It was June 1960 and the CFEME had been inactive for months, despite the fact that the construction of a Federal Europe was progressing, and even the Franco Regime showed some interest in it as long as the dictatorship was tolerated openly by western democracies, such as the US, whose good vibes were shown by the visit of President Eisenhower to Spain in 1959.<sup>355</sup>

According to what Jordi Amat explains in his book *La primavera de Múnich*,<sup>356</sup> the democratic opposition to Franco had been organizing and meeting secretly on both sides of the Pyrenees since 1956, encouraged by the strikes and protests taking place in Spain against the regime. In these meetings, Julián Gorkin,<sup>357</sup> a communist, Trotskyist, and anti-Stalinist and Dionisio Ridruejo,<sup>358</sup> an old-guard Falangist who had abandoned the Francoist postulates in 1942, together with Salvador de Madariaga, were the representatives of the fight against the Franco Regime and the unity of the democrats for establishing a new government in Spain. Despite the efforts of the Spanish dictatorship to block the activities held by the democrats,

*“(...) esa imagen, que deja fuera de la historia la tradición democrática para que la fagocitasen a su favor los reformistas franquistas, borra el esfuerzo sostenido en paralelo o en confluencia por el exilio y la oposición democrática del interior – perseguida por el régimen – para articular una alternativa al sistema dictatorial equiparable a la de los países de nuestro entorno.”<sup>359</sup>*

On January 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1957 Fernando Baeza (member of Acción Democrática) went to the Basque delegation in Paris to present to the *Lehendakari* a project for a Democratic Spain. That project follows almost point by point the items that 20 years later would define the transition to democracy in Spain, according to Amat’s analysis,<sup>360</sup> but despite the efforts, it seems that the

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<sup>355</sup> DELGADO, Lorenzo, 2003, “¿El “amigo americano”? : España y Estados Unidos durante el Franquismo,” *Studia Historica. Historia Contemporánea*. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 21, pp. 231-276.

<sup>356</sup> AMAT, Jordi, 2016, *La primavera de Múnich. Esperanza y fracaso de una transición democrática*. Barcelona: Tusquets Editores.

<sup>357</sup> Julián Gorkin was the alias of Julián Gómez García, a communist member of the PCE who had worked for the Kommintern in Paris before the Spanish Civil War. After his return from the USSR, Gorkin abandoned orthodox communism and denounced Stalinism, joining the POUM during the Spanish Civil War. He wrote several books on Marxism and communism and against Stalin. In a later section, we will see more on Gorkin and his activities against Stalinism.

<sup>358</sup> Dionisio Ridruejo was a poet and writer who initially followed the dictates of Falange, and even participated in the creation of its anthem, “Cara al Sol,” but who left the Franco postulates in 1942, and ever since then developed a critical attitude against the Franco regime that would bring him to prison and, finally, to exile. More on Dionisio Ridruejo in: MORENTE VALERO, Francisco, 2006, *Dionisio Ridruejo: del fascismo al antifranquismo*. Madrid: Síntesis.

<sup>359</sup> AMAT, Jordi, 2016, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.*,

negotiations to establish a roadmap for democracy in Spain were not as smooth as was desired. Not only the political differences between politicians that had fought on opposite sides during the Spanish Civil War, but also the differences between the exile and the inside, arose during the preliminaries. The national differences, although often ignored by the Spanish democrats, and somehow also by the forgers of the story of “*National reconciliation*,” were also an obstacle that was difficult to sort out without previous consideration.

The European Federal movement was important for Basque nationalists; and, as we have seen, the unity of the Basque forces, and by extension the unity of the Spanish democrats, was something that the Basques were able to accept, although always within certain limits that had to do with Basque national recognition and the respect for Basque laws and institutions, something that the Spanish democrats seemed to have forgotten when they began imagining up the Transition to democracy. In a letter from Gonzalo Nárdiz to Javier Landáburu, in relation to the meetings with the socialists to discuss the possible ways of preparing a transition towards democracy, Nárdiz is hesitant about the socialist’s plan:

*“En el caso que considero habría de perfilarse claramente nuestra personalidad nacional así como el objetivo de nuestras aspiraciones.”*<sup>361</sup>

Although the Basque nationalists were not talking about full sovereignty—they were only demanding respect at least for the situation of 1936, and the organization of a referendum to let the Basque people decide on certain other matters during the transition—the Spanish democrats considered that the Basque demands were impossible to meet.

*“Guardan muy mal recuerdo de esta entrevista. Por lo que cuentan, los vascos se presentaron en plan de preguntar en primer lugar si “estaban dispuestos a concederles la independencia,” esto como condición sine qua non para poder seguir tratando (...).”*

Such are the reflections contained in the report written by *Izquierda Demócrata Cristiana*, who were trying to contact the democratic forces, and from their report we can infer that the Basque attitude was not baseless:

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<sup>361</sup> Nárdiz to Landáburu, Bayonne, October 1<sup>st</sup>, 1959. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, UFD Section, Signature J, Box 46, File 2. Source 165. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/9149.pdf> (consulted on February 20<sup>th</sup> 2017).

“En su trato con los socialistas se tocó el tema de los puntos de vista con relación a las autonomías y los socialistas expusieron que «ellos tampoco consideran procedente el conceder Estatutos ahora.»<sup>362</sup>

It was clear that Basque nationalism and its demands were something that could not be simply ignored, and, although the report also refers that Aguirre and Landáburu were more open to negotiation and correct in manners than the Basque members of “la Resistencia” in Beyris, the Basque statute of autonomy and national recognition were not negotiable, as was made clear by Manuel Irujo to Romualdo Rodríguez Vera (PSOE) in a meeting in Paris in 1958. Manuel Irujo wrote a report on that meeting in which he transcribed their conversation literally. It is worth reproducing some of it here for its clarifying nature:

Romualdo Martínez Vera: *¿Y mantendrían ustedes en este primer periodo de transición su carácter y aspiraciones de Gobierno propio?*

Manuel Irujo: *¿Por qué no? Qué va ganando nadie con que no sea así?*

Romualdo Martínez Vera: *Pero eso, para comenzar, sería un inconveniente. Yo creo que, al principio, lo mejor sería contentarse con poco, para ir después mejorando, poco a poco.*

Of course, Irujo, even angry and upset, answers with his usual good manners:

Manuel Irujo: *Mire usted, amigo Vera. A buena voluntad no ha de ganarnos nadie. Pero crea usted que no nos hemos de dejar tomar por el pito del sereno. Hablando se entienden los hombres. Pero ir a normalidad no puede significar el que unos señores quedan satisfechos a costa de otros que quedan hechos ciscos.*

At the end of the report, under the title “Impresión general,” Irujo expresses his reflections on the meeting (which initially had to be with José Maria Gil-Robles) and evaluates the meeting with Martínez Vera as well as the previous one with Gil Robles, concluding with the words:

“*Pour commencer: nada de estatutito. Después... ya veremos. Eso es todo lo que va a ofrecernos Gil Robles. Y como eso es todo, es natural que no quiera entrevistarse con el guardian del Estatuto.*”<sup>363</sup>

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<sup>362</sup> *Ibid.*, Source 176.

<sup>363</sup> Meeting between Martínez Vera and Manuel Irujo. Paris, July 7<sup>th</sup>, *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 28, Exp. 9A. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/4395.pdf> (consulted on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017). The previous meeting with Gil Robles can be found in: *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 47,

The exile was moving, trying to get a plan together (between Christian-Democrats, socialists, and liberals, as Gorkin had already said and Irujo had defended in the meeting), but in Spain, the technocrats were also moving forward to open the regime to Europe. Spain had asked to join the European Economic Community on February 9th, 1962, and had promoted economic reforms. In the book *La política europea del régimen de Franco* by María Teresa Laporte, the author states that the economic changes did not change anything of importance in society, and did not involve the improvement of the rights or freedom of the Spanish people. The author also asserts that the negative to include Spain in the EEC was a decision related more to the political nature of the future European Union, than to the lack of freedom and democratic structures, as was realized by the anti-Francoist resistance who had attended the Conference of Munich.<sup>364</sup>

Europeanism was one way to fight the Franco Regime, since it used to be an isolated regime of self-government, and that political movement had been used by the Spanish anti-Francoist resistance and by the Basque: by the PNV, but particularly by Manuel Irujo and Javier Landáburu, who were great defenders of the European Federalist Movement. If Spain were to be accepted in the EEC, that strand of anti-Francoism would be dismantled, but the most important thing would be that democracy would not have arrived to Spain and yet Spain would become part of the European Union.

The European movement had to be seen as an effort of opposition on the part of the Spanish democrats against the Franco regime, since the European Federal movement and all the political parties and associations that integrated it were based on democratic principles. The admission of Spain into any European structure had to be done under conditions of a rebuilding of the institutions, with democratic structures and a warranty of freedom for Spanish citizens.

The strategy employed by the Basques within the European movement was to develop a European federation based on democracy and the recognition of the peoples, and, therefore, with the exclusion of any kind of totalitarianisms, such as the Spanish.

Getting back to the meeting where Gironella had presented the objective of holding a meeting between the Spanish democrats from the exile and from inside Spain, the idea was to do it at

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Expedient 1. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/3058.pdf> (consulted on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>364</sup> LA PORTE, María Teresa, 1992, *La política Europea del régimen de Franco: 1957-1962*. Pamplona: EUNSA.

the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in 1961, but it seems that the pressures of Francoist diplomacy blocked the meeting.<sup>365</sup>

According to the information on the document of the meeting with Gironella, the idea of Madariaga was that: “*La asamblea tendría gran resonancia internacional y sus conclusiones practicas serían las de que en España no puede entrar en Europa mientras no se democratice. La reunión sería financiada por un fondo que se constituiría con donativos de las grandes organizaciones internacionales europeístas y tal vez por aportaciones de los sindicatos americanos.*”<sup>366</sup>

This last piece of information about the financing of the meeting is what Jordi Amat gave as an explanation of the relationship between the “*Contubernio de Múnich*” and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, since its representatives in Europe in relation to Spain were Julián Gorkin and Salvador de Madariaga. The Congress for Cultural freedom was founded in West Berlin in 1950, and is considered a CIA’s Cold War covert operation to block the advance of Communist ideas by promoting culture, with the celebration of conferences, the printing of journals and books, and the support to intellectuals.<sup>367</sup>

Julián Gorkin and Salvador de Madariaga were part of the “*Centro de Estudios y documentación,*” an anti-Francoist think-tank in Paris that developed the Spanish interests at the Congress for Cultural Freedom, financed by some American organizations and foundations like the Ford Foundation.<sup>368</sup>

In a meeting of the CFEME in Paris on April 18<sup>th</sup>, 1961, Gorkin announced the arrangement that they had been working on to promote a meeting with the European movement:

*“Venimos preparando otro plan de envergadura mucho mayor desde hace varios meses, respondiendo asimismo a una incitativa de don Salvador y mía suscrita por los componentes del Centro de Documentación y de Estudios, cuya obra decidieron ustedes patrocinar hace un año. Se trata de una convocatoria en Estrasburgo y por el*

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<sup>365</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

<sup>366</sup> *Entrevista del Sr. Gironella con el Lendakari (Sic.), Irujo y Landáburu.* Paris, June 20<sup>th</sup>, 1960. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Section CFE, Signature J, Box 28, File 6.

<sup>367</sup> The Congress of Cultural freedom is analyzed in the next section of this chapter, given to its relation to Manuel Irujo.

<sup>368</sup> AMAT, Jordi, 2016, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-173. Amat analyses the interests and objectives of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, as well as the “Centro de Estudios y documentación” and its publications, especially in relation with Julián Gorkín, in the chapters “Operación Congreso” (166-185) and “Desactivar la máquina” (186-231). Some of this information given by Amat will be used in the following section to describe the Basque interaction with the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

*Movimiento Europeo que abarca a las tendencias liberal, demócrata-cristiana y socialista, de una Asamblea que reúna personalidades españolas del interior y de la emigración según la base de acuerdo que también suscribimos en Oxford Madariaga y yo.*<sup>369</sup>

Although the link between the promoters of the meeting in Munich and the Congress for Cultural Freedom is clear and proved, and the idea was strongly promoted by the President and the director of the *Centro de Documentación de Estudios*, we cannot confirm that the US was involved in the organization of the meeting in Munich, but rather the opposite:

*“From the US view, while the US is in no way involved in the Munich Affair, and has not been brought into it (except by such tortuous Soviet propaganda as that in Izvestia–Moscow’s dispatch 1116)—which tried to claim that US forces in Spain had come actively to Franco’s aid), there is perhaps a useful lesson to be learned or at least to be reminded of. This is that efforts to help to solve the riddle of the future of Spain and to nudge the country along towards liberalization had best steer clear of any suggestion of a foreign aided conspiracy or of identification with the old-time political elements, especially the exiles.*<sup>370</sup>

The report prepared by the American embassy in Madrid on the Munich meeting was a detailed, confidential document of 13 pages, plus some more documents attached, which, to say the least, revealed the interest that was aroused and the repercussions that were occasioned by the meeting in the international spheres.

According to the last paragraph, cited above, the US became more interested in the future of Spain after the Congress, and what is true is that, although not directly, they did indirectly contribute somehow to help the Spaniards who had been forced to remain in the exile after the Congress: *“De acuerdo con Ridruejo, aquí se ha decidido, en vista de que no hay otra organización que lo haga, una ayuda a 14 de los amigos que andan sueltos por ahí, e igual cosa se hará con Cembrero.*<sup>371</sup>

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<sup>369</sup> Gorkin at a CFEME meeting, Paris, April 18<sup>th</sup>, 1961. AMAT, Jordi, 2016, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

<sup>370</sup> Confidential Report *“An evaluation of the Munich meeting of the Spanish opposition.”* Madrid, June 19<sup>th</sup>, 1962. NARA, General Records of the Department of State. RG 59. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. 1960-63 General Decimal File. Box, 1808.

<sup>371</sup> Letter to Manuel Irujo from Julián Gorkin, writing as representative and on the letterhead of *Congreso por la Libertad de la cultura*. Paris, June 21<sup>st</sup>, 1962. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 43, File 6, p. 25. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/14039.pdf> (consulted on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

Notwithstanding, we can assert that, if not directly nor fully, but partially, the funds for the Congress came from the Congress for Cultural Freedom and some other private funds, obtained through the efforts of Julián Gorkin. According to studies by Olga Glondys: “*A la postre, obtuvo al menos cinco mil dólares del CLC [Congreso por la Libertad de la Cultura], por indicación de Lovestone y, a través de Brown, otros cinco mil de la AFL [American Federation of Labour], además de mil dólares de la AFL y de su amigo David Dubinsky.*” However, not all of the funds came from the Congress; the Consejo Ibérico, founded in New York, contributed as well, and the European Movement subsidized the meeting with 1.350.000 francs.<sup>372</sup>

The European Movement had called the Congress to hold a political meeting with the primitive objective of “*l’étude de la démocratisation des institutions européennes et des voies et moyens de la création d’une Communauté politique, susceptible d’assurer un progrès véritable vers l’édification des Etats-Unis d’Europe.*”<sup>373</sup>

The European Federal movement would grant the Spanish democrats the international recognition they needed in order to debate and clarify the different proposals and tendencies of the anti-Franco resistance, and at the same time, the European frame would protect them from Francoist repression.

The Treaty of Rome (1957), on which the European Federal union was based, did not specify the political conditions that States had to meet in order to join the European Union, but the issue was debated in the European Parliament under the pressure of the Spanish pro-democratic forces until finally, in January 1962, the Birkelbach Report was approved, establishing that Democracy was necessary to become a candidate member, and complicating the matter of the interests of Spain to access the common market.<sup>374</sup>

On May 18<sup>th</sup>, Robert Van Schendel, Secretary General of the European Movement, sent invitations to the Spanish representative to attend the Munich Congress on the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> of June, 1962, specifying that a debate would be held to discuss the future of Spain: “*Ce Congrès pourrait être une occasion pour tous les participants espagnols de confronter leurs vues sur le*

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<sup>372</sup> GLONDYS, Olga, 2012, *La guerra fría cultural y el exilio republicano español*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, pp. 215-216.

<sup>373</sup> Invitation to the Congress and participation form sent by Maurice Faure, president of the European Movement. EAH-AHE, Fondo PNV-0076-09.

<sup>374</sup> CRESPO MACLENNAN, Julio, *Spain and the process of European integration, 1957-85*. Houndmills: Palgrave in association with St. Anthony’s College, pp. 53-54.

*problème de l'intégration éventuelle de l'Espagne à l'Europe, et d'en dégager quelques lignes générales.*"<sup>375</sup> The lists of proposed names from the exile and from inside Spain were sent by Julián Gorkin and Manuel Irujo, with the names and addresses of the people who could be interested in attending the Congress in Munich. Manuel Irujo and the attendants to the CFEME meetings, on the days previous to the Munich meeting, were confident about the freedom of movement of the invited people coming from inside Spain:

*“Las noticias que llegan de España, según los reunidos, permiten afirmar que, las huelgas actuales en lugar de hacer apretar los resortes gubernativos y policíacos, han dado lugar a una fuerte relajación de los mismos, por lo cual, no se espera que el Gobierno ponga dificultades a la salida de los delegados.”*<sup>376</sup>

But they were wrong. Before the social situation in the inside, and the pro-democracy forces pressing from the exile, the Franco regime did not facilitate the participation of the Spanish representatives in the conference of Munich, and some of them were even arrested or their passports retained.

Finally, 118 Spaniards (80 from inside Spain and 38 from the exile<sup>377</sup>)<sup>378</sup> were able to participate, and they joined a pre-conference meeting held in Munich on June 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> to debate the possible entrance of Spain in the Common market. Initially, the idea was for the debate to be done by a group presided by Madariaga, with a table of 10 members, “*Gil Robles, Llopis, Giménez Fernández, un republicano (si no sale alguna personalidad destacada, Irujo), Satrústegi, Lain Entralgo, Sopena o Díaz Alegría, Ridruejo, un vasco y un catalán designados*

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<sup>375</sup> Invitation to the Congress sent by Robert van Schendel, Secretary General of the European Movement. EAH-AHE, Fondo PNV-0076-09.

<sup>376</sup> Letters between Gorkin and Irujo talking about the lists of invited members (30/05/1962), and minutes of the CFEME meetings written by Irujo (25/05/1962). *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 43, File 6, p. 25. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/14039.pdf> (consulted on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>377</sup> Among others, there were representatives of the most important Spanish political parties, with the exception of the PCE, which was not invited: Fernando Álvarez de Miranda (Democracia Social Cristiana), Jesús Barros de Lis (Izquierda Demócrata Cristiana), José María Gil Robles (Democracia Social Cristiana), Jaime Miralles (Unión Española), Dionisio Ridruejo (Partido Democrático Acción Social), José María Satrústegi (Unión Española), Fernando Valera (Futuro del Gobierno Español de la República en el Exilio, Acción Republicana Democrática Española), Rodolfo Llopis (PSOE), etc.

<sup>378</sup> Madariaga went so far as to state that “*Aquí estamos todos menos los totalitarios de ambos bandos,*” in reference to the communists and the fascists; apparently, some members of the PCE, like Tomás García, and of the PSUC, such as Francesc Vicens, had been seen at the Hotel Regine in Munich, accompanying some of the Spanish participants who were staying for the Munich meeting. <http://www.lavanguardia.com/hemeroteca/20120605/54303390132/contubernio-munich-politica-oposicion-antifranquista-movimiento-europeo.html>



*por los propios grupos,*”<sup>379</sup> who would debate in two different commissions, a political and an economic commission—but that was not possible.

Due to the atmosphere of distrust between the inside members and the exile representatives, especially owing to the negative of Gil Robles, two separate commissions were created to debate and agree on a statement. Although it is true that Van Schendel had to mediate with the Spanish representatives because Gil Robles had refused to debate with them, forcing two separate commissions to be formed according to the origin of the representatives (exile & inside),<sup>380</sup> still the members of the CFEME had already shown previously that they felt uncomfortable with the presence of Gil Robles at the meeting: “*Se ha discutido mucho. No se ha llegado a un acuerdo. La tesis dominante ha sido la de que Gil Robles, lo que pretende, es convertir el Movimiento Europeísta en movimiento cedista, a lo que no podemos prestarnos (...).*”<sup>381</sup>

Although more than 20 years had passed—and Gil Robles had been elected president of the interior Pro-Europe Organization, the *Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea* (AECE)—the Spanish Civil War was ever present, and the political rivalry and the factions were still alive.

The suspicions were probably not baseless, since Gil Robles, according to the Confidential Report developed by the American embassy in Madrid, quotes Gil Robles’s declarations as stating:

“He told us that the time had apparently come for the moderate opposition to offer help to Franco to guide Spain towards the eventual transition from Franco to the post-Franco period. He told us he wanted to offer such collaboration to Franco in a constructive sense, without threats of violence and without aiming at Franco’s overthrow, and that he would also make it clear at Munich, if his proffered collaboration were accepted, that he would put no obstacles in the way of Spain’s admission to the Common market while Franco was still in power.”<sup>382</sup>

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<sup>379</sup> Minutes CFEME, 15/05/1962. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 43, File 6, p. 33. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/14039.pdf> (consulted on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>380</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 307; AMAT, Jordi, 2016, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

<sup>381</sup> Minutes CFEME, 03/05/1962. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 43, File 6, p. 34. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/14039.pdf> (consulted on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>382</sup> Confidential Report “*An evaluation of the Munich meeting of the Spanish opposition,*” Madrid, June 19<sup>th</sup>, 1962. NARA, General Records of the Department of State. RG 59. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. 1960-63 General Decimal File. Box, 1808.

With that objective, Gil Robles sent a letter to Carrero Blanco, Minister Under-Secretary of the Spanish Government, as well as some other moderate leaders who had gone to Munich, such as Jaime Miralles, Vicente Piniés (brother of Jaime Piniés, Spanish representative at the UN), or Joaquín Satrústegui, all of them looking for some kind of cover in advance.<sup>383</sup>

As soon as the Basque representatives at the CFEME (mainly Manuel Irujo) confirmed that a federal meeting in Munich with the presence of Spanish democrats from both sides of the Pyrenees would be held, the EBB and the Basque government worked to decide on who had to be present in Munich.

Given the importance that the European Federal Movement had for Basque nationalists, their presence in Munich was essential, and their message was divided into two fronts: to remind the Spanish of the Basque cause and vindications, and to show themselves off in front of the European representatives as a group of importance within the European Movement.<sup>384</sup> With these two objectives in mind, it was decided to invite Basques from both the exile and from inside the mainland Basque country, as well as to mix in industrialists, priests, trade unionists, and young representatives from EGI and ELA-STV. There were thus members of the Basque government from the nationalist parties PNV and ANV, along with representatives from ELA-STV and EGI, as I have already noted.

The list of attendees is not accurate due, of course, to the given circumstances of secrecy and the difficulties that the representatives from inside Spain had to face in order to cross the border and attend the Munich meeting. In connection with this, from the existing lists of attendees, which differ in no more than two or three details, we confirm that the Basque representation consisted of 34 persons: 14 from the exile and 20 from inside the Basque country.<sup>385</sup>

The 14 Basque people from the exile were: Agustí Alberro Picavea, Iñaki Aspiazu, José María Aspiazu, Jon Bilbao (Basque-American), Manuel Irujo, Francisco Javier Landáburu, José Ignacio Lizaso, Gonzalo Nárdiz, Alberto Onaindia, Manuel Robles Aránguiz. Gregorio Ruiz de Ercilla, Jesús Solaun, Iñaki Unzueta, and Julio Jáuregui. And the 20 from inside the Basque country were: Iñaki Aguinaga Beristain, Kepa Anabitarte, Mertze Arribas Cortajarena,

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<sup>383</sup> Confidential Report “An evaluation of the Munich meeting of the Spanish opposition,” *ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>384</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

<sup>385</sup> The different works on the Munich meeting that we have consulted (UGALDE, ARRIETA, SATRÚSTEGI, AMAT) agree on the figure of 34 Basque representatives, based on the information given by the list found in the Irujo Fund in Eusko Ikaskuntza. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 43, File 6, p. 163. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujofund/14039.pdf> (consulted on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

Eugenio Arzubialde, Josñe María Busca Isusi, Juan Celaya Letamanedia, José Luis Echegaray Pagola, Xabier Echeverría Arrue, Andoni Esparza Gallastegui, Isidro Infante Olarte, Ibon Navascués Ugarte, José Salegui, Juan Ugarte Guridi, Martín Zubizarreta Pildain, Javier Alonso Ezcaín, Santiago Alonso Esquíán, Antonio Anoz G. de Anzuola, Luis Benito del Valle, and Andoni Elorza.

According to the list included in the American embassy report, there is one more name: Jesús Aguirre, brother of the First *Lehendakari*, who also appears in the provisional list stored in the Irujo fund in Eusko Ikaskuntza together with some other names that were proposed but not included in the final list published by the Federal movement, such as Josu Hickman, Irujo's close collaborator, or Ramon de la Sota, a well-known Basque nationalist.<sup>386</sup>

On June 5<sup>th</sup>, the two commissions—exile and inside—met separately to discuss the documents that had been prepared in advance (one was a document by Madariaga, and the other by Gil Robles and his European association), with the objective of vindicating democracy in Spain and forcing the European Movement to take control of the democratic changes needed and requested, before accepting the integration of Spain into the European space.

*“El acuerdo que se adopte dirá más o menos diáfananamente que España tiene su puesto en el Consejo Federal y en Europa, pero Franco no,”* explained Irujo in a letter to the PNV, ANV, and ELA-STV on March 13<sup>th</sup>, 1962.<sup>387</sup>

The mistrusts and divergences between the exile and the inside were quite difficult to deal with. If Gil Robles did not want to be seen together with the exiles—and, as he stated in the letter sent to Carrero Blanco, *“El criterio que el firmante (Gil Robles), va a defender en Munich no es el resultado de imposiciones exteriores, que jamás admitiría, ni el producto de pactos con fuerzas políticas u organizaciones sociales”*<sup>388</sup>—the exiles for their part were no less uncomfortable with the presence of Gil Robles:

*“Nuestros amigos socialistas están llenos de temores; temores a Gil Robles, temores a que tras lo brazos de la cruz se escondan los cuernos del diablo, temores a que se nos*

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<sup>386</sup> There are some lists and letters with the names proposed, in the already mentioned Irujo fund. *Ibid.*, pp. 58-69.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 87.

<sup>388</sup> Gil Robles' letter to the Minister Under-Secretary of the government, Luis Carrero Blanco, Madrid, June 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1962, p. 2. In the Confidential Report *“An evaluation of the Munich meeting of the Spanish opposition.”* NARA, General Records of the Department of State. RG 59. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. 1960-63 General Decimal File. Box. 1808.

*cuelen en Munich los enemigos. Ayer me costó trabajo batir esta posición fundada en el temor y en la desconfianza. En Munich no habrá posibilidad de ser franquista,”* wrote Manuel Irujo to Salvador de Madariaga in March, 1962.<sup>389</sup>

After some disagreements and a heated discussion between Gil Robles and Irujo, where Gil Robles accused Irujo of having organized a “*grupo de presión*,”<sup>390</sup> on June 8<sup>th</sup> the Spanish representatives and the chairmen of both commissions (Gil Robles from the inside, Salvador de Madariaga from the exile) read the Iberian Resolution approved by the representatives of Italy, Belgium, Great Britain, and France, despite the efforts done by the Franco representative trying to prevent the agreement.<sup>391</sup>

The Iberian Resolution approved by the IV Congress of the European Movement stated the following:

*Projet de résolution*

*Présenté par l’unanimité des 118 délégués espagnols et approuvé, dans son esprit, par acclamations.*

*Le Congrès du M.E., réuni à Munich les 7 et 8 juin 1962, considère que l’intégration de tout pays à l’Europe, soit sous forme d’adhésion, soit sous forme d’association, exige de chacun d’eux des institutions démocratiques, ce qui dans le cas de l’Espagne, en accord avec la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme et de la Charte sociale européenne, signifie :*

- 1. L’établissement d’institutions authentiquement représentatives et démocratiques qui garantissent que le gouvernement soit fondé sur le consentement des citoyens.*
- 2. La garantie effective de tous les droits de la personne humaine, particulièrement ceux de liberté individuelle et d’opinion et la suppression de la censure gouvernementale.*
- 3. La reconnaissance de la personnalité des diverses communautés naturelles.*

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<sup>389</sup> *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 43, File 6, p. 163. Also in:

<http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/14039.pdf> (consulted on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017), p. 37.

<sup>390</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre. *op. cit.*, p. 310.

<sup>391</sup> The Marqués de Valdeiglesias, the Spanish Francoist representative, had been hovering around on the fringes of the Congress, trying to stop the Spanish democrats’ resolution, with the help of Von Merkat, a member of Adenauer’s cabinet. Confidential Report “*An evaluation of the Munich meeting of the Spanish opposition.*” NARA, General Records of the Department of State. RG 59. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. 1960-63 General Decimal File. Box, 1808, p. 8; SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, “*1962: El llamado contubernio de Munich*,” p. 34. In ARZALLUS, Xabier [et.al.], 1989, *Vascos en la construcción de Europa*. Bilbao EAJ-PNV.

4. *L'exercice sur des bases démocratiques des libertés syndicales et la défense, per les travailleurs, de leurs droits fondamentaux, notamment par le moyen de la grève.*
5. *La possibilité d'organiser des courants d'opinion et des partis politiques, ainsi que le respect des droits de l'opposition.*

*Le Congrès exprime le profond espoir que l'évolution consécutive à l'application des points précédemment annoncés, permettra l'incorporation de l'Espagne à l'Europe dont elle est un élément essentiel. Il prend acte de la forme conviction exprimée par tous les délégués espagnols présents au Congrès, que l'immense majorité du peuple espagnol souhaite que cette évolution se fasse selon les règles de la prudence politique et aussi rapidement que les circonstances le permettent, dans la sincérité de tous, et leur engagement de renoncer à toute violence active ou passive avant, pendant ou après le processus d'évolution.*<sup>392</sup>

The resolution was presented as the joint effort of democratic forces both inside and outside Spain, facilitating a discourse of unity and censure against the Franco regime in front of its possible inclusion in the European movement.

Each and every one of the 5 items of the resolution had to be debated and agreed upon, since the versions and opinions of the representatives from the exile and from the inside differed so much from each other. For instance, the first point was amended after the exiles refused to accept the automatic instauration of a Monarchy after the end of the Franco regime, as Gil Robles proposed, and the concept of “consent” was added in, making reference to a possible referendum. Don Juan immediately disavowed the actions taken by the Monarchists in Munich, and expelled Gil Robles from his private council.<sup>393</sup>

The Franco regime, and the forces that were not present at the Munich meeting, tried to underrate the significance of the Conference, but the facts have to be analyzed after the repercussion developed, and these seem quite disproportionate, which is only understandable if the agreement caused a great shock.

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<sup>392</sup> *Projet de resolution. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 43, File 6, p. 163. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/14039.pdf> (consulted on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017), p. 159.*

<sup>393</sup> Confidential Report “*An evaluation of the Munich meeting of the Spanish opposition.*” NARA, General Records of the Department of State. RG 59. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. 1960-63 General Decimal File. Box, 1808, p. 8.

ii. Nothing without Euzkadi, nothing against Euzkadi. Internal differences within Basque nationalism on the Munich agreement.

The Basques present at the Munich meeting, especially Manuel Irujo—who was also a member of the CFEME, promoter of the meeting—were satisfied with the result of the Conference.

The agreement of the Spanish democrats was satisfactory, especially for the exiles, who had been following the Munich meeting through the chronicles written in OPE and the articles published in *Alderdi*.<sup>394</sup>

*“Mi distinguido Amigo: Con la emoción que Vd. Puede figurarse escuchamos ayer los cables por radio del feliz resultado de su reunión en Munich y hoy la prensa, le dedica grandes titulares y gran espacio a dicha reunión con trectos amplios de los discursos de Madariaga y Gil Robles, nombres de muchos asistentes, etc.... (...) Después de las huelgas, con una programación perfecta y ahora este acuerdo y naturalmente programas de actuación conjunta, es de esperar que la Dictadura (sic.) no pueda resistir mucho tiempo y deje paso a otra situación que permita establecer la libertad y la democracia para todos.”*

Julián Larrea expressed his satisfaction from Caracas, where *Gudari*, the publication of EGI (the youth members of the PNV), also described the Munich agreement as follows:

*“El acuerdo de la oposición antifranquista de Munich tiene como base una afirmación humanista contra el régimen español, opresor de la persona humana y genocida por atentar contra las comunidades naturales.”*<sup>395</sup>

In fact, the expression “comunidades naturales” was not chosen at random, but on purpose. Article no. 3 of the final resolution, “*El reconocimiento de las distintas comunidades naturales,*” was written to fulfill the demands of the nationalities inside Spain other than the Spanish—the Basque, the Catalan, and the Galician—and, after a proposal made by the Basques:

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<sup>394</sup> On the Munich meeting, see OPE nos.: 3637 (15/06/1962); 3670 (20/06/1962); 3642 (22/06/1962); 3645 (27/06/1962); 3656 (12/07/1962). And *Alderdi* nos.:183 (July 1962); 184-185 (August-Septemebr 1962).

<sup>395</sup> Larrea’s letter can be found in: *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 3, File 13. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/9318.pdf> (consulted on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017). *Gudari*’s report on Munich is found in issue no. 12, August 1962.

“Gironella ha dado cuenta de la propuesta de Landaburu. La modificación por adición de las Comunidades naturales no ha dado lugar a discusión alguna,” which is how it was explained in the minutes of the CFEME meeting of May 25<sup>th</sup>, 1962, when the exiles were preparing the proposal to discuss in Munich.<sup>396</sup>

The statement was too ambiguous or too naïve for some Basque nationalists, who expected, since they regarded themselves as a unique people inside Spain, something more decisive that included the defense of an “immediate Autonomy” in case of that the Franco Regime was overcome.

The divergences were not insurmountable, but they pointed to a new disagreement inside Basque nationalism and represented a crisis in the development of a future strategy.

It cannot be said that the disagreement was a question of generational conflict; it was, but not only.

The young generation of EGI was pretty satisfied with the national definition included in the resolution:

*“Nosotros estamos contra Franco porque somos demócratas. Pero nuestro antifranquismo tiene otro signo: el de lo vasco, el de la libertad nacional. No aceptaríamos ninguna solución que no implicara el reconocimiento de nuestro derecho de autodeterminación. De ahí que en Munich hayamos trabajado por conseguir y hayamos conseguido el reconocimiento pleno de nuestra personalidad vasca (...) Nada puede hacerse en la península después de la caída de Franco sin que se respeten nuestras prerrogativas nacionales. Ningún régimen podrá entrar en el concierto Europeo en otras condiciones que en las que el IV Congreso del Movimiento Europeo ha adoptado en Munich (...). Sin la condición del respeto a nuestra personalidad como pueblo no hubiésemos participado en ningún acuerdo. (...) Nuestro lema ha sido: Nada sin Euzkadi, nada contra Euzkadi.”*

But not all young nationalists (not even all of the EGI members) were as enthusiastic as the report in *Gudari* was. Some of the young representatives of EGI and ELA-STV who had been

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<sup>396</sup> *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 43, File 6, p. 163. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/14039.pdf> (consulted on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017), p. 30.

invited to participate in Munich believed that the resolution was too vague in its defense of the Basque nation, and they held a different concept of what the future must be like after Franco. In the words of José Antonio Ayestarán,<sup>397</sup> they were upset with the Basque representative at the Federal movement because the resolution agreed upon did not include

*“La autonomía inmediata para Euskadi y Cataluña como condición indispensable para hablar de democracia y de ruptura con el régimen franquista. El pacto de Munich tiene connotaciones parecidas al de San Sebastián y a las circunstancias anteriores al 14 de Abril de 1931, y nosotros teníamos muy presente que los catalanes, proclamada la República, se tomaron la autonomía inmediata y proclamaron el Estat Català. (...) Por otra parte, y viendo que la única oposición seria y organizada en el Estado español era la vasca, algunos consideramos que hubiera sido necesario exigir algo más de lo que allí se firmó.”*<sup>398</sup>

For ELA-STV, the invitation to attend the meeting in Munich was well-received, and the young members, very active inside the Franco regime those years, grew expectant before the prospect of their participating in a European meeting. But the realpolitik developed by the “old guard” of Basques in the exile crashed against the energy and impatience of the young trade unionists who, after two years, in 1964, decided to create a new organization, ELA-Berri, to unite the young to confront the “olds”: “(...) *La juventud rebelde se enfrentó con sus mayores: las neo izquierdas rompieron con el PCE, ETA con el PNV, ELA-Berri con ELA-STV, el PSOE interior (Amat y algún otro) intentó hacerlo con Toulouse.*”

This is how Idoia Estornés<sup>399</sup> describes the days when the young Basques were looking for answers to the Franco regime, amidst the names of the different political parties, trade unions, and associations that mushroomed in Spain during the 60's. ELA-Berri was born of the unconformity of the Munich meeting, and Aguinaga “*El Bonzo*,” Kepa Anabitarte “*Eladio*,”

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<sup>397</sup> José Antonio Ayestarán, Iñaki Aguinaga, and Kepa Anabitarte were three of the members of EGI and ELA-STV who were critical with the resolution in Munich.

<sup>398</sup> Ayestarán was not able to attend the Munich meeting because he did not have a passport; but he was very actively critical against the position taken by the Basques in Munich. Ayestarán had been a member of EKIN, was member of EGI since 1960, and in 1964 would join ELA-STV. Interview by IBARZÁBAL, Eugenio, “José Antonio Ayestarán y la historia de ELA-STV,” in *Muga*, no.3, 1980, pp. 57-72.

<sup>399</sup> ESTORNÉS, Idoia, 2013, *Cómo pudo pasarnos esto. Crónica de una chica de los 60*. Donostia: Erein, p. 302. Although Idoia Estornés follows the explanation given by Anabitarte or Ayestarán about the creation of ELA-Berri, Koldo San Sebastián (in “1962: *El llamado contubernio de Munich*,” *op. cit.*, p. 37) relates a second version where the real cause of the secession would be the demand inside the group of ELA-STV of having greater presence in the Consultative Council and other bodies.



and José Antonio Ayestarán “*Baroja*” were the parents of the new ELA, for whom immediate autonomy was an unnegotiable part of social and national liberation, and inseparable “*como en la China de Mao*” from the fight to abandon the Bourgeois nationalism of the PNV.<sup>400</sup>

The young Basques were broadening the breach already opened by ETA; but inside the PNV there were also opinions that minimized the importance of the agreements signed there.

According to the words of Solaun, a member of the Bizkai-Buru Batzar, the Iberian Resolution, with its reference to the “Natural Communities,” was not enough for Basque political goals: “*De ninguna manera la resolución aprobada en Munich podría considerarse un pacto que vinculase a los nacionalistas en particular. Allí no se reseñaba ni la autonomía ni, mucho menos, el ejercicio del derecho de autodeterminación.*”<sup>401</sup>

Different concepts of Basque nationalism were being developed in those days; and it was probably to face the criticism and the leaks within traditional Basque nationalism that Irujo wrote an article in *Alderdi* to waterproof the old barrel of Basque nationalism of the PNV. Irujo wanted to explain the decisions and the realpolitik deployed by the PNV in Europe, probably as an answer to all the criticism received after the agreement, and especially in reaction to the controversy created by the “natural communities.”

In the article, published in *Alderdi* no.183 in July 1962, Irujo distinguished between Basque nationalism and the Basque government. Although we have seen that most of the time the activities of Basque nationalism and those of the Basque government got confused—especially if we realize that the activities were taken from the exile and without any real government activity—Irujo in this case wanted to differentiate between both concepts:

*“Una cosa es nacionalismo, o si se quiere Partido Nacionalista Vasco, y otra muy distinta Gobierno de Euzkadi. El nacionalismo vasco es un movimiento filosófico, social y político, que aspira a realizar la nación vasca en todas las áreas del pensamiento, de la cultura, de la sociología, de la economía, de la espiritualidad, del genio civil, de la étnica y de la política. El nacionalismo vasco es una civilización. Esto es lo que queremos decir cuando afirmamos que Euzkadi es la patria de los vascos. (...) El Gobierno de Euzkadi es la Institución representativa de un régimen autonómico*

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<sup>400</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 305.

<sup>401</sup> SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo “Vascos en el contubernio de Munich,” in *Muga*, Bilbao, 1983, no. 26, pp. 56-69.

*logrado por aplicación de la doctrina de los Estatutos afirmada por la Constitución de la República española.”*

What Irujo is trying to explain is that the policies developed by the Basque government in order to fulfill the Basque nationalists' aspirations were linked to the development of sovereignty, but he highlights the importance of the European federation, within which the new order of the State must be developed. It is implicit in the article that the Basque nationalism of the PNV defends the European movement as a way to keep the singularity of the Basque people alive, “No queremos poner aduanas en el Ebro. Aspiramos a quitar las de los Pirineos,” thus defining the frame of the future European Union as something necessary.

The firm defense of the European movement is present in different articles of the same Alderdi issue, for example in one of the editorials, “*El Congreso Europeísta de Munich*,” or in “*El Movimiento Europeo. Las Conversaciones de Munich*,” defining the interests of the PNV.

Europe and the European Movement would be the political strategy followed by the traditional Basque nationalism of the PNV during the 60's and the 70's. Their presence at international bodies was reduced to participating in the European federal meetings and in some conferences of the Christian Democracy, but the idea of promoting the European frame as the field of battle for the recognition of the rights of the Basque people was the only hope they held on to. Although not the same as the Europe imagined by Lehendakari Aguirre, and far from the “Europe of peoples,” still Europe was being built, and it seemed that, sooner or later, the Franco Regime would be accepted.

*“Demostrada como quedaba que esa no era la Europa en cuya edificación había puesto tantas esperanzas y rota, por supuesto, cualquier aspiración a acceder a ella de manera autónoma, el PNV optó por avanzar en el marco de una política pragmática de cooperación, aunque limitada, con fuerzas democráticas estatales, tanto en el plano peninsular como en el europeo.”*<sup>402</sup>

The strategy of alliances with the Spanish forces was painful for Basque nationalism, because, despite being one of the founding members of the European Movement, the condition of State nationalism prevailed. Irujo tried to explain that the agreements with the Spanish democrats were the only way to get recognized in Europe, and he defended the *Unión de Fuerzas*

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<sup>402</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre. *op. cit.*, p. 248.

*Democráticas* (UFD),<sup>403</sup> an agreement signed in 1961 that was not too far from *Lehendakari* Aguirre's idea of a unity of all democrats.

In fact, the several agreements made with the Spanish democrat forces became one of the main points of divergence with the young Basque nationalists—more important even than European Federalism, as we have seen before.

The divergences were public and noticed. Basque nationalism was losing followers:

*“El mundo se encuentra en periodo constituyente. Es propio de la humana naturaleza y en especial de todos los periodos constituyentes el que los hombres cambien ideas y opongan actitudes. Los vascos ni podemos ni queremos ser excepción a esa condición humana. Ha de sernos permitido no obstante llamar cariñosamente la atención a nuestros amigos de los diversos grupos desgajados del tronco maternal del Partido Nacionalista Vasco como son Jagi-Jagi, ETA, en cuyas tribunas encontramos con harta frecuencia vertidos conceptos que, tal vez sin buscarlo y hemos de suponer que de buena fe, dan lugar a que se produzcan las confusiones que motivan el que estas líneas sean escritas.”*

Wrote Manuel Irujo in the aforementioned article “Gobierno de Euzkadi y nacionalismo Vasco,” adding and highlighting the points in common with the Basque nationalist critics: *“Tenemos el mismo programa, igual doctrina, idénticas aspiraciones, similares sentimientos de patria y de nación. Para todos Euskadi es la patria de los vascos. ¿Por qué en el nacionalismo vasco ha de haber hermanos separados?”*

Moving its focus away from the Spanish since 1960, the polarized world was no longer bipolar *stricto sensu*, but there were still changes affecting that way of believing in world politics. The countries that became independent with the dismantlement of the colonial empires created a third way, rallying the UN under the “non-alignment movement.”

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<sup>403</sup> The UFD was an agreement signed on June 4<sup>th</sup>, 1961 initially by Izquierda Democrática Cristiana, Partido Socialista Obrero Español, Acción Republicana Democrática, Unión General de Trabajadores, Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Acción Nacionalista Vasca, and Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos. The UFD was created as a way to organize collectively the opposition to Franco. The Foundation acts and some of the first meetings' minutes can be found in: *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 47, File 4. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/3126.pdf> (consulted on February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017)

The blocks of the Cold War were melting down, even though the USSR tried to keep them up by building a wall across Berlin on August 13<sup>th</sup>, 1961. The ice of the Cold War was melting into water, which escaped through the wall's cracks.

The “non-alignment movement” meant also the rise of a popular conscience and the rise of European regionalisms or nationalisms that were looking to the self-determinations of the third world as an example to follow. That was the strategy ETA would follow in approaching the “third world movement,” as it also clearly involved approaching the revolutionary and socialist movements. By the end of the 60's Europe was in a political and social turmoil after some years of relative economic and social calm. Something was going on with the European middle class, that they just wouldn't accept liberal democracies as an answer to their frustrations.

In this respect, it is worth mentioning that the European concept was embraced by all kinds of Basque nationalists, not only the traditional nationalism of the PNV, but also the emerging revolutionary nationalisms, especially those from ETA,<sup>404</sup> despite coming from different points of view.

At the same time, however, it is important not to ignore the ever more frequent presence of articles dealing with the repression inside the continental Basque country. Articles about the strikes, detention of Basque nationalists, tortures, and the increasing number of Basque prisoners were inevitably bound to shift the importance of Basque nationalism from the exile to the inside. As we will be able to see in the next chapter, the recognition that Basque nationalism had not obtained from the European movement was going to be granted as a result of the repression in the Franco regime.

### **Actions and Reactions to the Munich Agreement**

For the democratic Spanish representatives, the agreement reached in Munich was a success: in Salvador de Madariaga's words, it amounted to the end of the war,<sup>405</sup> since it represented a union of all the pro-democracy forces in order to defeat the Franco Regime and establish/reestablish democracy in Spain.

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<sup>404</sup> SAN SEBASTIÁN, 1989, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

<sup>405</sup> Salvador de Madariaga finished his speech with the sentence: “*The Spanish Civil war is over today.*” OPE. No. 3637, June 15<sup>th</sup>, 1962.

As we saw already, among Basque nationalists the agreement was seen as a triumph of the democracy that was represented by the exiles, the “inside exile,” and the casualties of the Spanish Civil War, according to Ibón Navascués, member of EGI in 1962, who moreover added the important, relevant fact that the Basque nationalists were members of the European movement.<sup>406</sup>

But the consequences of the agreement in Munich cannot be analyzed without taking into account the reaction of the Franco regime—and what is more, the knowledge and concept of the meeting that we have today, and even the conception of it as the beginning of the transition (a concept that was coined later on), came as the result of the disproportionate reaction of the Spanish dictatorship.

The reaction of Franco’s regime was quick. The day immediately after the conference, article 14 of the *Fuero de los Trabajadores* (Spain’s Bill of Rights), which allowed the free change of residence, was suspended. The Spanish Regime explained this reaction as due to a campaign against the regime coming from the exterior, and necessarily involving collaboration of certain persons from inside Spain.

The participants at the Munich meeting were asked to choose between remaining in exile or being confined in the Canary Islands, the archipelago that had already been used for the same purpose by Primo de Rivera during his dictatorship.<sup>407</sup> Thus, for example, Satrústegui, Álvarez de Miranda, and Jesús Barrios Lis were sent to confinement in the Canary Islands, whereas José M<sup>a</sup> Gil Robles, Dionisio Ridruejo, Isidro Infante, and Vicente Ventura were forced into an exile from which many never came back.

The Spanish newspapers were forced to publish two chronicles—even though they never sent any journalist to the conference—and they had to follow the article written for the French newspaper *France-soir*, whose correspondent was also not at the meeting, resulting therefore in reports based on a highly erroneous account.<sup>408</sup>

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<sup>406</sup> SATRÚSTEGUI, Joaquín [Et.Alt.], 1993, *Cuando la transición se hizo posible: El Contubernio de Munich*. Madrid: Tecnos. pp. 74-77.

<sup>407</sup> OPE. No. 3637. June 15<sup>th</sup>, 1962.

<sup>408</sup> ABC published it openly on its front page on June 10<sup>th</sup>, 1962, with the headline “Marcel Niedergang ha asistido a la reunión ultrasecreta de Munich. El contubernio de la traición.”

One of these two chronicles described the meeting between the Spaniards of the inside and of the exile as a “*Contubernio de la traición a España,*” and a “*Nuevo Pacto de Munich,*” in clear reference to the Pact of Munich in 1938.

The regime also organized demonstrations and an intense anti-Europe campaign, banning the publication of the Iberian Resolution.

The international community condemned the reaction of the Franco Regime: the committee *Amitiés Méditerranéennes*, *Le Figaro*, *Le Monde*, *L’Express*, the Swedish radio, The New York Times, and many other media<sup>409</sup> condemned the repression against the democrats who had attended the meeting in Munich, and the European Movement sent a delegation to visit Franco in order to protest against the sanctions imposed to the Spaniards who had attended Munich.

The EEC Commission’s spokesman emitted a communication on June 12<sup>th</sup>, 1962, condemning the measures taken by the Franco regime against the participants in Munich; but despite the statement and all the support received from the European Federal Movement, as well as from some political personalities of different governments in Europe, the statements were not the facts.

The proof that what was being constructed in Europe was nothing but a Union of States that would ignore the rights of the peoples and would even play politics with dictators, was a telegram that can be read at the NARA archives in Washington. The report, written and sent through a telegram on June 20<sup>th</sup>, 1962, probably after a Secretary of State’s request, explains the EEC statement and its possible consequences.

We can assert without a shadow of a doubt that the US government, through the Department of State, was interested in the future of Spain, as can be confirmed from the report *Speculation on form and nature of a Post-Franco Government*,<sup>410</sup> written by the American embassy in Madrid on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 1961, the objective of which was clear:

“(…) *Despite the speculative nature of the exercise, it seems worth going into, now and from time to time, if only to seek to avoid being suddenly confronted with a political surprise in this strategic corner of Europe*” adding “*and to see if there is anything the*

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<sup>409</sup> OPE. No. 3642 (22/06/1962); OPE 3656 (12/07/1062)

<sup>410</sup> *Speculation on the form and nature of the Post-Franco Spanish Government*. Madrid, September 11<sup>th</sup>, 1961. NARA, General Records of the Department of State. RG 59. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. 1960-63 General Decimal File. Box, 1808.

*US can or should do, that is not now doing, to try to influence the course of political events in Spain for the sake of US interests in this part of the world.”*

The telegram that was sent the year after was intended to confirm whether the ECC was going to veto the entrance of Spain in the Economic Union, as could be understood from the assertion taken from the ECC statement: “Commission circles were profoundly shocked at the measures taken by the Spanish government against European militants who were punished as a result of their participation in the European Congress at Munich. It was considered that such measures are not compatible with examination of the Spanish request for association with the CM.”<sup>411</sup>

The US agents in Brussels were determined to know if the ECC was serious about the measures against the Franco Regime, understanding that “this strategic corner of Europe” and its relations with the European Union were something they needed to care about. But the EEC commissioner calmed down the Americans: “Has told me (to the person who writes the report) that he does not think Spanish Government’ sanctions against Munich participants will have immediate practical effect on Spanish application, which already was at bottom of a long list and in his opinion might not be acted on ‘before many years.’”

The European Community declared in public against the Spanish repression, but did nothing to help the Spanish democrats.

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<sup>411</sup> The Statement is a free translation done by the author of the American report, found in the telegram sent from Brussels to the Secretary of State on June 20<sup>th</sup>, 1962. NARA, *ibid*.

## f. Irujo and the Congress for Cultural Freedom

Give me a hundred million dollars and  
a thousand dedicated people,  
and I will guarantee to generate  
such a wave of democratic unrest among the masses - yes,  
even among the soldiers - of Stalin's own empire,  
that all his problems for a long period of time,  
to come will be internal.  
I can find the people.  
*Sidney Hook, 1949*

If Manuel Irujo was famous for anything, despite his Basque nationalist affiliation, it was for being a hard-working and broad-minded person. His archive of articles, notes, letters, reports, meetings, reflections, sessions, conferences, etc. is a good example of these two features that define Manuel Irujo.

“*Exilio es papel en que escibimos,*”<sup>412</sup> said Joseba Sarrionandia, and that is exactly what Manuel Irujo developed during his long exile, ceaselessly writing to keep the Basque nation alive, to fight for the Basque cause, to vindicate the Basque institutions and laws, to defend democracy and denounce totalitarianism, to avoid being forgotten, to be remembered. As we have seen already, the participation of Basque nationalism in the European movement was a political strategy followed mainly by the PNV, but it was also employed by the Basque government, and it was a good scenario for the Basque people to be internationally recognized. Yet international recognition through the means of culture was another way that could be explored by a cultured man like Irujo.

We have already seen the involvement of Basque nationalists in the development of the “Unión Cultural de los países de Europa Occidental,” as well as some previous actions related with

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<sup>412</sup> “Exilio es papel en que escibimos” is a verse of Sarrionandia’s poem “Propuestas para una definición de exilio.” SARRIONANDIA, Joseba, 2017, *Hilda dago poesia?/¿La poesía está muerta?* Iruña: Pamiela.



international culture bodies, such as UNESCO, mainly through the Basque delegates in America.

But exile facilitates encounters with strange travelling companions, and so we can analyze the multiple and diverse contacts made by Manuel Irujo. One of those strange contacts was the relationship established with Julián Gómez García, better known as Julián Gorkín, a Spanish communist, member of the POUM, who fought in the Spanish Civil War with the Popular Front and fled into exile in 1937,<sup>413</sup> with whom Irujo was in contact through the European Movement, but also, as will be analyzed in this chapter, through the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom was a cultural conference that was founded in the last week of June 1950 in Berlin, one day after North Korea invaded the South,<sup>414</sup> in a meeting of 118 writers, artists, and “*hombres de ciencia*” from 21 different countries who were there to debate about freedom but were also determined to work together in protecting the freedom of thought: “Se comprometieron a trabajar conjuntamente para salvaguardar la más amenazada de nuestras libertades: la del pensamiento creador y crítico,” in a clear, intellectual meeting against the lack of cultural freedom, especially as it was suffered in the countries under Soviet influence. It was not a coincidence that the place chosen to hold the foundational meeting was a landmark of the Cold War.

With the objective of defending the “Manifiesto a los hombres libres”—the founding manifest that had been approved during the sessions—they decided to create a permanent organization to fight any attacks to the freedom of culture. That is how the Congress for Cultural Freedom

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<sup>413</sup> A very interesting account of Julián Gorkin’s life can be read in an autobiography that was censored during many years in Spain: (2015) *El Revolucionario Profesional: Testimonio de un hombre de acción*, Barcelona: Aymà; and although there is no a biography on him available, we can also follow part of his life in the works of Jordi Amat (2016) *La primavera de Múnich...*, *op. cit.*, and (2016) *La semilla del liberalismo: Política y literatura en torno a la actividad española del Congreso por la libertad de la cultura. (1958-1969)*. Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona, pp. 26-53; 74-79.

<sup>414</sup> Michael Warner, the CIA former historian who studied the Congress based on the CIA’s confidential documents, suggests that there was some CIA connection between that fact and the creation of the Congress, although due to the lack of information the question is not studied. “Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50,” in *Studies in Intelligence*, 38, 1995. Also in: <file:///Users/auroramadaula1/Desktop/Bascos%20i%20Munic/Congress%20of%20the%20Cultural%20Freedom.pdf> (consulted on March 1<sup>st</sup>, 2017). Among all the publications dealing with the Congress for Cultural Freedom, it is important to highlight the following, which I made use of to write this section: GLONDYS, Olga, 2012, *op. cit.*; STONOR SAUNDERS, Frances, 2001, *La CIA y la Guerra fría cultural*. Madrid: Debate; CONGRESO POR LA LIBERTAD DE LA CULTURA, 1961, *El Congreso por la libertad de la cultura*. Paris; as well as the works already mentioned by Jordi Amat: (2016) *La primavera de Múnich...*, *op. cit.*, and (2016) *La semilla del liberalismo*, *op. cit.*

was created, and got material published in different countries of Africa, Europe, America, and Asia.

The attendees to the foundational meeting were intellectuals of different nationalities committed to freedom and to democracy, including, among many others: Julian Amery (UK), Germán Arciniegas (Colombia), Ralph Bunche (USA), R.H.S. Crossman (UK), André Malraux (France), Eleanor Roosevelt (USA), and Tennessee Williams (USA).<sup>415</sup>

The interesting fact about the Congress for Cultural Freedom is that, despite being a congress with the aim of developing the freedom of culture and promoting the work of western writers and intellectuals, the Congress was nonetheless part of the American cultural and ideological strategy to stop the Soviet offensive: “The Congress for Cultural Freedom is widely considered one of the CIA’s more daring and effective Cold War covert operation,” stated Michael Warner, rejecting the idea that the Congress was an independent intellectual movement.<sup>416</sup>

The Congress developed its activities from 1950 until 1967, when the CIA’s funding of the Congress was discovered—with the subsequent scandal—and was transformed into the International Association for Cultural Freedom, mainly funded by private donors, and especially the Ford foundation.<sup>417</sup>

During these almost two decades, the Congress published several cultural journals, organized dozens of conferences, and brought together some of the most eminent Western thinkers, not only to fight against the world behind the iron curtain, but also to denounce the lack of freedom, promote the liberal values and freedom of thinking, and fight against indifference and political neutrality. It was no wonder that Manuel Irujo wanted to participate in a cultural movement like that.

Irujo participated by doing what he best did: writing in the Spanish-language journal Cuadernos and—according to his vast archive and his correspondence with Julian Gorkin—following with interest the publication of the issues and articles that Gorkin and Madariaga would send to edit.

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<sup>415</sup> CONGRESO POR LA LIBERTAD DE LA CULTURA, 1961, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2

<sup>416</sup> WARNER, Michael, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

<sup>417</sup> The Ford Foundation was the same private American foundation that paid for the “*Centro de Estudios y documentación*,” as already mentioned, and their participation in the organization of the Munich Congress is what arouses the suspicions on the American funding. After having read all the sources that talk about the Munich meeting, especially those from the American State Department, I cannot confirm whether the USA was behind the funding of the Munich meeting, mainly in view of the report where they deny it, but also because of the financing troubles some attendees experienced to be at Munich. Nevertheless, since some of the NARA documents related to the Munich Congress are still classified, I cannot totally dismiss the possibility.

The first journal edited by the Congress was *Preuves*, a monthly publication directed by François Bondy from Paris. After this first journal came *Encounter* in London, *Forum* in Vienna, *Tempo Presente* in Italy, *Soviet Survey*, directed by Walter Laqueur, and *Quest*, published in India. In 1960 there were 12 different publications edited by the Congress, like *Cuadernos*, which was in Spanish and well known in South America, when the Congress started spreading its influence not only in the west but also to other areas that needed it. That is how we can find *Jiyu* published in Tokyo or *Quadrant* in Australia. The headquarters of the Congress were in Paris, and apart from the conferences and journals, its activity was developed through national committees in charge of the organization of the journals.<sup>418</sup>

Since 1952 there was an increasing interest in developing national committees in Latin America, and Julián Gorkin was the person chosen to lead the expansion.<sup>419</sup>

The strategy followed by the American services in South America to chase and eliminate Nazis, which had been carried out with the help of the Basque services in the 40's, as we have already seen in previous chapters, was used once again against a new totalitarianism, but making use of what Joseph Nye would later describe as *soft power*.<sup>420</sup>

*“La libertad no está amenazada únicamente por las doctrinas totalitarias. Puede verse también comprometida por la propia evolución de un progreso material originalmente emancipador, pero que se manifiesta a veces según el capricho de ciertas ambiciones nacionales, ideológicas o privadas que se interfieren anárquicamente, sin tener en cuenta las tradiciones vivas y sin ningún criterio regulador. La extensión del sistema parlamentario y de las prácticas democráticas entraña problemas de adaptación no menos serios, más fecundos, pero más difíciles que los que plantean las dictaduras...”* says Denis de Rougemont, President of the executive committee and founder of the European Cultural Center in 1949, in his “En defensa de la libertad.”<sup>421</sup>

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<sup>418</sup> CONGRESO POR LA LIBERTAD DE LA CULTURA, 1961, *op. cit.*; SAUNDERS, Frances, 2001, *op. cit.*, pp. 300-304.

<sup>419</sup> AMAT, Jordi. 2016. La semilla del liberalismo, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

<sup>420</sup> Joseph Nye first coined the concept in his 1990 book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic books. He describes soft power as: “when one country gets other countries to want what it wants-might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants.” Later, Nye developed the concept in his 2004 book *Soft Power*. New York: Public affairs. I believe that what the Congress for Cultural Freedom was doing can be considered as a kind of Soft Power, especially if we contrast the activities developed through that strategy with the selective targets, or military invasions, or cooperation that are related to “hard power.”

<sup>421</sup> CONGRESO POR LA LIBERTAD DE LA CULTURA, 1961, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

The objective was not only totalitarianism, although it was the main one, focused especially on the Soviet Union; but with the growing of the Conference, the aims of the vindication of freedom were also broadened. So the Congress for Cultural Freedom “was more than merely the invention of the CIA; it also sprang from a well-developed tradition of spontaneous self-organization of the Anti-Stalinist left,” in words of Hugh Wildford,<sup>422</sup> referring to that spontaneous feature of the Congress and its adaptation to Europe, as well as the need of looking for a “third way” that could place Europe somewhere in the bipolar world of the Cold War.

Every journal published or edited by the Congress was independent and, therefore, was not expressing the opinion of the Congress but rather of the board of the journal. In that way, “*Algunas tienen un carácter más técnico, otras se dirigen al gran público; unas se interesan casi exclusivamente por la literatura mientras otras siguen una determinada tendencia político cultural; algunas se inclinan por el socialismo, otras hacia el liberalismo e incluso existe una de carácter bastante conservador.*”<sup>423</sup>

Nevertheless, most of the participants in the Congress were ex-communists, members of the non-communist resistance against Nazism, European federalists, some intellectual refugees from the Soviet Block, and a small representation of Spanish exiles. The participation of European federalists, Spanish refugees, and even ex-communists gave the Congress that special feature that the US government sometimes seemed to ignore with regard to the Spanish resistance. There was a third way lying in the way of totalitarianism in Europe, and that was what the Basque nationalists were trying to vindicate in front of Christian Democracy and European federalism. A good example of that vindication was the editorial of *Alderdi* from November 1962, “*Comunismo no, Franquismo tampoco,*” denouncing those two axis as a single one: “*Existen dos tipos de regímenes totalitarios, el izquierdista y el derechista que tienen de común la divinización del Estado y la minimización de los derechos de la persona humana.*” In the bipolar world of the Cold War, the threat of a possible communist regime after Franco was the excuse for non-intervention, despite the efforts of the Spanish democrats’ resistance in rejecting that idea. The editorial finishes saying:

“*Rechazamos como ficticio ese dilema de <Comunismo o anticomunismo> que nutre toda la propaganda franquista, porque para nosotros la verdadera réplica del*

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<sup>422</sup> Hugh Wildford “The Permanent Revolution?,” quoted in GLONDYS, Olga, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

<sup>423</sup> CONGRESO POR LA LIBERTAD DE LA CULTURA, 1961, *op. cit.*, pp. 5.

*comunismo es la democracia respetuosa con los derechos del hombre y de los pueblos. Rechazamos también ese falso dilema porque al prescindir de la democracia, predispone a quienes no lo conocen y están asqueados del franquismo, en favor del comunismo. Nuestro slogan es pues, ni comunismo ni franquismo, sino democracia.”*

At the foundational meeting in Berlin there were two Spanish representatives, the socialist Carmen de Gurtubay, and the Basque clergyman Alberto Onaindía.

Manuel Irujo and the Basque nationalists were fully aware of the participation of the two in the Berlin meeting of June 1950, when Irujo answered a letter to Jesús Leizaola with his characteristic irreverence:

*“Las he hecho llegar (las notas) a Carmen Gurtubay. Esta mujer, que es bastante insensata, se ha movido para lograr que Don Alberto Onaindia sea invitado a las Conferencias de Berlín y que, además, le paguen el viaje y estancias. Ha dado su conformidad en principio. Supongo que irá. ¡Vaya pareja!”<sup>424</sup>*

Carmen Gurtubay, Marchioness of Yurreta and Gamboa in Biscay, went to Berlin in representation of Salvador de Madariaga, who had not been able to assist, probably because he went to India, according to Irujo’s sources, and Alberto Onaindia gave two speeches in Berlin: “Report on Intellectual Life in present Spain” and “Culture, Freedom, Christianity,”<sup>425</sup> which showed how the Spanish representation would contribute to the Congress with a fierce anti-Francoism, denounced through the journal Cuadernos and its news bulletin, Boletín de prensa.

Based on the memories of Francesc Ferreras, a former Falangist who became a democrat against the Franco Regime, Jordi Amat explains that at a meeting in Paris the Congress of Cultural Freedom showed its interest in the situation of Spain, and they decided to act on two different fronts: a cultural and a political front, the latter being led by Julián Gorkin.<sup>426</sup>

For Gorkin, leading the cultural front meant touring Latin America and directing the journal Cuadernos, as well as some other similar ones like *Cadernos Brasileiros* since 1955, or establishing in Argentina the *Asociación Argentina por la Libertad de la Cultura*.

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<sup>424</sup> Manuel Irujo to Jesús M<sup>a</sup> de Leizaola, Paris, June 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1950. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 30, File 9. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/11050.pdf>. There is also information on the Berlin meeting in a letter from Hickman to Irujo, June 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1950, in *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 34, File 4.

<sup>425</sup> GLONDYS, Olga, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

<sup>426</sup> AMAT, Jordi, 2016, *La Primavera de Múnich...*, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

The journal *Cuadernos*, where Irujo collaborated, was essentially anti-totalitarian and reproduced articles from the other journals of the Congress (Preuves or Encounter), also expressing a strong anti-sovietism and supporting the development of the American plan of promoting European federalism with articles like “*La unidad Europea y la coexistencia,*” written by Gorkin in February 1955.<sup>427</sup>

In its first editorial, in March, 1953 the objectives were expressed:

*“(...) Aspiran nuestros cuadernos a recoger y a traducir lo universal a nuestro idioma, pero asimismo y sobretodo a recoger y a canalizar las ricas y variadas expresiones del espíritu latinoamericano hacia lo universal. (...) Una tribuna abierta al pensamiento creador de las Américas y un medio de comunicación con la espiritualidad de los otros pueblos y continentes.”*<sup>428</sup>

The journal was quarterly until 1954, when it began to be issued bimonthly, and in 1961 it became monthly due to the importance of Latin America in the Cold War, the social changes, the awakening of the masses, and the necessity of attracting the new generations.

We have seen already that Irujo and Gorkin intensified their relationship mainly through the European Federal Movement, and especially with the organization of the Munich meeting, but their “friendship” was not recent, as the former stated in an article written in 1957, where he relates the story:

*“Corrían los días de 1938. Había yo dimitido de mi cargo de Ministro vasco en el Gobierno de la República por incompatibilidad con los modos políticos aplicados y por solidaridad con Cataluña. Me encontraba en París. En Barcelona se preparaba entre tanto un proceso que prometía ser sensacional varias docenas de intelectuales, socialistas de izquierda, desafectos a la dictadura soviética fueron puestos en prisión con motivo del “putsch” de mayo de 1937.*

*Tras la acusación del Ministerio público estaba el interés del Partido comunista, que pretendía lograr la declaración de traidores para los procesados que permitiera un fallo condenatorio y fusilar en ejecución de sentencia a aquellos anti-stalinianos (...).”*

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<sup>427</sup> AMAT, Jordi, 2016, *La semilla del liberalismo...*, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

<sup>428</sup> “Libertad y universalidad de la cultura,” in *Cuadernos del Congreso por la Libertad de la Cultura*, Paris, Num. 1, March, 1953, p. 4.

Manuel Irujo, a conservative man in politics, Catholic, and Basque nationalist, was above anything else a democrat, and he was against the death penalty and the abuse of violence, regardless of the perpetrator, which is why he traveled from Paris to declare in favor of the communists that had been charged:

*“Tres horas duró mi declaración. Al terminar, el Fiscal modificaba sus conclusiones. En lugar de acusar a los procesados de traición y pedir para ellos la pena de muerte, los acusó de sedición y pidió diversas penas, ninguna de ellas capital. La conspiración quedaba desecha. El partido comunista había perdido el pleito y los procesados salvaban su cabeza arrostrando el fallo de la Justicia. Uno de aquellos procesados era Julián Gorkin.”*<sup>429</sup>

This article shows once again how Irujo was capable of getting in touch with anyone who could contribute anything to him, no matter if they were centuries apart ideologically. Although Cuadernos focused mainly on spreading the anti-communism word in a Latin America that was “presa de la propaganda estalinista , peronista y franquista,” according to a report written by Gorkin in 1952,<sup>430</sup> Irujo understood that the journal was also a good platform to spread Basque nationalism.

The exile brought possibilities for culture and for making Basque nationalism known internationally that had to be taken advantage of—and, apart from the political bodies that Basque nationalism was working with, other areas that could be turned to advantage were culture and the intellectual field—and Irujo was one of the best persons to do this.

On June 25<sup>th</sup>, 1953, Irujo wrote a letter to the clergyman Alberto Onaindia, attaching an article on Sabino Arana on the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of his death, with the intention of publishing it in an international medium: “*Lo que tengo empeño es en que se trate el tema fuera del círculo integrista al que llega la revista ALDERDI (sic.) y del que formamos honorable staff Jemein, Altube , Leizaola, Andima Jáuregui y yo.*”<sup>431</sup>

That international medium happened to be *Cuadernos*, and Gorkin the person who made it possible. After informing him who Sabino Arana was in few lines, Irujo suggested, with his natural good manners: “*Pienso que el hecho y la figura merecen un hueco en CUADERNOS.*”

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<sup>429</sup> “*Marx y Rusia,*” article unpublished, 1957(?). AN, Irujo-0068-C3.

<sup>430</sup> GLONDYS, Gloria, 2012, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>431</sup> Manuel Irujo to Alberto Onaindia, Paris, 25<sup>th</sup> June, 1953. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 2, File 9. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/1268.pdf> (consulted on March 1<sup>st</sup>, 2017).

(...) *Cabe un artículo dedicado a su recuerdo en la fecha de su cincuentenario? Se han publicado ya varios. Le incluyo el de Cassou que fue uno de los primeros. Espero sus noticias.*”<sup>432</sup>

We do not have notice of earlier letters between Irujo and Gorkin, but it was obvious that Irujo knew about the existence of the journal and was not only interested in collaborating, but also in receiving the issues, whose regular contributors were brilliant intellectuals of the likes of Raymond Aron, Germán Arciniegas, Herbert Luthi, Czeslaw Mlosz, Andre Malraux, Denis de Rougemont, Salvador de Madariaga, Cladio Sánchez Albornoz, or Americo Castro.

The article on Sabino Arana was finally published in issue number 5 of March-April 1954, under the title “*Sabino de Arana, propulsor del renacimiento vasco,*” and Irujo received 14.000 French francs for it, according to what Gorkin stated in a letter of February 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1954.<sup>433</sup>

Although we do not see more articles by Irujo in the journal, his interest for it was clear, and he kept asking for the issues in several letters exchanged with Gorkin.

In Irujo’s archive we find some issues of Cuadernos that, together with those that one can consult in specialized archives, give us an idea of what the journal was trying to promote as culture.

The journal combines articles on Latin culture like “*La agonía de don Miguel de Unamuno,*” by Benjami Carrion, “*Aproximación a la obra de Jorge Luis Borges,*” by A.L.Revol, or “*Orígenes de la novela en el Brasil,*” by J.Lins do Rego, alongside political articles like “*Aspectos de la sociedad post-stalinista,*” by Franz Borkenau, “*¿A dónde va Rusia?*” by Alex Weissberg, or “*Comunismo y asalariados en Francia.*”

The journal’s anti-communism feature is evident, and the fact that Basque nationalism was willing to collaborate is nothing to be surprised of, since it defines the political strategy employed in the Cold War and the ideological trend of traditional Basque nationalism,

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<sup>432</sup> Manuel Irujo to Julián Gorkin. Paris, October 1953. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box.50, File 4A. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/6420.pdf> (consulted on March 1<sup>st</sup>, 2017). It is also interesting to comment that the letter by Irujo begins with “Decíamos ayer...,” probably quoting his professor Miguel de Unamuno, who after Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship, in 1930, retook his classes after having being forced into exile, with these words. Unamuno was in turn quoting what Fray Luis de León had said four centuries before. Beginning the letter with that sentence was probably because Manuel Irujo wanted to emphasize the cultural nature of it.

<sup>433</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.



especially remarkable given that Basque revolutionary nationalism was embracing the socialist ideas.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to say that this anti-communism was focused on anti-Stalinism, which led the Congress for Cultural Freedom to develop a new organism in the 60's, one in which the Basque nationalist also collaborated, as we will see later in this same section.

Not even this journal was oriented towards the Spanish case: despite being under a totalitarian regime, the publication had only dedicated to it some articles, and it is only since 1958 that a new orientation of the journal is observed, with growing contributions of authors from inside Spain,<sup>434</sup> probably after adopting that “independent feature” that the publications of the Congress would adopt, and that we have commented on before.

Although the turn toward Spain is clear in 1958, some articles published before attracted the interest of Manuel Irujo, who underlined them: “*El problema de las nacionalidades hispánicas*,” by Antoni Rovira i Virgili, or “*Las autonomías en España*,” by Salvador Madariaga, are two examples of this.<sup>435</sup>

As we have already commented, the journal Cuadernos was not the only activity carried out to promote freedom of culture; there were also specialized journals such as Science and Freedom, which was founded after a congress in Hamburg in 1953. The congress that the journal took its name from had been funded with 10.000 dollars from the Rockefeller Foundation and 35.000 dollars from the Farfield Foundation. Directed by Michael Polanyi, a Hungarian-British intellectual, it worked for the same purposes of freedom as the Congress, but highlighting thorny issues like racial segregation in the US or apartheid in South Africa.<sup>436</sup>

Manuel Irujo managed to publish an article denouncing the disappearance of his much-cherished Jesús Galíndez, in August 1956. The article, entitled “The disappearance of Professor Galíndez,” was a final effort from the part of Basque nationalism to spread the word of the fatal disappearance:

“Professor Galíndez was a tireless advocate of freedom. Apart from the cause of his own native Basque country and of the Spanish Republic, he had a particularly at heart the liberation of the peoples of the Dominican Republic from the tyranny which he

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<sup>434</sup> GLONDYS, Olga, 2012, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-193.

<sup>435</sup> There is a fact sheet in the journal *Cuadernos* that details all of the data as well as the full list of participants, sections, and special issues. See: GLONDYS, Olga, 2012, *op. cit.*, pp. 351-353.

<sup>436</sup> STONOR SAUNDERS, Frances, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

himself had experience. (...) His doctoral thesis, which was accepted and approved by Columbia University, is a documentary study of some 700 pages, giving a systematic appraisal of the origins, development and present characteristics of the dictatorship.”

In a formidable way, Manuel Irujo linked the lack of freedom of the Basque country with the lack of freedom of that well-known academic at Columbia University—who was chased down and killed due to the information contained in his research—in a perfectly fitting issue that included articles dealing with academic freedom in the USA and the situation of cultural freedom in the Soviet Union.<sup>437</sup>

The relationship between Gorkin and Irujo continued, and they collaborated together in some cultural and political activities related to the Congress of Cultural Freedom, which made Irujo to be very well considered by Gorkin. From the activities they carried out together, and the nature of these, we can infer that the orientation of the Cultural Congress had transformed slowly from anti-totalitarianism to anti-Stalinism, an activity Gorkin was famous for. The events and meetings that Irujo attended in connection with the Congress were understood as possibilities to spread Basque nationalism in the intellectual spheres, but also, as we have noted before, conformed an ideological frame that was close to anti-communism.

A good example of that trip from anti-totalitarianism to anti-Stalinism is offered by the meeting organized by the association “*Amigos de la libertad*” (a branch of the Congress), where Irujo was invited to talk about the forced migrations from totalitarian countries in 1953 and, after that, the relations focused on discussing the participation in the “*Comisión Española por la Verdad sobre los crímenes de Stalin*.”<sup>438</sup>

Although there is no evidence that Manuel Irujo took part in these meetings on behalf of the Basque government or in representation of Basque nationalism, it is still true that, according to the letters and comments made by Irujo, found in his correspondence, the PNV and the Basque Government were fully aware of it. Knowing the loyalty that Irujo had for the PNV and the Basque Government, it can be asserted that Basque nationalism was not uncomfortable with Irujo’s participation in activities that were related to the Congress for Cultural Freedom; quite

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<sup>437</sup> *Science and Freedom*, Num. 6, August, 1956. Also in : <http://www.euskomedia.org/fondo/12913> (consulted on March 1<sup>st</sup>, 2017).

<sup>438</sup> Letters from Gorkin to Irujo, Paris, December 17<sup>th</sup>, 1953. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box.50, File 4A. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/6420.pdf> (consulted on March 1<sup>st</sup>, 2017), and letters from Gorkin to Irujo, Paris, February and April, 1962. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box.4, File 2c, 2d. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/fondo/10241> & <http://www.euskomedia.org/fondo/10116> (consulted on March 1<sup>st</sup>, 2017).

the opposite, they were always on the lookout for international spaces in which to intervene in name of the Basque country.<sup>439</sup>

The Commission for the truth of Stalin's crimes, founded on December 21<sup>st</sup>, 1961, was organized in national and international commissions with the objective of:

*"(...) rechercher, étudier, démasquer les crimes de l'ère stalinienne partout où ils ont été commis et dans tous les domaines où ils sont intervenues, c'est-à-dire dans toutes les parties du monde et quelles qu'en aient été les victimes."*<sup>440</sup>

Considering that Gorkin was the director of *Cuadernos* and a fierce anti-Stalin promoter, it is easy to understand why that commission came into existence after the XXII Congress of the PCUS, held in Moscow between October 17<sup>th</sup> and October 31<sup>st</sup>, 1961. In that Congress, Khrushchev, who had received criticism from the Party due to his "Secret Speech" of 1956, created controversy once again when he attacked the Stalinist regime of Enver Hoxha in Albania.

Gorkin was the promoter and developer of a Spanish commission to participate in the Commission for the Truth on Stalin's Crimes, as he informed the executive committee of the PSOE on February 12<sup>th</sup>, 1962:

*"Figuro como uno de los iniciadores de dicha comisión, a la que han dado su adhesión 25 personalidades francesas además de la S.F.I.O, del P.S.U., el partido Radical y el Radical Socialista y el Sindicato Nacional de Maestros. (...) Se ha decidido la constitución de diversas comisiones nacionales y una de ellas, la Española."*<sup>441</sup>

As it was explained by Gorkin, the Commission appeared to be an act of revenge for what the Spanish Communist Party had done during the Spanish Civil War, not only to him, as we have already seen, but rather it would especially investigate the crimes of Andreu Nin, Camilo

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<sup>439</sup> The letters sent by Gorkin to Irujo where he says "Esta semana les mandaremos algunos ejemplares del número I del Boletín del Centro de Documentación y de Estudios Españoles del que le hablé al Presidente Aguirre," "Le agradezco el escrito que me ha mandado," or "He recibido su carta e inmediatamente he escrito y he hablado por teléfono con Quintanilla para recomendarle que envíe (sic.) su manuscrito en mi nombre, a nuestro representante en Argentina, Carlos P. Carranza," show the relationship and the interest of both parts in the participation in and reception of *Cuadernos* and other publications of the Congress for Cultural freedom, and they also show that other Basque nationalists, apart from Irujo, were knowledgeable of the participation of the Navarrese in it. Letters sent by Gorkin between February 1960 and December 1961. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box.3, File 8. Sources: 19,25,76 & 90.

<sup>440</sup> "Projet de travaux de la commission pour la vérité sur les crimes de Staline." *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box.4, File 2d. Also in : <http://www.euskomedia.org/fondo/10241>

<sup>441</sup> Gorkin to the executive committee of the PSOE, Paris, February 12<sup>th</sup>, 1962.

Bernieri, or Marc Rein-Abranovitch, who were arrested and killed in 1937 by Stalin supporters after being accused of treason.<sup>442</sup>

In fact, what the Commission was trying to develop was, again, a good example of soft power, as can be deduced from the list of channels that would be used by the Commission to make known their investigations: “*Par tous les moyens de publications possibles, journaux, revues, bulletins, dont la Commission devra assurer la parution.*”<sup>443</sup>

Manuel Irujo was invited to participate in that commission because of his value as a law person and his experience as Minister of Justice during the Spanish Republic, as well as his highly important contributions to teach the new generations of Spanish “*que no saben nada o saben muy poco de la intervención comunista durante nuestra guerra civil.*”<sup>444</sup>

In the end, the Spanish commission did not succeed, but Gorkin continued working within the International Commission, as he informed Irujo in a letter of April 4<sup>th</sup>, 1962, reporting on communist’s activities, sending reports on Stalin’s crimes to the Soviet Union representative in Paris, and writing articles on the Spanish investigations for the Bulletin.

This experience, along with the relationship with Gorkin, gave Irujo the opportunity at last of being invited in 1963 to participate in the International Commission, where he would exchange his knowledge with intellectuals of such standing as Victoria Ocampo for Argentina, Wolfgang Leonhard for Germany, Joseph Berger for Israel, Ignazio Silone for Italy, or Alexandre Soljenitsyne for the Soviet Union. The International Committee would be working under the French commission, where personalities such as François Bondy, Jean Cassou, or André Ferrat took charge of coordinating the office in which Gorkin and some other French socialists and anti-Stalinists worked.<sup>445</sup>

We do not know whether Irujo finally accepted the offer, which would have made of him the only other representative of Spain apart from the Socialist Rodolf Llopis, but what we can confirm is that their relation continued all the way until the end of the exile.

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<sup>442</sup> Gorkin wrote about these disappearances on several occasions in his works, but we recommend consulting *El proceso de Moscú en Barcelona: El sacrificio de Andrés Nin*. Barcelona: Aymà, 1974, and *Contra el Stalinismo*. Barcelona: Laertes, 2001.

<sup>443</sup> Projet de travaux de la commission pour la vérité sur les crimes de Staline, *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box.4, File 2d. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/fondo/10241>

<sup>444</sup> Gorkin to Irujo. Paris, February 12<sup>th</sup>, 1962, *Euskomedia*, *ibid*.

<sup>445</sup> The whole list of the participants to the Commissions, as well as the letters between Gorkin and Irujo, are found in: *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box.4, File 2d. Source signature: 3-5, <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/10216.pdf> (consulted on March 1<sup>st</sup>, 2017).

During the 60's, and especially around the dates when the Congress of Munich was being prepared and then held, Irujo and Gorkin exchanged different letters in which the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the *Centro de Documentación y Estudios*, and the CFEME were all mixed up as if they were the same thing.

The *Centro de Documentación y Estudios* was another branch of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, founded near the end of 1959 and organized as an anti-Franco think tank, based in Paris, and with a good representation of intellectuals from the exile and even some participation from inside Spain. The *Centro*, directed by Gorkin and presided by Madariaga, was part of the Spanish operation developed by the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and its founding meeting included the participation of Michel Josselson, Raymon Aron, and Denis de Rougemont, among others.<sup>446</sup>

The *Centro* published a kind of bulletin called *Boletín Informativo del Centro de Documentación y de estudios*, which was designed more as a newsletter to inform on what was happening in Spain than as an intellectual platform like *Cuadernos*.

The *Boletín*, published quarterly between 1960 and 1964, engaged in anti-Francoism by means of articles and reports denouncing the situation in Spain, such as the pages that were dedicated to the repression of Basque nationalism in the last issue of 1961 (number 8), and presented a democratic and European alternative through articles dealing with European Federalism.<sup>447</sup>

Manuel Irujo and the Basque nationalists collaborated with the activities proposed by Gorkin and the *Centro*, but always giving priority to their national cause and its vindications.

On March 15<sup>th</sup>, 1962, Gorkin proposed a project to be sent to the CFEME called “*Por las libertades culturales, civiles y penales en España y Portugal*” and asked Irujo to study it and make any amendments needed. Irujo resent the project to the PNV, ANV, and STV for their consideration and, after that, it came back to Gorkin with the proposal for some emendations that had to do with the use of languages:

*“Libertad para el empleo de los idiomas distintos al castellano hablados en los diversos territorios del Estado español y que deben poder ser utilizados, tanto en la vida y expresión ciudadana como en su aplicación a los distintos medios de difusión, imprenta*

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<sup>446</sup> AMAT, Jordi, 2016, *La primavera...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 186 and ff.

<sup>447</sup> Some issues of the *Boletín Informativo del Centro de Documentación y estudios* can be consulted online at: <http://mdc.cbuc.cat/cdm/ref/collection/premsapolc/id/10416> (consulted on March 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2017).

, radio y televisión, como en los centros y actividades oficiales dentro del país respectivo.”<sup>448</sup>

Basque nationalism was making use of the international bodies and their potential influence in order to vindicate the Basque cause: in this case, the Basque language, always in conjunction with the other national languages of the State, such as Catalan, the example of which had inspired them in their proposal for the said amendment.

Nevertheless, and although the relations between Irujo and Gorkin went on for many years after that, when we look into the correspondence that they exchanged, as we have already noted, Manuel Irujo never ceases to surprise us.

On December 6<sup>th</sup>, 1962, in a speech for Radio Euzkadi, he was very critical with the American attitude in relation to the anti-communist campaign in South America:

*“(…) la política dicha anticomunista, aplicada desde Washington a los países ibero-americanos, se apoya, las más de las veces, sobre personas que, fueron comunistas, conservan adhesión al ideario comunista, pero por anti-stalinianos, pasaron a engrosar las filas de la democracia.”*

These words were a direct attack on Julián Gorkin and most of the members of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, but we may infer that Gorkin was never informed of that speech from the fact that the mood of their letters did not change at all.

What Irujo was claiming was a direct link with the American funds, since, as can be deduced, he was fully aware where Gorkin’s funds came from: “(…) Sí decimos que la política democrática no debe apoyarse exclusivamente sobre esos elementos, que son, en estos momentos, los dispensadores de ayudas económicas y de otro género, procedentes de U.S.A.”

The Basques’ national cause appears once again in his vindications. Irujo might be a very strong democrat and courteous politician, but he never lost the focus on the nationalist cause and demands, one of the main reasons why he was in exile.

“En Ibero-América viven diversas minorías, selectas bajo el punto democrático. Una de esas minorías es la vasca. Sus elementos integrantes están alcanzados por el ambiente, pero sólo en parte. En general, mantienen cohesión entre ellos, son demócratas, están bien situados y pueden

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<sup>448</sup> The letters between Irujo and Gorkin, as well as the document “*Por las libertades culturales, civiles y penales en España y Portugal,*” are found in: Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 43, File 6, pp. 75-90. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/14039.pdf>

servir de base a una acción permanente, con mayor solidez y claridad que los excomunistas orgánicos, que no han dejado de ser comunistas espirituales.”<sup>449</sup>

Those were the features that were required—and so many times demanded by Lehendakari Aguirre—to attract the interest of those who were in America. The Basque community living in Latin America was a cohesive group, in good relations with its host community, and democrats. They were the alternative, and they were living in the exile.

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<sup>449</sup> IRUJO, Manuel, 1962, “Comunistas anti-stalinianos,” in *Desde el partido nacionalista vasco*.

## 5. WE ARE NOT ALONE: MANUEL IRUJO VS ELI GALLASTEGUI AND ETA IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE RADICAL BASQUE NATIONALISM. FROM "ECUMENICAL THERAPY" TO "PATRIOTS AND HOOLIGANS"

### a. *Patriotas y gamberros*

*“El mantener una concepción patriótica es de patriotas, pero el insultar grosera y zafiamente es de gamberros.”<sup>450</sup>*

With these words Manuel Irujo concludes his article “Patriotas y Gamberros,” written after he felt insulted at what he believed to be the attitude of the young patriots in the headquarters of the PNV and the Basque government in Paris in the fall of 1961.

In May, 1962, Irujo published in *Alderdi* the article “Patriotas y gamberros,” where he pointed a finger at the youths who had participated in one of the conferences in Paris, referring to them as part of the “*Bloisons noirs*,” an alternative French cultural movement. Of course, Irujo’s intention was to discredit those youths who defended violence and criticized the “useless” Statute of Autonomy and the political work of the PNV.

But why did it take Irujo so long to respond to the conferences? Why wait until May 1962, almost eight months after they took place?

The differences between the traditional Basque nationalists and the revolutionary Basque nationalists were increasing, and after the Paris conference they seemed to be irreconcilable in certain respects. After the speeches of the new generation at the PNV’s headquarters in Paris, feelings were running high among Basque nationalists, and editorials and articles were being exchanged that were loaded with messages coming from very different, and distant, positions. The zenith was reached in March 1962, when *Tximistak*, the National Front’s publication in Argentina, published the conference of the young Basques in Paris, accompanied by an editorial that addressed Irujo directly with reference to his last article:

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<sup>450</sup> “Patriotas y gamberros,” *op. cit.*



*“(…) Son hombres nuevos en el campo patriótico vasco y sus ideas son nuevas también. Ante estos hombres jóvenes y sus manifestaciones claras, tajantes, valientes, aparecen como cosa de museo los hombres del grupo que actuó en el 36, sus pensamientos y sus métodos. (…) De nada sirve Sr. Manuel de Irujo (…) siguiendo los dictados de su “educación latina”, hacernos creer que independencia es lo mismo que autonomía y nación que región. (…) Se acabó señores del “Gobierno vasco”, la hueca palabrería adormecedora. Ya no son estos los tiempos de D. Arturo Campion y de los liberales ingleses, cuya propuesta de autonomía para Irlanda, de nada hubiese valido, Sr. Irujo, sin todo lo que sobrevino: el holocausto de Mac Swiney, la sangrienta Rebelión de Pascua y el Ejército Republicano Irlandés.... Un holocausto como aquél, una rebelión de ese tipo, un ejército como el I.R.A. necesita Euzkadi. Y los tendrá, porque se lo darán nuevos hombres que hoy actúan con nuevas ideas.”<sup>451</sup>*

This editorial, along with some previous ones, were the motivating cause behind the writing of “Patriotas y Gamberros” eight months after the conferences—and also the cause for the emergence of the conflict between Irujo and Gallastegi.

Actually, the conferences were being followed with expectation by young and old Basque nationalists alike, but the radical positions of the youth immediately generated controversy among the traditional Basque nationalists, although some other voices, like those of Xabier Landaburu or Telesforo Monzón, of course, were sympathetic with the new generation.

There was nothing weird about the attitude of Telesforo Monzón with respect to ETA’s members; he was only following the strategy employed by the old Basque nationalists to face the Basque Government and the PNV as expressed in the Basque World Conference in 1956, referred to in previous chapters.

As to Xabier Landaburu, his interest in the young Basques is expressed in his book “*La causa del pueblo vasco*,” which, as we have seen, was written to help convince the new generation, born under the dictatorship, to side with Basque nationalism and democracy and to avoid violent reactions. The book was very well received and highly considered by the young

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<sup>451</sup> “Nuevos Hombres, nuevas ideas,” *Tximistak*, Frente Nacional Vasco. March 1962. Also in: <http://urazandi.euskaletxeak.net/vol1/dvd03/Publicaciones/Tximistak/htm/index.htm>

Basques, and it became, in the words of Iñaki Anasagasti,<sup>452</sup> a reference for the young generation.

Landaburu maintained a fluent relationship with the young Basque nationalists who had been forced into exile, as is laid down in a letter he exchanged with Elías Gallastegi on November 30<sup>th</sup>, 1962 where he explains his relations with Gallastegi's son, one of the participants at the Paris conferences: "*He visto a Iker esta temporada con bastante frecuencia. Como ha tenido la atención de consultarme algunas cosas, procuro siempre ayudarle con mis consejos y he puesto a su disposición todos mis medios oficiales y particulares.*"<sup>453</sup>

After the conferences, Irujo wrote an article that was published in *Alderdi*, "Fueros sí, estatuto no,"<sup>454</sup> in which he criticized the attacks of the youth Basque nationalists on the Statute of Autonomy.

The new generation of Basque nationalists rushed to defend independence without hesitation, since for them achieving the Statute of Autonomy was something as useless as the Basque government 25 years after the outbreak of the Civil War. In Irujo's words:

*"Con fines más honorable que los perseguidos por los tradicionalistas en 1933, vienen a repetir lo mismo los patriotas vascos, en 1961, se enfrentan con el Partido Nacionalista Vasco y con el Gobierno de Euzkadi, diciendo de ellos que, cumplieron su misión los años anteriores al 1939, pero que, después del tiempo transcurrido, han envejecido, se han hecho caducos e inservibles y deben ser substituidos por la nueva generación, que no quiere batirse por un Estatuto de Autonomía, sino por los Fueros de la Soberanía Vasca, de su independencia."*

The young Basque nationalists were attacking all that Irujo had defended since the creation of the Basque Government and during the long exile. The new generation respected the Basque government, but it did not believe any more in its legitimacy as based on the Statute of Autonomy, which they flatly rejected.

But Irujo was not alone in his consternation about the youth and the positions that had been presented at the conferences held in Paris; he shared his doubts and disappointment with some

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<sup>452</sup> <http://ianasagasti.blogspot.com/2006/05/la-causa-del-pu.html>

<sup>453</sup> Letter from Xabier Landaburu to Elías Gallastegi, Saint Jean de Luz, November 30<sup>th</sup>, 1962. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 5, File 7. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/2445.pdf> (consulted on April 10<sup>th</sup>, 1962).

<sup>454</sup> "Fueros sí, Estatuto no," *Alderdi*, November, 1961, no.176.

other traditional Basque nationalists. In fact, the new ideas of the new generation were not only attacking the Basque government, but Basque unity, something that they had been fighting for since they had been expelled from the motherland. In his exchange of letters with Iñaki Unzueta, in relation with the articles sent to be published in *Alderdi*, both reflected on the attitude of the youth:

*“Las conferencias que habéis organizado ahí me parecen bien y que así los jóvenes puedan soltar un poco de vapor,”* and *“Por la conferencia de Etxebarrieta se ve que estos jóvenes están desorientados (...),”* according to Unzueta.<sup>455</sup>

Their disorientation turned into pessimism, perhaps because they had been raised under the dictatorship, but, according to Irujo, *“El pesimismo es una enfermedad o una modalidad temperamental,”* and someone who wanted to rule a country could not afford to be pessimistic at all, especially since Basque history was a history of success, thanks to the Basque government, the Basque Statute of autonomy, and the Basque Nationalist party.<sup>456</sup> Irujo was not letting up on his efforts to defend all that he believed in.

To judge from the conferences in Paris, and the different ways of political fight they proposed, the new generation of nationalist Basques, despite their controversy with the Basque government, were being pursued and imprisoned by the Franco regime as much as the previous generation had been, if not even more. By 1961, some of them were already in exile when the Conferences were held, and in 1962 a few dozens more were added to the Basque nationalists in exile.

The young and fresh ideas also opened discussions in the exile, not only in Europe but also in America. Although their first option of exile was Iparralde, where they found shelter among old Basque nationalists like Telesforo Monzón or Elías Gasllastegi, soon they spread their influence and were moving to America, in particular to Venezuela.

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<sup>455</sup> Unzueta is referring to José Antonio Etxebarrieta who, although we don't have the conference he gave, we know he participated in the meetings in Paris. Iñaki de Unzueta to Manuel Irujo, November 8th, 1961 and December 19th, 1961. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 39, File 1.

<sup>456</sup> “Juventud pesimista” in *Alderdi* January 1962, nº177-178

## **b. From Rebellion to revolution. “El amargo Cubalibre del exilio”**

ETA edited and published its own journal, *Zutik* (“standing,” in Basque language), mainly from Bayonne, but shortly after the first numbers, *Zutik Berriak*, with some news, documents, and ETA’s directives, also saw the light, and an American version, *Zutik en Tierras americanas*, was conceived to spread their voice in America. Although it was probably intended to be an American version containing some different point of views, the American journal often lacked the regularity of the original and would mainly reproduce articles from the original published in Bayonne.<sup>457</sup>

Apart from ETA’s official publication, the new generation’s ideas were also receiving support from other Basque communities and publications, and soon the Basque delegates in America began to worry about the division this situation generated:

*“Me temo que entramos en una fase de desavenencias, desagradable e inconveniente, si bien estimo que, aquí, son pocos los que les siguen a ellos y al F.N. (National front),”* reported the Basque delegate in Venezuela, Lucio de Aretxabaleta, to the *Lehendakari* on October 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1961.<sup>458</sup>

Aretxabaleta was wrong in his analysis of the potential influence of the new ideas in Venezuela, where the revolutionary ideas of the new Basque nationalism had taken root and cheered up many Basque nationalists. The exile and America were an opportunity to live in free communities, where new trends and alternative ideologies could be debated, discussed, and experienced. Iñaki Anasagasti describes as follows the freedom of living in Venezuela and the debates they used to engage in:

*“Solíamos hablar del amargo cubalibre del exilio. Te la pasabas discutiendo sobre si era Buena o no la lucha armada, sobre si era bueno o no el marxismo-leninismo, sobre si era bueno o no Fidel...”*

These discussions were taking place under the influences that arrived from Cuba and Algeria. Venezuela, according to Anasagasti, was receiving a good influence from Cuba, and the new Basque revolutionaries took example from them, vindicating the example of “*los barbudos*,”

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<sup>457</sup> JÁUREGUI BERECIARTU, Gurutz, 1981, *Ideología y estrategia política de ETA. Análisis de su evolución entre 1959 y 1968*. Madrid: Siglo XXI. p. 89.

<sup>458</sup> Letter from Lucio Aretxabaleta to *Lehendakari* Jesús Leizaola. Caracas, October 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1961. EAH-AHE, Archivo Histórico del Gobierno Vasco. Fondo del *Lehendakari* D. Jesus María de Leizaola. C-32/05.

in clear reference to the Cuban Revolution, to defend the political fight against the Franco dictatorship in the Basque Country.<sup>459</sup>

Violence was one of the answers that the new revolutionary Basque nationalism was offering to the Basque cause, as an example taken from the exile, but also defined as a product of the reality of that new generation. As we will see, violence was attributed to the fact of living under the Franco dictatorship, and, combined with the external influences, it came to be seen as a good solution to attain the Basque national wills.

As we have mentioned, the impulse of the new generation boosted the support from some Basque communities in the exile, who believed this was a new opportunity for the youth to spread more radical options for the Basque cause. This allows us to explain the radical positions against the Basque Statute of Autonomy and in favor of independence that the Euzko Mendigoizale Batza had taken in Argentina, as presented in a letter addressed to the *Lehendakari* on November 9<sup>th</sup>, 1960:

*“Los nacionalistas vascos que formamos parte de la EUZKO MENDIGOIZALE BATZA DE LA ARGENTINA (sic.), impulsados por nuestra inquebrantable fidelidad a la causa vasca que, por lógica e inexorable consecuencia del nacionalismo vasco, se traduce en la INDEPENDENCIA NACIONAL DE EUZKADI, formulamos a Vd. Las manifestaciones que siguen por entender que le ha de interesar el conocimiento de los postulados que sustentan todas y cada una de las organizaciones de Euzkadi y del Exterior.”*<sup>460</sup>

The *Euzko Mendigoizale Batza* (Basque mountaineer Federation) took its name from the original entity, founded in 1934 by Elías Gallastegi and others in the Basque Country, and had a special incidence in Biscay as pro-independence, anti-capitalist, and keeper of Sabino Arana’s nationalism.<sup>461</sup> One of their main objectives was the creation of a pro-independence

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<sup>459</sup> Reflections on the life in Venezuela and the Basque exiles living there, by Iñaki Anasagasti in an interview in Bilbao, on November 30<sup>th</sup>, 2016.

<sup>460</sup> Letter from the *Euzko Mendigoizale Batza* in Argentina to *Lehendakari* Leizaola, Buenos Aires, November 9<sup>th</sup>, 1960. EAH-AHE, Archivo Histórico del Gobierno Vasco. Fondo del Lehendakari D. Jesus María de Leizaola. C-32/18.

<sup>461</sup> SEBASTIÁN GARCÍA, Lorenzo, 1995, “«Euzkadi Mendigoxale batza» durante la guerra civil española (1936-1939),” in *Cuadernos de sección. Historia-Geografía* 23, pp. 335-357. Donostia: Eusko Ikaskuntza. More on Euzko Mendigoizale Batza in: NÚÑEZ SEIXAS, Xosé M., 2007, “Los nacionalistas vascos durante la Guerra civil (1936-1939): Una cultura de guerra diferente,” in *Historia contemporánea*, vol. 35. pp. 559-599; ELORZA, Antonio, 1978, *Ideologías del nacionalismo vasco, 1876-1937: de los euskáricos a Jagi jagi*. Donostia: Haranburu. pp. 441-464.

National Front, an idea that never wholly succeeded, but that was organized within the exile under the name of “*Frente Nacional Vasco*,” managing to gather some Basque nationalist organizations and some nationalists publications, including *Frente Nacional Vasco (Delegación extraterritorial de Venezuela)* or *Tximistak (Frente nacional Vasco)*.<sup>462</sup>

In the letter sent to *Lehendakari* Leizaola, the *Mendigoizales*, signing as members of the Basque National Front, attacked the Basque Statute of Autonomy arguing that it merely represented three of the seven Basque provinces, and criticized the Basque Government’s policy of joining with the Spanish political forces to fight the Franco regime. The *Mendigoizales* appealed to the “*rebelión y la lucha*” as the only effective method to attain the will of “*plena soberanía nacional*,” words that call to mind the words that would be used by the young nationalists in the conference of Paris a year later.

Although in its firsts days ETA trusted the Basque government and showed respect for *Lehendakari* Aguirre, as well as for *Lehendakari* Leizaola when he took over—as we commented in previous chapters—after the first assembly, and in behalf of its new members like Etxebarrieta’s brothers—as we will be seen later on—ETA vindicated the figure of Sabino Arana and his early nationalism, trying to overstep the Basque government and seeing themselves as his true heirs. According to *Beltza*, “*En cierto modo, ETA aparece como la continuadora de la intransigencia política de los aberrianos.*”<sup>463</sup>

In this respect, the contact with Elías Gallastegui in the exile was not unlike the connection with the old *Aranism* of Jagi-Jagi, but the exile as an eighth province promoted that idea and took advantage of the disagreement with the Basque government to create a new strand of Basque nationalism. The proposals of the young Basque nationalists were accepted and promoted not only by the youths in exile, but by old Basque nationalists dissatisfied with the Basque government and willing to support an alternative.

One of the places in the exile where the ideas of the new generation took deeper root was among the Basque community in Venezuela, where ETA had organized some kind of branch, which was of special importance because during the 60’s most of the economic resources of the Basque Government in exile were coming from that American country. It was indeed in

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<sup>462</sup> Some issues of these publications and an uncountable number of very valuable Basque publications can be consulted in the vast online archive focused on the Basque publications in the exile *Hemeroteca de la diáspora vasca*: <http://urazandi.euskaletxeak.net/default.html> (consulted on April 10th, 2017).

<sup>463</sup> LÓPEZ ADÁN, Emilio “Beltza,” 1977, *op. cit.*

connection with the collection of money resources that the first encounters between ETA and the delegation of the Basque government arose. What first started as a questioning of the legitimacy of the Basque Government, or the disbelief regarding the policies developed by traditional Basque nationalism, evolved into a questioning of the authority and capability of the Basque government of raising money for the Basques.

From the beginning of ETA's "active resistance" against the Franco regime the resources of the Basque Government and the activity of the Basque nationalists in exile had been focused on helping Basque prisoners and new exiles, and thus the management of resources was called into question.

In a letter sent to *Lehendakari* Leizaola signed as "ETA de Venezuela," the question of the management of resources and the divisions within Basque resistance formed an essential part of their demands. ETA identified with three different groups of the Basque resistance in Euskadi, all placed on the same level: "*Eusko Gaztedi, grupo controlado y dirigido por el PNV, La Resistencia de ANV, ETA; apartidista.*"<sup>464</sup> Although undated, by its apolitical self-definition we may deduce that the letter is from before the first assembly, i.e. from 1960 or early 1961.

According to the letter, the diversity within Basque resistance groups is creating obstacles for the proper development of actions, which would be carried out more easily if they were to be the charge of a single front of action. The document makes a reflection specifically on the situation in Venezuela, where the difficulties, far from the "active resistance" seen in the streets of Euskadi, were related with the confusion among the Basque patriots living there: "*confusionismo y escándalo en la mente de muchos vascos que no alcanzan a comprender como es posible estemos desunidos en asunto de tan vital importancia.*" Due to that confusion, the Basques in Venezuela were giving up their contribution to the Basque cause, and it is in front of that issue that ETA outlined the possible solution of creating a common front for collecting funds, whereas in order to solve the problem in the Basque Country the organization proposed the creation of a General Staff charged with managing the resistance and coordinating the organizations of the resistance—but creating a common committee.<sup>465</sup>

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<sup>464</sup> Although the letter is undated, its date can be deduced. See further on.

<sup>465</sup> Letter from ETA Venezuela to *Lehendakari* Leizaola. Undated. EAH-AHE, Archivo Histórico del Gobierno Vasco. Fondo del Lehendakari D. Jesus María de Leizaola. C-32/15.

From the letters exchanged between the Basque Government and Caracas, and those between the Basque delegation in Bayonne and the Basque government in Paris, we can deduce that ETA members in Venezuela, together with members of the National Front, had developed a more radical stance against the Basque Government and its policies, while the relationships with ETA in *Iparralde*, especially with the founders of the organization (Madariaga, Benito del Valle, and Txillardegi), became warmer despite the existent differences.

The funding issue raised in Venezuela was solved with the delivery by members of ETA of more than 38,000 French francs to the Basque delegation in Bayonne, closing the episode as a misunderstanding and recognizing the legitimacy of the authority of the Basque Government, according to Dorronsoro's words when he delivered the money to Gonzalo Nárdiz.<sup>466</sup>

ETA did solve the issue by recognizing the role of the Basque government as the intermediary managing the resources on behalf of the prisoners, but the dispute showed the power that ETA had in the exile and the capabilities of the new generation of flying on their own.

In 1961, the evident presence of ETA supporters in Venezuela became one more subject of discussion for the Basque community in the South American country, as Lucio de Aretxabaleta<sup>467</sup> described to *Lehendakari* Leizaola in their correspondence in 1961:

*“Dejando aparte ya lo de ETA, arreglado satisfactoriamente, debo significar que estos incidentes han dado ocasión para que afiancemos aquí más la unión de los tipos que “están con el Gobierno”, cuyo afianzamiento espero traiga resultados satisfactorios para las recaudaciones mensuales(...).”*<sup>468</sup>

What Aretxabaleta was referring to was the growing conflicts with ETA supporters in Venezuela, and the management of the donations which allowed the Basque Government to develop its activities, the Venezuela community being one of its main contributors. In the weeks previous to that letter, the Basque center in Caracas had been discussing the management

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<sup>466</sup> The funding issue can be followed in several letters sent to *Lehendakari* Aguirre by Lucio de Aretxabaleta, Basque delegate in Venezuela, and in the letters containing the information about the contacts made in Bayonne by Gonzalo Nárdiz, including important information provided by Juan Carlos Basterra, member of ANV in Caracas. EAH-AHE, Archivo Histórico del Gobierno Vasco. Fondo del *Lehendakari* D. Jesus María de Leizaola. C-32/5 and C-33/1.

<sup>467</sup> Lucio Aretxabaleta had been President of the Euzko Gaztedi in Bilbao and fled into exile in 1941. Established in Venezuela, he preside the Basque Center in Caracas and the CEVA, and was Delegate of the Basque Government in Venezuela. He and his wife died in the Caracas earthquake of July 29<sup>th</sup>, 1967. Fernando Carranza was appointed his successor as Delegate.

<sup>468</sup> Letter from Lucio de Aretxabaleta to *Lehendakari* Leizaola. Caracas, November 9th, 1961. EAH-AHE, Archivo gobierno Vasco, Fondo del Presidente Leizaola. Box 32/5.



of the funds, and some of the opinions that were expressed suggested that the Basque government should not have to handle all the money—in other words, a total distrust and lack of legitimacy for Basque institutions. The growing number of prisoners created new necessities and new expenses, that would accentuate the differences between the two nationalisms represented by the Basque Government and the new forces of ETA.

Although ETA had defended and shown respect for the Basque Government since its foundation, their strategies were different from the very beginning, as related by Aretxabaleta:

*“(...) pretenden que el dinero se envíe a un Comité formado en Euzkadi Continental por E.G., ETA y el Frente. Discutí con los de ETA haciéndoles ver que eso no lo aceptaban los representantes de aquí de E.G. del interior, de E.G. de Caracas, del PNV, STV y ANV, ni yo mismo como Delegado.”*

It was clear that the PNV and the Basque Government had lost control of the mainland Basque Country, and ETA wanted to manage the funds on the same level as the Basque Government did. The conclusions were fatal regarding the unity of the Basques and, especially, for the Delegate Council:

*“De la reunión con ellos, saqué la consecuencia de que ETA actúa con instrucciones del Interior. Que quiere aprovechar la circunstancia de la recaudación de fondos para crear en el interior un Organismo al margen del Consejo Delegado, o presionar para que se les de ingerencia (sic.) en ese Consejo con su propia personalidad.”*<sup>469</sup>

Despite the fact that the money issue was conveniently sorted out, the publications in America that we mentioned before, straddled between ETA and the National Front, continued their campaign against traditional Basque nationalism, questioning the policies and even the leaderships, as we have already mentioned, with articles written directly against Manuel Irujo. The authority of the Basque government itself was not directly questioned or formally attacked, but the ideological distance had grown to be more than evident, and the development of Basque nationalism in the exile took a different path.

The split *Jagi-Jagi* of the 30's got a new lease of life in the exile and, since the birth of ETA, was reconverted into a new *Aranism* that was anti-Basque-Government and totally committed

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<sup>469</sup> Letter from Lucio de Aretxabaleta to *Lehendakari* Leizaola. Caracas, October 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1961. *Ibid.*

to the new generation of Basque nationalists, who would add “revolutionary” to their list of definitions.

The base in Venezuela came to represent the most active group of Basques, generating a new current of nationalism that demanded more from the Basque Government-in-exile and claimed for new policies, new political fighting, and even new actors.

According to Iñaki Anasagasti, if there was any place in the exile that had the power to generate a new trend in Basque nationalism on its own, that was Venezuela: “*En Venezuela, se exilian no pocos periodistas profesionales vascos (Genaro Egileor "Atxerre," Luis Ibarra Enciondo "Itarko," Bernabé Orbegozo "Otarbe," Andoni de Astigarraga, Manuel Fernández Etxebarria "Matxari," José de Abasólo Mendibil).*”<sup>470</sup>

The presence of a good number of journalists and writers and the publication of several journals and newspapers facilitated the generation of debate, discussion, and even controversy within Basque nationalism.<sup>471</sup>

Among the most controversial journals which supported the new generation of Basque nationalists, linked to the *Jagi-Jagi* movement and the defense of the National Front, was *Irintzi*, the journal published and directed by Manuel Fernández Etxebarria since 1957 and until 1962.<sup>472</sup>

In *Irintzi*—whose subtitle was “*Erri aske batean- Euzkadi’ko azkatasunaren alde*” (“In a free country, until the freedom of Euskadi”)—*Matxari* and some other Basque nationalists in favor of *Jagi-Jagi*’s ideas defended the independence of the Basque Country directly and attacked the political strategy of the Basque Government, as *Matxari* expressed to Manuel Irujo in some of the letters exchanged in 1961:

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<sup>470</sup> [http://ianasagasti.blogs.com/mi\\_blog/2015/09/la-prensa-nacionalista-en-venezuela.html](http://ianasagasti.blogs.com/mi_blog/2015/09/la-prensa-nacionalista-en-venezuela.html) (Consulted on April 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017)

<sup>471</sup> Iñaki Anasagasti, [http://ianasagasti.blogs.com/mi\\_blog/2015/09/la-prensa-nacionalista-en-venezuela.html](http://ianasagasti.blogs.com/mi_blog/2015/09/la-prensa-nacionalista-en-venezuela.html) (consulted on April 12<sup>th</sup>, 2017). For more on the Basque press in Venezuela: AJURIA, Peru, and SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, 1992, *El exilio vasco en Venezuela*. Gasteiz : Eusko Jaurlaritzaren argitalpen zerbitzu nagusia; SAN SEBASTIÁN, Koldo, 1989, “*Prensa vasca en América (I). Los medios de comunicación en Venezuela*,” in *Muga*, no. 70.

<sup>472</sup> Manuel Fernández Etxebarria, *Matxari*, was a committed nationalist Basque journalist who fled to Venezuela after being imprisoned in *El Dueso* prison during the Spanish Civil War. He was expelled from the PNV due to his repeated attacks against the Basque Government and the PNV. He published *Irrintzi* (1957-1962), *Frente Nacional Vasco* (1960/1964-1968), and *Sabindarra* (1970-1974) from Venezuela, from where he also wrote in 1965 the controversial book *Euzkadi, patria de los Vascos*.

“Sí, señor, Vd, don Manuel, no sabe cuánto le aprecio y SIN EMBARGO LE TENGO POR EL CUELLO (sic.). Le aprecio a Landaburu; les aprecio a “su amigo” Axuriaguerra y Artetxe. Pero si de un plumazo los pudiese dejar encerrados en una habitación de Sabin Etxia”, allí se estarían un buen rato. Entre los unos y los otros, el nacionalismo vasco no es un jeme más que “federalismo español”. De Sabin se han pasado a Pi (3-14-16) y Margall.”<sup>473</sup>

Despite the familiarity and cordiality shown in the letter between the two nationalists, the criticisms made by *Matxari* were harsh, and they were a direct attack on the Basque Government and the legitimacy and work of the institution. The constant calls to bring back the spirit of Sabino Arana—and with it the original Basque nationalism—were mixed with ideas that the new generation of Basque nationalists also vindicated, such as the violence and the absolute rejection of the Basque Statute of Autonomy.

*Matxari* and the *Jagi-Jagi* movement, together with the National Front and ETA’s supporters, took a critical stance against the traditional Basque nationalism that was coming from the exile, mainly from South America and in particular, as we have seen, from Venezuela (although Argentina also had some importance in the opposition movement).

Barricaded in the editorials of *Irintzi*, *Matxari* and the Basque nationalists opposed the “official” Basque nationalism represented by the PNV and developed a Basque nationalism that was anti-Statute-of-Autonomy, wholly devoted to the independence of the Basque Country, and, consequently, absolutely opposed to any pact with the Spanish democrat forces in the exile—that is, against the strategy followed by the PNV and the Government, and especially promoted by Manuel Irujo.

This nationalism was a return to primeval Sabino Arana, a reinterpretation of his writings and thought that could, for instance, take his controversy with Eustaquio de Echave-Susaeta<sup>474</sup> in 1897 on the *Fueros* and compare it with those who in 1961 were defending the Statute of Autonomy. For them, indeed, the defenders of the Basque Statute of Autonomy were in the same position, because it was nothing more than a “*forma política para acallarnos y que*

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<sup>473</sup> Manuel Fernández Etxebarria “Matxari,” to Manuel Irujo. Caracas, June 29<sup>th</sup>, 1961. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 3, Exp. 14. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/6019.pdf> (consulted on April 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>474</sup> Eustaquio de Echave-Susaeta was a journalist and writer who directed, among others, the Carlist weekly “Chapel Zuri” and “Pensamiento Navarro.” More at: <http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/36474>

*sigamos estando en manos de los españoles*”.<sup>475</sup> The non-recognition of the Basque Statute of Autonomy drove them to the non-recognition of the *Lehendakari*, and therefore of the Basque Government, being even far more radical than the youth members of ETA.

The document entitled “Manifiesto de Caracas,” published in 1962,<sup>476</sup> developed the idea of the need for a national front that would replace the Basque Government, given the latter’s provisionality and dependence on the Spanish institutions:

*“Considerando que el actual Gobierno Provisional Autónomo Vasco no está en capacidad de conducir al pueblo vasco a su libertad por no tener autoridad legal propia sino dimanada por el Gobierno Español Republicano, del que es un apéndice legal para una parte solamente del territorio vasco, fuera del cual se encuentran Navarra, Laburdi y Zuberoa.”*

The promoters of this manifesto, who according to Gaizka Fernández Soldevilla were the PNV dissidents José Estornés Lada and Augusto Miangolarra, together with Francisco Miangolarra,<sup>477</sup> proposed the idea of replacing the Basque Government with a National Government made up of organisms, sectors, and entities having a clear pro-independence program and coming from both the exile and the inside. The resulting national Basque Government would act immediately on different fronts, which would include the defense of the *Zazpiak Bat*—with Iruña as capital city of the Basque Confederation—the official status of the Basque language in the national government and its bodies, and some economic and social measures to sort out the difficult situation.<sup>478</sup>

The introduction of the Basque language as a necessity and a feature of Basque nationalism was accompanied by a blaming of the Basque nationalists of the PNV for having abandoned their original language.

During the 60’s, the vindication of the Basque language was a common feature in the development of Basque nationalism, gradually coming to replace the ethnical origin. In a Basque nationalism that was finally sprouting after more than twenty years of exile, ethnicity

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<sup>475</sup> “A un gazte de Euzko Gaztedi de Caracas,” by Eibar’ko Betikua, *Irintzi*, no. 11, p. 196.

<sup>476</sup> Although Gurutz Jáuregui and Gaizka Soldevilla have dated this document to 1960, the first line runs: “*Considerando que después de 23 años de acabada la guerra civil que España impuso a los vascos...*,” therefore it seems to me that the real date should be 1962. Besides, in *Documentos Y*, where the document is reproduced, it has been placed in the 1962 section.

<sup>477</sup> 2015. “De Aberri a ETA, pasando por Venezuela. Rupturas y continuidades en el nacionalismo vasco radical (1921-1977),” in *Bulletin d’histoire contemporaine de l’Espagne*. No. 51, p. 237.

<sup>478</sup> “Manifiesto de Caracas,” *Documentos Y*, vol. 1, p.511.

linked to the place of birth had lost its sense and was being replaced instead by a more civic feature, linked to culture and, in this case, to the language.

It is worth saying that the growing interest in the Basque language was shared by every publication related to Basque nationalism, not only those that were linked to the opposition against the traditional Basque nationalism of the PNV. In fact, in *Alderdi*, the PNV's official journal, there was a section in Basque language every month, "Iletik Ilera," as well as other monthly articles in Basque, but it must be said that in the Basque nationalists' publications of the 60's it became more and more frequent to find sections in Basque language and articles in the defense of the Basque language. The Basque language became the center of the national Basque vindication, displacing the ethnic origin.<sup>479</sup>

The clearest demonstration of this growing interest in the Basque language and subsequent replacing of the ethnic component is the PNV declaration of January 26<sup>th</sup>, 1966.

Written and presented at the end of the acts organized in memory of Sabino Arana a hundred years after his birth, the 1966 declaration, although respecting and vindicating the two previous ones of 1949 and 1960, incorporated the Basque language as part of the national definition of the Basque nation:

*“PROCLAMA el PARTIDO NACIONALISTA VASCO la realidad de Euzkadi, la Nación Vasca, comunidad natural creada en la historia; manifestada en su lengua, sus costumbres y modo de ser; afirmada por la voluntad del Pueblo Vaco, en sus manifestaciones civiles, en las persecuciones y en prisiones, y con el derramamiento de su sangre.”*

And to the first item of their proposal for the reestablishment of the Basque Country was added: *“EN LO NACIONAL VASCO: Las características nacionales y en especial el euzkera, vivan y se desarrollen; y la conciencia de nuestro ser colectivo se afirme auténticamente en todos los vascos.”*<sup>480</sup>

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<sup>479</sup> Since there are countless examples of Basque nationalist publications to support the view that the presence of the Basque language was more frequent in these editions, we will only mention the most relevant and the most interesting to consult, just as an example: "Euskara eta Euskal Kulturaren alde" in *Alderdi* no.182; "En defensa de las lenguas amenazadas en el mundo (UNESCO)", "Euskararen eguna"; in *Alderdi* no.183; "Gure umeak eta Euzkara" in *Gudari* no. 13, 1962.

<sup>480</sup> Declarations and statements of the PNV, 1945-1976. AN, Manuel Irujo, 0071, C-2.

It's easy to understand that after a long exile, as days went by it became more and more incomprehensible to base the essence of being Basque on one's place of birth, given that an entire new generation had been born in the exile.

Apart from that, the opposition from the National Front had in *Frente Nacional Vasco (Delegación Extraterritorial de Venezuela)* (1960-1968) and *Tximistak* (1961-1967), from Argentina, their most important publications.

Like the *Jagi-Jagi* followers, the sympathizers of *Frente Nacional* supported a more active and direct Basque nationalism, the use of violence, and the organization of a national front of Basque nationalist organizations—no matter what political party they came from—that would somehow replace the Basque Government. As a matter of fact, the National Front did not have a specific will to join the Basque Government, nor replacing it, but it was an important focus of opposition.<sup>481</sup>

The leaflet *Tximistak*, published in Argentina, was perhaps one of the most controversial and overtly anti-Basque-Government but, like the others, its main goals were the defense of the independence of the Basque Country, the use of violence, and the National Front.

It is in 1962—after the Paris Conference at the headquarters of the PNV and the Basque government—when we find the most critical and rough articles against the Basque government, aimed particularly against Manuel Irujo and the strategy adopted by traditional Basque nationalists, as we have already mentioned. The appearance on the scene of a new youth generation, especially those who were representative of ETA, radicalized the messages against traditional Basque nationalists and caused the emergence of a total support to the youth.

The exile, in particular from America (at least, an important part), was not only rebelling against traditional Basque nationalism, but was also intent on supporting the revolution that would lead to the development of ETA's movement.

On the other hand, Venezuela, apart from being the center of the opposition to the PNV's orthodoxy, was also a great locus for the development of new ideas, as already commented, and also the most important point of origin of the economic resources that the Basque Government would receive. Probably owing to the need of giving recognition to the efforts made by the Venezuelan Basque community, combined with the need of explaining and

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<sup>481</sup> *Eusko Aberrri Alkartasuna*, Caracas, 1960; *Tximistak*, May 1961. *Tximistak*, May 1962.

maintaining the sentiment among the new generation raised in the exile, traditional Basque nationalism began to change its ethnic conception of Basque nationalism and endowed it with a more inclusive and civic meaning.

In 1962, the Basque Government promoted a “*Carta de Condición Vasca*” that went in this direction of modernizing Basque nationalism in accordance with the new features of Basque society and, of course, taking heed of the situation of the exile. In this sense, life in the exile was not only influencing the decision of modifying the characteristic ethnicity of Sabino Arana’s Basque nationalism—it was even demanding it. The Basque Government had issued this Basque identification document in response to the demands made by the Basque organizations in Europe and in America.

*“Ha sido puesta en circulación la carta de condición vasca, aprobada por decreto reciente del Gobierno de Euzkadi. Este documento acreditativo de la condición vasca del titular, determinada por el origen, el nacimiento o la residencia, servirá al propio tiempo de justificante de contribución a las cargas del gobierno vasco.”*<sup>482</sup>

With that document, and the establishment of the new conditions for “being Basque,” we see how the place of birth ceases to be an essential requirement, giving precedence to the residence or the origin, thus conforming an inclusive nationalism that is not determined by the ethnos but by a willingness to be Basque.

However, it cannot be denied that the change and the new “Basque condition” were imposed by the critical financial situation that the Basque government was going through, so that the Basque recognition was extended to those who contributed to the cause regardless of where they came from.

In a ceremony celebrated in Venezuela on October 19<sup>th</sup>, 1962, the Basque Government expressed its recognition to those who had contributed to the Basque cause as Basques:

*“El nacer venezolano, japonés o vasco, no confiere ninguna calidad espiritual que identifique a uno con el alma de un pueblo. Lo que otorga al hombre el verdadero mérito de la*

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<sup>482</sup> “Carta de Condición Vasca,” in *Eusko Gaztedi*, Caracas. June, 1962. Also at: <http://urazandi.euskaletxeak.net/vol1/dvd10/Euzko%20Gaztedi/htm/port2.htm> (consulted on April 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

*nacionalidad es su obra. (...) El ser vasco identificado con las aspiraciones de su pueblo requiere hoy más que nunca de esa voluntad y esa responsabilidad.*<sup>483</sup>

Responsibility towards the Basque cause was rewarded with the recognition from the community in the exile of being part of the Basque nation. Although the change had been due to a situation of economic necessity, it is important to highlight the evolution of the concept of Basque nationality, and the importance that the exile had in it.

### **c. Getting to know each other. Paris, October 1961**

In October, 1961, the PNV in Paris and its Local Council, presided in those days by Manuel Irujo, organized a series of conferences with which traditional Basque nationalists wanted to “*abrir sus tribunas a todas las expresiones actuales del nacionalismo vasco, sean éstas ortodoxas o heterodoxas, estén de acuerdo con la doctrina y la política mantenida por el E.B.B. o se hallen en discrepancia con ellas, asegurando a quienes ocuparan la tribuna plena libertad de cátedra,*” according to Irujo in his article “*Patriotas y gamberros.*”<sup>484</sup>

The idea of renewal was indeed in the minds of some Basque traditionalists who were aware that they were growing apart from the new generation. It was not only a question of age, though; the exile also was marking distances and ideological borders.

Irujo was approaching the youth in an effort to lend an ear to the new Basque generation, as he had been doing throughout his endless exchange of letters, articles, meetings, and conferences. One should not be startled at Irujo’s idea, given the sort of man he was and knowing the close relationship he maintained with the members of the PNV and ETA in those days, as we have seen in previous chapters.

Probably realizing that the distance between generations had grown too wide, the meetings organized in Paris, described as an “Ecumenical therapy” in the words of José Antonio Rodríguez Ranz,<sup>485</sup> had the objective of avoiding extremism rather than of influencing the youth.

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<sup>483</sup> “Día de la condición vasca,” in *Eusko Gaztedi*, Caracas, October 1962. Also at: <http://urazandi.euskaletxeak.net/vol1/dvd10/Euzko%20Gaztedi/hm/port2.htm> (consulted on April 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>484</sup> “Patriotas y gamberros,” in *Alderdi*, May 1962, no. 182.

<sup>485</sup> RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 2002, “Manuel de Irujo. Lealtad crítica. (1960-1975),” *Vasconia*, 32, p. 165.



The meetings were attended by “radicals” like José Luis Álvarez Enparantza “Txillardegi,” Iker Gallastegui, or José Antonio Etxebarrieta, among the traditional nationalists who used to participate in such meetings in Paris.

Presented as a member of ETA, Txillardegi gave the conference “*La Juventud Vasca ante el 7 de Octubre de 1961*,” which opened the conferences,<sup>486</sup> with a direct attack against the Basque government and traditional Basque nationalism in exile after 25 years.

In *Zutik* Caracas, the conference is published alongside the leading editorial “*Ha pasado un cuarto de siglo*,” where ETA highlights the 25 years of life of the Basque Government, asking for a renewal and an opportunity for young nationalists.

For them, the hope lies in the Basque youth, since the Basque institutions have halted their activities and lost the trust of the Basque people:

*“El pueblo vasco no se ha detenido en 1936; NUESTRAS INSTITUCIONES SÍ (sic.) (...) Hay instituciones que no existen y que cuentan con audiencia en nuestras más altas autoridades. Hay partidos que ni creen en Euzkadi ni sienten el problema vasco, y que cuentan con voz y voto en los más altos organismos del País.”*

There is also a conflict between the inside and the exile. ETA vindicates the Basque resistance in the inside, but in this case makes a link between the work done and the age, that is, vindicates the action carried out by ETA and EG members, thus linking the Basque youth with the Basque nationalist Party. Like the exile, the age of Basque nationalists too is becoming a border. The youth are demanding their share in the Basque resistance movement—tired of waiting, they now also demand action.<sup>487</sup>

Txillardegi’s conference was entitled “*La juventud vasca ante el 7 de Octubre de 1961*,” in a clear reference to the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Basque Government. With a preface in Basque language, this ETA member makes a link between the national fighting of the Basque youth who had been tortured and detained and the use of the Basque language. Txillardegi is not only

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<sup>486</sup> Although the conference is not signed and is said to have been given by a “member of ETA,” according to the information received by Irujo on the organization of the conferences the first speech should correspond to Txillardegi’s, on his own petition. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 3, Exp. 1. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/12641.pdf> (consulted on April 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>487</sup> “Ha pasado un cuarto de siglo,” *Zutik* no. 15. Also in: <http://urazandi.euskaletxeak.net/vol1/dvd10/Zutik/htm/port2.htm> (consulted on April 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017)

defending those active Basque youth nationalists—and therefore, their strategy—but also the Basque language as a Basque nationalist feature.<sup>488</sup>

In his conference, Txillardegi talks about the new Basque generation raised under the Franco dictatorship, who ignore the creation of the Basque Government and the Statute of Autonomy and are waiting for some kind of action from the Basque national structure. According to him, the new generation and Basque nationalism are in need of a new strategy, since the strategy followed by the Basque government “*toda una estrategia, lógica entonces, de “conservar” y de “esperar”, así como de “contar con el pueblo”, ha ido perdiendo sentido progresivamente.*”<sup>489</sup>

The new generation of Basque nationalists need something else, they are not willing to wait, but to act, and the strategy proposed by Txillardegi is an “Estrategia abertzale” that relies on the “patriotic Front” to update the national Basque strategy.

The Basque government is respected, but there is a strong perception of the need for a shift in the strategy and for abandoning the political agreements with the Spanish forces. The new strategy presented by Txillardegi focuses on the “Patriotic Front” (the idea that had been promoted by the members of *Jagi-Jagi* and the Basque National Front), conformed by those patriotic organizations (Txillardegi avoids using the word “national”), especially by ETA and EG, but is also open to any other *Abertzale* forces. As we have already commented, the idea of a National Front or, in this case, a Patriotic Front, does not necessarily involve the creation of a Basque Government, but only the commitment of Basque nationalists’ organizations to fight for Euskadi.

Although Txillardegi’s conference contained some ingredients that might upset or shock some traditional Basque nationalists like Irujo, it was probably the conference entitled “*El sentimiento de nacionalidad,*” given on October 29<sup>th</sup>, which most upset the Navarrese and gave rise to the article “Patriotas y Gamberros.”

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<sup>488</sup> José Luis Álvarez Enparantza (1929-2012), best known as “Txillardegi,” was a committed, self-taught linguist who worked for and promoted the Basque language from the *Euskaltzaindia* (the Basque Academy of Language), wrote books, and helped to update the language and promote its use in the Basque country. In his political activity, he was member of ETA, ESB, Herri Batasuna, and Aralar, always combining the vindication of the Basque national cause with the use of the Basque language, and denouncing those Basque nationalists who had abandoned it. More on Txillardegi in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/9273>

<sup>489</sup> “La juventud vasca ante el 7 de octubre de 1961,” in *Zutik, En tierras Americanas*. April, 1961, no.15, pp. 3 and ff. Also in: <http://urazandi.euskaletxeak.net/vol1/dvd10/Zutik/htm/port2.htm> (consulted on April 13<sup>th</sup> 2017).

As we have said before, what made Irujo so angry was not just the content of the conference, but the fact that it was published in *Frente Nacional Vasco* in April 1962 along with a tough preface attacking the Basque Government.

Although Irujo avoided naming the author “*por motivos de discreción fácilmente comprensibles pues que, en Euzkadi peninsular manda Franco,*” we know from the correspondence of Eli Gallastegui that the author was none other than his son, Iker Gallastegi.<sup>490</sup>

Iker, according to his father, had crossed the *muga* on several occasions:

*“hace ya bastantes años, cuando la situación era más sombría aún que hoy, regresó del exilio espontáneamente a Euzkadi para tomar parte en la lucha por la libertad “en el interior”. (...) Y no es que solamente le hubiera preocupado aquella actividad de resistencia, sino que, dando mayor trascendencia a su obra simultánea de restauración nacional, se hizo también euzkaldun y dirigió durante años un grupo de teatro euzkerico y de coros (...).”*

In fact, Iker was a member of Euzko Gaztedi and he knew the Basque resistance of the inside—and that was probably the reason why he was so critical with the work done by the Basque Government from the exile.

In line with the other youths who participated in the conferences, Iker was intent on the independence of the Basque Country and refused any other political objective regarding the question of autonomy:

*“Pretendemos una Euzkadi libre y para nosotros, la libertad tienen más que una definición. No quiere decir una libertad limitada; una libertad condicionada a los intereses de otra nación: una libertad compatible con la autoridad feudal de un parlamento extranjero sino una libertad absoluta, el control soberano de todos los destinos de Euzkadi.”*<sup>491</sup>

Recognizing the work done by the Basque Government and the Basque nationalists before them, he (speaking in the plural, on behalf of the youth) considered that Basque nationalism had misunderstood the concept of nationalism, and he states that nationality is something

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<sup>490</sup> “Patriotas y Gamberros,” *op. cit.*; Letter from Eli Gallastegui to Manuel Irujo, *op. cit.*

<sup>491</sup> The conference given by Iker Gallastegi, “El sentimiento de nacionalidad,” can be found in *Documentos Y*, vol. 1, pp. 504 and ff. All the extracts presented here have the same source.

spiritual, not material, something that cannot be determined by statutes or agreements or interests. For that reason, he insists that they want their words to come across clearly, without confusions:

*“Queremos la separación completa de Euzkadi y España. No el volver a 1839, sino actuar de acuerdo con 1961; no el restaurar los llamados Fueros o la Ley vieja, sino el fundar una nueva nación; el crear un pueblo libre, y fuerte además de libre, y seguro de sí mismo además de fuerte.”*

Their demands were clearly and directly attacking the strategy followed by the Basque Government, accused of having abandoned the independence project in favor of the Statute project with the agreements made with the Spanish democratic forces, seen as *“Estatutos, conferencias y alianzas con políticos españoles exiliados.”*

Although the statements were a tough criticism against traditional Basque nationalists, and the cry of protest of a new nationalist Basque generation that wanted to participate in the fight for the freedom of Euzkadi from their own different positions, these critics were not the straw that broke the camel’s back, especially not so for Manuel Irujo, much too accustomed to discordant voices during those days.

What really upset Manuel Irujo the most was the evidence that violence had settled in the mind of these youths and that its defense was given for granted in the fight for the Basque cause.

Iker Gallastegi’s experience under the Franco dictatorship had instilled in him the opinion that the use of passive resistance would not be successful while the State was armed and subduing the Basque people.

The repression, detentions, tortures, and even assassinations carried out by the Franco regime against Basque nationalists in the inside, especially during those days of the last quarter of 1961, made him pronounce stunning sentences:

*“Y hay momentos en que únicamente las armas satisfacen la necesidad. Los policías y los soldados son argumento inexpugnable contra el razonamiento, pero no lo son contra las balas. Con quien quiera razonar razonaremos; pero únicamente el brazo patriota que empuña un arma puede prevalecer contra el depotismo armado. Euzkadi desarmada conseguirá exactamente la libertad que a España le plazca concederle. Euzkadi armada conseguirá a la larga, toda la libertad que desee.”*

The violent actions carried out by the young Basque nationalists of ETA and the resistance inside the Basque Country were not random coincidences, but came from a deliberate decision of replying in kind.

Violence was a tragic companion for the Spanish people on the streets those days. The attacks inflicted against Spanish nationalist monuments, the burning of Spanish flags, and the increasing nationalist Basque propaganda upset the Franco regime and led to its deciding to chop down the insurgency by attacking ETA's founders directly. That is how, in March 1961, some dozen policemen opened fire against a car in Vitoria to kill Julen Madariaga, Benito del Valle, and Manu Aguirre, who were supposed to be travelling inside the car to an ETA meeting. Benito and Manu were indeed in Vitoria, Julen had fled into exile—but none of them were inside the car. The police had killed Javier Batarrita at point-blank range, filling his body with more than 40 bullets. The man was engaged in no political activity whatsoever.<sup>492</sup>

In Iker's words one cannot but recognize the influence of his father, who fled to Dublin during the Spanish Civil War and even changed his nationality to Irish: "*Y como dijo Mac Swiney, alcalde de Cork y mártir irlandés; No serán los que más puedan infringir, sino los que más capacidad para sufrir tengan los que triunfarán. No seremos nosotros quienes derramaremos sangre inocente, sino nosotros quienes la ofreceremos.*"

The reference is clear and direct. The new generation of Basque nationalists were determined to fight back the violence of the Franco regime.

One of the most important differences was the use of violence. ETA was created in 1959, but there were also some groups inside the PNV, such as EGI, that defended the use of violence and were overawed by Irish violence. That violent element was not new in traditional Basque nationalism; *Jagi-Jagi*, a radical split from traditional Basque nationalism created in 1934, stood for a more "active" answer. Without creating a political party, but instead a national radical movement, *Jagi-Jagi* represented one of the most radical versions of Basque nationalism, defending the ideas of Sabino Arana in his most anticapitalistic moments, Basque self-determination, and the formation of Basque battalions during the Spanish Civil War, under the leadership of Elias Gallastegi, "Gudari."<sup>493</sup>

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<sup>492</sup> CASANOVA, Iker, 2007, *ETA 1958-2008. Medio siglo de historia*. Tafalla: Editorial Txalaparta, pp. 30-31.

<sup>493</sup> More on Jagi-Jagi in: RENOBALES, Eduardo, 2010, *Jagi-Jagi: historia del independentismo vasco*. Bilbao: Ahaztuak 1936-1977; ELORZA, Antonio, 1978, *op. cit.*

The ETA organization was seen at first as a youth section of the PNV, nothing to worry about, as is reflected in the correspondence they exchanged in 1960.<sup>494</sup>

Irujo and the traditional Basque nationalists considered those “radicals” as part of the nationalist family, in fact, some of them *were* really family, the next generation after the first Basque Government-in-exile. Despite the similarities, they had something that was absolutely different from the Basques in the exile, which may well have affected the development of their nationalism: those radicals had been born under the Franco dictatorship.

This feature is what allows us to get a closer look at the differences between the exile and the inside in the development of Basque nationalism. Despite the idea of an “internal exile” that the democrat resistance had lived in during the dictatorship, the evolution of Basque nationalism and its features, especially since the emergence of the new generation, changed gradually.

As we have already seen, the interest of the Basque nationalists in exile for the young generation of Basques increased when the latter became politically active. On the one hand, this interest could involve attempts to attract and control them, in a strategy to regain control of the inside; on the other hand, it could take the form of actions to avoid them from being attracted by the PCE, the political movement that was controlling anti-Francoism inside Spain. But on the contrary, the new generation did not feel attracted to the old-fashioned PNV; according to Iker, the references they had among the Basque leaders had disappointed them. Here is a reproach against traditional Basque nationalism for distancing themselves from the new generation and the sufferings they experienced in the inside:

*“Hay una generación que ha pretendido encontrar a sus líderes donde le habían dicho que se hallaban pero al encontrarlos no los ha conocido. No los ha conocido porque esos jefes siguen hablando de cuestiones que no comprende ni conoce: siguen tratando de solucionar problemas que ni son reales ni existen hoy en Euzkadi; siguen ignorando*

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<sup>494</sup> Not only the Basque government did not consider ETA as a threat, but ETA felt likewise towards them. The information that the Basque government had about ETA was first-hand information: the youth Basque organization sent its publications to the Basque Government and offered their collaboration, as can be confirmed if one reads the letters sent on June 9<sup>th</sup>, 1960 directly addressed to the *Lehendakari*: “Adjuntamos para su conocimiento varios ejemplares de los dos primeros números de la hoja “ZUTIK” que publica en Caracas la filial de EUZKADI TA AZKATASUN (E.T.A).” Or another letter sent from Bayonne on June 15<sup>th</sup>, 1960: “Próximamente vamos a editar un libro de formación vasca, y nos hallamos con la dificultad de no conocer con la debida exactitud la actuación del Gobierno Vasco. Mucho le agradeceríamos una exposición, en tres folios, por ejemplo, sobre dicho punto.” In EAH-AHE, Archivo Histórico del Gobierno Vasco. Fondo del *Lehendakari* D. Jesus María de Leizaola. C33/15.

*los problemas actuales y latentes, mientras esta generación se agota y se desanima. (...) Todavía puede lograrse que el pueblo confíe en sus líderes. Pero no va a ser fácil pues el mito se va desvaneciendo y con ello su autoridad.”*

In fact, Iker was talking about two different strategies and concepts of fighting for the Basque cause—and violence was not the only difference.

Basque nationalism was fragmented: age was one factor, violence was another, but ideology and strategy were other two different factors that we will see in the next section.

What we can infer from Gallastegi’s conference is that the young nationalist Basque generation felt abandoned by the Basque government and by traditional Basque nationalism as represented mainly the PNV. Their solutions for the “Basque cause” did not solve their “Basque problem,” especially that problem related to the fact of living under the dictatorship. There were different concepts, deriving from the different origin of their demands, there were different speeches being given from the different sides of the border. The strategy presented by Iker in his speech is intended to be used in the battle waged in the inside, resorting not only to the use of violence but to an insurreccional strategy developed by the Basque population against the institutions of the regime in the Basque country:

*“(…) los maestros y los obispos que educan españolizando al pueblo todos los policías, Guardia Civil y fuerzas de represión, estos son nuestro verdadero enemigo. Estos son los que efectúan y llevan a cabo el genocidio en nuestra patria. No el gobierno español en Madrid, sino los Gobiernos civiles en Euskadi; no la policía española en sí, sino los policías españoles en Euskadi que cumplen e imponen la Ley Española.”*

The strategy planned by the young generation consists in acting against the Basques’ enemy through an active response and in the Basque field, rejecting political agreements with the Spanish democratic forces and international aid. Their campaign is direct and active, influenced by other international experiences, far from the influences that the Basque Government had received, as will be seen in next section.

#### d. Who are the “*Patriotas y Gamberros*”?

After the conferences, as we have already commented, there were some reactions against those youths and their opinions.

In the correspondence between Manuel Irujo and Francisco de Belausteguigoitia<sup>495</sup>, who was Julen Madariaga’s father-in-law, one of ETA’s founders, they exchanged impressions on the youth: “*A propósito de todo esto se me ocurrían algunas consideraciones y son de que quizá habría que pensar en tartar de encontrar nuevas tácticas de lucha.*”<sup>496</sup>

The traditional Basque nationalists were worried about the detour that the young Basque nationalists were taking with respect to the Basque cause, every day further and further away from the traditionalists, the PNV, and the Basque Government. Although all the efforts were focused on attracting the youth, some practices, like violence, were unacceptable for the old Basque nationalists:

*“Desde luego, quizá por los años, soy enemigo de la violencia. De todos modos, se ve que hoy en día el que tiene el poder, maneja una serie de resortes contra los cuales es muy difícil luchar. (...) No dudo por otro lado que el sacrificio de esos muchachos a (sic.) originado un movimiento de protesta y de inquietud que anteriormente no existía (sic.) pero la realidad es que el único movimiento que ha tenido éxito ha sido el de los catalanes contra el director de la Vanguardia en Barcelona.”*<sup>497</sup>

What was implied in these reflections was the influence and the power that young Basque nationalists had inside the Basque Country. The strategy of the Basque nationalist party had been superseded by the activities (usually violent) carried out by the young.

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<sup>495</sup> Francisco Belausteguigoitia Landaluce had fled into exile in the 1920’s. Established in Mexico, and in a wealthy situation, he collected funds for the Basque Government during the Spanish Civil War, helping the government purchase the Basque headquarters in Paris. He was the Basque delegate in Mexico until 1942. More on Belausteguigoitia in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/23678> (consulted on April 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>496</sup> Francisco Belausteguigoitia to Manuel Irujo. Mexico, November 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1961. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 3, File 5. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/9669.pdf> (consulted on April 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>497</sup> He is referring to an incident involving the director of *La Vanguardia*, Luis de Galinsoga, who, during a Mass at the Catalan church of Sant Ildelfons in 1959 stated “*Todos los catalanes son una mierda.*” The statement had been motivated by the fact that the Mass had been in Catalan. These declarations provoked a Catalanist campaign against the newspaper that ended with the dismissal of Galinsoga. DÍAZ ESCULIES, David, 1996, *L’oposició catalana al franquisme: El Republicanisme liberal i la nova oposició (1939-1960)*. Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, pp. 114 and ff.



Despite the disagreements with ETA members, the Basque Government continued supporting the Basque prisoners, following the strategy of diplomacy and of involving the international bodies, as they had been doing throughout the exile. The Basque cause was being recognized because of the violence, which did not form part of the Basque traditionalists' strategy, and yet from the very first moment the government and the PNV had supported the prisoners, the *gudaris*.

When ETA boycotted a train full of Falangists while they were on their way to celebrate the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Coup d'état, the repression after the attack had sent some of ETA's members to jail. Julen Madariaga, one of ETA's founders, was arrested and, according to a confidential report written by the American consulate in Bilbao:

“was picked up by police agents and taken to a local police station where he was severely beaten resulting in three broken ribs. A few days later he was taken to Madrid where it is understood he has been charged with direct implication in an attempt to derail a train near San Sebastian on July 18, 1961.”<sup>498</sup>

Eyes were set on the Basque revolutionary nationalists, although, at first, even the Basque nationalists in the inside did not believe that ETA could have organized such an attempt. Ángel Zarraga, one of the Basque nationalists who provided information to the American Consulate in Bilbao, stated to the American Consul that the Basque nationalists—Julen Madariaga and the group of 20 young Basque nationalists recently arrested—had had nothing to do with the attempted derailment of the train.<sup>499</sup> Almost nobody could believe, or did not want to believe, that the young Basques were capable of acting that way.

Manuel Irujo, from London, was very critical about the derailment, but he indicated the strategy to follow in September 1961 in a letter to Solaun and Landáburu:

“*¿Te has dirigido a la Comisión de Derechos del Hombre de las N.U.? ¿O lo ha hecho en su caso la Liga? Porque, eso sí que me parecería bien, por el hecho en sí y por la propaganda que con ello (...) podría hacerse por el Gobierno y contra Franco.*”<sup>500</sup>

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<sup>498</sup> *Confidential Report no.17*. Bilbao, August 28<sup>th</sup>, 1961. NARA General Records of Department of State. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. Bureau of European affairs. 1953-1962. NND959219 RG59 Box.7.

<sup>499</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>500</sup> Letter from Manuel Irujo to Jesus de Solaun and Xabier de Landaburu. London, 1961. EAH-AHE, Archivo Histórico del Gobierno Vasco. Fondo del *Lehendakari* D. Jesus María de Leizaola. C-32/24.

Despite the recourse to violence by the revolutionary Basque nationalists, the fact was that some of them were in jail and had been tortured, and the Basques in exile had to start managing the situation.

Aretxabaleta and some other Basques visited the Cardinal to acquaint him with the situation of the Basque prisoners in Spain, asking for humanitarian aid, and the Basque delegation in Biarritz activated the diplomacy with the Anglo-Saxon countries.

Although the strategy followed did not please everyone—especially not Manuel Irujo—the Basque government started a series of contacts from its delegations, mainly from Biarritz, as Jesús Solaun explains to the *Lehendakari* in November 1961:

*“Se han orientado estas gestiones (las del gobierno) a obtener el apoyo de los dos países anglo-sajones, de sus instituciones y su opinión pública, así como sobre las instituciones religiosas de los países europeos, de Roma y del interior. Esperamos que la reanudación de las sesiones del Parlamento inglés dará ocasión a que la intervención británica en este asunto se deje sentir más. Toda la publicidad que se lleva por el Gobierno de Euzkadi está directamente influida por el deseo de dar a estos medios la posibilidad de pesar eficazmente, logrando que se eviten condenas irreparables.”*<sup>501</sup>

The strategy followed by the Basque government put the stress on diplomacy as the way to force a public and political opinion against torture and the death penalty, mainly appealing to the defense of human rights. The defense of the Basque detainees, and the control of their safety, became one of the main causes for the Basque Government in exile: unable to control the inside, the least it could do was to act in favor of the Basque people suffering under the Franco repression.

Nevertheless, the diplomacy developed by the Basque Government also focused on the Basque political cause, as Solaun stated, quoting from the document sent to the Basque delegations explaining the Basque strategy: *“Para el futuro político también parece que esta actitud sea en definitiva la más útil en servicio de Euskadi y de su libertad.”*

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<sup>501</sup> Letter from Jesús Solaun to *Lehendakari* Leizaola. 1961 Undated. . EAH-AHE, Archivo gobierno Vasco, Fondo del Presidente Leizaola. Box 33/14.

On the question of the tortures of the detainees, the Basque government used its diplomacy with states and international bodies in combination with a mediation through ecclesiastical institutions, unions, and humanitarian organizations, mainly related to the Christian Democracy movement that the PNV was involved in, in order to intercede in favor of the prisoners. The contacts of the PNV connected with the Christian movement, especially those in Rome, thanks to the Basque delegate in Italy, Ángel Ojanguren, made it possible to spread word of the Basque cause and of the suffering of the Basques under the Franco dictatorship.

The situation in the exile and the treatment and torture of the Basque prisoners was an awkward question for traditional Basque nationalists. The difficult leadership of Leizaola had been questioned from the inside by the young Basque revolutionaries and, in the 60's, also from the exile. The long path of the exile was opening scars in the unity of the traditional Basque nationalists, as well as around the leading figure of the *Lehendakari*. Managing such a situation was no easy task, and the loss of hegemony of the Basque nationalists' world was revealing the difference of opinions among the old guard.

In 1961, the young detainees on trial because of their involvement in the derailment of a train in July were facing court-martials and prison sentences of 25, 15, and 12 years, something rarely seen until then, although the verdict could still worsen the sentences and turn them into death penalties.

According to the information given by Solaun, from Beirys, "*Albisu y Laspiur, 25 años de condena, Urrestarazu y Larramendi, 15 años, Balerdi, Arrieta y Ferrán 12 años y un día.*"<sup>502</sup>

The PNV and the Basque government offered their support to the ETA members and prepared a report detailing the conditions of the detainees to see what they could do.

In a letter in which Irujo expresses his disagreement with some of the procedures taken to help the detainees, the Navarrese explains how the Basque Government (or the PNV, for, as usual, he is not very clear about this) had asked for help from the International Law Commission,

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<sup>502</sup> The full list of the detainees after the police raid is the following: Rafael Albisu, Imanol Laspiur, Iñaki Larramendi, Evaristo Urrestarazu, Iñaki Balerdi, Eduardo Ferrán, Julen adariaga, Andoni Iriondo, Angel Aranzabal, José Urbieto, José Antonio Eizaguirre, Eustakio Narbaiza, Serafín Basauri, Javier Aguirre, Agustín Olaskoaga, Robén López de la Calle, Javier Elozegi, José Mari Quesada, Ildfonso Iriarte, Sabin Uribe, Guillermo Mariñelarena, José Ramón Luzarraga, Patxi Amezaga, José Muñoa, Santiago Iturrioz, Juan José Etxabe, and José Antonio Lizarribar. Thanks to the license plate on the motorbike that was used for burning some flags on the same day as the attack on the train, the police were able to track all the names and successfully carry out an operation against the ETA members, getting close to dismantling the organization. David López Dorransoro, Paco Iturrioz, and Eneko Irigaray were able to escape and cross the border into exile, joining the fate of the traditional Basque nationalists.

based in Genève, and as an answer, through the English group, was requested to send a detailed report on the tortures undergone by the detainees.<sup>503</sup>

The letter goes on to say that Juan Jauriaguerra was their man in the inside, and he delivered a detailed list of the detainees and the tortures inflicted by the police in order to make them known to the public, but Leizaola was displeased with the idea of the International Law Commission of giving publicity to the tortures, and so finally decided to send the documents to the Secretary of State of the Vatican.

In the correspondence exchanged between Solaun and Irujo we can see the difficulties that the traditional Basque nationalists had in managing a new situation that involved tortures and, in some cases, the death penalty—but what they mostly disagreed on was the methods. Although Irujo had always been a very cautious man, maybe on being forced to face an extreme situation involving tortures, and fearing for the detainees' fate, he arrived at the conclusion that giving it publicity, as the International Law Commission suggested, was the best solution. Leizaola and Solaun, for their part, believed that making the tortures public would only serve to worsen the sentences.<sup>504</sup>

The strategy followed by the Basque Government in relation to the imprisoned and tortured Basques was the same that they would follow during the Burgos trial, as we will see in the next chapter.

When the conferences took place in Paris, the young Basque nationalists—ETA and EG—were suffering the first of their forced exiles owing to the repression of the Franco regime. As we have already seen, after the derailment in Donostia the repression had sent dozens to jail, and some of the young nationalists had decided to go into exile, from where they would develop their ideology.

In fact, since the summer of 1961 ETA had been planning its first Assembly from Laburdi, in Iparralde, where a small group of activists were discussing the ideology and the strategy to follow. The young organization needed a restructuring, as well as a cohesive ideology, after the repression and the loss of members. According to Alfonso Pérez-Agote: “The dissident nationalist culture was relatively cohesive, especially until the mid-1950's when a

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<sup>503</sup> Manuel Irujo to Jesús Solaun. October 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1961. EAH-AHE, Archivo gobierno Vasco, Fondo del Presidente Leizaola. Box 33/14.

<sup>504</sup> *Ibid.*

radicalization of the first post-civil war nationalist generation became apparent.”<sup>505</sup> The appearance of ETA on the nationalist Basque scene created a more heterogeneous world of dissidence, leading to successive splits within radical nationalism, so it was essential for the new organization to have an ideological corpus, and this question was debated and given shape in its First assembly in May 1962.

Despite his loyalty to the Government and his help in working internationally to solve the question of the tortures and the prisoners, Manuel Irujo could not bear to see how the Basque young nationalists were driving their violent nationalism against Spain.

Irujo dedicated two successive articles in *Alderdi* to those youths in 1962, “Juventud pesimista” and “Violencia Inútil”<sup>506</sup> (“Pessimistic youth” and “Useless Violence”), before writing his “Patriotas y gamberros” that would give rise to the conflict with Elias Gallastegi.

In his article “Violencia Inútil,” Irujo draws on his experience as historian to explain how violence was a useless strategy, paraphrasing Eamon De Valera, President of the Irish Republic, in reference to the violence exerted by the IRA. Comparing the vindication of the “Home Rule” of Ireland in 1913 with the Statute of Autonomy in Spain in 1931, Irujo affirms that politics always prevails over violence.

On February 26<sup>th</sup>, 1962, the IRA announced they were putting down the guns, marking the end of the violent period that had affected mostly the border between North Ireland and Ulster in what was referred to as the “Border Campaign,” launched to put pressure on the English Government and force a withdrawal.<sup>507</sup>

Irujo stated: “*Tras ello hay derecho de formularse otras preguntas: ¿Eran necesarios estos cincuenta años perdidos en luchas estériles, sembrando los bosques del Ulster de ruinas y cadáveres, para llegar a esta solución? ¿A quién benefició esta violencia inútil?*” Clearly, he

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<sup>505</sup> PÉREZ-AGOTE, Alfonso, 2006, *The social roots of Basque nationalism*. Reno: University of Nevada Press, p. 74.

<sup>506</sup> “La Violencia inútil,” in *Alderdi*, March-April, 1962, nos. 180 -181.

<sup>507</sup> The Border Campaign is explained in full in: FLYNN, Barry, 2009, *Soldiers of folly: The IRA Border campaign*. Cork: The Collins Press. Flynn explains how the campaign turned to guerrilla warfare and tactics that had been useful in the independence war, to attack Northern Ireland. It is interesting how a romantic uprising was constructed by taking advantage of southern voluntaries who knew barely anything about the north. Another reference on the Border Campaign, especially interesting for its focus on the Irish community in New York is: ALMEIDA, Linda Dowling, 2001, *Irish immigrants in New York City 1945-1995*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Relevant to this is the section on politics and nationalism, pp.130 and ff.

had in mind the political violence committed by the young Basque nationalists, and it was this concession to violence that would earn him a reprimand from Gallastegi:

*“Santo Tomás, y con él otros filósofos de todas las tendencias, mantiene la licitud de la violencia para derribar al tirano, cuando se han agotado los restantes medios que la posibilidad nos Brinda. Nos oponemos a la violencia inútil y a la innecesaria.”*<sup>508</sup>

But Irujo was actually attacking the youth who wanted to make a revolution against Spain: *“A nadie medianamente sensato se le puede ocurrir que Euzkadi pueda librarse del franquismo sin que al mismo tiempo se libere de España.”*<sup>509</sup>

This article probably shows the most positive views Irujo ever entertained in favor of violence, or at least the use of violence when there are no alternatives:

*“Queremos que, si tal es preciso, la violencia sea organizada y nos opondremos hasta donde lleguen nuestras fuerzas a la violencia inútil y sectaria de unos irresponsables que, aunque sean patriotas excelentes, carezcan de la autoridad precisa para poder mandar y de las aptitudes necesarias para la aplicación de las órdenes emanadas de quien pueda y deba darlas.”*<sup>510</sup>

That article was published in *Alderdi* no. 181-182, a double issue corresponding to the months of March and April, 1962. In the next issue of *Alderdi*, Irujo published the much-disputed “Patriotas y gamberros.” As we have already said, the constant attacks on the PNV, aimed directly at him and his opinions, coming from the Basque youth nationalists and their supporters in America, was probably the catalyst for Irujo’s writing the article.

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<sup>508</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>509</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>510</sup> *Ibid.*

## e. Correspondence between Manuel Irujo and Elías Gallastegui.

On July 19th, 1962, Elías Gallastegui wrote a letter to Irujo in answer to his article “Patriotas y Gamberros.”<sup>511</sup> The letter consisted of 45 typewritten pages plus an eight-page attachment entitled “Hacia la solidaridad nacional.” With that letter, Gallastegui wanted to explain, and somehow excuse, those “patriots and bastards” by depicting their attitude, opinions, thoughts, and actions, elaborating a sort of detailed study of the young Basque nationalists. Although the letter was originally meant as a defense of his own son, the extension of it allowed for an in-depth analysis of the new generation of revolutionary Basque nationalists and, although the word or any reference to ETA are avoided in the entire letter, it is impossible to ignore that he is referring to the organization.

Gallastegi’s son, Iker, was a member of EG, and although the conditions of clandestinity sometimes make it hard to tell between casual meetings and groups, it seems that he never actually became a member of ETA. Nevertheless, Gallastegui did host some members of ETA, like José Antonio Etxebarria, one of the ideologists of the group, who probably, as we will see, passed some of his ideology onto these young Basque patriots.

Manuel Irujo and Elías Gallastegui were old acquaintances, they had met in Dublin, where Gallastegui was living then, during Irujo’s visit to attend the Interparliamentary Union: “*Le visité. Nos hicimos muy amigos. Le llevé libros, muchos libros. Le puse al corriente de muchas de nuestras actividades. Le encontré cordial, vasco, bueno, pero enquistado en la sombra de sus recuerdos.*”<sup>512</sup> Irujo described his first feelings towards Gallastegui in a letter to Jon Bilbao in 1953 on the occasion of a controversy across different articles written by Irujo and Gallastegi.

He described Gallastegui as an old Basque nationalist who, like him—although he would not have owned it—did not always agree with the official version of the PNV: “*fue un teórico del nacionalismo, inspirador del Jagi-Jagi, ala separatista, cofundador del Eusko Mendigoizale Bazkuna.*” Despite the disagreements and differences with Gallastegui’s ideas, Irujo, as always, maintained his relationship with him, and things would have gone on that way had it not been

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<sup>511</sup> Although the letter was written in July, according to the information given by Irujo he probably received it later, perhaps in September.

<sup>512</sup> Irujo to Jon Bilbao. November 5<sup>th</sup>, 1953. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 2, File 9. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/4843.pdf> (consulted on April 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

for Gallastegui's deciding to end the relationship on account of the "Patriotas y Gamberros" episode.

In 1962, when Gallastegui wrote the aforementioned letter, he was living in San Juan de Luz, in Iparralde, where he was sheltering some young Basque nationalists who had fled from the Franco regime, like Etxebarrieta, already mentioned, with whom Irujo tried to establish bonds.

Their different outlooks on Basque nationalism were not an obstacle for continuing their relationship: "*Mi sueño (...) es más humano: tiende hacia la convivencia y la armonía, hacia la solidaridad nacional,*"<sup>513</sup> Gallastegui told Irujo in a letter just before the publication of the article that would draw them apart forever. Gallastegui was giving him notice of something that he would describe in the attachment accompanying the letter he sent to Irujo, the idea of "*Solidaridad nacional,*" which was a different way of explaining the National or Patriotic front.

The national or patriotic front, as it is called by certain authors like Robert P. Clark,<sup>514</sup> was something that kept recurring in revolutionary Basque nationalism but, although in some way it was the same idea that had been developed since the Bayonne pact of 1945, and also similar to the defense of Basque unity called for by the Basque Government since the very first moment, the revolutionary nationalists appealed for a unity that would only involve Basque nationalists, and that idea was not well received by traditional Basque nationalists, especially not so by Irujo, who had always defended the unity with the Spanish democrats.

Furthermore, the promoters of the National Front targeted Irujo as one of the most important adversaries hindering the achievement of their wills. In a letter sent in October 1962 to Antonio Ruiz de Azúa Zabalbeaskoa, *Ogoñope*, director of Euzko Deya in Mexico, Irujo told him in detail about the National Front and its links with Gallastegui:

*"Los del "Frente Nacional Vasco", están desatados. Yo conozco cuatro panfletos dirigidos contra mí (...) El fundador, cerebro y rector del Frente Nacional es Elias (Sic.) Gallastegui, autor, al menos, de algunos de los folletos relacionados, y que no ha desautorizado los restantes, suscritos por la organización que él inspira y dirige (Sic.)."*

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<sup>513</sup> Elias Gallastegui to Manuel Irujo. May 29<sup>th</sup>, 1962. Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 3, File 8. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/7217.pdf> (consulted on April 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>514</sup> This concept is developed in: CLARK, Robert P., 1984, *The basque insurgents. ETA, 1952-1980*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.



In the two consecutive letters sent to Ogoñope, Irujo accuses Gallastegui of being the leader of the National Front, although it seems that he was wrong, to judge from Ogoñope's answer.

After sending to Irujo his protracted answer to "Patriotas y Gamberros," Gallastegui, probably upset at Irujo's silence, sent the letter to be published in *Euzko Deya México*, and Ogoñope wrote to Irujo for advice on the convenience of publishing it or not.

When Irujo had visited Gallastegui in August, they were on friendly terms: "*Visité en Agosto a Eli Gallastegui en su casa. Estuve con él hora y media. Dedicó todo su tiempo a defender a su hijo Iker contra los ataques que yo le había dirigido. Con un padre derretido por el cariño de su hijo no se puede discutir. Yo me limité a escucharle.*" The long friendship between the two nationalists allowed them to sit and talk; but it seems that the visit did not calm Gallastegui after all, since he wrote and sent the aforementioned letter after Irujo's visit.

Irujo, a man who recognized before Ogoñope that he wrote too much—"Escribo a usted más que a una novia"—received the letter and, struck by the volume and aggressiveness of Gallastegui's words, he stopped to ponder on the possible solutions: "*El tenor de las cartas es de tal naturaleza que solo caben tres posturas: Una, devolvérselas (sic.), porque aquello no es de recibo; otra, ir a su casa y pegarle dos boleos; otra, no contestar. Esto último es lo que he hecho.*"<sup>515</sup>

Their relationship deteriorated after the incident of "Patriotas y Gamberros," and, although it is possible that they may have exchanged a few other spare letters, they did not resume their cordial relationship.

When some years later, in 1974, Irujo learnt that Gallastegui was taken ill, he sent him a letter asking for forgiveness: "*Un incidente desagradable nos alejó. Déjame que te pida perdón en lo que te falté y te ruegue seas generoso conmigo y volvamos a las relaciones de Amistad que antes tuvimos.*"

Unfortunately, according to Gallastegui's siblings, the letter arrived when Gallastegui had already passed away, and Irujo received a very unpleasant answer from them:

*"Aita no le debía a Vd. Ningún perdón. En todo caso sería Vd. Quien debe perdonarse a sí mismo si su conciencia no está tranquila. Lo único que aita le exigió fue que*

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<sup>515</sup> Letters between Antonio Ruiz de Azua Zabalbeaskoa and Manuel Irujo. October, 1962. Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 3, File 16. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/7543.pdf> (consulted on April 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

*reparase el mal hecho al buen nombre de uno de sus hijos en su artículo “patriotas o Gamberros” (...). Como en su carta no se ve tal propósito se la devolvemos.”*<sup>516</sup>

The awakening of the young Basque nationalists had resulted in a fatal dispute between the old Basque nationalists that had brought a long relationship to an end. Despite the fact that Irujo and some other traditional Basque nationalists continued maintaining some kind of relations with the “new generation” of Basque patriots, something strong stood in the way, dividing and distancing them.

The long letter that Elías Gallastegui sent to Manuel Irujo serves as a good reference for analyzing these young Basque nationalists and the evolution of ETA’s ideology in the exile.

## **f. Developing “Patriotas y Gamberros”**

By the time Irujo published his “Patriotas y Gamberros” article, ETA had celebrated its first Assembly in Urt, Lapurdi, at the Benedictine Monastery of Belloch, although the organization had already spread some of its ideology in several editions of *Cuadernos ETA* and in the *Libro Blanco* (1960).

In the article, Irujo reaffirms his respect for the alternative proposed by the new generation: “*Vaya por delante todo el respeto que me merecen las maneras de concebir nuestra acción política, aun cuando se opongan a las aplicadas por los vascos en el cursos de la historia y a las que en la actualidad siguen sus rectores,*”<sup>517</sup> although he was upset by the bad manners of those whom he claimed were “*Gamberros del patriotismo.*”

For Gallastegui, as he explains in his extensive letter in response to Irujo, that way of treating the young folk of a generation whose views differed from the orthodoxy was a return to the past, as the PNV had done the same to those who, like him, had dared to confront the PNV’s ideas. Nevertheless, he does admit that “*Estos jóvenes abertzales, a nuestra manera de ver, tienen serios defectos en cuanto a su formación patriótica y al enjuiciamiento histórico del nacionalismo*”—but what he cannot agree with is the idea that the young insurgents are

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<sup>516</sup> Letters between Gallastegui’s brothers and Manuel Irujo. January-February, 1974. Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 16, File G. <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/2046.pdf> (consulted on April 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>517</sup> All references from Irujo’s article “Patriotas y Gamberros” can be found in: IRUJO, Manuel, 1981, *Escritos en Alderdi*, vol II, pp. 41-46.

somehow the product of the Franco Regime, as Irujo had defined them,<sup>518</sup> and, quite on the contrary, he feels extremely upset at the assertion.

That idea is a recurring one among traditional Basque nationalists, who were trying their best to understand the insurgency of the young, especially in relation to the use of violence, but also after the conferences in Paris in 1961. Unzueta shows this in his own opinion about the youth:

*“(...) que desgraciadamente no han estado respirando impunemente durante toda su vida propaganda fascista. Los métodos del fascismo les han penetrado a algunos.”*<sup>519</sup>

Whether influenced or not by the fascism from Spain, the Basque nationalist youths had developed their own ideology in the exile, much as traditional Basque nationalists had done, and it was from the exile also that they took some influences.

The construction of ETA's ideology is characterized from the beginning by the diversity of the international sources on which it was based, which expresses their interest to internationalize the conflict no less than the remarkable academic training of its founding members.

ETA built its ideology around several influences, initially collected in the *Libro Blanco* (1960), where the parameters are summarized with a clearly instructional and informative aim and where, on a first approximation, one can see that the idea of National Resistance is analyzed as the clear willingness of the Basque people to adopt nationalism and to make of the defense of the Basque language a pillar of citizenship.

Although ETA and the new Basque generation analyzed and reinterpreted the primitive Basque nationalism of Sabino Arana, as we have already said, and although that may have been what attracted them to *Jagi-Jagi* and the Basque National Front movement in the first place, it is also true that these youths were going to change two of the basic pillars of *Aranism*: Religion and Race.<sup>520</sup>

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<sup>518</sup> Although in the article “Patriotas y Gamberros” Irujo does not refer to the youth as a product of the Franco regime, it is in some previous articles like “Juventud pesimista” (*Alderdi* nos. 177-178, January, 1962) that he suggests it when talking about the youth: “*Son patriotas. Van impulsados por altos ideales. Serán los que ocupen nuestros puestos u otros equivalentes el día que nosotros hayamos de dejarlos. Pero antes habrán de curarse de su pesimismo y de esa concepción de selectos, tres la cual, como tras los brazos de la cruz del inquisidor, se proyectan los cuernos del diablo totalitario.*”

<sup>519</sup> Iñaki de Unzueta to Manuel Irujo. November 8<sup>th</sup>, 1961 and December 19<sup>th</sup>, 1961. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 39, File 1.

<sup>520</sup> JÁUREGUI, Gurutz, “Los orígenes ideológicos de ETA,” pp. 171-232. In ELORZA, Antonio (coord.), 2000, *op. cit.*

## i. Confessional

In *Cuadernos* there was a section called “Iglesia y Estado” where, in that effort of Basque nationalist training, different examples of the relationship between Church and State were analyzed, turning to Pakistan, Israel, or Tibet as models to compare the Basque case with. To place the analysis in a more practical field, instead of studying it on a philosophical level, they linked the demand of Basque nationalism with the confessionality of the PNV, reckoning that the difficulties in the way to Basque autonomy during the Spanish Republic were related to that particular feature: “*Cuando se leen los editoriales de la prensa abertzale de 1931, se observa una gran preocupación en el seno del PNV en torno a la laicidad clara de la naciente república Española.*”<sup>521</sup> The concepts about the State-Church question differing between the Spanish Republicans and the traditional Basque nationalists caused trouble for the achievement of autonomy, according to this analysis. Apart from this, the section also studied the religiousness of Basque society, making links between them, and placing the focus on the working class because “*Gipuzkoa y Bizkaya tienen hoy poblaciones activas cuyo 60% e incluso más, son obreros,*” and that working class had moved away from religion.

Finally, the section analyzes and links the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Franco regime, stating that the unpopularity of the Church is increasing due to that reason.

After several issues of *Cuadernos*, debates, meetings, and discussions on ETA’s principles, in the document generated after the First Assembly, considered ETA’s first official statement on its ideological principles, and entitled *Euzkadi ta Askatasuna. Principios*, ETA declared its secular, non-religious nature, distancing itself from the religious feature that had characterized previous versions of Basque nationalism: “*ETA manifiesta su aconfesionalidad y la propugna para la Constitución de Euzkadi.*”<sup>522</sup>

Although that trait was unquestioned within the PNV—an organization of the 60’s—it would become be an interesting topic of debate during the days of the Spanish transition to democracy, something that we will look into in the next chapter.

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<sup>521</sup> “Cuadernos ETA. Iglesia y Estado,” in HÓRDAGO (ed.), 1979, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 146.

<sup>522</sup> “Principios Ideológicos Primera Asamblea,” May, 1962. In HÓRDAGO (ed.), 1979, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 532-533.

## ii. Language

ETA differs from old Aranism, almost from the very beginning, in its treatment of race and in its relation to Basque nationalism. Although, as Gurutz Jáuregui has shown in his analyses, the idea of Basque superiority was not abandoned, the racial cause was, replacing it by an ethnological or, mostly, by a cultural-linguistic feature.

In that respect, there are two important elements to consider in the development of language over race: one is the fact that a good proportion of ETA's members might not fit with the concept of biological origin according to Arana's theories, since they had non-Basque origins (Álvarez Enparantza or Krutwig Sagredo, for instance); the other is the circumstance that the approach to Basque nationalism through the language (Basque) gave some of them the opportunity of focusing more on the cultural and linguistic feature of nationalism rather than on the biological origin.<sup>523</sup>

Moreover, the interest in the language felt by Álvarez Enparantza, *Txillardegi*, one of the founders and a self-taught linguistic, is well reflected already in the firsts documents and, as we have seen, in the conference he gave in Paris.

If nationalism is the way to the modernization of a community,<sup>524</sup> choosing language over race as a key feature of the new Basque nationalism turns it into an open, civic, voluntary nationalism which can be acquired. Thus the old ethnic Basque nationalism is transformed into a new civic Basque nationalism.

The social and economic changes experienced in the 60's resulted in a rapid growth of the working class and an intensive declassification that brought about a crisis of the traditional values, but at the same time developed a cultural defense in front of mass anonymity, what was called by Jean Chesnaux the "vindication of the right to difference." The defense of culture, which has been termed as the "emergence of culturalists," provoked new changes in Basque

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<sup>523</sup> JÁUREGUI BERECIARTU, Gurutz, 1981, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-135.

<sup>524</sup> "Nationalism is the most important social and political phenomenon of our time. It is the cultural framework of modernity and, as such, it defines all of the specifically modern experience, be it social, political, economic, personal, that is, it defines the ways we, modern men and women, live our lives." GREENFELD, Liah, 2016, *Advanced introduction of Nationalism*. Northampton: Edward Elgar.

nationalism and pressed forward to place the Basque language at the center of Basque identity.<sup>525</sup>

As we have already quoted, ETA and the new nationalist Basque generation were not the only ones to vindicate and promote the use of the Basque language, but their public denunciation of its abandonment and their clear position in favor of its promotion forced the other Basque nationalisms (mainly the PNV) to adopt similar stances.

In their *Cuadernos*, the section “Euskera y patriotismo vasco”<sup>526</sup> links Basque nationalism and the pro-independence movement with the defense of the Basque language. Although the vindication of the Basque language could have been enough to define a new ethnic trend—such as identifying the Basque nation only with Basque-speakers—in this case ETA avoided the issue by identifying one of the causes for the abandonment of the language as being the fault of the Basque Country’s leading class:

*“Hay otro retroceso, que llamaremos “social.” Los aundikis, jauntxos, aiton semes<sup>527</sup> y demás dirigentes del país, han abandonado el euskera desde tiempo inmemorial: y lo siguen haciendo en términos un poco menos absolutos.”* In fact, in identifying the three major causes for the recoil of the Basque language, they had established that these were: the geography factor, the diversification of the dialectal variants, and the abandonment of the language by the Basque leading classes. As to the immigration factor, that is, the ethnic use of the language, this was not only not mentioned but, on the contrary, the message was positive in terms of unity and social progress. For them, the explanation of the nation and the feeling of being Basque is built through the language:

*“En un sentido estricto, sólo el idioma vasco mantiene a un nivel indiscutible la unidad objetiva de Euskadi, a través de sus zonas euskaldunes de los Estados español y francés. (...) Ni los bearneses ni los riojanos se sienten vascos, ni los vascos consideran*

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<sup>525</sup> RUBIRALTA CASAS, Fermí, 2003, “Els intel·lectuals en la conformació del nou nacionalisme radical gallec, català i basc durant la dècada de 1960.” *Revista del Centre de Lectura de Reus*, no. 8; URLA, Jaqueline, 1993, “Cultural Politics in an Age of Statistics: Numbers, Nations, and the Making of Basque Identity,” in *American ethnologist*, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 818-843.

<sup>526</sup> “Euskera y patriotismo vasco.” In HÓRDAGO (Ed.), 1979, *op. cit.* Vol.1, pp. 104-109.

<sup>527</sup> It is usual to alternate popular words in Basque when speaking in Spanish in the Basque Country, as well as the opposite when speaking in Basque. In this case *aundiki*, *jauntxos* and *aiton semes* are words used to describe rich kids and siblings coming from wealthy families.

*patriotas a los riojanos y bearneses. La razón fundamental de esa escisión es que hace de seis a ocho siglos, los bearneses y los riojanos dejaron de ser euskaldunes.”*<sup>528</sup>

In their imagined nation, the Basque language becomes the unity factor and, therefore, one of the main objectives for a future Basque State and Basque government.

Illiteracy rates in the early twentieth century were high among the Basque-Navarrese population, with 38% of children aged 10 being unable to read or write; but with the arrival of the Second Spanish Republic and the compulsory free education system, this percentage falls to below 10%. The action of the State in relation to language could be crucial for the recovery or collapse of a language. Thus we see how Spain has reacted on many occasions as any other State has done when confronted with national problems within their borders (especially during the Franco dictatorship, to limit ourselves to the chronology of our research) by making use of the force of the State as a homogenizing power on the cultural level, promoting a single common language and culture, ignoring all the others that exist only within the political institution, by means of a national education system that oversees the monolingual assimilation of minority languages.<sup>529</sup>

The same fate was suffered by the Basque provinces of *Iparralde*, integrated inside the revolutionary French government since 1789; as it happened, the Basque language was directly ignored by the Republican administration, which only recognized French as the language of unity in all of its departments—but fortunately for the Basque language, the absence of industrialization in the three Basque provinces favored a slower decline.

The support of the government is crucial for the development of a language, this cannot be overstated. The statistics show that the development of education in Basque language has run parallel to the development of Basque nationalism,<sup>530</sup> but this growth has taken place mostly when the powers have been in the hands of Basque nationalists, with the support of the administration.

*“En los tiempos de creación del PNV, la masa euskalduna [Basque language speakers] en Bizkaia eran Pescadores y habitantes de algunas villas y baserris del interior, pero en la ciudad, y por la industrialización y por los obreros que habían llegado, la lengua*

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<sup>528</sup> “Euskera y patriotismo vasco.” In HÓRDAGO (Ed.), 1979, *op. cit.* Vol.1, pp. 104-109.

<sup>529</sup> GUIBERNAU, Montserrat, 1999, *Nacions sense estat*. Barcelona: Columna edicions, pp. 61-62.

<sup>530</sup> DE LA GRANJA, José Luis; DE PABLO, Santiago (eds.), 2002, *Historia del País Vasco y de Navarra en el siglo XX*. Madrid : Editorial Biblioteca Nueva, pp. 333-339.

*común era el castellano. (...) A diferencia de la burguesía catalana, la burguesía vasca no había defendido el euskera como símbolo del vasquismo, sino que para legitimar su nacionalismo vasco utilizaban sus ancestrales apellidos vascos.*<sup>531</sup>

According to Xabier Kintana, the role of the nationalist Basque political parties in supporting the Basque language was less than it could have been, at least in the early stages, since they did not do much to recover it and identify it with the national movement. Xabier Kintana was one of the key elements in the modernization of the language, along with the aforementioned Krutwig and Txillardegui, and the poet Gabriel Aresti. They would be the main drivers behind the Congress of Bayonne (1964) and the Congress of Arantzazu (1968), where the first rules were established.<sup>532</sup>

Although it is true that the language was not the basic pillar of Basque nationalism for the PNV, as we have already seen, one should not overlook the fact that several congresses dealing with Basque studies were organized; the first one was held in Oñati in September 1918, and it debated seven major groups of topics: race, language, history, art, education, political and social sciences, and Basque studies. Apart from these, the promotion and creation of the Basque University, as well as the creation of *Ikastolas*, should be regarded as activities carried out under the influence of traditional Basque nationalism and prior to the impulse of revolutionary Basque nationalism.<sup>533</sup>

In their effort to link the use of the Basque language to the development of the nation and the State, the political objectives to achieve in the Basque Country were defended in ETA's principles as follows:

*“La proclamación del euskera como única lengua nacional. Ella debe de volver a ser la lengua de todos los vascos. Su primacía y carácter oficial dentro de Euskadi serán*

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<sup>531</sup> Interview to Xabier Kintana, member of *Euskaltzaindia*, the Academy of Basque Language. Bilbao, November, 2011.

<sup>532</sup> INTXAUSTI, Joseba. 1992. *Euskera. La lengua de los vascos*. Donostia: Elkar. pp. 184-185.

<sup>533</sup> The Congresses on Basque studies were celebrated between 1918 and 1930 in the Basque Country. During the exile, the Congress was celebrated in three different occasions in Bayonne. In 1978 was reestablished in the Basque Country. More on the Basque Studies congresses at:

<http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/32088/123009> . Regarding the creation and promotion of *ikastolas*, even they were private schools, we cannot ignore that the founders of the *ikastolas* movements, like Resurrección Maria de Azkue, were linked to the Basque nationalism. The expansion of the *ikastolas*, as well as the culturalist movement aforementioned, was developed during the 1960's. More on *Ikastolas* at: <http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/73307/76032>



*totales sin perjuicio de la instauración de un régimen provisional trilingüe habida cuenta de las realidades lingüísticas del presente.*”<sup>534</sup>

The promotion of the Basque language and the idea of its further development in the future Basque country was not incompatible with the exile, but quite the opposite. The language pertaining to a nation in exile was susceptible of being transformed into the “tangible residue of homeland that the exile can carry, keeping the memories and roots alive”<sup>535</sup>.

In a foreign country, language would become one weapon with which to resist the process of assimilation—but what was really needed, much like in politics and in Basque nationalism as a whole, was a unity of language. The multiple and diverse dialects of the Basque language made the communication and even the study of the language a difficult matter. The need for a unified or standard language was identified in *Cuadernos*, when Txillardegui and the first ETA members urged: “*Debemos escoger INMEDIATAMENTE, un dialecto vasco - con literatura suficiente para poder ser bien definido – y apoyarlo con exclusividad a la hora de crear la escuela vasca, la prensa vasca, etc..*”

The model for this standard or unified language would be found also in the exile, following the example and the pattern of nations like Israel or Finland, and avoiding other examples considered non-suitable in the world of nationalisms, as Kintana remembers:

*“La referencia de Irlanda no era un buen ejemplo en el tema de la lengua porque ellos no lo controlaron, sino que más bien basaron su oposición a los ingleses en materia religiosa, y aquello no era un ejemplo valorable en nuestro caso.”*<sup>536</sup>

The Irish case was not a good mirror to reflect themselves on, as the Irish had lost their language, Gaelic, in favor of English, the language that was used in their national struggle. However, Ireland was indeed an example and an influence for the Basque movement, particularly as related to the situation of armed conflict.

According to Kintana, the Basque language was used for the defense of their Basque nationality, especially since “*Muchos pensamos que no era la independencia la que salvaría el idioma sino que salvar el idioma nos llevaría a la independencia.*”

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<sup>534</sup> “Principios Ideológicos Primera Asamblea.” *Op.Cit.*

<sup>535</sup> GHOSH, Devleena. 2008. *Op.Cit.* p. 285.

<sup>536</sup> Xabier Kintana. Cited interview.

As the question of language in the Irish case provided too few matchable elements, by the end of the 1960's and in the 1970's Basque nationalism veered its attention towards Israel and its national language system.

But even in the case of Israel, the promotion of the national language had not come about as a necessity in face of the power exerted by another language, like in the case of the Basque country, and thus Hebrew also was able to become a national language and a cohesive element within Israel.

A Basque bank, *Caja Laboral Popular*, organized raffles among its customers in 1976, the prize being a trip to the Holy Land. Such relations with the Israelis intensified the cultural relationship to the point of bringing Ariel Shoval, an Israeli linguist of the Israeli Ministry of Education, to give a talk on language in the Basque country. By that time, Israel was an example of social democracy and Shoval, who was a socialist, spent his sessions talking about how the Arabic language had been taken as an example for developing the Hebrew method of integrating the use of a language in a sociolinguistic context.

After the meeting with Shoval, Kintana and a group of writers to whom the PNV had commissioned a study on the recovery of the Basque language were fascinated with the work done by the State with regard to Hebrew. In 1976, they began to travel to Israel in order to learn the method that had been used to unify the nation, a nation made up of immigrants coming from several places around the world, using the language as a unifying element.

The State of Israel had chosen Hebrew as the original language of the Jewish people, and also as the language that would be used by all the State. They could have chosen Yiddish or English, but then the language would not have served as an element of unity. Hebrew, however, was a language that no one spoke, and the State of Israel needed to quickly create a learning method. The emergency led to the creation of the "Easy Hebrew" method, which taught Hebrew quickly and efficiently. This method consisted in teaching the Hebrew language through words and short sentences that are plain and simple, while also very common, and employing all the information channels available in the country.

*"En Israel vimos unos periódicos especiales para recién llegados con un vocabulario muy básico, pero que a la vez era el mismo que se usaba en la televisión, la radio, etc. El elemento más importante era que estaban todos coordinados y trabajaban con el mismo método."*

The similarity between the two Semitic languages, Arabic and Hebrew, and the geographic proximity of Arabic, made it easier for the promoters of Hebrew in Israel to pay close attention

to the evolution of Arabic in order to create a modified Hebrew, thus giving birth to a standardized language. Similarly, it was under this influence that the Basques found the solution to the problem of the Basque dialects, evolving towards a standardized common language by means of an easy teaching method that was the same for all Basques: the *Euskara batua*.

### iii. Race and *Coreanos*

In the Principles that originated in the first Assembly, the racial conception was absolutely discarded: “*La repulsa del racismo y, por tanto, de los principios de superioridad legal de unos pueblos o razas sobre otros. No apoya, consecuentemente, la segregación o expulsión de elementos extraños del País, en tanto éstos no se opongan o atenten contra los intereses nacionales de Euzkadi.*”<sup>537</sup>

In this respect, a gap existed between the old *Aranism* and the new Basque nationalism, such that Gallastegui, in his letter, could not refrain from interfering. In the letter, running contrary to the principles of the young, and far from the new conception of Basque ethnicity, Gallastegui developed the idea that years before there were different tendencies within Basque nationalism vying with each other. When referring to the Basque country’s economy, Gallastegui recalls how the article “Los Coreanos,”<sup>538</sup> by Manuel Irujo, published in 1957 in *Alderdi*, had generated controversy around the treatment of the Spanish immigration in the Basque Country.

In June 1957, Irujo had published in *Alderdi* his article “Los Coreanos,” where he tried to update the controversy regarding the immigration of Spanish population to the Basque Country and the paper these immigrants had in the Basque economy. Irujo was quoting Sabino Arana when he wrote: “(...) *Que esto no está reñido para que, siendo cada uno dueño de su casa y sin admitir ajenas imposiciones, se trata con toda clase de consideraciones, y con cariño nacido del corazón al extranjero.*”

In his article, Manuel Irujo defends some of Arana’s presumably racist theories, explaining that the use of certain pejorative vocabulary like “*maketo*” or “*coreano*” was not meant to be offensive, and he states that “*Nosotros no podemos aspirar a echar a los coreanos del suelo vasco,*” arguing that they are part of the Basque industry and, considering their degree of

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<sup>537</sup> “Principios Ideológicos Primera Asamblea,” *op. cit.*

<sup>538</sup> “Los coreanos,” by Manuel Irujo. In *Alderdi*, no. 123, June, 1957.

integration in the Basque society, the best option is “(...) *hacer lo necesario para que cambien sus chozas y chabolas por habitaciones dignas de los hombres procurando que nos conozcan, que nos quieran y que, de tal manera, sean absorbidos por lo vasco y para lo vasco, entrando a formar parte de nuestro grupo humano, con todas las consecuencias inherentes a esta conclusión.*”

The article generated some controversy, prompting Ceferino Jemein,<sup>539</sup> a traditional Basque nationalist who had set himself up as one of the defenders of Sabino Arana’s orthodox nationalism, to write some articles in response to the insult that Manuel Irujo had thrown upon the memory of Aranism.

In his first article, “No estoy conforme,” signed under the pseudonym *Jadarka* and published in *Alderdi* nos. 124-125 in August 1957, he attacked Irujo and insisted on the fact that the Spanish immigration in the Basque country had been organized by the Franco regime in order to exterminate the Basques and the Basque Country,<sup>540</sup> and therefore that the “*invasión organizada premeditadamente por Franco para arrancar los ojos a Euzkadi, no la protegen los Derechos del Hombre,*” as Irujo had called for in defense of the immigrants.

Although in his article Jemein addresses Irujo as “*mi viejo amigo Manuel de Irujo,*” in fact, their ideological controversy had prevented them from being friends since a long time ago, as was properly pointed out by Jemein in a 1950 letter to Irujo: “*En mi correspondencia anterior me costó mucho esfuerzo llamarle a Vd. amigo, porque Vd. no lo ha sido mío nunca. Hoy menos que nunca, porque Vd. es un enemigo mío.*”<sup>541</sup>

Their dispute in 1950 had been in relation with Arana’s orthodoxy, and the same was happening with his response to “Los Coreanos” in 1957, when Jemein was calling for a control of the immigrants (he called them “*Invasores*”) through the law and work permits.

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<sup>539</sup> More on Ceferino Jemein at: <http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/63966>

<sup>540</sup> This idea was quite extended in some parts of Spain, including the Basque Country and Catalonia, but if it was true, nobody has ever found a document proving that the Franco regime had such a strategy. Moreover, the fact that the Basque Country, as well as Catalonia, were two of the most industrialized areas in Spain means that no immigration plan was needed in that respect. On the other hand, what is easily verifiable is that immigrants were being confined in camps in Barcelona, for instance, and forced to return to their places of origin. On the immigration process during the Franco regime, consult: GONZÁLEZ MADRID, Damián-Alberto (ed.), 2008, *El franquismo y la transición en España: desmitificación y reconstrucción de la memoria de una época*. Madrid: Libros de la Catarata; as well as another analysis, focused on the economy and the repercussions of the immigration: TORRE, Joseba de la, SANZ LAFUENTE, Gloria (eds.), 2008, *Migraciones y coyuntura económica del franquismo a la democracia*. Zaragoza: Prensas universitarias de Zaragoza.

<sup>541</sup> Letter from Ceferino Jemein to Manuel Irujo. Pau, December 21<sup>st</sup>, 1950. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 2, File 5. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/6117.pdf> (consulted on April 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

The polemic with the “Coreanos” article did not end with Jemein’s answer, since a debate was generated within Basque nationalism around the issue. The evolution of society, and even the fact that most of the Basque nationalists who were debating the issue were living in the exile abroad, resulted in a diversity of opinions that were illustrated by means of examples taken from life or from the foreign experience.

Irujo published a new article in *Tierrra Vasca* in August—basically at the same time as Jemein’s answer appeared—deepening on the question and, in fact, approaching the idea of the Spanish civil servants as the image of the Franco Regime in the Basque Country, the same idea that Iker Gallastegui would explain some years later in Paris.

In “Maquetos y Coreanos” (such was the title of the said article in *Tierra Vasca*), Irujo defends the idea that there are two classes of *coreanos*, whom he divides into those who “*han ido a Euzkadi a realizar una labor franquista, que consiste en trabajar contra todo lo que sea vasquismo, peculiaridad nacional,*” and those who are “*gentes llegadas con el único objeto de trabajar para poder vivir.*”<sup>542</sup> The attitude towards the second kind had to be positive, an attitude of integration, since they were part of the Basque community and, anyhow, in a future Basque autonomous Government, the only problem—that of the Basque language—would be solved by the Government’s recovering the use of the Basque language.

As we have already mentioned, the polemic had spread among Basque nationalists, to the point that the August issue of *Alderdi* published not one but two articles on this matter.

The first article, “Al servicio de la Verdad,” was a chronicle describing the repercussions of the Spanish immigration, adopting the same theses that Irujo defended with respect to the rights of the immigrant workers and, despite their quantity, the need to integrate them. In an analysis centered on Bizkaia, the article moves away from ethnic nationalism, considering as Basques all those who live there: “*Bizkainos que sólo lo eran de nacimiento e incluso solo de adopción, de adaptación, de afecto, han dado la vida por el Ideal Nacionalista Vasco.*”

Along opposite lines, the article written by Jemein, using another of his pseudonyms, *Belandia*, retakes Arana’s nineteenth-century ideas on immigration, and even on the Basque industrial economy, to attack the industrial system for having distorted the system: “*Bilbao era un pueblo honrado, de limpios negocios y sanas costumbres (...) el comercio ha perdido su honradez innata. (...) Todos los negocios sucions están permitidos; no hay hierro en los Altos Hornos,*

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<sup>542</sup> “Maquetos y Coreanos,” *Tierra Vasca*, Buenos Aires, August 15<sup>th</sup>, 1957.

*pero se puede comprar en los cafés, a través de estraperlistas sin más conciencia que amasar millones (...).”*

The distorted view of Jemein and his use of Sabino Arana’s thoughts to legitimate his racist opinions about the immigrants and the Basque industrial system generated a heated debate in the exile and a confrontation of ideas among Basque nationalists. The inside–exile element was present in the debate since, while some Basque nationalists contributed from the exile with ideas and positive solutions for the immigration problem in the Basque Country, some others saw the immigration and even the industrialization of the Basque Country as a threat against Basque essence and, therefore, an attack on the traditional values of Basque society.

Taking this debate as an example, we can see how Basque nationalism was developing and changing in the exile and, despite not even being located within the geographical borders of the nation, contributing to the creation of an imagined nation, making true what Devleena Ghosh has affirmed through her quotation of Richard Eder: “Exile is the only country with no geography.”<sup>543</sup>

Finally, considering the importance that the debate had acquired (and owing also to the indirect pressure exerted by Manuel Irujo to get the Basque Government involved),<sup>544</sup> the *Lehendakari* decided to include the question in his annual Christmas Message, discarding the racist solutions and appealing to an understanding and comprehension:

*“Este problema, por lo tanto, debe ser situado en un plano humano, profundamente humano, que no puede jamás ser resuelto -y menos entre cristianos- con rencores, fáciles "slogans", y menos aún con odios de clase alguna.”*<sup>545</sup>

In his speech, the president also refers to the *Coreanos*’ polemic and pleads for their integration, charging against those Basques who forget their national duties:

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<sup>543</sup> GHOSH, Devleena, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 284. In fact, Ghosh is quoting Richard Eder’s commentaries in a book review published in *The New York Times* on a book by Dubravka Ugresic, *The Museum of unconditional surrender*. The review can be consulted at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/09/books/books-of-the-times-treating-exile-as-a-separate-country.html> (consulted on April 29<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>544</sup> As an outsider, although a good ideologist and member of the Basque Government, Manuel Irujo normally made someone else speak to or put pressure on the *Lehendakari*. He confronted his ideas with the Basque president, but, as we can see in his letters, he also generated a group of pressure on several occasions in order to get the Basque Government involved. In that specific case, we can follow the controversial debate on immigration through the letters he exchanged in November 1957 with Francisco Belausteguigoitia, former Basque delegate in Mexico. AN, PNV, 0097, C-5.

<sup>545</sup> Christmas message, December, 1957. AGUIRRE, José Antonio, 1981, *op. cit.*, pp. 985-991.

*“Todo aquel que olvida los deberes nacionales pertenece a esta escuela, todo aquel vasco que abandona su idioma y sabiéndolo no lo transmite a sus hijos es un heraldo de un coreanismo mucho peor y más grave para la patria que aquel que viniendo de extrañas tierras quiere asimilarse a la nuestra.”*

With the Christmas speech, the *Lehendakari* closed the controversy by offering a modern answer to the problem of Spanish immigration, appealing to Human Rights, Christian duties, and the integration of the immigrants into the Basque society, taking their own exile experience as example: *“Nadie mejor que el que vive exilado para comprender lo que es y significa el buen o mal trato en país extranjero y todo emigrado tiene algo de exilado, el vasco que se va o el extraño que viene a Euzkadi.”*

Ceferino Jemein—the person most involved in the polemic—had been a member of *Jagi-Jagi*, as we have already seen, and even though he also had a heated debate with Elías Gallastegui, the two remained good friends. In 1962 they lived together in the exile at Gallastegi’s home in Biarritz and, from what we can read in the letter sent to Irujo after “Patriotas y Gamberros,” Gallastegui had not forgotten the issue and kept falling back on the immigration cliché of 1957:

*“Me limitaré a hacer resaltar que, a mi juicio, no creo haya habido problema más grave ni prejudicial que el provocado por el gobierno genocida español, realizando con propósito deliberado de extinción de nuestra raza esa invasión masiva sin control alguno y sin tener en cuenta los valores morales de nuestro pueblo ni los intereses económicos del trabajador del país.”*<sup>546</sup>

In this respect, Gallastegui and the Basque nationalists of the *Jagi-Jagi* movement were far from the PNV, the new young Basque nationalism, and ETA. Preserving Sabino Arana’s theories got them stuck in a racist and ethnic version of Basque nationalism that had not been updated through the political and social trends of the Basque society of the 1960’s.

Furthermore, Gallastegui linked his racist statements against immigration to the economy and development of the industrial sector in the Basque Country—which gives us an opportunity to talk about the economic model that the young Basque nationalists were defending.

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<sup>546</sup> Letter from Elías Gallastegui to Manuel Irujo, July 19th, 1962. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 5, File 7. p.27. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/2445.pdf> (consulted on April 29th, 2017).

#### iv. From anti-capitalism to communism

When in 1962 the workers' tension got out of hand and invaded the streets of the Basque Country, as was explained in the previous chapter, ETA and the young Basque nationalists took the opportunity to link the national movement to the workers' movement.

In fact, attempts to approach the workers' movement had begun since the huge strike at Beasain (Gipuzkoa) broke out in 1961, when ETA realized the importance of the workers' movement in the struggle against the Franco regime. For that purpose, ETA established that the three enemies of the Basque cause were: capitalism, the Franco regime, and the Castilian dictatorship.<sup>547</sup>

In that respect, in the extended letter written by Elias Gallastegui it is hard to distinguish to what extent he was explaining the youth's ideas or developing his own, because, as we have already seen with regard to the immigration concern, he was contradicting some of the documents that were published by the youth in those days.

Nevertheless, when talking about the criticism against the industrialists and the traders who had upset Irujo,<sup>548</sup> he stated that the Navarrese had distorted the declarations of the speaker by attacking capitalism instead of the industrialists: “(...) esas manifestaciones sinceras son inspiradas por el dolor que a aquel joven abertzale le causa ver la obra verdaderamente genocida de ese capitalismo industrial ambicioso y cruel (...).”<sup>549</sup> In Gallastegi's words, the young Basque nationalists were concerned about the situation of the Basque workers, totally in accordance with the arguments that ETA had given in their first *Zutiks*<sup>550</sup> to explain their position in relation to the Basque working class:

*“Le he oído a él comentar revelando sincere sentimiento: - en las crisis económicas hay tres factores: el gobierno español que establece leyes y orienta la economía y la política; el industrial y el capitalista que emprenden sus negocios con la mira principal*

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<sup>547</sup> CASANOVA, Iker. 2007. *Op.Cit.* pp. 33-36; JÁUREGUI BERECIARTU, Gurutz. 1981. *Op.Cit.* pp. 170-173.

<sup>548</sup> Irujo wrote in his article “Patriotas y Gamberros”: “Es demagógico y sirve mal la patria el inculpar a los industriales y comerciantes que viven en nuestro país y acuden y recurren a Madrid para solucionar sus problemas.”

<sup>549</sup> Letter from Elias Gallastegui to Manuel Irujo, July 19th, 1962. *Op.Cit.* p. 34.

<sup>550</sup> When ETA began to be identified with the working class movement and attracted to the worker's protests, they published some articles related to that question in *Zutik*, like: “Los trabajadores guipuzcoanos enseñan el camino,” *Zutik*, unnumbered, Dec-January 1961-1963; “Los obreros hemos comenzado la lucha,” *Zutik*, no.4, August 1962; “Perspectivas de la lucha obrera en Euzkadi,” *Zutik*, no.5, October 1962; “Euskadi Libre con obreros libres,” *Zutik en tierras americanas*, no. 20, 1962.



*y en ocasiones única de hacer dinero cuanto antes, y en muchos casos como sea. Y por otra parte el trabajador.*”<sup>551</sup>

The criticism against industrialism expressed in the letter reminds one of the positions taken by the Aranists and *Jagi-Jagi* in the aforementioned polemic with the “*Coreanos*,” and, although in this part of the letter Gallastegui refers frequently to Sabino Arana, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether he is defending his son’s thoughts or his own.

Besides, if we take into account that ETA and the young Basque nationalists were still working on building their ideological corpus, and therefore different kinds of opinions and trends coexisted during those days, it is clear that the national struggle was increasingly linked to the social struggle, although we have to wait until 1964 before we can see a clearly defined strategy for defending the Basque working class.<sup>552</sup>

Although in its early years ETA was not clearly Marxist or communist—two political ideologies associated with the working class movement—its first documents did analyze those currents. There is an annex to the *Libro Blanco* which analyzes Leninism and Bolshevism in response to the alleged scarcity of explanations on the Revolution, that mother of the movement which was the Revolutionary Marxist Party of the October Revolution.

“*El marxismo está de moda*,” announced the section on Marxism published in *Cuadernos*, which examined the main aspects of Marxism and communism based on the works of Karl Marx, Frederik Engels, Henry Lefebvre, Jean Baby, or André Piettre.<sup>553</sup>

Although ETA and the young Basque nationalists, and especially Iker Gallastegui—who had given occasion to Elias Gallastegui’s long letter—were not clearly Marxist, it was clear that they were flirting with something that the traditional Basque nationalists did not even want to hear about.

On August 25<sup>th</sup>, 1962, Francisco de Belausteguigoitia confessed to Irujo his doubts about the ideology of Julen Madariaga, his own son-in-law, married to his daughter Osane:

*“A mi llegada por estas tierras me he encontrado con un gran rebumbio, como aquí decimos a cuenta de las andanzas de ETA. Aun cuando yo he visto varias veces a mi*

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<sup>551</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>552</sup> JÁUREGUI BERECIARTU, Gurutz, 1981, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-176.

<sup>553</sup> “Marxismo” and “Comunismo.” HÓRDAGO (ed.), 1979, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-215.

*yerno, en Biarritz, no tengo costumbre de hablar con él de política pues me doy cuenta que no andamos por el mismo camino.*”<sup>554</sup>

Belausteguigoitia, or *Patxo*, as Irujo affectionately used to call him, believed that the rumors about communism spreading among the young Basque nationalists were unfounded, the product of Francoist anticommunist psychosis, but at the same time he thought that the Franco regime was a place where “*esa desviación*” could be perfectly believable, since the hate propaganda tended to be counter-productive.

For Manuel Irujo and the traditional Basque nationalists, the alliance between nationalism and communism was a problem, and more so in 1962, when the Congress in Munich was being held, with all the ensuing implications that we have already described. Irujo, a sharp political analyst, analyzed the increasing importance of communism among the young Basque nationalists in the letter he wrote as an answer to Patxo’s impressions:

*“El clima actual, las circunstancias en que el mundo vive, las reacciones acusadas en todos los pueblos de la tierra – no solo en el vasco – ponen de manifiesto el nacimiento de movimientos de tipo nacionalista, que por su radicalismo extremista, caen dentro de la esfera de influencia estimulante de los movimientos extremistas internacionales.”*<sup>555</sup>

The link between extremists and communism or fascism is recurrent in Irujo’s explanations when referring to the growth of totalitarianism. For him, the political strategy of an alliance of democrats would manage to stop the advance of the extremists of both sides, left and right, who were represented in Basque nationalism and had the PNV as the center.

*“Hoy, el nacionalismo vasco, se encuentra con dos brotes, uno de extrema derecha, el F.N, y otro de extrema izquierda, ETA, que son candidatos naturales a ser estimulados, solicitados o engullidos por los grandes movimientos internacionales fascista y comunista.”*

If before the Paris conferences of 1961 Manuel Irujo was optimistic in relation to the young Basque nationalists, believing that their radical ideas or political tendencies were something related with their youth, by the end of 1962 he was not as optimistic in this respect: “*Las gentes*

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<sup>554</sup> Francisco Belausteguigoitia to Manuel Irujo, August 8<sup>th</sup>, 1962. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 5, File 5.

<sup>555</sup> Manuel Irujo to Francisco Belausteguigoitia. September 12<sup>th</sup>, 1962. *Euskomedia*, Ibid.

*se inclinan a suponer que todo ello no pasará de efemeron (Sic.) juvenil. Yo, desgraciadamente, no soy tan optimista, o afortunadamente no soy tan insensato.”*

Even though ETA did not define itself as communist, its connection with the working class movement in the context of the resistance in the Basque Country, especially during such an agitated year as 1962, with so many strikes and demonstrations, the rumors of their increasing connections with the Spanish Communists were on the rise: “*Sabemos que con motive de las recientes huelgas, ETA ha suscrito con varias organizaciones filocomunistas y con la unión de juventudes comunistas un manifiesto fechado el 8 pasado. (...) Tenemos muy fundadas razones para creer que ETA ha suscrito además de este manifiesto un pacto con las juventudes comunistas.*”<sup>556</sup> The report of Gonzalo Nárdiz to *Lehendakari* Leizaola was referring to the activities organized in conjunction with the communist movements, but it ignored the fact that in both the *Libro Blanco* and in *Principios de ETA* the organization had put some distance between itself and communism—something that would generate an intense debate that lasted for almost ten years.<sup>557</sup>

In fact, in *Principios de ETA* the organization had developed its economic ideas attacking liberalism and industry: “La desaparición del liberalismo económico como sistema base de la futura economía vasca (...).” Nevertheless, there are some statement that might have caused alert among traditional Basque nationalists: “*Una profunda modificación de la propiedad privada. (...) La socialización de recursos e industrias de los sectores básicos de la economía y de los sectores de alcance general, así como el fomento, mediante pertinentes disposiciones de estímulo, de las cooperativas.*”

Be that is it may, the increasing preoccupation about the communist/socialist tendencies of the youth were being reflected and reproduced in several articles and editorials on the subject. If ETA and the new generation of Basque nationalists were taking left-wing positions that might approach them to the communists, the PNV and traditional Basque nationalism tried to uphold their position as democrats beyond everything, placing democracy between the two totalitarianisms that had devastated Europe:

*“Hay totalitarismos azules y rojos y democracias que en su gradación se hallan tan distantes unas de otras que resulta difícil identificarlas, pero ello no impide establecer diferencias*

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<sup>556</sup> EHA-AHE, Fondo Leizaola. C-33-1.

<sup>557</sup> CASANOVA, Iker, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

*esenciales entre ambos regímenes,*” related the editorial article of *Alderdi* no. 184 in September 1962. The editorial clearly refers to the great workers’ strikes, accusing the communists of politicizing the anti-Francoist movement—being “*una organización que recibe su inspiración del imperialismo moscovita*”—and refusing to participate in any anti-Francoist front denying participation to their youth section.

Another example of the identification of the two totalitarianisms as opposed to democracy in the view of the PNV is the editorial article in *Alderdi* issue no. 187 of November 1962, “Comunismo no, Franquismo tampoco.”

The suspicions or accusations that ETA was communist, or at least a communist-infiltrated group, were not just a fear coming from traditional Basque nationalists, but a rumor deliberately spread by the Spanish-controlled Francoist press, especially by the Ministry of Information-sponsored weekly, *El Español*,<sup>558</sup> as is referred in a report of the US embassy in Madrid in October 1964.

Two young men claiming to be representatives of ETA paid a visit to the US Embassy in Madrid while they were in the capital city in connection with several political trials that were being held in the city. One of the men, according to the report, was German Urbizu (although the report presented him as “Ubizu”), and the purpose of their visit was “to acquaint foreign embassies and foreign newspaper correspondents with the aims of ETA.”<sup>559</sup>

This document provides us with the definition of the organization as they themselves wanted it to be known by those public spheres that might be interested in hearing them, and it is a good source for learning how they presented themselves and what their aims were, according to what they presented at these private meetings, in this case in the American embassy.

The two young men stressed that ETA “was a nationalistic movement, was not a Communist infiltrated, and was aimed to overthrowing the Franco dictatorship and obtaining complete

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<sup>558</sup> “El Español” was a Falangist-ideology weekly magazine published in Madrid during the Franco dictatorship. It was founded in 1942 by Juan Aparicio and was dependent on the National Delegation of Press and Propaganda. A good proportion of the fascist intellectuals, such as Ernesto Giménez Caballero, wrote or collaborated in that weekly during the 1940’s. The magazine had several phases, and in the sixties it was dominated by Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Minister of Information and Tourism, who made use of it for his regime-opening operation, linking it to the School of Journalism of Madrid. That drift meant that some well-known anti-Francoist activists and writers, such as Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, would write articles for the magazine, since it formed part of the compulsory course for future journalists in Madrid.

<sup>559</sup> “Activities of ETA,” from the Embassy in Madrid to the Department of State. October 26<sup>th</sup>, 1962. NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State. Bureau of European Affairs. Office of Western European Affairs. Records Relating to Spain, 1963-1976. NND959000 Box.5.

independence from the Basque people.” In that respect, the two members of ETA declared their non-communist nature by affirming that they did not want to change a right-wing dictatorship for a left-wing one.

It is interesting to notice the picture that the Americans had of the young nationalist Basque movement, since one of the issues reflected in the report was that they would be satisfied if Spain were to grant the Basque Country some kind of cultural autonomy. The activities in relation to the Basque language and to the cultural vindication had given ETA’s movement a cultural image, but the alleged representatives of ETA clearly stressed, in answer to the possibility of a cultural autonomy, “that their movement was definitely separatist, and that ETA ultimately aimed at combining all Spanish and French Basques into an integrated democratic Government to take its place in a European Federation.”

Nevertheless, they also admitted that they would not object to some sort of federal arrangement within a Spanish Republic, provided that Basque culture and language were preserved, yet always with the major aim of independence as the first objective and, to the interviewer’s surprise, they admitted that “violence must be used now.”

Finally, the report presents an interesting reflection from the revolutionary Basque nationalists, who were clear that ETA should not be considered a youth group or an offshoot of the PNV, and defined themselves by marking out the differences between the two Basque nationalist groups. The four main items that the members of ETA emphasized as their differences with the traditional Basque nationalists of the PNV were: ETA was “an activist group not in favor of evolution, but of an immediate action program”; it was a “non-confessional” group, although they admitted that a number of young priests belonged to it, who were nevertheless totally against the Church hierarchy that collaborated with the Franco government; they had a social program, unlike the PNV; and their “ultimate aim is an independent Basque democratic republic without any ties between State and Church.”

## v. From the Basque Statute of Autonomy to Independence

As for the political strategy and the work done by the Basque Government, the young Basque nationalists were very critical. Although, as we have pointed out, the young Basques of ETA were some of the first to recognize the Basque Government, as time went by the young became more and more critical and skeptical about the figure of the Basque Government and its legitimacy, due to its being tied to the Republican Spanish legal system.

Irujo was ashamed at the reaction of the youth during the Paris conference and at their (or rather “his,” for Irujo was talking about Iker Gallastegui’s) speech against the strategy of political agreement that the Basque Government had been developing with all of the Basque forces, demanding the complete separation of Euzkadi. The opinion of the youth against the Basque Statute of Autonomy and, according to Irujo, against the old *Fueros* (the Basque regional code of laws), was absolutely against everything that Irujo had defended and fought for throughout the exile, and he could not help showing angry. Irujo defended and stood in support of the Basque Government’s work:

*“El “llamado” Gobierno Vasco ha hecho que todos los centros vascos del mundo se cubran con la bandera nacional vasca y reciban al Presidente de Euzkadi con los honores que se otorgan al Primer magistrado de la nación y al Jefe de Estado. La “paparrucha” estatutista ha servido para que el Presidente de Euzkadi comparezca ante las Naciones Unidas en nombre del pueblo vasco y haga la defensa de su derecho y su interés.”*<sup>560</sup>

Actually, Iker Gallastegui had not been as tough as all that against the Statute nor the Basque Government in his conference, but when the speech was published in *Tierra Vasca*, the editorial article had referred to the Statute employing the offensive words quoted before. Gallastegui, for his own part, criticized the Basque Government and the policies of the traditional Basque nationalists, yet he also dedicated some affectionate words to them, as Elias Gallastegui pointed out to Irujo in his response: “*A pesar de ello – se lee en la conferencia – creo que nuestro antecesores fueron honestos, pues su intención era buena.*”<sup>561</sup>

Indeed, in the eyes of the new generation of Basque nationalists, the old men who had fought in the Civil War and taken charge of the Basque Government in the exile were honorable and,

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<sup>560</sup> “Patriotas y Gamberros,” *op. cit.*

<sup>561</sup> Letter from Elias Gallastegui to Manuel Irujo, July 19<sup>th</sup>, 1962, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

to a certain degree, respectable—but they needed something else, and the vindication of the Basque Statute of Autonomy did not seem enough for them, since under the Franco dictatorship in which they had grown the Statute was not going to have any importance or possibility at all. The legality of the Basque Government as an institution, and therefore of the Statute of Autonomy, was something that they had never experienced, and that was why representation was for them something without any importance.

Instead of that, in their *Cuadernos* they analyzed and imagined the Basque Country in accordance with the political principles of a State, analyzing concepts such as Parliamentarism, Democracy, or Republic, always giving special importance to the respect of Human Rights and suffrage.<sup>562</sup>

In the *Principios de ETA*, they insist on the idea of Human Rights and of democracy as the political system chosen for the Basque Country: “*El establecimiento de un régimen democrático e inequívocamente representativo, tanto en el sentido político como en el sentido social-económico y cultural (...)*,” adding with respect to human rights: “*La garantía cierta y efectiva de los Derechos del Hombre: libertad de expresión, libertad de reunión, libertad de sindicación, libertad de práctica de cultos y credos religiosos, etc. (...)*.”

In fact, as we already mentioned, although their principles and ETA itself were considered close to communism, they were quite clear in their statement that they adhered to Human Rights, “*siempre que éstos [in reference to human rights], no vengan a constituir un instrumento, bien sea destinado a atentar contra la soberanía de Euzkadi, a implantar en ella un régimen dictatorial (sea fascista o comunista)*.”

At least on this point, ETA was not interested in communism as a possibility for the Basque Country, although later on the organization would clearly follow authors, strategies, and patterns connected to Marxism and communism.

The political goal for these young Basque nationalists was “absolute freedom,” in other words, they were clearly pro-independence, something that the orthodox PNV and traditional Basque nationalism had discarded some time ago and replaced with European federalism, as we have seen in previous chapters.

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<sup>562</sup> “Principios políticos constitucionales.” HÓRDAGO (ed.), *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 75-83.

What the speaker had stated at the Paris conference was: “*Pretendemos un Euskadi Libre y para nosotros, la libertad no tiene más que una definición. No quiere decir una libertad limitada: una libertad condicionada a los intereses de otra nación (...) sino la libertad absoluta, el control soberano de todos los destinos de Euzkadi.*”<sup>563</sup>

Manuel Irujo described the goals of the youth using these words: “*Se proclama la «libertad absoluta» de la patria, como si con el empleo de esas palabras huecas se fuera más patriota.*” And he sentences: “*La libertad «absoluta» no existe. El concepto absoluto aplicado a la patria es doctrina fascista, como lo son otras expresiones que acompañan a ese absolutismo totalitario (...)*”<sup>564</sup>

Irujo had already criticized the pro-independence ideas of the youth in previous articles. “*Nos hablan de independencia y ponemos los ojos en blanco. Nos dicen autonomía y miramos al oráculo como la voz del enemigo o como al compatriota cansado,*” as Gallastegui remembers in his response letter, adding a reference to Sabino Arana, who, according to Gallastegui, had defended independence and yet had not been singled out by the Basque nationalists as they had done with the new generation.

Gallastegui made a direct link between Sabino’s legacy and the new generation of young Basque nationalists, who were searching for new answers to the political future of Euskal Herria and who, on account of that goal, trusted and reinterpreted the old Sabino’s ideas, which happened to be practically the same with respect to the question of independence: “*El nacionalismo aspira, como es sabido- “como es sabido” escribía Sabino hace setenta años – a la independencia absoluta del Pueblo Vasco,*” Gallastegui reminds Irujo, so as to point out to him that the pro-independence ideas were not something instilled by the fact of living under the Franco dictatorship, but rather by reading the words of the father of Basque nationalism.<sup>565</sup>

In that respect, ETA stated in the first paragraph of its principles, after having defined the organization as “*Movimiento Revolucionario Vasco de Liberación nacional*”: “*La libertad de Euzkadi no constituye para ETA el interés supremo, sino el único medio realista de desarrollo y vigorización de la Nación Vasca en todos sus ámbitos.*”

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<sup>563</sup> “El sentimiento de nacionalidad,” in HÓRDAGO (ed.), vol. 1, pp. 504 and ff.

<sup>564</sup> “Patriotas y Gamberros,” *op. cit.*

<sup>565</sup> Letter from Elías Gallastegui to Manuel Irujo, July 19<sup>th</sup>, 1962, *op. cit.*, p. 16.



Nevertheless, ETA was not dismissing all the international policies that the Basque Government, and especially Manuel Irujo, had been developing in favor of European Federalism, and which had been used by Irujo to explain that the independence of nations was not a modern concept anymore, since modernity was included in the new concept of a European union and in the importance of the European supra-institutions.

European Federalism was studied in the first documents of *Cuadernos*,<sup>566</sup> where ETA defended federalism as a good option for the survival of minorities: “*En efecto el federalismo no conoce problemas de minorías. Da gustosamente a una minoría los mismos derechos que a una mayoría sin mirar las cifras, es un sistema «cualitativo» no «cuantitativo».*” For ETA, defending the independence of Euzkadi was necessary because the federation that was going to be formed would be taking the independent regions as its starting point, respecting the different administrative strata, such as the Basque municipalities, and therefore “*(...) La comunidad Europea es la mayor esperanza del patriota vasco. No escatimemos por tanto los esfuerzos para apoyarla.*”

Moreover, ETA’s principles of 1962 also recognized the Basque political administrative organisms, including the municipality and the region, and emphasized the importance of the European Federation, “*siempre que ésta se lleve a efecto a la altura de las nacionalidades (...)*,” absolutely rejecting the Union of the States.<sup>567</sup>

## vi. Political violence

If there is anything in the history of ETA and young Basque nationalism for which it has been famous, it is the use of political violence. Although it took the organization some years to decide on the use of political violence as a strategy to attain the freedom of the Basque Country, the actions carried out from the beginning and the possibility of responding in a violent manner was always a distinguishing feature of the new Basque nationalist organization.

The strategy followed by the traditional Basque nationalism of the PNV and the Basque Government of making political agreements with the Spanish republican forces was not enough for the youth Basque nationalists. The political agreements proved inefficient before the

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<sup>566</sup> “La Federación Europea,” in *Cuadernos*. HÓRDAGO (ed.), *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 84-85.

<sup>567</sup> “Principios Ideológicos Primera Asamblea,” *op. cit.*

sufferings of the Basques living under the dictatorship and, according to ETA and the young Basque nationalists, they were very similar to the Carlists' political strategies.

In the article “Neo-Carlismo,” written by *Txillardegui* in 1962, the voice of the youth resounds, linking once again their thoughts to Sabino Arana's: “*ETA ha comprendido. La generación vasca ha comprendido. Sabino Arana comprendió a tiempo lo que había dentro del carlismo. Nosotros hemos comprendido lo que hay en ese neo-carlismo que domina la política “nacionalista” (?), que se llama legalismo republicano.*”<sup>568</sup>

Again, the young did not recognize the republican legality or authority, and that meant that they absolutely discarded the Spanish republican institutions and the Statute of Autonomy, “*un infra-estatuto,*” and rejected the idea of trusting any other Spanish institution whatsoever.

For Irujo, such ideas were totally linked to the use of violence, as explained in the conference:

*“El texto de la conferencia reclama para Euzkadi «libertad absoluta», con «separación completa de Euzkadi y España», que los vascos deben procurar por «todos los medios a su alcance». Dice que hoy no caben pactos con las fuerzas políticas españolas, y por lo tanto, no caben métodos políticos y legales en nuestro país. Hoy solo cabe un método, hoy solo existe un camino... el camino de las armas, el único camino.»*<sup>569</sup>

For Irujo, the only conditions under which war could become the only solution to the Basque problem would be if a direct offense and attack were launched against those who had fought in the Spanish Civil War, and a complete amendment were made to the vast political work that the Basque Government had undertaken for almost 25 years, insulting the old nationalists—and thus he was converting those young men into “*gamberros.*”

Elias Gallastegui tried to justify his son's words by defending that what they really meant was that violence was the last recourse, but in his extended answer that question occupies several pages.

Even if it had not been true that Iker Gallastegui had defended the war, given that Irujo affirmed that “*Que la Guerra no es cosa mala solamente lo dicen los fascistas,*” while the exact sentence pronounced was “*La Guerra es una cosa terrible pero no es una cosa mala... los motivos que provocan las guerras, esos sí son malos,*” the fact was that the young Basque nationalists did

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<sup>568</sup> “Neo-Carlismo,” in *Zutik* (third series), no. 5, 1962; *Zutik en Tierras Americanas*, no. 23, 1962. Also at: <http://urazandi.euskaletxeak.net/vol1/dvd10/Zutik/htm/port2.htm> (consulted on May, 8<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>569</sup> “Patriotas y Gamberros.” *Op.Cit.*

have violence in mind, although not as a desirable answer and, as Gallastegui justified: “*Que prometa el estado español no discutir la cuestión utilizando como argumentos los cuartelillos, las torturas, las cárceles y las ejecuciones y nosotros tampoco utilizaremos la fuerza.*”

Violence had been bred as a defensive weapon, an answer to Francoist violence, and it is probably here that we find the most important influence of the exile. Of course, it was not the exile that motivated violence, but it was in the exile where the young Basque nationalists had found answers—some of them successful answers—to the Basque cause.

Violence is presented and defended in Gallastegui’s letter of response as the last option for the young nationalists, who, according to Elias, are not violent people but pacifists like Gandhi or Sabino Arana had been: “*Esta teoría [referring to the statement whereby Iker Gallastegui admitted their violent answer to Francoist violence], no niega el carácter pacifista del escritor. Gandhi fue, probablemente, el mayor pacifista después de Cristo. Sin embargo, son tuyas estas palabras, idénticas en significación a las del conferenciante: «Prefiero ver la India libre por la violencia, que esclava y encadenada a la violencia dominadora.»*”<sup>570</sup>

In his explanation, Elías Gallastegui defines the violence of the young Basque nationalists as an exercise in “active resistance,” and presents us with some of the strategies and vocabulary that ETA would use when its armed strategy began. The armed struggle was to wake Basque society and would be a good way to internationalize the cause, resorting to guerrilla warfare, active or passive resistance, or organizing strikes and boycotts.

Elias explains that the violent answer came as a result of the Basque government and traditional nationalism having disappointed the youth. The easy strategy summarized by the motto “*dejar hacer y esperar*” had not satisfied the young people who had suffered under the violence of the Franco regime; it had nothing to do with any fascist influence they may have received, as Irujo had insinuated, but rather was due to a lack of confidence on the part of the Basque organizations and their managers.

The young Basque nationalists seemed prepared to fight for the freedom of the Basques, combining the violence, the nation, and the language, all in defense of the Basque Country, in order to fight back the repression with resistance, and willing to “*utilizar únicamente medios*

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<sup>570</sup> Letter from Elias Gallastegui to Manuel Irujo, July 19th, 1962. *Op.Cit.* p. 10.

*pacíficos y fuerzas morales si es que el gobierno español se limitase a ellos también; pero si no, no.”*

We can see that the idea of *National Resistance* was being used to analyze the clear willingness of the Basque people with respect to nationalism, and the defense of the Basque language as a pillar of citizenship.

With this idea of resistance, on which they had built their historical and political symbolic imaginary, the situation of the Basque people was being compared with the national conflicts in Algeria or Cyprus, flirting also with the idea of anti-colonialism that would later on be expanded so as to form part of the links of connection with the various liberation movements that had emerged against the colonies, particularly in North Africa and Israel.

Clearly, ETA and its members, some of whom had been educated abroad, did not see any internal solution to the Basque conflict, nor any example internally, and had to seek their inspiration in a comparison with other conflicts, preferably armed struggles. When they decided that the fight had to be militarized, the need to import a strategy emerged, since neither traditional Basque nationalism nor they themselves had any previous experience.<sup>571</sup>

It was by looking out to the outside that they began to approach the national liberation movements that were prevalent then, and thereby finally fixed their interests on the Third World anti-colonial guerrilla, particularly in Algeria, Vietnam, or the Israeli urban commandos.

A concern about the future of the conflict is reflected in the analysis of the national conflicts in Tunis and Ireland expounded in the already mentioned *Libro Blanco*,<sup>572</sup> which also set about explicitly citing some similar (in their view) national conflicts that had been resolved through independence, especially Israel, highlighting its internal resistance.

Until then, the ideological corpus of ETA had been formed and nourished by what they considered similar national conflicts, placing a stress on the pure ideology of class and taking particular notice of the conflict. After establishing its ideological principles, from the First Assembly (1962) onwards, the new organization was considered as anti-racist, anti-clerical, a defender of socialism, and opposed to economic liberalism.

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<sup>571</sup> IBARRA, Pedro, 1987, *La evolución estratégica de ETA (1963-1987)*. Donostia: Kriselu. p. 63.

<sup>572</sup> Analysis of Tunis' conflict, pp. 57-73; Analysis of Ireland's conflict: pp. 75-85, in *Libro Blanco*, *op. cit.*

## **g. We are not alone. Ideological foundation of the revolutionary Basque nationalism: From Federico Krutwig to Etxebarrieta's brothers**

The ideological development of ETA in the 1960's would be product of the influence of the exile, not only in view of the international and revolutionary ideas that were adopted, but also because its principal ideologists were forced to flee into exile after the first significant violent actions, as we commented before.

Since we are focusing our research on the development of Basque nationalism, its international patterns and recognition, and its political constraints, it is essential for us to analyze the most important documents and its authors, in order that we may understand the impact of the exile on the development of this revolutionary Basque nationalism.

### **i. “*Vasconia*”; Krutwig's new strategy in the exile**

Gradually, the ideological corpus was built and the anti-colonialist feature took on an increasing importance, particularly owing to the influence of the work *Vasconia*<sup>573</sup> by Federico Krutwig (although initially published under the pseudonym of Fernando Sarrailh de Ihartza), where the idea of an “active resistance” was reinforced.

Federico Krutwig Sagredo, born in Getxo but of German descent, was interested in philosophy and linguistics from his early childhood days, becoming a member of the Euskaltzaindia (the Basque language academy) in 1943. After living with his family in Germany and Portugal during the Spanish Civil War, they would return to the Basque Country once the conflict was over, and it was while living under the Franco dictatorship that he developed his interest for the Basque language and culture, especially since he met by chance Resurrección María de Azkue,<sup>574</sup> a prominent Basque linguistic who had presided the Euskaltzaindia since its foundation.

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<sup>573</sup> SARRAILH DE IHARTZA, Fernando, 1963, *Vasconia*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Norbait

<sup>574</sup> More on the important life and vast work of Resurrección María de Azkue at: <http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/1368> (consulted on May 7<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

After getting involved in the reorganization of the Euskaltzaindia and the Athenaeum of Bilbao, a speech of his at the Basque academy earned him an accusation of incitement to rebellion by the Francoist authorities, so that he had to flee into exile to avoid being sentenced.<sup>575</sup>

He lived in different countries, starting with Iparralde, where he met members of the *Jagi-Jagi*, and then Paris, where he exchanged opinions with Basque members of the “Rue Singer,” such as Manuel Irujo or Landaburu; from there he moved to Germany, Brussels, Italy, Algeria, etc. Among his works, the one that holds the most interest for this research, *Vasconia*,<sup>576</sup> was written and developed in the exile, and published in 1963 in Biarritz, although the first edition goes back to his years in Buenos Aires. It was a time of exile and clandestinity.<sup>577</sup>

During his first exile, in Iparralde, Krutwig met some Basque refugees from different spheres of Basque nationalism, such as Agustín Zumalde, Lezo Urreztieta, and Iker Gallastegui from the *Jagi-Jagi*, or Jon Bilbao and Francisco Miangolarra, American refugees.

In Krutwig’s words, it was Miangolarra who encouraged him to write *Vasconia*: “*Mira, Federico, necesitamos para salir de este atolladero la formulación de un nuevo tipo de nacionalismo, que debe ser a la vez muy nacionalista y enteramente progresista.*”<sup>578</sup>

*Vasconia* discusses “traditional” war based on the reports by Colonel Trinquier<sup>579</sup> of his attempts to curb the activities of the Algerian guerrilla resistance, and Krutwig establishes that so-called *Revolutionary War* is an evolution of military strategy, the organizing of guerrillas in order to defeat a powerful enemy identified with the metropolis, thus making a clear parallelism with the Basque case and the role of Spain.

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<sup>575</sup> KRUTWIG, Federico, 2014, *Años de peregrinación y lucha*. Tafalla: Txalaparta, p. 26.

<sup>576</sup> For this research I have used the second edition of *Vasconia*, since copies of the first edition of the book are very difficult to come by. The second edition was published in April 1973, with no changes regarding the contents, but with the documentary part missing. Krutwig explains in the prologue why it is important to read it that way and appreciate the changes that Basque society has undergone since the original text was written—but I wanted to illustrate here something I discovered about this second edition when I interviewed Sabin Atxalandabaso, member of ETA-PM, who was in charge of the international area of the organization until 1977: “*De Vasconia hay dos ediciones. (...) Pertur y yo fuimos al Valle de Aosta, donde vivía Krutwig, a pedir permiso para volverlo a publicar. Una vez allí pensamos en los problemas que eran que tenía que pesar poco para pasarlo al otro lado, etc. Era igual que la primera edición, pero llena de documentos, así que, a la hora de imprimirlo, creo que fui yo, que decidí que los quitaran. Así que tú lees esa edición y hace referencia a documentos que no están. Lo editamos en Baiona, pone Buenos Aires, pero es Baiona. Krutwig reaccionó subiéndose por las paredes, diciéndonos que no teníamos idea de nada....*” Interview with Eneko Irigaray and Sabin Atxalandabaso. Donostia, April 20<sup>th</sup>, 2012.

<sup>577</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 15-39.

<sup>578</sup> KRUTWIG, Federico, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

<sup>579</sup> Roger Trinquier was a Colonel of the French army during the Algerian Independence war (1954-1962). He wrote *La Guerre Moderne*. Paris: La Table Ronde, 1961.

Krutwig's work, and his ideas in general, became one of the basic sources of inspiration for ETA, to the point of being labeled the "Bible of ETA" by such voices as the Francoist Ministry of Industry and Tourism, Mr. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, who tried to discredit the organization: "*La gente creyó, gracias a la propaganda del señor Fraga Iribarne, que Vasconia era el alma de ETA, y en Adelante el espíritu de Vasconia se apoderó del cuerpo de ETA, y con la llegada de nuevos miembros sustituyó hasta las células materiales primitivas.*"<sup>580</sup>

In fact, *Vasconia* consists of seven quite interesting parts (*Ethnica, Oeconomica, Dynamica, Historica, Politica, Bellica, and Dialectica*), where Krutwig analyzes and updates Basque nationalism according to his political, economic, and linguistic views, but in the end, the part that had the most influence on the young Basque nationalists of ETA was the *Bellica* part, where, for the first time, a warlike proposal was made in the form of a strategy of national liberation for the Basque country.

*Vasconia* provides an analysis of the intellectual war, but what is particularly important is the considerations around the idea of the colony. Krutwig takes the anti-colonial movement, which has been very successful in North Africa, and applies it to Basque nationalism and its struggle against Spain. The book identifies the Spanish domination of the Basque people with the common strategy developed by the metropolis in all of the different colonies that at that time were struggling to regain the freedom and dignity of their people.

According to Krutwig, revolutionary war should be the strategy of the *gudaris*, since it constitutes the evolution of traditional war and provides the ideological element that the Basque people are in need of, allowing them to become *gudaris*, a kind of medieval crusaders who received the support of Basque citizens.

The impact of the exile is easily recognizable in Krutwig's ideas. Apart from the strategic ideas about warfare, Krutwig, the intellectual, believed in revolution more than in rebellion, to paraphrase the Marxist author Eugene D. Genovese, who later on, in 1979, would write some words about the importance of ideology when discussing about revolution, in his case in reference to the Afro-American slave revolts.<sup>581</sup>

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<sup>580</sup> KRUTWIG, Federico, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

<sup>581</sup> GENOVESE, Eugene D., 1979, *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American slave revolts in the making of the modern world*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

The Asian philosophers, especially Mao Tse-tung and Ho-Chi-Minh, inspired Krutwig's defense of the need for ideological preparation in order to develop a successful national strategy:

*“Por esta causa una Guerra revolucionaria tiene que empezar por la preparación del ambiente que vaya a actuar. En Indochina Ho-Chi-Min prepare ideológicamente el terreno en que iba a actuar la guerrilla reanimando la llama nacionalista. (...) En toda Guerra revolucionaria hay una llama ideológica que incita a la población a sostener y ayudar al guerrillero, a quien ella considera algo así como el exponente de sus aspiraciones”*<sup>582</sup>

The importance of Krutwig's work was especially evident in a text that would become the work of reference for ETA during that stage: *La Guerra Revolucionaria / Insurrección en Euskadi*.<sup>583</sup>

In this document, written in 1963 and published in 1964, ETA definitely laid down the strategy to follow in the fight for the national and social liberation of Euskadi.

With *La Guerra Revolucionaria...*, these young ETA members were outlining a different route that had never been taken by Basque nationalism until then, and they advocated for direct action to achieve their goals.

From there on, we will see how external influences—received mostly from the experiences of ETA's ideologists in the exile—will be present in the works and strategies developed. Although it has no known author, various studies attribute the authorship to one of the founders of ETA, Julen de Madariaga, who was then spearheading the decision to take up arms and who, years later, would launch a series of criticisms against the armed struggle and declare a firm commitment to political activity.<sup>584</sup>

Julen Madariaga had fled into exile with his wife, Osane, after the episode of the train derailment—and after being tortured for several days by the Spanish police. Their first exile

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<sup>582</sup> SARRAILH DE IHARTZA, Fernando, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

<sup>583</sup> “Guerra Revolucionaria / Insurrección en Euskadi,” *Cuadernos de ETA n°20*, 1964, in: HÓRDAGO (ed.), *op. cit.* (vol. III), pp. 21-70.

<sup>584</sup> Antoni Batista, in his book *Madariaga de las armas a la palabra* (Barcelona: RBA, 2008), defends that Julen Madariaga was the ideologist behind the armed struggle and the identification of the Basque Country as a colony, but, as we have already seen, the anti-colonialist idea and the armed struggle were concepts that had been developed beforehand in documents that were previous to *Guerra Revolucionaria/Insurrección en Euskadi*. Nevertheless, it is true that Madariaga was the leader of an ETA faction that supported political violence, against an opposing faction that defended a non-violent resistance inspired by Gandhi; “En torno a la no violencia,” *Zutik*, no.7, pp. 9-10; MADARIAGA, Julen, “Quién es el culpable de la violencia,” *Zutik*, no. 8, p. 5.



would be in Iparralde, like that of so many other Basques refugees—and they met a whole bunch of them there—until in October 1964 the prefecture of the French Government in Iparralde (Basses Pyrénées) issued an expulsion order on account of Madariaga’s being found in illegal possession of a gun.

Although Sven Johanssen, president of the Union Fédéraliste des Communautés Ethniques Européennes (UFCE) wrote a letter to the court of Bayonne asking them to revoke the expulsion, arguing that carrying a gun was necessary in view of the constant threats coming from the Franco Regime—“*s’est senti gravement menace après réception de plusieurs lettres d’intimidation*”<sup>585</sup>—the order was executed and Madariaga, Txillardegui, and Eneko Irigaray moved to Belgium.

The expulsion generated great confusion and controversy among the Basque nationalists exiled in Iparralde, since, according to ETA’s members, the expulsion had been the result of an accusation made by Patrick de la Sota, a member of the PNV. Writing to Manuel Irujo, Txillardegui required immediate action to be taken against De la Sota, in order to avoid worsening the relations between ETA and the PNV. In the letter, a very upset Txillardegui further asked Irujo to write an article to put an end to the rumors spread by traditional Basque nationalists, who were affirming that ETA were communists. Again, rumors were confirming that the young Basque nationalists were flirting with the communists’ ideas:

*“Pero (y esto es muy grave) todavía la semana pasada hemos sabido, directamente que en Gipuzkoa, y en otros pueblos de Euzkadi y de fuera de Euzkadi (véase el reciente artículo de “Gudari”), los medios del PNV continúan difundiendo la CALUMNIA de que somos comunistas.”*<sup>586</sup>

Manuel Irujo contacted Txillardegui to express his solidarity and concern after the expulsion order, but he refused to fulfil Txillardegui’s wishes in reference to De la Sota, arguing that the

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<sup>585</sup> Letters by Sven Johanssen informing Enbata and the Basque Government about the petition sent to the court of Bayonne. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 7, File 1.

<http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/9270.pdf> (consulted on May 10<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>586</sup> Txillardegui finally abandoned ETA (together with Benito del Valle and Xabier Imaz), due to the Marxist tendency of the organization: “*ETA ha dejado de ser un movimiento de tendencias diversas, para convertirse progresivamente en un partido de tendencia claramente marxista-leninista,*” affirmed in their letter of permanent withdrawal of the organization of April 1967. (In *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 10, File 5). Years later, in 1971, Txillardegui confessed in a long letter to Manuel Irujo that a part of the organization (ETA VI), as Irujo had expressed, got ran out of control: “*Hay una ETA, (...) ETA VI, que es una correa de transmisión manifiesta del PCE.*” Txillardegui was worried about the veer of a part of Basque nationalism which was turning into a Spanish Marxism: “*Pues el paso de una idea abertzale a un marxismo-leninismo español se está produciendo con regularidad (...).*” In *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 13, File A.

ETA members had attacked him. As for the communist rumors, Irujo mentioned another round table organized by the PNV in Paris in which the communist feature of the young Basque nationalists had made it impossible to reach any agreement.

Although Irujo did not lose contact with ETA's members—and with Txillardegui in particular—he condemned and rejected the Marxist ideas that they were increasingly espousing, as well as the violent methods that the new generation of Basque patriots were employing to achieve their goals: “*Cómo quieren ustedes que entablemos diálogo con atracadores? (...) Aprovechen las dificultades actuales para hacer examen de conciencia. ¿A dónde van con esos ‘modos’?*”<sup>587</sup>

Nevertheless, Irujo and *Lehendakari* Aguirre did everything in their hands to avoid the expulsion and the imprisonment of the four ETA members affected by the order, as Irujo explained to Solaun in a letter on November 30<sup>th</sup>, 1964:

“*Espero que el Presidente referirá a ustedes cómo, al tener conocimiento del confinamiento de los cuatro ETA, él se dirigió a Labeguerie y yo a Txillardegui, diciéndole que el Presidente se había puesto en relación directa con aquel diputado y preguntándole que creía él que podíamos hacer para oponernos a la medida gubernativa de confinamiento.*”<sup>588</sup>

But getting back to *La Guerra Revolucionaria / Insurrección en Euskadi*, it must be said that although the work was greatly influenced by *Vasconia*, its analysis goes a bit further and presents revolutionary war as a fair war, being as it is “*una guerra de liberación nacional y social*” against an unfair war, the counter-revolutionary war, which is oppressive and is endowed with an element of conquest promoted by oppressive States—in a clear reference to the Spanish State and the situation in the Basque Country.<sup>589</sup>

The constant revolutions and national liberation movements that were sprouting in North Africa (Tunis, Algeria) and Israel in those days were seen as modern, urban examples of the biblical battle of David against Goliath: the colony was rising in arms against the metropolis, and the resulting national and State victory was riveting the attention of the whole spectrum of progressive Europe, without exception.

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<sup>587</sup> Letters between Txillardegui and Irujo. November 1964. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 7, File 1. Also in : <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/9245.pdf> (consulted on May 12th, 2017).

<sup>588</sup> Irujo to Solaun. November 30th, 1964. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 7, File 1. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/fondo/9195> (consulted on May 12th, 2017).

<sup>589</sup> *Guerra Revolucionaria/Insurrección en Euskadi*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

The military strategy of revolutionary war, therefore, was based on examples of recent experiences, with a special emphasis on the Israeli case, in particular as regards the similarities with Irgum, the Sephardic armed group of national liberation against the British Empire, in which ETA could not help but see itself reflected. But the Israeli influence also shows up when we analyze the “*Guerrilla de asfalto*,”<sup>590</sup> since the Basques could not copy the strategies employed by the rural guerrilla in Tunis, given the high component of urban population in the Basque Country (80% urban population), and therefore they felt more identified with the Israeli example, where the “*Guerrilla urbana primó por encima de la guerrilla rural*.”<sup>591</sup>

Julen Madariaga and Eneko Irigaray both confirmed that the young Basque nationalists felt attracted in one way or another by the Israeli experience in those days. Madariaga was clear about it: “*Nos atrae el enorme conflicto que habían tenido con el Imperio Británico, aquella voladura del Hotel King David... y otras cosas, allí estaban el Haganah, el Irgun, etc...*” The successful example of Zionism in the creation of the State of Israel was a model to follow for other national movements like the Basque.

But Julen recalls that the example of the Jews came to him from some previous experience:

“*Yo tenía una atracción hacia los judíos, cuando aún no eran israelíes. Me atrajo la terrible batalla que tuvieron en el gueto de Varsovia contra los alemanes y donde los soviéticos pararon la ofensiva para que los alemanes acabaran con ellos. (...) Yo guardaba un recuerdo de ellos de lucha, de pueblo en lucha, y después ya de triunfo, con el año de la fundación, 1948, con Balfour y la batalla directa con el Irgun y la Haganah.*”<sup>592</sup>

As Federico Krutwig recalls, the earliest influences that led ETA to develop an armed struggle came from Israel’s example and from the book *The Revolt*, by Menachem Begin.<sup>593</sup>

ETA was collecting the experiences of the Jews and endorsing them, as is evident when we take a look at the bibliography of its first documents, such as the *Libro Blanco*, where *The Revolt* was one of the books featured in the Moral of National Resistance section, which dealt

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<sup>590</sup> In fact, the concept had previously been fully developed in *Vasconia*, where Krutwig explains that the high density of industrial population is a problem in the Basque Country, and he goes on to imagine a group of warriors in formations of three, named “*hirurkos*,” wholly inspired on the Israeli experience. *Vasconia, op. cit.*, pp. 332-335.

<sup>591</sup> *Guerra Revolucionaria/Insurrección en Euskadi, op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>592</sup> Interview with Julen Madariaga. Saint-Pée-Sur-Nivelle, November 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2012.

<sup>593</sup> Menachem Begin was a leading member of the Irgun who, after the creation of the State of Israel, joined the political party *Herut* and became its leader. Years later he would become Prime Minister of the State of Israel.

with the situation of nationalism and the Basque people. Julen Madariaga recalls with nostalgia how he was deeply moved by Menachem Begin's book when he read it in the French translation during his confinement in the prison of Carabanchel.

*"Y sabes quién me lo dio? José María Retolaza, el que luego será el primer consejero de Interior del Gobierno Vasco...."*<sup>594</sup>

Jewish influences were mainly on the military side, and if any action marked them in a special way, it was the one that the Jews carried out on July 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1946 against the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, the headquarters of the army and civil government of the British regime—inspiring Madariaga with the idea of blowing up the civil government's seat in Bilbao using the Jewish strategy of direct attack against the "enemy" bases stationed in the Basque Country.<sup>595</sup>

The admiration for the successful strategy of the Jews, along with the relations that the Basques maintained with the people of Israel, drove the leaders of ETA to try and obtain a meeting with the heads of the young State of Israel, seeking for their technique and military help. The meeting was arranged through the contacts that the Basque Government-in-exile and the PNV had with the Jews and the Israeli government, and was set to be held in Paris in 1963.

ETA was represented by Julen Madariaga and Juan Luis Irusta. Through the PNV contacts, which included Juan de Ajuriaguerra, *El Amirante*, a former partner of Madariaga in the early days of EGIN, they made an appointment to meet at a place near the Paris Opera with a representative of the State of Israel, Shlomo Stiemberg.<sup>596</sup>

ETA was interested in spreading the cause against the Spanish invader, but, apart from the expected sympathy or understanding, they also needed materials for carrying out their armed struggle, and so they hoped that the meeting would be useful for obtaining weapons and access to training camps. The ETA members were well aware that in order to be successful with their campaigns against Spain they needed a military arsenal and technical knowledge for the struggle; the Israelis knew those deficiencies at first hand, and they had achieved their objective—therefore, they could satisfy both their needs.

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<sup>594</sup> Interview with Julen Madariaga. Saint-Pée-Sur-Nivelle, November 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2012.

<sup>595</sup> LISBONA, José Antonio, 2002, *España – Israel. Historia de unas relaciones secretas*. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, p. 377.

<sup>596</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 379.

*“El contacto israelí fue amable, nos escuchó con mucha atención y respeto durante más de una hora. Finalmente, concluye que ya conocía nuestra causa (por razones evidentes de las relaciones con el PNV), y nos entendía, pero que al interferir una de las reivindicaciones con el Estado francés, no se podían arriesgar. (...) Él le contaría con un informe a Begin todo lo que habíamos pedido y cuál era su punto de vista personal, dejando claro que no era partidario de la ayuda.”<sup>597</sup>*

However, as we mentioned before, their influences straddled the war fronts that in future times would confront the Arabs and Israelis. The Algerian influence was especially noticeable, most of all in connection with the organization of ETA as a national liberation front; the Algerian FLN influenced them to the point that they would later call themselves *Movimiento Socialista Vasco de Liberación Nacional*, although at this primary stage the influence was seen rather in the organization of the resistance and in the strategy of placing bombs, following the example of the city of Algiers.

According to Eneko Irigaray, one of ETA's founders and exiled in Algeria since 1965: *“Antes de la Vª Asamblea, Federico Krutwig viene a Ain Taya, donde vivíamos entonces, y empezamos a preparar el informe verde que después se presenta en la Vª. Es donde definimos a ETA como Movimiento socialista vasco revolucionario de liberación nacional.”<sup>598</sup>*

Eneko Irigaray and Julen Madariaga moved to Algeria looking for refuge and help from the other successful national movement of the moment. With the aid of Leopoldo Igaralde, who lent them a car, they traveled to Germany, where Madariaga bought a Volkswagen beetle with which he crossed Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Italy to get to Naples, from where they would be transferred to Alger.

In the ferry they met an English settler and another young man, who turned out to be a member of the Algerian secret services:

*“Creo que éste es el que nos pone en contacto con Antonio Cubillo. Él (Cubillo) nos acoge en su casa desde el principio y pasamos unos días allí hasta que nos pone en contacto con el FLN.”*

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<sup>597</sup> Interview with Julen Madariaga. Saint-Pée-Sur-Nivelle, November 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2012.

<sup>598</sup> Interview with Eneko Irigaray and Sabin Ataxalabaso. Donostia, February 20<sup>th</sup>, 2012.

During this first visit of ETA to Algeria, Antonio Cubillo,<sup>599</sup> leader of the *Movimiento por la Autodeterminación e Independencia del Archipiélago Canario* (MPAIAC), which had been created one year before in Algeria, helped them to get in contact with the FLN, although the strategy would not succeed. The revolutionary Basque nationalists were asking for weaponry, training camps, and a radio station to broadcast their messages, taking the example of the MPAIAC, who already had their own *Canarias Libre Radio*, which broadcasted from Radio Algiers.

It was this first meeting that served to establish the first contacts with the Government of Algeria, starting a long-term relationship that had its climax in the peace talks in Algiers from 1987 to 1989.<sup>600</sup>

But just as the relations with the Jews, and afterwards the Israelis, had not worked out so well due to the difference in status between a revolutionary group and the diplomacy inherent to a new State, the first encounter with the Algerians followed a similar pattern, and Madariaga and Irigaray immediately realized that, despite the humanitarian aid and lodging they were receiving as refugees, the trade relations between Algeria and Spain were more important than the relationship of international solidarity that ETA had been hoping for.

The Algerian example, as an experience of exile, is not simply another one in a long list of conflicts analyzed; rather, *Vasconia* emphasizes its ideological role and dedicates to it the three appendices of the book, affording a clear comparison with the territorial organization of the urban area of Algiers and a practical example of how to apply the Algerian experience in the Basque country.<sup>601</sup>

During this first stage, however, the strategy was nothing more than: a strategy; and the armed actions, the armed struggle, was not as important nor as efficient as one might infer from the preparations, probably due to the fact that ETA had not yet acquired enough capacity to start a real revolutionary war.

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<sup>599</sup> The “*Movimiento para autodeterminación e independència del archipiélago Canario*” (MPAIAC) developed its activities between 1964 and 1979, resisting the Spanish control of the Canary Islands and vindicating the full independence of the archipelago. There is no bibliography on the organization, save for the work of a self-publishing organization: MOVIMIENTO POR LA AUTODETERMINACIÓN Y LA INDEPENDENCIA DEL ARCHIPIÉLAGO CANARIO, 1970, *El Nacionalismo revolucionario de Canarias: La "crisis" colonial de Madrid ; Fase actual de nuestra lucha nacional y revolucionaria*. Alger.

<sup>600</sup> BATISTA, Antoni, 2007, *Madariaga, de las armas a la palabra*. Barcelona: RBA Editores, p. 114.

<sup>601</sup> SARRAILH DE IHARTZA, Fernando, *op. cit.*, Appendices I, II, and III.

This was what motivated Ibarra to speak of “*un claro desfase entre la teoría y la práctica,*” since the young members of ETA did not yet have the training nor the social conditions to create the structures for supporting the commandos that could have begun a Basque insurgency. However, their first actions, although not particularly violent, did begin to spark some hope and awaken the national consciousness from the lethargic state it had fallen into due to the ineffectiveness of the PNV, which was “*durmiendo el sueño de los justos.*”<sup>602</sup>

In the meantime, the leadership of ETA, decimated by the forced exile of some of its most important members, and influenced by the experiences lived by the leaders abroad, was evolving towards a socialism that followed the internationalist trend, but with a *workist* twist given to it by the inland members, especially by Patxi Iturrioz, who extended his influence to gain control of ETA’s leadership after the flight of the founders.

Those were the years of the Fourth Assembly, which was held in two different places: the first was the monastery of Loyola, and the second was the mountain refuge of Oñate (both in Gipuzkoa). And it was at that assembly, during its second part in 1965, that the strategy of revolutionary war was finally approved—a decision that was reinforced by an eager Madariaga, who, recently arrived from Algeria, where he had adopted the war name of “Ahmed,” could confirm from his own experience the effectiveness of the strategy in that territory.

At the same time, this was also the assembly that marked the organization’s deepening into socialism,<sup>603</sup> which resulted in ETA modifying some of its 1962 principles in order to adapt them to a Marxist conception of the future Basque State, and this socialist deepening was what would later drive the nationalist element to start creating a strife.

The influence of Algeria, however, soon began to show, giving evidence of the deep admiration they had for the FLN, as is clearly reflected in the document *Bases Teóricas de la Guerra Revolucionaria*,<sup>604</sup> presented during a lecture by José Luís Zalbide, where he explained that a new strategy was needed to open up to newer, more socialist positions.

This document opened the door to the new armed strategy that ETA was going to develop mainly after the V<sup>th</sup> Assembly—but which was already present here in the systematic

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<sup>602</sup> IBARRA, Pedro, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>603</sup> *Zutik*, no. 31, July, 1965. In HÓRDAGO (ed.), 1979, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 521.

<sup>604</sup> HÓRDAGO (ed.), 1979, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 514-518.

enactment of the action-repression-action spiral, clearly linked to the Algerian example in Zalbide's intervention. According to the author of the paper, what the process of action-repression-action was striving for was the recognition of the Basque country from the part of the oppressor, i.e. the recognition of the nation. Spain was expected to give them more and more autonomy, until they could reach political independence: "*En el momento en que la represión se hace lógica con sus propios fines, da al pueblo oprimido su carta de naturaleza como Nación.*"

Zalbide drew a parallel between this strategy and what had happened in the cases of the English and French colonial empires, citing Algeria explicitly as an example where the Metropolis had lost its control over a submissive people.

José Luis Zalbide belonged to the so-called Anti-colonialist or Third World movement, deeply influenced by the national liberation movements that were spreading across the "third world," and his efforts to extract their particular socialist ideology were not received among ETA's members without turmoil.

The document *Bases teóricas para la Guerra revolucionaria* lays out the strategy with which ETA intended to achieve self-determination and absolute independence by paying close attention to the example not only of those peoples who had recently succeeded in that respect—with Algeria as the main example—but also from other anti-colonial victories:

*"En el orden internacional por otra parte, no podemos olvidarnos del papel que juega la división del mundo en tres bloques, y el interés de americanos y soviéticos por satisfacer al bloque neutralista. Este juego de fuerzas condujo a la partición que dio nacimiento al Estado de Israel, al aislamiento de Francia en la cuestión argelina, etc."*<sup>605</sup>

The influence of the exile and the international experience, particularly the Third-World element, is clearly visible in Zalbide, who embodies the organization's internal conflict between its working-class and its Third-World supporters—as a result of which the organization would end up splitting into two different branches.

Apart from Zalbide's work, the other culminating point of ETA's Third-World ideology was the document entitled *Carta a los intelectuales*,<sup>606</sup> first published in 1964 and only reedited in

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<sup>605</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 517.

<sup>606</sup> "Carta a los intelectuales," *Zutik*, no. 30, June, 1965.



June 1965, where the organization was trying to reorganize and regenerate its ideology in order to achieve the goal of national freedom. This document shows a clear influence from the revolutionary Third-World movements and, as Gurutz Jáuregui points out, its structure and objectives recall the letters of Franz Fanon during the Algerian Revolution, a telling indication of the influence that certain external intellectuals were having on the organization: “*La influencia de Fanon y de otros autores directamente ligados a la revolución argelina es patente. Una prueba de ello lo constituye el hecho de que tanto el libro Pour la révolution africaine, de Fanon, como Le portrait du colonisé, de Albert Memmi, van a ser traducidos al Euskera.*”<sup>607</sup>

In fact, the *Carta a los intelectuales* was the last attempt to summarize and put together all the different ideological tendencies within the organization, before the differences drove the organization to split up. The two major trends—the Third-World strategy and the *workist* tendency—are analyzed and combined in that document, in an attempt to adapt the Third-World revolutions to a modern working-class society such as the Basque.<sup>608</sup>

The contrast with the national and independence movements of the Third World, clearly different from the Basque case, sent a part of the Basque nationalists’ world into shock, including the members of the PNV, who were appalled at the patterns of action chosen by the young members of ETA.

The young Basque nationalists did not carry out a deep analysis of the peculiarities and differences, as José Mari Garmendia has observed, but all the same it seems that what the organization intended was to find some common ground with those successful examples—which would encourage the Basque population to start a revolution—not the points that might move them away from the revolution.<sup>609</sup>

Falling back to the idea suggested by Garmendia about the little gain that could be made from making a comparison between the Basque conflict and the Algerian conflict, the *workist* faction in ETA, led by Iturrioz, launched a campaign within ETA that increasingly emphasized the Spanish and working-class features, while the national element (Basque nationalism) was

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<sup>607</sup> JÁUREGUI BERECIARTU, Gurutz, 1981, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

<sup>608</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 256.

<sup>609</sup> “*Es impensable que mientras se acusa, por ejemplo, al PNV de burgués y se afirma la necesidad de ligar liberación nacional con liberación social, se mantenga al mismo tiempo la confusión entre el FLN argelino, el Irgún israelí, o la Eoka, considerándolos todos movimientos de liberación nacional sin más matices.*” GARMENDIA, José Mari, 1979, *Historia de ETA*. Donosti: L.Haramburu Editor, vol. I, p. 167.

criticized and questioned, dismissing it, or at least relegating it, to a second level.<sup>610</sup> Attention was directed toward the workers' struggle, in the belief that the nationalists' fight was something pertaining to the bourgeoisie.

This group advocated for closer ties with the Spanish labor movement and an engagement with the class struggle, in line with the Third International, criticizing the Third-World faction for the comparisons it was making of the Basque conflict with such conflicts as the Algerian that, in their opinion, had little if anything to do with the Basque people. The debate for them was whether nationalisms were inherently conservative, or if they could be reformulated from left-wing positions.

To stop the advance of the *workist* front in ETA, and always with the rigor of the organization's assemblies, strongly conditioned by its intellectual founders, we find in *Zutik's* no. 31 issue from July, 1965 an article submitted by the Third-World/Anti-colonialist faction<sup>611</sup> where the Algerian example is taken up once again by the organization as a model for the national liberation movement. The text that we are referring to is an excerpt from the memoirs of the Algerian military soldier Ahmed Ben Cherif, who chronicled his evolution and stance within Marxism, based on his personal and professional experience as a member of the French Communist Party. Ben Cherif concludes that while social revolution remains in the hands of French, there will be nothing for the Algerians to do. According to him, if the working-class movement continued to rely on the French Communist Party and its opportunism, linked with the politicians at the Parliament of Paris, there would simply be no revolution.<sup>612</sup>

In putting forward the example of Ben Cherif, the intention of the anti-colonial front (which was also the part of ETA that was in the exile) had been to compare the situation experienced by the Algerian revolutionaries with what was beginning to take shape within ETA and among the Basque revolutionaries in general, that is, the presence of an increasingly strong Spanish *workist* front, tending towards the realization of an internationalist proletarian Leninism. This

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<sup>610</sup> The influence that the *workist* front had within ETA will be shown clearly from the moment that Zalvide is imprisoned and Patxi Iturrioz is left to manage ETA's executive on his own. This stage is recognizable in the analysis that *Zutik* made from October 1965 to December 1966, explaining the history of the Basque Country no longer from a nationalist perspective, which it had discarded, but instead from a Marxist perspective that considered a union of all working-class groups fighting together as a better alternative to the national front.

<sup>611</sup> Back then this group was formed by the founding members, Txillardegui, Benito del Valle and Julen Madariaga.

<sup>612</sup> *Zutik*, no. 31, p. 6. In HÓRDAGO (ed.), *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 521.

struggle between the working-class interests and the national interests would be compounded over time, particularly after the V<sup>th</sup> Assembly, the most relevant assembly of the organization. With Iturriz leading the organization's political front and controlling *Zutik*, the development of ideology was in the hands of the Spanish *workist* faction in the inside—but the old guard, who lived in the exile, did not give up on the importance they gave to Basque nationalism, and the reaction came quickly in the form of an alliance between Txillardegui and Krutwig, with a series of writings denouncing the drift of the Spanish *Zutik*.<sup>613</sup>

The return of Julen Madariaga to Belgium stirred up a reaction among the historical founders (mostly congregated in the exile in Flanders) against the working-class front in the inside, and the organization decided to redress the situation by uniting forces and naming Madariaga *Burutzagi* (supreme head), thus contradicting the spirit of the assembly on which the organization was founded. But this was an operation carried out by ETA in the exile in order to regain control after the dissents, arrests, and reduced militancy brought about by the police activities that were decimating the organization.<sup>614</sup>

The exile in Algeria is essential for explaining the evolution of ETA's ideology and the armed struggle, not only because Algeria would become a long-term refuge for ETA members, but also because from there the revolutionary Basque nationalists would come into contact with many different and diverse national liberation movements that would influence them in one way or other, as Irigaray recalls:

*“Nos inspiramos en el movimiento Argelino pero no solo en él, sino en todos los otros movimientos de liberación nacional del norte de África y América. El informe verde está influenciado por el movimiento anticolonialista que se da en Argelia, no en el movimiento panarabista. Argelia es la base porque hay muchos movimientos africanos y americanos. Allí conocí a Otello de Carvalho, estaban los del Frente de liberación del Quebec, los de Uruguay, los de Brasil. Estaba Vietnam, Camboya, etc... Hasta conocimos al Che. Patricio Lumumba lo invita a visitar el Congo y después hace un tour por otros países. El Che era ministro de industria de Cuba, y propone investigar*

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<sup>613</sup> *Zutik*, from November 1965 to July 1966.

<sup>614</sup> BATISTA, Antoni, 2007, *op. cit.*, p.119.

*el nuevo orden mundial para desarrollar la sanidad. Años más tarde vuelve para entrenarse en los campos de Argelia.*"<sup>615</sup>

ii. Etxebarrieta brothers, political violence & poetry.

*“El Che participaba también de ese antiguo espíritu. Tenía algo de Javier Mina, el guerrillero español que cruzó el Atlántico para luchar contra la tiranía de su país y la independencia de México. Y algo de Lord Byron en su Aventura contra los turcos: la Guerra como la forma superior de la poesía.”*

This is how Enrique Krauze defines Ernesto Che Guevara in his book *Redentores. Ideas y poder en la América Latina*,<sup>616</sup> linking poetry with violence as if the revolutionary use of violence were a superior form of poetry, something that reminds me of the special connection that violence, poetry, and “el Che” had for the Etxebarrieta brothers, the Basque revolutionary poets.

If there were any ETA members who possessed the ability to influence through their writings, with a mixture of nationalism, Marxism, and violence, in the development of the armed struggle and the strategy of action-repression-action—those were the Etxebarrieta Brothers. Txabi, the youngest, had joined ETA in October 1963, following on the footsteps of his older brother and mentor,<sup>617</sup> José Antonio, who fled into exile in 1960 with the intention of getting more deeply involved with the Basque cause.

The two brothers became key pieces in the redefinition of ETA during the most remarkable of its assemblies, the V<sup>th</sup> assembly, which was divided into two parts and took place between the end of 1966 and March of 1967. The Fifth Assembly was important because it established a

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<sup>615</sup> Otello Saraiva de Carvalho was a Portuguese military officer who was chief of strategy during the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal that put an end to the authoritarian regime. Patrice Lumumba was the first president of Independent Congo, but since he was assassinated in 1961, and the Che’s tour in Africa was in 1963, he was probably invited by Cyrille Adoula, who formed part of the [Mouvement National Congolais](#) (MNC) that was responsible for the Independence movement. Ernesto Che Guevara was a Marxist revolutionary warrior who participated in the Cuban Revolution; he served as Minister of Industry for Castro’s first government and gave up his government duties in order to travel and spread the revolution. He gave a speech in Alger in 1965 and visited some African countries. He was assassinated in 1967 in Bolivia.

<sup>616</sup> KRAUZE, Enrique, 2011, *Redentores. Ideas y poder en América latina*. Barcelona: Debate, p. 328.

<sup>617</sup> According to some ETA members, in those days José Antonio, like Patxo Unzueta, was not an official member of the organization. He had to wait until 1966, just before the V<sup>th</sup> Assembly, although due to his disease he was never able to attend any of the assemblies. His brother Txabi, became his voice in the presentation and defense of his works. LORENZO ESPINOSA, José María, 1994, *Txabi Etxebarrieta: Armado de palabra y obra*. Tafalla: Txalaparta, p. 58.

new ideology in face of the need of determining certain aspects before the great diversity of the new tendencies, but also because after the assembly ETA suffered yet another crisis. The crisis was resolved in 1971 by vindicating the legitimacy of the V<sup>th</sup>, presenting its values and ideology as the real and authentic ETA.

The Etxebarrieta brothers brought theory and practice into the strategy of armed struggle of ETA, turning it into the centerpiece of the new ETA,<sup>618</sup> but at the same time they substituted the working-class vindication with the inclusion of the concept of Pueblo Trabajador Vasco (PTV), introduced by José Antonio in his famous report *Informe Txatarra*.

Basque nationalism and violence were linked to one another, and they were finally developed as such starting from 1967, in particular after the assassination of Melitón Manzanás, according to an analysis done by Pedro Ibarra<sup>619</sup>; but we could argue that violence and the action-repression-action strategy had already begun with the assassination of Txabi Etxebarrieta, the “tragic subject,” first martyr of the homeland, the necessary victim of the revolution.<sup>620</sup>

The writings of the two brothers, both intellectually brilliant, had an impact on the revolutionary nationalist Basque organization, composing an ideological corpus that would last for decades. For the purposes of our research, we will focus on José Antonio and his experience in the exile, where he was able to get into contact with different kinds of Basque nationalists, from Gallastegui’s family to the traditional nationalists of the PNV, and was introduced to new philosophers like Rousseau, Sartre, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Fanon, Ho Chi Minh, Mao, or Ernesto Che Guevara, who influenced his intellectual work in different ways.

In Iparralde, José Antonio contacted with the EG organization in San Juan de Luz, where he came across the Gallastegui family and, as Iker Gallastegui acknowledged, “*era un joven muy despierto y presto a emprender nuevos proyectos de lucha por su pueblo. (...) no estando en aquel momento en condiciones de utilizarle en Iparralde, decidimos enviarle a París donde estaban varios otros refugiados jóvenes, además de bastantes estudiantes vascos, y donde podría hacer alguna labor útil.*”<sup>621</sup>

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<sup>618</sup> ZULAIKA, Joseba, 2014, *That Bilbao old moon. The passion and resurrection of a city*. Reno: Center for Basque studies, p. 55.

<sup>619</sup> IBARRA, Pedro, 1987, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

<sup>620</sup> ZULAIKA, Joseba, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

<sup>621</sup> Declarations of Iker Gallastegui in: ETXEABARRIETA ORTIZ, José Antonio, 1999, *Los vientos favorables. Euskal Herria 1839-1959*. Tafalla: Txalaparta, pp. 31-32. In the same book, but in the chapter signed by

He also participated in the conferences that the PNV organized in Paris, in which the young Basque nationalists finally broke with the old guard, as we have already analyzed.

Manuel Irujo, who had met him and had been following his political and ideological activities, said of José Antonio that he was part of the new generation of Basque nationalists. In a letter sent to Elias Gallastegui on May 4<sup>th</sup>, 1962—therefore after the conferences in Paris—Irujo, conscious of the fact that the Gallasteguis were giving him shelter, defined Etxebarrieta with the following words: “*Les he dicho que forma parte de la vanguardia nacionalista vasca, que figura entre los insatisfechos y protestatarios y que es el pensador de Euzko-Gaztedi.*”<sup>622</sup>

The letter was meant to inform Etxebarrieta that the journal *Cuadernos* was interested in publishing an article by José Antonio Etxebarrieta on the situation in Spain, and Irujo adds with his peculiar sense of humor: “*Yo he preferido no conocer el texto de su artículo, por si, a lo peor me parecía mayor que no apareciera. Siempre es bueno librarse de malas tentaciones.*”

Old guard, but very active in his political and intellectual endeavors, Manuel Irujo was aware of just about everything that the young Basque nationalists were up to and involved in, and that is why, as we saw before, his worries about the possible connections between ETA and communism were aroused quite early, after having met with them only a couple of times.

In a letter to his friend Francisco Belausteguigoitia—already commented in the section dealing with the suspicions about the communist feature of ETA—Irujo identifies some of the insights and criticisms that José Antonio would develop later on in his work on national Basque history, *Los vientos favorables. Euskal Herria 1839-1959*. After the contact with the Basque Government, the meetings with the traditional Basque nationalists in Paris, and the education (we might even say traineeship) he received from Gallastegui’s family, Etxebarrieta had grown more and more interested in Basque nationalism, and it was out of that interest that he came up with the theory that he developed in the aforementioned book, analyzing the history of Basque nationalism, vindicating Sabino Arana, and reprimanding the Basque government for its bad management. Irujo describes the thoughts and considerations expressed by Etxebarrieta in a round table organized in Paris:

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Txomin Ziluaga, it is stated that José Antonio would receive a scholarship from the Basque Government for studying political science in Paris. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>622</sup>Irujo to Elías Gallastegui. May 4<sup>th</sup>, 1962. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 3, File 8. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/7367.pdf> (consulted on May 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

*“Daba una conferencia uno de los suyos [in reference to Gallastegui] Echevarrieta (sic), de la nueva promoción. Dijo que su nacionalismo no era ni el de Sabino ni el de Aguirre. Le objeté yo que en el mundo no hay más que dos nacionalismos, uno demócrata y otro fascista; y él me respondió que los vascos podíamos acudir a los medios del uno y del otro para logra nuestra independencia. ¿Qué es “eso”? Quieres decírmelo?”*<sup>623</sup>

José Antonio had directed a harsh criticism against the role of the PNV in the evolution of Basque nationalism, dividing the latter into “interventionist” and “non-interventionist.” The interventionists were those political forces, like the PNV, that took part in Spanish politics, whereas the non-interventionists were those, like ETA, that worked with the people to attain freedom and independence. In fact, these ideas were not originally conceived by José Antonio, but were a reinterpretation of the concepts that Arana’s brothers had used—which comes to show the total connection that the young Basque nationalists had with Sabino Arana, completely skipping over the PNV’s legacy.

For José Antonio, the mistake of the PNV was that they had accepted and given recognition to the “oppressor,” Spain, thereby recognizing its authority: *“La aceptación de la legalidad del opresor, de “su” libertad de asociación, de “su” libertad de reunión, es una inconsecuencia doctrinal, es una inconsecuencia en la comprensión de la lógica y de los métodos del ocupante, es un inconsecuencia esterilizadora de toda política realista.”*<sup>624</sup>

His analysis of the history of Basque nationalism is full of details that help us understand the mistakes made and show us the new strategy that he believed Basque nationalism should adopt.

The main source for his reflections—proving that Irujo was not entirely mistaken—is Lenin, on whom he draws for his study of the political phases, and he identifies that the main problem of the PNV is the lack of an objective, an objective which, according to him, should be independence, revolution.<sup>625</sup>

By means of his interesting theory of the steps, he sets out to explain that the politics of the PNV had gone up some steps, with the defense of the Statute of Autonomy, for instance, but then the forward advance had been cut short when they stopped being interventionists and

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<sup>623</sup> Irujo to Belausteguigoitia. September 12<sup>th</sup>, 1962. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 5, File 5. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDF/Fondo/iruj/10594.pdf>

<sup>624</sup> ETXEBARRIETA ORTIZ, José Antonio. 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 74

<sup>625</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

turned into legalists—since the Spanish code of laws would not allow for anything else except autonomy. For Etxebarrieta, the constant problem of the PNV was that they did not have any political project beyond autonomy. In that aspect, although he describes Irujo as a “*vocero del PNV*,” he recognizes that Irujo, together with Monzón and Jáuregui, had plans of action that were different from Aguirre’s during the war, especially in reference to the Basque National Council in London, which constituted a “*superación de la aventura estatutista y el encuadramiento del problema vasco en su justo conjunto nacional*.”<sup>626</sup>

In that sense, we can see that Etxebarrieta’s goal, and ETA’s national mission, was to fulfill the national plan, to reach the top of the stairs, achieving that last step which was Independence.

The lack of ideology of the PNV had led them to the political stagnation that was represented by the 1956 Basque Congress in Paris, which for Etxebarrieta marked the moment of fracture between the old guard and the new Basque generation. The young Basque nationalists “*buscan una ideología propia que resultará ser la superación del intervencionismo*.”<sup>627</sup>

The idea of building an ideology for the new generation of Basque nationalists was what drove José Antonio to visit the exiles, study the history of Basque nationalism, and make a comparison of the theories and experiences, which in turn showed him the path of revolutionary nationalism and led him to embrace a Marxism-Leninism that was not only presented as the ideology of the communist party, but of the working class as well, so necessary for the socialist and revolutionary transformation of society. In the Basque case, the ideology of revolutionary patriotism—with independence as a major objective linked to a socialist society—replaced the Catholic confessionality of the PNV. Patriotism became the new passion—replacing love in the case of Txabi Etxebarrieta, and becoming his fate and curse<sup>628</sup>—but in general, revolutionary Basque nationalism availed itself of revolutionary patriotism as “*una suerte de desacralización del cristianismo y como instrumento de una religión confortadora capaz de dar sentido a la existencia*.”<sup>629</sup>

Txabi and Jose Antonio had been entertaining the idea of the armed struggle since the V<sup>th</sup> assembly, inspired by their readings of classical Marxist texts and the experience of the Cuban

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<sup>626</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 120-122.

<sup>627</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 145.

<sup>628</sup> ZULAIKA, Joseba, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>629</sup> BULLAIN, Iñigo, 2011, *Revolucionarismo patriótico. El Movimiento de liberación nacional vasco. (MLNV)*. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, p. 100.



revolution—but it was the Irish experience of Iker Gallastegui that gave José Antonio the first occasion to implement the theory of armed struggle.

Federico Krutwig devoted a section in his memoirs to this first Basque attempt at guerrilla warfare, an experiment that did not succeed. Although he says he wants to maintain certain discretion regarding the authors, in “*Primer intento de Guerrilla vasca*”<sup>630</sup> Krutwig explains that Gatarrieta (which was the alias Krutwig used for Iker Gallastegui and Etxebarrieta, in a clear abuse of Jose Antonio’s name) had devised, organized, and prepared groups of young Basque nationalists ready to take action in the Basque Country.

If in the case of ETA’s founders the national conflicts that had inspired them the most were those of Israel and Algeria, for the next generation of revolutionary Basque nationalists the main influence (in this particular case, based on the experience of Gallastegui’s family) came from Ireland and the war tactics adopted there by the IRA.

In fact, as Krutwig explains, Gallastegui was in contact with all kinds of Basque nationalists, and, as in many other cases, the funding necessary for the guerrilla came from America. Thus, with the initial help of Joseba Rezola, he managed to travel to Ireland, where he contacted IRA members to get weapons and army traineeship there.

After a failed attempt to get traineeship in Ireland, and with Rezola having withdrawn from the armed strategy, Gallastegui returned to Iparralde—and it was there that he contacted Etxebarrieta, who was then in Paris, to go ahead with the idea of the guerrilla. Etxebarrieta had been studying *La guerre revolutionnaire* by Claude Delmas, as well as some works by Mao Zedong, but the strategy that he and Gallastegui prepared was inspired also by the Israeli experience: from the manner in which Gallastegui bid farewell to José Antonio—“Abi Gezund!”<sup>631</sup>—to the strategy of recruiting “hirurkos” to get them trained in Iparralde.

Although they managed to take about fifteen young Basques with them to get instruction in Donibane, the order of expulsion from Iparralde issued to Gallastegui in 1962 and Jose Antonio’s disease meant that Etxebarrieta had to contact Julen Madariaga in order to receive some help from ETA.<sup>632</sup> In 1963, after being forced to return to Bilbao, the group of young

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<sup>630</sup> KRUTWIG, Federico, 2014, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-89.

<sup>631</sup> “Abi Gezund!” was the way among the members of the Irgum to say goodbye to a comrade who was departing on a mission to carry out a patriotic action. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>632</sup> LORENZO ESPINOSA, José María, 1994, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

Basques that had been trained by José Antonio Etxebarrieta in Iparralde were absorbed by ETA, and Txabi Etxebarrieta received the baton from his brother's hands with the mission of keeping ahead with the reinterpretation of Basque nationalism—this time from inside ETA.

Txabi Etxebarrieta was seduced by ETA during a meeting with Madariaga in Bilbao to which he had gone on behalf of his convalescing older brother; and it was Madariaga who had believed in him—the young intellectual from Sarriko's university—to conduct the V<sup>th</sup> Assembly, which was where the works of Etxebarrieta's brothers first came to light.

In the first part of the V<sup>th</sup> Assembly, held in a parish house in Gaztelu in December 1966, the debate centered on the work presented by Txabi but written by José Antonio that became the axis of the entire assembly: *Informe Txatarra*.<sup>633</sup>

The report assembled the warnings and reproofs made basically by Txillardegui against the political office, which was under the control of Iturrioz. Txillardegui had been writing letters and articles to the executive of ETA to warn them about the pro-Spanish and communist tendencies within the organization. In an alliance with Krutwig, he had conceived *Branka*,<sup>634</sup> an alternative publication within the ethnolinguistic and Third-World tendency that was intended to put a halt to *Zutik*, which, in Txillardegui's words, had turned into a journal that was “*pseudoizquierdista del imperialismo y el del colonialismo político del estado español*.”<sup>635</sup>

The *Informe Txatarra* fits well with the group of exiles who had crossed the *muga* from the exile to the inside to stop the Iturrioz campaign, and, after having met with them, José Antonio wrote the report in direct opposition to the political office, accusing it of being utopic for not having analyzed the working-class struggle from the perspective of the Basque situation; uchronic for not distinguishing the phases of the revolution and the necessary alliance with the national bourgeoisie; un-national for not only ignoring the political oppression but also considering national diversity as an obstacle; reformist for having faced the revolution only

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<sup>633</sup> The report was lost and no copy is left. We know about its contents from the testimonies of the members who attended the assembly, especially the recollections of Patxo Unzueta in *Documentos Y*, vol. 5, pp. 127-128. Its original title was “*Análisis y crítica del españolismo social-chauvinista*,” leaving no doubt as to its intentions.

<sup>634</sup> The first issue of *Branka* saw the light in April 1966, with the aim, according to Txillardegui, of stopping the social-imperialist thesis, what meant the Spanish communists tendency that Txillardegui had denounced in several occasions. *Branka* was published until 1972 and was the official publication of those who abandoned ETA after the V<sup>th</sup>, mainly being a Basque nationalist cultural journal of the Basque nationalists in the exile, as Txillardegui, the founder and principal promoter, liked to define it. More in: 1979. *Branka*. Donostia: Ediciones Vascas. 2 Vols.

<sup>635</sup> ELORZA, Antonio. (Coord.). 2000. *Op.Cit.* p. 240.

from the union, avoiding political struggle; anti-organizational because of its intention of dissolving ETA into a leftist front; and finally pacifist, for having renounced to the armed struggle.<sup>636</sup>

The report shows a noticeable influence from the lectures of Lenin, and probably of Mao, as we have already mentioned.

Due to the disease of José Antonio, it was his brother Txabi who took all the credit during the V<sup>th</sup> assembly and, after having structured the organization into four fronts (cultural, political, military, and socio-economical), he was involved in the new executive, once the expulsion of the Spanish *workist* faction of Iturrioz was effected. The new executive would be formed based on the new structure of the “Biltzar Ttipia” (small assembly), which would control the organization, and its members were: Txabi Etxebarrieta, Beltza, Eskubi, Etxabe, Balduino, Aguirre, Azurmendi, and Krutwig. These eight people then chose two more: Arregi and Madariaga. The 10 leaders would be the only ones with the executive power to call an assembly.

The work that would form the ideological basis of the V<sup>th</sup> Assembly would be the *Informe Verde*, written by Krutwig in the exile, where ETA is defined as a “*Movimiento Socialista Vasco de Liberación Nacional*.”

Lasting until 1970, the ideological basis of the V<sup>th</sup> Assembly highlighted the national and social fight, the use of the Basque language as the cornerstone of Basque Ethnicity, the collaboration with the Basque national bourgeoisie, and the involvement of the working class in the national revolution.<sup>637</sup>

The role of the Etxebarrieta brothers in the new ideological development of the organization, as we commented before, was divided into two different aspects: the promotion of the working-class connection with the Basque national cause, and the maturing of the action-repression-action, of which Txabi would be the main protagonist.

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<sup>636</sup> HÓRDAGO (Ed.). 1979. *Op.Cit.* Vol. 5, pp. 127-128.

<sup>637</sup> There are several books and sources on the Vth Assembly. The ideological basis can be found in HÓRDAGO (Ed.). 1979. *Op.Cit.* Vol. 5, pp. 174-177; Different historical analysis can be read in: ELORZA, Antonio. (Coord.). 2000. *Op.Cit.* pp. 233-251 and CASANOVA, Iker. 2007. *Op.Cit.* pp. 77-84. Besides, the testimony of Krutwig is essential to understand the elaboration of the thesis and the ideology from the exile, as well as it shows us a different version of the events: KRUTWIG, Federico. 2014. *Op.Cit.* pp.103-132.

After the withdrawal from ETA of the *workist* front after the V<sup>th</sup> assembly, the reconstruction of the working-class front and its inclusion in the national struggle was achieved especially thanks to the efforts of Txabi Etxebarrieta.

In *Zutik* nos. 44 and 45, Txabi wrote some articles on the Basque working class, including the one in *Zutik* no. 44, January 1967, entitled “Pueblo Trabajador Vasco.” In this article, Txabi found a link between the new Basque generation—but in this case he was pointing to the new working-class Basque generation—and national oppression. Thus what Txabi was describing was the national and social oppression of the Basque people: “*Sí, existen dos dictaduras. Y son dos las naciones oprimidas. Porque si Euzkadi está oprimida por España y Francia, la “nación” obrera está oprimida por la nación burguesa.*”

Revolution and independence are linked to the Basque people, and so is the Basque cause: “*« En pie los oprimidos del mundo » con estas palabras comienza la Internacional, « Da y esparce tu fruto por el mundo » exclama Iparragirre en su himno al Árbol de Guernica.*”

Such were the opening words of Txabi’s article on the 1<sup>st</sup> of May, 1967, making a total connection between Basque nationalism and the working class. “*Por esta razón, el Aberri-Eguna y el Primero de Mayo son idénticos para ETA.*” There was no working-class freedom without national freedom.

In this article published on the first of May, we can identify common ideas that were also present in his brother’s work. One them was an attack on reformism, identifying two kinds: a national and a social reformism—both of which are accused of being reactionary. While the social kind of reformism only wanted to reform capitalism and implement some social reforms without altering “*el modo de producción capitalista,*” the national reformism was associated with the defense of the Statute: “*En lugar de luchas por la independencia nacional, los que predicán el estatutismo no son reaccionarios porque hayan adoptado un camino más largo y más pacífico, sino porque han tomado otra meta concerniente a la libertad de Euzkadi.*” The attack on traditional Basque nationalism, and in particular against the Basque government, is quite evident.

The national and social Basque struggles were united by the revolution, but that revolution could only be achieved by fighting—and for the Etxebarrieta brothers, especially for Txabi, the fight would involve, if it was necessary, sacrifice.

Txabi Etxebarrieta was a poet. Despite his short life (he was killed at the age of 23), he wrote five books of poetry, and in them we can see the special relation that he had with death.<sup>638</sup>

As Joseba Zulaika relates, the relation that Txabi had with death was inspired in Feodor Dostoyevsky: “*Dostoyevsky was the prophet of my generation’s deadly struggle between Christianity and faithlessness, crime and punishment, freedom and guilt.*”<sup>639</sup> The duality was not only between the national and the social, but also between life and death, action and passiveness, and finally between action and reaction. Txabi would be the trigger of the action-reaction chain, he would be the first of ETA’s victim and the first martyr—or should we say the first to be sacrificed?

In January of 1968, ETA vastly distributed *Zutik* no.48 (more than 20,000 copies), which contained a text written by José Antonio Etxebarrieta entitled “*Qué hacemos. Por qué lo hacemos. Qué tenemos que hacer. Por qué lo tenemos que hacer,*” under the clear influence of Mao Zedong, the thinker of those days, defending the revolution and linking the national revolution with social oppression, taking China and the Japanese occupation as an example.<sup>640</sup>

After a process of reflection, it was obvious that ETA was ready to open a new chapter, or to use José Antonio’s words, the organization was ready to go up the next step of the stair—a step that included the revolution, and therefore the armed struggle.

Repression in the streets had become routine, and tortures, detentions, explosions, bank robberies, and shootings were common practice in the Basque Country by the end of 1967 and the beginning of 1968.<sup>641</sup> ETA’s 1968 *Aberri Eguna* manifesto<sup>642</sup> by Txabi Etxebarrieta was therefore encouraging the Basque population to start the revolutionary fight against the oppressor:

*“Es un enfrentamiento radical con el opresor que, según la V asamblea de ETA, se manifiesta en 4 frentes de lucha (...). Estos frentes (...) se encaminan a concienciar al pueblo vasco de sus intereses y se concretan en la toma del poder por el pueblo trabajador vasco y el establecimiento de un régimen socialista vasco. (...) Con esta*

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<sup>638</sup> His poems and some of his personal and political writings are published in: LORENZO ESPINOSA, José María, 1994, *op. cit.*

<sup>639</sup> ZULAIKA, Joseba, 2014, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

<sup>640</sup> CASANOVA, Iker, 2007, *op. cit.*, pp.91-92.

<sup>641</sup> A detailed explanation about the repression is developed in the next chapter.

<sup>642</sup> LORENZO ESPINOSA, José María, 1994, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-269.

*estrategia revolucionaria ETA ha desarrollado una serie de actividades que han provocado la furiosa reacción del capitalismo.”*

Revolution is action, and action is sacrifice and a long-term path. Txabi made a link between Lenin and Jesus Christ: “*Todo este proceso sólo se puede efectuar a través de una práctica concreta; con razón decía Lenin que para conocer a un socialista no hay que mirarle a la boca, sino a las manos; y en el mismo sentido decía Cristo; «Por sus obras les conoceréis»; La Revolución no se hace sobre el papel.”*

The *Aberri Eguna* Manifesto finally recognized the action-reaction-action strategy—and according to Txabi, although the conditions of the Basque society were not mature enough for achieving success, the time was ripe to begin the revolution.

*Sólo queda marcharme*

*Sólo .*

*Y esperar que la tierra aún nos quiera.*

Txabi Etxebarrieta. Spring, 1968.



## 6. THE BURGOS TRIAL

### a. The awakening of the street

After the Munich meeting, the weight of the activities developed by Basque nationalism moved from the exile to the inside, especially due to the increase of violence and repression that took place on the streets of Spain, although these activities maintained a constant link with the exile.

In the late sixties and the seventies, the strikes, demonstrations, and protests in the streets of Spain against the Franco Regime were constant. A new generation, without the fear linked to the Spanish Civil War, was receiving democratic and revolutionary ideas constantly, often arriving from the exterior, and decided to take to the streets to protest—but the dictatorship answered with repression, tortures, and imprisonments, forcing Basque nationalism to focus its strategy on defending the inmates, managing the new exiles, and obtaining international recognition through a new situation of violence, rather than through political or national vindication.

*(...) en la calle, en el espacio público, la conciencia nacional se va haciendo dominante. Es una época de progresiva multiplicación del uso de signos y símbolos. Es, en definitiva, la expresión pública de la diferencialidad, del Nosotros colectivo, radicalmente expresado en oposición a las estructuras sociales.*<sup>643</sup>

Violence during the Franco Dictatorship had been usual and characteristic, but ever since the creation of ETA, and after its assumption of the armed struggle and the strategy of action-repression-action, violence had increased in the streets, particularly in the Basque country.

The repression and reaction from the Spanish State came in the form of detentions, tortures, imprisonments, and killings.

In view of the new political and social unrest of the recent years, the regime decided to elaborate the *Ley de Orden Público* in July of 1959. This text defined the new basics of public order by pursuing strikes, illegal closure of companies, illegal meetings, the apology of violence or subversion, etc. In addition, the State regulated the State of Emergency, a resource that the regime employed eleven times between 1956 and 1975. During these states of exception, basic freedoms, like the freedom of residence, were restricted, and any juridical

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<sup>643</sup> GURRUCHAGA, Ander. 1985. *El código nacionalista vasco durante el franquismo*. Barcelona: Anthropos Editorial, p. 271.



protection against random detentions was suspended, increasing the episodes of violence and the repression against all citizens. Each and every state of emergency was called after an episode of violence, after demonstrations that turned into riots and fights between the demonstrators and the police, or else as a way of preventing possible future riots.

In September of 1960, the regime decided to promote also the *Decreto Ley sobre Rebelión Militar, bandidaje y terrorismo*,<sup>644</sup> reaffirming the court-martials, the summary processes, and the death sentences against certain types of political subversion.

In the meantime, the creation of the *Tribunal de Orden Público* (TOP) in 1963, with the objective of “*conocer de los delitos cometidos en todo el territorio nacional, singularizados por la tendencia en mayor o menor gravedad a subvertir los principios básicos del Estado, perturbar el orden público o sembrar la zozobra en la conciencia nacional*,”<sup>645</sup> became a new weapon for the Franco regime with which to repress the population, especially those who dared put in danger the political unity of Spain, and therefore to control and repress the social and political unrest. The TOP received the support of the special police brigade, *Brigada de investigación social*, best known as “*Brigada político social*” or “*La social*,” first created in 1941, and responsible for the detention, interrogation, torture, and killing of most of the victims in those days.<sup>646</sup>

The Basque country (Basque country and Navarre in the Spanish administration) suffered ten states of emergency<sup>647</sup> decreed by the Franco authorities which suspended the articles of the “*Fueros de los Españoles*” (the Spanish jurisdiction during the dictatorship), in such a way that reproducing violence became the founding principle of the Franco order, as Ander Gurruchaga

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<sup>644</sup> A complete analysis of the Decree is found in SALABERRI, Kepa, 1971, *Sumarísimo 31-69. El proceso de Euskadi en Burgos*. Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, pp. 49-73. The law can be consulted in: *Decreto-Ley sobre rebelión militar, bandidaje y terrorismo*. [https://www.boe.es/publicaciones/anuarios\\_derecho/abrir\\_pdf.php?id=ANU-P-1960-30045500459](https://www.boe.es/publicaciones/anuarios_derecho/abrir_pdf.php?id=ANU-P-1960-30045500459) ANUARIO DE DERECHO PENAL Y CIENCIAS PENALES Decreto de 21 de septiembre de 1960, revisando y unificando la Ley de 2 de marzo de 1943 y el Decreto-Ley de 18 de abril de 1947 (consulted on March 9<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>645</sup> Ley 154/1963, de 2 de diciembre, sobre creación del Juzgado y Tribunales de Orden Público. [https://www.boe.es/diario\\_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-1963-22622](https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-1963-22622) (consulted on March 9<sup>th</sup>, 2017)

<sup>646</sup> More on the *Brigada político social* and on TOP in: AGUILA, Juan José del, 2001, *El TOP. La represión de la libertad (1963-1977)*. Barcelona: Ed. Planeta. BATISTA, Antoni, 1995, *La brigada social*. Barcelona: Empúries.

<sup>647</sup> The Francoist regime declared 11 different states of emergency within the period 1956-1975; four of them affected the whole of Spain (1956, 1962, 1969, and 1970), one was declared in Asturias (1958), and the rest, six, were exclusively declared in Basque provinces, which means that at least on ten occasions one of the Basque provinces was affected by a state of emergency. The exact lengths, dates, causes, and number of detainees of the states of exceptions during Francoism are detailed in GURRUCHAGA, Ander, 1985, *El código nacionalista vasco durante el franquismo*. Barcelona: Anthropos Editorial, pp. 291-309.

has stated: “(...) *los estados de excepción reproducen simbólicamente el acto funcional del nuevo Estado franquista porque implican que abiertamente la violencia se transforma en el principio fundador del orden franquista.*”<sup>648</sup>

The years before and after Burgos—the end of the 60’s and the beginning of the 70’s—are marked by the heightened visibility of the social nationalism represented by the ETA movement. Nevertheless, ETA could not have carried out its activity without the support of the Basque people, who conformed ETA as a social movement.<sup>649</sup>

## **b. ETA and the Revolutionary war**

It was after the 5<sup>th</sup> assembly of 1966, in which the ideological bases of ETA were established,<sup>650</sup> that the organization developed in full its strategy of armed struggle intended to achieve the National Revolution, mixing the workers’ movement with the Basque national front and with guerrilla war.

In fact, ETA was suffering internal secessions and divisions, aggravated by the expulsion from France of the historical founders of the organization Txillardegi, Irigarai, Del Valle, and Madariaga in 1965.

The armed struggle had been approved at the IV<sup>th</sup> assembly in 1965, and the document *Guerra revolucionaria- Insurrección en Euskadi*<sup>651</sup> became the basis on which to develop it, although another document that was presented during the assembly, *Bases teóricas de la guerra revolucionaria*, was clearly inspired on the previous document.

The importance of the work of Federico Krutwig is especially evident in the writings of ETA in reference to this stage. With *Guerra revolucionaria- Insurrección en Euskadi*, written in 1963 and published in 1964, ETA definitely lays down its strategy of continuing to fight for the national and social liberation of the Basque Country. With the revolutionary war, those

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<sup>648</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 293.

<sup>649</sup> The defense and development of this concept of ETA is analyzed in: ODRIOZOLA IRIZAR, Onintza, 2016, *Erakunde bat baino gehiago: ETA herri mugimendu gisa (1958-1968)*. UPV-EHU.

<sup>650</sup> In later chapters we will see the development of the ideology of ETA in relation to Basque nationalism.

<sup>651</sup> “Guerra revolucionaria- Insurrección en Euskadi,” 1963, in “Cuadernos de ETA,” num. 20. HÓRDAGO (Ed.), 1979, *Documentos Y (18 volums)*. Donostia: Lur Ed. (vol.III), pp. 21-70. “Bases teóricas de la guerra revolucionaria” can be found in: HÓRDAGO (Ed.), 1979, *Documentos Y (18 volums)*. Donostia: Lur Ed. (vol.IV), pp. 514-518.

*mutil*<sup>652</sup> of ETA were suggesting that the Basque cause could take a route that was different from the ones developed until then by traditional Basque nationalism—and they advocated direct action as a means to achieve their objectives.

The document is markedly influenced by *Vasconia*, Krutwig's previous work, but its analysis moves beyond and presents the revolutionary war as a fair war, arguing that it is a “*war of national and social liberation*” that struggles against the unfair war that is the counter-revolutionary war of conquest and oppression practiced by oppressive States or empires, in clear reference to Spain and the Basque situation.<sup>653</sup>

This stage is situated chronologically by Pedro Ibarra between 1963 and 1965<sup>654</sup> although, as we will see, we can extend it up until 1970 when considering the nature of the influences received in the forming of their ideology. In the defense of armed struggle, ETA insists on basing it on the principles of revolutionary war, mainly because, as they say, revolutionary war was not only military but also ideological.

The ETA *mutil* are fully aware that *classical war*, the war between States and armies, is not possible in their case, thus they opt directly for guerrilla warfare as part of the strategy of revolutionary war, which involves a highly ideological content that substitutes for the lack of armed troops.

ETA elaborated a large ideological corpus for its defense—being very aware that that was precisely what was missing in the Spanish army or the armed forces—and based it on individuals following this ideology for a fight in which they could gain ground. The work emphasizes the inferiority of soldiers or policemen, precisely because “*it is poor people who may have no interest in letting themselves killed like a rabbit,*”<sup>655</sup> something that ETA will try out later when, in carrying out armed actions against members of the army and border police officers, these struggle to save a confrontation, as a captain of the Guardia Civil stated a few years later to Antoni Batista. The captain's arguments agree precisely with what we have been telling: ETA fought for an ideal, whereas they fought for a wage; their ability for sacrifice is

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<sup>652</sup> *Mutil* is a Basque word meaning “boy,” and was used to refer to the members of ETA, denoting their youth. The popular Basque singer Mikel Laboa composed a song titled “Haika Mutil” (Rise, boy) that encouraged the young Basque boys to rise.

<sup>653</sup> “Guerra revolucionaria- Insurrección en Euskadi,” 1963, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>654</sup> IBARRA, Pedro. 1987. *La Evolución estratégica de ETA. (1963-1987)*. Donostia: Kriselu, p. 25.

<sup>655</sup> “Guerra Revolucionaria- Insurrección en Euskadi,” 1963, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

uneven. Precisely for this reason, Lieutenant Colonel Troncoso was patriotically calling for a updating of the Spanish army.<sup>656</sup>

The strategy of revolutionary war took its first victims very early, though. After the IV<sup>th</sup> assembly, Xabier Zumalde, better known as “*el cabra*” (the goat), led an autonomous group that, hiding in the Basque mountains, followed the ideas of revolutionary war and prepared themselves as a guerrilla, until in 1968 their activities were discovered and Zumalde had to flee into exile.<sup>657</sup>

The armed activities of ETA—including bank robberies, some bombs in official buildings, attacks on police vehicles, and several bombs on francoist monuments—together with mass activities—such as the celebration of the *Aberri Eguna* (day of the Basque homeland) and a sharp rise in workers’ struggles—created an atmosphere of tension,<sup>658</sup> not unlike the effect of the war of the colony against the metropolis, reproducing the anti-colonialism trend that had also been developed in ETA’s theories.

Although the armed struggle was but one among many fronts, the propaganda created by the armed and violent activities increased the feeling that the strategy was successful, and the criticism against the passivity of traditional Basque nationalism grew. In a declaration written by Txabi Etxebarriaeta and published in March 1968, coinciding with the *Aberri Eguna*, the organization left no doubt as to their intentions and their clear position of armed struggle:

*“Hemos visto que es el desarrollo armónico de los cuatro frentes lo que nos garantiza una línea revolucionaria vasca, que nos ponga a salvo de las posturas oportunistas d derecho e izquierda, así como de toda la oposición españolista o legalista. (...) Ya no basta con celebrar el Aberri Eguna o dar 20 duros al mes. Todos los abertzales debemos dar un paso adelante en nuestra colaboración con los que luchan por la liberación integral de Euskadi. Y si no es así, que no se autocalifiquen de abertzales; porque – digámoslo de una vez- hoy en día sólo es abertzale aquel que hace TODOS LOS DÍAS COSAS CONCRETAS (sic.) por la liberación nacional.”*<sup>659</sup>

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<sup>656</sup> BATISTA, Antoni. 2008. *Madariaga. De las armas a la palabra*. Barcelona: RBA, p. 110.

<sup>657</sup> SULLIVAN, John, 1988, “ETA and Basque nationalism. The fight for Euskadi. 1890-1986.” New York: Routledge, p. 68.

<sup>658</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>659</sup> “Manifiesto,” Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, March, 1968, in CASANOVA, Iker, 2007, *ETA 1958-2008. Medio siglo de historia*. Tafalla: Editorial Txalaparta, p. 94.

But the event that triggered the reaction of deploying the strategy of action-repression-action—and further defined it—was precisely the death of Txabi Etxebarrieta, ETA's first martyr. Etxebarrieta, who was a very well-known ETA member, especially after the V<sup>th</sup> Assembly,<sup>660</sup> shot and killed a Civil Guard, José Pardines, at a police control point on June 7<sup>th</sup>, 1968, causing the first mortal victim of ETA. After gaining refuge in Tolosa, Txabi Etxebarrieta and his partner, Iñaki Sarasketa, were intercepted again by the Guardia Civil, and Etxebarrieta was shot dead in front of *Benta Haundi's* bar, where still today there is a commemoration plaque. Sarasketa was able to escape, but was detained shortly after.<sup>661</sup>

When ETA emptied the whole magazine of bullets of a Czechoslovakian pistol into the head of the man responsible for the Brigada Político-Social in Gipuzkoa, the well-known torturer Melitón Manzanos, on August 2nd, 1968, they knew that they were dealing a blow to Franco, but could not imagine that the murder would only end up two years later with a summary process. The Process of Burgos, the name that was given to the military court that was to judge the 16 members of ETA accused of murdering Manzanos, would change the image of the regime.

ETA was striking back with their particular spiral of action-repression, and they announced that Melitón Manzanos was not going to be the last:

*“Como tantos otros peones del capitalismo español, Melitón Manzanos estaba condenado a muerte desde hace mucho tiempo. Pero no queremos que esta ejecución sea considerada como un hecho aislado, como una venganza privada de poca importancia. La ejecución del policía Manzanos es un importante paso en nuestra lucha revolucionaria y adquiere su verdadero valor el situarlo dentro de esta lucha. (...) Seguiremos Adelante mientras el pueblo nos ayude, nos apoye y quiera que sigamos; mientras nuestro pueblo siga comprendiendo que ser vasco y ser pueblo, hoy significa lucha. Lucha a muerte, como decíamos en el último Zutik! O ellos o nosotros. O patria o muerte. Nuestra lucha, la lucha del pueblo trabajador vasco, ya no puede*

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<sup>660</sup> If Txabi Etxebarrieta happened to be the first martyr of ETA, it was because, in spite of his youth, he was a recognized intellectual and ideologist, a political member, and a natural leader. More on Txabi Etxebarrieta in: LORENZO ESPINOSA, José María, 1994, *Txabi Etxebarrieta: Armado de palabra y obra*. Tafalla: Txalaparta.

<sup>661</sup> An account of the killing of Txabi Etxebarrieta was published by ETA, in: *Zutik*, num.49, July, 1968.

*detenerse hasta que Euskadi sea realmente libre, es decir, hasta que Euskadi sea independiente y socialista.*<sup>662</sup>

The immediate response to the murder was the establishment of a new state of emergency exclusively in Gipuzkoa, starting on August 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1968, initially for three months but finally extended until December. The state of emergency was accompanied by the suppression of articles 14, 15, and 18<sup>663</sup> of the *Fuero de los Españoles*, allowing the regime to detain dozens of people, torture them, and keep them detained, almost dismantling ETA and leaving it with very little capability.

### **c. A trial against the Basque people**

The reaction of the Basque people—and even of the Basque Church, which had already showed signs of disagreeing with the Franco regime in 1960 with the document signed by 339 Basque priests<sup>664</sup>—was also a sign of new days for the dictatorship. It was not only the Basque nationalists who were uncomfortable with the Franco Regime, but workers, regardless of where they came from, were also joining the demonstrations of social unrest and, finally, the Church, one of the regime's pillars, began also raising its voice against it. The regime was showing evidence of weakness, and its fierce reaction to control the dissidence, as it had been doing during almost 30 years of dictatorship, was giving the international community an image that would hinder its strategy of becoming accepted. The Basque nationalists believed that the document constituted one of the best presentations of the Basque problem ever made in Spain,

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<sup>662</sup> “Manifiesto de ETA. Melitón Manzanos ejecutado.” In HÓRDAGO (Ed.), 1978. Burgos: *Juicio a un pueblo*. Donostia: Lur Ed., p. 16.

<sup>663</sup> Article 14 refers to the right to fix one's residency anywhere within the Spanish territory; Article 15 establishes the inviolability of one's home; and Article 18 limits detentions without a trial to up to 72 hours. <http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/1945/199/A00358-00360.pdf> (consulted on March 10<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>664</sup> On May 30<sup>th</sup>, 1960, the Bishops of Vitoria, San Sebastian, Bilbao, and Pamplona, together with 339 priests, presented a writing denouncing the Franco Regime. The document denounced not only the situation of the Basque Church, something that could have been deemed acceptable by the regime, but also referred to society's lack of freedom, the repression suffered, the tortures, and the attacks on the Basque language and culture. A copy of that writing (translated into English) was sent to the President of the United States by reverend J. Arana, of the Incarnation Rectory in New York. In a letter that was attached to the document, the reverend tells of the attacks suffered by the priest who had signed the denouncing document, and asks the American President to sever relations with Spain, appealing to the fight against communists that the USA had been carrying out. The Basque priest compares communism with the Franco regime, using the same strategy many times employed by the Basque nationalists of the PNV in their attempt to equate totalitarianisms. NARA, General Records of Department of State, Bureau of European affairs. Office of Western European Affairs 1953-1962. RG 59, NND 959219. Box 7. An original copy of the letter can also be found in: AN, Irujo, 0098,03.

therefore Ajuriaguerra decided, from the inside, to print a special edition of 100,000 copies of the document.<sup>665</sup>

The detention of Sarasketa, and the immediate court-martial that resolved the imposition of the death penalty on the member of ETA, unchained yet another variant of the action-repression-action strategy: the protests against the repression. The Basque society was unwilling to accept the repression and vulnerability implied by the state of emergency. At every funeral commemoration in memory of Etxebarrieta, some of which were prohibited, there was a mass demonstration against Sarasketa's detention, with the consequent repression from the security forces. After weeks of mobilizations, protests, detentions, and social unrest, Sarasketa was finally pardoned by the Minister's cabinet, and his sentence commuted to 58 years of prison.<sup>666</sup>

The synergy established by ETA and the workers' movement broadened the impact of the Basque nationalists' vindications, but also the range of the repression.

Although the detentions carried out during the state of emergency almost managed to dismantle ETA, as we have mentioned, the extension of the repression meant the detention of dozens of people who had never been involved in politics before.

The regime was determined to give an exemplary response to the protests, and if the decrees or the court-martials were not enough, the decision about the substitute for Manzanos was a clear declaration of intentions. Antonio Juan Creix, a well-known torturer at the police station in Via Laietana, was called to replace Manzanos in the Basque country.

Vicente Cazcarra, responsible for the political committee of the *Partit Socialista d'Unificació Marxista* (PSUC) in Barcelona, who had been detained and tortured under the orders of Creix in 1961, described and defined the head of the *Brigada Regional de Investigación Social* in Barcelona with the following terms:

*“Tampoco podía imaginar que dirigiendo aquella operación, aquella macabra orgía de palos, aquel horroroso juego del ratón y el gato, iba a tener, más que a un hombre, a una hiena a un verdadero monstruo: alguien que odiaba ferozmente a la oposición democrática, uno de los torturadores más experimentados y temidos de esa época, y que actuaba con verdadera saña. Cuando acudía a las sesiones de tortura tenía los*

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<sup>665</sup> Manuel Irujo to Jesús Leizaola. Leigh-on-See, August 16<sup>th</sup>, 1960. EAH-AHE, Archivo gobierno Vasco, Fondo del Presidente Leizaola. Box 32/1.

<sup>666</sup> HÓRDAGO (Ed.), 1978, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

*ojos, ya de por sí saltones, casi fuera de las órbitas y anormalmente brillantes: era evidente y sabido que se drogaba para pegar. Se trataba de Antonio Creix, jefe entonces de la Brigada político-social de Barcelona que, según pude saber por la prensa, murió de un ataque al corazón muchos años después de torturarme a mí.”<sup>667</sup>*

The youth section of the PNV, in the journal published in Venezuela, *Gudari*, wrote a letter to the Commissioner in the same issue where the assassination of Melitón Manzanos was explained, decrying the consequent repression and describing it as “*razzias*.” Creix’s reputation had crossed borders, but the feeling that the repression on the Basque country had gone to cruel and brutal extremes began to be a growing feeling. The Basque Country felt it was being attacked and being made the objective of an even harder repression owing to the nationalists’ struggles. Creix was described by the youth of EGI as: “*El comisario Creix es el encargado de dar el acabado a la “solución final” del problema vasco. Para ello, con la colaboración de los gobernadores ha formado usted una organización fantasma: la O.A.E, que, como su nombre indica, es una organización anti Euzkadi. (...).*”<sup>668</sup>

The regime was showing the worst of its faces, and when it felt that one of its pillars was under attack—the army and the police—the reaction grew even more violent than could have been expected. The different consecutive states of emergency were destroying the “*Paz social*,” a motto developed by the Franco regime to give a good international impression, and its European campaign was brought to an end.

Not even the figures are exact, judging from the different sources consulted on the repression of the Franco Regime, although we can tell that it extended to Catalonia, Madrid, and some other “subversive” parts of Spain, and that it was particularly focused on the Basque Country, where the detainees and imprisoned were counted by the hundreds since 1968, with the situation worsening in 1969.

In *Euskadi eta Askatasuna*, published in 1994, we find a good summary of the repression’s figures. It is established that in 1968 there were 434 detainees, 189 imprisoned, 75 deported, and 38 exiled, while in 1969 the figures increased considerably: 1953 detainees, 352 exiled, 53

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<sup>667</sup> Vicente Carranza detailed his horrible ordeal in *La hora tercia*, published posthumously, and can be read in the work by Antoni Batista on Antonio Juan Creix: (2010) *La Carta. Historia de un comisario franquista*. Madrid: Debate, p. 140. In the book, Batista also points out that Carranza was not right about Creix’s use of drugs; it seems to be a rumor about his person that only gives an even more negative impression of the Commissioner. He didn’t need to be on drugs to beat, torture, and even kill a detainee.

<sup>668</sup> EGI, num.48, 1968, p. 1.



judged by a martial court, and 93 receiving sentences by the TOP. Bizkaia was the province with more detainees and more repressive actions taken, with over 900 detainees, followed by Gipuzkoa, with 589, Navarre, with 328, and Araba, with 101.<sup>669</sup>

*“La principal característica de la represión llevada a término durante esos meses fue la amplitud e indiscriminación, patrón de actuación que las fuerzas policiales de la dictadura ya no conseguirían abandonar en los años siguientes, pese a los intentos en sentido contrario. A lo largo de todo el año, y no solamente en Guipúzcoa, fueron numerosas las detenciones practicada: sin embargo, en un elevado número de casos la ausencia de pruebas impedía la posterior incriminación penal de los arrestados. De las 312 personas detenidas en Vizcaya durante 1968 por la Brigada regional de Investigación Social (...) tuvieron que ser liberadas “sin responsabilidad”. De las 204 restantes, 112 eran catalogadas como “separatistas,” lo que nos da también una indicación sobre el volumen que el nacionalismo vasco había tomado respecto al conjunto de la “subversión” en el País Vasco, o por lo menos de la preocupación que generaba en las instancias policiales.”<sup>670</sup>*

Basque nationalism was becoming a bigger problem than had initially been imagined, but the repression, since it was indiscriminate, extended the problem to the totality of the population of the Basque Country. What had been conceived by the Franco regime as a repression against “*el repugnante y sangriento separatismo vasco*,” as it was described by the Falangist journal *Libertad*,<sup>671</sup> had been turned, due to the sheer proportion of the repression, into an attack on the Basque Country as a whole.

The repression began to be seen as a repression against Basque society in general, and the use of torture and explicit violence during the detentions, complete with car chasings, gunshots in the streets, and even killings of people by accident,<sup>672</sup> created the opposite feeling in a

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<sup>669</sup> TXALAPARTA (Ed.), 1994, *Euskadi eta Askatasuna = Euskal Herria y la libertad*. Tafalla: Txalaparta, p. 123, Vol. 2.

<sup>670</sup> CASANELLAS, Pau, 2014, *Morir matando. El Franquismo ante la práctica armada. 1968-1977*. Madrid: Los Libros de la catarata, p. 38.

<sup>671</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>672</sup> In April, 1969, there was a spectacular detention and chase in Artecalle Street in Bilbao, where Mikel Etxebarrieta managed to get away, Victor Arana was seriously injured, and a taxi driver was shot dead by the police. In the town of Urabain, in Araba, Segundo Urteaga was killed by the police because they thought he was trying to help ETA members by ringing the church’s bells; and, in Irun, a young man called Roberto Pérez Jáuregi was killed by police shots while he was at a demonstration against the Burgos Trial on December, 1970. *Lehendakari* Leizaola sent a letter of condolence to his family, which can be consulted in: EHA-AHE, Fondo Archivo Histórico Gobierno Vasco, Fondo Especial Beyris, P-61/1-6. These are just some examples of the fatal

population who seemed fearless, and who began to answer with mobilizations, demonstrations, and new ways of protest that included hunger strikes and church occupations. The regime's strategy of broadcasting the conflict also generated the opposite reaction from the people, who, instead of seeing terrorists, saw neighbors and young people being killed for fighting against the dictatorship.

Making use of the privilege of the state of emergency to carry out detentions without substantial evidence, and to torture detainees at police stations for hours, as in the case of Andoni Arrizabalaga, who had been detained after the assassination of Melitón Manzanás in Ondarroa, generated a spiral of people's reactions. Arrizabalaga was tortured in several police stations, serving as target for a frustrated police. Telesforo Monzón wrote a song of protest, *Itziaren Semea* (Itziar's son), bringing out the police abuse committed against the detainee. Those were days of protest song groups, with *Ez dok Amairu* (There is no thirteen) as the best representative, and political songs against the dictatorship, like *Baga, Biga, Higa* or *Zenbat Gera?* (How many are we?), filling the streets.

If we look at *Alderdi*, the official bulletin of the PNV, most of the issues of the publication concentrated on the violence. The axis had veered towards the interior, where urgent problems were in need of a solution, and traditional Basque nationalism had to share its power with the new revolutionary nationalism.

Slowly, the idea that the repression was an attack on the Basque people as a whole began to be unanimous:

*“(...) Estos últimos meses, sobre todo desde la declaración del Estado de Excepción en Gipuzkoa, ha tomado esta represión tales proporciones que calificarla de brutal y sádica no es en modo alguno exageración. Sacerdotes, obreros, hombres de profesiones liberales, comerciantes e industriales, estudiantes, Iglesias y conventos, despachos de notarios y abogados, toda Gipuzkoa en sus diversos sectores y clases sociales han sufrido la bestial embestida de una policía que borracha de odio ha querido vengarse de la altivez y dignidad de nuestro Pueblo, tratando así de dominarlo por el terror.”<sup>673</sup>*

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victims of the Franco repression. More in: HÓRDAGO, 1978, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-24; SALABERRI, Kepa, 1971, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-102.

<sup>673</sup> “La persecución al pueblo vasco,” *Alderdi*, nos. 244-245, 1968.

Although the traditional Basque nationalism represented by the PNV had been against violence and the use of political violence by ETA, as we will see in the following chapters, the repression of the Franco regime exceeded the limits of the conservative party.

As the pages of *Alderdi* became filled with countless files and lists of prosecuted people, tortures, acts of repression, and lists of activities of resistance,<sup>674</sup> Basque nationalism tried to unite against the Franco Regime. The repression was firmly condemned, and the Basques made efforts to stay together, inspired by the Gabon message sent by the *Lehendakari* Leizaola on December 24<sup>th</sup>, 1968:

*“Esta presidencia ha subrayado en sus documentos de años anteriores y del actual que la unanimidad de los vascos en su acción por la libertad está integrada por la concurrencia de todas las ideologías defensoras de la libertad del hombre, y que su propia representación y del Gobierno de Euzkadi tienen por base la plural representación de todas ellas.”*<sup>675</sup>

The idea of a continuous violence being exercised against the Basque country since the Spanish Civil War was a recurrent one, and a fact that needed to be denounced before the international community. The international strategy of traditional Basque nationalism would focus on the defense of the Basques who had been tortured, the detainees, the victims of reprisal, treating them on some occasions as the new *gudaris*.

In an article written on January 17<sup>th</sup>, 1968,<sup>676</sup> Manuel Irujo details the extreme situation of violence that the Basque country is going through, caused by the regime’s battle against Basque nationalism, and, according to him, it is not necessary to create martyrs, but to solve the Basque problem.

In “Gudariak”—that is the name of the article—Irujo makes a reflection on the use of violence by young Basques. For the first time, he admits the situation and insinuates a slight criticism to the strategy followed by the PNV:

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<sup>674</sup> Since 1968 and until 1971, *Alderdi* and OPE tried to inform the Basques in the exile, but also those in the inside, making known the lists of those who had been detained, prosecuted, or tortured. There is extensive information on the OPE of 1968, especially from August 1969 and 1970. *Alderdi* presented a series of reports on the repression since nos. 246-247, at the beginning of 1969, and articles in the following numbers. In the first issue of 1970 (nos. 256-257), there is again a special report on repressive activities in 1969 entitled “La persecución contra el pueblo Vasco en 1969.”

<sup>675</sup> Gabon Message, December 24<sup>th</sup>, 1968. *Alderdi*, nos. 246-247, 1968.

<sup>676</sup> “Gudariak,” January 17<sup>th</sup>, 1968. IRUJO, Manuel, 1984, *Desde el partido nacionalista vasco*. Bilbao: Idatz Ekintza, pp. 480-481.

*“Los hombres y mujeres que vienen de Euskadi peninsular reconocen que hemos llegado a la situación actual, porque a un largo periodo de inmovilismo ha puesto fin la actitud dinámica de ETA. La juventud se ve atraída por quienes predicán y practican la “acción”. Y tras los jóvenes van intelectuales, hombres de profesiones liberales, obreros, estudiantes, sacerdotes, patriotas de todas las edades y condiciones.”*

Inspired on the experience in the exile, Irujo proposes the idea of creating an association of war veterans, one that could take care of the present-day Basque *gudaris*, in order to preserve Basque unity and the authority of the Basque government and the PNV. Irujo sees that a problem with violence is that it is making the young nationalists move away from them: *“Ir a la cárcel por sentirse un gudari es un honor. Matar un hombre puede ser un crimen. Permitir que se extienda el clima de violencia sería irresponsable. Tratar de controlar las manifestaciones y actividades patriotas valiéndose de un órgano popular, puede ser un acierto y una solución.”*

Manuel Irujo, who had been very critical about the use of violence, and refused violence of any kind, received the news about the repression in the Basque country while he was in America on the longest trip he would do in that continent during his exile, between February and December, 1969. In Venezuela, where the revolutionary nationalism of ETA had put down roots among the Basque community, Irujo made a heated speech in defense of the Basque patriots:

*“Hay muertos, hay heridos, hay torturados. A éstos, que lo dan todo por la patria, no se les pregunta su idea. No se les pregunta su filiación. No se les pregunta su filosofía política, con la cual estaremos o nos estaremos conformes. Son hombres, son vascos, son héroes. Pare ellos nuestro saludo ¡Agur Jaunak!”<sup>677</sup>*

The strategy followed by the defense attorneys at the Burgos trial had been adopted by the Basque population some months before. What the regime tried to present as an attack to the regime by terrorists became an examination of a terrorist regime that used torture and violence against its population.

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<sup>677</sup> “El discurso de Irujo en Caracas,” May – June, 1969. *Ibid.*, pp. 464-466.

#### d. Making up the trial

The strategy of the Franco regime consisted in judging ETA as “*organización clandestina ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna, patria vasca libre), de tipo separatista-terrorista-comunista,*” regardless of what the accused might have done. Membership in the organization was considered guilt enough, as shown clearly in the indictment presented by the prosecutor:

*“habiendo llevado a cabo por medio de sus grupos armados de existencia subrepticia en núcleos urbanos y Rurales multitud de reuniones ilegales, manifestaciones ilícitas, siembras de propaganda subversiva, pintadas, robos de armas y explosivos, atracos a mano armada – nueve en los últimos tres años -, asesinatos – en número de tres -, colocación y explosión de artefactos – en número de cuarenta y seis oficialmente registrados en los últimos años.”*<sup>678</sup>

The regime, although unable to admit its weakness, was showing signs of feebleness by resorting to that strategy, recognizing in that way, indirectly, that an armed organization was damaging the strict military regime. In fact, the first lines of the summary proceeding were a detailed list of the attacks received by the regime:

*“(...) con fines todo ello de trastocar el orden interior, la seguridad pública, la paz social, la unidad de la patria, el desprestigio del gobierno, instituciones, autoridades y la de efectuar represalias de carácter politicosocial.”* Once such an attack is recognized, it must have its subsequent repression: *“En tal acción, desplegada de forma muy acusada desde la primavera de 1968 hasta el mes de mayo de 1969, los procesados presentes en autos han tenido la siguiente participación individualizada para cada uno de ellos en su apartado correspondiente, sin perjuicio de completarse al relatar los hechos imputables a los demás procesados....”*

Thus, instead of a trial against the accused after the assassination of Melitón Manzanas, what we have is a summary proceeding against ETA in which the organization is accused of altering the “*paz social,*” attempting against the unity of Spain, and insulting the prestige of the government.

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<sup>678</sup> Indictment written by the prosecutor, “Sumarísimo nº31/69.” SALABERRI, Kepa, 1971, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

The incarceration of the 16 members of ETA accused at the Trial of Burgos began in November 1968 with the arrest of Aranzazu Arruti Odriozola in Iruña. The first to be detained—the first to be tortured, as a result of which she would lose the baby she was expecting.

After her came the rest: Eduardo Iriarte Romero, José María Dorronsoro Ceberio, Mario Onaindía Nachiondo, Joaquín Gorostidi Artola, Francisco Javier Izco de la Iglesia, Francisco Javier Larena Martínez, Jesús Abrisqueta Corta, Enrique Gesalaga Larreta, Juan Echave Garitacelaya, Victor Arana Bilbao, Gregorio López Irasuegui, Juana Dorronsoro Ceberio, Itziar Aizpurúa Egaña, José Antonio Carrera Aguirrebarrera, and Julián Calzada Ugalde.

The detentions were followed by a press campaign orchestrated by the regime, intended to involve the population against the members of ETA, with detailed broadcastings of the detention processes, spectacular arrests like that of José Mari Dorronsoro in December 1968, presented as one of ETA's men-in-charge, "*Detención de un jefe de la E.T.A. en San Sebastián,*"<sup>679</sup> or the arrest of Xabier Izco and Goio López Irasuegui, who were shot in a provisional prison when they were visiting and trying to free Aratnza Arruti. Izco got shot in a lung and required emergency surgery.

News of the treatment given to the detainees were spread quickly through thousands of leaflets, reports, and statements that multiplied their presence in the streets in 1969, and not only in streets of the Basque country, but also in the rest of Spain, and even in Europe. Clearly, the regime had underestimated the enemy and the reaction of the people.<sup>680</sup>

Besides, probably in an attempt to correct the unsuccessful strategy, the regime tried to take advantage of the fact that two of the accused, Julen Kalzada and Jon Echabe, were priests as an excuse to hold the trial on camera, resorting to clause XVI of the Concordat signed with the Vatican in 1953. The regime was using that clause to hold martial courts on camera, deliberately judging together both clerics and lay people, but in that particular case the hierarchy of the Spanish Church took part against the will of the regime and respected the will of the detainees. Both Kalzada and Echabe refused their "on camera" privilege and asked the Holy See to respect their decision in order to avoid damaging the rest of the accused. In May 1970, the Vatican announced through Monsignor Dadaglio, nuncio in Spain, that they had

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<sup>679</sup> La Vanguardia Española, December 13<sup>th</sup>, 1968.  
<http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/1970/12/29/pagina-10/34342891/pdf.html?search=Dorronsoro%201968>

<sup>680</sup> SALABERRI, Kepa, 1971, *op. cit.*, p. 92; "La actitud de los obispos Aryaga y Ciriarda," *Alderdi*, no. 260, Feb., 1971.

renounced to the privilege, and on November 21<sup>st</sup> the Bishops of Bilbao and Donostia demanded a public trial. Although the regime had the last word, and initially decided to maintain the on-camera privilege, in the end, before the firm position of the Basque clergy and the protests of the detainees' families, on November 25<sup>th</sup> it was announced that there would be a public hearing of the trial.<sup>681</sup>

The Burgos trial overflowed beyond the Basque mobilization and transferred the social unrest to the rest of Spain. Identification of the social movements (students, workers) with the trial, and rejection of the repression caused by the Franco regime, is total and results in strikes and demonstrations.

The demonstrations, the strikes, and, of course, the repression were reproduced greatly in the cities and industrial towns of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa—but also in Barcelona, where, on November 30<sup>th</sup>, some ninety companies called for a strike and thousands of people occupied the streets in a massive demonstration in the center of the Catalan city.<sup>682</sup>

“CONTRA EL CONSEJO DE GUERRA

POR LA LIBERTAD

*El lunes 30 de noviembre el régimen quiere realizar un consejo de guerra en el que se piden seis penas de muerte y 754 años de cárcel, contra patriotas y revolucionarios vascos.*

*La dictadura que surgió de una lucha contra el pueblo, que ha perdurado durante 31 años oprimiendo y explotando (sic), intenta impedir, mediante un nueve (sic.) asesinato, que el pueblo consiga la LIBERTAD.*

*Ha llegado el momento de decir ¡BASTA!, de llevar a cabo todo tipo de paros, manifestaciones, de realizar el lunes una HUELGA GENERAL, de llevar a cabo todas acciones para impedir que sean condenados.*

*Ha llegado el momento de decir ¡NO! A la dictadura, de unirse todas las fuerzas que estén en contra de la represión, de la opresión y que quieren la LIBERTAD.*

CONTRA EL CONSEJO DE GUERRA

BOICOT A LOS TRANSPORTES

LUNES: HUELGA GENERAL

A LAS 8 DE LA TARDE EN PLAZA CATALUÑA<sup>683</sup>

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<sup>681</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 102-110.

<sup>682</sup> GURRUCHAGA, Ander, 1985, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

<sup>683</sup> Leaflet distributed in Barcelona in November, 1970. Unknown author. CRAI. Biblioteca del Pavelló de la República. Universitat de Barcelona. FV.1970/1.

Workers, unions, students, and even Christians' associations protested against the trial and the repression, campaigning through assemblies, articles, and leaflets to mobilize the Catalan population, generating a solidarity movement that was not only a class movement, but a national one:

*“Com a ciutadans i com a cristians creiem que aquests fets demanen una resposta. A més del problema de es penes de mort i dels anys de presó demanats –i tot i que això és gravíssim- hi ha un problema de fons: el dret d’un poble, el basc, com el català, el gallec, el palestí o qualsevol d’altre en situació d’opressió, sigui de la mena que sigui, a una existència normal i lliure. (...) reaccioneu, al costat d’altres sectors del poble, contra tot allò que pugui representar mesures arbitràries, per demanar autèntica justícia (...),”* urged a Catalan Christian movement by the end of November, demanding the suspension of the trial, the political and cultural normalization of the peoples inside the Spanish State, and a general amnesty.<sup>684</sup>

On December 12<sup>th</sup>, about 300 Catalan intellectuals (artists, singers, writers, actors, democratic activists, etc.) occupied the Montserrat Abbey in an act of protest against the Burgos trial, and in solidarity with the accused. During three days, the intellectuals debated on the political and social situation and presented a statement denouncing the court-martials, the lack of freedom, and the repression, as well as the manipulation of information on the part of the Spanish media. The conclusions of the declaration were mainly political:

*“1. Que quedi sense efecte qualsevol condemna que pugui ésser dictada pel tribunal de Burgos.*

*2. Que sigui promulgada una amnistia general de tots els presos per motius polítics i socials, els sancionats i dels exiliats.*

*3. Que sigui derogat el decret llei de bandidatge i terrorisme i abolides les jurisdiccions especials.*

*4. Que sigui abolida la pena de mort per qualsevol delicte.*

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<sup>684</sup> *Ibid.*



*5. Que sigui establert un estat autènticament popular que garanteixi l'exercici de les llibertats democràtiques i dels drets dels pobles i nacions que formen l'Estat espanyol, inclòs el dret d'autodeterminació.*

*Finalment, manifestem la nostra completa adhesió fraternal al poble basc i a les seves reivindicacions, que són les nostres.*”<sup>685</sup>

The people had turned the trial into a trial against the Franco regime. The strategy of the dictatorship of presenting the Basque ETA members as terrorists had not been successful, on the contrary, the spectacular arrests, the use of violence against the accused, the tortures, the killings, the consecutive states of emergency had caused a terrible unrest among the Spanish population.

By the end of the summer the sentences against the accused at the Burgos trial were made public:

6 death penalties, 754 years of prison and other sentences, as it was described in the leaflets distributed in Catalonia containing the detailed sentences of the accused.<sup>686</sup> Sentenced to death were Eduardo Uriarte Romero, Xabier Izco de la Iglesial, Mario Onaindia Nachiondo, Joaquín Gorostidi Artola, Francisco Javier Larena Martínez, and José María Dorronsororo Ceberio. Izco, Uriarte, and Gorostidi got 2 death sentences, and Arantza Arruti was finally absolved, although by the time the trial began she had been interned in a Madrid prison's psychiatric hospital ward.

As the growing rumors insisted that the trial would begin in November, the mobilizations, demonstrations, multiplication of leaflets, and proposals of strike did nothing but increase, crossing the borders to spread the protest against the Franco regime abroad.

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<sup>685</sup> COLOMINES, Joan, 2003, *Crònica de l'antifranquisme a Catalunya*. Barcelona: Angle Editorial, p. 150.

<sup>686</sup> *Sumarísimo Militar. VI Región. N° 31/69*. CRAI. Biblioteca del Pavelló de la República. Universitat de Barcelona. FV.1970/2.

## **e. The process against the Franco regime. The trial from the exile.**

### **i. International Reactions**

The assassination of Melitón Manzanas, the repression, the use of torture by the police, the states of emergency, the protests—in conclusion, the violence, spread the word of the Basque conflict abroad.

In a Europe that was lately becoming turbulent due to the youth revolution of what would come to be called “May 1968,” especially in France, the events in Spain were unacceptable. In fact, the youth generation as a feature of the social unrest was common to both Spain the rest of Europe, including the revolution in Paris in May 1968. The Europe of the 60’s was teeming with young citizens, as a product of the after-war demographic explosion; just in France they represented 16.1% of the total population. The distance between the young generation of the 60’s and the generation of their parents was bigger than in previous generations; freedom, culture, sex, music, drugs, and politics were features that made them too different.

The youth of the 60’s did not feel a necessity to understand the world, but to change it, and they found in Marx and the Marxists’ theories the source of inspiration that they needed. In the resigned words of the anti-communist Raymond Aron, Marxism had become *the secular religion of those days*.<sup>687</sup>

The new generation of the Post War Era was rebelling just when the longest period of peace ever known in Europe during the 20<sup>th</sup> century was taking place, but peace was not enough for them. The feeling that the political system had been built to exclude them from participation settled among the youth movement. The Parisian May or the Prague Spring of 1968 are two examples of disagreements with the political system. In Paris, the discontent of a middle and university-educated class was levelled against the system and order. But it was also the struggle against the system, and, here, the lack of political and social freedom that boosted the Prague Spring.<sup>688</sup>

News from Spain arrived mainly through newspapers like *Le Monde*, which explained the situation of conflict in the streets of Madrid, Barcelona, or the Basque Country, where students,

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<sup>687</sup> JUDT, Tony, 2006, *Postguerra. Una historia de Europa desde 1945*. Madrid: Taurus, pp.

<sup>688</sup> ARRIETA ALBERDI, Leyre, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

workers, and trade unionists were protesting against the Burgos process and the death sentences.

*“La police disperse un millier d'étudiants qui tenaient une réunion en faveur de l'amnistie,”* the French journal was fully following the events of November 4<sup>th</sup>, 1970, the day after a demonstration in favor of calling an amnesty, organized by clandestine trade unions in Madrid, had brought thousands of workers out into the streets of the capital city of Spain.<sup>689</sup>

On November 3<sup>rd</sup>, the amnesty day was celebrated in Spain, with demonstrations and protests in several places, especially in Barcelona and Catalonia, where riots broke out in the city center and work stoppages affected SEAT and other companies, especially in Terrassa, Catalonia.

The foreign press became one of the main sources of information about what was going on inside Spain, due to the censorship that the Spanish press was experiencing, and, apart from the hundreds of leaflets and clandestine publications that flourished those days, the Basque and Spanish exiles were also able to organize themselves and protest against the trial. The strategy followed by the PNV was to contact with correspondents, journalists, and media to defend the Basque cause and create a favorable opinion against the trial and the death sentences.

Ramon de la Sota, son of the Basque nationalist who collaborated with the CIA in South America, had been collaborating with the nationalist Basque party since 1969. His good knowledge of English, thanks to his academic background in the English capital, made him the most suitable person to work with the media in England:

*“También empecé a dedicar muchos esfuerzos a la prensa, tanto en Londres como en París, con reiteradas visitas a periodistas, para apoyar las diversas campañas del partido, Aberri Egunas, etc. Durante estas campañas visitaba a tres o cuatro periodistas al día durante varios días seguidos. Los días previos y posteriores al juicio*

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<sup>689</sup> [http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1970/11/04/la-police-disperse-un-millier-d-etudiants-qui-tenaient-une-reunion-en-faveur-de-l-amnistie\\_2658550\\_1819218.html?xtmc=burgos&xtr=23](http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1970/11/04/la-police-disperse-un-millier-d-etudiants-qui-tenaient-une-reunion-en-faveur-de-l-amnistie_2658550_1819218.html?xtmc=burgos&xtr=23) ; [http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1970/11/05/greves-et-manifestations-ont-marque-la-journee-nationale-pour-l-amnistie\\_2657993\\_1819218.html?xtmc=burgos&xtr=22](http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1970/11/05/greves-et-manifestations-ont-marque-la-journee-nationale-pour-l-amnistie_2657993_1819218.html?xtmc=burgos&xtr=22) *Le Monde* followed with interest the Burgos trial and sent its journalists to cover the news. Both before and after the process, the French newspaper was able to interview ETA members, make reports on Basque violence, and publish more than 50 articles and editorials on the Basque conflict. Among all the articles and interviews published in those days by the international media, the following can be highlighted: *Politique Hebdo*, a left-wing French journal, also showed interest in the process and ETA, and published an interview with ETA members in January 1971, *“Après Burgos l'ETA nous parle,”*; *Le monde Diplomatique* left the reports on the Basque country in the hands of the biographer (he would write a biography of Charles De Gaulle) and well-known anti-colonialist journalist Jean La Couture, who wrote the article *“Des deux Côtes de la frontière”*, where he interviews Julen Madariaga; *L'Express* dedicated to the Trial some articles written by Edouard Bailby, including *“Décembre 1970 : Le procès de Burgos”*.

*de Burgos del 3 de diciembre de 1970 este trabajo fue particularmente intenso. En Londres hablé con cada periodista que cubría la península, con cada periódico y en cada agencia de noticias. El objetivo era evitar la condena a muerte y los fusilamientos de los seis miembros de ETA y obtener su indulto.”*<sup>690</sup>

Basque nationalism was drawing the attention of the international media by showing its worst face—political violence—but Franco’s violence had also caught the eye of the international opinion, which was reluctant to accept the death penalty and the brutal repression of the Spanish regime.

On October 19<sup>th</sup>, more than 100 people concentrated in front of the Spanish embassy in London to protest against the trial and the infringement of human rights in Spain. The protesters were mainly Catalan, Basque, and Galician exiles, who had received support from the English trade unionist Mr. Jack Jones and from Sir Harry Nicholas, Secretary General of the Labor Party.<sup>691</sup>

The clandestine leaflets that were being distributed in Spain also informed about the spreading of the protests and the international reactions to the Burgos trial. A sensation that the world was putting the Franco regime up against the ropes was evident in the reports:

*“En el mundo y especialmente en Europa se inician acciones relacionadas con el Consejo de Guerra. El día 7 la Confederación internacional del trabajo (CMT), envía dos cartas, una a la comisión internacional de juristas y otra a la Comisión internacional de los Derechos humanos de las N.U. a fin de que intervengan acerca del Gobierno español, de las cuales transcribimos los siguientes párrafos:*

*“Hemos de tener en cuenta que uno de los hechos fundamentales por el cual tienen tanto interés los Tribunales Militares en mantener el procedimiento a puerta cerrada, es el de impedir que sean presentadas pruebas, o se hagan declaraciones sobre las torturas aplicadas a los detenidos en el período de la detención hasta que son puestos en manos del juzgado correspondiente, torturas que tienen un doble sentido: conseguir la confesión del torturado y la revelación de otros nombres por una parte y hacer que se produzca un estado de terror por otro.”*<sup>692</sup>

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<sup>690</sup> DE LA SOTA, Ramon, 2016, *Euskadi. Siete años. 1969-1976*. Unpublished.

<sup>691</sup> Manifestación de protesta en Londres con motivo del próximo consejo de Guerra de Burgos. In *OPE*, October 20th, 1970.

<sup>692</sup> *Hoja Informativa. Consejo de Guerra de Burgos. Proceso al régimen*. Unknown author. CRAI. Biblioteca del Pavelló de la República. Universitat de Barcelona FV.1970/2

During November of 1970, several demonstrations were held in European cities: on November 3<sup>rd</sup>, a demonstration takes place in Perpignan with more than 10.000 attendees, and another one in Paris on November 10<sup>th</sup>. On November 16<sup>th</sup>, there is a 5-minute national work stoppage in France in solidarity with the Burgos' accused, organized by all the workers' unions.

There are more demonstrations and acts against the process, especially during November and December, in other European cities like Rome, Bern, Basel, Milan, Stockholm, Copenhagen, London, Berlin, etc.

In Münster (Germany), an "ETA's friends committee" is established, and in America there are mobilizations against the Burgos Process in places like New York, Caracas, or Buenos Aires.<sup>693</sup>

## ii. Coping with tortures and detainees. The Basque nationalists' strategy.

The use of violence and tortures against the Basque detainees, and the infringement of the Human Rights, were wielded as part of the strategy followed by the Basque nationalists and the Basque government to fight the repression under which the Basque people was suffering inside the Franco Regime.

In the previous case of Arrizabalaga, the Basque Government had used the strategy of human rights to ask for clemency and help from international bodies such as the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*, who received a letter of gratitude from Manuel Irujo on November 7<sup>th</sup>, 1969, recognizing their help<sup>694</sup> in the commutation of the sentence.

Tortures and Basque prisoners were an issue for the Basque government since the beginning of the 60's, as we have already mentioned. Not only the pages of *Alderdi* were full of news about the increasing number of detentions and imprisonments; the management of that new situation was also keeping the Basque government very busy.

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<sup>693</sup> TXALAPARTA. (Ed.), 1994, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.

<sup>694</sup> Manuel Irujo to Mr. Danie Mayer, President of the Ligue des Droites de l'Homme. Paris, November 7th, 1969. Euskomedia, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 12, File M-N  
<http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/9650.pdf> (consulted on March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

In 1961, the presence of ETA supporters in Venezuela became clear, and it was one more subject of discussion among the Basque community in the South American country, as Lucio de Aretxabaleta<sup>695</sup> detailed to *Lehendakari* Leizaola in their correspondence in 1961:

*“Dejando aparte ya lo de ETA, arreglado satisfactoriamente, debo significar que estos incidentes han dado ocasión para que afiancemos aquí más la unión de los tipos que “están con el Gobierno,” cuyo afianzamiento espero traiga resultados satisfactorios para las recaudaciones mensuales(...).”*<sup>696</sup>

What Aretxabaleta was referring to was the growing conflicts with ETA supporters in Venezuela, and the management of the donations which allowed the Basque Government to develop its activities, the Venezuela community being one of its main contributors. In the weeks previous to that letter, the Basque center in Caracas had been discussing the management of the funds, and some of the opinions that were expressed suggested that the Basque government should not have to handle all the money—in other words, a total distrust and lack of legitimacy for Basque institutions. The growing number of prisoners created new necessities and new expenses, that would accentuate the differences between the two nationalisms represented by the Basque Government and the new forces of ETA.

Although ETA had defended and shown respect for the Basque Government since its foundation, their strategies were different from the very beginning, as related by Aretxabaleta:

*“(...) pretenden que el dinero se envíe a un Comité formado en Euzkadi Continental por E.G., ETA y el Frente. Discutí con los de ETA haciéndoles ver que eso no lo aceptaban los representantes de aquí de E.G. del interior, de E.G. de Caracas, del PNV, STV y ANV, ni yo mismo como Delegado.”*

It was clear that the PNV and the Basque Government had lost control of the mainland Basque Country, and ETA wanted to manage the funds on the same level as the Basque Government did. The conclusions were fatal regarding the unity of the Basques and, especially, for the Delegate Council:

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<sup>695</sup> Lucio Aretxabaleta had been President of the Euzko Gaztedi in Bilbao and fled into exile in 1941. Established in Venezuela, he preside the Basque Center in Caracas and the CEVA, and was Delegate of the Basque Government in Venezuela. He and his wife died in the Caracas earthquake of July 29<sup>th</sup>, 1967. Fernando Carranza was appointed his successor as Delegate.

<sup>696</sup> Letter from Lucio de Aretxabaleta to *Lehendakari* Leizaola. Caracas, November 9<sup>th</sup>, 1961. EAH-AHE, Archivo gobierno Vasco, Fondo del Presidente Leizaola. Box 32/5.

*“De la reunión con ellos, saqué la consecuencia de que ETA actúa con instrucciones del Interior. Que quiere aprovechar la circunstancia de la recaudación de fondos para crear en el interior un Organismo al margen del Consejo Delegado, o presionar para que se les de ingerencia (sic.) en ese Consejo con su propia personalidad.”*<sup>697</sup>

Despite the disagreements with ETA members, the Basque Government continued supporting the Basque prisoners, following the strategy of diplomacy and of involving the international bodies, as they had been doing throughout the exile. The Basque cause was being recognized because of the violence, which did not form part of the Basque traditionalists’ strategy, and yet from the very first moment the government and the PNV had supported the prisoners, the *gudaris*.

When ETA boycotted a train full of Falangists while they were on their way to celebrate the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Coup d’état, the repression after the attack had sent some of ETA’s members to jail. Julen Madariaga, one of ETA’s founders, was arrested and, according to a confidential report written by the American consulate in Bilbao:

*“was picked up by police agents and taken to a local police station where he was severely beaten resulting in three broken ribs. A few days later he was taken to Madrid where it is understood he has been charged with direct implication in an attempt to derail a train near San Sebastian on July 18, 1961.”*<sup>698</sup>

Eyes were set on the Basque revolutionary nationalists, although, at first, even the Basque nationalists in the inside did not believe that ETA could have organized such an attempt. Ángel Zarraga, one of the Basque nationalists who provided information to the American Consulate in Bilbao, stated to the American Consul that the Basque nationalists—Julen Madariaga and the group of 20 young Basque nationalists recently arrested—had had nothing to do with the attempted derailment of the train.<sup>699</sup> Almost nobody could believe, or did not want to believe, that the young Basques were capable of acting that way.

Manuel Irujo, from London, was very critical about the derailment, but he indicated the strategy to follow in September 1961 in a letter to Solaun and Landáburu:

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<sup>697</sup> Letter from Lucio de Aretxabaleta to *Lehendakari* Leizaola. Caracas, October 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1961. *Ibid.*

<sup>698</sup> *Confidential Report no.17*. Bilbao, August 28<sup>th</sup>, 1961. NARA General Records of Department of State. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. Bureau of European affairs. 1953-1962. NND959219 RG59 Box.7

<sup>699</sup> *Ibid.*

*“¿Te has dirigido a la Comisión de Derechos del Hombre de las N.U.? ¿O lo ha hecho en su caso la Liga? Porque, eso sí que me parecería bien, por el hecho en sí y por la propaganda que con ello (...) podría hacerse por el Gobierno y contra Franco.”*

Despite the recourse to violence by the revolutionary Basque nationalists, the fact was that some of them were in jail and had been tortured, and the Basques in exile had to start managing the situation.

Aretxabaleta and some other Basques visited the Cardinal to acquaint him with the situation of the Basque prisoners in Spain, asking for humanitarian aid, and the Basque delegation in Biarritz activated the diplomacy with the Anglo-Saxon countries.

Although the strategy followed did not please everyone—especially not Manuel Irujo—the Basque government started a series of contacts from its delegations, mainly from Biarritz, as Jesús Solaun explains to the *Lehendakari* in November 1961:

*“Se han orientado estas gestiones (las del gobierno) a obtener el apoyo de los dos países anglo-sajones, de sus instituciones y su opinión pública, así como sobre las instituciones religiosas de los países europeos, de Roma y del interior. Esperamos que la reanudación de las sesiones del Parlamento inglés dará ocasión a que la intervención británica en este asunto se deje sentir más. Toda la publicidad que se lleva por el Gobierno de Euzkadi está directamente influida por el deseo de dar a estos medios la posibilidad de pesar eficazmente, logrando que se eviten condenas irreparables.”<sup>700</sup>*

The strategy followed by the Basque government put the stress on diplomacy as the way to force a public and political opinion against torture and the death penalty, mainly appealing to the defense of human rights. The defense of the Basque detainees, and the control of their safety, became one of the main causes for the Basque Government in exile: unable to control the inside, the least it could do was to act in favor of the Basque people suffering under the Franco repression.

Nevertheless, the diplomacy developed by the Basque Government also focused on the Basque political cause, as Solaun stated, quoting from the document sent to the Basque delegations

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<sup>700</sup> Letter from Jesús Solaun to *Lehendakari* Leizaola. 1961 Undated. EAH-AHE, Archivo gobierno Vasco, Fondo del Presidente Leizaola. Box 33/14.



explaining the Basque strategy: “*Para el futuro político también parece que esta actitud sea en definitiva la más útil en servicio de Euskadi y de su libertad.*”

On the question of the tortures of the detainees, the Basque government used its diplomacy with states and international bodies in combination with a mediation through ecclesiastical institutions, unions, and humanitarian organizations, mainly related to the Christian Democracy movement that the PNV was involved in, in order to intercede in favor of the prisoners. The contacts of the PNV connected with the Christian movement, especially those in Rome, thanks to the Basque delegate in Italy, Ángel Ojanguren, made it possible to spread word of the Basque cause and of the suffering of the Basques under the Franco dictatorship.

The situation in the exile and the treatment and torture of the Basque prisoners was an awkward question for traditional Basque nationalists. The difficult leadership of Leizaola had been questioned from the inside by the young Basque revolutionaries and, in the 60’s, also from the exile. The long path of the exile was opening scars in the unity of the traditional Basque nationalists, as well as around the leading figure of the *Lehendakari*. Managing such a situation was no easy task, and the loss of hegemony of the Basque nationalists’ world was revealing the difference of opinions among the old guard.

In 1961, the young detainees on trial because of their involvement in the derailment of a train in July were facing court-martials and prison sentences of 25, 15, and 12 years, something rarely seen until then, although the verdict could still worsen the sentences and turn them into death penalties.

According to the information given by Solaun, from Beirys, “*Albisu y Laspiur, 25 años de condena, Urrestarazu y Larramendi, 15 años, Balerdi, Arrieta y Ferrán 12 años y un día.*”<sup>701</sup>

The PNV and the Basque government offered their support to the ETA members and prepared a report detailing the conditions of the detainees to see what they could do.

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<sup>701</sup> The full list of the detainees after the police raid is the following: Rafael Albisu, Imanol Laspiur, Iñaki Larramendi, Evaristo Urrestarazu, Iñaki Balerdi, Eduardo Ferrán, Julen adariaga, Andoni Iriondo, Angel Aranzabal, José Urbieto, José Antonio Eizaguirre, Eustakio Narbaiza, Serafín Basauri, Javier Aguirre, Agustín Olaskoaga, Robén López de la Calle, Javier Elosegi, José Mari Quesada, Ildfonso Iriarte, Sabin Uribe, Guillermo Mariñelarena, José Ramón Luzarraga, Patxi Amezaga, José Muñoa, Santiago Iturrioz, Juan José Etxabe, and José Antonio Lizarribar. Thanks to the license plate on the motorbike that was used for burning some flags on the same day as the attack on the train, the police were able to track all the names and successfully carry out an operation against the ETA members, getting close to dismantling the organization. David López Dorransoro, Paco Iturrioz, and Eneko Irigaray were able to escape and cross the border into exile, joining the fate of the traditional Basque nationalists.

In a letter in which Irujo expresses his disagreement with some of the procedures taken to help the detainees, the Navarrese explains how the Basque Government (or the PNV, for, as usual, he is not very clear about this) had asked for help from the International Law Commission, based in Genève, and as an answer, through the English group, was requested to send a detailed report on the tortures undergone by the detainees.<sup>702</sup>

The letter goes on to say that Juan Jauriaguerra was their man in the inside, and he delivered a detailed list of the detainees and the tortures inflicted by the police in order to make them known to the public, but Leizaola was displeased with the idea of the International Law Commission of giving publicity to the tortures, and so finally decided to send the documents to the Secretary of State of the Vatican.

In the correspondence exchanged between Solaun and Irujo we can see the difficulties that the traditional Basque nationalists had in managing a new situation that involved tortures and, in some cases, the death penalty—but what they mostly disagreed on was the methods. Although Irujo had always been a very cautious man, maybe on being forced to face an extreme situation involving tortures, and fearing for the detainees' fate, he arrived at the conclusion that giving it publicity, as the International Law Commission suggested, was the best solution. Leizaola and Solaun, for their part, believed that making the tortures public would only serve to worsen the sentences.

The use of torture and the protection of human rights were again questions included in the strategy employed by traditional Basque nationalism in the case of the Burgos detainees.

In 1968, knowing that the year had been declared official year of Human Rights, the Basque Government appealed directly to the UN through their Basque Delegate in New York, Pedro Beitia, in order to denounce the violation of human rights and the use of torture in Spain. On July 14<sup>th</sup>, the Basque delegate presented a memorandum condemning the situation in police stations in the Basque country, especially with the successive impositions of states of emergency, during which torture was commonly used and detainees were deprived of freedom without any evidence for more than 72 hours. The strategy was unsuccessful, though.

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<sup>702</sup> Manuel Irujo to Jesús Solaun. October 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1961. EAH-AHE, Archivo gobierno Vasco, Fondo del Presidente Leizaola. Box 33/14.

Manuel Irujo had written an article in *Alderdi* recalling the International Year of Human Rights,<sup>703</sup> detailing the infringements of human rights perpetrated in Spain, which ranged from the lack of freedom of speech, freedom of labor association, and freedom of election, among others, to the use of torture and repression on the part of the security forces. For traditional Basque nationalists, the international bodies were key agents in solving the Basque cause, since spreading the voice of the Basques among such influential organizations had been the strategy followed by the PNV and the Basque Government throughout the exile. But nothing seemed to work in eliciting a positive actuation from the UN, the efforts of the Basque delegate were fruitless. Since Euskadi was not a State, it was not recognized as a legal body by the UN, and the treatment of the Basques' human rights could not be considered separately from the Spanish.<sup>704</sup>

Results were similar for the Basque Delegate in the USA in his contacts and demands addressed to the Department of State. Although in October he had obtained the support of the United Automobile Workers (UAW), through the person in charge of International Relations, Victor G. Reuther, and roused the interest of the World Confederation of Labor (the Christian Union that had replaced the CISC), still the American Government had remained distant.

The propaganda strategy against the death penalty and tortures, designed by Beitia, was working: The New York Times, the Washington Post, and International Amnesty started an information campaign on the Burgos process, stressing the manipulation that the Franco Regime was using to hold the trial *on camera*, the situation of the detainees, and the repression and infringement of human rights in the Basque country.

Nevertheless, the efforts made by the Basque delegation and some American politicians, including Don Samuelson (Governor of Idaho), Paul Laxalt (Governor of Nevada), Pete T. Cenarrusa (Secretary of State in Idaho), and Frank Church (Senator for the State of Idaho) to get the help and involvement of the Department of State ended in vague answers, according to a letter sent by Margaret J. Tibbets to Victor Reuther on December 5<sup>th</sup>, 1970:

*“Compartimos su preocupación por los derechos humanos y el Estado de derecho, y hemos cableado el texto de su carta a nuestro embajador en Madrid. Dado que el gobierno español ha iniciado el procedimiento bajo sus propias leyes, sería impropio*

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<sup>703</sup> “El año Internacional de los Derechos Humanos,” *Alderdi*, no. 242-243. 1968.

<sup>704</sup> TXALAPARTA (Ed.), 1994, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

*intervenir en un asunto doméstico de una nación soberana. En lo que se refiere al juicio a puerta cerrada de su carta, entendimos que los tribunales militares en España son generalmente abiertos, y que este juicio es abierto. En este caso dado que hay dos sacerdotes entre los encausados, una disposición del concordato con el Vaticano requeriría que el juicio fuera cerrado, pero el Vaticano aparentemente renuncia a este requisito.”<sup>705</sup>*

In the European field, Basque nationalism received a little more attention from European governments. The Basque government had spread the word among different chancelleries, warning them about the Franco Regime. In a message published in Alderdi, *Lehendakari* Leizaola explained:

*“La España franquista lleva varios años llamando a las puertas de Europa, sin que ni el Consejo de Europa ni el Mercado Común le abran las puertas, porque en política, como en matemáticas, no pueden sumarse números heterogéneos. Europa es asociación de países democráticos y la España franquista es una dictadura totalitaria.”<sup>706</sup>*

Even with the Process of Burgos out in the open, it was necessary for the Basque government to keep its European strategy, given the possibility that the Franco Regime might finally be admitted into the European institutions.

Their contacts with the European chancelleries were achieved mainly through their contacts with the Christian Democracy and the European Federal Movement, with particular stress on the petitions and answers made in Italy. Ángel Ojanguren, as we mentioned before, worked hard to publicize the Process of Burgos, as can be read in the article “*El proceso de Burgos en la prensa italiana*,” written by Joseba Rezola:

*“Por el diario <Il Popolo> hemos seguido nosotros estas intensas palpaciones de los órganos de difusión italianos a partir del 26 de Noviembre en el que se hablaba ya de la proximidad del Consejo de Guerra y de la interpelación dirigida al Gobierno por los diputados Fracanzini, Rognoni, Padula, Scotti, de Poli y Marchiotti de filiación demo-cristiana, reclamando, urgente intervención en favor de los acusados. Los*

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<sup>705</sup> MOTA, David, 2016, *op. cit.*, pp. 391-396; “El Gobernador del Estado de Idaho en favor de los vascos,” *Alderdi*, nos. 252-253, July- September, 1969.

<sup>706</sup> “Mensaje del Presidente del Gobierno de Euzkadi,” *Alderdi, ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

*diferentes grupos del Senado formularon una petición parecida, con la sola exclusión del Movimiento Social Italiano, que se explica por su carácter fascista.”*

The Italian Christian Union, the Christian Democrats’ youth movement, and the former Italian president, Mariano Rumor, who was also President of the Christian Democrat European Union, joined the Italian protest against the death penalty and tortures inflicted by the Franco Regime on the accused in Burgos.

When the sentences were made known, Mariano Rumor stated in a telegram to Franco: “*Al conocer gravísima sentencia Burgos, en particular las seis condenas capitales, en nombre de demócrata-cristianos del mundo entero le ruego considere con extrema atención la gravedad del hecho. Ruégale ejercite su alta responsabilidad para que las condenas sean modificadas.*”<sup>707</sup>

The contacts established by the Basque government and the letters sent to the Italian authorities may have worked. In September and October, 1969, when ETA members had been arrested and the possibility of a martial court was beginning to be more than a rumor, the Basque government wrote a series of letters to their European contacts. Mr. Amintore Fanfani, president of the Italian Senate and member of Italian Christian Democracy, received a letter in which he was asked for help to avoid the death penalty for the Burgos detainees, although “*Los activistas vascos en cuestión en modo alguno pertenece a nuestra disciplina.*” The Basque Government asked some European governments for help, in order to put pressure on the Franco Regime from the international sphere.

In a letter sent to Prieto Nenni, Italian socialist and Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1969, the petition for help was made in the name of the Basque government, calling to mind the heterogeneity that characterized it as a feature, with the inclusion of socialists, republicans, and Basque nationalists. Aware of the difficulties that the public support might entail for the Basque cause, *Lehendakari* Leizaola, made it clear that:

*“De los hechos y de las posibilidades de una ayuda por parte del Gobierno italiano ayuda evidentemente no pública, hemos dejado una relación en el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores*

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<sup>707</sup> “El proceso de Burgos en la Prensa Italiana,” *Alderdi*, no. 260, February, 1971.

*(Dirección de asuntos políticos) en la Farnesina. Adjunto incluyo una nota extractada de dicha relación.*”<sup>708</sup>

In the eyes of the Basque nationalists, those young patriots who were in trouble inside the Franco regime were fighting for the freedom of the Basque Country, so that, despite the use of violence, they received the support of the “old guard” of nationalists.

The Trial of Burgos became a fight for freedom and a process against a dictatorship that was using torture and repression against the Basque people:

*“Es obligado que mis últimas palabras sean dirigidas a todos cuantos en Euzkadi luchan por la libertad vasca. Cualquiera que sea su signo político, el que vive para su patria y que está dispuesto a morir por ella merece nuestro aplauso y hasta donde podamos dárselo nuestro apoyo. (...) La responsabilidad de la violencia, ni entonces ni ahora, fue nuestra. Ahora como entonces, el único responsable, es el régimen tiránico padecido que, además de oprimir, provoca, que no se satisface con mandar en jefe, sino que tiene necesidad de someter al país al tormento de la vida vivida bajo la violencia del terror impuesto como sistema de gobierno.*”<sup>709</sup>

### iii. Who are they?

On December 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1970 the trial in Burgos began against 16 accused and detainees, and against 16 others who had managed to escape and would be judged in absentia,<sup>710</sup> as is described in the 31/69 Summary, a document of more than 5000 pages that evoked great public interest.

It was claimed that Xabier Izko was the author of the assassination of Melitón Manzanos and Teo Uriarte, while Jokin Gorostodi, Xabier Larena, Unai Dorronsoro, and Mario Onaindia had acted as instigators. The six of them received death sentences, in a summary where the only thing needed by the court-martial was evidences, and such that, following the Military Code, the defense would only have had four hours to read the summary and prepare the defense.

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<sup>708</sup> Letter to Amintore Fanfani. Paris, September 20<sup>th</sup>, 1969; Letter to Pietro Nenni. Paris, October 14<sup>th</sup>, 1969, EHA-AHE, Fondo Archivo Histórico Gobierno Vasco, Fondo Especial Beyris, Box 54, P-93/2-3; P-94/2-3.

<sup>709</sup> “Mensaje del Presidente del Gobierno de Euzkadi,” *Alderdi*, nos. 252-253, July- September, 1969.

<sup>710</sup> The following were prosecuted in absentia: Pedro Aquizu, Juan José Echave, Juan Manuel Echevarria, Miguel Echeverria, José María Eskubi, María Asunción Goenaga, José Ángel Iturbe, Pablo Iztueta, Emilio López Adán, Julen Madariaga, and Francisco Montero Hormaechea.

Finally, probably due to the expectation generated by the trial, lawyers were given access to the summary by the beginning of November.

If the trial had mobilized a considerable part of the Spanish population, the mobilization of lawyers was no less spectacular: it was a trial against the Franco regime, and well-known anti-Francoist lawyers were part of the defense.

These are the details of the accused and the lawyers who defended them:

Name	Age	Place of Birth	Sentence	Lawyer
Josu Abrisketa Korta	21	Miravalles (Bizkaia)	80 years	Josep Solé Barberà
Bittor Arana Bilbao	27	Bilbao (Bizkaia)	76 years	Gregorio Peces-Barba
Itziar Aizpurua Egaña	27	Deba (Gipuzkoa)	15 years	Francisco Letamendía
Arantza Arruti Oriozola	24	Zarautz (Gipuzkoa)	Absolved	Jesús María Bagués
Jone Dorronsoro Zeberio	31	Ataun (Gipuzkoa)	54 years	Gurutze Galparsoro
Unai Dorronsoro Zeberio	29	Ataun (Gipuzkoa)	Death Penalty, 30 years	Pedro Ruiz Balerdi
Jon Etxabe Garitazelaia	37	Alzola, Elgoibar (Gipuzkoa)	70 years	Ramón Camiña
Enrique Gesalaga Larreta	27	Eibar (Bizkaia)	70 years	Juan Miguel Moreno
Jokin Gorostidi Artola	26	Tolosa (Gipuzkoa)	2 Death Penalties, 50 years	Juan María Bandrés
Xabier Izko de la Iglesia	29	Berango (Bizkaia)	2 Death Penalties, 75 years	José Antonio Etxebarrieta
Julen Kalzada Ugalde	35	Busturia (Bizkaia)	6 years	Pedro Ibarra Güell
Antton Karrera Aguirrebarrena	27	Amezketta (Gipuzkoa)	12 years	Artemio Zarco

Xabier Larena Martínez	25	Sestao (Bizkaia)	Death Penalty, 40 years	Ibon Navascués
Goio López Irasuegi	24	Bilbao (Bizkaia)	30 years	José Luis Castro
Mario Onaindia Natxiondo	29	Lekeitio (Bizkaia)	Death penalty, 60 years	Miguel Castells
Teo Uriarte Romero	25	Sevilla (Sevilla)	2 Death penalties, 90 years	Elías Ruiz Ceberio

Source: TXALAPARTA (Ed.), 1994, *op. cit.*, vol. 3. pp. 51-56.

The accused, especially those sentenced to death, were extremely young and became popular with society by the time the trial began, thanks to the mobilization campaigns and the working-class members. Their names, faces, and life details appeared in every leaflet, poster, foreign newspaper, television or radio broadcast.

*“El proceso de Burgos comenzó siendo el proceso seguido contra 16 militantes de ETA. El gobierno del general Franco lo ha convertido en el proceso del Pueblo vasco. Todos los vascos estamos implicados en él. Todos sentimos como propias las sentencias que se dictan,”* wrote Manuel Irujo in one of the many drafts he used to prepare for his articles.<sup>711</sup> Everyone was getting ready for the trial, and the feeling was that the process was absolutely unfair and exaggerated.

On a cold December morning, Burgos wakes up amid strong security measures: journalists, lawyers, relatives and supporters of the accused stand about in the surrounding area of the *“Gobierno Militar,”* talking, waiting, and lining up to attend the trial.

At nine, journalists and lawyers enter the Court, presided by Colonel Manuel Ordovás, Captain General in Madrid, accompanied by four vocals and two acting vocals. The public prosecutor for the Fiscal Ministry is Antonio Troncoso de Castro, acting also as speaker vocal, who will be seated with the rest of the Court-Martial in front of the 16 accused, handcuffed throughout the trial.

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<sup>711</sup> Drafts on the Burgos trial. December, 1970. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 36, File 2.



Meanwhile, in the Basque Country, students and workers are being mobilized at the universities and workplaces. Although the news in the official media of the regime would not let them know about the mobilizations, the success of the protests is shown by the increasing presence of police agents, members of the army, and even armored cars on the streets.

A document distributed from one of the workshops relates the efforts of mobilizing the people, even without knowledge about the extent of the success:

*“Para que los comercios cerrasen fueron las mujeres, etxekoandre del pueblo, las que incidieron mucho. (...) Es importante destacar que los panaderos se preocuparon de hablar los unos con los otros, para ponerse de acuerdo y cerrar todos juntos. Otro tanto hicieron los bares, que sin duda tuvieron cierta importancia para que la huelga no se relajase y siguiese su camino.”*

The mobilization rose strong and defiant on the first day of the trial, when the strikes and protests on the streets were general:

*“A las 8,30 de la mañana, la totalidad de los alumnos de la E.P.O. se manifiesta silenciosamente por las calles, interviniendo la Guardia Civil que termina por disolverla. Más tarde, sobre las 10, se reagrupan los estudiantes sumándose a éstos, grupos de trabajadores (algunos habían conseguido parar y otros no habían entrado a la fábrica), consiguiendo cerrar los tres únicos establecimientos que seguían abiertos (a uno de ellos, hubo que amenazarle con destrozar el establecimiento, por resistirse a cerrar).”<sup>712</sup>*

In Donostia, the downtown streets were filled with people, observed sternly by the police and army members, fully equipped with weapons, helmets, and shields—just in case they were needed. The workers’ stoppage had spread over the main industrial areas in Gipuzkoa, from Goierri’s factories, where the powerful train company CAF was located, to the coast shipping-centers and the cooperatives in Mondragon. Greater Bilbao along with its influential industrial area was taken by the police, who were watching the development of the protests closely.

Despite the strong surveillance, the police could not stop the general mobilization, especially in Gipuzkoa, where, in places like Tolosa or Urnieta, the protesters had built barricades to block

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<sup>712</sup> HÓRDAGO (Ed.), 1979, *op. cit.*, vol. 10, pp. 85-89.

the access of the police. The Basque country was paralyzed—but the regime’s media kept saying that a mere 15% of the workers supported the protests.<sup>713</sup>

On December 5<sup>th</sup>, The New York Times published these lines: “*Spain puts curbs on Basque area. State of emergency invoked in Province that is center of agitation over trial. The Government decreed a three-month state of emergency tonight (Dec.4<sup>th</sup>) in the Basque province of Guipuzcoa (Sic.), where a West German consul was abducted Tuesday.*”<sup>714</sup>

#### iv. Eugene Beihl Schaafer. The kidnapping of the German Honorary Consul

Apart from the mobilizations, protests, and worker’s stoppages organized throughout Spain and some European cities, there was another piece of news that concentrated the attention during the first day of the trial: the German Honorary Consul in Bilbao had been kidnapped.

On December 1<sup>st</sup>, at night, an ETA commando had taken Eugene Beihl Schaafer from his garage when he was driving back home.

That was the first kidnapping of ETA, although at first everything was quite confused, since a document released by the organization refused the authorship:

“*Euzkadi ta Askatasuna, ETA comunica:*

- *Que, como declararon los propios procesados en Burgos, ETA no tiene nada que ver con el rapto del cónsul alemán en San Sebastián.*
- *Que desconocemos quién o quienes pueden ser responsables del acto.*”<sup>715</sup>

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<sup>713</sup> HÓRDAGO (Ed.), 1978, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-53.

<sup>714</sup> “Spain Puts Curbs on a Basque area,” *The New York Times*, December 5<sup>th</sup>, 1970. Also in: <https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1970/12/05/355164802.html?action=click&contentCollection=Archives&module=LedeAsset&region=ArchiveBody&pgtype=article&pageNumber=1> (consulted on March 26<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>715</sup> “Comunicado de la dirección nacional de ETA.” HÓRDAGO (ed.), 1979, *op. cit.*, vol. 10, p. 117.

The day after, however, ETA held a press conference from Anai Artea<sup>716</sup> (the center for the Basque exiles in Donibane Lohitzune, presided by Telesforo Monzón), where they claimed responsibility in the kidnapping.

In the exile, although traditional Basque nationalism supported the accused in Burgos, the puzzlement began to surface.

In a letter to Victoria Kent, editor of the journal *Ibérica* of New York with whom Manuel Irujo collaborated, the Navarrese tries to calm the bewilderment of those who were following the events from the exile:

*“Actualmente la situación de Eta es la siguiente: en el último congreso celebrado en Agosto en Bayona, salieron de ETA dos grupos: el Marxista-Leninista, al que pertenecen los 16 procesados de Burgos, cuyo Jefe es Eskubi y cuyo domicilio es Bruselas, el nacionalista, cuyo jefe es Echabe y cuyo domicilio es San Juan de Luz; y el que venció en la contienda, quedándose con el aparato del Movimiento, pero sin los “activistas” – los procesados de Burgos- ni los “militares” – los que asaltan bancos, dan golpes de mano y han raptado al cónsul alemán de San Sebastián - .”<sup>717</sup>*

What Irujo had said was not entirely true, because during those days ETA was divided into three different groups, but it does show the interest from the exile and the confusion generated by the kidnapping and, afterwards, as we will get to see further on, by the development of the trial and the statements made by the accused.

The Basque government in exile tried to solve the kidnapping of the consul from the very start. Far from the intentions of ETA, traditional Basque nationalism and the Basque Government believed that the action would not benefit the Burgos accused, but the opposite. Not that they thought that the issue was devoid of interest for the accused, but they considered that the impact of the kidnapping would not be positive for the international relations and the international acceptance of the Basque cause. That is probably why *Lehendakari* Leizaola himself took the reins of the issue and tried to close the episode.

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<sup>716</sup> *Anai Artea*, meaning “between brothers,” was an organization to help the Basque Refugees, established in Donibane Lohitzune. In 1970 Telesforo Monzón was its President and the Abbot Pierre Larzabal its Secretary. More information on *Anai Artea* at: <http://anai-arte.com/-Nuestra-historia-.html> (consulted on March 26<sup>th</sup>, 2017)

<sup>717</sup> Manuel Irujo to Victoria Kent. Paris, December 11<sup>th</sup>, 1970. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 12, File H-I-J-K. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/7950.pdf> (consulted on March 26<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

Julián de Illarramendi, a Basque professor living in France, explained his surprise to Manuel Irujo some days after he received *Lehendakari*'s phone call:

*“Éste me llamó hace unos días un tanto apurado. Cuando me explicó la razón de su llamada, me quedé de una pieza. Lo primero que se me ocurrió fue mirar el calendario por si marcaba ya el 28 de Diciembre... Resulta, a estas Alturas, que yo soy la única persona capaz de salvar el cónsul alemán ... y debía ir a Bayona a convencer de ellos a los etarras.”*<sup>718</sup>

The press conference released from Anai Artea was the evidence that Telesforo Monzón and father Larrazabal were giving support, at least, to the ETA faction that had kidnapped the consul. The links between ETA and the PNV were clear, and sometimes showed straight. Monzón was not a member of the Basque nationalist party anymore, but historical links, almost family ones, and the exile, make contacts approach.

For his part, Manuel Irujo contacted Federico Krutwig,<sup>719</sup> in order to put pressure for the release of the consul. Krutwig, descended from a German family, and considered a member of ETA in 1970—*“Mi entrada en ETA fue tan sigilosa que ni el propio Txillardegi se enteró, quien, por lo demás creo que no tenía ningún interés en que yo entrase en ETA”*<sup>720</sup>—was one Basque who could intercede in the kidnapping.

In fact, when Krutwig received Irujo's letter he had already tried to do something to save the consul's life, which shows the clear division within ETA in three different fronts. The strategy followed this time by Basque nationalism (here it must be said that the radical Basque nationalism of ETA behaved much like the traditional Basque nationalism of the PNV) was to contact the German Chancellery to reach a pact. If the German Chancellor, Mr. Willy Brandt,<sup>721</sup> was willing to recognize the Basque cause, Krutwig would put pressure in order to free the Honorary Consul.

Krutwig, although having had had nothing to do with the kidnapping and having learnt about it through the press, used his condition as member of the Biltzar Ttipia of ETA, the highest authority in ETA's organization chart, to act as intermediary. From Mrs. Magali Von

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<sup>718</sup> Julián de Illarramendi to Manuel Irujo. Berferec, December 20<sup>th</sup>, 1970. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 13, File U-Z. <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/5424.pdf> (consulted on March 26<sup>th</sup>, 2017)

<sup>719</sup> Krutwig's work *Vasconia* is considered one of the main documents that helped build ETA's ideology before the V<sup>th</sup> assembly. We will see more on his ideology in the following chapters.

<sup>720</sup> KRUTWIG, Federico, 2014, *Años de peregrinación y lucha*. Tafalla: Txalaparta, p. 30.

<sup>721</sup> Herbert Ernst Karl Frahm, best known as Willy Brandt, served as Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1969 to 1974, when he died.

Brentano's home, they contacted the Chancellor and offered the liberation of Beihl in exchange for the recognition of the Basque cause. While they were waiting for the German government's answer, Krutwig, who was accompanied by the journalist Giulio Cataolfi acting as witness, wrote a telegram to Larzábal, who in turn would act as intermediary with ETA:

*“Von Brentano propuso que Canciller Brandt o Ministro Scheel hicieran gesto valor efectivo causa vasca incluso viaje Canciller a Donibane, en cambio vida cónsul. Mañana respuesta desde Bonn. Caso afirmativo propongo aceptar tratativas.”*<sup>722</sup>

Despite the efforts of Krutwig and Mrs. Von Bretano, the Chancellor did not accept the exchange, which was due, in Krutwig's opinion, to the political and economic relations between Germany and Franco: *“Por mi parte es evidente que lamentaría muchísimo que le sucediera algo a la vida del cónsul. Pero he de recalcar que al Gobierno alemán me parece que le interesan más la defensa de sus intereses materiales que la de un simple cónsul.”*

The division in ETA is clear, and in the view of Krutwig, a member of the “*ETA auténtica*,” those who are loyal to the V<sup>th</sup> Assembly have nothing left to do because, as he states, *“En ETA se había efectuado es división del poder entre quien lo “posee” y quien lo “ejerce,” con el fin de evitar estalinismos. Así pues, si bien es verdad que el Biltzar Ttipia es la autoridad suprema de ETA, el Biltzar Ttipia no ejerce la autoridad.”* In fact, what Kruwig did not want to recognize was that there were divisions within the organization.

Telesforo Monzón and Father Larzábal, on the other hand, had established contacts with the German Consul in Bordeaux, Christian Sell, who visited Anai Artea in order to find a solution. Anai Artea would become the base for the intermediation with ETA. International journalists received information and updates on the kidnapping through press conferences that were held there, spreading the Basque cause, as well as through Burgos and ETA.

Anai Artea became the headquarters of the mediation during the kidnapping, but also the center of the new Basque exiles. Telesforo Monzón, who had moved apart from traditional Basque nationalism, as we have already seen, had regained his hope in these young Basque nationalists. For Monzón, ETA was not only the rebel son of a father (PNV), but the renewal of Basque nationalism, connecting the *jeltzale* tradition with radical nationalism, becoming the new *Gudaris*, fighting for the Basque cause. To Monzón, the young Basque nationalists of ETA,

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<sup>722</sup> Telegram reproduced in a letter from Federico Krutwig to Manuel Irujo. Rome, December 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1970. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 13, Exp. HIJK.

those who had been forced to flee from the Basque continental country, were doing the same that their parents had done because of the fascists' attacks. The young Basques judged in Burgos and the bombing of Gernika were two sides of the same coin—the Basques from ETA were “Gudaris de hoy,” in Monzón's words.<sup>723</sup>

Not everybody in the exile was as enthusiastic as Monzón about ETA and the new actions with which they had internationalized the Basque cause, but almost everybody agreed on the impact that their actions were having. The trial of Burgos was a turning point for Basque nationalism and for Basque recognition; it was also a turning point for the Franco Regime, whose members were realizing how people were not prepared to put up with their injustices any longer.

ETA was not only offering a revolutionary nationalism, with an ideology that was far from the traditional Basque nationalism, but also new ways of fighting the dictatorship and answering back. The kidnapping was the first of these ways, one that would not be used as regularly as direct violence, although it still represented a new turn in the Basque fight that was attracting many Basque patriots.

While Beihl was held kidnapped in a small attic in Berorize, a town in Zuberoa, Iparralde, his family received several letters informing them about his health, and Monzón and Father Larzábal initiated conversations with the French authorities, who had deployed a huge army contingent and even members of the air force, scouring Iparralde in search of the Honorary Consul.

Although Monzón announced in a press conference that the Consul had been released “somewhere in Europe” on December 24<sup>th</sup>, in fact, Beihl had been driven to Germany in company of the German journalist Albert Gaum. The document presented by Anai Artea and delivered to the Consul General in Bordeaux, Christian Sell, left no doubt as to ETA's intentions with the kidnapping:

*“os pedimos que hagáis saber a vuestro Gobierno que ETA no exige absolutamente nada a cambio de su gesto. En este día de Navidad permítanos decirle que nuestros pensamientos se trasladan a Burgos, en donde dieciséis compatriotas vascos, juzgados en las condiciones que usted ya conoce, están en peligro de muerte.”<sup>724</sup>*

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<sup>723</sup> MARTÍNEZ RUEDA, Fernando, 2016, “Telesforo Monzón, del nacionalismo aranista a Herri Batasuna: Las claves de una evolución,” *Revista de estudios políticos*, 174, p. 289.

<sup>724</sup> TXALAPARTA (ed.), 1994, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 59.

Federico Krutwig, who had tried to help in the liberation, also believed that the action was important in terms of internationalizing the Basque cause. The kidnapping, carried out by Etxabe's group—those whom Irujo called “*Grupo ETA patriota de acción directa*”<sup>725</sup>—had generated great expectation and had involved international authorities, recognizing “de facto” the Basque cause. In the correspondence exchanged, we see that Irujo and Krutwig believed that the kidnapping had had its results, another instance to show that there were different ways of thinking about the methods.

For Krutwig, the kidnapping had had its positive face, especially in terms of internationalizing the Basque conflict. Krutwig was living in Italy, where he observed an increasing interest in the Basque fight from the Italian press and media, with much attention on the kidnapping but interests focusing mainly on the fate of the Burgos' accused; newspapers such as “*Il Messaggero*,” “*L'Unità*,” “*La Stampa*,” “*Il Giorno*,” or “*Il Corriere de la Sera*” lavished pages, articles, and even front pages to the Basque cause.

In his analysis, Krutwig left it clear that there was a difference between the revolutionary Basque nationalism and the traditional Basque nationalism, the latter being represented by the PNV and its defense of autonomy, and currently out-of-time with the aspirations of the young Basques. His words bear an implicit criticism against the strategy of pacts and of vindication of the Basque Statue of Autonomy followed by the PNV:

*“Pero aquí nadie (excepto los fascistas) han hablado de que los vascos luchan por una autonomía sino que todo el mundo ha hablado de la lucha del pueblo vasco por su independencia. (...) Es decir, que el propio periódico fascista (...) le reconocía al pueblo vasco, más de lo que de “facto” le reconoce el PSOE al pueblo vasco...,”* and then, adding to his analysis against the traditional Basque nationalists: “*Me parece que era evidente que había que representar al problema vasco diferentemente que lo que permiten las alianzas con el PSOE.*”<sup>726</sup>

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<sup>725</sup> Drafts on the Burgos trial. December, 1970. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 36, File 2.

<sup>726</sup> Letter from Krutwig to Irujo. Undated. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 13, Exp. HIJK.

In those days, the possibility of forming a National Front was once again on the field. The EBB had launched an initiative to create an alliance with these young patriots of ETA, and the debate was open.<sup>727</sup>

After the release, ETA made a public statement detailing the objective of the action and their political wills:

*“Hemos liberado al cónsul Beihl. Nuestro objetivo ha sido atraer la atención del mundo entero sobre la existencia de nuestro Pueblo y sobre la inquebrantable voluntad de lucha por su liberación integral: independencia nacional, reunificación del Sur y del Norte de Euskadi y la instauración de un moderno Estado Vasco, democrático, euskaldun y socialista.”*<sup>728</sup>

Slowly, the breach between the two Basque nationalisms grew wider. They recognized each other, and were even respectful with one other, but it was not only their ways of fighting that were different, but also the objectives each desired in relation to the Basque Country.<sup>729</sup>

*“Desde luego, ETA ha roto la vajilla; ha hecho hablar, velis nolis, a todos hasta hacer vivir el mundo a la hora vasca. Yo veo en ellos ciertas ventajas en nuestro país, en el sentido de que ha removido consciencias, nos ha hecho sacar el pecho con orgullo a los vascos y, tal vez ha prestigiado el movimiento nacionalista. Pero en cuanto al verdadero problema, el franquismo y sus secuelas posteriores, creo que hemos retrocedido muchos kilómetros. (...) El hecho es que, en mi opinión, en adelante habrá que dividir la historia del nacionalismo, y aún la del franquismo, en dos etapas: antes del juicio y después del juicio. (20/12/70).”*

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<sup>727</sup> We will see more on the National Front in the following sections.

<sup>728</sup> “Comunicado de ETA al Pueblo Vasco y a la opinión pública mundial,” ETA, Euskadi, December 24<sup>th</sup>, 1970. *Documentos Y*, Vol. XII, pp. 237-238.

<sup>729</sup> TXALAPARTA (ed.), 1994, *op. cit.*, vol.3, p. 60.



## v. Burgos & ETA's fronts

The Trial of Burgos was not a common trial and, coming from a dictatorship, it was not even fair—however much the regime took pains to pretend it was.

The lack of evidence on the part of the accusation, the use of torture and violence against the detainees, and the court-martial were nothing more than the result of a judicial system controlled by the dictatorship and regulated according to a concept of lack of freedoms.

Manuel Irujo, even from the exile, analyzed the trial and, as a good lawyer, compared it with the Trial of Leningrad in which Jews had been judged. It was clear that the pretended trial against the terrorist actions carried out by ETA members had been extended so as to judge the entire Basque people, and in particular Basque nationalism.

The development of the trial, starting on December 3<sup>rd</sup>, only made matters worse. The strategy followed by the defense was to present the trial as an unfair process, highlighting that the treatment that the accused had received, from the tortures already mentioned to the state in which they were forced to attend the court, handcuffed, and even bruised, was followed by a constant demonstration on the part of the lawyers that the trial was full of irregularities.

Aside from the issue of the tortures, the strategy consisted in defining the process as a political trial, which meant recognizing ETA as a political factor and the Basque struggle as a political fight. But although during the whole trial against the Trial the idea of a political fight had developed, it was the use of torture that had focused the attention and vindications of the defense and the supporters of the Basque people.

During the trial, the defense tried to dismantle the accusations of terrorism and violence through the interrogations it made, and presented the accused as political victims, victims of a regime that was working against the Basque people.

Especially focused on this thesis was the defense of Xabier Izko de la Iglesia, accused of being the murderer of Melitón Manzanás and defended by José Antonio Etxebarrieta.

José Antonio Etxebarrieta was a well-prepared lawyer, brother of the first victim suffered by ETA, Txabi Etxebarrieta, and one of the main ideologists of the Basque organization until the V<sup>th</sup> assembly. In the written memory of his defense of Izko, he developed the idea of a political trial being conducted against the Basque country, and against the political cause that was Basque nationalism:

*“Por encima del problema jurídico del sumarísimo que nos ocupa, está el problema político que testimonio. Y no se responda que el Consejo no está sino para resolver el problema jurídico, pues la forma de plantear y resolver el problema jurídico es ya parte del problema político.”*<sup>730</sup>

Etxebarrieta was delineating a political feature of the fight of revolutionary Basque nationalism, dressing up the actions carried out by ETA as the answer to a cruel and continued attack from the Franco regime on the Basque people.

The Process had been set up as a trial against 16 dangerous terrorists and had ignored all the law’s procedures—thus only showing the weakness of the dictatorship, especially once the international opinion set its eyes on it. According to Irujo’s analysis:

*“El proceso de Burgos tiene vicio de nulidad desde que el Tribunal impidió a los abogados el libre ejercicio de su cargo, negándoles el uso de la palabra e impidiendo la declaración de los testigos propuestos, entre los cuales se encontraban los obispos de Bilbao y San Sebastián. Los abogados quisieron abandonar la sala de audiencia. El Tribunal lo impidió. Pero en aquel momento, los procesados carecían de defensores. Y es perceptivo que ningún juicio pueda seguirse sin defensores. Todo lo que se actuó desde aquel momento hasta el final es nulo de derecho.”*<sup>731</sup>

It was clear that, in that case, the exile had provided more opportunities for receiving better information and news about the process than the inside. The Basque people, who were beginning to get used to being informed through foreign media, followed the development of the trial through *Radio Pirenaica*, the French press, and, wherever it was possible, by watching the French television’s broadcasts.

On days 5, 6, and 8, when the accused declared, there were moments of particular tension when, following the strategy planned by the defense, the ETA members detailed the tortures they had received and the actions developed by ETA, the latter being mainly related with cultural sessions, defense of the Basque language, and promotion of their political aspirations.

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<sup>730</sup> “Memoria escrita de J.A. Etxebarrieta Ortiz, abogado de Francisco Javier Izko de la Iglesia.” In HÓRDAGO (ed.), 1978, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-362.

<sup>731</sup> Drafts on the Burgos trial. December, 1970. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 36, File 2.

As we have already mentioned, despite the efforts made by the regime to censor, distort, and prohibit the development of the trial, the Basque people were able to follow the process through different means—some of them perfectly illegal, like the use of recorders inside the court.

The declarations made by the accused in relation to their political wills caused some surprise, especially those related to the Marxism-Leninism that they embraced, or their reference to the internationalism of the organization avoiding the use of the word “nationalist.” But the declaration that could potentially cause the most expectation, and even perplexity, was the statement made by Mario Onaindia near the end of his declaration on Wednesday 9<sup>th</sup>:

*“Miguel Castells (Defense Lawyer) : Vamos a ver, Mario Onaindía. No nos diga qué es ETA, en su opinión, pero díganos usted qué entiende concretamente por ETA. ¿Cuál es su ideología política?*

*-Mario Onaindía: Personalmente, no a nivel de organización?*

*- M.C.: Personalmente, no a nivel de organización.*

*- A.O.: Yo, personalmente soy marxista-leninista.*

*- M.C.: Mario Onaindia, ¿Usted se considera separatista?*

*- A.O.: ¡Eh! Soy internacionalista.*

*- M.C.: Usted es internacionalista, y, ¿Cómo ve usted su internacionalismo?*

*- A.O.: Pues que la lucha que lleva el pueblo vasco en contra del Estado español, favorece enormemente la lucha que lleva el pueblo español en contra del estado opresor y nuestra lucha, en ese caso, favorece la lucha... ”<sup>732</sup>*

At this point the declaration was interrupted, but if these definitions had upset the Court, and also the people’s opinion, the rest of the declaration caused outrage among the Francoist forces.

By the end of the interrogatory, Mario Onaindia was asked whether he considered himself a war prisoner. When he answered affirmatively, making reference to the Genève Convention, Onaindia took the opportunity to firmly and loudly defend the fight of the Basque people

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<sup>732</sup> TXALAPARTA (Ed.), 1994, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 60, pp. 307-308.

against the oppression it suffered, and concluded his statement by standing up and raising his arms, fists closed, shouting: “Gora Euskadi Askatuta!”

Public prosecutor Antonio Troncoso and the stand-in Julián Fernández García drew their swords in the midst of the uproar created in the courtroom as the 16 prosecuted raised their voices and sung “Eusko Gudariak.”

The episode was so outrageous to the Regime that *Radio Nacional* explained it on the evening of Wednesday 9<sup>th</sup> with a clearly biased account, but thanks to the recorder secretly introduced into the courtroom it was listened almost immediately by thousands of people. The recording with Mario Onaindia’s declaration, the moment of the disturbance, and the singing of Eusko Gudariak was distributed underground as a “single”, and it became a popular hit among the anti-Francoist movement.<sup>733</sup>

The rumors about the declarations of the Burgos’ prosecuted crossed the border and were debated in the exile. The statements referring to Marxism-Leninism, the refusal to speak of Basque nationalism, and the solidarity with the revolution in the rest of Spain set the alarm bells ringing.

Manuel Irujo, very worried about what he defined as “*un movimiento de juventud*,” was personally very upset with the “*radicalización por las persecuciones del General Franco y que aspira a obtener el reconocimiento de la personalidad nacional vasca por la violencia. Esta actitud inicial le ha llevado a aceptar como bases económicas principios socialistas, hallándose el movimiento dividido en todas las gamas del socialismo contemporáneo.*”<sup>734</sup>

If the violence had disturbed Irujo, the embrace of Marxist or socialist principles upset him very much—but the suspicion of a Spanish tendency inside ETA nearly sent him into shock.

These suspicions about such different tendencies were not unfounded. ETA, despite the popular support received thanks to the Burgos trial, was not in its best moments.

After the assassination of Melitón Manzanás, the organization believed that the strategy action-repression-action was working—but it was just a matter of time before the consecutive detentions affected the structure gravely. The popularity gained by the action against Manzanás made hundreds of Basque youths to approach ETA, strengthening the organization not only

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<sup>733</sup> The recording can be consulted at the CRAI Archive in Pavelló de la República: PCD Dis-8.

<sup>734</sup> Drafts on the Burgos trial. December, 1970. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 36, File 2.

politically but also strategically, and creating a false state of euphoria expressed in *Zutik* no. 50.<sup>735</sup>

In November, 1968, when Arantza Arruti was detained, a new spiral began, but in this case it was a spiral of detentions that left the organization in a very weak position. Due to the successive detentions, and the repression by the Spanish police, the Executive Committee organized after the V<sup>th</sup> assembly was affected in such a way that, from the original team, only Jose Mari Eskubi would be allowed to continue. The old leadership had been dismantled through a series of resignations and a few forced desertions, like those of Mikel Azurmendi, Txato Aguirre, Julen Madariaga, Federico Krutwig, and Juan José Etxabe, who fled into exile.

In order to reorganize and recover from the massive detentions, the members who remained free and inside were obsessed with organizing a new assembly, which would be the VI<sup>th</sup>, to lead the “Frente Interno,” ignoring the reservations that the new authority aroused in the military front and the exile.

The new inside authorities were mainly: Patxo Unzueta (Political Office), Peru Erroteta (Worker’s Front), Jon Fano, and José Vicente Idoyaga.<sup>736</sup>

According to the analysis made by José María Garmendia, the upsetting declarations of the prosecuted in Burgos cannot be understood without the work of Unzueta, the real ideologist of that period, and the one who redirected the nature of the fighting within ETA towards a “workerist” tendency. Garmendia noticed a change in the vocabulary used by ETA in its documents before the Burgos Trial, when concepts such as “*pueblo trabajador Vasco*” are replaced by “*Clase obrera*,” and the “*Carta a los Makos*,” written to the prisoners, would in the same way overturn the previous strategy to prioritize the worker’s front instead of the national front. The organization was trying to attract the activists of the labor movement, nearly all of whom were non-nationalists, or very close to the postulates of the PCE and MCE.<sup>737</sup> Slowly, ETA changed its activity of developing the revolution to attract the interest of the working class, forgetting Basque nationalism and erasing the national vindication from its demands.

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<sup>735</sup> CASANOVA, Iker, 2007, *ETA 1958-2008. Medio siglo de historia*. Tafalla: Editorial Txalaparta, pp. 99-100.

<sup>736</sup> ELORZA, Antonio (coord.), 2000, *La historia de ETA*. Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, p. 147.

<sup>737</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149; SULLIVAN, John, 1988, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-100.

On the other hand, the military front, led by Etxabe, and mainly based in Iparralde, was acting without control. Etxabe had been involved in some hunger strikes in Bayonne in protest against the repression of the French police against Basque refugees, and he was basically defined as a nationalist in favor of political violence. It was his group that was responsible for the German consul's kidnapping, apart from a few bank robberies.

The exile was puzzled at the declarations in Burgos, and at how different actions were being signed by ETA and at the same time being denied by ETA, such as the consul's kidnapping, among others. It was difficult to understand. In a letter exchange with Victoria Kent (already mentioned), Manuel Irujo tried to explain what ETA was, and what its divisions were, but he got it wrong, in that he just identified two groups:

*“En el último congreso celebrado en Agosto en Bayona, salieron dos grupos: El marxista-leninista, al que pertenecen los 16 procesados de Burgos, cuyo jefe es Eskubi y cuyo domicilio es Bruselas; el nacionalista, cuyo jefe es Echabe y cuyo domicilio es San Juan de Luz; y el que venció en la contienda, quedándose el aparato del Movimientos, pero sin los “activistas” – los procesados de Burgos – ni los “Militares” – Los que asaltan bancos y dan golpes de mano y han raptado al cónsul alemán de San Sebastián.”*

Irujo was obviously mixing up information and details—but he was not way off track.

Indeed, the VI<sup>th</sup> assembly, held in a hostel in Itxaso, Iparralde, on August 31<sup>st</sup> of 1970, was a turning point, although, as we have seen, the division was already a fact and the holding of the assembly was just a staging of the leading group of the inside.

The VI<sup>th</sup> assembly was the culmination of the crisis in ETA, and the manifestation of a division that, once again, as before, would end up with part of the members being expelled from the organization. The inside and the exile were divided, but in this case the opinions about the strategy to follow, and about the conflict and how to handle it, were not the main issue causing the division—this time, essentially, it was about Basque nationalism.

In the VI<sup>th</sup> assembly, while the inside executive led by Patxo Unzueta defended a document such as “*Proposiciones generales*,” where independence was being substituted with the right of self-determination, and the national references and strategies approved by the V<sup>th</sup> assembly were being ignored, the exile, for its part, was in fact divided into two different groups.

The group which had relevant members such as Krutwig, Edu Arregi, López Adán, and Etxabe, or founding members like Madariaga, was representative of the V<sup>th</sup> Assembly and the Biltzar

Ttipia, and although they did not have control over the military front of Etxabe, they defended political violence and, of course, the action-repression-action strategy.

On the other hand, there was a third group (the second in the exile), called “Células rojas,” which, as name suggests, was deeply influenced by Marxist theories; and it was on account of these that they refused Basque nationalism, defining it as bourgeois. They absolutely rejected the National Front idea and supported the idea that the executive committee of ETA in the inside had proposed of drifting towards a Workers revolutionary party. The exile had influence on them, May 68 was still in their minds, and their experience of living in Paris and Brussels made them reject their previous nationalism and increasingly embrace Marxism. Although Mikel Azurmendi was one of its prominent theorists, Eskubi was the main referent.<sup>738</sup>

The confusion was total, making it difficult to figure out the real situation about the groups and fronts in ETA. The news on the VI<sup>th</sup> assembly were no better than rumors, and the statements made by the prosecuted in Burgos had complicated matters even more.

Exile was not new for ETA’s members—they had been forced to flee from the Basque country almost since their very first actions—but at that time, in 1970, the situation was even more complicated due to the increasing number of exiled members and the multiplicity of different opinions and political tendencies (although they were basically Marxist, they encompassed a wide range of families), and also even personal disqualifications and confrontations.

The impact of the Burgos Trial and its success in terms of popularity and challenge to the Franco Dictatorship created a situation where the different groups of ETA tried to vindicate the prosecuted as part of their own group.

When Manuel Irujo asked Federico Krutwig about the possibility of a Spanish feature being observable in the Burgos detainees, especially after the declarations above mentioned, Krutwig, who was living in Italy, denied the infiltration of Spanish members of the PCE in ETA:

*“La gente que es condenada en Burgos pertenecen todos ellos (no creo que existe ninguno entre ellos perteneciente al grupo españolero de los expulsados, los unos porque los conozco personalmente y los otros por las declaraciones que han hecho), a la ETA del Biltzar Ttipia.”*<sup>739</sup>

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<sup>738</sup> CASANOVAS, Iker, 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-115; ELORZA, Antonio (coord.), 2000, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-153.

<sup>739</sup> Krutwig to Irujo, Rome, December 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1970. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 13, File HIJK.

Krutwig was defending the legitimacy of the Biltzar Ttipia, especially after the expulsion of their representative during the VI<sup>th</sup> Assembly.

The executive committee organizing the VI<sup>th</sup> Assembly invited eleven members of the “Células Rojas” group and four members of the Biltzar Ttipia. The Biltzar Ttipia, in clear disagreement with the organization of the assembly, decided to send Madariaga as its single representative. But Madariaga was expelled from the assembly, being that decision— Madariga’s expulsion—presumably the only agreement made during that Assembly.

The correspondence between Krutwig and Irujo shows us how difficult the situation had become in the exile and within ETA. Basque nationalists had been disbanded from the organization, replaced by what Krutwig defined as “*españolistas*.”

As the VI<sup>th</sup> assembly was being held, and after the expulsion of Madariaga, the two groups left, so that the executive committee from the inside and the group represented by Eskubi began to engage in a political discussion that resulted in personal accusations, ultimately ending in *Células Rojas* abandoning the assembly and the organization. The situation was difficult to explain and understand for the exile, but it was no easier in the inside, where the questions regarding Eskubi were left unanswered.

Despite the confusion, the militancy and the Burgos prisoners took part, and they decided to support the decision taken in the Assembly, considering that, by doing so, they supported the legitimacy of the Assembly and the executive committee. The document released by the prisoners while they were waiting for the resolution of the sentence of the trial (waiting to know if the death sentences were confirmed or not) denied the legitimacy of the Biltzar Ttipia, represented by the group of Kruwig in exile, and defined ETA according to the ideas of the V<sup>th</sup> assembly, moving away from the nationalist postulates:

*“Uno de los acuerdos fundamentales de la V<sup>a</sup> asamblea fue la afirmación de la clase trabajadora vasca, la clase más revolucionaria y la que debe dirigir, por tanto, la revolución vasca.”*

The document was prioritizing the class front before the national front, with such clear and determined sentences as: “*ETA es una organización socialista. ETA no es un frente nacional.*” Basque nationalism was being pushed aside and even condemned as if it belonged to a Basque history was not part of that new executive, not even of the new generation that had taken over power in the inside. They promoted a national front, but it was a front where class was the



prevailing feature, far from the national front proposed by the Biltzar Ttipia, which, according to them, was a front that would exclude the popular political forces.

Rejecting even the national front and Basque nationalism, and focusing the fight on the class struggle, the document developed a roadmap for the development of the “National Liberation Front,” followed by the creation of an independent, socialist Basque Country that, led by the Basque working class, would precede a Basque socialist revolution that would eliminate all social classes.<sup>740</sup>

With the appearance of that document, there were not many options left for the Biltzar Ttipia if they wanted to get back in control of the organization. The strategy followed by the five members in exile was to begin a “*nueva cruzada antiespañolista*,” centered on Eskubi’s disqualification, who was considered to be the one who had introduced *Spanishness* into the organization.

In fact, the campaign was confronting the exile with the inside: they had a lot in common, but they were separated by Basque nationalism. The inside ETA, and those who followed ETA VI, had given up the Basque national vindication, according to Krutwig’s words, due to the influence of Eskubi.

In the December letter to Irujo, Krutwig was critical with Eskubi and accused him of having organized the Spanish infiltration in ETA, referring to the origins in the V<sup>th</sup> assembly, trying in this way to legitimate his defense.

According to Krutwig, the authentic ETA was the group defending the V<sup>th</sup> assembly’s resolution, since he did not consider the organization of the VI<sup>th</sup> assembly as legal. For him, the inside group that had organized the VI<sup>th</sup> assembly was a “Grupo de Españoles infiltrados, miembros del PC Español.” But what generated even more criticism from him was the use of Marxism by that group, since, according to Krutwig, that group, by denying the Basque nation, was denying even the Marxists’ theories on nationalism. The authentic ETA was Marxist, but, unlike the inside ETA, which was under the PCE’s influence, the authentic ETA represented by Biltzar Ttipia followed Maoism, while the ETA from the inside embraced Stalinism:

*“Quienes siguen la estrategia maoista, somos nosotros que los hemos expulsado justamente por esta razón de que para llegar al socialismo en concreto, hay que luchar*

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<sup>740</sup> “Documento de los presos de Burgos dirigido al Biltzar Ttipia de su Organización Euskadi ta Askatasuna,” ETA, Burgos, January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1971. *Documentos Y*, Vol.X, pp. 199-218.

*por la liberación nacional, al igual que en su día, por ejemplo hizo Mao Tzetung (Sic.) en China,” and he clarifies for Irujo: “Si quiere, comparando con posiciones en el mundo comunista, nosotros adoptamos una posición como Ceausecu (sic.) o Mao Tsetung, mientras que ellos adoptan la posición de un Husak, un Ulbricht o un Kadar.”*

ETA V<sup>th</sup>, the one represented by the Biltzar Ttipia, was calling back to mind what had already happened during the IV<sup>th</sup> Assembly, when the group led by Patxi Iturrioz had engaged in a *workist* tendency that moved them away from Basque nationalism. For the Biltzar Ttipia, the transformation of part of the members of ETA and the defense of the workers front over the national front was an intoxication coming from the Spanish Communist party, and after the Burgos trial, the necessity of taking the control of ETA back was even clearer.

The ETA in exile was not recognizing an ETA in the inside that, according to Krutwig, had developed new features that were even more Spanish and anti-Basque than the Iturrioz group.

After the Burgos Trial, ETA was definitely split in two. ETA VI controlled the apparatus of the organization, had the support of the members operating in Spain, and received the recognition of the 16 accused in Burgos, recognized by that time already as the anti-Franco heroes. ETA VI defined themselves as a Socialist revolutionary organization supporting a class-based struggle in preference over a national one. Basque ethnicity and language remained as second-rate interests.<sup>741</sup>

The Biltzar Ttipia in exile defended the legitimacy of the V<sup>th</sup> assembly, remaining as ETA V. Despite not enjoying the support of the inside, ETA V could count on the support of the intellectual group of Txillardegui and his group around *Branka*, the cultural journal created by the intellectuals, and had an influence on the “milis” group: “*Del grupo “militarista” no le he hablado en especial, porque en realidad NO EXISTE, sino que forma parte de la auténtica ETA dirigida por el Biltzar Ttipia democráticamente elegido en la V<sup>a</sup> asamblea,*” as Krutwig reminded Irujo in one of his letters in early 1971.

ETA V embraced Marxism and was strongly supportive of political violence, influenced by the resurgence of international armed struggles in the 70’s, leading them to the belief, as Robert P. Clark explains, that they were part of a wave of global significance. “The rise of the Tupamaraos in Uruguay through the late 1960’s and into 1970 and 1971 gave ETA V a valuable

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<sup>741</sup> CLARK, Robert, p. 1984. *The basque insurgents. ETA, 1952-1980*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 58-59.

model that stressed links between mass revolutionary movement and the leadership provided by a relatively small but activist armed group.”<sup>742</sup> The exile provided them with the possibility of being global in their defense of the Basque cause.

Moreover, the defense of Basque nationalism, which was one of the features that ETA VI had forgotten about, gained them the support of PNV and EGI, since these were uncomfortable with how ETA VI was approaching positions similar to those of the PCE. The defense of the national front, beginning near the end of 1970 but having its zenith after the Burgos trial and during the 1971 spring, provided a strong definition of the positions of the Basque struggle and organizations.

Whereas, as we already mentioned, ETA VI had placed the Basque national cause on a second level, ETA V defended the national front, even though, due to the Marxist ideology and the differences between the imagined social societies, there were breaches too wide to really get past.

The rebuilding of ETA V was based on a national struggle that included political violence, inspired on the anti-colonialism strategy already defined in the V<sup>th</sup> Assembly, but also based on an anti-imperialism aimed against both the USA and the Soviet Union.

*“A pesar de todo el Internacionalismo predicado en abstracto... la cuestión vuelve hoy a época del imperialismo (es decir lucha de un pueblo oprimido contra el opresor – una lucha que es “horizontal” – y no lucha de clases, del de arriba contra el de abajo, una lucha “vertical” a plantearse en términos nacionales. Los opresores son pueblos enteros, el más característico son los EEUU.”*

The identification of ETA VI with the PCE and, therefore, with *Spanishness*, gave ETA V the necessary reasons to engage in a fight against the Spanish infiltrators.

Without abandoning his Marxism, Krutwig defends the link between socialism and nationalism, attacking those Marxists who had forgotten about the national cause because they had followed Stalin’s theories. It is clear that the division between the Marxists was dividing ETA then; nationalism was the cause of the division, but different families of Marxism were also involved.

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<sup>742</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

According to Krutwig's words in a letter written to Manuel Irujo in April 1971, the abandonment of Basque nationalism by ETA VI was due to a lack of ideology and preparation on the part of its members, who were infiltrated by PCE members, completely unaccustomed to thinking or reading widely.

*“Se contentan con la lectura de cualquier manual... que además suelen ser de esos que ha preparado la Unión Soviética, sobre todo tipo de cuestiones en la que suministra ciencia y socialismo en píldoras... pero que están compuestos con los ingredientes que a la Unión Soviética le conviene en el momento dado.”*

An anti-Stalinism and anti-Soviet Union feeling shows clearly in the words of Krutwig, who followed Mao's version of Marxism, combining cultural revolution, anti-imperialism, and national uprising against the oppressor. It was the gate to the new trend that was about to enter into ETA: *Third-Worldism*.

## vi. Prisoners and exiles.

On December 30<sup>th</sup>, 1970, Franco signed the reprieve of all six death sentences, amidst demonstrations and riots of opposite signs in the Spanish streets.

The anti-Franco mobilizations had not ceased during the trial, nor whilst the sentence was waiting to be ratified, but the constant mobilizations also got a reply from the pro-Franco movement which, until then, had not felt the necessity of defending the Regime.

While in the eyes of some of Franco's supporters the decision was an act of clemency from the regime, unrelated to the Church's petitions or the international pressure,<sup>743</sup> some others saw it as a surrender to the pressure of liberal democracies and a sign of weakness. As a matter of fact, it was the latter who were right, probably having forgotten all about the kidnapping affair, although later on the *Consejo Nacional del Movimiento* would admit that the international pressure and the consul's kidnapping were of capital importance in the commuting of the death penalties.<sup>744</sup>

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<sup>743</sup> The governments of Austria, Venezuela, Chile, Ireland, Denmark, Germany (FRG), Italy, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, and the Vatican asked Franco to make use of the right of clemency.

<sup>744</sup> TXALAPARTA (ed.), 1994, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 68-71; SULLIVAN, John, 1988, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-109.

The international opinion—including the exile—unanimously agreed that the mobilizations in the Basque Country, as well as those in different cities in Europe, especially during the holding of the process—attacking the Spanish interests in countries like Italy, France, Germany, Great Britain, or Germany—had contributed to the act of clemency. The international Herald Tribune, the Times, and some French newspapers published editorials and articles about this, further highlighting that the repression of the regime was only going to increase after the commutation of the sentences.<sup>745</sup>

Indeed, what with all the repression and the prisoners, Basque nationalism was not just having the same problem as before the Burgos trial, but instead it had grown worse. According to OPE, before the Burgos trial there were more than 137 Basque political prisoners in the Basque Country; and with the new repression campaign after the process some more were added, and the number of exiles increased.

The full list of prisoners and detainees was published in OPE and *Alderdi*, the latter also publishing the differences that there were within the Spanish regime between three very important families, the Opus Dei, the Falange, and the army. The regime was not satisfied with the situation that had been left by the development and outcome of the Burgos trial, and the vindications of the army, with new demands, provoked a crisis inside the Spanish Government. The army demanded more presence in the streets and more power for the Franco Government, showing that there was a need once again to defend the unity of Spain, in a military regime that had given away so much power to the Opus Dei.

The starting point of that new patriotic demand by the army was made visible during the celebration in Madrid of the funeral and mass in memory of José Pardines, Melitón Manzanos, and Fermín Monasterio, the first three victims of ETA,<sup>746</sup> followed by a massive demonstration in favor of Franco and the army. According to *Le Monde*, there were a few thousands of people shouting against separatism and in favor the Unity of Spain, although the official media talked about half a million attendees. Franco observed the army march by, while some people at his

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<sup>745</sup> OPE, no. 5589, January 4<sup>th</sup>, 1971.

<sup>746</sup> Fermín Monasterio was a taxi driver who was found dead after having presumably transported Mikel Etxebarria, an ETA member who was running from the police in Bilbao in 1969. ETA never recognized that murder, and the case was closed by the police without any evidence of ETA's authorship.

side raised their arm saluting in the fascist style, something that the Regime had given up during the 50's.<sup>747</sup> The sabre-rattling was increasing its noise.

Meanwhile, the Basque government went on with its strategy of internationalizing the Basque conflict, while at the same time helping the Basque prisoners, whose numbers were increasing, as we have already mentioned.

Manuel Irujo and the *Lehendakari* Leizaola contacted the UN's Human Rights Commission in Genève to inform them on the Basque cause and the infringement of Human Rights in Spain, especially through the use of torture and the death penalty against political prisoners.

The Basque Government, although not agreeing with the violent methods employed by the young patriotic Basque members of ETA, was defending the prisoners as political prisoners, since it was part of the adopted strategy to vindicate the Basque cause as a political cause. The use of violence by Basque nationalists could blur the political demands, and the Basque Government, with the PNV at the forefront, was committed to avoid it.

In the report sent to the UN, Irujo and Leizaola, introducing themselves under their respective political positions in the Spanish Republican Government and in the Basque Government, explained the Basque cause by starting with the Spanish Civil War and the establishment of the Fascist dictatorship of Franco.

The defense of Human Rights is presented as a natural feature of the Basque society, a society that has never given up defending these rights, even when it became a crime after the constitution of the TOP in 1963, followed by the promotion of the court-martials introduced by decree since 1968.

The use of torture is explained in the report, highlighting the proliferation of cases, especially in the Basque country, which would include abuse on students, lawyers, and even clergymen.

With that report, and the letter attached with it, the Basque Government was not only asking for a statement of condemnation of the Spanish situation from the Human Rights Committee, but for the protection of the rights of the Basque exiles who were having problems in the European countries where they were trying to get refuge.

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<sup>747</sup> OPE, no. 5611, February 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1971.

The letter ends with a petition to the international body to intercede on behalf of protecting the Human Rights:

*“(...) Vous priant de bien vouloir en prendre connaissance et de vous en server en l'appuyant sur toutes les raisons d'ordre juridique, humanitaire et politique, auprès des instances pertinentes afin de promouvoir un changement de la politique de l'Etat espagnol face aux Basque qui pulse s'accorder avec le respecte des droits de l'Homme.”*<sup>748</sup>

The exile was coping with the new arrivals, and the situation presented in the letter to the UN was referring to the difficulties of the refugees in settling down, something that was not new and was increasing as the numbers of refugees kept mounting.

Although it cannot be said that the traditional Basque nationalism represented by the PNV and the first generation of exiles did not have problems settling down in their exile, it is true that the new generation of exiles were not welcome with open arms.

The post-Civil War situation and the flight of hundreds of thousands from Spain was a difficult situation, not only for the exiles, but also for the receiving countries, not to speak of the fact that just a few months after the end of the Spanish War the WWII began. In France, where most of the Basque exiles had gone, the situation was not easy, as we have already seen in previous chapters, but in 1970 the refugees of ETA were even deported or imprisoned.

New ways of protest (hunger strikes, occupations), the use of violence, and the political vindication of the French Basque Country were features of the new exiles that upset the French Government and led to the first deportations of ETA members, including Julen Madariaga, Benito del Valle, Txillardegui, and Eneko Irigaray, who were expelled from “*Basses Pyrénées*” in 1964.<sup>749</sup>

Although Telesforo Monzón was not part of those new exiles, his approach in relation to them, his active intervention during the kidnapping of the German consul, and later on his activities to find refuge for the ETA members put him in a difficult situation before the French Government.

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<sup>748</sup> Letter sent to the UN's Human Rights commission, Basque Government, March, 1971. EAH-AHE, Archivo gobierno Vasco, Fondo Especial Beyris. Box 54 P-2/2-2.

<sup>749</sup> Brief note of protest from different bodies of the region against the refugees' expulsion. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Box 7, Exp.1.

Anai Artea had become the reference for the Basques in exile since the episode of the Honorary Consul Beihl, as Alberto Onaindia complained to Irujo in a letter in February 1971:

*“Durante los días duros de Burgos, lo que más nos llamó la atención fue el silencio de nuestro Gobierno. Fue muy doloroso. Parecía que Telesforo se había convertido en portavoz de los vascos. Nuestro Lehendakari guardó un silencio ominoso. Fue una gran pena.”*<sup>750</sup>

Indeed, Telesforo Monzón became a relevant figure of the Basque resistance and the Basque cause in Iparralde, which even put him in danger when a campaign against him prepared by the Francoist propaganda ended up with a Molotov-cocktail attack on his house in Donibane, probably carried out by the Spanish far-right group *Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey*.

On May 5<sup>th</sup>, 1971, the order to abandon Iparralde was notified to Monzón through superintendent Jean Caillou. The French Government had banned him from living in Iparralde. Monzón answered the attacks by issuing a public and defying statement, “*A toutes les Basques,*” and he organized a hunger strike in Bayonne’s cathedral.<sup>751</sup>

The order of expulsion was not only for Monzón, but also for Txillardegui and Arregi, and the Basque nationalists set up a campaign to reverse the French decision.

Despite the disagreements between Irujo and Monzón, time had smoothed out their differences and the two old friends maintained friendly contact and exchanged correspondence. The distance with the PNV was evident, although for Irujo, who was always striving to unite forces among Basque nationalists, Monzón was a good source of information regarding the activities of ETA’s members and the developing of their ideology. Monzón gradually began to show himself more and more distant with the PNV, being very critical against the management of Leizaola, and, on the other hand, he felt cheerful about the new generation of Basque nationalists; nevertheless, in his political activity Monzón was one of the most tireless promoters of the unity platforms, the National Front or the National agreements, as we will get to see further on.

When Irujo received the news about the expulsion order against Monzón, he was one of the first to write to him and to give him his support, as well as—without consulting them, of course—the support of the Basque Government. Apart from the efforts made by Ordoki, who

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<sup>750</sup> Letter from Alberto Onaindia to Manuel Irujo, Saint Jean de Luz, February 8<sup>th</sup>, 1971. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Sig. J, Box 13, File 0.

<sup>751</sup> ANASAGASTI, Iñaki, *op. cit.*, p. 29.



wrote to the French Minister of Interior, and Ramon Agesta, who probed the possibility of appealing the expulsion order,<sup>752</sup> Manuel Irujo himself took charge of getting a political refugee certificate for Telesforo Monzón.

Finally, in July of 1971, Telesforo Monzón received his political refugee certificate, accompanied by a long political letter by Irujo informing him about the presumed intentions of Anai Artea of replacing the influence of the Basque Government, especially in America.<sup>753</sup> Long friendship knows nothing about disputes.

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<sup>752</sup> Kepa Ordoki Vázquez was Major of the Gernika Battallion during the Spanish Civil War, and after that he enrolled in the French army. Letters from Ramon Agesta and Kepa Ordoki in: EAH-AHE, Archivo Gobierno Vasco, Fondo Especial Beyris. Box 53 P-63.

<sup>753</sup> Letters exchanged between Irujo and Monzón. From April to July, 1971. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 13, Exp. M-N.

## 7. THE END OF THE “EIGHTH PROVINCE”? TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY. THE END OF THE EXILE AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE BASQUE NATIONALISM

### a. Returning from exile

The exile was over. On March 24<sup>th</sup>, 1977 Manuel Irujo left the exile to return to his homeland, the Basque Country, where, in Pamplona, he would receive a warm and crowded welcome from his homeland.

Although the journal published by the PNV dealing with the 1977 Assembly and the homage to Irujo explained that Manuel Irujo was convinced by a member of the Party to return to Navarre while he was in Leigh-on-Sea (Essex), in an interview with Iñaki Anasagasti<sup>754</sup> he confirmed to me that he and his brother, together with Pello Irujo, had been the senders of the petition to an old but active Manuel Irujo in Paris.<sup>755</sup>

Be that as it may, after Franco's death on November 20<sup>th</sup>, 1975 the situation had started to turn and, although it was not so clear that democracy was something that was going to happen in the country, certain things had begun to change.

1976 is a very active year in this respect, and we can see how the Basques from the exile are returning home, although not without problems, as Alberto Elósegui was commenting to Irujo from London in March 1976. The situation of work in London is not as good as it used to be, the working permit and the low salary conditions due to the general crisis,<sup>756</sup> together with the cognitive problem of one of his siblings, who is deaf, force Elósegui to look for solutions in Euskadi, but the legal situation in Spain is not encouraging for the exiles: “*tenemos encima una*

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<sup>754</sup> Iñaki Anasagasti is a Basque nationalist who was born in Venezuela, son of a Basque nationalist family that fled into exile after the Spanish Civil War. He was educated in the Basque Country by his grandparents, but he returned to Venezuela in 1965 after his father's death and got involved in the Basque nationalist movement, first in EGI, with the promotion of *Radio Euzkadi* or by editing *Gudari*. On his return to the Basque Country in 1975, he published the journal of the PNV *Euskadi* and during the democracy was elected Member of Parliament from 1980 to 2004. He was recently retired from his position at the Spanish Senate.

<sup>755</sup> Journal on the 1977 Iruña Assembly. AN, DP-0506-05; Interview with Iñaki Anasagasti. Bilbao, November 29<sup>th</sup>, 2016.

<sup>756</sup> The UK underwent a financial crisis in 1976 (just after coming out of the oil crisis of 1973) that forced the Government to apply to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan. The result was that the IMF negotiators obliged the Government to make deep cuts in public expenditure that would affect the economy and the social situation. More at: <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/imf-crisis.htm#Harold%20Wilson's%201974%20government> (consulted on May 15<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

*nueva figura delictiva que descubrió mi hermano Joaquín (...). Esa figura es «actividad continuada subversiva en el exterior».*<sup>757</sup>

The country was not ready to receive all the political exiles nor to recognize their political diversity, although the vindications are constant since the death of the dictator on November 20<sup>th</sup>, 1975.

In the PNV's declaration after the decease, the political party aligns itself with those organizations that are contrary to a political transition, and defends a clear democratic rupture that includes the recognition of the political prisoners:

*“Otras organizaciones políticas, en abierta oposición al Régimen, propugnan la ruptura democrática con amnistía de todos los presos políticos y sindicales, elecciones libres, creación de instituciones representativas a nivel de Estado y a nivel de nacionalidades, libertad de partidos políticos y sindicatos libres y efectiva garantía de los derechos humanos,”* and finally adds: *“Esta es, también la postura del PNV en esta etapa del proceso de liberación de Euzkadi.”*<sup>758</sup>

The situation in the Basque Country was not clear, and there were a lot of things that had to be done, especially in a political party whose structures were divided between the exile and the inside, developing certain differences of opinion.

Since 1971, especially after the Burgos trial, and in the light of the evidently increasing interest of the new generation for a Basque national alternative like the one represented by ETA, the party decides to reorganize itself, in an attempt to catch the interest of the young Basque nationalists who recognized a certain stagnation of the party, as Iñaki Anasagasti, a young Basque nationalist in 1975, recalls: *“Teníamos una cierta sensación que la persona que estaba encargada del PNV en el exterior, en Bayona, Mikel Isasi, había perdido chispa, se había acomodado.”*<sup>759</sup>

Despite the changes, Juan Ajuriaguerra maintained a prominent position within the Euskadi Buru Batzar, combining the old Basque nationalist's experience with the new generation of the PNV.

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<sup>757</sup> Correspondence between Alberto Elósegui and Manuel Irujo. London, March 18<sup>th</sup>, 1976. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 18, File E-F.

<sup>758</sup> “Al Pueblo Vasco,” *Euzkadi*, November 20<sup>th</sup>, 1975. *OPE* no. 6702, December 1<sup>st</sup>, 1975.

<sup>759</sup> Interview with Iñaki Anasagasti. Bilbao, November 29<sup>th</sup>, 2016.

Manuel Irujo, very worried with the situation generated by the violence of ETA, the hunger strikes in Bayona, and the order of expulsion of Monzón from Iparralde connected with the kidnapping of the German consul, explained to Martín García Urriaga, an old friend of Irujo's who lives in Mexico, the situation of the political party with the new generation:

*“ Es indudable la existencia de una corriente de opinión, de manera singular en la juventud, que al referirse a “los viejitos” del Gobierno Vasco piensa y dice que el PNV es una formación del siglo XIX que corresponde a las características del momento en el que fue concebido y que se ha hecho vieja, siendo preciso renovarla, reemplazarla o sustituirla.”*<sup>760</sup>

Irujo is referring to the young Basque nationalists of ETA, who used exactly the same words in reference to the PNV in their documents<sup>761</sup>—but it was also something that deep inside he knew had to be done.

*“Con todo el panorama relacionado, el Gobierno y el Partido están en su lugar, cure su puesto, aguantan la marea, se mueve con ponderación, tal vez con excesiva ponderación (...). Pero cuánto me gustaría encontrarlos vestidos de otro dinamismo!”*<sup>762</sup>

The party's renewal was effected with the intention of renewing or rejuvenating the party by replacing the different bureau representatives (Gipuzkoa, Bizkaia, Euzkadi Buru Batzar) for younger ones, not without some annoyance: *“Eso ha costado una serie de violencias con los viejos que quedan en Beyris. Se han superado con dificultad y sin elegancia,”* yet, nevertheless, Irujo recognizes that *“(…) en el nuevo EBB es figura dominante Juanito, que no está en EBB y ha pasado a la categoría de consejero y de actuante al servicio y por orden de EBB, orden que los nuevos burukides [members of the executive] consultan con él antes de adoptarla.”*<sup>763</sup>

Manuel Irujo identifies himself with the renewal of the party and, as will be seen later on, he and Ajuriaguerra will be one of the “*viejitos*” who will enjoy the confidence of the young

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<sup>760</sup> Manuel Irujo to Martín García Urriaga, May 28<sup>th</sup>, 1971. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 13, File G. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/3449.pdf> (consulted on May 15<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>761</sup> In the ideological positions approved by ETA in its Vth Assembly one of the items asserted with regard to the PNV: *“Es, hoy por hoy, un partido superado en los dos aspectos: nacional y social. (...) Para sobrevivir solo puede: o reivindica la soberanía nacional vasca y para ello abandono de los intereses económicos que lo ligan a España, o se dedica a esos intereses económicos traicionando su contenido vasquista, o desaparece por extinción.”* in HÓRDAGO (Ed.). 1979. *op.cit.*, Vol.5. pp. 176-177.

<sup>762</sup> Manuel Irujo to Martín García Urriaga. May 28<sup>th</sup>, 1971, *op. cit.*

<sup>763</sup> *Ibid.*

Basque nationalists in the organization of the party, building a bridge between the two generations, but also a bridge that unified the exile and the inside.

Despite the efforts in changing the party and the new situation in the Basque Country, Manuel Irujo was not so sure about returning. Almost 40 years in exile were reason enough to calmly think over about the matter, although the voices asking for the return of the exiles kept growing day by day.

During the meeting of the Spanish Christian Democracy team for the European Union, held in Madrid in February 1976, Juan Ajuriaguerra, the representative of the Basques, expounded the Basque cause, the problems derived from the violence, and the need for a solution. It was important that the Basque cause did not become blurred inside the Spanish democrat's cause, and Ajuriaguerra stated the grievances suffered by Basque nationalists: "*Hay presos que liberar, exiliados que reintegrar a la Patria, mutilados que asistir, funcionarios que reponer e indemnizar (...)*."<sup>764</sup>

The reorganization of the Party required experience, and although Manuel Irujo was in constant contact with the inside, taking part in the changes and the decisions, and advising the young Basque nationalists in everything he could, the necessity for the party to grow within Navarra and to have a unified impact in the different provinces increased the pressure for Irujo's return, as Alberto Elósegui told Irujo in one of his 1976 letters. He was about to move from London back to Bilbao with his family and, when he was getting sincere with Irujo, describing the situation of his family after the disappearance of "Pertur,"<sup>765</sup> Alberto explained to him the situation of the PNV in the Basque Country: "*Lamentablemente en Guipúzcoa la dirección del PNV se halla muy contagiada con los esquemas de la izquierda y sumergida en algo que es estéril: la lucha por el euskera batúa. (...) En Vizcaya las cosas están mucho mejor. Saben lo que quieren y están buscando y encontrando la gente que necesitan.*"<sup>766</sup>

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<sup>764</sup> "Euskadi. Boletín informativo del Partido Nacionalista Vasco," February 15<sup>th</sup>-21<sup>th</sup>, 1976. AN, Irujo Fund, 0071, C-2.

<sup>765</sup> Eduardo Moreno Bergaretxe "Pertur" was a member of ETA-PM, the political-military branch of ETA, who was presumably kidnapped and killed on July 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1976. His body has never been found. His disappearance caused controversy among the two branches of ETA, because ETA-PM was suspicious of ETA-M. The latest research on the case has revealed a possible involvement of the Italian fascist paramilitary group "Triple A" in the disappearance. The Italian fascists would have handed Pertur over to the Francoist police, according to research made by Ángel Amigo and presented in a documentary in 2007, "El año de todos los demonios." More on Pertur in: AMIGO, Ángel, 1978, *Pertur: ETA 71-76*. Donostia: Hórdago; GIACOPUZZI, Giovanni, 1997. *ETApm. El otro camino*. Tafalla: Txalaparta.

<sup>766</sup> Correspondence between Alberto Elósegui and Manuel Irujo. London, September 9<sup>th</sup>, 1976, *op. cit.*

The situation in Bizkaia was fine, as far as Ajuriaguerra and Anasagasti were concerned, but the same could not be said of other parts of Euzkadi—and that is why Irujo’s charisma is so much needed in the inside: “*Alguien me ha dicho que pensaban hacerle pasar a usted a Euskadi Sur no sé con qué motivo. Creo que sería un error, pero es una opinión personal, no compartida por todos los burukides.*”<sup>767</sup>

Manuel Irujo has not yet decided to go back to the Basque Country. He has been collaborating with Anasagasti and Ajuriaguerra and keeps working on the European Federal Movement, as we will see further on; he has been preparing for the 80<sup>th</sup> anniversary of *Lehendakari* Leizaola, and has marked out the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Abolitionist law of 1876<sup>768</sup> (the law that abolished the Basque political Constitution and the Representative Assemblies of Biscay, Gipuzkoa and Araba) as a cornerstone of the recovery of the Basque laws: “*El 21 de Julio es el aniversario de la Ley abolitoria. Creo que el PNV debe esforzarse en marcar la fecha. Y esto lo digo, no porque yo crea demasiado en ella, sino porque nos conviene aprovecharla, podemos y debemos hacerlo, asociándola a la de 1839, al Estatuto de Autonomía.*”<sup>769</sup>

The strategy presented by Irujo was defended in an article by him in the PNV’s journal *Euskadi*, edited and published by Iñaki Anasagasti from a basement in Bilbao. In the article “*La Ley 21 de Julio de 1876,*” published in the second half of May 1976, Manuel Irujo combines his facet as historian and lawyer to explain the importance of the 1876 law that derogated the remains of the Basque code of laws:

“*Esta ley, cuyo centenario estamos viviendo, fué pues la que derogó los restos forales de Álava, Guipúzcoa y Vizcaya, poniendo fin, de hecho, a en las tres regiones ascas a su régimen foral. Nosotros no podemos considerarla más que bajo este punto de vista, causando contra ella y lo que simboliza toda nuestra protesta de vascos, demócratas y hombres de derechos.*”<sup>770</sup>

Through a vindication of history, Manuel Irujo was defending the opportunity that the Basques had in those days of reestablishing their own code of laws, thanks to which Basque nationalism

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<sup>767</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>768</sup> AGIRREAZKUENAGA Joseba. 2011. *The Making of the Basque Question Experiencing Self-Governments, 1793-1877.* Reno, CBS. More on the “Ley Abolitoria de fueros de 21 de Julio de 1876” in: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4966551.pdf> (Consulted on May 15th, 2017) . More on the “Ley Abolitoria de fueros de 21 de Julio de 1876” in: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4966551.pdf> (consulted on May 15<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>769</sup> Irujo to Ajuriaguerra. May 7<sup>th</sup>, 1976. AN, Irujo Fund, 0071, C-2.

<sup>770</sup> “La Ley de Julio de 1876,” *Euzkadi*, 2<sup>nd</sup> half of May, 1976.

could be endowed with a perennial feature, better than the ethnic trait that had been vindicated up until now.

In fact, vindicating history in order to develop the idea of validating the traditional historical rights of the Basques was not something new—Irujo had promoted this since his early days in London. With that idea, Manuel Irujo was resolved to promote:

“Irujo attempted to draw parallels between Basque and British Whig historical narratives, both of which projected visions of countries simultaneously rooted in a continuum of tradition and involved in processes of change. According to him, the change had to be channelled strictly within permanent frameworks of tradition as opposed to revolutionary change. Basque constitutional law was, in Irujo’s opinion, akin to common law : both began as oral custom and were subsequently translated into written legislation.”<sup>771</sup>

Tradition thus becomes the guarantor of the Basques’ historical rights, certifying their national vindications and becoming a distinctive element that will enable the reestablishment.

Apparently, Manuel Irujo doesn’t feel like going back from the exile. He feels comfortable collaborating with the changes in Euzkadi, but he does not see the need to go back. Besides, his only daughter, Miren, and his grandchildren live in the UK, and the properties that the family used to have in the Basque Country are no longer in their hands.

But Irujo was considered by the inside an indispensable political piece, especially for regaining the importance that the PNV used to have, and for that reason there was the intention of having Irujo in Pamplona for the 1976 *Aberri Eguna*. Alberto Elósegui was preparing things for his return to the Basque Country with his family, collaborating with Anasagasti in the edition of *Euskadi*, from whom he received the commission of asking Irujo to participate: “*El Aberri Eguna será en Iruña. Y le voy a transmitir una petición de los del interior: quieren que usted esté en Iruña el Día de Pascua y me han rogado que sea yo quien se lo pida.*”<sup>772</sup>

It was the beginning of 1976 and the PNV was preparing the *Aberri Eguna*, a call of unity to all the Basque forces: “*(...) debe ser más que nunca el día de la Patria sin distingos de partidos,*

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<sup>771</sup> AGIRREAZKUENAGA, Joseba. 2016. “Reinterpreting the Basque Past in exile; Scholars, Narratives and Agendas (1936-1977).” In *Storia della Storiografia*. Pisa-Roma: Fabrizio Serra Editore. 1: p. 71.

<sup>772</sup> Alberto Elósegui to Manuel Irujo. London, January 14<sup>th</sup>, 1976. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 18, File E-F.

*ideologías, regiones o dialectos, debe ser el Aberri Eguna de la unidad.*”<sup>773</sup> The announcement of the Aberri Eguna made by the “*Asamblea patriótica de Navarra*” detailed all the problems traditional Basque nationalists were going through: political differences between the several nationalist parties that had mushroomed in the Basque Country, the different geography concepts about Euzkadi, the conflict of the Basque language, the *Euskara batua*... The Basque Country was in the process building itself after the death of the dictator, and the 1976 *Aberri Eguna* was the first without him—although not without the regime’s violence.

On March 3<sup>rd</sup>, as protests developed amid the general strike, the police killed 3 young strikers inside the church of San Francisco de Asís in Pamplona—all the sources report it as a massacre, before going into the details of the moment when the police breaks into the church and fires against the people inside:

*“La policía rompe las vidrieras de la iglesia y arroja al interior de ésta 24 granadas de humo. El aire es irrespirable. La gente se lanza hacia las puertas. (...) y es entonces cuando LA POLICIA, METRALLETA EN MANO DISPARA CONTRA LA MULTITUD. Dispara dentro de la iglesia, a bocajarro, una y otra vez. Dispara no al aire sino al cuerpo.”*<sup>774</sup>

The *Aberri Eguna* of 1976 became a claim of unity, of protest, and of vindication. The call was made for the *Aberri Eguna* to be celebrated in Pamplona (with some new organizations questioning the Basque character of Navarre), and there was also a call to celebrate the decease of the dictator and to claim for a total amnesty of the prisoners and the Basque exiles. Despite all the efforts, the violent situation in the Basque Country interfered with the celebration of the patriotic day. When ETA kidnaps and kills Ángel Berazadi, a Basque industrialist close to the PNV, the traditional Basque nationalists condemn the action and the EBB cancels its participation in the *Aberri Eguna*, despite the protests of the representatives of Bilbao.<sup>775</sup>

The Basque Government published a statement on April 13<sup>th</sup>, 1976, announcing their decision:

*“Ante la grave tensión creada por incidentes de todo género que se suceden desde hace varias semanas sin objetivo aparente en muchos de ellos y con pérdida de vidas humanas de muy vario origen y profesión, el Gobierno de Euzkadi de acuerdo con las*

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<sup>773</sup> “Aberri Eguna 1976.” AN, Fondo Irujo, 0071, C-2.

<sup>774</sup> “Última hora. 3 de marzo. Masacre en Gasteiz.” *Hautsi* no. 10, March, 1976.

<sup>775</sup> PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago de; MEES, Ludger, and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 331.



*organizaciones políticas que le asisten han decidido desistir de su asistencia al Aberri Eguna anunciado para el día 18 del corriente en Pamplona.”*

Although in a later announcement published in *Euzkadi*<sup>776</sup> the Government tried to clarify its reasons for having cancelled their participation in the Aberri Eguna in Pamplona, the truth is that not all the members of the PNV had received that decision in a positive way.

The Basque government’s headquarters in Paris had decided to go on with some of the events that had been prepared, and when Manuel Irujo finds out that *Lehendakari* Leizaola has cancelled almost everything despite the agreements made, he breaks out in anger: “*El acuerdo fué (sic.) de que hubiera, primero misa, después conferencia dada por tí (sic.), y después comida. Tu (sic.) has suprimido tu conferencia en el anuncio. Y lo has hecho porque así te ha salido de la chola.*”

Being a very respectful man, and loyal to the Basque Government, Manuel Irujo could not tolerate the disloyalty to the agreement, and on this occasion—as on many others—he aligned himself with those who believed in celebrating the patriotic day:

*“Que se suprima Aberri-Eguna ante la monstruidad del crimen cometido con Berazadi es una cosa. Pero que tu (sic.) por ti personal decisión, suprimas la conferencia acordada en la reunión conjunta con el colectivo Vasco de París celebrada bajo tu presidencia, es otra muy distinta. La verdad es que no sé en qué Evangelio has aprendido esta norma de gobierno.”*<sup>777</sup>

Manuel Irujo had been working from the distance in the rebuilding of the Basque Country, particularly, as we will see later on, in the inclusion of Navarre in the future political Basque Country within Spain, by collaborating, for instance, with *Amaiur*, the information bulletin of the NBB (*Napar Buru Batzar*) from its first issue.<sup>778</sup>

He is aware of all the difficulties and is fully committed to reconstructing a political space for Basque nationalism in the inside—but he is not willing to return at any price: “*Quieren que yo vaya a Iruña. Comprendo su deseo. Me parece algo infantil. Creo que, ir a Iruña, hoy no expone a ir a la cárcel. Por eso tiene menos mérito,*” Irujo told Alberto Elósegui, although he

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<sup>776</sup> *Euzkadi*, first half of May, 1976.

<sup>777</sup> Irujo to Leizaola. April, 8<sup>th</sup>, 1976. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 18, File L-LL. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/13233.pdf> (consulted on May 19<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>778</sup> *Amaiur*, first published in March 1976, vindicated the Basque Code of Laws, the inclusion of Navarre in the political Basque Country, and the European Federation—a clear signature of Irujo’s.

was not denying the possibility of returning, not at least with the same vigor as he had on previous occasions: “*Pienso que ir ahora a Iruña, cediendo al afán infantil de llevar al A.E. (Aberri Eguna), una nota distinta y llamativa, sería en cambio rebajar el mérito y la autoridad que puedo tener si un día voy allí como el único diputado foral en vida elegido en forma democrática.*”<sup>779</sup>

He kept constant contacts with the inside, especially with Anasagasti and the group of Bizkaia, as well as with Ramon de la Sota, a very active young nationalist who would cross the border regularly and bring fresh news from the inside, keeping Manuel Irujo updated with all the progresses taking place within the Basque Country.

Iñaki Anasagasti and his brother Jon got in touch with Manuel Irujo, who helped them to publish their articles—that was the strategy to be followed in the different political events, meetings of the party, etc. Anasagasti would report to Irujo weekly with the news, troubles, and achievements, and we can see here the influence of the old Basque traditionalist: “*Comentó Juan el otro día en la reunión que en vista que las relaciones del partido con el exterior no funcionan, sus quejas, las de Argentina, las de Venezuela, etc... y ya que de hecho el EBB funciona dentro, toda la correspondencia debería ser enviada directamente.*”<sup>780</sup>

Anasagasti was referring to Juan Ajuriaguerra—who bore the entire leadership of the PNV in the inside—to point out the ineffectiveness of the EBB in the inside. On many occasions, when Ajuriaguerra and Anasagasti traveled to Paris they would not visit Beyris, and Anasagasti did the same, building the new traditional Basque nationalism in the inside.

“*Estuve con Juan y le presenté un borrador de posibilidades sobre las distintas ideas editoriales que se me ocurrían, de acuerdo a lo hablado con usted (...).*” They were preparing the 80<sup>th</sup> anniversary of *Lehendakari* Leizaola, and Irujo was collaborating with them.

Their relationship was cordial, fruitful, and loyal: “*Por eso interesa mucho su opinión y sus ideas al respecto de esta parte del homenaje. (...). Me dice usted que pido más que un fraile limosnero. Y tiene usted razón, pero resulta que es usted quien se lleva la lana de la orden*

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<sup>779</sup> Irujo to Elósegui. January 16<sup>th</sup>, 1976. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 18, File E-F.

<sup>780</sup> Correspondence between Manuel Irujo and Iñaki Anasagasti. May-December 1976. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 18, File A. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/12991.pdf> (consulted on May 19<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

*terciaria porque tengo entendido que le llaman también Carmelita y eso sí que suena a fraile limosnero.*”<sup>781</sup>

Manuel Irujo married in 1916—but two years later, his wife, Aurelia Pozueta, died of the devastating “Spanish flu.” He never married again, and his entire life was devoted to Basque nationalism and the Basque Country, the only personal exceptions being his daughter and her siblings. Irujo was an indefatigable worker for the Basque cause, and even at the age of 85 he was committed to the Basque cause.

Anasagasti had informed Irujo about the increasing popularity of Xabier Arzallus,<sup>782</sup> a former Jesuit who had joined the nationalist Basque party only after the execution of Melitón Manzanás, and who was gaining popularity thanks to his ability as an orator:

*“El partido sigue reorganizándose a marchas forzadas. Hoy en Iruña se reunirán alrededor de unas cuarenta personas de todas las regionales (...). El otro día en Forua hubo un pequeño mitin de Arzallus con los de la zona de Marquina, Ondárroa, Lekeitio, Bermeo, etc... Alrededor de 400 personas en el local de los frailes hablando sobre el partido. Dato a destacar fue que toda la reunión fue en Euzkera.”*<sup>783</sup>

Arzallus was a growing reference in the inside despite his age, although he was fully aware that he was quite old: “*La Navarra actual, barrida por vientos sociales, ni sabe quién soy yo ni le interesa. Yo no soy para ellos más que historia y vejez.*” As he explained to Alberto Elósegui, Irujo had become a reference in the exile for the new generation.

His friends, colleagues, and even family insisted on his return. Irujo was the connecting link with the vindications of the transition, since the amnesty of the prisoners was always linked to the return of the exiles: “*Con la mirada puesta en quienes, a pesar de la muerte del dictador, siguen en las cárceles y en el exilio, queremos proclamar colectivamente nuestra voluntad de libertad y vuelta a sus hogares de todos ellos,*” as was defended during the announcement of the *Aberri Eguna* in March, 1976.<sup>784</sup>

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<sup>781</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>782</sup> Xabier Arzallus ended up becoming president of the Euzkadi buru Batzar (1980-2004). For more on Xabier Arzallus, consult “Así fue,” by Xabier Arzallus (Madrid: Foca, 2005).

<sup>783</sup> Letters from Iñaki Anasagasti to Manuel Irujo. May, 1976. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 18, File A. Also in : <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujos/12991.pdf> (consulted on May 19<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>784</sup> The Spanish Amnesty law was approved on October 15<sup>th</sup>, 1977—<https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1977/10/17/pdfs/A22765-22766.pdf> (consulted on May 19<sup>th</sup>, 2017)—but there had been a partial amnesty decreed on July 20<sup>th</sup>, 1976 for political prisoners: <http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1976/08/04/pdfs/A15097-15098.pdf> (consulted on May 19<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

It should not come as a weird surprise that Iñaki Anasagasti closed his letter of June 1976 with the following words: “*Termino pues quiero que esta salga pronto. Cuídese, que en Nabarra es usted el Arzallus de Bizcaya. A pesar de sus décimas.*”<sup>785</sup>

For Irujo, however, his return would mean the return of democracy—the exiles were a symbol of it. In his view, the situation is not ready for a return yet; the violence, the political prisoners, and the violation of the basic human rights are reason enough to hold his position in October 1976. Pertur was given up for dead after rumors of the involvement of a parallel police began to increase; the Civil Guard was repressing demonstrations, shooting students and workers; and in Montejurra (Navarre) an ex-commander, Italian fascists, and members of *Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey* and Falange shot and killed two Carlists during the annual pilgrimage. Spain was not yet a democracy, the TOP was still legal, prisons were crowded with democrats, and the exiles were considered no less than criminals by the Minister of Information, Manuel Fraga Iribarne.<sup>786</sup> Irujo resisted:

“*Yo me resistiré todo lo que pueda a entrar al otro lado, quemando una posición para no verla compensada. El exilio es actitud frente a un régimen impuesto por la violencia, que no reconoce la libertad vasca ni los derechos humanos: alguien debe mantener esa actitud mientras hechos tangibles y reales no la hagan cambiar.*”<sup>787</sup>

The attitude of Irujo before the regime was constant, as it had been throughout the entire exile. So many times they had imagined themselves going back to the homeland, and so many times they had been deceived by the seemingly endless regime. Irujo was keeping on with the faith, the intense work in Europe, and the idea of a Federal union that might recognize peoples instead of States, up until his last days in exile. Europe was first and foremost in his dedication to achieve the international recognition of the Basque cause.

The efforts of the Basque government and Basque nationalism had been turned to the inside, trying to rebuild the political force, but the ideology and the strategies came mainly from the exile, as we have seen in the contacts of Irujo, and will see again later on.

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<sup>785</sup> Correspondence between Manuel Irujo and Iñaki Anasagasti. May-December 1976. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 18, File A. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/12991.pdf> (consulted on May 19<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>786</sup> SÁNCHEZ SOLER, Mariano, 2010, *La transición sangrienta. Una historia violenta del proceso democrático en España (1975-1983)*. Barcelona: Península. pp. 21-43.

<sup>787</sup> PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago de, 2002, “Manuel Irujo: Un nacionalista vasco en la Transición democrática. (1975-1981).” *Vasconia*, 32, p. 178.

By the beginning of 1977, Irujo was 85 years old and the tiredness showed in his excuses for not getting more involved in the reconstruction of the Party. The Basque youth had to handle the situation, and the PNV was in need of the youth:

*“Quieren que yo vayan aprovechando una de esas fechas, la Asamblea nacional del PNV o Aberri-Eguna. Ya veremos lo que pasa. Yo les he dicho que no me olvido que cuento 85 otoños. (...) Por otra parte, tampoco quiero hacer sombra a nadie. Necesitamos valores nuevos, gente joven que salga a torear. A esos hay que ayudarles, no hacerles sombra. Estamos viviendo un momento histórico en el cual prima la juventud, que se cree con derecho a todo, sabiéndolo todo, sin que se reconozca a la experiencia derecho ni ventaja de ningún género.”*<sup>788</sup>

The need for the youth was an important question, given that most young Basque nationalists had embraced ETA, and the PNV ran the risk of becoming a political party of old exiles without any links to the new society. That was why Anasagasti had emphasized the presence of youths in the meetings: *“En Zalla, en una reunión de Juntas de 33 personas, 13 eras mujeres y menores de 30 años.”*<sup>789</sup>

But the end of the exile is close at hand—and Irujo knows it. Despite the weight of his years, he is willing to come back to Navarre, to the Basque Country, as he states by the end of February of 1977:

*“Me piden que vaya allí. Tengo una pereza infinita. Estoy deseando ver aquel cielo y pisar aquel suelo, pero solamente ir al consulado me pone enfermo con pensarlo tan solo. Y no tengo otro remedio, con mis 85 otoños, con la casa de mi padre vendida porque se hundía, con Pamplona que es un patio de manicomio político.”* Nevertheless, and despite the objections, he still wants to help his country: *“Pero no tengo aquello, ni juventud, ni ánimo, ni nada, más que la necesidad apremiante de ir, para empujar, para hacer, para tratar de levantar aquello.”*<sup>790</sup>

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<sup>788</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>789</sup> Letters from Iñaki Anasagasti to Manuel Irujo. May, 1976. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 18, File A.

<sup>790</sup> *Ibid.*

## b. “40 Años de exilio os saludan”

More than 2000 people were awaiting the arrival of two small planes at the airport of Fuenterrabía, located just at the border between France and Spain, where the Bidasoa river flows into the sea. It was a cold afternoon on March 24<sup>th</sup>, 1977, the day that would mark the end of the exile for Manuel Irujo.

“A mí no me gusta hacer el ridículo,” Irujo told Iñaki Anasagasti, the man in charge of organizing the welcome: “*Le organizamos un recibimiento, muy a su pesar, él no quería pero nosotros insistimos. “Queremos que usted venga del aire y le queremos organizar un gran recibimiento”, le dijimos.*”<sup>791</sup>

Irujo decided to take the train to Donibane, in company of Lehendakari Leizaola and his brother, Pello, who was also closing his exile. After visiting the tomb of Lehendakari Aguirre and assisting to a mass, he decided that it was time to go back home.<sup>792</sup>

He had flown from Biarritz, in a small plane piloted by Pedro Sota, where he had left the *Lehendakari* Leizaola and the members of the Basque Government with whom he had fled into exile. Leizaola would remain in exile until 1979. He only returned when the Statute of Gernika was approved and the Basque Government reestablished, closing the circle of the Civil War and the dictatorship that had forced him and the Basque Government to live in exile for 42 years.<sup>793</sup>

Manuel Irujo descended from the small plane with tears in his eyes, welcomed by a huge sign which read “*Irujo jauna: ongi etorri*” and a huge *ikurrina* decorated with a *lauburu*, presiding a crowd hoisting *ikurrinas*.<sup>794</sup>

His first words were a clear summary of who he was and what he was devoted to: “*A mis 85 años no llego aquí sino como afiliado. Estoy seguro de que el pueblo vasco dispondrá de los instrumentos adecuados para conseguir una democracia que nos lleve a la libertad. La gran tristeza al pisar mi tierra es comprobar que todavía hay presos en las cárceles.*”<sup>795</sup>

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<sup>791</sup> Interview with Iñaki Anasagasti. Bilbao, November 29<sup>th</sup>, 2016.

<sup>792</sup> AMEZAGA IRIBARREN, Arantzazu. 1999. *op.cit.*, pp. 388-389.

<sup>793</sup> *Lehendakari* Leizaola had crossed the border once, travelling incognito, to celebrate the Aberri Eguna in Gernika in 1974, but he did not officially return until December 15<sup>th</sup>, 1979.

<sup>794</sup> “Irujo Jauna: ongi etorri,” means “Welcome Mr. Irujo.” *Ikurrina* is the name given to the Basque flag, and *lauburu* is the name of the Basque cross, carrying important meanings within Basque nationalist symbolism.

<sup>795</sup> “El retorno de don Manuel de Irujo,” Journal on the 1977 Iruña Assembly. AN, DP-0506-05. In fact, some days before, coinciding with the anniversary of *Lehendakari* Aguirre’s death, on March 20<sup>th</sup>, some Basque

Irujo was a kind of “soldier” of the PNV, always at its orders, and a firm defender of democracy; he could not stand the situation of the Basques in the Basque Country, and that had been an important reason for his refusing to return.

The welcome was prepared in detail, with a display of all the symbols of Basque nationalism that had been kept hidden from the public spaces during the long dictatorship. A little girl welcomed Irujo in Basque language, and the patriotic songs “Emon, emon,” “Batasuna,” and “Eusko Gudariak gara,” among others, were sung by the people.

In the same small plane that had brought him to Fuenterrabía, Irujo flew to Pamplona, to Noain’s airport, where he received another crowded welcome, this time in his dear Navarre.

The mayor of Estella (Irujo’s birthplace) Pedro Arbizu and some other members of the city hall traveled to Noain to receive their prodigal citizen and present him with the golden insignia of the city.

At the airport he was welcomed by some members of the PNV and his brother, Pello Mari, who had also just arrived from his exile in Argentina, together with his sister and his niece Pello, one of the persons who had helped convince Manuel Irujo to come back from the exile.

Among shouts of “Askatasuna” or “Gora Euskadi Askatuta,” Irujo abandoned the airport as if he were a Head of State, being driven to the Hotel Tres Reyes, where he gave a speech accompanied by Pedro Basaldúa, Estanis Aranzadi, and Iñaki Anasagasti.

After remembering once again, first and foremost, the political prisoners of the Basque country, and asking for their freedom and amnesty, he vindicate the legal system of political parties and the autonomy for the Basque country, linking directly with the Republic. Without ignoring the social situation of the people, Irujo rejected once again—having done so for 40 years in the exile—he rejected violence: “*No soy partidario del diálogo de las pistolas ni de la violencia. Estoy en contra la violencia institucionalizada que ha estado 40 años en el poder. Que no haya vencedores y vencidos. Vamos a construir un país con el esfuerzo de todos. Vamos a empezar de cero.*”<sup>796</sup>

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prisoners had been released from prison. The OPE no. 6972 of March 25<sup>th</sup> would inform about it: “Amnistiados: Declaraciones del señor Jáuregui,” “La amnistia tiene aspectos positivos pero los vascos no cederan mientras no salgan todos,” or “Los Vascos con la Ikurrina saludan a los primeros hermanos liberados” are articles dealing with the news.

<sup>796</sup> *Ibid.*

On a non-stop agenda, Manuel Irujo was awarded a homage dinner in the sports citadel of Pamplona, presided over by the man who would become the *Lehendakari* of the reinstated autonomy, Carlos Garaikoetxea (*Lehendakari* between 1980-1985)<sup>797</sup>.

Standing on the platform that had been set up for the speeches, Manuel Irujo raised his voice, not seeming tired, and directed one of his most famous speeches to the audience:

*“40 años de exilio os saludan. 40 años desde que los militares me multaron, me despojaron de mis bienes y me obligaron a exiliarme. Estamos en unos momentos constituyentes. En los momentos actuales puede jugarse la causa vasca para otros 40 años.”*<sup>798</sup>

His speech went on to remember the 40 years of the Basque Government-in-exile, recalling the important names he had worked with, Aguirre, Landaburu, and Leizaola, and the work they had done in upholding the historical rights of the Basque Country. The exile had been the safe of Basque rights.

The welcome ceremony continued in the city hall of Pamplona, and finally in Estella, over the successive days, where Irujo visited the cemetery and the church, answered all the questions, and thanked all the warm welcomes he had received, insisting on his own humbleness:

*“He estado en el exilio porque era una protesta contra el régimen impuesto por la Guerra. He vuelto porque el PNV me ha dicho que mi puesto está ahora aquí. Ni soy un mito ni soy nada que pueda significar protagonismo, o dar lecciones o sentar cátedra. Sé muy bien las limitaciones que la edad impone. Una de las cosas que más me molestaría sería hacer sombra a los valores auténticos que necesita Navarra.”*<sup>799</sup>

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<sup>797</sup> Garaikoetxea left the presidency of the Basque Country despite being reelected due to discrepancies with the PNV. He would be the founder of a new political party, Euskal Alkartasuna (1986), a split from the PNV.

<sup>798</sup> “El retorno de don Manuel de Irujo,” Journal on the 1977 Iruña Assembly. AN, DP-0506-05.

<sup>799</sup> *Ibid.*



### c. Iruña, 1977. The Assembly of the PNV

“*Batzar Nagusia Irunan. Batasuna ta Indarra.*”<sup>800</sup>

The Basque streets woke up papered all over with a PNV poster calling for the General Assembly in Pamplona. A full-color poster, where the colors of the *Ikurina* cut through a black chain representing the long Franco dictatorship, was calling for the unity of traditional Basque nationalists and for pulling up strengths before the difficult task of rebuilding the political party that had been in exile for almost 40 years.

The assembly of Iruña (Pamplona, in Basque language) was held on March 24<sup>th</sup>, marking the updating of the PNV and its nationalism, and becoming the booster of the PNV’s importance in the Basque Country, despite the divergences between the representatives (especially between the Bizkaia representatives and the rest), the political and socio-economic communications, and the use of the Basque language.<sup>801</sup>

The assembly, under the direction of Juan Ajuriaguerra, had the objective of renewing the statutes of the party, unaltered since 1933, and updating the Basque nationalist ideology. A bureau of the assembly was elected, as instructed by Ajuriaguerra, who decided that each region should have a representative and the President should be someone from Navarre. The elected names were the following: Garaikoetxea (President), Pello Irujo (Navarra), Pedro Arrizabalaga (Alaba), Txomin Saratxaga (Bizkaia), and Jesús Mari Alkain (Gipuzkoa).

There were four different areas of discussions to establish the new policy and political principles that would work as the axis the representatives in the Assembly would discuss about. The four axis were: organization, political, socioeconomically and culture and identity.

Xabier Arzallus defended the political communication; the cultural and identity section, where the use of the Basque language was the main item, was explained by Iñigo Agirre. The socioeconomically communication, probably one of the most debated before and during the assembly was defended by Kepa Sodupe and, Josu Bergara was in charge of the Party’ structure communication.

From March 24<sup>th</sup> to March 27<sup>th</sup>, the members of the political party, legalized already in February, debated, discussed, and presented communications dealing with the exile and the

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<sup>800</sup> “General Assembly in Pamplona. Union and force.”

<sup>801</sup> PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago de; MEES, Ludger, and RODRÍGUEZ RANZ, José Antonio, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

work of the Basque government during all those years, and introduced new items like the role of Basque women in the exile, with Garbiñe Urresti, member of the extraterritorial assembly in Venezuela, explaining the importance of the *Emakume abertzale Batza*<sup>802</sup> and the work of Basque women.

The assembly days in *Anaitasuna*—the pavilion where it was held—were closed by a speech given by Manuel Irujo, who amazed the audience with his vitality and vigor, attracting old and young Basque nationalists alike.

But the assembly had only come about as a result of intense debates, meetings, and discussions carried out in the exile in order to present the communications in Iruña. The same as with the World Basque Congress in 1956, what is interesting for this research is the debates and impressions that took place previously, and how the exile affected those debates and the decisions taken, since they were debating the future of traditional Basque nationalism.

The assembly of Iruña presented a declaration of principles, extracted from the four main communications. But how did they end up there? How was the importance of the exile reflected in those principles? These are the questions that we will analyze in the next headings, where we will see how the weight of 40 years in exile would condition the principles.

### i. Structure and essence of the Party

Although the structure of that political party is not something directly connected with the object of our study, it is still interesting to note how the exile was present in the reorganization of its administrative bodies—which comes to show the importance of the exile in the new structures.

In the previous documents available on the organization of the assembly, we see that the assembly was divided into four different regions, each with its own voice and vote: Alaba, Gipuzkoa, Bizkaia, and Navarra, plus two Extraterritories.<sup>803</sup> This gives us an idea of the importance given to the voice of the exile, which is considered the 8<sup>th</sup> province, completing the system of imaginary geographic regions of Basque nationalism.

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<sup>802</sup> Basque nationalist women's board.

<sup>803</sup> "Proyecto de reglamento de la asamblea nacional del Partido Nacionalista Vasco." *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box, 40, File 3, p. 52.

The exile was present at the General Assembly of Pamplona from the very start. It was the first time after the dictatorship that the Party could call an assembly from outside its clandestine marginality—and the symbol of Irujo coming from the exile just as the Assembly was being held in Pamplona was something that had been very well studied and planned beforehand, as we have already seen.

A good number of the speakers were members of the Basque Nationalist Party who were coming from the exile and had connections with the most prominent young members, such as Xabier Arzallus, who had a leading role. The assembly was connecting the past with the future, the exile with the inside—that is, with the resistance, with those who in Basaldua’s words: “*Sois desterrados con más mérito que todos nosotros que hemos pasado 40 años respirando al fin y al cabo un poco de libertad.*”<sup>804</sup>

The exiles had been defending Basque rights for 40 years, with the bitter taste of being in exile, but with the blessing of freedom, as Antoon de Baets<sup>805</sup> put it, which had allowed them to develop Basque nationalism.

The weight of the exile in the definition of the four main topics debated at the Assembly and in the declaration of principles itself is identifiable from the very outset:

“*EUZKO ALDERDI JELTZALEA. Partido Nacionalista Vasco, fundado por Sabino Arana, recibe su nombre de lema “JAUNGOIKOA ETA LEGE ZARRA.”*”

This long line, which headed the declaration of principles approved during the Assembly, was by no means an easy task.

In a letter to Manuel Irujo from a worried Alberto Onaindia on November 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1976, the priest confessed to the Navarrese his concerns about the feature that the Basque party was beginning to acquire: “*Parece que hay una fuerte tendencia a suprimir Jaungoikoa etc. Esto puede provocar una escisión y quizá de fondo. Según puedo observar. Y andan con afanes de socialismo. Algunos ven la mano de Arzaillus (sic.). Me parece un disparate.*”<sup>806</sup>

Onaindia was harried by two points that would cause great debate when it came to preparing the assembly and defining the principles on which the renewed Basque Nationalist Party would

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<sup>804</sup> “Vosotros habéis sido desterrados,” Journal on the 1977 Iruña Assembly. AN, DP-0506-05.

<sup>805</sup> BAETS, Antoon de, 2011, *op. cit.*

<sup>806</sup> Alberto Onaindia to Manuel Irujo. November 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1976. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 18, File O-Q. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/iruj/10221.pdf> (consulted on May 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

be based. The old motto and the social feature of the party were the topics chosen for the discussion, in an attempt to broaden the target of potential voters. The social circumstances when the PNV was created in 1895 were far different from what they were in the days of the transition from the dictatorship to democracy, and some voices among traditional Basque nationalists had begun to question some of the party's tenets with a view to accommodate the party to the political and social demands of Basque society in 1976.

*“Eran tiempos en los que se debatía mucho sobre socialismo autogestionario y también sobre si el partido debía definirse como confesional o no. Sí había mucho debate,”*<sup>807</sup> confirmed Iñaki Anasagasti. The young Basque nationalists who were standing for the PNV were trying to update the Party and veer its attention towards the needs of the young, preserving the traditional values of the Basque nationalism of the PNV, but at the same time introducing new features that could halt the loss of supporters, who were being absorbed by the multiple and new political parties present in the Basque Country.

Meanwhile, in the exile, Alberto Onaindia exchanged a long letter with Doctor Dunixi de Oñatibia, a Basque nationalist who had asked Onaindia for his opinion on the two aforementioned subjects.

Onaindia, a Basque nationalist clergyman, defended the *“Jaungoikoa eta lege zarra”* as being part of the history of the PNV and as belonging to its Catholic confession. According to Onaindia, after the Second Vatican Council the Church was promoting the use of names other than “Catholic” for Catholic parties, and that is how the PNV is Catholic although its name does not reflect it, and that is why it was so important to defend the motto created by Sabino Arana: *“La divisa o lema revela un fondo, pero no lo constituye, recoge la inspiración inicial, un pasado histórico, sin llegar a una definición. La Monarquía británica ostenta una divisa redactada en francés, pues alude a una tradición.”*<sup>808</sup>

Linking to the second question, that of the social feature, for Onaindia the politics developed by the PNV had always been social, in the sense of connecting the social work done in favor of Basque workers with the Cristian inspiration of the political movement and its founder. In a defense of Christian Democracy, Onaindia defends social justice and politics within the PNV and rejects the idea of including the word “socialist” in the political party: *“Este partido*

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<sup>807</sup> Interview with Iñaki Anasagasti. Bilbao, November 29<sup>th</sup>, 2016.

<sup>808</sup> Alberto Onaindia to Dunixi de Oñatibia. November 11<sup>th</sup>, 1976. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 19, File O-Q.

*propugna la justicia social en el más amplio sentido, la promoción del trabajador. Él inspire la creación de SOLIDARIDAD DE TRABAJADORES VASCOS. Hay que acentuar ese tono social, pero ¿Por qué llamarse socialista?''*<sup>809</sup>

The opinion sent by Onaindia to Dr. Dunixi was published in the January's issue of the journal "Goiz Argi," where a whole section was devoted to the aforementioned question, and it was also published by some priests in the form of leaflets distributed among Basque society, together with an opinion along the same lines by José Miguel Barandiaran,<sup>810</sup> another nationalist Basque priest. It was a heated debate.

In his annoyance, Onaindia contacted Irujo by the end of the year (December 27<sup>th</sup>) to share with him the updates about the activities carried out in the inside and in relation with the rebuilding of the Party, and, once again, as he had done in November, he told Irujo about the danger posed by the "*Jaungoikoa eta lege zarra*" motto, since it was adding socialist ingredients that, in his view, were trying to seep into the party. Onaindia, who directly blames the youth for these changes, refers to Arzallus and a meeting of the party in Bergara in the following terms:

*"Yo tengo un texto de Arzaillus (sic.) pidiendo la desaparición de la propiedad privada y la eliminación hasta de su necesidad. Todo esto va quedado más en silencio. En Bergara, el gran mitin, un orador dijo que el PNV no era marxista. ¿Había necesidad de decirlo? ¿Por qué eso? Porque había ciertos rumores socializantes. Hay fuerte reacción en estos puntos."*<sup>811</sup>

We do not know whether Manuel Irujo felt very concerned about the socialist feature that the political party was acquiring in the eyes of Onaindia, but we do know, from a text he wrote under the title *Jaungoikoa eta lege-zarra*, that he was concerned about maintaining Sabino's motto.

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<sup>809</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>810</sup> José Miguel de Barandiaran Ayerbe was a nationalist Basque priest who was very interested in ethnographic and language studies, as well as in prehistory and anthropology. More on Barandiaran at: <http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/11007> (consulted on May 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>811</sup> Alberto Onaindia to Manuel Irujo. St. Jean de Luz, December 27<sup>th</sup>, 1976. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 18, File E-F.

Irujo appealed once more to history and tradition in order to defend the slogan as a link between the past and the present: “*Como el emblema de un escudo de armas, un lema de carácter político entraña emociones patrióticas y humanas, continuidad histórica y realidad virtual.*”<sup>812</sup>

In that sense, he agrees with Onaindia that the defense of tradition does not involve the fear of change, but a vindication of continuity:

“*Comprendo el parecer de quienes mantienen la tesis de que el PNV no se confesional. Lo comprendo y lo comparto, como lo comparten las autoridades de la Iglesia, que no quieren partidos confesionales. Pero, prescindir del lema de Sabino, como me parece que algunos desean. ¿Por qué? ¿Por qué vamos a dejar de ser Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea?*”

The extraterritorial assembly met in Paris a few days after, on January 30<sup>th</sup>, to debate, modify, and ratify the proposals sent by the PNV.<sup>813</sup>

When debating the Political communication, the attendees to the meeting agreed unanimously on the approval, but at the express wish of some of the members they also agreed on the proposal of introducing an amendment that recognized the “*Jaungoikoa eta Lege Zarra*” motto as a historic legacy.<sup>814</sup>

Finally, the declaration of principles defined the PNV as follows:

- a) *Partido vasco en su ámbito territorial de acción y en cuanto a su obediencia, sin vinculación orgánica a fuerzas políticas no vascas.*
- b) *Partido democrático, tanto en su estructura interna confederal, respondiendo así a las peculiaridades de cada una de las regiones de Euzkadi, como en su formación de voluntad de régimen interno.*
- c) *Partido popular, en cuanto defiende la causa de todo un pueblo y no los intereses de un grupo o clase social.*

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<sup>812</sup> “Jaungoikoa eta Lege-zarra.” *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 53, File 6. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDF/Fondo/iruj/14615.pdf> (consulted on May 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017).

<sup>813</sup> The extraterritorial meeting in Paris took place on January 30<sup>th</sup>, 1977 under the presidency of Juan Ajuria, who read the regulations of the assembly. The attendees to the meeting and the debate were the following: Manuel Irujo, Josu Arrieta, Faustino Pastor, Julián Garmendia, Patxi Iturrioz, Garbiñe de Arrieta, Pelikene Arrese, Rosario Domínguez, Mari Carmen de Arrarte, Antonio Gamarra, Iñaki Múgica, Satur Gárate, Ramón Agesta, Peru Ajuria, Maria Luisa Axtainza de Ajuria, Gregorio Urrejola, Enrique Sánchez, Maite Garmendia, Pepita Arrieta, José Luis Echebarrieta, and Felipe Malda. The members who took part in the deliberation were: Garmendia, Iturrioz, Arrieta, Gamarra, Mugika, Garate, Agesta, Ajuria, and Maite Garmendia. “Asamblea extraterritorial. 30 enero 1977.” AN, PNV-0359-07.

<sup>814</sup> “Asamblea extraterritorial. 30 enero 1977.” AN, PNV-0359-07, p. 12.

- d) *Partido de masas, por su pretensión de aunar las energías de todo un pueblo en situación de emergencia, en orden a la recuperación de su personalidad integral.*
- e) *Partido aconfesional y abierto a personas de cualquier credo o filosofía humanista, siempre que compartan los principios fundamentales del acervo cultural vasco entre los que destacan la igualdad en dignidad de todos los hombres y su autonomía de voluntad, su derecho al desarrollo de la propia personalidad a partir de sus peculiaridades propias, la forma democrática de ordenar las relaciones políticas, sociales y económicas, el respeto a los demás, la cohesión familiar en la cohesión y solidaridad social.*
- f) *Partido abierto a todos los vascos, entendiendo por tales a todos aquellos que se hallan integrados en nuestro pueblo y le conforman identificándose con él. Considera que la cualificación primero de pertenencia a un pueblo no lo constituye la sangre ni el nacimiento, sino la voluntad integradora, la impregnación cultural y la aportación a su desarrollo en cualquier orden de la vida.*

These definitions constitute a significant shift away from the PNV that had left for exile. The abandonment of the confessional character, although maintaining the “*Jaungoikoa eta lege zarra*” motto, together with a definition of Basque-ness without reference to blood ties or the place of birth, position the traditional Basque nationalism of the PNV as a more civic than ethnic nationalism, recognizing that nationality is not linked to such static features as ethnicity or blood, but rather a dynamic characteristic that may be acquired by means of language, culture, or even just through free will.

We can take for granted that Irujo’s opinion was listened to and taken into account, and, although we cannot assert that the opening statements of the Party’s declaration of principles had been forced by Irujo’s opinion, it is meaningful to quote a question posed to him in an interview that was published in the Journal of the Assembly: “*¿Qué le parece el párrafo inicial de la «declaración de principios»?*” To which Irujo answers: “*Muy bien.*”<sup>815</sup>

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<sup>815</sup> “Las impresiones de Irujo. Entrevista,” Journal on the 1977 Iruña Assembly. AN, DP-0506-05

## ii. Politics: From Europe to Autonomy

The first item of the political principles is very clear about the political goals of the traditional Basque nationalism of the PNV, when it asserts that the Party will work for: “*a) Por un Estado Vasco autonómico que sea ente político progresivo, en el ámbito de su democratización política, con la constante profundización en los niveles de libertad ciudadana a alcanzar, y en postura de solidaridad con la libertad de los demás pueblos del Estado.*”

It was nothing new—the political strategy of the PNV during the exile worked that way, as we have seen—but the updating of the principles of the Party left no room for interpretation, and certain details indicated that this could be but an initial stage, the key being in the second item, where the autonomy project was confirmed: “*b) Apoyando decididamente la actuación de las fuerzas políticas vascas de Euzkadi continental para la consecución de un marco político autónomo de las regiones vascas continental y reforzando los lazos culturales, económicos y viarios entre ámbitos vascos.*”

But if there is one thing that can be regarded as a potential future change in the Statutes with relation to the political autonomy of the Basque Country, and as a direct influence of the exile—that is the European feature of the principles.

Although, as Leyre Arrieta<sup>816</sup> states, the presence of Basque nationalism in Europe during the 60’s and 70’s was almost incidental, we should observe that the European Federal Movement had been Irujo’s spoiled child, and continued to be so until his return from exile.

The making of Europe during the decade of the 70’s was placing all the importance on the nation-states, leaving no space for nations without a State. Europe—and when we talk of Europe we are mostly referring to France during those years of building—had experienced the anger of nationalism during almost three quarters of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The national vindication from a people who did not have a State posed a threat for Europe, too heavily conditioned by the memory of two world wars and a totalitarian Russian nationalism that was still present in Europe, to consider a Europe of the peoples. Although Basque nationalism, and especially the PNV, had nothing to do with the ethnic and collectivistic nationalism associated with the Nazis or the Italian Fascio, and was totally opposed to the Spanish nationalism that still reigned in

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<sup>816</sup> ARRIETA, Leyre, 2007, *op. cit.*, p. 248.



Spain, the demands of the nations without a State were too risky for a “nationally” damaged Europe.

During these days, the PNV adopted the term “Europe of Peoples” to refer to a Europe that was in the making, dismissing the terms “Europe of Regions,” a concept used by Denis Rougemont, and the “Europe of Ethnic Groups,” by Guy Héraud.<sup>817</sup> The concept of “Region” did not fit well with the imagined Europe they had been dreaming of since 1949, yet in 1961 some Basque nationalists and recognized Europeanists, such as Manuel Irujo, did accept the “region” idea: “*Euzkadi Región de Europa*”. *Si lo flamenco y lo walon pueden ser regiones de Europa sin dejar de ser Bélgica, Cataluña y Euzkadi podrían ser regiones de Europa sin dejar de pertenecer al Estado español.*”<sup>818</sup>

Thus, in their 1966 Statement, the PNV were declaring an international politics plan that was firmly democratic, Europeanist, and nationalist, but linking their nationalism with culture, history, and language.

In relation to Europe, it defended the establishment of a Federation of peoples, avoiding again the word “nation,” and aligning its vocabulary with the mainstream vocabulary of the analysts who back in those days were studying nationalism and the making of Europe, such as Denis Rougemont or Guy Héraud. The articles by these authors in *Alderdi* dealt with the concept of Europe and the making of Europe, focusing on the “regions,” or even on the “ethnic groups,” but always avoiding “nation.”

The concept of “Europe of the peoples” or “Europe of the regions” was far from what left-wing Basque nationalism advocated in the period 1974-1976, when they signed the Brest Charter, but it implied the introduction of Revolutionary Basque nationalism in the European Movement.<sup>819</sup>

The Europe of peoples defended by the PNV and traditional Basque nationalism was also a vindication of the Federation of the European Union over the Confederation of State-nations. With the concept of Federation, the federalists had set out to defend the idea of “natural

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<sup>817</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 273.

<sup>818</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 274.

<sup>819</sup> The Brest Charter was an agreement signed by different European nationalist organizations in 1974, ratified in 1976 with the participation of the Basque nationalists of EHAS (Euskal Herriko Alderdi Sozialista), the Sinn Fein, the PSANP (Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacional Provisional), UDB (Union Démocratique Bretonne), UPG (Union do pobo galego), Cymru Goch, CG (Pays de Galles Rouge), ECT (Esquerra Catalana dels Treballadors), and Su populu Sardu – MCC. This charter was a declaration against colonialism and a defense of a Socialist Europe of peoples.

communities” that “*juzgaban como condición indispensable que la nueva Europa se hiciera realidad bajo el respeto de los derechos de las minorías, nacionalidades y regiones en el interior de los Estados y que, consecuentemente, preconizaban la modificación de la estructura interior de los Estados miembros como condición previa a toda federación.*”<sup>820</sup>

In those days Manuel Irujo had different opinions; he defended the Federal Movement (referring to the Europe of the States) and almost contradicted the official version of the PNV—which cost him a report from the EBB criticizing the disconformity of Manuel Irujo. The pragmatism of his plan, which involved negotiation with the Spanish political parties, was confronting the PNV declaration directly, although there was no declaration of intentions.

The idea that Manuel Irujo had about Europe and Federalism was always the idea of a superstructure that would ultimately render the States (Spain in that case) unnecessary for representing either peoples or nations. The idea is developed in many of his articles, including the one published from New York in *Ibérica*, “Nuestro Clamor a 1972.” Irujo expressed: “*Ansiamos una Europa Federal, con un parlamento, un gobierno, un tribunal supremo, un ejército, una representación internacional, una moneda, unas aduanas y un régimen económico-social de base común, dentro de cuya comunidad vivan libres y solidarizados los pueblos que integran el continente.*”<sup>821</sup>

There was also the opposite example in the PNV—probably very representative of the transition that the Traditional Party was undergoing. The section of EGI, through their journal *Gudari*, defended the “Europe of the peoples,” but without the equidistance that the PNV put at the forefront. Their theories were close to those espoused by left-wing nationalist movements during the 70’s, and vindicated the rights of the nations over the rights of the States, but in EGI’s case, the Christian component was added.<sup>822</sup>

Although the restructuring of the political party had turned all efforts towards the inside, Manuel Irujo never let the European strategy of achieving recognition for the Basque cause slip from his mind until the end of his days in exile.

He had developed the theory of the superstructure by taking example from his trips and experiences in the exile. Thus, in 1974, to counter the incidence of other Basque nationalisms

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<sup>820</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 272.

<sup>821</sup> “Nuestro clamor a 1972,” in *Ibérica*, January 15<sup>th</sup>, 1972. Published in: IRUJO, Manuel, 1984, *op. cit.*, pp. 296-297.

<sup>822</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 278-279.

that vindicated independence for the Basque Country, Irujo published an article entitled “*Independencia, Autonomía, Federación,*” where he tried to explain the updating of these three concepts.

In the article, Irujo sets out the idea of “interdependence,” which he sees as the future of a federal union in Europe, a union of regions, since, in fact, “*Nuestro destino es el de trocarnos en región de Europa, para los vascos la formula política equivalente, de hecho, a la independencia nacional.*”

The future for Irujo lay in an interdependence inside a connected Europe, devoid of borders, with Europe as the guardian of Euskadi’s national independence. And the message was addressing the young people directly: “*Es preciso que sepa incorporar a su acervo político el ideal europeo; que se dé cuenta de que “Europa Unida” tiene para nosotros la traducción de “Euzkadi Azkatuta.*”<sup>823</sup>

Probably with the aim of instilling in the young Basque nationalists the same enthusiasm for the European movement that he had, Irujo promoted the presence of young people at the meetings of the different bodies that the PNV had presence in. Ramon Sota relates his experience at several European meetings:

“*A partir de 1970 se fueron añadiendo otras actividades, concretamente en el terreno internacional, con la asistencia a diversos y variados congresos. Asistí al congreso de la Unión Europea de Federalistas, con una delegación encabezada por Jose Mari Lasarte, donde les conocí a Jesús Insausti, a Andoni Olabarri y a Gorka Aguirre. Al congreso del Movimiento Europeo, con una delegación encabezada por Manuel Irujo, donde conocí al Bermeano Gonzalo Nárdiz Consejero del Gobierno Vasco por ANV, a diversas reuniones del CFEME....*”<sup>824</sup>

He also attended some meetings of the European Christian Democracy but, according to Sota, they were afraid that excessive identification of the PNV with Christian Democracy would affect their national identification. In that respect, Sota recalls how the Spanish representatives were baffled when they visited the international circuits and discovered a worrisome presence of Basques, especially because the Basques were well-prepared and constant in relation to

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<sup>823</sup> “Independencia, Autonomía, Federación,” in OPE, no. 7. Caracas, September, 1974. Published in: IRUJO, Manuel, 1984, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-310.

<sup>824</sup> DE LA SOTA, Ramon, 2016, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

international spheres. According to Sota, the Spanish never understood the Basque interest in international influence: “*En uno de estos encuentros estaba José María Lasarte hablando con Enrique Tierno Galván*<sup>825</sup> y en el transcurso de la conversación José María mencionó «El Pueblo Vasco», a lo que Tierno Galván le interrumpió diciéndole «no empecemos con argumentos antropológicos». Para el Profesor Don Enrique Tierno Galván, el pueblo vasco no era más que un fenómeno antropológico sin derecho a tener una dimensión política.”<sup>826</sup>

The European bodies that traditional Basque nationalists had been participating in during the exile were in crisis, as has just been mentioned, and linked to that crisis was a sensation of uselessness and anachronism that many of the Basque nationalists, especially the young, felt in relation with the European cause. Nevertheless, Irujo, Ajuriaguerra, and some other Spanish democrats still stood by the European Federal Movement as a lobby of pressure to force the democratization of Spain.<sup>827</sup>

Irujo was the president of the CFEME from 1973 to 1976; that was the strategy that he had developed during the Congress of Europe in February 1976—and it would be his last.

The congress, according to a report written by Irujo on December 5<sup>th</sup>, 1976, was organized with the aspiration of becoming as important as The Hague Congress had been 1948, and the objective of the Congress was the constitution of the European Union. With that in view, the CFEME prepared a project proposal that envisaged the possible future democratization of Spain.

The Congress took place in Brussels from February 5<sup>th</sup> to 7<sup>th</sup> of 1976, and in his speech Manuel Irujo deployed his strategy of proposing a European federation that would stand in favor of the democratization of Spain: “*El Congreso de Europa declara que sólo una España plena y efectivamente democrática podrá formar parte del conjunto de naciones que componen la Europa Comunitaria.*”<sup>828</sup>

It was the same strategy that had been followed by the Spanish European Movement, particularly since the Congress in Munich, but Irujo was still confident in the European bodies. Europe had opened its relations with the Spanish dictatorship somewhat, whether Irujo was

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<sup>825</sup> Enrique Tierno Galván was a socialist member of the PSOE. Tierno Galván was elected mayor of Madrid in the first democratic elections, and was mayor until his death on January 19<sup>th</sup> 1986, enjoying a vast popularity.

<sup>826</sup> DE LA SOTA, Ramon, 2016, p. 6.

<sup>827</sup> PABLO CONTRERAS, Santiago de, 2002, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

<sup>828</sup> AN, PNV-0128-05.

willing to admit it or not, but the access to the European Union should have been restricted to only democracies.

In his speech, Irujo emphasized the interest of the Spaniards in becoming a part of the European Union, but at the same time he demanded

*“la liberación inmediata de todos los presos y detenidos políticos, el retorno libre de todos los exiliados, el restablecimiento de la libertad de expresión, de reunión y de asociación, el reconocimiento de todos los partidos políticos y de todas las organizaciones sin discriminación alguna, y el respeto a la personalidad, derechos u libertades de las diferentes nacionalidades y comunidades del estado español.”*<sup>829</sup>

The proposal was adopted after being acclaimed and showered with a long ovation.

But however successful Irujo might be in the European arenas, where he was well recognized, the PNV did not seem to be interested in the European movement, as became clear after the resignation of Irujo from the presidency of the CFEME on November 19<sup>th</sup>, 1976.

The Secretary General of the European Movement, Mr. Van Schendel, had intended to slowly incorporate the CFEME in Spain, since this was the only case of a member with a Presidency in the exile, and therefore it was proposed to allow for a duality of presidents, one from the inside and the other from the exile—just in case. The proposal was accepted in February, and in May it was decided that the headquarters would move to Madrid.

In face of the little interest that the Party had shown with respect to the changes, and despite Irujo having exposed in a letter to the EBB in June of 1976 that *“Quiero que EBB sepa lo que hay planteado para que discurra y opere. Lo vasco, teóricamente está expresado por el Consejo Federal Vasco por el Movimiento Europeo (...) pero a la práctica, la gestión la lleva el PNV”*<sup>830</sup>—Irujo resigned from the presidency.

His position was filled by Miquel Coll i Alentorn, a Catalan politician, member of Unió Democràtica de Catalunya and recommended by Irujo, but the CFEME was practically dead after having effected its transfer towards the inside.

Irujo lamented the situation in a letter to Iñaki Ansagasti in January, 1977 intimately hoping that the young man would be able to do something:

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<sup>829</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>830</sup> Letter to EBB. June 25<sup>th</sup>, 1976. AN, PNV-0128-05

*“El consejo federal se ha trasladado al Estado Español, como usted sabe. (...) El consejo ha celebrado ya dos sesiones plenarias. Todos los miembros han designado sus representantes. Todos, menos los vascos. (...) Los vascos constituimos una de las “familias” fundadoras del Consejo, en el que tenemos la representación consiguiente, que no debemos perder. Así al menos lo entiendo yo. A trabajar.”*<sup>831</sup>

Despite the long agony of the European Federal Movement, it was probably the long tradition of Europeanism within the PNV that explains the fact that the declaration of political principles included a special reference to Europe, reaffirming its European tradition:

*“ c) Responsabilizándose de su deber de colaborar en la construcción y el desarrollo de Europa, a lo que concibe:*

- *Formada no solo la federación de las actuales estructuras estatales, sino por pueblos libres en su ser político y diferencial y unidos bajo un techo estructural común político y económico, susceptible de cubrir un desarrollo comunitario.”*

In that respect, also interesting is the next reference, which is directly pointing to the international division into blocks that was born out of WWII and gave birth to the Cold War:

- *Liberada de los condicionamientos y dependencias de la política de bloques surgida del reparto de despojos de la II Guerra Mundial y de la subsiguiente guerra fría.*
- *Progresiva, buscando nuevas formas de convivencia y de colaboración en la convergencia de sistemas político-sociales y del intercambio de experiencias válidas, adquiridas en marcos tan diferentes.*
- *Con vocación Mundial, de cara al Tercer Mundo, al subdesarrollo tecnológico y al hombre y a la tiranía.”*

And, finally, the declaration makes a turn back to the “Europe of the peoples”:

- *En el marco de esta Europa de Pueblos es donde hallará su relación la unidad política de los vascos y su libertad, en igualdad y solidaridad con los demás pueblos europeos y con una estructura política propia surgida de la voluntad libre de todos los vascos.”*<sup>832</sup>

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<sup>831</sup> Letter from Manuel Irujo to Iñaki Anasagasti. January 28<sup>th</sup>, 1977. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 19, File A. Also in: <http://www.euskomedia.org/PDFFondo/irujjo/9121.pdf> (consulted on May 20<sup>th</sup> 2017).

<sup>832</sup> “En lo político,” Journal on the 1977 Iruña Assembly. AN, DP-0506-05

### iii. Culture: The Basque language

If something had changed in the years of exile, it was the central position of culture in the definition of Basque nationalism.

As we have already seen, the use of the Basque language and the promotion of Basque culture grew through the creation of *Ikastolas* and the new impulse of *Euskaltzaindia* since the Basque Studies congress in Aranzazu in 1968. That was a meeting of linguistics and literature writers to create a new standard common Basque language led by Koldo Mitxelena, professor of linguistic at University of Salamanca, and linked to the PNV.<sup>833</sup>

In the declaration of principles of the Iruña Assembly, culture and the Basque language played an important role, linking the Basque culture with the existence of the nation, and definitely turning Basque nationalism into a civic nationalism: “*La cultura es expresión de la existencia de un pueblo, elemento de coexión (sic.) e instrumento de identificación del mismo.*”<sup>834</sup>

The communication dealing with culture was one of the most debated in the assembly, as we mentioned before, especially as regards the questions of the use of the Basque language and which language should be used by the Basque nationalists of the PNV.

The necessity of a unified Basque language was an old debate, but, as we have seen in previous chapters, in the 60’s there was a renewal of the necessity, the studies, and the promotion.

Since 1963, and mostly from Bayonne, a group around Txillardegui promoted the creation of a standardized version of the Basque language, as presented in the document *Baiona’ko Biltzarrereren Erabakiak*, generating much interest and debate in the Basque cultural world.

In 1968 another report came out, conceived by the same group of people, this time gathered in *Ermua*, and was published in the journal *Jakin* (nos. 31-32). Finally, the *Euskaltzaindia* commissioned a project from the linguist Koldo Mitxelena, which would be published in full in *Euskera* (1968).<sup>835</sup>

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<sup>833</sup> More on Aranzazu and the agreements approved there at:

<http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/102736/98002> (Consulted on May 20th, 2017)

<sup>834</sup> “En lo cultural,” Journal on the 1977 Iruña Assembly. AN, DP-0506-05

<sup>835</sup> More info on the evolution of the unification of the Basque language can be found at:

<http://www.euskomedia.org/aunamendi/137948/92969>, as well as a detailed linguistic analysis of the changes in the article “La unificación del Euskera,” by Kamarka. AN, Irujo Fund- 0071-02

The need for a “national language” is a good sign of the will to build a nation and the firm goal of becoming a State, which developed around the cultural and educational idea and project.

In this respect, the extraterritorial assembly in Paris was convinced that the Culture communication should clearly mark out the difference between culture and education, since in order to build a good educational framework it was essential to properly develop culture. The use of the Basque language was moreover indispensable: “*Sobre la finalidad, todos los abertzales están de acuerdo: que toda la enseñanza se de en euskera en todos los grados y en todo el territorio vasco.*”<sup>836</sup>

Related to the use of the Basque language and derived from the necessity for a standard language, a question that caused controversy was the choosing of the dialectal variant of the Basque language that the PNV should use.

The *Euskara batua* that had emerged from the different studies, especially from Koldo Mitxelena’s project, was based on the central dialectal variants, that is, those from Gipuzkoa, Navarre, and Lapurdi—and that was something that generated certain reservations, especially among the Biscayans, who, considered that the language of a minority was being imposed on a majority, quickly launched a campaign against the use of the Basque of Gipuzkoa, accusing it of making a disproportionate use of the letter “H.”

These accusations are reflected in a letter sent by Alberto Onaindia to Manuel Irujo by the end of 1976, where he describes the situation in the inside and the divisions that the use of the language is provoking: “*Todo ello con hojas de inscripción y textos oficiales llenos de H y H y H. No poco han devuelto las hojas. Esta labor Hachista se atribuye sobre todo al sobrino del Lehendakari, un hijo de Ricardo que debe ser del GUI.B.B. Hay corriente contra él.*”<sup>837</sup>

Although in the declaration of principles there is no specific reference to the dialectal variant chosen, we know from the chronicle in the journal that the Party decided to adopt the Gipuzkoan variant and promoted its use as the national language:

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<sup>836</sup> “Asamblea extraterritorial. 30 enero 1977.” AN, PNV-0021-11.

<sup>837</sup> Alberto Onaindia to Manuel Irujo. St. Jean de Luz, December 27<sup>th</sup>, 1976. *Euskomedia*, Irujo Fund, Signature J, Box 18, File E-F.



“EL PARTIDO NACIONALISTA VASCO, en consecuencia, SE COMPROMETE a promover la tarea colectiva de LIBERTAD CULTURAL de Euzkadi mediante el recate, la conservación, desarrollo u creación continua de cuanto suponga cultura propugnando:

- La promoción del euskera como lengua nacional de Euzkadi, vehículo de cultural con carácter de valoración social inmediata para el desempeño de funciones públicas.
- Control vasco de nuestra cultura, no admitiendo que injerencias extrañas regulen el fomento y la gestión de las manifestaciones, medios y canales culturales.”<sup>838</sup>

With respect to education, the PNV developed a solution that was social in nature, with its defense of the “enseñanza libre, gratuita, adaptada, permanente, descentralizada y práctica, en consonancia con las leyes promulgadas por los órganos en que la sociedad vasca delegue el poder.”

And, as a feature of modernity and a differentiating element, they promoted bilingualism, as described by Joseba Azkarraga: “El euskera es una de los elementos más diferenciadores de la nación vasca. Hay que buscar un bilingüismo progresivo y efectivo.”<sup>839</sup>

In fact, the assembly of Iruña approved the promotion of an immediate bilingualism from kindergarten to university, defending the creation of “national ikastolas” that would integrate all the Basques, and a Basque University that would be organized around a single university district.<sup>840</sup>

Culture and language became one of the features of nationalism for building up a unified nation, not only under the same political organization, but under the same cultural structures and the same language.

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<sup>838</sup> “En lo cultural,” Journal on the 1977 Iruña Assembly. AN, DP-0506-05

<sup>839</sup> “Frases Felices,” Journal on the 1977 Iruña Assembly. AN, DP-0506-05

<sup>840</sup> “En lo cultural,” Journal on the 1977 Iruña Assembly. AN, DP-0506-05

#### iv. Socio-economic Basque nationalism

The Socio-economic communication that was to be presented at the General Assembly in Pamplona was considered by the Extraterritorial Assembly in Paris as the key document, without any doubt.

This consideration was grounded on the conscience of having been in the exile long enough to have built up an imagined community, as Benedict Anderson would say, but adding besides a positive perception of Basque society as seen from the exile:

*“Los afiliados de París que llevamos gran parte de nuestra vida en el exterior nos hemos formado de Euzkadi una imagen idealizada.”*<sup>841</sup>

But this situation—proving Plutarch’s theory right—could be seen as an advantage: *“ya que ha sido contrastada con el acontecer cotidiano de los países más adelantados. Se trata pues de una aportación modesta, pero no exenta de interés, al tratar de encontrar el futuro del pueblo vasco.”*<sup>842</sup>

The eighth province was aware of its importance and of the significant contribution that the community in exile could make for the renewal of traditional Basque nationalism. The exile had been long and tough, lives had been flung far away from the Basque Country, yet at the same time it had been capable of constructing, through analysis and experience, an alternative system that could be instituted in a new Basque Country.

*“Reflexionando sobre el comportamiento de las colectividades vascas en Europa y las Américas, con sus fallos y contradicciones, se puede afirmar que se han movido en torno a tres nociones principales: el espíritu al trabajo, el amor a la libertad y el sentimiento de solidaridad.”*<sup>843</sup>

It was possible for these three qualities to be introduced in the Basque Country, since, according to the extraterritorial assembly in Paris, despite the autarchic situation of the dictatorship they were qualities inherent in the Basques.

As Alberto Onaindia had remarked in advance, there was a heated debate on the social politics from the economic perspective of the PNV and, although that did not mean they were

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<sup>841</sup> “Asamblea extraterritorial. 30 enero 1977.” AN, PNV-0359-07, p. 2.

<sup>842</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>843</sup> *Ibid.*

considering adopting socialism, it is still true that there was some pressure from certain groups within the PNV to adjust the economic program to the social needs of the Basques.

As for the members of the extraterritorial assembly in Paris, when they analyzed the section that went under the title “*Hacia un sistema socializado*,” they put the emphasis on the fact that the economic and social tradition of the PNV had always been popular: “*El pueblo fue el elemento dinámico que tomó las decisiones y las puso en práctica. (...) el partido rechazó los planteamientos de los grupos minoritarios cuando pretendieron erigirse en protagonistas de los procesos de inmovilismo o de protección de los intereses creados.*”<sup>844</sup>

In a Basque Country that had changed so much economically since their flight into exile, the PNV was vindicating the economic tradition that they had developed alongside the people—although the other political parties saw matters differently. The conservative feature of traditional Basque nationalism in the field of economics had been criticized by the emergent leftist and *abertzale* groups, like ETA, as we have already seen—thus the strong necessity to explain its “social economy.”

What we can infer from the parallel assembly that took place in Paris is that its gathered members were criticizing the communication of socio-economical proposals for having forgotten not only about the socio-economic activities carried out by the PNV during the short period of the Republican Government, but also about its work in towns and provincial councils as if nothing had been done, taking the accusations of their political opponents at face value:

*“En una enumeración de antecedentes, con las alteraciones de la época, convendría considerar la labor del PNV en ayuntamientos y diputaciones. (...) Los servicios públicos de ayuntamientos y diputaciones en general, en 1936, hubieran podido compararse ventajosamente con los que vimos funcionar en otros países al iniciarse nuestro exilio. Las cajas de ahorro se hallaban entonces bajo el patronato de los ayuntamientos, más cerca de los problemas sociales y de las necesidades de la población que las instituciones similares de otros países a día de hoy.”*<sup>845</sup>

Once again, the exile and the experiences afforded by it are an invaluable experience for the construction of a new nationalism. The exile was vindicating not just the tradition but the experience—and not at all with the intention of stagnating, but with the will of advocating the

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<sup>844</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>845</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

good work that had been done. Again, the differences not only came from the young-old duality, but also from the exile-inside.

Maite Garmendia, present in Paris, believed that a communication as important as the social economic proposal had been should involve an economic program based on data and statistical information, rather than just a simple exposition of the problems found in socialist and capitalist systems.

*“Propone un intento de superar las deficiencias, pero no da ninguna solución para resolver los problemas. Es un relato muy teórico (...).”*<sup>846</sup>

The socio-economic communication was, for the nationalist members in Paris, an exercise in political and economic prejudices (especially against capitalism) which they, drawing from their experiences in the exile, could prove wrong.

*“Se preocupa la Ponencia de condenar, y con justicia, los errores y excesos del capitalismo vasco. Una primera matización de las afirmaciones del autor pudiera consistir en rendir el debido homenaje al pueblo trabajador. ¿No ha cumplido su deber hasta con creces?”*<sup>847</sup>

Capitalism is intensely criticized and yet, based on their own experiences in the exile, industrialization is the future and means progress—although, as in France, the social tendency is to censure capitalism while at the same demanding more industries to balance the situation between the regions.

Based on the experience of the work carried out by the Basque Government and the life-lessons of the exile, the Basque nationalists in Paris recommend introducing within the PNV a group that would be in charge of studying and controlling the situation.

Finally, a sharp reprimand is levelled against the communication in relation to the lack of references to workers’ rights. The extraterritorial assembly in Paris suggested including some reference to the defense of workers’ right, in agreement with the Basque nationalist trade unionist tradition, as petitioned by Ramon Agesta, representative of the ELA-STV.

The declaration of principles of the Assembly in Iruña gathered some of these proposals, but the debate, as already commented, was long and heated when it came to that particular

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<sup>846</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>847</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

communication, as the rumors about the “socialism” of the PNV were not very well welcomed on the part of the audience.

The most important agreements in the declaration had to do with the economic and social aspect, the matters that came under the title of “*Económico Social*”: “*La liberación plena de Euzkadi recoge las ideas fundamentales de libertad nacional y liberación social. Ambos conceptos están íntimamente relacionados y forman parte del mismo proceso de acción política que han de conducir al hombre en Euzkadi a la libertad.*”<sup>848</sup>

Such statement shows that the PNV was yearning to retrieve the social feature originally found in Basque nationalism, more in accordance with their own vision, and was prepared to win over that portion of the people that in those days, by the end of the 70’s, had to be shared with other Basque nationalist organizations that were not there before.

The development of the “social economy” is envisaged in all of the economic principles, where egalitarianism is developed in both social and economic terms with a view to transforming society and fulfilling the right of every citizen to take part in the decision-making. Power is handed over to the people as the agent of transformation: “*El orden social a instaurar en Euzkadi ha de revestir un carácter popular, entendiendo que ha de ser el mismo Pueblo el elemento dinámico de su transformación.*”<sup>849</sup>

The principles directly incorporated some of the suggestions that had been made from the exile, such as the importance of the workers’ rights in social economy, the valuation of private property, and the plan to control certain community services.

Finally, it should be interesting to notice that there was a constant appeal to the connections existing between social economy and democracy: “*Las ideas de la democracia política y democracia económica implican conceptos inseparables, considerado que la aplicación simultánea de las mismas es indispensable para una configuración justa y democrática de la sociedad*” and also “*La planificación de la economía ha de revestir un carácter plenamente democrático, de forma que permita a la sociedad optar entre las distintas alternativas económicas y haga posible el acceso de todos los ciudadanos a las responsabilidades que se derivan de las decisiones adoptadas.*”<sup>850</sup>

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<sup>848</sup> “En lo económico social,” Journal on the 1977 Iruña Assembly. AN, DP-0506-05.

<sup>849</sup> “En lo económico social,” Journal on the 1977 Iruña Assembly. AN, DP-0506-05

<sup>850</sup> “En lo económico social,” Journal on the 1977 Iruña Assembly. AN, DP-0506-05

The nationalism of the PNV had the intention of defending the “social economy,” therefore social democracy, not socialism.



## 8. CONCLUSIONS

Havent arribat al final de la nostra anàlisi i després de la recerca exhaustiva sobre l'evolució del nacionalisme basc a l'exili, que no va ser un de sol, sinó molts, ara és moment de recapitular per determinar si s'han assolit els objectius plantejats i, per tant, si es poden corroborar les hipòtesis plantejades en la introducció d'aquesta tesi.

Fem memòria, per començar. Els tres eixos amb els quals he estructurat la investigació es resumeixen així: Primer, l'exili i la influència dels exiliats en la redefinició del nacionalisme tradicional basc; segon, l'homologació internacional de les diverses branques del nacionalismes basc, i, tercer, els models polítics i ideològics de cada sector.

A quines conclusions hem arribat. Resumidament, són aquestes:

- **L'exili i la influència dels exiliats en la redefinició del nacionalisme tradicional basc**

Si des d'una perspectiva teòrica ens plantejàvem quina era la relació entre el nacionalisme i l'exili i si havia estat possible "imaginar" la nació des de l'exili, acabada la nostra investigació hem de concloure que sí que va ser possible. El nacionalisme tradicional basc va "endur-se" la nació a l'exili, si se'n permet formular-ho així, a fi de preservar-ne la continuïtat, un cop sotmès el territori a la dominació franquista. Les relacions personals i polítiques a l'exili es van construir com si encara fossin a Euskal Herria. Tota acció es feia en nom de la nació i la causa basca. Com hem explicat al llarg del treball, una nació no necessita límits territorials per ser definida i assumida pels que s'hi identifiquen. Al contrari, de vegades els límits es posen posteriorment a la voluntat d'una comunitat d'individus d'erigir-se en nació. El límits geogràfics poden variar, i de fet moltes vegades passa, quan arrenca la fase de construcció de la nació imaginada, en la reproducció de l'ideal nacional.

Si el primer nacionalisme tradicional basc identificava la nació basca tan sols amb el territori de Biscaia, al segle XX aquests límits territorials van ser ampliat pel mateix nacionalisme que es feia anomenar "bizkaitarra" al segle XIX. Tal com hem vist, a l'exili es passa de la reivindicació del "Laurak bat" (del quatre a l'u) al "Zazpiak bat" (del set al l'u), però també hem vist que l'exili es converteix, de fet, en una vuitena província, en aquest cas imaginària, que serveix de refugi per a la nació delmada pel franquisme.



La (re)construcció de la nació a l'exili comença tan bon put s'inicia el desterrament. Ara bé, aquest procés qualla amb la celebració, l'any 1956, del Primer Congrés Mundial Basc. Va ser llavors, quan el règim franquista s'anava consolidant gràcies als reconeixement internacional, que el nacionalisme tradicional basc va propiciar el debat sobre la nació des d'una perspectiva cultural, política, econòmica i fins i tot estratègica. Al congrés es posa de manifest la voluntat de (re)construir la nació, de desplegar un projecte nacional nou malgrat viure fora de les fronteres geogràfiques establertes en l'imaginari basc tradicional.

L'exili és un no-lloc que esdevé el refugi de la nació mitjançant l'empenta del nacionalisme per definir la nació cultural i política i consolidar-la en l'imaginari nacional. Dotar l'exili d'història, de relacions humanes i d'identitat nacionals preserva els exiliats de convertir-se en mers emigrants. Els exiliats nacionalistes bascos omplen de contingut el seu exili per ajudar a desenvolupar la nació i fins i tot recrear-la més enllà de les fronteres tradicionals. El no-lloc es converteix en lloc.

El Congrés Mundial Basc és la materialització d'aquest projecte en un gran debat universal que pretén ajudar a refer els patrons nacionals. Amb l'edició del *Libro Blanco* dedicat a analitzar els 20 anys del govern a l'exili es busca expandir internacionalment la causa basca, però també té com a rerefons la voluntat dels nacionalistes de connectar les institucions basques d'autogovern de 1936 amb les de l'exili. I tanmateix son una mena d'evolució, per no dir-ne rectificació, en relació amb el que defensava el PNB dels anys 30.

A París, al 1956, es fa un pas endavant en la manera d'entendre la nació, incloent-hi propostes dirigides a modificar, per exemple, les reivindicacions territorials tradicionals, ja que, per exemple, s'inclou Navarra entre els territoris d'Euskal Herria, o bé la defensa de la llengua, per damunt de l'origen, del llinatge, a l'hora de definir la pertinença.

En aquest sentit, aquesta modificació serà una de les més determinants alhora de tornar a conceptualitzar el nacionalisme basc i passar d'un nacionalisme ètnic i exclusiu a un nacionalisme cívic, inclusiu i voluntari, de lliure adhesió.

La llengua esdevindrà al llarg de l'exili una de les característiques pròpies del nacionalisme basc que més rellevància i que amb més força creixerà en la reformulació teòrica del corpus ideològic dels diferents nacionalismes.

- **L'exili, vuitena província**

L'exili, malgrat els inconvenients, esdevé el marc ideal per redefinir el nacionalisme basc. És un espai segur i no tan sols en un sentit territorial. És un estat d'anomia, per dir-ho en termes durkhemians, que converteix l'expatriació en una oportunitat per recrear, conservar i protegir la nació perduda. El no-lloc, com he dit abans, es converteix en el lloc per preservar la cultura i la llengua ja que al País Basc, sota domini de la dictadura franquista, és perseguida i es pretén erradicar.

L'exili, per tant, va convertir-se, de facto, en la vuitena província basca, un territori no definit geogràficament però que defensa la nació dels bascos representada pel govern basc i els partits nacionalistes. És per això que a l'exili proliferen com mai abans les revistes i les publicacions i fins i tot altres mitjans de comunicació com ara Ràdio Euzkadi. La nació es viscuda des del relat, del record, i, sobretot, de la pàtria imaginada que els exiliats van ajudar a definir. La profusió de la premsa basca a l'exili ajuda no tan sols a mantenir la nació, sinó a reproduir-la i a conservar-la i, també, a fer-la evolucionar.

La nació pot reproduir-se lluny del territori real sempre que la comunitat afectada se senti identificada amb la nació imaginada, que és el que dona sentit de pertinença. La diferència entre un grup d'immigrants i les comunitats d'exiliats és que els exiliats reproduïen els trets nacionals per evitar ser assimilats. La idea del retorn és molt present i, per tant, cal evitar passar a esdevenir immigrants allà on s'ha arribat fugint de la dictadura. Sense menystenir la comunitat d'acollida, els exiliats viuen en una bombolla a l'espera de retornar a casa. És per això que la seva vida sembla viscuda en diferit, com si fos una extensió del país d'origen. Si l'exili passa de ser passiu i es converteix en actiu, llavors és quan, com passa amb els nacionalistes bascos, esdevé una nova comunitat, la vuitena província basca.

Malgrat tots, la força de la nova província basca no rau només en la reproducció de la nació sinó que, com hem comprovat, esdevé creadora de contingut divers i diferenciat, dotant-la encara més d'una identitat que la fa part del moviment nacional.

- **L'exili, la benedicció amarga**

Un dels aspectes que corrobora aquesta investigació sobre l'exili és que queda confirmada la tesi formulada per l'historiador clàssic grec Plutarc, segons la qual "l'exili pot arribar a ser una benedicció amarga".

El llarg exili al que van set sotmesos els nacionalistes bascos va ser, certament, “una benedicció amarga”. La llarga expatriació que empènyer-los a configurar una nació basca imaginada, acomodada, per tant, als estàndards polítics de les democràcies on van anar a viure els exiliats. Lluny de la repressió, quan la nació basca sota la dictadura franquista estava en perill de desaparèixer, els exiliats es van convertir en els mantenidors de l’ideal nacional, que es va veure modificat per la influència de l’ambient polític del país d’acollida.

El que he pogut constatar és que el nacionalisme basc a l’exili s’ajusta als paràmetres democràtics occidentals, que incorporarà al corpus ideològic que adopta per definir-se, extret dels contactes amb partits ideològicament afins, la democràcia cristiana o els moviments d’alliberament nacional. Reivindicar la democràcia es convertirà en part de la reivindicació nacional. L’homologació internacional del nacionalisme tradicional basc arriba de l’entorn del federalisme europeu i la democràcia cristiana, legitimant així els valors europeistes i democràtics oposats a la dictadura franquista que domina el territori d’Euskadi.

L’exili amarg del qual parlava Plutarc –i que també va reivindicar el filòsof contemporani polonès Leszek Kolakowski, combina un doble sentiment: per una banda, el sentiment de culpa vers els compatriotes que pateixen les restriccions del règim totalitari i, per l’altra, el sentiment d’epifania, ja que l’exili és on els condemnats a viure fora de la pàtria desenvoluparan la tasca de bastir els fonaments intel·lectuals de la nova nació imaginada. Una nació imaginada que estarà condicionada per la benedicció amarga que representa la llibertat forçada per l’exili. Allò que la comunitat basca de Veneçuela definia com el *Cuba libre* amargo del exilio, de fet va ser acabar essent un factor de modernització de les base doctrinals del nacionalisme basc.

- **El reconeixement internacional del nacionalisme basc**

L’exili preserva la comunitat però també és porós respecte de l’entorn on viu. I un dels aspectes és el contacte amb partits i corrents culturals que són presents al país on s’han instal·lat una comunitat d’exiliats. El PNB de seguida va pensar en diverses estratègies d’homologació internacional del nacionalisme basc a l’exili. Com hem pogut constatar al llarg d’aquesta tesi, el nacionalisme tradicional basc, representat bàsicament pels membres del PNB i d’ANB i també pel Govern Basc, va abocar-se en el Moviment Europeu i la Democràcia Cristiana per obtenir el reconeixement internacional.

Si en la primera etapa de l’exili, l’anterior als anys estudiats aquí, el nacionalisme va decantar-se per l’estratègia americana o atlantista, buscant aconseguir una relació estable amb els Estats

Units, a partir del 1956 l'eix vira cap a Europa. El motor d'aquest canvi va ser la celebració aquell any del Primer Congrés Mundial Basc.

La constatació que el règim franquista es consolidava amb el reconeixement per part de les NN.UU. amb l'aval dels EUA, va obligar al nacionalisme tradicional basc a replantejar la seva estratègia internacional. A més, ja s'havia acabat l'època en què els nacionalistes bascos havien ajudat els aliats com a espies. Calia cercar noves aliances internacionals. Des del congrés mundial de París però especialment després de la mort del lehendakari Aguirre i del Congrés de Munic, l'estratègia que s'imposa al PNB és l'uropeisme, amb la participació dels nacionalistes tradicionals bascos en moltes i diverses assemblees i organitzacions implicades en la reivindicació d'Europa com a alternativa democràtica o fins i tot en organisme transnacionals com ara la UNESCO. L'uropeisme esdevé una forma d'antifranquisme i sovint topa amb l'experiència dels que viuen a l'interior i que no comparteixen la deriva del nacionalisme tradicional basc i el seu alineament amb el bloc occidental que es reivindica des dels paràmetres de la guerra freda. L'arreglament occidentalista i antisoviètic del nacionalisme tradicional basc a l'exili els aboca a participar en iniciatives com ara el *Congress for Cultural Freedom*, que serà rebutjat pels sectors joves que han anat sorgint a l'interior.

El nacionalisme basc revolucionari, nascut sota la pressió de la dictadura franquista però també consolidat a l'exili, optarà per donar suport al moviment dels no-alineats, creat a redós dels moviments anticolonials del Tercer Món i del comunisme dissident a l'estil iugoslau, per a reivindicar l'Europa dels pobles davant de l'Europa dels Estats. La retòrica revolucionària i la violència esdevindran l'estratègia internacionalista dels nacionalistes bascos revolucionaris vinculats a ETA

Malgrat que, com hem vist, tot i que a la dècada dels anys 60 comencen a obrir-se pas les teories que parlen de l'ús de la violència per assolir objectius polítics i l'alliberament nacional, no va ser fins a la dècada dels 70 que la violència es va convertir en una estratègia constant. Totes les reflexions que fan els nacionalistes bascos revolucionaris al voltant de l'ús de la violència contempen la internacionalització de la causa basca. El judici de Burgos, tot i que no va ser buscat, és la materialització d'aquesta estratègia internacionalitzadora, unida al segrest del excònsol alemany per una part de l'organització armada per pressionar el govern alemany i indirectament el règim franquista. L'ús de la violència monopolitzarà els debats i les activitats del nacionalisme a l'exterior, obligant als nacionalistes tradicionals bascos a posicionar-se. Aquí, com hem vist, Manuel Irujo es va convertir en un pont entre dues maneres

d'entendre l'acció política, condemnant l'ús de la violència però defensant els torturats i damnificats per règim dictatorial franquista.

Seria agosarat afirmar que haver optat per la violència va ser una influència exclusivament adquirida a l'exili. No va ser així, però l'exili va proporcionar models, mètodes i exemples que van inspirar el nacionalisme revolucionari basc i van connectar-lo amb altres moviments armats del món. Des de la publicació de *Vasconia*, de Federico Krutwig, que és qui teoritza la lluita armada molt influenciat per l'experiència algeriana i israeliana, fins a les tesis dels germans Etxebarrieta, els quals afegeixen al nacionalisme basc aspectes ideològics apresos de la revolució vietnamita o de la revolució cultural de Mao, el nacionalisme revolucionari basc sempre té posada la mirada a l'exterior.

En aquest respecte, és important assenyalar la connexió de les idees revolucionàries i d'acció directa, de resistència activa, de les noves generacions de nacionalistes bascos amb el nacionalisme radical sorgit dels anys 30, abandonat a l'exili per Elias Gallastegi. Gallastegi esdevingué la font d'inspiració i la gran influència d'Etxebarrieta a l'exili. L'opció per la lluita armada refuta l'opció moderada del Govern Basc i la reivindicació estatutària per a abraçar les tesis violentes de Gallastegi, d'influència irlandesa. Per a la nova generació, la solució del conflicte nacional només es resoldria amb lluita armada. Així doncs, per aquest sector la internacionalització del conflicte basc havia d'anar lligada a la solidaritat revolucionària mundial i dels moviments d'alliberament nacional.

- **Les ideologies polítiques**

A l'exili el nacionalisme basc es diversifica. Per al PNB, la democràcia cristiana esdevé el marc ideològic i polític, per bé que acabarà evolucionant cap postulats propers a la socialdemocràcia. En canvi, el nacionalisme revolucionari d'ETA, tot i els orígens d'alguns dels seus fundadors, refutarà les identificacions confessionals i abraçarà teories socialistes per a acabar alineant-se cada cop més amb el marxisme-leninisme o fins i tot el trotskisme i el maoisme.

- **El conflicte de l'exili amb l'interior**

El que s'ha pogut constatar en aquest treball són les constants diferències entre l'exili i l'interior. Les divergències ja s'aprecien en els debats del Primer Congrés Mundial Basc i les apreciacions respecte a la resistència. Però quan aquest conflicte es fa més evident és durant la

celebració de Congrés de Munic de 1962 perquè la defensa de la via europeïsta conjuntament amb les forces polítiques espanyoles debilita la representació del nacionalisme basc. Aquí hi ha una primera disputa, que consisteix a debatre quina ha de ser la relació entre l'oposició nacionalista basca i l'oposició espanyola.

Les divergències entre l'exili i l'interior tornen a aflorar durant els anys de la Transició. L'experiència a l'exili de la vella guàrdia nacionalista xoca amb les idees renovadores de les forces nacionalistes a l'interior. Va ser llavors que es van posar de manifest els límits del que s'havia construït a l'exili. Manuel Irujo va ser un personatge cabdal en l'evolució del nacionalisme basc a l'exili, sobretot perquè va homologar el nacionalisme tradicional basc als estàndards del nacionalisme cívic democràtic, però el vell nacionalista navarrès no representava la línia oficial del partit.

D'aquesta manera, l'enfrontament entre l'exili i l'interior és evident a l'Assemblea d'Iruña, celebrada el 1977, i Manuel Irujo va quedar atrapat entre els tradicionalistes (exili) i els renovadors (interior). El seu pragmatisme polític, unit a la seva llarga experiència vital a l'exili, li proporcionen una maduresa intel·lectual capaç d'adaptar les seves idees a la nova situació política i social del país basc. És per això que, malgrat tot, Irujo era el referent de l'exili que es va reivindicar des de l'interior.

*Quod erat demonstrandum.*



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<http://urazandi.euskaletxeak.net/default.html> Digital archive of Basque publications in exile.

<http://www.lehendakariaguirre.eu/> Website on Lehendakari Aguirre. Contains speeches, communications, articles, books, etc. by Lehendakari Aguirre.

<http://ope.euskaletxeak.net/> Website with the bulletins of the *Oficina de Prensa de Euzkadi*.

[https://www.boe.es/diario\\_boe/](https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/) Website of the *Boletín Oficial del Estado*.

## Newspapers and Magazines

Alderdi (1947-1974)

Cuadernos

Euzko Deya

Gudari

La Vanguardia

Tximistak

Hautsi

Kemen

Zutik

