



HOW FAR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM GOES IN A LAIC STATE: ALEVIS OF TURKEY

Didem Doganyilmaz

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HOW FAR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM GOES IN A LAIC STATE:
ALEVIS OF TURKEY

DOCTORAL THESIS

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyze the necessities of Alevism as a belief and the limits of freedom that Alevis have had since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey to maintain and practice their cultural and religious components in between a laic state structure and traditionally Sunni Muslim society. It puts the debate on the limits of religious freedom of a certain group; this is to mention Alevis, in a laic state structure, which should aim to keep its distance to any religious identity with possession none of them on the center. This thesis focuses on the nonrecognition of Alevism and limitation of their religious freedom in a clash between traditional Ottoman-Islamic identity and laic republican one. Hence, the distinguishments aim to emphasize the place of Alevis in political history of the Republic of Turkey, which has been fulfilled with a concrete competition of two aforementioned identities, and to mention the difficulties that Alevis have faced with as a result of their *officially* unrecognized religious identity by none of the two identities and its consequent limitations.

Keywords: Alevism, political history of Republic of Turkey, laicism, religion, political Islam

RESUMEN

Este estudio tiene el objetivo de analizar las necesidades del alevismo como una creencia y los límites de la libertad que los alevís han tenido desde la fundación de la República de Turquía, al mantener y practicar sus componentes culturales y religiosos entre una estructura estatal laica y la sociedad tradicionalmente musulmana sunita. Pone el centro del debate en los límites de la libertad religiosa de un grupo determinado, es decir los alevís, en una estructura del Estado laico, que debe tratar de mantener su distancia hacia cualquier identidad religiosa, sin optar por ninguna de ellas. Esta tesis se centra en la falta de reconocimiento del alevismo y la limitación de la libertad religiosa en un enfrentamiento entre la identidad tradicional otomano-islámica y laica republicana. Por lo tanto, las determinaciones tienen el objetivo de destacar el lugar de los alevís en la historia política de la República de Turquía, que se ha cumplido con la competición concreta de dichas identidades, y hablar de las dificultades a las que se han enfrentado los alevís, como consecuencia de su identidad religiosa no reconocida oficialmente por ninguno de las dos identidades y sus consecuentes limitaciones.

Palabras clave: alevismo, la historia política de la República de Turquía, el laicismo, la religión, el Islam político

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*To my beloved family
and
to “the one”*

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NOTES ON TERMS AND TURKISH PRONUNCIATION

As Turkey, both with its political history and being the recent homeland of Alevism, is the center of this study, official names have been used with abbreviations regarding their Turkish versions, with inclusion of their translation to the first usage of related names. Besides, private names of people have been kept as they are in Turkish in terms of special letters (ç, ğ, ı, ö, ş, and ü.), those do not exist in English language. Last of all, as translations cannot be sufficient for all the words of a language, some words are left with their Turkish versions, such as Imam-Hatip schools - a special version of religious vocational school.

For the pronunciation of aforementioned additional letters, the information below will be beneficiary:

Letter	International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) Value	Example
c	/dʒ/	As j in jump
ç	/tʃ/	As ch in church
ğ	N/A, although /ɣ/ in some dialects	Lengthens preceding vowel
ı	/ɯ/	As e in happen
j	/ʒ/	As s in pleasure
ö	/œ/	As oo in soot
ş	/ʃ/	As sh in ship
u	/u/	As oo in root
ü	/y/	As ü in über

ABBREVIATIONS

A.D.	:	Anno Domini (in the year of Lord)
AKP	:	Justice and Development Party (<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>)
ANAP	:	Motherland Party (<i>Anavatan Partisi</i>)
AP	:	Justice Party (<i>Adalet Partisi</i>)
B.C.	:	Before Christ
BP	:	Unity Party (<i>Birlik Partisi</i>)
CHP	:	Republican People's Party (<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i>)
CKMP	:	Republican Peasants' Nation Party (<i>Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi</i>)
CMP	:	Republican Nation Party (<i>Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi</i>)
DİB	:	Presidency of Religious Affairs (<i>Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı</i>)
DP	:	Democrat Party (<i>Demokrat Parti</i>)
DSP	:	Democratic Left Party (<i>Demokratik Sol Parti</i>)
DYP	:	True Path Party (<i>Doğru Yol Partisi</i>)
EU	:	European Union
FP	:	Virtue Party (<i>Fazilet Partisi</i>)
HP	:	Liberty Party (<i>Hürriyet Partisi</i>)
Ibid.	:	Ibidem (the same place)
MBK	:	National Unity Committee (<i>Milli Birlik Komitesi</i>)
MDP	:	Nationalist Democracy Party (<i>Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi</i>)
MGK	:	National Security Council (<i>Milli Güvenlik Kurulu</i>)
MHP	:	Nationalist Movement Party (<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i>)
MNP	:	National Order Party (<i>Milli Nizam Partisi</i>)
MSP	:	National Salvation Party (<i>Milli Nizam Partisi</i>)
MP	:	Member of Parliament
MÜSİAD	:	Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (<i>Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği</i>)
NGO	:	Non-Governmental Organizations
PM	:	Prime Minister
RP	:	Welfare Party (<i>Refah Partisi</i>)
SHP	:	Social Democratic Populist Party (<i>Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti</i>)
SP	:	Felicity Party (<i>Saadet Partisi</i>)
TBMM	:	Grand National Assembly of Turkey (<i>Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi</i>)
TBP	:	Turkish Unity Party (<i>Türkiye Birlik Partisi</i>)
THK	:	Turkish Civil Aviation Foundation (<i>Türk Hava Kurumu</i>)
TİP	:	Worker's Party of Turkey (<i>Türkiye İşçi Partisi</i>)
TOBB	:	The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (<i>Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği</i>)
TSK	:	Turkish Armed Forces (<i>Türk Hava Kuvvetleri</i>)

- TÜSİAD** : Turkish Industry and Business Association (*Türkiye Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği*)
- UNESCO** : United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- USA** : United States of America
- YÖK** : Council of Higher Education (*Yükseköğretim Kurumu*)
- YTP** : New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*)

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1. INTRODUCTION

Religion, or within a simplest approach, belief is an important component of individual life, as the need of believing in *something* is essential for human beings. Since the early ages of the history, belief has possessed significant importance, and within time, it has been evolved to systematically advance various belief systems such as monotheist and polytheist. Even, concrete belief systems have been divided into different sects.

Religion as one of the basic components of individual life has affected social and political structure; hence, it has brought about new terms to literature. Among all, the idea of separation of church and state, in other words, laicism and/or secularism, has become one of the most discussed ideas when it comes to the relation between religion and politics. The occurrence of the idea of separation opened a new era in the history of the world regarding the way of dealing issues of individuals in terms of judicial, economic and political orders.

The idea of separation has been evaluated either positively or negatively; however, constitutionally or not secularism/laicism has been adopted into many Western states. Eventually, it caused a new understanding that argues Westernization, which was used synonymously with *modernization* in some certain cases as in example of the Republic of Turkey, is linked with secularism/laicism.

The Age of Enlightenment carried Western civilizations a step forward of their time; consequently, the Ottoman Empire intended to adopt western style applications into its structure in order to maintain its existence. With the 19th century, modernization process based on western ideologies started to be carried out in the Ottoman Empire; however, it could not save its existence. Instead, it led to foundation of a new state, the Republic of Turkey. The newborn republic was aimed to be structured as a modern state at the level of Western civilizations, and in order

to achieve this level, laicism was put in the core of the reforms to draw an exact line between the Islamic Ottoman Heritage and the modern Republic of Turkey. In addition to free itself from Islamic identity with its certain superiority, the idea was to provide religious freedom for different groups of people with different religious identities; however, the limits of religious freedom could not include Alevis, who form a significant amount of whole population of the Republic of Turkey. Not only under the Ottoman rule that possessed the Caliphate, but also under the rule of laic Republic of Turkey, Alevism has not been recognized officially with its different characteristics from Sunni Islam, religion of majority of the population. Therefore, Alevis have not had a place to live their religion freely.

Laicism of Turkey has been an issue that was favored by a significant amount of people; nevertheless, on the other hand, there has been always antagonist approaches regarding the way it applies to social structure of Turkish society. Under the Ottoman rule, due to its Islamic identity and the authority of Sultan-Caliph, patriotism was a concept that was evaluated with loyalty to Sultan and to Islam. With foundation of the republic, the importance of Islam was decreased by state authority; and instead of its usage for political power, it was taken under control of the state with adaptation of laicism into Turkish political structure. Hence, it cannot be considered as surprising to have antagonist approaches to laicism for one who was/is in favor of Islamic Ottoman identity.

Turkish politics has been a scene that was shared by two groups possessing two different perspectives regarding real Turkish identity: on one side, the people supporting laic republican identity, and on the other hand the people yearning Islamic Ottoman identity. When the Turkish politics is considered within this frame, the conflict between these two perspectives gets clear with their different actors who have intended to take the power in order to apply their own perspectives not only to political but also to social structure of Turkish society. Three military interventions took place; various political parties closed; many politicians were banned from politics; and these have just been the most visible examples of unstable Turkish politics.

With shifted perspectives among political scenes, the politics has been re-shaped each time and instability affected the social structure, as well. Within this complexity among political and social orders, Alevis have been the ones, who were not taken into account by any of the parts of aforementioned two different groups; although, Alevism possesses both laic republican identity and Islam in its distinctive character. In accordance with this, Alevis have had a lot of problems due to their different way of belief as a result of their official non-recognition and exclusion from the society.

In Turkey, as a general perspective, problems of Alevis are considered that they have to be investigated by Alevi people, who have already faced with discriminative attitudes in their lives, in order to possess a realistic approach to the problems. However, as I see this argument unclear for an academic approach, I decided to work on this issue, not as an Alevi but as one whom grown up in a heterogeneous society in terms of religious diversity, in which both political ideologies and religious identities were hidden due to security issues. Apart from my neighborhood, with Alevi visibility among society and consequent press releases, Alevism with its differences from the majority succeeded to attract my attention as a topic that I was interested in. Alevism has been the topic that I have advanced my knowledge from scratch not only by witnessing personally, but also by reading and listening their way of understanding the world, the humanity, the politics and religion. With my increased interest, I wish to start my career about Alevism with respect to its distinctive character and historical evolution, and its place in a laic state structure with majorly Sunni Muslim society. The most interesting part of my curiosity has been that question: “How come they could not find a place in Turkish politics to secure themselves in the society, while being one of the most important supporters of laic republican part of the conflict regarding political power and its consequences among society?”

The idea of separation of church and state has been a topic that I have been interested, with different types of states and society. That interest of mine was concreted with my M.A. degree final project, in which I focused on the effects of religion on social and political structure. Hence, specialization with a concrete religious group in one of the most difficult examples, this is to mention the Turkish

laicism that has been the unique example with its majorly Muslim population and sometimes the inspiration point for many other Muslim societies, has become a further step of my academic career.

Alevism has never found a concrete base for their distinctive identity in Turkey since foundation of the republic. Before I started this thesis, the main argument on my mind had been: “as a laic state structure should have responsibility to provide religious freedom, no matter how it applies laicism including taking it under its own control, the main question becomes how far it goes and can expand its limits for religious groups, with specific curiosity in Alevism of Turkey.” The title of this study has been composed as a result of this question and special interest: “How Far Religious Freedom Goes in a Laic State: Alevism of Turkey.”

This thesis examines many different questions of social sciences concerning religion, state-religion affairs, Turkish perspective of laicism and Alevism. These problems have been discussed for many years within various academic fields. As introductory basic information on different perspectives will be given to the lecturer, while every single of them has been analyzed with its details regarding interpretations of different scholars at the beginning of related chapter of the thesis in order to maintain continuity of the entire thesis.

The difficulty of defining religion has become the common point that many scholars have agreed. Most commonly it has been associated with individuals and their unanswered questions as stated Max Weber and associated with sacredness as Milton Yinger and Rudolf Otto argued. Besides, religion's link with set practices has become another point that has been argued, as Emile Durkheim and Clifford Geertz analyzed.

With respect to effects of religion to different order, most salient and most relevant one with the purpose of this thesis has become its effects on politics. During the Age of Enlightenment, many contributions have been made with different perspectives. The separation of religion and state affairs have been argued by many different thinkers; however, the level that the religion should present on state has

possessed different interpretations. While, John Locke reduced the level of religion to individual base with arguing that it did serve for commonwealth, Montesquieu, contrarily, highlighted the necessity of a collaboration of religious institutes with state for the commonwealth. Voltaire claimed the necessity of religion; however, for the sake of stability of politics, he supported the idea of separation. As a different perspective; Rousseau separated religion into two different concepts, while one was concerning the individual, the other concerned the citizen with pointing out the link with individual and state. These ideas will be discussed with its details, in following chapters, under dedicated parts.

Turkish experience of laicism has become another problem that has been focused for the purpose of this thesis. Within this perspective, there are three different arguments regarding Turkish perception of religion-state affairs. While Niyazi Berkes argued that the concept of secularism would suit well with Turkey, Andrew Davison argued that, laicism is the exact description that would define the Turkish perception. On the other hand, Binnaz Toprak referred the Turkish experience as a semi-secular state as the state has its own interests in terms of controlling the religion. Control mechanism was pointed out by Hakan Yavuz and Bülent Daver, as well, for being a different characteristic of Turkish experience. Apart from different definitions, *laiklik* (laicism, in Turkish) has been referred as the base of democracy in Turkish experience, by Heinz Kramer, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı and Emre Kongar.

When Alevi discourses and demands are taken into account, it will be visible that the references have always pointed out the necessities and the right that Alevis should have possessed in terms of a laic state structure. There has been significant difficulties during the literature search regarding the sources about Alevism. It has been considerably difficult to find objective approaches among authors, most specifically among Turkish ones as they generally are Alevis, as the issue has always been analyzed within the basis of two-antagonist interpretation regarding Alevism. According to the one of these approaches, Alevism was the part of Islam; hence, they are all welcome to benefit from Turkish social and administrative structure based on Sunni superiority. On the other hand, distinguishments have been made with exaggeration due to sentimental approaches with respect to second group

interpretation. On this point, sources of foreign authors can be considered as more objective; however, on these sources, the history of Alevism, and its place in laic structure under the pressure of majorly Sunni society have been overlooked.

Alevism has been highlighted with its significant differences those should be taken into account for their official recognition, by Umut Azak, Heinz Kramer, David Shankland, David Zeidan, and Ali Balkız, as contrary to the Islamic scholars those inviting Alevis to follow Sunni Islamic practices as the differences were the outcomes of lack of religious information. Among all authors that have investigated the issue of Alevism in many different academic fields, the great contribution of Martin van Bruinessen and Irène Mélikoff to the literature should be emphasized. In the meantime, different perspectives of these two experts of Turkology should be mentioned as well. While Bruinessen constructs the identity of Alevism among the Kurdish ethnicity, Mélikoff based her studies with the center of Turkishness.

With this study, making considerable contribution to the literature within a historical perspective regarding the unrecognized Alevi identity and the limitations of their religious freedom in between a laic state structure and Sunni Muslim society is aimed with intention to fill the gap.

This thesis touches different fields of social sciences within different perspectives on different chapters of entire thesis, including introduction to sociology of religion and politics, history and political science with the help of statistical information. The main subjects that will be discussed are the Turkish politics and the conflict between laicism and Islamic conservatism and the Alevis with their distinct character in between. Apart from the main subjects, this thesis also discusses the role of belief in individuals' life, its intervention into politics, French model of *laïcité*, and French political history in order to highlight and to form background of the aforementioned main arguments within different perspectives.

This thesis analyzes its two main arguments within the perspectives of religious freedom. For the first subject, the laic state structure and the way it deals

with Islam among political scenes after the Islamic Ottoman heritage will be discussed in order to understand the limits of religious freedom within a wider perspective for the entire society. For the second subject, Alevism will be focused to see if its adherents have been granted with freedom with respect to aforementioned limits of a laic structure. In order to do so, the cultural components and detailed historical references will be given for Alevism.

Due to limitation of religious freedom as a result of being an unrecognized belief system, Alevis have possessed two different courses of action with respect to their life conditions under the rule of the Republic of Turkey. Within this perspective, chronological approach is possessed in order to divide these two actions: remaining in secrecy as they did for centuries under Ottoman rule and becoming visible as an organized and mobilized society. As Alevis have become more and more public, Alevism became a topic of debates regarding its distinctive syncretic structure, and it started to be discussed stronger than before within two different perspectives that governments and Alevi communities possessed, which have always been antagonist. The question is whether Alevis will be able to find a base for their identity both in political and social structure of Turkey to expand the limits that have always been obstacles for their religious freedom under a laic state structure.

The aim of this thesis is to analyze the status of Alevis in Turkish political and social orders with respect to historical references in order to highlight the problems of Alevis within an academic perspective with probable solution proposals. In order to do so, the Turkish political history will be analyzed with details regarding the conflict between laic republican identity and conservative one. With detailed analyzes of the Turkish politics within the frame of political struggle based on Islamic references and Alevism, this thesis is planned to serve to two different aspects regarding laicism in Turkey: a general critic for the way of application of laicism and its consequences among political and social orders; and with a specific point of view, the relation between Alevis and laic republic, problems that Alevis have faced and the way the state have dealt with these problems (if there has been any initiative). However, this thesis does not aim to discuss any theological aspects regarding Alevism to see or to decide whether it is a religion itself or not. Opponent

perspectives of different authorities will be given; nevertheless, the aim will not be further than to discuss the differences of Alevism from the majority religion of Turkey, this is to say Sunni Islam, and its place in a laic state structure with difficulties that Alevis have faced with.

This thesis, with all its arguments, may lead to future studies regarding the future of Alevis, who left their secrecy behind and manage to mobilize within more organized groups day by day, and the future of Turkish politics with a more conservative society. At the writing time of this thesis, under the rule of Justice and Development Party (AKP – *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) Government, with a neutral working group a new constitution is being prepared and laicism and the official status of Alevis, unsurprisingly, have become two important issues that are being discussed. No matter how the negotiations end, it seems that these two subjects will be discussed a lot in near future. Hopefully, this thesis will lead any future academic studies concerning the Turkish laicism, its evolution within time and the place of Alevis.

Laicism in Turkey, and the place of Alevis in this laic state structure have been discussed for many decades in social sciences. This thesis has been composed for the purpose of analyzing three hypotheses connecting to each other with significant points.

The common hypothesis about laicism is that the term laicism, which is derived from secularism, should provide religious freedom for all religious identities within state. However, in Turkish understanding, as well as in French experience, it has obstructed and limited the religious freedom by taking it under the control of the state. Hence, instead of concrete religious freedom, *laic* state intends to take it under its own control and intervenes into religious life of individuals. With respect to state control mechanism, within time, the Republic of Turkey became the power that assigns Sunni Islamic religious authorities as control mechanisms at social level. As the religion is one of the elements of one`s private life, this intervention to religious life does not suit with the ideal laicism, and Alevis could not find religious freedom to live their private life properly. The Turkish understanding of laicism could not

embrace Alevis due to its limits on religious freedom. What have Alevis encountered within this limitation of religious freedom?

Secondly, Alevis, the case study of this thesis, have been facing problems based on their religious differences not only in the Republic of Turkey's understanding of laicism, but also in the Caliphate of Ottoman Empire. The "new" and the "old" state structures created two dominant identities (laic republican identity and the traditional Islamic Ottoman) among the population, which have been in clash. Within this clash, Alevis have never found the base for their distinctive religious identity in Turkish society. The common belief about Alevism is that, it possesses Islamic elements with their distinctive interpretation; and in the meantime, Alevis have been supporters of modern-laic republic. This belief put Alevism in discussion of does Alevism a branch of Islam or a total different religion. As stated earlier, this thesis does not seek to answer this question. It accepts the reality of Alevis in Turkey and tries to reflect their position in the identity struggle. As the political system does not let Alevis to be a player in political arena with their own political parties, they have always been forced to choose a side in political clash of two aforementioned identities. What were the reasons behind Alevis' choices? Because of this situation, Alevis could not become a shaping political player and were seen *just* as electorates by political parties, which have been formed around two dominant identities. Consequently, this caused that the demands of Alevis have not heard enough. Within the perspective of demands, what do Alevis ask for: privilege or equality? What are the efforts of AKP Government?

Lastly, the heavy control of religious affairs by state agencies and the undeclared promotion of Sunni Islam created prejudgments in the minds of Sunni majority of the diverse population regarding Alevism. As these prejudgments had been inherited from the Ottoman Empire, the supporters of traditional Islamic identity in Turkey considered Alevis as *perverted* Muslims, *infidels*, and even the enemies of Islam. The problems of daily life between Sunnis and Alevis forced Alevis to hide their religious identity in the Ottoman Empire, and in the Republic of Turkey. The prejudgments that Sunnis had, and still have caused discriminated actions at individual level and tragic events in the history of the region and continuous disappointments of Alevis.

Within these three main hypothesis and the questions that already asked, this research tries to answer the main question, which is also the title of this thesis: “How far religious freedom goes in a laic state?” Even with taking this question a step further, the part conclusion reflects how a laic state should position itself for diverse religious groups.

This thesis has been structured to find the answers of aforementioned questions and to analyze aforementioned hypothesis. With respect to its structure, qualitative research methods, such as field study and observations, and in-depth literature search have been carried out.

As mentioned earlier, this thesis has focused on two issues: the identity clash in Turkish political history and the place of Alevism in the said clash. Hence, there has been two parts differentiated with respect to their methodologies. For the first part regarding the Turkish political history around the clash between laic and conservative identity, the literature search has been the main method that has been used. In addition to that, I have taken advantage of personal observations as the representative of qualitative research methods. For the second part, as Alevism has been a hidden identity maintained in secrecy for centuries, written sources could not be sufficient to understand and to explain the identity with its distinctive characteristics. For that reason, qualitative methods including personal interviews and observations have been the main method that has been used in addition to the literature search.

Regarding the literature search, several libraries have been investigated for the related sources in various languages, in multiple cities in three different countries, such as Bibliothèque Nationale de France in Paris, Library of Bilkent University in Ankara, Library of University of Mersin, Library of Çukurova University in Adana, Library of Istanbul Kultur University, Biblioteca de la Universitat Rovira I Virgili in Tarragona, Biblioteca de la Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona and the CCUC (Catàleg Col·lectiu de les Universitats de Catalunya). Additionally, related sources can be classified as primary sources, such as European

Union Reports, State Constitutions and official reports of the Republic of Turkey regarding Alevi Initiative, and secondary sources, including books, M.A. and Ph.D. thesis, academic and newspaper articles. Among all, it is important to emphasize frequent usage of newspaper articles regarding the recent events. Besides, the usage of newspapers helped to understand instant reflections of certain events of the history within different interpretations of two dominant identities.

For the field study, the representatives and the chairpersons of Alevi foundations were selected as the target group in order to have a general opinion of different Alevi groups with respect to their ritualistic components, explanation of difficulties faced with and the way that they make themselves heard by the authorities. In order to fulfill this part of the research, six representatives and chairpersons and authors were contacted in Ankara and Mersin (Turkey) between 12 and 20 April 2011. The questions for interviews were composed in order to obtain information for different groups of Alevis with their self-definition and self-placement in the clash of identities. In addition to the interviews, personal observations have been done regarding Alevi visibility among society, individuals' opinions for Alevism including Sunni people, and last of all, I have attended one of the most important Alevi meeting during the period of 60th Turkish Government's Alevi Initiative, in Ankara on 12 April 2011. The transcripts of the meeting and the interviews with the questions are included to this study as appendixes. In addition to the visit to Turkey for the interviews, an in-depth literature search was carried out regarding the French experience of *laïcité* for three months in Paris.

The place of Alevis in between of two antagonist dominant identities in the Republic of Turkey and the limits of religious freedom for their case have been analyzed within three main topics. The three topics have a strong connection among themselves, although they seem entirely at first glance. These three topics are religion and state affairs, Republic of Turkey and place of religion, and Alevism: unrecognized identity.

After the introduction part as the first chapter, religion and state affairs have been focused as the second chapter, in which the term of religion is analyzed within a historical perspective and its effects on political structure in order to arrive at the idea of separation of church and state. After this point, the French Revolution and its aftermath have been analyzed to clarify the evolution of French *laïcité*, which has been the inspiration point for Turkish understanding of *laiklik*, with its history, and most specifically with clashes between traditional Catholic identity and the laic republican one.

For the third chapter, an in-depth analyze of Turkish political history has been made in order to clarify the clash between two identities. For this analyze, governmental implementations and discourses referring any of these two identities with significant limits for the *other* have been taken into account and chronological perspective is intended to given to the lecturer, for the purpose of a background of clashes affecting religious freedom of individuals. Within this clash, the political parties formed around two dominant identities have been discussed in details in order to clarify the groups that Alevis have taken side with, which is a part that is examined in fourth chapter.

In the fourth and the last chapter before conclusion, Alevism has gotten under the spotlight with its historical evolution including its components adopted from different belief systems in order to analyze their syncretic belief system. After detailed information regarding Alevism, the place of Alevis in the Republic of Turkey in between the clash of two dominant ideas and the religious freedom that they have been provided so far have been analyzed within chronological order and with respect to the information that had been given under the third chapter. In other words, within this chapter, the clashes those had been explained in the third chapter form a basis for the changed limits of Alevi freedom within the frame of governmental implementations and consequent social changes. As this chapter has been composed for the case study of this thesis, significant issues have been examined in order to clarify the position of Alevis up until the present time.

This study have been concluded with the help of the information that had been analyzed under three chapters in order to analyze the hypothesis those were given above and to answer aforementioned questions.

2. RELIGION-STATE AFFAIRS

Throughout history, human beings have accumulated their knowledge as answers to their questions regarding to issues related with many different aspects of life. However, individuals could not be capable of finding answers for all their questions; hence, these questions have been conveyed to supernatural beings, which or who was more powerful and capable than human beings.

To believe in supernatural beings can be considered as a premature approach for the concept of religion, which has been shaped in many different ways within the history. While some religious systems have been composed by human beings in order to give a better world view to their adherents with the help of their founders' teachings, such as Manichaeism and Buddhism, some religious systems have been believed as the teachings of God, the supernatural being himself, instead of human being founders, such as Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Although the forms have been varied, religion has played significant role in human beings' life. For this reason, role of religion has been analyzed within many different perspectives by various academics, it was even discussed that religion was capable of forming the culture of a society, itself.

Religion, in fact, has been a set of rules providing order for societies involving different aspects of life such as social, economics, legislative and political ones. Even further, religion possessed politics, and accordingly, the relation between state and religious authorities could not be maintained reasonable. Eventually, the idea of separation started to be discussed in order to end conflicts between these two powers, and secularist/laic approaches were emerged for the purpose of protection of individuals from religious oppression, protection of religion from politics and protection of politics from religion.

Today, the idea of separation is applied as laicism or secularism in various countries' political systems, generally in Western world, as a component of modern politics. This is the exact point that suits with the purpose of this thesis. Within this chapter, role of religion and its effects on political structure will be analyzed in historical process as the basis of laicism and state's approach to religious freedom for better understanding of the case study of this thesis, which is the place of Alevis under the rule of laic republic and in between two dominant antagonist identities and the limits of religious freedom that they have been provided.

2.1. Religion

The term religion has been defined by Western scholars for many years in many different ways. For instance, religion has been intended to be examined within sociological, psychological, philosophical, anthropological and ethnological perspectives; however, every single perspective dealt with the term within necessities of its own field and with domination of any sacred concept such as unconditional obedience, belief, supernatural almighty beings and gods.¹ In fact, due to existence of different belief systems and worship methods, defining religion is quite difficult. Furthermore, definitions often begin with an assumption of what a religion is and is not. Within this perspective, religion will be discussed with its different aspects and historical development under this part of this chapter.

2.1.1. What is Religion?

The word *religion*, etymologically, derived from “*relegere*” according to Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 B.C.-43 B.C.), with the meaning of “go through again, read again” as the word “*relegere*” is divided as *re-* (again) and *legere* (read). However, as a different perspective, many modern scholars, for instance Tom Harbur and Joseph Campbell, connect it with “*religare*”, which means, “to bind fast” via notion of “place an obligation on” or “bond between human and gods”.² On the

¹ Baki Adam and Mehmet Katar, *Dinler Tarihi* (Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi Açık Öğretim Fakültesi Yayınları, 2005), 17.

² Tom Harpur, *The Pagan Christ* (Toronto: Walker & Company, 2005), 260.

other hand, another possibility is being discussed with reference to “*religiens*” which means “careful” as contrary of *negligens*.³

Far from an academic approach, religion is defined as following in Encyclopedia Britannica:

“Religion is human beings’ relation to that which they regard as holy, sacred, absolute, spiritual, divine, or worthy of especial reverence. It is also commonly regarded as consisting of the way people deal with ultimate concerns about their lives and their fate after death. In many traditions, this relation and these concerns are expressed in terms of one’s relationship with or attitude toward gods or spirits; in more humanistic or naturalistic forms of religion, they are expressed in terms of one’s relationship with or attitudes toward the broader human community or the natural world. In many religions, texts are deemed to have scriptural status, and people are esteemed to be invested with spiritual or moral authority. Believers and worshipers participate in and are often enjoined to perform devotional or contemplative practices such as prayer, meditation, or particular rituals. Worship, moral conduct, right belief, and participation in religious institutions are among the constituent elements of the religious life”⁴

This is not only a very simple, but also a clear definition of religion. This definition points out the relation between human and the ones considered sacred and the components of a religion. However, as it was mentioned, it is far from an academic approach. Hence, it will be beneficial to examine the term within scholarly perspective. The term is being defined by many different scholars in many different approaches. The definition that will be intended to be given within this part of the thesis will be the substantive meaning of the religion. Due to that purpose, basic sociological approaches will be given; however, most specifically historical perspective will be discussed.

Although religion has a very long history, there has not been any universally agreed definition of religion or an adequate one, as it was mentioned by W. Cantwell

³ *Online Etymology Dictionary*, s.v. “religion,” (1 May 2013)
<<http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=religion>>.

⁴ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. “religion,” (5 May 2013)
<<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/497082/religion>>.

Smith.⁵ Additionally, Max Weber mentioned that the examinations regarding what essential character of religion was would not be a correct approach for the definition of religion.⁶ These handicaps lead examination of different perspectives with different reference points regarding religion.

Difficulty in defining religion led scholars to orientate to various reference points on their own definitions. For instance, Emile Durkheim focused on sacred-unsacred issue in his studies regarding religion. He stated that a religion was a unified system of both beliefs and practices related with sacred things, and Church was the community united by beliefs and practices. He also added that the beliefs were related with well-defined practices.⁷

Clifford Geertz defined religion as a system of symbols, which stands to compose a powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in human. He pointed out the way of this composition as a formulation of conceptions of a general order of existence and varnishing them with an aura of factuality to make them seem realistic.⁸

Milton Yinger, as another example, mentioned that religion was a system of belief and practices. With this system, in other words with religion, groups of people intend to struggle with ultimate/unsolved problems of human life.⁹ Similarly, Talcott Parsons defined religion,

"as a set of beliefs, practices, and institutions which men have evolved in various societies, as far as they can be understood, as responses to those aspects of their life and situation which are believed not in the empirical-instrumental sense to be rationally understandable and/or controllable, and to which they attach a significance which includes some kind of reference to the relevant actions and events to man's conception of the existence of the "supernatural " order which is conceived and felt to have a fundamental bearing on man's position in the universe

⁵ Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion* (San Francisco: Harper, 1978), 11.

⁶ Ünver Günay, *Din Sosyolojisi* (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2008), 211.

⁷ Meredith McGuire, *Religion: The Social Context* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1987), 11;

W.S.F. Pickering, ed., *Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 93.

⁸ McGuire, *Religion*, 11-12.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 12.

and the values which give meaning to his fate as an individual and his relations to his fellows."¹⁰

As it is visible, Parsons also focused on a unity of belief and practices. The institutions that he mentioned should have been Churches, within a general perspective, as the evolvment of individuals was mentioned.

Rudolf Otto based his definition on an “experience of sacred”, which was also accepted by Joachim Wach.¹¹ While, Edward Burnett Tylor pointed out the basis of religion as “the belief in spiritual beings”, Weber distinguished the connection of religion with supernatural events, like a reference to unsolved problems of human beings.¹² On the other hand, Peter Berger possessed a different approach on his studies regarding religion, which was the “humanistic behaviors combined with sacredness”.¹³ Similarly, two Turkish scholars focused on sacredness, supernatural beings and problems of human beings. Ali Fuad Başgil defined religion as a sacred law that was accepted mentally and sensed by spiritually by individuals within a simple approach.¹⁴ Hüseyin Akyüz pointed out the spiritual and mental approach with his definition of religion, as well. He defined it as a set of rules, which helps individuals to achieve happiness by gaining the consent of a supernatural power with mental and/or spiritual orientation.¹⁵

With respect to mentioned definitions, religion can be based on belief within a very simple perspective, as it generally refers to supernatural beings, in other words, gods who are accepted without a concrete proof. As mentioned by Karl Jaspers, gods are accessible only through faith and obedience, as they do not possess reality for human beings.¹⁶ For various times, problems of human beings were pointed out as the reason of relation between individuals and supernatural powers.

¹⁰ Ibid.,11-12.

¹¹ Joachim Wach, *Din Sosyolojisine Giriş*, trans. Battal İnandı, (Ankara: AÜİFY, 1987), 17.

¹² Yümnü Sezen, *Sosyoloji Açısından Din: Dinin Temel Sosyal Müesseseler Üzerindeki Tesirleri* (İstanbul: MÜİFY, 1988), 30.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ali Fuad Başgil, *Din ve Laiklik* (İstanbul: Yağmur Yayınevi, 1962), 63.

¹⁵ Hüseyin Akyüz, “Toplumsal Bir Kurum Olarak Din.” *Türk Yurdu* 204, no.24 (2004): 24.

¹⁶ Karl Jaspers, *The Way to Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy* (London: Yale University Press, 2003), 41.

Religion, or as a simple approach, belief, has been a component of human life within a long history. With the time passing, problems and/or necessities of individuals have varied from one to another; consequently, religion demonstrates variety and splits into different faiths. For instance, there are religions without any founders, such as Hinduism; without any understanding of a sacred god, such as Buddhism; or with monotheist or polytheist approaches. Even monotheist religions vary with different perspectives of practices and god figures.

2.1.2. A Historical Approach to Religious Systems

The variety in religious systems should be examined within a historical process in order to see the relation between change in time and necessities, and emergence of different religious systems.

Apart from the relation between change in necessities of human beings and religions, there is another approach regarding the variety of religions in world history. As religion has been connected to social order against chaos and mentioned as an accumulated experience of human beings by scholars,¹⁷ it was distinguished as an order, from which human beings cannot be distanced; instead, a religious system was shifted with a new one.¹⁸ Acceptance of either way will lead this part to a historical approach to world religions in order to see differences in religious orders.

History of religion goes back to the first written records regarding religious components of life. However, the remainders of Neolithic people's settlement in Çatalhöyük (central Anatolian historical settlement in Turkey) were studied within religious perspective and considered as proof of existence of religion even before the first written records. Çatalhöyük was seen as the spiritual center of Anatolia with its well-formed female figurines, which represented female deity of Great Goddess. These figurines were found in grain bins, and that was connected with ensuring or protecting harvest.¹⁹ Due to security issues regarding food supply, Neolithic people believed in figurines, which were referred as God. However, a systematical

¹⁷ Betty R. Scarf, "Dine Sosyolojik Yaklaşım: Öncüler." trans. Bünyamin Solmaz, *İlahiyat Dergisi* 7 (1997): 154.

¹⁸ Şemsettin Günaltay, *Dinler Tarihi* (İstanbul: Kesit Yayınları, 2006), 71.

¹⁹ James Mellaart, *Çatal Hüyük: A Neolithic Town in Anatolia* (Michigan: Thames & Hudson, 1967), 181.

formation of religion cannot be found in mentioned figurines; instead, that can be considered as a simplest approach to a *protector*.

Within the time of written records, the most important period with respect to history of religion was accepted as Axial Age, between 800 and 200 B.C.²⁰ The period has been highlighted due to simultaneous enlightenment in different geographies with various approaches regarding spiritual components of life.²¹ During Axial Age, many different systematic belief systems were occurred, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism in the Far East, Zoroastrianism and Judaism, as representatives of monotheism, in the Middle East and Persia.

The aftermath of Axial Age witnessed emergence of Christianity, Manichaeism, Tengriism, Shamanism²² and Islam. All these were born in different geographies; however, they were in interaction for a long time due to clashes between different groups of people through wars, invasions, migrations, etc. For instance, Shamans were in conflict with Buddhists, Taoists, Muslim and Christians as a result of Mongol invasions. Muslims were in conflict with Hindus in Indian subcontinent and with Zoroastrians in Persia during Muslim conquests. Christians were in conflict with Jews in the time of Crusades, Reconquista and Inquisition, and with Muslims during Byzantine-Arab Wars, Crusades, Reconquista, and Ottoman era.²³

Interaction between different religious systems brought about the emergence of religious syncretism. Due to relation with outsider groups as a result of invasion or migration, people intended to maintain their original cultural components while being affected from different ones. Eventually, within a long process like decades or hundreds of years, different belief systems occurred with inspiration of various

²⁰ Chad V. Meister, *Introducing Philosophy of Religion* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 9-11.

²¹ Jaspers, *The Way to Wisdom*, 98.

²² Shamanism is not a religion but a spiritual calling. It is based on the philosophy that everything is a part of the Creator - every tree, every creature, the elements, the sun, moon, the planets, even the four elements themselves. Everything is sacred and behind what appears to the external observation as inert or mindless, is a supportive energy that is not only intelligent but cognisant and communicative. Source: "About Shamanism," *The Globalight Experience*, n.d., <<http://www.globalight.com.au/healing.html>> (1 May 2013).

²³ Alexander Smith, *The Holiest Lie Ever: Glorified by Myths, Mysticism, Symbolism, Rituals and Traditions* (Bloomington, IN: Trafford Publishing, 2012), 10.

religions without turning into none of them. Religious syncretism is basically defined as a fusion of diverse religious beliefs and practices.²⁴ For instance, Manichaeism is one of the syncretic religious systems. Manichaeism was founded by Mani, who was accepted as an Iranian prophet, as a combination of Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Buddhism; hence, Manichaeism became a different religious system composed by significant components from listed religions. Alevism, which forms the case study of this thesis, is also a considerable example for religious syncretism. Formation of Alevism from diverse religious systems will be examined with details within a dedicated part in following chapters.

Religion has been a fact in individual's life and it has been carried by mobilized people to different geographies. As a consequence of interaction between different groups of people, new religions or religious components were introduced to diverse geographies. Within this context, what has been the role of religion within a society? What are the effects of religion in different orders?

2.1.3. Effects of Religion

Religion has been defined within different perspectives as mentioned above; however, in every single definition, individuals form a significant part of belief systems. Hence, mutual effects between religion and individuals' life become unavoidable facts. This connection between religion and individuals is considered as the way of life.

A reference to "way of life" demonstrates another connection, which is between religion and culture. Culture, which is a recently occurred term, is an idea as a witness of the great changes, which occurred in all ways of social life. Clifford Geertz explained culture as;

“(...) There is no such thing as a human nature independent of culture. Men without culture would not be the clever savages of Golding's *Lord of the Flies* thrown back upon the cruel wisdom of their animal instincts; nor would they be the nature's noblemen of Enlightenment primitivism or even, as classical

²⁴ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "religious syncretism," (1 May 2013), <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/497438/religious-syncretism>>.

anthropological theory would imply, intrinsically talented apes who had somehow failed to find themselves. They would be unworkable monstrosities with very few useful instincts, fewer recognizable sentiments, and no intellect, mental basket cases. (...)”²⁵

Therefore the idea generates a concept, which provides a principle of unification for people, through the time and the world, as religion did.

Relation between religion and culture has been studied by different scholars. For instance, Malory Nye distinguished the relevance as “The religious life is the cultural life, one’s religion not only emerges from one’s culture – religion is culture.”²⁶ With this comment, Nye pointed out the connection between culture and religious life, which can be defined as the practical way of religious system. He distinguished religion as the only component, even further, as the exact same concept of culture. However, as it is a subjective issue, there should be different perspectives. Hence, apart from being the culture itself, religion should be taken into account as one of the components of human life.

Durkheim stressed that religion played a significant role as a reason of solidarity of individuals in the society in 19th century. He added that religion strengthened morals and social norms and provided social control within a society.²⁷ In 20th century, Weber mentioned that religion was a pivotal component of social structure and culture.²⁸

Religion and culture, or way of life has been connected even further, sometimes these concepts taken into account as one. This is, as mentioned, a modern approach that started to be discussed since the last three centuries. However, with different examples, religion can be associated with diverse orders, such as economic, juridical, and political, or with treatment methods.

²⁵ Chris Jenks, *Culture* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 6.

²⁶ Malory Nye, *Religion: The Basics* (London: Routledge, 2003), 3.

²⁷ Paul Carls, “Émile Durkheim (1858-1917),” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 3 June 2012, <<http://www.iep.utm.edu/durkheim/>> (1 May 2013).

²⁸ Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Türkler, Türkiye ve İslam* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007),13.

Shamanic culture, for instance, has been a method used for special treatments both in history and in present day. On this point, components of Shamanism serve as a part of medical service. On the other hand, there are more influential examples regarding religious influence on different orders.

Belief systems and religion have been effective on economic issues through money. For instance, in ancient times Christian Church had some actions, which were related with money. In New Testament, money was described as a path to evil and as a master in competition with God.²⁹ Besides, for Islam, money is the way to wealth, which should be gained in Islamic way.

Today, Islamic implementations can be monitored within a new capital system with the name of Islamic banking system. While conventional banking system is based over interest and credit, in Islam there is no place for interest. This was the reference that the Islamic way of gaining money points out. According to Islamic rules, a Muslim cannot deposit his/her money to an account with interest. Additionally, he/she is not allowed to make any investment to *haram* sectors, such as alcoholic drinks, pork, porn or gambling. Even, it is not allowed to be involved in a system, where money is used for listed sectors. Due to that necessity, Islamic tradition had created its own banking system: Interest-Free banking. According to Interest-Free banking, profit sharing system is used instead of interest, and the deposited money is invested in *halal* sectors with guarantee of official acts with respect to Islamic Law (Sharia) and its practicals.³⁰ The origin of Interest-Free banking does not go far in history. System started to be used in late 1940s, and today it functions not only in Muslim countries, but also in laic or secular countries such as Turkey, France, United Kingdom and United States of America.³¹

Economic rules have been arranged within a juridical approach in Islam; this is to say that Islam possesses a legislative characteristic to deal with judicial issues, as well. Religious law of Islam is named as Sharia law. According to Islamic faith,

²⁹ John R. Muether, "Money and the Bible." *Christian History Magazine* 14 (1987): 6.

³⁰ Muhammad Ayub, *Understanding Islamic Finance* (Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2007), 75-81.

³¹ "Islamic Banking Assets to Reach 1 Trillion Dollars in 2012: Expert," *Asian Institute of Technology*, 2012,

<<http://www.ait.ac.th/news-and-events/2012/news/islamic-banking-assets-to-reach-1-trillion-dollars-in-2012#.UYzw5mNGTD0>> (1 May 2013).

Sharia law is responsible for managing different issues including religious, economic, legislative and political issues.³² Sharia law is believed as an expression of God's command for Muslim society. Hence, the law forms a path leading Muslims towards an expression of conviction in this world for the purpose of goodness in the other one, as meaning of the name sharia, which is *the path leads to watering place*.³³ Today, Sharia law is in function in many Islamic countries.

Involvement of religion into political order is an important theme that should be focused with respect to the purpose of this thesis. Within diverse historical processes, both Christianity and Islam had involved, and still involve, into politics. The reason why two religious systems are being examined is to enlighten the process between religion and politics in order to give a background for the process of laicism and secularism, which is one of the basic issues that this thesis focuses on.

If the history of Christianity and Islam are taken into account, two different processes will be appeared. Christianity, on one side, was born to a, relatively, well-organized state, to the Roman Empire; hence, relation between religion and politics were cut at the time of Jesus with his notable saying: "*So give back to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's.*" Islam, on the other hand, was born to an unorganized political structure in Arabian Peninsula, where the tribal sovereignty used to play significant role among political order. Accordingly, while Christianity did not use to possess a political functionality, which was already set under the rule of the Roman Empire, Islam created its proper state and became more than a religious system, which manages the relation between two worlds. Islam became a way to govern a state in order to fulfill the lack of a mobilized society.³⁴ Therefore, Islamic states were born, and these states were governed within an Islamic perspective, under the sovereignty of *Allah*. On the other hand, there is one thing that should be distinguished on that point. Although, Christianity was born independently from politics, within three centuries, Christians mobilized and

³² Valentina M. Donini, "Islamic Law" (Mediterranean Cultural Studies MA Program Seminar, Tarragona, 18 January 2010).

³³ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Sharī'ah," (2 May 2013), <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/538793/Shariah>>.

³⁴ Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, *Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2007), 158; Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 103.

institutionalized the Church with political, juridical and social power. Due to increased numbers of Christians and a systematic formation of Church, in 381 A.D., Christianity was accepted as official religion of Roman Empire by Constantine, and religion involved in politics with an official base.³⁵ Within time, religion possessed dominance over politics; consequently, popes gained more power over kings. The crown ceremonies, in which kings were crowned by popes, is a significant example for the mentioned dominance.³⁶ After different historical processes, today, Vatican City stands as a unique example with Pope, who holds both religious power for all Catholic people around the world, and political power for the state.

According to Islam, political concepts, such as a juridical system, leadership with Caliphs, were already included in Islam traditionally.³⁷ Hence, within the established Islamic states, Islamic seminaries (*medrese*) were built in order to provide Islamic education and to educate Muslim scholars. Sharia was constituted with Muslim judges (*kadı*), states were governed by Caliphs, and with all these components, political Islam was applied. As sovereignty belongs to God in political Islamic perspective, Caliphs were the successors of God for the implementation of his justice, and representatives of this sovereignty.³⁸ Briefly, the political order of Islam demonstrates no difference between religion and politics.³⁹ With the title of Caliph for leaders and all listed implementations, Ottoman Empire was a considerable example for political Islam. Today, the title Caliph does not exist; however, political Islam is being applied in different states, either directly with its entire components, or indirectly with implementations.

2.2. Separation of Religion and State Affairs

During history, different political systems have occurred and they have all interacted with the sociological conditions of the time. As it was mentioned, religion

³⁵ Ethem Ruhi Fiğlalı, "Din ve Devlet İşleri." *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 38 (1997): n.p.

³⁶ Kışlalı, *Kemalism, Laiklik ve Demokrasi*, 158.

³⁷ Edward Mortimer, *Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), 37.

³⁸ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Caliphate," (3 May 2013), <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/89739/Caliphate>>.

³⁹ Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, trans. Carol Volk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 13.

has been a significant component of culture not only in individual but also in social levels. Unavoidably, political systems have been affected by religion, as well.

Religion should be considered as an important component of life with being guidance both in human and social behaviors. Within the perspective of political system, it has been the tool to construct social order with its rules and control mechanism. On this point, it is possible to distinguish three different forms of religion-state affairs based on different levels of involvement of these two components.⁴⁰ These three forms are theocratic system, in which the government is under the rule of religion, like in the example of Vatican City or in the example of the Islamic Republic of Iran; semi-religious system, in which the state accepts a religion as official state religion, for instance the former Ottoman Empire; and laic and/or secular system, in which religious and state affairs are separated with different approaches, like the secular United States of America (USA) and the laic Republic of Turkey.

Separation of religion and state emerged as an idea in the 17th century, and it has been generally associated with John Locke. As it will be mentioned, his idea was about limitation of responsibilities of Church and disallowance its intervention to commonwealth. His idea regarding this separation was supported during the Age of Enlightenment (during the 17th and 18th centuries) within different levels. Charles Louis de Secondat Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued the separation and its necessities. Ideas of these intellectuals will be analyzed one by one.

Age of Enlightenment has become a considerable point for the World history with a scientific and reformist perspective, which took place of dogmatic and traditional ideas. First Europe, then American colonies were affected from mentioned scientific approach within different orders. Among all, separation of religion and state was one of the ideas of this period. The idea was taken into account as one, separation of Church and State, in order to decrease and/or cut the

⁴⁰ Davut Dursun, *Yönetim Din İlişkileri Açısından Osmanlı Devleti'nde Siyaset ve Din* (İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 1989), 80.

political power of Church; however, two different approaches emerged after this period.

Separation of religion and state affairs is named as secularism or laicism with respect to different experiences. This separation, either laicism or secularism, plays a significant role on today's Western politics. Many times these two terms, secularism and laicism, are used on behalf of the other; however, it will not be wrong to claim that they are not exactly the same terms.

Between laicism and secularism, there is a difference, which keeps them from synonymous usage. Laicism is a political theory aimed that focuses on separation of politics and religion. On the other hand, there is a direct or an indirect control mechanism of state authorities via ministries or committees over religion. Secularism can be defined as an advanced version of laicism within the perspective of relations between state and religious organizations. Different from controlling religion, secularism is more far aimed, which is to say, secularism does not interfere to the freedom of religion both in public and private life.⁴¹ Two different approaches regarding separation of religion and state were distinguished by T. Jeremy Gunn with these two different cases;

"Unlike France, where "laicite" might have the connotation of the state protecting itself from the excesses of religion, the term "religious freedom" in the United States would be more likely to have the connotation of religion being protected from the excesses of the state. Thus Americans are more likely to be predisposed to have suspicious about state laws regulating religion while the French are more likely to be suspicious of an absence of regulation of religious activity. At least this is the theory."⁴²

Within this part of the thesis, two different approaches will be given with brief descriptions, the evolution of laicism within French political tradition since

⁴¹ Rashad Ibadov, "Religious Liberties in Secular Public Education" (MA diss., University of Lund, 2006), 12.

⁴² T. Jeremy Gunn, "Under God But Not the Scarf: The Founding Myths of Religious Freedom in United States and Laïcité in France." *Journal of Church and State* 46, no.1 (2004): 9.

French Revolution will be analyzed and discussions regarding compatibility of Islam in a laic structure will be focused.

2.2.1. Secularism and Laicism

Within the history, there are many terms underlying pivotal evolutions. These kinds of terms, generally, are possessed by individuals unconsciously and lead to evolutions. The idea of separation of church and state relations should be considered as one of these concepts. It emerged in western political structure and possessed an important role as an ideological term.

The idea of separation is, generally, associated with European Enlightenment of 17th and 18th centuries, in which French Revolution of 1789 was an important milestone. Although France possesses a different approach to religion-state affairs - this is to mention laicism - in its actual political structure, role of French Revolution on the evolution of secularism is significantly considerable. In this part of this thesis, two different approaches will be analyzed with differences.

Secularism, etymologically, is originated from “*sæculum*”, which is a Latin word meaning *age, generation, and one belongs to this world*.⁴³ Within a general perspective, secularism is separation of religion and state affairs in governmental level, and it points out undistinguished distances to each religious system, including atheism. In other words, secularism highlights the right to be free from any religious rule and the right to freedom from governmental pressure regarding any religion over its citizens within a neutral state to different belief systems.⁴⁴

Secularist approach includes various perceptions. With respect to one of these approaches, made by George Holyoake, secularism is a code of duty, which is

⁴³ Barry A. Kosmin. “Contemporary Secularity and Secularism,” in *Secularism and Secularity: Contemporary International Perspectives*, eds. Barry A. Kosmin, and Ariela Keysar (Hartford, CT: ISSSC, 2007), 2.

Online Etymology Dictionary, s.v. “secular,” (4 May 2013), <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=secular&searchmode=none>.

⁴⁴ Bruce A. Phillips. “Putting Secularity in Context,” in *Secularism and Secularity: Contemporary International Perspectives*, eds. Barry A. Kosmin, and Ariela Keysar (Hartford, CT: ISSSC, 2007), 29.

founded on evaluations based on perspectives of human beings free from religious point of views.⁴⁵

Within historical evolution of secularism, it will be beneficial to highlight Locke's explanation about the term. In his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke stated that;

“This only I say, that, whencesoever their authority be sprung, since it is ecclesiastical, it ought to be confined within the bounds of the Church, nor can it in any manner be extended to civil affairs, because the Church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles heaven and earth together, the things most remote and opposite, who mixes these two societies, which are in their original, end, business, and in everything perfectly distinct and infinitely different from each other. No man, therefore, with whatsoever ecclesiastical office he be dignified, can deprive another man that is not of his church and faith either of liberty or of any part of his worldly goods upon the account of that difference between them in religion. For whatsoever is not lawful to the whole Church cannot by any ecclesiastical right become lawful to any of its members.”⁴⁶

He made his statement with respect to Bible's sentences with many references. The reason why he distinguished the importance of separation of church and state in 17th century can be defined as necessity with a very simplest approach. Social conflicts of England during mentioned period emerged due to the clash between these two institutions, state and church; for that reason, the only way to end the conflicts was the separation of them. In the same letter, Locke also pointed out the freedom of individuals regarding ceremonies. Within this point, the only responsibility of Church was mentioned as;

“The only business of the Church is the salvation of souls, and it no way concerns the commonwealth, or any member of it, that this or the other ceremony be there

⁴⁵ George J. Holyoake, *The origin and Nature of Secularism* (London: Era Books, 1987), 41.

⁴⁶ John Locke, “Letter Concerning Toleration,” *University of Virginia Library - Electronic Text Center*, n.d., <<http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=LocTole.xml&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=1&division=div1#n2>> (3 May 2013).

made use of. Neither the use nor the omission of any ceremonies in those religious assemblies does either advantage or prejudice the life, liberty, or estate of any man.”⁴⁷

Briefly, perception of Locke regarding separation of church and state has been an important milestone for the actual concept of human right as a matter of freedom of conscience.

On the other hand, Montesquieu highlighted the importance of Church within state structure as long as it supported obedience to the authority and played significant role in order to provide public order.⁴⁸ According to the model of Montesquieu, the church and the state are two *distinct* institutions that should work within an exact harmony in order to generate good citizens for the commonwealth.⁴⁹

With respect to aforementioned definitions, secularism is an order and a concept based on science, causation and experimentation, on which states are built, instead of a dogmatic belief. In the modern age, general perspective is the superiority of a political structure, which legally guarantees the idea of freedom and equality, than a political structure that puts religious dogmas and wills of kings or any clergy in its center.

The idea of separation of religion and state was developed within two different aspects, as mentioned above, and secularism is one them. The term laicism should be analyzed with its background, as the second approach. Etymologically, the word laic is a direct usage of French word “laïque”, which is originated from Greek “laikos” that means *belonging to the people* (with relation to “laos” meaning *people*).⁵⁰ In French, the word *laïcité* has been used for the separation of religion and state affairs shaped within a proper historical process. This French term cannot be translated into English with an exact word. Generally, the translation is made as

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Charles Louis de Secondat Montesquieu, *Kanunların Ruhu Üzerine I*, trans. Fehmi Baldaş, (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1963), 45-46.

⁴⁹ Ahmet Cevizci, *Aydınlanma Felsefesi Tarihi* (Bursa: Asa Kitabevi, 2007), 160.

⁵⁰ *Online Etymology Dictionary*, s.v. “laic,” (4 May 2013), <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=laic&searchmode=none>.

secularism; however, as these two terms have been evolved within two different perspectives, they cannot meet at the same meaning.

Separation of religion and state was carried out by the purpose of securing the allegiance of individuals to the republic. Within the historical context, it aimed to break the dominance of Catholic Church over political order. During the French Revolution, with providing private spheres to individuals regarding their religious identities, state maintained *undivided loyalty* of citizens to the nation. In other words, religion was swept away from political sphere to private one. This implementation also aimed to protect individuals from the claims of religion.⁵¹ With this characteristic, laicism separates from secularism; because, (Anglo-American) secularism aims to protect religion from the state and to protect state from religion; on the other hand, in (French) laicism, the state intends to protect individuals from religion in addition to mutual protection of religion and state.⁵² Therefore, within a laic structure, individuals are protected from dominance of any religious system with the help of equal conditions regardless of any recognized privilege to any part of society due to religious preferences.⁵³

Voltaire, who is accepted as one of the most important influencers of French Revolution,⁵⁴ pointed out the unnecessary of dogmas that led to intolerance, in order to stop the conflicts. According to him, the reason of intolerance was the dogmas emerged with Christianity with significant reference to the Catholic Church. The intolerance was an outcome of dogmas and consequent conflicts. Hence, less dogmas, less conflicts.⁵⁵

With significant critics to the Church, Voltaire, in one sense, pointed out the necessity of religion, which was one of the basic components of a society within Voltaire's interpretation. Religion was a tool to provide public order.⁵⁶ On that point,

⁵¹ Joan Wallach Scott, *The Politics of The Veil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 91.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 92.

⁵³ Kışlalı, *Kemalism, Laiklik ve Demokrasi*, 151.

⁵⁴ Gerhard Falk, *Man's Ascent to Reason: The Secularization of Western Culture* (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), 221.

⁵⁵ Jean Baubérot, *Dünyada Laiklik*, trans. Ertuğrul Cenk Gürcan (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2008), 39.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

similarity between Montesquieu and Voltaire attracts the attention. These two intellectuals meet at the necessity of religion. However, within political perspective, Voltaire supported the separation of church and state in order to provide a stable political structure free from religion based dogmas.⁵⁷

In *The Social Contract*, Rousseau pointed out two different perspectives regarding the role of religion. He stated that;

“Religion, considered in relation to society, which is either general or particular, may also be divided into two kinds: the religion of man, and that of the citizen. The first, which has neither temples, nor altars, nor rites, and is confined to the purely internal cult of the supreme God and the eternal obligations of morality, is the religion of the Gospel pure and simple, the true theism, what may be called natural divine right or law. The other, which is codified in a single country, gives it its gods, its own tutelary patrons; it has its dogmas, its rites, and its external cult prescribed by law; outside the single nation that follows it, all the world is in its sight infidel, foreign and barbarous; the duties and rights of man extend for it only as far as its own altars. Of this kind were all the religions of early peoples, which we may define as civil or positive divine right or law.”⁵⁸

With this statement, Rousseau separated religion into two different spheres, that is the private and the public spheres. Within this context, religion of the man was a matter of private sphere; on the other hand, religion of citizen, in other words the civil religion, was a composition of divinity of a religion and the love of country for the sake of the nation.

Rousseau, additionally, discussed the source of sovereignty, which should have belonged to *the people*. Rousseau formed a chain starting with single law and ending with sovereignty. According to him, laws were the basis of legislative power, and there should be no law without *ratification of people*. Hence, the legislative

⁵⁷ Falk, *Man's Ascent to Reason*, 221.

⁵⁸ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract: or Principles of Political Right Book III*, trans. G.D.H. Cole (University of Virginia Library Electronic Text Center, 2002), <<http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=RouSoci.xml&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=all>> (16 May 2012).

power, as a composition of laws, should belong to the people. At the end of the chain, he mentioned legislative power as *the only source* of sovereignty.⁵⁹

With respect to the aforementioned chain, it will not be wrong to claim that Rousseau took the sovereignty from God and handed it over the people; although, he did not made any direct references for the shift. He just pointed out how sovereignty should be understood without any previous source of it. However, for a classical approach regarding religious power over politics, both the power of Church in Medieval Europe and the power of Sharia in political Islam, the sovereignty used to belong to God and his representatives, this is to mention Pope or Caliph, who were responsible to constitute it. Within this interpretation, the shift of the source of sovereignty was a significant point for the separation of religion and state.

2.2.2. Evolution of Laicism: From French Revolution to Fifth Republic

French Revolution was started as an opposition to significant power of clergy among social, political and economic orders on 14 July 1789.⁶⁰ Hence, it was a revolution against the monarchy; however, with the ideas of mentioned intellectuals regarding the separation of church and religion, opposite movement aimed to remove Church from political order.

Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (*Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*) of 26 August 1789 was significant to understand the aims of the opponents and the aim of the Revolution. It was a declaration of 17 Articles distinguishing the liberty and rights of individuals. Among them, the 10th Article was a considerable statement regarding the freedom of conscience. According to this article “No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law.”⁶¹ With this article, as René Rémond stated, the ties between

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ M. Emin Ruhi, *Fransız Devriminde bir Başrol Oyuncusu: Sieyes* (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2002), 19.

⁶¹ “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,” *The Avalon Project - Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library*, 2008, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp> (3 May 2013).

Catholicism and political society were cut, in other words, people of France were relieved from religious identity.⁶²

Aftermath of the Revolution, various implementations were carried out by the National Constituent Assembly (*Assemblée Nationale Constituante*). It worked between 1789-1891, regarding the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, most specifically its 10th Article. In order to sweep away the power of Church from political order, economic sources were cut. For instance, special taxes collecting by the Church were annulled on 4 August, and Church's assets were nationalized on 2 November 1789.⁶³ With these implementations, it was not only the economic power that the Church lost, but also its independence; as, it became dependent on the state economically. Besides, the new Assembly intended to reorganize the structure of Church in order to establish a new order compatible with the new regime. However, according to some scholars, this intention was not about the compatibility of the Church; instead, it was an initiative to gain certain control over the Church.⁶⁴

Reorganization of the Church, in fact, was a considerable step in order to change the balance of power. Eventually, on 24 August 1790, Civil Constitution of the Clergy (*Constitution Civile du Clergé*) was accepted, and according to it, bishoprics were established for each Department; bishops and priests were to be elected locally, and to be assigned by the archbishop; accordingly, authority of Pope, who had had the responsibility to assign, was to be reduced to be informed regarding local elections' results, and Assembly of French Clergy (*Assemblée du Clergé de France*) was annulled. Abolishment of the Assembly was not welcomed by the clergy, obviously. It was considered as another step to deprive Church from its power and liberty. On the other hand, according to the Constituent Assembly, it was the gallicanism, in other words, nationalization of the Church.⁶⁵ Therefore, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy should be accepted with entire loyalty by clergy. On 27

⁶² René Rémond, *Religion and Society in Modern Europe*, trans. Antonia Nevill (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1999), 39.

⁶³ Albert Soboul, *1789 Fransız İnkılâbı Tarihi*, trans. Şerif Hulusi (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1969), 211.

⁶⁴ Rémond, *Religion and Society*, 42.

⁶⁵ Soboul, *1789 Fransız İnkılâbı*, 211-212.

November 1790, the Constituent Assembly made a call for the oath of members of clergy; however, there were only seven bishops responded to call.⁶⁶ That was the point that the polarization started among clergy. Due to a campaign carried out by Pope against these seven bishops, they were excluded from the society; and eventually, they were excommunicated. This campaign was supported by the members of clergy, who refused to oath for the Civil Constitution.⁶⁷ This polarization among loyal members of clergy to the Civil Constitution with support of the Constituent Assembly on one side and opponent members with the support of Pope on the other, lasted until 1793 within a bloody conflict.⁶⁸

Implementations of the Constituent Assembly were, obviously, against the political power of the Church, and the idea of separation of church and state was the inspiration point of this movement. However, an entire separation was not a point of achievement; instead, control of state over religious issues was intended. Therefore, with the origin of a separation idea, it was a shift in power. On the other hand, making an evaluation of laicism with respect to actual perspectives regarding religion and politics would be an anachronistic approach, as it was highlighted by Rémond. Nevertheless, as an unavoidable fact, the process played a significant role in history of politics regarding the actual concept of laicism, like a primitive approach.

With the abolishment of kingdom and the establishment of republic, on 10 August 1792, various implementations were carried out by the Legislative Assembly, which was on duty between October 1791 and September 1792. With these new implementations, the Church was disqualified from its responsibilities regarding birth certificate, marriage and divorce, and listed issues were carried out within civil laws regardless from the Church.⁶⁹ Besides, in order to reduce the importance of the Church, Gregorian Calendar was annulled; instead, French Republican Calendar

⁶⁶ Ibid., 213.

⁶⁷ Ali Reşad, *Fransız İhtilali*, trans. Ömer Faruk Lermioğlu (İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 2006), 70.

⁶⁸ Hugh Mcleod, *Religion and the People of Western Europe 1789-1989* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 2.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 46.

(*Calendrier Républicain Français*) was applied on 5 October 1793. Additionally, festivals of Republic were popularized instead of Catholic festivals.⁷⁰

During the process of separation, different religious approaches were intended to be popularized. First, the approach was considered as concrete hostility to religion; then, it shifted to a perspective, which was suggested by Rousseau, it was the religion of the citizen. According to this perspective, limited freedom was provided for the religion. With respect to this limitation, on 22 July 1794, tolls of church bells were prohibited.⁷¹

Polarization between supporters and opponents of the new regime could not be dissolved until the time of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821). He ended the conflicts with a special agreement with Catholic Church known as *Concordat of 1801*, on 15 July 1801. Concordat was applied until 1905, and according to it, the idea of separation of church and state was abandoned; Catholicism was accepted as the religion of majority; and members of clergy was started to be paid by the state, since they were accepted as officers.⁷² Besides, clergy was not the only group, who were started to be paid by the state; instead, the religious functionaries of four different religious groups, which were recognized with the Concordat: Catholicism, Judaism and two different sects of Protestantism. Hence, they started to be considered as public servants. The rest of the functionaries from different religious groups than in the four listed, were not under control of the state, were not paid by the state, but were provided tolerance regarding their distinct religious identity.⁷³

The process of laicization was significantly strict regarding religious issues, including religious education. However, with the Second Empire of N. Bonaparte, the Church was allowed to be involved in educational order, and on 15 March 1850, primary school education became mixed, in which some of the primary schools were

⁷⁰ François-Alphonse Aulard, *Fransa İnkılabının: Siyasî Tarihi: Demokrasinin ve Cumhuriyetin Kaynakları ve Gelişmesi-Cilt I*, trans. Nazım Poroy (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987), 679.

⁷¹ Jacques Robert, *Batı'da Din-Devlet İlişkileri: Fransa Örneği*, trans. İzzet Er (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1997), 45.

⁷² Baubérot, *Dünyada Laiklik*, 58.

⁷³ Robert, *Batı'da Din-Devlet İlişkileri*, 45-47.

under supervision of the state, but some of them were given to supervision of local priests with Falloux Laws (*Loi Falloux*).⁷⁴

Education was an important tool regarding the leaning of head of states. Hence, many implementations were applied to the educational order; consequently the responsibility of supervision of schools were handed over many times between state and church within time. The Church was in good relations with the Second Empire, due to provided rights, recognition and the official intervention in the education system. However, the Third Republic of France (1870-1940) possessed an approach based on separation of church and state, and reorganized state's relations with the Church. Within this perspective, religious freedom and neutrality of state were provided once again with respect to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. In this process, education system, once again, was changed with respect to shifted perspective of state. Jules Ferry Laws were adopted to education system in 1882, in order to laicize it. According to Jules Ferry Laws, education system was unified and became laic, in which entire supervisory responsibility belonged to state, and mandatory system was applied.⁷⁵ Within time, laic republicans gained more power over politics with increased support of society. Between 1901 and 1904, religious foundations were either closed or given under state control; religious schools were closed; and with order of the Minister of Justice, court rooms were cleaned from religious symbols, as the crosses were removed.⁷⁶

The year 1905 possesses significant importance regarding the separation of state and religion, because of the 1905 French law on the Separation of the Churches and State (*Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l'État*). With the law, which was applied on 9 December 1905, state ensured the freedom of conscience with its First Article and within a general perspective, religion lost its

⁷⁴ Hans Kohn, *Making of The French Mind* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1955), 54.

⁷⁵ William Safran. "Religion and Laïcité in a Jacobin Republic: The Case of France," in *The Secular and The Sacred: Nation, Religion and Politics*, ed. William Safran (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2005), 51.

⁷⁶ Ahmet Kuru, "Dynamics of Secularism: State-Religion Relations in the United States, France, and Turkey" (PhD diss., University of Washington, 2006), 168-169.

importance among society, and independence of citizenship from religious identity was provided.⁷⁷

Separation Law was interpreted as an *assertive secular approach* due to its strict rules based on cleaning of public sphere from religious components. In fact, that cannot be considered as a surprise, because when the conditions of the period are taken into account, strict separation would be the only way. On one side, there were the supporters of the old regime, in which the Church possessed social and political power, on the other hand, there were the supporters of the new laic regime. Since, the second group was on the power, it was unavoidable to apply an assertive way of the separation.⁷⁸

The strict separation of church and state, in fact, was not an unfamiliar concept for France, as Civil Constitution of the Clergy was adopted more than a century before the Separation Law. Hence, Catholicism was not the basic characteristic of France anymore; however, there was not an intention to popularize a republican civil religion as it was done with Civil Constitution, either. Briefly, Civil Law can be considered as an inspiration point for the Separation Law; however, it would not be true to claim considerable continuity between the two of them.⁷⁹ Instead of any religious identity, laicism was popularized as the basis of France. As they succeeded to do so, after a century, in 2003, then French President of Republic, Jacques Chirac, was to distinguish laicism as the core of French republican identity with this statement: “Laicism is in our veins. It has been the core of our republican identity.”⁸⁰

Separation Law had been discussed strongly, it was not welcomed instantly; however, the Constitution of 1946, which led the establishment of the Fourth French Republic (1946-1958), with its laic structure was not reacted negatively. As the

⁷⁷ “Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat,” *Le Service Public de la Diffusion du Droit*, n.d.,
<<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070169&dateTexte=20080306>> (2 May 2013)

⁷⁸ Kuru, “Dynamics of Secularism,” 170,

⁷⁹ Rémond, *Religion and Society*, 43.

⁸⁰ Jeremy T. Gunn, *Din Özgürlüğü ve Laisite: ABD ile Fransa Arasında Bir Karşılaştırma*, trans. Hüseyin Bal ve Ömer Faruk Altıntaş (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2006), 17.

Church did not stand against the constitution, laicism gained base among the society.⁸¹

In 1958, politics of France witnessed another new constitution that led to the today's Fifth French Republic. Laicism was implemented as one of the main characteristics of the regime in the constitution, which was composed with significant references to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. France was defined as below in the First Article:

“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organised on a decentralised basis. Statutes shall promote equal access by women and men to elective offices and posts as well as to position of professional and social responsibility.”⁸²

With the First Article, laicism was highlighted with the equality of citizens regardless of their religious identity. In the Third Article, which is “National sovereignty shall vest in the people, who shall exercise it through their representatives and by means of referendum.”⁸³, sovereignty was given to the people, which is another proof of laicism. Within the same system laic education was applied and freedom of conscience of individuals was guaranteed.⁸⁴ For the financial issues of functionaries of religious groups, state has not been involved in salaries of any of them. For the implementation of this rule, Separation Law of 1905 has been effective.⁸⁵

Today, in France, the state is involved in some of the religious activities, such as financial support for the buildings, which handed over to religious authorities only if they were maintained as public assets; providing social security for the religious functionaries; tax reduction for the favor of religious foundations;

⁸¹ Kuru, “Dynamics of Secularism,” 175.

⁸² “Constitution of October 4, 1958,” World Intellectual Property Organization, n.d., <http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=179092> (3 May 2013).

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Alain Garay et al., “The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief in France.” *Emory International Law Review* 19 (2005): 790-791.

⁸⁵ Francis Messner. “Fransa,” in *Avrupa Birliği Ülkelerinde Din-Devlet İlişkisi*, ed. Ali Köse ve Talip Küçükcan (İstanbul: İsam Yayınları, 2008), 114.

and special allowance for higher education within religious perspective unless it is for the commonwealth.⁸⁶

Discussions regarding the clash of power between Church and state was dissolved with the 20th century step by step. However, due to the strict prohibition of religious components from public sphere in France, led to a shift of the basis of discussions and the parts, who were the clergy and republicans before, changed. Today, discussions are being carried out between supporters of assertive secularism, in other words traditional French laicism, and supporters of passive secularism, who are in favor with secularist idea without state control over religion. For instance, the law regarding the prohibition of “conspicuous signs” of religions in public schools, which was applied on 15 March 2004, was discussed a lot between these two groups. According to the Law;

“In public elementary, middle and high schools, the wearing of signs or clothing which conspicuously manifest students’ religious affiliations is prohibited. Disciplinary procedures to implement this rule will be preceded by a discussion with the student.”⁸⁷

The aim was to prevent students wearing skullcaps, turbans and headscarves of Jewish, Sikh and Muslim students. However, it has been an issue regarding the limitation of freedom of individuals due to their religious identities. While the supporters of laicism were in favor with the law, the law was criticized for being against the human rights.⁸⁸

2.3. Separation of Religion and State: Compatibility with Islam?

The critics regarding laicism are an issue not only in France, but also in Turkey. However, there is one thing that should be distinguished for these two states. Although, they are both laic states with respect to similar interpretations of laws and

⁸⁶ Jean Baubérot, *Avrupa Birliği Ülkelerinde Dinler ve Laiklik*, trans. Fazlı Arabacı (İstanbul: Ufuk Kitapları, 2003), 101.

⁸⁷ Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*, 1.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 1-4.

constitution, the religion of the majority of society differs, Catholic Christians and Sunni Muslims. As the revolution that led to possession of laic idea was carried out in a Catholic society, it is important to examine the compatibility of laicism and Islam.

Islam, traditionally, has been considered as a set of rules or a comprehensive worldview governing both personal and political aspects of life, as it was mentioned in previous part. Within this perspective, Islam, as contrary to Christianity that became the base of separation idea, has intended to sanctify political system based on religious order. Consequently, the idea of separation of religion and state has been considered as a threat to assimilate religion of Islam. Besides, there is no such instruction regarding mentioned separation in Islamic society, as distinct duties of God and Caesar in history of Christianity.

Laicism was started as a rebel movement to the dominance of Catholic Church in Europe, and concluded after a process of Enlightenment, which brought about thinking based on scientific interpretations instead of dogmas of Church. However, in Islamic history, there has been no such rebel movement against the authority, which was the Caliphate before its abolishment, then, to the Islamic rules, such as political Islam, Sharia, or economic ones.

With the Age of Enlightenment, Western societies integrated the idea of laicism/secularism; consequently, there is not insistence of an exact religion to individuals. With the loss of Church's dominance, dogmas, which were the obstacles, were swept away and scientific perspectives gained more importance. Additionally, as the sovereignty was handed over from God to people with laicism, democracy was framed as a modern approach to political scenes. Hence, the will of people possessed significant role in evolution of actual concepts, such as modernity and democracy.

Briefly, the idea of separation of state and religion has been interpreted as two distinct ways. According to the Western world, laicism or secularism has been related with the freedom of political structure, accordingly mutual protection between state and religion, and protection of individuals from religious oppression

and with modernity. On the other hand, in Islamic societies, it has been associated with an obstacle, which prevents Muslims to live their life with respect to their Islamic components.

For the purpose of this thesis, a theoretical perspective was intended to be given to the lecturer, in order to clarify the role of religion and the emergence of laicism within French concept. Laicism of France was adopted to the Turkish political structure step by step after the establishment of the republic. The Republic of Turkey possesses significant importance regarding discussions of compatibility of laicism and Islam with its majorly Muslim society.

With respect to the necessities of the modern world, abolishment of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate were followed by emergence of the Republic of Turkey with adopted implementations from Western world, which was the inspiration point with its modern structure for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) and his companions. Laicism was one of these concepts that adopted into Turkish political structure and made Turkey the unique example with its majorly Muslim society.

Turkey's 90-year-politics has witnessed many discussions regarding its laic structure and state's approach to different religious identities. The third chapter will examine the laicization process of the Republic since its establishment and the aftermath discussions up until today. With the help of third chapter which will help to understand how far religious freedom goes in Turkey, the fourth chapter will be dedicated to Alevism as a different belief system with its millions of believers and both their position and problems in a laic political and a majorly Sunni-Islamic social structures.

3. REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND PLACE OF RELIGION

Change, or better to say, evolution into a better one, both in political and sociological orders, is an unavoidable fact that should be followed in order to be capable of responding the needs of time. Within political perspective, states need to adapt their structures to the conditions of time to maintain their existences. The Ottoman Empire is a considerable example for relation between importance of adaptation to changes and existence of a state.

Implementations regarding modernization, which has been a synonymous usage for Westernization due to changed ideological structure originated from French Revolution, had been applied in the late Ottoman Period; however, could not be sufficient to catch the needs of time. Consequently, the Empire was weakened and after the World War I (1914-1918) the Empire was dissolved; eventually, with the establishment of the National Assembly of Turkey in 1920, the Empire lost its legitimacy. With a new state, many implementations should be applied in order to catch the level of Western civilizations, in other words, to modernize the structure.

Laicism, as mentioned, has been one of the most pivotal requirements for a modern structure of state, in which the possessors of sovereignty and free will shifted from God to the people. Hence, modernization of the Turkish Republic was based on laic ideology, which was adapted from the French political history.

The Republic of Turkey was established with the basis of many different principles related with modernization; however, they were all associated firstly with laicism. As it was argued by Ali Kirman, laicism was to be used to refer modernity and modernization (*çağdaş - çağdaşlaşma*) in Turkish politics, within time.¹

¹ M. Ali Kirman, *Din ve Sekülerleşme* (Adana: Karahan Yayınları, 2005), 53.

Modernization process based on laicization was welcomed by a significant part of the society; however, that part cannot be considered as entire population of the state. As focused on second chapter, laicism gained its actual form in more than two centuries within French political system, in which the Age of Enlightenment was significantly effective. When it is compared with the foundation process of the Turkish Republic and application of reforms, which was lasted less than two decades, the lack of entire support will not be surprising. It was transition process, in which a laic structure was applied over the heritage of Ottoman Dynasty with Caliphate. Hence, unexpectedly, oppositional groups mobilized against laic structure.

Turkish politics have witnessed many conflicts between the supporters and opponents of laicism since its foundation. Arguments against laic implementations were for the favor of defending Ottoman system based on Islamic rules aftermath of foundation; however, within time, in addition to yearning for Ottoman system, arguments have been decreased within different points of view regarding the application of laicism in Turkey; for instance its incompatibility with human rights or its malfunctioning.

This chapter will focus on laicization process of the Republic of Turkey with details regarding different orders, institutionalization of laic implementations and consequent discussions between supporters and opponents of laicism, which have been expanded within long history since the establishment of the Turkish Republic until present day. Today, laicism is still an issue being discussed on Turkey's agenda within different perspectives. According to supporters, laicism has been under threat due to Islamic implementations aiming to integrate political Islam into Turkish political scenes; according to Islamists, laicism has undermined the real identity of Turkish people based on Sunni Islamic Ottoman heritage; within humanistic perspective, rigid approach of laicism to religion cannot meet with human rights as in examples of the ban of veil; and according to Alevis, laic structure has not functioned properly as it has favored Sunni Islamic identity within different ways.

The aim of this chapter is to give different perspectives of various parts of society, which have led Turkey to military interventions, bloody attacks, and concrete polarization of society, by distinguishing the first three of aforelisted four

types of interpretations within Turkish political structure with respect to chronological order. Hence, whole political structure of the Republic with its conflicts based on religious references will be given in order to place Alevi perspective and state's approach to Alevism as a different religious identity. This relation between Alevis and the State, which is the case study of this thesis, will be analyzed with details in fourth chapter.

3.1. From the Empire to the New Republic

Modernization of Turkey was completed with various implementations dealing with many different orders of both individuals and state structure. Said modernization process was started in the 19th century under Ottoman rule; however, with the foundation of a new state, this is to refer the Republic of Turkey, the process gained a more significant progress with concrete outcomes.

Foundation of the Republic of Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his companions aimed to form a state with a level of Westernized civilizations, which led the modernization process of the World with the Age of Enlightenment. In order to achieve that level of civilization absolute monarchy of Ottoman Empire, Ottoman Dynasty and Caliphate should be changed with a modern state, in which the source of sovereignty was the people, instead of God, and consciousness of individual identity was embedded, instead of beings subjects of the *Sultan*.

In this part of the chapter, reforms of modernization process will be analyzed starting from 19th century under Ottoman rule until the second half of the 20th century, in other words, until the end of Single Party Period.

3.1.1. Modernization in the Ottoman Empire

Today's modern, westernized Turkey was established in 1923; however, the modernization process had begun in the 19th century during the Ottoman Empire. There were several movements that the Empire intended to modernize its structure and to catch the developments of its time.

The Ottoman Empire was established in 1299 in Söğüt/Bilecik, northwestern Anatolian city, and within short time, it expanded its territories with new conquests from Eastern Europe, to South-Western Asia and to Northern Africa. Ottoman Dynasty was a member of tribal nomadic Turkmen groups; however, there was significant variety among peoples of the Empire in linguistic, ethnic, and religious bases. Among all, religious diversity is quite significant for the purpose of this thesis.

The variety among society under the Ottoman flag regarding religious diversity was not only between Muslims and non-Muslims, but also among Muslim people. As the Ottoman Empire possessed Sunni-Hanafi Islam as its official state religion with support of Caliphate after 16th century, said understanding of Islam was strengthened with education networks, such as Islamic seminaries (*medrese*) led to a systematically well-defined written theology with the basis of Quran and Sunnah (*Sünnet*), while entire understandings of Islam were considered as heterodox Islam and as oppositional identity for the central authority. Hence, Islamic understandings apart from the Sunni-Hanafi one were maintained unsystematic, based on oral transmission, and accordingly syncretic.² This information will be a pivotal reference point regarding the Alevi culture maintained under the Ottoman rule, which will be examined with details in following chapter.

Until the end of its rise and growth in 17th century, the Ottoman Empire had a self-contained structure; consequently, the Western World used to mean just new territories to conquer. Besides, within hierarchical order, the Empire considered itself in a better position than the West. However, after the late 17th century, the Empire started to lose its power on military base, which led to loss of territories; hence, the superiority was vanished, and the relations between the Empire and the West was changed. While the Empire focused on its internal problems, the Western World witnessed the Age of Enlightenment that led to modernization of western political and social structure; consequently, within different orders, Europe became the superior power for the Ottoman Empire.

² Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 17.

Modernization of Europe was an important challenge for Ottoman politics with its Islamic and monarchic state structure. These two concepts were not compatible with understanding of modernization; however, the Empire took European modernization as a model, which was seen as a way to overcome the problems of its dissolution. Except from the reforms in military structure during the 18th century, the first embassies were established in order to possess diplomatic relations with Europe and to monitor its modernization process. The reorganization of state structure with the Imperial Edict of Reorganization (*Tanzimat Fermanı*, hereafter Tanzimat Reforms) was originated from this idea based on acceptance of European modernization as a model.³

Modernization process was started with significant implementations regarding military structure, such as the change of military order with respect to European understanding. Because, reason of the loss of territories was associated with insufficient functionality of Ottoman military.⁴ Abolishment of the Janissary System⁵ by Mahmud II with respect to fatwa of Muslim theologians (*ulema*) was considered as the abolishment of an obstacle for reforms, due to significant power of Janissaries in Ottoman politics.⁶ The power of Janissaries was pointed out by Voltaire with this description; “Janissaries are generally in favor with Sultan; however, there is always a possibility that they take the power to disorganize the politics.”⁷ Apart from the military structure, abolishment of Janissary System was to cause social change concerning Alevi identity under the Ottoman rule, due to its Bektashi origin. This relation and the social change will be discussed in next chapter.

With the Tanzimat Reforms, the modernization process of Ottoman state institutions was expanded to different orders in addition to military, such as the fields of law, education, and state bureaucracy,⁸ and modernization movement was

³ Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), 10.

⁴ Şerif Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*, trans. Mümtaz'er Türköne Fahri Unan, and İrfan Erdoğan (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 153-154.

⁵ Ottoman military system, from the late 14th century to 1826.

⁶ Metin Heper, *Bürokratik Yönetim Geleneği* (Ankara: ODTÜ Yayınları, 1974), 60.

⁷ Paul Imbert, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Yenileşme Hareketleri: Türkiye'nin Meseleleri*, trans. Adnan Cemgil (İstanbul: Havass Yayınları, 1981), 129.

⁸ Umut Azak, *Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2010), 4.

actually started.⁹ The importance of Tanzimat period was to provide equality for the subjects of Sultan and to take a step forward laicize the state structure with decreased power of *ulema*. Due to the Reforms, implementations of religious law (Sharia) was reduced to issues regarding marriage and heritage, and the juridical system for the rest of the issues, such as administrative and trading, was reorganized with adaptations from the Western World.¹⁰

During Tanzimat, absolute power of the Sultan-Caliph was limited, as Grand Vizier and bureaucrats, officially, involved in politics and legislative process;¹¹ hereby, this group became civil servants of the Empire, instead of being subjects of the Sultan. Within traditional Ottoman understanding, maintaining the power of empire was only possible with good education of sultans' sons; however, with Tanzimat, limitation of power of sultans was started to be discussed as effects of Western enlightenment, which was based on liberalism and modern constitution, instead of monarchic state structure.¹²

Idea of equal citizenship became a concept that was pointed out with the Tanzimat Reforms. Within social structure, a laic understanding was adopted for the purpose of sweeping away difference approaches to different religious groups. For instance, non-Muslim groups were started to be represented in regional administration offices. With the declaration of Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856 (*Islahat Fermanı*, hereafter Islahat Reforms), the implementations of Tanzimat Reforms were strengthened.¹³

With the declaration of Islahat Reforms, Muslims were provided with equal rights as non-Muslims were granted with Tanzimat Reforms in order to ensure equality between Muslim and non-Muslim people in front of the law, in other words, in order to embed the idea of the citizenship of the Ottoman Empire known as Ottomanism (*Osmanlılık*). Under Ottoman rule, the society possessed

⁹ İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınları, 2006), 31.

¹⁰ Günay, *Din Sosyolojisi*, 586.

¹¹ Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun*, 101.

¹² Şerif Mardin. "Tanzimat," in *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, ed. Mümtaz'er Türköne, and Tuncay Önder (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), 298.

¹³ Teyfur Erdoğan, "Osmanlılığın Evrimi Hakkında Bir Deneme: Bir Grup (Üst Düzey Yönetici) Kimliğinden Millet Yaratma Projesine." *Doğu-Batı* 45 (2008): 29-30.

heterogeneous structure regarding diverse religious and ethnic origins. These diverse groups were named as “Millet” with respect to their religious origin, and each Millet was granted with autonomous self-governing system regarding their own laws. Millets were headed by religious leaders, who were the representatives of their communities for the responsibilities of taxes and internal security.¹⁴ Briefly, the Ottoman Millet System was a way to guarantee the existence of diverse religious identities, which were important components of the Empire.¹⁵ According to this system, other peoples of the book apart from the Muslims, this is to say Christians and Jews, were granted with aforelisted rights. The ruling millet was the Muslim millet composed by people from different ethnical origins regardless of which sect they were from. Apart from the Muslim Millet, there were the Greek, Jewish, and Armenian millets under the rule of Ottoman Empire, and these millets were to become official minorities of the future Republic of Turkey.

As Kemal Karpat points out that millet system was not only to maintain diverse religious and cultural continuity, but also to permit their incorporation with the Empire by their religious leaders.¹⁶ With the 19th century reforms, the idea of equal citizenship, which is a laic approach for individuals regardless of any religious components,¹⁷ was started to be spread; consequently, the power of millets started to be dissolved. The reforms were applied in order to embed a modernist approach for individuals and to take their status a step forward.

With Tanzimat and Islahat Reforms education system was, relatively, relieved from religion and western style schools were established as alternatives to *medreses*. During Tanzimat, General Directorate of Schools (*Mekatib-i Umumiye Nezareti*) was established in 1846, Mekteb-i Mülkiye was established in 1859 as a vocational high school and education system was divided into three parts as primary schools (*sıbyan mektebi*), secondary school (*rüşdiye*) and schools of higher education (*Dar-ül Fünun*). While primary schools were divided into two for Muslim

¹⁴ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "millet," (2 May 2013), <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/382871/millet>>.

¹⁵ Jorgen S. Nielsen. “New Perspectives on Ottoman History,” in *Religion, Ethnicity and Contested Nationhood in the Former Ottoman Space*, ed. Jorgen S. Nielsen (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 4.

¹⁶ Kemal H. Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 611-612.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 611.

and non-Muslim students, secondary schools were unified for all religious groups. Besides, in 1857, General Directorate of Schools was turned into Ministry of Education (*Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti*), primary and secondary schools were given under the control of the Ministry in 1861.¹⁸ Involvement of girls to the education was encouraged, and primary and secondary schools for the education of girls (1858), and schools of vocational teacher education for girls were opened as result of official encouragement.¹⁹ Additionally, Regulations of General Education (*Maarif-i Umûmiye Nizamnâmesi*) were composed with the basis of French education model and declared in 1869. With these regulations, primary school education became obligatory for girls and boys.²⁰

With the reforms that led to political and juridical westernization, dichotomy between two identities, traditional Ottoman identity and the westernized one, started to occur. In fact, the idea being discussed was the laic approach, which stressed equality of Muslim and non-Muslims Ottoman subjects within the fields of administration, education, and juristic. The new concept of Ottoman citizenship was associated with every single person living under the rule of the Empire regardless of religion and ethnicity. The change has been evaluated within two different perspectives. On one side, it was criticized by some scholars, such as Hilmi Ziya Ülken and Bülent Tanör, as being an outcome of Western states' oppression with the excuse of protecting the rights of religious minorities in order to involve internal Ottoman politics;²¹ and on the other hand, as İlber Ortaylı argues clearly, the Ottomanism with the reforms of 19th century, no matter how they occurred, were the Orientalist approach of Western modernization and modern understanding of becoming a nation.²²

Regulations in the fields of law, state bureaucracy and education were laic implementations with respect to reduced responsibilities of Sultan-Caliph and Sharia.

¹⁸ İlyas Doğan, "Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Aydınlarında Çağdaşlaşma Sorunu ve Arayışlar." *Kamu Hukuku Arşivi* 3, no. 2 (1999): 114.

¹⁹ Kışlalı, *Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi*, 80.

²⁰ Zülfü Demirtaş, "Osmanlı'da Sıbyan Mektepleri ve İlköğretimin Örgütlenmesi." *Fırat University Journal of Social Science* 17, no. 1 (2007): 179-180.

²¹ Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri* (İstanbul: YKY, 2007), 95;

Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi* (İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 2005), 36.

²² İlber Ortaylı, "Osmanlı Kimliği." *Cogito* 19 (1999): 78.

With all these implementations, the source of sovereignty was started to be shifted from Sultan-Caliph (representative of God) to the superiority of law.²³ With this shift of sovereignty and the reduced role of religion, the power of *ulema* in administration, the judiciary and the educational systems was undermined. This loss of power was deepened with the graduates of new-opening middle schools based on a laic approach, as they started to take part in administrative process with their critical interpretations of Islam.²⁴

Tanzimat, as a period, ended with the first and the last constitution of the Ottoman Empire named as the 1876 Constitution (*Kânûn-i Esâsî*). With this constitution, Ottomanism based on equality among all subjects of the Empire was guaranteed, and strengthened the process, which opened the path to acceptance of non-Muslims to all administrative ranks with Islahat Reforms.²⁵

With the beginning of the 20th century, a new movement based on laic and nationalist ideas carried out by Young Turks (*Jön Türkler - Genç Türkler*), who were young intellectuals educated in abroad mostly in France and affected from the ideas of Enlightenment, started. With the graduates of the schools based on laic education both abroad and in the Ottoman Empire, Young Turks intended to spread Ottomanism with ideas of modernization, westernization, laicism and nationalism. As discussed by Yıldız Atasoy, with respect to Young Turks' perspective, modernization was not a rejection of traditional Islamic-Ottoman identity as contrary to aforementioned dichotomy; instead, the aim was to create an Ottoman nation as a synthesis of east and west.²⁶ According to them, among all Ahmet Rıza, Abdullah Cevdet, and Ziya Gökalp, who is believed as the father of Turkishness, a social change was to be carried out in order to embed the ideas of modernization. For instance, religious superstitions should have been swept away in order to progress within a modernist perspective; hence, they supported the reform of Islam.²⁷

²³ Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Türkiye'de Politik Değişim ve Modernleşme* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2000), 14.

²⁴ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 4.

²⁵ Yıldız Atasoy, *Islam's Marriage with Neo-Liberalism: State Transformation in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 44.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 50.

²⁷ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 6.

Because, the cause of the backwardness was not the religion itself; instead, it was the usage of religion and religious superstitions.²⁸

The ideas of Young Turks were systematically unified with the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) that was in power for interrupted periods, between 1908-1918. The movement of the Committee popularized the ideologies regarding the synthesis of east and west with the idea of Pan Turkism (*Türkçülük*); however, this endeavor could not be sufficient to save the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, accumulation of modernist implementations were to become an important part of the Ottoman heritage for the foundation of the new state, and most importantly, and as a consequence of modernization endeavors, a new reformist group, who was to lead the process of the establishment of the Republic, was educated with the components of modern state structure.²⁹

The dichotomy between the Islamist-Ottoman identity and the westernized one was also one of the components of Ottoman heritage for the Republic of Turkey. According to Sencer Ayata, difference between these two approaches regarding the social identity is the source of different perspectives between laic and Islamist political parties of modern Turkey.³⁰ This difference was analyzed by Emre Kongar within a deeper interpretation. According to Kongar, starting from language, there were different components of different parts of the Ottoman society. Among them, there were two dominant cultures, which were elitist and public cultures, and they were strictly separated with no interaction. The elitist culture was possessed by the ruling class, who were the former subjects of the Sultan-Caliph became the bureaucrats with the 19th century reforms, while the other one belonged to public. The political and sociological origin of the difference dominated the cultural components of these two groups.³¹ During the dissolution of the Empire, the culture of ruling class was also divided into two, which led to political parties' different

²⁸ Kışlalı, *Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi*, 178.

²⁹ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 230-238.

³⁰ Sencer Ayata. "Poverty, Social Policy and Modernity in Turkey," in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem, and Philip Robins (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 193.

³¹ Emre Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye: 2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2006), 73.

ideological structures. The ruling class became the statist-elites as the saviors of the Empire, who led the reforms of the Republic with the basis of modernization. As its dialectic, the opponents of western style modernization gathered around the traditional-liberal ideology based on Islamic-Ottoman identity.³² This interpretation of Kongar will be referred in upcoming parts regarding political structure of the Republic of Turkey.

After the World War I (1914-1918), the Ottoman Empire was officially partitioned with respect to the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920), as a result of the defeat of Central Powers composed by the German Empire, the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire by the Entente Powers, composed by the French Republic, the British Empire, the Russian Empire, and lately attended Italy, with many others allied later.

The government of the Empire based in Istanbul (hereafter, Istanbul Government) signed the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918 with the Entente Powers to declare the acceptance of defeat, and this armistice led the partition of Ottoman territories in case of necessity that might occur as a security issue. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) was an outcome of this necessity. However, between 1918 and 1920, the years of two important agreements, the Anatolian people started to be mobilized against the Entente Powers.

Although the World War I was lost, many generals (*paşa*-pasha) made name with their success in different fronts. Among them, Mustafa Kemal Pasha (1881-1938), İsmet Pasha (1884-1973), Kâzım Karabekir (1882-1948), Refet Pasha (1881-1963), Ali Fuat Pasha (1882-1968) and Rauf Bey (1881-1964) were the most well-known ones, who were to become the leaders of the Turkish War of Independence (*Kurtuluş Savaşı* - 1919-1923), which was the national mobilization of Anatolian people against invasion of the Entente Powers.

³² Ibid., 610.

As expressed by Gökalp, in times of great political disasters national feeling gains its utmost ascendancy.³³ The nationalist idea was based on religion during the late Ottoman period, as the idea of citizenship could not be successfully embedded to the society; hence, the “national feelings” that Gökalp referred was associated with Islamic identity of Ottoman people. With the invasion of the Entente Powers, the Muslim Millet of the Empire was mobilized against the hostile “Christian” countries; in other words, the Turkish Muslim *ethnie*³⁴ turned into the guardians of the Empire.

The War of Independence was started with Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s arrival to Samsun, a northern Anatolian city, on 19 May 1919 with an assignment by the Istanbul government in order to provide public order during the invasion. However, the real aim was to mobilize people for a national disobedience against the invasion of Anatolia.

After 19 May, Mustafa Kemal Pasha initiated the process with sending the Amasya Circular (*Amasya Genelgesi* - 22 June 1919), which was the first written document regarding the War of Independence, to aforesaid four Pashas in order to distinguish the deficiency of Istanbul Government for the independence and to organize a congress in Erzurum, eastern Anatolian city, in secrecy.³⁵ With the Erzurum Congress on 22 July - 4 August, “national power” was distinguished in order to reject the European invasion into Anatolia, to maintain the unity and integrity of fatherland (*Vatan*), and to save the Sultanate and the Caliphate.³⁶ There is one thing that should be distinguished on that point. Anatolian people were mobilizing for the sake of the Sultanate and for the Caliphate; however, the War of Independence was ended with official abolishment of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Islam was used as an important tool to attract the attention of the Anatolian people and to mobilize them for the movement.

³³ Soner Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (London: Routledge, 2006), 8.

³⁴ Anthony Smith defines *ethnie* as a pre-modern ethno-religious community “that possesses a common ancestry, myths and historical memories, a shared culture, a link to a historic territory and some measure of solidarity.”

³⁵ Sina Akşin, *Ana Çizgileriyle Türkiye'nin Yakın Tarihi* (Ankara: İmaj Yayıncılık, 2012), 111.

³⁶ M. Fahrettin Kırzioğlu, *Bütünüyle Erzurum Kongresi* (Ankara: Kültür Ofset, 1993), 131.

After Erzurum Congress, another congress was organized in Sivas, central Anatolian city on 4 September 1919. For the Sivas Congress, delegates were sent from different parts of Anatolia to be represented for the decisions regarding the War of Independence and its aims. Among these delegates, there were religious and tribal leaders as well as the selected ones.

Sivas, due to the Congress, is believed as one of the most important cities in Turkish political history, as the movement of independence gained a concrete structure in there. Due to the purpose of this thesis, details of the War of Independence will not be focused; instead, the role of Islam during the War will be pointed out.

In March 1920, the Istanbul Government annulled itself due to British invasion into Istanbul. With this occasion, the necessity of a government gained official base, and in Ankara, central Anatolian city, the Grand National Assembly was established on 23 April 1920, as the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly introduced itself as the unique representative of Anatolian people and the members proclaimed their loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph Mehmed Vahideddin and reaffirmed their will to save him from the hostile powers.³⁷ As a tool of the mobilization, Islamic references were significant on the establishment of the Assembly. First of all, it was opened on Friday, after special Friday prayers, in which all delegates attended,³⁸ then, opening speech made for the sake of the Sultan-Caliph.³⁹ Additionally on 5 May, the Mufti of Ankara, Borekçizade Mehmed Rifat Efendi, issued a fatwa, endorsed by 152 other muftis in Anatolia. This fatwa declared that a fatwa written under the oppression was not valid (this referred to the fatwa of Shaykh al-Islam with collaboration of Sultan-Caliph, in which a religious duty was distinguished regarding the murders of *rebels*, in other words, the members of the national movement), and the real duty was to liberate the Caliph from captivity. This was a significant call for the Muslims in order to gather them around the movement.⁴⁰

³⁷ Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 251.

³⁸ Please see Appendix I on page 283 for the photo of Opening of the Assembly.

³⁹ Yalçın Bayer, "Dua ve Tekbirle Açılan Meclis," *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, 23 April 2013.

⁴⁰ Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 252.

The day after the establishment of the Assembly, on 24 April, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was selected as the Head of the Assembly. Within time, while the War of Independence was continuing on different fronts in Anatolia, the Grand National Assembly took the power as the representative of the people of the former Empire, and on 20 January 1921, declared the first constitution of the Turkish State. According to the First Article of the 1921 Constitution, the sovereignty was given to the nation without any reference to state regime, and according to the Fourth Article, the delegates of the Grand National Assembly were to be selected by the city population that to be represented.

The shift of the source of sovereignty was a significant point regarding the character of the War of Independence. The Assembly was opened with oaths for the sake of the Sultan-Caliph; however, the sovereignty was taken from him, although his existence might have been maintained in the future. Nevertheless, on 1 November 1922, the Sultanate was abolished by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* - TBMM)⁴¹ by a declaration about the official rejection of the Istanbul Government. This declaration was like a response for the Conference of Lausanne, in which both the Istanbul Government and TBMM were invited. As TBMM introduced itself as the unique representative of the Anatolian people, it should represent the Turkish State in a conference, where negotiations were to be carried out for the future of the State with the Entente Powers. Eventually, with the abolishment of the Sultanate, TBMM became the unique and legitimate representative of the Turkish State in the Conference of Lausanne.⁴²

In 1923, the war on the fronts was won, and the TBMM was recognized by the Entente Powers, as two significant victories in military and political bases. However, it was not considered as a complete success, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha mentioned the point that the Turkish people were to be achieved as below;

“The successes which our army has gained up to now cannot be regarded as having achieved the real salvation of our country. These victories have only

⁴¹ The name of the Assembly was changed from Grand National Assembly to Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 8 February 1921.

⁴² “Biography of Atatürk,” *Republic of Turkey - Ministry of Culture*, n.d., <<http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN,31350/biography-of-ataturk.html>> (25 April 2013).

prepared the ground for our future victories. Let us not be puffed up with military victories. Let us rather prepare for new victories in science and economics.”⁴³

3.1.2. Foundation of the Republic and Aftermath

In territories of the former Ottoman Empire, the reforms had already been started with a new Assembly, a new state, and the Constitution of 1921 by which the sovereignty was taken from the Sultan and vested in the nation. On 1 April 1923, the first Assembly proposed an election for a new assembly, and meanwhile a workgroup was formed with Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s leadership in order to make a new constitution in which there would be a specific definition of a state and a more detailed constitutional structure regarding to the new Turkish State.⁴⁴

At the same time with the workshops of a new constitution, Ismet Pasha was in Switzerland for the Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty was a strong proof of TBMM’s being the unique representative of newly-founded Turkish State not only in internal, but also in international affairs. When the Treaty was signed by Turkey and allied British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, and Romania on 24 July 1923, TBMM and the new Turkish State were recognized officially and independently from the former Ottoman Empire.

With the Treaty of Lausanne, many issues were clarified regarding to borders, capitulations and foreign debts of the former Empire, Aegean Islands, war reparations, the possession and the right to use of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, foreign schools, the legal status of Orthodox Patriarchate⁴⁵, and last of all the legal status of the minorities of Turkish State, which forms an important part of this section.

According to the Treaty of Lausanne, the concept of “minority” was based on religious distinction. Since there was not a specific “national consciousness” in

⁴³ *Cumhurbaşkanları, Başbakanlar ve Milli Eğitim Bakanlarının Milli Eğitimle ilgili Söylev ve Demeçleri*, (Ankara, 1946), 10, quoted in, Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 255-256.

⁴⁴ Hamza Eroğlu, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin İlanı.” *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 16 (1989): n.p.

⁴⁵ According to the 40th article of the Treaty, the legal status of the Orthodox Patriarchate has been interpreted and it has been allowed to lead the Orthodox community within the Turkish State without its political power.

the Ottoman Empire, the only diversity was formed by religion. All the people living under the sovereignty of the Empire were the “subjects” (*teb`a*) of the Sultan. As aforementioned in previous part, according to the “millet system”, all religious groups, that is to mention Greek-Orthodox subjects, Armenian subjects and Jewish subjects, were officially recognized by the laws and these groups had their own law under the Ottoman rule. Consequently, this heterogeneity made the religious groups *relatively* free in their own homogeneity. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, there was nothing to identify the people but the religion.⁴⁶ Eventually, in the Treaty of Lausanne these religious groups were recognized as the minorities of the Turkish State and their rights were granted with a dedicated section of nine articles named as “Protection of Minorities”.⁴⁷

The Turkish Government guaranteed the life protection, religious freedom and right to practice and granted equality among all citizens without any distinction. The articles 38 and 39 explain the responsibilities of the Turkish Government with these sentences:

“ARTICLE 38.

The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals.

Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defense, or for the maintenance of public order.”

“ARTICLE 39.

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems.

⁴⁶ Henry J. Barkey. “Turkey and Great Powers,” in *Turkey's Engagement With Modernity*, eds. Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem and Philip Robins (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 242-243.

⁴⁷ Please see the Appendix II on page 285 for full text of mentioned part of the Treaty of Lausanne.

All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honors, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.”

As it is visible in the articles written above and also in entire section dedicated to the minorities, there was not any specific definition of either the Jews and the Armenians, or the Greek-Orthodox. The list has been clarified with the interpretation of the Turkish Government with regards to the social and demographic structure of the former Ottoman Empire and, accordingly, to the Millet System. With respect to Turkey’s official position, only the three aforementioned groups were recognized as minorities, as a result of being the three largest Millets in the former Ottoman administration system. Other non-Muslim religious groups, for instance, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Nestorians, who were not included in the Ottoman Millet system, were not recognized as official minorities. Likewise, the Baha’is, the Yezidis, and believers of the Syrian Orthodox Church, the Catholic United churches (the Chaldean Church and the Syrian Catholic Church), and the Roman Catholic Church were not included in the official interpretation of the Treaty.⁴⁸ In addition to aforelisted religious groups, Alevi were not defined as official minorities either, as they were counted as members of the Muslim Millet, and under the new state, they were still a part of the Muslim society. According to the treaty, apart from the minority rights, “all inhabitants of Turkey” were granted with equal treatment by the State; however, religious freedom and citizenship issues were discussed for more than a decade among religious identity of individuals. In following parts, these issues will be explained.

⁴⁸ Şule Toktaş and Bülent Aras, “The EU and Minority Rights in Turkey.” *Political Science Quarterly* 124, no. 4 (2010): 700.

The Turkish State was recognized officially among international scenes; however, the form of the state was an issue of discussions among internal scenes. There were three opinions those were being discussed.⁴⁹ The first group proposed to maintain the Caliphate and to charge the Sultan-Caliph as the president of the new state with concrete support of the Islamic societies. The second group, similarly, proposed an extended authority for the Caliph. As contrary to these two, there was the idea of a republic of reformist group including Mustafa Kemal and his companions. In fact, the idea of a republic was not declared officially; however, there were significant signs pointing out a republic before the official declaration. For instance, in an interview with Maria Lazar for Wiener Neue Freie Presse on 22 September 1923, Mustafa Kemal expressed:⁵⁰

“The sovereignty belongs to the nation. Executive power and legislative authority are concentrated in the assembly, which is the unique representative of the nation. It is possible to express these two phrases within one word: *republic*. The reformation of Turkey has not been completed yet. The Constitution cannot be considered as entirely completed. It is essential to make amendments and revisions to make it perfect. The mission that is started has not been completed. Within a short time, existing form of Turkey will be constitutionalized. The governmental proposal will be presented to the Assembly. All the outcomes of this regulation will develop the Constitution. Within the basic characteristics, as there is no difference among all the European and American republics, but the form of state, the only existing difference of Turkey from these republics is its form, as well. We have an assembly that has the sovereignty, like the other countries governed by republic. However, our TBMM has both the legislative and the executive powers. In our system, members of parliament are responsible of their own duties, like in other countries. The executive members of the parliament are believed to be puppets of the National Assembly. However, this is a mistake. Regarding the issue of duties and responsibilities of members of the parliament, these will be clarified with the revisions of the Constitution. Eventually, we will establish a government composed of the president of the republic, the prime minister and the members of the parliament.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, C. III (1918-1937)*, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1961), 63-64, quoted in Eroğlu. “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin İlanı,” n.p.

When it comes to the issue of capital of Turkey, the answer is clearly visible. Ankara is the capital of Turkey.”⁵¹

On 13 October 1923, Ankara was declared as the capital of the Turkish State, while the aforementioned three opinions were under discussion in the Assembly until the official declaration of the republic on 29 October 1923. The reasons why Ankara was selected as capital of the new state should be examined within different perspectives. On one side, as it was not invaded by hostile forces, it was safe in the middle of Anatolia and difficult to invade due to its geographical location. And on the other hand, as it was mentioned by İsmet Pasha, in foreign forces’ perspective, Istanbul was the representative of the Caliphate and the government of the former Ottoman Empire and the seat of the Ottoman Dynasty. Although with the Lausanne Treaty, TBMM was considered as the unique representative of the Turkish State, the Caliphate was still an existing power in Istanbul. Selecting Ankara as a capital was a considerable chance to cut ties with Caliphate, even though the Caliph was not supposed to be granted with responsibilities within the Turkish State.⁵² Besides, as Ankara was a small and not-urbanized city, it would be easy to build a capital with respects to the needs of a new modern state. With the declaration of the capital, the Caliphate and accordingly Istanbul lost their symbolic importance.

On 29 October 1923, the form of the state was declared officially in the Assembly after a long process of discussions between reformists and supporters of the Caliphate, and with the approved final version of draft, the first article of the Constitution of 1921 was revised and changed into: “Turkey is a people’s state governed by a republican form of government.”⁵³ Due to the discussions between two groups, the opponents did not attend to the session as a remonstrance and only the 158 over 287 members of parliaments attended to the voting of the form of the

⁵¹ Author’s translation.

⁵² İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar 2* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987), 168, quoted in Eroğlu. “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin İlanı,” n.p.

⁵³ Edel Hughes, *Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: The Politics of Exclusion* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 17;

Eroğlu. “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin İlanı,” n.p.

state.⁵⁴ At the same day, Mustafa Kemal was elected as the first president of the republic.

Declaration of the republic strengthened the change from a centralized religion based empire to a state based on sovereignty of nation that started with the foundation of the Assembly. There is one another concept that was to be changed with the republic: the concept of *patriotism*. Under the Ottoman and the authority of the Sultan-Caliph, *loyalty to the Sultan* and *loyalty to the religion* were the basic components of patriotism; however, with the new rule the religious authorities were dismissed, the president of the republic became a civil person without the title of Caliph, and the concept of nation was to be embedded to the minds of individuals. Depending on this, an ideological resistance to establishment of a republic after a religion-based empire could not be considered as an unexpected event. For instance, Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) explained his doubts about extended authority of the President of Republic with his ability to the government, even a Sultan had not been granted with such power. As another example, Ahmet Emin (Yalman) criticized this instant change with being a unique example in the history. Additionally, Rauf Bey (Orbay) gave a statement in which he explained his disagreement with instant approval of the republic.⁵⁵

The action plan of Mustafa Kemal was composed of two basic ideas. These were the mobilization of Anatolian people against the hostile forces and to inspire the idea of Turkish nationalism. With establishment of the republic, the first mission was completely accomplished; however, the Turkish nationalism was not a familiar stream among the former Ottoman subjects. Bernard Lewis stated;

“Among the people of the Ottoman Empire the last to be affected by the national idea was, not unnaturally, the masters of the Empire themselves. It was only slowly, under foreign influence, that the Turks at last began to recover a

⁵⁴ Can Dündar, “Avrupa’dan Kopmayacağız,” *Can Dündar Personel Web Page*, 29 October 2002, <http://www.imge.com.tr/product_reviews_info.php?products_id=4818&reviews_id=57> (12 January 2013).

⁵⁵ Ibid.

sense of their separate national identity as Turks, as a Turkish nation distinct from –though included in- the Ottoman State and the Islamic religion.”⁵⁶

Briefly, when the republic was declared in 1923, the aims of the new Turkish State were already defined. The laicization process had already been started with a republican structure; however, creating a “nation state” out of diverse ethnic and religious groups and institutionalizing a coherent political entity were not easy tasks. Indeed, the aim was not only to create a nation state with the civilizational norms, but also to *replace* religion with national identity.⁵⁷ In order to create a new state with these characteristics, the first thing should be done was to *create an identity* due to the lack of a concrete concept of identity. Because concept of citizenship was considered as a cultural requirement of a western modernity,⁵⁸ and as it was mentioned, the *subjects* of the Ottoman Empire were conscious about neither an individual identity nor concept of citizenship.

As Alev Çınar explained, building a nation-state from scratch embodies clarifying both material and metaphorical boundaries, such as territorial, national, ethnic, racial, cultural and religious components. To clarify these components, the nation is supposed to involve in determining who will constitute the nation - who will be the members of the national community, what language they will speak, what their history will be, what sort of a lifestyle they will have, what their identity will be. In order to create this homogeneous structure, Mustafa Kemal and his companions applied series of reforms by shaping and monitoring the lifestyles of individuals and their private affairs.⁵⁹ What they achieved in fifteen years after the establishment of the republic until the death of Mustafa Kemal was to initiate the complex and comprehensive transformation of a traditional society that had been lived under outmoded state institutions. Like Heinz Kramer mentioned, the establishment of the Republic of Turkey was simultaneously an endeavor for not only a nation building process but also a political institutionalization, a cultural revolution and a social and economic change. Although the modernization process

⁵⁶ Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 344-345.

⁵⁷ Barkey. “Turkey’s Engagement with Modernity,” 242-243.

⁵⁸ Atasoy, *Islam’s Marriage*, 59.

⁵⁹ Alev Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 34.

started far before than the republic in these territories with Tanzimat policies, the reforms of the republic went to cultural roots of Anatolian population by abolishing the religious foundations of the state.⁶⁰

The reforms of Mustafa Kemal, as it was mentioned, were different than the previous modernization movements with involving every single order of the social and political life of the new state. The all reforms were considered coherently, and this entire ideology was named as *Kemalist ideology* (*Kemalizm* or *Atatürkçülük* in Turkish); however, it is still being discussed whether a set of reforms can be named as an ideology or not.

The Kemalist ideology was based on six basic principles, which became the second article⁶¹ of the first constitution of the Republic with a change on 5 February 1937, as definition of the characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. These six basic principles are: republicanism (*Cumhuriyetçilik*), nationalism (*Milliyetçilik*), populism (*Halkçılık*), secularism (*Laiklik*), statism (*Devletçilik*) and revolutionism (*İnkılapçılık*). These reforms were meant to organize all the orders from political to economic, from social to educational. The said reforms cannot be considered as symbolical, because, even for the daily life of individuals, they were *for* the modernization. The reformist implementations, which will be explained in upcoming pages, such as educational ones or the ones related with the appearance, were all planned in order to strengthen the change of sovereignty by civilizing all with decreased importance of Islam. Consequently, laicism became the *principal* one among all the others, except the statism, which is related just with economic conditions of the new state's market.

Laicism's importance cannot be surprising, though. Laicism is the basis of freedom of thought, modernization, and it can be considered as a prerequisite for democracy. Laicism is the prerequisite of nationalism; because, with the lack of laicism, the tie among the citizens of a state will not be the nation, nor the territory. Instead, it will be the religion; the solidarity will be related just with the religion

⁶⁰ Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey: Challenges to Europe and the United States* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 3.

⁶¹ "The Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secularist and revolutionary-reformist. The official language is Turkish. The capital is Ankara. "

(*ümmetçilik*) as it was during the Ottoman era. However, that cannot suit with a multi religiously based state. Besides, laicism is the prerequisite of populism. In a religious state, the will of the religious elite play a significant role among the society, while the will of people is null. Moreover, laicism is the prerequisite of revolutionism. Within a religious state, the science cannot possess an importance due to the existence of religious terms. Additionally, religion is traditionalist; that's why, a reform, a change cannot be considered as a necessity in order to catch the time with its improvements. Last of all, as aforementioned, laicism is the prerequisite of republicanism, as a result of the change of possessor of sovereignty. With the help of laicism, religion was removed from the political scenes in which it possessed a competitive role against the sovereignty of the people. Besides all, thanks to laicism, religion was saved from being a political tool of anti-reformist politicians. As a result of all these reasons, as aforementioned, laicism became the most pivotal principle for a modernized and a democratic state.

The basic characteristics of the reforms of Mustafa Kemal can be listed within four different specifications, as argued by Kongar.⁶² First of all, it, as a whole, aimed to create a westernized society. It is to say, the reforms were adapted from western societies. As its second characteristic, they were adapted to the society from top to the down by statist-elites. Hence, laicism was understood as the civilizing mission of the Kemalist elite. However, that statist-elitism was an Ottoman concept that was formed by the Tanzimat reformists and by the Young Turks as the unique social and political power of initial years of the republic. Thirdly, it was planned as a systematic progress, in other words they were not implemented instantly. The social needs were considered and every single reform was formed as a necessity of the society and put in practice one by one. The last characteristic to be listed was the basis of all reforms, which was built on sovereignty of people in a theoretical perspective. On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal and his companions not only used the political power that was gathered by themselves, but also with controlling the religion, they prepared the society for every single change. That was an unpredictable progress, as a result of settled consciousness of equality between loyalty to the religion and loyalty to the Sultan/Caliph. However, as a result of this

⁶² Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 109.

implementation, Kemalism was considered as an anti-religionist movement, while there was only one issue that it dealt with Islam: taking its political sovereignty off the state.

Among three Abrahamic religions, Islam can be considered as the most systematic and institutionalized religion. It is not just a set of belief; instead, it was born as a whole system that involves to political, social, cultural, juridical, and family issues and, last of all, to the moral code, as a matter of fact.⁶³ During the former Ottoman Empire, Islam used to possess its political, social, cultural and juridical importance within all orders of both individual's and society's. After the abolishment of the Sultanate, the reforms were salient necessities in order to achieve to the required level, which was defined as westernized and a modernized civilization. In order to do so, they not only involved to political order, but also to the cultural and social life. The characteristics of Kemalist reforms were formed as a result of that said necessity. What implemented by Mustafa Kemal and his companions was to address a laic and republican system, which aims a democratic structure within a frame of a nation-state, as a response to all philosophical questions.⁶⁴ With the help of this action, they succeeded to keep both the religion and the new state from any probable maltreatment as a natural fact of the existence of laicism. Although that kind of a movement can be considered as reasonable and legitimate in present time, the Kemalism was assumed to be an anti-religious doctrine among the Islamic spiritual leaders and imposed to the society in that way.

As it was mentioned, there was the necessity to establish simultaneously the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish people as a nation, and the *Türk* as a citizen with an identity different from being a Muslim subject of the Sultan.⁶⁵ As stated by Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, revolution is an outcome of the *new people*, if it is a result of the evolution; however, if not, within an undeveloped society, the revolution itself should create the *new people*. Consequently, the first mission to be accomplished

⁶³ Maxime Rodinson, *İslamiyet ve Kapitalizm*, trans. Orhan Suda (İstanbul: Gün Yayınları, 1969), 156-157, quoted in Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 111.

⁶⁴ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 244.

⁶⁵ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 5.

should be the *cultural revolution*.⁶⁶ Within this context, set of implementations will be the most salient example.

In addition to all characteristics of the reforms, there is another thing that should be distinguished before analysis of the implementations. As it was mentioned by Falih Rıfki Atay, to be Westernized was most specifically meant to escape from being Arabicized; it meant being Turkified.⁶⁷ This was a consequence of the nationalization part of Kemalism. Mustafa Kemal asserted that Turks were already an old and well-known nation before their Islamization; however, Arab culture was spread over the Ottoman Empire after taking the Caliphate and accordingly the responsibility of all Muslim World by Selim I in 16th century. With this claim, he not only wanted to encourage the consciousness of Turkishness, but also tried to purify it from any religious identity, in this case from Islamic identity and interrelated Arabic culture. Due to these conditions, the reforms will be examined within that frame and chronologically ordered.

In 1924, after a little while of the declaration of republic many reforms were implemented simultaneously. First of all, the Unification of Education Law (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*) came into force in order to unify the form of education.⁶⁸ According to that law, the Islamic seminaries (*medrese*) were meant to be closed. This implementation was a considerable stroke to the religious culture because, as a result of the closure of seminaries, the next generations would not be educated according to the Islamic principles. Besides, after a while of the Law, lectures of Quran, from primary schools' curriculum, and the Persian and Arabic lectures, from the secondary schools' curriculum were removed.⁶⁹ As a starting point, religion classes became optional, then in 1930 from secondary schools, in 1931, from schools of vocational teacher education, in 1933, from schools of provinces, and in 1939, from schools of rural areas religion classes were removed. Consequently,

⁶⁶ Kışlalı, *Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi*, 58.

⁶⁷ Falih Rıfki Atay, Çankaya: Atatürk'ün Doğumunda Ölümüne Kadar (İstanbul: Sena Matbaası, 1980), 446, quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism in Turkey*, 11.

⁶⁸ Beyza Bilgin, "Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu ve Din Eğitimi." *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 35 (1996): n.p.

⁶⁹ Feriha Özkan, "Atatürk'ün Laiklik Anlayışının Eğitim Sistemimizdeki Yansımaları (1919-1938)" (M.A. diss., Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, 2006).

between 1939-1948, a religion-free formal education was experienced in the Republic of Turkey.⁷⁰

In the same year, Ministry of Military (*Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Vekaleti*) and Ministry of Religious Affairs (*Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti*) were abolished. According to the new state structure, military and religion should be separated from the daily politics; that's why there was no role in the cabinet to be possessed by these two offices. Instead of an abolished ministry, Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı - DİB*) was established on 3 March 1924.⁷¹

While the new government was in intention to laicize the form of the state by pushing Islamic culture out of people's mind, a new religious office was opened by the same government under the authority of Prime Minister. Even though, its name is "religious affairs", the aim of its establishment has become governing the Islamic faith, practices, and ethic, enlightening the people about religion, which is Islam, and managing the places of worship within time.⁷² DİB has been the basic tool to spread official Islam both over the country and to abroad. The new state preferred to keep control of religious affairs with a presidency. With this preference, Mustafa Kemal and his companions both took the management of religious issues on their hand, and they managed to break the sacred importance of the DİB.⁷³

Not only in initial years of the Republic, but also during all period including the present, DİB has always been an issue on the agenda. Its existence has brought nothing but predominance of Sunni Islam to the country. Today, with its budgets, its domestic and international implementations, and the reasons why it exists within a laic structure are still being discussed. A detailed analysis about the issue will be examined in the upcoming parts of this thesis.

⁷⁰ Zeynep Nevzatoglu, "Basında Din Eğitimi-Öğretimi Laiklik Tartışmaları (1945-1960)" (M.A. diss., Ankara University, 2006).

⁷¹ "Kuruluş Tarihi ve Gelişim," *T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, 11 November 2010, <<http://www.diyamet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/Diyamet-Isleri-Baskanligi-Duyuru-8221.aspx>> (4 January 2013).

⁷² "Temel İlkeler ve Hedefler," *T.C. Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, 11 November 2010, <<http://www.diyamet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/Diyamet-Isleri-Baskanligi-Duyuru-8222.aspx>> (9 May 2011).

⁷³ İftar Gözaydın, "A Religious Administration to Secure Secularism: The Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey." *Marburg Journal of Religion* 11, no. 1 (2006): 1.

Late on the same year, on 2 November, the Caliphate was abolished officially.⁷⁴ After the abolishment of Sultanate in 1922, the Caliph existed just *symbolically*; however, in order to keep on with the laicization process, a probable obstacle in front of the modernist implementations should be abolished. The Ottoman Dynasty lost its sovereignty in 1922 with the abolishment of Sultanate, and eventually, with the abolishment of the Caliphate, the *sacred* source of that sovereignty was forced to vanish and Islam was saved from being a political tool.⁷⁵

In 1925, the second part of the cultural revolution began to be implemented. The appearance was taken into account and the implementations targeted the *clothing*. Between 25-27 August, Mustafa Kemal made a visit to Kastamonu, a northern Anatolian city, and he made a public speech in Inonu (a town in Kastamonu) regarding to the clothing. The Hat Law of 1925 was an implementation through which the state intervened with regard to bodies toward instituting secularism, nationalism and Westernism in the public sphere.⁷⁶ Mustafa Kemal made a special effort to prepare the public to this new kind of headdress. That is the reason why his Inonu speech is important. His visit to Kastamonu was three months before the declaration of the law. The Hat Law was come into force on 28 November 1925.⁷⁷ However, the said visit was the first time that he introduced the Western style hat to the public. In fact, it was not an introduce. He, himself, wore the said hat in order to encourage the men. Since then, Mustafa Kemal wore a western style hat at his conferences and meetings to display it with the aim of making people accustomed to it. As a result, when the government declared the Hat Law, as a part of the Law of Outfit Costume, the people had already gotten used to wear it. With this law, any kind of religious outfit costume was prohibited, (such as *cübbe*, *sarık*), and the Muslim women were discouraged to wear Islamic veil. The reason why Mustafa Kemal chose Inonu/Kastamonu for this display at first sight was the city's conservative atmosphere. Due to the conservatism that possessed by the people of Kastamonu, it would be possible to have a negative reflection against

⁷⁴ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 59.

⁷⁵ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 242.

⁷⁶ Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 59.

⁷⁷ "Şapka ve Kıyafet Devrimi," *Atatürk İnkılapları*, n.d. <<http://www.ataturkinkilaplari.com/ik/54/>> (2 October 2011).

the new implementation when it was declared.⁷⁸ Hence, the choice of Kastamonu was a planned action.

During this visit, the target group was not composed by only men; instead, the women were also encouraged to change their appearance. The Ottoman heritage about the appearance of women can be seen within this statement. According to Şeyhülislam Musa Kazım, Islamic law (*şeriat*) required women to cover their bodies, including their hair, by wearing a form of dress that did not arouse sexual desire in men.⁷⁹ He supported his discourse within “primordial human nature” theory of men. He expressed:

“It is not within a husband’s capacity to resist the allure of and desire for a younger and more beautiful woman than his wife. Such an inclination, which is beyond the husband’s capacity and power to control, will destroy not only the affection between a husband and his wife but also the ties between woman whom he desires and her husband. In other words, the happiness of both families will be destroyed as a result of the man’s lust and uncontrollable sexual appetite. It is in view of these sorts of circumstances that the Muhammedi seriat requires women to cover themselves.”⁸⁰

That was the general perspective about the clothing of women. As a matter of fact, modernization about clothing could not be considered as surprising within these conditions while whole state was in a transformation process. On his speech, Mustafa Kemal stated:

“...The nation that established the Republic of Turkey is civilized. Both in history and present, it is civilized... ..Briefly, the civilized nation of Turkey that claims it is civilized should prove that it is civilized entirely, including the appearance... ..Is our clothing civilized and international?

(as a response from the public): No, no!

I am totally agree with you... Than, is there a nation without clothing? Friends, will you contend with being defined so?

(as a response from the public): No, no!

⁷⁸ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 114.

⁷⁹ Atasoy, *İslam’s Mariage*, 150.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 155.

Does it make sense to show valuable jewelry surrounded by mud? Is it logical to say: “Actually, there is a valuable jewelry hidden in that mud; however you cannot understand”? In order to show the jewelry, its cleaning is an obligation and a natural fact... What our nation deserves is civilized and international clothing. We will wear that!..”⁸¹

In the same speech, Mustafa Kemal also mentioned his disapproval about women’s facial cover:

“In my travels I observed not in villages but in towns and cities that women friends are covering their faces and eyes with great care. This must inflict them with pain and a great deal of suffering, especially on hot summer days such as these. Male friends, our own selfishness is in part of the cause of this outcome... Women should show their faces to the world. And, they should see the world with their own eyes.”⁸²

Within this speech, Mustafa Kemal encouraged the women for modernized clothing. There was not a law about the clothing of women; however, a significant discouragement was being promoted by the state and by Mustafa Kemal, himself. For instance, he endeavored a lot to promote the image of the new women as a “symbol of the break with the past”.⁸³ His appearance in public with his wife and adopted daughter at social meetings and official ceremonies was a significant effort to do the promotion of a modernized visibility of women. In addition to that, not only the appearance, but also the visibility of women in the public sphere was being promoted with these visits. The state was in duty to promote the appearance of women in public places, with modernized clothes and a member of the modernized activities. For instance, the photographs of women lawyers, women parliamentarians, women pilots, women in athletics and women in military training were the parts of

⁸¹ “Ataürkçü Düşünce Derneği,” n.d.

<http://www.addkayseri.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=33&Itemid=55> (3 October 2011). Author’s translation.

⁸² Atasoy, *Islam’s Mariage*, 155.

⁸³ Deniz Kandiyoti. “End of Empire: Islam, Nationalism, and Women in Turkey,” in *Women, Islam and the State*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 220.

the said state mission.⁸⁴ As it was mentioned, the mission of state aimed to cut ties with the past regarding to women's role in social life. According to the European perceptions of Ottoman Empire and its Orientalist Islamic structure, image of the Turkish women was a veiled figure behind the harem walls, and what the Turkish State tried to replace the new modernized image of the Turkish women in social life with the old figure. In fact, apart from all the political change, visibility of the new modernized Turkish women in public sphere can be considered as one of the most salient proof of the Republic's break with former Empire and its social structure. With the help of implementations concerning the women's role in social life, the Turkish women gained more self-confidence that led Keriman Halis (1913-2012)⁸⁵ to be the winner of International Pageant of Pulchritude⁸⁶ of 1932,⁸⁷ and it was a significant moment that the Republic of Turkey proved her existence in international scenes with her nationalized, secularized, and unveiled Turkish women. Hence, Keriman Halis became the symbol of the modern Turkish women, and she mentioned that her success was an outcome of the Kemalism in her telegram to Mustafa Kemal: "My success is the result of the ideas inspired by you in the women of our country."⁸⁸ In the telegram that Mustafa Kemal sent her in order to celebrate her success, he mentioned her mission with these sentences:

"We are so proud about the decision of the international members of the jury who have shown that the Turkish race maintained its beauty forever. However, Keriman Ece⁸⁹ mentioned, as we all heard, that she is not the most beautiful one among all Turkish girls. Our beautiful Turkish girl is so happy and content to be introduced with her beauty that she was granted as a natural fact of beauty of her race, to the world by international jury. Turkish nation sincerely congratulate its beautiful girl."⁹⁰

⁸⁴ Sarah Graham-Brown, *Images of Women: The Portrayal of Women in Photography of the Middle East, 1860-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 218-21. quoted in Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 63.

⁸⁵ After the Surname Law, she was rewarded with the surname "Ece", which means *queen* in old Turkish, with reference to her success in International Pageant of Pulchritude 1932 by Mustafa Kemal.

⁸⁶ The name used in 1920s and 1930s of the actual Miss Universe.

⁸⁷ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 87.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 88.

⁸⁹ This word was used in order to refer that she was the "queen". She was rewarded with that surname on 1934.

⁹⁰ Can Dündar, "Dünyanın En Güzel Türk'ü," *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 31 January 2012.

She was the winner of the contest with 25 of 28 votes, which were not only representing the beauty of Keriman Halis, but also the Westernization of Turkey.⁹¹ However, according to the Islamists, that victory could not be something to celebrate; because, the laic ideology used and abused the female body as a symbol of modernization and Westernization process. It could represent everything but the Turkish woman who was alienated from her own body and her own home, where she used to belong.⁹² If one compares the statement of Şeyhülislam Musa Kazım and the final point that the Turkish women arrived with the Republic, the progress will be visible about the change of Turkish women`s social status.

In 1926, Turkey became closer to the Western world with the help of the new implementations. A change, westernization indeed, was proposed for the calendar and the hours. On 26 December 1925, a law was adopted regarding the calendar system for a shift from the Islamist (*Hicrî Takvim*)⁹³ and solar (*Rumî Takvim*)⁹⁴ calendar systems into the Gregorian one (*Milâdî Takvim*)⁹⁵. The law was come into force on 1 January 1926.⁹⁶ This implementation prevented any inconvenience that the state could face regarding the complexity of the former system due to the existence of two different calendar systems in use. In the meantime, the hours were changed. Regarding to a draft composed on 25 December 1925, a day was planned to be started in the midnight and divided into 24 equal hours, from “0” to “24”, like the Western world. Before the change, a Turkish-style timing system (*Alaturka Saat*)⁹⁷ was in used and the system was not applicable for a

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Hüseyin Besli, “Kadının Medyatik Değeri.” *İstanbul Bülteni* 2, no.29 (1995): 14-15.

⁹³ The Islamic calendar (Muslim calendar or Hijri calendar) is a lunar calendar consisting of 12 months in a year of 354 or 355 days. Being a purely lunar calendar, it is not synchronized with the seasons. With an annual drift of 10 or 11 days, the seasonal relation repeats about every 33 Islamic years (every 32 solar years).

⁹⁴ The Rumi calendar, a specific calendar based on the Julian calendar but starting with the year of Muhammad's emigration (Hijra) in 622 A.D., was officially used by the Ottoman Empire after Tanzimat (1839) and by its successor. It was adopted for civic matters and is a solar based calendar, assigning a date to each solar day.

⁹⁵ The Gregorian calendar (Western calendar or Christian calendar) is internationally the most widely accepted civil calendar. It was introduced by Pope Gregory XIII, after whom the calendar was named, by a decree signed on 24 February 1582. The Gregorian calendar was adopted initially by the Catholic countries of Europe, with other countries adopting it over the following centuries.

⁹⁶ “Takvim, Saat ve Ölçülerde Değişiklik,” *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı*, n.d., http://www.meb.gov.tr/belirligunler/10kasim/inkilaplari/toplumsal/takvim_saat.htm (28 October 2012).

⁹⁷ According to the Turkish-style timing system, a day is divided into 12 parts and the hour points out 12 at sunset. It is based on local timing regarding the solar movements.

unification of the whole Empire. The draft was accepted officially on 2 January 1926,⁹⁸ and, since then, western style timing and calendar systems were adopted in the new Turkish State. Obviously, these former systems were different from the ones being used in the Western World. The difference would be a significant obstacle that used to complicate the international social, economic, and official relations, and used to cause confusions. During the late Ottoman period, the differences were intended to be decreased; however, the outcome was not sufficient to solve the problem. Regardless from the chronological order that has been followed so far, the implementations related with the Westernization will be listed in this paragraph. In 1931, with a new law, the units of measurement were changed.⁹⁹ Besides all, the most salient adaptation was implemented on 1935. The official workdays were rearranged, and the official weekly holidays became Saturday and Sunday, instead of Fridays. It was an adaptation to the Western World; however, there was another thing to be distinguished. The importance of Friday was a religious culture among Islamic World due to the special Friday Prayers (*Cuma Namazı*). Accordingly, the meaning of working on Fridays was being unable to go to the Friday Prayers.

In the same year with the change of calendar and timing, in 1926, more reforms were implemented, related with legal issues and aimed to create a laic, democratic, pluralist, liberal, and egalitarian, state and social structure. On 17 February, TBMM declared that they approved a secular Civil Code, which was adapted from Swiss Civil Code.¹⁰⁰ A primitive version of a civil code was composed during the Tanzimat; however, it was not sufficient to solve the issues about family, proprietorship, inheritance, purchasing and leasing. According to the new Civil Code, the listed articles were adopted to the social structure of the new Turkish State:¹⁰¹

- An egalitarian structure was possessed between man and woman, within the family.
- A civil marriage was accepted as an obligation.

⁹⁸ “Takvim, Saat ve Ölçülerde Değişiklik.”

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ “Türk Medeni Kanunu’nun Kabulü (17 Şubat 1926),” Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, n.d., <http://www.tsk.tr/8_tarihten_kesitler/8_4_turk_tarihinde_onemli_gunler/turk_medeni_kanunu/turk_medeni_kanunu.htm> (10 December 2012).

¹⁰¹ “Medeni Kanun’un Kabulü,” Atatürk Devrimleri, n.d., <<http://www.ataturkdevrimleri.com/yazi-156-medeni-kanun-un-kabulu.html>> (10 October 2011).

- Monogamy was adopted.
- Within the social structure, the women were granted with the right to work, as they will.
- An egalitarian system was adopted between men and women in being witness in courts, on issues related with inheritance and divorce.

The Civil Code was composed and declared; however, it had not been come into force until 4 October.¹⁰² On the other hand, the Shari'a courts were still in use. On 4 October, the government annulled the Shari'a (Islamic) courts, by declaring that the Islamic law¹⁰³ was null and void, and the Civil Code was come into force, instead. As it was visible, the Islamic culture was being swept away from all parts of the state one by one. With this implementation, the juridical order was distanced from religious judgments. According to Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt)¹⁰⁴ (1892-1943), the new Civil Code of Turkey would close the doors of old civilization and open those of contemporary civilization.¹⁰⁵

In 1928, on 10 April,¹⁰⁶ the Kemalist commitment to laicism was proclaimed with the removal of the second Article of the 1924 Constitution, which declared Islam as the official state religion.¹⁰⁷ The exclusion of Islam from the Constitution should be considered as an intelligent step due to social structure of the Republic and the path that the state followed. First of all, the society was not composed just from Muslims; there were other religious communities, which were recognized officially by the state. An official definition regarding the religion would cause just hostility among the society which would be resulted with the exclusion of the

¹⁰² İhsan Ulsan, "Türk Medeni Kanununun Dünü ve Bugünü," *İKÜ Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* 1, no. 1-2- (2001): 161.

¹⁰³ Sharia is the moral code of religious law of Islam. Also meaning "path" in Arabic, sharia guides all aspects of Muslim life including daily routines, familial and religious obligations, and financial dealings. It is derived primarily from the Quran and the Sunna--the sayings, practices, and teachings of the Prophet Mohammed. Precedents and analogy applied by Muslim scholars are used to address new issues. The consensus of the Muslim community also plays a role in defining this theological manual. Source: Toni Johnson, and Lauren Vriens, "Islam: Governing Under Sharia," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 9 January 2013, <<http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governing-under-sharia/p8034#p2>>, (10 January 2013).

¹⁰⁴ He was one of the close colleagues of Mustafa Kemal and worked a lot on the new juridical system of the Republic of Turkey.

¹⁰⁵ Alan Duben and Cem Behar, *İstanbul Hanleri: Evlilik, Ail eve Doğurganlık 1880-1940* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 229. quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 10.

¹⁰⁶ Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey*, 14.

¹⁰⁷ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 10.

minorities. Moreover, there could not be a “Muslim State” in these religion-based-multicultural-territories with the Western values. Therefore, laicizing the state was the best way to achieve to aforementioned goals.

In the meantime, a change on 26th Article was implemented and TBMM was saved from being the executer of the Shari’a. According to the new regulation, the oath that was taken before the duty on the Assembly started to be based on the personal honor instead of the “God”.¹⁰⁸

In the same year, there was another change implemented to create a symbolic rupture with traditional daily habits.¹⁰⁹ The Arabic alphabet was abandoned, and instead, a new Latin-based alphabet was adopted. The law was declared on 1 November 1928,¹¹⁰ and it was stated that the new alphabet would be taught from the beginning of the new year (from the 1 January 1929).¹¹¹ It was a powerful change for the Muslim society, because they would not be able to learn to write and read in Arabic, which is the language of Quran, anymore. Furthermore, it was a limitation for the next generations with respect to their links with the Ottoman past and with the Islamic World.¹¹²

In 1932, with a regulation, the language of the call for prayers (*ezan*) was shifted to Turkish, from Arabic, the sacral language of Islam and the Turkish translation of Quran was composed. Mustafa Kemal mentioned the necessity of this regulation with these words:

“Turks do not know what their religion is. That is the reason why the Quran should be in Turkish. Turks follow the Quran; however, they do not understand what it says. What my aim is to help Turks to understand what is written in the book that they follow.”¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 113.

¹⁰⁹ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 11.

¹¹⁰ “Latin Alfabesi’nin Kabulü (1 Kasım 1928),” *Uludağ Üniversitesi*, n.d., <<http://gemlik.uludag.edu.tr/ataturk/?p=300>> (12 October 2011).

¹¹¹ Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey*, 14.

¹¹² Erik-Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 196.

¹¹³ Kışlalı, *Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi*, 39. (Author’s translation)

That was one of the most controversial attempts to bring Islam under the control of the secular state.¹¹⁴ The Quran was read in Turkish for the first on 22 January 1932, in Istanbul.¹¹⁵ On 30 January 1932, the first call for prayers translated into “pure Turkish” by the Turkish Language Association, was chanted in Istanbul.¹¹⁶ In July the Presidency of Religious Affairs standardized the implementation throughout mosques all over the country. When the call for prayers chanted in Turkish five times a day all over the country in Turkish, the laic state proved both the control that it has over the religion and Turkification of state saved from the Arabic culture that was spread and interiorized during the Ottoman Empire.

In fact, the desire of a call for prayer in Turkish was first declared in 19th century.¹¹⁷ Ali Suavi¹¹⁸ (1839-1878) was the first person that defended the use of Turkish in worship. In the journal of *Ulûm*, he defended the idea of a prayer (*namaz*) and the Friday sermon (*hutbe*) in Turkish. During the sultanate of Sultan Abdulhamit II, between the years 1876-1909, he was assigned as the director of the Galatasaray High School, he gave the sermons in Turkish in Ayasofya and Beyazit Mosques in Istanbul.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, there are more studies that prove there are Turkish religious rituals before the official implementation. The first sermon in Turkish was read by Müfid Efendi, the MP of Kırşehir, on 22 November 1922.¹²⁰ Besides, during the Independence War, sermons began to be used for mobilizing popular support for the national government.¹²¹ The first parts of the sermons were in Arabic due to its references to the prophet, his companions and the caliphs, and the second parts, as they were dedicated to the daily issues related with the national government and the principal of the integral sovereignty of the nation, were read in Turkish.¹²² Additionally, Gökalp wrote a poem named as *Vatan* (Homeland) about the idea of Turkification of the worship. He described a Turkish homeland with these words:

¹¹⁴ Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 17.

¹¹⁵ Emre Kongar, “Aydınlanma,” *Emre Kongar Official Website*, n.d., <http://www.kongar.org/aydinlanma/2004/440_Turkce_Ezanin_Oykusu.php> (3 November 2011).

¹¹⁶ Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 17.

¹¹⁷ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 47.

¹¹⁸ An intellectual from the Tanzimat period.

¹¹⁹ Seçil Akgün, “Türkçe Ezan,” *DTCF Tarih Araştırmaları Fakültesi* 13, no.24 (1980): 106.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 107.

¹²¹ Arın Erdican, *Atatürkçülükte Dil ve Din* (İstanbul: Atatürk Kent, 1974), quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 49.

¹²² Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 49.

“A country where the call for prayer is recited in Turkish.
Peasants understand the meaning of the prayer in its call
A country where Turkish Quran is recited in its schools
Everybody, from the oldest to the youngest, understands what the God’s orders are
You, Turk! This is where your homeland is.”¹²³

Although, the year that the poem was written could not be clarified, when the year of death of Gökâlp took into account, it would be visible that the idea was mentioned publicly before the legal arrangement. In fact, there were some significant regulations those had been adopted before the change of language. In 1924, in the year that the Caliphate was abolished, the prayer for the Caliph was removed, as well. Before the said removal, the prayer was devoted to the “peace and happiness” of the Caliph; however, it changed into the “nation and the Republic” on 23 February 1925.¹²⁴ Within time, DİB began to publish a sermon journal (*hutbe mecmuası*),¹²⁵ and in 1927 a book was published named as *Türkçe Hutbe* (Turkish Sermon) by Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, then vice-chair of DİB (1887-1951). Copies of the book were sent to local religious officers (*müftü*) over the country.¹²⁶ Although, a translation was prepared, the sermons did not become entirely Turkish. Only the “admonition” (*mev‘iza ve nasihat*) part of the sermon could be in Turkish.¹²⁷

A long process was experienced in order to adapt the Turkification to the religious rituals, until the final regulations about the change in language. As it was mentioned, it could be considered as a double victory by the state both in terms of nationalization, that is to say Turkification, and state control over the religion.

¹²³ “Bir ülke ki, camiinde Türkçe ezan okunur. / Köylü anlar manasını namazdaki duanın / Bir ülke ki, mektebinde Türkçe Kuran okunur / Küçük büyük herkes bilir buyruğunu Hüda'nın / Ey Türk oğlu, işte senin orasıdır vatanın.” Author’s translation.

¹²⁴ “Halifenin durumu ve halifelik makamının kaldırılması dolayısıyla hutbelerde millet ve cumhuriyetin selamet ve saadetine dair dua edilmesi.” 7 March 1924. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Diyânet İşleri Başkanlığı Fonu, Fon Kodu: 51..0.0.0, Yer No: 2.1..30. quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 50-51;

Abdullah Manaz, *Atatürk Reformları ve İslam* (İzmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1995), 208.

¹²⁵ “Hutbelerin tarzında yapılan tadilat ile hutbe mecmuası yazılması kararı.” 6 June 1925. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Diyânet İşleri Başkanlığı Fonu, Fon Kodu: 51..0.0.0, Yer No: 2.13..5. quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 50-51.

¹²⁶ “Müftülüklere gönderilen hutbe kitaplarının hatiplere dağıtılması, yetmemesi halinde ihtiyaç kadar başkanlıktan istenmesi.” 3 October 1928. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Diyânet İşleri Başkanlığı Fonu, Fon Kodu: 51..0.0.0, Yer No: 2.7..13. quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 50-51.

¹²⁷ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 51.

Despite all the mentioned endeavors, Turkish call for prayers could not be institutionalized, and as it will be mentioned in upcoming parts of this thesis, the language was shifted back into Arabic in 1950.

In 1934, the Surname Law was adopted on 21 June.¹²⁸ According to that law, every single citizen was obliged to possess a surname, and it became the basis of Turkish identity of individuals. The reason of this implementation was not only about the Westernization, but also it was about building an egalitarian society all over the country. With the adoption of this law, any kind of nicknames and titles those might privilege their possessors were prohibited, and within a logical frame, all adults were allowed to possess a surname according to their will.

The Surname Law was applied as a part of the Turkification. As the old, pre-Islamic Turkic states and their historical heroes were very popular among the society as a result of denial of the Ottoman period with its Islamic identity, the surnames those were possessed “generally” used to belong to said period and heroes. As it was mentioned, the state was in duty of promotion the pre-Islamic Turkic civilizations in order to awaken the consciousness of being a “Turk” instead of a “Muslim”, which was related with the Muslim subject of the Ottoman Sultan. For instance, an outline of Turkish History was prepared as a result of the said duty of promotion. In this outline, the Turkish nation was said to be originated in Central Asia sometime around 9000BC. The most significant part of that study was the part related with the Ottoman Empire. Among all 467-page-study, the pages dedicated to whole Ottoman Period, about 600 years, was limited just with 26 pages.¹²⁹

With the Surname Law, Mustafa Kemal was granted with the surname of “*Atatürk*” which means the “father of Turks”.¹³⁰ This surname was given just to Mustafa Kemal, and not to anybody from his family. Instead, his family was given the surname of *Atadan*, which means “from Atatürk”. The most significant part of this surname process was the list of proposals. The list was composed from the names of the said heroes of the said Pre-Islamic period.

¹²⁸ “Soyadı Kanunu,” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Adalet Bakanlığı, n.d., <<http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/559.html>> (28 October 2011).

¹²⁹ Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 147-148.

¹³⁰ Ayşe Hür, “Arız, Beşe, Etil, Tokuş mu yoksa Atatürk mü?,” *Radikal*, 10 November 2012.

In 1934, the egalitarian place of women in society was secured with a new law. Women were granted with the right to vote on local elections in 1930, and in 1933 to vote for elections of reeve. Finally, on 5 December 1934, they gained the right to vote on general elections and to be selected as members of parliament.¹³¹ As it was mentioned by Sirin Tekeli, granting of full suffrage and allowing the presence of women in the parliament were strategic moves on the part of the state to show Europe that Turkey belonged to the world of Western democratic societies.¹³²

The achievement of the progress of granting women with an equal role in the society was mentioned by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk with these sentences:

“This decision has earned Turkish women a higher status than that of the women of other nations. In the future, it will be necessary to search for covered and veiled women (only) in history books... By participating in general elections, Turkish women are now using the most important of all rights. This right, which is denied to women in many civilized countries, is now fully available to Turkish women. She will use that right effectively and confidently.”¹³³

In 1937, on 5 February, a new regulation was come into force in order to complete all progress that has been achieved in less than two decades. The definition of the state, which was saved from religion in 1928, was completed with an additional part to the Second Article of the Constitution: “The republic of Turkey is a laic state.”¹³⁴

Within the implementations and regulations those were adopted to political, social, educational orders, the Republic of Turkey was already in a secular function; however, with this article, laicism in Turkey was guaranteed within constitutional frame.

¹³¹ “Kadınlara Seçme ve Seçilme Hakkının 78. Yıldönümü,” *TRT Haber*, 5 December 2012, <<http://www.trthaber.com/haber/turkiye/kadinlara-secme-ve-secilme-hakkinin-78-yildonumu-65931.html>> (5 December 2012).

¹³² Şirin Tekeli, *Kadınlar ve Siyasal Toplumsal Hayat* (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1982), 210-213.

¹³³ Cihan Aktaş, *Kılık Kıyafet ve İktidar: 12 Mart`tan 12 Eylül`e* (İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1991), 171-172, quoted in Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 65-66.

¹³⁴ “Atatürk İnkılapları,” *Sakarya Üniversitesi*, n.d., <<http://www.atamer.sakarya.edu.tr/ink-07.htm>> (3 December 2012).

3.1.3. After M.K. Atatürk's Death

When M.K. Atatürk passed away on 10 November 1938, the Republic of Turkey had been laicized entirely within constitutional frame. This was the most salient characteristic of his ideology, as he mentioned in 1937 in parliament's opening speech. "Our principles should not be confused with the dogmas of books supposed to have come down from heaven. We derive our inspiration not from heaven and the other world, but directly from life."¹³⁵ This characteristic of him was the reason why Andrew Mango described him as an empiricist.¹³⁶ He relied on the positive sciences and showed a significant distrust to metaphysical arguments, in other words religious arguments. This was the heritage of M.K. Atatürk and his companions as ruler group of his time.

On 11 November 1938, the day after death of M.K. Atatürk, İsmet İnönü was elected as the second President of the Republic. According to a draft that was proposed by deputy General Manager of Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* – CHP), Celal Bayar, and accepted unanimously, he was assigned as the President of the Party, as well.

Andrew Mango stated that, İnönü gave priority to maintain the main success of the republic, such as political and economic independency, territorial unity, cultural reforms of M.K. Atatürk, and development of national economy.¹³⁷ Accordingly, he made a significant effort to control the functionality of reforms, and he focused on the counter implementations. For instance, he tried to determine the actions, which were against the new Alphabet, the Hat Law, and Turkish calls for prayer those were considered as Islamist movements.

The state was *still* in duty of *progress* in order to achieve to the high level of modern civilizations. Between 17-23 July 1939, during the first Meeting of Ministry of Education was held and the committee implemented new regulations. As a result

¹³⁵ Mango. "Ataturk and Kemalism Throughout the 20th Century," 3.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Andrew Mango, *Türkiye ve Türkler: 1938'den Günümüze* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2005), 38.

of the proposal of then Minister of Education, Hasan Ali Yücel (1897-1961)¹³⁸, Greek and Latin, which were the languages of European Enlightenment, was intended to adopt to high school transcripts in order to free the new generations' mind and to embed the humanist culture.¹³⁹ For 1940-1941 educational year, 3 high schools, which were Ankara Atatürk High School, Ankara Female High School, and Istanbul Galatasaray High School, were selected and since their first years Greek and Latin were taught as the second foreign language for 5 hours per week, under a new section named as *Classic Section* apart from Science and Literature sections. However, the Classic Section was closed in 1949.¹⁴⁰

For the aims of the republic, girls' education was encouraged in order to ensure women integration to the society, building schools to villages, and establishing conservatories and state radios could be listed as the most salient implementations.¹⁴¹ These regulations and Greek and Latin classes were reacted negatively by a part of the society, as they were all related with Westernization, which meant an escape from Ottoman components and threat to Islamic Ottoman heritage. On 15 December 1942, in an article published in Magazine of *Türk Yurdu*, the humanist perception of Yücel and the implementations were protested with these words: "We are neither humanists, nor communists. We are the Muslim Turks!"¹⁴²

The most salient implementation of this period regarding to educational order was the village institutes (*Köy Enstitüleri*). The aims of village institutes were to provide improvement on the progress of villages not only on educational order,

¹³⁸ The former Minister of Education (between: December 1938-August 1946). He is well-known with his regulations related with the educational system. During his time, the World Classics were translated into Turkish (a significant example of *modernization* understanding), university reform was implemented (accordingly, many faculties were established), and the first official Turkish encyclopedia was printed. Thanks to his endeavors, State Conservatories were established and the Law of Universities, which gave (relatively) administrative autonomy, came into force. His most salient work, which will be explained in upcoming pages of this part of the thesis, was the Village Institutes with different educative systems entirely dedicated to conditions of rural life.

¹³⁹ Şerif Budak, "Atatürk'ün Eğitim Felsefesi ve Geliştirdiği Eğitim Sisteminin Değiştirilmesi," *Milli Eğitim Dergisi* 160, (2003): n.p.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ali Dikici, "Millî Şef İsmet İnönü Dönemi Laiklik Uygulamalar," *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 42 (2008): 179-180.

¹⁴² Gotthard Jaeschke, *Türkiye Kronolojisi 1938-1945* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1990), 81.

but also on social and agricultural life of farmers. They were planned to be the basis of the struggle against fanaticism and reactionary.¹⁴³

Village institutes were legalized in 1940; however, the project had been discussed during the period of M.K. Atatürk. During the presidency of M.K. Atatürk, then Prime Minister İnönü and then Minister of Education Reşit Galip (1897-1934) paid significant attention with a specific committee to provide sustainable educational services to hard-to-reach villages. According to results of said committee, there was a certain necessity of providing teachers, who were capable of living under rural conditions, helping villagers to advance the conditions of life, leading the village not only with his/her knowledge, but also with ability to change vision of villages and to provide overall development.¹⁴⁴ In 1934, there were approximately 38000 villages and the lack of teachers could be counted as 50000, while the schools of vocational teacher education were able to graduate only 150 teachers per year.¹⁴⁵ According to the census of 1935, only the 19.25% of total population was literate. Furthermore, ratio of literacy was not equally divided between two genders: the ratio was 26.35% for women and 73.65% for men.¹⁴⁶

Village institutes were opened in 1940 as unique examples dedicated to rural conditions. According to the system, the instruction period was 5 years, the weekly credits were shared for four, and half were dedicated to cultural lectures, one fourth to agricultural lectures and the other one fourth to technical lectures. Institutes accepted students, who were healthy and competent and who completed five-year-basic education in a village school, regardless of any gender differences. The students were planned to be educated as teachers for village school with 20-year-obligatory-service. Within this circulation, the state would be able to provide well qualified teachers for villages and modern, laic, and scientific (free of charge) education service to hard-to-reach villages.¹⁴⁷ Laicization of education was

¹⁴³ Dikici, "Millî Şef İsmet İnönü Dönemi Laiklik Uygulamalar," 180.

¹⁴⁴ Seçil Karal Akgün, "İsmet İnönü ve Köy Enstitüleri," *İnönü Vakfı*, n.d., <<http://www.ismetinonu.org.tr/index.php/cumhurbaskanligi-yillari/ilkogretim-seferberligi-ve-koy-enstituleri/ismet-inonu-ve-koy-enstituleri>> (2 November 2012).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ "Okuma Yazma Oranı," *TÜİK*, n.d., <www.tuik.gov.tr/Beslenme/excel/0104t02.xls> (2 November 2012).

¹⁴⁷ Akgün, "İsmet İnönü ve Köy Enstitüleri."

specifically. Not only the general and cultural classes, but also the agricultural techniques based on science and technology were included within the system instead of traditional culture techniques based on faith and destiny. İsmail Hakkı Tonguç (1893-1960)¹⁴⁸ mentioned the significance of laicism in the Magazine of Village Institutes, with this statement:

“We should hope that the future world would not be feed by invisible power which comes from the sky or by transcendental ideas. If we want to establish it on a safe and content base, we should give a rational and humanist religion free from lies. Our children who are educated in village institutes are intended to be saved from being slaves of outdated philosophy.”¹⁴⁹

The same importance was highlighted by Sabahattin Eyüboğlu (1908-1973),¹⁵⁰ as well. He mentioned;

“One of the most important aims of the founders of this project was to replace the moral of religion with moral of profession and science. Laicism in Anatolia, where various races, beliefs, languages, and traditions coexist and clash, was not only a tool to achieve to a modern mentality, but also a prerequisite of a life as a nation. Dignity of work in village institutes dedicated to different conditions of each region was like a new common religion.”¹⁵¹

Within a limited time, village institutes achieved concrete success. For instance, the number of teachers for village schools tripled within ten years.¹⁵² However, it could not be institutionalized as a result of protests against its structure, and they were transformed into regular teacher-training schools by the Democrat Party Government¹⁵³ as a concession to the opponents of laicism.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ İsmail Hakkı Tonguç was a pedagogue, the General Manager of Primary Schools and one of the founders of village institutes.

¹⁴⁹ Mehmet Başaran, *Köy Enstitüleri* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları 2003) 32. (Author’s translation).

¹⁵⁰ Sabahattin Eyüboğlu was a writer, translator and an academician. He was assigned by Hasan Ali Yücel and worked for one of the village institutes as a lecturer of cultural history.

¹⁵¹ Sabahattin Eyüboğlu, *Köy Enstitüleri Üzerine* (İstanbul: Yeni Gün Haber Ajans Basın ve Yayıncılık, 1999), 76. quoted in Dikici, “Millî Şef İsmet İnönü Dönemi Laiklik Uygulamalar,” 180-181. (Author’s translation)

¹⁵² Alp Şimsek, “*An Economic Look at the Village Institutes*,” MIT-Massachusetts, 2006, <<http://economics.mit.edu/files/2323>> (3 November 2011).

¹⁵³ The reasons will be examined in upcoming parts.

The regulations were implemented with significant support from society; however, the said support could not be considered as hundred percent support from the entire society. There were individual events, which were detected and punished within the laws, against the regulations. In fact, those could be considered as normal reflections; since, complete transformation among the entire society could not be institutionalized instantly; although, the society was encouraged with maximum endeavor by the state. Like M.K. Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, also, faced with these kinds of reactions during his presidency. For instance, in 1939, in the villages of Erzurum, some people were arrested and sent to the courts, as they were accused with disobedience to the regulation and teaching in old Arabic alphabet.¹⁵⁵ As another example, in Trabzon, a group of people, who were accused of teaching Quran without authorization, was sent to the courts.¹⁵⁶ It was not just the alphabet protested, but also there were other reactions related with yearning to the Islamic Ottoman past. Within this perspective, the usage of titles, most specifically the religious ones such as Hadji (*Haci*), Hodja (*Hoca*), Mulla (*Molla Efendi*), propagandizing Islam, protesting the state, and Arabic calls for prayer were the issues that the state would deal with.

As it was mentioned, Turkification of calls for prayer was a long-time endeavor that started before the republic; however, it could not be institutionalized all over the country. There were individual protest actions, which started in Bursa, a northwestern Anatolian city, in 1933.¹⁵⁷ The *problem* in Bursa was solved; however, the protests did not end during 1930s and 1940s,¹⁵⁸ and kept its importance until the implementation was nullified in 1950. The change of the implementation will be analyzed with its details in upcoming parts.

As laicization process was a threat for Islamic Ottoman identity, there were some aspects those were considered as a threat or the laic republican identity, such

¹⁵⁴ Marie Carlson, Annika Rabo, Fatma Gök, *Education in 'multicultural' societies: Turkish and Swedish perspectives* (İstanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 2007), 94.

¹⁵⁵ Dikici, "Millî Şef İsmet İnönü Dönemi Laiklik Uygulamalar," 165.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 170.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 169-174

as *Nurculuk*, the Islamic movement. Said-i Nursi¹⁵⁹ (1878-1960), the founder of *Nurculuk*, was considered as a “security issue” and became one of the most salient topic that the state watched. Although, Said-i Nursi was under state’s surveillance, his commentaries were spread over the society in order to find his followers with the help of Nur Talebeleri.¹⁶⁰

State control was taken more seriously day-by-day, and the state had involved more issues within time. The newspapers were not allowed to publish any articles, which would support reactionary movements or criticize the state, for instance. Eventually, in the middle of 1940s, the Office of Press (*Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü*) published an instruction, in which the newspapers and the journalists were warned about not to promote religion in their articles.¹⁶¹ In the meantime, as a governmental initiative, Encyclopedia of Islam, which was published in Leiden/Netherlands, was started to be translated into Turkish in 1939. In fact, it was not only a translation; instead, it would be a new edition based on the said publication but with annexes and commentaries of Turkish theologians. The initiative was strongly refused by Eşref Edip, the publisher of Sebilürreşad, and by other Islamist intellectuals.¹⁶² The Islamist intellectuals accused the Encyclopedia of Islam of being published by missionaries in order to abolish Islamic culture, and they published Turkish-Islam Encyclopedia (*Türk-İslam Ansiklopedisi*), in 1941, as an alternative Islamic encyclopedia and a tool to abuse the one that translated by the government. As it was argued by Bernard Lewis, that was considered as the first

¹⁵⁹ He, Bediüzzaman Said Nursî, was born in 1873, educated in Islamic seminaries, and became a theologian. When he was 15, he was named as *Bediüzzaman* (the Wonder of the Age), and since then, he commonly used this name. In his youth, he arrived to Istanbul in order to contact with the Sultan Abdülhamit. Although, he was against the rule of the Committee of Union and Progress due to its counter activities against the Sultanate, then he became one of the supporters of the Ankara Government during the War of Independence. He trusted in Ankara Government that it would save and maintain the Sultanate and Caliphate. With intention to talk to M.K. Atatürk, he went to Ankara, and this visit changed his ideas about the Ankara Government. He understood the laic idea and he drew his support away from the Ankara Government, and settled to Van (one of the eastern provinces of Turkey); however, after 1925 he exiled to different provinces several times due to the state security policy. Although it is not clear, in Van or in Isparta, where was his first settlement after the exile, he started to write his commentaries (*tefsir*) on the Quran. The said *tefsir* would be completed in 23 years, and would be the “guide” for his followers, who were named as the “Students of Nur” (*Nur Talebeleri*) by him. The guide *Risale-i Nur*, the Islamic movement *Nurculuk*, Students of Nur, and Bediüzzaman Said Nursî, himself, became prominent personalities; even, the public opinion created *rumors* about the relation between them and the politicians. The rumors will be mentioned in upcoming parts.

¹⁶⁰ Dikici, “Millî Şef İsmet İnönü Dönemi Laiklik Uygulamalar,” 176.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 183-184.

¹⁶² Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 181.

sign of opposition to laic policies of the state¹⁶³, and the religious awakening¹⁶⁴. The Encyclopedia was published until 1950,¹⁶⁵ and apart from the Encyclopedia, over 100 books related with religion were published during the Single Party Period.¹⁶⁶

Within general perspective, all implementations including translation of Islamic encyclopedias, prohibition of newspaper articles were parts of control issue. The state intended to take every single issue regarding Islam under its own control without any exception; hence, there was no movement, or publications that would promote Islam, but the government. Due to this approach to religious issues, Single Party Period has been criticized even stronger. Edip accused the Single Party Period of being an *enemy to Islam* within these words:

“They have completely ignored the society. They have not hesitated to offend the sacred feelings of society. The entire country was covered by misery and suffer. They have stabbed the consciences. They have changed the calls for prayer. They have even involved into the mosques, they have involved into the prayers. They have closed religious institutions.”¹⁶⁷

Tension in society increased with religious promotions on one side and governmental prohibitions on the other hand, during the late 1940s. In the same magazine, Sebilürreşad, Ali Fuat Başgil mentioned that the tension resulted with society’s discontent attitude to Single Party Period that led to Democrat Party rule,¹⁶⁸ which will be a topic of the following part. Besides, there were some scholars argue that the heritage of M.K. Atatürk was changed into *another form* with strict implementations and legal punishments. For instance, Henry J. Barkey mentioned that M.K. Atatürk’s ideology was sanctified by his followers,¹⁶⁹ and Bernard Lewis

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Dikici, “Millî Şef İsmet İnönü Dönemi Laiklik Uygulamalar,” 183-184.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 184.

¹⁶⁶ Ahmet Esenkaya, “İnönü Dönemi Laiklik Politikası (1938–1950)” (MA diss., University of Hacettepe, 1995), 141–145.

¹⁶⁷ Dikici, “Millî Şef İsmet İnönü Dönemi Laiklik Uygulamalar,” 183. (Author’s translation.)

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 183.

¹⁶⁹ Henry J. Barkey. “Turkey and Great Powers,” in *Turkey’s Engagement With Modernity*, eds. Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem and Philip Robins, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 243.

described the change as a transformation of his authoritarian and paternalistic mode of government into a form close to “dictatorship”.¹⁷⁰

3.2. Experiencing Democracy

During transition period, M.K. Atatürk and his companions intended to solve all issues within a *laic and republican structure*. In fact, the planned path was for the cleaning of political scenes from Islam, by its limitation with private sphere and taking it under control in order to *protect* both the religion and the politics. However, there is one thing that should be highlighted; the said revolutions were not applied by the society itself.¹⁷¹ In other words, laicism process of Turkey was not brought about by an enlightenment process as the Western World had experienced.

In the Western World, as a result of economic development and enlightenment process, the institutionalization of modernism occurred as a natural fact. However, in Turkey, modernization process was intended to *catch* after the republic within a *shortcut*. During the time of M.K. Atatürk, all political groups were unified under his control. Within this time, the statist-elitist group¹⁷² including M.K. Atatürk and his companions embraced the socialist groups as they were all in favor of the modernization process. On the other hand, traditional-liberals¹⁷³ were suppressed by the ruling group.¹⁷⁴ That is the reason why Kongar states that, M.K. Atatürk has been the symbol of unification of the country.¹⁷⁵ However, the lack of a progressive background brought about many complications to the Turkish political history.

During the presidency of İnönü, the government faced with many protest movements concerning the regulations of modernization, and these protest movements resulted with judicial processes. Consequently, the tension caused more

¹⁷⁰ Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*,

¹⁷¹ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 244.

¹⁷² The group was formed by the civilian and military bureaucracy of the Empire who had worked out an alliance with some of the landowners during the War of Independence.

¹⁷³ Traditional-liberal group included all fundamentalist-fanatic religious groups.

¹⁷⁴ Tevfik Çavdar, *Milli Mücadele'nin Ekonomik Kökenleri* (İstanbul: Köz Yayınları, 1974), 157-158, quoted in Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 611.

¹⁷⁵ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 611.

reaction among society and displeasure about the single-party period. Besides, the Wealth Tax (*Varlık Vergisi*) issue was also another problem that led to displeasure of society. The law regarding the Wealth Tax was put into force on 11 November 1942 for a probable involvement into the World War II, and targeted wealthy citizens to oblige to pay high amounts of taxes. That was the official reason declared officially; however, then Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu (1887-1953) declared in on of party meetings that it was the Turkification of markets.¹⁷⁶ This tax has been criticized strongly as being an unfair application to non-Muslim citizens. Besides, that application with significant focus on the statement of the Prime Minister opens a debate of both “citizenship” and the role of Islam in it, and the usage of “Turk”. Although the law did not directly target non-Muslim citizens, the discourses cannot suit with egalitarian principle of both the Treaty of Lausanne and the constitution. This issue will be discussed with details in upcoming parts.

Under these conditions, the Republic of Turkey took a step into an experience of democracy with Democrat Party in 1946. Within this part of the chapter, multi-party period, military interventions, the rise of political Islam, Turkish Islamic Synthesis, and transformation of the society will be examined. The events of a half-century of Turkish politics until the 21st century will be analyzed within the frame of laic and anti-laic discussions.

3.2.1. Multi-Party Period - Democrat Party

The displeasure about the Single Party Period increased during the second half of the 1940s. The *strict control* of state over the citizens brought about tension among the society; eventually, debates around laicism had a part on the agenda of CHP. In fact, it was a competitive process on Turkish politics due to the establishment of Democrat Party.

CHP, due to its structure, was a party of different ideologies in itself. However, the tension was effective on its meetings, and in 1945 the budget debates of the government became one of the most heated debates among all; especially, the

¹⁷⁶ Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar 1939-54* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1963), 263.

law concerning the farmers in order to make them possessors of their own fields (*Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu*) was argued a lot by opposites.¹⁷⁷

The law has been discussed a lot regarding its articles, its necessity, and its benefits to economic system. As the economic benefits and its background are irrelevant with the purpose of this thesis, only the political outcomes will be discussed. The budget debates hosted many discussions, and according to different scholars there were many different reasons.¹⁷⁸ According to supporters, it was a movement concerning the protection of little farmers against powerful landowners; besides, unused fields were supposed to be valued as they would be owned by the farmers working for the mentioned landlords. Herewith, both the unused fields would become valuable and the farmers would work for their own favor. The opponents considered the law as an adaptation of a Nazi-German land regulation as a fascist implementation. According to another opponent idea, the government intended to control the powerful landowners, who were, generally, the leaders of oppositional movements, with the law. Among all, the most salient part was the way that it paved to the multi party period.

The law concerning the farmers was accepted on 11 June 1945; in the meantime, it caused the increase of oppositional discourses and made the oppositional voices official. Adnan Menderes (1899-1961) and Fuad Köprülü (1890-1966), the deputies of CHP, were not in favor with the law, and they published articles in daily newspaper Vatan, which demonstrated an official opposition against the party.¹⁷⁹ Eventually, due to their oppositional discourses, Menderes, Köprülü and Refik Koraltan (1890-1974) were excluded from the CHP, on September 1945.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, "Bir Tepeden Reform Denemesi: "Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu"nun Hikâyesi." *Birikim* 107 (2003):

<<http://www.birikimdergisi.com/birikim/dergiyazi.aspx?did=1&dsid=99&dyid=2340>>.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Sanem Gök, "Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Vatan Gazetesi (1950-1960)", (M.A. diss., University of Ankara, 2003).

¹⁸⁰ "Adnan Menderes," *Milli Savunma Bakanlığı*, n.d.,

<<http://www.msb.gov.tr/anasayfa/html/Bakanlar/BakanPotre/AMenderesB.htm>> (2 May 2013);

Kadir Özdamarlar, "Develi' de Siyasi Hayatın Gelişimi-3," *Çağdaş Develi Haftalık Yerel Gazete*, n.d.,

<<http://www.cagdasdeveli.com.tr/index.php/arsiv/kose-yazarlari/27-yrld-doc-dr-kadir-ozdamarlar/708-develide-siyasi-hayatn-geliimi-3>> (2 May 2013);

Osman Akandere, "Fuad Köprülü ve Demokrat Parti'nin Kurulmasındaki Rolü." *Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3 (1997): 240. 231-242.

After the resignation of Celal Bayar (1883-1986), these four former CHP members declared that they would found a new party.¹⁸¹ Regarding to that declaration, İnönü asked for a promise regarding not to involve any reactionary movement (*irtica*) as the oppositional party. Eventually, Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti - DP*) was founded on 7 January 1946.¹⁸²

Since the beginning of 1946, the TBMM hosted two parties, and the said competitive process was started. The debates regarding laicism started with CHP's implementations. Two CHP deputies, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver from Istanbul and Hakkı Baha Pars from Bursa, proposed a regulation concerning religious instruction in curriculum of public schools to TBMM on 24 December 1946.¹⁸³ They stated that religious instruction would protect the society from involving into communist trend, which was originated from the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁴ In 1947, the proposal was supported by more deputies, who were Vehbi Dayıbaş from Sinop, northern Anatolian city, Abdülkadir Güney from Çorum, central Anatolian city, Şükrü Nayman from Kayseri, central Anatolian city, Sinan Tekelioğlu from Adana, southern Anatolian city and Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver from Istanbul; additionally, they took it one step forward, and they proposed religious instruction for primary schools and opening of theology faculties. They defended these regulations because, in their opinion, the national solidarity was in need to be protected and the only way was the use of religion. Aforelisted deputies criticized the interpretation of laicism, as well.¹⁸⁵ These opponent proposals were not accepted by the Assembly in that year; however, in 1949, CHP Government put some regulations regarding the religious education into force. According to the said regulations; religious instructions were applied to curriculum of primary schools as optional lectures that will be elected with a special petition,¹⁸⁶ courses for preachers and prayer leaders (*imam-hatip kursları*) were

¹⁸¹ Ali Fuad Başgil, *27 Mayıs İhtilali ve Sebepleri* (İstanbul: Özal Matbaası, 2006), 52.

¹⁸² Ibid. 54.

¹⁸³ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 63.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Suat Yıldırım, "Zorunlu din eğitimi olmaz!," *Zaman Daily Newspaper*, 26 September 2007, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?haberno=593169&title=yorum-prof-dr-suat-yildirim-zorunlu-din-egitimi-olmaz&haberSayfa=1> (25 September 2012).

opened,¹⁸⁷ and the Faculty of Theology of University of Ankara was opened in 1949. Moreover, a law regarding the allowance of visits to some of the tombs of Ottomans Sultans and some religious leaders was applied on 1 March 1950,¹⁸⁸ just two months before the general elections. As it was stated by Şadiye Ay,¹⁸⁹ these regulations could be considered as given concessions in order to get closer with conservative part of society before 1950 elections.

As it could not be institutionalized, Turkish calls for prayer started to be discussed once again. According to Ömer Rıza Doğrul (1893-1952), Turkish calls for prayer was an unnecessary implementation due to the originality of calls. He stated:

“We are not against the recital of *ezan* in Turkish. Nevertheless, we believe that it is an unnecessary trouble and a useless initiative. The *ezan* of Mohammed, which is known and adopted by the Turk, is not in Arabic, but in the language of Islam. Because it is in the language of Islam, it is in Turkish, in Persian, and even Hindu and Chinese. It is a shared language, which is understood by all who belong to this community. Maybe they cannot comprehend its words, but their spirits grasp the real truth of the words. ... This issue [of the *ezan*] has been kept alive for centuries by history, tradition, blood of martyrs. According to us, the government should pull its intervention in this issue back and leave this to the conscience of the nation.”¹⁹⁰

On the other hand, the implementation was criticized within a different perspective: involvement of a laic state into religious issues. For instance, Edip stated his disagreement:

“It is now time to be able to talk about the need to remove treatments against religion which have been conducted for long years under the guise of secularism. Therefore, it should also be natural to talk about the issue of the *ezan*. ... If the government is secular, it should not interfere in affairs of religion neither positively

¹⁸⁷ Recep Kaymakcan, “Türkiye’de Din Eğitimi Politikaları Üzerine Düşünceler,” *Değerler Eğitimi Merkezi*, n.d., <http://www.dem.org.tr/makaleler/dinegitimi_recep_06072006_EKEV.pdf> (26 September 2012).

¹⁸⁸ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 64.

¹⁸⁹ Şadiye Ay, “Türkiye’de Siyasal İslam,” *Mevzuat Dergisi* 7, no. 83, (2004): n.p.

¹⁹⁰ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 69.

not negatively... How can a secular government intervene in the nation's recital of the *ezan*, which is a totally religious affair?"¹⁹¹

In fact, the issue was not only the Turkish calls for prayer, but worship in Turkish within a general perspective. The opponents of implementation were in favor of originality of the language due to distrust in equality between a translation and original. For instance, M. Raif Ogan published various articles in *Sebilürreşad* concerning his distrust in translation in worship.¹⁹² Due to these discussions, implementation had never gained whole trust from the society; consequently, it did not take too long to be annulled.

According to latest implementations and concessions of CHP government, Bernard Lewis argued that a considerable religious awakening was occurred among the society; consequently, prayers in the mosques got crowded, religious orders such as Nurcu movement got more power, and religious press with its special target group composed by conservative and even clericalist people emerged.¹⁹³ These policies of the CHP were criticized by journalists and writers with undermining the reforms of M.K. Atatürk and encouraging reactionary movements.¹⁹⁴ On the other hand, as it would be obvious with the results of 1950 Elections, concessions that CHP Government gave could not be sufficient to make the conservative parts of the society content.¹⁹⁵

On 14 May 1950, the general elections ended an era and led a new start in Turkish politics. The elections concluded with DP's success with 408 seats over 487, while CHP gained 69 seats in the Assembly.¹⁹⁶ The percentages of each party are as shown in Chart I.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² M. Raif Ogan, "Kur'an Tercümesi Kur'an'ın Yerini Alabilir mi?", *Sebilürreşad*, vol 2, no. 32, February 1949, pp. 109–112. quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 71.

¹⁹³ Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 414-417.

¹⁹⁴ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 63-64.

¹⁹⁵ Sabahattin Nal, "Demokrat Parti'nin 1950-54 Din Siyaseti," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 60, no.:3 (2005): 142.137-171.

¹⁹⁶ Süleyman Güngör, "14 Mayıs 1950 Seçimleri ve CHP'de Bunalım," *SDU Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 21 (2010): 202-203.

With the DP Government, two new terms occurred in Turkish political scenes: *the reforms possessed by people (millete malolmuş inkılaplar)* and *the ones not possessed by people (millete malolmamış inkılaplar)*.¹⁹⁷ These terms were used by Menderes, the Prime Minister of the DP Government, during his speech about the party program, which was composed by the DP's perspective concerning laicism and religious issues. He mentioned that; “As it was written in our election declaration, we will secure the reforms possessed by people.”¹⁹⁸ As it will be mentioned, reforms not possessed by people would be the first issues that DP Government would pay attention. As Kongar stressed, this policy of government was considered as “leaving behind the modernization process” by supporters of laicism.¹⁹⁹




Chart I: 1950 General Elections

Source: “1950 Yılı Genel Seçimlerinde Partilerin Aldıkları Oylar ve Oranları,” *TBMM*, n.d., <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/secim_sorgu.secimdeki_partiler?p_secim_yili=1950> (20 May 2013).

The DP Government supported its actions within a different perspective of laicism, while it was criticized strongly by supporters of laicism. In fact, it was a significant occurrence of an alternative laicism, which has been the first but not the last time of redefinition of laicism. As argued by Umut Azak, said alternative laicism discourse has been used; possible to say still is being used, by the right-wing

¹⁹⁷ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 246.

¹⁹⁸ Nurhan Dağlı and Belma Aktürk, *Hükümetler ve Programları 1920-1960* (Ankara: TMBB Basımevi, 1988), 161.

¹⁹⁹ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 246.

political parties in Turkish politics.²⁰⁰ For instance, Celal Bayar, the chairman of the DP, had stated before the elections that his party respected to sacred religious values unified with laicism with these sentences:

“According to the policies of the DP, we respect to religious freedom as much as we respect to other freedoms. Citizens are totally free to possess any religion they will and free to practice it. The way it functions will be discussed when it is the time. Due to DP’s policies, which respect freedom, the party in power [this is to say, CHP] was obliged to discuss religious issues and religious education; accordingly, they proposed negotiations and put the topic on the agenda of the Assembly.”²⁰¹

Similarly, after the DP came into power, Menderes stated his perspective of laicism in his public speeches, in which he pointed out the freedom of conscience as the basis of laicism. However, his discourses were not referring total freedom; instead, he referred the Islamic identity of Turkish nation. For instance in his speech in Adana, on 6 December 1952, he pointed out the importance of freedom of conscience:

“Turkish nation is Muslim and will remain Muslim. Nobody in this country has the right to violate the right of others. Real believers and sincere Muslims can be completely sure of the freedom of conscience. And just the real Muslims know to respect to others’ religious beliefs and freedom of conscience. Within the framework of the principle of freedom of conscience, religion as a sacred and respectable concept should be protected from any kind of offenses. To understand laicism as opposing religion or hostility does not suit with our government’s understanding of freedom of conscience. Apart from our decision to protect religion from all kinds of offenses, our decision to prevent religion from becoming a tool for suppressing citizens having other beliefs and personal ideas is definite, as well. This country has no tolerance to abuse of a sacred concept like religion by certain social debris and self-seeking politicians.”²⁰²

²⁰⁰ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 84.

²⁰¹ Sabahattin Nal, “Demokrat Parti’nin 1950-54 Dönemi Din Siyaseti,” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 60, no.3 (2005): 143. (Author’s translation)

²⁰² Milliyet Daily Newspaper, 7 December 1952, page 1-7.

For the original copy of the related page of Milliyet, please see Appendix III on page 289.

Within DP perspective Turkish calls for prayer was considered as a reform not possessed by people,²⁰³ and it became the first issue that the DP Government paid attention. On 16 June 1950, within a month of the establishment of government, Arabic calls for prayers were allowed over the country.²⁰⁴ Two deputies from the DP Government, Ahmet Gürkan from Tokat, northern Anatolian city, and İsmail Berkok from Kayseri, prepared a draft of the law, and they mentioned that then implementation was a violation of freedom of conscience and a contradiction of principles of laicism.²⁰⁵ Contradiction of laicism issue was also distinguished by Menderes with this statement:

“While never permitting any reactionary provocation, we will respect the necessities of the freedom of religion and conscience. This is how we understand the meaning of true secularism. As it is also expressed clearly in our program, we understand that true secularism requires the lack of any relation between religion and state politics and the absence of influence of any religious idea on legal arrangements and practices.”²⁰⁶

In fact, Turkish calls for prayers were considered as an *issue that should be solved* by conservatives. As it can be seen in Appendix V (on page 293) the daily newspaper Vakit announced the regulation on 14 June 1950, even before the official acceptance, by this headline: “The DP has solved an important issue: The calls for prayers will be recited in Arabic”. As it was the DP Government that solved the issue, Menderes was considered as “the heroic figure that was a true Muslim and a true Turk”.²⁰⁷ Because the Arabic call for prayer was a return to the Islamic roots of the country. That was the reason why the debate of language of worship was so significant. Shift to Arabic was an *unprogressive step* within laic republican identity, and its supporters believed in the necessity of Turkish calls for prayers as a pivotal component of laicism, as they saw the lack of reformed Islam on the way to achieve a real modernization. However, due to the certain unpopularity of the Turkish calls, the initiative could not be resisted. The attitude of CHP was clarified by Cemal Reşit

²⁰³ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 246.

²⁰⁴ Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper, 17 June 1950, page 1.

For the original copy of the related page of Cumhuriyet, please see Appendix IV on page 291.

²⁰⁵ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 73.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 73-74.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 75.

Eyübođlu, MP of Trabzon, northern Anatolian city, on behalf of his party with this declaration:

“The concepts of nation-state and national consciousness were established with the republic in this country and CHP followed this path. Within this framework, the calls for prayers were considered as a topic related with language and national consciousness. According to the nation-state policy, the Turkish language should be used as much as possible. That is the reason why we preferred the calls in our native language in our homeland. We are not in favor of an argument concerning the language of calls for prayers. We believe that national consciousness will solve the issue and we will not stand against the regulation.”²⁰⁸

Accordingly, some MPs of CHP voted in favor with acceptance of the law, and this was announced by daily newspaper Cumhuriyet as a headline with this expression “The MPs of CHP also approved and accepted the law”.

The acceptance of the law was a gladsome regulation within the perspective of Islamic Ottoman identity. Apart from the allowance of Arabic calls for prayers, with another regulation put into force on 5 July 1950, Qur’an recitations and sermons recorded by 2 *hafız* under the supervision of DİB, would be broadcasted in state-owned radio (*Ankara Radyosu*) three times a week.²⁰⁹ Supporters of Islamic Ottoman identity considered it as an “auspicious success” (*hayırlı başarı*).²¹⁰ Besides, it was considered as a will of the public, and “any Kemalist reform might be abolished with respect to the people’s will” was said in Sebilürreşad.²¹¹

Religion-based implementations and Menderes’ Izmir speech of 1951, in which he stated;

“We set our religion, which was under constraint so far, free. We did not take the blind-followers of reforms seriously, and we Arabized the calls for prayers. Turkey

²⁰⁸ Nal, “Demokrat Parti’nin,” 152.

²⁰⁹ Milliyet Daily Newspaper, 6 July 1950, page 1.

For the original copy of the related page of Milliyet, please see Appendix VI on page 295.

²¹⁰ Nal, “Demokrat Parti’nin,” 160.

²¹¹ Ibid.

is a Muslim state, and will remain Muslim, and it will accomplish all the duties of Islamism.”²¹²

gave a relief to Islamic movements and caused irritation among supporters of laic republican identity. With support of Islamic discourses of the government, conservative media started to promote Said-i Nursi and his teaching Nurculuk. As contrary to the promotion of Nurculuk, it was considered as proof of reactionary Islam by supporters of laicism.²¹³ As Kongar stated, the DP Government, which came to power after a long time of single party period as a result of people’s harassment, intended to institutionalize the “political Islam” by making concessions. Herewith, the promotion of Said-i Nursi and his strong relationship with Menderes became the said proof of reactionary.²¹⁴

There are many different perspectives regarding the role of Said-i Nursi among the society. Some scholars stated that he was the missing personality of a religion-based daily life,²¹⁵ or within a sociological definition, the missing personality of transformation from *Gemeinschaft* (communal society) to *Gesellschaft* (associational society) among people.²¹⁶ With a different perspective, Said-i Nursi could be considered as an important personality by many different parts of the society, such as a religious leader by conservatives, a Kurdish Molla for Kurdish nationalists with his ethnic origin, an anti-communist or an Islamic reformist by his *proper* approach to Islam.²¹⁷ On the contrary, within laic republican perspective, he was an objector of reforms and M.K. Atatürk,²¹⁸ and a leader of a fake Islamic movement.²¹⁹

As a result of the strict control over Said-i Nursi by CHP Government and the lack of significant support by the DP Government until the second half of the

²¹² Sinan Meydan, “İşte Hür Adamın Gerçek Öyküsü,” *Oda TV*, 31 December 2010, <<http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=iste-hur-adamin-gercek-oykusu-3112101200>> (30 September 2012).

²¹³ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 116.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 99;

Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 246.

²¹⁵ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 117.

²¹⁶ Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 151.

²¹⁷ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 138.

²¹⁸ Meydan, “İşte Hür Adamın Gerçek Öyküsü.”

²¹⁹ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 134.

decade, he was not able to proceed in his works within sight. For instance, his book *Risale-i Nur* was published within an informal process until 1956.²²⁰ In 1956, the first year that *Risale-i Nur* was published in book format, the government facilitated the process of publication.²²¹ In fact, the support was not one-sided; instead, the government supported him in order to get votes of conservatives and Said-i Nursi's disciples²²² and he supported the government due its policies regarding the religious issues. Although the truth of the event is still being discussed,²²³ due to the mutual support and strong relationship between Menderes and Said-i Nursi, Menderes is said to kiss Said-i Nursi's hand in respect and flattened him.²²⁴ Whether it is true or not, the closeness between them caused significant enmity among supporters of laic republican identity that gave birth tension between two parts of the society.

Since the beginning of the DP Government, Islam was promoted due to its role in *real* Turkish identity. Islam was seen as a savior, which would be helpful to lead the Turks in true path, which could never ever intersect with communism – the real enemy of the state. Regarding this policy, DİB was assigned to fight with the *enemy* with the help of sermons those would be chanted from the mosques. As it was quoted in one of the sermons by Sabahattin Nal, the policy was mentioned with this statement:

“For many years, we isolated ourselves from the Qur'an. With the left of the Qur'an, obviously a setback occurs. The salvation is possible only with remaining true with the holy Qur'an. Only Islam will save people from the malady of communism.”²²⁵

Relatively, former CHP Government was accused of being the reason of communist trend existing in Turkey. Village institutes became a reason of this accusation.²²⁶ They were considered as the schools of communism, where the youth was being taught with communist principles; consequently, they were closed

²²⁰ Ibid., 120.

²²¹ Ibid., 20.

²²² Meydan, “İşte Hür Adamın Gerçek Öyküsü.”

²²³ Oral Çalışlar, “Adnan Menderes Said Nursi'nin Elini Öptü mü?,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 20 January 2010, <<http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=975630>> (28 September 2012).

²²⁴ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 246.

²²⁵ Nal, “Demokrat Parti'nin,” 162.

²²⁶ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 95.

officially and transformed into schools of vocational teacher education with an official regulation on 27 January 1954.²²⁷ As a result of the closure, reformist groups criticized the DP Government, because it obstructed a type of education, which would bring up an enlightened generation for the sake of a laic and modern republic.²²⁸

As it was mentioned in French experience, education system has been one of the most intervened orders in the clash of two identities. Before the 1950 Elections, CHP intended to get votes of the conservatives with courses for preachers and prayer leaders; however, it failed. When the DP came into power, the government took the regulation one step forward and transformed the courses into schools for preachers and prayer leaders, which was organized as two steps. The first step was composed by four years as secondary schools and the second step was for three years as high schools.²²⁹ Said vocational schools, which were supposed to educate qualified religious men, has always been an issue of educational system, but most significantly an issue of politics. Within years, the number of these schools has been increased, and its form was changed according to the religious policy of different governments. The issue will be examined within chronological order in upcoming parts.

As aforementioned in previous parts, the regulation and *Turkification* of language was a considerable endeavor on the way of a nation-state process, and that process was including all means of escape from Arabic culture. Within this perspective, the usage of old Ottoman words in schools books and in official discourses attracted the attention of supporters of laicism, obviously in a negative way, and intensified their enmity to DP Government. For instance, the Turkish usage of the Commander of Turkish Armed Forces (*Genelkurmay Başkanı*) changed with the old Ottoman version (*Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Reisi*) during the time of DP governments.²³⁰

²²⁷ Akgün, “İsmet İnönü ve Köy Enstitüleri.”

²²⁸ Dikici, “Millî Şef İsmet İnönü Dönemi Laiklik Uygulamalar,” 182.

²²⁹ Nal, “Demokrat Parti’nin,” 159.

²³⁰ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 535-536.

Conservatism became visible in many different orders. For instance, the beauty contests became an issue once again by conservative media. The contests were considered as “an attempt to lead Turkish girls into prostitution and to sell them to ‘American Jews’”.²³¹ Necip Fazıl Kısakürek stated that the beauty contests were a new version of prostitution and totally against the *national* honor.²³² According to another work that Azak carried out, there were many different demands proposed by local branches of DP that could be considered as anti-reformist. For instance, on 11 March 1951 in Konya, central Anatolian city, some members of the DP proposed to apply the Arabic alphabet and to encourage people to wear Ottoman style hat (*fes*) and *çarşaf*; on 15 September 1952 in Çorum, central Anatolian city, compulsory courses on the Qur’an, the ban of beauty contests, and parties and to disallow women to work were the proposals on the agenda.²³³ However, due to an official warning that was sent by the party leadership, the proposals were stopped as they were against the Turkish revolution.²³⁴

Governmental support on Islamic traditionalism encouraged women with *çarşaf* in the city centers, which was entirely opposite of the laic republican vision of the Turkish women.²³⁵ With increased tension, the society was divided into two with labels of progressivists (*ilerici*) and reactionary (*gerici*).²³⁶ The said division started with the DP Government period, and has played a significant role in Turkish political scenes since then.

Polarization of society has caused many bloody attacks in political history of Turkey, and Istanbul Pogrom (6-7 Eylül Olayları) has become one of the most significant ones targeting non-Muslims, most specifically the Greek-Orthodox citizens of the republic.

On 6 September 1955, non-Muslim merchants were targeted by mobilized groups and their stores were looted in Istanbul, after a news coming from

²³¹ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 97.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid., 109.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Nilüfer Göle, *Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 46.

²³⁶ İsmail Cem, *Türkiye’de Geri Kalmışlığın Tarihi* (İstanbul: Cem, 1971), 307.

Thessaloniki - Greece concerning an attack to M.K. Atatürk's house. Attacks and loots lasted two days and according to court proceedings, more than four thousands houses, more than a thousand stores, 73 churches, one synagogue, two monasteries, many schools and more than five thousand buildings including factories, restaurants, hotels and bars were damaged.²³⁷ In fact, news of the attack in Thessaloniki cannot be considered as the real reason, as there were many other reasons based on different orders. For instance, the oppression to Turkish Cypriots was an important issue on then agenda of Turkey. On the other hand, economical power that non-Muslims possessed was a fact, and *nationalization* of economy could be considered as a policy. After the events, non-Muslim population of Istanbul significantly decreased due to security issues, and this consequence was commented as “scratch of the mosaic” with reference to solved diverse characteristic of Istanbul.²³⁸

Regarding the whole information given above, Turkey could be considered as a state undergoing *another* transition period. In all means, there were significant differences from the early republican period. The meaning of glorious-past was shifted from pre-Islamic time into pre-republican Ottoman period, which was the dark-past of Kemalists. Even, the early republican period was considered as the dark-past of the Turkish State by the DP Government. The concept of nationalism was interpreted within a different perspective; rather than laic-nationalism of CHP, Muslim-Turkish nationalism was promoted by the DP governments.²³⁹ Moreover, the interpretation of laicism was changed and it was considered as expanded limits for Sunni Islamic belief. Meanwhile, definitions of personalities were changed. For instance, Said-i Nursi, who was a spied-by-state man during CHP governments, was considered as a “harmless old man”²⁴⁰ and even was asked for a support by government. This transformation process satisfied the supporters of traditional Islamic Ottoman identity; however, supporters of laicism were extremely disturbed due to *anti-laic* regulations and Islamic gestures of Menderes. For instance, his visit

²³⁷ Dilek Güven, “6-7 Eylül Olayları” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 6 September 2005, <<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=163380>> (27 September 2012).

²³⁸ İlber Ortaylı, “Eylül 1955’in Sancısı,” *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 31 January 2009, <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/---eylul-sancisi/ilber-ortayli/pazar/yazardetay/01.02.2009/1054009/default.htm>> (30 September 2012).

²³⁹ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 66.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 130.

to the Eyüp Sultan Tomb²⁴¹ or his welcoming ceremony by Said-i Nursi in Emirdağ by green based flag with sultan's signature on it (as a significant symbol of Islam)²⁴² were considered as clear proofs of reactionary.

Besides the conservatives, the DP was also supported by the capital owners, powerful landowners and businessmen due to the changing economic system of Turkey; even, the party was considered as a product of the said economic system, as discussed by Kongar.²⁴³ Additionally, the party was supported by the society, who was bored with single-party. Herewith, a capitalist party became the leader of a popular action,²⁴⁴ and possessed both economic and political power. However, when Turkey arrived to the end of 1950s, the division among society, the supporters as listed above on one side and the opponents on the other, became obvious in media, in political and sociological orders, and even on the streets. That was the final situation of Turkish political scenes before the first military intervention.

3.2.2. 2 Decades – 3 Military Interventions

The establishment of DP, and as its consequence, the transition to multiparty system were considerable steps for the path to democracy on Turkish political history. However, as the transition process could not be governed with sustainable success, four elections after the multi-party period, Turkish political scenes witnessed a military intervention.

Support of DP from different parts of society was mentioned in previous part; however, the oppositional front was mobilizing due to its implementations simultaneously. While the religious discourses of government were causing considerable annoyance among supporters of laicism, different levels of annoyance were emerged among economic circles due to the inequality in the distribution of income, which led to socio-political problems.²⁴⁵

²⁴¹ Ibid.,122.

²⁴² Meydan, "İşte Hür Adamın Gerçek Öyküsü."

²⁴³ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 612.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Mahir Taş, "Menderes Dönemi Ekonomi Politığı ve 1958 İstikrar Programı," *Mevzuat Dergisi* 7, no.76, (2004): n.p.

Critics to DP were gathered around the oppositions on political scenes; so that, Liberty Party (*Hürriyet Partisi* - HP)²⁴⁶ dissolved itself and many members attended to CHP, and Peasants' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Köylü Partisi*) joined Republican Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi*), these two parties formed a new party named Republican Peasants' Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* – CKMP), in order to mobilize as a stronger oppositional front against DP.²⁴⁷ Apart from the political parties, press members, academicians, even military personnel were unified against DP. This reunification was called as “evil front” (*şer cephesi*) by DP, and its member were criticized by Menderes, strongly. For instance, he pointed out the academicians with this sentence; “These heroic academicians (...) Some puppets wearing black robes hired by a certain group (...)”²⁴⁸ On the other hand, supporters of DP gathered around Fatherland Front (*Vatan Cephesi*). Fatherland Front was a governmental initiative, in which its supporters were listed publicly everyday in radio programs.²⁴⁹ While the tension was rising each day both in politics and social life, the discourses of DP and CHP representatives were getting more aggressive day by day. For instance, CHP accused DP of establishing an oppressive regime; correspondingly, DP accused CHP of encouraging people for a revolution (*ihtilal*) because of İnönü's speeches, such as:

“If, human rights cannot be executed and the rights of citizens are forced, a revolution will be a necessity. Even me, I cannot save you. A revolution is a legitimate right, when the terms are matured.”²⁵⁰

or with references to Syngman Rhee, the first President of South Korea,²⁵¹ who resigned due to popular protests. Eventually, in 1960, DP established a so-called Investigation Commission (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*) in order to investigate the claims regarding “CHP's politics with illegal methods and with support of some press

²⁴⁶ It was established by former DP members, who resigned from the party as a result of disagreements with Party management, in 1955.

²⁴⁷ Hakkı Uyar, “Demokrasinin Bir Açmazı: Cepheleşme,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 19 May 2002, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/ek_haber.php?ek=r2&haberno=1212> (1 March 2013).

²⁴⁸ Mustafa Arıkan, “27 Mayıs'a Damgasını Vuran Söz ve Beyanlar,” *Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi* 4, (1997): 302.

²⁴⁹ Hasan Pehlivan, “İsmet Paşa darbeyi istemedi,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 31 May 2010, <<http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=999776&CategoryID=133>> (1 March 2013).

²⁵⁰ Arıkan, “27 Mayıs'a Damgasını Vuran,” 304.

²⁵¹ Pehlivan, “İsmet Paşa darbeyi istemedi.”

members” with a strict prohibition of any news about that commission’s and DP’s works.²⁵²

With restrictive implementations of DP, public protests were carried out at the end of April, both in İstanbul and in Ankara. These protest meetings ended up with one dead, one seriously injured by police, and a serious boundary among security forces, this is to say, between police officers and military personnel.²⁵³ For instance, after the arrival of military personnel, the protesters shouted out the slogan of “The youth and the military are united!”²⁵⁴ (*Ordu, gençlik elele!*). That was a significant moment that the military showed its side against the DP government.

During May, the problems could not be solved, and the reaction of military was ended with an intervention on 27 May 1960, which was the first intervention in the republic. With the 27 May Military Intervention, the rule of DP was over after ten years.

On 27 May 1960, the first proclamation was made by a colonel, named Alparslan Türkeş (1917-1997), who was to become the leader of nationalist movement in Turkish politics. He highlighted the *necessity* of an intervention in order to solve the disagreement of political parties with a supra-party neutral power, which was the military, and added that the power would be handed over as soon as a result, whatever it would be, was obtained after a legitimate election.²⁵⁵ After the military intervention, leaders of DP were arrested and were judged between 14 October 1960 and 15 September 1961; eventually, Menderes, the Prime Minister; Zorlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Hasan Polatkan, the Minister of Labor and Finance were sentenced to death, and they were executed on 16-17 September. Additionally, Bayar, the President of Republic was sentenced to life imprisonment.²⁵⁶

²⁵² Sedef Bulut, “27 Mayıs 1960’dan Günümüze Paylaşılmayan Demokrat Parti Mirası,” *SDÜ Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 19, (2009): 79.

²⁵³ Serdar Şahinkaya, “29 Nisan 1960’da Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi ve Adım Adım 27 Mayıs,” *Mülkiye* 267, (2010): 97.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁵ For whole proclamation (in Turkish), please see Appendix VII on page 297.

²⁵⁶ Nedim Yalansız, “27 Mayıs Darbesi Sonrası Celal Bayar ve Eski Demokrat Partililerin Türk Siyasi Hayatına Etkileri,” *Turkish Studies* 7, no.3 (2012): 2587.

In the meantime, a committee of five law professors was appointed in order to make a draft for a new constitution. That draft was submitted to National Unity Committee,²⁵⁷ and after a revise by another committee, it was approved and put on force by 61% of votes after a referendum on 9 July 1961.²⁵⁸ According to the new constitution, the principle of laicism was protected and many articles were accepted regarding equality before the law for all citizens regardless of any variety of religion, ethnic origin or language, such as articles 11-12-19. In addition to that, one of these articles, Article 19, was dedicated for “Freedom of Religion and Conscience”, in which below mentioned paragraphs were written:

“Every individual is entitled to follow freely the dictates of his conscience, to choose own religious faith and to have his own opinions.

Forms of worship, and religious ceremonies and rites are free provided they are not in opposition to public order or morals or to the laws enacted to uphold them.

No person shall be compelled to worship, or participate in religious ceremonies and rites, or to reveal his religious faith and belief. No person shall be reproached for his religious faith and belief.

Religious education and teaching shall be subject to the individual’s own will and volition, and in the case of minors, to their legally appointed guardians.

No person shall be allowed to exploit and abuse religion or religious feelings or political or personal benefit, or for gaining power, or for even partially basing the fundamental social, economic, political and legal order of the State on religious dogmas. Those who violate this prohibition or those who induce others to do so shall be punishable under the pertinent laws. In the case of associations and political parties the former shall be permanently closed down by order of authorized courts and the latter by order of the Constitutional Court.”²⁵⁹

The new constitution encouraged freedom of thought; hence, it was considered as a liberalistic constitution,²⁶⁰ which led to the occurrence of leftist and

²⁵⁷ Group of military officers (junta) that carried out the military intervention and took the power, judged the former DP members and led the process of new constitution.

²⁵⁸ “1961 Anayasası,” TBMM, n.d.<<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa61.htm>> (3 January 2013).

²⁵⁹ “Turkish Constitution of 1961,” *Türk Anayasa Hukuku Sitesi*, n.d., <<http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf>> (1 Ocak 2013).

²⁶⁰ Zühtü Arslan, “Temel Hak ve Özgürlüklerin Sınırlanması: Anayasanın 13. Maddesi Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler,” *Anayasa Yargısı* 19, (2002): 139-141.

proletarian ideologies.²⁶¹ Additionally, as it will be mentioned in upcoming parts of this thesis, 1961 Constitution caused politicization of Alevis, with the freedom of thought and with the freedom of conscience with journals (Journal of Cem) or political party (Unity Party; *Türkiye Birlik Partisi – TBP*).²⁶²

On 11 February 1961, a new party named Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi - AP*) was formed by Ragıp Gümüşpala (1897-1964), a retired general of Turkish Armed Forces. Although, 11 new parties were established after the military intervention, AP has a significant importance with playing a pivotal role among Turkish political scenes for almost two decades as the successor of DP.²⁶³ During the general elections of 1961, votes of supporters of former DP were shared between AP, CKMP and another new-established political party New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi - YTP*). The results were as shown below in Chart II.²⁶⁴




Chart II: 1961 General Elections

Source: “1961 Yılı Genel Seçimlerinde Partilerin Aldıkları Oylar ve Oranları,” *TBMM*, n.d., <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/secim_sorgu.secimdeki_partiler?p_secim_yili=1961> (16 April 2013).

²⁶¹ Korkut Boratav, “İslâmcı Kapitalizme Teslimiyet İşçilerin Alinyazısı mı?,” *Haber Sol*, 9 September 2012, <<http://haber.sol.org.tr/yazarlar/korkut-boratav/islamci-kapitalizme-teslimiyet-iscilerin-alinyazisi-mi-59392>> (1 March 2013).

²⁶² Bezim Can Zırh, “Laik Anayasa Tartışmaları Çerçevesinde Aleviler: Lamekan Bir Demokrasi Çağrısı,” *Birikim* 280-281, (2012): 100.

²⁶³ Başak İnce, *Citizenship and Identity of Turkey From Ataturk’s Republic to the Present Day* (London: IB Tauris, 2012), 114.

²⁶⁴ “1961 Genel Seçimleri,” *BelgeNet*, n.d., <http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=4> (1 March 2013).

As it is visible, new-established AP gained significant public support among three right wing parties. Although any of these four parties gained enough votes to form a government, a coalition government was established by CHP and AP in order to stabilize Turkish politics.²⁶⁵ Ironically, this coalition government became the beginning of an unstable period of coalition governments until the end of century.

AP had always mentioned that the party possessed the same ideology with DP both in political and economic orders not only with welcoming the former members of DP, but also with implementations or at least intentions, such as the big campaign for an amnesty for sentenced members of DP.²⁶⁶ As AP marketed itself as the successor of DP, it obtained the support of Nurculuk, as a consequent.²⁶⁷ When Gümüşpala died in 1964, Süleyman Demirel (1924-...) was elected as the new party leader by party members, and he visited the house of Said Nursi, in order to pray for his soul.²⁶⁸ This visit can be considered as a significant proof of the relation between AP and Nurculuk. On the other hand, there was another Islamic movement named Naqshbandi that gained importance in the liberalistic atmosphere of 1960s. With increased freedom of gathering around foundations and associations with the basis of freedom of thought, which was granted by the 1961 Constitution, mentioned Sufi orders established associations in order to build mosques, and these associations let them to get legitimized and gain power during the decade.²⁶⁹

As will be discussed, a legitimate power of political Islam started after 1980; however, some scholars argued that the decade starting with 1960 became the period of “ideological formation”, which led to following decades with a consistent base of supporters. For instance, İlhan Tekeli distinguished the importance of second half of 1960s regarding the mutation of relation between political parties and religion. He indicated that the liberalistic structure of 1961 Constitution allowed the born of leftist ideologies; simultaneously, the interpretation of religion was changed within

²⁶⁵ Nedim Yalansız, *Türkiye’de Koalisyon Hükümetleri* (İstanbul: Büke Yay., 2006), 50-51 and 67-70, quoted in Yalansız, “27 Mayıs Darbesi Sonrası,” 2587.

²⁶⁶ Bulut, “27 Mayıs 1960’dan,” 80.

²⁶⁷ “DYP’den Said Nursi ve Nurculuk Açıklaması,” *Risale Haber*, 10 August 2011, <<http://www.risalehaber.com/dypden-said-nursi-ve-nurculuk-aciklamasi-115884h.htm>> (1 March 2013).

²⁶⁸ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 134.

²⁶⁹ “Siyasete Damgasını Vuran Tarikat,” *Haber Türk*, 19 September 2006, <<http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/478-siyasete-damgasini-vuran-tarikat>> (1 February 2013).

the perspective of right wing parties. As leftist ideologies were in favor with Marxism/socialism, conservative part mobilized around Islam as if it was a savior; moreover, that perspective became the point of intersection that Turkist (*Türkçü*) group and Islamists unified. Communism became a common enemy of these two groups, and Islam, the savior, caused these two groups became closer to each other on ideological level. He also added that in order to succeed against leftists, laicism was sacrificed, as it was considered as an obstacle to use the religion. Laicism was seen as the reason of loosening of family and religious ties. That was the reason why *degenerated youth* turned towards left. Therefore, a religious awakening became a necessity to succeed in the struggle against communism within this perspective.²⁷⁰

Reliance on religion was not an unfamiliar perspective among Turkish people; in fact, it would not be wrong to claim that the unification of Turkists and Islamists was a familiar consequence. If Ziya Gökalp's perspective on nationalism was taken into account, the similarity would be obvious. It was laicism that separated Turkish nationalism from Islam; and as indicated by Tekeli, that concept was considered as an obstacle consequently it was sacrificed. Eventually, Islam once again took its place on Turkish politics with a struggle at the end of 1960s, and most specifically in 1970s; however, this time *the hostility* was not against supporters of laic republican identity, instead, with a general perspective to left ideology, which was considered as an enemy to religion.

Islamization of politics includes significant examples, such as the case of CKMP. In 1965, Alparslan Türkeş was elected as the chairman of party, and in 1969 on a congress, the name of party was changed into Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - MHP*).²⁷¹ As another change, the party flag was changed into three crescents on a red background, which was an obvious Islamic symbol. However, the most considerable event of that congress was the discourse of Alparslan Türkeş. He used the motto of "We are as Turk as Tian Shan (Tanrı

²⁷⁰ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 249-250.

²⁷¹ "Tarihçe," *MHP*, n.d., <http://www.mhp.org.tr/mhp_tarihce.php> (1 March 2012).

Mountain) and as Muslim as Hira Mountain”²⁷² in order to distinguish the characteristics of MHP.²⁷³

Islamic references of rightwing political parties can be considered as a trend because, after the establishment of MHP as a political party with strong references to Islam, another party was established in 1970. However, this time, it was not pointing out Islam as a reference point; instead, it took Islam on its center, because it was a party that was established by Sufi orders. That was the exact time, when the Sufi orders would rather form a new party totally loyal to their rules than support any existing one, within liberalistic atmosphere of 1961 Constitution,²⁷⁴ hence, on 26 January 1970, National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi - MNP*) was established.

Two important Sufi orders of the time, Nurculuk and Naqshbandi orders played a significant role on the establishment of MNP. There were three important members of the process: Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011) was said to be a member of Naqshbandi order, while two other members, Hüseyin Abbas (1934-2013) and Hüsametdin Akmumcu (1923-2011), who was also the lawyer of Said-i Nursi during his judgment process,²⁷⁵ were said to be members of Nurculuk.²⁷⁶ Within these two Sufi orders, support of Naqshbandi was dominant; for instance, Necmettin Erbakan was said to be appointed by Mehmet Zahid Kotku (1897-1980), a Sheik from Bursa, a member of Naqshbandi order and founder of *İskenderpaşa Cemaati*²⁷⁷, as a representative of order on political scenes, while Esad Coşan (1938-2001), the groom of Kotku family, was appointed as the successor of Mehmet Zahid Kotku as the leader of order. With MNP, political Islam became a legitimate actor of political

²⁷² Tian Shan (Tengri Tagh - Tanrı Mountain: literally God's Mountain) is a large system of mountain located in Central Asia, former Turkish homeland before the immigration to Anatolia. On the other hand, Hira Mountain is located in Mecca, where Prophet Mohammed received his first revelations from God through the angel Gabriel, according to Islamic belief. A significant reference to these two geographic terms was a distinguishment of Turkish origin within an ethnic and religious perspective.

²⁷³ Tamer Balcı, “İslam’ın Millileştirilmesinden Milliyetçiliğin Özelleştirilmesine: İslamiyet ve Türk Milli Kimliği,” *History Studies* 1, no. 1(2009): 101.

²⁷⁴ “Siyasete Damgasını Vuran Tarikat;”

Soner Yalçın, “AKP’nin Asıl Büyük Korkusu Nurcu-Nakşibendi Kavgası,” *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, 1 June 2008, <<http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=9069979>> (1 March 2013).

²⁷⁵ “Hüsametdin Akmumcu Vefat Etti,” *Risale Haber*, 15 April 2011,

<<http://www.risalehaber.com/husametdin-akmumcu-vefat-etti-104662h.htm>> (1 March 2013).

²⁷⁶ Yalçın, “AKP’nin Asıl Büyük Korkusu.”

²⁷⁷ A sub-order of Naqshbandi order led first by Mehmet Zahid Kotku, and then, by other male family members.

scenes and gained a considerable base of voters among Anatolian capital and small entrepreneurs by the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan,²⁷⁸ who would take his Islamist party (not with the same name but with successors of MNP) to the power and become the first *obviously* Islamic supporter Prime Minister within two decades. Economic references were considerable points those should be highlighted, because during 1980s Islamic capital would play an important role on intensification of political Islam, as it will be mentioned.

Tension among political and social orders once again increased due to the struggle between conservative nationalism, even Islamism, and left ideologies, such as socialism *the enemy of religion*. On this atmosphere, left and right ideology struggles took the streets. Additionally, as left ideologies were seen as threats, liberalistic 1961 Constitution was being limited with additional laws.²⁷⁹ As a result of limitations to syndication, protest meetings were started as a chain with the leadership of labor unions in June 1970. The most considerable part of this chain was actualized during 15-16 June, as the incident was named as Events of 15-16 June (*15-16 Haziran Olayları*). Due to the protests, a martial law was declared for 60 days, many labor unions' leaders were arrested, and two laborers, one artisan and a police officer died during the protests.

While all these incidents were happening, the Prime Minister and the chairman of AP Süleyman Demirel intended to maintain relations stable with military as he did during all his prime ministry. For instance, presidency of Cevdet Sunay (1899-1982), who was a former Commander of Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri* – TSK), was said to be supported by AP government in order to keep the relations calm with military.²⁸⁰ As it had been just a decade after the military intervention, which was ended with executions of important members of government, that cautiousness cannot be considered as baseless; although, it should have been unnecessary within a real democratic system. However, this entire endeavor was ended in failure, and on 12 March 1971, another military intervention took place. As different to 1960, a three-article memorandum was presented, the

²⁷⁸ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 248;

Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, 48.

²⁷⁹ Arslan, "Temel Hak ve Özgürlüklerin Sınırlanması," 140.

²⁸⁰ Bulut, "27 Mayıs 1960'dan," 83.

government dissolved itself, and instead of a military-based government, establishment of a new government was asked by military.²⁸¹

1971 Military Intervention possessed different characteristics from 1960; however, Turkish politics faced with similar outcomes. Instead of composing a new constitution, the existing one was revised in 1971 and 1973, and regarding to these revises individuals' rights, freedom of establishing associations and labor unions were limited and government officers were excluded from the right to establish a labor union.²⁸² Martial law was declared in order to maintain social order and security, many leftist intellectuals were arrested, and three socialist university students Deniz Gezmiş (1947-1972), Yusuf Aslan (1947-1972) and Hüseyin İnan (1949-1972) were executed.²⁸³ The execution of these three people was considered as a revenge of 1961 executions of three government members, one prime minister and two ministers; it was "three to three".²⁸⁴ Last of all, two parties were closed: Workers Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi - TKP*) due to its socialist ideology and MNP due to its anti-laic implementations. Both of them were accused of protesting the constitution.²⁸⁵

MNP was closed; however, party members were not banned from politics, which would be a common way on further party. Hence, another party named National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi - MSP*) was formed on 11 October 1972, and as the successor of MNP, support of Sufi orders was granted.²⁸⁶ The ideology of MSP was exactly the same with MNP: right wing, Islamist and possessor of National View (*Milli Görüş*). National View Movement was an ideology based on conservative modernization, as Hakan Yavuz stated, *becoming modern with Islam*.²⁸⁷ Modernization was industrialization, within Erbakan's perspective, that would lead the society to better conditions of living, with one

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² "Bunalımlı Yıllar (1971-1980)," *Anadolu University - Open Education Faculty*, n.d., <<http://w2.anadolu.edu.tr/aos/kitap/IOLTP/1269/unite07.pdf>> (1 March 2013).

²⁸³ "Deniz Gezmiş idamdan sonra 52 dakika yaşadı," *Sabah Daily Newspaper*, 14 May 2012, <<http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2012/05/14/deniz-gezmis-idamdan-sonra-52-dakika-yasadi>> (1 February 2013).

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Bulut, "27 Mayıs 1960'dan," 85.

²⁸⁶ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 137;

Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 64.

²⁸⁷ Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, 49.

specific characteristic: Turco-Islamic values. According to National View, state was responsible of economic and spiritual development of country within a frame of conservative approach. While the family issues were significant components of this conservative approach of National View, religious education was pointed out as an important tool in order to create a loyal Muslim generation.²⁸⁸ Hence, religious education was to become a political tool in upcoming years within the decade.

As mentioned, Islam was the savior of previous decade, and nothing changed during 1970s. Besides, it became an ideology named as Turkish Islamic Synthesis (*Türk İslam Sentezi*), consisting both Turkish nationalism and Islam as its basic components. The synthesis was a *political-philosophical idea*²⁸⁹, and it was developed by a group of conservative intellectuals during the 1970s within an organization known as Hearts of Intellectuals (*Aydınlar Ocağı*). The Hearts of Intellectuals were established on 14 May 1970 and formed as a think-tank center by conservative nationalist academics, politicians and businessmen. During the 1970s it became a political movement, which was composed by, so-called, *similarities* between Islam and pre-Islamic Turkish culture, herewith Turks were to become linked with Islam as a natural fact,²⁹⁰ in order to unify all rightwing political parties of the time (AP, MHP, and MSP).²⁹¹

Ideology that the Hearts of Intellectuals developed was a synthesis of Kemalist elements, such as Kemalist perspective of laicism and nationalism, and Islam. Hence, according to the intellectuals of the said Hearts, M.K. Atatürk was the most progressive nationalist of the Turkish political landscape, with his commitment to ideas, which were the basis of this newborn ideology.²⁹² However, Islam

²⁸⁸ Ibid., 49-50.

²⁸⁹ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 65.

²⁹⁰ Erik-Jan Zürcher, "Importance of Being Secular: Islam in the Service of the National and Pre-National State," in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem, and Philip Robins (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 64.

²⁹¹ Ümit Kurt, "The Doctrine of "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" as Official Ideology of the September 12 and the "Intellectuals' Hearth –Aydınlar Ocağı" as the Ideological Apparatus of the State," *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies* 3, no.2, (2010): 113.

²⁹² Ibid., 116.

possessed a specific role, and the ideology aimed to create a Sunni-Muslim identity accompanied by strong Turkish nationalism within this proper interpretation.²⁹³

With the elections of 1973, MSP entered to the Assembly with 48 members and more importantly, it became the shareholder of power with CHP-MSP coalition government.²⁹⁴ Turkish Islamic Synthesis was to become more important during 1980s, and it would be non-official state policy after the military intervention; nevertheless, according to Kongar, said coalition government was the institutionalization of Turkish Islamic Synthesis on rightwing politics even before 1980s.²⁹⁵ This argument of Kongar's has been affirmed many times, and the success of MNP has been considered the initial of political Islam on power.²⁹⁶ CHP-MSP coalition government was the first important event on the (unofficial) Islamization of state-policy; although, the coalition government was dissolved after a little while of its establishment, on 17 November 1974.²⁹⁷

The dissolution of CHP-MSP coalition caused government crisis, which lasted until the September 1980. The politics was dominated by right-wing parties year by year, and CHP was not considered as sufficient for left ideologies. Hence, the crisis and anarchy, as a result of conflicts between leftists and rightists, were deepened.²⁹⁸ In order to decrease the hostility between leftists and rightists, in other words Marxists/socialists and Islamists/nationalists, religious education was pointed out. Therefore, Imam-Hatip schools were distinguished as a tool to *shape* the youth with Islamic sensitivity, as it was mentioned regarding the Turkish Islamic Synthesis. Therefore, as an antagonist tool to socialist *threat*, Islamic education was promoted, and the existing number of Imam-Hatip schools was augmented from 108 to 341 by opening 233 during 3 years between 1975-1978.²⁹⁹ However, as contrary to the

²⁹³ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 65.

²⁹⁴ Kerem Çalışkan, "Bugün AKP'nin Kuruluş Yıldönümü," *Oda TV*, 12 March 2013, <<http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=bugun-akpnin-kurulus-yildonumu-1203131200>> (12 March 2013).

²⁹⁵ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 249-250.

²⁹⁶ Çalışkan, "Bugün AKP'nin Kuruluş Yıldönümü."

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁸ Bulut, "27 Mayıs 1960'dan," 84.

²⁹⁹ Bülent Serim, "Hangi Hükümet Döneminde Kaç Tane İmam Hatip Açıldı," *Oda TV*, 3 January 2013, <<http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=hangi-hukumet-doneminde-kac-tane-acildi-0301131200>> (1 March 2013). This number was to be augmented in direct proportion to increasing visibility of conservatism among political and social orders in upcoming decades.

promotion of religious education, increase of anarchy and social crisis could not be precluded; so that, atmosphere of chaos dominated the social order.

With the help of a study that was carried out by Banu Eligür, results of the conflicts as consequent of increased anarchy and crisis can be listed with numbers: Between the years of 1975-1980, more than 5000 people died, and almost 15000 people were wounded. Violation was intensified by radical groups with assassinations, bank robberies, kidnappings and bombings between 1978-1980. By the summer of 1980, number of political murders was an average of 20 per day. That was a brief overview for the results of conflicts with the lack of public security due to the lost control of security forces.³⁰⁰ The sides of these brutal conflicts were listed as many different leftist groups on one side and idealist youth (*ülküçü gençlik*), who were linked with MHP unofficially,³⁰¹ and MSP's Raiders Organization (*Akıncılar Teşkilatı*), who were said to be out of armed conflicts,³⁰² were on other side as the representatives of rightist groups, and the hostility was spread with the mottos of "Fascism is here!" to provoke leftist groups and "Communism is here!" to provoke rightist ones. Within this period, there is one important thing that should be highlighted. As the sensitivity of Islam was increased, Alevis, who were left-wing politics supporters and were considered as "less-believers", or worse, "unbelievers" by conservative Sunnis, became the targets of rightist groups' attacks. Between 1978-1980, three massacres (on 18 April 1978 Malatya Massacre, on 24 December 1978 Maraş Massacre and on 29 May 1980 Çorum Massacre) targeted Alevi populated towns and caused mass murders of hundreds of people.³⁰³ These issues will be discussed with detail in upcoming chapter; however, in order to understand the tension and hatred, these unfortunate but considerable examples should be referred.

On the way to 12 September Military Intervention, conservatism reached to a level that an Islamic state was mentioned as the will of some rightist groups. On 6 September 1980, a meeting was held by MSP in Konya in order to protest the

³⁰⁰ Banu Eligür, *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 87.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ "Unutmak İhanettir," *Pir Sultan Abdal Kürtlür Derneği*, n.d., <http://www.psakd.org/alevi_katliamlar.html> (1 February 2013).

decision of Israel regarding its official declaration of its capital, Jerusalem.³⁰⁴ During the day, National Anthem of Republic of Turkey was protested, slogans were shouted like “We want Sharia back!” with Islamic costumes, such as green robes and turbans.³⁰⁵ That was a yearning to an Islamic state,³⁰⁶ which was considered as the “straw that broke the camel's back”³⁰⁷ by military and would cause the closure of MSP after the military intervention.

Unstable period of political order, which led to social chaos, ended with another military intervention on 12 September 1980.³⁰⁸ As a result of this stroke to democracy, all political parties were closed, and the state was governed by military with National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu - MGK*) for three years.

During three years under military control, many lawsuits were carried out, and many people were sentenced due to their political activities. For instance, 650 thousand people were in custody; 1 million 683 thousands were *labeled* with regards to their political ideology; 517 were sentenced to death, and 50 were executed; 30 thousands people were dismissed from their jobs because of being *inconvenient* due to their political stands; 300 were death suspiciously; 117 were death by torture; 30 thousands emigrated as political refugee; 937 films were banned because of being *inconvenient*; 3854 teachers, 120 academicians, and 47 judges were discharged; 400 journalists were sentenced to 4000 years totally; newspapers could not be printed freely for 300 days and 39 ton newspapers and journals were destroyed due to their political stands.³⁰⁹ 12 September and military in power have been criticized strongly by being entirely against to left ideology based on Marxist, socialist approaches and by allowance existence and empowerment of right ideology.³¹⁰ According to the bill of indictment of 12 September military intervention, explanation of democracy can

³⁰⁴ Ömer Aymalı, “12 Eylül Askeri Darbesine Giden Süreçte Neler Yaşandı ?,” *Dünya Bülteni*, 12 September 2012, <<http://www.dunyabulteni.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=204563>> (1 February 2013).

³⁰⁵ Yavuz Donat, “Al Sana Derin Devlet,” *Sabah Daily Newspaper*, 11 February 2007, <<http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/02/11/donat.html>> (16 March 2012).

³⁰⁶ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 252.

³⁰⁷ Aymalı, “12 Eylül Askeri Darbesine.”

³⁰⁸ Pınar Kaya Özçelik, “Understanding of 12 September (12 Eylül’ü Anlamak),” *University of Ankara SBF Dergisi* 66, no.1, (2011): 74.

³⁰⁹ “12 Eylül İddianamesi Baştan Aşağı Antikomünizm Kokuyor,” *Sol Portal*, 12 January 2012, <<http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/12-eylul-iddianamesi-bastan-asagi-antikomunizm-kokuyor-haberi-50404>> (12 January 2012).

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*

be pointed out as the proof of said argument. On fourth part of Section two, pluralist democracy was defined as:

“(…) Pluralist democracy was a tool that aimed to achieve ideal freedom with freedom. Within this approach, freedom is both a tool and an achievement. However, freedom is not an achievement, instead it is just a tool, according to Marxist democracy. The path ended with that achievement is not freedom but just dictatorship of proletariat.”³¹¹

That definition has been the proof that the military intervention intended to eliminate leftist movements,³¹² instead, nationalist rightist movement was possessed and promoted by the military. As Kramer argued, it was an equivalent of Turkish Islamic Synthesis, which was to become an unofficial basis of new Turkish politics of 1980s with new implementations.³¹³

A new ideological approach was developed including Islamic perspective, and with respect to that approach, MGK in power carried out some implementations in order to spread religious morality with the help of educational system and DİB. A new constitution was composed by a committee instead of the libertarian 1961 Constitution, and it was accepted by a referendum on 18 October 1982. 1982 Constitution, which is the actual Constitution of Republic of Turkey, has been the tool that MGK applied Islamic interpretations with. According to the Article 136, DİB was pointed out as responsible of *national solidarity and integration*.³¹⁴ With respect to same article, it was considered as a non-political, neutral power to all ideologies; however, the religious identity has played a significant role, which is still an issue on the agenda of Turkey. Additionally, according to Article 24, religious education became obligatory in primary and secondary schools;³¹⁵ in order to protect new generations from any threat both might come from Marxist, socialist ideologies and baseless religious dogmas.³¹⁶ On the other hand, the graduates of Imam-Hatip

³¹¹ “12 Eylül İddianamesi,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, n.d., <www.radikal.com.tr/files/12eyluliddianame.doc> (12 March 2013).

³¹² Eligür, *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey*, 24.

³¹³ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 65.

³¹⁴ “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası,” *Türk Anayasa Hukuku Sitesi*, n.d., <<http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982ay.htm>> (17 March 2012).

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*

³¹⁶ Özçelik, “Understanding of 12 September,” 88.

schools, who were specially educated to be Islamic religious staff, were allowed to enter any faculties with a change on Article 32 of Education Law.³¹⁷ This allowance would let Imam-Hatip schools to be exact alternates of regular schools. With all these implementations, MGK aimed to *shape* new generations within *correct* religious morality, which would *protect* them from any provocation of neither leftist nor rightist movement. There is one thing that should be clarified on that point: The aim of MGK was not put political Islam on the center of Turkish politics; instead, it aimed to depoliticize new generations with the help of religion. Because, within the perspective of MGK, the implementations were put in force in order to protect laic structure of Turkey with respect to Kemalism; however, in a decade it would turned into Islamization of laicism, which will be described in upcoming parts.

In 1983, MGK handed the power over political parties after an election, which was a return to democratic structure; however, there were only three political parties *allowed* to elections: Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi - ANAP*)³¹⁸, People's Party (*Halkçı Parti - HP*)³¹⁹ and Nationalist Democracy Party (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi - MDP*)³²⁰. The elections ended with success of ANAP, and its leader of Turgut Özal (1927-1993) became the first Prime Minister after the return to democracy.³²¹

Apart from mentioned three political parties, there were two new political parties more, True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi - DYP*) and Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi - RP*), which were not allowed to enter to elections due to administrative problems. In fact, Turkish politics was not unfamiliar to these two parties, because they were successors of banned political parties. DYP was the successor of DP of Menderes and its successor AP of Demirel, and RP was the successor of MNP and MSP of Erbakan. These two parties could not be active members of Turkish politics

³¹⁷ “İmam-Hatiplerin Tarihi,” *Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı*, n.d., <http://mebk12.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/56/03/714563/icerikler/ihl-tarihcesi_285187.html> (1 March 2012).

³¹⁸ Conservative political party, which was also a supporter of liberal economy. ANAP would be a considerable actor of Turkish politics.

³¹⁹ It was a continuation of CHP, which was closed after 1980 military intervention.

³²⁰ It was the supporter of 1980 military intervention, it is to say political reflection of MGK.

³²¹ “1983 Genel Seçim Sonuçları,” *Seçim Anketi TV*, n.d., <<http://secimanketi.tv/sonuclar/1983-yili-genel-secim-sonuclari>> (1 March 2012).

until 1987, the following elections; however, both would play significant roles during 1990s and would lead a coalition as two shareholders of it.

3.2.3. 1990s in Turkey with Its Complexity

The Islamic atmosphere among public sphere was a reality since the 1950s, and it would not be wrong if one claims that it gained its utmost rise during 1980s with military intervention, Motherland Party and its leader Özal. By some scholars, Özal was the responsible person of this rise with his implementations;³²² on the other hand, as another perception, he was said to have no intentions to undermine the laic structure of the state; but, his *laissez-faire* approach both in political and economic orders caused significant Islamic revival.³²³ As a result, 1990s started with tension and accordingly separation among society, and that tension had not fallen since then.

Sociological circumstances were as mentioned above; additionally, complexity of the decade was not limited with society; instead, the politics was also in an unstable process. During the decade, the government was changed eight times, and TBMM hosted the 49th Government at the beginning of decade and entered to 21st century with 57th Government. Due to the purpose of this thesis, all governments will not be examined one by one; instead, the Islamic implementations, gestures of the political leaders, sociological atmosphere and military on the scenes will be focused in order to clarify the background of the actual situation of country.

As mentioned with details, Sufi orders, such as Nurcu and Naqshbandi movements, were active actors of Turkish politics since 1950s, and that did not changed during 1990s. When Özal became the eighth President of Republic in 1989, the leadership of ANAP was possessed by Yıldırım Akbulut (1935-...) first, then Mesut Yılmaz (1947-...), and none of them was supported by Naqshbandi leaders as considerable as Özal due to their laic approach against Islamic wing of the party.³²⁴ That caused a lack of power for ANAP. As argued by Kramer, withdrawal of

³²² Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 255;

Uğur Mumcu, *Rabıta* (Ankara: um:ag Vakfı Yayınları: 1996), 138.

³²³ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 66.

³²⁴ İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey," *Government and Opposition* 18, no.4 (1983): 432.

Naqshbandi support to ANAP brought about the rise of RP of Erbakan, which was the successor of MSP.³²⁵

In 1991, with the General Elections, RP entered to TBMM with 62 MPs. As it will be mentioned in upcoming paragraphs, it raised its representation ratio in TBMM, and became the first party of following election in 1995. A year before the general elections, RP gained important municipalities with significant support of conservative part of society. The events and implementations of RP municipalities will be discussed within the perspective of political Islam.

Existence of RP in TBMM after the 1991 General Elections was a result of increased conservatism among society; however, it will not be wrong if one claims that its real *victory* was the Local Elections of 1994, in which it gained 329 municipalities with 19.07 vote percentage and most significantly six of the 15 metropolitan municipalities with 22.4% of votes. A general view of the said elections can be seen below.




Chart III: 1994 Local Elections

Source: “İllere Göre Belediyeleri Kazanan Partiler,” *Yerel Seçim*, n.d.
<http://www.yerelsecim.com/YerelSecimSonuclari.asp?SY=1994> (25 December 2012).

³²⁵ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 64.

The Elections resulted with the highest percentages of votes in favor with ANAP, RP and DYP, in other words with rightwing parties. When the results regarding gained metropolitan municipalities by each party are examined, success of rightwing politics will be more visible.




Chart IV: 1994 Local Elections – Gained Municipalities by Each Party

Source: “İllere Göre Belediyeleri Kazanan Partiler,” *Yerel Seçim*, n.d.
<http://www.yerelsecim.com/YerelSecimSonuclari.asp?SY=1994> (25 December 2012).

As demonstrated in Chart IV, In 1994 Local Elections, ANAP gained three coastal metropolitan municipalities (Bursa, Adana and Mersin), and DYP gained three metropolitan municipalities (İzmir, Eskişehir and Antalya), which have been important for the leftwing politics of Turkey. The number of gained metropolitan municipalities by RP included two important metropolitans: İstanbul with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (1954 - ...), the current Prime Minister and the chairman of AKP and Ankara with İbrahim Melih Gökçek (1948 - ...), who is still in the same duty from AKP. That inclusion of two biggest municipalities, obviously, depened the victory of the Party. The mentioned *victory* of RP and the political fact of augmentation of conservatism with general success of rightwing parties caused the mobilization of supporters of laic republican identity. For instance, according to that mobilization, M.K. Atatürk became a *visible* symbol, which was used in order to demonstrate oneself as the *guardian* of the laic regime, and Atatürk pins, mugs, key chains became very popular.³²⁶ Atatürk pins took their places on coats, jackets,

³²⁶ Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 20;

Esra Özyürek, *Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey: Politics, History, and Culture* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 1-2.

shirts, sweaters, suits, in other words, on most visible parts of everyday dressing. The mugs were on duty as the representatives of office staff. Briefly, supporters of laicism felt the necessity to demonstrate themselves against conservatives and government established by their representatives of political Islam, and this social mobilization was an *autonomous movement*³²⁷ of the civil society.

Islamism was in agenda of Turkey since the DP; however, the ideology spread by RP was seen as a hostile, an antagonist approach to Westernized laic identity of the Republic of Turkey, due to its accusations of undermining the real characteristics of Turkishness against the laic structure of the state. According to Erbakan and the ideology his party, Islam was exclusively for Turkish people not only with its religious but also cultural characteristics originated from Ottoman past. Hence, Islamic Ottoman identity was promoted as the basic national culture that was swept away by Western style laic implementations. Furthermore, as a concrete reason of hostility between supporters of laic republican identity and RP supporters, accusations were made for the time of M.K. Atatürk by Erbakan with claiming that the laic regime caused the ban of worship in mosques, the ban of veil (*peçe*) and execution of theologians of Islam.³²⁸ Accordingly, the Islamist movement of 1990s led by RP developed an alternative national identity that was defined within the frame of Islamic Ottoman civilization,³²⁹ in which Islam was the basic component that unified people, the Islamic community (*ümmet*). He mentioned his and his party's *mission* within a speech he made in Sivas in 1994. He said:

“One cannot be a believer without dedicating oneself to jihad (*cihat*). The first obligation (*farz*) is to find a leader, to obey him and to create the army. RP is the army of Islamic Jihad (*İslam-i Cihat Ordusu*). We all will be the soldiers of this army. The one who dedicates oneself is in a better and higher level than all Muslim world and sheiks. Even, if you see that leader sins directly, you will obey his orders. For instance, you see him drinking alcohol. Then he ordered you while he is sober. You should obey. Everyone will obey and follow the representative of RP of his/her city. It is not possible to be a Muslim without financing the jihad. The level of being Muslim is measured with the money given. A Muslim does not give his zekat

³²⁷ Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 20.

³²⁸ Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, *Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2007), 234.

³²⁹ Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 30.

to a poor needy. He will give his zekat to the treasure (*beyt-ül mal*), to the army of jihad. If you do not serve to RP, none of your worship will be accepted on God's level. If you support other political parties, you will be responsible of the people who fail. We all will obey and follow RP. The one who does not support RP is a member of religion of potato."³³⁰

That was a clear proof of Islamist discourse of RP and Erbakan. Additionally, that was a discourse that separated Muslims between supporters of RP, who were the real Muslims according to him, and the ones, who support other political parties.

When RP representatives were elected as mayors to municipalities, the ideology of the party was localized; accordingly, many national and international conferences, workshops, and panels were organized in order to spread this alternative national identity with a new historical memory.³³¹ As a result of official promotion of the said ideology, İstanbul became a part of the process with its Islamic Ottoman culture, as contrary to laic structure of Ankara. In a magazine article, İstanbul was said to be established regarding the Western cultural institutions in order to construct a European city, and republican regime was *accused* of being the architecture of it.³³²

İstanbul is believed to be compromised to the Muslim world, by a hadith of Prophet Muhammad. What is believed in Islam is that the conquest of İstanbul in 1453 was announced by Prophet Muhammad in his lifetime with this saying; "Certainly, Constantinople (İstanbul) will be conquered. Blessed is the commander who will conquer it, and blessed are his troops."³³³ That's why, Mehmet II (The Conqueror) of the Ottoman Empire was considered as a blessed commander due to his success to take the city from Christians (Byzantine Empire) and to include it to the Muslim world. In addition to that, İstanbul had been the capital of the Empire for

³³⁰ "Emire itaat edeceksin" *Günaydın*, 16 March 1994, quoted by Mustafa Taşar, "Refah Partisi Gerçeği," *Personal Website*, n.d.,

<<http://www.mustafatasar.gen.tr/yayinlar/refahgercegi/belgeler.htm>> (28 February 2013).

³³¹ Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, 62-63.

³³² Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 163.

³³³ "What Are The Reasons?," *Understanding and Respect*, 14 June 2006,

<<http://en.fgulen.com/questions-and-answers/2109-what-are-the-reasons-for-the-fact-that-islam-spread-over-such-vast-territories-in-such-a-short-time-in-the-past-what-are-the-reasons-for-the-muslims-defeat-and-failure-at-the-present-time>> (14 March 2011).

five centuries with the Caliphate for four centuries; accordingly, the city was built with considerable Islamic influence. Due to all that historical background, Istanbul has been an important city of Islamic culture. As it was mentioned, that was one of the reasons why the capital was shifted to Ankara, a small town of Anatolia, which was planned to be built with respect to a laic state structure without any religious influence. Within this perspective, the promotion of İstanbul by RP should be seen as a result of construction of an alternative ideology, which was based on Islam, as contrary. Within this frame, the conquest day of Istanbul, 29 May, started to be an unofficial commemoration day; furthermore, this commemoration day was published as “re-conquest” of İstanbul by Islamist press. For instance, *Akit*, a daily newspaper (which was known with its Islamic articles) mentioned the event with these sentences;

“This Muslim community (*ummet*), which is brought together by an iron will and the unity of Allah (*tekbir*), will understand the real meaning of conquest and make İstanbul once again the capital city of Islam, as it was before.”³³⁴

In fact, usage of “re-conquest” belonged not only to press, but also to Erbakan. He mentioned the importance of the day on 29 May 1996 with these sentences: “We are on the eve of a new conquest, which merges with the incident that took place 543 years ago... As the Islamic world, we will accomplish this with the help of Allah.”³³⁵ The aim of this usage was to distinguish the importance of the conquest and İstanbul for the Muslim world. In the same year, religious importance of İstanbul was highlighted by a different author. A special newspaper of an international conference named HABİTAT II, a columnist claimed that the characteristics of İstanbul were “spread out from mosques and minarets, from the domes and from the tombs of its saints (*evliya*)” Within this interpretation, “İstanbul is primarily an Islamic city” as it was mentioned by the same columnist.³³⁶

The local governments under the power of RP opened many public parks, restaurants and public places; however, there was one common characteristic of

³³⁴ Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 159.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*

³³⁶ Mustafa Kutlu, the spirit of a city, *Habitat Days*, 31 March 1996, 4, quoted in Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 121.

these places: Sale of alcoholic beverages was banned.³³⁷ The conservative and Islamic ideology of the mayors was spread with the public services of municipalities. For instance, in İstanbul during the time of Erdoğan, alcoholic beverages were banned in all restaurants those belong to the municipality, any advertisement consisting a photo of a woman with swim-suit was banned to be published on billboards of the municipality, and the municipality refectories and cafeterias were closed during the month of Ramadan.³³⁸ These are the most significant examples of the time, and can be multiplied, as it will be in upcoming paragraphs.

In June 1996, a coalition government was formed by RP and DYP (known as REFAH-YOL), while Erbakan became the Prime Minister; Tansu Çiller (the chairwoman of DYP) became deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in this government. The duty that Erbakan possessed was not welcomed by supporters of laicism due to the hostility with the party; additionally, this political event was discussed among international media by Western allies.³³⁹ Political Islam had been on the agenda of Turkish politics since 1950s; however that was the first time that a party with its obvious Islamist discourses was in power and had its leader as Prime Minister. Within the form of REFAH-YOL government, Erbakan and Çiller *shared* the relations with international allies; hence, within the policy that they developed Çiller was responsible for the relations with Europe and Western countries, and Erbakan was in charge of the relations with Eastern countries; that is to say, he was in charge of a more Islamist foreign policy. His visits to Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and Iran were criticized within this frame. On the other hand, these visits were seen as a proof of RP's difference from previous parties in power within the perspective of foreign policy initiatives.³⁴⁰

On domestic issues, implementations of the party were still on the agenda as a reason of hostility with supporters of laicism. The Islamic Ottoman identity was in promotion; for instance, in addition to the list above, encouragement of the

³³⁷ Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, 62-63.

³³⁸ Göksel Özköylü, "Kasımpaşalı Tayyip, Nasıl Tayyip Erdoğan Oldu," *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, n.d., <<http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/tayyiperdogan/tayyip.asp>> (1 January 2013).

³³⁹ Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan," *Survival* 29, no.2 (1997): 82.

³⁴⁰ Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, 64.

headscarf, the ongoing relations with Sufi orders,³⁴¹ the promotion of Sufi leaders such as Said-i Nursi with his series of book, *Risale-i Nur*, by Ministry of Culture,³⁴² a special invitation to the Sufi leaders for a Ramadan dinner by Erbakan in Prime Minister's official residence,³⁴³ proposal about preventing Turkish Civil Aviation Foundation (*Türk Hava Kurumu*) from collecting and selling the hides of sacrificial sheep (that is one of the most significant part of the budget of said foundation) and to give the right to the religious foundations, the proposal about changing the working hours during the month of Ramadan,³⁴⁴ and the rising number of Imam-Hatip schools³⁴⁵ (whose graduates were considered as "natural allies" and "base of voters" of RP)³⁴⁶ were the issues those were being discussed.

Islamic Ottoman identity was being promoted by municipalities on individual level. For instance, during the third Traditional Youth Festival, the Mayor of İstanbul, Erdoğan, talked to youth about the Turkish nation with these sentences:

"As the grandchildren of a nation that has always been at the forefront in the quest for civilization, you have to put an end to mimicry. If Turkey is to reach the height of contemporary civilizations, it can only do so with its own civilization. The youth has to return to its true roots. The poet, who wrote our National Anthem, Mehmet Akif Ersoy, did not write his poem in a disco or when he was drunk. He wrote it in Tacettin Dergahı (a dervish lodge), where he disciplined his soul."³⁴⁷

The root mentioned here was the Ottoman Empire with its Islamic culture, and in order to find their own identity, the Turkish youth should take the Ottoman era as the source of civilization and national identity.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Kışlalı, *Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi*, 127.

³⁴³ "Ölüm Tarihindeki İlginç Tesadüf," *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 27 February 2011, <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/olum-tarihindeki-ilgincesaduf/siyaset/sondakika/27.02.2011/1357748/133634>> (7 March 2011).

³⁴⁴ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 72-73.

³⁴⁵ Serim, "Hangi Hükümet Döneminde."

³⁴⁶ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 272.

³⁴⁷ Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 160.

There was significant endeavor about visual changes of cities.³⁴⁸ As it was mentioned, Ankara was selected as the capital in order to construct it due to requirements of a laic and modern state without any religious impact; hence, Ulus Square, where the first Assembly building is, and Çankaya district were urbanized within planned structure. Other city centers were arranged within the same requirements, as well. For instance in İstanbul, the Taksim Square has its own characteristics with its Monument of the Republic (*Cumhuriyet Anıtı*), which was inaugurated in 1928 as a symbol of the newborn republic. The election of Taksim Square in İstanbul to put the Monument should be seen symbolic; because, the square is located in one of the hills of city, where it is not possible to see any minarets of the great mosques of Ottoman capital. With this characteristic of Taksim Square, it will not be wrong to claim that it has been the *republican face* of the city. The municipalities of İstanbul and Ankara, both were governed by RP, offered to build mosques in Taksim Square and Çankaya district, and these proposals were criticized for being political more than a religious necessity.³⁴⁹ The discourse of Erbakan about the mosque project, which was “We will complete the conquest of Istanbul with building a mosque in Taksim.”,³⁵⁰ showed the political background of the project, and spread fear among supporters of laicism.

The blurred situation of country got worse and became more complicated by an accident on 3 November 1996, known as *Susurluk Scandal*. The accident became one of the most important debate of the decade, because the involvement of state, politics and mafia on the accident was an issue that could not be solved. It was a traffic accident in Susurluk near a western city, Balıkesir, in which Abdullah Çatlı, a former ultra-rightist militant wanted by police for multiple murders and drug trafficking; Hüseyin Kocadağ, a senior police official; and a beauty queen were killed and Sedat Bucak, a parliamentary deputy from DYP was injured, creates

³⁴⁸ Ibid., 99-138.

³⁴⁹ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 276;

Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 72-73;

Engin Balm, “Meğer Taksim’e Cami Tartışmasını İlk Demirel Başlatmış, Özal Devam Ettirmiş, Erdoğan Seçim Bildirgesine Koymuş!,” *Halkın Habercisi*, 1 December 2012, <<http://www.halkinhabercisi.com/taksime-cami-su-faturasinda-3-cocuga-25-4-cocuga-50-5-ve-uzerine-beles>>, (2 February 2013);

“Taksim'e Cami Yerine Cumhuriyet Müzesi,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 23 August 2007, <<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=230764>> (2 February 2013).

³⁵⁰ Hasan Pulur, “Sürekli Aydınlık İçin 1 Dakika Karanlık,” *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 1 February 1997, <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/01/yazar/pulur.html>> (2 February 2013).

political uproar and charges that this incident highlights the illegal relationship between state officials and the mobsters.³⁵¹ The accident caused a considerable public reaction, because the Prime Minister Erbakan referred the accident as “nonsense”,³⁵² and accident reports were considered as suspicious by the public due to the bloody past of the decade full of unsolved murders. Hence, with the leadership of a lawyer named Ergin Cinmen³⁵³ and a public initiative named *Aydınlık İçin Yurttaş Girişimi*,³⁵⁴ a public action called “One Minute of Darkness for Permanent Light” (*Sürekli Aydınlık İçin Bir Dakika Karanlık*) started on 1 February 1997. According to the action, at 21:00 o’clock everyday all the lights would be turned off in order to attract the attention of the REFAH-YOL government for corruption and lawlessness, and the action was planned to be continued until the end of February.³⁵⁵

Agenda of the month of November 1996 was not just busy just with Susurluk Scandal; instead, in addition to it, the mayor of Kayseri, an Anatolian metropolitan municipality governed by RP, publicly announced his discontentedness in participating to the Commemoration Day of M.K. Atatürk’s Death,³⁵⁶ on 10 November 1996 that has been commemorated with public ceremonies all over the country. The mayor also made a speech on the same day in Provincial Council Meeting of RP, in which he mentioned;

“Do not count me as a laic just because of my fancy appearance. I participated a ceremony due to my official duty. Perhaps, the Prime Minister, ministers and members of parliament have some obligations. However, you do not have any obligations. Even if I will be the only one as member of RP in the world, this

³⁵¹ “Domestic Review: Accident in Susurluk Reveals Links Between Politicians, Police and Mobster,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, 12 February 1996, <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/domestic-review-accident-in-susurluk-reveals-links-between-politicians-police-and-mobster.aspx?pageID=438&n=domestic-review-accident-in-susurluk-reveals-links-between-politicians-police-and-mobster-1996-12-02>> (4 March 2012).

³⁵² İlker Akgüngör, “28 Şubat’a Nasıl Gelindi?,” *Vatan Daily Newspaper*, 12 April 2012, <<http://haber.gazetevatan.com/28-subata-nasil-gelindi/443179/1/Haber>> (2 February 2013).

³⁵³ Faruk Bildirici, “MİT Olayında Ne Olup Bittiğini Beş Yıl Sonra Öğreneceğiz,” *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, 1 April 2012, <<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/pazar/20248782.asp>> (1 April 2012).

³⁵⁴ Zeynep Çetinkaya, “İşğımızı Çaldırmayız,” *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 25 September 1997, p. 15. Please see the Appendix VIII on page 299.

³⁵⁵ Pulur, “Sürekli Aydınlık İçin.”

³⁵⁶ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 73.

persecution order has to be changed. You, the Muslims! Do not skimp the ambition, the grudge, the hatred and the belief. This is our duty.”³⁵⁷

Obviously, that was another issue for the supporters of laic republican identity and caused rise of tension among country between two poles of the state. As another action, on 31 January 1997, RP member mayor of Sincan (a town of Ankara), Bekir Yıldız, had invited the Iranian ambassador to Turkey, Mohammad Reza Bagheri, and organized a commemorative ceremony for the Palestinian intifada, known as Jerusalem Night (*Kudüs Gecesi*), in which the policies of Israel were criticized,³⁵⁸ the yearning of an Islamic state was mentioned,³⁵⁹ and a play about intifada was presented with posters of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders.³⁶⁰ The ceremony was criticized strongly and caused reaction among supporters of laicism; hence, it was protested afterwards by a crowd leaded by CHP in Sincan,³⁶¹ where the Jerusalem Night took place. As aforementioned, as the symbol of decade, M.K. Atatürk pins were given with Turkish flags to the protestors like a visible proof of the values that they defended.³⁶² As a result of protests, the mayor was investigated, and he was imprisoned, and the Iranian ambassador was called to be protested by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.³⁶³

Before shifting the theme into the political outcome of aforementioned process, there is one more thing that should be distinguished: the other side of RP-Islamic-based politics. As it was mentioned, the politics of RP was criticized for undermining laic structure of the republic; hence, the Islam-based-politics was considered as a threat that should be resolved. However, conservatives accepted and welcomed the said politics of RP as a guarantee of their religious freedom. In fact, the subject of religious freedom had always been an argument that RP used:

³⁵⁷ Akgüngör, “28 Şubat’a Nasıl Gelindi?.”

(Author’s translation)

³⁵⁸ Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, 64.

³⁵⁹ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 276.

³⁶⁰ Durmuş Sevindik, “Kudüs Gecesi İtirafı,” *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 1 March 2011, <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/kudus-gecesi-itirafi/guncel/haberdetay/02.03.2011/1358822/default.htm>> (16 May 2012).

³⁶¹ “Sincan’da Gergin Miting,” *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 4 February 1997, <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/02/04/siyaset/sincan.html>> (3 March 2011).

³⁶² *Ibid.*

³⁶³ *Ibid.*;

Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 73.

“religious freedom for everyone”.³⁶⁴ However, the *religious freedom* issue was a theme that should be discussed for this decade, when well known academicians and journalists, who supported the laic structure of state, were killed; a hotel was put into the fire just because Alevis, who are considered as “less” believers than Sunni majority, or worse “non-believers”, were in a meeting; and the municipalities established alcohol-free places and restaurants in order to make them *more family-friendly and Islamic*,³⁶⁵ which was a way to *otherize* the people, who drink alcoholic beverages. Therefore, the society was tensed by the political structure. Besides, the intentions to Islamize the social structure apart from the political one by supporting new dress-codes and Islamic structure of family issues caused suspicion about RP’s ideology based on *religious freedom*; even further, said issues supported the fear of “political Islam”.

The Jerusalem Night caused a problem in political arena with its outcome, which is not limited with the aforementioned information. The separation of society was considerably visible; however, the most significant part was the *supporters* of two parts of society: while the conservative part was supported by the government of REFAH-YOL, supporters of laicism were supported by the military. That support did not occurred as a result of collaboration; instead, it was a natural occurrence due to the historical self-duty possession of military. Before 1980s, the last two decades were witnessed three military interventions with the *reason* or *excuse* (the usage of these two terms totally depends on one’s perspective) of protecting the state from reactionary Islamic movements (*irtica*). Within this perspective, implementations of RP were considered as a proof of reactionary movements, which should be *stopped*. Therefore, the military with power of popular support became an actor of Turkish politics of 1990s, as well, and the Jerusalem Night had been the most significant event of the process. Even though, the process has been called as “February 28”, it was a long process of entire month of February or even before, on January during the meeting of ranking officers of Turkish Naval Forces, in Gölcük/Kocaeli, a western city where is one of the naval bases.³⁶⁶ During the Gölcük meeting,

³⁶⁴ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 276.

³⁶⁵ Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, 63.

³⁶⁶ Bayram Kaya, “28 Şubat’ın Planlandığı Gölcük’teki Harp Oyununa Karadayı da Katılmış,” *Zaman Daily Newspaper*, 28 January 2013, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_28-subatin-planlandigi-golcukteki-harp-oyununa-karadayi-da-katilimis_2046146.html> (28 January 2013);

reactionary movements were discussed and eventually a general comment was made: “Reactionary movement is in power!”³⁶⁷

After the Gölcük Meeting, the tension raised to its highest level with Jerusalem Night; hence, on 4 February 1997, the tanks were sent to Sincan, where the Jerusalem Night took place, and they rolled through the streets of Ankara in order to challenge the government led by Erbakan.³⁶⁸ Although, TSK announced that the event was a previously organized periodical training,³⁶⁹ it has become the symbol of February 28, which was considered as a “post-modern” military intervention. During the month of February, the tension never decreased; instead, it was raised with public protests, such as “Women Protests Against the Sharia” (*Şeriata Karşı Kadın Yürüyüşü*) on 11 February, or with hostile discourses against the other side of the process, such as the speech of Admiral of the Fleet of Turkish Naval Forces Güven Erkaya regarding the danger of reactionary movement. Additionally, the tension increased with the comment of the Minister of Justice, Şevket Kazan, who was a member of RP and a lawyer worked as a defense lawyer of Sivas Massacre suspects, regarding the “One Minute of Darkness for Permanent Light”. He commented the action as;

“The opposition is keeping itself busy with childish actions. They think they can clean up the country by turning off their electric switches. They play “candles off”³⁷⁰ by turning the lights off. Do Alevis turn candles off?”³⁷¹

Şeyma Akın, “28 Şubat Süreci ve Batı Medyasındaki Algılaması,” (M.A. diss. Karamanoğlu Mehmet Bey University, 2011).

³⁶⁷ Türker Karapınar, “28 Şubat Soruşturmasında Tank da Var Brifing de,” *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 24 November 2011, <<http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/28-subat-sorusturmasinda-tank-da-var-brifing-de/gundem/gundemdetay/24.11.2011/1466744/default.htm>> (12 April 2013).

³⁶⁸ “Former Land Forces Commander Arrested in New ‘Coup’ Sweep,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, 27 February 2013, <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/two-retired-generals-one-active-colonel-detained-in-feb-28-coup-probe.aspx?pageID=238&nID=41962&NewsCatID=341>> (27 February 2013).

³⁶⁹ İsmail Çağlar, “The Welfare Party and the February 28 Process: A Historical Analysis of Turkish Conservatives’ Move to the Center,” *Turkish Journal of Politics* 3, no.1 (2012): 27.

³⁷⁰ The term “candles off” refers to a conventional folk fallacy about Alevi traditions. According to this belief, when Alevi families gather together at night, they put the candles off and engage in an *incestuous orgy*. The origins of this fallacy lie in historical process. Unlike Sunni Muslims, Alevi men and women perform their worship together in their Cem rituals. The form of prayers is a form of dancing accompanied in a sense, by a form of religious music, performed by both men and women. In the history, due to the security issues, immediately after the warning of watchmen, who were in guard-duty in the entrance of village/town for a probable hostile attack by other villages or by the Ottoman Empire, Alevis who were performing their worship put the candles off and darken the place,

His comment was strongly criticized by the society, the press, and obviously by Alevis, who took the streets in order to protest his speech.³⁷² This event will be discussed with more details under dedicated chapter.

Within the Turkish political structure, MGK has been an important component for the military-civil bureaucracy, and with its meetings for every two months, it had significant power among politics. It would not be wrong to claim that the origin of this power has been the society; because, according to the public surveys, after 1980s, TSK had been the most trusted institution over all governmental offices among the society.³⁷³ On the other hand, February 28 was a considerable proof of the power that the military had. After a tensed period, the periodical meeting of MGK on 28 February 1997 lasted nine hours, and during the meeting the members of the TSK submitted their perspectives on issues regarding laicism and political Islam within a frame of the danger of reactionary movement due to recent events and implementations of RP led government. Laicism and Kemalist principles composed the basis of the meeting, in which a nine-article proposal was presented to the government regarding the said principles. Within this proposal, laicism was referred as not only a guarantee of the regime, but also as the basis of democracy and community amenity, and overall, it was referred as a lifestyle.³⁷⁴ The proposal was re-composed after the meeting, and became a 20-article document, in which final decisions were written. The document implied general's decisions, which were basically concerning laicism, Dress Code (in order to prevent from Islamic clothing), eight-year-obligatory classes (in order to close the secondary school of Imam-Hatip Schools), courses on Quran, Turkey-Iran relations,

where they were, in order to protect themselves from outsiders. This is the historical background why the term “candles off” is used in order to insult the Alevis.

(source: Ali Balkız (author and the ex-Chairman of Alevi-Bektashi Federation), interview by Didem Doganyilmaz, Ankara/Turkey, 12 April 2011;

Zafer Yoruk, “One Minute Darkness Leads to Daylong Controversy,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, 14 February 1997, <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/one-minute-darkness-leads-to-daylong-controversy.aspx?pageID=438&n=one-minute-darkness-leads-to-daylong-controversy-1997-02-14>> (2 March 2011).)

³⁷¹ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 280;

Yoruk, “One Minute Darkness.”

³⁷² Yoruk, “One Minute Darkness.”

³⁷³ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 32.

³⁷⁴ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 283.

For all proposal (in Turkish), please see Appendix IX on page 301.

recruitment of state officers, strict control of Sufi orders and control of press, and sent to the Prime Minister Erbakan to sign.

February 28, as an event, became another turning point of political history of Turkey with outcomes of process, the instability, party closures, bans from politics and new political parties.

Since 1960, after the first military intervention within a decade of multi-party period, political scenes faced with a *controversial competition* between so-called representatives of two antagonist identities, almost every decade until the end of century. February 28 was one of the political attempts that TSK made political decisions *against* the government; that is the reason why it was listed with the anterior military interventions with a title of *post-modern coup-d'etat*.³⁷⁵

February 28 was named as a post-modern coup-d'etat; however, the implementations of TSK were applied with the support of a part of society and certainty of accomplishing a duty. This duty of TSK, accordingly the National Security Council, was to *protect* the laic structure of state against any kind of *threat*, in this case, against reactionary movements and political Islam.³⁷⁶

On 13 March, Erbakan signed the document, and declared that the decisions would be applied. The Assembly was tensed; and on 8 May, an MP of RP from Şanlıurfa, a southeastern city, İbrahim Halil Çelik, made a speech in TBMM, and commented on February 28 with these sentences;

“If you dare to close the Imam-Hatip schools under Welfare Party, blood will be shed. It will be worse than Algeria. I do not want it, either. The democracy will arrive in this sense, it will be perfect. The military could not overcome 3500 PKK terrorists, how come they will defeat six million of Islamists. Who pies against the wind, shall taste his own pie. Who hits me, I hit back him. I am an entire Sharia supporter (*şeriatçı*). I want that Sharia be applied.”³⁷⁷

³⁷⁵ Akın, “28 Şubat Süreci.”

³⁷⁶ Atasoy, *Islam's Marriage*, 81.

³⁷⁷ “1997'deki Refah Partisi Kapatma Davası İddianamesi,” *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, 14 March 2008, <<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/8460645.asp>> (2 March 2011).

This speech caused significant hatred among supporters of laicism, made them more confident on their fear about threat of an attempt to establish an Islamic state, and encouraged MGK with support of major part of society.

Simultaneously with the tension in TBMM, TSK intended to form a specific public opinion against political Islam and reactionary movements, which were unified within military discourses, with briefings given in order to gather around the laic ideology with contrast to the government. Target groups of these briefings were composed by press members, academics, prosecutors and adjudicators. During these briefings, recruitment among juridical, economic, and national police offices; intentions to abolish the laic, democratic republic; the lack of a political authority and as a result of it, self-assignment of military for protection of state as an obligation in order to fill the lack; intentions to prove a religious hostility of the military in order to cause distrust among society; and the necessity of accomplishment the task, which was to protect the state against internal threat even with arms if necessary were the issues highlighted. Besides, economic references were given such as the privileges given to Islamic holding companies and the amount of encouragement provided to Islamic and Sufi orders supporter. MGK briefings also included numbers about Islamism among different orders. For instance, the support to Islamic capital was demonstrated with a list of the highest asset of businessmen, in which the amounts were mentioned with billions. Additionally, 19 newspapers, 110 journals, 51 radio and 20 TV channels were listed with support to political Islam, and 2500 foundations, 500 waqfs, 1000 enterprises, 1200 dormitories, 800 schools and courses and 5000 Sufi orders were mentioned as political Islamist institutions.³⁷⁸

With the briefings, MGK asked for the support of aforementioned target groups, most specifically from Constitutional Court, Council of State, and Supreme Court. On the other hand, the Chief Prosecutor of Supreme Court Vural Savaş filed a lawsuit for the closure of RP with the accusation of “dragging the country into a civil war” on 21 May.³⁷⁹ After less than a month, on 18 June, Erbakan resigned from

³⁷⁸ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 286-287.

³⁷⁹ “RP, İç Savaşta Sürüklüyor,” *Sabah Daily Newspaper*, 22 May 1997, <<http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1997/05/22/f01.html>> (3 March 2011).

prime ministry. He mentioned the reason of his resignation as to hand over the office to Çiller, to other member of coalition government. However, the President of Republic, Demirel, assign Yılmaz then chairman of ANAP with the duty of establishing the government, instead of Çiller. Hence, the REFAH-YOL era was closed, and on 30 June, a new government was established by the leadership of ANAP and prime ministry of Yılmaz with Democratic Turkey Party³⁸⁰ and Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti – DSP*). The government was supported by CHP inside the Assembly, and with the approval of new education bill composed by MGK, the tension was *relatively* lowered.³⁸¹ However, the new government had been the target of critics for applying the decisions of MGK by conservative part of the society, press members and by RP in TBMM. For instance, on newspapers named Yeni Şafak and Zaman, which are known with their conservative approach to social and political issues, the issue was discussed by many columnists, who accused the new government of being in favor with MGK and its decisions.³⁸² Besides, after special Friday prayers, the crowd gathered and protested the education bill, which would cause the closure of secondary part of Imam-Hatip schools and the new government who applied the bill.³⁸³ Hence, once again educational system became a tool of political competition. With the new education bill, primary and secondary schools were laicized and unified within eight-year-uninterrupted education system and became obligatory regarding the Law of Unification of Education. Accordingly, Imam-Hatip Schools were limited with high school level. Erbakan and RP members pointed out that the new education bill was not an educational reform; instead, it was a laic project. However, as the most significant part of this discourse was the *accusation* of this laic project's being *against* the path to an *Islamic state (şeriat devleti)*.³⁸⁴ In the meantime, Rıza Zelyut, a reporter of a newspaper named Akşam, went to Iran and discussed the closure of

³⁸⁰ The party was formed by a group of former members of parliament of DYP. These members of parliament resigned from the party as a protest due to the coalition government with RP.

³⁸¹ Meral Aslankaya, "Siyasetin Şairi Karaoğlan: Yeniden Doğuş," *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, n.d., <<http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/ecevit/4bolum.asp>> (1 March 2013).

³⁸² Mustafa Ünal, "Anasol-D Hükümeti'ni Sevelim, Koruyalım," *Zaman Daily Newspaper*, 3 January 1998, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/mustafa-unal/anasol-d-hukümetini-sevelim-koruyalım_489942.html> (3 March 2011);

Nazlı Ilıcak, "İrtica Yasaları ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararname," *Yeni Şafak Daily Newspaper*, 26 July 2000, <<http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2000/temmuz/26/nilicak.html>> (3 March 2011).

³⁸³ Ruşen Çakır, and Kemal Can, "Tüm Gözler Radikallerde," *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 22 August 1997, <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/08/22/siyaset/refahdizi.html>> (3 March 2011).

³⁸⁴ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 295.

Imam-Hatip secondary schools with Meclis-i Hubregan (the Assembly of Iran). According to his report, quoted by Bekir Coşkun in another national newspaper, the members of Assembly, who were also religious leaders, mentioned their disagreement on closure of Imam-Hatip secondary schools and added, “Because the Iranian Revolution initiated on these kinds of schools... We experienced, we know... The only way is to educate these children...”³⁸⁵

The political instability that started at the beginning of the year could not be resolved until the end of it. While the lawsuit of RP’s closure was continuing, the members of the party were trying to reach their supporters in order to mobilize the conservative group of society. For instance, Erdoğan made a speech, in which he read a different version of a poem of Ziya Gökalp, in Siirt, a southeastern city, in December 1997. The poem he read was: “The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers”.³⁸⁶ This discourse of his caused him ten-month prison because of inciting hatred among society; eventually, he was sentenced with four-month prison in 1999.³⁸⁷

On 16 January 1998, the Constitutional Court solved the case about closure, and regarding to the decree, RP was closed and Erbakan was banned from politics for five years, because of being the origin of anti-laic implementations.³⁸⁸ Closure of parties was not something new for the political scenes of Turkey. In fact, it was considered as a way to overcome political Islam; however, RP was not the first political party with National View ideology, and it did not become the last one. For many years, RP used to be a considerable representative of political Islam with a strong reference to Islamic Ottoman identity, which was a total contrast of the laic republican identity. Their discourses and implementations were obviously against the laic structure of the republic; however, they had very considerable support from conservative part of the society, as it was visible in results of the last elections before their closure. Hence, former party members, who were allowed to do politics,

³⁸⁵ Bekir Coşkun, “Rejimin Başına Gelenler,” *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, 1 August 1997, <<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=-257779&yazarid=2>> (3 March 2011).

³⁸⁶ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 31-32.

³⁸⁷ Özköylü, “Kasımpaşalı Tayyip Erdoğan Oldu.”

³⁸⁸ “Refah Partisi de Aynı Gerekçelerle Kapatıldı,” *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 15 March 2008, <<http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/rp-ile-ayni-gerekce-/siyaset/siyasetdetay/15.03.2008/505586/default.htm>> (3 March 2011).

established a new political party named Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi* - FP) on 17 December 1996 with same ideology.³⁸⁹ The party was established before the closure of RP in case it should be dissolved. Hence, after the closure of RP, its members of parliament became new members of FP.

Closure of RP or bans from politics could not be considered as sufficient for the dissolution of tension, or better to say, fear among supporters of laicism. RP and Erbakan were considered as the origins of threat to actual republican regime, and although, they were both banned, supporters of laicism were gathered around the regime and mobilized for a protective stand. Hence, the ceremony of 75th anniversary of the republic on 29 October 1998 turned into a significant demonstration with a great participation all over the country.³⁹⁰ The slogans those were shouted by the crowd were about the protection of regime like “Live Long The Republic!” (*Yaşasın Cumhuriyet!*); about M.K. Atatürk, such as “Our Great Leader, We Follow Your Path!” (*Atam izindeyiz!*) and “We Are Proud, We Are Strong and We Are Kemalists!” (*Gururluyuz, Güçlüyüz, Atatürkçüyüz!*); and about laic structure of republic, for instance “Laic Turkey Will Remain Laic!” (*Türkiye Laiktir, Laik Kalacak!*).³⁹¹ The demonstrations were supported by military, by governors, by mayors of different political parties mostly excluding FP members, by university students and by different parts of society. For all these reasons, it would not be wrong to claim that the demonstrations were a *show of strength* against former RP’s, and its successor FP’s anti-laic discourses.

In 1999 General Elections, FP managed to enter to TBMM with less members (111 members of parliaments over 550) and a lower percentage of total votes (11%),³⁹² if we compare with the last elections of 1995, in which RP had 158 members and gained 21.37% of total votes.³⁹³ The most significant event of this

³⁸⁹ “Siyasi Partiler,” TBMM, n.d., <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/siyasi_partiler.html> (1 March 2013).

³⁹⁰ “Milyonlar Yürüdü,” *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 26 October 1998, <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/10/26/haber/hab00.html>> (1 March 2011).

³⁹¹ Ibid.

Author’s translation.

³⁹² “1999 Yılı Genel Seçim Sonuçları,” *Seçim Anketi TV*, n.d., <<http://secimanketi.tv/sonuclar/1999-yili-genel-secim-sonuclari>> (1 March 2011).

³⁹³ “1995 Yılı Genel Seçim Sonuçları,” *Seçim Anketi TV*, n.d., <<http://secimanketi.tv/sonuclar/1995-yili-genel-secim-sonuclari>> (1 March 2011).

government led by a coalition of DSP, MHP and ANAP was the oath-taking ceremony, which hosted an *incident* regarding headscarf (*türban*). Merve Kavakçı, one of the MPs of FP from İstanbul, intended to enter to TBMM with her headscarf in order to take her oath to start her mission officially. However, she was protested by other MPs, she was criticized and prevented from taking her oath by then-Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit (1925-2006) with the following speech, which was broadcasted by one of the public broadcaster, TRT 2;

“In Turkey, nobody interferes in the clothing and in the headscarf of women in their private life. However, here is not a domain of private life of anybody. Here is the greatest institution of the state. Those who serve here have to suit the tradition and the rule of state. This is not the place to challenge the state. Please put this lady in her place.”³⁹⁴

This speech of Ecevit was protested by conservatives, MPs of FP and with protest meeting in Iran and Palestine. According to different national newspapers, Tehran University hosted one of the very first protest meetings about the incident.³⁹⁵ On the other hand, discourse of Ecevit and his attitude towards Kavakçı were considered as a helpful stand in order to end a greater crisis and a probable military intervention.³⁹⁶ Thus, his stand was supported by then-President of Republic Demirel, and then-Commander of TSK.³⁹⁷ Besides, Kavakçı was criticized by Demirel for being provocative and causing trouble, even aiming to transform Turkey into Iran, Afghanistan or Algeria.³⁹⁸ On the other hand, supporters of Kavakçı claimed that there was not an exact law about the outfit of MPs; hence, the protests against her could not be considered as a fair stand. Eventually, her membership of parliament was reduced; however, the debate could not be closed as actors of February 28 Process are being indicted

³⁹⁴ Complete video can be seen on <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2-Z3USO1kM>>.

(Author's translation)

³⁹⁵ “From the Papers,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, 9 May 1999, <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=from-the-papers-1999-05-10>> (1 March 2011).

³⁹⁶ Turan Yılmaz, “Darbeyi Ecevit Önledi,” *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, 16 October 2012, <<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/21703869.asp>> (16 October 2012).

³⁹⁷ “From the Papers.”

³⁹⁸ Meyda Yeğenoğlu, “Clash of Secularity and Religiosity: The Staging of Secularism and Islam Through The Icons of Atatürk and The Veil in Turkey,” in *Religion and the State A Comparative Study*, eds. Jack Barbalet, Adam Possamai and Bryan S. Turner (London: Anthem Press, 2011), 236.

since 2012. This issue will be mentioned under the relevant title in upcoming parts of this thesis.

As another important event of decade regarding Islamism was the left of Fethullah Gülen, who became one of the leading names of political Islam, or as mentioned by Kramer, Turkish Islamic Synthesis, with his discourses.³⁹⁹ Gülen with his teachings derived from Said Nursi's Risale-i Nur, has become a well-known Sufi order leader, and formed the Gülen Movement (*Gülen Hareketi*) or Service (*Hizmet*).⁴⁰⁰ During the decade, he and his followers mobilized, and they established a network with private courses (*dershane*), dormitories (*ışık evleri*, literally: house of light),⁴⁰¹ and media institutions⁴⁰² (daily newspaper, such as *Zaman*; radio station, such as BURÇ FM; TV channels, such as Samanyolu TV and *Dünya*; journals, such as monthly scientific *Sızıntı*, theological journal *Yeni Ümit*, magazines *Aksiyon* and *Ekoloji*). In fact, subjects of that list were matching with the ones in list of MGK, which was declared to be controlled due to security concerns regarding reactionary movements; however, nothing changed regarding Gülen's network; contrarily, he supported MGK and as he had been one of the actors of political arena during the decade, he made several positive declarations regarding the action that was carried out by military.⁴⁰³ At the end of the decade, in 1999, he left the country and settled in the U.S.A. and his departure was explained with health concerns.⁴⁰⁴ In the same year as his departure, an investigation was initiated about him regarding his Islamic discourses, and this investigation turned into a lawsuit in 2000 with accusation

³⁹⁹ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 66.

⁴⁰⁰ Pim Valkenberg, "The Hizmet Movement in the Dialogue Between Muslim and Christian Religious Traditions," in *The Gulen Hizmet Movement and its Transnational Activities*, eds. Sophia Pandya, and Nancy Gallagher, (Florida: Brown Walker Press: 2012), 35-36.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁴⁰² Fran Hassencahl, "Framing Women's Issues in The Fountain Magazine," in *The Gulen Hizmet Movement and its Transnational Activities*, eds. Sophia Pandya, and Nancy Gallagher (Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2012), 118.

⁴⁰³ "Erdoğan'dan Gülen'e 28 Şubat Potporisi," *Oda TV*, 28 February 2013, <<http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=erdogandan-gulene-28-subat-potporisi-2802131200>> (28 February 2013).

⁴⁰⁴ "Fethullah Gülen Niye ABD'de Yaşıyor, Neden Türkiye'ye Dönüyor?," *Fethullah Gülen*, 24 February 2012, <<http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/20018/172/>> (1 March 2012).

of “forming an illegal organization in order to establish a state based on religious rules with changing the laic structure of it”.⁴⁰⁵

At the end of decade, political arena of Turkey was not stabilized due to familiar discussions regarding reactionary movements. The decade had started with assassinations and ended with another one, in which Ahmet Taner Kışlalı (1941-1999), an academic, politician and author was assassinated with a bomb in his car on 21 October 1999, after a few days that *Akit* published an article about him with his photo and a cross on it.⁴⁰⁶ Concerning the discussions about reactionary movements, Gülen movement and FP were on the agenda of Turkey. Briefly, Republic of Turkey closed the century with familiar discussions and familiar hostility between supporters of laic republican identity and supporters of traditional Islamic identity.

3.3. Beginning of Justice and Development Party Governments

After the establishment of the republic, with various implementations in different orders, laicization process was *almost* accomplished; however, single party politics cannot be sufficient to carry out a real democratic regime. As there was no other political party apart from CHP, which embedded oppositional ideas and its supporters in it. Hence, it was not only the party in power, but also its own opposition. With the establishment of DP, Turkey started to experience democracy.

During 50 years, political scenes of Turkey hosted many different actors, such as military or politicians under Sufi orders’ leaders’ control, apart from political parties, which possessed a significant variety due to party closures and reforming their successors. However, the most significant point of this half-century was the polarization of politics and accordingly the polarization of society between two different groups.

⁴⁰⁵ “Oda TV.com Açıklıyor: Fethullah Gülen Neden Türkiye’ye Dönüyor?,” *Oda TV*, 4 April 2008, <<http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=odatv.com-acikliyor-fethullag-gulen-turkiyeye-neden-donmuyor-0404081200>> (1 March 2012).

⁴⁰⁶ “Akit’e Göre Kontrgerilla,” *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, 23 October 1999, <<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=-109257>> (1 March 2012).

The Republic of Turkey was established with a westernized approach based on laicism. Laicism was considered as prerequisite of all other reforms; so that, any *threat* to laicism was interpreted as a threat to regime. As DP started its implementations with religious actions, such as Quran recitals in public state radio station and Arabization of calls for prayer, its approach was perceived as a *move away* from laicism. Besides, the power of Sufi orders among political and economic scenes deepened the concerns of that *move away*. Simultaneously, tolerance to *other* was lowered and polarization started. Thereafter, *for the sake of democracy*, Turkey faced with three military interventions, which were strokes to democracy in fact. First, a right-wing government was abolished by the military intervention, then the same military *fight* against the left-wing politics and its supporters with the help of Islam as an antidote.

Conservative perspective of politics, which started with DP, developed in time and became political Islam during 1980s; then, as snowball effect, it was radicalized and turned into a concrete discourse of Islamic state (*şeriat*) under RP and its successor FP politics. While the politics intervened in religion, with the Islamization, the politicians started to abuse religious sentiments of society in order to do politics. For instance, RP politicians' discourses regarding the relation of worship value with voting to their party was a significant proof of abuse. Theoretically, this is the second reason of existence of laicism. Acceptance of laicism is supposed to protect not only the state from religion, but also the religion from any kind of political abuse. This very simple example should prove the importance of laicism in order to free both parts of the debate. On the other hand, as it will be discussed in upcoming chapter, rise of conservatism brought about hostility to adherents of different belief systems.

There is another thing that should be highlighted before a deepened debate about the separation of society: the education system. As it was stated, the education system has been changed many times during this half century due to government policies. This debate had started with Village Institutes and continued with Imam-Hatip Schools and religious ethic classes; however, the most significant changes targeted Imam-Hatip schools. For instance, the number of newly-opened Imam-Hatip schools, (although it was way too much than the necessity), considerable ratio

of girl students of these schools (although, they would not be able to become imams), and the acceptance of Imam-Hatip schools' graduates to various university faculties rather than theology faculties have been the sources of discussions regarding the issue. While these implementations were applied by rightwing governments, they were discussed among supporters of laicism, and RP's interpretation about the Imam-Hatip schools' graduations as their "base of voters" deepened the concerns of laics.




Chart V: New Opening Imam-Hatip Schools (1950-1997)

Source: "Hangi Hükümet Döneminde Kaç Tane İmam Hatip Açıldı," *Oda TV*, 3 January 2013, <<http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=hangi-hukumet-doneminde-kac-tane-acildi-0301131200>> (1 March 2013);

"İmam Hatiplerin Yeniden Doğuşu," *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 19 September 2012, <<http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1100847&CategoryID=86>> (1 March 2013);

Özlem Soğukdere, "İmam Hatip Liseleri'nin Tarihsel Gelişimi," *CNN Türk*, 28 May 2004, <<http://www.cypriot.org.uk/Documents/Haber1/Imam-Hatip-Liseleri.htm>> (1 March 2013).

The Chart V has been drawn with the help of different sources in order to show the increase of Imam-Hatip school numbers with the total number. As it can be seen, every single government contributed to existing numbers of Imam-Hatip schools; however, periods of 1975-1978 (coalition government of AP, MHP, MSP, CGP), 1984-1989 (the time that Turkish Islamic Synthesis was being promoted), and 1995-1997 (coalition government of RP and DYP) were the ones, when numbers of Imam-Hatip schools were significantly increased. For instance, in 1995-1996, there were 492.809 students in 561 Imam-Hatip schools, and 53.553 graduates. However,

the number of imams needed was 2288.⁴⁰⁷ The discrepancy between the numbers of graduates and necessity of imams was considerable, and it was the issue that concerned the supporters of laicism. The number of Imam-Hatip schools was just one of the issues attracting the attention regarding the concerns of supporters of laicism. In addition to that, there were the Islamic discourses of politicians, Islamic implementations of municipalities, and rising budget of DİB as a government policy. The reason why the issue of Imam-Hatip schools was highlighted was, indeed, as the explanation of Meclis-i Hubregan of Iran: the revolution starts with education.

Separation among society became more obvious during the 1990s. These two different groups were gathered around two different identities. As the republic was established on modernized and westernized values, these two characteristics became the basis of the identity promoted for citizens of modern republic. However, with increased conservatism, an alternative identity was started to be promoted by politicians with a concrete accusation of the existing identity by undermining the *real culture* of Turkey. The real culture mentioned here was the one used to belong to the Ottoman Empire blended with significant Islamic motives. The separation was turned into a kind of hostility between these two groups. While the identity possessed by supporters of laic republican identity was westernized, recently promoted identity based on Islam was traditional, briefly. If the explanation is expanded, the description of Çınar will be helpful,

“Secularism is public, Islam private; secularism is knowledge, Islam is belief; secularism is modern, Islam is traditional; secularism is urban, Islam is rural; secularism is progress, Islam is reactionary (irtica); secularism is universal, Islam is particular.”⁴⁰⁸

That was the point that perspective of society against the *other* arrived at the end of century. Two different identity interpretations were dominant among different parts of society at the same time. Therefore, these two identities were entirely contrary to each other, and it would not be wrong to claim that, this contrariness has kept its place during the new century.

⁴⁰⁷ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 286-288.

⁴⁰⁸ Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 47.

In 2001, Turkey faced major economic crisis, which effected both economic and political structure of Turkey. Same year AKP was founded to enter the upcoming elections of 2002. The founders of AKP were coming from the National View. However, its founding members have often declared that their ideas were changed and they embraced the new conditions of 2000s. AKP made its propaganda with a new vision for Turkey for the elections of 2002. As expected, AKP had the majority of valid votes and become the first party according the results of the election with 34.28% percentage of total votes.⁴⁰⁹

3.3.1. 2002 Elections

After the 2002 Elections, the first AKP government was formed by Abdullah Gül (1950 – ...), who is the current President of Republic. As Erdoğan was not eligible to enter the 2002 Elections, Gül formed the single party government and lead the government as Prime Minister between 18 November 2002 and 11 March 2003. In March 2003, elections in Siirt province was renewed and Erdoğan became an MP, then took the Office of Prime Minister from Gül.⁴¹⁰

With AKP, Turkey had single party government after many years of coalitions. As a government formed by a single party, AKP used its power for the reforms, which were declared during the propaganda period for the elections of 2002. AKP started its reforms with respect to the European Union (EU) perceptive, and between 2002-2004 eight legislative reform packages were approved for the Copenhagen Criteria of the EU. The reforms were considered as Turkey's and AKP's declaration of commitment to human rights in international convention by EU Officials.⁴¹¹ The reform packages fulfilled the European perspective and also helped solving numerous internal problems regarding the social and political life. As a result of reforms packages, many improvements had placed, such as; on government-military relations European standards were adopted, State Security Courts abolished, freedom of expression within a wider perspective was provided, laws which led easy

⁴⁰⁹ "2002 Yılı Genel Seçim Sonuçları," *Seçim Anketi TV*, n.d., <<http://secimanketi.tv/sonuclar/2002-yili-genel-secim-sonuclari>> (1 April 2011).

⁴¹⁰ "Bir Yılda 2 Hükümet," *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, 2 August 2003, <<http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=163071>> (2 November 2012).

⁴¹¹ "Europe Welcomes Turkish Reforms," *BBC News*, 3 August 2002, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2170331.stm>> (04 April 2013).

punishment due to critics of military and state system were changed, limits of freedom on gathering and demonstration were expanded, necessary changes have been made for television broadcasting other than Turkish, usage of languages other than Turkish become possible for private language courses, etc.⁴¹²

As a consequence of AKP's efforts on reform packages, in 2004 EU confirmed that Turkey had made all necessary changes in its legal system and was ready for the negotiations for full admission to the EU, and negotiations started on 3 October 2005.⁴¹³ AKP's efforts also affected the party's image in Western media. As Yavuz argues, when AKP was established in 2001, Western media described it as "fundamentalist party", then after the victory of elections in 2002 Western, media started to refer AKP as "Islamist or Islamic Party", and with the reform packages they started to refer AKP as "Party with Islamic roots".⁴¹⁴ While AKP had critics about coming from National View as a political structure from Western and local media, Erdoğan stated in 2003 that AKP was not coming from the National View, which was led by Erbakan, but coming from the DP tradition, which was led by Menderes.⁴¹⁵ One can say that with reference to DP, Erdoğan tried to avoid the long fear of Islamism in Turkey. As stated earlier, National View movement was often considered as reactionary movements against the laic values of the republic. Nevertheless, AKP has been associated with religious references and critics regarding its Islamic roots is still an issue within the perspective of supporters of laic republican identity.

With the help of reform packages and support of liberals in Turkey, AKP won the 2004 Local Elections and raised its votes to 40.18%.⁴¹⁶ The rise of AKP started with 2002 General Elections, then continued with 2004 as it had majority of municipalities. Starting in 2004, founding members referred the party as an example of "conservative democracy". It is to say, AKP accepted the concept of democracy,

⁴¹² "Avrupa Birliği Uyum Yasa Paketleri," *TC Başbakanlık Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği*, 2007, <<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/pub/abuyp.pdf>> (14 April 2013).

⁴¹³ "Accession Negotiations," Republic of Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs of Turkey, n.d., <<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=37&l=2>> (04 April 2013).

⁴¹⁴ Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, 1.

⁴¹⁵ "Erdoğan: Milli Görüş'ün Değil Demokrat Parti'nin Devamıyız," *Zaman Daily Newspaper*, 17 May 2003, <<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/05/17/politika/h2.htm>> (17 April 2013).

⁴¹⁶ "2004 Yerel Seçim Sonuçları," *Seçim Anketi TV*, n.d., <<http://secimanketi.tv/sonuclar/2004-yili-yerel-secim-sonuclari>> (01 April 2012).

which often refers to Western concept, but paid significant attention to Turkish traditions based on conservatism. Briefly, AKP tried to place itself in between traditional – historic- identity of Turkey and laic – republican – identity.

As AKP has conservative roots, supporters of laicism have questioned every AKP action whether it harmed the laic republican character of state and society or not. Consequently, AKP has faced many problems. For instance, in 2007, the Presidential Elections period was started with high tensioned debates. At the beginning of April 2007, rumors started to circle around that AKP would select Gül as their candidate for Presidential elections. In mid-April street protests started be organized by some NGOs under the name of “Republic Protests” (*Cumhuriyet Mitingleri*).⁴¹⁷ AKP officially declared in 24 April that their candidate was Gül.⁴¹⁸ As he was a former member of RP, in other words was an active politician in National View movement, and has a veiled wife, many people started to argue that Gül could not represent the laic state structure of Turkey. Three days after the nomination of Gül, TSK published a press release in its website and stated that, TSK was aware of certain groups` intention to erode the laicism in Turkey.⁴¹⁹ The press release was considered as a message against the nomination of Gül, and even further, a secret message for a possible *coup d`etat* in case of his election.⁴²⁰

According to the Constitution of Turkey, to be elected as president, at least 367 over 550 members of parliament should be presented in the assembly, in other words a quorum of two-thirds of MPs should be presented in the assembly. The quorum of two-thirds was also the necessary *yes* number to be elected in first or second round. If not, election process continued with the third tour and the necessary *yes* votes would decrease. Gül had 357 valid votes in the first round for his nomination, which was not sufficient to be elected, but AKP had the idea to continue with second and thirds round and select Gül as President in third round. However,

⁴¹⁷ “Ankara’da Tarihi Cumhuriyet Mitingi,” *NTVMSNBC*, 16 April 2007, <<http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/405418.asp?cp1=1>> (1 April 2012).

⁴¹⁸ “AKP’nin Adayı Abdullah Gül Oldu!,” *Haber 3*, 24 April 2007, <<http://www.haber3.com/akpnin-adayi-abdullah-gul-oldu-haberi-231221h.htm>> (2 April 2012).

⁴¹⁹ “Askerden Açıklama,” *Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper*, 28 April 2007, 1-4.

For the original copy of the related page of Cumhuriyet, please see Appendix X on page 303.

⁴²⁰ “Hükümetin Açıklaması: Zamanlama Dikkat Çekici,” *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 28 April 2007, <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/04/28/son/sonsiy12.asp>> (2 April 2012).

the Constitutional Court of Turkey declared that quorum of two-thirds were not present at the time of election in first round, therefore the election process could not be started.⁴²¹ Hence, AKP faced a major problem, which was supported by opposition parties and had legal base by the Constitutional Court's decision on the election of Gül. Consequently, AKP decided on snap general elections to overcome the problem. On 4 May 2007, all parties accepted AKP's proposal for early general elections date as 22 July 2007.⁴²²

3.3.2. 2007 Elections

In 2007 General Elections, AKP kept its pace on receiving more votes in every election. According to the results, AKP had 46.58% and gained 341 seats in TBMM.⁴²³ After the election, first issue on agenda was the Presidential elections again. A part from AKP, MPs of MHP were present in the assembly at the time of election; so that, the quorum of two-third was not a problem to start the election process. Eventually, Gül was elected as 11th President of Republic in the third round with 339 votes on 28 August 2007.⁴²⁴

As AKP had overcome the major problem of presidential elections with support of general elections, it proposed a constitutional change for next election in order to prevent probable future problems. According to proposed change, starting with the election of 12th President, presidents will be elected by public voting. The aforementioned change needed to be approved by the population. Hence, on 21 October 2007, general referendum took place and AKP's proposal was approved by 68.95% of valid votes.⁴²⁵ With this result, related articles of the Constitution regarding the election of president of republic were changed. If everything goes according to the calendar, the next presidential election will take place in 2014 and

⁴²¹ "Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçiminin İlk Turu İptal," *NTVMSNBC*, 3 May 2007, <<http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/406859.asp>> (2 April 2012).

⁴²² "Erken Seçim Kararı İttifakla 22 Temmuz," *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 4 May 2007, <<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=220295>> (2 April 2012).

⁴²³ "2007 Yılı Genel Seçim Sonuçları," *Seçim Anketi TV*, n.d., <<http://secimanketi.tv/sonuclar/2007-yili-genel-secim-sonuclari>> (2 April 2012).

⁴²⁴ "Türkiye'nin 11. Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül," *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 29 August 2007, <<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=231368>> (2 April 2012).

⁴²⁵ "Referandum Sonuçları Kesinleşti," *Yeni Şafak Daily Newspaper*, 31 October 2007, <<http://yenisafak.com.tr/gundem-haber/referandum-sonuclari-kesinlesti-31.10.2007-78344>> (5 April 2012).

the 12th President of Turkey will be selected by public votes.

In 2009, local elections for municipalities took place in Turkey. According to the results, AKP lost around 2% votes then the elections of 2004. In 2009 Elections, AKP had %38.64 of votes and gained 1442 municipalities.⁴²⁶ Many columnists and intellectuals considered the results as a message from the public regarding AKP policies and some of them even stated that AKP's lost on public support would continue in 2011 General Elections.

While AKP was often criticized by becoming the representative of traditional Islamic Ottoman identity, some improvements about religious freedom for non-Muslim took place in Turkey. For instance in 2010, Monastery of Sümela, which is important for the Greek-Orthodox and serves as museum, was opened for religious ceremony for 15 of August.⁴²⁷ Starting on 15 August 2010, Monastery of Sümela, became the place of worship only for 15 of August in every year. However, religious freedom that AKP Government provided was limited. On the other hand, the right to practice (even it is one day annually) of Greek-Orthodox religious rituals after 88 years is a huge step in the perspective of religious freedom. On the other hand, said AKP Government started a series of workshop regarding the problems of Alevis. The Workshop will be discussed with its details on upcoming chapter; however, it is another significant example regarding AKP's approach to different belief systems regarding to religious freedom.

3.3.3. 2011 Elections

On the way to 2011 Elections, AKP repositioned itself on the problem of veil in universities. After the military intervention of 1980, a lot of changes happened in Turkey regarding religious freedom. Starting from 1984, wearing veil became prohibited in universities; however, the ban of veil haven't been applied strictly during the rest of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s. Nevertheless after the February 28 Process, the ban of veil applied strictly by a notice of Council of Higher

⁴²⁶ "2009 Yılı Genel Seçim Sonuçları," *Seçim Anketi TV*, n.d., <<http://secimanketi.tv/sonuclar/2009-yili-yerel-secim-sonuclari>> (9 May 2012).

⁴²⁷ "Sümela Manastırı İbadete Açılıyor," *Habertürk*, 10 July 2010, <<http://www.haberturk.com/yasam/haber/522338-sumela-manastiri-ibadete-aciliyor>> (9 May 2012).

Education (*Yükseköğretim Kurulu – YÖK*) to universities in September 1997.⁴²⁸ According to the notice, YÖK ordered to universities not to allow any student with veil or headscarf. One can see that the ban of veil was obviously against the religious freedom. However, as the military and some state officials considered veil/headscarf as a symbol of political thought rather than religious necessity, the ban came from the State. As a party of ‘conservative democracy’, AKP took problem of veil on its agenda to solve. Months before the 2011 Elections, YÖK sent a notice to universities and ordered to allow students with veils and headscarves to the classes and not to issue any rapport against them.⁴²⁹ One can see that the ban of veil, which was implemented by the State back in 1984, was lifted by the State, as well. At this points, different policies of State officials under different governments are an obvious evident of the clash between traditional Islamic Ottoman identity and laic republican one.

AKP entered 2011 Elections in an atmosphere, in which a solution for veil problem was relatively founded, applied and accepted by public. 2011 Elections took place on 12 June 2011, and according to results, AKP had 49.83% and gained 327 seats in TBMM.⁴³⁰ One can see that the claims after the local elections of 2009 about AKP’s future on losing public support in elections became insignificant. In fact, AKP raised its percentage of votes significantly; besides, having almost 50% of valid votes is a significant success in a representative democracy. With the results of 2011, 4th AKP Government period started.

4th AKP government continued its reforms on legal basis and, as usual, faced critics about implementing the Sunni-Muslim ideology with the power of State. For instance, AKP proposed a change to educational system at the beginning of 2012. The new system, known as ‘4+4+4’, planned for twelve continuous year of education for children. According to the plan, 4 year for primary school, 4 year for middle school and last 4 year for high school education were to be applied. However, last 4 years for high school does not require continuous attendance, and makes it

⁴²⁸ “Türban Yasağının Geçmişi,” *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, 10 February 2008, <<http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=8201449>> (9 May 2012).

⁴²⁹ “Üniversitede Artık Türbana Engel Yok,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 2 February 2011, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/egitim/universitede_artik_turbana_engel_yok-1038728> (11 May 2012).

⁴³⁰ “2011 Yılı Genel Seçim Sonuçları,” *Seçim Anketi TV*, n.d., <<http://secimanketi.tv/sonuclar/2011-yili-genel-secim-sonuclari>> (11 May 2012).

possible to have lessons via dedicated TV channels. The plan promoted by AKP as improvement over uninterrupted 8-year educational system. It is true on paper that 4+4+4, indeed, makes improvements over educational system; however, option of having high schools classes at home harms the idea of having uninterrupted education. The 4+4+4 system was approved on 30 March 2012 by the TBMM,⁴³¹ and after its approval critics about the new educational system continued. Many columnists claimed that AKP introduced the 4+4+4 system in order to re-open the middle sections of Imam-Hatip schools. Regarding Imam-Hatip schools, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated, “Imam-Hatip Schools will be the dearest of this country and nation” in one of his speeches.⁴³² This declaration of Erdoğan was considered as an evidence of a special attention over Imam-Hatip schools. It would not be wrong to argue that in a laic state structure, a prime minister could not point-out any type of school, which does not target all parts of society, as *special* one. On the other hand, that issue should taken into account that, while Imam-Hatip schools are being represented as dearest, Theological School of Halki has been maintained closed since 1972 as its status cannot be clarified within Turkish education system. There are discussions that AKP Government considers to open it; however, any concrete steps have not been actualized yet.

2013 brought different political discourses on the agenda. As generally known, the agenda of Turkey changes day by day. Hence so far, agenda of Turkey has shifted from one to another.

In March 2013, Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç (1948 – ...) stated that the state of Turkey made wrong implementations towards the religious minorities through its history and called the members of minorities back to Turkey.⁴³³ In the same speech, he described the differences among society as *richness*. As AKP promoted the party as the guarantee of freedom, that call should be considered

⁴³¹ “4+4+4 Teklifi Kabul Edildi,” *Sabah Daily Newspaper*, 31 March 2012, <<http://www.sabah.com.tr/Egitim/2012/03/30/son-dakika-4-4-4-yasalasti>> (31 March 2012).

⁴³² “İmam Hatipler Milletin Gözbebeği Olacak,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 25 April 2012, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/imam_hatipler_milletin_gozbebegi_olacak-1086035> (25 April 2012).

⁴³³ “Bülent Arınç, Azınlıklardan Özür Dileyip ‘Dönün Çağrısı’ Yaptı,” *Zaman Daily Newspaper*, 6 March 2013, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_bulent-arinc-azinliklardan-ozur-dileyip-donun-cagrиси-yapti_2061591.html> (6 March 2013).

significant for religious freedom for those emigrated due to security reasons.

During the first half of 2013, AKP introduced a regulation about consumption and sale of alcoholic drinks. AKP promoted the regulation as a measure of protection of adolescents. Unsurprisingly, the party has faced many accusations about this regulation. Commonly, critics made to AKP by saying that the regulation was made with Islamic references and to intervene to life styles of individuals. According to the regulation, sale of alcoholic drinks are prohibited from 22:00 to 6:00. Additionally, companies that produce and sell alcoholic drinks cannot promote their brand with giveaways – like glasses with brand names, ashtrays etc.-, and cannot be sponsor to any event, unless the event is an international fair.⁴³⁴ Erdoğan answered these critics in one of his speeches in TBMM and claimed that the regulation was made to protect the adolescents. He also said, “Why a law which was made by two *drunks* is legitimate but the one that is also the order of religion supposed to be rejected?”⁴³⁵ Erdoğan’s speech raised the tension as he gave the religion – in this case Islam- as a reference for said regulation, and used the term “two drunks”. The debate started over: How come a PM can defend a law by saying it is an order of religion in a laic state. On the other hand, about the term “two drunks”, Spokesman of the Government stated that it was a saying without a reference to anyone. However, significant portion of public opinion considered it as a reference to Atatürk and İnönü. With this assumption, critics started to circle around, as AKP is against the ideas of Atatürk and even Atatürk himself.

While the discussions were continuing about the regulation, groundbreaking ceremony for the third bridge in Bosphorus took place in Istanbul on 29 May 2013, started with prayers led by the Mufti of Istanbul, and the name of bridge was declared as ‘Yavuz Sultan Selim’ by Gül.⁴³⁶ Yavuz Sultan Selim was the 9th Sultan of Ottoman Empire, who is also known for massacres of Alevis during his time of

⁴³⁴ “Yeni Alkol Düzenlemesi Neler Getiriyor?,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 10 June 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/yeni_alkol_duzenlemesi_neler_getiriyor-1137075> (10 June 2013).

⁴³⁵ “Başbakan: İki Ayyaşın Yaptığı Muteber de...,” *CNN Türk*, 28 May 2013, <<http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/turkiye/05/28/basbakan.iki.ayyasin.yaptigi.muteber.de/709778.0/>> (28 May 2013).

⁴³⁶ “3. Köprünün adı Yavuz Sultan Selim,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 29 May 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/3_kopru_icin_temel_atma_toreni-1135436> (29 May 2013).

rule of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, naming the bridge with his legacy started another debate. Alevis' main argument was the name Yavuz Sultan Selim was a bad reference for their history. Discussions started with the groundbreaking ceremony continued for a while among society, which is explained in detail in related part of following chapter.

Meanwhile in Istanbul, a group of people was protesting against Government's plan to destroy the Gezi Park in Taksim and built a replica of Ottoman Barrack (name of the barrack was Topçu Kışlası). Erdoğan promoted the plan of the Ottoman Barrack as re-establishing the history where it belonged. Ecological protests to protect the Gezi Park from destruction evolved after the police intervention towards protestors early in the morning of 31 May 2013. After that moment, thousands of people gathered in Taksim Square against police brutality. However, police forces tried to disrupt the crowd with tear gas and water cannons. The harsh attitude of police sparked multiple demonstrations in multiple cities all over Turkey. The protests started with Gezi Park, turned into anti-government protests and gained global support within a short time. People hit the streets, shouted slogans and demanded freedom without any interfere to life styles. Many of the protestors stated that government's attitude nearly on every topic was affecting and undermining their private life. The most recent given example was the regulation of alcoholic drinks.

Gezi Park Protests were carried out in different cities of Turkey, and apart from protest meetings in the streets or workshops on city parks, many people supported the movement from their houses by banging pans and pots and blinking the lights. These protests had a significant difference than any other previous ones, which used to base on directly laic structure of state; because they were about limited freedom with religious references with respect to conservative identity of AKP. This time, it was about individuals. Additionally, protests were supported by some groups of conservative part of the society as well. With the first special Friday prayers, solidarity between conservative part of the society and the rest of the protesters became visible and with the month of Ramadan, protesters gathered around Ramadan dinners in order to demonstrate that they were not against the religion itself, but to usage of religion for politics and AKP's interfere to different

orders of individuals' life.⁴³⁷

With Gezi Park Protests, polarization among society became visible one again: on one side, supporters of AKP Government and most specifically Erdoğan, and on the other hand, opponents composed by supporters of laic republican identity, Alevi, official religious minorities, a significant number of conservative part of the society, who was not content with AKP Government. On the other hand, it would not be wrong to claim that polarization was encouraged by political discourses on religious base. For instance, on 22 June 2013, the PM Erdoğan stated in his speech in Samsun that, "They send millions of tweets, our one *basma* ruins the plans."⁴³⁸

Since the beginning of protests, they have been associated with foreign actors, internal provocateurs, marginal groups and *interest lobby* with economic interests of capital holders by political discourses of AKP members.⁴³⁹ At the writing time of this thesis, the protests seem to be faded away; however, there are still individual demonstrations based on different reasons on different orders with one common point: discontent of recent applications. During the time of writing this thesis, the most salient example is demolition of METU (Middle East Technical University) forest with a mid-night operation in order to build a highway.⁴⁴⁰

On the way to a new constitution, AKP Government declared the Democratization Package with significant regulations concerning many different orders and different parts of the society. The most significant outcome of Democratization Package regarding the aim of this thesis has been the abolishment of veil ban from governmental offices excluding the ones, where uniforms are worn. This abolishment was associated with expanded limits of religious freedom for conservative Sunni population. In addition to that, territory of Mor Gabriel

⁴³⁷ "Gezi'nin Ramazan'a yansıması: Yeryüzü İftarı," *BBC Türkçe*, 9 July 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2013/07/130709_yeryuzu_iftari.shtml> (9 July 2013).

⁴³⁸ "Bizim Bir Tek Besmelemiz Yeter," *TRT Haber*, 22 June 2013, <<http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/bizim-bir-tek-besmelemiz-yeter-90554.html>> (22 June 2013).

⁴³⁹ "Turkey's EU Minister Blames 'Interest Rate Lobby' for Protests in Developing Countries," *Anadolu Agency*, 19 June 2013, <<http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/194885--c>> (19 June 2013).

⁴⁴⁰ "ODTÜ Baskını Gökçek'e de Sürpriz Olmuş!," *CNN Türk*, 19 October 2013, <<http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/turkiye/10/19/odtu.baskini.gokceke.de.surpriz.olmus/727616.0/>> (19 October 2013).

Monastery, world's oldest surviving Syriac Orthodox monastery, in Mardin, southeastern city, was handed over the Syriac community. Concerning Alevis, a university was decided to be named as Hacı Bektaş-I Veli University as a response to critics regarding the name of third bridge on Bosphorus. These applications were considered as positive for religious issues; however, the entire package was evaluated as insufficient for democratization.⁴⁴¹ Most specifically Alevis declared their disappointment for the package; nevertheless, Government officially declared that there is another package on the way dedicated to problems of Alevis.⁴⁴² This debate will be discussed in following chapter with its details.

As has been discussed in the entire chapter, there have been two dominant groups shaping Turkish politics and the society. The clash between these two groups has become concrete that led the country to unstable periods, most specifically to military interventions. Regarding the limits of religion, these two groups have taken different positions: laic republican identity has taken certain limits for religious issues with taking it under its strict control; and on the other hand, Islamic Ottoman identity representatives (such as DP, AP, RP, FP and AKP within different perspectives) have taken religious freedom into account as an issue concerning conservative Sunni part of the society, who have been limited within their perspective. There is one thing that should be highlighted in this point: Although conservatization of the society has its utmost ascendancy during the last decade, AKP governments have been the ones those have paid more attention to religious issues including official/social minorities when we compare with its successors. The opening of Armenian Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Van, solution of territory issue of Mor Gabriel Monastery's are the most salient examples. In addition to those, a series of workshops have been carried out by AKP Government regarding the problems of Alevis as the first systematic governmental initiative of Turkish politics. These initiatives have not been considered sufficient and even sincere; nevertheless, they show that the religious freedom issue has taken into account not just for

⁴⁴¹ "Başbakan Erdoğan 'Demokratikleşme Paketi'ni Açıkladı," *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 30 September 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/basbakan_erdogan_demokratiklesme_paketini_acikliyor-1153198> (30 September 2013).

⁴⁴² "Demokratikleşme Paketi'ne İlk Tepki!," *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 30 September 2013, <<http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/-demokratiklesme-paketi-ne-ilk/gundem/detay/1770585/default.htm>> (30 September 2013).

conservative Sunnis, but also for different parts of society. Among all, Alevi initiative will be discussed with its details on following chapter.

Within the clash of aforementioned two identities, Alevis have maintained their position in between, and within different applications of different governments, they supported one or another regarding their own interests without having their own representatives. On social order, there have been different events affected their social life, including industrialization, urbanization, Marxist movements and conservatization of society. Within this chapter, political trends and consequent situation of Turkey have been analyzed and during the following one, reactions and position of Alevis against these social and political trends will be examined.

4. ALEVISM: UNRECOGNIZED IDENTITY

Identity is a characteristic that belongs to an individual, or to a group of people, a community of common shared components. These components may vary, and each of them forms a different theme to study within different principles of social sciences. This thesis, most specifically this chapter of it, will focus on cultural and religious components of an identity, Alevism, and the place of its adherents, Alevis, in Turkish social and political orders regarding their religious freedom.

Alevism has been the target of many discussions based on its characteristics to see whether it is a religious identity, a cultural one, even social or political identities. In either way, Alevism is a component of identity, which has been used for centuries in order to make self-definition or to be defined by others, under different names, in different geographies and with different approaches.

Today, Alevism is a religious component with its distinctive cultural characteristics and has been spread to a wide geography, which can be defined basically: from Central Asia to Central Europe with historical roots. In fact, it would be beneficial to make a certain definition of Alevism; however, Alevism is not a set of beliefs with certain limits; instead, it is a religious syncretism that has been formed and enriched by many different religious and cultural components.

Under this chapter of the thesis, Alevism will be examined within different perspectives, which are historical, political and social, in order to give detailed information to the lecturer for the answers of questions regarding Alevism, such as: What is Alevism? How has it been formed? What components does it include? How different is Alevism, within political and social perspectives? How were they differentiated from the majority under different state rules? What has been the place of Alevis in the Turkish society, and what did affect their place throughout history?

How far their religious freedom goes under a laic state structure, this is to say, in Turkey?

4.1. What is Alevism?

Alevism can be defined, briefly, as a set of belief with different components of various independent religious systems not only monotheistic, but also Iranian and Indian ones, which have been melted in order to form a new religious and cultural way of life. This definition, obviously, is a general perspective without any historical or geographical references, which form an important part of formation of Alevism.

In order to understand what Alevism is, or who Alevis are, it is essential to deepen the discussion within history. For all these reasons, Alevism will be examined with historical roots from Central Asia starting with nomad Turkmen tribes, to Anatolia with significant references to Safavid and Ottoman empires, which had affected Alevism directly or indirectly. This part of the chapter will focus on historical evolution until the time that name *Alevi* started to be used in order to define this community. These historical references will lead this study to analyze current form of Alevism, and the relation of Alevis with the laic Republic of Turkey. However, as historical references will not be sufficient to understand Alevism, a part will be dedicated to Alevi worships to see Alevis' distinctive religious way of practicing and to comprehend the necessities of Alevis in order to live and maintain their identity freely. Eventually, discussions will be examined regarding the definition of Alevism by different communities and authorities.

Alevism has been spread to a wide geography by transaction and mass immigration flows, as it was mentioned. This immigration route and evolution of Alevism has been clarified by Ali Balkız as following;

Alevism is a path, a philosophy, and a way of life, which has been fed from various elements within its route starting from Khorasan, going to Iran, then to

Mesopotamia and then to Anatolia. It embedded various characteristics of local cultures, and has not turned into any of them.¹

If one should mention the limits of existence of Alevism, it will not be wrong to start with Kazakhstan in Central Asia and go to Balkan region or far more, to Poland and to Russia through Iran, Iraq and Turkey.² As a historical consequence, which will be mentioned in upcoming parts, Alevism is a considerable component of Balkan region (apart from Anatolia), especially Ludogorie region including Babadag in Romania, Silistra, Dobrich, Kubrat, Razgrad, Ruse, Targovishte, Sliven, Yambol, Haskovo, Kardzhali in Bulgaria, and Didymotikon in Greece and Albania within different names and diversity.³ Due to aforementioned expanded geographical limits, Ercan Geçmez stated;

“I am against the usage of ‘Anatolian Alevis’. It is very limited, while Alevism is not something limited to a certain geography. You mention the Alevis of Anatolia; however, there are many Alevis outside this region.”⁴

Due to geographical diversity, Alevism has been varied within time in different regions; however, only the Alevism of Anatolia will be focused with respect to the aim of this thesis. In order to analyze relation of Alevis with the Republic of Turkey, Anatolian Alevis will be examined; nevertheless, necessary references will be given with respect to its relevance with the main theme.

Apart from the territorial diversity, Alevism of Turkey also contains significant inner diversity. Alevis are spread almost all over the country, as it is shown in Figure I: Alevi Population in Turkey.⁵ Since there is not an official record about religious preferences in Turkey, there is not an exact number of Alevi

¹ Balkız, interview.

² Ercan Geçmez (Chairperson of Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Foundation), interview by Didem Doganyılmaz, Ankara/Turkey, 12 April 2011;

Irène Mélikoff. “Bektaşiler Tarikatı ve Hacı Bektaş’a Bağlı Zümreler: Probleme Toplu Bakış” in *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*, trans. Turan Alptekin (Istanbul: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 22;

Mustafa Şen (Associate Professor of Sociology in Middle East Technical University), interview by Didem Doganyılmaz, Ankara/Turkey, 14 April 2011.

³ Irène Mélikoff. “Bulgaristan’da Deliorman Kızılbaş Topluluğu” in *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*, trans. Turan Alptekin (Istanbul: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 130.

⁴ Geçmez, interview.

⁵ Please see Appendix XI on page 305.

<<http://www.aleviform.com/showthread.php?t=29393&page=12>> (17 December 2010).

population; however, according to different sources, it varies from 10 to 20 million.⁶ The word *Alevi*, within a general perspective, refers to two different groups living in Turkey as the representatives of said inner diversity: Anatolian Alevi (known as *Kızılbaş*—literally red headed) and Arab Alevi (known as Alawi, Alawite and Nusayri). Origin of difference between these two groups is the territorial background, and it led to a significant dissimilarity among Anatolian Alevi and Alawis with respect to way of practices, cultures and languages. As they form the majority of entire Alevi population of Turkey, Anatolian Alevi will be examined with their distinctive culture; however, it will be undeniably essential to give brief information regarding Alawis to the lecturer, in order to mention the synonymous usage of word Alevi for these two groups and brief instruction regarding their history and worship before the definition of Alevism of Anatolia.

Alawis living in Turkey are ethnically Arabs and that is the reason why they are named as Arab Alevi, as well. Alawis arrived to Turkish territories as a result of immigration flows, initiated from Yemen and headed to north, due to economical conditions and political pressure. Within this route, Alawis settled in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey. As it is shown in Figure I, Alawis of Turkey live generally in three southern cities, Mersin, Adana and Hatay, which are close to the borderline close to Syria.⁷

Alawis living in Turkey are identical with the Alawis of Syria, who form approximately 10% of Syrian population; despite, of being demographically minority among Sunni majority (65% of total population).⁸ Alawis of Syria are in power since 1971, with Assad Family, Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar al-Assad from the Arab Socialist Baath Party. Since 2011, as a part of Arab Uprisings, anti-government demonstrations targeted Baath Party, in other words Assad Rule, and it

⁶ Ali Balkız, *Sivas'tan Sydney'ye Aleviler* (Ankara: İtalik Kitaplar, 1999), 87; John Shindeldecker, "Turkish Alevi Today," *Alevi Bektaşî Araştırma Sitesi*, n.d., <http://www.alevibektasi.org/xalevis_home.htm> (22 January 2011).

⁷ Ahmet Özügür (an Arbiter of Nusayri Community), interview by Didem Doganyılmaz, Mersin/Turkey, 18 April 2011.

⁸ Nir Rosen, "Assad's Alawites: The guardians of the throne," *Aljazeera*, 2011, <<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/10/20111010122434671982.html>> (12 March 2013).

turned into a civil war, in which significant references are being made to religious differences between Alawis and Sunnis.⁹

Alawis are named after Caliphate Ali; however, there are other names in use in order to mention them. For instance, name *Nusayri* is a common usage in Turkey, even more than Alawi, or Arab Alevi. Name *Nusayri* has its historical roots. Alawis are not content to be named as Nusayri, because, it became a way to discriminate Alawis and to accuse them of being unbelievers. *Nusayri* has been used as followers of Muhammad ibn Nusayr, who was a follower and a pupil of Hasan al Askari, the 11th of Twelvers, in order to isolate them from Muslim society.¹⁰ According to another approach, Alawis maintained in An-Nusayriyah Mountain, which formed the natural border between the Alawite State and Syria during 1920-1936, in order to be safe; consequently, they were named after the Mountain as Nusayri.¹¹ Name Nusayri is still in use in Turkey with an intention to differentiate Alevis and Alawis, which are homonyms with their translation to Turkish.

Alawis differentiate themselves from Sunni majority of Turkey with their strong belief in Ehl-i Beyt, which means *the family, the people of the house* in pre-Islamic time; however, after Islam, it is used to mention the family of the Prophet Muhammad,¹² and they believe that Ehl-i Beyt is one of the two most weighty things that Prophet Muhammad left (the other is the Book, *Quran*). They comment Quran within the frame of Ehl-i Beyt; however, apart from that their religious rituals are mostly similar to Sunni Islamic ones, such as five times a day prayers (in a different form), fasts in Ramadan and religious festivals as in Sunni belief. There is another thing that should be distinguished that they practice in mosques, separately for different gender groups similar to Sunnis and entirely different to Alevis.¹³ The difference between Alevis and Alawis will be clearer with detailed information regarding Alevi faith. On the other hand, although, there are not much similarities

⁹ "Profile: Syria's Ruling Baath Party," *BBC News Middle East*, 2012, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18582755>> (14 March 2013).

¹⁰ Mustafa Ali Bedir, *Ehl-i Beyt Sevgisi Cennet'in Anahtaridir* (Adana: Koza Matbaası, 2000), 6-10; Özüğurlu, interview.

¹¹ Bedir, *Ehl-i Beyt Sevgisi*, 7.

¹² "Ehl-i Beyt," *Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, 2011, <<http://www.diyenet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/DiniBilgilerDetay.aspx?ID=299>> (06 May 2011).

¹³ Özüğurlu, interview.

apart from being supporters of Ali,¹⁴ Alawis feel themselves close to Shia branch of Islam, and to Sunni belief as well, they define this complexity with an expression, which is “We are neither Alawi nor Sunni; we are both Alawi and Sunni.”¹⁵ Similarities to Sunnis regarding the form of rituals have already been mentioned, and ‘Alawi’ in this sentence probably refers to Shia Islam. This reference can be supported by their accounts of their historical scholars. Because, Alawis possess the Shia authors, lecturers and men of letters as they are Alawis.¹⁶

4.1.1. History of Alevism

Alevism is a set of belief, which has been composed by many different components from different religious systems. This syncretic structure makes history of Alevism a pivotal theme to define the characteristics of Alevism with significant historical references.

As it was mentioned for the case of Alawis, Alevi is a word that refers to the supporters of Caliphate Ali. However, apart from being the supporter/follower of Caliphate Ali, there is another usage of Alevi, which means to be from the same race of him. For instance, in Iran, Alevi has been used to point out to be *Seyyid*, which means a relative of Caliphate Ali. For that reason, Irène Mélikoff points out the etymological mistake with the usage of Alevi in order to mention the Alevis of Anatolia, as Alevis of Anatolia have no relation in ethnic level with Caliphate Ali.¹⁷ Hence, it will be beneficial to understand the historical usage of word “Alevi”.

Alevis had been named as *Kızılbaş*, which was mentioned above as one of the names of Alevis, after the Safavid Empire during 15th and 16th century with

¹⁴ İsmail Engin. “Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alevi Kimliğinin Oluşumu, Gelişimi ve Değişmesinde ‘İmaj’ Sorunu ve Düşman İmajlarının Etkileri” in *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alevi Tarih ve Kültürü*, ed. İbrahim Bahadır (Bielefeld: Bielefeld Alevi Kültür Merkezi Yayınları, 2002), 287.

¹⁵ Özügürlü, interview.

¹⁶ Mehmet Es-Salih, *Gerçeklerin Işığında Aleviler*, trans. Ahmet Bedir (Ankara: Baran Ofset, 2007), 73.

¹⁷ Irène Mélikoff. “Aleviliğin Temelleri,” in *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*, trans. Turan Alptekin (İstanbul: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 34;

Irène Mélikoff. “Kızılbaş Problemi,” in *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*, trans. Turan Alptekin (İstanbul: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 51.

reference to the red hat of the Turkmen tribes under the rule Safavids.¹⁸ This name had been used as a self-description and as description of others for a long time until the end of 19th century.¹⁹ Within this period, name Kızılbaş had become synonymous with *unbeliever*, in order to define this *non-conformist* and *heterodox community*. The name Kızılbaş is still in use in Turkey; although, self-definition had changed with *Alevi* due to the faith in Ali, after the initials of 19th century in order to avoid being insulted or being accused.²⁰ With respect to the inner diversity of Alevism, and in order to avoid any insulting usage, related community will be named as *Alevi*s in this thesis and necessary information will be given to point out the diverse structure and to differentiate a specific group.

Alevism has a syncretic structure that has been affected by many different religious systems. The origin, or better to say, the first components of Alevi belief belong to Central Asian Turkic customs, because nomad Turkmen tribes played a significant role, while they emigrated to west from Central Asia, they carried their traditional belief systems to Anatolia. Anatolia has been the region, where traditional belief systems were mixed with Islamic customs.²¹

Nomad Turkmen tribes were in cultural interaction with Chinese and Indian people; hence, *Turkish paganism*, based on spiritual leadership of every single creature, was occurred as a consequence of effects from Buddhism and Manichaeism. Additionally, these nomad tribes were affected by Shamanism with respect to religious rituals, as well as the deification of Sun. On the other hand, in old Turkic tribes' culture, such as Oghuz Turks and Altay people, there were significant proofs regarding Bai-Ulgen (*Ülgen*²²) belief, which was considered as an effect of Abrahamic religions regarding the soleness of God (*Bir Tanrı*).²³ As the belief Ulgen led to the belief in *Tengri* (*Gök Tanrı*), nomad tribes buried their

¹⁸ David Zeidan, "The Alevi of Anatolia," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3, no. 2 (1999): 78.

¹⁹ Mélikoff. "Bektaşiler Tarikatı," 25-26;

Mélikoff. "Kızılbaş Problemi," 51.

²⁰ Mélikoff. "Aleviliğin Temelleri," 34.

²¹ Balkız, interview.

²² A benevolent deity and the God of Upper World, which led to the belief in *Tengri* (*Gök Tanrı*).

²³ Kutluay Erdoğan, *Alevi-Bektaşî Gerçeği: İslamiyetin, Türkmen töreselliği içinde özümленerek Anadolulaşması* (İstanbul: ALFA, 2000), 19-20.

corpses in uphill in order to be close to the *Tengri*.²⁴ At the end of the 11th century, immigration flows of Turkmen tribes started and during 12th and 13th centuries, flows became more intense due to the necessity of escape from Mongol invasion.²⁵ During the mentioned period, Anatolia was under the rule of Seljuk Sultanate of Rum (*Anadolu Selçuklu Devleti*). With the immigration of Turkmen tribes, a three-year religio-political revolt, Baba’i Revolt was carried out with leadership of Baba Ishaq, a popular Turkmen preacher, against the rule of Sultanate.²⁶ This revolt affected Alevi belief significantly because of the new settlement of Hacı Bektaş.

Hacı Bektaş, who had immigrated with Turkmen tribes to Anatolia, was a Muslim mystic philosopher from Khorasan. He escaped from the Baba’i Revolt and settled in Central Anatolia, in Nevşehir (*Soluca Kara Öyük*), central Anatolian city, where his tomb is now.²⁷

Hacı Bektaş, although he did not form a systematic doctrine, became the eponym of a religious order after his death. Despite different records of his death in different sources, he is believed to die before the establishment of the Ottoman Empire (1299). Neither, he was not alive in Ottoman period, nor he formed a systematic doctrine or possessed pupils in order to convey his thoughts, he affected the Ottoman Empire with *indirect* influences in military and social orders.

Hacı Bektaş was peer with Sheik Edebali, the father-in-law of first Ottoman Sultan Osman I; that’s why, there was not a direct interaction of him with Ottoman Sultans due to age discrepancy. However, when the first military force was established by Murat I, the third Ottoman Sultan, named Janissaries (*Yeniçeri*), it was connected to the Bektashi order, which was not yet institutionalized. Janissaries were named as “Sons of Hacı Bektaş”, and a *Vekil* represented the Bektashi order by remaining in the Heart of Janissaries.²⁸ By the way, Janissaries were not only

²⁴ Ibid., 24.

²⁵ Irène Mélikoff. “Bektashi/Kizilbas: Historical Bipartition and Its Consequences,” in *Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives*, eds. Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Ozdalga and Catharina Raudvere (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 1998), 1.

²⁶ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Anatolia," 02 April 2013, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/22897/Anatolia>>.

²⁷ Mélikoff. “Aleviliğin Temelleri,” 32.

²⁸ Mélikoff. “Kızılbaş Problemi,” 55.

responsible with military, but also they were used to Islamize the newly conquered territories by building dervish lodges (*tekkes*) and small ones (*zaviye*). This was seen as the reason of existence of Alevis in Thrace and Balkan region. Consequently, Alevis/Bektashis became an important actor of Ottoman Empire with the help of Janissary system, until its abolishment in the 19th century.²⁹

Hacı Bektaş is believed to be respected by first Ottoman Sultans, as his dervish lodge was built and enriched by different sultans. His tomb was built by Murat I, and it was enlarged by Murat II, the sixth Sultan and Bayezid II, the eighth Sultan. However, the period of Selim I, the ninth Sultan, who took the Caliph title from Mamluk Sultanate with the Battle of Ridaniye in 1517, was not clear concerning support to Dervish Lodge of Hacı Bektaş. According to different sources, the same support was either kept,³⁰ or cut.³¹

Hacı Bektaş is considered as a Sufi belonging to Turkmen tribes.³² He is considered as a good Muslim; although, he was not practicing within a concrete form such as prayers for five times a day.³³ This liberalistic form of worship would considerably affect the process, which led the actual form of Alevism. In fact, he did not institutionalize a systematic order; however, his doctrine turned into one during the first years of 16th century by Balım Sultan, who was assigned as the head of Dervish Lodge of Hacı Bektaş (*Postnişin*) by Sultan Bayezid II. Institutionalization process was carried out by taking little lodges under control of Dervish Lodge of Hacı Bektaş.³⁴

²⁹ Irène Mélikoff. "Anadolu'da Cemaat Dışı İslamlık: Örf-dışılık, İnanç Karışması, Gnose," in *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*, trans. Turan Alptekin (Ankara: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 101-103.

³⁰ "Hacı Bektaş Veli Müzesi," *Hacı Bektaş Web*, n.d., <http://www.hacibektas.com/index.php?id=hacibektas_veli_muze> (1 March 2012).

³¹ Suraiya Faroqhi, "The Tekke of Hacı Bektas: Social Position and Economic Activities." *Journal of Middle East Studies* 7, no.2 (1976): 183-208 quoted in Irène Mélikoff. "Bir Kolonileştirici Dervişler Tarikatı: Bektaşiler Sosyal Roller ve İlk Osmanlı Sultanlarıyla Bağlantıları," in *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*, trans. Turan Alptekin (Istanbul: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 204.

³² Mélikoff. "Bektashi/Kızılbaş," 4.

³³ Mélikoff. "Kızılbaş Problemi," 54-55.

³⁴ İbrahim Bahadır. "Hacı Bektas Veli Tekkesi'nin Dini Merkez Olarak Yükselme Süreci," in *Hacı Bektas Veli: Güneşte Zerresinden. Deryada Katresinden*, eds. Pınar Ecevitoglu, Ali Murat İrat and Ayhan Yalçınkaya (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2010), 238;

Mélikoff. "Bektaşiler Tarikatı," 21-22.

There is one thing that should be clarified on this point. So far, the community of the case study of this thesis was named as Alevi; however, right now, Bektashi order has been highlighted. In order to avoid any inconvenience or misunderstanding, Alevi - Bektashi definition should be done before the explanation of doctrine. Alevi and Bektashis are both from the same historical root, which was composed by the nomadic Turkmen tribes with their distinctive belief system synthesis. Both groups respect the doctrine of Hacı Bektaş. As it was stated by Mélikoff, the difference is not coming from the origin; instead, from the forms. Since Bektashi lodges were used as a tool to Islamize newly conquered territories, they were settled in urban places as a state policy; on the other hand, Alevi, who were to be named as Kızılbaş after 15th and 16th century, maintained in rural areas.³⁵ This is the point, where two different approaches have occurred: While Bektashis are generally considered as a significant part Alevi,³⁶ with respect to Fuat Köprülü's argument Alevi were a part of Bektashism, as Mélikoff referred. Köprülü described Alevi as "rural Bektashis" in order to unify two groups, who were considerably identical with one exception based on urban/rural distinction.³⁷ In addition to that distinction, Bektashi order, as a Sufi order, is open to anybody; however, being an Alevi requires lineage. Additionally, due to strict endogamy, some scholars have considered Alevism a quasi-ethnic group.³⁸

As name of Alevi was started to be used in 19th century, and mentioned rural communities of Turkmen tribes those were to be named as Kızılbaş under Ottoman rule more than four centuries before, the word *Alevi* should have covered both Bektashis and Kızılbaş under one significant definition including all religious references those have been and will be mentioned within this part. It is clear that the difference between urbanized Bektashis and rural Kızılbaş people would be increased within time; however, name *Alevi* will be efficient to refer both of these groups, who were not separated with certain limits on the level of religious practices and doctrines. Because, within time, Safavid style religious components of Kızılbaş

³⁵ Mélikoff. "Anadolu'da Cemaat Dışı İslamlık," 101-103.

³⁶ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Bektashi," 06 May 2011, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/58980/Bektashi>>;

"World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples-Turkey: Alevi," *Minority Rights Group International*, 2008, <<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49749c9950.html>> (3 April 2013).

³⁷ Mélikoff. "Aleviliğin Temelleri," 33.

³⁸ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 141.

people started to be spread among Bektashis, as well.³⁹ That should have been the reason why their distinctive culture has been referred as Alevi-Bektashi culture. Since the name *Alevi* has been considered efficient to refer the target community of this thesis, it will be used so in entire explanations.

After the 16th century, Alevism of Anatolia started to be affected from the Safavid Empire established in 1501 by Shah Ismail, who was to become an important influencer not only to belief system, but also to Alevi literature with his native Turkish language.⁴⁰ Turkmen tribes settled in Azerbaijan and northern Iran, who formed significant part of Safavid subjects, supported Safavid Dynasty.⁴¹ As it was mentioned, the rural community of Turkmen tribes were named as Kızılbaş after Safavid Empire due to their headdresses: a red bonnet with twelve facets referring to Twelvers of Shi'a Islam.⁴² Within a decade, Shah Ismail achieved great territorial unity including Iran and some provinces of Iraq, such as Baghdad and Mosul, and despite predominantly Sunni character of said territories, he declared Shi'a Islam as state religion.⁴³ In Shi'a Islam of Shah Ismail, strong belief in Twelvers, in Caliphate Ali and his deity, and anthropomorphism, which led Shah Ismail to consider himself as a sacred personality and an incarnate of Ali, were significant components, which were to be components of Anatolian Alevism due to interaction of Turkmen tribes with the Safavid Empire and its religious propaganda.⁴⁴

Shia Islam, as opposed to Sunni Islam official religion of the Ottoman Empire, and its obvious supporters, who were Turkmen tribes of eastern Anatolia, were considered as threats against the Ottoman Empire; consequently, the name Kızılbaş turned into a way to point them as rebels, followers of Shah Ismail,⁴⁵ and unbelievers to insult them. In Ottoman documents, said Turkmen tribes were named

³⁹ Mélikoff. "Kızılbaş Problemi," 56.

⁴⁰ Roger Savory, *Iran Under The Safavids* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 213.

⁴¹ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Safavid Dynasty," 04 April 2013, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/516019/Safavid-dynasty>>.

⁴² Mélikoff. "Bektashi/Kizilbas," 5-6.

⁴³ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Safavid Dynasty," 04 April 2013, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/516019/Safavid-dynasty>>.

⁴⁴ Mélikoff. "Kızılbaş Problemi," 51.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 52-54.

as *zındık*, heredic, *rafizi*,⁴⁶ schismatic, shi'ite, *mülhid* and atheist; so that, significant hostility, which will be discussed with details under relevant topic, occurred.⁴⁷

Heart of Janissaries possessed more importance with expanding territories of the Ottoman Empire, and became a political power. Soldiers of Janissaries were recruited by Christian youth, who were converted to Islam before the service, and apart from their military capability, they were well educated. However, after the late 16th century, the restrictions were relaxed; consequently, the system lost its functionality. During the 17th and 18th centuries, many revolts were carried out by Janissaries against the Ottoman Dynasty; eventually, in 1826 Heart of Janissaries were abolished by Sultan Mahmud II, 30th Sultan. Most of Janissaries were killed or executed after prison.⁴⁸ With the abolishment of Heart of Janissaries, the official status of Bektashi lodges were changed, and they were closed, and all asset belonging to Bektashi lodges were sold.⁴⁹ Closed lodges of Bektashis were handed over the Naqshbandi order, which was defined in previous part, due to their loyal stand to official Ottoman Islamism, in other words, Sunni Islamic culture.⁵⁰

After the closure of Bektashi lodges, the order lost its power in the Empire and hid from the authority; however, its adherents did not disqualify themselves. Therefore, the lodge was assumed to be carried to a different level.⁵¹ According to Mélikoff, Bektashis became freethinkers and, in the 20th century, often Freemasons (*Franc-maçonnerie*)⁵² as progressivists due to common ideals, such as non-conformism and freethinking. According to many scholars, this interaction between

⁴⁶ A person, who does not accept the caliphate of Abu Bakr and Umar, the first and second Caliphs according to Islamic belief. However, Shia Muslims and Alevis do not recognize their caliphate, and Ali is believed as the first Caliph.

⁴⁷ Mélikoff. "Bektashi/Kizilbas," 5-6;

Ali Yıldırım, *Osmanlı Engizisyonu* (Ankara: Öteki Yayınevi, 1996), 151.

⁴⁸ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Janissary," 04 April 2013, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/300350/Janissary-corps>>.

⁴⁹ "Cemevi Tartışması," *Türkiye'nin Nabzı*, Habertürk TV (Istanbul, December 12, 2012).

⁵⁰ Irène Mélikoff. "1826'dan Sonra Bektaşiler Tarikatı," in *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*, trans. Turan Alptekin (Ankara: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 211.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 212.

⁵² The teachings and practices of the secret fraternal order of Free and Accepted Masons, the largest worldwide secret society. Spread by the advance of the British Empire, Freemasonry remains most popular in the British Isles and in other countries originally within the empire. Secret lodges developed modern symbolic or speculative Freemasonry, which particularly in the 17th and 18th centuries, adopted the rites and trappings of ancient religious orders and of chivalric brotherhood. Source: *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Freemasonry," 08 April 2013, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/218618/Freemasons-order-of>>.

Bektashis and Freemasons of France fastened the revolutionary movement of Young Turks,⁵³ even further, the Committee of Union and Progress, with personal endeavor of Ziya Gökalp, who was a Bektashi himself, and his students Fuat Köprülü, Hamid Sa'di (1914– 1949) and Baha Said (1882–1939). Mélikoff counted Fuat Köprülü, Namık Kemal, and Abdülhak Hamit as Bektashis, also.⁵⁴

The time Bektashis started to associate with Freemasonry was assumed to be the most increasing moment of differentiation process between Bektashis and Kızılbaş people.⁵⁵ On the other hand, simultaneously the name Alevi started to be used in order to refer these two groups. Hence, the abusual usage of Kızılbaş left its role to name Alevi for the same purpose. The name Alevi started to be used; nevertheless, re-emergence of Alevi identity as a systematic component of society was not a fact in this period, and would not be a significant one until the second half of 20th century.

4.1.2. What Makes Alevism Different?

Today's Alevism has been evaluated within hundreds of years as it was examined in previous part, and it was enriched by many different belief systems and cultures within this historical process. Alevism re-interpreted these components; eventually, it possessed its distinctive culture with distinctive religious rituals as a heritage of mentioned traditional belief systems.

Within time, Alevism has gained its own characteristics, which have considerably been effective to their distinctive culture. Their support of gender equality, Turkish-speaking rituals, its special type of music, and its minstrels form the Alevi culture. There are many discussions regarding the characteristics of Alevism, if it is a culture or an entire religion; however, this discussion will be put

⁵³ Irène Mélikoff. "Bektasi-Alevi Senkretizmini Meydana Getiren Ögeler Üzerine Araştırmalar," in *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*, trans. Turan Alptekin (Ankara: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 101-103;

Mélikoff. "Bektashi/Kizilbas," 7;

Richard Davey, *The Sultan and His Subjects* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1907), 155; Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution Of 1908* (n.p.:Literary Licensing, LLC, 2012), 116.

⁵⁴ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 142-143;

Mélikoff. "1826'dan Sonra," 218.

⁵⁵ Mélikoff. "Anadolu'da Cemaat Dışı," 101-103.

aside, and this part will focus on the rituals in order to clarify the difference of Alevism. On the other hand, it is important to distinguish that there is not an exact form of Alevism, in other words, Alevi rituals may vary from one group to another. This variety might have occurred due to lack of a systematic interaction of Alevi communities within history; therefore, it will not be wrong to say that while a group live their religion with dominance of Shamanism within syncretic structure of Alevism, another group in a different geography live under dominance of Islam. Additionally, possession of Sunni Islam as official religion of the Ottoman Empire led systematic transformation from older generations to new ones with its distinctive schools and written sources; and, as it was mentioned, Alevism remained oral. With the lack of written sources and difficulties of interaction between diverse groups in different geographies, it could not possess a unique form and varied within time. This variety has been alleged as an obstacle to the recognition of Alevis by authorities, as it will be mentioned in following part; however, this variety has been supported by Alevis as it forms the richness of Alevi identity. Alevis refer this theological variety with a saying: “The way is one, the form a thousand and one.”⁵⁶

Within this part, mentioned variety led to ritualistic differences of Alevism will not be discussed; instead, general perspectives will be given regarding Alevi rituals. Whether Alevism is a religion itself, or a culture, it has its own way of belief, practices and place of worship. These differences will lead the lecturer to understand reasons of problems, which Alevis face with, in today’s laic Turkey.

According to Islamic belief, the prerequisite of being a Muslim is to testify in *Allah* (God) as the creator and Muhammad as his prophet with Shahada (*Şehadet*). As Alevis have considerable fellowship to Caliphate Ali, the form of Shahada changes, and they testify in the trinity of *Hak-Muhammed-Ali*.⁵⁷ With this saying, four references are made. First of all, God (*Hak*) is unique. Secondly, Muhammad is his prophet, who conveyed the words of God to people and lived accordingly. Thirdly, Caliphate Ali is his Wali (*Veli*), he understood the word of God, lived

⁵⁶ Geçmez, interview.

⁵⁷ *Alevi Tören ve Ritüelleri Cem Cenaze Kurban* (Ankara: Akademi Matbaası, 2005), 29.

accordingly, and interpreted under changed circumstances. And last of all, *Hak-Muhammed-Ali* is an inseparable completeness.⁵⁸

Quran is the book Islam, which is believed to be completed in 23 years as the words of God revealed to Muhammad through Gabriel. Alevi have faith in Quran, as well, and they do not limit the words of God with Quran; instead, they believe in four holy books.⁵⁹ They have faith in Torah, Psalms, Bible and Quran; however, with a significant distinction. Alevi believe that Quran was changed while it was written to be copied by Caliphate Osman, which is named as Quran-e Samit (*Kuran`ı Samit*) and the one in use today. Instead of Quran-e Samit, they believe in Quran-e Natic (*Kuran`ı Natic*), which is believed to be the original version of Quran memorized by Caliphate Ali.⁶⁰

Hak-Muhammed-Ali is believed to be a way of unification of God and human. This is to say; the difference between creator (referring the God) and creatures (referring humans) is vanished. Additionally, the creed of *En-el Hak*⁶¹ leads Alevi to believe that God is embedded in every single person and creature. Hence, there is not a concept of a God figure that provokes fear; so that, they do not afraid of God and possess a questioning approach. As God is not a frightened figure, they do not believe in reward or punishment system, in other words heaven or hell, which would come from God as a result of their obedience or disobedience. Instead, they believe that human nature includes both heaven and hell inside oneself. Therefore, a person may live any of them as result of his/her attitudes.⁶² Briefly, Alevi believe that a person is responsible to himself/herself instead of a creator, due to personal conscience.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 30.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.;

Geçmez, interview.

⁶¹ The creed belongs to Mansur Al-Hallaj (858-922) a Persian writer and a teacher of Sufism, borned to a Zoroastrian father. En-el Hak means that: "I am the God". Mansur Al-Hallaj used to deny God as a great figure above, and argued that God was inside of human. Within the history Alevi possessed it as a proof of their belief about creature`s being a part of God.

⁶² *Alevi Tören ve Ritüelleri*, 30;
Geçmez, interview.

Responsibility to oneself due to personal conscience is mentioned with three limitations. According to these limitations, a person should be the master of his/her hands, tongue and loins (*Eline, diline, beline sahip ol!*); this is to say, “Take responsibility for your words, actions, and morals.”⁶³ This saying forms the basis of Alevi morality. There are two different perceptions regarding the origin of it. İbrahim Aksoy claims that Mansur Al-Hallaj converted the creed of “think well, speak well and do well” of Zoroastrianism into taking responsibility of words, actions and morals.⁶⁴ On the other hand, Mélikoff argues that Manichaeism affected Alevism on this characteristic with its creed three seals (*üç mühür*), which are seal of mouth, seal of hand and seal of heart.⁶⁵

There is a concrete ethic of Alevis, which forms the path to understand the entire doctrine and to achieve the perfect human being. According to Four Gates and Forty Levels (*Dört Kapı, Kırk Makam*), there are four different spiritual levels that a person can achieve, and within every new level, the individual gets closer to the aim. The first gate is Sharia (*Şeriat Kapısı*). There is one thing that should be distinguished on that point that there is no relation between Sharia the Islamic Law and Sharia the Gate. A person, who arrives at this gate, becomes conscious that he/she is nothing but a speaking living being. The second gate's name is Tariqa (*Tarikat Kapısı*). One, who achieves here, gets aware of him/her and become able to think individually. For instance, taking responsibility of words, actions and morals is a part of this level;⁶⁶ because, now he/she is more than a speaking living being, is an individual who is aware of his/her responsibilities. When an individual arrives at the third gate, Marifa (*Marifet Kapısı*), the individualism vanishes, and “consciousness of community” occurs. And when a person achieves to the last gate, which is called as Haqiqa (*Hakikat Kapısı*), he/she will get aware of unity of all nature and mankind that leads him/her to perfect human being. A person, who arrives at that level of ethic, is considered as a saint (*ulu*).⁶⁷

⁶³ Balkız, interview;

Shindeldecker, “Turkish Alevis Today.”

⁶⁴ İbrahim Aksoy. “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alevilik” in *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alevi Tarih ve Kültürü*, ed. İbrahim Bahadır (Bielefeld: Bielefeld Alevi Kültür Merkezi Yayınları, 2002), 243.

⁶⁵ Mélikoff. “Bektaşî-Alevî Senkretizmini,” 123.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 123.

⁶⁷ Geçmez, interview.

Ramadan is the month of fasting according to Islamic belief. A person, who fasts, does not eat and drink anything during the day, which starts with sunrise and lasts until sunset. Alevis also fast, however not in same time and not in same form. Differently from Sunni fasts, Alevi fast is not about nourishment. They eat and drink, but with strict limitations. First of all, pure water is strictly prohibited; it is allowed to drink tea or other drinks containing water in order to serve the need of water of body. Knives get out of use; hence, any solid food need to be cut or chopped is not preferable.⁶⁸ Personal moral purification plays a significant role in Alevi fasts, which is why it is believed that telling anyone about the fast is inappropriate.⁶⁹

Time of fasts also differs from Ramadan. Alevis have their own special days to fast. *Muharrem* fasts form an important part of Alevi fasts. Muharram is the first month of Islamic Calendar (*Hicri Takvim*), and the month of Battle of Karbala, in which Imam Husayn, the son of Caliphate Ali was killed in 10 Muharram 61 according to Islamic Calendar. In Shi'i Islam, Muharrem fasts are for ten days; however, Alevis fast for 12 days, while the first ten days are regular fasts like in Shi'i Islam, to understand the cruelty of Imam Husayn, and the last two days are for being grateful for the salvation of Ali ibn Husayn (son of Husayn) in order to maintain the generation of Muhammad.⁷⁰ *Muharrem* fasts end with sacrificed animals and a special dish named *Aşure*, which is a special soup with different ingredients like fruits, nuts and grains. Usually it contains 12 ingredients with reference to the Twelvers.⁷¹ During *Muharrem* fasts, attending any ceremonies, such as weddings or celebrations, is not appropriate. Additionally, shaving was not an appropriate behavior; however, under urban conditions, it became inapplicable.⁷²

Muharrem fast is not the only fast that Alevis follow. Fast of *Hızır* is another one, which is practiced by people suffering for any reason in order to obtain relief and to achieve welfare.⁷³ *Hızır* is believed to be one of the saints or prophets, who is

⁶⁸ Irène Mélikoff. "Alevi Adetleri Üzerine Notlar: Bazı Orta-Anadolu Kutlamaları Dolayısıyla" in *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*, trans. Turan Alptekin (Istanbul: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 78.

⁶⁹ Geçmez, interview.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Mélikoff. "Alevi Adetleri," 78; Shindeldecker, "Turkish Alevis Today."

⁷² Kazım Ak, "Muharrem Ayı ve Orucu," *Alevitische Gemeinde Schweinfurt e.V.*, 2008, <<http://www.alevi-schweinfurt.com/alevilik/muharremorucu/index.html>> (11 April 2013).

⁷³ Geçmez, interview.

capable of solving problems of suffering people.⁷⁴ During 5-6 May, *Hidirellez* (*Hızır-İlyas*) *Bayramı* is celebrated as a spring festival of Alevis;⁷⁵ however, today it is celebrated within a wider geography and not just by Alevis. According to the belief, *Hızır* delivers health, success, life (it is to refer spring, as plants turn into green as if they get back into life) and chance.⁷⁶

Muharrem fasts and fast of *Hızır* can be considered as the most important, or better to say the best-known fasts; however, there are some other days that Alevis fast. These fasts are generally a part of religious festivals. For instance, *Hızır Bayramı* is one of them. It is celebrated as the new year of Earthly Branches system (*12 Hayvanlı Türk Takvimi*), which was used by Turks and still being used in China. According to Gregorian calendar, it is celebrated in February. Before *Hızır Bayramı*, people fast for three days, and the day after the last fast is celebrated as festival, in which they wear white according to old Turkic traditions.⁷⁷ Earthly Branches is not the only calendar system that Alevis celebrate. In central Anatolia, in Sivas, the new year of Julian Calendar is also being celebrated with the name of *Kagant*. Process starts on 10 January with three days of fasts and on 13 January, which is the beginning of new year according to Julian calendar, *Kagant* festival is celebrated.⁷⁸ *Haftamol Bayramı* is another festival of Alevis, again in Sivas, between 7-12 March as commemoration for all saints, prophets and late-family members.⁷⁹ Additionally, new year of Iranian Calendar (*Celali Takvimi*) is celebrated as Nowruz (*Nevruz*) by Alevis on March equinox, 21 March that refers both the new year and the day that Turks left Ergenekon.⁸⁰ Today, it is celebrated not only by Alevis, but also by entire population in Turkey. Moreover, it is celebrated in all Turkic states, Iran, Afghanistan, Armenia and many other ones.

⁷⁴ Erdoğan, *Alevi-Bektaşî Gerçeği*, 25.

⁷⁵ Ibid.;

“Hidirellezfest (Khizer-Elias): ein Frühlingsfest der Aleviten,” *Föderation der alevitischen Gemeinden in der Schweiz*, 2011, <<http://www.iabf.ch/t/index.php/almanca-alevilik/121-56-mai-hidirellez-fest>> (11 April 2013).

⁷⁶ Hasan Kılavuz, “Alevilerde Hidirellez 5-6 Mayıs Günleri,” *Kiblesi İnsan Olanlar*, 2006,

<http://kiblesi-insan-olanlar.com/index.php?id=27&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=10&cHash=a47a45b44b> (13 April 2013).

⁷⁷ Mélikoff. “Aleviliğin Temelleri,” 37;

Mélikoff. “Kızılbaş Problemi,” 62-63.

⁷⁸ Mélikoff. “Kızılbaş Problemi,” 69.

⁷⁹ Mélikoff. “Alevi Adetleri,” 81.

⁸⁰ Satı Bal, “Yaşasın Newroz,” *Danimarka Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu*, n.d., <http://www.alevi.dk/BASIN%20ARSIV/nevruz__newroz.htm> (13 April 2013).

It is important to highlight the geography, where a certain Alevi culture is practiced, as it was explained for *Kagant* and *Haftamol* festivals. There is another thing that varies from one group to another: Qibla. According to Islamic belief, Qibla is Mecca, where Kaaba is. It is accepted so by some groups of Alevis from Kahramanmaraş, a southeastern city. In addition to that, there are two other perceptions regarding the direction of Qibla. According to the heritage of Shaman culture, some Alevi groups deify the Sun; hence, it becomes the Qibla. They feel thankful to the sunrise, and they mention it every single morning (*şükür*). Moreover, they bury their corpses situated “head-to-Sun” as they deify it.⁸¹ Last of all, according to another belief, Qibla is the human, as human contains God in oneself, and as he/she has responsibility for oneself due their personal conscience.⁸²

According to aforementioned Four Gates and Forty Levels, an individual gets consciousness of community, when he/she arrives at Marifa the third level of all four. Hence, the community is one of the most important components of Alevism. For that reason, the most powerful penalty system was based on being excluded from the community. The most shameful punishment, named as Shunned (*düşkünlük*), is believed to be one of the most important components of Alevism. However, like Tamer Kaya mentioned, under urban conditions the penalty system lost its applicability; because, the predominance of being an isolated community was vanished; instead, the terms of metropolitan life got more power. Consequently, dependence of people to other was decreased.⁸³

Within an Alevi community, there is one other important concept, which is named as Companionship (*Müsahiplik*). This companionship is composed by four people, who are two married couples. It is an alliance between these couples, and it means that, four people possess all responsibilities of each other and should take care of themselves till their death. It is considered as important as blood relation; that why, it is named as spiritual brotherhood, as well.⁸⁴ On the other hand, there is

⁸¹ *Alevi Tören ve Ritüelleri*, 218;

Geçmez, interview;

Hasan Kılavuz, “Alevis” (speech, Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Foundation, Ankara, 12 April 2011).

⁸² *Alevi Tören ve Ritüelleri*, 121.

⁸³ Tamer Kaya (the representative of Mersin Cemevi), interview by Didem Doganyilmaz, Mersin/Turkey, 19 April 2011.

⁸⁴ Balkız, interview.

another information regarding Companionship, and according to that, every single person should have a companion, who will help him/her in marriage, death, good or bad days.⁸⁵ Hence, this should be done before marriage as contrary to the first information given. In both ways, the companions are responsible of each other. Companions may share everything they have, except honor (*namus*)⁸⁶ and have responsibilities to solve other`s problems. Companionship is an important spiritual tie that connects people as brothers; that`s why, children of companion couples cannot get married.⁸⁷ Pir Sultan Abdal, who is considered as one of the most important poets of Alevi culture, distinguishes the Companionship as a prerequisite of entering ceremonies and acceptance of one`s supplications (*niyaz*) in one of his incantations (*nefes*).⁸⁸

Considerable effects of Shamanism to Alevism has been mentioned many times. It is also visible in the best-known Alevi ritual, *cem* ceremony, with songs, rhythms, dances and attendance of both women and men.⁸⁹ Geçmez defined *cem* as following:

“It is wrong to define *cem* just as a religious ceremony. Alevis consider many things as religious practices, including working, human respect, self-respect etc. Because if an Alevi does not possess inner peace, he/she cannot be in peace with others. Hence, *cem* becomes the place where he/she judges himself/herself.”⁹⁰

With this explanation, Geçmez emphasized that a *cem* ceremony is not only a religious ceremony or a ritual, but also a social and judgmental meeting. It is led by a *dede*, who is spiritual leader of Alevi community. Responsibilities of *dedes* are far more than responsibilities of a spiritual leader. They will be listed after explanation of *cem* ceremony.

⁸⁵ Mélikoff. “Aleviliğin Temelleri,” 48-49.

⁸⁶ This information will be a significant reference point for next parts.

⁸⁷ Irène Mélikoff. “Alevilerin Bir Adeti Üzerine Araştırma: Müşahip, ‘Ahiret Kardeşi,’” in *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*, trans. Turan Alptekin (İstanbul: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 92.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 87.

⁸⁹ Mélikoff. “Bektaşî-Alevî Senkretizmini,” 119.

⁹⁰ Geçmez, interview.

Cem can be defined as a special meeting, which is held in a place called *cemevi*, not only to fulfill religious responsibilities, but also to socialize and to face with oneself for anterior attitudes. In cem ceremonies, community plays a significant role; because, before beginning the ceremony, dede should ask for a consent (*rızalık*) from every single attendee for the entire attendees. That's why the members of community should be familiar to each other and be content with attendance of all members of cem. This is to say, there should be no problem, or all problems should be solved before starting to ceremony. A cem is composed by three different parts,⁹¹ and the first part is dedicated to mentioned consent process. If that part cannot be completed, in other words, if all attendees cannot agree on members of cem, it will not be possible to carry out the ceremony. The second part is the longest part, in which self-questioning is made. Within this part, members of cem face with themselves and with their community. This part functions as a judgment process under the guidance of dede. This judgmental process occurred as a result of *unfair* decisions of Ottoman judges (*kadı*) after 16th century (time of Selim I). As Kızılbâş people were offended by Ottoman judges, they started to form this unofficial judgmental process within their community; eventually, cem ceremonies became meetings, in which judgmental process are carried out.⁹² The third and the last part is for religious rituals, in which the *Semah* is performed. Semah,⁹³ which has been selected to be a part of cultural world heritage by UNESCO,⁹⁴ can be described as a set of mystical and aesthetic body movements in rhythmic harmony performed by semah dancers (*semahçı*), accompanied by musical performers (*Zakir*) playing the ritual music by *saz*.⁹⁵ Within this harmony, hand and body motions have symbolical meanings. For instance, the motion in which one palm faces the sky, while the other faces the earth is meant to say "You are God, we are the people, I come from You and hold your essence in me, I am not separate from You".⁹⁶ The aim of this ritual is to be unified with God and purified from world materials.⁹⁷ In general perspective, aesthetic body movements within harmony are related with moves of crane. Crane is

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² *Alevi Tören ve Ritüelleri*, 279.

⁹³ Please see Appendix XII on page 307 for photos.

⁹⁴ "Semah, Alevi-Bektaşî Ritual," UNESCO, 2010,

<<http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00011&RL=00384>> (20 December 2010).

⁹⁵ UNESCO, *Semah, Alevi-Bektaşî Ritual*, 00384 (N.p., UNESCO, November 2010),

<<http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/doc/download.php?versionID=07301>> (6 May 2011).

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Geçmez, interview.

not only the symbol of nomad life, but also the symbol of Caliphate Ali.⁹⁸ Symbolization of birds is also a cultural component originated from Shamanism.⁹⁹

Cem ceremonies, as other components of Alevism, differs from one group to another, as well. For instance, a cem from southern coast of Turkey show dissimilarities from a central Anatolian one.¹⁰⁰ They are performed once a week on Thursday nights in urban centers; however, in villages, where a dede does not live, people gather for cem whenever a dede arrives. Dedes have responsibilities for a list of villages, and he is obliged to visit every single village at least once a year in order to fulfill his duties.¹⁰¹ As it was mentioned, a dede is more than a spiritual leader for Alevi community as he was assigned for different duties within history as result of necessities. Responsibilities of a dede for his community can be listed as below:¹⁰²

- leading the community within social and religious aspects, being a role-model with his behaviors and lifestyle,
- instruct and unify his society,
- leading the social and religious ceremonies,
- providing justice,
- leading the rituals,
- being the person to be consulted for any problems or sickness of the society due to his blessed personality.

Today, under different conditions, responsibilities of dedes may change; however, obviously they keep their importance with regards to being the spiritual leader of community.

Alevi belief does not possess a regular understanding of time, which passes within a linear dimension. Instead, they believe in renewal of time with a new day

⁹⁸ Mélikoff. "Aleviliğin Temelleri," 48.

⁹⁹ Irène Mélikoff. "Anadolu Sufiliğinin Orta Asya Kökenleri" in *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*, trans. Turan Alptekin (Istanbul: Demos Yayınları, 2006), 149.

¹⁰⁰ Mélikoff. "Aleviliğin Temelleri," 48;

Mélikoff. "Bektashi/Kizilbas," 6.

¹⁰¹ Mélikoff. "Aleviliğin Temelleri," 45-47.

¹⁰² *Alevi Tören ve Ritielleri*, 52.

after a night or with a spring after a winter.¹⁰³ Accordingly, the life of human possesses an immortal formula; it is to say that they do not believe in death.¹⁰⁴ A person is a composition of *can* (soul) and *ten* (body), and the death is only about the body but not about the soul.¹⁰⁵ It is to say that, the immortal soul changes only its temporary body. Belief in reincarnation is said to be originated from Buddhism, which was considerably common among Uyghur Turks (*Uyghur Türkleri*), and gained base in Anatolia during the Great Seljuq Empire.¹⁰⁶ As a soul changes its temporary possessor, it might be a human or any other creature in the world, which is why Alevis pay attention to the nature. Because, they give credence to the unity of human and nature, as each might have other's previous or following soul. On the other hand, there is another reason of the credence in unity of human and nature. According to creed of En-el Hak of Mansur Al-Hallaj, nature has its own sacred power, and every single part of nature has a part of God inside. This is a component that was originated from Zoroastrianism.¹⁰⁷

According to Alevism, understanding the nature is one of the most important components as they have faith in unity of human and nature. This necessity strengthens the questioning approach that they possess. The question "why" is said to form the basis of Alevism; accordingly, it is claimed that Alevism welcomes science, instead of getting isolated with excuse of religion.¹⁰⁸ This characteristic of Alevis was pointed out by Mélikoff as a reason that some Bektashis became members of Freemasonry after 1826.

Alevis aim to achieve the level of Perfect Human Being (*Kamil İnsan*). In order to achieve this level, a person should not only have the sufficient intelligence, but also the responsibility of mankind.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, as individualism vanishes after a level, community possesses significant importance. Therefore, it is aimed to

¹⁰³ Mélikoff. "Bektaşiler Tarikatı," 30.

¹⁰⁴ Geçmez, interview.

¹⁰⁵ *Alevi Tören ve Ritielleri*, 65.

¹⁰⁶ Mélikoff. "Aleviliğin Temelleri," 44.

¹⁰⁷ Aksoy. "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alevilik," 243; Geçmez, interview.

¹⁰⁸ Aksoy. "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alevilik," 243.

¹⁰⁹ *Alevi Tören ve Ritielleri*, 30.

form a Perfect Community (*Kamil Toplum*) by individuals, who are nothing but a part of their community.¹¹⁰

Alevi is defined as *can* with reference to their souls, but not the bodies. Can is a soul, as aforementioned, regardless from any gender characteristic.¹¹¹ It has an egalitarian structure among men and women. With respect to traditional culture of nomadic life, women and men do not separate in social, either in religious life, as contrary to the patriarchal culture of Islam. Today, Alevi religious rituals are being actualized by both women and men, side to side, while both Sunni Islamic and Alawi rituals are performed separately.¹¹² This is what makes Alevism “the belief of equality” concerning gender discrimination. Besides, while a community can be led by a *dede*, who is a male figure, as the spiritual leader, a woman can be an *ana* and perform the same functions as the *dede*.¹¹³

4.1.3. Discussions on Defining Alevism

For Alevism, there are various definitions; even though, as stated by Geçmez, Alevi is bored with being defined by Sunni majority.¹¹⁴ Making a definition is not one of the purposes of this thesis. Within this part, different perceptions of different authorities and/or individuals will be given regarding the place of Alevism both in society and in politics, in order to explain self-definition and other-definition regarding Alevism to the lecturer.

There are many different interpretations about Alevism; for instance, some claims that it is a belief with its distinctive components, others argue that it is just a sect under Islam with denial of its characteristics, or as a different perception, it is a Turkish way of Islam as a response to dominant Arabic Islamic culture. These perceptions will be given to see how Alevism has been placed so far.

¹¹⁰ Erdoğan, *Alevi-Bektaşî Gerçeği*, 26.

¹¹¹ *Alevî Tören ve Ritüelleri*, 65.

¹¹² *Alevî Tören ve Ritüelleri*, 34;
Erdoğan, *Alevi-Bektaşî Gerçeği*, 24;
Mélíková. “Aleviliğin Temelleri,” 49-50;
Şen, interview.

¹¹³ Balkız, interview.

¹¹⁴ *Alevî Tören ve Ritüelleri*, 218;

Geçmez, interview;

Kerime Ata, “Alevî” (speech, Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Foundation, Ankara, 12 April 2011).

Examination of Alevism, in fact, is a different task to accomplish, as its literature has been developed in oral base, instead of systematically written sources. However, there are undeniable facts that it has different characteristics from Sunni Islam, as it was mentioned above one by one. For instance, with respect to significant effects of Zoroastrianism, specifically by Mansur Al-Hallaj, Aksoy claims that Alevism is a subversion of Zoroastrianism despite of being affected also by Hinduism or Shamanism.¹¹⁵

During the Ottoman Empire, Kızılbaş people were defined as *zındık*, heredic, *rafizi*, schismatic, *shi'ite*, *mülhid* and atheist in order to make a clear distinguishment for being *unbelievers*. Alevi have been defined as unbelievers by some Sunni societies during the Republic, as well, and those led many bloody attacks between these groups and Alevi. On the other hand, there is a significant ratio among all, who define Alevism as a part of Islam. This proposal has been accepted by many different parts of the society; however, a considerable difference occurs after that point. Some of the supporters of this idea claim that, as Alevi are members of Islam, then there is no point to mention different characteristics of it, while there is another group, who argues that Alevism is obviously a part Islam, but with its special syncretic structure.

Balkız refers four current different descriptions of Alevism being talked in public: First of all, it is the core of Islam with belief in God, Muhammad, Quran and Ehl-i Beyt. Secondly, it is the Anatolian comment of Islam. Thirdly, it is a religion itself, which is affected by Islam. And lastly, it is a culture, a way of life and a philosophy, an approach with its Anatolian origin, and it was affected by Shamanism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity and blended all together with its pre-Turkish-Anatolian culture; and emerged in Anatolia against the Arabic pressure on the region.¹¹⁶ Both the second and the last perspectives based on Anatolian comment were discussed strongly in Republic of Turkey during mid-twentieth century. These perspectives will be analyzed with details in following sections.

¹¹⁵ Aksoy. "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alevilik," 243.

¹¹⁶ Balkız, *Sivas'tan Sydney'e*, 270.

Since the Ottoman era, especially after the possession of Caliph title, Sunni Islam, which has been based on Arab culture, affected Anatolia as the dominant culture. This is the Arabic pressure pointed out as Anatolian people resisted and developed Alevism in aforementioned descriptions. As Mélikoff mentioned, there are many references made to mention the difference of Alevism, most specifically Bektashi order, from Arabic or Persian interpretations of Islam. She also pointed out the syncretic characteristic of Alevism and *non-conformist* structure, since there were no conformist components of Islam such as Ramadan, mosques, or prayers.¹¹⁷ In addition to certain ties between Bektashi order and Alevism, she pointed out both of them as Turkish popular Islam.¹¹⁸ Besides, as she agreed on “rural Bektashis” distinguishment of Fuat Köprülü for Kızılbaş people, her definition can be expanded for all Alevis, instead of a reference only to Bektashis. Mélikoff defined the syncretic characteristic of Alevism as a composition of Manicheism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam within its evolution during the history. It is based on humanism, and an outcome of non-Islamic Turkmen religious culture *varnished* by Safavid religious propaganda. It was sufficient to fulfill the lack of religious necessity of people as an adaptation of Turkic religious and cultural life into a primitive form of Islam; even though, it was not similar to Sunni Islam, which was the religion of majority in Anatolia.¹¹⁹

The synthesis of Islam with Turkish culture was referred by other scholars, as well. For instance, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu (1886-1978), an author, politician, educationist and a scholar, who supported the ideas of Ziya Gökalp regarding Turkish Islam, defined Alevism as an outcome of Islam and Turkish culture and civilization, which were melted together. It was a self-defense of Turks for their pre-Anatolian culture, *a survival strategy of Turks* against Arab culture, which was based on “inequality between men and women, male despotism, slavery and mysticism.” On contrary, he highlighted the characteristics of Turkish customs, such as “free thought, fine arts, literature and music, respect towards the elderly, mutual

¹¹⁷ Mélikoff. “Aleviliğin Temelleri,” 37-43.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 29.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 49;

Mélikoff. “Kızılbaş Problemi,” 54;

Mélikoff. “Bektaşî-Alevî Senkretizmini,” 111;

Mélikoff. “Anadolu’da Cemaat Dışı,” 101.

trust, solidarity and tolerance.”¹²⁰ Azak, underlines that Alevism was managed to be maintained for centuries as it was thanks to isolated community *despite* the dominance of Sunni political center.¹²¹

Ercan Geçmez, points out the syncretic structure of Alevism, as well; and he declines any concrete ethnicity belonging to Alevism. He stated that;

“... There is a general but incorrect understanding regarding Turkishness of Alevism. This is wrong. Alevism affects any ethnic identity and it accepts it as richness; however, it denies to be possessed by any of them. It blesses humanbeings and it accepts any language, religion, race and places, where those humanbeings were born. That demonstrates on an absolute decree that Alevism is not a concept concerning ethnicity. In Turkey, there are Kurdish-Alevis commonly, Arab-Alevis as well, and Turkish Alevis. In Bulgaria, there are many Bektashis; in America, there are Alevis. I mean, there are Alevis in different geographies; that`s why it has been varied.”¹²²

Ethnicity of Alevis has been detailly analyzed by Bruinessen. He points out the existence of Kurdish Alevism in Turkey. As he stated, Kurdish Alevism does not possess many differences from Turkish Alevis. There is a significant similarity between Turkish and Kurdish Alevism, majority of the poems (*nefes* and *gülbank*) are in Turkish; that means the religious rituals are performed in Turkish. The sun worship, for instance, was pointed out by Bruinessen, and it was linked with Kurdish Alevi villages. This sun worship is identical with the one that Geçmez stated: being thankful to the Sun and explaining it every day with the sunrise. Additionally, Kurdish Alevism has also strong connectivity to Hacı Bektaş, as a spiritual leader. Bruinessen argues that Kurdish Alevis were not Turcomanos those immigrated from Central Asia.¹²³

Alevism has an Islamic characteristic; however, as mentioned, variety occurs after that point. According to İsmail Engin, Alevism is a part of Islam, and it

¹²⁰ İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, *Türk'e Doğru* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 1972), 181, quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 82-83.

¹²¹ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 139.

¹²² Geçmez, interview.

¹²³ Martin van Bruinessen. ““Aslını inkar eden haramzadedir!”: The debate on the ethnic identity of the Kurdish Alevis” in *Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East*, eds. Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele and Anke Otter-Beaujean (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 6.

contains Turkishness, as well. Nevertheless, he argues that it is identical to Sunni Islam within different perspective. Alevism, which played significant role to Turkify Anatolia with Hacı Bektaş, is a nationalist, Turkist sect. It is nothing but Turkish Sunni Islam, which is more liberal and compatible with laicism than the Arab based Sunni Islam.¹²⁴

Since the establishment of the Republic, there have been many discussions that DİB involved regarding the situation of Alevism. These discussions will be examined within chronological order in following parts; however, it will be beneficial to see the actual definition of Alevism in official website of DİB, which is the representative of the state in religious affairs. According to that definition,¹²⁵

“Alevism has been developed as belief, worship and morality within the frame of Quran and Sunnah (*Sünnet*) in history of Islam. A minstrel named Virani defined Alevism as, to profess the unity of Allah, the prophethood of Muhammad and the imamate of Ali. Accordingly, it is not true to accept any cultural component, which was possessed by Alevism, as ritualistic component. Instead, they should be interpreted as cultural richness, and distinction. Culture of Alevism has a considerable place within the frame of morality and humanitarian affairs. Friendship, brotherhood, neighbourliness, hospitality, bravery, generosity, love to minors and respect to elders and honesty are some of the leading ones. Besides, the doctrine of being master of his/her hands, tongue and loins was possessed in order to be protected from any kind of prohibitions and the things forbidden by religion.”

Special characteristics of Alevism and some basic components have been accepted by DİB; however, some of them have been ignored and not accepted as ritualistic distinctive. This definition; although, it has relatively correct references, led to ignorance of some significant components, and caused problems for relations between the State and Alevis.

As a general perspective that has been accepted by many other scholars, Faruk Bilici claims that, Alevism is not a religion itself; instead, it is a way of life

¹²⁴ Engin. “Turkiye’de Cumhuriyet Döneminde,” 286.

¹²⁵ “Alevi(lik),” *Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey*, n.d., <<http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/dy/DiniBilgilerDetay.aspx?ID=688>> (15 April 2010).

that has been composed by various religions.¹²⁶ As it was mentioned, the purpose of this thesis is not to define what Alevism is; however, it is undeniable that, Alevism has its distinctive components from different religions; hence, it is a synthesis, a syncretic belief system, even further it is a particular philosophy, a belief, a moral code, a culture, a doctrine and most importantly a social fact, which puts human in its center, with specialty to Anatolia. Therefore, denials of its distinctive characteristic or considerations of Alevis as unbelievers or identical to Sunni Muslims caused many problems, and the way that state *intended to solve* these problems has been considered as a part of assimilation process.

4.2. Alevis in the Republic of Turkey

Existence of Alevism goes back until the late 11th century in Anatolia; however, its current form had not been composed in that time. Since then, Alevis have lived under different states' rules, and were affected by different cultures, and now, they form considerable part of population of the Republic of Turkey.

Before the establishment of the Republic, Alevis had unstable period under the Seljuk and Ottoman empires. In fact, during the first decades of the Ottoman Empire, the religion was not affected from the Sunni Islam like in the late 15th and 16th centuries; so that, Alevism-Sunnism was not a considerable dualism among society. As contrary, the first sultans of the Ottoman Empire were in a good relationship with lodges of Bektashi order, as it was mentioned in previous part. Furthermore, the Janissary system helped Bektashis to gain more power, especially in political order, with significant success in wartime. Until disband of the Janissary system in the early 19th century, Bektashi influence was considerable in the Empire. However, Selim I and the Battle of Chaldiran against Safavid Empire in 16th century has been mentioned as the first “mass targeted attack” to Alevis, because of Selim I's “massacre” to Kızılbaş people on his way back to the capital after the battle.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Faruk Bilici. “The Function of Alevi-Bektashi Theology in Modern Turkey” in *Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives*, eds. Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Ozdalga and Catharina Raudvere (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 1998), 52.

¹²⁷ Uğraş Ulaş Tol. “Ayrımcılık ve Alevilik,” in *Aleviler Ayrımcılık ve İnsan Hakları*, ed. Cahit Korkmaz (Ankara: Akademi Matbaası, 2007), 43.

Battle of Chaldiran brought about a new era for Alevis, due to their support to Shah Ismail of Safavid Empire against Ottoman rule. Kızılbaş people, supported the Safavid Dynasty against the Ottoman Empire, which was seen as a hostility against Islam by heretics that should be eliminated, due to their religious compatibility to the Safavid Empire.¹²⁸ That support of Kızılbaş people to Safavid Empire caused usage of pejorative names, which were to become like synonymous with Kızılbaş within time. While the Islamization of the Ottoman Empire, or better to say Sunni Islamization of Empire under significant effect of Arabic culture was deepened in state level, Kızılbaş people were discriminated from the society. This clash between two parts of Anatolian people, between Sunnis and Alevis (in this time, Kızılbaş people) increased. Kutluay Erdoğan argues that it has been the first division due to religious propaganda in Anatolian history.¹²⁹

The state authority started to inspect the Kızılbaş people, since they revolted against the Ottoman Empire as a result of their oppositional attitude within religious perspective during the Battle of Chaldiran.¹³⁰ Consequently, inspection of state authority brought about isolation of Kızılbaş people from society and made them close communities within territorial limit of their villages or towns. Besides, with respect to their egalitarian social structure, their co-attendance of both women and men at different occasions, such as ceremonies, rituals and social life, were found *odd* and *inappropriate* by Sunni people. That was the time that pejorative discourses started to be spread among society about them. In addition to all these, their isolated life caused curiosity and helped to strengthen mentioned pejorative discourses. For instance, their cem ceremonies became a significant tool to insult them. “Candles off” (*mum söndü*) has been the mostly used sentence for the intention of said insulting approach.¹³¹ As Kızılbaş people were isolated in their villages and were being inspected by state authority, they used to actualize their cem ceremonies with help of watchmen, who were in duty at the entrances of their villages. These watchmen were responsible for warning people performing cem, for any probable

¹²⁸ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "Battle of Chāldirān," 19 April 2013, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/104688/Battle-of-Chaldiran>>.

¹²⁹ Erdoğan, *Alevi-Bektaşî Gerçeği*, 22-23.

¹³⁰ Kristina K. Bogardi. "Alevî İnançının Modern Yorumları," in *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alevî Tarih ve Kültürü*, ed. İbrahim Bahadır (Bielefeld: Bielefeld Alevî Kültür Merkezi Yayınları, 2002), 307.

¹³¹ Erdoğan, *Alevi-Bektaşî Gerçeği*, 22-23.

attack coming from state authority or neighbour villages. Hence, after a warning of watchmen regarding a probable danger, they used to turn the lights (candles) off in order to hide, and, that became the reason that they were insulted for. As they attend to cem regardless of gender difference, they were accused of incest, which started to be carried out after the *candles went off*.¹³² Mélikoff, on the other hand, interpreted “candleless off” with a different perspective, in which she commented that cem started with 12 candles with respect to Twelvers and during ceremony they sacrificed a cock. That means, as it was commented by outsiders, first the cock was sacrificed, then the *candles went off* and eventually the revel (*alem*) started.¹³³

Pejorative discourses were carried to juridical level with fetwas of Ottoman judges (*kadi*) after the 16th century. Most specifically, the fetwas of Seyh-ul Islam Ebussuud (1490-1574) regarding the Kızılbaş people show that they were pointed out as “the ones who deserve the most severe imprisonment and punishment”.¹³⁴ With these fetwas, he also declared that,

“The assets and the lives of Kızılbaş people are legitimate (*helal*) to take away.”;
“Mass murders of Kızılbaş people are both legitimate and considerable jihads for the sake of Islam. One who dies in a war against a Kızılbaş, will be rewarded with the most valuable level of martyrdom.”;
“Slaughter of a Kızılbaş is more considerable than slaughters of other unbelievers.”;
“Kızılbaş women are allowed to be raped, as soldiers of Islam will be strengthened with abusals of religious enemies (this is to mention Kızılbaş people).”¹³⁵

These social and juridical approaches against Kızılbaş people deepened the desire to hide from state authority and closed them to their villages until the 20th century, most specifically after the second half of it. Due to mentioned juridical unjust implementations, dedes started to be in charge of basic juridical issues, which were and still are carried out in first parts of cem ceremonies, as it was mentioned above. Additionally, İbrahim Bahadır argues that these social and juridical

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Mélikoff. “Bektaşiler Tarikatı,” 27.

¹³⁴ Bilici. “The Function of Alevi-Bektashi,” 60.

¹³⁵ Engin. “Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet Döneminde,” 280;

Mehmet Ertuğrul Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislâm Ebussuud Efendi Fetvaları Işığında 16. Asır Türk Hayatı* (İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1972), 109-117;
Yıldırım, *Osmanlı Engizisyonu*, 153-170.

constraints caused Alevis to escape from Anatolia to Dobruja and Albania with respect to the information collected in Ottoman assessment records.¹³⁶

Pejorative discourses, unjust fetwas against Alevis, curiosity to their way of ritualistic and social lives had started in Ottoman era, and they still are the issues regarding Alevism in the laic Republic of Turkey. Within this part, from the War of Independence, until present day, the relation between Alevis, Sunni majority and state authorities will be examined, and the problems will be analyzed with different perspectives of listed parties in order to see reasons and outcomes of distinctive interpretations regarding Alevism.

4.2.1. Early Republic Era

The very first decades of the 20th century witnessed the abolishment of the Ottoman Empire, which was down after the World War I, and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Within this process, as other populations of Anatolia, Alevis played a significant role and supported the movement of M.K. Atatürk.

When the movement of Anatolia for independence started, there was neither a privilege for, nor dominance of any religious system; instead, majority of the Anatolian population with different religious bases including Alevi and Sunni orders (Mevlevi and Naqshbandi) supported.¹³⁷ However, in order to provide *significant mobilization* of different parts of society against hostile forces, personal endeavors came into prominence. For that intention, Hacı Bektaş Dervish Lodge was a pivotal point to obtain entire support of Alevis of Anatolia. Therefore, M.K. Atatürk's intention to have support of Alevis started with his meeting with Cemalettin Çelebi then *postnişin* (religious leader) of Hacı Bektaş Dervish Lodge and was to be selected as a member of parliament from Kırşehir, a central Anatolian city, which used to include Soluca Kara Höyük,¹³⁸ in 1920 for the first Assembly. The Dervish Lodge was a significant point to attract the attention of Alevis; hence, with respect to an order of M.K. Atatürk, in June 1919, representatives of movement contacted

¹³⁶ İbrahim Bahadır. "Cumhuriyet'in Kuruluş Sürecinde Atatürk ve Aleviler," in *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alevi Tarih ve Kültürü*, ed. İbrahim Bahadır (Bielefeld: Bielefeld Alevi Kültür Merkezi Yayınları, 2002), 169.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 179-180.

¹³⁸ Currently, Soluca Kara Höyük is a part of Nevşehir, as it was mentioned before.

with Cemalettin Çelebi in order to convince him to support the movement with every single Alevi village.¹³⁹ Although the form of visit varies from one to another, there are many scholars quoted the connection between the Dervish Lodge and representatives got deepened with M.K. Atatürk's personal visit to Hacıbektaş in December 1919.¹⁴⁰ As a result of this visit, Cemalettin Çelebi mediated between Alevi people and the movement, hence he traveled to different Alevi villages to mobilize Alevis.

Alevis' support cannot be considered as a surprise; because, first of all, it was a national struggle against hostile forces. Secondly, within time, it turned into a struggle against the Ottoman Empire, which used to be governed by *Caliph* and had an official Sunni Islamic identity that formed significant oppression over Alevis for four centuries. However, according to different scholars, there were some other reasons that brought about the entire support of Alevis to Ankara movement. For instance, Cemal Şener stated that Alevis considered Mustafa Kemal as *one of them*, due to his Turkmen race,¹⁴¹ during his interview with Sabah Daily Newspaper.¹⁴² On the other hand, there was a creed based on Mustafa Kemal's personality, who was believed as *Mehdi*, the savior sent to help Alevis in order to end their sufferings from the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴³ According to Cemal Bardakçı, Cemalettin Çelebi was the one, who had spread that idea based on Turkishness of Bektashi order/Alevism, which protected Turkish customs and language against dominant Arab culture.¹⁴⁴ Briefly, for various reasons, Alevis mobilized around the Kemalist movement that

¹³⁹ Bahadır, "Cumhuriyet'in Kuruluş Sürecinde," 182.

¹⁴⁰ Baki Öz, *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Alevi-Bektaşiler* (İstanbul: Can, 1989), 58-63;

Bedri Noyan, *Bektaşilik Alevilik Nedir?* (İstanbul: Ant Yayıncılık, 1995), 105;

Cemal Bardakçı, *Alevilik, Ahilik, Bektaşilik* (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1950), 58-59, quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 145;

Cemal Şener, *Atatürk ve Aleviler Kurtuluş Savaşında Aleviler-Bektaşiler* (İstanbul: Etik Yayınları, 2006), 64-66;

Enver Behnan Şapolyo, *Mezhepler ve Tarikatlar Tarihi* (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1964), 331-332, quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 145;

Naşit Uluğ, *Tunceli Medeniyete Açılıyor* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1939), 15, quoted in Bahadır, "Cumhuriyet'in Kuruluş Sürecinde," 183.

¹⁴¹ Mustafa Kemal's mother Zübeyde Hanım was the daughter of a Turkmen family named *Hacısofular* settled in Rumelia from Karaman during 15th century.

¹⁴² Cemal Şener, "Aleviler 'Atatürk Bizdendir' Der, Çünkü Soyu Türkmen," interview by Balçışek Pamir, *Sabah National Daily Newspaper*, 5 October 2004.

¹⁴³ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 145-146;

Cemal Canpolat, "Aleviler'in Atatürk Sevgisi" (speech, İstanbul, 12 May 2000), *Cem Vakfı*;

Metin Tarhan, "Cumhuriyet'in Omurgası," interview by Selcen Tasçı, *Türk Sazı* 1 (2012): 6.

¹⁴⁴ İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, "Türklük Bakımından Aleviler." *Türk Düşüncesi* 3, no. 13 (1954): 1-5, quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 147.

aimed to form a modern and, more importantly for Alevi point of view, laic state structure.

Laicism, as it was mentioned in previous chapters, has not meant simply a formal separation between religious and political authority and institutions; instead, a positivist state ideology to engineer a homogeneous and stratified society.¹⁴⁵ However, the separation is difficult to apply to Sunni Muslim societies due to the lack of established institutions of religion.¹⁴⁶ Islam, as a result of its own structure, is more political than the other two other religions. Hence, it does not separate state and religion; it seeks to regulate public life with its own conception of the law and provides an alternative sense of loyalty, identity and community. The characteristic of Turkish laicism was to take the absolute control of Islam; as aforementioned, instead of a separation between all religious and political affairs. The institutionalization of laicism included bringing all religious activities under direct control of the laic state.¹⁴⁷ Besides, it was linked with democracy within Turkish interpretation. Laicism became the basis of democracy; consequently, any anti-laic political force was considered as non-democratic.¹⁴⁸

For the sacralization term, there was another idea that was argued by Dankwart Alexander Rustow. As it was quoted by Azak, he mentioned that the charismatic figure of M.K. Atatürk filled the lack of emotional gap resulted with the surrender of the Muslim heritage.¹⁴⁹ In fact, that could not be considered as surprising, due to social structure of the former Ottoman Empire, in which the Sultan was the Caliph and, most saliently, the *shadow of the God*;¹⁵⁰ consequently, the Sultan was a holy figure for his subjects. Even though, M.K. Atatürk intended to suppress this *sacred loyalty*, it just shifted into a different form, from loyalty to the shadow of the God, to a *man* who led the society with his charismatic figure. As an “instant” change cannot suit with any society, the said outcome can be considered as a simple fact. As it was mentioned, M.K. Atatürk was considered as a sacred

¹⁴⁵ Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, 25.

¹⁴⁶ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 6.

¹⁴⁷ Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularity*, 16.

¹⁴⁸ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 83.

¹⁴⁹ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, xiii.

¹⁵⁰ Carter Findley, *The Turks in World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 115.

personality by Alevis, as well. These two explanations demonstrate that the entire society, traditionally, made their references with a religious point of view.

The establishment of a new state was a hope for Alevis, as they believed in relief from the Ottoman Empire and its Sunni Islamic characteristic. Hence, they supported the Kemalist implementations as they had supported the movement. A laic state was seemed to be the best guarantor for recognition of their distinctive religious identity. In fact, many implementations suited well with their culture.

New implementations were not only to laicize the newborn republic, but also to escape from dominance of Arabic culture, as it was mentioned in related chapter. That was a significant point for Alevis, who have defined themselves as a resistance movement against the dominance of Arabic Sunni culture. Within this interpretation, encourage for unveiling of women; given equality to women and men in social, political and business life; closure of Islamic seminaries; gradual liberalization of education from religion; new Civil Code; abolishment of Sharia courts; Turkification of rituals, such as calls for prayer, translation of Quran from Arabic; and new alphabet different from Arabic one became the implementations that attracted attention of Alevis. The most salient one was, obviously, the constitutional guarantee of laicism, which was carried out with a change in Second Article, in 1937, stating that the Republic of Turkey was a laic state. All listed implementations were in perfect coherency with Alevism, regarding its secular-leaning, progressive and egalitarian structure. The sovereignty was taken from God and handed over to individuals. As it was mentioned, human is in the centre in Alevism; therefore, he/she should be source of sovereignty. Within this perspective, it was not surprising that Alevis welcomed and supported the entire movement. Even further, with respect to these changes, Gökalp, whose Bektashi identity was already mentioned, argued abolishment of Bektashi order, as the Republic had already accomplished what Bektashis had supported with their strong confidence in Turkishness.¹⁵¹

Listed implementations were in favor with cultural values of Alevis; however, the newborn laic state intended to fulfill the religious necessities of Sunni

¹⁵¹ John Kingsley Birge, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes* (London: Luzac&Co, 1937), 20; quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 143.

Muslims, and left Alevis aside with no official intention to end social and religious oppression. Within this perspective, there were two significant implementations, which caused disappointment among Alevis: the opening of DİB (1924), and the closure of dervish lodges (1925).

Abolishment of Caliphate was a significant step for the laicization progress of newborn republic. In addition to that, it brought about considerable hope among Alevis to end political and social dominance of Sunni Islamic culture; however, opening of DİB was seen as a new threat for continuation of mentioned cultural dominance among religious issues. Besides, DİB, as it is a religious institution under the control of government, could not be acceptable within a laic state within the perspective of Alevis, and they took DİB into account as *institutionalization of political intervention of state into religious order*.¹⁵² The founder article was expanded within time according to governments' political leanings, and it became the target of discussions regarding not only Alevism-Sunnism, but also entire religious diversity of Turkey. Besides, it was seen as the pivotal institute of *official assimilation* of Alevis, with references to DİB's Sunni Islamic structure and changed responsibilities within time. The interviewees commented on this issue as following:

Geçmez: "The advanced democracy is being obstructed. There will be no certain success, unless the DİB is closed. The constitution talks about laicism, but there is the DİB. It is under the control of Sunnis."¹⁵³

Mustafa Şen: "There is a significant assimilation policy targeting Alevis, even stronger during republic. The DİB is significantly effective on this policy."¹⁵⁴

Tamer Kaya: "We strongly criticize DİB, but we cannot say that it should be demolished. We are not that powerful."¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, and Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı Genel Merkezi, *Alevi Çalıştayı 1. Etap Alevi Örgütleri ve Temsilcileri Toplantısı Değerlendirme İstem ve Öneri Raporu*, (Ankara: Hisar Ofset, 2009), 32-35.

¹⁵³ Geçmez, interview.

¹⁵⁴ Şen, interview.

¹⁵⁵ Kaya, interview.

Ahmet Özüğurlu: “I think that the DİB should also be demolished. The DİB goes and every sect will have its own foundation. Meantime the control mechanism will function. It should be so. Because the most important thing is the sake of state. I should clarify that, the control mechanism should not be carried out by governments, but the state itself.”¹⁵⁶

As it has been pointed out by different people, the DİB has not been an institute that welcomed by Alevis. On the other hand, the critics cannot be associated *just* with Alevis, as there are many people criticizing its functionality, its budget and its increasing importance among society.

In 1925, another implementation was put into force, which is still being discussed with its outcomes whether they targeted Alevis or not. With the new implementation, Law Number 677,¹⁵⁷ dervish lodges and shrines were closed and religious titles, such as *dede*, *çelebi*, *baba*, *derviş*, *mürüt*, which were (and, unofficially, still are) used in Alevi communities, were prohibited. That caused *dedes* to be disqualified from leading their community and *cemevis* to be closed. During the republic, *cemevis* found places for themselves; however, their legal status is either a cultural center or a foundation. With other minor legal obstacles, Law N.677 became the main reason to exclude *cemevis* from being a worship place.

In 1826, Mahmud II abolished the Janissary System, and handed Bektashi lodges and all their assets to Naqshbandi order, as it was mentioned in previous chapter. Hence, according to some scholars, Law Number 677 of 1925 did not take Alevis or their lodges as target, as they had already been closed in 1826. For instance, Melikoff referred an article of Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper written by Haluk Y. Şehsuvaroğlu, in which many important Bektashi dervish lodges (Hacı Bektaş Dervish Lodge, Seyyid Baba, Mürsel Baba, Şah Kulu Sultan, Şehitler, Çamlıca tekkes, and Nafi Baba, Karaağaç and Karyağdı dergahs) were recorded as Naqshbandi assets. Hence, according to Melikoff, the closure of listed dervish lodges were not an outcome of Law N. 677.¹⁵⁸ Additionally, same issue was discussed recently in a TV Programme, and Cemal Canpolat stated that the Law

¹⁵⁶ Özüğurlu, interview.

¹⁵⁷ Please see Appendix XIII on page 311 for the whole text of article (in Turkish).

¹⁵⁸ Melikoff. “1826’den Sonra,” 211.

N.677 did not pointed out *cemevis*; so that, it cannot be considered as an obstacle regarding decisions of *cemevi*'s legal status.¹⁵⁹ On contrary, Bahadır stated that Abdi Bey Dervish Lodge, which was functioning for Bektashi order, was closed in 1925, after acceptance of mentioned law, and it was demolished step by step.¹⁶⁰

Law N.677 was not only about Alevism, but also about all Islamic orders, such as Naqshbandi and Mevlevi orders, with respect to its content. Although, the outcome, directly or indirectly, had negatively affected Alevis, according to a considerable part of Alevi population, it was seen as *a change developed within a modern state perspective*.¹⁶¹ However, there is one point that should be underlined. According to the Law, Hacı Bektaş Dervish Lodge and central lodge of Mevlevi order in Konya (Shrine of Mevlana) were both closed. Nevertheless, within a short time, Shrine of Mevlana transformed into a museum and opened for visit in 1927,¹⁶² while Hacı Bektaş Dervish Lodge was maintained closed until 1964, when it was transformed into a museum and opened for public visits.¹⁶³ That was the point that state favored Sunni based Mevlevism between two equal religious orders; in other words, official intention was not to Turkify Islam for the sake of cultural similarities with Bektashi order/Alevism as it was pointed out by Ziya Gökalp. Instead, it would not be wrong to claim that it was the *Turkification of Sunnism* with Turkish calls for prayer and Turkish Quran and with the favored state approach.

The Law N.677 was mentioned as the basic obstacle among other minor ones for recognition of *cemevis* as a place of worship of Alevis. Regarding the minor obstacles, *common necessity of people* should be examined with its official explanation in different articles. As Islam has always been understood as Sunni Islam in Turkey, Islamic place of worship has been mentioned as mosque. Hence for the common necessities of people, mosques were pointed out for fulfillment of places of worship. That was the point that all people, regardless of diversity, were

¹⁵⁹ "Cemevi Tartışması."

¹⁶⁰ Bahadır. "Cumhuriyet'in Kuruluş Sürecinde," 220.

¹⁶¹ Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, *Alevi Çalıştayı*, 42.

¹⁶² "Konya Mevlâna Asitanesi," *Semazen*, n.d., <<http://muze.semazen.net/content.php?id=00142>> (14 April 2013).

¹⁶³ "Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Müzesi," *Nevşehir İl Kültür ve Turizm Müdürlüğü*, n.d., <<http://www.nevsehir.kulturturizm.gov.tr/belge/1-41400/haci-bektas-i-veli-muzesi.html>> (14 April 2013).

underlined as the ones who were in need of a mosque to practice. For instance, according to the Article 2 of Village Law N.442 accepted in 1924,

“Common properties, such as mosque, school, pasture, mountain pasture, coppice, and people, who live within a group or separated houses, with their vineyards, orchards and fields form a village.”

and Article 91 of same law,

“The headman of village, who does not keep a copy of present law in village room and another copy in mosque and/or in school, will be punished with five lira penalty with the order of local administrator (*kaymakam*).”

mosques were mentioned as one of the basic necessities of a village. In fact, it was not surprising for the year 1924, when Islam was the official religion of the Republic of Turkey. However, mentioned laws are still in use, and the issue that has been and still is being discussed was the word *mosque* that state used to constitute a settlement. Instead of mosque, *place of worship* may serve for the same purpose in order to mention the place, where religious necessities are fulfilled regardless of difference. This issue will be discussed with its details, while Alevi Workshops are examined.

Political, educational and social orders were cleaned from Arab-dominated cultural components with implementations of newborn state; however, there was not a specific legal regulation, which would lead to recognition of Islamic variety including Alevism. Apart from distinguishment of mosque as a basic necessity of the smallest settlements regardless of any diversity, in the censuses of 1927 and 1935, Islamic faith was considered as one religion.¹⁶⁴

In 1928, mentioning Islam as the religion of the state was removed from the Second Article of Constitution, and in 1937, same article was revised, and laicism was taken under constitutional guarantee of state. That was the ultimate point that

¹⁶⁴ For more information about religious minorities on the censuses, see Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism*, 66-69.

Alevis' support to Kemalist implementations achieved. Although, there were unfavorable implementations caused disappointment as listed above, addition of laicism into the constitution was deepened their trust and support to the movement, as it perfectly suited with their credence in laicism. Muzaffer Karan, who would be a member of parliament in 1960s, was to mention Alevism as following for a survey regarding Alevism in Cem, which was a journal published by Alevis.

“Alevism is a social organization and a progressivist social outlook, which is based on the principles of nationalism, populism, statism, reformism and secularism; in short, it was Ataturkism itself.”¹⁶⁵

The new implementations and the new state order were welcomed by majority of Turkish society; however, some revolts, which were in favor of Islamic-based Ottoman culture, occurred in the meantime. Dersim Rebellion of Kurdish Alevis took place in 1937-1938 in Dersim (Tunceli), an eastern Anatolian city, which is *majorly* populated by Kurdish Alevis.¹⁶⁶ According to Martin van Bruinessen, Dersim always had complex relations with governments, as tribal Kurdish families had never accepted the laws entirely. Due to existence of their tribal laws regardless of state laws, they used to refuse to pay taxes to the central government, which used to form the basis of disagreement.¹⁶⁷ Due to previous rebellions, starting from 1936, military control was increased with a special law accepted the TBMM,¹⁶⁸ and under this pression, Seyyid Rıza, a religious leader of the town, started to call for an uprising against infrastructure constructions being built in the meantime. According to his call, state built bridges and other constructions were to take away sheiks' and large landowners' authorities on the

¹⁶⁵ “Büyük Anketimiz,” *Cem* 2, August 1966, 12–16, quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 166.

¹⁶⁶ The United Nations Refugee Agency, *Turkey: Ethnic and religious composition of the Tunceli Region and the town of Ovacik*, by Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2000, <<http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=topic&tocid=4565c22523&toid=4565c25f287&publisher=IRBC&type=&coi=&docid=3ae6ad7c18&skip=0>> (25 April 2013).

¹⁶⁷ Martin van Bruinessen. "Genocide in Kurdistan? The Suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in Turkey (1937-38) and the Chemical War Against the Iraqi Kurds (1988)," in *Conceptual and Historical Dimensions of Genocide*, ed. George J. Andreopoulos (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 146.

¹⁶⁸ Kemal Kirisci, and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict* (London: Routledge, 1997), 105.

region and to destroy tribal tradition.¹⁶⁹ The rebellion started with the burnt of a bridge on 21 March 1937.¹⁷⁰ However, there are different perspectives regarding the reason. On contrary to aforementioned one, Abidin Özgünay was to mention that the Dersim Rebellion was not as a revolt against state authority; instead, it was a defense of honor of Alevi people due to gendarmerie's abusul attitudes to Alevi women.¹⁷¹ With increased tension, troops surrendered the city, and as stated by Bruinessen, during the rebellion, almost 10 percent of entire population of Dersim was killed and this ratio has been expressed even higher than that by Kurds.¹⁷²

Dedes were officially disqualified from being religious leaders of their communities, they became mediators between their communities and the state during the Dersim Rebellion, and they sided with the state.¹⁷³ Dersim Rebellion has always been discussed if it was a Kurdish or Alevi revolt. It was generally mentioned as a Kurdish revolt, as it had not any religious reference, and was carried out by Kurdish tribes due to power issues.¹⁷⁴ Besides, this revolt, which was carried out in the time of M.K. Atatürk's presidency, did not bring about any hostility to him as mentioned by Hüsniye Takmaz, the Chairwoman of Federation of Alevi Foundations (*Alevi Dernekleri Federasyonu*). Alevis maintained their support to laic modern state.¹⁷⁵ Murtaza Demir, the Founder Chairman of Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Foundation, mentions two significant periods, in which Alevis were not under oppression. The first one is the aforementioned early Ottoman period between 1299-1450, started with Osman I lasted with Mehmed II., and the second one is the early republican period between 1923-1950.¹⁷⁶

Alevis, both Kızılbaş people and Bektashis were in favor with the new implementations, and mentioned the period starting with republic until the end of single party rule as period of peace; however, as they were restricted within religious

¹⁶⁹ Safiye Dündar, *Kürtler ve Azınlık Tartışmaları: Tarih, Kimlik, İsyamlar, Sosyo-Kültürel Yapı, Terör* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2009), 156.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Abidin Özgünay, "Her Gün Kanayan Yara." *Cem* 6 (1966): 4-5, quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 166.

¹⁷² Bruinessen. "Genocide in Kurdistan?," 151.

¹⁷³ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 147.

¹⁷⁴ Deniz Toprak and Gamze Çınlar, "Dersim Tartışmaları," *Aydınlık Daily Newspaper*, 17 February 2013, 15.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

perspective, they maintained in their rural settlements and lived their Alevi culture within secrecy. This secrecy was identical for both Kızılbaş people and Bektashis, as Melikoff stated. She mentioned the year 1925, when dervish lodges and shrines were closed with Law N.677, was the time that Bektashis, who were still in action - semi-officially- after 1826, were drawn back to exact secrecy.¹⁷⁷

After the death of M.K. Atatürk, progressivist implementations were carried out, as well. Among them, establishment of Village Institutes was a significant step based in rural settlements in order to achieve entire development within different orders of life, such as agriculture, literature, education and so on. Village Institutes with their progressivist, enlightened and laic structure were welcomed by Alevis as representatives of development. Today, they are still being commemorated with respect and yearning by many different Alevi Foundations, due to listed characteristics of institutes.¹⁷⁸ Within this perspective, personal endeavors of Hasan Ali Yücel and İsmail Hakkı Tonguç to escape from Arab-dominated culture in educational order with translations and shift of foreign languages, to support laicism in education, and to support humanism and science were also respected by Alevis, as it is visible in programmes of mentioned commemoration ceremonies.

1950, as it was mentioned as the end of peace period, was a significant year for Alevis regarding the relations between Alevis and the state authorities. In 1950, a new era started with 1950 Elections, in which religious implementations became a political tool both in elections and anterior propagandas.

¹⁷⁷ Melikoff. "1826'dan Sonra," 212.

¹⁷⁸ "17 Nisan 1940 Tarihli Yasa ile Kurulan Köy Enstitülerinin 70. Kuruluş Yıldönümü," *Hacıbektas*, 17 April 2010,

<http://www.hacibektas.com/index.php?id=haber_ayirntlari&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=272&cHash=34b469b381afb5329f0bc206516276c2> (12 April 2013);

"Aydınlanmanın Meşalesi Köy Enstitüleri," *Evrensel Daily Newspaper*, 19 January 2009, <http://www.evrensel.net/v2/haber.php?haber_id=43963> (12 April 2013).

4.2.2. Urbanization in Democracy: Neighborliness of Alevi and Sunni

1950 Elections was a significant point of Turkish political history, as it was already discussed earlier. However, taking *only* 1950 Elections and its aftermath into account would not be correct, as its anterior witnessed considerable changes.

Laicization period, which also included an escape from Arab-dominated cultural components, was welcomed by majority of people; however, there were negative reactions, as well. The establishment of DP was an outcome of that unsupportive reaction against CHP's implementations. Meantime, it was a prerequisite for a real democracy, in which people from different ideologies might be represented in the assembly. In previous chapter, a part dedicated to CHP's implementations between 1946, when DP entered into the Assembly, and 1950, when DP established its government, it was a period of "soft laicism". Within that part, CHP's initiatives targeting conservative side of society were discussed with its details and outcomes. While CHP intended to gain votes of conservative side of society in order to *cut* the support to DP for the following elections, it caused religious awakening. The support that CHP obtained from conservatives as a result of *soft laicism* was not a considerable success for itself, with respect to the election results; however, said religious awakening led DP to form the government with usage of religion as a political tool, as it might be seen in its implementations.

CHP's implementations between 1946-1950 were criticized strongly as it was undermining the Kemalist reforms. These critics were already mentioned; however, it is important to distinguish that Alevi were a side of these critics. As they supported Kemalist reforms, they were against *backward steps*. Within this perspective, religious instructions, although they were optional, courses for preachers and prayer leaders, shifts regarding educational structure of Village Institutes and opening of theology faculty in Ankara were considered as unfavorable by Alevi.¹⁷⁹ Eventually, displeasure among Alevi led them to support DP against CHP in 1950 elections.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ Ali Balkız, *Kent Koşullarında Sosyolojik Olgu Olarak Alevilik* (İstanbul: Alev Yayınları, 2007), 11.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 12;

"Cumhuriyet Dönemi ve Alevilik," *Karacaahmet Sultan Derneği*, n.d.,

It would not be wrong to claim that Alevi votes played decisive role on DP's victory in 1950 Elections due to its democratic-leaning propagandas before the elections. However, DP Government could not be sufficient to respond all democratic needs of different parts of society, including Alevis; instead, DP's implementations aimed the necessities of Sunni-Islamic side of society.

Within a month of establishment of DP Government, the language of calls for prayers was re-shifted into Arabic. This implementation of DP was responded with significant pleasure by conservative part of the society, as it was discussed earlier. However, it was not suited with what Alevis expected as a response to their support during the elections. Besides, Quran recitals as *auspicious success*, and DP members' discourses with significant references to Islamic identity to the Republic of Turkey were the implementations that excluded Alevism and favored Sunni Islam.¹⁸¹

Since the Ottoman Empire was abolished, many implementations were carried out, and newborn state was Westernized, which meant to be modernized as it was mentioned, and laicized. However, Islamic references, which were pointing out the *superiority* of Sunni Islam could not be swept away; therefore, egalitarian approach regarding religious identity could not been embraced by all parts of society, as it could not achieve to a sustainable success in political order. For instance, Edip - the publisher of Sebilürreşad- had supported Islamic thought against any reformist implementations; hence, considerably respected by Islamist intellectuals, pointed out Alevis as below regarding the national unity issue during the period of transition to multiparty government.

<<http://www.karacaahmet.com/alevilik-olayi/cumhuriyet-donemi-ve-alevilik-.htm>> (22 April 2013).

¹⁸¹ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 147.

“Cumhuriyet Dönemi ve Alevilik”;

“DP Dönemi,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 31 March 1999,

<<http://www.radikal.com.tr/1999/03/31/turkiye/dp.html>> (1 April 2013);

Fevzi Gümüş, “Seçimler ve Aleviler Üzerine Denel Değerlendirmeler,” interview by Barış Erdoğan (Sabah Daily Newspaper) and Kenan Karkaya (DİHA), *Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği Antalya Şubesi*, 2011,

<http://www.psakd.org/yazarlar/secimler_aleviler_uzerine_genel_degerlendirmeler.html> (1 April 2013).

“These miserable wretches constitute the most ignorant, the most credulous community in Anatolia. Beliefs incompatible with reason, culture or even humanity have reduced these unfortunates to the level of animals.”

[...]

“Wouldn't it be more reasonable to achieve unity between Sunnis and Alevis by raising them to our own level rather than lowering ourselves to theirs.”¹⁸²

These discourses can be considered as a proof of continuous insulting approach to Alevis that was significantly effective since 15th century under Ottoman flag. Besides, as the second phrase underlines *raising* Alevism to the *superior level of Sunni Islam*, that can be considered as a reference to assimilation of Alevis and insistence on *Sunnifying* them. Alevis mention that they have been faced with assimilation, which was to be considered as a state policy after 1980s, in many different ways.

Period of DP became significant disappointment for supporters of laic republican identity due to re-definition of laicism with favor of Sunni Islam, consequent implementations with respect to *superiority* of Sunni Islam and Islamic discourses of party members. As Alevis have been significant supporters of laicism, their support to DP lasted short because of the listed reasons.

Islamic implementations in educational order were started to be discussed with CHP's *soft laicism* period; however, with DP government, religion gained significant importance in different levels of education with various regulations applied step by step. As religious education has been a serious issue, which is being discussed by not only Alevis, but also considerable part of the society supporting laic republican approach, it will be useful to examine the origin and the history of implementations in different levels of education. Therefore, chronological order of regulations of DP Government regarding religion in educational order will be given as a list,¹⁸³ which is:

¹⁸² Baki Öz, *Aleviliğe İftiralara Cevaplar* (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 1996), 44-47.

¹⁸³ Turgay Gündüz, and Medine Sevim, “Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet Dönemi Din Eğitimi ve Öğretimi Kronolojisi.” *Dem Dergi* 2 (2008): 67-68.

- in 1950, primary school teachers were obliged to give lectures of religion; lectures of religion for curriculum of fourth and fifth grade of primary school were approved by Government; students, who did not want to take lectures of religion, were allowed to be exempted unless their parents applied with a petition to the school administration; and DİB published a report regarding religious education, which played significant role on opening of Imam-Hatip schools;
 - in 1951, courses for preachers and prayer leaders turned into Imam-Hatip schools in level of secondary schools for four years in seven cities; and religious education was applied to Village Institutes' curriculum;
 - in 1953, Council of National Education agreed on necessity of professional teachers educated specifically for lectures of religion; and first and second grades of schools of vocational teacher education were obliged to take lectures of religion;
 - in 1954, mentioned second part of Imam-Hatip schools were opened for the level of high school education for three years; consequently, total period of Imam-Hatip schools were increased to seven years;
 - in 1956, optional lectures of religion were applied to curriculum of first and second grades of secondary schools;
 - in 1958, Imam-Hatip schools, which were opened under regulation of Administration of Private Schools (*Özel Okullar Müdürlüğü*), were taken under regulation of General Administration of Secondary Schools (*Ortaöğretim Genel Müdürlüğü*);
- and;
- in 1959, Higher Islamic Institute (*Yüksek İslâm Enstitüsü*) was opened in Istanbul in order to educate teachers of lectures of religion.

All listed implementations were responded positively by conservative part of the society; however, religious education regarding Sunni Islamic doctrines was not welcomed by Alevis, who were excluded from the contents of lecture. Additionally, Alevis could not associate these implementations with a laic state. As mentioned, regulations were applied by the DP Government step by step, optional classes were expanded to different levels of education, then they were turned into obligatory, and firstly, courses for preachers and prayer leaders was changed into Imam-Hatip schools, then the period was expanded to seven years, and eventually, they were

considered as an equivalence of regular secondary schools, as they were both taken under regulation of General Administration of Secondary Schools.

Religion in educational order was to become a tool that would change regarding the ideology of governments as it was in French history, and within two decades after DP Governments, lectures of religion would be a constitutional obligation, and would be one of the main targets of discussions with increased numbers of Imam-Hatip schools as shown in Chart V: New Opening Imam-Hatip Schools (1950-1997) on page 149 among Alevis and other supporters of laic republican identity. Within time, graduates of Imam-Hatip Schools would be considered as a *growing army of reactionaries* by supporters of the laic republican identity,¹⁸⁴ and as *dearest* of all education system by supporters of conservative identity.¹⁸⁵

At the end of 1950s, Alevi support turned back to CHP, which was granted with Alevi votes as indicators of their loyalties. As the support to DP was ended, Alevis strongly supported the 1960 military intervention against DP.¹⁸⁶ After the intervention, same support was carried out for the new constitution by Alevis.

The Constitution of 1961 has been the most liberalistic constitution of Turkish politics. Within this respect, support of Alevis cannot be considered surprising. Besides, aforementioned Article 19 was the most valuable part regarding the support of both Alevis and entire supporters of laic republican identity.¹⁸⁷ Article 19 was the constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience, which was considerably important to respond various necessities of different parts of society, as it did not point out any superior belief or religion among others.

Within the political atmosphere based on freedom of thoughts thanks to the Constitution of 1961, socialism and communism were spread among Turkish society. These ideologies were associated with economic development with the basis of

¹⁸⁴ Cahit Tanyol, "Aydın Din Adamı Sorunu." *Cem* 2 (1966): 10-11, quoted in Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 167.

¹⁸⁵ "Imam Hatipler milletin gözbebeği olacak."

¹⁸⁶ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 152;

Balkız, *Kent Koşullarında*, 12.

¹⁸⁷ "DP Dönemi."

statism, workers' right, social justice, and rejection of religion-based nationalism, which was promoting Islamic Ottoman identity. Within this context, the Kemalist principles were reinterpreted as socialism due to similar understandings of populism, reformism and statism.¹⁸⁸ With respect to the link between Kemalist principles and rejection of religion-based nationalism with the Turkish interpretation of socialism and communism, Alevis took their side with this ideological trend.¹⁸⁹ The connection between Alevism and socialism were deepened with endeavors of minstrels (*aşık*), as they wrote their poems with significant references to socialism in order to distinguish the political and economic rights of individuals within socialist ideology. This link was strengthened within time; eventually, during the process of 1980 military intervention, these records were collected due to their inconvenient (*sakıncalı*) content.¹⁹⁰ Additionally, with the annual festivals starting to be organized after 1966 in Hacibektaş, Hacı Bektaş became more than a religious leader and started to be defined as a socialist revolutionary thinker with respect to his humanist and egalitarian approach.¹⁹¹

Kemalist reforms took modernity into account not only as laicism and Westernization, but also as an escape from Arab-dominated cultural components, which was not a reflection of real Turkish culture, as it was mentioned. With DP governments, real Turkishness was connected with Islam, which was considered as the basic component of Turkish culture. Hence, as Islam found its principal basis within Arab culture, Arabization, due to its relevance to Islam, was promoted, especially in philological order. That brought about significant dichotomy regarding real Turkishness. According to DP, real Turks were the Muslims, who accomplished the practices of Sunni Islamic doctrine. On the other hand, there were significant references to Alevism, which protected Turkic culture against Arab domination during Islamization of Anatolia. With the discussions of socialism, humanism, and

¹⁸⁸ Kemal H. Karpat. "Ideology in Turkey After the Revolution of 1960," in *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural and Historical Analysis*, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973), 341. (317-365).

¹⁸⁹ Karin Vorhoff, "Let's Reclaim Our History and Culture!: Imagining Alevi Community in Contemporary Turkey." *Die Welt des Islams* 38, no. 2 (1998): 230-231.

¹⁹⁰ Ulaş Özdemir, "Aşık Mahzuni Şerif / Huruli Cennet İstemem," *Müzik Söyleşileri*, 2002, <http://www.muziksoylesileri.net/cms/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=43> (13 May 2013).

¹⁹¹ John David Norton. "The Development on the Annual Festival at Hacibektaş 1964-1985," in *Bektachiyya: Études sur l'Ordre des Bektachis et les Groupes Relevant de Hadji Bektach*, eds. Alexandre Popović, and Gilles Veinstein, (Istanbul: Isis, 1993), 193. (191-200).

laicism related with characteristics of Alevism, Alevis defined themselves and were defined by entire laicism supporters as the protectors of laicism and modern Republic of Turkey. This is what Şen pointed out as the reason that a laic Sunni feels herself/himself close to Alevism. He argued;

“There is not much difference between Sunni people supporting laicism and Alevis. Many of Sunnis supporting laicism feel themselves closer to Alevism. Its egalitarian structure regarding the gender, Turkish worships, Turkish poems etc. are significant components attracting the attention of Sunnis supporting laicism.

On significant points, it goes beyond theology and reaches to political differences. For instance, you cannot find many differences between an Alevi and a Sunni supporting left-wing politics. Yes, in recent history, left-wing politics has gained dominance in Alevism.”¹⁹²

1950s and 1960s possess importance not only regarding changed political balances for Alevis, but also regarding sociological changes. As it has been mentioned many times, Alevis settled in rural areas due to security issues since Seljuk and Ottoman empires, and they managed to maintain their situation until 1950s. They were economically, sociologically and politically (relatively) homogeneous groups under the conditions of rural life until then.¹⁹³ During this time, they used to have their own religion-based hierarchical order in their life; accordingly, they formed their own communities. These homogeneous and hierarchically ordered communities used to perform their rituals with the guardianship of watchmen in their villages, due to being under control by gendarmerie.¹⁹⁴

With the time of Menderes after 1950, mechanization process for agriculture started, and it brought about unemployment in rural areas. Consequently, this process led to domestic immigration flows from villages to cities within a decade. 1960s became the period that Alevis urbanized and settled in city centers due to

¹⁹² Şen, interview.

¹⁹³ Balkız, *Sivas'tan Sydney'e Aleviler*, 269.

¹⁹⁴ *Alevi Tören ve Ritüelleri*, 52-53;
Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 144;
Balkız, interview.

increasing unemployment.¹⁹⁵ Immigration flows caused significant changes for Alevism. Due to prejudgments, Alevis could not demonstrate themselves with their Alevi identity in the social life. They hid their Alevism within their urban life; however, they intended to maintain their identity with *differentiation of districts*¹⁹⁶ among Sunni and Alevi communities and villager associations or cultural foundations that they founded.¹⁹⁷ For instance, in 1961, The Foundation for Touristic Beautification of Hacibektas (*Hacibektaş'ı Turistik Bakımdan Güzelleştirme Derneği*) in Hacibektaş; in 1962 Hacibektas Cultural, Development and Aid Foundation (*Hacibektaş Kültür, Kalkınma ve Yardım Derneği*) and a year after Hacibektas Tourism and Promotion Foundation (*Hacibektaş Turizm ve Tanıtma Derneği*) in Ankara; and in Istanbul, Hacibektas Cultural Foundation (*Hacibektaş Kültür Derneği*) were established.¹⁹⁸ Within this secrecy, not only in our personal interviews, but also in many inquiries, Alevis have mentioned that they used to wake up early in the morning during the month of Ramadan for the special meal before dawn (*sahur*) as if they were fasting in order to hide their Alevism from their Sunni neighbours, as they started to be excluded from the society when their identity was coming out due to their non attendance to special Friday prayers.¹⁹⁹

Among all changes of decade, the most significant one was the interaction between Sunnis and Alevis, who started to share same settlements and became neighbours. As a consequence of increased Alevi visibility in public sphere and newly-emerged institutionalization, considerable curiosity regarding Alevism occurred in social life among Sunni majority. Additionally, disengagement of Alevi communities due to immigration to urban areas weakened practicability of Alevi practices. As communities possess significant importance in Alevism, immigration caused to spread the members of these communities to different parts of the country; hence, communities were broke up. Dedes were separated from their communities.

¹⁹⁵ Aksoy. "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alevilik," 260.

¹⁹⁶ Martin Van Bruinessen, *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik: Etnik ve Dinsel Kimlik Mücadeleleri*, trans. Hakan Yurdakul (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 120.

¹⁹⁷ Tahire Erman, and Aykan Erdemir. "Aleviler ve Topluma Eklemlenme Sorunsalı," in *Türkiye'de Çoğunluk ve Azınlık Politikaları: AB Sürecinde Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları*, ed. Kaya Ayhan, and Turgut Tarhanlı. (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2005), 132.

¹⁹⁸ Ata, *Alevilerin İlk Siyasal Denemesi*, 47-48.

¹⁹⁹ Balkız, interview;

Cahit Korkmaz et. al. eds., *Alevi Bakış Açısıyla Türkiye'de Ayrımcılık* (Ankara: Mattek Matbaacılık, 2010), 66;

Cahit Korkmaz et. al. eds., *Türkiye'de Alevi Olmak* (Ankara: Mattek Matbaacılık, 2010), 120-125.

Moreover, companions were broke up. The secrecy was vanished for the performance of rituals.²⁰⁰ As mentioned by Balkız, they became unprotected due to the lack of their traditional communal structure.²⁰¹ However, despite the changed structure of Alevi communities, they have been able to maintain the basics of their belief system under different conditions. They managed to perform their rituals; because, according to the Alevi perspective, Alevism is not only a set of belief, but also a way of life.²⁰² As Geçmez distinguished, Alevis accept the whole life as a religious practice; therefore, there was not a possibility for them to leave their practices due to changed conditions.²⁰³ While they endeavored to maintain their Alevi identity, they demonstrated significant effort at adaptation to modern vision of city centers in order to save Alevism from dissolution.²⁰⁴

In 1966, the first magazine dedicated to Alevism was published with the name of “Cem” in order to distinguish the problems of Alevis. In various issues of Cem, Alevis were defined as defenders of progressivism, equality, and civilization; fellow followers of Kemalist principles that provided a state where Alevis could live according to their own lifestyle; people ready to serve M.K. Atatürk’s Turkey with *enlightened* Sunnis; and people capable to adapt themselves to the necessities of time due to liberal understanding of Alevism.²⁰⁵ Among all, the last definition was a significant reference to Sunni based Islamic sects, such as Nurculuk and Naqshbandi orders that put Arab culture in a superior position, supported by the DP governments in 1950s and AP in 1960s, as mentioned in previous chapter. In the same magazine, one of the writers pointed out the the Good and Evil, in which M.K. Atatürk was defined as an incarnation of Good with his reforms and principles that led Turkey in an enlightenment process. However, within the same interpretation, the end of enlightenment was associated with DP governments due to its official popularization of and support for Nurculuk that kept on in 1960s with AP government.²⁰⁶ With this reference, Alevism started to be discussed, once again, as a component of real

²⁰⁰ Élise Massicard. “Alevism in the 1960s: Social Change and Mobilization,” in *Alevis and Alevism: Transformed Identities*, ed. Hege Irene Markussen (Istanbul: Isis, 2005), 109. (109-135.)

²⁰¹ Balkız, interview.

²⁰² Balkız, *Sivas’tan Sydney’e*, 42.

²⁰³ Geçmez, interview.

²⁰⁴ Necdet Subaşı, “Güvenliğin Modern Mekânları ve Aleviler.” *Milel ve Nihal* 1 (2003): 78.

²⁰⁵ For more information regarding the volumes of Cem, please see; Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 165-168.

²⁰⁶ Vorhoff, “Let’s Reclaim Our History and Culture,” 247.

Turkish identity with its national and enlightened characteristic as contrary to *reactionary Islam*, which was associated with and represented by Nurculuk in political scenes during 1950s and 1960s. Consequently, Alevism was defined within different perspectives either a religion, a sect or a union that was composed by Turks, who loved Ali and protected Turkishness from Arab-dominated Sunni culture.²⁰⁷

In the same year, another weekly newspaper named as '*Ehl-i Beyt*' was started to be published. Ehl-i Beyt and Cem had significant differences based on critics and references. Cem and its writers are more Turkic-center regarding the Alevism, while Ehl-i Beyt significantly pointed out the diversity regarding Alevi people, such as Kurdish origin and Turkish origin. On the other hand, Cem has supported equal representation on DİB, instead of a revision or a total abolishment, as another difference from Ehl-i Beyt.²⁰⁸

Urbanization of Alevis, their considerable visibility and their neighbourliness with Sunnis not only caused curiosity for the other, but also started an era of clashes between these two sides. In 1966, two villages, one populated by Sunnis and the other by Alevis, in Ortaca/Muğla, a south-western city, had an issue, which was interpreted in two different versions: According to then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, press and to the government, it was an issue based on land problems not related with religious identities. On the other hand, according to Alevi people, it was an issue regarding their Alevi identity and it started so since the very beginning.²⁰⁹ Whatever the reason was, this incident has been recorded as the first of Alevi-Sunni clash of the Republic.

The Ortaca Event caused significant mobilization among Alevis from different parts of the country. Even the first issue of the Cem can be related with the

²⁰⁷ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 148-149, 161-163.

²⁰⁸ Murat Yünlü, "Türkiye'de Alevi Siyaseti Örneği Türkiye Birlik Partisi (1966-1981)" (M.A. diss., Yıldız Technical University, 2008).

²⁰⁹ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 157-159;

Evren Güvensoy, "Ortaca Katliamı," Alevi Forum, 2007, <<http://www.aleviforum.com/showthread.php/26602-Ortaca-Katliam%C4%B1n%C4%B1-Duydunuzmu>> (13 April 2013);

Süleyman Çıtak, "Türkiye'de İlk Alevi Sünni Çatışması," *Süleyman Çıtak Personal Webpage*, 2010, <<http://schitak.wordpress.com/2010/11/14/turkiyede-ilk-alevi-sunni-catismasi/>>(13 April 2013).

clash with its aim, which was to point out the problems of Alevis, as it was published just a month after the clash started. In addition to the magazine, the liberal atmosphere of political scenes led Alevis to form a political party. The Unity Party (*Birlik Partisi* - BP) was established later in the same year.²¹⁰ Officially, there was not any Alevi reference among party members' speeches; however, the party emblem was associated with the lion of Ali with 12 stars related with Twelvers.²¹¹ The Chair of the Party, Hasan Tahsin Berkman, officially declared that the lion was a symbol of their desire to gain power and party's political leaning was based on neither left or right wing politics; instead, it was a supporter of Kemalist principles, and had its doors open for everyone progressivist and reformist.²¹²

According to some parts of the society, the laic structure of the state was under threat, due to the existence of a political party *unofficially* related with a religious identity.²¹³ For some parts of the society, Demirel was effective on the decision of establishment of the BP, as he wanted to divide the votes of CHP that it would have gained from Alevi population during the elections. Additionally, within this perspective, the emblem was reinterpreted as a way to attract the Alevi attention, and Berkman was a fellow of Demirel and was a Sunni politician.²¹⁴

The BP declared its official party programme with the basis of domination of Turkish language, necessity of revision for religious education, and the representation of Alevis within DİB's structure.²¹⁵ In 1969 General Elections, BP had eight MPs, and this support was decreased within two elections. In 1973 General Elections only one MP was elected and, eventually, in 1977, BP could not be represented in the Assembly.

BP's position regarding the representation of Alevism in DİB was questionable. The party could not be sufficient to attract the attention of entire

²¹⁰ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 170.

²¹¹ Aksoy, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alevilik," 264.

Please see Appendix XIV on page 313 for the party emblem. (Source: Kelime Ata, *Alevilerin İlk Siyasal Denemesi: Türkiye Birlik Partisi (1966-1980)* (Ankara: Kelime Yayınevi, 2007).)

²¹² Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 170-171.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 170.

²¹⁴ Aksoy, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alevilik," 264.

²¹⁵ Erkin Topkaya, *Anayasa ve Siyasal Partiler Kanunu, Program ve Tüzükleriyle Türkiye'de Başlıca Siyasal Partiler* (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1969) 475-484.

Alevi and could not gain sufficient and sustainable support. The rumor concerning support of Demirel for the establishment of the party and ideological diversities had played significant role on the lack of entire support. As stated by all the interviewees, considerable group of Alevi have not been in favor with the existence of DİB, that is to say, the origin of the problem was not the representation.²¹⁶ However, there were some Alevi leaders and intellectuals, who demanded the representation of Alevi in DİB.²¹⁷ (This dichotomy is still an issue that divides Alevi into two groups as supporters and opponents.) In 1970, some of the MPs of BP changed their party and became members of AP of Demirel, and that was interpreted as a proof of both Demirel's support for the BP and the reason of decreasing trust in the BP.²¹⁸ In 1971 the name of the party was changed and became Turkish Unity Party (*Türkiye Birlik Partisi* - TBP); eventually, during the 1980 military intervention, TBP was closed as all other political parties.

During the time of discussions of Alevi representation in DİB, its position concerning religious identities was questionable. With respect to *unofficial* governmental policies, which were carried out by DP and its successor AP as stated in previous chapter, favoring Nurculuk was the trend of DİB, as well.²¹⁹ In addition to being in favor with Nurcu movement, DİB used to make several declarations with ignorance of Alevi with its distinctive characteristics. For instance, Alevi funeral services were insisted to be carried out with respect to Sunni Islamic rules in order to sweep away any dichotomy within religious frame and to abide the rules of Islam. These kinds of insurances were considered as a part of Alevi assimilation with obliging them to follow Sunni Islamic rules.²²⁰

The 1970s witnessed the gradual political polarization of Turkish society, as it was mentioned with details in previous chapter. On one side, there was the Turkish Islamic Synthesis as a systematically growing conservative nationalist

²¹⁶ Balkız, interview;
Geçmez, interview;
Kaya, interview;
Özügürlü, interview;
Şen, interview.

²¹⁷ Azak, *Islam and Secularism*, 152.

²¹⁸ Aksoy, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alevilik," 264.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 140.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 152.

identity and on the other hand, there was the socialist left-leaning ideology defending egalitarian, anti-imperialist and non-Islamic national identity. Alevism have associated with this left-leaning ideology as it was seen as the only way that Alevism might have survived due to the lack of Islamic-nationalist idea's superiority. As Ali Murat İrat argued, instead of a Marxist approach, Turkish left ideology was associated with Kemalism and that association played significant role that Alevism took their position with favor of this ideology.²²¹

On the other hand, the decade of 1970 was the period that Turkish Islamic Synthesis started to be spread as a *political-philosophical idea*²²² in order to unify all separated political parties, under the flag of Islamist nationalization. The decade faced with a different perspective of laicism, which was affected by Islamic implementations, as a fact of increasing Islamic trend. Laicism of Turkey was *Islamicized* during the first years of the decade.²²³ These two completely different terms were unified within the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. The synthesis was developed by a group of conservative intellectuals within an organization known as Hearts of Intellectuals (*Aydınlar Ocağı*). The Hearts of Intellectuals were established on 14 May 1970 and formed as a think-tank center by conservative nationalist academics, politicians and businessmen, and during the 1970s it became a political movement, which was composed by, so-called, *similarities* between Islam and pre-Islamic Turkish culture, herewith Turks were to become linked with Islam as a natural fact,²²⁴ in order to unify all right-wing ideas of separated political parties (AP, MHP, MSP).²²⁵ The idea was a synthesis of Kemalist elements, such as Kemalist perspective of laicism and nationalism, and Islam. Hence, according to the intellectuals of the Hearts, M.K. Atatürk was the most progressive nationalist of the Turkish political landscape.²²⁶ However, within the nationalist ideology of the Hearts, Islam possessed a specific role, and the ideology aimed to create a Sunni-Muslim identity accompanied by strong Turkish nationalism.²²⁷ This ideology was

²²¹ Ali Murat İrat, *Devletin Bektaşi Hırkası: Devlet Aleviler ve Ötekiler* (İstanbul: Chiviyazıları Yayınevi, 2006), 93.

²²² Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 65.

²²³ Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no.2 (1996): 242. 231-251,

²²⁴ Zürcher, "Importance of Being Secular," 64.

²²⁵ Kurt, "The Doctrine of "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis"," 113.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 116.

²²⁷ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 65.

linked with Gökalp's perspective of Turkishness, which was composed by Turkish nationalism and Islam by Yıldız Atasoy.²²⁸

During 1970s, most specifically in the last years of decade, communism was seen as a powerful hostile that should be stopped, and like the Menderes period, Islam was the only component that could mobilize people against it.²²⁹ Within this political atmosphere, Sunni Islam was associated with strong nationalism based on religious identity and Alevism was linked with socialist ideology. Hence, Alevis were the “natural allies” of leftist movement; therefore, “fascist and fundamentalist radical rightist groups” provoked significant hatred among conservative Sunnis against Alevis, which led to brutal attacks between *fascist Sunnis* and *communist Alevis*”.²³⁰

The last years of the decade became the period of said brutal attacks and bloody struggles between Alevi and Sunni communities. Apart from individual incidents, masses had been targeted between 1978 and the 1980 military intervention in three different heterogeneously populated cities.

In 1978, Hamit Fendoğlu, then mayor of Malatya (eastern Anatolian city) without a political party, a former member of DP, and a former MP of AP, was killed with a letter-bomb sent from Ankara with a fake name belongs to his close friend on 18 April.²³¹ Within a short time, Sunni communities got armed and attacked Alevi districts due to a rumor spread that *communists* were the responsables; accordingly, they accused Alevis for the assassination of Fendoğlu.²³² As a result of simultaneous attacks in different districts of the city, eight people were dead, many were wounded, and many buildings including residential areas and shops, specifically the ones belonged to Alevis, were damaged.²³³ According to authorities, there were two major ideas regarding the reasons of incidents chain: it

²²⁸ Atasoy, *Islam's Mariage*, 54.

²²⁹ Kışlalı, *Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi*, 200.

²³⁰ Bruinessen. ““Aslını inkar eden haramzadedir!””, 16;
Bruinessen, *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik*, 120.

²³¹ Erhan Akyıldız, “Erhan Akyıldız Malatya'dan Yazıyor,” *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 20 April 1978, 9. Please see Appendix XV on page 315 for the said page.

²³² Başak İnce, *Citizenship and Identity in Turkey: From Atatürk's Republic to the Present Day* (London: I.B. Tauris Co. Ltd., 2012), 131.

²³³ Akyıldız, “Erhan Akyıldız Malatya'dan Yazıyor.”

was a clash either between leftist and rightist groups or between religious sects, which referred to Alevi and Sunni communities.²³⁴ As mentioned earlier in this part, even the polarization was based on political ideologies, the parties were clarified: leftist Alevis on one side and rightist Sunnis on the other. Therefore, no matter what the reason of polarization was, two parties of the clashes were clear, and the provocation among them increased the tension, successfully.²³⁵ Besides, the involvement of municipality to the incident with announcements based on religious references, such as Quran recitals, and the slogans as “Religion is gone!” (*Din elden gidiyor!*), “Bombs are on the mosques, as well!” (*Camilere de bomba konuluyor!*), and “Victory belongs to Islam!” (*Zafer İslam’ındır!*) with accusation of Alevis, who have been assumed to be the enemies of real Islam, demonstrates that the religious difference played significant role.²³⁶

The Malatya Incident was one of the significant points that the tension among political/religious groups was at its utmost ascendancy until then. During the rest of the year, it could not be decreased. Besides, it was spread to neighborhood, to different cities, such as Muş, Elazığ, Erzurum, Iğdır (all, eastern Anatolian cities) and Sivas. For instance, during the month of Ramadan, individual attacks were carried out against Alevis, in Sivas.²³⁷ In December, another bomb was exploded in a cinema in Kahramanmaraş (southeastern Anatolian city) on 19 December 1978, and “Alevi communists” were pointed out as perpetrators.²³⁸ The whole incident, which has been called as “massacre”,²³⁹ lasted a week between 19-26 December, and due to several attacks carried out in various districts majorly populated by Alevis, more than 100 people were killed.²⁴⁰ Many buildings belonging to Alevis were burned and damaged, which were signed before the bomb to differentiate from

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Emma Sinclair-Webb. “Sectarian Violence, the Alevi Minority and the Left: Kahramanmaraş 1978,” in *Turkey’s Alevi Enigma: A Comprehensive Overview*, eds. Paul J. White, and Joost Jongerden (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 223.

²³⁶ Erhan Akyıldız, “Olaylar,” *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 19 April 1978, 8.

Please see Appendix XVI on page 317 for the said page.

²³⁷ İnce, *Citizenship and Identity in Turkey*, 131.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Uğur Mumcu, “Katliam,” *Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper*, 25 December 1978, 1.

²⁴⁰ Ayça Örer, and Abdullah Kılıç, “Maraş Katliamı MIT Planıydı,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 22 December 2011;

İnce, *Citizenship and Identity in Turkey*, 131-132;

“Kahramanmaraş’ta Ölü Sayısı Dün 102’ye Çıktı,” *Milliyet Daily News*, 27 December 1978, 1.

Please see Appendix XVII on page 319 for the said page.

Please see Appendix XVIII on page 321 for the photos of event.

the ones belonging to Sunnis; therefore, the Kahramanmaraş *Massacres* have been doubted for being an organized crime.²⁴¹ The slogans those were used and yelled in the streets demonstrate that the Alevis were targeted by provocations. The slogans were based on religious solidarity for the Sunnis against Alevis for the sake of Islam, as it was in Malatya Incident. For instance, during the special Friday prayer, an imam encouraged the community with telling “If a Muslim kills an Alevi, the reward will be as equal as five Hajj travels.”²⁴² According to official reports, 1350 people were involved in *Massacre*, and 752 were arrested during the first days of the events. The cases opened to 804 people lasted 23 years, and 29 were sentenced to death; seven people were life-sentenced; seven got 15-24 years, 29 got 10-15 years, and 259 got 5-10 years prison sentence. However, eventually, sentence reductions were declared for the prisoners except the ones sentenced to death and were life-sentenced, and the executions were not carried out. 68 people, who were directly related with murders, could not be found.²⁴³

On the way to the 1980 military intervention, these two mass targeted attacks played significant roles, as they were mentioned as two of the reasons. Between the month of May and July, another incidents chain was occurred in Çorum (northern Anatolian city) between leftist and rightist groups, in other words, Alevis and Sunnis starting from 29 May, due to a provocation.²⁴⁴ In fact, the reasons cannot be differentiated from the previous mass targeted attacks; slogans were considerably similar, as well. During the whole incidents, 57 people, mostly Alevis, were killed, more than 200 people were wounded and almost 300 building belonging to Alevis for residential or business usage were damaged. After the events, as happened in other cities, many Alevis were emigrated from Çorum.²⁴⁵

²⁴¹ Mumcu, “Katliam;”;

Örer, and Kılıç, “Maraş Katliamı MİT Planıydı.”

²⁴² “Maraş Katliamı (24 Aralık 1978),” *Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association Branch Office of Antalya*, n.d., <http://www.psakd.org/maras_katliami.html> (20 April 2011).

²⁴³ “Maraş Katliamı’nda Siyasiler O Gün Ne Dedi,” *Oda TV*, December 2012, <<http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=maras-katliaminda-siyasiler-o-gun-ne-dedi-2312121200>> (2 May 2013).

²⁴⁴ İnce, *Citizenship and Identity in Turkey*, 132.

²⁴⁵ “Çorum Katliamı,” *Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association Branch Office of Antalya*, n.d., <http://www.psakd.org/maras_katliami.html> (11 April 2013).

In a study that Banu Eligür carried out, *ülkücü gençlik* was pointed out as armed group of rightist ideology. During the incidents in these three cities, some slogans were attracting the attention, which referred as an unofficial link with MHP by Eligür. In addition to aforelisted slogans, “Nationalist Turkey!” (*Milliyetçi Türkiye!*), “Chieftain Türkeş!” (*Başbuğ Türkeş!*), and “Long live Chieftain Türkeş!” (*Yaşasin Başbuğ Türkeş!*) were yelled in Malatya, Kahramanmaraş and Çorum,²⁴⁶ and party flags of MHP were used as it can be seen on Appendix XVIII on page 319. Although, Türkeş called for “common sense”, which can be considered as a proof for disencouragement of violence, the slogans of rightist groups did not change.

With the 1980 military intervention, leftist ideology was swept away as it was considered as a “communist threat”; hence, Alevism became a hidden identity. Furthermore, after the 1980 military intervention, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis became an *unofficial basis* of the new political landscape.²⁴⁷ As a result of the post-military intervention MGK rule policy, Islamic values were mixed with Turkish nationalism, which was an escape from Arabic culture and a part of laicism with respect to the M.K. Atatürk’s definition, for the sake of national unity. Briefly, Kemalist laic nationalist idea was combined with Islamic values.²⁴⁸ Herewith, the government intended to pacify diverse ethnic and religious groups both including Alevis with respect to religious (based on Alevi-Sunni difference) and ethnic (based on Turkish-Kurdish difference) points of view.²⁴⁹ The involvement of government was pointed out as the reason why Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was considered as an official government policy, rather than an unofficial basis, by Kışlalı.²⁵⁰

The post-military intervention MGK rule led by General Kenan Evren instituted the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in state structure, and the motto of “We are Muslim Turks”²⁵¹ was possessed by the said government. For instance, on 12 September 1980 (the day of the intervention), General Evren made a speech in the

²⁴⁶ “Çorum Katliamı,”; İnce, *Citizenship and Identity in Turkey*, 132; “Maraş Katliamı (24 Aralık 1978).”

²⁴⁷ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 65.

²⁴⁸ Atasoy, *Islam’s Mariage*, 91.

²⁴⁹ Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, 50.

²⁵⁰ Kışlalı, *Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi*, 100.

²⁵¹ Atasoy, *Islam’s Mariage*, 104.

state television and on radio, in which he stated the religious component of nationalism with the following sentence:

“The Turkish citizens sharing the same national and religious values were divided and turned into hostile groups those may kill the others without hesitation for the sake of political benefits.”²⁵²

Therefore, MGK rule institutionalized the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis among *the Turkish citizens, who share the same religious values*, and in order to do so, the government used the Ministry of National Education and the DİB. With the new policy, superiority of Sunni Islam was to be intended to be embedded by with the help of official governmental institutions, and this process would increase the importance of conservative identity, which considerably excludes Alevism, among society. For instance, according to the Article 136, DİB was pointed out as a part of state responsible with the solidarity. That means, an institution that privileges a certain religious belief with exclusion of all others, was assigned to maintain the solidarity of a society, which was composed by many different religious identities not only including Alevism, but also Judaism and Christianity with different sects.

Turkish identity was significantly associated with Islam; hence, relations with international Islamic organizations became visible during 1980s with the Özal Government. As Islam (Sunni Islam) was *the main* component of Turkish identity, the government strengthened the connections with Turkish citizens living abroad within base of common Islamic identity; so that, the DİB was charged with assignments of teachers of religious courses to Europe, which had been carried out by the Ministry of National Education before, and the titles of these functionaries were changed into religious personnel.²⁵³ Besides, aforementioned relations with international Islamic organizations were used in order to provide salary of the said personnel. Under a dominant influence of Saudi Arabia, a foundation called as *Rabitat-al-Alam al İslâmi* (known as *Rabıta* in Turkish) became an important actor of the relations and financial sponsor of religious services of Turkish government to

²⁵² Please see Appendix XIX on page 323 for the whole speech. (Author’s translation)

²⁵³ Orhan Gökdemir, “12 Eylül’de 12 Eylül’e Evet,” *Oda TV*, 27 August 2010, <<http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=hakimden-ve-savcidan-imam-yetistirmeliyiz-2708101200>> (2 March 2011).

Turkish immigrants of Europe, such as religious instruction and provider of salaries of assigned religious personnel and imams.²⁵⁴

As aforementioned, the religious education was a *tool* in Turkish politics and it was not in a fixed and sustainable policy; instead, it has been shaped regarding the ideology of the governments. After the 1980 military intervention, religious education was used in order to *shape* the next generations, as well, and the classes of religious ethics became obligatory in primary and secondary schools with the new constitution of 1982.²⁵⁵ The regulation aimed to teach Islamic rules, Islamic ethics and Islamic duties to the students in order to make them conscious about their religion, which was also a significant component of their *national identity*. Besides, as it always was, Islam was considered as one referring the Sunni Islam, and the content of said religious classes were composed with respect to the Sunni-Islamic duties. As stated by all interviewees, obligatory religious ethic classes were considered as the pivotal part of Alevi assimilation by Alevis. This issue has been pointed out in every single occasion by Alevis such as in public speeches, press conferences, inquiry responds, and official Alevi demands.²⁵⁶

The religious classes were just one part of the educational implementations. On the other hand, the secondary schoolbooks were rewritten, and in order to distinguish the importance of Islam in Turkish identity, the slogan of “*The best Turk is a Muslim Turk the best Muslim is a Turkish Muslim.*”²⁵⁷ was written in them. Simultaneously, the rising numbers of schools of Imam-Hatip during the late 1960s and 1970s were supported during the 1980s, as well; besides, the graduates of these vocational schools were officially allowed to enter any faculty of universities. In other words, the graduates of Imam-Hatip schools, who were specifically educated

²⁵⁴ Ibid.;

Mumcu, *Rabita*, 138.

²⁵⁵ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 65.

²⁵⁶ Alevi Kültür Dernekleri GM, and Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı GM. *Alevi Çalıştayı*, 28-31;

Balkız, interview;

Geçmez, interview;

Kaya, interview;

Korkmaz, et. al., *Alevi Bakış Açısıyla*, 104-119;

Özüğurlu, interview;

Şen, interview.

²⁵⁷ Günter Seufert, *Café Istanbul: Alltag, Religion und Politik in der modernen Türkei* (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1997), 66; quoted in Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 65-66.

in order to serve as imams of mosques or theologians of theology faculties of universities as it was mentioned in Article 32 of the Basic Law of National Education,²⁵⁸ became able to enter to any faculties without any restriction. Herewith, the said vocational schools became *an alternate* to the regular education.²⁵⁹ With this implementation, for the first time since the republic, the religious education was accepted far more than a vocational duty; it was normalized and spread among the country more than necessity. These schools financing by the government has been an issue that was highlighted by Alevis, as well as the increased number of new opening ones, which was shown in Chart V on page 149. The actual situation of issue will be examined in upcoming parts of this chapter.

Considerable increase of the number of mosques has also been distinguished by Alevis as another part of assimilation policy. New mosques started to be built all over the country and most significantly in Alevi settlements in rural areas.²⁶⁰ This implementation has been claimed as a psychological pressure on Alevis, as they do not need mosques to perform their religious rituals. According to the quantitative study that Yusuf Ziya Özcan carried out regarding the number of mosques in Turkey for almost two decades between 1971-1988, after 1981, while the increase of population in urban areas was higher than the increase of number of mosques, this ratio was *vice-versa* in villages and suburban areas. In this study, factors affecting the change of mosque number between 1986-1988 were pointed out as demographic change, numbers of associations dedicated to mosque-building (*cami yaptırma dernekleri*), and the rate of votes of right-wing parties for the city centers; and demographic characteristics and numbers of said associations for the villages.²⁶¹ According to the results of this analysis, it would not be wrong to claim that Turkish-Islamic Synthesis found base among society, who founded and financed associations in order to build mosques around the country that were identical as

²⁵⁸ “The high schools of Imam-Hatip were educational establishments that apply vocational education, as well as preparation to higher education within the secondary education system of the Ministry of National Education in order to train personnel responsible for the fulfillment of religious services, such as imams, preachers, instructors of courses on Quran.”

Source: <<http://mevzuat.meb.gov.tr/html/88.html>> (Author’s translation)

²⁵⁹ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 535-536.

²⁶⁰ Balkız, *Sivas’tan Sydney’ e Pir Sultan*, 131;
Tol. “Ayrımcılık ve Alevilik,” 46.

²⁶¹ For more information regarding the analysis: Yusuf Ziya Özcan, “Ülkemizdeki Cami Sayıları Üzerine Sayısal Bir İnceleme.” *İslami Araştırmalar Dergisi* 4, no. 1 (1990): 5-20.

affecting factor both for villages and city centers. On the other hand, as another assumption, apart from the emigration flows from villages to city centers, the reason of higher increase rate of mosques than demographical increase can be associated with statements of Alevi, who have said that they met with mosques in their villages after 1980 military intervention. The foundation Rabita was involved in financing mosque establishments and Islamic centers in universities (For instance, the mosque of Middle East Technical University and Ankara University and Kocatepe Mosque of Ankara were the products of that collaboration.) and in the TBMM. Besides, the politicians, chief of police, governors and members of Supreme Court were invited to pilgrimage visits by the same foundation.²⁶²

On this point, there is an important difference regarding necessity of mosques among Alevi and Nusayri. As it was explained in previous parts, Alevi do not need mosques to practice, as they gather in *cemevis*. On the other hand, Nusayri practice in mosques, as they do five-time prayers as well as the special Friday prayers. While Alevi are completely against to the idea of having a mosque in their villages, Nusayri think that they have been *discriminated* by not having mosques in their cities as a result of not being considered Muslims. According to them, if one is Muslim, he/she needs a mosque to practice.²⁶³ In addition to this explanation of A. Özügürlü, he mentioned that the most important component was the imams assigned by the state for the mosques those they have in their districts, due to common discriminative approach regarding Nusayri. Their reproof was state approach that gets concrete with individual events like imams' discourses.²⁶⁴ Briefly, the mosque issue has been a problem both for Alevi and Nusayri; however, it occurs with different interpretations as assimilation and discrimination. This dichotomy, as it will be mentioned in previous parts of this chapter concerning probable ways of solution, has been an important issue that has been used for the government as an obstacle on the way to a solution.

Turkish Islamic Synthesis was carried out with significant success in political scenes with discourses, constitutional and institutional implementations;

²⁶² Gökdemir, "12 Eylül'de 12 Eylül'e Evet."

²⁶³ Özügürlü, interview.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

however, it was not just the political arena that has been targeted by conservatization process. Due to strong relations with Islamic organizations, Islamic capital, specifically Saudi financial institutions, entered to Turkey, such as Faisal Finance Corporation and Al-Baraka Financial Corporation;²⁶⁵ As Çetin Yetkin argued, these occurrences were linked with the Özal Government, which was the result of the 1980 military intervention and the period that the reactionary movements gained its utmost ascendancy.²⁶⁶ Similarly, Kongar associated Özal Government with the integration of political Islam into the state.²⁶⁷ With this period, Islam found a legitimate base for itself not only in Turkish politics, but also in policies regarding the international politics.²⁶⁸

As this thesis strongly argues, Islamic Ottoman identity has always been in a clash with the laic republican one. This clash led many different periods with governmental efforts intending to shape the society regarding its own position within this clash. With the military intervention itself, post MGK rule and Özal Government the society was, once again, reshaped with respect to the conservative idea privileging Islam in national identity. However, there is one thing that should be distinguished on that point: So far, the society had intended to be shaped; however, as Özal stated “So far, everyone desired to spread Islam among the society. But, the main issue was the Islamization of the state.”²⁶⁹ he intended to change the politics of the state in order to generate more conservative future for the society.

Empowered conservative identity supporters started to organize their own market, thanks to liberal economic policies of Özal, consequently, a new kind of bourgeoisie was emerged. The newborn bourgeoisie became an alternate, or better to say, a counter to the existing elites supporting laic republican identity, due its characteristics, which were originated from Islamic liberalization among political scenes. Eventually, as stated by Yavuz, the new Islamic bourgeoisie and Islamic

²⁶⁵ Kramer, *A Changing Turkey*, 65.

²⁶⁶ Çetin Yetkin, *12 Eylül'de İrtica, Niçin ve Nasıl Gelişti?* (Ankara, Ümit Yayıncılık, 1994), 16.

²⁶⁷ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 253.

²⁶⁸ Sedat Laçiner, “Özal Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası,” in *1980-2003 Türkiye'nin Dış, Ekonomik, Sosyal ve İdari Politikaları*, eds. Turkut Göksu, et.al. (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2003), 36.

²⁶⁹ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 674.

intellectuals of the time played a pivotal role among public sphere and led the existing change of Turkey since the second half of 1980s, up to present.²⁷⁰

The entrepreneurs of Islamic bourgeoisie were the ones, who were just out of their small towns and villages; however, they had not cut their ties with their origin. On that point, the important role of Sufi orders, such as Nurculuk and Naqshbandi order, should be distinguished. The mentioned entrepreneurs grew up with Islamic values due to the conditions of rural life since their childhood, and entered to university far from their towns; accordingly, they lived in dormitories, which were generally run by said Sufi orders. Herewith, they deepened their Islamic knowledge, and became “conscious Muslims”.²⁷¹ These conscious Muslims were the new generations of society with significant Islamic identity. Besides, with their consciousness, they differentiated themselves from the others who were traditionally or just namely Muslims.

As a general perspective, Islamic values cannot be suited with capitalism; however, the Islamic bourgeoisie managed to introduce capitalism alongside Islam. For instance, due to the Islamic sensitivity²⁷², the entrepreneurs did not want to get loans with high interests from the banks; instead, they asked for credits from their religious networks.²⁷³ That was a simultaneous process with the time that Sufi orders, religious groups and sects gained power in the late 1980s. Additionally, the Islamic banking²⁷⁴ models entered to Turkish markets as a necessity of the said Islamic sensitivity, such as the establishment of Al-Baraka Financial Cooperation. It was the first Islamic banking model of Turkey that works without interest.²⁷⁵ Instead of an

²⁷⁰ Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, 57.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 52.

²⁷² According to the Islamic thought, interest in an amount of money that humankind does have right to spend, as they did not put a work for it. That is the reason why interest is considered as money illegitimately acquired (*haram para*).

²⁷³ Günay Altan, “Özlem Madi ile “İslam burjuvazisi” Üzerine,” Sendika.org, 12 February 2009, <<http://www.sendika.org/2009/02/ozlem-madi-ile-islam-burjuvazisi-uzerine-gulay-altan-aksam/>> (18 May 2009).

²⁷⁴ Islamic banking refers to a system of banking or banking activity that is consistent with the principles of the Shari’ah (Islamic rulings) and its practical application through the development of Islamic economics. The principles which emphasise moral and ethical values in all dealings have wide universal appeal. Shari’ah prohibits the payment or acceptance of interest charges (*riba*) for the lending and accepting of money, as well as carrying out trade and other activities that provide goods or services considered contrary to its principles.

(source: <http://www.islamic-banking.com/what_is_ibanking.aspx>)

²⁷⁵ “Bizi Tanıyın,” *Albaraka Türk*, n.d.,

interest, the Islamic banks have a different system with participant shares, which is used to legitimize the money comes from the money. Briefly, with the help of these involvements, the Anatolian based and conservative originated *conscious Muslims* started to work with Islamic values and gained capital, accordingly power, and started to compete with laic-Westernized elite and their economic capacity. Eventually, the pro-Islamic business group founded Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği - MÜSİAD*) and gathered around it.

Apart from the MÜSİAD, already existing Turkish Industry and Business Association (*Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD*), and The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (*Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, TOBB*) played significant role among political scenes, and with the social, political and economic change they acquired significantly different characters from each other.²⁷⁶

The economic mobilization of pro-Islamic entrepreneurs was not only a domestic process, but also there was a significant financial support from Turkish immigrants to Islamic corporations with the help of Turkish pro-Islamic associations in Europe. The money used to be collected as cash donations in mosques and transferred with private couriers to companies of Turkey.²⁷⁷

The 1980 military intervention was aimed to “deepen Kemalist ideology” among the society; however, a different interpretation of Turkish nationalism and laicism gave birth a legitimate existence of Islam in public and economic spheres with support of government. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, Islamic bourgeoisie, visible existence of Sufi orders both in political and economic scenes, educational regulations regarding religious education, and increased importance of DİB with constitutions regulations were the characteristics of the point that Turkey arrived after 1980 military intervention and its afterwards. Within this atmosphere, Alevites were not a part of any privileged order due their distinct identity. They maintained

<http://www.albarakaturk.com.tr/bizi_taniyin/detay.aspx?SectionID=AvW7CcOUELQIQzfWvBQMfQ%3d%3d&ContentID=SjpszafdvjZK8baQMqwSZQQ%3d%3d> (2 May 2011).

²⁷⁶ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 619.

²⁷⁷ Atasoy, *Islam's Mariage*, 121.

their social position until the end of the decade, when Alevism awakening was started. During the late 1980s, with press dedicated to Alevi writings, new foundations and associations as centers for Alevis to gather and unify, and media organs for special broadcasting regarding Alevism, Alevis started to reveal and to protect their identity. The secrecy of Alevi identity that was maintained since the 1950s started to be vanished with a new decade.²⁷⁸ With the help of foundations and annual cultural organizations, Alevis started to explain themselves and to be heard publicly; hence, after 1990s, Alevism found a new form among society.

4.2.3. Re-emergence of Alevi Identity

The complexity of 1990s have already been analysed with details in previous chapter. Among all, on one side increased visibility of Alevis, and on the other increased Islamization due to new political and economic conditions were the ones that led to mostly individual physical and psychological attitudes those have been considered as *discriminative* by Alevis. Within this part, starting from 1990s up to today, individual events will be taken into account within a chronological order in order to form a general view regarding Alevis and Alevism among society.

With the visibility of Alevis not only by their settlement in city centers, but also with cultural organizations, press, media and so on, Alevism started to be known not only by Sunnis, but also by the new Alevi generations. Due to the lack of written sources regarding Alevism, there had not been a systematic information transformation regarding Alevi identity from older generations to younger ones.²⁷⁹ Besides, according to various studies carried out separately, as a result of mass targeted attacks, there are many young people telling that his/her Alevi identity was hidden from himself/herself by their parents for security reasons or fear of being discriminated.²⁸⁰ 1990s are important for the vanishment of this secrecy. On the other hand, it would not be wrong to claim that, traumatic incidents have played considerable role for the consciousness of Alevism, apart from the mobilization. For

²⁷⁸ Besim Can Zırh, "1980'ler Alevilik, 2000'ler Dersim: Uyanışı Anlamak." *Alevilerin Sesi* 161 (2012): 22.

²⁷⁹ Şen, interview.

²⁸⁰ Balkız, interview;
Zırh, "1980'ler Alevilik, 2000'ler Dersim." 21.

instance, the Sivas Massacre, which is believed as the most traumatic incident of republic history, brought about Alevi recognition among society.

In 1993, the fourth annual Pir Sultan Abdal Festival was organized in Sivas, in the city center for the first time. Before, annual meetings had been held in village of Sivas named Banaz, where Pir Sultan lived significant part of his life; however, for 1993, the city center was also included to the program. During said period, Sivas used to be governed by a mayor from RP. Although, local elections is not a sufficient source for ideological assumption for a region, as the business of governing a city is not supposed to possess any ideological approach; in Turkey, it gives a general opinion for the leaning of society for related region. Hence, it would not be wrong to associate majority of people of Sivas with conservative identity, as RP possessed the mayorship. This became a reason for critics regarding Sivas choice, like Alevis were claimed to provoke the people of Sivas. Besides, attendance of Aziz Nesin (1915-1995), a writer and a humorist known with his left-wing ideology, also was criticized as another reason of provocation. According to these critics, people of Sivas, who has had sensitivity to Islamic values, was provoked by the organization of Alevis and most specifically with Aziz Nesin, who was assumed to be disrespectful to Islam.²⁸¹

The annual meeting was organized with great attendance of authors, minstrels, poets and many people from different cities, and with official support of governorship and Ministry of Culture. On the other hand, since a day before the meeting started, a campaign had started to be carried out by radical Islamists with proclamations those were distributed to the public. With one of this proclamations distributed on 30 June, which addressed “Muslim public opinion”, people were provoked with a call to *protect the religion that was under threat due to non-believers, who had not hesitated to swear to Muslim people.*²⁸² Distribution of

²⁸¹ Attila Aşut, *Sivas Kitabı: Bir Toplu Öldürümün Öyküsü* (Ankara: Edebiyatçılar Derneği, 1994), 319;

Balkız, *Sivas'tan Sydney'ye Pir Sultan*, 208-214;

“Sivas Katliamı İçin Neler Söylemişlerdi,” *Oda TV*, 04 May 2012,

<<http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=sivas-katliami-icin-neler-soylemislerdi--0405121200>> (2 May 2013);

“Sivas Madımak Katliamı: 2 Temmuz 1993,” *Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association Branch Office of Antalya*, n.d., <http://www.psakd.org/sivas.html> (2 May 2013).

²⁸² Aşut, *Sivas Kitabı*, 319.

proclamations was continued during the day after, on 1 July. According to the second proclamation, they declared that *they were ready to protect their values no matter what it would cost, even including their life.*²⁸³ In these proclamations, laic state structure, governor of Sivas, organizers of the meeting, Aziz Nesin, and participants were pointed out as culpables against Islamic values.

Within this atmosphere, the first day of organization, 1 July 1993, was completed without any problem; however, the day after, local newspapers published some news regarding the organization with concrete hatred. For instance, *Hakikat*, one of these local newspapers, asked:

“Were the Events of Pir Sultan Abdal organised with the purpose of promoting anti-religious activities? If so, we would say that we have already prepared ourselves for these kinds of attitudes. We will not let anyone sell snails in Muslim territories. We will never ever allow any propaganda against our religion.”²⁸⁴

With propagandas of proclamations and local news, many people gathered on the mosques for special Friday prayer, and then initiated protest march through the Hotel Madımak, where Alevi meetings were being carried out. During said protest march, many slogans were yelled against laic structure of the state and republican regime with yearning to Sharia. A few of the slogans were “The republic was established here and will be demolished here, as well!” (*Cumhuriyet Sivas'ta kuruldu, Sivas'ta yıkılacak!*), “Sivas will be the grave for laics!” (*Sivas laiklere mezar olacak!*), “Sharia will be back, and we'll achieve relief!” (*Şeriat gelecek, dertler bitecek!*), “Military of Mohammed will be the fear for infidels!” (*Muhammed'in ordusu kafirlerin korkusu!*), and “Livelong Sharia!”, (*Yaşayın şeriat!*).²⁸⁵ Until the evening, the protesters gathered around the Hotel and they set it fire. As a consequence of this arson attack, 33 participants of the organization and 2 hotel staffs died by flames and smoke. Additionally, two outsider protesters died with the fire. Regarding the reason of death, one of the Islamic leaning newspapers

For the whole proclamation (in Turkish), please see Appendix XX on page 329.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, 323.

For the whole proclamation (in Turkish), please see Appendix XXI on page 331.

²⁸⁴ Balkız, *Sivas'tan Sydney'e Pir Sultan*, 267.

²⁸⁵ “Sivas Madımak Katliamı.”

named *Yeni Akit*, published an article after 19 years, on 27 July 2012, and assumed that the reason of the death was not smoke or flame; instead, it was bullet. According to said article, Sivas Massacre was a “19-year-old Lie” as it was written as title of the article, with the accusation of Alevis as they would like to provoke people against religion with their own lifes.²⁸⁶

The day after the attack, national newspapers printed the events with different interpretations. While one covered the news with the title of “Supporters of Sharia took the streets!”, another one wrote “Revolt against Aziz Nesin, in Sivas!”.²⁸⁷ Authorities interpreted the incident with following sentences:²⁸⁸

Tansu Çiller, then PM: “There was no harm for our citizens who gathered around the Hotel.”

Mehmet Gazioğlu, Minister of Interior: “The incident occurred because of the Statue of Pir Sultan Abdal.”

Mesut Yılmaz, Chairman of ANAP: “I do not see anyone else who supports the freedom of thinking. However, we cannot be oblivious to usage of this freedom against the sacred values of our people.”

Due to lack of security forces in order to prevent the incident was criticized, and with aforementioned declarations, the government was accused by Alevis with being oblivious to the protest march and not providing security to an organization, which was officially supported by the Ministry of Culture. As it had happened three times during 1970s for mentioned mass targeted attacks, security weakness and neglect were pointed out once again as the reason of deaths.

2 June has been a commemoration day not only for Alevis, but also for a large part of the entire population supporting the laic republican identity. Due to association of Alevis with their considerable credence to laic state structure and the

²⁸⁶ Murat Alan, “19 Yıllık Yalan,” *Yeni Akit Daily Newspaper*, 27 July 2012, 1-18.

Please see Appendix XXII on page 333 for the said page of newspaper.

²⁸⁷ For related newspapers, please see Appendix XXIII on page 335.

²⁸⁸ “Sivas Katliamı İçin Neler Söylemişlerdi.”

slogans those were shouted against laicism, Sivas *Massacre* has become an unforgettable incident for the supporters of laicism. Since, 1993 many songs have been composed, books have been written, two theatrical plays have been performed and one movie has been shot regarding the Sivas Massacre. Çorum, and especially Kahramanmaraş incidents were wide-ranging events; however, Sivas Massacre had a wider impact than those two. Why? First of all, as Kongar mentioned, it targeted individuals directly. Secondly, after a long time, it was a concrete yearning to Sharia and hostility to laic structure.²⁸⁹ It was another proof of radically Islamization of society. Besides, this attack showed that tolerance was not a sociological concept for heterogeneous regions in Turkey regarding religious diversity, yet. The same understanding regarding Alevism had not been changed for almost four centuries despite the change of time, conditions and state structure. Additionally, Sivas Massacre was pointed out as the last part of Islamization chain starting with the language shift of calls for prayers by DP. According to this chain, increased numbers of Imam-Hatip schools and courses of Quran, visibility of veil, individual attacks to people not fasting during Ramadan, constitutional obligation of religious ethic courses, and the assassinations of journalist, authors, academics were the outcomes of Islamization of society.²⁹⁰

The lawsuit of Sivas Massacre had also been another issue. According to the lawsuit, 124 people were accused of intention to change the laic regime in order to establish a religious state, and in 2000, 33 were sentenced to death. With the change of law in 2002, and the abolishment of death sentence, those 33 were sentenced to life imprisonment, eventually in 2005 they were released with respect to a new regulation and 12 escaped abroad and they could not be found. On the other hand, seven of perpetrators could not be found since the beginning of the lawsuit.²⁹¹ In 2012, the lawsuit of those seven people dropped, and it was interpreted by PM Erdoğan as “May it be good for our nation for our country. There were many citizens in prison for many years, and some of them were runaway.”²⁹² This

²⁸⁹ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 230.

²⁹⁰ Edebiyatçılar Derneği, 1994, quoted in Ibid.

²⁹¹ Meltem Günay, “Zaman Aşımına 8 Gün Kaldı!,” *Vatan Daily Newspaper*, 4 March 2012, <<http://haber.gazetevatan.com/Haber/434741/1/Gundem>> (2 May 2013).

²⁹² “Erdoğan: Karar hayırlı olsun,” *NTVMSNBC*, March 2012, <<http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25330055/>> (2 May 2013).

interpretation of PM, and drop decision have been discussed and criticized a lot,²⁹³ even it was protested by a group of people in Ankara on 13 March 2012, and a lawsuit was opened for 52 of the protesters between 2 and 13 years of imprisonment.²⁹⁴ Most importantly, it demonstrated that the point of view of state authorities have not been changed since the incident when we compare Erdoğan's sentences with the ones made by then politicians right after the incident in 1993.

Sivas Massacre has been an incident that attracted the attention of not only Alevis, but also wider part of Turkish society, and possessed its importance as being the symbol of *otherization*, although it is not the unique incident of Turkish history targeted Alevis. Additionally, it would not be wrong to claim that it significantly contributed the awakening process of Alevism. After Sivas Massacre, another mass targeted attack took place in 1995, in Istanbul, Gazi Quarter, where is populated majorly by Alevis. On 12 March 1995, simultaneous attacks were carried out by unidentified persons on four different places in Gazi Quarter. As a result of the attacks, an Alevi dede was killed by gunfire and 20 people were wounded.²⁹⁵ On the same day, Alevis organized a protest march through the police station, as they claimed the security forces to be late to intervene. Police responded to the crowd with gunfire and one more person died consequently. A day after, on 13 March, thousands of people gathered in order to protest simultaneous attacks and police brutality; however, police opened fire once again to the protesters and 15 people died. According to autopsy report of deads, seven of 17 were killed by police bullets.²⁹⁶ Eventually, two police officers were sentenced to four years and 32 months.²⁹⁷

²⁹³ Fikret Bila, "Madımak Katliamına Zamaşıımı Örtüsü," *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 6 March 2012, <<http://wap.milliyet.com.tr/Columnists/ColumnistArticle.aspx?ID=1511724>> (2 May 2013);

Selda Güneysu, "Sivas 93: Bir İsyanın Adı," *Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper*, 10 February 2013, <<http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=398094>> (2 May 2013).

²⁹⁴ Çınar Özer, "13 Yıl Hapis İstendi!," *Vatan Daily Newspaper*, 23 March 2013, <<http://haber.gazetevatan.com/13-yil-hapis-istendi/524323/1/gundem>> (23 March 2013).

²⁹⁵ Müjgan Halis, and Evrim Altuğ, "Önüm, Arkam, Sağım, Solum Provakasyon!," *Sabah Daily Newspapers*, 3 August 2008, <<http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/08/03/pz/haber,556466EC8A9C4013BD12CB9C60F7311A.html>> (2 May 2013).

²⁹⁶ "Houses Set on Fire in İstanbul's Gazi Quarter," *Todays Zaman Daily Newspaper*, 9 August 2007,

<<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-118967-houses-set-on-fire-inistanbuls-gazi-quarter.html>> (2 May 2013).

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

During 1990s, apart from aforementioned two mass targeted attacks, many individual incidents were carried out. For instance, in a TV Show in 1995, the presenter referred Kızılbaş people in order to ask *incest* during a conversation with hostess of the show.²⁹⁸

With the 21st century, as it will be discussed, there was not a significant change regarding the interpretation of Alevism by certain groups supporting conservative identity. There have been many individual cases that Alevis have felt to be discriminated, or claimed that they were discriminated by governmental and/or personal aspects.

The relation between Alevis and DİB has not possessed a stable period due to incompatibility regarding Alevism and a probable way of solving the problem. While Alevis cannot associate an institution like DİB with a laic state structure, DİB mostly has possessed a strategy to welcome Alevis to the mosque in order to practice, as they are Muslims, as well. In 2001, then President of DİB, Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz gave an interview to a national newspaper and declared that giving a similar function to *cemevis* as mosques would be a threat for national unity.²⁹⁹ He also added that they did not want to assimilate Alevis, they just invited them to the mosques to practice, as mosques were the places, where Alevis *should* practice, also.³⁰⁰ In fact, that was the exact explanation that Alevis have considered as a proof of assimilation, as they were invited to mosques to practice instead of their *cemevis*. That was the same position that DİB possessed during 1960s and 1970s, when authorities forced to carry out Alevi funeral services in mosques with respect to Sunni Islamic traditions. Additionally, as it was stated by majority of interviewees, invitation to mosques to practice was the reason why they started to have mosques in their villages and quarters one by one since 1980s.³⁰¹

²⁹⁸ Bülent Ant, "Yeter Artık, Ezber'lerden ve Gaf'lardan Bıktık," *Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu*, n.d., <<http://www.alevi.dk/BASIN%20ARSIV/aabk%20yeter%20artik%20biktik.htm>> (24 April 2013).

²⁹⁹ Besim Can Zırh, "Aleviler nerede?," *Birikim* 267 (2011): 66.

³⁰⁰ İsmail Kaygusuz, "Namaz, Cami ve Cemevi," *Alevi Bektaşî Araştırma Sitesi*, 13 September 2001, <http://www.alevibektasi.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=749:namaz-cami-ve-cemevi&catid=38:arattirmalar-kategori&Itemid=54> (27 April 2013).

³⁰¹ Balkız, interview;
Geçmez, interview;
Kaya, interview;

Increased number of mosques all over the country attracted the attention and this curiosity started to be discussed strongly. For instance, according to an analysis for the year 2007, while there were 67000 schools, 1220 hospitals, 6300 clinics, there were 85000 mosques and 100 cemevis and 270 churches all over the country. Obviously, the population regarding each belief plays significant role for the numbers; however, a comparison between hospitals and mosques demonstrates an unproportional distribution of state supplies. While there was one hospital for 60000 people approximately, there was one mosque for every 350 people.³⁰² The numbers were updated for the year 2012, and the discrepancy between the increase of mosques and hospitals has become quite considerable. In 2012, there were 1453 hospitals and 93000 mosques.³⁰³ That means, in five years, only 233 hospitals were built, while 8000 new mosques were erected. Regarding the state supply, Alevis have pointed out that the process has been carried out unfair and unproportional for a laic state, and it has always been one of the demands of Alevis that the state should possess an egalitarian approach regarding religious identity instead of giving privileges to Sunni Islam in order to put it in a superior position. These demands will be analyzed with details in following part of this chapter.

Since 2002, governments of AKP have been in power with its conservative characteristic. As it was mentioned, with its liberal approach regarding internal and international politics, the first three AKP governments between 2002 and 2011 had attracted the attention of liberals and empowered itself with significant support of almost 50% of valid votes during 2011 Elections. The third AKP Government has intended to maintain more moderate approach regarding Alevism, and launched Alevi Opening in 2009, which finished in 2010 with its seventh meeting. This Initiative is significantly important for Alevi case, and it will be analyzed in upcoming lines of this chapter as an official government initiative.

Even though AKP's approach was moderate and liberal, individual cases have taken place in the meantime. Some of the discourses came from high state officials were considered as demonstration of official discrimination by Alevis and

Şen, interview.

³⁰² Can Dündar, "Sayıyla Kendine Gelmek," *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 21 June 2007, <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/06/21/yazar/dundar.html>> (10 May 2011).

³⁰³ Turan Eser, "Söz mü? Sayılar mı?," *Birgün Daily Newspaper*, national edition, 12 February 2013.

caused questioning of sincerity of official opening. Conservative discourses with significant religious references, which made not only Alevis but also entire supporters of laic republican identity deeply concerned about AKP Government. For instance, in 2007, special dinners were organized due to Muharrem fasts as a result of personal endeavor of an MP of Istanbul from AKP,³⁰⁴ on the other hand, within the same year, Ministry of National Education published a list of recommended books for primary school and secondary school students, in which there were two sources including discriminative contents regarding Alevism.³⁰⁵ Hence, the Muharrem dinners were responded within a suspected interpretation, and due to suspicions, only six of 279 Alevi Foundations attended, meanwhile it was protested in Tunceli as the dinner was claimed to be insincere and an intervention of AKP to Alevism.³⁰⁶

The awareness of religious identity and its distinguishment have not been acceptable for Alevis, as they had intended to hide their religious identity in order not to be excluded from the society or not to be discriminated. Hence, these kinds of distinguishments, even they are not malicious, disturb Alevis, as they feel offended due to experiences.³⁰⁷ For instance, the President of the Republic, Gül, made a speech in 2010 and mentioned “We have assigned rectors to the universities from Alevi communities.”³⁰⁸ in order to distinguish his *fair approach* to religious identities. Although the intention was to demonstrate goodwill, the reflection did not occurred in a way that Gül thought; instead, it brought about uneasiness among Alevis due to the awareness of religious identity and its usage. Additionally, Erdoğan, use the religious identity of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who is an Alevi and the chairman of CHP, as a political tool during his speech before the 2011 elections. His discourse caused disappointment not only among Alevis, but also among wider part

³⁰⁴ “Tartışmalı Alevi İftarı Gerçekleşti,” *CNN Türk*, 11 January 2008, <<http://www.cnnturk.com/2008/turkiye/01/11/tartismali.alevi.iftari.gerceklesti/418305.0/index.html>> (2 February 2013).

³⁰⁵ Nergis Demirkaya, “Taner ve Seyfettin’e Alevilerden Tepki,” *Sabah Daily Newspaper*, 13 February 2007, <<http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/02/13/gnd110.html>> (3 February 2013).

³⁰⁶ “Alevilerin sorunları neler?,” *Neden*, NTV - Public TV Channel, Istanbul, 18 November 2008; “Tartışmalı Alevi İftarı Gerçekleşti.”

³⁰⁷ Şen, interview.

³⁰⁸ İsmet Berkan, “Gül: Haksızlık Edilmesin Alevi Rektör de CHP’li Rektör de Atadım,” *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, 7 November 2010.

of society.³⁰⁹ As another example, the Mayor of Ankara, Gökçek used his Twitter account to mention his attendance to a wedding “I performed his wedding ceremony; although, I know that he is an Alevi and a member of CHP.”³¹⁰ These kind of references used by state authorities brought about doubts and uneasiness among society due to religious awareness and fear of being discriminated. Besides, positive endeavors are being evaluated as insincere due to simultaneous discriminative discourses. The case of Muharrem dinner is a considerable example for this dilemma.

As a state tradition, funeral ceremonies of martyrs have been carried out with attendance of high-ranking TSK officers; however, in 2012, an exception occurred in Istanbul. In a bomb attack in Izmir, a western city, on 9 August 2012, two soldiers were killed, while 10 were wounded. One of the martyrs was Alevi; consequently, his funeral ceremony was organized in a *cemevi* in Istanbul, in his hometown. For the attendance of TSK officers, another ceremony was organized in a mosque, as they denied attending to the ceremony in a *cemevi*. Regarding the second ceremony, the uncle of the martyr stated that they wanted to carry out the ceremony with respect to their culture. The Chairperson of Hubyar Sultan Alevi Cultural Foundation, Ali Kenanoğlu, interpreted the situation with this sentence: “No matter dead or alive, if you are an Alevi, you are being discriminated!”³¹¹

The discriminative discourses can be separated into two different levels. Apart from the discourses of state officers, there have been individual incidents, which were reported in daily and business life, and in schools for primary and secondary students.

With the 1982 Constitution, religious ethic classes have become obligatory, and it has been considered as a method of assimilation of Alevis beginning from the early ages. The lecture was named as religious ethic; however, mostly, depending on

³⁰⁹ Şenol Kaluç, “Erdoğan, Kılıçdaroglu ve Alevilere Dair,” *Taraf Daily Newspaper*, 7 June 2011.

³¹⁰ “Gökçek Twitter’da Ortalığı Karıştırdı,” *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 5 April 2011, <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/gokcek-twitter-da-ortaligi-karistirdi/siyaset/sondakika/05.04.2011/1373706/default.htm>> (5 April 2011).

³¹¹ “Alevi askerin cemevindeki cenazesine devlet katılmadı,” *Agos Daily Newspaper*, 10 August 2012, <<http://www.agos.com.tr/haber.php?seo=alevi-askerin-cemevindeki-cenazesine-devlet-katilmadi&haberid=2270>> (10 August 2012).

teachers' perspectives, Sunni Islamic practices have been performed such as prayers. These kinds of applications during the classes brought about difficult times for Alevi students. With the aforementioned regulation named 4+4+4, religion lectures have been varied; however, as it is still being protested by Alevis, the following fieldwork maintains its importance. With a project named "Mobilizing Towards Equality and Non-Discrimination" carried out by the leadership of Alevi Cultural Associations (*Alevi Kültür Dernekleri*) and financed by The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), a field work was progressed between 12 July-13 August 2009, in seven geographical regions of Turkey, which were represented by two cities each, in order to analyze individual discriminative attitudes. According to the report of this project, there have been many problems that Alevi students have been faced due to obligatory religious ethic classes.³¹²

Regarding the same issue, then Minister of State, Faruk Çelik made a statement that Alevism would be included into the curriculum of the religious ethic classes, in 2010.³¹³ On 16 January 2011, an Alevi parent organized a press conference in Istanbul, in order to carry this problem to the public attention, and he stated that his daughter was told to learn how to practice prayers, as it would be the prerequisite of success for the end of the term by teacher of religious ethic class.³¹⁴ A day after, the obligatory religious ethic classes was protested by a group of high school students in Istanbul, as they want the abolishment of the class.³¹⁵ With aforementioned 4+4+4 system, three different religious classes were included to the transcript apart from the obligatory one. While the obligatory class will be educated beginning with the fourth year until the end of 12-year-education, other three classes are presented as optional after the second part of education circle. Three optional classes have been listed as "Qur'an", "Life of Prophet Muhammad", and

³¹² Korkmaz, *Türkiye'de Alevi Olmak*, 104-120.

³¹³ "Faruk Çelik: Alevilik Din Dersi Müfredatına Girecek," *Euroactiv AB Haber ve Politika Portalı*, 14 December 2010, <<http://www.euroactiv.com.tr/politika-000110/article/faruk-en-alevilik-din-dersine-giriyor-013937>> (14 December 2010).

³¹⁴ "Alevi Kıza 'Okulda Zorla Namaz' İddiası," *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 16 January 2011, <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/alevi-kiza-okulda-zorla-namaz-iddiasi/guncel/haberdetay/16.01.2011/1339910/default.htm>> (16 January 2011).

³¹⁵ "Zorunlu Din Dersine Zincirli Protesto," *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 17 January 2011, <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/zorunlu-din-dersine-zincirli-protesto/guncel/haberdetay/18.01.2011/1340575/default.htm?ref=SolDigerHaberler>> (17 January 2011).

“Fundamental Information of Religion”, and Alevism is said to be included to the curriculum of Fundamental Information of Religion as other religions, such as Judaism, and Christianity.³¹⁶ As it was mentioned in previous chapter, new educational system has been discussed strongly by many different parts of the society; among all, Alevi have fear for their children, who would be excluded or discriminated by their Sunni friends and/or teachers with respect to their choices.³¹⁷

Apart from religious ethic classes, there are other individual cases covered by newspapers regarding discriminative attitudes. On 9 April 2013, a philosophy teacher of a high school in Bursa insulted Alevism by referring “candleless off” during the course of religious philosophy.³¹⁸ In addition to that, according to an article on a national newspaper of 15 May 2013, during a campaign for a petition to build a mosque in a high school in Ankara, parents of students were asked to sign the petition; eventually, students were divided into two different sections in the classroom and settled accordingly. On one side, students with signed signatures were settled and on the other hand, students who were accused of being “*communist Kızılbaş*”. Additionally, according to the related article in the newspaper, a student, whose parents refused to sign the petition was threatened by other students.³¹⁹

According to the Mobilizing Towards Equality and Non-Discrimination Project and Nil Mutluer’s interviews for her article series in Milliyet Daily Newspaper, there are many reports claiming that Alevi are being discriminated due to their religious identity in their business life. There are people reporting that they are not being promoted or even not being accepted for the vacancy due to their Alevi identity. Additionally, the month of Ramadan, and especially the special Friday prayers have been an issue that Alevi have felt offended by the Sunni majority of

³¹⁶ Republic of Turkey - Ministry of National Education, *12 Yıl Zorunlu Eğitim - Sorular Cevaplar*, by Ömer Dinçer, Ankara, 2012, <http://www.meb.gov.tr/duyurular/duyurular2012/12Yil_Soru_Cevaplar.pdf> (24 June 2013).

³¹⁷ Nil Mutluer, “Türkiye’de Alevilik - Seçmeli Din Dersi’nde Dışlanacağım Kaygısı” *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 15 January 2013.

³¹⁸ “Felsefe Öğretmeni: Ali’ye Allah Diye Taparlar, Mum Söndü Yaparlar,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 9 April 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/felsefe_ogretmeni_aliye_allah_diye_taparlar_mum_sondu_yaparl-ar-1128759> (9 April 2013).

³¹⁹ “Mescit İçin İmza Alamayan Öğretmen Sınıfta Alevilerle Sünnileri Ayırdı!,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 15 May 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/mescit_icin_imza_alamayan_ogretmen_sinifta_alevilerle_sunnile-ri_ayirdi-1133556> (15 May 2013).

society. For all these reasons, keeping religious identity in secret is still a way to protect oneself from any of these aforementioned discriminative attitudes.³²⁰

Psychological discrimination can be considered as a common way due to the lack of tolerance for the religious diversity; however, they have not been unique incidents that offended Alevis. In 2012, during the month of Ramadan, an Alevi family had an argument with the drummer during *sahur*, and as a consequence of this argument, house of Alevi family was attacked with stones by Sunni neighbours. The tension has been decreased and a lawsuit was opened; however, due to erased statements of defendants, which were electronically recorded, the doubts could not be vanished from Alevis' mind regarding the suspicious approach that they possessed whether it was a deliberate attack or not.³²¹ In December 2012, Alevis gathered in Kahramanmaraş in order to commemorate the Kahramanmaraş Massacre of 1978; however, they were not allowed to enter the city and obstructed with police barricades. The negotiations did not resulted positively; and eventually, police used tear gas and batons in order to disperse the crowd.³²²

As Alevism has been a topic being investigated within various perspectives, an article series were written by Nedim Şener to be published in Posta, a daily newspaper, starting on 27 May 2013. The advertisement of the article series was sent to TV Channels in advance in order to inform the public; however, the state channel TRT denied covering the advertisement since it was evaluated as *non-coverable* due to a sentence, in which "Alevis were silenced with massacres." was said.³²³

³²⁰ Korkmaz, *Türkiye'de Alevi Olmak*, 126-154;

Nil Mutluer, "Türkiye'de Alevilik - 'Alevileri Destekledim Diye Terfim Engellendi,'" *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 27 January 2013;

Nil Mutluer, "Türkiye'de Alevilik - Hayatın Her Alanında Ayrımcılık Var," *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 13 January 2013.

³²¹ "Sürgü Olaylarında 58 Sanığın İfadelerinin Bilgisayardan Silindiği Ortaya Çıktı," *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 10 December 2012,

<<http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/surgu-olaylarında-58-sanigin-ifadelerinin-bilgisayardan-silindigi-ortaya-cikti/gundem/gundemdetay/10.12.2012/1639940/default.htm>> (10 December 2012).

³²² Enis Tayman, "Narlı'da Alevilere Gazlı Coplu Müdahale," *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 23 December 2012, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/narlida_alevilere_gazli_coplu_mudahale-1113505> (23 December 2012).

³²³ "TRT'den Aleviler Yazı Dizisine Sansür," *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 29 May 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/trtden_aleviler_yazi_dizisine_sansur-1135416> (29 May 2013).

Alevi interpretation regarding the period of Selim I was already explained in previous parts of this chapter. On 29 May 2013, the groundbreaking ceremony of third bridge of Bosphorus was carried with the attendance of President Gül and PM Erdoğan. During his speech, President Gül declared that the bridge will be named as Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge in honor of Selim I.³²⁴ As it was mentioned, the name has been protested by many different parts of the society, Alevis pointed out another reason to protest. According to Alevi perspective, choice of the name was a way to demonstrate the state authorities' interpretation of problems of Alevis.³²⁵ Due to the protests, President Gül pointed out the Alevi sensitivity regarding the name of the bridge, and he added that there were many different state projects, which were to be named after Hacı Bektaş Veli or Pir Sultan Abdal, in order to provide solidarity.³²⁶ Nevertheless, this explanation could not be enough to make Alevis withdraw their complaints regarding the name, as they mentioned in their commemoration meeting for Sivas Massacre, on 23 June 2013. Besides, after the discussions, P.M. Erdoğan mentioned a new Alevi initiative, which may end up with concrete solutions regarding the problems of Alevis.³²⁷ With respect to the discussion about names of state projects, a new step was taken with the Democratization Package, as it was mentioned. However, it was not considered as sufficient and as a response from the government, Deputy PM Bekir Bozdağ stated that there was another project concerning Alevis and not completed yet.³²⁸

Recent Gezi Parki Protests have been carried out in many different cities of Turkey, as it was mentioned in previous chapter, and the resistance for

³²⁴ “3. Köprü'nün Adı Yavuz Sultan Selim,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 29 May 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/3_kopru_icin_temel_atma_toreni-1135436> (29 May 2013).

³²⁵ “Aleviler'den 'Yavuz Sultan Selim Köprüsü'ne Tepki,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 30 May 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/alevilerden_yavuz_sultan_selim_koprusune_tepki-1135626> (30 May 2013);

“Kadıköy'de 'Sivas Katliamı' Mitingi,” *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, 23 June 2013, <<http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/kadikoy-de-sivas-katliami-mitingi/gundem/detay/1726725/default.htm>> (23 June 2013).

³²⁶ Mustafa Ünal, “Büyük Bir Projeye Pir Sultan Abdal Adı Verilebilir,” *Zaman Daily Newspaper*, 19 June 2013, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_buyuk-bir-projeye-pir-sultan-abdal-adi-verilebilir_2101989.html> (19 June 2013).

³²⁷ “‘Yavuz Sultan’ Gitmiyor, ‘Pir Sultan’ Geliyor,” *NTVMSNBC*, 26 June 2013, <<http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25451420>> (26 June 2013).

³²⁸ “Bekir Bozdağ: Alevi açılımı için çalışmalar devam ediyor,” *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 30 September 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/bekir_bozdag_alevi_acilimi_icin_calismalar_devam_ediyor-1153239> (30 September 2013).

demolishment of Gezi Park turned into a protest chain against the AKP Government within many different perspectives. Alevis had sided with the protests as they support the resistance, and due to the new characteristic of protests, Alevis have declared their secondary demands like each diverse group of protesters and their discontendness of the AKP Government.³²⁹

Since the foundation of the Republic, the relation of Alevis both with state and governments and with the rest of the society have been analyzed with individual cases in order to demonstrate the general view regarding different perspectives. It is important to see that, no matter left wing or right wing, Alevis have become the *others* for governments. Besides, as it was mentioned, Alevis, even they have been under attack, as they were in Çorum, Kahramanmaras, Sivas or in Gazi quarter, they have possessed reasonable approach and maintained their peaceful position. When the protests are taken into account, a democratic perspective will attract our attention. This position of Alevis has played important role for preventing the struggle from getting worse or from getting even bloodier. For this reason, Kongar pointed out Alevis as guarantee of institutionalization of democracy and law abidance.³³⁰

4.3. Problem and Solutions

In previous parts of this chapter, the distinction of Alevism and the problems that they have lived since the Ottoman period have been examined. In some period of the history, Alevis isolated themselves, either for security reasons or for disconnecting themselves from the Sunni majority and state structure; however, since 1990s they started to ask for their demands, even since the new century, as Alevis are more organized and significantly mobilized, their voice is becoming more clear.

With organized mobilization, Alevis have discussed their wills in their own communities in order to declare it officially and to negotiate with the government.

³²⁹ Çağıl Kasapoğlu, “Gezi Parkı'na Destek Çıkan Samandağ Alevilerinin Talebi,” *BBC Türkçe*, 11 June 2013,

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2013/06/130611_gezi_parki_samandag.shtml?ocid=socialflow_twitter_bbcturkce> (11 June 2013).

³³⁰ Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye*, 526.

For this reason, various protest marches were organized. In Ankara (2008), in Istanbul (2009), in Izmir (2011), in Ankara (2012), and in Istanbul (2013) became the most significant protest marches carried out in order to attract the attention of the government. Besides, many meetings have been carried out in order to list their demands. One of the meetings was held on 12 April 2011, in Ankara, in which I was invited personally. During this meeting, many people from different origins and minorly different traditions discussed their problems, and declared their demands, in order to compose a concrete text for whole demands of all Alevis. In this part of this chapter, Alevi demands will be listed in order to analyze what they want, and to understand if they are compatible with laic structure of the state; Alevi Opening of AKP Government will be discussed with its format and outcomes; and suggestions will be made for a probable solution.

4.3.1. What Do Alevis Want: Privilege or Equality?

Alevis form a significant part the society of Turkey with their distinctive characteristics, and with concrete mobilization since the beginning of 1990s, they started to demand and declare their rights clearly from the governments of Turkey. If their demands should be classified, there will be five different titles that would attract the attention, and these four titles would be official Alevi recognition, the situation of *cemevis* and other Alevi dervish lodges, the privileges that DİB has, problems regarding educational system, and implementations against laic struggle. Within this perspective, it is important to see what are these demands in detail from Turkish governments? Is it privilege that they ask or equality?

Alevism, with its internal heterogeneous characteristic, which was linked with the lack of written sources and isolated territories that had never led to interaction with “other” Alevi societies in order to follow a single path, and centuries-long-secrecy have brought about significant curiosity towards Alevi identity. Consequently, Alevism started to be discussed by state authorities in order to define the identity for different intentions including otherization, assimilation, exclusion, or inclusion. As it was mentioned by Geçmez, Alevis do not want to be defined in order to be standardized; because, according to Alevi belief, the heterogeneity is the richness of Alevi culture, as it is visible in various religious

cultures. However, this variety may cause dilemma within Alevism itself. On this point, two dominant perspectives occur:³³¹ Political Alevism and Islamic Alevism.

Political Alevism is the definition that has been distinguished in first part of this chapter. It has its significant references to Islam; however, does not put it in the center of Alevism. Instead, it is the humanity in the center of Alevism. Within this perspective, Islam is just one of the components that have affected Alevism among all aforementioned others. For instance, aforementioned different characteristic of God is a part of syncretic structure of Alevism. On the other hand, there is the Islamic Alevism, which claims that it is purely Islam with a different perspective on practices as contrary to Arabic Islam.

The most important difference between two different approaches of Alevism is the characteristic of demands of their adherents. Regarding the difference between the demands, it would not be wrong to claim that while syncretic identity is being represented by Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Cultural Foundation, Alevi-Bektaşî Federation and Alevi Cultural Association, the Islamic one is being represented by Cem Foundation. When the demands are considered, the difference will be visible. According to Cem Foundation, with respect to its chairman İzzettin Doğan's declarations, recognition of Alevism within state level includes shareholding from public purse including recognition of dedes with monthly salaries as the imams are provided and representation of Alevism in official and administrative structure of DİB. However, these suggestions were strongly criticized by chairpersons of Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Cultural Foundation, Geçmez and Alevi Cultural Association, Tekin Özdil. Besides, similar criticism was made by dedes themselves.³³² According to written declarations, discourses and personal interviews with Representative of Mersin Cemevi, Chairperson of Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Cultural Foundation and ex-Chairperson of Alevi-Bektashi Federation, recognition of Alevism does not include any demand regarding salaries of dedes or representation of Alevism in DİB. With respect to listed sources, Alevis, majorly, are against financing of any

³³¹ Uğraş Ulaş Tol, "The Sustainability Crisis of Alevis" (Ph.D. diss., METU, 2009).

³³² "Alevi Dedeleri Devletten Maaş İstemiyor," *CNN Türk*, 06 December 2012,

<<http://www.cnnturk.com/2008/turkiye/12/06/alevi.dedeleri.devletten.maas.istemiyor/503789.0/index.html>> (2 May 2013).

religious identity, including theirs; hence, financial assistance is not an issue to negotiate.³³³ Besides, in addition to understanding of monetary issues as a way to assimilate Alevism under state control, as their representative would serve as state officers; financing of specific religious identities is not considered compatible with laic state structure.

On the other hand, there is a specific distinguishment that was used by Geçmez during the personal interview. He mentioned, “Alevi are bored with being defined by Sunni majority”.³³⁴ Alevism, in itself, has specific diversity and being standardized by the control of state is not referred as an acceptable approach. Within this perspective, Alevi do not want to be defined; instead, they want to be recognized by the state officially with simple regulations, which would refer every single diverse culture of Alevism. Following three demands will be more specialized regarding exact characteristics of Alevism.

Cemevis have been an important part of Alevism as they have gather in order to deal with both religious and social issues before and during *cem* ceremonies. As it was mentioned earlier, during the Ottoman Empire and until the second half of 20th century, Alevi had lived in their villages with their own communities under isolated conditions. The new Republic was a new hope for their recognition after the Ottoman period under the rule of Islamic Caliph; however, new structure could not respond specific necessities of Alevi including the status of *cemevis*. The law regarding the closure of dervish lodges and shrines has been pointed out as the main issue that should be gotten over, for a probable solution in the way that Alevi demand. Although the relation between the law and Alevi as the target is still being discussed, the same law is being interpreted as the most pivotal obstacle for the recognition of *cemevis* as official places of worship. Kemalist implementations were totally welcomed, as they were compatible with Alevi belief and cultural components and meant to be an escape from Arab dominance. On the other hand, as Erik Jan Zürcher and Harry van der Linden stated, Alevi, also, responded positively

³³³ Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, *Alevi Çalıştayı*, 45;
Balkız, interview;
Geçmez, interview;
Kaya, interview.

³³⁴ Geçmez, interview.

to exclusions of Alevism, unless the Republic would deny any religious identities in public sphere.³³⁵ This is to say that for the sake of the state and to maintain its laic structure, Alevi would have been in favor with being denied as a religious identity; unless, the same policy applied to all religious identities. However, within time, Sunni Islam was started to be favored; even further, the escape from Arab dominance was interpreted as *Turkification of Sunni Islam*.

With domestic immigration flows starting from 1960s, city centers had become a challenge for Alevism, due to lack of *cemevis* and Alevi communities. This absence has started to be vanished with cultural foundations and associations, including *cemevis* in their central buildings as a part of cultural foundation. This is the issue that Alevi are against. They ask the recognition of *cemevis* as other places of worship, such as mosques, synagogues and churches, and the withdrawn of assigned imams to the mosques built in Alevi villages, which have been considered as a part of assimilation.³³⁶ This demand is being declared as one of the most important issues, as it has been stated many times by several attendees of the meeting that I attended in 2011.

On the other hand, the status of Hacı Bektaş Veli Dervish Lodge has been discussed widely. Since 1964, Dervish Lodge is maintained opened as a museum only for cultural visits; however, Alevi ask for the right to practice. In 2009, with personal endeavor of then Minister of Culture Ertuğrul Günay, the Dervish Lodge was opened for once in order to host a *cem* ceremony.³³⁷ This has been considered as a positive approach regarding the issue for the future; however, since then, no further attempt has been done.

DİB, since its foundation, has been the basis of the discussions regarding its questioned compatibility with laic state structure, not only by Alevi but also entire supporters of laic republican identity. DİB has always been considered as a way to

³³⁵ Erik Jan Zürcher and Harry van der Linden, *The European Union, Turkey and Islam* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004), 127.

³³⁶ Abdurrahman Küçük, and Mehmet Alparslan Küçük, *Türkistan'dan Türkiye'ye Alevilik – Bektaşilik* (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2009), 214-216.

³³⁷ Pinar Ecevitoğlu, Ali Murat İrat, and Ayhan Yalçınkaya, foreword to *Hacı Bektaş Veli: Güneşte Zerresinden. Deryada Katresinden*, eds. Pinar Ecevitoğlu, Ali Murat İrat and Ayhan Yalçınkaya (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2010), 19.

privilege Sunni Islam. For instance, according to “The Family Imam” project of the AKP Government, which is started to be carried out in March 2011, the imams are assigned to take care of the problems of individuals, beside of serving in the mosques.³³⁸ This intention has been considered as an involvement in social life of individuals with usage of religion.

The financial support that DİB has been given by the state has a considerable portion in total budget of state, with significant increase over years. For instance, in 1997, the budget of DİB was 66 million Turkish Liras³³⁹, and it became 4.6 billion Turkish Liras in 2013, which was more than 13 Turkish ministries including Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Health.³⁴⁰ Accordingly, the budget of DİB is being criticized by Alevis in addition to its existence. Not only the financing of a specific religion by a laic state, but also its increased budget has been an issue that Alevis mention.

Additionally, with supportive laws the role of DİB has been empowered and it was assigned to maintain the national unity and solidarity with the Article 136 of 1982 Constitution. Furthermore, according to the Article 89 of the Law of Political Parties mentions

“None of the political parties can act against the Article 136 of the Constitution, which is related to the Presidency of Religious Affairs and its functioning in the general administration.”³⁴¹

With this law, DİB’s subra-political structure was intended to be protected; however, it gave significant exterritoriality to its organizational structure.

³³⁸ “‘Aile İmami’ Ziyaret Edecek,” 9 March 2011, *Milliyet Daily Newspaper*, <<http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/-aile-imami-ziyaret-edecek/gundem/gundemdetay/09.03.2011/1362120/default.htm>> (9 March 2011).

³³⁹ The currency has been modified to the New Turkish Liras.

³⁴⁰ “Diyanet Bütçesi 11 Bakanlıđı Geride Bıraktı; Savunmada da Yüksek Artış Var,” *T24 Online Newspaper*, 23 October 2012, <<http://t24.com.tr/haber/diyanetin-butcesi-11-bakanligi-geride-birakti/215871>> (23 October 2012).

³⁴¹ Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, *Alevi Çalıştay*, 34-35.

The demand regarding the closure of DİB is one of the most concrete demands of Alevis with respect to official declaration of Alevi Cultural Foundation, Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Cultural Foundation, discourses of every single attendees of the meeting and all the personal interviews those were carried out.

Education system has been a political tool during the whole history, not only in Turkish case, but also in French one as it was mentioned in second and third chapters of this thesis. With significant changes in Turkish educational system, religion has been a component that has gained more and more power within time. As the final step, with 4+4+4, secondary parts of Imam-Hatip schools were re-opened and three more religious classes have been added to the curriculum of the last two parts of three-step-education system, while the already existing one was being discussed.

Obligatory religious ethic classes have brought about many individual issues during the early ages of Alevis as it was mentioned earlier. Regarding these classes, three different perspectives are being discussed.³⁴² First of all, the class should be taken out of the curriculum. Secondly, its obligation should be lifted, and it should be given as an optional class. Lastly, it should include Alevism. Regarding these three options, aforelisted two different representatives interpret the issue with distinctive distinguishments. For instance, Islamic Alevism supports the inclusion of Alevism into the index of classes, Political Alevism points out the first two options for a concrete solution.³⁴³ With the new educational system, Alevism was added to the curriculum of one of the optional classes; however, neither the obligatory class was removed, nor its obligation was vanished. On the other hand, the Imam-Hatip schools, which were strongly discussed by the Alevis as it is a state financed alternative education on contrary to regular high schools, regained their importance with new-opening secondary parts. Due to these reasons, new education system has been considered as a political tool, once again, to conservatize the new generations from early ages, and in terms of Alevism, various religious courses, even they are

³⁴² İlyas Üzüm, *Günümüz Aleviliği* (İstanbul: İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi Yayınları, 2000), 137-138.

³⁴³ Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, *Alevi Çalıştay*, 34-35;

“Aleviliğin Ders Kitaplarına Girmesi,” *Yakın Plan*, NTV - Public TV Channel. (Ankara, 10 February 2004).

optional, and Imam-Hatip schools have still been the tools to assimilate their distinctive identity.

The critics regarding 4+4+4 education system has been made since it was started to be discussed, and continued after the first educational year of system's application, this is to mention educational year of 2012-2013. In March 2012, various Alevi associations and foundations gathered in order to protest the judicial decision regarding Sivas Massacre and made several declarations about their problems. Apart from slogans those referred "racist" and "unprogressive" characteristics, the chairpersons of Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Foundation Hüseyin Güzelgöl, Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Cultural Foundation Geçmez, Confederation of European Alevi Unions Turgut Öker, Alevi-Bektashi Federation Selahattin Özer, and vice chairperson of Alevi Cultural Foundations Engün Gündüz pointed out the 4+4+4 education system, which aimed to conservatize the new generations in the point of view of not only Alevis, but also wider part of society.³⁴⁴

Besides, Chairpersons of many different Alevi Foundations have made official declarations in order to protest it and to criticize its conservative approach regarding the new generations. On 17 September 2012, in Antalya, a southern city, the Chairperson of Antalya branch of Hacı Bektaş Cultural Foundation Hakverdi Çelik made a declaration after the protest meeting and stated:

"We, Alevis, will not let 4+4+4 education system, which is based on AKP's racist, unprogressive and assimilative Turkish-Islamic approach. We will keep on our struggle against the AKP fascism."³⁴⁵

In Mersin, a southern city, 4+4+4 was protested, as well. On 17 September, as in Antalya, a group of Alevis gathered, and the protest speech was made by Chairperson of Mersin branch of Alevi Cultural Foundation, Suat Yıldız. He stated;

³⁴⁴ "Sivas Kararına Karşı On Binler Kadıköy'de," *Emek Hareketinin Gündemi*, 31 March 2012, <<http://www.sendika.org/2012/03/sivas-kararina-karsi-on-binler-kadikoyde/>> (31 March 2012).

³⁴⁵ "Antalya'da 4+4+4'e Alevi Tepkisi," *Emek Hareketinin Gündemi*, 18 September 2012, <<http://www.sendika.org/2012/09/antalyada-444e-alevi-tepkisi/>> (18 September 2012).

“Alevi have been denied so far, have lived under oppression, cruelty and massacres, and have faced with assimilative and denier education systems. With 4+4+4 education system of AKP Government, assimilative policies have been concreted in order to create ‘one religion’ and ‘one society’.”³⁴⁶

With respect to official declaration regarding Alevi demands for the Alevi Opening, Alevi foundations stated that, apart from the Imam-Hatip schools, state financed courses of Quran and theology faculties, which are, majorly, professionalize on Islamic issues, such as fiqh, sharia and so on, are not compatible with laic structure. According to Alevi perspective, a laic state should keep its distance to all religious identities, instead of financing any of them.³⁴⁷ That is the reason why supporters of Political Alevism mention that they are against the idea of salaries for dedes, or inclusion of Alevism to the structure of DİB, or financing of monthly bills of *cemevis* instead of official recognition.³⁴⁸

Implementations against laic state structure has been mentioned above within first four classifications; however, apart from those, there are some other legal issues pointing out the superiority of Sunni Islam among all other religious identities or denial of Alevism.

Laicism was constitutionally approved in 1937; nevertheless, many different articles regarding various issues should have been taken into account for the functioning of laicism. Some of the examples about the superiority of mosques, which was referred as a prerequisite of recognition of a place as an urban area, or acceptance of mosques as the representatives of all places of worship were given in previous parts of this chapter. Hence, Alevi ask for regulation of related articles that bring about dichotomy for the religious recognition of state. For instance, the aforementioned Village Law of 1924, Article 91; the Forest of Law of 1956, Article

³⁴⁶ “Mersin’de Zorunlu Din Dersi Protesto Edildi,” *Vatan Daily Newspaper*, 17 September 2012, national edition, <<http://haber.gazetevatan.com/alevilerden-tepki-geldi/481528/7/yasam>> (18 September 2012).

³⁴⁷ Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, *Alevi Çalıştayı*, 50-52.

³⁴⁸ Place of worships in Turkey are excluded from monthly bills infrastructural services. For the demand of official recognition of *cemevis*, exemption from monthly bills was offered by AKP Government.

31;³⁴⁹ and the Law of Cadastral Survey of 1987, Article 16³⁵⁰ should be revised, in order to change the word “mosque” with “places of worship” to mention not only Islamic places of worship, but also to include different religious systems, such as synagogues, churches and *cemevis* after its official recognition.³⁵¹

State awareness about religious preferences as a result of Turkish ID Cards should be distinguished, as well. In Turkish ID Cards, there is a section, in which the religion is written.³⁵² According to Alevis, this implementation is not compatible with laicism, as religious issues should be kept in personal and state is not supposed to intervene in this kind of personal issues. On this point, there is one thing that should be highlighted. Regarding the religion section of ID Cards, there are two different interpretations, as there were in previous demands of Alevis. While some of the groups claim that the section should be removed and the identities should be swept away from any religious component including Confederation of European Alevi Unions, and Alevi-Bektashi Federation,³⁵³ some other groups ask for the change of Islam with Alevi, as Islam is meant to be Sunni Islam for centuries.³⁵⁴

Alevis refer laic state structure as the basis of their demands; however, the question is what they ask for among this laic structure, privilege or egalitarian approach. When aforementioned demands are taken into account, the references to the laic state structure can be considered legitimate, as their description of laicism is fully understandable with the consideration of its theoretical meaning. Laicism means that maintaining equal distance to every single religious identity with strict state control as contrary to secularism. Hence, regarding this description, constitutionally guaranteed obligatory religious classes with significant issues

³⁴⁹ Within villages that include abundant state forest territories are allowed to be handed over for the purpose of construction of common necessities of villagers, such as *mosques*, sanatoriums, roads, bridges and houses.

³⁵⁰ Among the all places those are possessed by the state for public usage and those are unowned privately: A) the ones that are separated for the usage of official buildings and facilities (*open-air prayer place, mosques* or similar) are determined with by State Revenue, public offices, administration of villages, cities or local governments with respect to related regulations.

³⁵¹ Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, *Alevi Çalıştayı*, 41-47.

³⁵² Please see Appendix XXIV on page 339 for a sample of a male ID Card.

³⁵³ Selahattin Özel, and Turgut Öker, “Din Hanesi Cüzdanlardan Kaldırılın” (press release, Ankara, 18 March 2006), Alevilik Hakkında Ayrıntılı Bilgi ve Bilinmeyenler,

<http://www.guvenabdal.com/abfaabf_din_hanesi_cuzdanlardan_kaldirilsin-t14310.0.html>.

³⁵⁴ Mutluer, “Türkiye’de Alevilik - ‘Alevileri Destekledim Diye Terfim Engellendi’.”

regarding Sunni Islamic practices, financement of Imam-Hatip schools not only to educate religious officers but also forming it as an alternate education tool, significant references to Imam-Hatip schools to point out its superiority than regular laic education system, the usage of mosques as a common necessity for the society instead of place of worship, existence of DİB with its increased responsibilities among society such as being responsible of national solidarity, and DİB's role in linking with Turkish immigrants living in abroad as Turkishness is strongly associated with Muslimhood are the implementations that gives privilege to Sunni Islam among all other religious identities including Judaism, Greek and Armenian Churches. On the other hand, their demands regarding recognition of *cemevis* should be seen as a respectful and egalitarian approach regarding their distinctive identity; so that, it cannot be associated with asking for privilege, as well. Regarding the opening of Hacı Bektaş Veli Dervish Lodge, like many other small dervish lodges should be analyzed within the Law N.677 and other legal regulations.

Hacı Bektaş Veli has been considered as one of the most important influencer of Alevism and the founder of Bektashism, as it was mentioned. Hence, the Dervish Lodge is the most important place of worship for Alevism. For this reason, it is questionable whether the law has the right to intervene to such a religious issue, while the freedom of conscience as one of the basic human rights has been guaranteed with the Constitution. Therefore, apart from a judicial approach, this issue should be taken into account as a problem of limitation of religious freedom. Briefly, demands should be seen within the perspective of egalitarian basis.

With respect to the definition of laicism, existence of DİB should be focused with much more attention. Laicism differs from secularism with its control mechanism over the religion; hence, DİB was founded in order to fulfill this duty for the sake of laic state structure. Responsibilities of assignments of imams and preachers, and controls of weekly sermons were the duties of DİB. However, the things that should be criticized within its structure should be its annual budgets, which have been composed by the tax of not only Muslim citizens but also entire population of Turkey, included responsibilities as the ones aforementioned, and as its recent activities comments on social events. Its total abolishment would be a shift from French *laïcité* to Anglosaxon secularism, which causes a significant shift form

the purpose of this thesis. This probable shift will be referred to conclude this research study, and to put the question on the table to lead future studies.

Apart from all aforementioned demands, Alevis ask for transformation of Madımak Hotel into a museum; however, this demand was responded with a special corner inside the Hotel, in which the names of the whole death people, both 33 attendees and two hotel staff and two outsider protesters were written.³⁵⁵ The Governor of Sivas stated that they interpreted the event within a humanistic perspective; so that, they included two protesters' names in the corner. However, the response could not be considered sufficient for Alevi perspective. First of all, they asked for a museum, but were given a corner instead, and names of the victims were written with their murderers'. These two issues were criticized strongly by Alevis.³⁵⁶ These critics have started to be made in 2011, after the report of Alevi Initiative, and in the meantime, new projects were declared regarding transformation of the Hotel building into Special Provincial Administration Center of Science, Culture and Art (*İl Özel İdaresi Bilim Kültür ve Sanat Merkezi*),³⁵⁷ and the expropriation was completed in 2012.³⁵⁸

Among all, only the demand of Madımak Museum can be considered as a privilege; however, regarding the incident's importance and trauma, a museum cannot be seen unreasonable. Besides, when the slogans are taken into account, it was not an attack targeting only Alevis; instead, it was an attack to the laic structure of the state, which has been associated with unbelief and consequently Alevism. Therefore, demand for a museum should be seen as a demand of a wider group of people supporting the laic republican identity with significant tolerance. Briefly,

³⁵⁵ "33 Aydınla 2 Gösterici Aynı Panoda," *NTVMSNBC*, 30 June 2011, <<http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25228215>> (30 June 2011).

³⁵⁶ "Aleviler Madımak'ın Utanç Müzesi Olmasında Israrlı," *Sol Haber Merkezi*, 1 July 2011, <<http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/aleviler-madimak-in-utanc-muzesi-olmasinda-issarli-haberi-44139>> (1 July 2011).

³⁵⁷ Eraydın Aytekin, and Halife Yalçınkaya, "Madımak, Bilim Kültür ve Sanat Merkezi Oluyor," *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 5 April 2011, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/madimak_bilim_kultur_ve_sanat_merkezi_oluyor-1045204> (5 April 2011).

³⁵⁸ "Madımak'a 7.7 Milyon Bedel Biçildi," *CNN Türk*, 26 April 2012, <<http://www.cnnturk.com/2012/turkiye/04/26/madimak.7.7.milyon.bedel.bicildi/658783.0/index.html>> (26 April 2012).

Alevi demands should be paid attention in order to provide egalitarian atmosphere regarding religious diversity of Turkey.

4.3.2. What Can Be Done?

Problems of Alevis with their distinct characteristics have been examined with details above. These problems have been shouted out loud since the 1990s, however, concrete steps have started to be taken recently.

With the AKP Governments, a new era started in Turkish politics, after many years of unstable coalition governments. With respect to implementations regarding EU negotiations, approved candidatureship, and domestic progressive steps, the first three AKP Governments attracted the attention of liberals. During this time, an initiative was started for the problems of Alevis as a part of AKP's democracy understanding.

The Alevi Opening of 60th Government possesses significant importance with being the first official step that has been taken with specific concern on problems of Alevis.³⁵⁹ The demands were started to be declared after the awakening of identity within a concrete perspective; however, apart from individual examples, an organized initiative has been carried out for the first time. This is the most important and the only supported side of the Opening. Why?

The Initiative was composed of seven workshops those were carried out between 2009 and 2011 with different parts of the society including Alevi and Sunni ones. The first workshop was done on 3-4 June 2009 with attendance of Minister of State Faruk Çelik, and 35 Alevi-Bektashi representatives, and five basic issues were discussed. These five issues were a) official recognition of *cemevis*, b) abolishment of obligatory religious ethic classes, c) transformation of Madımak Hotel into a museum, d) stopping the construction process of mosques in Alevi villages, e) handing the sacred places of Alevi faith over Alevi Foundations.³⁶⁰ Since then, the rest of the workshops were carried out with attendance of academics (second

³⁵⁹ Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, *Alevi Çalıştayı*, 5.

³⁶⁰ Süleyman Zaman, "Alevi Çalıştayı," *Danimarka Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (DABF)*, 2 October 2009, <<http://www.alevi.dk/BASIN%20ARSIV/alevi%20calistayi.htm>> (2 May 2011).

workshop), professors of theology faculties and DİB (third workshop), artists and representatives of NGOs (fourth workshop), journalists (fifth workshop), with heterogeneous profiles of attendees (for the last two workshops).

During these seven workshops, the problems of Alevis were discussed within different perspectives by various parts of societies. This has been one of the critics that was made regarding the methodology, which was totally disputed due to several issues. Regarding the discussions of workshops, it was defined as a *pedagogic process*, with not being in-depth.³⁶¹ Besides, the attendance of theology professors and considerable intervention of DİB in the workshops became one of the most controversial issues that has been discussed negatively. Regarding the representatives of Alevis those were invited to the workshops, the lack of representation of Arab Alevism was emphasized as a negative issue, as they also have been part of discrimination regarding their distinctive religious identity. As stated by Alevi Cultural Foundation and Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Cultural Foundation, Alevism should be taken into account as a complete identity regardless from any ethnic origin, or diverse practices.³⁶²

The critics were not only about the representatives or the attendees of workshop series. The perspective that has been possessed regarding the problems was discussed, as well. With respect to the discourses of the workshops, Geçmez and Şen evaluated the process as a way of labeling Alevis and to assimilate them into Sunni Islamic culture.³⁶³

After seven workshops with different attendees and discussing different topics, the official report was published on 31 March 2011. The aim was to solve the problems of Alevis within a systematic approach, which would not be against the laic structure. However, the result could not be enough to satisfy Alevis, as caused them to define the whole process as a *total disappointment*.³⁶⁴

³⁶¹ Şen, interview.

³⁶² Alevi Kültür Dernekleri Genel Merkezi, *Alevi Çalıştayı*, 9-10.

³⁶³ Geçmez, interview;
Şen, interview.

³⁶⁴ "Alevi Çalıştayı Raporu Açıklandı," *Dersim News Agency*, 31 March 2011, <www.dersimnews.com> (31 March 2011).

Within a general perspective, Alevi demands were generally based on democratic, humanistic and laicist approaches in order to finalize the process that excludes Alevis from social and political structure and assimilates them. As a response, the suggestions are classified as below:³⁶⁵

1) Alevis should be unified in order to be defined in a concrete way as a prerequisite of implementation of state responsibilities. After that, as its proper responsibilities, the state should take precautions in order to cease the so-called discriminations that Alevis claim that they have faced with.

2) Solidarity regarding the brotherhood should play significant role within this process, and the problems should be solved with respect to laic state structure under the rule of law.

3) It is important to pay attention to the inconvenience that might occur if an identity distinction regarding Alevism would be pointed out.

4) Alevis, under the common values of Islam, are welcome to DİB in order to benefit as much as Sunni citizens. Hence, the administrative structure of DİB should be revised in order to be compatible with Alevi demands. Within this perspective, a moderate way should be composed for Alevis, who do not want to be linked with DİB, with respect to the necessities of societies and laic state structure. In the meantime, laicism should be understood as a wider, liberal base instead of a way to limit and obstruct the religious freedom.

5) A constitutional regulation is a necessity regarding the problems of practices. With the Minister of National Education, related workshops should be started to be carried out. Besides, the index of religious ethic classes should be revised and information about different religious systems should be introduced, as well.

6) The Madimak Hotel should be expropriated and the new form should be constructed with respect to the wills of people of Sivas. For the memory of incident,

³⁶⁵ “Alevi Çalıştayı Nihai Raporu,” *Faruk Çelik Personal Webpage*, 31 March 2011, (p.187-194), <<http://www.farukcelik.com.tr/index.php?page=faaliyetleridetay&id=44056>> (5 January 2012).

a special place should be prepared, with respect to the solidarity in order to prevent from any probable problem.

7) Cemevis should be gained an official status, and their necessities should be provided by the state.

These responses were considered as insufficient and insincere by Alevis, as they claimed that the government did not understand what Alevis ask for. For instance, invitation to DİB, while they were against its existence and actual structure was considered as *inappropriate*. On the other hand, the necessity of unification of Alevis for a concrete *definition* that was pointed out by the state was seen as insincere, as Alevis support their internal diversity as a richness of Alevi culture.

According to the report, *cemevis* were distinguished, as they should be given an official status; however, recognition of *cemevis* as places of worships was pointed as a probable threat for mosques, as they would be seen as an alternative place of worship for Muslims. However, this discourse was responded with a concrete negativeness by Alevis, and they claimed that the AKP Government behaved as Vatican, as it intended to decide whether *cemevis* were places of worship, or not.³⁶⁶

Briefly, the Alevi Opening could not be a concrete solution for any of the Alevi demands. The only thing that should be seen as a significant within this process, was its being the first official step has been taken for the purpose to solve the problems. Within this perspective, there are two important issues that ought to be emphasized. Firstly, no matter what the aim was, the Opening was carried out by a conservative government. In 2002, when AKP came into power, supporters of laic republican identity maintained their distance with significant doubts regarding party's and its members' support to Ottoman Islamic identity. It is a fact that the doubts have never been vanished; however, for the history of the Republic, Alevis have been taken into account for the first time by a government. Most interestingly, this government has caused one of the most significant periods of polarization between the supporters of two different identity of Turkishness. This polarization

³⁶⁶ "Alevi'lerden Sert Tepki," *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, 1 April 2011, <<http://www.hurriyet.de/haberler/gundem/872967/alevilerden-sert-tepki>> (1 April 2011).

and increased tension caused a social movement with Gezi Protests all over the country not around these two identity groups but around supporters and non-supporters of AKP Government. On the other hand, secondly, the issue of religious freedom for a certain religious group should not be questioned in a state, where laicism was guaranteed by the Constitution for more than three quarters of a century. Laicism was constitutionally guaranteed; however, as it is visible for the case of Alevis, there are dichotomies regarding the limits of freedom for maintaining a certain identity.

The issue regarding the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge has been examined in previous chapter. As a response to Alevi discontentment, a university in Nevşehir was changed into Hacı Bektaş Veli Üniversitesi. The Democracy Package was expected to solve many problems of Alevis at least to touch more important one, which is the recognition of the cemevis. However, the only outcome has been the change of said university name. As stated by Bozdağ, the government is working on a new series of regulations dedicated to the problems of religious groups. According to newspaper articles, this package is said to be completed before March 2014 (the time of upcoming Local Elections) and to refer following issues concerning Alevis:³⁶⁷

- Cemevis will be granted with an official status. However, so far, the status has not been clarified yet. While Alevis ask for “place of worship”, the government insists on “belief center”.
- Dedes and one more person from cemevi staff will be granted with monthly salary.
- Government will cover significant costs of belief centers.
- Municipalities will allocate landed territories to belief centers.
- State Channel TRT will do broadcasting regarding different belief systems including Alevism.
- Actual structure of DİB will be revised in order to facilitate the communication with different belief systems.

³⁶⁷ Hakkı Kurban, “Seçimden Önce İnanç Paketi,” *Aksam Daily Newspaper*, 4 October 2013, <<http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/secimden-once-inanc-c2paketi/haber-250015>> (4 October 2013).

As it can be seen on articles of a probable content, financing has formed the main idea: salaries, financial aids, and landed territories. The most salient article among all is the reorganization of DİB's structure. The solution referred here might be to form various sub-offices for different belief systems to facilitate the communication. As the articles have not been officially declared yet, it will be early to say that it whether would suit with Alevi demands or not; however, it is certain that if aforelisted articles form the regulation, supporters of Islamic Alevism will be content, while supporters of Political Alevism will be excluded. As it was mentioned above, adherents of Political Alevism are unified around unsuitability between financing of any belief system and laic state structure; hence the financial references will not satisfy them. Additionally, representation in DİB will be another disagreement theme as it has always been for these two groups of Alevis.

There is another issue that has brought about divergence between these two groups: co-location of a mosque and a cemevi as a belief complex. This project has been declared as a *peace-building* project by Prof. Doğan.³⁶⁸ On the other hand, there have been many critics for this project. The project has been the target of critics, since its prime mover was Gülen, and it was a project that was associated with Doğan and with Cem Foundation those have been referred many times with close relationship with AKP Government. In addition to critics, Balkız referred this project as a *betrayal* to Alevis.³⁶⁹ This project, once again, has put two different ideas from different Alevi groups and demonstrated significant divergence between them.

The issue of freedom of conscience with its limitations has been emphasized by EU in Progress Reports of Turkey with significant references to Alevism. Since 2000, the Progress Reports have contained distinguishments regarding the lack of any progress for providing freedom of maintaining Alevi identity. Sometimes the issue focused on financing of Sunni identity, sometimes laicism was pointed out

³⁶⁸ “İzzettin Doğan: Cami-cemevi projesini protesto edenlerin Alevi olması mümkün değil,” *T24 Bağımsız İnternet Gazetesi*, 10 September 2013, <<http://t24.com.tr/haber/izzettin-dogan-bunu-yapanlarin-alevi-olmasi-mumkun-degil/239164>> (15 September 2013).

³⁶⁹ “Aleviler neden kendilerini dışlanmış hissediyor?,” *Aykırı Sorular*, CNN Türk (Istanbul, 30 September 2013).

as the guarantee of religious freedom.³⁷⁰ Within different points of views, official un-recognition of Alevism has been pointed out in every year's Progress Report, as a lack of real progress in terms of freedom of conscience. In the Report of 2013, the official fast-breaking dinner, the revision of religious classes, co-location of a mosque and a cemevi, and inclusion of Alevi faith into the books were pointed out as positive approach; however, the same report underlined that there has been no concrete step regarding recognition of cemevis, DİB's insists on mosques as the unique worship places of entire Muslims and the insufficiency of Alevi information in revised religious culture and ethics textbook as negativeness of an ongoing process regarding the limits of religious freedom of Alevism.³⁷¹

As internal and external critics demonstrate, Ottoman heritage of Sunni Islamic culture has, somehow, been maintained in terms of exclusions of Alevis from social structure. Under these conditions, state should have possessed significant role for providing religious freedom without giving privileges to any religious identity. On this point, AKP Governments' endeavours should be considered significant; however, the role given to DİB regarding the discussions of Alevi problems, unification calls and frequent Islamic Ottoman references made by party members cause suspicions among Alevis and questions to these steps' sincerity.

Regarding legal issues, the problems should be taken into account with respect to laic state structure. While the existing laws and constitutional requirement should be taken into account, they should also be revised in case of necessity. Recent discourses concerning laicism are considerable within this point. Both Deputy PM Ali Babacan and President Gül distinguished a necessity to shift into an Anglo-Saxon understanding of laicism, that is to say secularism, for Turkey.³⁷²

³⁷⁰ "Avrupa Birliđi İlerleme Raporları," *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Avrupa Birliđi Bakanlığı*, 10 December 2012, <<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=46224&l=1>> (2 May 2013).

³⁷¹ "Türkiye 2013 Yılı İlerleme Raporu," *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Avrupa Birliđi Bakanlığı*, 16 September 2013, <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/AdaylikSureci/IlerlemeRaporlari/2013_ilerleme_raporu_tr.pdf> (28 October 2013).

³⁷² "Cumhurbaşkanı Gül'den Türbanlı Vekil Açıklaması," *Radikal Daily Newspaper*, 29 October 2013, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/cumhurbaskani_gulden_turbanli_vekil_aciklamasi-1158063> (29 October 2013);

"Daha Anglosakson bir laiklik istiyoruz," *CNN Türk*, 24 September 2013,

These statements possessing significant importance referring obstacles those have been occurred against religious freedom due to the laic structure of state; however, it is important to understand which obstacles are being referred. As it has always been in the history of the republic, when the limits of religious freedom are taken into account by state authorities, it has always referred Sunni Islamic culture and obstacles that limited Sunni Islamic necessities; such as veiling issue.

Necessary regulations should be done in order to form an equal base for religious requirements of Alevism. Official recognition of cemevis is the most important one. The state, the government and DİB should withdraw themselves from the discourses whether it is a regular place of worship or not. This definition has already been made by its adherents, as Alevis practice their religious necessities, such as cem ceremonies and funerals, in these places. Hence, this should be the first implementation that the government should carry out in order to attract the attention of Alevis and to gain their support with their sincerity. Existence of DİB, Imam-Hatip schools and religious classes are the issues those should be solved with legal regulations in order to reduce their privileges and consequent superiority of Sunni Islam. Within the national identity of Turkishness, Sunni Islamic belief is *just one of the* religious components. Hence, the state should maintain its equal limits, without privileging any of the religious identities.

For a total religious freedom for everyone, including Alevis, legal regulations form only the primary step. Apart from them, which were implemented by states, the role of society has significant importance, as well. Alevis believe that necessary legal regulations would not be sufficient to solve their problems as they have faced with discriminative attitudes among society in daily life. According to the results of “Mobilizing Towards Equality and Non-Discrimination” project, Alevis believe that it is possible to resolve discrimination problem with the help of social communities (80%) and NGOs (75%) by awakening social awareness and with the help of the state (71.1%).³⁷³

<<http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/ekonomi/genel/10/24/daha.anglosakson.bir.laiklik.istiyoruz/728342.0>
> (24 September 2013).

³⁷³ Korkmaz, *Alevi Bakış Açısıyla Türkiye’de Ayrımcılık*, 86.

As one can see, majority of Alevis see the solution inside the society itself. It is obvious that state policies are essential for a solution for legal problems; however, the problem in general can be solved by embedding the idea of equality in society with official discourses based on egalitarian approach, not pointing out one of the religion's superiority, and support of state policies, not only for Alevis, but also for all religious and ethnic richness.

5. CONCLUSION

Religion and state affairs, with recent Arab Uprisings, has become an issue on international agenda with references to secularism's importance for democratization, especially for Muslim societies. Within western values, it has been a component in the frame of political and/or social system. The progress did not occur as an instant change, of course. As the laic/secular idea has a long history in western politics, it has been integrated in and possessed by the society, no matter which concept is taken into account, whether French laicism or Anglo-Saxon secularism. On the other hand, while it has been an issue to discuss for Muslim societies, the Republic of Turkey adopted this western concept over its traditional eastern heritage almost eighty years ago.

The Republic of Turkey took French *laïcité* - *laiklik* as a part, or better to say as a prerequisite of its modernization process. Application of laicism to a majorly Muslim society over political and social heritage of the Ottoman Empire, which was based on absolute power of the Sultan-Caliph not only in political but also in religious orders, created a dichotomy among society on understanding of the new identity. Consequently, Turkish political and social structures have witnessed a clash between supporters and opponents of laicism up until to present time.

What was laicism in Turkish experience? It was the privatization of religion and reducing its importance to individual level. Within this perspective, religion was necessary for private life; however, its separation from state affairs was considerably important in order to provide a stable political structure free from religion based dogmas and consequents obstacles, as Voltaire argued. The abolishment of Caliphate is the most salient implementation within this perspective. However, the establishment of Presidency of Religious Affairs demonstrates that the Turkish laicism desired to take religion under state's control, in order to intervene Islamic issues. The source of sovereignty was also an important part of Turkish

laicization process. As stated by Rousseau, it should have been possessed by people; hence, it was taken from Islam and handed over the society with legislative power thanks to various legal and constitutional regulations. The most salient and original characteristic of Turkish laicism was the escape from Arab culture. As the Ottoman Empire accepted Sunni Islamic doctrine and welcomed Arab culture, that was a necessity in order to cut the ties with Islamic past and to embed a new identity entirely different from the previous one.

With aforementioned characteristics of Turkish laicism, it created its own supporters and opponents gathered around two dominant antagonist groups: supporters of new laic republican identity and the supporters of old Islamic Ottoman identity. This polarization brought about significant conflicts, and instable history regarding the limits of religious freedom. Religious freedom issue has been tangled around Sunni Islamic perspective: (according to this perspective) Sunni Muslim society was kept from their religious necessities due to implementations based on laicism; consequently, when governments take the subject of religious freedom into account it was the extension of limits concerning Sunni Islamic necessities. However, the Muslim society of Turkey is not homogeneous and they are not the adherents of just Sunni Islamic doctrine. As already stated, Alevis are members of Turkey's Muslim society, and their ratio in entire population of Turkey forms a significant part that should be taken into account concerning religious freedom.

Alevis, as adherents of a syncretic religious identity, have considered the history as a centuries-old-process based on oppression for themselves that has been the reason of the secrecy they maintained during their rural life starting from the Ottoman Empire up until 1960s under the rule of the Republic of Turkey. The foundation of the republic and laicization process with its aforelisted components were welcomed, and became a new hope for Alevis. Most importantly, for them it was an escape from Arab based cultural components. From the foundation of Republic of Turkey, Alevis have supported the idea of living under a new state with a new identity. While old Islamic Ottoman Identity supporters have never given up the Arabic components of Turkish culture, and considered the creation of a new identity as denial of history, the idea of escape attracted the attention of Alevis as a most salient characteristic of Turkish laicism.

Within this clash of identities, Alevi took their position favoring the new laic republican identity, and they consider themselves not only supporters, but also as constituents of newborn Republic of Turkey, and one of the guarantees of laic state structure. In fact, this was not just a self-definition; even republican minded Sunni supporters of new laic identity have also accepted Alevi as defenders of state structure of Republic of Turkey. This evaluation caused significant political results concerning their misrepresentation in political scene.

As Alevi have been certain supporters of new laic republican identity, they have not associated very well with right wing political parties. Besides, left wing political parties have not paid significant attention to Alevi demands. Support of Alevi has always been taken for granted and they have been considered as definite electorates. On the other hand, as an outcome of laic state structure, forming a political party dedicated to Alevi in terms of religious identity cannot be considered as acceptable. Besides, due to divergence among Alevi of Turkey, a single political party would not be effective in representation of Alevi demands as they differ from one group to another. (Turkish) Unity Party is an important example of Turkish political history regarding being the representative of Alevi. On one side it was criticized strongly for being a threat to laic state structure as it targeted a religious group (even unofficially); and on the other hand, it was not reflecting entire Alevi demands. Eventually, Unity Party was recorded as a failure in Turkish political history due to critics on its incompatibility with laicism, insufficiency in representation of Alevi demands and rumors regarding its association with other political parties not for interests of Alevi but for the purpose of political goals.

The lack of representation forced Alevi to reconsider their position at concrete turning point of political history of Turkey. As the election of 1950 started a new period in Turkish democracy, their support shifted into Democrat Party from Republican People's Party, which could not respond their demands. Their support to Democrat Party lasted in a short period, and they supported the 1960 Military Intervention; and they ended with Republican People's Party again; although, it was not efficient for Alevi representation in the Assembly. As (Turkish) Unity Party was a failure, it would not be wrong to claim that Alevi were lost in terms of political representation.

Limits of religious freedom have been taken into account by right leaning political parties those have frequently referred to Islamic Ottoman identity; however, within their point of view, they have been the Sunnis, who were hindered in terms of religious freedom. Accordingly, the implementations of these governments, starting from Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes, Justice Party of Süleyman Demirel, until Welfare Party and many others of Necmettin Erbakan, and Justice and Development Party of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have focused on Sunni Islamic demands. The limits of religious freedom have been changed, narrowed or expanded with respect to then governments' leanings; however, demands of Alevis and their religious necessities have never been taken into account on discussions regarding religious freedom in Turkey. While political parties considered being in power as a tool to change the limits of religious freedom, and have put its own rules over the society (as it has been referred in French experience), Alevis were not taken into account as one of the players of game of democracy. Briefly, *the game* was not fair for Alevis. On this point, there is one thing that should be distinguished. As it was mentioned in related part, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the chairman of the Republican People's Party - main opposition party of the current political structure - is an Alevi politician. This fact may be a chance for Alevi representation in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey; however, he has not used his religious origin in political scene as a tool to attract Alevi attention.

In addition to laicization process, the industrialization process also brought about significant social changes in Turkey. For Alevis, the most specific result was the urbanization. With the urbanization, Alevis started to have many difficulties in terms of religious freedom, many social problems regarding their distinctive identity including curiosity, fear and insult, security within Sunni majority. As their limit of religious freedom was narrowed eventually, they felt to hide their religious identity from their neighbor, even from their own children. It was not just an outcome of any political implementation, but also a result of neighborliness of two distinct religious identities those have prejudgments to the other for centuries as an old habit, which is inherited from the Ottoman Empire.

All the prejudgments and consequent pejorative discourses caused unfortunate social problems regarding religious differences between Sunnis and

Alevis. As Sunni Islam has been frequently pointed out as superior, *other* belief systems have been considered as secondary. Due to prejudgments other belief systems often have been insulted, and Alevism has become a target of these kinds of prejudgments not only in the Ottoman period but also today. Certain groups of supporters of Islamic Ottoman identity consider Alevis as *perverted* Muslims, *infidels* and even enemies of religion. These prejudgments have been the reasons of mass targeted attacks, for instance in late 1970s and most recently, in Sivas. Of course, there had been security deficiencies; however, as they were discussed in detail, prejudicial discourses played significant role for the mobilization of Sunni groups. Apart from mass targeted attacks, these kinds of pejorative discourses and prejudgments also caused discrimination against Alevis at individual level. In terms of pejorative discourses, legislative regulations will be pivotal for the process of providing religious freedom; however, legislative regulations should be supported with egalitarian discourses of state officials, spiritual and opinion leaders.

As discussed earlier, polarization of society has caused bloody attacks during 1970s within political groups those were concretely associated with religious preferences. Hence, it would not be wrong to claim that these groups were driven by not only political goals, but also religious ones. Within tensed political and sociological atmosphere, Alevis associated themselves with socialist ideology as it denies any religious component and possessed egalitarian structure; on the other hand, nationalist ideology in Turkey had been re-defined with Sunni Islam in its core. With respect to Sunni Islam centric nationalist ideology, *communist Alevis* were enemies both to religion and national unity of the state. When the mass targeted attacks are taken into account and the re-awakening of Sunni Islamic identity as a component of nationalism, it is possible to see the simultaneity. Increased awareness of religious identity caused more discussions, and with the interaction between the Alevis and the Sunni majority as a result of urbanization, the problem scaled up with the attacks in the cities where religious diversities are more significant.

Since the 1980 Military Intervention, state-religion affairs were carried to a different level. As the hostility among political groups was often associated with religion, Presidency of Religious Affairs was pointed out as responsible institution

among state's institutions for solidarity of the nation by military government. Pointing out Presidency of Religious Affairs could be accepted as military government's effort to establish collaboration between institutions of state, which is similar to Montesquieu's reference on necessity of harmony between state institutions and religious institutions. However, one can see that while Montesquieu was talking about the collaboration of two distinct sets of institutions, military government was talking about the collaboration of institutions of same state. At that point, it is important to discuss the actual responsibility of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. According to Alevis, its existence is not compatible with laic state structure. However, its existence can be legitimized with the Turkish understanding of laicism, which aims to control the religion by the hands of state. On today's structure, the Presidency of Religious Affairs functions around Sunni Islamic centric policies, which does not provide any space for the representation of other religious groups including Alevis. In order to have religious freedom for everyone in Turkey, the Presidency of Religious affairs should be re-structured and should cut its ties from the state to become a totally independent institution in the structure of Turkey. By doing so, the Presidency would be an institution in which every member of distinctive religious groups can be represented.

Increased conservatization among society forced Alevis to mobilize for many different reasons. First of all, it was a necessity that resulted with urbanization. They lost both their companions (*müşahip*) and their communities, which are two important elements of Alevism. The city life was a threat for their religious identity, which may weaken their ties to Alevism. In order to maintain their religious identity, they have formed new communities with respect to urban conditions and established foundations to gather and to practice. And secondly, there was the security issue. Under the conditions of rural life, they were practicing with the help of watchmen; however, in city life, it changed. Far from their communities, they felt lonely and insecure. Besides, the collective memory of recent past with mass targeted attacks deepened their concerns. With mobilization in city centers, they felt secure, started to make themselves heard despite lack of political representation. Additionally, gathering around their foundations facilitated the adaptation to new life style in urban areas, without losing their ties with Alevism.

When it comes to the question that whether laic Turkish state has provided religious freedom to Alevis, or not, it would not be wrong to claim that it has failed so far. A laic structure was a concrete necessity for the modernization period of Turkey. Its control mechanisms can be understood as well, with respect to the conditions of transformation process. However, giving privileges a specific religious identity, not only with implementations and sponsorships but also with political discourses pointing out the superiority of one of the belief systems those are composing the entire society, cannot be associated with laic state structure. The state should maintain itself equally far from any religious belief system. Within this perspective, as also pointed out by Alevis, Imam-Hatip schools, religious lectures, financing establishment of mosques, assignments of imams as state officers are not compatible with ideal laicism. Hence, on going discussions (at the writing time of this thesis) about series of regulations in order to finance *cemevis* and to pay monthly salaries to *dedes* and *cemevi* staff cannot be considered as a solution for the problems of Alevis, either.

The Alevi Opening of Justice and Development Party was a considerably positive step that has been taken by a government, most importantly by a government, which frequently referred as pro-Islamist one. The entire process have been criticized a lot, and it is not possible to claim that these critics were unfair; nevertheless, it has been the first time that any state initiative has been carried out in order to contact directly with Alevis. Among all, the most salient critic that Alevis claimed was they were not well represented during the workshops. As there is divergence among Alevis, positions of Alevi representatives is another issue that haven been discussed; attendance of Islamic scholars and representatives of Presidency of Religious Affairs puts the question on the table: Would Sunni Islamic scholars decide, whether Alevis should be granted with significant regulations concerning their problems? The issue should be discussed not only by the representatives of Sunni majority, but also by every side, and common consensus would be achieved. Like the whole process, its final report has been criticized as well. The final report made a call for unification of Alevis and stated that Alevis could benefit the services of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, which were heavily criticized by Alevis. As all communities, Alevis possess different approaches to the life with their religious identity and political ideology. It would not be correct to

expect all of them to think and to move in one direction. Additionally, due to its syncretic structure and lack of systematic information transfer, Alevism differs from one group to another. Hence, I do not see a necessity of unification as the Government called them to. There are certain issues that all Alevis are agreed on, such as the recognition of *cemevis*. Salary issues or their financing should be further steps that have to be considered with respect to definition of ideal laicism with its theoretical and practical status. Briefly, it is right to take a step in order to provide more religious freedom to Alevis with Alevi Opening and recent regulations; however, the methodology that has taken to solve the problems are not carefully considered. Therefore, it is possible to say that despite positives sites, Justice and Development Party's way of dealing with the problem of Alevis is not completely right. As the problem cannot be solved in a day or two, Turkey needs more than government policies and initiatives and should build state policies, which would not be changed depending party in power. Moreover, it is evident that Turkish understanding of laicism caused problems during the time, therefore it should be defined clearly within the frame of religious freedom. Briefly, instead of series of regulations like patches to existing system, the *entire structure* should be revised. In addition to revised state structure, the political leaders and opinion leaders should also revise their discourses regarding the issue and adopt more positive tone. While inappropriate or discriminative speeches damages the trust of public opinion, positive tone will improve the support of the society, which eventually pave the way for the common consensus.

To conclude, the state of Turkey has failed in terms of providing religious freedom to diverse religious identities so far, as it should have been an outcome of laic state structure. This failure brought about oppression among society, and with the identity dichotomy, political scene of Turkey have witnessed significant competitions, while polarization have occurred among the society. Even recently, the Gezi Park Protests can be evaluated within the same framework of this competition.

In terms of identity clash, Alevis have been excluded and not been provided complete religious freedom by none of the aforementioned identities, new laic republican and old Islamic Ottoman. Turkish understanding of laicism was to

control the religion and to ignore its diverse components; hence, it excluded Alevism as many other religious identities. On the other hand, traditional old Ottoman Islamic identity have not respected to distinctive components of Alevism and excluded it, unless Alevis would ignore their differences and accept the values of Sunni Islam as the unique values of Islam, such as the issue of worship places, structure and privileges of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. Consequently, neither the laic republican identity, nor the Islamic Ottoman identity representatives could take sufficient steps to expand the limits of religious freedom for everyone. Accordingly, problems of Alevis will keep on taking its place on the agenda of Turkey, which should be evaluated within basic human rights in terms of religious freedom, until they arrive at certain limits of religious freedom that let them to live and practice freely and properly. If the actual situation needs to be summarized, the sentence that Ercan Geçmez, the Chairperson of Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Foundation, stated during our interview will be significant to point it out: *“Although, we have been otherized, we have been attacked physically and psychologically, even we were murdered, we have never otherized other identities and we will keep this position.”*

In an ideal laic state structure every religious group should be treated equally by state and should have total religious freedom in terms of human rights. For the case of Alevis this thesis argues that Alevis have not religious freedom to practice freely and properly. As this thesis takes the case of Alevis in order to understand the limits of religious freedom in laic state structure, it would not be wrong to say that even in laic state structure arriving to the point of total religious freedom for everyone is a long process. The process should be carried out not only by state but also by the society. While the state is providing more freedom and space for diverse religious groups, the society should embed the idea of religious freedom for all regardless of any religion as the pivotal part of the process. It is sure that it will take time to suppress discriminative behaviors among the individuals in order to expand religious freedom within the society. As a general perspective, people of Turkey should pay more attention to understand the *other*, in other words, to have empathy, and deepen the tolerance to ones, who are different in a way or another. The most important duty on this process will be the role of state officials. As selected leaders of society, egalitarian approach should be possessed by them first,

so that, they would be able to embed the idea to the individuals with respective discourses not with discriminative ones. Ideal society should accept every single citizen as he/she is regardless of religious, ethnic, or sexual identities. The common element should be the total understanding that they live in the same country, under the same flag and in the same world.

CONCLUSIÓN

La iglesia y el estado, con los alzamientos árabes, se ha convertido en un tema en la agenda internacional, con referencias a la importancia de la laicidad en el proceso de democratización, sobre todo en las sociedades musulmanas. Dentro de los valores occidentales, ha sido un componente en el marco del sistema político y/o social. El progreso no fue producido como un cambio instantáneo, por supuesto. Ya que la idea laica / secular tiene una larga historia en la política occidental, se ha integrado en la sociedad, sin importar qué concepto se tiene en cuenta, ya sea el laicismo francés o el secularismo anglosajón. Por otro lado, si bien ha sido objeto de discusión en las sociedades musulmanas, la República de Turquía adaptó este concepto político occidental sobre su herencia oriental tradicional hace casi ochenta años.

La República de Turquía adaptó la *laïcité* (francesa) - *laiklik* como una parte, o mejor dicho, como requisito previo a su proceso de modernización. La aplicación de la laicidad en una sociedad mayoritariamente musulmana sobre la herencia política y social del Imperio Otomano, que se basaba en el poder absoluto del sultán-califa no sólo en las órdenes políticas sino también en las órdenes religiosas, crea una dicotomía entre la sociedad en la comprensión de la nueva identidad. En consecuencia, las estructuras políticas y sociales turcas han sido testigos de un choque entre partidarios y opositores del laicismo hasta la actualidad.

¿Qué significó el laicismo en la experiencia de Turquía? Fue la privatización de la religión y la reducción de su importancia a nivel individual. Dentro de esta perspectiva, la religión era necesaria en la vida privada; sin embargo, su separación de los asuntos del Estado fue bastante importante, con el fin de proporcionar una estructura política estable y libre de dogmas basados en la religión y los obstáculos consecuentes, como argumentó Voltaire. La abolición del califato es la aplicación más relevante dentro de esta perspectiva. Sin embargo, el establecimiento de la

Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos demuestra que el laicismo turco desea tener la religión bajo el control del Estado, con el fin de intervenir en asuntos islámicos. La fuente de la soberanía fue también una parte importante del proceso de laicismo turco. Como dijo Rousseau, la soberanía debería haber residido en la gente, por lo que se tomó del Islam y fue entregado a la sociedad con poder legislativo gracias a diversas disposiciones legales y constitucionales. La característica más destacada y original del laicismo turco fue el escape de la cultura árabe. Como el Imperio Otomano aceptó la doctrina islámica sunita y dio la bienvenida a la cultura árabe, el escape era una necesidad con el fin de cortar los lazos con el pasado islámico y para poder integrar una nueva identidad completamente distinta de la anterior.

Con las características antes mencionadas del laicismo turco, surgieron sus propios partidarios y opositores, los que se reunieron en torno a dos grupos antagonistas dominantes: los partidarios de la nueva identidad republicana laica y los partidarios de la vieja identidad del otomano islámico. Esta polarización provocó conflictos importantes y una historia inestable con respecto a los límites de la libertad religiosa. El tema de la libertad religiosa se ha enredado en torno a la perspectiva islámica sunita: (de acuerdo con esta perspectiva) la sociedad Sunni musulmana se mantuvo fuera de sus necesidades religiosas, según las implementaciones basadas en la laicidad y en consecuencia, los gobiernos toman el tema de la libertad religiosa en cuenta con la expansión de los límites con referencia a las necesidades de los sunitas islámicos. Sin embargo, la sociedad musulmana de Turquía no es homogénea ya que no están sólo los seguidores de la doctrina sunita islámica. Como se ha mencionado, los alevís son miembros de la sociedad musulmana de Turquía, la proporción suya en toda la población de Turquía es una parte importante que debe ser tomada en cuenta en relación con la libertad religiosa.

Los alevís, como partidarios de una identidad religiosa sincrética, han considerado la historia como un proceso centenario basado en la opresión por sí mismos, que ha sido la razón del secreto que mantuvieron durante la vida rural desde el Imperio Otomano hasta 1960, bajo el Estado de la República de Turquía. La fundación de la república y el proceso de laicismo con sus componentes anteriormente citados fueron recibidos y se convirtieron en una nueva esperanza para los alevís. Lo más importante para ellos es que fue un modo de escape de

componentes culturales basados en los árabes. Desde la fundación de la República de Turquía, los alevís han apoyado la idea de vivir bajo un estado nuevo con una nueva identidad. Por otro lado, los partidarios de la vieja identidad del otomano islámico nunca han renunciado a los componentes árabes de la cultura turca, y han considerado la creación de una nueva identidad como la negación de la historia, mientras que la idea de escape fue la característica más sobresaliente de la laicidad turca que llamó la atención de los alevís.

En este choque de identidades, los alevís tomaron su posición a favor de la nueva identidad republicana laica, y se consideran a sí mismo no solo como los partidarios, sino también como los constituyentes de la recién nacida república y una de las garantías de la estructura del Estado laico. De hecho, esto ha sido algo más que una autodefinición, los partidarios sunitas de la nueva identidad laica con una mentalidad republicana también han aceptado los alevís como los defensores de la estructura estatal de la República de Turquía. Esta evaluación ha causado resultados políticos importantes en cuanto a la desfiguración de los alevís en la escena política.

Como los alevís han sido partidarios determinados de la nueva identidad republicana laica, ellos no han asociado bien con los partidos políticos de derecha. Además, los partidos políticos de izquierda no han prestado mucha atención a las demandas de los alevís. El apoyo de los alevís siempre se ha dado por sentado y ellos han sido considerados como electorados determinados. Por otro lado, como resultado de la estructura del Estado laico, la formación de un partido político dedicado a los alevís no puede ser considerado como aceptable en términos de identidad religiosa. Además, debido a la divergencia entre los alevís de Turquía, sólo un partido político no sería eficaz para representar las demandas de los alevís, puesto que varían de un grupo a otro. El Partido de la Unidad (de Turquía) es un ejemplo importante de la historia política turca porque ha representado a los alevís. Por un lado, fue criticado fuertemente por ser una amenaza a la estructura del Estado laico, ya que lo dirige un grupo religioso (aunque no oficialmente), y por otro lado, no estaba reflejando las necesidades enteras de los alevís. Con el tiempo, el Partido de la Unidad se ha registrado como un fracaso en la historia política turca debido a los críticos de su incompatibilidad con el laicismo, la insuficiencia de la representación de las demandas de los alevís y los rumores acerca de su asociación

con otros partidos políticos con el propósito de intereses políticos que no están relacionados con los intereses de los alevís.

La falta de representación de los alevís ha obligado a reconsiderar su posición en el punto de inflexión concreto de la historia política turca. Las elecciones de 1950 iniciaron una nueva etapa en la democracia turca cambiando el apoyo de los alevís del Partido Republicano del Pueblo hacia el Partido Demócrata, por dejar de responder a sus demandas. A continuación, su apoyo al Partido Demócrata se prolongó en un corto período, y apoyaron la intervención militar de 1960, que terminó con el Partido Republicano del Pueblo de nuevo; aunque no fue eficiente para la representación de los alevís en la Asamblea. Como el Partido de la Unidad (de Turquía) fue un fracaso, no sería erróneo afirmar que los alevís estuvieron perdidos en términos de la representación política.

Los límites de la libertad religiosa han sido tenidos en cuenta por los partidos políticos de la derecha, los que se han referido, con frecuencia, a la identidad islámica otomana. Sin embargo, desde su punto de vista, los sunitas fueron la gente reprimida en términos de la libertad religiosa. En consecuencia, las implementaciones de estos gobiernos, a partir del Partido Demócrata de Adnan Menderes, el Partido de la Justicia de Süleyman Demirel, hasta el Partido del Bienestar, y muchos otros de Necmettin Erbakan, y el Partido de Justicia y Desarrollo de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, se han centrado en las demandas de los sunitas islámicos. Los límites de la libertad religiosa se han modificado, reducido o ampliado con respecto a los gobiernos; sin embargo, las demandas de los alevís y sus necesidades religiosas no se han tenido en cuenta con los debates relacionados con la libertad religiosa en Turquía. Los partidos políticos consideraron estar en el poder como una herramienta para cambiar los límites de la libertad religiosa, y pusieron sus propias reglas sobre la sociedad (tal y como se ha mencionado en la experiencia francesa); los alevís no han sido tenidos en cuenta como uno de los jugadores del juego de la democracia. En pocas palabras, *el juego* no ha sido justo para los alevís. En este punto, hay una cosa que debe ser distinguida. Como se mencionó en la parte relacionada, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, el presidente del Partido Republicano del Pueblo - principal partido de la oposición de la estructura política real - es un político aleví. Este hecho puede ser una oportunidad para que la

representación aleví en la Gran Asamblea Nacional de Turquía; sin embargo, él no ha utilizado su origen religioso en la escena política como una herramienta para llamar la atención aleví.

Además del proceso de laicismo, el proceso de industrialización trajo consigo importantes cambios sociales en Turquía. Para los alevís, el resultado más concreto fue la urbanización. Con la urbanización, los alevís comenzaron a tener muchas dificultades en cuanto a la libertad religiosa y otros problemas sociales en cuanto a su identidad distintiva como la curiosidad, el miedo, el insulto, y la seguridad en la mayoría sunita. Sus límites de libertad religiosa se redujeron con el tiempo, de modo que sentían la necesidad de ocultar su identidad religiosa de sus vecinos, incluso de sus hijos. No era sólo el resultado de cualquier implementación de política, sino también el resultado de la vecindad de dos identidades religiosas distintas que tienen los prejuicios entre sí durante siglos como un hábito viejo que se ha heredado del Imperio Otomano.

Todos los prejuicios y discursos peyorativos consiguientes causaron problemas sociales desafortunados sobre las diferencias religiosas entre sunitas y alevís. Así como el Islam sunita fue señalado como superior frecuentemente, los *otros* sistemas de creencias fueron considerados como secundarios. Debido a los prejuicios, otros sistemas de creencias a menudo fueron insultados y el alevismo se ha convertido en objetivo de este tipo de prejuicios no sólo en la época otomana, sino también en la actualidad. Ciertos grupos de partidarios de la identidad islámica otomana consideran a los alevís como musulmanes *perversos*, *infiel* e incluso enemigos de la religión. Estos prejuicios han sido las razones de los ataques dirigidos en masa, por ejemplo en la década de 1970 y, más recientemente, en Sivas. Por supuesto, ha habido deficiencias en la seguridad, sin embargo, como se discutió en detalle, los discursos perjudiciales jugaron un papel importante para la movilización de los grupos sunitas contra los alevís. Por un lado los ataques dirigidos en masa, y por otro lado este tipo de discursos peyorativos y los prejuicios han causado discriminación contra los alevís a nivel individual. En cuanto a los discursos peyorativos, las normas legislativas serán fundamentales para el proceso de la libertad religiosa, sin embargo, las regulaciones legislativas deben ser apoyadas

con los discursos igualitarios de los funcionarios estatales, líderes espirituales y de opinión.

Como se señaló anteriormente, la polarización de la sociedad ha provocado los ataques sangrientos durante los años de setenta dentro de los grupos políticos, sobre todo contra los que concretamente se asociaban con preferencias religiosas. Por lo tanto, no sería erróneo afirmar que estos grupos fueron impulsados no sólo por objetivos políticos, sino también los religiosos. Dentro de esta tensa atmósfera política y sociológica, los alevís se asociaban a sí mismos con la ideología socialista, ya que esta ideología negaba cualquier componente religioso y poseía una estructura igualitaria. Por otro lado, la ideología nacionalista había sido redefinida con el Islam sunita en el centro, en Turquía. Con respecto a la ideología nacionalista centrada en el Islam, *los alevís comunistas* eran enemigos tanto de la religión como de la unidad nacional del Estado. Cuando se toman en cuenta los ataques y el re-despertar de la identidad islámica otomana como un componente de nacionalismo, es posible ver la simultaneidad. Una mayor conciencia de la identidad religiosa causó más discusiones y la interacción entre los alevís y la mayoría sunita como resultado de la urbanización, el problema aumentó a su punto máximo con los ataques en las ciudades donde las diversidades religiosas son más significativas.

Desde la intervención militar de 1980, los asuntos de Estado-religión pasaron a un nivel diferente. Como la hostilidad entre los grupos políticos se asoció a menudo con la religión, la Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos fue señalada como la institución responsable de la solidaridad de la nación entre las instituciones del Estado por el gobierno militar. Señalando la Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos podría aceptarse como el esfuerzo del gobierno militar para establecer la colaboración entre las instituciones del Estado, que es similar a la referencia de Montesquieu sobre la necesidad de la armonía entre las instituciones del Estado y las instituciones religiosas. Sin embargo, se puede observar que mientras Montesquieu hablaba de la colaboración de dos grupos de instituciones distintas, el gobierno militar estaba hablando de la colaboración de las instituciones de un mismo Estado.

En este punto, es importante hablar de la responsabilidad actual de la Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos. Según los alevís, su existencia no es compatible

con la estructura del Estado laico. Sin embargo, su existencia puede legitimarse con la comprensión turca de la laicidad que pretende controlar la religión por las manos del Estado. En la estructura actual, la Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos funciona alrededor de las políticas céntricas islámicas suníes, lo que no proporciona ningún espacio para la representación de otros grupos religiosos, incluyendo los alevís. Con el fin de tener la libertad religiosa para todos en Turquía, la Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos debe ser re-estructurada y debe cortar sus lazos con el Estado para convertirse en una institución totalmente independiente en la estructura de Turquía. Al hacerlo, la Presidencia sería una institución en la que todos los miembros de grupos religiosos distintos se pueden representar.

El aumento del conservadurismo entre la sociedad ha obligado a los alevís a movilizarse, por muchas razones diferentes. En primer lugar, era una necesidad que resultada de la urbanización. Los alevís perdieron sus compañeros (müshahip) y sus comunidades, dos elementos importantes del alevismo. La vida de la ciudad fue una amenaza para su identidad religiosa, lo cual puede debilitar sus vínculos con el alevismo. A fin de mantener su identidad religiosa, han formado nuevas comunidades con respecto a las condiciones urbanas y fundaciones establecidas para reunirse y practicar juntos. Y en segundo lugar, estaba el problema de la seguridad. En las condiciones de la vida rural, estaban practicando con la ayuda de los vigilantes; sin embargo, esto cambió en condiciones de la vida de la ciudad. Lejos de sus comunidades, se sentían solos e inseguros. Además, la memoria colectiva del pasado reciente con ataques dirigidos a las masas profundizó sus preocupaciones. Con la movilización en los centros urbanos se sintieron seguros y comenzaron a hacerse oír a pesar de la falta de representación política. Además, reuniéndose en torno a sus bases se facilitó la adaptación al nuevo estilo de vida en centros urbanos, sin perder sus vínculos con el alevismo.

Cuando se trata de la cuestión de si el Estado turco laico ha proporcionado la libertad religiosa a los alevís o no, no sería erróneo afirmar que ha fallado hasta ahora. Una estructura laica era una necesidad concreta para el período de modernización de Turquía. Su mecanismo de control puede ser entendido, también, con respecto a las condiciones del proceso de transformación. Sin embargo, dando privilegios a una identidad religiosa específica, no sólo con las implementaciones y

patrocinios, sino también con discursos políticos señalando la superioridad de uno de los sistemas de creencias que están componiendo la sociedad, no se puede asociar a la estructura del Estado laico. El Estado debe mantenerse igualmente lejos de cualquier sistema de creencias religiosas. Desde esta perspectiva, como se ha señalado por los alevís también, las escuelas de Imam-Hatip, los discursos religiosos, la financiación del establecimiento de mezquitas, las asignaciones de los imanes como funcionarios estatales, no son compatibles con el laicismo ideal. Por lo tanto, debates en curso (en el momento de escritura de esta tesis) sobre la serie de las regulaciones con el fin de financiar *cemevis* y para pagar los sueldos mensuales de *dedes* y el personal de *cemevi* tampoco podrían ser considerados como una solución para los problemas de la comunidad aleví.

La Apertura Aleví del Partido Justicia y Desarrollo fue un importante paso positivo que ha sido tomado por un gobierno, sobre todo por un gobierno, que se refiere a menudo como un pro-islamista. Todo el proceso se ha criticado mucho, y no es posible afirmar que estas críticas eran injustas; sin embargo, ha sido la primera vez que una iniciativa estatal se ha llevado a cabo con el fin de ponerse en contacto directamente con los alevís. Entre todas, la crítica más importante que los alevís alegaron es que no estaban bien representados en los talleres. Como existe divergencia entre los alevís, las posiciones de los representantes alevís han sido otro tema que se ha discutido. La asistencia de académicos islámicos y representantes de la Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos pone la cuestión sobre la mesa: ¿decidirían estos académicos sunitas islámicos, si los alevís deben considerarse con los reglamentos importantes relativos a sus problemas? El tema debe ser discutido no sólo por los representantes de la mayoría sunita, sino también por todos lados, y finalmente, un consenso común se llevaría a cabo. Al igual que todo el proceso, el informe final ha sido criticada también. El informe final hizo una llamada a la unificación de los alevís y afirmó que alevís podrían beneficiarse de los servicios de la Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos. Estas dos partes fueron criticadas por los alevís. Como todas las comunidades, los alevís poseen diferentes enfoques para la vida con la identidad religiosa y la ideología política. No sería correcto esperar que todos ellos piensen y se muevan de una manera. Además, debido a su estructura sincrética y a la falta de transferencia de información sistemática, el alevismo difiere de un grupo a otro. Por lo tanto, no se puede ver la necesidad de unificación a la que

el Gobierno llama. Hay ciertas cuestiones en las que todos los alevís están de acuerdo, tales como el reconocimiento de los *cemevis*. Las cuestiones salariales o su financiación deberían tener medidas adicionales que se deberían tener en cuenta con respecto a la definición de la laicidad ideal con su estatus teórico y práctico. En pocas palabras, es correcto dar un paso con el fin de proporcionar una mayor libertad religiosa a los alevís con la Apertura Aleví y las regulaciones recientes; sin embargo, la metodología con la que se han de resolver los problemas no es considerada cuidadosamente. Por lo tanto, se puede decir que a pesar de las partes positivas, la forma de lidiar del Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo con los problemas de los alevís no es del todo correcta. Como el problema no se puede resolver en un día o dos, Turquía necesita más de las políticas y las iniciativas del gobierno, y debe construir políticas de Estado, las que no se pueden cambiar en función del partido en el poder. Además, es evidente que la comprensión de la laicidad turca causó problemas durante el tiempo, por lo que debe definirse claramente en el marco de la libertad religiosa. En pocas palabras, en lugar de una serie de reglamentos, tales como parches al sistema actual, toda la estructura se debe revisar. Además de la estructura estatal revisada, los líderes políticos y líderes de opinión también deben revisar sus discursos con respecto al problema y adaptar el tono más positivo. Mientras los discursos inapropiados o discriminatorios dañan la confianza de la opinión pública, el tono positivo mejorará el apoyo de la sociedad, que con el tiempo preparará el terreno para el consenso común.

Para concluir, el estado de Turquía ha fracasado en términos de proporcionar la libertad religiosa a las diversas identidades religiosas hasta ahora, como debería haber sido el resultado de la estructura del Estado laico. Este fracaso provocó la opresión en la sociedad, y con la dicotomía de la identidad, los escenarios políticos de Turquía han sido testigos de las importantes competiciones, mientras que la polarización se ha producido entre la sociedad. Incluso recientemente, las protestas del Parque Gezi pueden ser evaluadas dentro del mismo marco de este concurso.

En términos de choque de identidad, los alevís han sido excluidos y no se ha proporcionado la libertad religiosa completa por ninguna de las identidades anteriores, la nueva republicana laica y la vieja islámica otomana. La comprensión turca de la laicidad funcionaba para controlar la religión e ignorar la diversidad de

sus componentes, por lo que se excluye el alevismo, así como otras identidades religiosas. Por otro lado, la vieja identidad otomano islámica no respetó los componentes distintivos del alevismo y lo excluyó, a menos que los alevís pasaran por alto sus diferencias y aceptaran los valores del Islam sunita como los valores únicos del Islam, como la cuestión de los lugares de culto, estructura y atribuciones de la Presidencia de Asuntos Religiosos. En consecuencia, ni la identidad republicana laica, ni los representantes de la identidad islámica otomana podrían tomar suficientes medidas para ampliar los límites de la libertad religiosa. Los problemas de los alevís seguirán teniendo lugar en la agenda de Turquía, que deberían ser evaluados dentro de los derechos humanos fundamentales en materia de libertad religiosa, hasta llegar a los límites exactos de la libertad religiosa que les permitan vivir y practicar libre y correctamente. Si la situación actual se pudiera resumir, la frase que Ercan Geçmez, el Presidente de Hacı Bektaş Veli Fundación de Anatolia, dijo durante la entrevista habría que tenerse en cuenta: *"A pesar de que hemos quedado como los otros, hemos sido atacados física y psicológicamente y nosotros también hemos sido asesinados, nunca hemos considerado a nadie como los otros y mantendremos esta posición"*.

En una estructura de Estado laico ideal cada grupo religioso debe ser tratado igualmente por el estado y debe tener la libertad religiosa total en términos de derechos humanos. Por el caso de los alevís, esta tesis sostiene que los alevís no tienen la libertad religiosa para practicar libremente y adecuadamente. Como esta tesis lleva el caso de los alevís el fin de comprender los límites de la libertad religiosa en la estructura del Estado laico, no sería erróneo decir que incluso en la estructura del Estado laico llegando hasta el punto de la libertad religiosa total para todo el mundo es un proceso largo. El proceso debe llevarse a cabo no sólo por el Estado, sino también por la sociedad. Mientras que el estado está proporcionando más libertad y espacio para grupos religiosos diversos, la sociedad debe integrar la idea de la libertad religiosa para todos, independientemente de cualquier religión como la parte fundamental del proceso. Es seguro que se necesitará tiempo para reprimir las conductas discriminatorias entre los individuos con el fin de ampliar la libertad religiosa dentro de la sociedad. En una perspectiva general, el pueblo de Turquía debería prestar más atención a comprender al otro, en otras palabras, tener empatía, y profundizar la tolerancia a los, que son diferentes de una manera u otra.

El deber más importante de este proceso lo llevarán a cabo los funcionarios estatales. Como seleccionados líderes de la sociedad, el enfoque igualitario debe ser poseído por ellos primero, de modo que sean capaces de integrar la idea de los individuos con los respectivos discursos, no con los discriminativos. La sociedad ideal debe aceptar cada uno de los ciudadanos ya que él / ella es ciudadano/a independientemente de las identidades religiosas, étnicas o sexuales. El elemento común debe ser la total comprensión de vivir en el mismo país, bajo la misma bandera y en el mismo mundo.

APPENDIX I

Opening ceremony of the first Assembly



Source: Emre Gül, “TBMM Dualarla Açılmıştı,” *Dünya Bülteni*, 3 November 2013, <<http://www.dunyabulteni.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=207130>> (3 November 2013).

APPENDIX II

TREATY OF PEACE WITH TURKEY SIGNED AT LAUSANNE JULY 24, 1923 THE CONVENTION RESPECTING THE REGIME OF THE STRAITS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS SIGNED AT LAUSANNE

THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, GREECE, ROUMANIA and
the SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE,
of the one part,
and TURKEY,

of the other part; Being united in the desire to bring to a final close the state of war
which has existed in the East since 1914,

Being anxious to re-establish the relations of friendship and commerce which are
essential to the mutual well-being of their respective peoples,

And considering that these relations must be based on respect for the independence
and sovereignty of States,

Have decided to conclude a Treaty for this purpose, and have appointed as their
Plenipotentiaries:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND IRELAND AND OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS,
EMPEROR OF INDIA:

The Right Honourable Sir Horace George Montagu Rumbold, Baronet, G.C.M.G.,
High Commissioner at Constantinople;

THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC:

General Maurice Pelle, Ambassador of France, High Commissioner of the Republic
in the East, Grand Officer of the National Order of the Legion of Honour;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ITALY:

The Honourable Marquis Camillo Garroni, Senator of the Kingdom, Ambassador of
Italy, High Commissioner at Constantinople, Grand Cross of the Orders of Saints
Maurice and Lazarus, and of the Crown of Italy;

M. Giulio Cesare Montagna, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at
Athens, Commander of the Orders of Saints Maurice and Lazarus, Grand Officer of
the Crown of Italy;

HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN:

Mr. Kentaro Otchiai, Jusammi, First Class of the Order of the Rising Sun, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Rome;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE HELLENES:

M. Eleftherios K. Veniselos, formerly President of the Council of Ministers, Grand Cross of the Order of the Saviour;

M. Demetrios Caclamano, Minister Plenipotentiary at London, Commander of the Order of the Saviour;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ROUMANIA:

M. Constantine I. Diamandy, Minister Plenipotentiary;

M. Constantine Contzesco, Minister Plenipotentiary;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE SERBS, THE CROATS AND THE SLOVENES:

Dr. Miloutine Yovanovitch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Berne;

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF TURKEY:

Ismet Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy for Adrianople; Dr. Riza Nour Bey, Minister for Health and for Public Assistance, Deputy for Sinope; Hassan Bey, formerly Minister, Deputy for Trebizond;

Who, having produced their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

PART I.

POLITICAL CLAUSES.

(...)

SECTION III.

PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.

ARTICLE 37.

Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them.

ARTICLE 38.

The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals.

Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public order.

ARTICLE 39.

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems.

All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before the law.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.

ARTICLE 40.

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

ARTICLE 41.

As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes.

The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the establishments and institutions concerned.

ARTICLE 42.

The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities.

These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the

minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen from amongst European lawyers.

The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature.

ARTICLE 43.

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest.

This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservation of public order.

ARTICLE 44.

Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

ARTICLE 45.

The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory.

APPENDIX III

Milliyet Daily Newspaper (7 December 1952, p.1)

7
Aralık
1952
Pazar

Milliyet

Hafta Dünüsü

Dün Adanada muazzam tezahüratla karşılanan
Başbakan Menderes 30.000 kişi önünde dedi ki:

Türk umumî efkârı Malatyadaki son hâdise üzerinde dikkatle durmaktadır

"Malatyadaki bu hâdise dini hükümlere aykırı olarak gösterilmek isteniyor, hattâ toplu halde çalışma kararında olduklarını göstermiştir"

"Bu gibi faaliyetler bir neferin bir takım amiyânî fikirleriyle ve eğilimleriyle her çaptaki vatandaşlarımızın dikkatini çekmektedir. Bu amiyânî fikirlerin, dikkatimizi bu hâdise üzerine çekmektedir."



The crowd, 30,000 strong, welcomed the Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, with great enthusiasm in Adana.



Cumhurbaşkanının dinîî fikirleri

Gl. Eisenhower Kore için henüz kararını vermedi

Güney Kore Başbakanı iyi teçhiz edildikleri takdirde cephe hattındaki yerini alabileceğini söyledi



KRAL FARUK BİR CAMİ MİDİR?

Kralın söylediği sözler kızı korku ile titretmişti



Kanserle mücadele

Dr. İsmail Hakkı Özalp

İki kardeş kadın uğruna katil oldu

Menderes'in Papagos'a telgrafı

Öğrencilerin dileme günü

Beşiktaş dün Etilos'u 2-0 mağlup etti



Yasar Doğu Hatıralarını Anlatıyor!

Balkan şampiyonası ve elde edilen sonuç

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Yasar Doğu Hatıralarını Anlatıyor!

Son Haberler

Başbakan Menderes, Adanada 30.000 kişi önünde dedi ki:

Kastamonu cinayeti tabhikati

Ziraat Fakültesinde grev dün sona erdi

Umumi efkâr Malatya hâdisesi üzerinde dikkatle durmaktadır

Kamyon, kamyonet ithalâtı

Zarfa zarar kâğıtları

Menderes'in Paşagosa telgrafı

Gl. Eisenhower Kore için henüz kararını vermedi

Be işlebi çıktı

Winceria dîmeze girdi

Bakanda bir kez kâğıtları kâğıtları

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APPENDIX IV

Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper (17 June 1950, p.1)



APPENDIX V

Vakit Daily Newspaper (14 June 1950, p.1)

YENİ GAZETE 14 Haziran 1950 ÇARŞAMBA Yıl: 33-3 Sayı: 11742-090 Sayısı her yerde 10 kuruştur

VAKIT

Müdü: ASİM US * Yazı İşlerini Füllen İdare Eden: REŞAT ENİS * Basıldığı Yer: Vakit Basınevi * Gazetemizin müdürlüğünün telif hakları mahfuzdur

İDARE YERİ: İstanbul-Ankara Cad. VAKİT Yurdu * Posta kutusu: İstanbul 46 * Telgraf: VAKİT İstanbul * Telefon: 24370 - 23872

D.P.mühim bir dâvayı halletti: Ezan Arapça okunacak

Kanun Bugün Meclise veriliyor

D. P. Meclis Grubu müzakerelerinin kapalı veya gizli olması üzerinde uzun tartışmalar yapıldı

Valiler arasında değişiklik

İçişleri Bakanlığı, 300 kaymakamın emekliye ayrılacağı haberini yalanladı

Ankara, 13 — İçişleri Bakan- Boşiktay Kaymakamı Faz

APPENDIX VI

Milliyet Daily Newspaper (6 July 1950, p.1)

Milliyet 32 TEMMUZ 1950 Perşembe

Başbakanın meclisteki beyanah
Baskı kanunları değiştiriliyor

Alihan Memetov muhalefete her türlü teminatı vermezler
hazır olduğuna bildirdi. Merfıs Un, Bolşev ve makarnadaki
muamele vergisi ile şekerden alınan istihlak vergisini kaldırıldı

Muzaffer Kayalibay hadisesi
Öğretmen kadrosu var
öğretmen kadrosu var
öğretmen kadrosu var

**Kore harbi tehlikei
bir safhaya giriyor**
Kızıl Çin'in harbe girmesi ihtimali var. Mac
Arthur Birleşmiş Milletler komutanı oluyor

**"Haydutlar kralı,"
nihayet öldürüldü**
Büyük kaçakçı Mithatpaşa, 400 askerle birlikte
İstanbul'da öldürüldü

**İstanbul sergisine
rağbet eden az**
Halk sergilerin peşini bırakıp, gırtlara kadar
sokulmuş. Her şeyi gözde tutuyor

Bükradaki muhakeme komedisi
**Türkiye hesabına casusluk
yaptıkları iddia edilen 7 kişi**

HEYELİNE MUSA BAKAMIZ
Musa'nın heyeli, İstanbul'da
görülüyor. Musa'nın heyeli,
İstanbul'da görülüyor.

Celâl Beyazın doğduğu ev
Celâl Beyazın doğduğu ev,
İstanbul'da görülüyor.

**Bayram yüzünden
ölenler**
Bayram yüzünden ölenler,
İstanbul'da görülüyor.

2000 hediyeziniden huzurlar
2000 hediyeziniden huzurlar,
İstanbul'da görülüyor.

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APPENDIX VII

Proclamation of 1960

"Sevgili Vatandaşlar, Bugün demokrasimizin içine düştüğü buhran ve son müessif hadiseler dolayısıyla kardeş kavgasına meydan vermemek maksadıyla Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, memleketin idaresini ele almıştır. Bu harekâta Silahlı Kuvvetlerimiz; partileri içine düştükleri uzlaşmaz durumdan kurtarmak ve partiler üstü tarafsız bir idarenin nezaret ve hakemliği altında, en kısa zamanda adil ve serbest seçimler yaptırarak idareyi, hangi tarafa mensup olursa olsun, seçimi kazananlara devir ve teslim etmek üzere girişmiş bulunmaktadır.

Girişilmiş olan bu teşebbüs, hiçbir şahsa veya zümreye karşı değildir. İdareimiz, hiç kimse hakkında şahsiyata müteallik tecavüzkâr bir fiile müsaade etmeyeceği gibi, edilmesine de asla müsamaha etmeyecektir. Kim olursa olsun ve hangi partiye mensup bulunursa bulunsun, her vatandaş; kanunlar ve hukuk prensipleri esaslarına göre muamele görecektir. Bütün vatandaşların, partilerin üstünde aynı milletin, aynı soydan gelmiş evlatları olduklarını hatırlayarak ve kin gütmeden birbirlerine karşı hürmetle ve anlayışla muamele etmeleri, ıstıraplarımızın dinmesi ve milli varlığımızın selameti için zaruri görülmektedir.

Kabineye mensup şahsiyetlerin, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'ne sığınmalarını rica ederiz. Şahsi emniyetleri kanunun teminatı altındadır.

Müttefiklerimize, komşularımıza ve bütün dünyaya hitap ediyoruz. Gayemiz, Birleşmiş Milletler Anayasası'na ve insan hakları prensiplerine tamamen riayetlidir. Büyük Atatürk'ün 'Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh' prensibi bayrağımızdır.

Bütün ittifaklarımıza ve taahhütlerimize sadıqız. NATO ve CENTO'ya inanıyoruz ve bağlıyız. Düşüncemiz 'Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh'tur."

Milletimizin bir zarara uğramayacağı delaletinde sabır ve ihkamla tebessür etmeleri beklentilerimiz arasındadır.

(T.S.K., Albay Alparslan Türkeş)

APPENDIX VIII

Milliyet Daily Newspaper (25 September 1997, p.15)

Milliyet Perşembe 25 Eylül 1997 15

açık pencere

BAĞIR ABİR

Neden garson?..

Abi'nin numarası

Sanatçı Bakan

Rekabet Kurulu...

Boş karamame

Türkiye... sızdı...

İncirlik'te saldırı...

İşçimizi çaldırmayız

Yurtta Geziye 1 dakika RP ve DHP'ni verildi denilge karşı kampanya başlatıldı

Sorumlu DİTİM

Soruşturma kilitlendi

Arena'ya saldırıda yeni suçlamalar

90 Saatte İNGİLİZCE

Yıldırım Aktuna'nın KİLFİ

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APPENDIX IX

MGK Proposal (28 February 1997)

- 1) Demokratik, laik ve sosyal hukuk devleti olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ni hedef alan rejim aleyhtarı faaliyetler karşısında ödün verilmemelidir.
- 2) Anayasa'nın 174. maddesinde koruma altına alınan Devrim Kanunları'nın ödün verilmeden uygulanması esastır. Hükümet, icraatında Devrim Yasaları'na uygunluğu sağlamakla görevlidir.
- 3) Savcılar, Devrim Yasaları'nın ihlalini oluşturan davranışlar karşısında harekete geçmelidirler. Yasaları ihlal eden dergahlar kapatılmalıdır.
- 4) Sarık vecüppeli giyim şeklinin özendirildiği görülmektedir. Kılık ve kıyafetleri bu yasaya ters düşen kişilerin onurlandırılmamaları gerekir.
- 5) Anayasa'nın 163. maddesinin kaldırılmasının yarattığı hukuki boşluklar, irticai akımların ve laikliğe aykiri tutumların güçlenmesine yol açmıştır. Bu boşlukları telafi edecek yasal düzenlemeler getirilmelidir.
- 6) Eğitim politikalarında yeniden Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu ruhuna uygun bir çizgiye gelinmelidir.
- 7) Temel eğitim 8 yıla çıkartılmalıdır.
- 8) İmam-Hatip okulları toplumdaki bir ihtiyacı karşılamak üzere kurulmuşlardır. Bu ihtiyacın fazlası olan İmam-Hatip okulları, meslek okullarına dönüştürülmelidir.
- 9) Ayrıca köktendincilerin kontrolünde olan Kuran Kursları kapatılarak Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı'na bağlı okullarda düzenlenmelidir.
- 10) Devlet dairelerinde ve belediyelerde köktendinci bir kadrolaşma hareketi sürdürülmektedir. Hükümet, bu kadrolaşmanın önüne geçmelidir.
- 11) Cami yapımı gibi dini konuları siyasi amaçlar için istismar etmeye dönük olan her türlü davranışlara son verilmelidir.
- 12) Pompalı tüfekler kontrol altına alınmalı ve gerekirse pompalı tüfek satışları yasaklanmalıdır. Ayrıca, pompalı tüfek sahiplerinin dökümü çıkartılmalıdır.
- 13) İran'ın Türkiye'deki rejimi istikrarsızlığa itmeyi amaçlayan çabaları yakın takibe alınmalıdır, İran'ın Türkiye'nin içişlerine kaşmasını önleyici politikalar uygulanmalıdır.
- 14) Yargı mekanizmasının daha etkin çalışmasını sağlayacak ve yargı bağımsızlığını güvence altına alacak, hükümetin tasarruflarından koruyacak düzenlemeler bir an önce getirilmelidir.
- 15) Son dönemde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetler mensuplarını hedef alan tahriklerde büyük artış gözlenmektedir. Bu sataşmalar TSK içinde rahatsızlığa yol açmaktadır.
- 16) İrticaî faaliyetlere karışıkları için TSK'daki görevlerine son verilen subay ve astsubayların belediyelerde istihdam edilmelerinin önüne geçilmelidir.
- 17) Partilerin belediye başkanları ve il, ilçe yöneticilerinin konuşma ve davranışları da Siyasî Partiler Yasası'nın sorumluluk alanına sokulmalıdır.
- 18) Tarikatların, denetimlerindeki finans kuruluşları ve vakıflar aracılığıyla ekonomik güç haline gelmeleri dikkatle izlenmelidir.

19) Laiklik aleyhtarı yayın çizgisi olan TV kanalları ve özellikle radyo kanallarının verdikleri mesajlar dikkatle izlenmeli ve bu yayınların Anayasa'ya uygunluęu saęlanmalıdır.

20) Millî Görüş Teşkilatı'nın bazı belediyelere yaptığı usulsüz para transferleri durdurulmalıdır.

Source: Emre Kongar, *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye: 2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2006) 285.

APPENDIX X

Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper (28 April 2007, p.1)



Cumhuriyet



Genellenen: TSK kağıt ve işliğin artırılması: Genelinde terim açıkta ortaya konuldu

Askerden açıklama

İktidar açıklama Genelinde terim açıkta ortaya konuldu. TSK kağıt ve işliğin artırılması: Genelinde terim açıkta ortaya konuldu.

İktidar açıklama Genelinde terim açıkta ortaya konuldu. TSK kağıt ve işliğin artırılması: Genelinde terim açıkta ortaya konuldu.

İktidar açıklama Genelinde terim açıkta ortaya konuldu. TSK kağıt ve işliğin artırılması: Genelinde terim açıkta ortaya konuldu.

Atık yekleme yapmaları ve 367'yi bulmadık seçme proj. CHP Anayasa Mahkemesi'ne başvurdu

Seçim mahkemelik

Hukukçular: Arın'ı içtüzük ihlali yaptı

Cumhuriyet için büyük miting yarın

Devlet bunlara emanet edilemez

Günler yükseltilmiş

4 milletler 10 kilitli DYP'de sürpriz



AKP'yi lanse ediyor

CMP karıştı

GÜNCEL
Türkiye'nin en büyük haber sitesi

Özellikle
İticia için propaganda

4 gün
Türkiye 1 parti çatısı

Özellikle
İticia için gencile çab

GÜNDEM
Türkiye'nin en büyük haber sitesi

28 NİSAN 2007
HABERLER

DÜNYADA BUGÜN
311 HABERLER

E. Erdoğan'ın Sıkıntıları

Gereklikten ziyade ZSK'ın işte deliliği kesin görünümüne Gereklikçilerle terim açıklaması bastırıldı

Askerden açıklama

Askerden açıklama... Gereklikçilerle terim açıklaması bastırıldı... ZSK'ın işte deliliği kesin görünümüne...

Tuğrul İnan 45. yıl yemeği

Tuğrul İnan'ın 45. yıl yemeği... Tuğrul İnan'ın 45. yıl yemeği...

'Erdogan siyasi kumar oynadı'

MHP Genel Başkanı Devlet Bahçeli, AKP Önceki Cumhurbaşkanı'nı hesaplarına atarak yapacak imajını ve seçimi stratejik bir kavgaya halini getirdiğini belirtti.


SİYASİ YAKLAŞIM ÇIRAL ÇALGIÇAR

'Diğirmeye Basınak' ve Türkiye

Diğirmeye Basınak ve Türkiye... Diğirmeye Basınak ve Türkiye...

APPENDIX XI

FIGURE I: ALEVI POPULATION IN TURKEY



Source: "Türkiye`de Yasayan Aleviler." *Alevi Forum*, 26 December 2007
<<http://www.aleviforum.com/showthread.php?t=38304>> (17 December 2010).

APPENDIX XII

Photos of *Semah*.







Source: UNESCO, *Semah, Alevi-Bektaşî Ritual*, 00384 (N.p., UNESCO, November 2010), <<http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/doc/download.php?versionID=07301>> (6 May 2011).

APPENDIX XIII

TEKKE VE ZAVİYELERLE TÜRBELERİN SEDDİNE VE TÜRBEDARLIKLAR İLE BİR TAKIM UNVANLARIN MEN VE İLGASINA DAİR KANUN*

Kanun Numarası : 677
Kabul Tarihi : 30/11/1925
Yayımlandığı R. Gazete : Tarih: 13/12/1925 Sayı: 243
Yayımlandığı Düstur : Tertip: 3 Cilt: 7 Sayfa: 113

Madde 1 – Türkiye Cumhuriyeti dahilinde gerek vakıf suretiyle gerek mülk olarak şeyhının tahtı tasarrufunda gerek suveri aharla tesis edilmiş bulunan bilümüm tekkeler ve zaviyeler sahiplerinin diğer şekilde hakkı temellük ve tasarrufları baki kalmak üzere kamilen seddedilmiştir. Bunlardan usulü mevzuası dairesinde filhal cami veya mescit olarak istimal edilenler ipka edilir.

Alelümüm tarikatlerle şeyhlik, dervişlik, müritlik, dedelik, seyitlik, çelebilik, babalık, emirlik, nakiplik, halifelik, falcılık, büyücülük, üfürükçülük ve gayıptan haber vermek ve murada kavuşturmak maksadiyle nüshacılık gibi unvan ve sıfatların istimaliyle bu unvan ve sıfatlara ait hizmet ifa ve kisve iktisası memnudur. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti dahilinde salatine ait veya bir tarika veyahut cerri menfaate müstenit olanlarla bilümüm sair türbeler mesdut ve türbedarlıklar mülğadır. Seddedilmiş olan tekke veya zaviyeleri veya türbeleri açanlar veyahut bunları yeniden ihdas edenler veya ayını tarikat icrasına mahsus olarak velev muvakkaten olsa bile yer verenler ve yukarıdaki unvanları taşıyanlar veya bunlara mahsus hidematı ifa veya kıyafet iktisa eyleyen kimseler üç aydan eksik olmamak üzere hapis ve elli liradan aşağı olmamak üzere cezayı nakdiile cezalandırılır.

(Ek: 10/6/1949 - 5438/1 md.) Şeyhlik, Babalık ve Halifelik gibi mensupları arasında baş mevkiinde bulunanlar altı aydan az olmamak üzere hapis ve 500 liradan aşağı olmamak üzere ağır para cezasından başka bir yıldan aşağı olmamak üzere sürgün cezası ile cezalandırılırlar ⁽¹⁾.

(Ek: 1/3/1950 - 5566/1 md.; Değişik: 7/2/1990 - 3612/5 md.) Türbelerden Türk büyüklerine ait olanlarla büyük sanat değeri bulunanlar Kültür Bakanlığınca umuma açılabilir. Bunlara bakım için gerekli memur ve hizmetliler tayin edilir.

Madde 2 – İşbu kanun neşri tarihinden muteberdir.

Madde 3 – İşbu kanunun icrasına İcra Vekilleri Heyeti memurdur.

677 SAYILI KANUNA EK VE DEĐİŐİKLİK GETİREN MEVZUATIN
YÜRÜRLÜĐE GİRİŐ TARIHİNİ GÖSTERİR LİSTE

Kanun No Farklı tarihte YürürlüĐe Giren Maddeler YürürlüĐe GiriŐ Tarihi

3612	—	16/2/1990
5438	—	16/6/1949
5566	—	4/3/1950

* (1) 13/7/1965 tarih ve 647 sayılı Cezaların İnfazı Hakkında Kanunun geçici 2 nci maddesiyle sürgün cezası kaldırılmıştır.

APPENDIX XIV

Amblem of the Unity Party



APPENDIX XV

Milliyet Daily Newspaper (20 April 1978, p.9)

20 Nisan 1978

Erhan Akaydiz
Malatya'dan yazarlar

Fotografılar
Gurbat Gazmay

Malatya'da yine çatışma oldu

Eşi: «Hamit geldi...Elinde bir paket vardı. Çocuklar, 'Ne o dede' deyip etrafımı aldılar. Hamit de, 'Kasım amcanız size çikolata göndermiş' demiştin»

ALLAH VERGİSİ

PAMUKBANK'ta paranız değer kaybetmez, yerinde saymaz. Büyür!

Bankanızın faiz oranları

Banka	1 yıl	2 yıl	3 yıl	4 yıl
1. Banka	10,00%	10,00%	10,00%	10,00%
2. Banka	10,00%	10,00%	10,00%	10,00%
3. Banka	10,00%	10,00%	10,00%	10,00%
4. Banka	10,00%	10,00%	10,00%	10,00%
5. Banka	10,00%	10,00%	10,00%	10,00%

PAMUKBANK %22'ye kadar faiz veririz.

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APPENDIX XVII

Milliyet Daily Newspaper (27 December 1978, p.1)

APPENDIX XVIII

Photos of Kahramanmaraş Massacres



Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper (25 December 1978)



Milliyet Daily Newspaper (27 December 1978)



Source: "Maras Katliamı (24 Aralık 1978)," *Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association Branch Office of Antalya*, n.d., <http://www.psakd.org/maras_katliami.html> (20 April 2011).

APPENDIX XIX

Speech of General Evren on 12 September 1980

“Yüce Türk Milleti,

30 Ağustos Zafer Bayramı dolayısıyla sizlere radyo ve televizyondan hitap etmek imkanını bulmuş ve ayrılan kısıtlı süre içerisinde mümkün olduğu kadar, yurdumuzun içinde bulunduğu siyasi ve ekonomik durumu ile anarşik ve bölücü eylemleri; alınması gereken tedbirleri çok kısa olarak izah etmeye çalışmışım. Yine çok iyi hatırlayacaksınız ki, iki yıldır her fırsattan istifade ile muhtelif defalar verdiğim beyanat ve radyo-televizyon konuşmalarında da bu hayati önemi olan konuları dile getirmiştım.

Kalbi bu vatan ve millet için atan sağduyu sahibi vatandaşlarım kabul edeceklerdir ki; ülkemizin halen içinde bulunduğu hayati önemi haiz siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal sorunlar, devlet ve milletimizin bekasını tehdit eder boyutlara ulaşmış ve bu hal devletimizi, Cumhuriyet tarihinin en ağır buhranına sürüklemiştir.

Yine hepinizin bildiği gibi; anarşi, terör ve bölücülük, her gün 20 civarında vatandaşımızın hayatını söndürmektedir. Aynı dini ve milli değerleri paylaşan Türk Vatandaşları siyasi çıkarlar uğruna, çeşitli suni ayrılıklar yaratılmak suretiyle muhtelif kamplara bölünmüş ve birbirlerinin kanlarını çekinmeden akıtacak kadar gözleri döndürülerek, adeta birbirlerine düşman edilmişlerdir.

Atatürk ilkelerini esas alarak kurulan Cumhuriyetimizin bu duruma düşürülebileceğini, bundan 10 sene evvel tasavvur dahi etmek mümkün değildi.

Bugüne kadar iktidara gelen çeşitli hükümetlerin, her yıl artan bir hız ile yaygınlaşan ve dünya tarihinde sayısız örnekleri görülen özel harbin sızma ve çökertme hareketına karşı iç güvenliği sağlayacak kararları ve tedbirleri birinci öncelikle alacaklarını vadetmelerine rağmen; sonuç alacak teşebbüsleri, siyasi çıkar çatışmaları ve basit parti hesapları, kaptisler, hayaller, gerçek dışı talepler ve Türk Devleti'nin niteliklerine ters düşen gizli ve açık emeller arasında kaybolup gitmiştir.

Düşmanın amaç ve yöntemleri, anarşi, terör ve bölücülüğün ulaştığı düzey; özel hukuki tedbirlere, idari düzenlemelere, sosyal koşulların geliştirilmesine milli eğitim ve iş hayatının düzenlenmesine ihtiyaç göstermekteyken; milletin vekaletini taşıyan milletvekilleri ve senatörler Meclislerde aylardan beri, hiçbir sorumluluk duymadan yalnız parti menfaat ve disiplini uğruna bu olaylara seyirci kalabilmişlerdir. İktidarların başarı ümit ederek aldıkları her tedbir, muhalefetler tarafından kınanarak ve hatta memleket yararına da olsa baltalanmıştır. Milli birlik ve beraberliğe en fazla muhtaç olduğumuz dönemlerde bile kutuplaşmalar ve bölünmeler adeta teşvik edilmiş; yangını beraberce söndürmek yerine, üzerine benzin dökülerek memleket bilerek veya siyasi çıkarlar uğruna, sırf iktidara gelebilmek pahasına bir yangın yerine çevrilmek istenmiştir.

Ağızlarından düşürmedikleri hukuk devleti kavramı, bir kısım anayasal kuruluşlarca, devletin parçalanması pahasına da olsa yalnız kişilerin müdafaası olarak yorumlanmış, devletin ve milletin savunulması ise sahipsiz kalmıştır.

Anayasanın kuvvetler ayrılığı ilkesinin birlikte getirdiği sorumluluk, uygulamada kuvvetler çatışmasına dönüştürülmüştür.

Düşüncelerimiz, dinimiz üzerinde ve akla gelebilen her konuda dış ve iç kaynaklı bölücü ve yıkıcı faaliyetler bütün şiddetiyle sürdürülürken ne hazindir ki; bir kısım gerçeğe uymayan özerklik, dar görüşlü, sahibinden başkasının inanmadığı bilimsellik ve koşulları dikkate almayan salt hukuk savunucuları, yıkılacak devletin enkazı altında kalacaklarının, yok olup gideceklerinin idraki içinde olmadıkları görünümünü vermişlerdir. Bu acı hakikatleri görüp çare arayanların veya Türk Ulusunu uyaran ve milleti bütünleşmeye davet edenlerin ise seslerini duymak mümkün olamamıştır. (Bir kısım kıymetli Türk basınının bu konuda zaman zaman yaptıkları uyarıları burada şükranla belirtmek isterim.)

Siyasi partiler, bu kritik dönemde milletin özlemle beklediği önlemleri almak yerine; iç gerilimi devamlı olarak arttırarak, yıkıcı ve bölücü mihrakları büsbütün kışkırtarak, onlara cüret ve cesaret verecek beyan ve eylemleri ile adeta yarışarcasına seçim yatırımları için zemin yaratma yollarını tercih etmişlerdir.

İktidara gelen siyasi partiler, devlet teşkilatının bütün kademelerini kendi görüşleri doğrultusundaki kişilerle doldurarak, kamu görevlilerinin ve vatandaşlarımızın bir tarafa girerek kamplara bölünmesini zorunlu hale getirmişler, giderek anarşi ve bölücülüğü destekleyen kaynakların şekillenmesine ve kamu kuruluşlarında çalışanlarla, polis ve öğretmenlerin dahi birbirine düşman kamplara ayrılmalarına neden olan partizan tutum ve davranışlardan vazgeçmemişlerdir. Böylece tarafsız halkımız, devletten beklediklerini parti kapılarında aramaya mecbur bırakılarak devlet otoritesi yok olmaya, vatandaşların hak ve hukukunu korumak ve ona tarafsız hizmet götürmek yerine, devletin saygınlığı yavaş yavaş erimeğe mahkum olmuş ve dolayısıyla ülkemizde tam otorite boşluğu teşekkül etmiştir.

Bir kısım bedbahtlar Türk Milletinin bağımsızlığını, birlik ve beraberliğini temsil eden İstiklal Marşımıza, koyu taassup veya sapık ideolojik amaçlarla protesto maksadıyla oturarak veya İstiklal Marşı yerine Enternasyoneli söyleyerek açıkça saygısızlık gösterebilmişler ve buna doğrudan sorumlu kişiler tevil yoluna sapmak suretiyle savunmalarını yapabilişlerdir.

Uzun zamandan beri bu fevkalade üzücü olayları yakından takip eden Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri hatırlayacağımız gibi; milletin kendisine verdiği yetkileri kullanamayan ve bu korkunç gidişi acz içinde seyreden anayasal kuruluşların tümünü Cumhurbaşkanımız aracılığıyla uyararak, alınması gereken tedbirlere de yer vermek suretiyle büyük Türk Milletine karşı yüklendiği sorumluluğu dile getirmiştir. Aradan geçen 8 aylık süre içerisinde yaptığımız sayısız uyarmalara rağmen hemen hemen bu tedbirlerin hiç birine yasama ve yürütme organları ile diğer anayasal kuruluşlardan yeterli bir cevap alınamamış ve bu konuda müspet faaliyetleri de izlenememiştir. Bu uyarı mektubundan sonra bir kısım yasaları etkisiz hale getirerek çıkaran Meclislerimiz 22 Mart 1980 tarihinden beri siyasi çıkar hesapları ile çıkmaza sürüklenen Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçiminden dolayı içinde bulunduğumuz buhran ile mücadelede en kıymetli unsur olan zamanı fütursuzca harcamışlardır. Dünyanın hiçbir ülkesinde Cumhurbaşkanlığı makamı ve seçimi bu kadar hafife alınmamış ve bu kadar zaman boşa harcanmamıştır.

Asayiş ve ekonomik bunalıma çareler getirmesi ve kanunlar yapması beklenen yasama organlarımız, memleket üzerine çöken bu kabusu karşı kayıtsız kalmışlardır. Anayasamız, Türk Vatandaşlarının dini inançlarından ötürü kınanamayacağını, açıkça belirtmiş olmasına rağmen, tek bir oyun peşinde koşan siyasi partilerimiz, yüce Atatürk'ün Cumhuriyeti Döneminde unutulmuş mezhep ayrılıklarını kışkırtmakta faydalar görerek Erzincan, Sivas, Kahramanmaraş, Tunceli ve Çorum

illerinde siyasi çıkarlar uğruna vatandaşlarımızın birbirini katletmelerine neden olmuşlardır.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti sınırları içerisinde yaşayan ve kendini Türk Vatandaşı kabul eden herkesin tek bir vücut halinde Türk Milleti'ni oluşturduğu unutulmuş ve değişik mezheplere bağlı vatandaşlarımızın tam bir kardeşlik bağı ile kaynaşmalarını engellemek isteyen kışkırtıcılar siyasi destek görmüşlerdir.

Bir kısım anayasal kuruluşlar muhtelif etkiler altında anarşi, terör ve bölücülük karşısında tarafsız, adil ve ortak bir yol izlemek yerine, bizzat Anayasanın ihlali karşısında dahi sesiz kalmayı tercih etmişlerdir.

Bütün bu şartlara rağmen; hukuk devletinin temel ilkelerini savunmakla görevli anayasal kuruluşlarımız, devletin en üst kademesindeki anarşizmin yarattığı tehlikenin büyüklüğünü idrak edemediklerinden veya terör odaklarının tehdidinden çekindiklerinden, devletin temellerine konan dinamitle her an parçalanma tehlikesi karşısında olduğunu gözlerden kaçırmaya çalışmışlardır. Devlet çökertildiği zaman Anayasanın kanatları altına sığınan tüm hukuk kurumları ile özerk, bilim ve müessese ve derneklerinin bu enkaz altında yok olacağı unutulmuştur.

Son iki yıllık süre içinde terör 5.241 can almış, 14.152 kişinin yaralanmasına veya sakat kalmasına sebep olmuştur. İstiklal Harbinde, Sakarya Savaşındaki şehit miktarı 5.713, yaralı miktarımız 18.480'dir. Bu basit mukayese dahi Türkiye'de hiçbir insanlık duygusuna değer vermeyen bir örtülü harbin uygulandığını açıkça ortaya koymaktadır.

Sevgili Vatandaşlarım,

İşte bütün bunlar ve buna benzer sayılabilecek ve hepiniz tarafından yakinen bilinen daha birçok sebeplerden dolayı Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri ülkenin ve milletin bütünlüğünü, milletin hak, hukuk ve hürriyetini korumak, can ve mal güvenliğini sağlayarak korkudan kurtarmak, refah ve mutluluğunu sağlamak, kanun ve nizam hakimiyetini, diğer bir deyimle devlet otoritesini tarafsız olarak yeniden tesis ve idame etmek gayesiyle devlet yönetimine el koymak zorunda kalmıştır. Bugünden itibaren yeni hükümet ve yasama organı kuruluncaya kadar muvakkat bir zaman için yasama ve yürütme yetkileri benim başkanlığında, Kara, Deniz, Hava Kuvveti Komutanları ile Jandarma Genel Komutanı'ndan oluşan Milli Güvenlik Konseyi tarafından kullanılacaktır.

Büyük Atatürk'ün deyişiyle "Ulusal kültürümüzü, çağdaş uygarlık düzeyinin üstüne çıkarmak yurdumuzu dünyanın en mamur ve en uygar araç ve kaynaklarına sahip kılmak" hedefine yönelik hızlı bir kalkınma döneminin en kısa zamanda gerçekleştirilmesi zaruretine inanıyoruz. Bu inancımızın gerçekleşmesi için yüce ulusumuzun, bağrından çıkardığı ve yurdumuzdaki kutuplaşmada hiçbir tarafı tutmayan, sadece Atatürk ilkeleri doğrultusunda yürüyen Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri yönetimine güveneceğinden kuşumuz yoktur. İçinde bulunduğumuz buhrandan çıkmamız için ulusça arzu edildiğine inandığımız, disiplinli ve her türlü tasarrufa ağırlık veren bir yaşam ve dayanışma ortamına girilmesini ve milletçe gücümüzün tümünü ortaya koyacak bir çalışma hızını bekliyor ve yüce Türk Milleti'ne güveniyoruz.

Vatandaşlarımızı kaderde, kıvançta ve tasada ortak bir bütün halinde milli şuur ve ülküler etrafında birleştirmenin iç barış ve huzurun sağlanmasında vazgeçilmez faktör olduğu düşüncesiyle, Atatürk Milliyetçiliğinden hız ve ilham almanın, politikada "Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh" ilkesine bağlı kalmanın, milli mücadele ruhunun, millet egemenliğine Atatürk ilke ve devrimlerine olan bağlılığın tam şuurunu yerleştirmek ve geliştirmekle ülkemize yönelik tehditlerin ulusça göğüsleneceğine inanıyoruz.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, NATO dahil tüm ittifak ve anlaşmalara bağlı kalarak, başta komşularımız olmak üzere bütün ülkelerle kar-şılıklı bağımsızlık ve saygı esasına dayalı, birbirlerinin iç işlerine karışmamak kaydıyla eşit şartlar altında ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel ilişkilerini geliştirme kararındadır.

Uluslararası sorunların barışçı yollarla çözümlenmesinden yana bir dış politika izlenmesine devam edilecektir.

Birçok tutum ve davranışlarıyla demokratik özgürlükçü parlamenter sisteme inancını defalarca kanıtlayan Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, en kısa zamanda Bakanlar Kurulu'nu kurarak, yürütme sorumluluğunu bu Kurula bırakacak ve hür demokratik parlamenter sistemin şimdi olduğu gibi dejenere edilmesine ve tıkanmasına mani olucu ve Türk toplumuna yaraşır bir Anayasa ve Seçim Kanunu ile Partiler Kanununu hazırlamayı ve bunlara paralel düzenlemeleri yapmayı müteakip insan hak ve hürriyetlerine saygılı, milli dayanışmayı ön plana alan, sosyal adaleti gerçekleştirecek, ferdin ve toplumun huzur, güven ve refahına önem veren özgürlükçü demokratik, laik ve sosyal hukuk kurallarına dayalı bir yönetime ülke idaresini devredecektir.

Sayılan bu hazırlıklar tamamlanıncaya kadar Yurdumuzda her türlü siyasi faaliyetler her kademedede durdurulmuştur. Zorunlu olarak faaliyetleri durdurulan siyasi partilerin yeniden hazırlanacak Anayasadaki düzenlemelere ve yeni Seçim ve Partiler Kanununa göre zamanı, koşulları ilan edilecek seçimlerden yeterince önce faaliyete geçmesine müsaade edilecektir.

Parlamento üyeleri, siyasi faaliyetlerden dolayı suçlanmayacak ve yeni yönetime karşı suç teşkil edecek tutum ve davranışlarda bulunmadıkları sürece haklarında herhangi bir işlem yapılmayacaktır.

Ancak, kanunların suç kabul ettiği fiilleri vaktiyle işlediği saptanan parlamenterler hakkında gerekli kovuşturma yapılacaktır. Adalet Partisi, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Milli Selamet Partisi ve Milliyetçi Hareket Partilerinin parti başkanları şimdilik can güvenliklerinin sağlanması amacı ile Silahlı Kuvvetlerin koruma ve gözetiminde belirli yerlerde ikamete tabi tutulmuşlardır. Durum müsait olunca serbest bırakılacaklardır.

Memlekette idarenin tam bir tarafsızlık içinde vatandaşın hizmetine koşması sağlanacaktır. Devlet hizmetinde bulunanların siyasi etkiler dışında çalışmaları kanun hakimiyeti altına alınacaktır. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yönetime el koyduğu şu anda devletin yanında tarafsız ve adil hizmet görececek yöneticiler, eski zamanın siyasi davranışlarına yönelmedikçe hizmet ve görevlerine devam edeceklerdir.

Kanun ve nizam hakimiyetini sağlamada tecrübeli ve yetenekli kişilerden oluşan mahkemelerin süratle ve doğru kararlar vermelerini ve bunları korkusuzca uygulayabilmelerini sağlayacak yasal ve idari tedbirler alınacaktır.

Memleketin ekonomik koşullarını kendi gücümüzle iyileştirmek için her alanda elden gelen gayret sarfedilecektir. Çalışkan ve vatanperver Türk işçisinin mevcut ekonomik koşullar çerçevesinde her türlü hakları korunacaktır.

Ancak temiz Türk işçisini sömüren, onları kendi ideolojik görüşleri istikametinde kullanmak için her türlü baskı oyunlarına başvuran, işçinin hakkı yerine kendi menfaatlerini ön planda tutan bazı ağaların bu faaliyetlerine asla müsaade edilmeyecektir.

Tüm işverenlerin iş barışının koşullarını sağlayacak esaslardan ayrılmadan üretimin arttırılması ve ihracata yönelik gayretlerin gelişmesine yardımcı olmaları için her türlü tedbir alınacaktır.

Köylünün, milletimizin efendisi olduğu inancını, kuvveden fii-len çıkarmak için tarım alanında üretimi arttıracak bir tarım seferberliği ve fiyat politikası ile gerekli

diğer önlemlerin alınmasına, bilhassa önem verilecektir. Türk köylüsünün tarlasından ayrılıp şehir-lere göç etmesini zorlayan ekonomik ve sosyal nedenlere çare aranacaktır.

Eğitim ve öğretimde Atatürk Milliyetçiliğini yeniden yurdun en ücra köşelerine kadar yaygınlaştıracak tedbirler en kısa zamanda alınacaktır.

Yarının teminatı olan evlatlarımızın Atatürk ilkeleri yerine yabancı ideolojilerle yetişerek sonunda birer anarşist olmasını önleyecek tedbirler alınacaktır. Bu maksatla hepimizin tek tek saygıyla andığımız öğretmenlerimizin Der'li, Bir'li derneklere üye olarak bölünmelerine müsaade edilmeyecektir. Her düzeyde öğrencinin amacı Atatürk ilkeleri ve milliyetçiliği ile pekişmiş ve üretime yönelik bilgi ve becerisini kazanmak olacaktır.

En kıdemsiz erinden, en üst komutanına kadar Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin tüm personeli, bu amaçlara ulaşmada devletin iç ve dış tehditlere karşı kollayıcı ve koruyucu gücü olarak siyasetin dışında kalacaktır.

Aziz Yurttaşlarım;

Bir defa daha belirtiyorum ki; Silahlı Kuvvetler aziz Türk Milletinin hakkı olan refah ve mutluluğu, vatan ve milletin bütünlüğü ve gittikçe etkisi (azalmaya) azaltılmaya çalışılan Atatürk ilkelerine yeniden güç ve işlerlik kazandırmak, kendi kendini kontrol edemeyen demokrasiyi sağlam temeller üzerine oturtmak, kaybolan Devlet otoritesini yeniden tesis etmek için yönetime el koymak zorunda kalmıştır.

Komutan, subay, astsubay ve erler olarak hepimiz vatan ve milletin refah ve mutluluğu uğruna her şeyimizi, bu arada hayatımızı dahi seve seve feda etmeye hazırız. Memlekette her zaman bulunabilen ve özellikle son zamanlarda çoğalan kötü niyetli birçok kişi ve kuruluşlar sizlere yalanlar düzerek, bunun aksini söyleyebilecekler ve menfi propagandalara başvurabileceklerdir. Bunlara asla inanmayınız. Bütün uygulamalar milletin gözü önünde yapılacaktır.

Kıymetli Vatandaşlarım;

Her zaman milletiyle bir bütün ve Türk milletinin emrinde olan Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerine ve yeni yönetime karşı yapılacak her türlü direniş, gösteri ve tutum anında en sert şekilde kırılarak cezalandırılacaktır.

Yurtta kan dökülmemesi için bütün vatandaşlarımızın tahriklere kapılmaksızın sükunet içinde yayınlanacak bildirimler doğrultusunda hareket etmelerini ve ikinci bir bildiriye kadar sokağa çıkmamalarını rica ederim.

Vatandaşlarımızın birbirlerinin hak ve hukukuna saygılı olmalarını, sevgi içinde kırılganlıklarını unutmalarını, hepimizin bu mübarek topraklar üzerinde aynı haklara sahip bir Türk vatandaşı olduğumuzun idraki içerisinde olarak yeni yönetime yardımcı olmalarını vatanperverlik ve asil karakterlerinden bekler, mutlu ve aydınlık yarınlar dilerim.”

Source: “Kenan Evren'in Radyo ve Televizyon Konuşması,” *VikiKaynak*, 20 April 2009,<http://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/Kenan_Evren'in_radyo_ve_televizyon_konusmasi> (10 April 2011).

APPENDIX XX

Proclamation of Sivas (30 June 1993)

“MÜSLÜMAN KAMUOYUNA,

Bismillâhirrahmânirrahim

‘Peygamber, mü’minlere kendi canlarından ileridir. Onun hanımları da mü’minlerin analarıdır.’ (Ahzâb:6)

Mü’minlere öz canlarından daha ileri olan Allah Resûlü (S.A.V.)’ne ve O’nun temiz zevcelerine, Allah’ın beytine (Kâbe’ye) ve kitab’ı Kur’an’a alçakça küfredilmekte ve mü’minlerin izzet ve namuslarına saldırılmaktadır.

Dünyanın bazı bölgelerinde şeytan ve onun yandaşları olan emperyalist kâfirler, dinimize ve mukaddes değerlerimize dil uzatmaktadırlar. Bunun başını ise satılmış, mürted Salman Rüşdi köpeği çekmektedir.

Bu şeytanî oyunlara karşı, izzetli ve duyarlı Müslümanlar yiğitçe mücadele ortaya koyarak, bu uğurda canlarını feda etmekten çekinmemişlerdir.

Bu iğrenç oyunların bir uzantısı olarak ülkemizde de; AYDINLIK gazetesi denilen bir paçavrada, mel’un Rüşdi’nin figüranlığına soyunan, dünya emperyalizminin gönüllü uşağı Aziz Nesin, aynı şekilde, Kur’an’ın korunmuşluğuna dil uzatmış, Hazret-i Peygamber (S.A.V.)’in aile hayatını (hâşâ) bir genelev ortamına benzetmiş ve ümmetin anaları olan hanımlarına (hâşâ) fahişe deme cür’etinde bulunmuştur. Bu olay, dünyanın değişik yerlerinde kâfir devletler tarafından dahi kabul görmezken, basımına müsaade edilmezken, ne yazık ki laik ve ikiyüzlü T.C. Devleti tarafından yayımlanmasına izin verilmiş, ayrıca bunu kabullenmeyip protesto eden izzetli Müslümanlar, devletin polis ve jandarması tarafından coplanmış, kurşunlanmış, bir kısmı da hapishanelere atılmıştır.

Salman Rüşdi köpeği Müslümanlar’ın çok az olduğu kâfir bir ülkede korkudan sokağa çıkmaya bile cesaret edemezken, onun yerli uşağı Aziz Nesin köpeği, yanında kendisiyle beraber bir ekiple birlikte, şehrimiz Valisi tarafından davet edilip, şehirde adeta Müslümanlar’la alay edercesine gezebilmektedir

Kâfirler şunu iyi bilmeli ki:

İslâmın Peygamberi’ni ve kitab’ın izzetini korumak için, bu uğurda verilecek canlarımız vardır.

Gün, Müslümanlığımızın gereğini yerine getirme günüdür.

Gün, Allah (C.C.)’ın vahyi Kur’an-ı Kerim’e, Allah’ın meleklerine, Allah’ın Resûlü Hz. Muhammed (S.A.V.)’e, O’nun ailesine ve ashabına yöneltilen çirkin küfürlerin hesabının sorulması günüdür.

‘İman edenler, Allah yolunda savaşırlar. Kâfirler de tağut yolunda savaşırlar. O halde şeytanın dostlarıyla savaşın. Çünkü şeytanın hilesi zayıftır.’ (Nisa:76)

Galip gelecek olanlar, şüphesiz ki Allah taraftarı olanlardır.

Source: Attila Aşut, *Sivas Kitabı: Bir Toplu Öldürümün Öyküsü*. (Ankara: Edebiyatçılar Derneği, 1994), 319.

APPENDIX XXI

Proclamation of Sivas (1 July 1993)

“ Halkımıza Çağrı;

Müslüman halkın yaşadığı bu ülkede, İslam için binlerce şehit verilmiş bu topraklarda, bir kesim tarafından, ‘basın özgürlüğü, düşünce hürriyeti’ adı altında, Müslümanlar’ın kutsal değerlerine sözlü veya yazılı olarak kimse saldıramaz.

Biz Müslümanlar, canımız pahasına da olsa, bu değerlerimizi korumakta kararlıyız.

Müslüman halkımızdan bu konularda duyarlı olup, İslam’ın değer yargılarını alaya alanlara izin vermemelerini, ne pahasına olursa olsun bunu engellemeyi dini bir görev olarak bilmelerini, bu alçaklar karşısında susulduğunda, yarın mahşerde Allah’a nasıl hesap vereceğimizi düşünmelerini istiyoruz.

‘Müminlerin, Peygamberi kendi nefislerinden çok sevmeyi gerekir. O’nun eşleri, onların anneleridir...’ (Ahzâb Suresi, Ayet: 6)

‘Ve kâfirlerin hesapları varsa, Allah’ın da bir hesabı vardır. Allah hesabı çabuk görür.’ (Enfal Suresi, Ayet : 30)

‘Kâfirler istemese de, Allah nurunu tamamlayacaktır.’ (Saff Suresi , Ayet:8)

Not: Bu yazıyı okuyan, Allah rızası için çoğaltarak dağıtsın.”

Source: Attila Aşut, *Sivas Kitabı: Bir Toplu Öldürümün Öyküsü* (Ankara: Edebiyatçılar Derneği, 1994), 323.

APPENDIX XXII

Akit Daily Newspaper (27 July 2012, p.1)

YENİ **akıt** 10 TL 100 TL 100 TL

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İmam Hatip ortadokular için verilen belge kaldırıldı değil mi, belki de bu nedenle geçici zamanın müderrisleri eğitimde başarılı olamazlar. 1000 öğrenci için müderrislerin belki de bu kadarını bulamazlar. Kayıtların 17 Ağustos'ta başlaması...

FUE YÖNTEMİYLE SAÇ EKİMİ

Eniye'nin ve diğer saç ekim uzmanlarının tecrübesiyle saç ekimi yapılıyor.

0212 440 32 32

Avicenna

19 YILLIK YALAN

Sivas Emniyet Müdürlüğü'nde kaybolan fotoğrafları ele geçirdik... 19 yıldır saklanan bu fotoğraflar, "Şeriatçılar yakıldı" denilen 37 kişiden kaçırılan yarımadayı ortaya koyuyor. Dahası cesetlerden bazıların enselerinden ve göğüslerinden vurularak öldürüldüğü çayır ağı görüldü.

Hani yakılmışlardı?.. Bunlar kurşunlanarak öldürülenler!



2 Temmuz gecesi Nispetiye Hastanesi Morgu'na getirilen genç kızın cesetindeki kurşun yarası açığa çıkarılıyor...

3 Temmuz 1992'de Sivas'ta 37 kişi öldü. Ölümüne, ölümüne mesum insanlar hiçbir soruşturma yapılmadan katledildi. Cesetlerinde çukurluklar ve yaralar vardı. Bu fotoğrafların ortaya çıkmasıyla bu cinayetlerin 19 yıldır saklanması sona erdi. Fotoğraflar Nispetiye Hastanesi Morgu'na getirildiği an açığa çıkarıldı.

Fotoğraflar: "Yasadık Öldükler" şeklinde hastaneden çıktı. Fotoğrafların Nispetiye Hastanesi Morgu'na getirilmesiyle ilgili olarak Sivas Emniyet Müdürlüğü'nde soruşturma başlatıldı. "Bunlar kurşunlanarak öldürülenler" denildi.

MURAT ALAN

18TC

APPENDIX XXIII

Sivas Massacre on press



Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper (3 July 1993)



Hürriyet Daily Newspaper (3 July 1993)

KANLI CUMA



Uzun ramaz sonrası cami önünde başlayan protesto gösteriler gitgide büyüdü.

35 ÖLÜ

Sivas'taki gösteri katliama dönüştü

Sivas'a Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür ve Sanat etkinlikleri için gelen Aziz Nesin ve arkadaşlarına karşı Aczdemirler'in başlattığı protesto gösterisi çığırından çıktı. 35 kişi öldü 60 yaralı var

SABAH 10 EKİM 1993 **10 NÜMARA**

3 TEMMUZ 1993 CUMARTESİ TELERAMA-TV GUIDE 6000 LIRA

Demirel'e gizli sağlık kontrolü

Turgut Özal'ın da doktora olan ünlü Amerikalı C. İzzetkhan'ın kontrolü Prof. Özal'a Demirel'i 15 Ocak'ta İstanbul'da yaptı. İzzetkhan'ın Demirel'e yaptığı kontrolün gizli olduğu ve Demirel'in kontrolü için İstanbul'da olduğu öğrenildi. Demirel'in kontrolü için İstanbul'da olduğu öğrenildi. Demirel'in kontrolü için İstanbul'da olduğu öğrenildi.

Sivas'ta olaylar üzerine iki gün süreyle sokağa çıkma yasağı ilan edildi

Sivas'ta olaylar üzerine iki gün süreyle sokağa çıkma yasağı ilan edildi. Sivas'ta olaylar üzerine iki gün süreyle sokağa çıkma yasağı ilan edildi.

Muhalefet avans vermeyecek

Muhalefet avans vermeyecek. Muhalefet avans vermeyecek.

23 PKK'lı öldürüldü

23 PKK'lı öldürüldü. 23 PKK'lı öldürüldü.

Tansu Çiller'in ilk sınavı!

Tansu Çiller'in ilk sınavı! Tansu Çiller'in ilk sınavı!

Alevi-Sünni çatışması yok

Alevi-Sünni çatışması yok. Alevi-Sünni çatışması yok.

APPENDIX XXIV

Sample Turkish ID Card (male)

TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ NÜFUS CÜZDANI		
 SERİ No	Erkek	
	T.C. KİMLİK NO.	
SOYADI		
ADI		
BABA ADI		
ANA ADI		
DÜĞÜM YERİ		(YERİNE TAHSİS)
MEDENİ HALİ	DİNİ	KAN GRUBU
İL	İLÇE	
MAHALLE - KÖY		
İLT. NO.	AİLE SIRA NO.	SIRA NO.
VERİLDİĞİ YER		VERİLİŞ NEDENİ
KAYIT NO.		VERİLİŞ TARİHİ
ÖNCEKİ SOYADI		

APPENDIX XXV

Personal interviews:

Questions:

Sayın ile görüşme.

Tarih:

– Anadolu Aleviliği'nin, Orta Asya'dan göç sırasında Zerdüştlük ve Şamanizm gibi İrani dinlerin, Şii İslam ile sentezin bir sonucu olduğu söylenmektedir. Nasıl bir sentezdir bu?

Aleviliği ne şekilde tanımlarsınız, bu açıklama doğru mudur?

– Bu bağlamda Alevilik bir din midir, bir inanç mı?

– 1 Ekim 2010 tarihinde gazetelerde okuduk. Aleviler demokratik yollarla haklarını aramak, seslerini duyurmak adına İzmir Konak Meydanı'nda bir oturma eylemi gerçekleştirdiler ve 24 saat süren bu eylemin sonunda Alevi Bektaşî Federasyonu Eski Genel Başkanı Sayın Ali Balkız, Alevilerin taleplerini dile getirdiği konuşmasında,

“...Ancak bizim gibi her etnik grubun “Artık Yeter!” diyeceği bir nokta vardır. O noktada biz de alacağız Pir Sultan'ın sazını davamızı göreceğiz...” demiştir. Alevilik bir inanış olmanın ötesinde aynı zamanda etnik bir bağ da sağlamakta mıdır? Alevi halkın kendi arasındaki bu kuvvetli bağ ne şekilde tanımlanabilir?

– Aleviliğin aynı zamanda bir felsefe, bir yaşam tarzı olduğu da söylenebilir mi?

– 14 Aralık 2010 tarihinde Avusturya Anayasa Mahkemesi, Aleviler lehinde bir karar açıkladı. Aleviliğin İslam dini içerisinde bir inanç olduğunu yasallaştıran bu karar Avrupa'da yaşayan Alevi kesim tarafından oldukça olumlu bir gelişme olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Sizin bu konudaki düşünceniz nedir?

– Aleviliğin, Allah-Muhammed-Ali üçlemesine dayalı bir din/inanç olduğu söylenmekte. Ancak “bazı kaynaklarda” Aleviliğin başlı başına bir felsefe olduğu, İslam ile kuvvetli bağlarının bulunmadığı görüşüne de rastlanmaktadır. Türkiye'de yaşayan Alevi halkın bu konudaki düşüncesi nedir?

– Haritada Aleviler 4 gruba ayrılmıştır. Arap Alevilerinin (Nusayrilerin) farklı bir kökenden geldiklerini, en basitinden Türkmen olmadıklarını biliyoruz. Peki, Anadolu Alevilerini, Büyükşehir Alevilerini ve Tahtacıları birbirinden ayıran özellikler nelerdir?

– Bu grupların dışında, Zazalar, Bektaşî Aleviler de var. İbadetler ve inanış biçimleri arasında farklılıklar var midir?

– Alevilerin ibadetlerinden bahsedecek olursak; 4 Kapı 40 Makam, cem, musahiplik, Muharrem ve Hızır Oruçları gibi kavramları açıklayabilir misiniz? (ayrıca kitaplar dışında, Aleviliğin 4 kaynağı daha kullandığı söylenmekte: Hadisler, Buyruklar ve Öğretiler, Neclül Belaga ve Vilayetnameler ile Menakibnameler.)

– John Shindeldecker, “Turkish Alevi Today” isimli makalesinde bazı Alevi gruplarının İsa’nın dünyaya yeniden geleceği öğretisinden haberdar olduklarını ve inandıklarını, ayrıca İsa’nın 12. İmam Mehdi ile aynı kişi olacağına inandıklarını yazmıştır. Yaygın bir inanış mıdır? Zira konu ile ilgili olarak birbirinden çok farklı bilgiler mevcut, açıklama yapabilir misiniz?

– Son dönemlerde Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye’de inanç özgürlüğü ile ilgili olarak atılan adımları çok yakından takip ediyor. (örneğin, Avusturya Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin kararı büyük yankı uyandırmıştır.) Konu ile ilgili olarak 2009 ve 2010 yılları İlerleme Raporlarında kapsamlı açıklamalara yer verilmiştir. Bu konuda genel kanı, olumlu adımların atıldığı ancak yeterli olmadığı yönündedir. Son olarak AKP hükümeti tarafından yayınlanan Alevi Çalıştay Raporu’nu da göz önünde bulundurursak, sizce bir ilerleme kaydedilmiş midir? Ortada somut bir adım olduğu söylenebilir mi, şu anki durumu değerlendirebilir misiniz?

– Cem evlerinin kapalı olması ve Aleviliğin inanç önderleri olan “dede”lerin tanınmaması ile ilgili olarak haklı talepler söz konusudur. Ancak bunun önünde hukuki bir engel olarak 30 Kasım 1925 tarihinde kabul edilmiş olan “Tekke, Zaviye ve Türbelerin Kapatılması Kanunu”nun bulunduğu belirtilmektedir. Sizce nasıl bir çözüm yolu geliştirebilir?

– Alevi halkın toplum içerisinde maruz kaldığı olumsuz durumlar mevcut mudur? Var ise nelerdir, birkaç örnek verebilir misiniz?

– Alevi halkın hükümetten daha doğrusu devletten beklentileri nelerdir?

– Türkiye nüfusunun yüksek oranda Sünni inanışa sahip olduğu bilinmekte ve bu Suni kesimde Alevilik ile ilgili olarak eksik bilgiler, yanlış anlamalar söz konusu, yeterli bilgiye sahip olunduğunu düşünmüyorum. Sizce Alevi halkın taleplerinin yerine getirilmesi, Sünni kesimde var olduğunu söyleyebileceğimiz önyargının kırılması için yeterli olacak mıdır? Olmayacak ise neler yapılmalıdır?

Teşekkürler...

Didem Dođanyılmaz: Evet en son Alevileri tanıyorduk. Kamil insan demiştik zaten.

Erhan Geçmez: Ya Alevilik o anlamıyla var olan inançlardan kendisini farklı yani ya da kişiler bir sana bakışını bir doğaya bakışını daha farklı bir yere koyuyor ama eninde sonunda kendisini İslam'ın mensubu olarak görüyor.

DD: İslam'ın bir kolu olarak görüyor, bu önemli evet.

EG: Evet ve muhalif bir kolu olarak görüyor ve var olan İslami uygulamaların çoğunun sonradan deđiştğine inanıyor ve onun için dört kitabı da hak biliyor. Aynı zamanda Pagan inanışlardan çok etkilenen çok da içerisinde yaşatan bir inançtır bana göre. Özellikle tapınma şekillerine baktığımızda çok ciddi bir Pagan kültürünü görebiliriz. Yaşamı sonsuzluk olarak görüyor. Yani baya Pagan dinlerden etkilenmişlerdir ve bunu tapınma şekillerinde; insana, hayata ve doğaya bakış açılarında görebilirsiniz. Hayatın sonsuzluđuna inanıyor, ölüme inanmayan bir inanış. Bir devir daime inanan... İnsanın mutlak tekrar doğada canlı olacağına inanan bir inanış. Bazen bir hayvanda, bazen bir insanda bazen, bir ağaçta... Böyle kutsallıklara inanan ve her şeyden önce Tanrı'yı sorgulayabilen bir inanış.

DD: Daha özgür olduğunu söyleyebiliriz bu bağlamda deđil mi?

EG: Tabi ki. Tanrı ile kendi arasında asla sınır koymuyor. Tanrı'da görmüş olduğu yanlışlıkları Tanrı'nın yüzüne söyleyebilecek kadar cesareti vardır. 'Kıldan ince, kılıçtan keskin köprü yapmışsın; erkeksen sen geç' diyebiliyor. Benim, bir Alevi olarak, Alevilik'in en çok hoşuma giden yanı; insanların dillerine, dinlerine ve ırklarına karşı kesin bir söylemi olmasıdır. Yani hiçbir insanı ayıplamayınız ve ayıp yapmayınız demesi ve o anlamda insanlar arasındaki o çeşitliliđi çok iyi koruması, dışlamaması ve onu saygın bir yerde koruması asıl insana saygının, doğaya saygının çok iyi fark edilmesi ve o kadar çok ötekileştirilmesine rağmen, Alevilik aslında kimseyi ötekileştirmeden kendisine hayat bulmaya çalışmıştır.

DD: Pagan inanışlar dedik ve bunlar Zerdüşlük ve Şamanizm olarak adlandırılıyor. Direk olarak bu iki dinle, İrani dinler olarak geçiyor zaten, etkileşimi vardır, bunun zaten İslam ile daha doğrusu Şii İslam ile bir sentezidir şeklinde kaynaklar yer alıyor. En azından yabancı basında bu şekilde tanımlanıyor Alevilik. Böyle midir peki Pagan din dedik ama Zerdüşlük ve Şamanizm midir?

EG: Yani aslında Alevilik'in Şii bir İslam olarak görülmesi çok yanlış bir şeydir.

DD: Yanlış tabi ki.

EG: Alevilik'in Şiilik ile ortak tek yönü vardır, Ehl'i Beyt sevgisidir, başka hiçbir şey deđil. Şiilik sonuçta var olan İslami anlayıştan çok farklı bir anlayış deđil. Onlar da namaz ve niyaz kılan, oruç tutan bir din; fakat Alevilik, Ramazan'a inanan bir inanış deđil. Namaza da inanan bir inanış deđil. İbadetin şekline şemailine karşı çıkar o anlamda. Evet, Zerdüşlükten ve diđer inanışlardan haliyle çok etkilenmiştir ama sonuçta Alevilik'i Hindistan'daki o tek tanrılı dinlerden, çok tanrılı dinlere kendi içerisindeki çoğunluğun içerisinde de görebilirsiniz. Örneğin; suyun içerisinde bađdaş kurup oturabilmeleri, Alevi dedelerin ateşin içinde oturmaları gibi yani. O anlamda çok etkilenmişler. Çok etkilemiştir Alevilik'i. Zerdüşlükten, Türklerin ilk inanışından çok etkilenmiştir, ama Alevilik bir etnik yapı deđildir. Mesela yaygın ve yanlış olan şey; Alevilerin Türk olduklarıyla ilgilidir. Bu çok yanlış bir şey. Alevilik

etnik yapıyı reddediyor. Yani onu zenginlik ve çeşitlilik olarak kabul ediyor ama kendisini bir etnik yapıya bağlamayı reddediyor. İnsanı kutsuyor ve insanın doğduğu yerin, dili, dini ve ırkının değerli olduğunu söylüyor ve bu Alevilik'in belirleyici olmadığına da kesin bir hüküm koyuyor. Türkiye'de Kürt Aleviler var yaygın bir şekilde, Arap Aleviler var, ondan sonra Türk Aleviler var, Bulgaristan'da Bektaşiler var, Bulgarlar var, Amerika'da var. Yani bir sürü yerde Alevilik var, Arnavutluk Alevileri var. Alevilik onun için çok çeşitli olmuştur. Bence önümüzdeki yüzyılda Alevilik Dünya'da çok yaygın bir inanış olacaktır. Benim gördüğüm kadarıyla, çünkü insanı rahatlatan bir inanış. Bu tabii ki benim kişisel görüşüm ve sonuçta tek tanrılı dinlerin çoğu şu anda insanı çok ciddi bir şekilde sıkıştıran, baskı altına alan bir noktada ve insanoğlunu bu kadar çok baskı altına alan inanışların eninde sonunda patlayacağına inanıyorum ben.

DD: Çünkü daha özgür bir yapıya sahip olan Alevilik'te bir sorgulama ve eşitlik söz konusu. Örneğin; cemlerin, cem ayinlerinin, hem kadınlar hem de erkekler tarafından birlikte yapılıyor olması İslam açısından, belirli ilişkileri olan bir yapı olduğunu düşünürsek çok özgür bir inanış olduğunu gösteriyor bize.

EG: Tabii Alevilikte öyle sonsuz özgürlük diye bir şey yok. Kendi içerisinde kontrol mekanizması olan bir inanış, ama kontrol mekanizması farklı inanış. Var olan dinlerden farklı bir inanış. İnsanın cinsiyetinden ve renginden ötürü ayırmaz tam tersine insanın değerlerine yani ne varsa yoksa bu hayatta var olduğuna inanır. Cennetin ve cehennemin de aslında insanın içinde var olduğunu ve insanın isterse cehennemi de isterse cenneti de yaşayabileceğini savunur. Karşısındakine de aynı şeyi yaşatabileceğine inanır. Bu bağlamda insanın kendisini sürekli donatması lazım, yani Tanrı'nın bir parçasının insanda var olduğuna inanıyor Alevilik. Kendi farkına varduktan sonra cehennem denen bir şey kalmayacaktır onun için. Yoksa bana itaat edin, benim sözlerimi dinleyin size cenneti vaat edeceğim denen bir inanış değil Alevilik. Nasıl ki Haçlı Seferleri'nde doğuya gidin size cennetten arsa satacağım diyen Papazlar varsa, şu anda da İslam'ın içerisinde Allah için gidin bir tane Alevi'yi ya da bir Hristiyan'ı öldürün, size cenneti vaat ederim diyen Sünni İslam anlayışından çok farklı bir anlayış.

DD: Peki az önce de bahsettik Kürt Aleviler dedik, Arap Aleviler dedik, Zazalar, Nusayriler olarak geçiyor. Bunların arasında ibadet anlamında veya inanış farklılıkları gibi çeşitlilikler söz konusu mudur yoksa yalnızca köklerinden dolayı mı farklı olduklarını söyleyebiliriz?

EG: Alevilikte bir söz vardır: Yol bir, süre binbir. Hepsi Alevidir o anlamda hepsi yoldadır, yolun içerisinde; ama hepsinin sürekliliği farklıdır ve Alevilik de zaten bunun için çok çeşitlidir ve bunun için çok zengindir. O anlamıyla Alevilerin bir olmalarının yani hani niye Aleviler bir değildir diye soranların Alevilik'i bilmediğindedir yani Alevilerin içerisindeki o çeşitliliği öldürmektir. Alevilik'i bir nehir olarak düşünün ve o nehri besleyen dereleri kurduğunuz anda Alevilik biter. Ben Kürt Alevilerin kendi içerisindeki yaptıkları inanışların Aleviliğin bir kolu olarak ve içerisindeki bir zenginlik, çeşitlilik olarak görüyorum ve böyledir bu. Farklılıklar vardır, kesinlikle vardır ama sonuçta şu noktaya hepsi gelebiliyor: En-el Hak diye bir görev. Önemli bir şey yani hepsi zaten Pir Sultan'ı, Hallaç'ı, Hacı Bektaş'ı, Yunus'u, hepsi bu bağlamda Alevi uygarlığı, cemlerinde gülbenklerini okuyorlar ama kimi Kürtçe okuyor, kimi Arapça okuyor, kimi Türkçe okuyor, kimi Farsça okuyor. Örneğin; İran'da, Irak'ta çok ciddi bir Alevi topluluğu var. Oradakiler farklı; bir kısmı Kürt, bir kısmı Türklerdir.

DD: Zaten ilk etapta, bu çerçevede yani en azından bizim projemizin içerisindeki Aleviler, Türkmen Aleviler olarak bizim bölüm koordinatörümüz iletilmiştir ancak

daha sonra 'hayır Türkmen-Aleviler diyemeyiz çünkü Alevilerin içerisinde Kürtler vardır, Araplar vardır' diyerek bir çeşitlilik getirdik 'Anadolu Alevileri' dedik.

EG: Ben 'Anadolu Alevileri' adlandırmasına karşıyım. Çok sınırlandırılmış. Yani Alevilik öyle sınırlandırılmış bir şey değil. Anadolu Alevisi dediğinizde o zaman Anadolu dışındaki Aleviler de var. Anadolu ama hangi Anadolu? Osmanlı dönemindeki Anadolu mu, Türkiye dönemindeki Anadolu mu yoksa, Selçuklu dönemindeki Anadolu mu? Osmanlı dönemini ele alırsak çok farklı bir yerdeyiz o zaman. Alevilik benim için daha önemli yani üst başlıktır. Onu görüyorum. Bunun adı dönem dönem değişmiştir. Kimi zaman Rafizi olmuştur, kimi zaman Kızılbaş olmuştur. Ama bu sonuçta bugün kendisini Alevilik olarak akseder belki yüzyıl sonra başka bir isimle kendisini var edecektir ama asıl olan o değerlerin bütünüdür. Mesela Irak'a gidin, Kakailer vardır, Kürt Alevilerdir ve çok ciddi Alevilik yaşarlar. İran'a gidin Ali Allahçılar vardır. Ali'nin Allah olduğuna inananlar vardır ve bunların bir kısmı Türklerdir. Ama bir sorunları yok. Onlar da Hacı Bektaşî'den, Pir Sultan'dan ve kendi bölgelerindeki pirlere etkileniyorlar, onlar da cinsiyete karşılar, onlar da insanın rengine ve dinine karşılar. Yani karşılar derken onu ayıranları ayıplıyorlar. Bu anlamıyla Alevilik olarak baktığımızda daha önemli. Örneğin: Hacı Bektaş Orta Asya'dan, Horasan'dan Türkiye'ye geldiğinde kendisini karşılayan Kürt Alevilerdir. Hacı Bektaşî'den önce bu topraklarda ciddi bir Alevi topluluğu yaşıyordu. Onlar karşılıyordu ve bunların çoğu da Kürt'tür. Örneğin Dede Kardı vardır, çok önemli bir şahsiyet, bu toprakların en eskileridir.

DD: Ben de bu kavramları soruyorum çünkü aynı zamanda biz bu çalışmanın bir de konferansını yapacağız ve orda ben yanlış terimler kullanmak istemiyorum. Sonuç olarak çok farklı. Örneğin; Anadolu Alevileri dediğimiz zaman aslında herkesi kapsayabileceğini düşünüyorduk, ancak değilmiş. İnançlar veya ibadetler konusunda örneğin, dört kapı kırk makam var, müsaiplik kavramı var, Muharrem orucu ve Hızır oruçları var. Kısaca bahsedebilir misiniz tam olarak ne şekilde ibadet türleridir? Çünkü genel olarak bizim tek bildiğimiz cem ayinleridir. Aleviler dediğimiz zaman cem evleri ve cem ayinleri şeklinde yer etmiştir bizim aklımızda, genel olarak baktığımızda. Akademisyenler olarak örneğin yurtdışında; Aleviler dendiği zaman, cem ayini akla gelir. Tabi ki bu kadar değil. Bu konuda daha bir çeşitlilik söz konusu yine.

EG: Lafımın başında söyledim bir hayat biçimidir, yaşam biçimidir diye. Aslında onu bilerek söyledim. Bir Alevi gerçekten, Alevi olarak yaşamak isterse hayatının her anında sorumludur ve onu uygulamakla mükelleftir. Örneğin: Alevilerin sabahleyin kalktığında Güneş'e tapmaları gerekiyor normal olarak. Alevilerin Kabe'si Güneş'tir. Mezarlarına bakın mezarlarının taşları Güneş'in doğduğu yere dönüktür ve bu bir sırdır Alevilikte. Çok önce konuşmazlardı bunu, çünkü bir baskı içerisindeydiler. Osmanlı'nın baskıları vardı. Örneğin: Aleviler durağan suda yüzlerini yıkamazlardı, akan suda yıkarlardı, çünkü akan suyun kirlilik barındırmadığına inanıyorlardı. Ve yine Aleviler, sabahleyin kendisi için istediklerini kendi komşuları ve insanlık için de isterlerdi. Ama bu şimdi şehirde var mı? Belki yok ama bu şehirde yoktur diye Alevilikte de yoktur diyemeyiz. Bunu yaşayanlar var hala. Dört kapı kırk makam, Alevilerin hayatla ilgili duruşlarını sergiliyor aslında. Birinci kapı şeriattır, insan safına varılan sınıftır. Diğer canlılarla tek farkımız düşünebilen, konuşabilen olmamızdır. Kendinizi geliştirmesiniz orada gider gelirsiniz sürekli. Aleviler insanken farkına varmazsa bu hayatın ızdırap olduğuna inanıyorlar. Bunun için onlara göre her kapı önemlidir. Birinci kapıdan ikinci kapıya geçtiğinizde, birinci kapının ne kadar girilen bir kapı olduğunu anlar. Çünkü çok geri bir kapıdır aslında. Bahsedilen şeriat da, Sünni inanişta bahsedilen şeriat değildir aslında. Asla

öyle bir şey değildir. İşte oradan ikinci kapıya geldiğinizde burada biraz daha kendi farkınıza varabiliyorsunuz. Kendi farkınızın dışında hala seninki sana benimki bana mantığı devam ediyor, hala benciller o konuda. Ama üçüncü kapıya geldiğinizde, seninki benimki değil hepimizin diye bir kavram var. Dördüncü kapıya geldiğinizde, hepimizin değil bütün varlığın aslında bir olduğuna karar veriyorsunuz ki aslında dördüncü kapıya varabilmek de çok zor bir şeydir. Zaten gelenler de uludurlar, onlar gelirler ve insanlığa sürekli yol gösterirler. Onun için kapıları bu şekilde açıklarsak daha iyi olur. Yani birinci kapı sen sensin, ben benim çok bencil, ikinci kapı biraz daha seninki sana benimki bana senin benim ilişkisi olan bir kapı. Üçüncü kapı 'hayır seninki benimki yok sen ve ben yok biz diye bir kavram var'. Dördüncü kapı bizi de reddediyor bütün alem var diyor. Doğayı da katıyor içerisine. Aleviler kendi içlerinde çocuklarına geleneklerini yaşatıyorlar, öğretiyorlar ama ne kadar yaşıyorlar dört kapı anlamında tabi bilmiyorum. Muharrem orucu, tabi Aleviler için önemli bir oruç. Sadece Hz. Hüseyin'le ilgili bir oruç değil. Çok eskiden gelen bir gelenektir Alevilik ve zaten Muharrem orucu Alevilikle ilgili ya da sadece Alevilerin inandığı bir oruç değildir. Tek tanrılı inançlarda da, çok tanrılı inançlarda da Muharrem orucuna inananlar var. Bunu Nuh'un Gemisi'nden tutun, insanların kurtuluşuna kadar var olan şeyleri kapsıyor. Alevilerin burada Muharrem orucuyla ilgili önemli gördükleri şey Hz. Hüseyin ile ilgilidir. Aslında on Muharrem olarak anıyorlar. On gün olarak. Son iki gün de, Hz. Hüseyin'in sülalesinden birilerinin kurtuluşunun, kurtuldukları için ve o soyun devam ettiği için ona şükran orucu olarak tutuyorlar son iki günü ve Hz. Hüseyin'e acımdan ziyade, Hz. Hüseyin'in o duruşuna olan saygılarından ötürü Muharrem orucunda O'nu yaşamak, O'nun gibi davranabilmek için yani daha doğrusu arınmak için. Bu arınmak derken, gıdayla ilgili bir şey değildir. Muharrem orucu tamamen vicdanlarını yeniden sorgulamalarıyla ilgilidir. Çünkü Hüseyin'in insanın vicdanında yaşadığını... İsteseydi Hüseyin Bağdat valisi olurdu, isteseydi Hüseyin oradaki insanları katledebilirdi ve bir hükümdar olarak hayatını devam ettirebilirdi işte bugünkü diktatörler gibi.

DD: Zalim bir hükümdar portresi çizebilirdi.

EG: Evet tam tersini yaptı Hüseyin. İnsanlığın öldürüldüğü bir yerde, kendi bedeninin ve güçsüzlüğünün bir şey ifade etmediğini yani varlığının, saraylarının bir şey ifade etmediğini, insanın kutsal olduğuna ve bu kutsalın da Tanrı tarafından insana emanet edildiğine inandıklarına ve bu insanların dilleri, dinleri ve ırklarından ötürü değil insan olduklarından ötürü değerli olduklarına inanıyordu. Hüseyin paylaşımcı olduğu için, o insanlar Hüseyin'i yaşamak istiyorlar, yani gönüllerindeki Hüseyin'i yaşamak istiyorlar ve çok hassaslardır şöyle hassaslardır bunu kimselere söylemezler yani o kişinin samimiyeti olsun baskıcı yapmazlar. Çünkü Hüseyin'e inanıyorsan bunu yaparsın, O'nu gönülünde hissedebiliyorsan bunu yapabilirsin. O anlamda, Muharrem orucu Alevilerde çok farklı bir oruçtur. Aşure zaten yaygındır ve sadece Aleviler bunu yapmıyor ama Aleviler yaygınlaştırmışlardır bu topraklarda, diğerleri unutmuşlardı. Aleviler hiç unutmadılar. Aşureye ilgi olarak zaten sadece Hüseyin'i katmıyorlar, insanın kurtuluşunu anarak geçiyorlar. Ta oradan getiriyorlar, bu öyle bir şeydir. Hızır orucu çok farklı bir şeydir. Hızır orucu, yardımın yani darda olanların, muradına ermek isteyenlerin talihlen birleşebilmeleri, onunla sohbet edebilmeleri anlamında kullandıkları bir şeydir. Cemlere gelince, Alevilerin cemlerini sadece ibadet olarak algılamak çok yanlış bir şey. Aleviler zaten oturmayı, kalkmayı, sohbeti ibadet olarak algılıyorlar. Çünkü genelde İslamsa gidip namaz kılmak, diğer dinlerse kutsal mekanlarına gidip orada ibadet etmek olarak algılıyorlar. Alevilik öyle bakmıyor ise. Örneğin; çalışmayı da bir ibadet olarak

algılıyor, insana saygıyı da ibadet olarak algılıyor, kendisine saygıyı da ibadet olarak algılıyor. Çünkü bir Alevi kendisiyle barışık değilse, başkasına hiçbir şey sunamaz. Cem o anlamıyla yeniden insanın kendisini sorgulama yeridir. Cemler üç bölümden oluşuyor. Birinci bölüm rızalıktır. Bu da dedenin ceme girenlerden rızalık istemesidir. Şayet ceme girenler rızalık vermezse, dede ve gelenlerin birbirlerinden rızalık almasıdır.

DD: Küslük olmaması için.

EG: Evet küslük olmaması için. İkinci bölümü tamamen sorgulama bölümüdür ve en uzun bölümüdür. Yani orada mevki, makam, para pul hiçbir şeyin önemi yoktur. İnsan çıplaktır ve bizzat kendisiyle yüzleştiği bir yerdir ve orada çaresiz dışarıda kendi gücünüzü kullanarak güçsüz birisine karşı bir haksızlık yaptıysanız ve o meydanda bulunuyorsanız ciddi bir sorgulama vardır, öğretisi vardır. Gelen çocuklara yönelik, genç çocuklara yönelik cemle ilgili, Alevilikle ilgili öğretiler başlar çünkü cemler de farklıdır. Dört-beş çeşit cem vardır ve bunların değişik amaçları vardır ve bu bağlamda ikinci bölüm çok önemlidir ve geneli en uzun bölümdür. Sorgulamanın en fazla yapıldığı ve öğretinin en fazla verildiği yerdir. Üçüncü bölüm tamamen işte beden artık bir şey ifade etmediği ruhun var olduğu bir dönemdir. Onun için yalın ayak ve başı açık semaha dönülür ve insan bütün duygularından arınarak orada Tanrıyla bütünleşmenin yolunu arar. Bu üçüncü bölümdür. Böyle bir ibadet vardır yani işte söylemlerinden birisi ise insanların coşkuya gelmesi ve semaha durmasıdır ve en sonda kurbanların dağıtıldığı ve cemin bittiği bölümdür.

DD: Bunun dışında Nehcül Belağa gibi bir kitap, Ali'nin sözlerinden genel olarak oluştuğunu söylüyorlar. Bu da sanırım takip edilen bir kavramdır, değil mi?

EG: Tabii ki. Aslında yazılı belgeleri var ama Alevilerin yazılı belgeleri ne yazık ki ortaya çıkartılmıyor yani özgürlükleri bir yerlerde kapatılıyor. Çok fazla kitap var. Örneğin: yani bizim özellikle Osmanlı ve Selçuklu dönemlerinde çok ciddi Alevi dergileri yok edildi, bir kısmına el konuldu ve hala onların nerede oldukları, bir kısmın devlette olduğunu biliyoruz, bir kısmın çalındığı ve bunların açığa çıkartılmamasıyla ilgili çok ciddi bir direnç var. Bu bağlamda Alevilerin yazılı belgesi yoktur diyenler aslında onu çok fazla bilmediklerinden. Örneğin: Hacı Bektaş Dergahı talan edildiğinde Nursiler tarafından, oraya cami kurulduğu zaman Osmanlı kurdu ama çok ciddi Alevi dergileri yok oldu. Amasya'da yine Alevi dergahları talan edildi, Dersim'de talan edildiğinde, ilk saldırdıkları yer Alevilerin yazılı belgeleri. O belgeler yok edildi yani çıktığında çok şey değişecekti. Hz. Ali'nin sözlerine gelince, Aleviler şu anki İslamiyet'e inanmazlar. Osman'ın yazdığı yazılara inanmazlardı ve taraflı olduğuna yani Kur-an'ı Kerim'i değiştirdiğine inanıyorlardı. Birçok belgesinin, Kur-an'ın birçok bölümünün değiştirildiğine, var olan Kuran'ın gerçek Kuran olmadığını ve aslında gerçek Kuran'ın Osman tarafından farklılaştırıldığını ve ondan sonra yazıldığını ve Hz. Ali'nin sözünü Kuran olarak kabul ederler. Bunu da şundan aldılar. Hz. Ali bir savaşta kendisine karşı Kuran takıp gelen askerlerin mızraklarından Kur-an'ın sayfaları toplanarak kendi askerleri Kur-an'a karşı savaş yapmadıklarından Hz. Ali dönüp kendilerine sunu söylüyor: Kurani Samit'e inanmayacaksınız, benim sözüm Kurani Natik'tir. Bu anlamda Hz. Ali'nin sözlerini çok önemli ve değerli buluyorlar.

DD: Bir de zaten ruhun varlığına inanıldığını, beden çok önemli olmadığını söylemişsiniz. Bu bağlamda, örneğin İsa'nın yeniden doğacağına olan inancın Alevilerde de yaygın olduğuna dair bir söylem söz konusu mu?

EG: Bence Hristiyanlık Alevilikten etkilenmiş bu anlamda.

DD: Öyle mi diyorsunuz?

EG: Evet çok net söylüyorum.

DD: Çünkü bu zaten ruhun dolaşması, farklı canlılarda, farklı bedenlerde can bulması kavramı daha eskidir diye düşünüyorum.

EG: Tabi, yani tek tanrılı dinlerin tarihi çok eski değil. Aleviliğin tarihi tek tanrılı din inanışlarından çok çok eskidir.. Örneğin: 3ler, 5ler, 7ler, 12ler Hristiyanlık'ın da kutsal saydığı sayılar. Örneğin, Hristiyanlık'ın kutsal saydığı hayvanlar var Alevilik'in de kutsal saydığı hayvanlar var. Bunlar tamamen tek tanrılı dinlerin Alevilik'ten etkilenmesi sonucudur. Bize tam tersi olduğunu söylüyorlar da işte bunlar acaba Hristiyanlık'tan mı etkilendiler diye. Hayır, bence Hristiyanlık değil çünkü bu topraklarda çok ciddi bir Hristiyan kültürü de vardı eskiden ve bunlar Alevilerle ortak yaşamışlardır. İlk bu Mezopotamya özellikle Alevilerin en yaygın olduğu yerdi. Aleviler kadim topluluğudur bu toprakların. Mezopotamya'nın özellikle çok eski en eski topluluklardan birisidir Alevilik. Ta ki ne zaman tek tanrılı dinler ciddi bir şekilde insanları yok ederek, zorla kendi birimleri altına aldılarsa ondan sonra Pagan inanışlar geriye çekilip kendilerine o inançların içerisinde bir yer edinerek var etmeye çalıştılar. Alevilik de aslında İslam'ın içerisinde kendine bu şekilde var ediyor. Sırlarını gizleyerek ve kelimeler üzerinde farklılıklar yaparak kendisini mecburiyetten orda var ediyor. Tabi şimdi artık hani İslam'ın içine mi dışına mı tartışması çok mantıksız bana göre çünkü 1400 yıldır İslam'la aynı yataкта yatıp kalkıyor ve aynı coğrafyayı paylaşıyor. Yani İslam'ın içindedir ama İslam'ın muhalif bir gücüdür, heteredoksi bir inanıştır. Hatta heteredoksinin ötesinde bir inanıştır, bana göre. Heterodoksi de kendi içinde problemleri olan bir inanıştır ama Alevilik'in onu aşan bir yönü de vardır. Bu nedenle de çok değerlidir Alevilik'e bakış açısı bizim için çünkü daha cihan yok iken biz Tanrı'yı var ettik, niha eyledik diyor Farabi. Daha cihan yok iken Tanrı'yı aldık var ettik adını Ali koyduk diyor. Bu kadar net söylüyor yani. Bunu böyle görmek gerekiyor.

DD: Bu yakınlarda Alevi Çalıştayı raporu yayınlandı. Çok açıkçası tepki topladı en azından basında okuduklarımızla. Tatmin edici yönleri var mıdır bu yani somut adımlar atılmış mıdır? Çünkü iki yıllık bir çalışma olduğunu biliyorum en azından. Avrupa açısından çok demokratik bir açılandır gözüyle bakıldı ancak buna ben hep söylüyorum Avrupa'da da söylüyorum dışa yansıyanla içeride yaşadıklarımız kesinlikle bir değil. Bu bağlamda da var mı sizin söyleyeceğiniz bir şey?

EG: Ya buna en iyi cevap nedir biliyor musun? Bu hükümet özellikle, başkasının gözündeki kıymığı görür ama kendisinin gözündeki başkasının gözüne batıracağı koca ağacı görmez hiçbir zaman. Bu Alevi çalıştayları, Kürt çalıştayları, Roman çalıştayları, tamamen var olan hakimiyetin yeniden ve adamlar bunu uygulamakta çok başarılılar. Yani Başbakan, Avrupa'da Almanya Başbakanı'nın sözünden ötürü siz Alman vekili yurttaşları aksine ama Türkiye'deki Kürt yurttaşların Alevilerin ve Romanların ne yaptıklarını hiç görmüyorsunuz. Yani bir laf söyleyeceksen, önce kendi içindeki problemleri göreceksin, kendi kapını temizleyeceksin önce. Sen kendi kapını temizlemeden nasıl başkasının kapısına kirlisin diyebiliyorsun? O anlamda bu bir hüsrandır, Alevileri asimile edebilmektir, Türkiye'nin önündeki ileri demokrasiden bahsediyorlar ya hani, bu ileri demokrasinin önünü kapatmaktır. Çünkü siz Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığını yok edemezseniz, Ne Alevi çalıştayı yaparsınız, ne de Sünnileri özgürleştirebilirsiniz. Asıl sorun Aleviler değildir bu memlekette, sorun hükümetle, devletle birleşmiştir. Devleti yönlendiren, şekillendiren sosyal, kültürel, politik yani şekilen bir Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı vardır ve sadece Sünnilerin bir kolu vardır. Herhalde, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti anayasasının laik olduğunu söylüyor, sosyal bir devlet olduğunu söylüyor ve paylaşımcı olduğunu söylüyor. Tam tersi aslında. Yani Alevi çalıştaylarının sonucunun her noktasını Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'ndan görüş alarak yönlendirdiler ve siz Türkiye'de

insanların giyim şekillerine bakarak yaygara kopartacağımıza, laik bir devlet olmak için önce anayasanızı düzeltmeye çalışın. Yani bir insanın kapalı veya açık olması, onun o şekilde üniversiteye girip girememesi insan haklarına ciddi bir saygısızlık olarak gören birisiyim ve edepsizlik olarak görüyorum. Bir insanın türbanlı olduğu için üniversiteye girememesi benim için bir edepsizliktir yani. O, onun yaşam şeklidir ve buna saygı gösterilmelidir ve bu eğitim hakkı olmalıdır. Diğer taraftan bunu söyleyenlerin yapmadığı bir şey vardır. Örneğin beş yaşındaki bir çocuğu Kuran kursuna göndermesi vardır ama imam hatip liseleri duruyor, Kuran kursları duruyor, ilahiyat fakülteler duruyor ve siz buraları kapatmıyorsunuz. Bu çocuğun bütün dini duygularını tek taraflı besliyorsunuz, üniversiteye getiriyorsunuz sonra hayır ben seni almam türbanlısın. Bu ahlaksızlıktır yani bu çocuklara zorla din dersleri veriyorsunuz. Avrupa İnsan Hakları mahkemesi kararı olmasına rağmen, gidiyorsunuz Avrupa'ya 'ben din derslerini değiştirdim' diyorsunuz. En büyük ahlaksızlık da budur zaten. Üniversiteliler ne yaptılar? Tekrar Alevileri asimile etmeye çalıştılar. Bizim talebimiz neydi? Din derslerini zorunlu olmaktan çıkartın müfredatını değiştirin dinler tarihi dersini koyun.

DD: Gerçekten 'din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi' olsun.

EG: Evet. Yani Türkiye'de şöyle bir durum var devletin, insanların tamamının ahlaksız olduğunu inanıyorlar yani kendi, kendi ahlakının dışındaki ahlaklara inanmayan bir devlet. O anlamda Türkiye'de çok ciddi bir şekilde anayasa değişikliği lazımdır ama onun bu parlamentonun yapacağına inanmıyorum. Hele AKP'nin hiç yapacağına inanmıyorum, çünkü AKP kendisine demokrattır. AKP aynı zamanda kendi sermayesine ya da işte bir anayasa değişikliği oldu, anayasa değişikliğinde kıyamet kopardılar özgürlükleri geri getireceğiz diye. Hiçbir özgürlük gelmediği gibi, Başbakanın anayasa değişikliğini bir mitingde yaptığı konuşmalar utanç vericiydi ve Aleviler için çok tehlikeli bir devlet. Çorum'da yaptığı konuşma hem de Alevilerin katledildiği bir şehirde ve gidip Alevileri katleden, katliamlarıyla ilgili ferman veren bir şeyhülislamı kahraman ilan etti. Sincan'da bir dedeler dönemini kapatıyor ki, HSYK'dan bahsetti bir tane Alevi vardı şimdi hiçbirisi Alevi değildir. Hani siz ileri demokrasiden bahsediyordunuz? Bu mudur yani? Sonra ciddi bir Alevilerin devletin sesine sorunu vardır. Örneğin en son Ankara'nın Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanı çok çirkin bir açıklama yaptı. 'CHP'li ve üstelik Alevi olduğunu bildiğim halde gidip nikahlarını kıydım.' dedi. Bunla ilgili hiçbir şey, hiçbir mahkeme, hiçbir savcı harekete geçmedi. Çünkü Türkiye'de nefret suçu denen kavram henüz anayasada yer bulmamıştır. Herkes Alevilere küfreder ve herkes kalkar sonra der ki Aleviler bizim dostumuz biz kardeşiz. Böyle bir kardeşlik olmaz. Dostluk dediğimiz şey, insanın omzundaki yükü alan bir şeydir ama artık kimsenin de kardeşi değiliz yani bu topraklarda.

DD: Onun dışında ben de zaten bunu soracaktım. Az önceki konuşmalarınızda ötekileştirildiğimiz halde Alevilikte ötekileştirme yoktur dediniz. Bu bahsettiğiniz ötekileştirilme sanırım anlattığınız şeyler yani bu çeşitli açıklamalar, Aleviliğe karşı bilinen, var olan yanlış bilgiler. Bu konuda daha farklı örnekler sayabilir misiniz? Örneğin cem evlerinin açılmıyor olması, dedelerin aynı şekilde sizin inanç liderleriniz olduğuna karşı bir yasal yaptırım olmaması. Bu konuda talepler nelerdir?

EG: Tabi Aleviler aslında bunu açarsak yani Alevilerin bu topraklardaki geçmişine baktığımızda katliamlarla anılan bir topluluk. Kahramanmaraş'ta, Çorum'da, Sivas'ta her yerde ciddi Alevi katliamlarının yaşandığı ve aslında sadece Alevilere değil öteki topluluklara da Ermenilerden tutun, Rumlara, gayrimüslimlere yönelik çok ciddi katliamlar yaşanmıştır bu topraklarda ve bu katliamların yaşandığı yerlerde Aleviler tüm ötekilerle birlikte ortak yaşamı geliştirebilmiş. Örneğin bu topraklarda

Ermeniler katledilirken, Aleviler Ermenilere sahip çıkmışlardır. Rumlar katledilirken, Rumlara sahip çıkmışlardır. Bu anlamda Aleviler katledilirken mesela Sünnilerle sorun yaşamamışlardır. Bizde yani kısasa kısas mantığını geliştirmemişlerdir. Hiçbir Sünni'nin burnunu kanatmamışlardır, tersine karşı çıkmışlardır. Örneğin bizim cem evlerimiz bizim ibadetlerimiz dersem bunu cami ya da kilise alternatifi olarak söylemediler. Biz böyle inanıyoruz, bunu böyle görüyoruz. Sonuçta devletin yapması gereken budur ve bunu söylerken de bizim elektriğimizi, suyumuzu, dedemizin maaşını karşılayın anlamında söylemediler. Devlet laik olsun, dinlerden elini çeksin, topluluklar kendi inançlarını kendi ve kendileri tarif etsin. Yani bunu istediler Aleviler. Bir Sünni yurttaş benim inanç yerim camidir, mescittir diyorsa devlet buna 'hayır sen buna camidir, mescittir diyemezsin' hakkına sahip olamaz. Bir Hristiyan yurttaş kendi dini liderlerinin eğitimini Türkiye'de yapmak istiyorsa ve kendi geleneğine göre yapmak istiyorsa devlet 'sen yapamazsın önce benden izin al' dememeli veya Aleviler 'bir cem evi bizim hakkımızdır' diyor ama devlet 'yok hayır sizin hakkınız olamaz. O hakkı biz kültür merkezi için kullandık' diyor. Yani şundan herkes vazgeçmeli. Aleviliği tariften vazgeçmeli. Alevilik, Aleviler sorunu teolojik bir sorun değildir bu topraklarda. Aleviler kendi teolojisiyle barışıklardır zaten. Sorun siyasal bir sorundur, parlamentoda çözülecek bir sorundur. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin anayasasındaki var olan kendisiyle çelişen maddelerin değişmesiyle çözülebilecek bir sorundur. Yoksa kalkıp da Alevi çalıştaylarında yaptıkları sey bir işi veya işte Alevilik Hak, Muhammed, Ali'dir biz Hak, Muhammed, Ali diyenlerle bu işi götüreceğiz diğerleri bizi ilgilendirmiyor. Hani sen tahrik etmeyecektin. Bakan kalkıp televizyonlarda olan televizyon programlarında 'Ercan Bey on gündür aynı şeyleri söylüyor'. Evet on gündür aynı şeyleri söylüyorum ben çünkü ortada değişen bir şey yok ki ve 'biz tahrik yapmadık' diyor ve bakan bunu söylediğinde Alevi çalıştayların sonuç bildirgesinde yayınladıkları raporlarda 'Biz Alevilik'i Hak, Muhammed, Ali yolunu bilenlerle birlikte yürüttük bu çalışmayı'. Yani çelişiyor kendi içerisinde. Çok ağır olacak ama, sahtekar davranıyorlar. Türkiye'de yüzleri başka, Avrupa'da yüzleri başka. Ne yazık ki Avrupa da bunlara inanıyor. Bunların arka gömleğinin ne olduğunu bilmiyor yani Türkiye'de var olan Alevi sorununun çözümüyle ilgili var olan partiler, özellikle parlamentodaki partilerden bahsediyorum diğerlerini kastetmiyorum, çözeceklerine inanmıyorum çünkü hepsi riyakardır ve hep inkardan geçiniyorlar. Hepsinin kafatası Diyanetin belirlediği bir noktaya kadardır ve Diyanet'ten korkmayan partiler ancak Alevi sorununu çözebilirler, Diyanet'ten korkanlar Alevi sorununu çözemezler. Parlamentodaki partilerin hiçbirisi Diyanet'in dışında hareket edemez, buna Alevilerin en çok oy verdiği CHP dahil, AKP dahil, MHP dahil. Bir tek şu anda bu konuda en düzgün duran Kürtlerin partisidir. En azından Alevi örgütlerinin söylemlerini 'bunlar söylüyorsa doğrusu budur' diyebiliyor.

DD: Çok teşekkür ediyorum.

EG: Ben tesekkür ediyorum.

Didem Doğanyılmaz: Sizce Alevilik nedir?

Ali Balkız: Alevilik çok zengin bir yelpazedir. 4 ana bakış var (kendilerini tarif ettikleri): 1.kimisine göre İslamiyet'in özü; 2. kimisine göre İslamiyet'in Anadolu'daki yorumu; 3. kimilerine göre yalnız başına kendisi bir din 4. Şamanizm'den başlayarak, Horasan'dan başlayarak, sonrasında İran'da, sonrasında Mezopotamya'da ve sonrasında Anadolu'da binlerce yıldır Türklerin yaşadıkları yerlerdeki inançlardan beslenen, onlardan öğeler taşıyan (Hristiyanlık, Hinduizm, İslamiyet), Anadolu'ya geldiğinde Anadolu'daki yerli kültürden ve inançtan beslenen, bunların her birinden birşeyler alan, ama hiçbirine benzemeyen, bir yol bir felsefe, bir yaşam tarzı, doğayı toplumu ve insanı algılamayı amaçlayan bir felsefedir, bir yaşam biçimi (bence de budur) aşureye benzer, yepyeni bir tat yepyeni bir aroma, yepyeni bir fizik ve kimya. Önerdiğim kaynaklar, daha çok bu dördüncüyü doğrulayan kaynaklardır.

Bir de Sünnilerin Alevileri tanımlamaları, onların bakış açısı var. Kökten dinci Sünniler, Alevilik'i İslamiyet'in bir alt grubu bir yorumu olarak görmezler, tam tersine, İslamiyeti'n dışında sapkın sıfatıyla tanımlarlar. Başka bir grup tasavufi anlamda, Alevilik'in İslam dairesi içinde, Mevlevilik gb Nakşilik gb bir alt grubu olduğunu söylerler.

Bir de devletin bakışı vardır. Selçuklulardan bu yana, hep dışlanmış, İslam dışı sayılmış katl-i vacip görülmüş (fetvalarda yeri vardır) ve o anlamda yok sayılmış bir bakıştır. Bugün gelinen noktada Alevilerin kente göçetmeleri ile birlikte, Aleviler kendilerini merak ettikleri kadar Sünniler de merak etmişlerdir bunlar kimdir diye. Devletin bakışını bu anlamda değerlendirecek olursak, Selçuklu, Osmanlı ve cumhuriyet (maalesef) yok sayan, dışlamakla yetinmeyen, sürgün etmekle yetinmeyen, aynı zamanda katleden politikaları oldu hep. Ama 60lardan bu yana, devlet politikasında bir değişiklik oldu. Hem katliamlara devam (Çorum, Sivas, Kahramanmaraş, Malatya), devlet dairelerinden dışlama, devletin, ordunun, emniyetin, siyasetin önemli kademelerine getirmeme, bunun yanında da bir de asimile çalışmaları olmuştur. Böylece onlardan kurtulma, yok ederek kurtulma mantığının yanına bir de asimilasyon politikası eklenmiştir. Türkiye'de en çok misyonerlik konuşulur. Hristiyanlar gelip misyonerlik yapar denilir, Zirve Yayınları basılır, katledilir. Ama asil misyoner olan devlettir, Türkiye'de, Alevilere karşı. Bir de kent koşulları, kapitalizmdir. Uygarlıktır ama aynı zamanda içe geçmişliktir. Köylerde Aleviler çok kendi başlarına yaşıyorlardı, homojen yapıları vardı, devletle ilişkileri sınırlıydı, askere giderken ve vergi verirkendi sadece. Karşıda bir Sünni köy vardı, onlarla bayramlarda, düğünlerde ve cenazelerde buluşurlardı. Halk birbirine kötü nazarla bakmazdı. Ama kent, aynı apartmanda, aynı okulda, aynı çarşıda, aynı sokakta aynı kahvede yaşıyor olmanın getirdiği bir içiçe geçmişliktir. Alevilerin kendilerini gizleme ihtiyaçları, bizde Müslümanız diyerek kendilerini koruma ihtiyacı hissetmişlerdir. Aslında özüne baktığımız zaman, yine o tanımlardan farklı bir biçimde değerlendireceğiz. İslamiyetin şartlarını biliyoruz. Bir Alevi'ye dönüp sorduğunuz zaman evet uyuyoruz diyemeyecek. Evet Hakka inanıyorum, dua ediyorum, ibadet ediyorum, mabede gidiyorum, peki nereye

gidiyorsun cemevine, neden cami değil? Biz Aleviyiz dendiği zaman farklılık ortaya çıkıyor. Türkiye'deki bütün dedeler, kendilerinin peygamber soyundan geldiklerini, seyit olduklarını (Muhammed, 4 halife, Ali ve 12 imamın ailesinden olan) söylerler. Ama onlar Araplardı, sen Arap mısın, haşa :)) bu sorular işlerine gelmez. O dedeler ya Türk'tür, ya Kürt'tür, ya Arnavut'tur, ya Bulgardır ya da Macar'dır. Ama Arap değildir, eğer soyunun oraya dayandığını söyluyorsun, bu soruya cevap vereceksin. Böylece biz seyitiz diyerek, doğuştan kendilerine bir saygı sevgi beslenmesini (varlığına) bir hürmet edilmesini isterler. Halbuki biz kent koşullarında Aleviler, bu insan dede olmak için, ana olmak için (kadin-erkek ayrımı yoktur) doğuştan gelen özellikler yetmez, işi ne kadar iyi yapabileceğini de merak ederiz. Yaşamıyla gerçekten eline, beline, diline sahip mi, bunlar da aranır. Mükemmele ulaşılamaz. Kent koşulları Alevileri ve Sünnileri birbirine yaklaştırdı. Bu çalıştayların bu anlamda katkıları oldu, kimiler için tabii ki de ama önyargılar kırılmaya başlandı, farklılıklar bilinerek birlikte yaşama duygusu gelişti, kısmen de olsa. Kent aynı zamanda birbirleriyle kaynaşmasını sağladı bu iki farklı kesimin. Ama yeterince aşılamadı.

Köylerde Aleviler kendi inançlarınca, istediğince yaşayabiliyordu. Her grubun bağlı bulunduğu bir ocak vardı, dedeler gelirler, ibadetlerini yapar döner giderlerdi. Aleviler genelde kışın, zaten yollar kar kaplı, jandarma gelmez, Sünniler gelmez, gizlice yaparlardı ibadetlerini. Köylerin girişlerine çıkışlarına, tepelere gözcüler konurdu. İbadetlerini yaparlardı. Hangi ocağa bağlı iseniz, hangi dede gelip sizi görecektir ise (görgü anlamında) o gelirdi, müsahiplik olurdu. Nedir müsahiplik? Alevi anne babadan doğmak yetmez, bir koşuldur ama yetersizdir. Genç evliler, iki çift, birbirleriyle kardeş olurlar, yol kardeşliğidir bu. 4 kişi, tek beden olur. Törende bunların üzerine büyük beyaz çarşaf örtülür, 4 kişi bir kişi olmuştur. Onların çocukları da kardeş olmuşlardır, evlilik düşmez. Bu dört kişi birbirlerinden hayat boyu sorumludurlar.

DD: Büyükşehir Alevileri ve Anadolu Alevileri farkı belki de buradan gelmektedir.

AB: Bunu su sebeple anlattım, kentte bunu yaşayamayacaklardır. Dedelerini nerede bulacaklar? Cem yapılan cemaat ayrıldı, müsahip kardeşler ayrıldı. Artık bulunan kişilerle cem yapılmaktadır. İşin kaynağında olan olay artık uygulanamamaktadır. Kent koşullarında nasıl yaşayabilirizi bulmaya çalışmışlardır. Artık daha açık durumdadırlar. Köyde korunuyorlardı, birliklerdi. Daha sonrada 12 Eylül Anayasası geldi ve zorunlu din dersleri başladı. Asimilasyonun en büyük araçlarından bir tanesi budur. Bu anlamda bu eşitsizliği gidermek adına çağdaş normlarda örgütlenme ihtiyacı hissetti Aleviler. Köylerde bu vardı, inanç temelli dergahlar vardı, pir mürşit gibi bir örgütlenme vardı. Bu benzetme yapılabilir. Kültürü devam ettirme ihtiyacı modern anlamda örgütlerin doğmasına sebep oldu. Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği 1988 yılında kuruldu. Diğer örgütler kuruldu, sonra federasyonlar kuruldu. Böyle bir dönem yaşıyoruz, artık Aleviler sokaktalar. Eylem vakti geldiğinde demokratik eylemler yapıyorlar Aleviler.

Alevi Meeting - Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolian Foundation (12 April 2011).

İnanç dolayısıyla cemlerimiz değişti, unuttuk cemlerimizi. Müsahiplik gibi bir kurum neredeyse kalmadı. Bunun yanında gençlerimiz inançlarını bilemez oldular. Onları ilgilendirmiyor fakat bu arada çok önemli bir şey oldu o da, örgütlenmeye başladık. Yakın da olsa tarihi, bu örgütlenme Avrupa'da da oldu. Onu bizzat yaşadım. Burada da oldu ve çok kısa sürede gerçekten çok büyük işler başardılar, bu örgütlerimiz. İster Avrupa'da olsun ister burada olsun. Hem sosyal mitingler hem de işte bugün içinde bulunduğumuz bu güzel toplantı bu çalışmanın bir ürünü. Fakat eksliğimiz şuydu: İnançsal boyutta bir şeyler eksikti bunu hepimiz fark ettik. İşte bunun için yollara düştük. İnançsal boyutta acaba bir birlik sağlayabilir miyiz diye ve Türkiye'ye geldik. Önümüzdeki günlerde de Avrupa'ya gidilecek. Bunlar bittikten sonra Hacı Bektaş'de bir toplantı olacak ve orada nasıl bir araya geliriz o tartışılıp bir karara bağlanacak ve ne kadar başarılı olduğumuzu orada göreceğiz dostlar. Size tekrar teşekkür ediyorum geldiğiniz için sağ olun. Bu konuda söz almak isteyen arkadaşlarımız için de mikrofonu uzatacağız. Düşünceleriniz bizim için çok önemli. İnançsal boyutta tekrar bir örgütlenme konumuzun adı Hacı Bektaş'ı etrafında bu konuda düşüncelerinizi dinlemek bizim için çok önemli çok teşekkür ediyorum tekrar size sağ olun.

EMEL SUNGUR: Aslında ilk açılması gereken konu ama hiç kimsenin sesi çıkmayınca mecbur kaldım. Yeni bir araştırma var Dumlupınar Üniversitesi'nde Şehriban Şahinkaya adında bir yardımcı doçentin yapmış olduğu bir araştırmadır. Kadınsız Alevilikler. 20 yıllık demokratik Alevi örgütlenme sürecinde geline bugünkü noktada altını biraz daha kalın çizerek tekrarlamak istiyorum ve çok önemsedğim için. Bunun bir yansıması olarak da inançsal boyutuyla şu an bir değineceğim de kadın ve erkeklerin uzun zamandır görmemiştim ayrı yerlere oturtma süreci başladığını sizinle paylaşmak istiyordum ve korkum şu: Alevi erkeği Sünnileşiyor ve Alevilik Sünnileşiyor. Söyleyeceğim bu kadar. Saygılarımla.

MUSTAFA ÖZCİVAN: Hacı Bektaş'den önceki belediye başkanı ve Hacı Bektaş Veli Kültür Derneği ikinci başkanım. Ankara'dan geçiyorduk eşim ve çocuklarla toplum için böyle Dernek olarak düşüncemizi çok kısa özetleyeceğim. Hepinize saygılarımı sunuyorum. Hacı Bektaş Veli Kültür Derneği 1964'ten beri devam eden 1980'de kapatılıp 1992'de tekrar açılan ve 2006'da aktif hale gelen Hacı Bektaş Kültür Derneği'nin yönetimindeyim. 1980 öncesi belediye başkanımız dernek başkanı 1980 sonrası belediye başkanı 2. başkan ve yönetiminde bu şekilde çalışmalarımız oldu. Öncelikle sevgili gördüğü için der ki zamanı uydun değil ama siyaseten de Alevilerin işinin müftü kadar olmadığını da burada söyleyeyim. Çünkü CHP'den en son listeleri görünce gerçekten üzüldüm. Alevi örgütlülüğünün hiçe sayıldığı, Alevi örgütlülüğünün yok sayıldığı kendi insanımızın dahi öyle gördüğü bir ortamdayız. Sevgili dostlar Hacı Bektaş Veli Kültür Derneği olarak 2011 yani Ağustos'un 25-26'sında Hacı Bektaş'de, 2. uluslararası 'Hacı Bektaş Ozanlar Buluşması'nı organize ediyoruz. Önemli ve geniş bir toplantı burada önce duyurusunu yapayım daha sonra Alevi örgütleri için, sizler için, Hacı Bektaş'nin

dışından olan ve Hacı Bektaşî'ye gelen insanlar için Hacı Bektaşî'ye bir ayak, barınacak bir yer ya da gözü kulağı olacak bir örgüt var Hacı Bektaşî Veli Kültür Derneği. Geçmişte 1964'ten yani törenlerin başladığı tarihten 2004'e kadar olan süreçte, 40 yıllık süreçte, belki yerel yöneticiler Alevi topluluğunun düşüncesi, sosyal ve siyasal düşüncesiyle, inançsal anlamında bir bütünleşme sağladığı için belki bir ayrışma yoktu ama 2004'ten sonra biliyorsunuz orada bir yerel yönetimle Alevi örgütleri arasında bir kopukluk var, yok sayılma var. Dolayısıyla siyasetten oraya gelen, hizmete gelen hizmet için seçilen insanlar gerektiğinde değişebiliyorlarmış. Yani Hacı Bektaşî de olsa. Dolayısıyla orada oluşacak ve orada var olan bir siyasal, inançsal bir sivil toplum kuruluşunun sizler için de Hacı Bektaşî'nin dışındaki insanlar için de yerinin çok önemli olduğunun altını bir kez daha çizmemiz gerekiyor. Bu yüzden oradaki Hacı Bektaşî Veli Kültür Derneği'ne sevgili postnişinimiz Veliyettin Ulusoy Beyefendi'nin de desteği ve katkısıyla, sizlerin de desteğiyle çok önemli bir yer edinmesi gerekiyor Alevi örgütlülüğü için çünkü inançsal boyutu bir tarafa kültürel ve örgütsel anlamda Hacı Bektaşî biraz önce söylediğimiz gibi bu toplumun inançsal başkanı ise orada güçlü bir örgütün bulunmasının da kaçınılmaz olması gerekir. Ve son olarak şunları söylemek istiyorum: Biraz önce Divani Baba'nın söylediği en son yapılacak toplantının Hacı Bektaşî'de olacağını söylediler. Biz de Hacı Bektaşî Veli Kültür Derneği olarak Eylül sonu Ekimin başında daha önce Ercan arkadaşımızla da bir istişarede bulunmuştuk. Geniş katılımlı Alevi örgütlerinin katılabileceği bir toplantı, kurultay anlamında ya da Alevi topluluğunun en son sözü söyleyeceği sayın Veliyettin Ulusoy'un da himayelerinde de böyle bir organizasyonun yapılacağını buradan duyurmak istiyorum. Hepinize saygı ve sevgilerimi sunuyorum. Toplantının başarılı geçmesini diliyorum.

A: Değerli arkadaşlar, hepinizi sevgiyle selamlıyorum. Ben aslen Adana'da yaşıyorum Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür derneklerinin genel merkezi yöneticisiyim. 20-25 yıla yakın bir zamandır Alevi örgütlerindeyim. Pir Sultan Abdal Derneği'ndeğim. Gördüğüm bir eksiklik vardı ve bu eksikliği bu toplantıların gidereceğini düşünüyorum. O eksiklik şudur: Meşhur bir Cemal Bardakçı varmış bizi ziyareti gelmiş bir kitap varmış diye ayırmışlar. Orada der ki 'her Alevi köyü bir devlet gibi yönetiliyordu Osmanlı'yı kendi devletleri varsayıyorlardı, kendi vergilerini topluyorlardı, kendi yasama organları vardı ve bunu kendileri yürütüyorlardı'. Orada Aleviliğini yaşayan insanlar şehirlere göç ettikleri zaman, kendilerini gizliyorlar, saklıyorlar. Ben 70li yıllarda Adana'ya geldiğimde, aman Aleviliğimi söylemeyeyim derlerdi. Alevilerin sorunları ile Aleviliğin sorunları ayrışmaya başladı. Ben bu toplantıları bu anlamda çok anlamlı buluyorum. Alevilerin sorunlarını tartışacağı bir mekana bir platforma ihtiyacı vardır ben bunu Rumların karşılayacağına inanıyorum. Beni dinlediğiniz için hepinize saygılar sunuyorum umarım başarılı oluruz sağ olun.

CEMAL ŞAHİN: Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Birliği Genel Müdürlüğündenim. Konuşmasının başında da söylediği gibi burada cemlerde de rahatsızlık duyuyorlar yani tabiri caizse. Cemlerin de ne durumda olduğunu hepimiz biliyoruz, bir kısım dedelerin nasıl cem yönettiklerini de biliyoruz. Bundan öncekilerde tebliğler alınsaydı, bu tebliğler bir yerde toplansaydı, burada bilim adamları, psikologlar işte dedelerden bir komisyon oluşturup bu komisyon o tebliğlere, sonra Hacı Bektaşî'de olacak o toplantıya sunacak bir taslak hazırlasalardı son noktaya kadar ulaşırdı o taslaklar üzerinde tartışılsaydı daha iyi olurdu. O nedenle ben buraya gelmişim ve konuda öneriler hazırlamıştım. Bu önerileri veriyorum lobiye ve bundan sonraki

konuşmacıların da böyle bir taslakları varsa yada önerileri varsa yazılı bir anlatım verirlerse daha iyi olur bu toplantılar daha faydalı olur diye düşünüyorum. Teşekkür ederim.

A: Merhaba arkadaşlar. Hepinizi selamlıyorum. Galiba 1988'de Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği'nin kuruluşuna imza atmıştık arkadaşlarımla birlikte. Bugün geldiğimiz yer bütün bu geçmişin deneyimlerinin sonucunda geldiğimiz bir yerdir. Eksiklerimiz, hatalarımız, kusurlarımız çok yakıcı bir biçimde ortaya çıktı. Değirmek istemem ama şöyle bir cümleyle değinerek geçeyim. Bu seçimlerde bu dağınıklığın ve bu organize olamamanın aslında bir bakıma da özümüzden kopmuş olmamızın bir sonucu olarak bakmak gerekir. Çünkü geçmişe baktığımızda bu topluluk Alevi Bektaşî toplumu sevgili Rıza Can'ın da söylediği gibi çok önemli bir hatırlatma yaptığı gibi batı aleminin padişahı hünkârı önde tuttuğumuz için, hünkârı dikkate aldığımız için geçmişte Osmanlı'nın, Selçuklunun bütün zulmüne karşı Alevi Bektaşîler ayakta kalmayı, inançlarıyla, kültürleriyle, gelenekleriyle birlikte hayatta kalıp bugüne kadar taşınmayı başarmış ender topluluklardan biridir. Buna da hünkârı öne almamız, hünkârı değerlendirmemiz, oraya uygun hareket etmemiz, sürekli oraya dönük olarak yaşamamızdan kaynaklanan bir sonuç idi. Ama son yıllarda bu da kentleşmeyle alakalı bir şey köyümüzden koptuk kentlere geldik. Öncelikle dürtülerimiz barınma, giyinme dürtülerimiz öne çıktı çok doğal olarak çok insani bir biçimde ama daha sonra bütün bu bir bakıma gereksinimlerimizi karşılamamızdan sonra baktık ki bizi var eden başka değerlerimiz var başka yaşamsal değerlerimiz var. Onu anımsadığımızda da bir miktar gelenek ve kültürün uğradığını gördük. Yeniden sarıldığımızda da birçok şeyi kaybetmiş olduğumuzu da içimiz bir bakıma yanarak fark ettik. Aslında tabii bu siyasal süreç 1950-60'ın ve sonrasındaki siyasal süreci de katmak isteyerek bir değerlendirme yapmak gerekir ama onu geçelim zamanın dolduğu nedeniyle. Bugün gelinen yerden bu dağınıklığın, bu perişanlığımızın, bu yok sayılmamızın bütün bunların nedeni bence fakire güvenmemek gerekir yoruma uygun olarak geçmişten kopmuş olmamızla ben izah edebiliyorum kendimi ancak böyle izah edebiliyorum ama çok daha zaman kaybetmeden geleneğimizi, cem insan ilişkilerimizi, edep ve erkanımızı daha fazla kaybetmeden, daha fazla dejenere olmasına izin vermeden bir an önce aklımıza gelip yeniden yaşatmamız gerekir. Kuşkusuz demokratik Alevi örgütlenmesi ya da herkesin kendince örgütlenmesi bir bakıma devam edecek ancak manevi yanı, baki yanı, geleneksel yanı, inançsal yanını da yaşatmak gerekiyor. Çok önemsemek ve önem vermek gerekiyor. Önem vermezsek dediğim gibi hiçbir sahada hiçbir alanda başarı şansımızın olmadığını görüyoruz. Cemlerimiz dejenere oldu. Cemlerimiz muhabbet tadını vermekten uzaklaştı, statikleşti, dedelerimizin erkandan, yoldan uzaklaştığını içimiz acıyarak görüyoruz. Hakirlerimizin geleneğini önemli ölçüde kaybettiğini, oturup kalkmaktan bile kaynaklı olarak canlar oradaki çocukluğumdaki katıldığım cemleri anımsayarak bugünkü girdiğim cemleri karşılaştırdığımda hakikaten içimin acıdığını ne büyük, ne muazzam bir kültürü kaybetmekte olduğumuzu acıyarak görmek mümkün oluyor. Bu bakımdan efendimizin yola çıkıp bizi yeniden, geleneği yeniden canlandırmaya çalışmasını, zahmete katlanmasını, hizmeti göze almasını, dört bir yanı dolaşmayı göze almasını minnetle karşılamak gerekiyor. Minnetle karşılıyorum, kendisini yad ediyorum, ellerinden öpüyorum efendimizin. Bir talip olarak, bir insan olarak, kişi olarak kurulumuzun da aynı niyette olduğunu söylemek isterim. Her türlü hizmette, ne görev verilirse, hangi hizmet verilirse elimizden geldiğince, gücümüz yettiğince bu yola devam edeceğimizi saygıyla, sevgiyle sizlere sunmak istiyorum. Çok teşekkür ediyorum.

A: Merhabalar, hoş geldiniz. Aleviliğin aslında katmanlaşmış, büyük sorunları yok da imkan sorunu var. Niteliği nasıl yükselteceğiz sorunu var. Bu nedenle öncelikle sahip olduğu birikimi bırakıp sorunlarının olduğunu görüyorum. Örneğin Hacı Bektaşî'nin kim olduğu, Hacı Bektaşî'nin niteliği nedir, onun etrafını saran söylenceler, anlatılar nedir? İslam ile, İslam'ın tanımıyla nasıl karışmış? Örneğin Hacı Bektaşî'nin açısından biz bunu çözebilirsek Hacı Bektaşî'yi çözmüş olacağız, Karacaahmet açısından biz bu sorunu çözmüş olursak yine Aleviliğe sonucu zaten kendi özgürlüğümüzü yaratmış olacağız. Önce temel değerlerin nerede biriktiğini yani nerede şekillendiğini daha iyi çözmüş olacağız. Kalan çalışmalarımız kalan çalışmalarda en çok gördüğümüz şey Aleviliğin kendisine ait söylentilerin hem karışması hem de Alevi yolunu yürüten olduğu kadar, yürütenler olduğu kadar, insanlar ceme katılanlar da Aleviliği hep ezbere bir nokta olarak görüyorlar. Değer yargılarının değişmez, bitmez ve hep ataların anlattığı olarak görüyorlar. Halbuki Alevilik düşünen kişidir. Düşünen insan kendisini ifade edebilmek, kendi özgürlüğünü yaratabilme hissine sahiptir. Bu hisler tabii kalıp olarak, gittikçe dayatmaya, kültürel bozulma yaşandığı, dayatmaya gittiği için de alanda da sorunlar karşımıza çıkıyor. Belki bunun çok görmüştür. Alana gidiyor insanlar hep yani O'nun gözlerinin içine bakıyor, kendi kafasında bir düşünce olmadığı için bireysel sorunla karşı karşıya. İşte Aleviliği tekrarlatan sorun da bu ezberi çok sevmeye başladı. Düşünemeyen bir Alevi direk yanındakine sormaya başlar ve inancın nedir sorusuna dönüştürürse zaten büyük bir hegemonya çıkıyor karşımıza. Böyle zamanlarda bize 'inanma nedir?' sorusunu yanıtlamak düşer. Alevilerin yüzde yüzüne kadarını gerçekten ciddi bir biçimde sorarsanız inanma nedir sorusunu yanıtlayamaz. Neye inanıyorsun ve nasıl inanıyorsun sorusunu size söyleyemez. En fazla yapacağı dört kapı kırk makamı sizlere ifade edebilmesidir. Bu çok kötü bir şey. Kendini bilmemek işte burada başlar. Muhammed'i taşıması yan peygamber olarak o dört kapı kırk makam ifadesinin içine O'nu koyabilmesi. Ondan sonra kırklar birliği büyük mitoloji kurgusundaki yeri nedir gibi sorulara yanıt veremeyeceği için inanmaya da yanıt veremeyecektir. Çünkü inanma sorununu çözememiştir. İnanmak için önce gerçek bir anlamda sanat anlamda Alevilikte düşünmeyi bilmek gerekir. Sentezlerken bunları koymanız gerekiyor. Yoksa okuyarak ve aynı zamanda başka kültürlerle başka inançlara ait kurguları taşıyarak bunu sürdüremezsin. Temel bir kurgu var, inanma dersin Alevilikte öyle ki anlaşılmalı. Dört kapı kırk makam. Bunun gibi farklı birçok öğreti de var dünyada. Örneğin Budist veya Tao inançlarının bu tür öğretileri var. Zaten Alevilik de bu tarz bir şeydir. Yoksa peygamberlerin sadece kurguları büyük sorunlar taşıyor. İşte bu nitelikleri öğrenmek için Alevi bireylerine gerçekten sormak lazım 'neye inanıyorsun?' ve 'nasıl inanıyorsun?'. Bu sorunların kurgu noktası da yine Aleviliğin işte bu okulu geleneğinin olduğu kadar şu anda da bir sorun var. Hep bir Alevi okuduğunu iddia ediyor. Ama okumakla olmuyor ki bu iş. Alevilikte rehber sorunu var, onların insan sorunu var. Sorunu evet çok büyük ama dede önemli değil. Önemli olan topluma Alevilikle ilgili felsefe, tarih, sanat vb. bilgileri sunacak kimliğin olması bunun çabasıdayız ama asıl sorun rehber, öğretici kişi ve de belli bir adalet duygusunu topluma verebilecek ve cemlerde bunu insanlara taşıyacak kişi ama dedeye yeterli bir olmuyor ki dedeyi yetiştirecek olan da bir rehber. Bu tür sorunlarımızı artık daha akılcı ve aynı zamanda kendimizi hiç çekinmeden ifade ederek görmeliyiz. Bir sorun değil önemli olan bunun önüne geçmemek. Bütün sorumluluk burada kilitlenmeye başlamıştır. Bir başka şey bu çok dışında bir önerimizdir. Ben dünyası büyük bir ufka sahip, biz buna dördüncü dünya diyoruz artık. Kralların, aşiretlerin ve Alevilik gibi öğretilerin kendi bağımsızlığı içinde düne

kadar yaşarken birden bire uluslararası sistemler karşısında kaldıkları noktada hiçbir şekilde kendilerini sürdürememeleri. Bu sürdürememelerinin sorunu da dördüncü dünya içerisinde kendini ifade edememeleridir. Makedonya'ya kendini taşıyamamaktır, Irak'a, İran'a kendini taşıyamamaktır. Oradaki dergahlarına gidip görüşmemektir. Hiçbir şekilde bağ kuramamaktır. Bunun dışında birkaç kuralla uluslararası koşullardan yararlanacağımız şeyler var. Örneğin Türkiye'deki ve Aleviliğin, Hacı Bektaşî'nin, çok geniş olduğu ülkeler ve göç olarak Avrupa'ya giden insanların yaşadığı yerlerdeki onların inanç merkezlerini bizzat protokol... Örneğin Türkiye'de Ortodoks patriğinden bizzat alıp gidip onlarla görüşmektir. Çünkü düne kadar bunlar çok önemliydi ve davetlerde bunlar yapılıyordu. Ortodokslar davet ediliyordu hiç düşünmeden çünkü siz uluslararası bir niteliğe sahipsiniz. Yaşadığınız yer onlarla ortak ve onlarla eşit olmakla ilgilidir, öyle değil. Herkes talep ediyor ama istenmeli bu. Bu istenirse bu sorun uluslararası duruma dönüşür. Örneğin Alevi Bektaşîlik orayı ziyaret etmeyi ve oradan ziyaretçi almayı önemsemeli ve oraya yönelmeli. Bunlar bizim sistemimizin göstergeleri. Örneğin resmi bir ziyaret için talepte bulunmalı Irak'tan veya Türkiye üzerinden dışişleri bakanlığı üzerinden. Bu tür şeyleri yürütebilmeli. Örneğin Girit'te bulunan Bektaşî tepkisi için uluslararası girişim ve Türkiye üzerinden girişimde bulunulmalı. Böyle servisler yapılmak durumunda. Bu servisler gerçekleştiğinde sorunların bireylerle ilgili olmadığını, toplumsal algılayış olduğunu, örgütlerle ilgili olduğunu bu tür noktaların belirlenmesi gerekiyor. Örneğin ve çok büyük sorunları olan bir aileye bırakılmış ve devlet orayı veya hiçbir şekilde işlemselleşmemiş bir noktaya taşımış. Orasıyla ilgili bir girişimde bulunabilir, oranın düzenlenmesini, oraya bir atama yapılmasını papa olabilir, dede olabilir. Yani bununla ilgili altyapılı bir çalışma yapılması gerekiyor. Türkiye'de durum böyle. Girişim yapılırsa, örnekleri çoğalır. Bir başka şey de artık kanamış bir sorun. Dedelerimizin bir kısmında ben bir bakış açısı bir örgütlenmesi. Aleviliğe yakışmayan örgütlenmeler bunlar aslında. Evet bir hak talebi çerçevesinde olabilir bir sorun yok fakat Aleviliğin kurallarının dışında, yeni bir sistemmiş gibi orada olması bir kirliliktir. Dedelerimiz bu kirliliğin başında özellikle. Orada yaklaşık 200 kadar dede din yürütme pozisyonundadır ve bunlar konuşulmalı çünkü bize en çok dayattıkları bu. Bize diyorlar 200 dede burada var 200 orada 200 daha. Çünkü böyle görüyorlar. Sistem böyle oturuyor zaten. Siz bunlarla görüşmeyi yükseltmek zorundasınız. Onlarla bu sorunu çözmek için bir adım atmak zorundasınız ve bu adımın atılabilmesi için de bu toplantıların birçoğunda da gördüğüm gibi bizim örgütlerimizin buna çok sıcak baktığını görüyorum çünkü çerçevesinde bugüne kadar hiç yapılmayan çerçevede bir çalışma var. Örgütlerimiz dernek ve vakıfsal olarak bir çaba harcadılar, yolun bir noktasına taşdılar ama artık bu yasal bir şeydir. Bu nedenle de biz Alevi Hareketi diye algılatıyoruz bunu, böyle söyletiyoruz. Hareketin bir sonraki adımı partileşmedir ama Alevi dernek vakıflarında var mı böyle bir çaba? Yok, söz konusu bile değil. Öyleyse doğru tanımların beklendiği veya doğru adımların beklendiği noktada adımlarımızı daha sert ve güçlü atmak durumundayız. Herkesin beklentisi olduğu yerde konuşmak hiçbir şeye çözüm değildir. Teşekkür ederim.

CEVDET SARAÇ: Değerli arkadaşlar hepinizi selamlıyorum. Ben daha çok sonuçlarla ilgili konuşacağım. Şimdi birkaç tespit yapmakta yarar olduğunu düşünüyorum. Alevi hareketinin en bilinen, en muhattap alınan bir döneminde bir kaos yaşanıyor. Bir yandan en görünür hal deyiş diğer yandan siyaseten en altlardayız. Bu tabii insanın işin doğrusu canını acıtan bir nokta. Hareketin inanılmaz kiteselleşmiş binler, on binler, yüz binlerle ifade edebileceğimiz bir noktaya gelmiş

ama siz ona uygun sonuçlar olamıyorsunuz. Bu işin doğrusu son derece can acıtıcı bir durum ama bir diğer boyutuyla da doğal yani çok fazla kendimizi de yormamamız gerekiyor. Kendimize de çok fazla haksızlık yapmamamız gerekiyor. Çünkü tarih aslında bir biçimde ifade ediyor. Bunun nedenlerinin birincisi, tarih boyunca hiç iktidarda bulunmamışız. İktidara yakın olduğumuz dönemler var, iktidarın kurumsallaştırıldığı her dönemde ilk darbe yiyenler bizler olmuşuz. Hiçbir iktidarla ilgimiz yok. Türkiye coğrafyasına bakın Kürtlerle, Aleviler arasında kırılmalar var. Kürtlerde iktidarlık deneyimi var. Alevilerde Dersim coğrafyası hariç hiçbir iktidar deneyimi yok. Buna Hacı Bektaşî de dahil. Yani Hacı Bektaşî Dergahı da dahil. İlk dönemlerini bir tarafa bıraktığımızda Hacı Bektaşî Dergahı'nda da iktidarlık deneyimi yok. Bu son derece önemli bir nokta diye düşünüyorum. Bu deneyimin olmadığı sürece siz dergah yönetmekle devlet yönetmeyi sürekli karıştırmak durumuyla karşı karşıya kalıyorsunuz. İkincisi, örgütlenme geleneğidir. Kalender Çelebi'den sonra çok ciddi bir kırılma var ve 400 yıldır Alevilerin örgütlenmesi yok ortada. Hacı Bektaşî Dergahı en iyi iki başlı olmuş. 1826 sonrası güçlü bir iktidar var ortada. Çelebiler var, Bektaşîler var. Güçlü bir iktidar var ortada. Şimdi o anlamıyla birbirimize yanlış söz etmeyeceğiz. Ortada örgütlenme yok. Alevi dünyasının doğruluğu en önemli aslında ayaklanma değildir ama iktidarı Çelebi ayaklanmasıdır. Kalender Çelebi yenildikten sonra 400 yıl boyunca tarih 1963'te diyanette Alevi yazısı kurulsun denene kadar ortak bir Aleviler gününde söz etmek mümkün değil. İstisnalar var, 1826 savunması bir istisnadır. Bir diğer geçici istisna da 2. meşrutiyetin ilanında dergahı istiyoruz. Başka yoktur. Hani hep söyleriz ya birbirimize biz şu kadar örgütlüyüz falan diye yok böyle bir gelenek. Çok net bir şey söyleyeyim. O şimdi burada Alevi ocakları, Hacı Bektaşî Dergahı da dahil olmak üzere, aslında hepsi özellikle yazıyor, çalışmışlar. Orada da aslında bir gelenek yok yani. Her yıl gelip dergahta görülmüşler ama hepsi aslında başlı başına bir örgüt, başlı başına bir devlet, başlı başına bağımsız yani böyle bir ortak bir kulvarda ortak bir koşu söz konusu değil. O da önemli bir teşhistir diye düşünüyorum. Bunlar yan yana gelince şöyle bir şey oluşmuş. Sen hep ikinci adam pozisyonunda olmuşsun. Aslında dördüncü, beşinci adam pozisyonu sürer. Hiçbir dönem kendini çoğunlukla eşit görmemişsin. İktidardan uzaksın ve arada var. Şimdi 400 yıllık sessizlik bunun üzerine gelince ortaya doğal bir tablo çıkıyor. Şu an son 20 yılda ne yaptık tüm misyonu son 20 yıla vermişiz. 1960-70 dönemleri önemlidir ama asıl Alevi dünyasının örgütlenmesi tekrar dünyayla buluşması doğrusu 1988 Pir Sultan Abdal ile başlamıştır. Başlayan süreçle 20 yılda bütün misyonlara vermişiz. İnancı, kültürü, sosyal hizmetleri, siyaseti bu derneklere vermişiz. Sonuç vasat. O yüzden kendimize eziyet etmeyelim. Kendimize de çok fazla kızmayalım. Çok fazla yandık yıkıldık edebiyatı yapmaya gerek yok. Dünyada iletişim müthiş arttı. Aleviliğin denk düştüğü semboller yok. Semboller olmayınca Aleviliğe demek kolay bir iş değil. Yani sonuçta semboller var. Hacı Bektaşî Dergahı ile Dergahı kenarda bırakın Şimdi geldiğimiz noktaya mimari olarak bile apartman daireleri var ortada. Mesela Dikmendeki bu bina özel olarak yapılmış bir bina ama... Yani karşılaşıyorsunuz. Camiye girdiğinizde bir başka atmosferi yakalıyorsunuz ya da işte hepimizin bildiği Hacı Bektaşî Dergahı'nda başka bir atmosfer var. Bir var, bir arka plan var ama bizim buralar apartman dairesi. İşin doğrusu o. Dede profili, sonuçta insanlar inanç özgür dediğinde kılık kıyafeti olan şey var işte o profil şimdi burada kravatlı, son derece düzgün bir beyefendi. İşte profil var ortada ama benim düşüncem açısından hiç böyle bir şey yok. Yani sonuçta inanç önderi deyince insan başka bir şey arıyor orada. Senin iki tane önderin var, Zülfikar'ı var, Pir Sultan'ı var o anlamıyla doğru ki o da zorlama yani tarih konuşacaksa Pir Sultan ile karşılaştırdığımızda Kalender

tarihinde çok önemli bir köşe taşı. Yani Pir Sultan'ı yapmıştır ama kıyaslamamız mümkün değil. Şimdi değerli arkadaşlar imam deyince gözümüzün önünde bir resim vardır, sultan deyince bir resim vardır, papaz deyince bir resim vardır. Cami deyince bir şey şekilleniyor. Cem evi dediğimizde ne şekilleniyor? O yüzden Hacı Bektaşî Dergahı ile Şah Kulu'nu örnek gösterdim. Burada çok önemli bir bina ama mesela bu profil şekillenmiyor yani gözünüzü kapatın bu anlamıyla söyledim bu son derece önemli. Yani bu semboller tabii kurumsallaşmanın getirdiği başka sıkıntılar olacaktır. O yüzden bu semboller önemli. Çünkü dernek örgütlenmesi bu ülkede cevap vermiyor. Bunun yeri yurdu da yok. Ankara'daki Pir Sultan Örgütü de Ankara'daki Alevi Kültür Derneği de, Alevi Kültür Merkezi de işte efendim cevap vermiyor. Şu anda ayakta duran, güçlenen yapılanmalardaki kriterler, kendi binaları olan yerler ayakta niye çünkü sosyal etkinliğe cevap veriyor. Şimdi ben Ankara Pir Sultan Abdal Derneği ile ilgili ne yapabileceğim? Yapabileceğim hiçbir şey yok. Sonra Alevi Kültür Merkezi'ni arayacağım. Kendine ait, yani sonuçta inançlar benim kültürel ve sosyal ihtiyaçlarımı karşılayabilecek bir yapı etkileşimi var. Bu anlamıyla da dergah örgütlenmeleri dahil bilimi çok rahat aşılıyor olmamız lazım. Ama burada gerekiyor. Yani buraya kadar yanlış yaptık ama bu da inançtan uzaklaştığımız için böyleydi. Yok öyle bir şey. Bu dernekler olmasaydı Aleviliğe ait bir Alevi dünyası buraya kadar gelmezdi. O yüzden buradakilerin muhtemeldir ki önemli ölçüde Alevilik için insanlardır. Eğer bunlar olmasaydı bu kadar konuşulmazdı. Bu dernekler olmasaydı, Alevi inançları da bu kadar gündemde olmazdı çünkü tarih bunu gösteriyor. Bu nedenle orada bir sorgulamaya da ben itiraz ediyorum. Sorun şu; mevcut örgütlenmeler ihtiyaca cevap vermiyor. Bunları yeniden yapılandırmamız lazım. Dergah örgütlenmeleri dahil, kaynaşabilmemiz lazım. Birilerimiz Avrupa'da tartıştık. Yani Avrupa'yı da sürece dahil ediyorum. İşte Avrupa belki de Alevi dünyasında şu anda en rahat dönemini yaşıyor ama hareketliliği durumda. Motivasyon yok. Yöneleceği bir şey yok. Yani yeni kadro üretimi yok. Ankara'daki Alevilerle konuşamıyorum. Mesela diyorum ki bir bu derneğin yönetimine düştükten sonra ne hale gelir burada. Yapabileceğim hiçbir şeyim yok. Bir araştırma yapıp ne yapacağız bu derneklerde. Karşılığı yok. İşledik ee bitti. Sonuçta telaffuzlarını o kadar kolay yapabiliyoruz ki, merkezi olmaktan çıktı. İki boyutu var; bir örgütlenme olayı, dergah dahil olmak üzere tartışacağız ama dergahı tartışırken ya biz burada büyük hatalar yaptık, aslında inançtan uzaklaşmasaydık şöyle olurdu demeyeceğiz. Bu ihtiyaca diyeceğiz ki 'evet böyle bir ihtiyaç var'. Sen sonuçta hayata dahil değilsen, söylediğinin dışına düşüyorsun. İkincisi, yani o anlamıyla da belki biraz daha gözünüzü kapadığımızda şekillenebilecek ilk örgütlenme olayıdır örgütlenmelerinde inanç var. O anlamıyla da aslında biraz inanç örgütlenmesi ama ona paralel hastanesi var, kreşi var, okulu var, kütüphanesi var, araştırmacılığı var en önemlisi dernekleri var. Yani bu söylediklerim, dernekleri kapatalım falan değil. Dernekler birlikte devam edecektir ama sizin yukarıda başka bir yapılanma yaratmanız lazım. Bu da dergah örgütlenmesi olacaktır diye düşünüyorum. Bu tartışmalarda biliyorum ki ben o anlamıyla karamsar değilim işin doğrusu bu tartışmalar bizi etnik bir noktaya götürecektir. O yüzden CHP yerine Alevilerin olmamasından dolayı ya da seçilemeyeceğinden dolayı. Ya aslında bir iki arkadaşımız var işin doğrusu yani gelip de Alevi derneklerine girmiş bir tek arkadaşımız var: Necati Yılmaz arkadaşımız için. Bu da mesela bizim canımızı acıtıyor ama bundan dolayı da şöyle bir psikolojiye girmeye gerek görmüyorum. Yani bu işte yandık yıkıldık deyip ben önümüzdeki dönemde bir biçimde bu işi yapılandıracağız diye düşünüyorum. Çünkü bunu yapılandıramadığımız sürece ama yapılandırdığımız sürece ben sıkıntılarını

hallolacağımı düşünüyorum. Teşekkür ederim.

A: Sevgili canlar merhabalar. Böylesine anlamlı bir toplantıda bir arada bulunduğumuz için ben Alevilik tarihi açısından çok önemli buluyorum. Devamını daha da zenginleşmiş bir biçimde diliyorum. Sevgili Cevdet arkadaşımız gerçekten bana söyleyecek çok fazla söz bırakmadı ama O'na ilave edeceğim birkaç cümle olacak. Emel Hanım biraz önce bir yazıdan bahsetti. O yazı kadınsız Alevilikti. Radikal gazetesinde okuduğumda içimin çok acıdığını hatırlıyorum. Hatta öyle bir etki yarattı ki yani böyle bir travma desem o ruh halini sanırım en iyi şekilde anlatmış olurum diye düşünüyorum. Evet kadınlar açısından durum böyle de, kadını olmayan Alevilik. Peki sosyologu olmayan Alevilik var mı? Tarihcisi olan bir Alevilik var mı? Gerçekten kabul görmüş, saygı gören, başkan olmanın ötesinde lider olan kadroları var mı Aleviliğin? O da yok. Siyasetçisi var mı? O da yok. Yani Alevilik bir bütün olarak baktığımızda aslında çok zavallı, biraz perişan, biraz acınacak halde diye düşünüyorum. Küçük bir anım var çok içimi acıtan. Bir Alevi aile çocuğunu Fethullah Gülen'in kolejlerinden birisine verdiğini söyledi. Niye böyle bir ihtiyaç duyduğunu da belki bizim yüzümüzde tokat etkisi yaratacak bir cümle kullandı. 'Çünkü artık çocuğuma bazı değerleri aktaramıyorum en azından daha ahlaklı olacağını düşünerek böyle bir mekanizmanın olduğunu varsayarak bu cemaatin okullarından birisine verdim' dedi. Sanıyorum bu cümleden çıkaracağımız çok dersler vardır. Geleneksel ilişkileri bozulmuş, geleneksel otoritenin şehirleşmeyle birlikte parçalanmış bir Alevilik var. Aleviler yolunu bulmaya çalışıyor. Aleviliğin yolunu bulması sanıyorum Alevilerin yolunu bulmasından daha zor, daha meşakkatli bir emek istiyor. Çünkü Alevilik artık dağ başlarında yaşayan homojen birbirini tanıyan, gören, bilen, kontrol eden bir topluluk olmanın ötesinde her türlü etkiye açık, korunmasız, savunmasız bir durumda görünüyor. Bunu sadece devlet baskısı, devlet asimilasyonu şeklinde ifade edersek bence sorunu görmemezlikten geliriz. Sonuçta devlete karşı mücadele Alevileri bir araya getiriyor ama mülkiyet ilişkileri, kültürel hegemonya, bizim dışımızda üretilen hegemonya, bizim dışımızda kurulan inançsal hegemonya sanırım devlet baskısından daha fazla etkili oluyor. Bunu şuradan anlayabiliyorum; biraz önce anlattığım örnek aslında devletten besleniyor ama aynı zamanda bir cemaatin çok uzun perspektifine 100 yıllık, 500 yıllık planlarına dayalı, düşüncelerine dayalı bir toplum düzeninin aslında bir ürünü ama bizim gibi gündelik düşünen, gündelik yaşayan Alevilere sanıyorum çok yabancı böyle uzun ömürlü planlar. Kaymakamlarının bugünün ziyaretçilerinin bugünün televizyonlardaki o İslamcı anlayışı çok yüceleştiren İslamcı anlayışın insanların 80'li yıllarda oturan gençler olduğunu, çocuklar olduğunu unutmamak lazım. Burada sevgili Cevdet gerçekten çok iyi anlattı. Ben o sözcükleri kullanmayacağım. Büzüm derneklerimiz karınca karınca kendi imkanları ölçüsünde bu mücadeleye bir katkı koydu. Yeterli mi? Elbette ki değil. Belki yaptığımız tahribatlar da var, Aleviliği yozlaştırma anlamında. Bu noktada biz önemli bir işlev gördüğümüzü düşünüyorum ama artık geline durumda dernekler bazı ihtiyaçları göremiyor. Bunu da görmemiz lazım ve gereğini yapmak gerekiyor. Bu genel olarak inanç alanıyla ilgili. Bu alanın düzeltilmesi ve nüfuz ettirilmesi konusunda gerçekten bir otoriteye ihtiyaç olduğunu düşünüyoruz ve bu ihtiyaçlar her geçen gün kendini daha fazla hissettiriyor. Benim bir örgüt yöneticisi olarak gittiğim yerlerde en temel sorulardan birisi şu oluyor: cenazenin kaldırılması için bana dedeyi nasıl, ne zaman gönderebilirsin? Tabi başka ihtiyaçlar da var ama onları anlatmayacağım ben. Burada şu anda bir devletin Alevilikle ilgili düşüncesi var. Bunun karşısında dergahın kesinlikle, bu ifadeyi kullanmak istemiyorum ama başka

bir sözcük bulamadığım için söyleyeceğim, sivil bir Aleviliğin sivil bir Aleviliği örgütlemesi gerekiyor. Çünkü yakın zamanlarda sanıyorum karşımıza devlet ve hükümet Aleviliği daha fazla çıkacak. Devlet bu noktada öncelikle her kendisine Alevi diyen veya Alevi duyarlılığını taşıyan insanlara şu bilinci vermeli: biz vermeye çalışıyoruz ama bizim örnek alınmışlığı aynı kanaatte değil. Sonuçta birisi daha insanın manevi tarafına hitap ediyor ve daha fazla inandırıcılığı oluyor diye düşünüyorum. Biz siyasal mücadele verdiğimiz için ister istemez bir tartışmanın içerisinde yer alıyoruz. Öncelikle benim çok hassas olduğum bir konu var. Çünkü bunun çok acısının olduğunu düşünüyorum. Aleviliğin bir inanç olduğunu, bir felsefe, bir kültür böyle tanınmamaları, tanınmaların yapılmasına imkan vermemesini gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Bu konuda taşıdığımız belli çünkü az çok siyasal hareketlerden geliyoruz. O siyasal düşüncelerimle Aleviliği eşitlemeye çalışıyoruz ve kalkınma olmadan ne yazık ki Aleviliğe çok büyük kötülükler yapıyoruz. Son 40-50 yılın en büyük tahribatı budur ve aslında sorunların büyük bir kısmı da bu bakış açısından dolayı ortaya çıkmaktadır. Çünkü ona göre insanlar pozisyon almaktadırlar. Aleviliğe ve Alevilere ona göre muamele yapmaktadır. Kültür dediğimiz zaman bunu bir zamanla çok kullanırdık ne yazık ki aklıma geldi ve cem evlerinin bir kültür merkezi olarak kabul edilebileceğini söylüyor ama biz diyoruz ki buralar bir ibadet yeridir. Dolayısıyla ağızımızdan çıkan sözcüklerin bir 10 yıl sonra, 20 yıl sonra bizim karşımıza nasıl bir siyasal proje olarak geleceğini kestirebilecek yetenekte, bilgide insanlara ihtiyaç var. Devlet bu anlamda gerçekten insanları bilinçlendirmeli. Ayrıca Alevilik bir inançtır. Utanmaya, mahcup olmaya hiç gerek yoktur. İnanan inanır, inanmayan da inanmaz. Saygı duyarsa duyar duymazsa bizim de buna bir saygımız olur. Bizim çünkü hoşgörü sınırlarımız çok geniş nedense. Dolayısıyla dergahın en temel görevinin ben bu olduğunu düşünüyorum. Eğer bunu biz aşarsak, bu bilinci insanlara verebilirsek sanırım birçok sorunu da kendi içimizde halledeceğiz diye düşünüyorum. Bir de temel bir sorun var. O da samimiyet sorunudur. Yani bu hareketin içerisinde olanların elbette ki herkese saygımız, sevgimiz var ama konuya başlarken söylediğim gibi kadınsız Alevilik, sosyologsuz, tarihçisiz Alevilik gibi bizim içimizde ne yazık ki Aleviliğe inanan hakikaten farklı disiplinlerde çalışan, bizim önümüzü açacak insan yok. Belki derneklerin başarısızlığıdır diyebiliriz ama ben ondan öte bu çok modernist kuşakların, çok pozitivist değerlerin de insanları buralardan uzak tuttuğuna inanıyorum. Aslında söylenecek çok şey var. Bu toplantıların daha dar ölçülerde, daha zihin açıcı biçimde devam ettirmek gerekiyor. Bizim derneğimiz Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği'nin bu çalışmaları gerçekten önemsiyor ve bir ihtiyaç olarak görüyor. Her türlü örgütsel desteği de vermeye hazırız. Beni dinlediğiniz için teşekkür ediyorum.

A: Öncelikle hepinizi selamlayarak başlamak istiyorum konuşmama. Ben bu tür konuşmaları yakinen takip eden ve destekleyen bir kurumun üyesiyim. Çok anlamlı buluyorum bu çalışmaları. Gerek Cevdet, gerekse diğer arkadaş Alevi örgütlenmeleri ve Alevilerle ilgili sorunları dile getirdiler ama bizim kendimize yönelik bir özgüven sorunumuz var Aleviler olarak. Ben şunu hep ısrarla söylüyorum sorun Alevilik değildir, sorun Aleviler ve Alevileri konuşanlar ve insanların Alevilere bakış açısıdır. Sadece Alevilere değil devletin bizzat dine, sosyal hayata, laikliğe bakış açısıyla alakalıdır ve Alevilerin tarihleriyle ilgili barışık yaşamamasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Bana Alevilik öğretir misiniz diyen 70 yaşındaki insanlar, bana Alevilik öğretir misiniz diyen 20 yaşındaki insanlarla karşı karşıya geliyoruz. Sanki hiç Aleviliğimizi bilmiyormuşuz, sanki Alevilik diye bir

inanç yokmuş ve sanki bu devirler bu inancı yaşamamışlar ve sanki bunu hiç görmemişler gibi çok tuhaf bir algılamanın, hareketin içerisinde bulunuyorlar. Bu beni hep şaşırtmıştır. Ben vakıf başkanı olduktan sonra Türkiye'deki çok fazla gezen insanlardan birisiyim ve hep kendime bir özgüvenim olduğunu orada çok net görmüştüm. Bu özgüvenle ilgili daima her konuşmamda bahsetmiştim. Kimse bize Aleviliği öğretmez. Bizzat biz kendimiz Aleviliği yaşıyoruz ve yaşatmak zorundayız. Devletten medet uman Alevilerin bizim çocuklarımıza din derslerinde Alevilik öğretilsin diyen Alevilerin tarihini çok iyi okumaları lazım. Başkalarının öğrettiği Alevilik ve başkalarının yetiştirdiği Aleviler tarihte hep düşmanımız olarak karşımıza çıkmıştır. Hem din olarak düşmanımız olmuşlardır hem de yolumuza ve öğretimimize düşman olarak karşımıza çıkmışlardır. Tabi ki çağımızın değişmesiyle birlikte modernleşmeyle birlikte Aleviler kendi inançlarını sıkıştırıp yaşamaya çalışıyorlar ve utanç verici davranıyorlar. Yani bir Aleviliğin ben ceme gidiyorum demesi toplum da veya bir komşusuna ben Aleviyim demesiyle ilgili hala sıkıntılar yaşadığımızın farkındayım. ve her şeyi örgütlerden beklemek gibi bir keyfiyet, bir rahatlığın içerisinde. Alevi örgütlerine gelmekten çekinirler, mücadeleye destek vermekten sakınırlar, onların sosyal, kültürel ve ekonomik sıkıntılarıyla ilgili olarak dedikodu üretmeyi çok iyi becerirler. Tamamını kastetmiyorum ama büyük bir kısmı bu nitelikte. Gerçekten çok fedakar olanları da vardır. Onlara zaten hiçbir sözümüz yoktur. Bunu aşmak zorundayız arkadaşlar. Birilerini örnek alarak bunu götüremeyiz. Yolumuzu feryat ve figan üzerine acılar üzerinde şekillendirip de götüremeyiz. O acılardan aldığımız dersle yola devam etmek zorundayız. Bunlarda bir sıkıntı yok, sıkıntı bizlerde. Bunu böyle yürütmeye çalışanlarda. Tabi köyde yaşadığımız sosyal, kültürel, ekonomik davranışların şehirde farklılaştığının artık farkına varmak zorundayız. Köydeki o kapalı ilişkilerin şehirde yaşanmayacağını, farklı olacağını görmek zorundayız. Üretim ve tüketim şekillerinin orda çok farklı olduğunu görmek zorundayız. Bunla ilgili yeni davranış şekilleri üretmeliyiz. Köyde bir gelenek yaşıyor arkadaşlar. Köyde dedeyi bilerek yaşıyorsun. Köyde camiye de ihtiyaç yoktur. Kendiliğinden gelişen ve devam eden bir süreçtir ve devam ediyor ama burada her şey çok farklı. Burada her şeyi yeniden inşa etmek zorundayız. Mekansal bakımdan inşa etmek zorundayız. İnancın söylemlerini yeniden inşa etmekten bahsetmiyorum. O söylemleri cesaretle burada söylemek zorundayız. Her şeyi derneklerden beklemek de haksızlık olduğuna inanıyorum. Evet Alevi dedeler arasındaki sorun ve Alevilerin şu anda yaşadığı en büyük sıkıntılardan bir tanesidir. Dergahın ve toplumun hareketi çok değerli ve önemlidir. Bu süreçte buraya bir el atmalıdır. Bunu ele almak zorundadır. Alevi dedeleri kavramından veya ben senden önceydin söylemlerinden artık vazgeçmeli. Alevi tarihini direk asimile etmeye yönelik bir hareketi ve ilk adımı attılar. Her durumda olduğu gibi bu onlarla birlikte çalışanlar var. Bunlar kaygıları farklı olan insanların Alevilikle ilgili söylemleri de farklı olur. Alevi sonucunda çıkan bizim en başından beri bildiğimiz oralarda birlikte olmak veya yıldızlı otellerde onlarla birlikte bir şeyler paylaşmanın Alevi dünyasına bir şey katacağını sandılar. Bir şey katmayacağı açıktır bu ülkede. Türbanı konuşanlar boşa konuşuyorlar arkadaşlar. Türbanı konuşanlar fakültelerini ve diyanetin bilmeden konuşurlarsa hayal peşindeler, sadece bazı siyasi partilerin sosyal ilgili olarak yapanlar ve tarih içerisinde kullandıklarını çok geç göreceklere. Bunu çok net söylemek gerekiyor. Alevilerin kendilerinden istediklerini başkaları için de isteme cesaretini göstermek zorundalar. Aleviler eşit yurttaşlıktan samimi bir şekilde bahsetmiyorlarsa, Alevilerin kendi etnik yapısından samimi bir şekilde bahsetmiyorlarsa ve Aleviler bu ülkede samimi konuşmuyorlarsa Aleviler daha çok bekleyeceklerdir. Aleviler kendilerini sorgulamazlarsa, siyasal

mevkilerini sorgulamazlarsa ve cesaretli davranıp kendi eylemlerini geliştiremezlerse bugün yaşadıkları hayal kırıklığı ilk olmayacaktır. Son da olmayacak bunu bilesiniz. Bize yıllarca söylediler Türkiye laikdir, laik kalacaktır diye. Türkiye'nin laik olmadığını söyleyen arkadaşlarınızı kendi içinizde temizleyin. Geçici hiçbir çözüm, hiçbir yarayı iyileştirmemiştir. Onları geçici bir şekilde kandırmıştır ve o yaranın sahipleriyle o uyuğu birbirine yabancılaştırmıştır ama iş işten geçmiştir. Çözüm bulamamıştır. Şayet biz, Aleviler, Türkiye'de ortak yaşamın faydalarını gerçekleştirebileceksek o zaman Aleviliği de kendimiz yeniden şekillendireceğiz, o zaman tarihimizdeki o çoğulcu, çeşitli yapıyı yeniden kurmuş olacağız. Sorunlarımızın birinci elden çözülmesi lazım. Alevi dedeleri dergahta tekrar toplamak cemlerimiz artık cumaları okunacak şekle gelmiştir. Aleviler dağılmış durumdadır ve onları tekrardan bir arada toplamak gerekiyor. Bu bizim birinci görevimiz. Biz insanlarımızı, cem evlerimizi buradaki etkinliklerimize davet etme cesareti ve davet etme yöntemleri bulamazsak dışarıda başka bir Alevilik üretiliyor ve çok güçlü üretiliyor ve bizi görmeyeceklerdir. Bunlar ayrı bir toplum arkadaşlar. Dergahın hareketine hiç kimsenin bencillik göstermeden destek vermesi lazım. Hiç kimsenin sorgulamadan, bu olayı bu işin bir tarafında tutması lazım. Bunun sosyal, kültürel ve ekonomik yönünü hepimizin karşılaması lazım. Dergah kendi sosyal köşkümüzde oturmanın onursuzluk olduğuna inanıyorum. Orada gelen sözleri süreçte dikkate almalıyız ve elimizden gelen çabayı sarf edebilmeliyiz. Yola işin bir tarafını çözerek devam ettiğimizde başarılı olacağımıza inanıyorum. Bize şu anda en acil gerekli olan şey dedelerimizin birleşmesi, Alevi dilini kullanması. Uzaklaştık Alevi dilinden. Bu dili dedeler kullandığı andan itibaren biz bunu kullanabiliriz, topluma yayabiliriz. Ve cenaze... Bir şekilde Alevi diliyle bu cenazeleri kaldırmalıyız. Çok cesaretli davranmalıyız. Hiç çekinmeden. Bu açıdan utanılacak hiçbir hareketimiz yok arkadaşlar. Asıl öbürleri utansınlar. Siz kimsiniz? Ne söz geçirmedik, laf geçirmedik, kimsenin kanını toprağa dökmedik. Ama bizim kanımızı toprağa dökenler var, bizim canımızı, malımızı ve ırzımızı helal görenler var. 16. yüzyılda Kanuni döneminde 21. yüzyılda bu ülkeyi yöneten başbakan aynı sözü söyleme cesaretiyle bulunabiliyor tekrardan. Kendimizi sorgulamalıyız. Evet biz işin pozitif yönüne bakıyoruz, işin biraz da derlenip, toplanıp ama işin her alandaki sahipleri taşın altına ellerini koymak zorundadır. Bugün dedelerimize çok büyük bir sorumluluk düşüyor. Hiçbir dedemizin sorgulamadan etrafına toplanması gerekiyor. Varsa bir sorun orada konuşulması lazım. Dışarıda dedikodu üretmenin hiçbir şeye çözüm olmayacağını herkesin bilmesi lazım. Evet Cevdet arkadaş simgelerimizden bahsetti. Ben Alevilerin simgelerinin değerli olduğuna inanıyorum ve bütün kültür merkezlerinde mutlaka o simgelerden var olmasına gerektiğine inanıyorum ama Alevilerin dedelerinin ve inanç işlerini yürütenlerin, cenaze işlerini yürütenlerin bir papaz, bir imam gibi belli bir simgeye bürünmesini asla doğru bulmuyorum. Alevilik içerisinde bir Bektaşilik ama unutmamak lazımdır ki asıl olan 'kızılbaşlılık'tır. Hacı Bektaş de bizzat Kızılbaş'tı. Belki de Bektaş kardeşlerimiz bazı simgeleri kullanabilirler ama yolun kendisi o değildir. Yolun kendisi, kızılbaşlıktır ve biz bunun nasıl doğduğunu da biliyoruz. Sevgili dostlar siyaseten geldiğimiz nokta beni yanıltan bir nokta değildir. Alevilere bir kez daha söylüyorum, hiç kimse sorgulanamaz diye bir şey yoktur ki Alevilik inancı bunu çok net söyler. Tarihi yargılayan bir inanış, devletin kurallarını da yargılayabiliyor, yanlışlarını görebiliyor. Aleviler eğer konuşamazlarsa şehit bir şehit olduğunu göremezlerse Aleviler katlanmalı. Hala daha farklı dillerle konuşup onları sorguluyorlarsa Kürtlerin gösterdiği kadar cesaret gösteremezlerse daha çok ağır bir uğrayacaklardır. Hepinize saygılarımı sunuyorum.

A: Özellikle ben dede ocaklarıyla ilgilenen, bu konuda kitaplar yazan, konuşan, çocukluktan beri de bu konuyu merak eden biriyim. Bu anlamıyla baktığımızda, tabii ki dede ocaklarının tarihiyle de ilgileniyorum, bazı söylemlere çok dikkat etmek gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Örneğin Hacı Bektaşî ocağına bir kısım Aleviler ama ocağına da bir kısım Aleviler diyor. Bu bizim dışımızda yani keşke Alevilikte söylemi olsaydı. Ben burada olmamalıdır gibi bir şey söylemiyorum ama bizim dışımızda böyle problemler var. Yani Türkiye'deki Alevilerin bir ocaktır, büyük bir bölümünü barındırır. Kendi diyorlar. Kendi ocağımdan örnek verecek olursam. Ben Ali Seyit ocağının talibiyim benim müridim dede ocağıdır. Dolayısıyla serçeşmem dede Tabî Hacı Bektaşî ocağı da Alevilerin bir bölümünün serçeşmesidir gibi bir algılama var son derece saygılıyım. Peki bunlardan kolayca vazgeçebilir miyiz? Ben vazgeçsem bile Alevi toplumu vazgeçer mi? Bu algıyı kırabilir miyiz? Bunlar çok ince ayrıntılarına kadar düşünülmeli ve konuşulmalı. Bir de ocak denildiğinde bir tekke, türbe, dergah aklınıza gelmeyecek. Ocak dedelerin ve taliplerin oluşturduğu sosyal bir yapıdır. Bir dede grubuyla o dede grubuna bağlı olan taliplerin topluluğuna biz dede ocağı diyoruz. Ziyarete, tekkeye, türbeye demiyoruz. Bir de diyelim ki Türkiye'deki ocakları tek bir yapıda topladık acaba Arapça konuşan Alevileri hiç düşünüyor muyuz? Arap şeyhlerini onların ocaklarını düşünüyor muyuz? Çünkü yarım milyon civarında da bir Arap-Alevi var. Demek ki bu işe kalkışmadan önce iyi düşünmek lazım. Sahadaki bilgileri iyi değerlendirmek lazım. En azından mürid olarak görülen ocakları, Hacı Bektaşî dışında, bunlar çok tartışmalı olmakla beraber. Bunlarla gerekirse en yetkin dedemiz bir araya gelip görüşmelidir diyorum. Saygılar sunuyorum.

NURCAN ÖZTÜRK: Merhabalar. Genel konuşmalarımda 10 yıldır Alevilikle ilgili araştırmalar yapıyorum. Öncelikle yaşta ve yolda büyüklerime hürmetlerimle, akranlarıma ve küçüklerime sevgiyle başlamak istiyorum. Aleviliğin yaşı çok büyük aslında. Türkiye'de Alevilik hala 10 yaşında çocuk konumunda bırakılmış. Bunda bizim, Alevi vakıf, dernek ayrıca federasyonlarının da suçu var. Bir söz var çok sensen sorumlu sensin. Şimdi efendim bizim de hatalarımız var. Toplumsal barış yüzleşerek sağlanır. Utanarak, unutarak, görmezden gelerek, üstünü örterek, unutturarak değil. Birisi damgalarıyla bizim yıkıyoruz. Ulusal değerlere bağlı kalarak, kişiye değil toplumların özgür düşünme ve özgür hareket etme hakları vardır. Hiç kimsenin bu hakları kötüye kullanmak gibi bir hakkı yoktur. Herkes kendi adına yaşar. Herkes kendi adına yürür. Az önce çok güzel bir şey söyledi. Bununla ilgili çok değer verdiğim bir şeyi okumak istiyorum. “Okuduk Kur'an-ı sazar çalarak, Yemedik haramı insan soyarak, Günah işlemedik insan yakarak, Kimseye verecek borcumuz yoktur. Kıldık namazları insan severek, Kullanmadık insanı din diyerek, Kıymadık bir cana Allah diyerek, Kimseye verecek borcumuz yoktur. Yaptık şartımızı hizmet ederek, Kötülere karşı göğüs gererek, Gittik doğruların izini sürerek, Kimseye verecek borcumuz yoktur.” Aslında biz Alevilerin çok önemli bir sorunu var. Alevilik hiçbir zaman bir inanç değildir. Ancak üzülerek söylüyorum ki yatılı öğretmen lisesi sınavını kazanmıştım 11 yaşında fark etmişler ki okulda toplam 15 tane yatılı okulda, devlet okulunda Alevi çocuk var. Kızlı, erkekli çocuklar var. Eski yurt binası akşam ısınmak için. Ben de 11 yaşındayım orta birdeyim. Bizi topladılar kantine. Benim köyümde olmadığını öğrenmişler düşerleri gibi ve bir de ben inançların kaynağını bilmiyorum. Dedemden öğrendiğim birkaç şeyi biliyorum ama inançlarımda kaynağını bilmiyorum. Ben bilmiyorum ve bizi devletin olanaklarından faydalanmayalım diye döverek ve yıldırarak okuldan uzaklaştırmaya çalışıyorlardı ve ben, 11 yaşındayım yani diğerlerinden küçüktüm,

yüzüme atılan yumrukla hala hiçbir zaman yaptıramayacağım ön dişimi kırdılar. Ben izahını vermiştim ve ben o okulu 2500 kişilik yatılı okulu birinci olarak bitirdim. Biz zavallılar arasında kaldık. Ancak bizim de yanlışlarımız var. Oturup kendi yanlışlarımızı düşünmenin zamanı çoktan geçti. Biz hem inançsal hem de siyasal inançta da her yerde hala tutunmaktayız. Ellerinden ancak sağlam oluşturamama ve kendi yapılandırmamızın olabilir. Siyasal gücümüzü dağıttığımızda etkilerimiz yok oluyor ve devre dışı kalmaktayız. Genel siyasal bir partide ağırlık, etkinlik oluşturamama, yön bulamama yıllardır bu anlamda örgütlü davranmış. Ve ben hep hayal de gör düş de gör. Paranıza sahip olun yarın darda kalırsanız lazım olur. Hayal de gör düş de gör hele bir yol düş de gör. Her anlamda söylüyordu ama ünlü olmadığı için.

HÜSNÜ İYİDOĞAN: Halk Ozanları Kültür Derneği genel sekreteriyim. Aleviliğin bir kere kurtarılması lazım diye düşünüyorum. Belki 10000 yıldır var olan Alevilik günümüze kadar dedelerin ve ozanların sayesinde bu şekliyle bize ulaştırılmış ama tabii üretim biçiminin değişmesi, tüketim biçiminin değişmesi, sosyal olayların değişmesi Aleviliğe de yeni bir vizyonun yolunu açmıştır. Fakat biz bu gerçeklerden uzak hala kulaktan dolma, okumadan, gelecek dünyayı görmeden, insanlarımızı daha aydın bir geleceğe hazırlamadan o geçmişteki hurafeleri anlatmışız cemlerimizde. Dolayısıyla Alevi çocukları da artık kapalı toplumdan daha çağdaş bir topluma ulaşmışlardır üniversite okumuşlardır, akademi okumuşlardır. Cemlere döndüğünde çok büyük çelişkilerle karşılaştıkları için cemlere gereken önemi vermemeye başlamışlardır. Bir akademisyenin kafasındaki Alevilik cemdeki gördüğü manzara onu hayal kırıklığına uğratmıştır. Oysa biz Aleviler olarak günümüzde yaşanan ortodoks kimliğin 1-0 önünde başlıyoruz, Alevi genci olarak. Onun için sayı, konuşmacı arkadaşlara da çok teşekkür ediyorum güzel konuşmalar yaptılar. Bizim önerilerimiz şu: 1)Aleviliğin hurafelerden kurtarılması lazım. 2) Aleviliğin belli bir sisteme oturtulması lazım. Yani inanç-din konuşmalarından uzaklaşmamız lazım. Ankara'daki Aleviliğin gidişatı neyse, semahı neyse, Kars'taki Alevinin de aynı olmalı. Bunu bir yazılı metin haline getirmeliyiz ve Türkiye genelinde, Avrupa genelinde yayınlamalıyız. Benim düşüncelerim bu hepinize saygılar sunuyorum.

A: Saygılarımı sunarım. Arkadaşlar ben evvelki konuşmasını bitiren Nurcan kardeşime gerçekten teşekkür ederim. Diğer konuşmacı arkadaşlarım da çok güzel konuştu ama O özden konuştu. O'nun yaşamının yakınından geçen benim yaşamım da olduğu için bana dokundu. Ben bütün hayatımı akademi, mastırla harcayıp bir insan olarak hep çalışarak ilkokul hariç öyle geçirdim, öyle çalıştım, öyle okudum. Şimdi bu hareketine saygılarımla, hürmetlerimle kendilerine bir şeyler arz edeceğim. Geç kalınmış bir şey değil. Zaman geçmiş değil, insanlar düşüncelerini tekemmül ettiği zamana kadar faaliyete geçirdiği zamandan attığı adımdan itibaren bence kara geçmiş olur. Yani bu daha evvel geçen zaman geçmiş olur. İnşallah bu da Aleviliğin içindeki bu kargaşayı sadeleştirip sosyal, siyasal hayattan taşırken inançsal durumunu tamamen değiştirip bir süreçte ve bir kademe kademe sonuç talimat alıp tabana kadar, tabandan işlenen olaylar dergaha intikal etmek. Hep yüzeysel açıklıyorlar, tam anlamıyla açıklamıyorlar. Zaten Alevilik budur. Bunun dışında ne tarif edebilirsiniz ki? Yani yazılmış, çizilmiş onca şey dışında tarif edemeyiz.

A: Bundan iki üç ay önce yine burada aynı şekilde böyle bir toplantı yaptık. Orada da ben söz alıp konuştum fakat kısaca dile getireyim biraz onları dinlemedeki gibi

olacak ama. Burada benden önceki kimi konuşmacı arkadaşlarıma katkı anlamında daha doğrusu ekleme anlamında bir konuşma olacak. Bildiğiniz gibi Alevilik yüzyıllardan buraya kadar gelebilmişse ve hala da yaşayabiliyorsa bunlardaki bu iki görevi üstlenen kişilerden biri dedelerimiz diğerleri de zakirlerimiz. Fakat dedelerimiz ne zaman ki bu yolu, yöntemi, kurallarını kentleşmeyle birlikte biraz. Bu sefer o bizim yüzyıllardır köylerde yaptığımız otantik anlamıyla değerlendirdiğimiz Cemlerimiz kentleşmeyle beraber şekil değiştirmeye başladı. Cemlerimiz artık bir gösteriden başka bir şey değildir. Yani bizim gerçekten hayal ettiğimiz görmüyoruz görüyoruz kişileri de görüyoruz. Orada büyük bir hoşgörü çerçevesi nitelendiriliyor ama bu aslında kendi içimize kendi değerlerimizi bozmak, onları asimile etmekten başka bir işe yaramıyor. Fakat günümüze dedelerimiz gerçekten kendilerine yüzyıllardır yüklenen yükü taşıyamadılar. Gerçekten dedelik hizmetini yapanları ayrı tutuyorum onun dışında kendine dedeyim dedirten bir sürü dedeler çıktı. Kimisi daha çok hurafelerden anlatılanlarla yola çıkıyor. Bu anlamda. Yani insanları bu yönüyle anlatıp, aydınlatmak isteyen dedelerimiz var. Gerçekten dedelerimiz bu anlamda Alevilik olsun, Bektaşilik olsun diğer cemin getirdiği konular olsun kendilerini yeterince geliştirmiyorlar, okumuyorlar, araştırmıyorlar. Çünkü ağ gün geçtikçe genişliyor. Artık bilişim çağındayız, uzay çağındayız. Tutup da eskisi kadar çocuklarınıza kılıcı anlatamazsınız, inandıramazsınız. Bunlar bitmiştir. Bu yüzden çağa ayak uydurmak zorundasınız. Dedelerimiz bu anlamda çağın koşullarına göre okumak zorunda. Sosyoloji okumalı, felsefe okumalı, tasavvuf okumalı. Yani toplumu aydınlatacak şekilde kendini bilgilendirmeli. Böyle bir eksiklikleri var. Bunu tamamlamalı. Şimdi gelelim örgütlenme alanına. Benden önce arkadaş bir örnek verdi, kilise modeli, tabi bu bize ne kadar uyar ya da biz ondan ne derece kopya çekebiliyoruz o ayrıca tartışılabilir. Gerçekten arkadaşın da belirttiği gibi bugün bizim Anadolu'da bu Alevi Bektaşiliği yayan ocaklarımız var ve örgütsel anlamda bunlar bir araya gelmişler. Bunları kabul edip diğer ocakları da bunların etrafında örgütleyip yaptığımız zaman sanırım tam anlamıyla inançsal örgütlenmeyi tamamlamış oluruz. Görüldüğü gibi işte 1990lardan sonra bu vakıflar, dernekler çoğaldı. Onların tabi kendi görevleri sosyal anlamda, kültürel anlamda birtakım görevleri yerine getirmektir. Yani Alevilerin ihtiyaç duyduğu işte cenaze kaldırma, gibi birtakım kursları vermektir ama onun dışında inançla ilgili hala bugün bir cenazemizin kaldırılacağına telaşına düşüyoruz orada imamın karşısına duruyoruz. Nerede o zaman bizim erkanımız? En azından bir sürü dernekler kurduk, belediyeden gidip oradan kendimiz için bir arsa alıp cenazemizi kendimiz kaldırma gibi bir işlem başaramadık. Bu ayrıca bizim bir ayıbımız. Şimdi dedelerimiz ne yapmalı? Günümüz koşullarına baktığımız zaman dedelerimiz gerçekten bunlara hizmet amacıyla yola çıkmalı. Kendine diyanetten maaş alacak gibi bir işe yatıp da acaba benim karım var mı gibi bir kaygı taşımamalı ama tarih bunu kabul edecek mi? Etmeyecektir. Tarih ayrıca kendi ocağına bağlı dedenin orada kendilerini gördüler. Onun dışında hiçbir yere kolay kolay kendisini çekmez yani. Bu anlamda görüyoruz sonuçsuz kaldı eğer dedelerimiz gerçekten iyi bir örgütlenme sağlamış olsalardı konusunda olsun, diyanete karşı tutumunda olsun hatta bir siyasi tavrını ortaya koyabilmeliydi. En azından Türkiye gündeminde bazı konular gündeme geliyor kendi aralarında işte böyle ocak temsilcileri bunların bir araya gelip onların yapacağı bir basın açıklaması iki üç basın açıklamasından daha etkili olacaktır. Çünkü devletlerin ancak kendi üye katmanı içerisinde güce sahiptir beyin yapacağı bir açıklamayı bütün Alevi ama bir başkanın yapacağı bir açıklama çok kalacaktır. O da ya duyulacaktır ya da duyulmayacaktır için bundan sonra bu çerçevede ciddi anlamda bir örgütlenme yaratmak zorundayız. Bundan sonraki çalışmalarda bir

atölye çalışmaları yapılmasını öneriyorum. Her konuda nasıl yaşama geçirmeliyiz bundan sonra nasıl yürütmeliyiz nasıl olmalı az önce bir arkadaşımızın önerdiği gibi cemlerimiz nasıl olmalı, iç hizmetler nasıl yapılmalı bunları belli bir sistematığe oturtursak sanırım bundan sonraki inancımız, düşüncemiz, felsefemiz devam edecektir diyorum. Bir de bir ricam olacak. Bunu ister bir eleştiri kabul etsin, isterse başka bir şey. Çünkü Hacı Bektaşî'den aldık diyoruz. Sanmıyorum ben bu işin böyle kolay kolay icazet verildiğini. Yani gerçekten hizmeti yapmayı bilen dedeler hizmetle ilgili iki tane ezberlerim varsa yaparsınız ama bu öyle olmamalı. Bu kadar da kolay değil. Çünkü önce bir kere aşık olmak gerekiyor, gerekiyor sahip olmak gerekiyor. Ancak bu özelliklere sahipseniz siz bu yoksa onun dışında Hani her gördüğünüz sakallıyı da dede, papaz sanmamak lazım.

Didem Doğanılmaz: Alevilik size ne şekilde öğretildi?

Mustafa Şen: Bilgi aktarımı çok sistematik olmadı. Ali-Hasan-Hüseyin figürleri vardır. Horasan geçiş noktası olmuştur. Köken ile ilgili bir tartışmayı çok verimli bulmuyorum. Son zamanlarda da aynı şekilde çalışmalar oldukça arttı. Bu iş ile ilgili bir sonuca varmak zor çünkü, tarihsel bir çalışma yapmak zor. Teolojik olarak çalışmak zor. Ana nedeni de Alevilik'in kaynaklarının düşünülenden daha kompleks olmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Cumhuriyet döneminde de ciddi bir baskının yaşanmış olması. Hacı Bektaş ailelerinin, Bektaşî dedelerinin ülkeyi terk etmek zorunda kalmaları, bilgi kaynağı konusunda sıkıntılara sebep olmuştur. Alevilik İran'dan hatta belki de Kazakistan'dan eski Yugoslavya'ya, Irak'tan başlayıp Bulgaristan'a, hatta Polonya'ya, Rusya'ya gidebilecek bir coğrafyadan söz edebiliriz. 1950lere kadar zorluklarla mücadele ediliyor ve 50lerden sonra göçler başlıyor. Bu da sistemin bozulmasına sebep oluyor. Devlet desteği diye birşeyden söz etmek biraz zor, daha çok devlet kösteği var... 90larda yeniden bir “başlangıç” dönemi. Alevi örgütlerinin gelişmesiyle birlikte, köken üzerine gitmek daha popüler hale geldi. Alevilik'te, formal bir yaklaşım yok. Alevilik, Bektaşilik'ten daha geniştir. Bektaşilik tarikat örgütlenmesidir. Alevilik doğum ile birlikte gelir ancak, Bektaşilik sonradan edinilebilir bir kimliktir. Farklılık her yerde, İslamiyette de benzer durum söz konusudur. Endonezya'dan Fas'a çeşitlilik görülebilir. Biz kabaca Alevilik ve Sünnilik diyoruz ancak onlar da kendi içlerinde farklılıklar gösterebiliyorlar. Sünnileştirilen gruplar mevcut ve bu da asimilasyon politikasının bir sonucudur. Cumhuriyet döneminde daha güçlü bir asimilasyon politikası mevcut. Diyanetin de etkisinin olduğunu belirtebiliriz. Laik Sünnilerle, Aleviler arasında çok da büyük bir fark yok. Birçok laik sünni de kendini Alevilik'e daha yakın görüyor. Daha eşitlikçi olması (kadın-erkek), ibadetin Türkçe olması, deyişlerin Türkçe kullanılması gb durumlar laik Sünniler açısından dikkat çekicidir. Belirli noktalarda olay teolojiden ayrılarak siyasi farklılıklara da gitmektedir. Örneğin iki solcu Sünni ve Alevi arasında çok büyük bir fark bulamazsınız. Evet yakın dönemde, sol görüş daha baskın durumdadır Alevilikte. Zorunlu din dersleri, kurumsal ayrımcılıktır. Diyanet işleri asimilasyon politikasının başını çekmektedir. Her yerde asimilasyona maruz kalınabiliyor. Büyük şehirlerde kaçmak kaybolmak çok daha kolay. Ancak küçük yerlerde bu şekilde değildir.

DD: Alevi çalıştay raporu ile ilgili ne düşünüyorsunuz?

MŞ: Evet daha rahat konuşuluyor şuanda ancak sadece konuşuluyor, somut bir adım yoktur. (Son 10 yılda konuşulabiliyor olması). Dağ fare doğurdu. Bakan iyi niyetli idi ancak... ilahiyatçılarla hazırlanan bir çalışma. Zaten bir şekilde İslami geçmişi olan kişilerle yazılıp tartışılıyor. Örneğin başörtüsü ile ilgili olarak bir dede çağrılmıyor, bu sebeple Aleviler için neden ilahiyatçılar çağrıldı. Kimi zaman, çalıştay olmanın dışında, yaftalama, yer yer aşağılama şeklindedir. Çalıştaylar genel olarak hep problemleri geçti. Bakış açısında bir problem var. İlahiyat, Diyanet her adımda işin içinde olmak istemişlerdir. Olmazsa da İslami yazarlar el atmışlardır, tanımlamaya çalışmışlardır. Ancak kimsenin, hukuki olarak da, böyle bir hakkı

yoktur. İlginç bir stratejileri vardır, örneğin bir kez devrim kanunları Alevilerin önüne konmuştur. Birkez dendi ki, eğer biz size hak verirsek, Nakşilere de vermemiz gerekir, dendi, bu nasıl bir mantıktır. Alevileri bir tarikat düzeyine indirmek istemişlerdir. Çocuk kandırma gb pedagojik bir işlem dönüyor. Aleviler eğitilecek güdülecek bir grup gibi görülüyor. Çalıştayın yürütülmesi yanlış gitti. Bir açıdan küçümsememek lazım, ancak ciddi bir hayal kırıklığıdır. Bazı konularda mesela hiçbir tartışma yoktur.

Madımak'ın müze yapılması, bu kimseye zarar vermeyecek birşeydir, kültür merkezi bile olabilir. Zorunlu din dersleri, bütün partilerin katılabileceği birşey, çok zor değil. Büyük büyük düzenlemelere gerek yok, içeriği değiştireceksin. Zaman zaman deniyor ki, eğer biz oraya Alevilik'i sokarsak, bir de seçmeli Sünnilik olsun, pratik dersleri olsun, okulda namaz kılınsın. Zaten anayasaya aykırı olduğu halde namaz öğretiliyor, açıkça din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi deniyor ama pratik öğretiliyor. Tüm dini gruplar açıklanmalıdır. AB müktesebatı açısından da uyulması gereken bir konu.

Hacı Bektaş Dergahı'nın statüsünün değiştirilmesi. Para verip giriyor Aleviler dergahlarına. Birkaç küçük ciddi düzenleme ile halledilebilir. Aleviler için Serçeşmedir. Ziyaretin dini anlamı vardır. Aslında bir iki çok basit çözüm önerileri var. Cemevlerinin statüsü. Kimse cemevlerine para verilsin demiyor. Anayasamıza göre, dini bir mekanın tanımlama yetkisi yoktur ve buna gerek de yoktur. İbadethane denmesi yeterli. Cemevi için Diyanet görüş bildiriyor, mantık bu. Çözmek çok kolay bir iştir. Cemevi kabul edilirse, camiye alternatif olur deniliyor.

DD: Avusturya'daki kararı nasıl yorumluyorsunuz?

MŞ: Avrupa biraz daha karışık. Hatta Avusturya'da farklı bir sistem var. Örneğin Almanya Alevilik'i okutuyor. Aleviler hiçbir yerde, devlet ile çatışma içine girmemiştir. Avrupa'nın raporlarında bunlardan bahsedilmesi, hükümeti de harekete geçirmekte etkili olmuştur. Referans demokrasi, insan hakları ve kardeşliktir. Gerçekten önemli bir adımdır, Avusturya'daki karar.

DD: Kanuni haklar verilse bile, Sünni-Alevi arasındaki önyargı kalkar mı?

MŞ: Zaman gerekir. Kamu otoritesi gerekmektedir. Örneğin, ABD'de ırkçılığın kaldırılması 50li yıllar, ama 50 yıl sonra bir siyahi başkan oldu.

DD: Örneğin, Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül bir açıklama yaptı, rektorler atadım.

MŞ: Evet 1 tane.

DD: Bu ayrımcılık değil midir?

MŞ: Aslında bu gayri ihtiyari söylemdir. Ama dindar toplumlarda bu böyledir. Örneğin ben kendimi bu ülkeye din bağı ile bağlı görmüyorum, vatandaşlık bağı ile bağlı görüyorum. Etnik olarak da bağlı hissetmiyorum, tek bağım vatandaşlık bağıdır. Modern cumhuriyette bu böyledir. "Ben Alevi bir rektör atadım." demek, aslında ben rektörlerin dini kimliklerini biliyorum ve önemsiyorum demektir. Gayri ihtiyaridir ama, kamu yöneticisinin sıkıntısı olduğunu gösteriyor. Çalıştaylarda sorun Alevilik sorunu değil, vatandaşlık sorunudur. Bu ülkenin Sünni kesime karşı dini konuları var, devlet yapıyor. Avrupa'da laiklik uygulamaları ile de çok bir bağdaşma yok. Bizde Diyanet devletin bir parçası. İlahiyatlar var, imam hatipler var, zorunlu din dersleri var ve bunların hiç birinin Alevilik ile alakası yok. Aleviler zaten bu kurumlar yoluyla baskıya uğradıklarını ve asimile edildiklerini düşünüyorlar. Biz sadece vatandaşlık haklarımı bana geri ver. Zorunlu din derslerindeki asimilasyon politikasından vazgeç, ibadethanemi tanı ve bir iki küçük

şey daha var (Serçeşme'yi Alevilere iade et). Üç dört tane konu, çok uzatmaya gerek de yok. Diyanetin bütçesi problemdir, son yılda %40 artış var bütçesinde. Bu sadece Alevilerin değil Sünnilerin de sıkıntıları vardır. Devlet bu kadar dinle içiçe olmalı mıdır?

Sadece Diyanet ile de sınırlı değil, aile imami diye bir şey var. Hayatın her alanına nüfuz etmek istiyorlar. Sünniliği de tek forma indirmek istiyorlar. Türkiye 'strictly secular' denir, ama katısı bu ise... Sanki hala 20lerde 30larda yaşıyormuşuz gb bakılıyor. Ama hiçbir şey aynı değil. Türkiye ciddi dönüşümler geçirdi. Sadece bu konu üzerine eğilmek yeterli olmayacaktır. Yavaş yavaş laikleşme var o dönemde, ama aynı zamanda ilahiyatlar da kuruluyor Diyanet de kuruluyor. Şuanki Türkiye'de ilahiyatlar, azınlık dışında, olması gereken teolojik yapıya ait değildir. Yalnızca Sünni İslam, yine.

Didem Doğanılmaz: Nusayri olarak biliniyor Arap Aleviler, bu şekilde tanımlayabilir miyiz?

Ahmet Özüğurlu: Hayır, bu şekilde tanımlanamaz. Bu başkalarının tanımlamasıdır. Osmanlı döneminde ortaya çıkan bir kavram. Osmanlı bu isme sahip çıktı, negatif ayrıştırma için kullanıldı. Yoksa bizim adımız Alevi'dir. Nusayri ismini, bizim insanlarımızdan da benimseyenler vardır, tabii ki. Çünkü yıllar içinde bu şekilde tanımlanmıştır bu halk.

DD: Ne demek peki, Nusayri?

AÖ: Muhammed ibn-i Nusayr isminde, yaklaşık 1100 yıl önce yaşamış bir din bilgini, bir kişiden geliyor. Saygımız çok büyük ancak, onun kurmuş olduğu bir mezhepmiş gibi isimlendirilmiştir, ancak doğru değil. 11. imamın kalem müdürü gibi bir konumda olan kişi. Zaman içinde İslam'a aykırı inançlar soktuğunu düşündüler ve o dönemde de bizi İslam'ın dışına itebilmek için bu isim kullanıldı. Biz Hz. Ali'ye tabii olan Alevi ismini taşıyoruz, başka da bir isme gerek yoktur.

DD: Türkmen Alevilerinin yaşadığı Alevilik ile Arap Alevilerinin yaşadığı Alevilik arasında bir farklılık var mıdır?

AÖ: Çok ciddi bir farklılık vardır. Yemen kökenliyiz biz. Zaman içerisinde göçler oldu. İki sebepten göç olur, ya ekonomik sıkıntı vardır, ya da politik baskı. Bizimki biraz can korkusu sebebiyle olanlardır, diğer etki de vardır tabii de. En sonunda Irak, Suriye ve Lübnan dolaylarında kalınmıştır.

DD: Alevilik'i ne şekilde tanımlarsınız?

AÖ: Alevilik İslam'ın özüdür. Hz. Muhammed benden sonrası için size iki emanet bırakıyorum diyor: birincisi Ehl'i Beyt'im ikincisi de Kuran'ı Kerim. Alevilik işte bu iki emanete sahip çıkan gruptur. Kuran'ı Kerim'i yorumlarken, Ehl'i Beyt'ten aldıklarımızla yaparız bunu. Bizde Kuran tefsir etmek yasaktır. Ehl'i Beyt yapar bunu. Ehl'i Beyt ile birlikte yürüyün diyor, Hz. Muhammed. Bizim ayırım noktamız budur. Anadolu Alevilik'i çok sonradan ortaya çıkan bir inançtır. Tasavvuf akımından ortaya çıkan bir sonuç diyebiliriz. Onların adına konuşmak istemem tabii de. Bu akımın sebebi, Sünnilik'in şekilciliğinden doğan rahatsızlıktan ortaya çıkıyor. Biz de "En-el Hak" yoktur. Allah'ı tüm bu somutlaştırmalardan ayrı tutarız. Biz deriz ki, "Ne Aleviyiz, ne Sünni, hem Aleviyiz, hem Sünni". Biz Kuran'ı yüzde yüz kabul ederiz. Namaz, oruç, hac, zekat... Bektaşilerden çok büyük farkımız vardır. Kuran'da yazan her harf, kelime bizim için farklıdır. Sünnilikten farkımız da halifelik makamı ile alakalıdır. Biz tamamen Ehl'i Beyt'ci ve 12 İmamcı'yızdır. Sanki, Şiiiler ile birleşiyoruz gibi görünüyoruz ama aslında onlarla da farklılıklarımız vardır, ancak çok da büyük değil. Zaman içinde yaşanan coğrafyadan dolayı ortaya çıkan farklılıklar vardır. Mesela Türkiye'de biz birçok fiziksel koşuldan ayrılmışızdır. Sünnilerin namazına benzerdir bizim namazlarımız, mesela. Ama camilerden uzaklaştırdık biz, bu sebeple çok da yaygın olmayabilir.) Sünni Müslümanlarla ayrışmada ikinci noktamız da: Usüller vardır, değiştirilemezdir,

temel uygulamalardır, bir de furûnler vardır, tamamlayıcıdır. Sünnilikte namaz, oruç, Hac usûldür ama bizde tamamlayıcıdır. Sünnilik'de olduğu gibi, her türlü günahı işleyeceksin sonra Hacca gideceksin ki, affola, biz de öyle değil. Önce temiz insan olacaksın. Allah'ın haram ettiklerinden uzak kalacaksın. Allah'a inanan her insanı, diğer insanlardan üstün tutup onun canını verebileceksin. Bunları yaptıktan sonra, namaz oruç kavramları da tamamlayıcı oluyor.

DD: Cem ayini gibi ayinler var mıdır?

AÖ: Bir araya geliriz, Ehl'i Beyt'i anarız, kurbanlar keseriz, ama buna cem demeyiz. Aslında bir nevi cem ayinidir bu, ama adına cem demeyiz. Saz söz vardır cem ayininde, ama bizde yöntem farklı. Biz Kuran okuruz. Muharrem orucu gibi kavramlar asla bizde yoktur. 30 günlük ramazan orucu vardır bizde. Ehl'i Beyt'ten, Kuran'ı Kerim den sonra çıkmış hiçbirşeyi kabul etmiyoruz. Bektaşiler ile aramızda çok büyük farklılıklar vardır. Tek ortak noktamız, 12 İmamlar, başka yoktur.

DD: İsa, 12. imam mıdır?

AÖ: Önce 4 kitaptan başlayalım. Kuran'ın emridir zaten bu, ama Kuran'da emredilen, kitapların orjinalleridir. Diğerlerine de iman ediyoruz, çünkü Bakara suresi bunu emretmiştir, ama mevcutlarının değiştiğine inanıyoruz. Hz. İsa'ya gelince, bu sadece Alevilere yüklenecek birşey değildir, başka gruplar da vardır buna inanan. Bu konuda Ehl'i Beyt'in sözleri de vardır. Kıyametten önce "Mehdi" isimli bir önder gelecektir.

DD: Peki "Mehdi" İsa ile aynı kişi midir?

AÖ: Yok. Mehdi inancı, İslam'da ne ise bizdeki de odur. Bizdeki inanç Mehdi inancıdır, İsa inancı değildir.

DD: Eğer namaz, zekat, oruç Arap Aleviliğinde de var ise, zorunlu din dersleri yine de bir problem midir, sizler için?

AÖ: Bizi rahatsız eden kısım, namaz oruç kısmı değil. Bizi rahatsız eden iki kısım vardır. Fıkhi bilgiler veriliyorsa bir kitapta, tamamıyla Sünni-Hanefi bilgileri vardır. Sadece bize değil, Şafilere de sorundur bu. Bir din öğretmeni, bu olayın tamamen politik olduğunu sadece Hanefilikteki anlaşmazlıktan ortaya çıktığını söylüyor, yanlış. Bence Diyanet de kalkmalı, Diyanet kalkacak, her cemaat kendi vakfını kuracak, ama kontrol olacak. Bu böyle olmalıdır. Çünkü devletin bekası herşeyin üstündedir. Şunu da belirtmeliyim: kontrol hükümetin kontrolü değil, devletin kontrolü olmalıdır. Biz devletimize bağlıyız. Birlikten yanayız. Cemaatlere inanç özgürlüğü gelecek ve birlik bozulmayacak. Böylelikle de kimse demeyecek, ben vergi veriyorum, benim vergimle devlet cami yapacak ve orada bana küfür edilecek! Sünni olmayan herkese. Diyanet'in bütçesi de daha mantıklı olarak kullanılabilir bu şekilde.

DD: Sadece din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi verilmelidir yani, değil mi?

AÖ: Tabi burada ahlak bilgisi de görecelidir. Eğer ahlak, Hanefi ahlak ise buna da karşıyız.

DD: Bunların dışında var mıdır, başka talepler?

AÖ: Biz şuana kadar, cumhuriyet döneminden bahsediyoruz, biz ibadetlerimizde özgürüz.mAtatürk'e olan bağlılığımızı belirtmeye gerek yoktur). Yeter ki, bizim ibadetlerimize karışılmasın, kurcalanmasın. Sadece inanç özgürlüğü olsun istiyorum. Kültürümü muhafaza etmek istediğimiz zaman bana karışmasınlar, ben finanse de ederim.

DD: Sıkıntılarınız var mıdır?

AÖ: Devlet bazında yoktur, ancak bireysel olarak vardır. Örneğin, bir makama getirilmiş bir Aleviyi, bireysel olarak birileri izlemesin, onu kontrol etmesinler.

DD: İbadetlerde kadın-erkek eşitliği var mıdır? Kadının yeri nedir, sizler için?

AÖ: İkiye ayırmamız gerekecek. Biz Kuran'a bağlıyız. Cemaat namazını sadece erkekler kılar. Ama adak vardır, Kuran okunur bayanlarla yapılır. Bu İslam'ın genel kavramıdır. Cenazelerde Sünni İslam'da olduğu gibi kadınlar arkalardadır.

DD: Cenazeler camilerden mi kalkar?

AÖ: Hayır, bir defa biz camilerde hiçbirşey yapmayız. İmam önemlidir. Alevi imam varsa olabilir. Ama onun dışında... İmama çok önem veririz. Örneğin bir kez Mersin'de bir camiye, Aleviler tarafından yapılmış bir camiye, devlet imam atadı. İmam namazdan önce "Ey kafirler sizin dininiz size, benim dinim bana" dualarını okuyarak başladılar. Bu şekilde bizler namaz kılamayız. Eğer imam konusunda anlamıyorsak, biz evimizde namazımızı kılarız. Camiye düşman değiliz ama imam konusunda seçiciyiz. Bu sebeple cenazelerimiz camilerden kaldırılmaz. Cenaze namazımız bizde 5 tekbirdir, Sünnilerde 4 tekbirdir ve eller önde bağlıdır, ve eller yanda bırakılır. Muhammed döneminde de böyle kılınmıştır, birinci halife döneminde de böyle kılınmıştır. İkinci halife döneminde değiştirilmiştir. Neden 5 tekbirdir, çünkü 5 vakit namaz vardır ve her vakit için bir tekbir verilir.

Transcript of interview with Tamer Kaya (19 April 2011)

Didem Dođanyılmaz: O zaman azönce de konuştuk ama Anadolu Aleviliđi dediđiniz gibi bir sentez. Bu sentezin kaynaklarını açıklayabilir misiniz? Yani Zerdüş dedik, şamanizm dedik..

Tamer Kaya: Bunun kaynakları işte demin de bahsettiđiniz gibi esas kültür şamanizme dayanır. Orta Asya kültürüdür. Orta Asya'dan bizim atalarımız geldikleri zaman, yani orda atın sırtına binip de Anadolu'da inmemişler. Bugün İran'ın kuzeyi, Afganistan'ın kuzeyi, Horosan dediđimiz bölgeye yerleşmişler. Kıyılarda 400 yıl yurt tutmuşlar, göçebe olarak yaşamışlar, işte 1071'den daha önce Anadolu'ya çeşitli vesileler ile gelmişler gitmişler ve en son Anadolu'yu yurt tutmuşlar ve burda gelirken de her kültürden her dinden etkilenmişler. Onların içerisinde aldıkları olmuş, benimsedikleri olmuş, benimsemedikleri olmuş. Ama benimsediđi güzel şeylerin diyelim, almışlar ve getirmişler Anadolu'ya. Ordaki kültürlerin, dinlerin, yaşam biçimlerinden aldıklarını Anadolu'da kendi kültürlerinden harmanlamışlar, Anadolu Aleviliđi, Bektaşî dediđimiz kültürü meydana getirmişler. Bunların yani maddi temelleri bunlar, buralardan geliyor.

DD: Anadolu Aleviliđi dediđiniz direk olarak Bektaşî Aleviliđi midir? Bunun dışında farklılar var mıdır yoksa Anadolu Aleviliđi demek kapsayıcı mıdır, örneđin ben bu konu ile ilgili sunumumu da hazırlayacađım, hani Avrupa'dan gelen bir çok profesöre yapacađım bu sunumu, orda hangi kimliđi kullanmam sizin için daha doğrudur?

TK: Anadolu Aleviliđidir. Şöyle söyleyeyim; bizim üst çatımız Anadolu Aleviliđidir. Bektaşîlik, onu da şöyle açıklayayım size, Alevilik, Alevi anne ve babadan doğanlar Alevi olabiliyor bizim düşüncemize göre. Fakat Bektaşîlikte yol gardaşlıđı var. Yani siz Sünnisiniz örneđin, bizim görgüç evlerimiz olur, o görgüç evinde, ben Aleviliđi kabul ediyorum, Alevi olmak istiyorum dediđiniz zaman, yol gardaşlıđı olarak yola girersiniz, Bektaşîlik budur. Özde bir yanlışlıđı yoktur, özde bir sapması yoktur, aynı bizim gibi alevilidirler. Fakat Alevililer ana-babadan gelir, Bektaşîlerde yola girenlerden oluşur. Örneđin Bektaşîler içinde çok Sırp vardır, Hırvat vardır. Örneđin Bektaşîliđin kurucusu Balat sultan Sırp'tır. Dimi? onu da biliyorsunuz, bunun gibi. Kavram Anadolu Aleviliđidir yani.

DD: Az önce de söyledik, aynı zamanda Alevilik bir inanç, bir din olmanın ötesinde, Alevilik bir yaşam felsefesi bir yaşam tarzıdır diyebiliriz deđil mi?

TK: Kesinlikle, kesinlikle.

DD: Peki Alevi grubunu nasıl tanımlayabiliriz? Örneđin, etnik grup demek açıklayıcı bir terim midir? Çünkü benim ilgimi çekti, 1 Ekim 2010 tarihinde İzmir Konak Meydanı'nda bir gösteri düzenlendi, oturma eylemi yapıldı. Orada Ali Balkız Bey, her etnik grubun artık yeter diyeceđi bir nokta vardır dedi. Etnik grup olarak tanımlayabilir miyiz Aleviliđi?

TK: Hayır. Biz etnik grup olarak kendimizi tanımlamıyoruz, biz asıl unsuruz. Bizim kültürümüzün kökenleri esasında Türk kültürüdür. Türkmen kültürüdür. Fakat bu kültür ile etkileşen bir sürü kavimler vardır. Örneđin işte Kafkaslarda vardır Balkanlarda vardır, Orta Dođu'da vardır, Orta Asya'da vardır. Yani bu bizim kültürümüzden etkilenmişlerdir ama kavim olarak farklıdır. Fakat esas olarak

Alevilik bir Türk kültürüdür.

DD: Örneğin bir kaynakta da, şimdi aklıma geldi, ilk olarak Türkmen Aleviliği olarak geçiyor, bu coğrafyada yaşanan Alevilik kavramı için. Fakat daha sonra Kürt Alevilerin, Zazaların varlığından yola çıkarak Anadolu Aleviliği söyleminin daha doğru olduğu geçiyor. Bunu da bu şekilde açıklayabiliriz değil mi? Doğrudur?

TK: Aynen. Kesinlikle.

DD: Bir sorun daha var. Örneğin, Balkanlarda veya Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinde de fazlaca Alevi halk mevcut. Genelde Bektaşiler zaten ve bu konu ile ilgili Avusturya anayasa mahkemesinin çok tarihsel bir kararı var, Aralık 2010 tarihinde aldılar. İlk olarak oradaki İslami birliklerin başkanı dedi ki, "Hayır Alevilik diye birşey yoktur. İslamdır, İslam da Sünni İslam'dır" gibi bir açıklaması oldu. Bunun üzerine Anayasa mahkemesi Aleviliğin İslam içerisinde farklı inanışlara sahip olduğunu söyleyerek, Avrupa'da Aleviliğin kendi cem evlerinin, dedelerinin tanınması gibi şeylerin önünü açtığı söylendi. Bu sizde nasıl bir adımdır? Yani Avrupa'da başarılı olacak, somut sonuçlar getirecek bir adımlar olarak değerlendirilebilir mi?

TK: Yani kesinlikle. O insanların da gerçekleri görmesi güzel bir şey. Şimdi Balkanlarda aslında İslamiyet'ten önce, Selçuklularda olsun, Osmanlılarda olsun, bizim misyonerler, yani Osmanlılardan önce Bektaşi babaları geldiler oraya. Ve bugün Balkanlarda Bektaşi yerleşimi çok fazladır. Arnavutluk'un hemen hemen yüzde doksanı Bektaşidir.

DD: Hatta geçtiğimiz günlerde bir toplantı yapıldı orada, devlet bakanımızın da gittiği. Bir Bektaşi dedesiyle birlikte yapılan bir toplantı vardı. O konuda da baya bir nüfusun olduğunu söylemişlerdir.

TK: Kesinlikle vardır. Hatta Türkiye'de yapılan bir çok toplantı ve konferanslara Balkanlardan çok sayıda Bektaşi babası da katılır. Yani bu da onların varlığını gösteriyor zaten. Dediğimiz gibi Arnavutluk bir devlet, Arnavutluğun yüzde doksanı Bektaşidir. Nereden kaynaklanıyor bu? İşte biz Anadolu ve Rum erenleri diyoruz ya, o erenlerin evliyaların, bizim öncülerin, ya da şimdiki tabirle misyonerlerin gidip o halkı savaştan önce o halkı bu görüşe bu felsefeye inandırmalarıdır. Tabi Osmanlı Balkanlara girerken bir kılıç dahi çekmemiştir, çünkü herkes artık bu işe razı olmuştu.

DD: Peki örneğin benim elimde bir harita var. Bu haritada Anadolu Alevileri, Arap Alevileri, Tahtacılar ve Büyükşehir Alevileri olarak dörde ayrılmış bir grup var. Buradan Arap Alevilerinin farklı olduğunu biliyoruz ancak benim Tahtacılar konusunda, bilgi konusunda birşeye ulaşamadım. Nedir farklılıklar veya büyük şehirde bulunan Alevilerin, Anadolu Alevilerinden farklılıkları var mıdır? Yoksa modernizasyon denilen süreç içerisinde mi kendilerini şehir hayatına adapte etmişlerdir? Bu konuda ne çeşit bir farklılıktan bahsedebiliriz?

TK: Bizler hakkaten yüzyıllarca çok büyük şeylere katlandık. Yani, hakaret derecesine varan söylemlerle bizle nolduk kabuğumuza çekildik. Kapalı bir toplum olarak yaşadık, köylerde yaşadık. Dört köyümüz varken, aramızda bir Sünni köyü olduğu için, korkumuzdan üç köy ile irtibat kuramadık. Mesela cemlerimizi, ibadetlerimizi biz gizli yaptık.

DD: Bazen köy girişlerine gözcüler dikildi. Haber verdiler.

TK: Cem yaptığımız, ibadet yaptığımız yerin tepesine insanlar konuldu aman birileri gelirse. Bir örnek vereyim size, bizim köyde benden önce olmuştur, ben çok küçüktüm. Ben Elbistanlıyım. Bizim köyde bir tane Sünni ev var diye, bekliyorlar o ışık sönsün, o ev yatsın ki bizimkiler ibadet yapabilsin. Bakın bir köyün içerisinde bir ev. Yani bu korkunç bir şey. Şimdi biz bunları yaşadığımız için kapalı toplumlarda kalmışız, daha sonra biz şehirlere geldik, varoşlara geldik. Bunu da

keyfimizden gelmedik. Hepimiz gibi işte ekmek davasına. Ve burada yaşam biçimimiz değişti. Sizinle tanıştık, siz bizi tanıdınız, önyargılar yok oldu, etkileşim oldu. Mesela benim iş yerinde arkadaşlarım oldu, komşularım oldu. Konuşurken yani sen Alevi misin? Evet. Allah Allah sanki bir şey varmış gibi. Şimdi bunları yıktık çok şükür. Bu Anadolu için bir kazanımdır. Çünkü bakın, Sünniler de aynı biziz, biz de onlarız. Değişen bir şey yok. Onun içinde büyükşehirlerde olan Alevilerin bu tür bir etkileşimlerden doğan farklılıkları var. Birde bizim geleneklerimizde, örneğin Hristiyanlıkta da var, toplum içerisinde yüz kızartıcı bir suç işleyen varsa aforoz ediliyor onlarda değil mi? Bizde de yol düşkününü sayılıyor. Köylerde, ben bir hata yapmışsam, ben bir komşumun tarlasına girmişsem, veya ben birinin tavuğunun bir yumurtasını kümesinden almışsam, dede beni dara çeker. Bizim dar da halk mahkemesidir. Yanlış anlaşılmasın bizim kendi içimizde halk mahkemesidir. Halkın hepsi orada hazır. Dede sorar buna, der ki bu böyle böyle yapmış, buna şu ceza vermek istiyoruz, ne diyorsunuz, hepsi razı olursa o cezayı verir. Bakın bugün Amerika'daki sistem aynı bizim sistemdir. Beni de yol düşkününü sayarlar. Kimse bana selam vermez, kimse beni evine koymaz, misafirim gelse, Tamer'in evi neresi dese kimse evimi göstermez. Sürüm, koyunum kuzum varsa kimse köyün sürüsüne katılmaz. Toplumdan tamamen dışlanırım. Onun dışında çok dikkat ederiz, davranışlarımıza. Ben kendi yöremizden bahsedeyim. Bizim orda her türlü kavgalar olur. İşte elma koparma, armut koparma, ufak tefek şeyler ama bizim oralarda hiçbir zaman cinayet olmaz. Cana kıymayız, bir. İki, namus meselesi olmaz. Biri birinin gözüne yan gözle bakmış, ondan dolayı da kavga çıkmış, mahkum olmuş, böyle bir şey bizim tabirimizde asla yer almaz. Bunun için, mesela, oradaki o aforoz dediğimiz, ya da yol düşkününü dediğimiz örneğin şehre geldik, cem yapıyoruz. Burada hangimizin dürüst olduğunu kimse bilmez. Dede beni dara çekse, dese ki senin şu yanlışın varmış, abim beni ihbar etse, ben de evet var desem. Seni artık aforoz ediyorum toplumdan dese ben güler geçerim, çünkü beni almasalar da gider kahvede otururum. Onun için biz hep şunu savunuyoruz. Alevi gelenek-görenekleri artık modernize edilmek zorundadır. Yani bakın, en ufak saydığım bir şey artık tedavülden kalkmış. Geçerliliği kalmamış. İşte büyükşehir Alevileri bu tür değişimlere ve dönüşümlere uğradılar. Özlerini kaybetmemekle beraber farklılıklar oluştu. Belki ona farklılık diyoruz. Arap alevileri bizim Nusayri dediğimiz alevilerdir. Onların İran Şiasıyla veya Ortadoğu Şiileri ile pek farkları yoktur. Tek fark olan, Hz. Ali'ye çok büyük bir hayranlık duymalarıdır. Yani haşa Allah'tan sonra gelen hatta bazı bazı Allah olarak düşünülen bir yapıları vardır. Fakat gelenek, görenek, töre, adet olarak da bize hiçbir zaman benzemezler. Bizim tek onlarla bulduğumuz şey nedir, Hz. Ali ve Ehl'i Beyt sevgisi. Onun dışında başka birşey yoktur. Gelelim Tahtacılar. Tahtacılar öz ve öz Türkmendir. Bunlar daha çok Toroslarda, Ege kıyılarında, Marmara'ya varan o bir yay şeklinde olan kıyı şeridinde yerleşmişlerdir. Onların iki tane büyük ocakları vardır. Biri Ahmedi Saniye ocağı, biri Yan Yatır ocağıdır. Ve bunların Tahtacı denmesinin sebebi de aslında, Osmanlı döneminde Osmanlı donanmasını yapmak için bunların buralarda odun kesip, saraya odun göndermelerinden kaynaklanır. Yoksa Türkmen'dirler, Alevidirler. Çok bakir bir yaşamları vardır, daha çok araştırma yapılmamıştır. Daha çok derinlemesine işlenmemiştir. Keşke haberim olsaydı da, Tahtacılar Derneği'nin Başkanı Mehmet Şahin abimiz var, onunla da görüşebilirdiniz. Onun bürosu vardır, kendisi mali müşavirdir, bizim derneğimizin de denetleme kurulu başkanıdır. Aynı zamanda bizim genel merkezin de yönetim kurulu üyesidir. Çok yetkindir bu konuda. Onun için haddimi aşmak istemiyorum. Şimdi köylerde zaten köy şeyi farkı çok kalmadı. İnanın buradaki görüşmelerimiz ne ise benim köyümde de aynı şey oluyor.

Komşuluk ilişkileri aynı oranda geliyor. Onun için bu farklıların çok bariz olduğunu söyleyemeyiz yani.

DD: Tabii etkileşim çağında, iletişim çağında yaşıyoruz zaten. Kopukluk soyutlanmak gibi bir şey söz konusu değil.

TK: Kesinlikle. Ayrıca şu var, Alevi toplumu, inanım Anadolu'daki Alevilerin yüzde yetmiş şuan dünyanın çeşitli ülkelerinde yaşıyor. Bugün Avrupa'da, İngiltere'de, Avustralya'da, Kanada'da. Ve şuna inanabiliyor musunuz, Kanada hükümeti sadece Alevi olduğu için oturma ve çalışma izni veriyor. Yani bir çok insanımız orada, onun içinde etkileşim olmaması mümkün değil.

DD: Peki ibadetlerden bahsedecek olursak, benim ismen duyduğum, hakkında çok bilgi sahibi olmadığım, örneğin dört kapı kırk makam var, müsaiplik kavramı var, işte cem ayini ve oruçlar var, muharrem oruçları, bunların dışında dört kitabın kaynak olarak kullanıldığı bilgisine ulaştım ben. Ve bunlar dışında hadisler, buyruklar, nechülbelaga ve melakip nameler diye bir kaynağa ulaştım. Bunlar hakkında kısaca bilgi verebilir misiniz?

TK: Tabii ki. Şimdi bizim ibadet şeklimiz tamamen Şaman kökenli olduğunu söyledik. Yani müzik ve raks şeklinde ibadet yaparız. Onun da kökeni şudur, bizim fikrimize göre evrende durağan statik hiçbirşey yoktur. Herşey hareket halindedir. Bakın, gökyüzündeki cisimlere bakın, uydulara bakın, hepsi hareket. Yani biz onu şöyle söylüyoruz; bütün evren semah döner. Anlatabiliyor muyum? Bütün evren semah dönüyor. Onun için semah bizim ibadetimizin son noktasıdır. Tanrı ile bütünleşmek için, cemlerimizi yaparız. Cemlerimiz sadece ibadet de değildir. Onu da belki açmam lazım bu konuda. Cemlerden önce biz muhabbet meclisleri açarız. Bunun anlamı şudur; halkın bir problemi bir sorunu varsa, orada halka arz edilir. Halk onun sorunu konusunda bir çözüm üretir ve onun sorununu çözer. Eğer yoksa, şikayetler varsa şikayetler çözülür orada, istekler varsa, arzular varsa onlar orada dile getirilir. Muhabbet meydanından sonra bizim ibadetimizin ikinci kısmında, bu kerbela olayından daha çok etkilenmiştir. Kerbela olayı ile ilgili deyişler çalınır. Dede dualarını okur. Ve ondan sonrada semah dediğimiz, raks dediğimiz semah döneriz en son. Oradada tanrı ile bütünleşiriz. Yani şöyle ki, tabii biz onu folklorik olarak yapıyoruz. Öyle birşey vardı ki ben gözümle gördüm, yetmiş yaşında bir insan, yüz yaşında bir insan, yetmişbeş kiloluk bir adam yüz kiloluk bir adamı elinde alıp böyle semah döndüğünü biliyorum. Buda nerden geliyor, manevi bir şey, yani trans durumuna geçme, tanrı ile bütünleşme. Artık orada kendi değil, başka birşey oluyor orada. Yani böyle bir ibadet şeklimiz var. Dört kapı kırk makam. Bizim dört tane kapı var. Bizim amacımız şu; kamil insan olmak. Kamil insan olmanın da dört tane basamağı vardır. İlki şeriat kapısıdır. Şeriat kapısında şeriata gireriz. Tarikat kapısında tarikata gireriz. Tarikatta yol, yöntem, edep, erkan öğreniriz. Marifete geçeriz. Marifette de tanrının verdiği o güzellikleri kavramak, onları paylaşmak, onları bütün dünyayı bütün yaratınları, işte bu on sekiz bin alem diyoruz ya, Rabbül Alemin diyorlar ya, işte on sekiz bin alemin yaratıcısının o olduğunu ve ona hürmet, sadık kalmak gerektiğini biz o kapıdan öğreniriz. Zaten burada da bunları geçtikten sonrada sır-ı hakikat dediğimiz, tanrı ile bütünleşme, kamil insan olma basamağına erişiriz. Onun içinde her kapımızın on tane maddesi vardır. Anayasa maddesi vardır. İşte şeriatatta on tane maddesini yerine getireceksiniz. Tarikatın on maddesi var onu yerine getireceksiniz. Efendim marifetin on tanesi var ve en sonda sır-ı hakikatın. Zaten o basamağı çıktıktan sonrada siz insan olmuyorsunuz, melek oluyorsunuz.

DD: Kamil insan denilen olguya o dördüncü kapıdan sonra mı eriliyor?

TK: Evet. En son kapı dördüncü kapıdır, ondan sonra kamil insansınız demektir. Eğer o kırk maddeyi başarı ile geçmiş olduktan sonra artık üniversiteden mezun

oluyorsunuz. En üst aşamaya geliyorsunuz, kamil insan oluyorsunuz. İnsan-ı kamil diyoruz. Yani güzel insan olmakta, dünyayı tek gözle görmek. Dünyanın bütün canlıların bir yurdu olduğunu bilmek, bütün canlılara, börtü böcek çiçeğe bile saygı duymak demektir.

DD: Peki Tanrı anlayışı nedir? Ben buraya gelmeden önce bir çok makaleye ulaşmaya çalıştım konuyla ilgili, orada örneğin Sünni inancındaki gibi günahdır gibi, asık suratlı bir tanrı kavramının olmadığına inanılıyor. Hatta şiirlerden bir tanesinde, kılıçtan ince köprü yaptık, erkeksen sen geç gibi bir şey olduğunda söylemişlerdi bana, Ercan Bey anlatmıştı bunu da bana.

TK: Umarım doğru anlatmışlardır. Ben onu tekrar anlatabilirim size. Şimdi bizim tanrı kavramımız, bir ailenin reisi kimdir; babadır. Eğer babaya siz nasıl gözle bakarsınız. Ya baba sizin her şeyinizdir. Rızkınızı getirir, sizi korur, sizi kollar, giydirir, evinizi çatınızı yapar, ekmeğinizi...baba anne bunların hepsidir. Yaratıcıdır. Şimdi ben babamdan ben bir hata yaptığım zaman beni bir kazana koyup haşlayacağını düşünebilir misiniz? Böyle bir şey olabilir mi? Biz onun için diyoruz ki biz tanrıdan korkmayız, niye korkalım. Biz seviyoruz çünkü onun da bizi sevdiğini biliyoruz. Sevgi ile yaklaşıyoruz, bu çok önemli. İkincisi, biz herşeye hakaten eleştirel gözle bakarız. Bu inandığımız veya inanmadığımızdan değildir. Bizim kafamıza bir şey takıldığında biz onu eleştirmekten geri kalmayız. Bakın bir imam, cemaatten bin kişiye namaz kıldırır. Hutbe verir. Bazısı da ne derse desin o toplum amin der. Çünkü orada bir şey vardır. Yani biat kültürü vardır. Bizde biat kültürü yoktur. Biz sorgulayıcıyız. Bilimin de gelişmesinde esas meselelerde oradan, çünkü korkulan adam. Mesela bir Alman bilim adamı diyor, insan hayatını iki şey etkiler diyor; biri merak, biri korku. Korku dinleri doğurur, merak bilimi doğurur. Şuna da inanıyoruz; Kuran'ın ilk ayeti "Oku!". Hazreti Muhammed'e bakıyoruz diyor ki, "Bana bir harf öğretenin kırk yıl kölesi olurum" diyor. Hazreti Ali'ye bakıyoruz, diyor ki "İlim Çin de ise git öğren". Hacı Bektaş'a bakıyoruz, diyor ki, "İlimden gidilmeyen yol karanlıktır." En son Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ümüze bakıyoruz, diyor ki; "Hayatta en hakiki mürşit ilimdir." Mürşit Alevilikte en üst kademe, yani en üst yol göstericidir, hayatta en hakiki mürşit ilimdir, fendir diyor. Burada öğrendiğimiz; bir, ilimden bilimden gideceğiz. İki, şuna da inanıyoruz belirteyim, Allah bizi o kadar güzel yaratmış ki, herşeyi vermiş bize, vicdan vermiş, duygu vermiş düşünce koymuş, mahkeme koymuş buraya hakimi var savcısı var. Örnek, ben bir kötülük yapacağım, vicdan diyor ki yahu sen bu kızcağıza niye kötülük yapıyorsun kardeşim. Ne yaptı bu kızcağız sana? Ben yapacağım o beni engelliyor. Şimdi biz Allah'ın bize lütfettiği o makinayı akıllıca kullanırsak bizim hiç kimseye ihtiyacımız yoktur. Ne hacıya, ne hocaya, ne dedeye, ne Şih'a. Ama biz onu eğer doğru bir yöntemle kullanamazsak birilerine ihtiyaç duyuyoruz. İşte bizim Alevilikte Allah'ın verdiği o lütfü o makinayı doğru kullanmak gibi bir düşüncemiz var. Sorgularız onun için. Bundan hiçbir zamanda yılmayız. Mesela İslamiyet'in içerisinde gördüğümüz eksiklikleri tarih boyunca, o Bektaşî fıkraları boşuna çıkmadı. Benim size gücüm yetmiyor, siz üç kişisiniz ben bir kişiyim. Siz bana bir şey diyorsunuz, bende size, hem sizi kırmadan, hem dökmeden, hem de düşüncenizin yanlış olduğunu size belirterek fıkra olarak sunuyorum. Bir de tanrı kavramında çok hassas davranıyoruz. Tanrının insanlara böyle bir şey yapacağına asla inanmıyoruz. Mesela sırat köprüsünü kabul etmez. Diyor ki, ya tanrı böyle bir şey yapamaz, böyle bir şey olmaz çünkü hem bilime akla aykırıdır, hem de Allah'ın bütün alemlerin yaratıcısı olan Allah beni niye sınısın. Benim her şeyimi bilen, kaderimi yazan biri beni niye bir de köprüden geçirsin değil mi? Onun için diyor ki, kıldan köprü yaptırmışsın gelsin kullar geçsin diye, hele bir şöyle duralım yiğit isen geç aslanım

diyor. Yani bir şöyle duralım, erkeksen sen geç diyor. Bunu tanrıya diyor. Bakın bu felsefe, bu düşünce o çok önemlidir. Yani orda bir Allah'a hakaret falan söz konusu değil. Orada Allah'ı yüceltiyor. Allah'ın kendi yarattığı kullara böyle bir şey yapmayacağı inancı hakim. Bilmiyorum dağıttık konuyu biraz ama.

DD: Ben dinliyorum daha detaylı bilgiye ulaşıyorum. Dönem içerisinde Ömer Hayyam'ında rubailerinden bir tanesinde 'beni benim gibi cezalandıracaksan benim benden farkın ne?' diye yazılmış bir şeyi var.

TK: Evet, çok doğru. Günah konusunda da Ömer Hayyam'ın şeyi var, diyor ki; 'demişler Hayyam bilmez haram ile helali', ben haram ile helali diyor hiç karıştırmam. Dost ile içilen şarap helaldir, puşt ile içilen su bile haram. Şimdi felsefenin içine girdiğiniz zaman, ama biz yüzeysel bilgilerimizle maalesef toplumumuzu takip ediyoruz. Birbirimizi yargılıyoruz, bilmeden etmeden, kalp kırıyoruz ama işin içine girmek lazım. Yani önce bilgi sahibi olacağız, sonra fikir üreteceğiz. Ama biz hiçbir bilgimiz yokken, toplumda fikir üretmeye kalkıyoruz o da maalesef böyle toplumsal facialara sebep oluyor.

DD: Son dönemlerde artık Alevilik kimliği, veya genel olarak Türkiye'de kimlikler konusunda bir ön plana çıkma sözkonusu. Bununla ilgili Avrupa Birliği ilerleme raporlarındaki durum göz önünde bulunduruluyor, örneğin 2009, 2010 yıllarında Alevilik üzerine çok geniş bir araştırmaya yer verdi Avrupa Birliği'de, bunun dışında hükümet tarafından yürütülen bir alevi çalıştayını vardı, 2 yıllık bir çalışmaydı ve bununla ilgili bir rapor yayınlandı. Bu son dönemde atılan adımlar size somut adımlar mıdır? Gerçekten bir sonuca varacağına inanıyor musunuz? Veya bu çalıştay raporu tatmin edici bir sonuç mudur? Bu konudaki fikirleriniz?

TK: Biz kesinlikle bunların tatmin edici olduklarına kesinlikle inanmıyoruz. Çünkü neden inanmıyoruz? Yani biz somut olan şeye bakarız. Yani Alevi çalıştayları var yapılıyor, kimler çağrılıyor, kimler nasıl konuşturuluyor. İşte Alevilik müfredata girecekmiş, yok efendim Diyanet de size pay ayrılacakmış. Biz böyle bir şeyin derdinde bile değiliz. Biz buna yüzyıllarca karşı çıkmışız. Bir sürü bedel ödemişiz. Biz şunu söylüyoruz, biz devletten beş kuruş istemiyoruz. Biz kendi grubumuzun, ekibimizin, düşüncemizin finansmanını kendimiz yaparız. Bizde bir lokma bir hırka kriteri vardır. Yani bizim dünya malında çok gözümüz de yok. Efendim kendileri en güzel Müslümanlar oğluna gemicik alıyor. Bu Müslüman olacak cennete gidecek, benim gibi gariban bir dikili ağacı olmayan ben de cehenneme gideceğim. Niye? Düşüncemden dolayı. Böyle bir şeyi kabul etmemiz mümkün değil. İkincisi, Avrupa Birliği'nin de Türkiye konusunda çok ikili oynadığı kanaatindeyim. Yani ben hep şuna inandım. Biz bu devleti kurarken onlarla savaşarak kurduk. Onların bizlere iyi gözle bakması, Alevileri korumak gibi bir şeyin içine girmesine ben kesinlikle inanmam. Hatta bizi azınlıklar statüsüne koymak istediler, azınlık haklarından faydalanalım diye. İyi de biz azınlık olsak, kimsenin yüzüne bakamayız. Biz onu kabul etmiyoruz. Biz bu ülkenin kurucu unsurlarıyız, asli unsurlarız çünkü bu devleti kuran da biziz. Biz Türk halkıyız. Onun için bana çok inandırıcı gelmiyor. Özür dilerim.

DD: Genel olarak aldığım cevap hep zaten bu konuda, hatta ilk açıklamalardan bir tanesi; devlet Vatikan değildir şeklinde açıklamalar yapıldı, bazı bölgesel dernek başkanları tarafından, bununla ilgili olarak sormak istedim ben. Tam buraya geleceğim vakit bu çalıştay raporu hazırlandı. Çok somut bir adım olarak görülmediğini söylediler genel olarak. Hatta şey söylediler, bunu tartışırken bile Aleviliği tanımlamak istediler, Alevilik bir başkasının tanımlayacağı bir şey değildir dediler. Bunu yaparken de yine ilahiyat profesörlerinin çağrıldığını, Sünni düşüncenin hakim olduğu profesörlerin bu çalıştayını hazırladığını söylediler. Bu da

tepki toplayan durumlardan bir tanesi.

TK: Tabii yani, benim gözümle, ben nasıl düşünüyorsam öyle Alevi olun dersiniz biz zaten bunu olmayız. Yüzyıllarca olmamışız. Yani bize birilerinin lütfetmesine gerek yok. Biz bu ülkenin vatandaşıyız, istediğimiz gibi yaşayabiliyoruz. Cem evlerimiz kabul edilmiyor, valla çok da umurumuzda değil. Kabul edilse de yaşıyoruz, edilmese de yaşıyoruz. Devlet desin ki yetmiş milyon vatandaşımızın yirmi yirmi beş milyonu Alevidir desin. Ama yirmibeş milyon insanın, benim verdiğim vergi ile sen beş tane bakanlığın bütçesine eşit olan bir diyanete para veriyorsun, ben haram ediyorum onu sana, ve sen orada, örneğin ben bir cemevi yapacağım. Bakın iki tane cemevi yaptırın ben karşı çıkarım. Niye? Çünkü saygınlığı biter. Ama sen her mahalleye yirmi tane cami yapıyorsun. İran İslam Cumhuriyeti 24.000 cami var, benim ülkem sosyal hukuk devletidir, laiktir, 86.000 cami var. Bizim dediğimiz şu, yani bu kadar, Alevi yaşıyor benim ülkemde, bunlar vatandaşlarımız, bunların ibadet haneside örneğin bir arsanın planlaması yapılırken, cami yeri, okul, sağlık ocağı...e niye cami kardeşim? Biz de diyoruz ki, cemevi, cami, okul sağlık ocağı. Biz en azından her şehirde bir tane olmalı diyoruz. Bizim bütün ibadetlerimiz Türkçedir. Arzumuz şudur devletimizden, bizim cemevimiz herşehirde mümkünse bir tane, Alevilerin yaşadıkları yerlerde bir tane olsun, kendi ibadetimizi kendi içimizde yaşayalım. Yani biz bağırıp çağırıp gürültü kirliliği de yapmıyoruz, sabah beşte ezan okutup da bütün bebeleri yataklarını da hoplatmıyoruz. Buna da şimdi devletimiz çok birşeyler söylüyor işte, şöyledir böyledir. Biz onu da istemiyoruz.

DD: Şimdi zaten devletten taleplerinizden bahsettik. Diyanet dedik, diyanete eleştirel bir bakış açısı....

TK: Eleştiriyoruz, kaldırılın diyemiyoruz çünkü gücümüz yetmez. Devletin varlığı diyanettir, Diyanet ortadan kalkarsa bu iktidarlar iktidara gelemezler. Arzumuz laik devlette din kurumu olmaz. Ben Alevi isem, kendi cemevimi kendi cebimden finansa ederim, siz de farklı inançtaysanız kendi cemiyetinizi kendiniz idare edersiniz. Devlette ne olur? Bakar denetler, gözetler.

DD: Onun dışında mesela din kültürü dersleri de aynı şekilde bir sorun, bunun dışında devletten talep, beklenti olan şeyleri sıralamanız mümkün müdür acaba?

TK: Bizim esas, çok müzdarip olduğumuz şeylerin başında, bu din derslerinin zorunlu olması vardır. Hiçbir laik ülkede, laik devlette din dersi diye bir şey yoktur. Keşke şöyle birşey olsa, bu da çok önemli, bunu lütfen yazın, gittiğiniz yerde de söyleyin. Yani dinler tarihi olsa, her din öğretilse biz ona saygı duyarız şapka çıkarırız. Ama bin yıldır ben mücadele etmişim, Aleviliğimi korumak için ama şimdi din dersleri mecbur olmuş, benim çocuğumun genç dimağına Sünniliğin Hanefi mezhebini aşılama çalışıyorlar.

DD: Namazlar, dualar...

TK: Evet. Geçen gün bir okulumuzda demiş, abdestinizi alın yarın gelin camiye götüreceğiz. Tabii biz burada müdürü aradık, okula gittik, dedik kardeşim noluyor falan. Valiye çıktık, vali ile görüştük. Mücadele ediyoruz ama istiyoruz ki....

DD: Örneğin mesela valiye gittik dediniz, size ne şekilde cevap verdiler.

TK: Çok nazik karşıladılar, vali yardımcısı konuştu, böyle bir şeyin olamayacağına, zaten kanunu yok. Sen benim çocuğumu okul dışına çıkaramazsın. Anlayışla karşılandı, bir daha böyle bir şeyin olmayacağını, hatta müdür bey de bu öğretmen işgüzarlığı falan filan... bizim istediğimiz hakikaten, dinler tarihi okutulsun. Din kültürü olsun, ahlak olsun. Biz onların altında neler olduğunu hepsini biliyoruz, anlatmaya gerek yok. Dinler tarihi öğretilsin, ahlak bilgisi zaten bizim kültürümüzün temeli, hedefi ahlaktır. Ahlaksız bir toplum olur mu? Bütün dinlerin temeli bu. Bu

olsun. Bütün inançların temelinde bu yatar. İyi insan olmak, toplumsal düzeni sağlamak. Efendim birincisi bu. İkincisi, bizim cemevlerimizi camiye alternatif gibi görmesinler. Yani bugün Mersin'de kaç cami var bilmiyorum, belki yüzün üzerindedir. Ama bir tane cemevimiz vardır. Ne kimse ile bir derdimiz var. Bakın üç yüze yakın Sünni vatandaşımız üye bizim derneğe. Buraya gelen cenazelere biz Sünni, Alevi diye bakmayız. Elimizden geleni yaparız. Bizim o tür insanlarımızla, arkadaşlarımızla, kardeşlerimizle, yurttaşlarımızla hiçbir problem yaşamayız, yaşamadık. Öyle bir şey asla olmaz, yeter ki devlet bizi rahat bıraksın. Yani devletin baskısından biz huzursuz oluyoruz. O gün bizim şey geldi, müftümüz geldi, tayini çıkmış, kutlu doğum haftası dolayısıyla bizi davete gelmiş sağolsun, kibarca nazikçe çayımızı içtik, sohbet ettik, konuştuk ettik.. yani kimse ile bir derdimiz yok. Bizim iki şeyde şeyimiz var. Bir, cemevlerimizin, Alevilerin ibadethanesi ya da Alevi kültürünün merkezi olarak kabul edilmesi, bunun anayasal güvence altına alınması. İkincisi de çocuklarımıza istemediğimiz bir dinin, meshebin öğretilmemesi.

DD: Bu cemevlerinin kapatılması da zaten, tekke zaviye ve türbelerin kapatılması kanununa takıldığını söylüyorlar. Bu konuda bir çözüm öneriniz var mı? Cemevleri Alevi halkın ibadet yeri olarak kabul edilsin, merkez olarak kabul edilsin, ancak bunun dışında varolan bir kanun var. Çözüm öneriniz nedir? Sonuçta kanunsal bir engele takıldığı söyleniyor devlet tarafından.

TK: Kesinlikle doğru söylenilmiyor. Yani o dönemde tekke ve zaviyeler kanunu çıkarılması elzemdi. Bütün Bektaşî tekkeleri, zaviyeleri hepsi kapatıldı. O zaman Ulusoy, Atatürk'e teşekkür yazısı göndermiştir. Çünkü Atatürk o dönemde ümmetten bir millet yaratıyordu. Din unsuru söz konusu değildi. Biz artık Alevi, Sünni falan filan demekten ziyade Türk vatandaşlarıyız. "Aha da kimliğimiz!" deme özgürlüğüne kavuştuk. O bizi çok mutlu etti. Zaten şimdiki mutluluğumuz da odur. Yani bana Alevi denmiş, Sunni denmiş çok da umrumda değil. Biz Atatürk'ün özgür yurttaşları olarak yaşamak istiyoruz. Tekke ve zaviyeler kanunu neden çıktı? Madem bu kadar kanuna düşkün devletimiz, devlet demiyorum ben devlet benim başımın tacı, hükümetimiz, hükümetlerimiz madem kanuna bu kadar şeyler, niye şapka kanununa muhalefet ediyorlar? Niye türbanla geziyorlar, bilmem kara çarşafı geziyorlar? Efendim onların hepsine şey var da, Alevilerin cemevi için mi tekke ve zaviyeler kanunu var. Bunlar ikiyüzlülük yapıyorlar. Kesinlikle böyle bir şey yoktur. Yani 24 saat içinde beş tane kanun çıkaran hükümet, tekke ve zaviyeler kanununu mu değiştiremeyecek. Biz inanmıyoruz. Samimiyetlerine inanmıyoruz. Burada bir art niyet var. Onunda bilincindeyiz, çokta umurumuzda değil.

DD: Ben sizin söylediklerinizi gayet net bir şekilde anlayabiliyorum. Söylediklerinizi, söylemek istediklerinizi...

TK: Yani evet bazı şeyleri söyleyemiyorum ama siz anlıyorsunuz...

DD: Peki örneğin ben orta ikinci sınıftaydım biz buraya taşındığımızda, bir arkadaşım vardı çok kısa bir süre sonra ortada hiçbirşey yokken gelip bana, "Didem biz Aleviyiz." dedi. "Tamam." dedim. Ve şu anda doktor, gayet görev yapıyor. Ve Didem biz Aleviyiz dedi, ben onun ne demek olduğunu bilmediğim için, çünkü daha 13-14 yaşındaydım, tamam dedim. Akşam geldim "Baba, Alevi ne demek?" dedim. Tabii bir şaşkınlık, nereden çıktı bu soru diyerekten. İşte böyle böyle dediler. Farklı düşüncelere sahip bir dindir, onlar da inanıyor falan filan gibi bir açıklama yapıldı. Ondan sonra 'o zaman biz neyiz' durumu ortaya çıktı. Ertesi gün ben sordum, sen bana bunu niye söyledin; "Birgün duyarsan şok olma, bana küsme." dedi. Çocuktuk. O zaman dedim ki demekki bir ayrımcılık söz konusu. Bunun hala var olduğunu söyleyebilir miyiz? Ne kadar iletişim çağında da yaşasak, geçmiş günümüze değişiklik veya şu anda hala var olan olumsuzluk, negatif ayrımcılık gibi bir durum

söz konusu mudur?

TK: Şimdi dar çerçevelerde bunun hala böyle olduğunu duyuyoruz, yaşıyoruz da. Tabii bizim Türkiye genelinde 120'ye yakın sadece Alevi kültür derneklerimiz var, onlarla irtibat halindeyiz. Zaman zaman duyuyoruz ama bu çok düşük seviyededir. Yani çok şükür ki biz artık toplumumuzda böyle bir problem yaşamıyoruz. Yani girdiğimiz toplumda evet Aleviyim ben diyebilirim. Öbür insanlar da benim onlara gösterdiğim gibi onlar da bana saygı gösteriyorlar. Ben dediğim zaman yani toplum olarak düşünün tabi ki. Böyle bir sıkıntı çok şükür yaşamıyoruz. Fakat bizim hükümetlerle problemimiz var. Onlar bu ayrımı yapıyorlar zaman zaman. Bir de dar bölgede yaşan insanlarımız arasında zaman zaman böyle şeyler duyuyoruz ama çok da önemsemiyoruz. Çünkü artık toplumumuz hakketen bu konuda aydınlandı. İletişim çağındayız. Artık insanlarımız dünyanın ne olduğunu biliyorlar. Toplumun ne olduğunu biliyorlar. Artık internet girdi evlerimize, televizyonlar girdi en ücra dağların başına... yani insanlar toplumu dünyayı tanıyor artık. O dar şeyden çıktık. Yani oluyorsa dahi çok önemsizdir, çok alt düzeydedir.

DD: Çok teşekkür ederim. Sormak istediğim herşeyi sordum. Çok sağolun vakit ayırdığınız için.

TK: Sizler de sağolun

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