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Comparative Analysis of Cross-Cultural Conflict Resolution in the Context of Iraq – United States Bilateral Relations

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Abbreviations

9/11	September 11, 2001 terrorism attacks in New York and Washington, D.C.
ABC	American Broadcast Corporation
AI	Amnesty International
AO	Area of Operations
AQI	Al Qaeda in Iraq
ASAM	Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies
BBC	British Broadcast Corporation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COW	Correlates of War
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CVI	Current Violations Initiative
DOD	Department of Defense
FM	Field Manual (U.S. Military)
GOI	Government of Iraq
HRC	Human Rights Center
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICP	Iraqi Communist Party
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTJ	International Center for Transitional Justice
IDF	Indirect Fire
IGC	Iraqi Governing Council
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IIG	Iraqi Interim Government
IO	International Organization
IPC	Iraq Petroleum Company
IS	Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (formerly ISIS)
ISCI	Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
ISG	Iraq Study Group
IST	Iraqi Special Tribunal

JCC	Joint Coordination Committees
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MHS	Mutually Hurting Stalemate
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NSCT	National Strategy to Combat Terrorism
NSD	National Security Directive
OFF	Oil-for-Food
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs
OSP	Office of Special Plans
PBS	Public Broadcasting Service
PIPA	Program on International Policy Attitudes
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SAMIFO	*Servizio Salute Migranti Forzati* (Rome, Italy)
SCIRI	Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SOI	Sons of Iraq
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
TAL	Transitional Administrative Law
TNA	Transitional National Assembly
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
U.S.	United States
UAR	United Arab Republic
UIA	United Iraqi Alliance
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)
UXO	Unexploded ordinance
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Introduction

As a teenager, I had a profound interest in the role of the United States (U.S.) in international affairs. My curiosity derived from my close proximity to Washington, D.C. and the daily international news coverage broadcast from that location. Local news stations continuously covered the visits of foreign dignitaries and the role of their U.S. counterparts. Unsurprisingly, media outlets frequently put a positive spin on U.S. political-military activity abroad, depicting the United States as an international leader, role model and global assistant. For the most part, I naively believed in the benevolence of my country at this time.

However, the U.S. military deployment to the Saudi Arabia following Iraq's annexation of Kuwait in 1990 challenged aforementioned preconceptions at a significant juncture in my life. I was about to graduate high school and had been contemplating joining the armed forces as a means of escaping my hometown. I was skeptical of U.S. motivations and goals *vis-à-vis* Iraq, as I had witnessed an oscillation in the quality of U.S. relations with Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein during the previous decade. In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan, and acting Vice President George H.W. Bush, had aided and befriended Hussein during his near decade-long war with Iran—a campaign initiated by Hussein. Nevertheless, when Iraq annexed Kuwait in 1990, George H.W. Bush was acting President, and he depicted Saddam as a rogue leader and a threat to international peace and stability. This seemingly sudden and complete reversal of nearly a decade of support made me question U.S. government motives.

In response to Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, the United States, Britain and France, among other countries, rapidly mobilized political and military assets to restore the *status quo* in the Middle East. During this time, the media persistently reported and conjectured about the possibility of war. Meanwhile, critics surmised that oil interest was the single motivating factor driving U.S. policy in the Middle East. Even the uneducated inhabitants of rural Virginia where I lived were objective enough to recognize the addiction the United States has to petroleum was most likely prompting the U.S. to demonize Hussein. With this in mind, it was unsurprising when the Persian Gulf War was launched in the spring of 1991, under the banner of liberating Kuwait, against Saddam Hussein.

During the war, the media provided around-the-clock news coverage throughout the two-month campaign. I did my utmost to stay informed about what was happening, but U.S. news coverage tended to put a positive slant on their coverage. For instance, I do not recall a great deal of information being provided about the effects the war was having on civilians in Iraq.

Instead, attention was concentrated on explaining U.S. military technology, missions and stated objectives. While I found this information interesting, it equally seemed biased. Ultimately the U.S.-led coalition successfully "liberated" Kuwait and the war ended. While a strategic victory, it was unclear that U.S. military capability would produce a political victory.

I graduated after the alleged U.S. military victory, but I refrained from enlisting in the armed forces subsequent to graduating from high school in the summer of 1991. I refused to become an instrument of what I perceived as unpredictable, aggressive U.S. foreign policy that was driven by economic interests. This perception was facilitated by the demonization of Saddam Hussein and the devastation wrought by the 1991 Persian Gulf War, whereupon my qualitative analysis of U.S. policy *vis-à-vis* Iraq was further undercut by the debilitating post-war sanctioning imposed. Although Iraq's military had been crippled by the Persian Gulf War, United States representatives repeatedly touted that the enforcement of economic and political sanctions were fundamental to ensuring Saddam Hussein was weakened and isolated. My skepticism was later confirmed as media outlets began emphasizing the humanitarian implications the policy was having on Iraq's society, including food shortages. It was at this juncture that I was unable to reconcile a U.S. policy. At that time, the U.S. was punishing Iraq's population as a means of isolating and weakening an authoritarian government that it had previously supported.

Prompted by intrigue and frustration with U.S. politics and policy, I later enrolled at university as a mature student, concentrating on international studies. In August 2001, after one year of studies, I took a break from university and left the U.S. to enhance my perspective by traveling to obtain first-hand experience. Nearly a month subsequent to my departure from the United States, the September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11) terrorist attacks on New York and Virginia occurred. While horrific, my location afforded me an opportunity to observe the U.S. response as an outsider. Equally beneficial, from my external vantage point, I was unexposed to U.S. media coverage and did not feel that I had been personally targeted or vulnerable.

With the perspective of an outsider, it was easy not to become entangled in the frenzy of fear and anger so evident among the U.S. population following 9/11. As opposed to feeling insecure, I was busy contemplating why the event had taken place and observing similarities between the George W. Bush administration's reaction and rhetoric to 9/11, to that which I had keenly observed in 1990 when the case for war with Iraq was presented. The similarities were profound: the United States was once again to assume for itself the role of benevolent leader, security provider and provider of justice. While the target in 2001 was initially

terrorism, an obscure concept, Iraq would later be identified as an existential threat to the United States, and a promoter and supporter of terrorism.

As we know, the George W. Bush administration launched its "War on Terrorism" campaign against Afghanistan in the autumn of 2001. Soon thereafter, one could readily recognize that the Bush administration was gradually refocusing its attention onto Iraq. As a component of its transition of attention, the acting administration began to demonize Iraq, arguing that the post-war 1991 violent sanctioning and isolation of Iraq, which was still ongoing at the time, was insufficient for securing U.S. regional interests and reducing the international threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Within this frame, the Bush administration argued that regime change and imposed democratization were necessary to reduce the threat of international terrorism, and to empower and assist Iraq's population, and stabilize the region. As rhetoric hardened, it became clear that George W. Bush was determined to affect regime change in Iraq using U.S. military force. His determination culminated in the controversial 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, whose campaign produced severe and long-term, albeit asymmetrical, ramifications in Iraq and the United States.

Motivation

This dissertation is a continuation of my master thesis in Peace, Development and Conflict Transformation, which explored the military and political components of George W. Bush's "War on Terrorism" and their manifestation in Iraq. As a result of researching how U.S. counterterrorism policy was designed and implemented in Iraq in 2003, and the physical, psychological and social disruptions associated with its implementation, I was motivated to understand how the two countries might improve the quality of their relationship subsequent to decades of violence. In short, I wanted to know how the United States and Iraq could alter the quality of their relationship following decades of violent conflict that had produced animosity and grievance between both populations. Naturally, this inquiry led me to explore conflict resolution as a discipline and practice; a practice that scholars suggest can be utilized to improve conflictual relationships.

During my research of conflict resolution as a discipline and practice, I quickly discovered two important research gaps. First, scholars frequently present their theories as representative of laypersons' opinion, but no research, to my knowledge, analyzes laypersons' understanding of conflict resolution. Thus, scholars imply their theories are representative, but it seems logical to question the veracity using quantitative research. Hence, the literature suggests it expounds upon a "Western" approach, or an "Arab/Muslim" approach to conflict resolution,

yet one is left wondering how accurate and representative scholarly theory is among those laypersons. Although few scholars qualify the opinion of laypersons, some emphasize the need to consult with societies when designing and implementing a conflict resolution program.

The second research gap I discovered is the narrow approach that scholars commonly use when comparatively analyzing “Arab/Muslim” and “Western” conflict resolution theory and practices. Existing comparisons generally limit themselves to the Western structural approach theory whereupon conclusions are drawn concerning comparisons between “Western” and “Arab/Muslim” approaches. Consequently, the narrowly constructed cross-cultural comparisons conducted hitherto hypothesize that the Arab/Muslim and Western cultural approaches are incompatible and containing competing objectives and practices. However, Western scholarship embraces more than one approach to conflict resolution. In particular, two Western approaches to conflict resolution, the social-psychological and spiritual, have been largely marginalized when cross-cultural comparisons are made. This thesis aims to fill these research gaps and, thereby, to demonstrate that there is a greater degree of similarity in how conflict resolution is conceptualized and practiced across Arab/Muslim and Western culture than scholars hitherto acknowledged.

Theoretical framework

My research conducts a comparative analysis of conflict resolution in theory and practice at the interstate level to determine how the conflictual relationship between the United States and Iraq might be altered. Pursuit of this objective requires the construction of a theoretical framework that accommodates comprehensive understandings of conflict resolution as articulated in Western and Arab/Muslim literature, whereby more representative cross-cultural comparisons can be made across Arab/Muslim and Western approaches. Most importantly, we seek to establish a broad framework, which is necessary for two reasons. On the one hand, notwithstanding agreement on the importance of conflict resolution for transforming violent conflictual relationships, Western scholars sometimes disagree on pivotal conceptual and methodological aspects of the process. Such divergences complicate calls for conflict resolution since consensus on elements, such as which tools are compulsory and at which point these should be introduced, is not forthcoming in Western literature. Theoretical and practical dissension, as alluded to, arises as a result of the complexity of conflict resolution as a phenomenon, in addition to the amalgamation of innumerable theories across a wide spectrum of fields, and the existence of three peacebuilding approaches, or schools of thought,

in Western discourse. We determine, therefore, that it is essential to build a framework where the theoretical diversity advanced by the three Western schools of thought, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation, can be accommodated, By creating a broad framework, we can ensure that Western theory is holistically represented, and not reduced to the structural approach as has been common hitherto, before comparisons are made across cultures.

On the other hand, a similarly inclusive approach must be applied when delineating and comparing Arab/Muslim theory with that advocated in the West. As noted above, most Arab/Muslim comparative literature produced hitherto is based on a narrow comparison. Based on this restricted framework, scholars conclude there are prominent cross-cultural incongruities between Western and Arab/Muslim approaches, a finding that leads those same scholars to hypothesize that Western conflict resolution principles and practices are inappropriate or unacceptable in the Arab/Muslim context. However, when a broad Western framework is applied, many of the theoretical and practical divergences denoted in the literature diminish. Moreover, there are some Arab/Muslim scholars who acknowledge cross-cultural convergences, but their work is frequently overlooked or dismissed by comparative literature. Thus, we believe it is theoretically beneficial to our research to establish a wide understanding of both Arab/Muslim and Western approaches to conflict, despite the challenge associated with locating relevant comparative literature (in the English language).

Subsequent to delineating our broad Western framework, it will be possible to make cross-cultural comparisons across scholarship as the Arab/Muslim tradition to conflict resolution is delineated. Once both macro level Western and Arab/Muslim conceptualizations have been articulated from our literature review, our analysis turns to comparing scholarly conceptualizations with those held by laypersons. At the same time, we are able to compare laypersons opinion with other layperson across samples, utilizing the data collected from a small sample of respondents from the United States and Iraq. At this juncture, the present thesis compares conceptualizations of conflict resolution across cultures as extracted from the literature review and across a sample of laypersons utilizing a questionnaire. The combined approach, I believe, demonstrates the high level of cross-cultural parallels at the macro and micro levels, which contradicts previous research conducted at the macro level.

For this reason, my research is theoretically valuable for three reasons. First, I incorporate a wider framework than most when comparatively analyzing Western and Arab/Muslim theory. Instead of limiting my analysis to the Western structural approach, which has frequently been the case hitherto, I also consider the social-psychological and spiritual

approaches. As will be demonstrated, these latter approaches are more similar to Arab/Muslim theory, whereby their integration suggests increased parallels in theory and practices between Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations of conflict resolution than generally acknowledged.

The second theoretical contribution that this research makes is its inclusion of laypersons' perceptions of conflict resolution into scholarly discourse. As stated previously, scholars frequently dismiss the practice of consultation when theory is drafted. Ironically, Western scholars emphasize the importance of inclusion and consultation of society when resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels, yet they seldom include laypersons' opinions into their publications. To reverse this trend, I incorporate laypersons' opinion, in a micro setting (U.S.-Iraq), to juxtapose laypersons' opinion across cultures with macro theory produced by scholarship. I anticipate that the introduction of public opinion will challenge several scholarly assumptions, and, consequently, I hope the practice will prompt and reinvigorate academic discourse on cross-cultural conflict resolution between two countries.

Finally, and alluded to above, my analysis is not limited to macro level theory of Arab/Muslim and Western practices. Contrary, I introduce laypersons' opinion, focused specifically on a convenience sample of citizens from the U.S. and Iraq. In this manner, my approach shifts the center of theoretical discourse away from conventional, scholarly generalizations (West versus Arab/Muslim approaches) to my sample of U.S. and Iraq citizens. Accordingly, scholarly understanding of conflict resolution, which is generalized to represent "Western" and "Arab/Muslim" approaches, is juxtaposed with my sample of laypersons. Incorporation of micro level opinion is logical since my interest is in exploring conflict resolution in the U.S.-Iraq case, and, therefore, my analysis should include these two groups of stakeholders.

Hypotheses

With my theoretical framework clarified, six working hypotheses guide the research. Hypothesis 1 states: There is a long-standing deconstructive conflict relationship between the United States and Iraq that has produced bilateral animosity between these respective societies. To qualify bilateral relations, a literature review of scholarly, independent and government resources, in the English language, is conducted to delineate the course of Iraq's history. Our historical analysis begins with U.S.-Iraq conflict mapping. Testing of Hypothesis 1 is completed with the qualification of the social impact of the U.S.-Iraq conflict relationship through an examination of open-source statistical data collected by various sources in the

English language, including independent research groups, media corporations and scholars, in chapter two. Amalgamated, the first two chapters of this research trace the history of U.S.-Iraq relations and prove the existence of a protracted conflictual relationship between the two countries respectively, which has produced suspicion and animosity across both societies.

Following the qualification of Iraq's history and U.S.-Iraq conflict mapping (1950s and 2011), attention turns to analyzing scholarly literature on conflict resolution to transform conflict relations between two societies or states. References to conflict resolution in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations, raises the theoretical and practical issue of expected cross-cultural divergence between U.S. (Western) and Iraq (Arab/Muslim) approaches. Namely, some Arab/Muslim scholars insist that Western approaches to conflict resolution are inapplicable and undesirable by Arab/Muslims. However, we believe that there is more commonality when conflict resolution is explored at the interstate level, and when all Western approaches to conflict resolution are considered. Hypothesis 2, therefore, states: Western and Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict resolution, as articulated in the respective literature, will generally converge when a broad Western conflict resolution framework is applied. This hypothesis is tested through a literature review of topical material produced by Western and Arab/Muslim scholarship in the English language respectively. Our cross-cultural comparison of approaches, tools and principles is conducted in three chapters, whereby we are able to produce and compare conceptual frameworks.

Upon the comparative theoretical framework designed according to scholarly literature, our research shifts its attention from macro analysis to qualifying how a convenience sample of U.S. and Iraq respondents (or laypersons), the latter of which are hereafter referred to as Iraqis, conceptualize conflict resolution at the interstate level. This aspect of the research is guided by four working hypotheses. Among those, Hypothesis 3 broadly states: A majority of U.S. and Iraqi respondents from our research samples will similarly embrace sixteen conflict resolution principles. Next, Hypothesis 4 states that a majority of respondents from our survey samples will comparably embrace the same eleven tools for resolving conflict at the interstate level in general terms. Succinctly, I predict that our convience samples of laypersons will generally agree on principles and practices at the interstate level. This preliminary assumption is then taken one logical step further in conjunction with contemporary U.S.-Iraq conflict relations, to produces two additional hypotheses that must be tested.

Foremost, Hypothesis 5 projects: Following decades of violent interaction, exemplified by the 2003 Iraq War, a majority of respondents from our convenience samples of U.S. and Iraq citizens will agree that conflict resolution is necessary to improve contemporary U.S.-Iraq

relations. Testing this hypothesis requires qualification of our samples' openness to a conflict resolution program in context. Finally, Hypothesis 6 suggests: A majority of those same respondents will support the use of a majority of thirteen conflict resolution techniques to alter the quality of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Hypothesis six, thus, examines acceptability of thirteen tools for advancing conflict resolution in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. To test hypotheses 3, 4, 5 and 6, I utilize an online survey. Data from our survey not only provides insight into how respondents perceive principles and tools associated with the advancement of conflict resolution between states, the first such study of its kind to the author's knowledge, but also provides insight into how U.S.-Iraq relations might be pursued. Another theoretical advantage our approach is that our survey of laypersons allows us to comparatively analyze laypersons' opinion against scholars' opinion, whereby convergences and divergences can be qualified.

Research objectives

With our working hypotheses delineated, it becomes evident that our research has three broad objectives. The first objective is to outline Iraq's historical trajectory while incorporating conflict mapping of U.S.-Iraq relations. Comprehensive delineation of Iraq's history informs the reader about how the culture, politics and society of Iraq developed throughout history. Underscoring these developments is important because they have a direct impact on Iraq's contemporary internal and external relations, social-political aspirations, as well as indigenous understanding of conflict and conflict resolution. Simultaneously, our historical analysis is valuable because it maps the conflictual relationship between the United States and Iraq, highlighting specific experiences, and demonstrating that there has been a long-standing violent relationship that has included the use of physical and structural violence. Within this frame, it is demonstrated that the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations has had a direct impact on citizens' perceptions and welfare. In short, I qualify the existence of a protracted conflict relationship between these two countries and its impact on society, whose deconstructive nature suggests that conflict resolution should be pursued to alter the quality of the relationship between these two countries.

Introduction of the concept of conflict resolution into this discourse raises the challenges of merging cross-cultural conceptualizations and the transference of theory and practice across cultures. Consequently, the second objective of this research is to comparatively analyze conflict resolution as articulated by Western and Arab/Muslim scholars. Analysis of the respective literature (in the English language) permits the creation of a framework of lexicon,

principles and practices of conflict resolution as articulated by scholars from both cultures. The values of this framework is that ours is broader, not limited to the Western structural approach alone, but also incorporating the social-psychological and spiritual approaches as well. Consequently, our cross-cultural comparison is broader than previous research, and is thereby able to better qualify convergences and divergences according scholarly articulations of theory and practice. Through the establishment of this framework, we are able to qualify a higher degree of cross-cultural convergence, which is fundamental to advancing conflict resolution between the United States and Iraq. Moreover, our comparative framework informs the creation of a questionnaire targeting laypersons, which is designed to qualify laypersons' conceptualizations whereby we can measure opinions across samples and across laypersons and scholarly theory.

The third and final objective of this research, as just alluded to, is to introduce laypersons' conceptualization of conflict resolution at the micro level across cultures, and *vis-à-vis* scholarship, using a sample of U.S. and Iraq citizens. Our analysis is developed from a small convenience sample that was queried through an online survey. The survey qualifies respondents' understanding of conflict resolution principles and practices in general, and then measures their perceptions of tools in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. The theoretical value of this survey is that it: a) comparatively analyzes layperson and scholarly conceptualization of conflict resolution; b) provides preliminary insight into laypersons' openness to conflict resolution in the context of U.S. and Iraq; and c), identifies which of the principles and tools presented to the sample are deemed acceptable to improving interstate relations following conflict. This line of questioning, to my knowledge, is the first time micro level research has been conducted in this particular dichotomy.

Combined, this research is a comprehensive case study that first traces the history of Iraq, and then qualifies U.S.-Iraq protracted conflict relations. Thereafter, it explores the possibility and viability of altering those relations by qualifying scholarly and laypersons' conceptualizations of conflict resolution across cultures. The ultimate selection of these two samples as exemplars for evaluating conflict resolution across Arab/Muslim and Western culture is obvious. Summarily, the media has constantly spotlighted U.S.-Iraq relations for as long as I have been fascinated with U.S. foreign policy, and my research interests continues to be centered on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East in general, and Iraq in particular.

In the context of this research, I perceive U.S.-Iraq relations are a microcosm of U.S.-Middle East relations. More specifically, I believe that Iraq epitomizes the violent relationship between the United States and other countries in the Middle East. While I could have just as

easily selected Afghanistan, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia as case studies to argue my thesis and test my hypotheses, Iraq was selected because the 2003 invasion and occupation was internationally unpopular, unnecessary, and counterproductive. Thus, while this thesis focuses immediately on transforming the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations, the historical experiences outlined in this text, as well as the hypotheses and theories examined herein, in my opinion, could be transposed onto other cases. Stated simply, I believe that many of the theories articulated, and conclusions drawn, from this research are applicable in the context United States' relationship with other Arab/Muslim countries.

Literature review

The present research utilizes English language literature reviews due to my limited language knowledge, buttressed by the fact that scholars frequently publish on the topic of conflict resolution in the English language. Literature reviews are initially used to trace the history of Iraq, to qualify the trajectory and impact of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations, and are incorporated to comparatively analyze conflict resolution in theory and practice across Western and Arab/Muslim scholarship. My choice of resources centers predominantly on scholars from the U.S. and the United Kingdom, as these are the most readily accessible resources in my mother tongue. Nonetheless, within this limited pool of English language resources, I have attempted to select a variety of sources throughout each stage of my research to provide comprehensive accounts that articulates, and to contrast events, theory and perspectives while exploring Iraq's history, mapping U.S:-Iraq conflict relations, and delineating conflict resolution from a Western and Arab/Muslim scholarly perspective. I also utilize a wide range of academic resources, including literature produced by historians, peace, and conflict resolution experts and practitioners. In addition, I have integrated some alternative English language resources outside of academia to broaden or reinforce theory.

The latter resources include publications from the U.S. government and military, think tanks, as well as public opinion polls and mainstream news reports. The inclusion of supplementary English material such as media productions and publications is designed to ground my research in readily accessible material that U.S. citizens could access via television, radio, or the Internet. Utilization of this combination of resources, I hope, assists in the creation of a thesis that is not only academic in nature, but is equally comprehensible and appealing to those outside of scholarship and peace studies. Since two primary objectives of my research are to demonstrate the ramifications the conflict relations between the U.S.-Iraq has had on respective citizens' perceptions, and then to qualify how a sample of those

individuals perceive conflict resolution in this instance, I believe that it is imperative that those same individuals have the opportunity to read and understand the contents of this thesis.

Methodology

The six hypotheses outlined are tested utilizing a literature review and a questionnaire. The first hypothesis is tested qualitatively with a literature review that recounts the history of Iraq, and another that examines public opinion at the micro and macro level as articulated by scholarly resources and public opinion polls. In this instance, we rely on historians and political commentary, reinforced by open source polling data. Hypothesis two is equally tested qualitatively through a comparative literature review of Western and Middle Eastern scholars' conceptualization of conflict, conflict resolution, and the techniques and principles deemed appropriate to resolve conflict. The theoretical advantage of our approach over previous research is our incorporation of a wide framework when comparatively analyzing Western and Arab/Muslim theory. Instead of limiting analysis to the Western structural approach, which has frequently been the case hitherto, we also consider the social-psychological and spiritual approaches found in Western discourse. As illustrated below, these approaches share increased similarities with Arab/Muslim theory, and thereby contradict scholarly assumptions of incompatibility. Consequently, we are able to identify additional cross-cultural parallels in theory and practices between Arab/Muslim and Western measures for advancing conflict resolution.

Our final four hypotheses are tested quantitatively and qualitatively utilizing an online survey targeting a convenience sample of adult citizens from the United States and Iraq. Those citizens consented to complete an online survey on conflict resolution. Respondents were recruited using snowball and convenience sampling techniques whereby contact was made with one respondent, and that respondent then recommended the survey to others. In any event, the questionnaire contains over seventy questions, which query respondents on their understanding of conflict and conflict resolution in general, and then focuses attention on a hypothetical conflict resolution program between the U.S. and Iraq to elicit their opinion in this context.

Subsequent to outlining survey methodology, we delineate how the data was processed, reliability was tested and findings were comparatively analyzed across samples using am R software package. Then, we descriptively analyze how our sample understands concepts such as conflict, in addition to their opinions on conflict resolution, and some associated principles and tools. During scrutiny of the survey data in chapter six, findings are comparatively

analyzed across sample groups (U.S. versus Iraq sample), in addition to the samples' responses *vis-à-vis* scholarly theory as articulated in the literature review (part two of this thesis). Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that since the combined research sample is demographically non-representative, our findings qualify respondents' opinion of conflict and conflict resolution and does not profess to represent U.S. or Iraq public opinion at large. Despite being non-representative, we are able to qualify important theoretical convergences and divergences across the survey samples, and between the survey sample and scholars, that contribute to cross-cultural conflict resolution discourse by approaching the topic from the micro, as opposed to the macro, level.

Thesis structure

To accomplish its objectives and test my working hypotheses, the thesis is divided into three distinct parts. The first part contextualizes historical events and experiences in Iraq for three fundamental reasons. First, historical experiences influence social-political developments in contemporary Iraq. Experience, in turn, impacts on collective identity, broadly defined as the manner in which people associate themselves, using markers such as ethnicity, religion, and so forth. The combination of elements has a profound impact on social-political trajectory of Iraq, and its internal and external relations. Second, and interconnected, these nuances simultaneously impact on inhabitants understanding of conflict and conflict resolution. This impact is better explained in the second part of this research. Finally, as our review of Iraq's history progresses, attention centers on the conflict relationship between the United States and Iraq that impact on the country's trajectory and societal perceptions. More specifically, we map the conflictual relationship between the United States and Iraq in detail since 2003.

Chapter 1, *The 2003 U.S.-Iraq War and Occupation*, focuses specifically on the U.S. military invasion and occupation of Iraq, a component of the post-9/11 U.S. national security policy. This chapter stands alone for four reasons. Foremost, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to detail the complete history of U.S.-Iraq relations. While regretful, the opening section of this chapter provides a brief summary of said relationship between the 1950s and 2003, highlighting several geopolitical events. Secondly, the gravity of events, especially their impact on the political, social and economic trajectory of Iraq, is staggering and well documented. Third, this event is the catalyst of my research and, therefore, is examined in detail. Lastly, I purposefully wanted to center my research on U.S.-Iraq relations up to 2011. The decision to confine my research to 2011 was determined necessary, because it is essential

to restrict the complex and ongoing relationship to one that can be managed within the confines of this thesis. This research, therefore, assesses U.S.-Iraq relations up to the point that U.S. troops left Iraq in December 2011, and when direct physical violence was terminated. The termination of physical violence is the period when many scholars conclude that conflict resolution between two countries can be pursued.

Chapter one begins by contextualizing the relationship between the United States and Iraq between the 1950s and 2003. It then focuses on events around the turn of the century, including existing dissatisfaction among some U.S. decision-makers with the containment policy implemented *vis-à-vis* Iraq during the 1990s. This sentiment advanced the call for a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq to purposefully overturn the political and social framework of Iraq, under the guise of a global counterterrorism campaign. However, only minimal resources were devoted to planning or contingency planning of the post-war environment. Once implemented, the U.S. invasion of Iraq upset the fragile social-political balance Saddam Hussein had managed to enforce. In the power vacuum created, preexisting ethnic-sectarian tensions inside Iraq violently ruptured into pervasive social unrest, which coincided with popular repugnance toward, and the use of violence against, the U.S. occupation. The combination of events destabilized occupied Iraq. Poorly conceived and implemented decisions during the occupation made by the U.S.-led governing authority exacerbated internal division, anti-occupation sentiment, and significantly impacted on the general welfare of Iraqis.

To qualify developments and the U.S. role during the occupation, the chapter chronicles the transition of authority from the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA), which was charged with temporarily managing reconstruction until an indigenous government could be established. Instability cut ORHA rule short, and a semi-permanent governing body, the Coalition Provisional Authority, was dispatched to rule Iraq until Iraq could elect a permanent government. During the transition of authority to an elected government, consecutive internal and external governing institutions were plagued by insurgency and civil violence, poor decision-making and questionable legitimacy. Although sovereignty was eventually returned to Iraq, the United States persistently interfered in Iraq's social and political affairs throughout the occupation, imposing decisions, standards, and benchmarks to dictate the trajectory Iraq was expected to follow. The population at large did not share many objectives set by the United States, amounting to structural violence.

In terms of conflict mapping, chapter 1 highlights numerous incidents of physical and structural violence committed by the United States when recounting the transition of control.

For instance, it outlines how particular events and decisions made by the United States institutionalized sectarian divisions in the newly created governing framework. Institutionalization of sectarian divisions, thereby, produced a spiral pattern, exacerbating social fear and animosity, which further induced sectarian mistrust and violence. As a result of these destabilizing trends, attempts were made to manage social-political relations to reduce internal conflict. Conflict management techniques included U.S. political pressure on government and recommendations for a national reconciliation program to be implemented—the latter of which is directly examined in a later chapter of this research.

In addition to sectarian and political upheaval produced by the invasion, humanitarian concerns proliferated under the occupation. Insecurity was prevalent, displacement common and post-war reconstruction hampered by poor planning, decision-making, and persistent violence. When the United States withdrew its military forces in December 2011, Iraq was fragile. Its government was weak and lacked popular support, sectarian and political tensions persisted, only a semblance of security had been restored to the country, and reconstruction was making slow but steady progress. Combined, the circumstance and events denoted in this chapter, including the structural and physical violence perpetrated, had a qualified impact on society at large, producing hardship and/or intensifying popular grievances and animosity toward the United States for its actions and involvement.

Chapter 2, *Qualifying the Bilateral Impact of U.S.-Iraq Conflict Relations*, highlights the social impact of two decades of structural and physical violence mapped in chapter one. It utilizes scholarly resources and open-source opinion polls conducted at the national and regional levels to qualify popular sentiment at the micro and macro levels. Amalgamated with the literature review, our findings test Hypothesis one. The primary objective of chapter two is, therefore, to qualify the impact of the protracted conflictual relationship between the U.S. and Iraq upon public opinion, with the purpose of showing how stakeholders perceive various aspects of the relationship and the "other". Our conclusions determine that historical experiences have impacted upon popular perceptions at the micro and macro levels, producing distrust, animosity and grievance. These byproducts suggest the conflict resolution should undergo transformation to reduce tensions and nurture amicable relations.

Our overview of effects and opinion is divided into three sections: effects of the conflict relationship on Iraqis; effects on the U.S.; and macro level opinion. The first examines outcomes and opinions through the lens of Iraqis. Assessment first qualifies the general impact of the 2003 War on Iraqis, qualifying public opinion, the human cost, and the degree of animosity and distrust expressed toward the United States, as a result of historical and

contemporary experiences. Amalgamated, this section demonstrates a high degree of animosity toward the United States, mainly couched on historical and contemporary experiences articulated in chapters one and two.

Next, the impact of the invasion and occupation of Iraq is analyzed through the lens of U.S. citizens. Since the decades-long conflictual relationship between Iraq and the U.S. was asymmetrical, both in terms of military capability and venue, among other criterion, our assessment reflects this reality. It consequently examines public opinion and the human cost, but then dovetails into qualifying: military overstretch, fiscal burdening, censorship and negative U.S. perceptions of Iraq. The combination emphasizes the historical and contemporary quality of U.S.-Iraq relations has produced problems and grievances within United States society.

Lastly, macro level opinion, from the viewpoint of the Middle East and the West/U.S., are examined. This analysis demonstrates that micro level sentiment held between Iraqis and U.S. citizens are mirrored at the macro level. Combined, this section confirms the influence of micro level policy and historical experience on macro level opinion, to the degree that scholars propose conflict resolution should be utilized to transform the quality of bilateral relations between the West/U.S. and predominantly Arab/Muslim countries in the Middle East. This thesis takes this macro level recommendation and narrows it to micro level relations between the United States and Iraq, and later directly tests the viability of promoting conflict resolution in this instance in chapter six.

Subsequent to the provision of a historical backdrop, conflict mapping, and a qualification of public opinion, our research enters part two. Upon determination that a conflictual relationship exists between the United States and Iraq, part two transitions our attention to elucidating how scholars conceptualize conflict and conflict resolution. Because our interests are on U.S.-Iraq relations, cross-cultural analysis is centered predominately on intrastate and interstate conflict resolution as articulated in Western and Arab/Muslim literature. In consideration of the historical, relational and cultural differences between these two entities, this thesis assumes, as other scholars do, that the concept and practice of conflict resolution will differ across cultures. To test this theory, we begin by examining Western literature before transitioning into Arab/Muslim theory to juxtapose cross-cultural approaches.

Consequently, the primary objective of this part of the research is to comparatively analyze conflict and conflict resolution as articulated by Western and Arab/Muslim scholars. During our analysis of “Western” literature, I create a framework whose lexicon, principles and practices can later be compared across cultures. The Western theoretical framework

constructed in chapters three and four accommodates a broad understanding of conflict resolution, including the structural, social-psychological and spiritual approaches. Nevertheless, the combination of resources referenced throughout this section, while broad, do not suggest that my research accurately represent all theory and practice as conceptualized and articulated in alternative Western languages, including French, Spanish, Italian or German. Nevertheless, part two consists of three independent chapters.

Chapter 3, *From Conflict to Conflict Resolution: Western Lexicon, Conceptualization and Framework*, analyzes conflict resolution as a discipline, theory and practice in the West. It opens by demonstrating how the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq intensified criticism of the discipline of conflict resolution while contextualizing contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Because some U.S. representatives portrayed the invasion of Iraq as a necessary means of proliferating democracy, good governance, and/or as an exercise in state building—practices commonly associated with conflict resolution and/or peacebuilding in its broadest sense, these associations augmented criticism of contemporary conflict resolution in both theoretical and practical terms. While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to detail such critiques, their introduction emphasize the impact the invasion of Iraq had on the field, although scholars persist in their belief that conflict resolution remains viable for improving deconstructive intrastate and interstate relationships when implemented in an objective, accommodating and inclusive manner.

Next, I define recurring concepts including conflict, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, cognitive transformation and reconciliation. When conflict resolution is examined, it is necessary to introduce the three primary schools of Western peacebuilding: conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation. In general terms, most comparative studies conducted hitherto rely predominantly on the Western structural approach. Subsequent to presenting the three Western disciplines, and their associated theories, I position the research within these schools of thought. I select to establish a broad Western theoretical framework that integrates all three disciplines. This wide approach, in my opinion, is ideal for combining theory from the three Western schools of thought and for making cross-cultural comparisons.

Subsequent to defining relevant terminology and explaining associated processes, Louis Kriesberg's concise theoretical framework of conflict resolution is introduced. This framework simplistically reduces conflict resolution to three components: the units, dimensions and degree. The theoretical significance of this framework is its simplification of a complex process that aids reader understanding of how scholars perceive conflict resolution

functions. Upon this foundation, deeper analysis of Western conceptualizations of conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels can occur in chapter 4.

Chapter 4, *Conflict Resolution in the West: Principles, Approaches and Problems*, deepens our understanding of conflict resolution, as articulated by Western scholars in the English language. This chapter makes three theoretical contributions to our cross-cultural comparative analysis. First, it qualifies prerequisites hypothesized necessary for introducing conflict resolution at the intrastate or interstate levels. While the prerequisites introduced provide a basic understanding of when scholars believe that a program should ideally be implemented, there is dissension among scholars concerning their importance and the order in which they must be fulfilled. Nonetheless, many of the parameters examined are useful for making cross-cultural comparisons later.

Second, three Western principled approaches to conflict resolution are introduced. The three approaches are broadly another means of classifying the three Western disciplines of peacebuilding: conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. The principled approaches analyzed are the structural, social-psychological and spiritual approaches. Each approach emphasizes specific, interrelated principles when resolving conflict, many of which are shared across approaches. By outlining these approaches, the Western theoretical spectrum of influential principles and tools are highlighted, whereby later comparisons of Western theory *vis-à-vis* that advocated in Arab/Muslim literature can occur.

Finally, chapter four closes by denoting multiple precautions and problems associated with the theory and practice of conflict resolution. Precautions and problems are introduced because they demonstrate the complexity of a conflict resolution program, and ground expectations by emphasizing the capacities and limitations of the process as conceptualized by scholars. Many of these precautions and problems recapitulate benchmarks and theory analyzed above. Chapter four completes our delineation of conflict resolution according to Western literature, transitioning our attention to Arab/Muslim theory and practices.

Chapter 5, *Arab/Muslim Conceptualization of Conflict Resolution*, explores conflict resolution literature written by Arab/Muslim scholars, in the English language, to analyze how the process is conceptualized and practiced in predominately Arab/Muslim communities. This comparative approach tests Hypothesis two. Namely, the chapter makes cross-cultural comparisons of essential concepts, theory and practices using my wide Western theoretical framework. While analyzing Arab/Muslim literature, this thesis juxtaposes Arab/Muslim theory and practice with Western peacebuilding approaches of conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Among its theoretical findings, the contents

demonstrate that historical, religious and cultural nuances unique to the Middle East, and which were outlined in the first part of this research, influence associated precepts and practices. In particular, characteristics such as robust family-community ties and Islam influence how conflict, peace and conflict resolution are conceptualized and how conflict resolution is implemented. While examining these elements, it will be demonstrated that some scholars suggest that specific conflict resolution theory and practices in the West contradict those found in Arab/Muslim culture.

Most noteworthy among the cultural differences are the Arab/Muslim prioritization of religion and its traditional implementation of conflict resolution at the community level. Unequivocally there are some divergences that must be considered and accommodated when resolving conflict across these cultures. However, our review of Arab/Muslim scholars' conceptualizations of conflict resolution, compared to the wide Western theoretical framework established in chapters three and four, suggests that there are multiple cross-cultural convergences overlooked by previous comparative research. Cross-cultural similarities qualified include fundamental concepts, principles and tools. Most importantly, we find that the conflict transformation school of thought, represented by John Paul Lederach's spiritual approach, mirrors many aspects of the Arab/Muslim approach. The commonalities qualified suggest a noteworthy degree of cross-cultural compatibility, far greater than most Arab/Muslim scholars hitherto have acknowledged. Nonetheless, Arab/Muslim scholars counsel there are marked discrepancies across cultures.

Concurrently, our comparative analysis underscores fundamental theoretical and practical voids in Arab/Muslim conflict resolution, most notably the absence of techniques for resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate level. Since Arab/Muslim traditional practices manage or resolve conflict at the familial level, there is no traditional mechanism available for resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels. This theoretical and practical void stimulates Arab/Muslim scholars to demand preexisting practices be supplemented and reformed. That said, although there is a lack of traditional techniques available for resolving conflict at the higher levels, Arab/Muslim scholars insist that the same principles and practices applied at the community level are applicable when resolving conflict at the higher levels.

Several conclusions deduced from our comparative analysis are tested in the subsequent chapter. Namely, multiple concepts, principles and practices articulated in chapter five are incorporated into a questionnaire targeting a convience sample of U.S. and Iraq citizens to examine how conflict resolution is perceived and deemed most appropriately applied at the

interstate level. The theoretical advantage of the survey is that it extends our research beyond scholarship and macro level analysis by sampling laypersons' opinion at the micro level to determine how they conceptualize conflict and conflict resolution between two countries.

Following our cross-cultural comparative analysis of conflict resolution traditions as articulated in the literature, part three of the present research refocuses our attention on the micro level where three hypotheses concerning Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations of conflict resolution at the interstate level are tested among a convenience sample of respondents from the U.S. and Iraq. The objectives of this part of the research are threefold. First, it qualifies and quantifies whether a majority from a sample of U.S. and Iraq respondents embrace sixteen conflict resolution principles (Hypothesis 3) and eleven tools or techniques of advancing resolution in general (Hypotheses 4). Then it qualifies whether a majority of those same respondents agree that conflict resolution is necessary to improve contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations (Hypothesis 5). Finally, our survey tests whether a majority of respondents agree on thirteen resolution tools for transforming the quality of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations (Hypothesis 6). During our evaluation of laypersons' opinion, responses are comparatively analyzed *vis-à-vis* the scholarly conceptualizations as extracted from the literature review in part two of this thesis. Part three of this thesis contains two chapters and several appendices.

Chapter 6, *Survey of Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Conflict Resolution: Questionnaire Design, Methodology and Findings*, articulates how the research questionnaire was designed, piloted and implemented. At this point, I explain which conflict resolution tools were included into the survey and why others were omitted. I also discuss how pilot participants and survey respondents were selected. Subsequent to explaining the demographic nature of our samples, the data is descriptively analyzed.

Chapter 6 contains four sections. The first reiterates the need for conflict resolution in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. It re-contextualizes information extracted from the previous two parts, and returns our attention to micro level relations. The second explains how my questionnaire was designed and piloted. At this point, we explain why tools were included or omitted, and outline piloting methodology. It then traces the reduction of tools that advance conflict resolution extracted from the literature in Appendix 1 to eleven of the most preferred and recognized techniques through pilot research. At this time, we explain why some methods were excluded from the research and why others were included.

The third section outlines survey research methodology. It explains how the online questionnaire was implemented and how the sample of U.S. and Iraq respondents was

obtained. Next, research weaknesses are articulated, including the unrepresentative nature of the sample due to challenges experienced recruiting respondents and with recruiting assistance to circulate the questionnaire. I then explain how data was processed, how the internal reliability of the data was measured and how it was analyzed.

The closing section of chapter 6 details survey findings gleaned from our convenience samples. Our analysis is subdivided into: how conflict is conceptualized; general perceptions of conflict resolution principles; general perceptions of techniques which advance conflict resolution; opinions concerning the effects of the 2003 war and occupation; and, a rating of techniques in the hypothetical context of improving U.S.-Iraq relations. Combined, this chapter qualifies how interstate conflict resolution is perceived at the micro level by a sample of U.S. and Iraqi respondents. To my knowledge, this is the first such research of its kind in this particular context. We determine that there are many similarities between how respondents across our samples conceptualize conflict resolution between two states. These findings challenge existing research that indicates that Arab/Muslim and Western approaches are incompatible.

The final chapter of this thesis, *Conclusions and Recommendations*, recapitulates the six working hypotheses and findings gleaned from the research. While reviewing the validity of each hypothesis, several recommendations are made based upon my research findings. These recommendations are thought useful on two levels. First, I propose several research gaps that should be filled to advance understanding of conflict resolution across cultures at the micro and macro levels. Second, I suggest conflict resolution between the United States and Iraq should be pursued.

This chapter is succeeded by a list of resources utilized in the main text and appendices. Four appendices follow the list of sources. Appendix 1 contains conflict resolution mechanisms utilized at the intrastate and interstate levels deduced from the literature during the course of the research. Appendix 2 provides a copy of the questionnaire. Appendix 3 contains comparative bar graphs of our survey data for each question according to country of origin. Appendix 4 is the contact log of institutions solicited for assistance with circulating my survey. Appendix 5 provides a basic overview of how to calculate and interpret p-values provided in chapter six.

PART 1: HISTORICAL BACKDROP AND CONFLICT MAPPING

Chapter 1 The 2003 U.S.-Iraq War and Occupation

The primary objective of this chapter is to map the conflict between the U.S. and Iraq by reconstructing the role of the United States in the evolution of Iraq between 2002 and 2011. Violent conflict between the United States and Iraq escalated subsequent to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, politically and socially destabilizing Iraq. The contents of this chapter chronicles events in Iraq during this period, highlighting some of the social and psychological impacts they had on Iraqis. Occurrences articulated herein contribute to the testing of Hypothesis 1, which states there is a long-standing conflict relationship between the United States and Iraq that has produced bilateral animosity between these respective societies.

Of particular importance, the overthrow of Iraq's government fractured its society, exacerbating preexisting ethnic and sectarian tensions. Social fracturing produced an unprecedented degree of ethnic, sectarian and tribal turbulence in the power vacuum manufactured by the invasion and occupation. Simultaneously, U.S. intervention exacerbated preexisting anti-American sentiment that was rooted in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and a decade of economic sanctioning imposed by the United States and the international community thereafter. Combined, Iraqis' general repugnance toward U.S. intervention and its policies during the occupation, compounded by the sectarian fissures created, generated backlash in the form of a civil war and insurgency. The manifestations of violence had a clear impact on Iraq's society and inhabitants' perceptions. The precise social impact of events during the occupation is expounded upon in chapter 2.

The present chapter commences by summarizing the quality of bilateral relations between the U.S. and Iraq between the 1950s and 2003. Due to the sake of space, we only denote important geopolitical events that impacted on the typology of U.S.-Iraq interaction, namely the Cold War rivalry, the Revolution in Iran and Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. Thereafter, we trace the escalation of tensions between the United States and Iraq prior to the events of 9/11. It denotes how some U.S. policymakers had become frustrated with the containment of Iraq, and were appalled by Saddam Hussein's bulking at international sanctions and weapons inspections. Determined to respond, the events of 9/11 provided impetus for a full-scale military invasion under the banner of a U.S. global counterterrorism strategy. Nevertheless, the fallible justifications for the invasion offered by administration officials, including Iraq being an existential threat due to its possession of WMD and support for terrorism, were

widely unaccepted by the international community. Therefore, the United Nations refused to endorse U.S. intervention. In response, George W. Bush created "a coalition of the willing" and proceeded to implement the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

Following a brief review of the invasion, a chronological outline of the occupation is provided to illustrate how the coalition assumed control and (mis)managed Iraq as the occupying power. Some failures were a consequence of the United States administration's expectation that the reconstruction of Iraq and its transition to a representative government would progress rapidly. To temporarily manage the rapid handover of sovereignty, the U.S. first dispatched the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA). However, the ORHA's tenure was prematurely terminated when civil disorder and ethnic violence exceeded coalition capacity.

The George W. Bush administration subsequently dispatched the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). This act terminated U.S. plans for a rapid transfer of governance back to Iraq, prolonging the unpopular occupation for an unspecified duration. Once in control, the CPA assumed extensive responsibility for governing and reconstructing the country. During its tenure, two early decisions made by the CPA proved counterproductive to social and political stability. More specifically, de-Ba'athification and the dissolution of Iraq's military and security forces produced sectarian backlash that gave impetus to an insurgency and precipitated ethnic-sectarian violence. These two examples of CPA decisions are highlighted because of their impact on the social and political evolution of occupied Iraq, and because they qualify as obvious examples of structural violence perpetrated by the U.S. during the occupation. Other examples of structural violence likewise occurred, and are briefly noted elsewhere in this chapter, including the U.S. failure to provide security, the *ad hoc* and poorly implemented reconstruction strategy, and U.S.-imposed governing frameworks, to name a few.

Because of local and international criticism of conditions inside Iraq, and persistent appeals for rapid transfer of sovereignty back to Iraq, the U.S. appointed the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). Jointly, the CPA and the IGC managed the daily affairs of Iraq and established official guidelines and a timetable for transferring authority from the United States to an elected Government of Iraq (GOI). The benchmarks and time frame established called for a phased transfer of authority over a three-year period. However, as the transition occurred, many of the decisions of the IGC and forthcoming governing bodies were subject to U.S. interference. Thus, despite local and international criticism, the United States continued to

intervene in Iraq's sovereign affairs throughout the occupation, and this tendency persisted even following the election and seating of the GOI.

While analyzing the CPA's role, we qualify the deteriorating security situation. In summary, Iraq experienced violence from mid-2003 to 2011, which reached its pinnacle around 2007. Violence had a significant impact on the well-being of Iraqis, undermining reconstruction, and exacerbating social and political tensions, prolonging the occupation, generating grievances and challenging the transition of authority. Eventually, a combination of events aided in the reduction of violence, including the increased capacity of Iraq's military. The purpose of highlighting the security situation is to classify the complex internal conflict that manifested during the occupation to qualify the degree of violence experienced. At this point, we also identify groups of actors, and several root causes that precipitated their activity. Finally, denotation of the security situation contextualizes U.S. government and military shortcomings when securing Iraq, for instance their failure to plan for contingencies, or effectively counteract civil disorder during the early period of the occupation.

After qualifying violence, we explore several practices implemented by the CPA to restore security and reconstruct occupied Iraq. Techniques are broadly reduced to military kinetic operations and the training of a reconstituted Iraq military; advancing regional cooperation; reconstructing infrastructure; and promoting national reconciliation. The latter is a salient component of conflict resolution and transitional justice. Nevertheless, many programs designed to reduce violence and reconstruct Iraq were improperly planned, subject to setbacks, and sometimes outright rejected by Iraqis because they had been imposed. Despite their shortcomings, stabilization and reconstruction practices were sustained throughout the occupation and responsibility for their implementation was ultimately transferred to the GOI.

With the deteriorating security situation and U.S. reconstruction policy outlined, our historical account then summarizes the transition of authority to a permanently elected government. The outline includes a brief overview of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), the Transitional National Assembly (TNA), and the Government of Iraq (GOI). For the sake of space, we only highlight dates, tasks and a general critique of each governing body. Whenever possible, the activities of these bodies are contextualized within the frame of U.S.-Iraq relations. In particular, we denote U.S. interference with their mandates to underscore how the United States persistently intervened in Iraq's sovereign affairs. Tracing their development likewise illustrates how sectarian differences became politicized and institutionalized within Iraq's (re-)emerging institutions, a phenomenon which undermined popular trust and legitimacy of the GOI. Thus, the sectarian and ethnic fighting that engulfed post-war Iraq not

only challenged successive governing bodies, but also became institutionalized in Iraq's emerging governing framework.

The chapter concludes with a brief critical summary of the invasion and occupation. It recapitulates invasion and post-war policy, as well as highlights internal social and political dynamics. Combined, the contents herein provide an overview of the occupation and its social and political impact. This information is essential for testing Hypothesis 1. Lastly, this chapter functions as a prelude to chapter 2, which qualifies and quantifies how many of the experiences traced below affect society and public opinion at the micro and macro levels.

1.1 Prelude to operation Iraqi Freedom (1950s-2003)

U.S.-Iraq (conflict) relations matured following the withdrawal of Britain's influence from the Middle East in the mid-1900s. At this juncture, the United States and the Soviet Union became increasingly involved in the Middle East, with both the nuclear rivals engaging regional leaders to selfishly augment the hegemons' relative influence (Kepel, 2004: 25). As part of its strategy, the United States utilized enticements, and sometimes violence, to coerce Iraq's leaders to conform to policies the U.S. determined favorable to its regional interests; which, among others objectives, were designed to undermine the regional authority of the Soviet Union, and to secure the flow of Middle East petroleum onto the international market (Galvani, 1972: 32-33). From its utilization of covert operations supporting Kurd rebels in Iraq (Neff, 1991: 31), to offsetting Iraq-Soviet relations by courting and assisting Iran (Cottam, 1970: 4; Marsh, 2003: 2-3), the United States regularly implemented policies which counteracted Iraq's leaders when they acted contrary to the desired objectives of the standing U.S. administration. The U.S. government[1] deployed analogous policies throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, generally perceiving Iraq as a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East.

1.1.1 Iran's Revolution

During the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. engaged Iran as a strategic ally to balance the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East (Gerner, 2004). The quality of U.S.-Iran relations, nonetheless, were challenged by the 1979 Iran Revolution that replaced the Shah

[1] Government in this text refers to the political structures, their representatives, and administrators who manage affairs and relationships among groups of individuals within a given territory (Modelski, 1978: 214-215). These structures broadly "includ[e] the executive, legislative, administrative and judicial" bodies which combine to establish a framework that produces and enforces "the laws, procedures, and norms by which the state operates" (Buzan, 1991: 82-83). The term government, as utilized, can be applied at multiple levels, including the local (villages, cities); the state (or national) (Iraq or the United States); the regional (the European Union); and the global level (*Pax Britannica*) (Modelski, 1978: 214-215).

with a Shi‘a clerical government directed by the religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini (Gerner, 2004: 122-123; Katzman, 2009: 2; Neff, 1991: 28). The Shah had exiled Ayatollah Khomeini to Iraq during the 1960s for his criticisms of Iran's government (Skocpol, 1982: 274). In exile, Khomeini "preach[ed] to students and pilgrims that the Shah was an agent of anti-Islamic foreign imperialism, and he called on the ulama, or the Arab/Islamic community, to assert their right to lead 'the Islamic community' in direct opposition to such unjust authority" (Skocpol, 1982: 274). Khomeini's rhetoric appealed to Shi‘a clerics and Muslims in Iran, as outlined in the previous quote, who had increasingly become frustrated with the Shah and were determined to remove him from power (Skocpol, 1982: 274). Ironically, the Shi‘a revolution inspired by Khomeini terminated a long-standing tradition of the clergy's disassociation with politics (Visser, 2007: 814). Equally important, the event changed the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and threatened neighboring Sunni-led governments.

Iran's revolution influenced the perception that Iran threatened U.S. geopolitical interests, notably Middle East social and political stability (Goldschmidt, 2004: 72; Public Broadcast Service, 2001). Suspicion in the U.S. was exacerbated by Iran's clerical leadership's blatant criticism of the United States and their expressed disinterest in maintaining diplomatic ties (Kepel, 2004: 167; Sick, 1989: 238). Faced with the improbability of continued U.S.-Iran relations, the Reagan administration adapted its geopolitical strategy—although Neff (1991: 28) argues that no coherent U.S. policy ever manifested. To the advantage of the United States, Iran's severing of ties with the U.S. forfeited valuable military assistance, which complicated Iran's regional ambitions of hegemony and spreading the Shi‘a revolution into neighboring countries (Karsh, 1990: 265-266; Neff, 1991: 28; Tripp, 2007: 222). Consequently, the U.S. turned to Iraq.[2]

With bilateral suspicion and tensions escalating in the region, Iran and Iraq progressed closer to military conflict. Prior to the 1979 Revolution, Iran-Iraq relations had oscillated between cooperation and hostility (Karsh, 1990: 257; Sick, 1989: 232-234). Concerning the latter, disputes and military intervention, when they manifested, were generally founded on issues including the demarcation of territory, Shi‘a and Sunni religious ideology or identity, and the increasing contest for regional hegemony (Oberg, 2007: 68; Parasiliti, 2003: 152;

[2] The implications of Iran's revolution and evangelistic rhetoric threatened more than Sunni-led Iraq or U.S.-Iran relations. It likewise aroused suspicion among other Sunni-led countries including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Gareau, 2004: 175; Goldschmidt, 2004: 71; Roy, 2007: 95; Tripp, 2007: 212). The governments of these countries, like Iraq, feared that the Shi‘a revolution would spread into the Shi‘a communities within their own countries (Gagnon, 2002; Gareau, 2004: 175; Roy, 2007: 103-105; Sick, 1989: 232-233; Tripp, 2007: 212-222). This hypothetical occurrence would threaten political stability and the existing governing arrangements where, in some instances, a minority of Sunni Arabs ruled a majority population of Shi‘a Arabs (Gagnon, 2002; Gareau, 2004: 175; Roy, 2007: 103-105; Sick, 1989: 232-233; Tripp, 2007: 212-222).

Sick, 1989: 232-234). Suspicion and enmity grew steadily during the 1970s. During this period, for example, both countries were guilty of making cross-border incursions and covertly supporting sectarianism inside their rivals' borders to politically undermine the other (for instance, Iran's support of Iraq's Kurd) (Neff, 1991: 28-30; Tétreault, 2004: 154-155; Tripp, 2007: 158-159). However, Saddam Hussein decided to outmaneuver and weaken Iran since it appeared vulnerable following Iran's Revolution, its proselytizing rhetoric, and increased support of Shi'a and Kurd rebellions inside Iraq (Parasiliti, 2003: 152; Tripp, 2007: 193-225).

Iran's vulnerability to a military campaign spearheaded by Iraq was presumed since the revolutionary leaders were experiencing difficulties consolidating their control over the newly created Islamic Republic of Iran (Skocpol, 1982: 276). In fact, popular uprisings in Iran were recurrent subsequent to the removal of the Shah (Skocpol, 1982: 276). Under the false assumption that the ongoing political and social turmoil inside Iran would prevent Iran's government from meeting Iraq's military challenge, Saddam Hussein instigated what he anticipated would be a limited military engagement to demonstrate Iraq's power *vis-à-vis* Iran (Tripp, 2007: 223-225)[3]. The calculation proved fallible.

Rather than acquiesce, Iraq's invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980, initiated the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) (Alfoneh, 2013: 88; Haass, 2009: 26; Iran Chamber Society, 2011; Sick, 1989: 230) [4]. Saddam Hussein premised his military incursion on a number of Iran-Iraq disputes, such as the long-standing border dispute over the *Shatt al-Arab* waterway and Iran's interference in Iraq's sovereign affairs (support for Shi'a and Kurds) (Iran Chamber Society, 2011; Sick, 1989: 231). In geopolitical terms, by default, Iraq's invasion made it the primary actor in a regional policy of containment, here narrowly defined as the process of isolating a hostile country and preventing its ideological and territorial expansion (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 225; Miller, 2005: 27; Parasiliti, 2003: 154; Roy, 2007: 80; Tripp, 2007: 223-225). In particular, Iraq's invasion provided its Sunni neighbors and the United States an opportunity to offer financial and/or military assistance to contain Iran (Allawi, 2007: 298).

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[3] Contrary, Karsh (1990: 267) asserts that while Saddam Hussein's government realized that their chances of success against Iran were marginal, they decided that war was the only way of containing Iran.

[4] Wilmer (1998: 90-113) defines "War as structured violence that occurs either between or within states." By comparison, J. David Singer's (1972) Correlates of War (COW) project defines war as an organized military conflict between at least two groups that results in 1,000 or more battle deaths per year among the warring factions (Correlates of War, 2006). COW distinguished between three broad categories of war: intrastate (a war fought inside a given state between at least two organized actors—either the governmental versus nongovernmental actors or a conflict between two or more nongovernmental actors); interstate (involving two or more different countries); and extra-state war (between a government and nongovernmental actors) (Correlates of War, 2006). The term war, as used in this text, refers to all three types, unless otherwise specified.

Officially, the U.S. government took a neutral stance on the Iran-Iraq War, imposing an arms embargo on both countries (Neff, 1991: 30). However, the Reagan administration arbitrarily enforced the policy as the war persisted (Neff, 1991: 30). Initially pleased that Iraq maintained the military advantage between 1980 and 1981, the U.S. remained indifferent (Tétreault, 2004: 155; Tripp, 2007: 225-226). Nevertheless, Iran acquired the military advantage in 1982 (Battle, 2003; Sullivan, 2005: 1) and in April, Saddam Hussein proposed a ceasefire that Iran rejected (Alfoneh, 2013: 89). With hostilities continuing, President Reagan had Iraq removed from the State Department's list of countries that sponsor terrorism, which allowed the U.S. to provide Iraq with economic aid and sell it military hardware (Battle, 2003; Sullivan, 2005: 1). This support proved valuable to the trajectory of the war.

In Iraq, Saddam Hussein was challenged by the need to fill the military ranks. To recruit soldiers, he utilized rewards and incentives offered to tribal leaders who would then entice their male members to join the fight against Iran (Hassan, 2007: 3). Hussein also relied on Shi'a conscripts (Terrill, 2003: 8). Ironically, despite the harsh treatment of the Shi'a in Iraq, Shi'a conscripts proved themselves on the battlefield against Iran. Terrill (2003: 8) hypothesizes Shi'a conscripts' performance was rooted in their allegiance to their communities rather than Saddam Hussein or his war against Iran. Their actions are surprising, considering Saddam Hussein had ordered Shi'a dissident Ayatollah Sayyid Muhmad Baqir al-Sadr to be executed in 1980 and he continued to expel Shi'a Arabs to Iran (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 217).

As the mid-1980s drew nearer, Iraq's military forces began experiencing territorial losses against Iran. Consequently, Reagan again increased support to Iraq in late 1984 to enhance its military capability (Battle, 2003; Haass, 2009: 28; Neff, 1991: 30; Sick, 1989: 239). At the same time, other Gulf States, namely Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, provided material support to Iraq through financial loans and/or armament (Parasiliti, 2003: 158; Tétreault, 2004: 155; Tripp, 2007: 229). Due to this influx of assistance to Iraq, the Iran-Iraq War edged closer to military stalemate during the mid-1980s (Battle, 2003; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 225; Haass, 2009: 26; Sick, 1989: 238). To shift the balance of power, the Reagan administration again increased assistance to Iraq (Battle, 2003; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 225; Haass, 2009: 26; Sick, 1989: 238)[5].

While U.S. commitment to Iraq appears relatively straightforward, U.S. regional policy in the mid-1980s was convoluted (Neff, 1991: 30-31; Sick, 1989: 239). More specifically, the

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[5] For a concise overview of U.S. policy toward Iraq during the early years of the Iran-Iraq War, see Battle (2003).

United States provided covert assistance to Iran and overt assistance to Iraq simultaneously (Sick, 1989: 239). The Reagan administration's covert provision of arms to Iran between 1985 and 1986 is commonly referred to as the Iran/Contra Affair (Koh, 1988: 1257; Neff, 1991: 31; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 130; Scheffer, 1987: 696-723; Sick, 1989: 239). "[T]he Iran/Contra affair [was] an 18-month operation to trade weapons through Israel to Iran in the hopes of gaining the release of [U.S.] hostages held in Lebanon and, in addition, to help fund the Contras fighting against Nicaragua" (Neff, 1991: 31). Disclosure of the activity outlined in Neff's quote prompted U.S. Congressional inquiries, for instance the 1986 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, where some mid-ranking military officials were accused of wrongdoing (for instance Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North) (Koh, 1988: 1275-1276; Walsh, 1994: 594)[6]. However, no high-ranking politicians were charged with wrongdoing.

Reagan's duplicitous policy (further) discredited the United States as an actor in the Middle East (Neff, 1991: 30-31; Sick, 1989: 239). This was especially the case in Iraq, since Saddam Hussein had been skeptical of the United States prior to his invasion of Iran (Neff, 1991: 30; Sick, 1989: 239). Hussein, nonetheless, agreed to accept economic and military assistance from the U.S. during the Iran-Iraq War to shift the balance of power in his favor (Neff, 1991: 30; Sick, 1989: 239). Subsequent to the public disclosure of covert support to Iran, and the fallout from its exposure, the Reagan administration reversed its policy and singularly supported Iraq by 1987 (Sick, 1989: 239-240). Despite mistrust, Saddam Hussein continued to accept aid provided by the United States.

Continued U.S. assistance in the latter half of the 1980s allowed Iraq to regain the military initiative (Goldschmidt, 2004: 72; Sick, 1989: 239; Tripp, 2007: 230). Following the transferal of momentum back to Iraq, hostilities expanded into international waters as Iran and Iraq's navies targeted their rival's ships (Goldschmidt, 2004: 72; Sick, 1989: 239; Tripp, 2007: 230). When the naval warfare escalated, Iran subsequently targeted Kuwait-owned oil tankers to discourage Kuwait's government from providing assistance to Iraq (Goldschmidt, 2004: 72; Sick, 1989: 239; Tripp, 2007: 230). Iran's naval tactics prompted the U.S. government to register Kuwait's ships in the United States, and then to dispatch the U.S. Navy

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[6] Oliver North was an architect of the illegal exchange of weapons for hostages and then funneling proceeds to the Contras in Nicaragua (Walsh, 1994). North was granted immunity prior to testifying before congress on the Iran-Contra Affair, which undermined the ability to prosecute his actions. Although initially convicted and given a light sentence, the decision was overturned on appeal due the immunity granted by Congress (Walsh, 1994: 594). For a detailed account of the legal implications of the Reagan administration's covert sale of arms to Iran, see Scheffer (1987). For an overview of the affair and the legal and political efforts to conceal Reagan administration involvement, see Sofaer (2003).

to provide convoy protection to secure shipping lanes and the flow of petroleum onto the international market (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 225; Sick, 1989: 239; Tripp, 2007: 230).

Although the war endured for eight years, the United Nations worked to secure a cease fire and peace agreement (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 24). Since it appeared that the conflict would escalate, and perhaps spread throughout the region, efforts to broker a ceasefire were redoubled in the late 1980s (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 24). Following increased pressure from the United Nations and Saudi Arabia, a cease-fire agreement was ultimately brokered in August 1988 (Alfoneh, 2013: 91; Neff, 1991: 31; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 24-25; Sick, 1989: 243). Both countries had suffered significant human loss and were devastated in infrastructural and economic terms, and, therefore, succumbed to negotiations.

Concerning the type of assistance provided by the United States to Iraq during the 1980s, it included military and economic aid, as well as surveillance and intelligence information (Lieberfeld, 2005: 8; Tétreault, 2004: 156; Tripp, 2007: 232). Moreover, the U.S. abetted the development of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs, commonly referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Gagnon, 2002; Haass, 2009: 30; Johnson, 2004: 224; Tétreault, 2004: 156). For example, the U.S. is reported to have provided Iraq biological cultures, or bacteria, needed to produce biological weapons (Johnson, 2004: 224). The U.S. also sold "dual-use technology", defined as technology that can be utilized for both peaceful civilian purposes and for manufacturing nuclear weapons (Milhollin, 2000)[7]. Other countries including England, Holland and Switzerland, likewise assisted in the development of Iraq's military capability (Gareau, 2004: 176-177). Germany also constructed a facility that produced chemical weapons but was officially billed as a pesticide production factory (Milhollin, 2000), and France built the Osirak nuclear power plant (Neff, 1991: 27; Tripp, 2007: 229). In any event, scholars cannot agree on the ramifications of this assistance.

For example, some claim U.S. aid was insignificant in terms of Iraq's military capability (Haass, 2009: 49), while others perceive it as very significant (Milhollin, 2000). On the one hand, Richard Haass (2009: 49) dismisses criticism of U.S. assistance, suggesting that numerous U.S. congressional investigations into executive policy discovered no wrongdoing. On the other hand, Gary Milhollin (2000) and Chalmers Johnson (2004: 224-225) condemn the type and magnitude of military assistance provided during the 1980s and its implications

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[7] Dual-use technology is strictly regulated and monitored by western states and international agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) due to the potential of its utilization in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Martin, 2004: 1578-1579). Examples of dual-use technology include high-precision electronic switches that can be used in the medical field and in circuitry for detonating nuclear warheads. Additional examples include glass and carbon fibers that can be utilized to build solid fuel rockets as well as for the manufacturing of sports equipment (Milhollin, 2000).

on national and regional events. For instance, Iraq's military utilized chemical weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (Rovner, 2014: 489-490), and later deployed them against Iraq's Kurds during a 1989 uprising (Roth, 2005: 7; Sick, 1989: 243). Irony should equally not be lost on the fact that, as detailed later in this chapter, although Western countries assisted Iraq's development of WMD in the 1980s, a few years later, their possession would be posited as a motivating factor for the U.S.-international community policy of containment[8].

The Iran-Iraq War was costly for both belligerents in terms of treasury and the human toll (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 226). Iraq's oil revenue had halved and it "had contracted a vast amount of debt owed to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States" (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 226). Hence, the quote denotes that Iraq emerged from the eight-year war as an economically fragile regional military power indebted to its neighbors (Allawi, 2007: 40; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 226; Neff, 1991: 33-34; Parasiliti, 2003: 157-158; Sick, 1989: 243; Tripp, 2007: 239). Determined to reacquire his strength, Saddam Hussein sought to circumvent his predicament by negotiating economic assistance from his Sunni-led regional neighbors (Allawi, 2007: 40; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 226). His diplomatic strategy did not produce rewards.

Perceiving that neighboring Sunni-led countries had benefited from his containment of Iran, Saddam Hussein expected his neighbors to demonstrate their gratitude through economic concessions (Allawi, 2007: 40; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 226). Among the concessions, Saddam sought debt forgiveness and an increase in the price of petroleum, policies which would allow Iraq's economy to be nurtured back to health. However, neighboring states would not yield. Absent assistance, Hussein applied pressure. His rhetoric increasingly incorporated subtle threats *vis-à-vis* Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Allawi, 2007: 40; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 226-227; Tripp, 2007: 242). Part of his increasingly harsh rhetoric implied that military force would be used if necessary to secure favorable concessions, which generated fear (Tripp, 2007: 242).

While tensions increased between Iraq and its Sunni neighbors, U.S.-Iraq relations were subject to oscillation (Neff, 1991: 31-32). Foremost, and noted above, "Saddam's traditional suspicions of the United States [had been] confirmed with the revelation of the Iran/Contra scandal in 1986" (Neff, 1991: 31). Donald Neff (1991: 31) goes on to express this suspicion noting, "Saddam and other Iraqi officials would cite the Iran/Contra scandal as added proof—

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[8] Throughout this text, the term "West" is shorthand for Anglo Saxon countries (Australia, England, the United States and Canada) and Western European countries, in full realization that there are vast differences across these elements. The author understands that defining the "West" is challenging, controversial, and is subject to Manichean stereotypes such as "us" and "them," or dichotomies with terms such as "developed" or "undeveloped" countries. However, since much of the literature utilized in this dissertation makes comparisons between "Arab/Muslim" politics, culture, ideology, religion and philosophy with those of the "West," this distinction is applied. The adjective Western broadly suggests individuals or ideas originating in the West.

along with the Nixon-Kissinger secret operation to support the Kurds in the early 1970s—that Washington's true goal was the overthrow of the Iraq government." Neff's quotes emphasize U.S. duplicity during the Iran-Iraq War, and previous assistance to the Kurds had a significant impact on the way the U.S. was perceived and which goals Iraqi politicians and the population thought it held. The experience thereby increased Iraqi suspicion of the United States.

Two incidents in late 1998 further undermined the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations (Neff, 1991: 31-32). The first occurred on September 8, 1988, when Reagan's Secretary of State, George Shultz, accused Iraq of using chemical weapons against Iraq-Kurdistan villages, an accusation Iraq's government adamantly denied (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 225; Neff, 1991: 31-32; Wimmer, 2003: 118-119). The events referenced occurred in February and March 1989, when a Kurd uprising was launched. In response, Iraq's military utilized chemical weapons and razed entire villages, such as Halabja. During this repressive campaign, Alex Bellamy (2004: 138) estimates that 100,000 people were killed. While the U.S. military was aware of the massacre, the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administration downplayed the events to prevent Congress from terminating economic assistance to Iraq (Allawi, 2007: 41; Exoo, 2010: 26-27; Gareau, 2004: 178). Accordingly, both administrations placed such a high priority on maintaining positive relations with Iraq that they willfully disguised war crimes.

The second incident that strained U.S.-Iraq relations manifested in mid-November 1989. At this time, Iraq expelled the head of the U.S. Embassy's political section (Neff, 1991: 33-34). The expulsion prompted a U.S. reprisal and an "Iraqi diplomat from Washington" was expelled from the United States (Neff, 1991: 33-34). Similar tit-for-tat expulsions continued between governments during the next few months, escalating tensions and suspicion in both countries (Neff, 1991: 32). Meanwhile, the George H.W. Bush (January 1989-January 1993) administration continued to try to stabilize and improve relations with Iraq.

Despite the ongoing diplomatic altercations, the George H.W. Bush administration continued to foster cordial relations with Iraq, as demonstrated on October 26, 1989, when the President signed National Security Directive (NSD) 26 (Gagnon, 2002; Gareau, 2004: 178; Haass, 2009: 46)[9]. NSD 26 emphasized the administration's interest in maintaining political relations and the strengthening of U.S.-Iraq military cooperation (Gareau, 2004: 178; Haass,

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[9] Mott and Fox (2012) define National Security Directives as a particular type of executive order that functions as administrative law. NSDs are drafted by the National Security Council, at the request of a President, who later signs the order making it legally binding (Mott and Fox, 2012). Controversially, executive orders can be used to supplant or circumvent the legislative branch of government thereby giving a U.S. President the possibility of bypassing Congress altogether to expedite a given policy and to circumvent Congressional disapproval (Mott and Fox, 2012). Once signed, NSDs are forwarded to federal agencies and agents where they function as policy guidelines (Mott and Fox, 2012).

2009: 47-48). Controversially, the directive was signed subsequent to, and despite, Saddam Hussein's aforementioned military suppression of the Kurd uprising (Allawi, 2007: 35-37; Bellamy, 2004: 138; International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: ix). Nevertheless, bilateral relations continued to deteriorate.

As tensions between the U.S. Congress and Iraq escalated in 1990, additional diplomats were expelled from both countries and rhetoric became harsh (Neff, 1991: 37). For instance, Saddam Hussein publicly expressed his dissatisfaction at an Arab Cooperative Council meeting on February 24, 1990, and again in a speech to Iraqis on July 17, 1990 (Neff, 1991: 35-37). Paraphrasing both speeches, Hussein accused the United States, Israel and other countries of subverting his leadership (and that of other Middle East leaders), manipulating oil production and prices to undermine Iraq's economic recovery, and of denying Iraq its sovereign right to technological advancements (including WMD) (Neff, 1991: 35-38). Approximately one week following Hussein's July speech, the U.S. Congress responded by restricting financial assistance through the imposition of economic sanctions, a policy President George H.W. Bush protested (Neff, 1991: 38) [10].

Meanwhile, regional tensions increased because Saddam Hussein persisted to threaten Kuwait and Saudi Arabia into granting economic concessions (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 228-229; Neff, 1991: 38). The situation climaxed on August 2, 1990, when Iraq's military invaded and occupied Kuwait (Haass, 2009: 60-61; Johnson, 2004: 224-225; Kepel, 2004: 218). This exploit increased international anxiety that Saudi Arabia would be annexed (Greenwood, 1992: 163; Haass, 2009: 60-61; Johnson, 2004: 224-225; Kepel, 2004: 180-218). The annexation of Kuwait forced the George H.W. Bush administration to reverse its approach toward Iraq (Haass, 2009: 60-61; Johnson, 2004: 224-225; Kepel, 2004: 218). The act also placed Iraq at odds with the international community (Haass, 2009: 60-61; Johnson, 2004: 224-225; Kepel, 2004: 218; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 18). The stage had been set for military confrontation since Saddam Hussein's actions were interpreted as unprovoked hostility and threatening to regional stability.

1.1.2 Persian Gulf War and post-war containment (1991-2001)

Approximately nine months after President George H.W. Bush signed NSD 26, U.S.-Iraq relations were fractured by Iraq's annexation of Kuwait (Gareau, 2004: 178; Haass, 2009: 47-48). In the face of excruciating debt incurred from its war with Iran, Iraq sent its military

[10] For a critique of sanctioning in foreign policy, see Thomas Weiss (1999).

forces into neighboring Kuwait in early August 1990 (Greenwood, 1992: 153; Tripp, 2007: 243). Hussein justified his behavior with two explanations (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 228-229; Goldschmidt, 2004: 75; Tripp, 2007: 242-243). First, he claimed the annexation was a reassertion of territorial claim since Kuwait had once been a part of the province of Basra (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 228-229; Goldschmidt, 2004: 75; Tripp, 2007: 159-160). Second, Hussein accused Kuwait of pilfering Iraq's oil through a process called slant drilling, or drilling diagonally into the earth, whereby Kuwait could extract oil located within Iraq's frontier (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 228-229; Goldschmidt, 2004: 75; Haass, 2009: 55).

There were also other interests purported to have driven Hussein's annexation of Kuwait. For instance, scholars conjecture that Saddam Hussein wished to bolster Iraq's economy by absorbing Kuwait's oil reserves (Greenwood, 1992: 154-155; Haass, 2009: 55). The increased revenue from the annexation of Kuwait was expected to provide an economic infusion into Iraq's ailing economy by alleviating Iraq's debt, of which Kuwait was a major financier, and increasing oil revenue (Greenwood, 1992: 154-155; Haass, 2009: 55-56)[11]. Others supplement this hypothesis suggesting Hussein wanted to demonstrate his determination and strength to neighboring Saudi Arabia, whose government had likewise persistently refused to provide economic concessions (Greenwood, 1992: 154-155; Haass, 2009: 55). Finally, some suggest Hussein's motivations included a desire to advance Iraq as regional hegemon (Allawi, 2007: 43; Parasiliti, 2003: 156-163). Regardless of the rationale, it is unclear whether Hussein calculated the response of the United States and the international community.

Numerous scholars suggest that Saddam Hussein anticipated that the U.S. would refrain from intervention, an estimation that may have been the product of mixed signals from the U.S. government (Allawi, 2007: 432; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 229; Gareau, 2004: 116-232; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003: 54-55; Neff, 1991: 36-37). For instance, critics reference a mid-July 1990 meeting between Saddam Hussein and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, to support their hypothesis that the U.S. may have (intentionally) misled Saddam Hussein concerning Kuwait's sovereignty (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 229; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003: 54-55; Neff, 1991: 36-38). Being summoned by Hussein, the U.S. Ambassador communicated to Hussein that the George H.W. Bush administration had "no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflict, like your border disagreement with Kuwait" (Neff, 1991: 38). This comment denoted by Neff, in conjunction with an earlier U.S. State Department announcement suggesting that Washington had "no special defense or security commitments on Kuwait," may have been

[11] Terrill (2003: 15) suggests that Iraqis may have generally supported the endeavor.

interpreted by Hussein as U.S. indifference on the matter of Kuwait's sovereignty (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003: 54). However, not all scholars ascribe to this interpretation.

Contrary, Richard Haass (2009: 56-57) accuses critics of taking Glaspie's comments out of context. He counters that Ambassador Glaspie emphasized that George H.W. Bush sought a peaceful resolution to the affair, and the meeting even succeeded in having Saddam Hussein agree to border negotiations hosted by Saudi Arabia (Haass, 2009: 56-57; Neff, 1991: 38-39). WikiLeaks released April Glaspie's (1990) July 25 cable[12] sent to the State Department following her meeting with Saddam Hussein, and the cable emphasizes that Saddam Hussein held the George H.W. Bush administration, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates responsible for keeping petroleum prices low, which aided in the constriction of Iraq's economy (Glaspie, 1990; Parasiliti, 2003: 152). The ambassador's cable also stresses that Saddam Hussein had agreed that nonviolent resolution was preferable, and that he would not act until the joint meeting brokered by Saudi Arabia was held (Glaspie, 1990). Glaspie's (1990) cable concludes that Saddam Hussein had not ruled out military intervention. Therefore, Haass may be correct in his assertion that Glaspie's words are taken out of context. However, the contents of the cable demonstrate that Saddam Hussein did not trust the United States and had not eliminated the option of a military campaign against Kuwait.

While it is impossible to determine the intentions of the George H.W. Bush administration prior to August 2, 1990, both the U.S. and the United Nations (UN) immediately denounced Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and called for a return to the *status quo* (Haass, 2009: 61). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) promptly passed UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 660 (August 2, 1990) condemning Hussein's occupation and demanding an immediate withdrawal of Iraq's military (Haass, 2009: 60-61; United Nations, 1990a). Upon noncompliance, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 661 (August 6, 1990), which imposed economic sanctions to coerce Iraq's withdrawal (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 233; Tripp, 2007: 244; United Nations, 1990b). Simultaneously, Britain and the U.S. mobilized their military and organized an international coalition to protect other Gulf countries, for instance Saudi Arabia, which feared annexation (Greenwood, 1992: 163; Kepel, 2004: 180-181). While the coalition military buildup progressed, diplomatic efforts continued in tandem at the bilateral, regional and international level to resolve the issue absent military intervention (Haass, 2009: 104-108; Rovner, 2014: 482-483).

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[12] To access Ambassador April Glaspie's cable forwarded to the State Department following the meeting, see Glaspie (1990).

Iraq's persistent noncompliance occasioned additional responses. For instance, Iraq was again placed on the U.S. State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism on September 13, 1990 (Miles, 2004). Two months later, UNSCR 678 was passed on November 29, 1990, reiterating the demand that Saddam Hussein renege on his territorial claim and withdraw troops from Kuwait (Greenwood, 1992: 165-166; United Nations, 1991). United Nations (1991) SCR 678 also included a January 15, 1991 deadline for compliance, authorizing the use of military force to eject Iraq's military if necessary (Greenwood, 1992: 165-166; Haass, 2009: 103; Tripp, 2007: 245). In this manner, the international community provided Hussein with an ultimatum to conform to its dictum.

Saddam Hussein, nevertheless, remained non-compliant (Haass, 2009: 103-116). When the deadline expired, the coalition military operation (Operation Desert Storm), under the auspice of the UN, was launched to expel Iraq's military from Kuwait on January 16, 1991 (Calhoun, 2005: 95; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 231; Haass, 2009: 116; Tripp, 2007: 245). The Persian Gulf War (1991) lasted for six weeks before Saddam Hussein capitulated (Rovner, 2014). While a comparatively short war, an estimated 200,000 Iraqis, both civilian and military, died in the few weeks of hostilities (Gareau, 2004: 180). The operation likewise decimated Iraq's deteriorated infrastructure (an outcome of the Iran-Iraq War), weakened Iraq's military capability and pushed it back inside Iraq's internationally recognized borders (Gareau, 2004: 180; Tripp, 2007: 245-246).

Securing the flow of petroleum was one factor prompting the United States to restore the *status quo* to the Middle East, as it has been and continues to be of salient interest to ensure market availability (Haass, 2009). Saddam's acquisition of Kuwait markedly increased his percentage of Middle East oil production, which would have given him leverage against the United States and the international community (Haass, 2009: 112). Richard Haass (2009: 76) simultaneously asserts that other issues equally influenced the war. Among the alternative issues, he includes the use and support of international terrorism and maintaining security commitments to Israel. By comparison, the stated objective of U.S. policy *vis-à-vis* Iraq according to the George H.W. Bush administration was to reverse the annexation of Kuwait (Haass, 2009: 115). As a result, following the "liberation" of Kuwait, a cease-fire agreement was brokered (Byman, 2001: 500-501) and Saddam Hussein was not removed from power.

According to Haass (2009: 130-131) the Persian Gulf War was terminated following the removal of Iraq's military forces from Kuwait for several reasons. Foremost, the U.S. wanted to avoid additional troop casualties expected with the invasion of Iraq. Second, the United States wanted Iraq to remain sufficiently stable to counterbalance Iran's regional influence.

Third, it is suggested that the administration feared becoming an occupying power. More specifically, the administration feared the internal instability and a violent insurgency that foreign occupation was expected to generate. Lastly, Haass (2009: 130-131) suggests that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would have exceeded the administration's mandate in the eyes of the United Nations Security Council and the U.S. Congress; an outcome the George H.W. Bush administration felt would be counterproductive to its interests.

Rather than remove Saddam Hussein by military force, the United States and the international community implemented a policy of containment by employing five tools to weaken and isolate Iraq. Containment included: 1) economic sanctions[13]; 2) weapons inspections; 3) a foreign military presence (to enforce no-fly zones); 4) military strikes; and 5) the provision of assistance to internal and external political movements striving for regime change in Iraq (Badie, 2010: 282; Byman, 2001: 500; Lieberfeld, 2005: 12). This containment strategy spanned three U.S. administrations over twelve years, encompassing the George H.W. Bush (1989-1992), William "Bill" Clinton (1992-2001) and George W. Bush (2001-2009) administrations (Badie, 2010: 282; Byman, 2001: 493-494)[14]. Nonetheless, indigenous and foreign attempts to undermine Saddam Hussein's control of Iraq proved ineffective (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 241). Hussein remained in power, and was openly defiant of the United States and the international community (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 241; Rovner, 2014: 484-485; Tripp, 2007: 259-260). For this reason, there was increased criticism within the United States government and military of the stagnation and impotence of the containment strategy (Dobransky, 2014; Ricks, 2007: 4-5; Roy, 2007: 14; Tripp, 2007: 270). Nevertheless, such critiques had been fermenting since 1991.

More specifically, some U.S. decision-makers had criticized the premature termination of the 1991 Persian Gulf War (Lieberfeld, 2005: 14; Ricks, 2007: 4-5; Roy, 2007: 14; Tripp, 2007: 270). They condemned George H.W. Bush for ending hostilities before Saddam Hussein had been removed from power (Lieberfeld, 2005: 14; Ricks, 2007: 4-5; Roy, 2007: 14; Tripp, 2007: 270). Critics felt that 1991 had been the perfect opportunity to effect regime change in Iraq. However, acting President George H.W. Bush was not convinced, and he terminated hostilities following the liberation of Kuwait, selecting to impose a containment

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[13] Both the United States and the international community sanctioned Iraq before, during and after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Sanctions are defined as real or threatened political and/or economic measures deployed by a government or other organizational body (such as the European Union or the United Nations) to restrict the capacity of the targeted individual, group, government, and thereby coerce desired behavior (Galtung, 1967: 379-380; Smith, 1996: 229-231).

[14] For a detailed account of how these U.S. tools were utilized to contain and weaken Saddam Hussein, see Byman (2001).

policy instead. To summarize sentiment within the U.S., while most policymakers and analysts agreed that Hussein was a threat, no consensus could be achieved on the appropriate measures to eliminate the threat: containment or military overthrow (Badie, 2010: 282-283).

During the next decade, political dissension and frustration continued as the U.S. maintained its containment policy. Critics persisted to argue that containment was insufficient because Hussein was repeatedly non-compliant (Badie, 2010: 282-283; Dobransky, 2014; Lieberfeld, 2005: 12; Mazarr, 2007: 3; Ricks, 2007: 4-5; Rovner, 2014: 492-500; Roy, 2007: 14; Tripp, 2007: 270). Alternatively, these individuals proposed that direct military intervention in Iraq was necessary to demonstrate U.S. resolve and to alter the geopolitical configuration of the Middle East (Dobransky, 2014; Lieberfeld, 2005: 12; Mazarr, 2007: 3-6; Ricks, 2007: 4-5; Roy, 2007: 14; Tripp, 2007: 270). Several detractors, for instance Paul Wolfowitz, acquired influential positions in the George W. Bush administration in January 2001 (Allawi, 2007: 98; Marsella, 2005: 661; Mazarr, 2007: 5; Roy, 2007: 14-15; Suskind, 2006: 64). Their presence suggests that Iraq was identified as a threat to U.S. interests in the infancy of George W. Bush's presidential term (Kepel, 2004: 98; Mazarr, 2007: 5-6; Roy, 2007: 14-15; Suskind, 2006: 64).

The influence of such critics was mute in the early months of the new administration. George W. Bush alternatively maintained the familiar Iraq containment strategy established by his predecessors (Badie, 2010: 278-280; Bush, 2003; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 241). Sanctions, no-fly zones, and (demands for) weapons inspections continued to be touted by the administration as necessary to isolate Saddam Hussein (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 241). That approach radically changed seven months into Bush's presidency following the events of 9/11. From this period, internal political momentum against Iraq amplified as policymakers and advisers suggested that Iraq be the primary target a U.S. military response to 9/11 (Allawi, 2007: 80; Badie, 2010: 285; Dobransky, 2014; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 241; Haass, 2009: 186; Roy, 2007: 13).

Despite their recommendations, George W. Bush initially focused U.S. retribution on Afghanistan during the fall of 2001 (Mazarr, 2007: 5-8; Roy, 2007: 11-13). This approach was temporal. By the end of the year, the administration was contending that U.S. national security was conditioned on military intervention to remove Saddam Hussein from power (Allawi, 2007: 80; Dobransky, 2014; Kepel, 2004: 6-7; Lieberfeld, 2005: 3; Mazarr, 2007: 8-9; Roy, 2007: 6; Rubin, 2003: 46-47; Western, 2005: 107-111). To advance the agenda, Bush launched a campaign to demonize Saddam Hussein in late 2001 (Martin, 2004: 1579; Roy, 2007: 15-16; Tripp, 2007: 272; Western, 2005: 111). For example, while speaking before

Congress on January 29, 2002, Bush called Iraq, Iran and North Korea an "axis of evil," thereby insinuating that the three countries constituted existential threats to international security and U.S. interests (Calhoun, 2005: 101; Davies, 2008: 385; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 47; Katzman, 2002: 3; Kepel, 2004: 199; Public Broadcast Service, 2002; Tripp, 2007: 272). Simultaneously, he demanded Saddam Hussein concede to UN dictum, threatening a full-scale military invasion if UN weapons inspections did not resume (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 242-423; Tripp, 2007: 272-274).

The message and timing of the administration's bellicose discourse was pivotal for four reasons. First, U.S. citizens felt vulnerable to additional attacks of terrorism and prioritized national security (Exoo, 2010: 30; Gallup, 2010; Lieberfeld, 2005: 14; Western, 2005: 111). The Bush administration was able to monopolize upon anxiety and use it to garner popular support for intervention in Iraq (Roy, 2007: 1; Western, 2005: 107-108). Second, there was a general desire among U.S. citizens for revenge following 9/11 (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 83). Western (2005: 109-110) claims retributive yearning remained unsatisfied subsequent to U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001, and was therefore transposed onto Iraq. Third, and linked to the former, the Bush administration perceived that its "war on terror" was progressing positively—notably the goals of removing the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan and challenging al Qaeda's sanctuary in that country were being attained, and perceived that the counterterrorism strategy could be implemented in Iraq (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 242; Kilcullen, 2009: 43; Roy, 2007: 11-12). Fourth, through his staunch encouragement of intervention, the President "staked his reputation" on fulfilling the objective (Davies, 2008: 388). This meant that if Bush failed to proceed according to his convictions, he risked losing support of the U.S. electorate (Davies, 2008: 388). The interplay of these influences had a profound impact on government determination to implement the policy, and public acceptance of that policy.

With these factors at play, another component of the campaign for intervention in Iraq was the establishment of the Office of Special Plans (OSP) inside the Department of Defense, headed by Undersecretary of Defense Policy Douglas Feith (Badie, 2010: 287-290). Assured the CIA was failing in its ability to produce evidence of Saddam Hussein's link with terrorism and pursuit of WMD, the OSP (re-) evaluated intelligence and presented findings that supported the administration's policy objectives (Badie, 2010: 287-290). OSP operations, therefore, purposefully minimized critical analysis of intelligence whereby a public policy campaign based upon (manufactured) evidence could be constructed (Badie, 2010: 289-290). In this manner, the Bush administration was able to provide evidence of Hussein's link to

terrorism and WMD, while marginalizing analysis provided by other agencies, such as the CIA or Department of State (DOS), that contradicted those assertions (Badie, 2010: 289-290; Mazarr, 2007: 9-18).

Simultaneously, measures were taken to prepare for an impending invasion. In November 2001, as part of the administration's preparation for war with Iraq, the President ordered various government agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD) and the DOS, to make arrangements for a potential military invasion (Brennan and others, 2013: 22; Mazarr, 2007: 7; Suskind, 2006: 81). During the planning phase, obvious divergences emerged between the DOD, CIA and DOS conceptualization of U.S. objectives, as well as preference for approaches and expected challenges (Brennan and others, 2013: 22-23). Associated with these discrepancies, and equally problematic, cross-institutional collaboration at all levels of planning was limited, and when information was shared, the DOD neglected or relegated external input (Brennan and others, 2013: 22-23; Rathmell, 2005: 1020-1021). As a result, the DOD and DOS could not agree on objectives or contingency plans, and the limited interaction and information sharing between the two agencies were further curtailed. Absent collaboration, the quality of planning suffered, while the disposition established between these agencies during the planning stage was transferred into Iraq once the invasion had occurred.

In addition to DOS and DOD preparation, other institutions likewise involved themselves in projecting how a hypothetical invasion might transpire. Several governmental and nongovernmental agencies conducted research to determine outcomes and best practices in Iraq. Among them, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2002) published a (later) declassified assessment entitled "The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq." The essay provides an abridged comparative analysis of the U.S.-led post-World War II occupation of Germany and Japan, and applies lessons learned from those historic experiences to a hypothetical invasion and occupation of Iraq (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002). The assessment provides three important recommendations. First, the CIA argues that an efficacious occupation of Iraq would require an international mandate (UN approval) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002: 2-3). Second, it suggests that internal stability would have to be firmly imposed utilizing a large number of occupying troops (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002: 3-4). Finally, the CIA claims the endeavor would have to be buttressed by a prolonged U.S. military-political commitment to ensure a successful transition of authority to an indigenous government of Iraq (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002: 1-2). With the advantage of hindsight, the recommendations provided in this report were relevant.

By comparison, another independent working group formed by the Council on Foreign

Relations, co-chaired by Edward P. Djerejian and Frank G. Wisner (2003: 9), was organized to contemplate the invasion. This report argues that the post-war occupations of Germany and Japan are theoretically and practically irrelevant when envisaging an invasion because Iraq would not be a defeated country but a liberated one. Despite this theoretical divergence, the study identifies hazards similar to those articulated in the CIA (2002) assessment. It does, however, provide additional recommendations. For instance, Djerejian and Wisner (2003: 5-6) recommend that Iraq's military be maintained to provide post-war security rather than be dissolved. Furthermore, the study advocates that United States authorities, as an occupying power, not impose policies and tools on Iraq during the occupation, but rather cede control of the (re)organization and (re)construction of Iraq's political and social structures to the international community and Iraqis (Djerejian and Wisner, 2003: 2)[15]. Despite the value of their recommendations, as detailed below, these proposals were not implemented.

At the same time various government agencies were independently planning for war, the Bush administration continued campaigning to acquire support for intervention before a domestic and international audience from early 2002 to 2003 (Exoo, 2010: 31; Haass, 2009: 202-231; Western, 2005: 109-111). Arguments for war were couched on several U.S. national security objectives. For instance, some scholars, such as Paul Williams (2006), assert that the invasion was primarily about usurping control of Iraq's natural resources. This assertion is supported by Paul Wolfowitz's testimony before Congress in which he stated that tens of billions of dollars could be generated from Iraq's oil revenue (Williams, 2006: 1074). In a similar vein, many Iraqis felt that acquiring control over oil was the principal motivation for the invasion.

Additionally, the justifications presented to the general U.S. public for war, although later expanded, centered on two salient points. First, it was argued that deposing Saddam Hussein was essential to undermining a current, or future, link between "rogue states," such as Iraq, and non-state groups, such as al Qaeda, which employ the tactic of terrorism (Calhoun, 2005: 97-98; Dobransky, 2014; Galtung, 2009: 48; Hamilton and others, 2006: 23; Hoffman, 2004: 9; Ikenberry, 2006: 241; Johnson, 2004: 229; Katzman, 2002: 3; Kepel, 2004: 5-7; Ricks, 2007: 66; Roy, 2007: 15-16). Second, it was asserted with great certainty that Iraq possessed and continued to pursue WMD (Calhoun, 2005: 97-98; Dobransky, 2014; Hamilton and others, 2006: 23; Hoffman, 2004: 9; Ikenberry, 2006: 241; Johnson, 2004: 229; Katzman,

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[15] See Djerejian and Wisner (2003). For a brief overview of additional internal U.S. Government documents (from the CIA and Pentagon) that warned of the negative consequences of invading Iraq, see Bowen (2009: 13-19) and Ricks (2007: 40).

2002: 3; Kepel, 2004: 5-7; Ricks, 2007: 66; Roy, 2007: 15-16). Concerning the former justification, no link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, or other groups that deploy the tactic of terrorism, was convincingly demonstrated by the administration (Banks and others, 2008: 312; Katzman, 2002: 8; Roy, 2007: 13, 15-16; Sageman, 2008: 91). Concerning the latter, intensified U.S. rhetoric and accusations that Saddam Hussein possessed and/or was proliferating WMD, was (in hindsight) unsubstantiated (Blix, 2003; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 242-423; Fisher, 2003: 393-394; Rubin, 2003: 52; Tripp, 2007: 272-274). Nevertheless, the increased pressure exerted by the U.S. prompted Saddam Hussein to allow UNMOVIC into Iraq in late 2002 to resume nonproliferation oversight and weapons inspections that had been suspended since UNSCOM's ejection in early 1999 (Blix, 2003; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 242-423; Fisher, 2003: 393-394; Rubin, 2003: 52; Tripp, 2007: 272-274).

Three months after UNMOVIC's entry into Iraq, its leader Hans Blix, presented his findings before the UNSC on 14 February, 2003, where he stated that no WMD had been located (Allawi, 2007: 88; Blix, 2003). His preliminary assessment reiterated UNSCOM's March, 1999 analysis that WMD in Iraq had been largely dismantled or eliminated during the previous decade (Allawi, 2007: 88; Blix, 2003). Although UNMOVIC's analysis had not documented any significant breeches in nonproliferation or noncompliance (Blix, 2003; ElBaradei, 2003), its assessment was downplayed by the Bush administration. The Bush administration counteracted those claims, presenting their own exaggerated or falsified intelligence when making the case for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein (Calhoun, 2005: 101-102; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 242-243). As a consequence of persistent U.S. pressure, and an inevitable U.S. invasion of Iraq, UNMOVIC was prematurely removed from Iraq before it could complete its investigation and without discovering any serious breaches in compliance (Tripp, 2007: 274). Since there were conflicting reports between the UN and the U.S. concerning the status of Iraq's weapons programs, the international community remained reluctant to endorse the U.S. invasion of Iraq. This meant that the decision to go to war was transferred to the U.S. public and the U.S. would have to unilaterally manage any overthrow.

Among U.S. constituents, the administration`s rationalizations proffered for intervention in Iraq did not resonate equally (Western, 2005: 122-133). On the one hand, some U.S. citizens favored a multilateral approach, suggesting the Bush administration work closely with the United Nations and give international inspectors additional time to fulfill their mandate (Kull and others, 2004: 570; Western, 2005: 122). Advocates of providing the international community with more time were most likely influenced by the contradicting reports proffered by the UN and U.S. government. On the other hand, by emphasizing the issue of U.S. national

security (Bellamy, 2004: 134), the Bush administration was able to acquire sufficient domestic popular support to commit troops to Iraq (Davies, 2008: 389; Western, 2005: 122-133). Scholars posit that this degree of popular support can be partially attributed to a mid-October 2002 joint resolution by Congress which authorized the President to utilize military force when and where he determined necessary to secure the United States and its interests (Gareau, 2004: 201; Haass, 2009: 229; Ricks, 2007: 61-63; Tripp, 2007: 273; Western, 2005: 132). Consequently, Bush obtained approximately 64% domestic popular support for intervention (Western, 2005: 119). This was a sufficient mandate to pursue the invasion.

At the international level, most countries overwhelmingly opposed U.S. military intervention (Abdallah, 2003: 63; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 242; Fukuyama, 2006: 97; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 48-51; Rubin, 2003: 47). Because George W. Bush's WMD and terror justifications were unsubstantiated, the international community refused to subscribe to the assertion that Iraq posed an imminent threat to its regional neighbors or the United States (Jackson and Towle, 2006: 48-51; Rubin, 2003: 54). Moreover, unable to associate the events of 9/11 with Iraq, politicians and citizens of many countries distanced themselves or palpably opposed intervention (Hamilton and others, 2006: 23; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 48; Lieberfeld, 2005: 14; J. Smith, 2005: 179; Zimmermann and Wenger, 2007: 2). For instance, European allies, such as Germany and France, publicly voiced opposition at the UN, fearing that U.S. policy threatened European security rather than providing for it (Abdallah, 2003: 63; Carty, 2011: 80-81, 95-96; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006: 56; Haass, 2009: 238-244; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 51; Mann, 2006: 196)[16]. Correspondingly, millions of people around the world protested against the war and petitioned their governing representatives not to support the U.S. invasion (BBC News, 2003; Carty, 2011: 86-88). Hence, most citizens and officials among the international community disapproved of an invasion of Iraq.

Encountering marginal international support, the Bush administration underwent a strategic shift since the terror-WMD nexus proved insufficient for mustering international endorsement (Rubin, 2003: 46-49; Wimmer, 2003: 111). Gradually, justification was reformulated to include "[r]emoving tyranny, building a democracy, introducing human and civil rights, [and] writing a progressive constitution" (Allawi, 2007: 459). Interestingly, the additional justifications proposed for intervention, and noted by Allawi, had become widely

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[16] Jan Oberg (2007: 72) notes that while Germany and France voiced their opposition, as two of the largest countries in the European Union, they were limited in their ability to dissuade other European Union countries, such as Italy and Spain, from joining the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq.

accepted within the UN and among scholarship as a component of liberal peacebuilding[17], and such references have a theoretical impact on the perceived utility of contemporary state building and conflict resolution as noted in chapter three (Johansen, 2004: 1-4; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 3). Nevertheless, the modification of rationalizations for war did not garner increased international support.

Frustrated by the United Nation's reluctance to endorse or support its planned invasion, the George W. Bush administration argued that extraordinary circumstances dictated the use of preventive unilateralism and the creation of a "coalition of the willing" (Carty, 2011: 80; Johansen, 2004: 4; Lieberfeld, 2005: 3; Tripp, 2007: 273)[18]. The U.S. thereby organized an *ad hoc* coalition willing to participate in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In several instances, the citizens of coalition countries did not support their government's involvement; this popular sentiment later weakened the coalition when governments were gradually pressured by their populations to withdraw their forces during the occupation (Carty, 2011: 95-98). Nonetheless, following the formation of this coalition prior to the invasion, and its deployment to the Middle East, the United States gave Saddam Hussein and his two sons, Quasi and Qusai, an ultimatum on March 18, 2003 to depart Iraq within forty-eight hours or be removed by force (Calhoun, 2005: 90; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 247; Tripp, 2007: 274)[19]. This unrealistic ultimatum ensured that war was inevitable (Calhoun, 2005: 90).

Since Hussein refused to comply with Bush's ultimatum, the U.S. conducted a premature surgical air strike on March 19, 2003, on a compound near Baghdad following false intelligence reports suggesting Hussein was there (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 247). Subsequent to this failure, the U.S. led its coalition—including Britain, Denmark, Spain, Poland and Australia—into Iraq under the military code name Operation Iraqi Freedom (Bellamy, 2004: 131; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 247; Gareau, 2004: 201; Suskind, 2006: 211; Tripp, 2007: 274). Coalition forces launched their ground offensive largely from Kuwait, since Turkey would not permit U.S. forces to use its territory to open a second front in Iraq-Kurdistan (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 247; Rubin, 2003: 62). Turkey's reluctance to cooperate, consequently, reduced

[17] Peacebuilding as used herein broadly refer to the process of transforming intrastate or interstate relations by reformation of the structural components producing and/or sustaining conflict relations (Ramsbotham and others, 2012: 32). Practices include democratic reform, improvements in the judicial system and rule of law, demobilization and disarmament and countless other techniques to resolve conflict (Sharp, 2013: 158).
[18] Some scholars use the term "preemptive" to classify the U.S. invasion of Iraq (Bellamy, 2004: 134; Calhoun, 2005: 95-96; Davies, 2008: 385). However, the term preemption is normally utilized to describe a military attack when an adversary poses an imminent threat (Johansen, 2004: 4). Iraq did not pose an imminent threat to the United States thereby making the invasion preventive (Johansen, 2004: 4).
[19] Laurie Calhoun (2005: 90) astutely notes: "By making this the single acceptable condition for the avoidance of war, the Bush administration effectively precluded the possibility of stopping the invasion, and then blamed it upon Hussein for refusing to do what would have been patently irrational for him to do."

the speed at which the coalition could assume control of Iraq.

During planning and execution of the invasion, United States officials had largely expected to be welcomed by Iraqis; they predicted Iraqis would be grateful for coalition assistance with the removal of Saddam Hussein (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 166). However, as opposed to appreciation of the invasion, animosity manifested. Two reasons explain the bellicose popular sentiment, namely distaste for being occupied and a marked degree of distrust of the United States. A third reason may have been that, prior to the invasion; Saddam Hussein promoted armed resistance against the coalition (Terrill, 2003: 9). Among other things, Iraqis were told that the United States sought to occupy the country and take control of its natural resources, an assertion that exploited disgruntlement towards occupation and existing distrust of the United States (Terrill, 2003: 9). Hussein's appeal to his constituents, however, does not appear to have significantly influenced initial organized armed resistance (Terrill, 2003: 9-12). Contrary, Iraq's military provided a measure of resistance in the southern Shi'a areas of the country, and then organized armed opposition to the coalition gradually waned (Rathmell, 2005: 1023; Terrill, 2003: 10-12).

As the coalition pressed deeper into Iraq's frontiers, Iraq's military dissolved itself (Dunlap, 2013: 14; Rathmell, 2005: 1023). Its dissolution minimized resistance against coalition advancements, at least in the short term, prompting Saddam Hussein to escape from Baghdad (Allawi, 2007: 148; Bowen, 2009: 54; Tripp, 2007: 274). While their dissolution expedited the speed at which the coalition acquired control, some military analysts suggest that the dissolution of Iraq's military was problematic in the long-term, since it was never defeated (Dunlap, 2013: 141). Absent defeat, soldiers were later able to reorganize, with the assistance of the population, to produce an insurgency (Dunlap, 2013: 141). The insurgency, in turn, complicated and prolonged the occupation, as detailed below.

In the short term, the U.S. military eventually prevailed. On April 9, 2003, the United States arrogated control of Iraq as the occupying power (Suskind, 2006: 233; Tripp, 2007: 274). At this point, "The UN Security Council recognized American authority over Iraq but did not endorse it, nor was the United States under any obligation to report back to the Security Council or seek periodic renewal of its mandate" (Dobbins and others, 2009: 12). Hence, while the UN recognized U.S. authority over Iraq and its associated responsibilities as the occupier, as indicated in the quote, it did not endorse the occupation, nor was the U.S. answerable to the UN or any other external authority. Through its overthrow of the existing government, the U.S. had essentially accepted absolute responsibility for occupied Iraq.

After capturing Baghdad, coalition forces continued northward to Iraq-Kurdistan (Fattah

and Caso, 2009: 248). Kurds did not resist the invasion, and its militia, the *Peshmerga*, instead provided assistance (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 248). The last major city to fall to the United States was Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's birthplace, which was captured on April 14, 2003 (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 248). Although the U.S. had aggregated control over Iraq in less than one month, an insurgency would later manifest, both challenging and prolonging the occupation.

Amalgamated, the U.S.-led coalition occupied Iraq from April 2003 to mid-December 2011 (Logan, 2011). During this period, the U.S. was not only responsible for the security situation, but it hastened the establishment of a legitimate elected government while trying to influence the government's composition and framework through the establishment of benchmarks and deadlines (Allawi, 2007: 4-9; Pascual and Pollack, 2007: 9). For example, the U.S. frequently determined the demographic composition of particular governing bodies and committees, as elucidated below. At the same time, it operationalized and implemented poorly designed policies of security provision and reconstruction, as well as social and political reformation. These policies, which are structurally violent, had minimal consideration for their political and social ramifications upon Iraq. The following sections detail the transfer of authority during the occupation, and highlight several policies imposed by the United States to illustrate their negative social and political impact of said policies.

1.2 The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs

As the United States arrogated control of Iraq as an occupying power, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA), supervised by Jay Garner, was dispatched to oversee what had been projected as a short-term occupation (Bowen, 2009: 58; Brennan and others, 2013: 22; Tripp, 2007: 279). The ORHA itself had been briskly established. From the point of its initial establishment to its arrival in southern Iraq, the ORHA had approximately two months to recruit personnel, organize and prepare for deployment (Dobbins and others, 2009: 7; Rathmell, 2005: 1022). Following the invasion, a token team from the ORHA first entered Iraq in early April 2003 without Garner (Bowen, 2009: 56). It established itself in "Umm Qasr as a testing ground to calibrate its approach to the post-invasion environment" (Bowen, 2009: 56). During this testing phase denoted by Bowen, the ORHA experienced several critical challenges, including U.S. cross-agency coordination deficits and localized civil unrest opposing the occupation (Bowen, 2009: 56). Its experiences foreshadowed acute challenges the ORHA would encounter following its permanent relocation to Iraq's capital later that month (Bowen, 2009: 56; Brennan and others, 2013: 23-25). After Baghdad fell into coalition hands, Jay Garner arrived in Baghdad on April 21, 2003

to manage a relocated ORHA that was now responsible for commencing operations throughout the country (Bowen, 2009: 59; Dobbins and others, 2009: 7; Tripp, 2007: 279).

Garner’s chain of command ran through the U.S. DOD (Perito, 2005: 3), with the OHRA’s primary objectives as providing humanitarian relief to Iraqis (Rathmell, 2005: 1022-1023), assisting for refugees, maintaining basic government services, and establishing law and order throughout the country (Brennan and others, 2013: 23; Tripp, 2007: 279). While quite complex, scholars argue that OHRA’s restrictive mandate partially illustrates the perceived ease with which the George W. Bush administration expected the occupation to progress (Tripp, 2007: 279), while its chain of command underscores the superiority of the DOD within the administration’s policy hierarchy. OHRA objectives likewise underscore the false assumption policymakers had, as they assumed that Iraq’s pre-war governing institutions and security forces would continue to function subsequent to the invasion (Brennan and others, 2013: 23; Rathmell, 2005: 1023). Succinctly, Garner assumed that his organization would acquire temporary control over a generally functional government, military and police force inside Iraq (Perito, 2005: 3). Emphasizing his expectations, the ORHA head optimistically projected that political “elections for a transitional government [would occur] within 90 days of his arrival” (Dobbins and others, 2009: 38). This expectation denoted in the quote determined the strategy that Garner prepared and implemented as head of ORHA.

To hasten the re-institution of Iraq’s governing and security framework, ORHA’s strategy hinged on “reconstitut[ing] as much of the old administration they could by recalling people to their posts, setting up temporary offices and guaranteeing salaries” (Tripp, 2007: 279). The arrangement summarized in the quote included the incorporation of low-level Ba‘ath party members into Iraq’s post-war structures (Dobbins and others, 2009: 7). To assist with this political transition, Garner “set up an interim Iraqi advisory group made of key Sunnis, Shi’ites, and Kurds to put a local face on the occupation government” (Dobbins and others, 2009: 8). The advisory group mentioned was to assist ORHA staff, the latter of whom were projected to temporarily serve as governing functionaries, and then transition into an advisory role for Iraq’s (temporary) governing body until a new government could be elected (Dobbins and others, 2009: 8; Perito, 2005: 3). This transitional arrangement had been endorsed by 300 diverse Iraqi representatives, who had attended the Baghdad Conference held on April 28, 2003 (Dobbins and others, 2009: 38-39). The conference concluded with members agreeing to meet one month later (in May 2003) to form a transitional government that would assume control of the country from the ORHA (Dobbins and others, 2009: 38-39). Circumstances on the ground ultimately compromised the arrangements agreed upon.

To his credit, Garner intended to engage Iraqis in dialogue[20] concerning how they desired post-war reconstruction to evolve and which changes they deemed appropriate (Tripp, 2007: 279). Garner's planned approach thereby conformed to Djerejian and Wisner (2003: 2) recommendations to engage and consult Iraq's society throughout the occupation. However, Garner's strategy was shelved following the proliferation of insecurity (Dobbins and others, 2009: 8-9; Tripp, 2007: 279). When violence and civil disorder intensified, it exceeded a magnitude the U.S. had projected and prepared for (Allawi, 2007: 94). Although the U.S. military had planned for the possible sabotaging of Iraq's oil fields, and thereby ordered U.S. troops to secure fields in Kirkuk and Britain's troops to take control of the Rumaila fields in Basra (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 247), the United States military neglected to anticipate widespread civil unrest (Allawi, 2007: 94). The decision to secure oil fields, as opposed to imposing law and order, offer credence to Paul Williams' (2006) assertion that the invasion was primarily about obtaining control of Iraq's natural resources. It equally played into the fears of the Iraqi people.

The outbreak of looting and violence that manifested throughout the country during the first weeks of the occupation undermined the ORHA's operational capacity (Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 2009: 59-60; Dobbins and others, 2009: 8). The U.S. administration, nonetheless, appeared oblivious to events on the ground. Despite the proliferation of instability, on May 1, 2003, aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, with an over-sized banner proclaiming "Mission Accomplished" in the backdrop, President George W. Bush publicly declared the end of major combat operations (Bellamy, 2004: 131; Brennan and others, 2013: 25; CBS News, 2008; Dobransky, 2014; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 248). According to the President, Iraq had been liberated and reconstruction of the country had commenced. The ceremony proved premature because violence escalated over successive months. The spiral of insecurity prompted Bush to later claim that elements of the ceremony had not been adequately clarified (CBS News, 2008). Instead of the ceremony representing the end of major combat operations in Iraq, Bush insisted that the ritual was meant for U.S. service members on that particular navy vessel (CBS News, 2008). Despite the President's attempts at concealing his impulsive action, the fact remains that security in Iraq spiraled beyond U.S. military control, and major combat operation in Iraq would persist for nearly a decade.

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[20] Dialogue is defined here as a constructive, symmetrical means of communicating, in which "minds open to take in new ideas and perspectives, modify earlier assumptions, and rethink judgments" (Saunders, 2009: 376-378).

Analysts attribute the deterioration of security to numerous causes, namely the inadequate number of occupying troops and failure of leaders to provide orders to those troops in theatre (Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 2009: 57; Edelstein, 2004: 49; Haass, 2009: 257; Record, 2007: 86). In total, the coalition committed 173, 218 troops to the invasion, which critics suggest was insufficient for maintaining law and order during the occupation (Rathmell, 2005: 1022; Tripp, 2007: 275). With insufficient numbers, and absent orders to intervene, coalition police, military and security contractors (or security forces) proved either unwilling or unable to restore order and thereby left civil violence largely unaddressed (Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 2009: 194-197). By early 2004, social-political dynamics escalated from sporadic civil disorder into a complex, violent conflict comprising of an insurgency[21], sectarian and criminal violence, and terrorism (Allawi, 2007: 173-230; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 259; Hicks and others, 2011: 2). Adding impetus, key decisions made by U.S.-led occupying authorities precipitated destabilization and undermined reconstruction of Iraq by furthering popular resistance and sectarian divisions (Allawi, 2007: 155-159; Barakat, 2005: 578-580). The evolution of, and explanations for, the intensification of insecurity are detailed below.

1.3 The Coalition Provisional Authority (May 2003-June 2004)

Transfer of political and security responsibility to the U.S.-led coalition was met by social disorder and protest rather than the warm reception, popular support, or the short-term occupation that the Bush administration had predicted (Barakat, 2005: 572; Bowen, 2009: 60-61; Oberg, 2007: 67; Perito, 2005: 3; Roy, 2007: 39; Stover and others, 2005: 831). These events in turn undermined plans for a rapid transfer of sovereignty. During the period of unrest, billions of dollars of Iraq's state assets that were stolen, the weapons purloined, and government infrastructure that was damaged or destroyed, which undermined the reconstitution of an indigenous government and the reconstruction of Iraq (Bowen, 2009: 60; Dobbins and others, 2009: 8). In short, Bowen (2009: 61) states: "Chaos on the ground threw the plan for a rapid political transfer to an interim Iraqi authority into confusion." The chaos Bowen references prompted the U.S. administration to alter its strategy.

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[21] An insurgency is defined a dichotomous armed conflict between an irregular force which utilizes an irregular form of warfare, or guerrilla-style tactics, combined with a political element of violent resistance against a country's military or an occupying military (Kiras, 2008: 236). On one side of this dichotomy are the "insurgents", those non-state actors attempting to usurp power. On the other side is the government or occupying forces, which are classified as the "counterinsurgents." The overall goal of the insurgents is "to inflict ever-increasing losses on government or occupying forces and tip the balance of forces in the insurgents' favour," whereby the counterinsurgent loses political and military control over a given territory and/or population (Kiras, 2008: 236). Reversely, the counterinsurgent tries to obtain or maintain control of a population while marginalizing or defeating the insurgents (Kiras, 2008: 236).

Reflexively, President George W. Bush publicly announced OHRA's dissolution on May 6, 2003, after it had served less than one month in Iraq (Dobbins and others, 2009: 11; Tripp, 2007: 282)[22]. Supplanting the OHRA, Bush dispatched a semi-permanent envoy to govern Iraq, whose extensive mandate was to endure until a functioning elected indigenous government could be established (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 250; Rathmell, 2005: 1025; Stover and others, 2005: 832). The U.S. provisional body that was dispatched was called the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which likewise fell under the aegis of the DOD (Dobbins and others, 2009: 12; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 250-251; Halchin, 2006: 1; Stover and others, 2005: 832; Tripp, 2007: 282). L. Paul Bremer III was appointed CPA head and he acted as the "executive, legislative and judicial authority" in Iraq throughout his tenure, giving him sweeping political authority (Bowen, 2009: 71; Dobbins and others, 2009: 111-112; Halchin, 2006: 1; Power, 2014: 343; Tripp, 2007: 282)[23].

As a consequence of the introduction of the CPA, the occupation of Iraq was prolonged without projecting the expected duration of its tenure (Brennan and others, 2013: 25). Insertion of the CPA, thereby, indicated that the United States had reneged on its promise of a rapid transfer of sovereignty (Dobbins and others, 2009: 39-41; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 250-251). The immediate response of Iraqis to this decision was disgruntlement. As Dobbins and others (2009: 13) explain, Iraqis began to liken the U.S. occupation to Britain's mandate. Nonetheless, U.S. policymakers had decided that a prolongation of the occupation was necessary to stabilize Iraq and ensure a smooth transition of authority back to Iraq.

To hasten the stabilization and rebuilding of Iraq, Bremer rationalized that transition of sovereignty would be most efficiently accomplished subsequent to particular benchmarks being achieved (Brennan and others, 2013: 26; Dobbins and others, 2009: 42-43). Among the benchmarks imposed were the establishment of a constitution and the conducting of national elections (Brennan and others, 2013: 26; Dobbins and others, 2009: 42-43). Achieving these objectives required time, since political parties, in addition to rules and procedures associated with democratic processes, needed to be established (Brennan and others, 2013: 26; Dobbins and others, 2009: 42-43). In its broadest sense, prolongation of the occupation was determined necessary to advance the institutionalization of democratic parties, standards and practices.

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[22] According to Dobbins and others (2009: 8), Jay Garner was notified by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld of his replacement by the CPA on the night of April 21.

[23] For comprehensive analysis of the characteristics and personnel of the CPA, see Halchin (2006). For an overview of the legal responsibilities of the United States as the occupying power in Iraq according to international law, see Power (2014).

Within this frame, scholars likewise suggest that handover was postponed due to U.S. concerns that Iran-linked political groups, such as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), would win early elections, because they were better established and organized (Dobbins and others, 2009: 43). According to this assessment, the U.S. was apprehensive that Iran's influence in Iraq would undermine the establishment of a democratic framework and marginalize the potential of newly created political parties which required sufficient time to be founded and mature (Dobbins and others, 2009: 43). Therefore, postponement of the transition was judged crucial to provide time to firmly establish political parties to compete with SCIRI, and to marginalize Iran's influence in Iraq's sovereign affairs.

Forgoing discussion on the associated challenges of fostering democratic development in Iraq, suffice it to say that the complexity and scope of the task assumed by the CPA was staggering (Bowen, 2009: 1-8). Among those responsibilities hitherto noted, the CPA likewise was responsible for: security; humanitarian assistance; the provision of basic services; the reconstitution of government; as well as the managing of day-to-day affairs of Iraq (Bowen, 2009: 1-8). Innumerable obstacles complicated the fulfillment of these responsibilities. Among them, there were no clear chains of command, nor coordination or information sharing between the CPA, DOD, U.S. State Department and other agencies involved during the occupation (Dobbins and others, 2009: 15-18). The CPA likewise suffered from resource deficits, including perpetual staff shortages, with analysts suggesting it usually operated at half its envisioned strength, and many of its members lacked knowledge or experience in the Middle East or post-conflict settings (Dobbins and others, 2009: 244; Flavin, 2013: 178; Rathmell, 2005: 1026). Within this environment, Bremer and his staff endeavored to "rule postwar Iraq from May 2003 to June 2004" (Bowen, 2009: 8). Unsurprisingly, this period witnessed controversial and counterproductive policy implementation.

Literature on the occupation underscores the acute lack of knowledge and appreciation for Iraq's historical, cultural, political and social nuances among policymakers in particular and U.S. society in general (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 268-270; Marsella, 2005: 664-665; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 165). The absence of knowledge was present at the highest levels of the military and political establishments prior to the invasion, as demonstrated in the Bush administration's expectation that a military invasion could rapidly alter Iraq's historical experience and undermine traditional power distribution without contest (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 268-270; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 165). This acute knowledge deficit, (mis)informed most aspects of the invasion and occupation, undermining objective insight that contradicted

administrative thinking, and consequently, opposing insight and recommendations were promptly discarded.

The close-minded nature and lack of knowledge continued to infect U.S. decision-making during the occupation. For example, Eric Stover and others (2005: 834-835) criticize that U.S. officials, including CPA employees, were detached from the political, social and economic conditions on the ground and insulated from Iraqi opinion even while serving in Iraq. Positioned in the fortified Green Zone, decision makers were "out of touch" with sentiment and events occurring beyond their immediate periphery (Allawi, 2007: 372). The differences in living standards, for instance, were profound since the Green Zone enjoyed relative security and the reliable distribution of basic services contrary to that experienced elsewhere in the country (Allawi, 2007: 372). Allawi (2007: 372), therefore, asserts that U.S. officials lived in a "bubble," whereupon (misguided) CPA policies were implemented since decision-makers were out of touch with popular sentiment or the immediate needs of the population they were charged with representing (Allawi, 2007: 372; Stover and others, 2005: 834-835). As a result, many CPA decisions were imposed without consultation, which is structurally violent, and whereupon a political framework with questionable relevance (or legitimacy) in the context of Iraq's historical, religious, social, political and cultural needs were institutionalized (Allawi, 2007: 12-372; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 268-270; Tripp, 2007: 292-293). In summary, disconnect between the occupier and the occupied existed at the political and social levels, from the planning of the occupation to its termination, prompting unpopular or superfluous decisions and actions by those charged with designing and implementing policy (Bowen, 2013: 11-12; Stover and others, 2005: 834-835).

1.3.1 Policy and structural violence

Our focus briefly turns to examples of structural violence. During its tenure, the CPA (and other U.S. authorities) imposed post-war decisions that impacted on the social, political, economic and general security situation in occupied Iraq (Bowen, 2009: 6). As alluded to below, many of the activities outlined herein were part of a transitional justice program, but, nonetheless, their techniques and benchmarks constitute structural violence. Johan Galtung (1990: 249) defines structural violence as a process that marginalizes and fragments individuals or collectives. Comparatively, Reimann (2004: 9) adds: "Structural violence defines the social, political and economic structure of a conflict situation when unequal power, domination and dependency are perpetrated." The quality of activity that Galtung and Reimann reference was implemented by the United States as the occupying power, and was

not only violent, but sometimes were counterproductive (Enterline and Greig, 2008: 885). For the sake of space, we will only scrutinize two examples of structural violence perpetrated during the occupation of Iraq at the moment. Other examples will surface later, including the failure to provide security (1.3.2), the *ad hoc* and poorly implemented reconstruction program (1.3.3.3), and various other U.S.-imposed decisions, including its influence over the composition of post-war governing frameworks (1.4).

The two examples highlighted in the present subsection are examined because of the long-term direct social and political impact these decisions have had on Iraq. Specifically, de-Ba'athification and the dissolution of Iraq's security forces were structurally violent because they marginalized sectors of Iraq's society and were imposed. These measures marginalized the Sunni, in addition to precipitated ethnic-sectarian fracturing, and attributed to increased insecurity that complicated the (re-) establishment of a functional and legitimate government (Allawi, 2007: 150-159; Bowen, 2009: 73-75). Each policy is addressed in turn.

1.3.1.1 De-Ba'athification

The CPA's first decree, Order Number 1, de-Ba'athification, was issued on May 1, 2003 (Allawi, 2007: 150; Brennan and others, 2013: 26; Dobbins and others, 2009: 15; Yamao, 2011: 3-4). The order denied previously high ranking Ba'ath Party[24] members (the top 1%), who were predominantly of Sunni Arab identity, the opportunity of holding political and civil service positions in Iraq's new governing and social framework as punishment for their complicit involvement in wrongdoing perpetrated under Saddam Hussein's leadership (Allawi, 2007: 150; Bowen, 2009: 73-75; Dobbins and others, 2009: 115; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 167; Yamao, 2011: 3-4). In general terms, scholars support the use of vetting as a transitional justice technique in post-conflict settings, conditioned the practice does not undermine the advancement of peace. For example, Wimmer (2003: 126) perceives vetting as a necessary act to punish perpetrators of wrongdoing and to ensure justice is served and transition occurs. However, while its implementation in Iraq was necessary following the

[24] The party was imported into Iraq in the late 1940s through Shi'a student movements (Devlin, 1991: 1404; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 180; Neff, 1991: 24). It became an official political party in Iraq in 1951 (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1991: 1415). Despite its Shi'a origination, after 1963, Sunni members dominated the upper echelons of the party's organizational hierarchy in Iraq (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1991: 1415). Ideologically, the Ba'ath were secular (Terrill, 2003: 6); they advocated pan-Arabism, the expulsion of foreign influence from Arab territory, and improved social conditions for the impoverished (Devlin, 1991: 1396-1404; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 208-209; Gerner, 2004: 103; Tripp, 2007: 138). The Ba'ath gradually spread into Iraq's officer corps and went on to become the most influential political parties in Iraq between 1958 and 2002, as traced below.

decades of wrongdoing perpetrated by Saddam Hussein's government, the breadth and depth at which it was implemented divided society.

Vetting was socially divisive. Some Kurd and Shi'a perceived vetting as necessary, and suggested punishment was warranted, whether Ba'ath members were compliant or directly involved in wrongdoing under Saddam Hussein (Dobbins and others, 2009: 112-115). However, the top tiers of the Ba'ath Party were predominantly Sunni, thus implementation created a potential strain. The disproportional sectarian composition of the organization's hierarchy meant that vetting would need to be balanced with alternative measures to reduce the perception that the act was violent retribution targeting the Sunni. However, balance was not established in Iraq's vetting process and the Sunni perceived de-Ba'athification as discriminatory, or "de-Sunnification," undoubtedly because, by its nature, the decree was predominantly targeted at the Sunni (Allawi, 2007: 150-152). Compounding Sunni disgruntlement, the decree was implemented broadly, affecting government representatives and civil servants alike, which magnified Sunni feelings of being purposefully singled out, sentiment which in turn exacerbated sectarian tensions (Allawi, 2007: 152). Summarizing sentiment, Perito (2005: 6) opines: the decree to which vetting was implemented "seemed not only unwise but also unfair"[25]. The unwise and unfair perceptions that Perito mentions, explains how de-Ba'athification divided Iraq's society, and produced a grievance among the Sunni. These circumstances prompted violent retaliation and armed efforts by the Sunni to secure their position within the developing social and political framework during the occupation.

De-Ba'athification produced individual and collective grievances predominantly because it constituted forcible unemployment simply because of one's political affiliation (Bowen, 2009: 73-74; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 167). It should be emphasized here that membership in the Ba'ath Party virtually became a necessity under Saddam Hussein's tenure (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1991). Nevertheless, the implications of being de-Ba'athified exceeded redundancy. Not only did the act deny individuals the right to work, or to serve in a post-war political-civil capacity, but equally relegated the skills and experience of those Ba'ath members who had not committed wrongdoing (Bowen, 2009: 74; Perito, 2005: 6; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 73). Marginalization of skills, in turn, affected the reconstitution and effectiveness of post-war structures since experienced individuals not guilty of criminal

[25] Once informed of the edict by the newly arrived Paul Bremer, Jay Garner unsuccessfully tried to persuade Bremer to challenge the de-Ba'athification order and reduce its scope to prevent the public backlash Garner anticipated the policy would generate (Brennan and others, 2013: 26; Dobbins and others, 2009: 114).

wrongdoing were denied an opportunity to operate in Iraq's new social and governing framework simply due to their political affiliation (Bowen, 2009: 74; Perito, 2005: 6; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 73). Consequently, critics argue that resurrecting Iraq's governing institutions was prolonged by the redundancies produced through de-Ba'athification (Bowen, 2009: 74; Perito, 2005: 6). Specifically, vetting innocent former employees meant that administrative and governing offices had to be staffed with less-experienced and often less-skilled politicians and civil servants (Bowen, 2009: 74; Perito, 2005: 6).

Despite this shortcoming, there are analysts who contend that de-Ba'athification was necessary and appropriately implemented. Dobbins and others (2009: 115), for example, argue the decree rightfully targeted the top one percent of Ba'ath Party members. They also assert that the measure was proportional, because there were a sufficient number of qualified alternative candidates capable of filling government and civil service ranks made vacant by vetting (Dobbins and others, 2009: 115). In their opinion, de-Ba'athification did not remove experienced technocrats or civil servants, but properly punished those most responsible for wrongdoing under Saddam Hussein (Dobbins and others, 2009: 115). They support their hypothesis of proportionality stating that early polling in Iraq demonstrated that de-Ba'athification was widely accepted by Iraqis, especially by the Kurd and Shi'a (Dobbins and others, 2009: 112-115). However, positive sentiment among these groups was expected, and the authors do not consider that some individuals in the top tier of government may not have been complicit in criminal misconduct.

Although the CPA institutionalized and implemented vetting initially, Bremer transferred responsibility for vetting to a High National De-Ba'athification Commission controlled by Iraq's government later (Dobbins and others, 2009: 112-118). The maneuver was aimed at undercutting criticism of U.S. control (Dobbins and others, 2009: 112-119). However, under Iraqi authority, the vetting process became deeply politicized, partially because it was inconsistently and opaquely applied by the governing bodies charged with its implementation, who were composed predominantly of members of the Kurd and Shi'a identity (Dobbins and others, 2009: 119, 132-134). Consequently, the High National De-Ba'athification Commission experience popular and U.S. criticism at the way vetting was being managed and executed (Dobbins and others, 2009: 119, 132-134).

As criticism of implementation mounted, Bremer intervened and overrode the de-Ba'athification Commission in the spring of 2004 (Dobbins and others, 2009: 119, 132-134). At this time, he curtailed the depth of vetting subsequent to pervasive redundancies made in Iraq's education sector as part of the vetting program (Dobbins and others, 2009: 119, 132-

134). In particular, Bremer demanded that a portion of the teachers whom had been vetted be returned to their positions (Dobbins and others, 2009: 133). Bremer's override is suggested to have been driven by the social and political divisiveness the de-Ba'athification process was producing (Dobbins and others, 2009: 136). Succinctly, the depth at which de-Ba'athification was being implemented became controversial and rather than providing transitional justice and unite society, it was dividing the country across ethnic/sectarian lines.

Open access qualitative research demonstrates the initial polarizing effect of de-Ba'athification and a later fluctuation in popular opinion. For example, a 2005 study found that only 43.7% of Iraqis believed that all ex-Ba'ath members should be barred from holding a position in government (International Republican Institute, 2005: 39). Within that study, 34.1% believed that only those convicted of crimes should be banned from office (International Republican Institute, 2005: 39). Nevertheless, it appears that nearly half of all Iraqis at that time believed that de-Ba'athification, as implemented, was necessary. By comparison, in 2007, ABC News and others (2007: 11) found that "[n]inety-six percent of Sunni Arabs say ex-Baathists should be permitted to hold Iraqi government jobs. About two-thirds of Shiites and Kurds alike say they should not." The findings by ABC News and others demonstrate the degree of polarization that vetting produced within Iraq's three primary identity groupings, indicating that the edict was divisive. The divisiveness of vetting among the population emphasizes the need for balancing implementation to satisfy all relevant stakeholders—to provide justice without making the Sunni feel isolated and victimized.

One year later, a shift in popular opinion toward de-Ba'athification occurred. In 2008, ABC News and others (2008: 9) found that a majority of respondents (69%) declared that previous low-level Ba'ath Party members should be permitted to hold public office. Moreover, and contrary to previous polling, respondents across ethnic and sectarian affiliation suggest that vetting had become too extreme (ABC News and others, 2008: 9). This finding demonstrates that Iraqis across ethnic and sectarian lines were beginning to appreciate that not all Ba'ath Party members were complicit or responsible for wrongdoing and were realizing the divisive nature of the edict. Unfortunately, ABC News and others (2008) do not examine why the change occurred and their 2009 survey does not follow up on the issue. We conjecture that the escalation in insurgent and sectarian violence may have prompted the Kurd and Shi'a to recognize that the scope of de-Ba'athification was a catalyst of violent divisions since it produced Sunni grievances and which became their impetus to resistance.

By way of conclusion, CPA Order Number 1 constituted a grievance for high-ranking Ba'ath party members, who were mainly Sunni Arab. While the act was necessary as a

transitional justice tool, the depth and breadth at which it was implemented produced grievances among the Sunni and gave impetus to sectarian turmoil (since social-political stakes increased during the occupation), manifesting in an armed insurgency (precipitated by anger at the implementation and effects of the decree) partly due to its disproportional nature (Allawi, 2007: 150-152; Rathmell, 2005: 1024; Ucko, 2008: 363). Moreover, the forbidding of innocent, former high-ranking Baʻath party members from holding political or civil offices undermined U.S. moral credibility (claiming to be proliferating democracy) and the strategic objectives of stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq (Abdallah, 2003: 62; Allawi, 2007: 150-152; Ucko, 2008: 363). Summarizing general Iraqi sentiment, Allawi (2007: 151-152) argues that the enforcement of de-Baʻathification is interpreted as the U.S. being more interested in exerting disproportionate control over Iraq's internal processes, and its favoritism of the Kurds and Shiʻa, and less concerned about promoting democracy and state building. Similarly, Olivier Roy (2007: 40-43) suggests U.S. manipulation of de-Baʻathification, in conjunction with other decisions (some of which are outlined below), compounded the challenges of creating a legitimate democratic government in Iraq.

1.3.1.2 Dissolution of security services

Prior to the invasion, some analysts had discussed downsizing and restructuring Iraq's military (Djerejian and Wisner, 2003: 5-6; Dobbins and others, 2009: 53). However, subsequent to the sweeping desertion experienced among Iraq's military and police forces during the invasion, "prewar plans to use the Iraqi military forces for post-war stability operations were rendered impractical, at least in the short term" (Dobbins and others, 2009: 53). The quote emphasizes that following the voluntary dissolution of Iraq's military, the U.S. military and other organizations associated with the occupation determined that Iraq's security forces should be officially dissolved and reconstructed later (Dobbins and others, 2009: 52-57). While expressing some reservations about the proposal, Bremer agreed to obey the dissolution edict, and officially instituted the decision to dissolve Iraq's military and security services on May 23, 2003 (Dobbins and others, 2009: 52-57).

Therefore, the second major decision of the CPA was the dissolution of Iraq's military, intelligence and police forces (Allawi, 2007: 155-159; Bowen, 2009: 75; Dobbins and others, 2009: 15; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 167; Tripp, 2007: 282; Ucko, 2008: 343). Bowen (2009) summarizes the decision's content and scope:

> CPA Order Number 2, titled "Dissolution of Entities," abolished seven institutions: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of State for Military Affairs, the Iraqi Intelligence Service,

> the National Security Bureau, the Directorate of National Security, and the Special Security Organization. The order put every member of Iraq's army, air force, navy, and air defense force, as well as the Republican Guard, the Special Republican Guard, the Directorate of Military Intelligence, and the Emergency Forces—some 500,000 men—immediately out of work, many without any compensation. Although the roughly 300,000 conscripts could receive a small termination payment, no soldier with the rank of colonel or above was eligible for either a termination payment or a pension (Bowen, 2009: 75)[26].

The quote illustrates the scale of the decree and alludes to the social implications of the dissolution policy where a large number of Iraq's security personnel were immediately made redundant without receiving compensation or being disarmed.

Hence, there were several obvious shortcomings associated with Order Number 2 (Allawi, 2007: 158). Foremost, no measures were initially implemented to provide alternative employment or financial compensation to many of those made redundant, creating animosity among former personnel who were now unable to provide for their families (Allawi, 2007: 158; Dobbins and others, 2009: 59; Tripp, 2007: 282). The act thereby exacerbated post-war unemployment (Bowen, 2013: 12) but also increased anti-occupation sentiment and attributed to accumulating post-war grievances (Allawi, 2007: 158; Hashim, 2006: 92-97; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 167). Humiliated and incensed, some nonviolently protested the decree and these demonstrations rapidly transmogrified into larger riots for which coalition troops were dispatched to contain (Allawi, 2007: 158). As protests and riots failed, humiliated officers and soldiers joined an emerging insurgency to counter occupying forces (Allawi, 2007: 243; Dobransky, 2014; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256; Fontan, 2006: 227-235; Hashim, 2006: 92-97).

At this juncture, humiliation in the context of Iraq's culture should be briefly examined. Victoria Fontan (2006: 218) suggests that humiliation is synonymous with shame whereby an event "depriv[es] the subject of self-value, or self-respect, and also ultimately induc[es] feelings of rejection. Shame is the result of the self-perception of failure to live up to certain standards and ideals." In consideration of Fontan's definition, shame is subjective and varies according to culture and experience. Providing increased insight into how honor and shame are conceptualized and practiced in Iraq, Avishai Margalit categorizes Iraq as a shame society, where an experience perceived as humiliating demotes an individual and their family's social status, and demotion in turn encourages a reaction to reclaim or reconstitute the social standing of the offended (Fontan, 2006: 219)[27].

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[26] Comparatively, Allawi (2007: 157) estimates that 400,000, mostly Sunni Arab, soldiers were affected.

[27] Avishai Margalit "differentiates between two types of society with regard to humiliation: guilt and shame societies. Members of guilt societies internalize their norms, and therefore feel guilt when they disobey them,

Within Iraq's culture, three broadly defined experiences constitute humiliation. These include: "A loss of physical force [*ihtiram*], the attempt to a woman's *ird* [purity], and the disowning of one's social rank [*sharaf*]" (Fontan, 2006: 219-220). Considering the three experiences that constitute humiliation articulated in the quote, the dissolution of security services was perceived offensive because of the loss of physical force and social rank (Fontan, 2006: 219-220). The act thereby humiliated soldiers and security forces, which prompted a response to regain honor. With this basic understanding of honor and humiliation outlined, our attention returns to recounting events following the dissolution decree.

As the groups of incensed and protesting soldiers multiplied, and insurgent activity started to increase, the CPA and DOD were forced to establish a scheme for compensating low ranking soldiers and conscripts (Allawi, 2007: 158; Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-60). A review was undertaken in July 2003, and a compensation scheme was established to remunerate low-ranking soldiers (Allawi, 2007: 158; Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-60). While the scheme did not guarantee employment of those soldiers or officers made redundant, it did provide a degree of compensation. According to DOD assessments, the compensation scheme successfully reversed the trend of protests and is thereby projected to have reduced popular animosity and the probability that former soldiers would become participants in the insurgency (Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-60)[28]. Nevertheless, the compromise was temporal.

An associated problem of CPA Order Number 2 is that there was no systematic effort to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate soldiers or police officers made redundant (Ucko, 2008: 344-345). In instances where disarmament orders were issued, their implementation was haphazard (Ucko, 2008: 346-353). Failure to disarm meant that former members of the security services were already armed and could join the insurgency to counter the occupation and their maltreatment (Allawi, 2007: 158; Ucko, 2008: 344-345). Disarmament was a controversial and complex undertaking in Iraq, which may partially explain why it was not implemented. For example, during instances of implementation, the act of disarming equally humiliated former soldiers because it removed an important source of family protection (Allawi, 2007: 158; Hashim, 2006: 92-97; Wyatt-Brown and Fontan, 2005). Consequently, there was a high risk of offending men by removing their weapons, a policy by which

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whereas the externalization of norms in shame societies leads their members to seek to maintain their honor and good name in the eyes of others, this at all costs" (Fontan, 2006: 219). As indicated, Iraq falls in the latter category (Fontan, 2006: 219).

[28] Following implementation of the DOD payment scheme, insurgents started offering financial rewards to entice recruits for the insurgency. Dobbins and others (2009: 60) note "that insurgent groups began to pay young men $100 to kill a U.S. soldier and $500 to disable a Bradley or Abrams armored vehicle." This counter-offer is believed to have tempted Iraqis to join the insurgency (Dobbins and others, 2009: 60).

humiliating consequences were equally probable to compel Iraqis to join the insurgency (Wyatt-Brown and Fontan, 2005). In this frame, disarmament produced a paradox, where failure to disarm ensured armed men could join the insurgency, while implementation was equally probable to offend Iraqi men and drive them to join the insurgency.

Despite growing insecurity, the process of reconstituting security forces was postponed for several months while U.S. officials determined the size and structure they believed Iraq would need (Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-62). Following contemplation, CPA Order Number 22, promulgated on August 18, 2003, re-established Iraq's Army (Dobbins and others, 2009: 62). Thereafter, recruitment and training of military and security personnel began (Bowen, 2009: 124-135). The process of re-establishing Iraq's security forces was, however, complicated by a lack of trainers, facilities and other resources (Bowen, 2009: 124-135). As a result, it took seven years for Iraq's military to be re-established to a sufficient degree where it could qualitatively and quantitatively operate independently (Department of Defense, 2010: 41).

In summary, the dissolution of Iraq's security services proved problematic. Associated policies, namely disarmament, were haphazard and poorly implemented, with its fallout increasing the number of challenges encountered during the occupation. Most importantly, the acts of dissolution and disarmament incensed former soldiers and are suggested to have contributed to social instability (Allawi, 2007: 157; Bowen, 2009: 75; Brennan and others, 2013: 28; Dobransky, 2014; Hashim, 2006: 92-97; Rathmell, 2005: 1024). Overall, dissolution of the security services qualifies as another example of structural violence.

With two primary examples of structural violence delineated, the next subsection outlines the origination and development of violence under the occupation. While violence spanned eight years and several governing bodies (outlined in section 1.4), insurgent and civil violence took root under the CPA's mandate. As mentioned, coalition inability to provide security equally constitutes another example of structural violence perpetrated by the United States during the occupation.

1.3.2 Increasing violence and insecurity

Throughout the tenure of the CPA, violence deepened and expanded. Meanwhile, the U.S.-led coalition seemed unprepared or unable to manage it (Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 2009: 57; Haass, 2009: 257; Record, 2007: 86; Steele, 2008: 1-2). Some attribute coalition failure to initially isolate and contain civil disorder to improper planning and the failure to consider contingencies (Allawi, 2007: 94; Rathmell, 2005: 1022). Civil unrest began with popular protests against the occupation, which quickly transformed into looting and targeted ethnic-

sectarian violence (Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 2009: 57; Haass, 2009: 257; Rathmell, 2005: 1020-1022; Record, 2007: 86). Left unaddressed, civil disorder spread and magnified, transmogrifying into an insurgency and civil war (Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 2009: 57; Haass, 2009: 257; Rathmell, 2005: 1020-1022; Record, 2007: 86). Despite its potentiality, the coalition reacted to events as opposed to adopting a proactive response.

Coalition military reporting captures the trend of increased violence between 2004 and 2010 (Department of Defense, 2010: 27). See Figure 1 and its integrated information for details. The graph illustrates the marked increase in violence from April 2004 until its zenith in June 2007 (Department of Defense, 2010: 27). Afterward, a combination of events led to the notable decline in violence during the summer of 2007. Two important reasons for the reversal include an increase in the number of U.S. troops (the surge) and greater emphasis on bridging sectarian and political divisions among Iraqis (Kuehl, 2010: 2-3; Simon, 2008: 57-60; Ucko, 2008: 357-362). These activities are detailed below.

Figure 1 Department of Defense (2010) Weekly Security Incidents



Figure 1 cites a Department of Defense (2010: 27) graph of violent incidents by typology between January 2004 and May 2010. The graph illustrates the steady increase of insurgent and sectarian violence up until the summer 2007 "Awakening" and the "surge" in U.S. troops. It also identifies key events, such as national elections and the Samarra mosque bombing and the resulting increase in violence generated by those events.

With the time-line and magnitude of violence introduced, our attention turns to qualifying its social impact. The impact of violence exceeds the thousands of deaths and injuries

resulting from the unrest (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 252; Johnson, 2004: 234; Terrill, 2003: 13). For instance, post-war disorder, especially the plundering and destruction of Iraq's cultural heritage (for instance the Antiquities Museums in Baghdad and Mosul), increased popular frustration and suspicion of the coalition (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 252; Johnson, 2004: 234; Terrill, 2003: 13). In this frame, most Iraqis were incensed that the coalition would not prevent looting and violence, and this frustration is also projected to have influenced Iraqis to join the insurgency (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 252; Johnson, 2004: 234; Terrill, 2003: 13).

Similarly, Sarkin and Sensibaugh (2009: 1065-1066) opine that initial lawlessness (looting) had a significant impact on the speed and potentiality of post-war reconstruction and transitional justice. For instance, many of Iraq's ministries were pilfered or destroyed, including ministry documents, furnishings and infrastructure (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 251-252; Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1065-1066). Those losses curtailed the speed in which a transfer of governance from the CPA to Iraq could transpire because ministries had to be completely reconstructed (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 251-252; Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1065-1066). Additionally, the annihilation of certain government assets, including files, denied Iraqis the opportunity to uncover the truth and/or prosecute Saddam Hussein-era injustices (Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1065-1066). Absent the documentary evidence necessary for conducting investigations and prosecuting human rights abusers, it became difficult or impossible to provide transitional justice (Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1065-1066). Combined, looting and destruction complicated the re-establishment of Iraq's post-war political framework, and undermined the chances of discovering the truth, providing justice, and bridging sectarian divisions among Iraqis under this framework (Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1065-1066). The latter aspects are essential to conflict resolution as examined later.

Unfortunately, space does not permit further exploration of the impact of violence. Instead, our attention briefly transfers to those perpetrating violence aside from the United States. Actors involved in post-war violence include four general groupings: "insurgents" who opposed the occupation; ethnic/sectarian groups who engaged their rivals; foreign nationals who participated in the insurgency and facilitated sectarian violence; and criminal elements that took advantage of the prevailing security void (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 260; Hashim, 2006: 82-120; Rathmell, 2005: 1020; Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1046). These groupings deployed a range of tactics including kidnapping, torture, murder and ethnic cleansing (Steele, 2008: 2). Only the former three groups are qualified below since they were motivated by political or socials interests, and represent the political and social atmosphere under the

occupation, while the latter is excluded, as criminal elements were primarily concerned with self-enrichment (Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1046).

1.3.2.1 Insurgency

Fattah and Caso (2009: 251) argue that maturation of the insurgency was predictable, but had been unforeseen by the United States. The historical precedence for popular resistance against occupation and foreign rule existed (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 268-269). Recalling Iraq's history, the authors abridge:

> From the first insurrections in Iraq against Umayyad rule to the civil war erupting in Baghdad as a result of the Persian annexation of Basra in the 1770s to the opposition movement spawned by the government signing of the Portsmouth Treaty in 1948, Iraqis have always rebelled at externally imposed diktats and foreign hegemony. And they will continue to fight foreign invaders until they leave the country once and for all, taking with them the patchwork agreements and piecemeal treaties the invaders once thought could govern the thousand-year-old nation of Iraq (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 270).

Despite the precedence highlighted in the quote, the United States-led coalition was unprepared when insurgency spread throughout the country (Allawi, 2007: 94; Bowen, 2009: 57; Haass, 2009: 257; Record, 2007: 86). Consequently, it sluggishly responded, which allowed the insurgency to take root and required several years before the United States was able to reverse the intensity of violence.

Similarly, Allawi (2007: 177) convincingly argues that insurgency was inevitable simply due to the nature and circumstances of the U.S. invasion and occupation. Such reactions were especially expected among the Sunni, whom the author proclaims "rejected the occupation in its entirety and refused to countenance any long-term changes to the political structure of the country that were based on it" (Allawi, 2007: 177). Outright rejection denoted in the quote not only guaranteed armed resistance to the occupation, it likewise compromised popular acceptance of occupational political processes, its frameworks, representatives, and their perceived legitimacy (Allawi, 2007: 177; Roy, 2007: 40-43).

Similarly, military analysts had predicted an insurgency early in the occupation (Terrill, 2003: 13). For instance, in July 2003, W. Andrew Terrill (2003: 13) from the Strategic Studies Institute warned that a prolonged U.S. occupation or an "attempt to install a pro-American government" would likely trigger indigenous resistance. Terrill's prediction came to fruition, expedited by other influences including the U.S. military's disproportional use of force and decisions made by the CPA.

Turning to its manifestation, analysts conclude that organized opposition to the occupation originated in Fallujah on April 28, 2003, when U.S. soldiers fired on protesters during a demonstration (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 255). The violence perpetrated against peaceful demonstrators amplified preexisting popular disgruntlement toward the occupation (Abdallah, 2003: 65). From this juncture, determination to resist the occupation increased as grievances mounted (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 255). Between the spring of 2003 and the spring of 2004, the insurgency evolved from sporadic guerrilla-style resistance targeting occupying security forces, into a full-scale insurgency that exploited the tactic of terrorism (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256-260; Hashim, 2006: 183-200). As the occupation persisted, popular sentiment continued to sour. By 2007, one survey found that 51% of Iraqis rhetorically supported organized violence against occupying troops (ABC News and others, 2007: 2). Hence, tacit, if not explicit, support for the insurgency was common in Iraq.

Numerous explanations are proffered to explain Iraqis' endorsement of, and/or participation in, the insurgency. Noteworthy among them are: the perception of the foreign military presence as unwanted (ABC News and others, 2007: 2; Hashim, 2006: 102-104; Hull, 2009: 12); the systematic violence perpetrated against Iraqis by insurgent and counterinsurgent forces (Gage and others, 2003: 4-5); the culturally insensitive and asymmetrical manner in which coalition forces conducted military operations (actions that offended individual, tribal and/or national honor) (Emery, 2004: 4-5; Gage and others, 2003: 1-7; Hashim, 2006: 257-319; International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 30; Kuehl, 2010: 4-5); and a feeling of dis-empowerment following the removal of Saddam Hussein from political power (common among the Sunni, and reinforced through decisions such as de-Baʻathification) (Allawi, 2007: 94). These reasons, among others, prompted both the Sunni and Shiʻa to support the insurgency, while the Kurds were noticeably not represented, since they generally did not perceive the occupation as a threat to their collective interests (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 252).

Numerous sources attribute the armed insurgency predominantly to Sunni Arabs (Allawi, 2007: 457; Hashim, 2006: 129; Tripp, 2007: 286), while others suggest its demographic composition is difficult to qualify (Terrill, 2003: 11). Among the former, scholars believe that the insurgency started with the Sunni and then spread to the Shiʻa (Allawi, 2007: 150-159; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 254-255). Sunni Arab resistance was not immediate, as the group initially refrained from engaging occupying forces militarily (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 254; Hashim, 2006: 123). The decision to be temporarily passive is theorized to be a result of their

uncertainty about the duration of the occupation or their place within the post-war social and political structures (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 254; Hashim, 2006: 123).

The turning point came the CPA was imparted with absolute control and U.S. officials reiterated their determination to establish a democratically elected government, whereupon the Sunni recognized that the probability of their retaining political superiority had diminished (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 254-255). It was then realized that, by default, the Kurds and Shi‘a would increase their representation within a democratically elected government while Sunni relative influence would decrease. CPA Order Numbers 1, outlined above, further validated those suspicions by outright challenging the Sunni’s historic position of social and political domination (Allawi, 2007: 150-159; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 254-255). Simultaneously, Sunni tribal leaders became disgruntled when they were ineligible for preferential treatment at the local level, as coalition forces began establishing local governments and services (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 255). Nevertheless, the social-political ambitions attributed to the Sunni here does not imply that Sunni Arab (insurgents) were unwavering supporters of Saddam Hussein or desired to marginalize other groups, but rather it indicates that the community wanted to advance their common interests (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 254).

By comparison, portions of the Shi‘a community later joined the insurgency as the occupation endured (Terrill, 2003: 17-23). Initially the Shi‘a cautiously embraced the occupation, although they aspired to minimize U.S. influence in post-war Iraq (Terrill, 2003: 17-18). However, marked discrepancies later emerged within this community over the degree and typology of resistance that should be exercised (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 257; Terrill, 2003: 19-23; Williams and Simpson, 2008: 209).

On the one hand, Grand *Ayatollah* Sayyid al Sistani, the highest-ranking Shi‘a cleric in Iraq, issued a decree that the Shi‘a should not oppose the occupation by force of arms (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 257; Terrill, 2003: 19). *Ayatollah* Sistani, who continues to be an influential religious voice in Iraq (Ali, 2014: 22), also proclaimed that Shi‘a should not become involved with governing or administrative systems associated with the U.S.-led occupation (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 257-258). Aiming to reduce U.S. influence and expedite its withdrawal, the *Ayatollah* instead called for immediate national elections to establish an indigenous government (rooted in Islam) (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 257-258). A rapidly elected government was endorsed to allow Iraqis to retake control of their country and its trajectory, whereby occupational forces could withdraw.

On the other hand, Shi‘a started joining the insurgency around 2004 (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256-259). In particular, Muatada al-Sadr deployed his militia, the Mahdi Army, to

engage U.S. forces (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256; Terrill, 2003: 21). His actions challenged both Sistani's religious pronouncement and the U.S.-led occupation (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256; Terrill, 2003: 21). Al-Sadr thus represented a Shi'a movement that was not bound by the *Ayatollah*, and would not submit to the occupation (Allawi, 2007: 321-333, 457). Through his political and military exploits, he successfully challenged both the mainstream Sunni hierarchy.

Successfully utilizing his militia, al-Sadr captured and expanded the amount of territory under his control throughout sectors of Baghdad, Basra and other cities (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 257). Al Sadr's militia likewise counterbalanced Sunni militias that were similarly trying to expand their authority in the power vacuum experienced during the occupation (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 257). The U.S.-led coalition fought several pitched battles against al-Sadr's Mahdi Army (Allawi, 2007: 457). Coalition counterinsurgency (COIN) operations against al-Sadr's militia included ferocious battles in cities, such as Najif (Dobbins and others, 2009: 313-314). The disproportional use of force during these campaigns augmented popular resistance to the occupation, and the Mahdi's military capability, in combination with local discontent, prompted a U.S. military retreat on several occasions (Dobbins and others, 2009: 313-314)[29]. Consequently, Muatada al-Sadr emerged as a recognized leader, later becoming directly involved in politics, prior to retiring in February 2014 (Ali, 2014: 14; Katzman, 2014: 10-11). His influence, nevertheless, continues to be influential to the al-Sadr political party and the Mahdi Army.

Against the Sunni and Shi'a insurgency, coalition security forces took on the role of the counterinsurgent (Emery, 2004; Hashim, 2006). As noted below (1.3.3.1), a component of COIN operations include kinetic operations against insurgents. In addition, the U.S. had to engage the population to persuade them to espouse occupying forces, or at minimum to dissuade them from supporting the insurgents (Emery, 2004: 11-12; Garfield, 2007; Hashim, 2006: 329-339). However, the U.S. had difficulty enticing Iraqis for the reasons noted above (Emery, 2004: 11-12; Garfield, 2007; Hashim, 2006: 329-339). Although impossible to accurately qualify, it is obvious that Iraqis supported the insurgency because insurgents were supplied and recruited mainly from among Iraq's population (Emery, 2004: 11-12; Hashim, 2006: 131-159; Krepinevich, 2005: 100-101). Nevertheless, there was an element of foreign

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[29] The United States had entertained the notion of arresting al-Sadr for his alleged connections with the assassination of *Ayatollah* Abd al-Majid al-Khoei around mid-2003 but feared the social repercussions of his detainment (Dobbins and others, 2009: 297-301). Other Shi'a organizations likewise joined the insurgency (Terrill, 2003: 22; Williams and Simpson, 2008: 209). For example, the SCIRI, funded by Iran and headed by *Ayatollah* Mohammad Bakir al Hakim, fielded its militia (the Badr Corps) to engage occupying forces (Terrill, 2003: 22; Williams and Simpson, 2008: 209).

resources (including foreign fighters, material and funding, which also contributed to the violence (Emery, 2004: 11-12; Hashim, 2006: 131-159; Krepinevich, 2005: 100-101). The next subsection qualifies the contribution foreign fighters made to violence.

1.3.2.2 Foreign infiltration

Foreign infiltrators attributed to deteriorating security in occupied Iraq (Hashim, 2006: 138-140). These elements, consisting of freelance warriors and foreign intelligence personnel, entered Iraq prior to and after the invasion to resist the U.S.-led occupation and problematize achievement of U.S. military-political objectives (Allawi, 2007: 184; Hashim, 2006: 138; Krepinevich, 2005: 89). Those operating in this capacity originated from innumerable countries throughout the Middle East and Europe (Hashim, 2006: 140), and "were motivated to fight what they saw as the despoliation of a Muslim land by infidels" (Hashim, 2006: 147). In this case, the "infidels" were the United States and its coalition partners, which foreign fighters perceived to be coming to take control of Iraq's people and resources, and to undermine Islam. In conjunction, foreign interveners from neighboring Syria and Iran also amplified internal violence, as those countries dispatched personnel to influence social and political dynamics within occupied Iraq (Brennan and others, 2013: 125; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 259-260; Perito, 2005: 8). Iran, for instance, is credited with supporting Shi'a militias in Iraq, providing them with financing, weapons and training (Brennan and others, 2013: 127-129). The porous and unsecured borders of Iraq were easily infiltrated by foreign elements and circumstances facilitated weapons transfers (Brennan and others, 2013: 131; Perito, 2005: 8). Coalition failure to patrol the borders thus precipitated the flow of men and material that amplified violence in occupied Iraq.

Once established within Iraq's frontiers, foreign infiltrators facilitated both insurgent and sectarian violence through their appropriation of ideological and material resources (Allawi, 2007: 184; Hashim, 2006: 138; Krepinevich, 2005: 89; Nasr, 2004: 13; Tripp, 2007: 287). Their influence on the intensity of violence is profound, since they are credited with the increase in acts of terrorism and bombings (Hashim, 2006: 139). One such example is the bombing of the Shi'a al-Askari Mosque in Samarra on February 22, 2006 (Bowen, 2009: 274; Brennan and others, 2013: 41; Simon, 2008: 58; Tripp, 2007: 306). The al-Askari bombing was pivotal in the trajectory of violence in occupied Iraq as it was reportedly designed to intensify civil animosity between the Sunni and Shi'a (Bowen, 2009: 274; Tripp, 2007: 306). Following that incident, there was a spike in sectarian violence as Iraq was driven closer to civil war.

Ultimately, coalition forces experienced difficulty undermining the influence of foreign elements, especially among those affiliated with al Qaeda. However, momentum shifted following the Sunni Awakening in 2006 (detailed in a later chapter) (Rodano, 2012: 39; Ucko, 2008: 359). The windfall was partially instigated by Sunni frustration at the wanton violence perpetrated by foreign fighters associated with al Qaeda in Iraq (Ucko, 2008: 359). The shift in Sunni allegiance enabled Sunni-coalition cooperation that significantly, albeit temporarily, reduced the capacity and appeal of foreign elements in occupied Iraq.

Nonetheless, the impact of the foreign element in contemporary Iraq continues to be significant. At the time of writing, the foreign element, combined with indigenous actors, has strengthened and is challenging the integrity of Iraq. The radical Sunni organization Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (IS)[30], whose origins are in the U.S. occupation and insurgency, remained active in Iraq throughout and beyond the occupation in a reduced capacity, and it later dispersed into Syria. The group has proven a persistent and noteworthy challenger in both Syria and Iraq since 2013 (Gulmohamad, 2014; Katzman, 2014: 9). IS territorial gains at the time of writing include large portions of both countries (Katzman, 2014: 9). The organization has thereby become a decisive stakeholder in Iraq and the Middle East, and a serious threat to the integrity of Iraq. While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to analyze events beyond 2011, denoting the existence of such groups is important, as its roots is in the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and it is greatly associated with the sectarian fracturing of Iraq that occurred under occupation.

1.3.2.3 Ethnic-sectarian fracturing

In the post-war security vacuum, Iraq's society increasingly identified itself in ethnic-sectarian terms (Williams and Simpson, 2008: 206) and violently fractured (Allawi, 2007: 145; Brennan and others, 2013: 147). Enterline and Greig (2008: 881-882) suggest that sectarian violence in Iraq was predictable since tensions were preexisting and long-standing. In addition to historic divisions, the Sunni realization that the democratic transformation envisaged by the United States would naturally predisposition the Kurd and Shi'a populations to acquire increased representation guaranteed a (violent) sectarian response (Allawi, 2007: 136; Möckli, 2012: 2-3). In short, scholars expected the Sunni would counterbalance structural changes to secure their collective social and political interests.

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[30] The organization initially referred to itself as ISIS, and then selected to use the term IS in late 2014. For a detailed review of IS(IS), see (Gulmohamad, 2014).

Therefore, Sunni (perceived) marginalization exacerbated ethnic violence, causing the community to mobilize to protect their interests (Möckli, 2012: 2-3). Mobilization was likewise necessitated since Kurd and Shi'a (retributive) violence was also being perpetrated against the Sunni during the early period of the occupation. Subsequent to the fall of Baghdad, Shi'a and Kurds mobilized to perpetrate retributive justice targeting Ba'ath Party members and intelligence officials (Allawi, 2007: 136-145; Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1048). As a means of vengeance and/or protecting collective interests, Shi'a, Sunni and Kurd groups founded, and/or deployed, independent militias to perpetrate acts of violence against members of other groupings (Bowen, 2009: 57; Tripp, 2007: 306). Sectarian militias were equally deemed necessary to fill the security void produced during the invasion since the United States-led occupying forces failed to provide security (Bowen, 2009: 57; Tripp, 2007: 306). In addition to retributive killings and the provision of security, ethnic-sectarian based militias also performed social service tasks, such as garbage collection, and thereby garnered local support (Kepel, 2004: 235). Their provision of security and basic services no doubt increased their popular appeal since the coalition and Iraq's governing bodies were unable to provide services or security.

As a consequence of their activities, the magnitude of violence between Iraq's various groups increased throughout the occupation (Allawi, 2007: 443-444). By 2006, the Shi'a, Kurd and Sunni were utilizing roaming death squads to summarily execute sectarian rivals and ethnically cleanse neighborhoods (Allawi, 2007: 453). With the numbers of the militias swelling, and the frequency and brutality of their operations expanding, a multidimensional power struggle at the local and national levels materialized, with militias committing violence against their sectarian rivals, and sometimes targeting coalition forces (Bowen, 2009: 229; Kilcullen, 2009: 125-126; Ucko, 2008: 342). At its height in the summer of 2007, Iraq became engulfed in a civil war (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 254)[31]. Interestingly, the increase in sectarian violence occurred despite popular support. When questioned about their perceptions of sectarian violence, Iraqis broadly condemned the phenomenon (Visser, 2007: 815).

Nonetheless, sectarian-based conflict was not only observable in its physical manifestation on the streets of Iraq; it spread into government institutions as well. Some ethnic-sectarian (mainly Shi'a) elements are alleged to have infiltrated and operated inside Iraq's Security Forces and government ministries once they were established (Hashim, 2006: 165). Infiltration of political and security structures increased popular distrust of the various

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[31] Internal sectarian divisions also emerged within the Shi'a, Sunni and Kurd populations, compounding instability under the occupation (Terrill, 2003: 19-32; Williams and Simpson, 2008: 210).

governing bodies (Allawi, 2007: 136, 443-445; Bowen, 2009: 274). For instance, members of the Ministries of Interior have been accused of acting for the benefit of the Shi‘a rather than the interests of Iraqis (Allawi, 2007: 136, 443-445; Bowen, 2009: 274). Comparable events give credence to notions that (certain) governing institutions prioritize sectarian interests over those of the population. It also lends to the popular perception of government illegitimacy, since portions of the population feel targeted by the government or particular ministries as opposed to being represented by them.

Combined, the U.S. overthrow of Iraq’s government fractured unstable sectarian relations and had an impact at the local, national and regional levels. At the local and national levels, the social-political restructuring manufactured prompted a retributive cycle of violence spearheaded by Shi‘a and Kurd against the Sunni (Allawi, 2007: 443-445). Simultaneously, the historical marginalization of Iraq’s demographic majority was reversed in post-war structures when the Shi‘a acquired the dominant political position in Iraq’s governing framework (Möckli, 2012: 1-2; Nasr, 2004: 7; Roy, 2007: 108). Consequently, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s government instigated (violent) competition for power and spoils in the post-war environment at the local and national levels (Allawi, 2007: 443-445).

At the regional level, the sectarian political balance of power, which had witnessed Sunni control in countries, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, was overturned (Kam, 2011: 100-101; Möckli, 2012: 1-2; Nasr, 2004: 7). The invasion thereby increased Shi‘a geopolitical influence, challenging the long-standing political domination by the Sunni in Iraq and the Middle East (Brennan and others, 2013: 126-127; Kam, 2011: 100-101; Möckli, 2012: 2; Roy, 2007: 108). Viewed from another perspective, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein augmented Iran’s geopolitical influence and leveraging capability in post-war Iraq by empowering Iraq’s Shi‘a (Brennan and others, 2013: 126-127; Kam, 2011: 100-101; Möckli, 2012: 2; Roy, 2007: 108). Ironically, Iraq’s contemporary geopolitical weakness and its Shi‘a led government undermines U.S. endeavors to isolate Iran. With the violence and its perpetrators qualified, our emphasis is redirected toward delineating how the coalition counterbalanced deteriorating social and political circumstances in Iraq.

1.3.3 Methods of stabilization

The U.S.-led coalition utilized several practices to counter the complex violent conflict that emerged, and its techniques was replicated throughout the duration of the occupation with fluctuating degrees of success (Kilcullen, 2009: 127, 141; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 199; Yamao, 2011: 1-2). For the sake of space, we reduce these approaches to four broad strategies

extracted from the literature. First, as a short-term solution, the coalition forces conducted military-policing kinetic operations centered on the use of force to kill or capture insurgents (Department of Defense, 2010: 32; Kilcullen, 2009: 124), or to geographically separate sectarian groups to minimize insurgent and ethnic-sectarian violence (Kilcullen, 2009: 145; Krepinevich, 2005: 88). Similarly, coalition forces trained Iraq's Security Forces (hereafter ISF) for the purposes of assisting with and gradually assuming responsibility for the country's security (Department of Defense, 2010: 3; Kilcullen, 2009: 61, 130; Krepinevich, 2005: 94-96). Second, efforts were made to advance regional dialogue to increase bilateral cooperation and address mutual security concerns (United Nations, 2012: 4-5; United States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 1-4). Third, focus was placed on (re)constructing Iraq's infrastructure to restore order and improve basic living conditions (United Nations, 2012: 13). Fourth, the U.S. and other actors promoted national reconciliation to reduce internal tensions and violence (United Nations, 2012: 4; Yamao, 2011: 1). Each practice is briefly outlined below.

1.3.3.1 Kinetic operations and ISF training

To undermine the insurgency and sectarian violence, U.S.-led coalition security forces engaged in counterinsurgency and policing operations deploying physical violence (Kilcullen, 2009: 60-63). The objective of kinetic operations was to neutralize those involved in the proliferation of insecurity. Nonetheless, the U.S. was slow in its provision of security; and consequently, it was not until late 2007 that combined militia-military forces in Iraq were able to markedly reduce the magnitude of violence (Brennan and others, 2013: 54). Equally problematic, while attempting to advance security, the U.S. frequently used disproportional degrees of force that killed and wounded civilians, offended Iraqis, and isolated occupying forces from the occupied population (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). Equivalently counterproductive, the U.S. military sometimes tried to physically separate warring ethnic elements, through practices including the construction of barriers and walls, as observed in Baghdad, to minimize violent interaction through the isolation of communities (Kilcullen, 2009: 142-143). These insulating techniques exacerbated social frustration since it inhibited daily life (Ucko, 2008: 355-356). Additional analysis of kinetic operations is included in chapter 2 when U.S. military tactics are qualitatively analyzed *vis-à-vis* their bilateral impact on Iraq's society.

Another aspect of kinetic operations was the coalition forces' training of the reconstituted ISF as a means of reconstructing Iraq's institutional capacities (Department of Defense, 2010: 41). Military and police training occurred in quantitative and qualitative phases, starting in

early August 2003 (Brennan and others, 2013: 28). Iraq's military was taught general policing and military operations in addition to counterinsurgency and counter terrorism techniques (Department of Defense, 2010: 41; O'Hanlon and Livingston, 2010: 23). As the quantity of ISF personnel and their quality of training increased, security responsibility was gradually transferred from the coalition to the ISF (Department of Defense, 2010: 41).

The transition of security responsibility followed a phased course where joint coalition and ISF operations were initially conducted; then the ISF acquired a more pronounced role (with coalition forces providing air and logistics support), until the ISF obtained the quantitative and qualitative capacity to assume complete control of security in Iraq (Department of Defense, 2010: 41). Accordingly, ISF training progressed so that U.S. "combat troops" were withdrawn from Iraq in 2010, leaving approximately 39,000 troops that were primarily involved in training and support (Belasco, 2009: 2). All U.S. troops were withdrawn from Iraq on December 18, 2011 (Katzman, 2012: 14). Hence, it took seven years to build Iraq's military capacity to the point where it could operate independently.

Critical of the process, Brennan and others (2013: 51) criticize that prolonged instability in Iraq was "facilitated in large part by an ISF that was too small, inadequately trained, and complicit in the sectarian violence in many cases." The U.S. was clearly complicit in the reduced size and quality of training expressed in this quote, as well as responsible for the lack of funding and organization (Brennan and others, 2013: 29). These circumstances undermined the speed at which the ISF could be trained, equipped and deployed. Simultaneously, the ISF and other security institutions became infused with sectarian-loyal personnel who operated according to sectarian interests (Allawi, 2007: 453). As a result, some ISF forces were deployed to combat sectarian rivals, as opposed to provide security for all Iraqis, regardless of their identity. The partiality of security institutions and their leaders raised popular suspicion and mistrust of the ISF and government.

Overall, the coalition's training program was plagued by numerous challenges. The security services, for example, also suffered from insurgent infiltrators whereby individuals loyal to the insurgency were recruited and then operated from within these institutions to undermine progress (Allawi, 2007: 453; Oliker, 2007: 6; Bowen, 2009: 202). To illustrate, an independent Iraq media organization reports that "insurgents" infiltrated Iraq's security forces and leaked sensitive security information to the insurgents (Alsumaria Iraqi Television, 2011). Infiltration thereby compromised operations and organizational unity, making operations

vulnerable to sabotage and their members suspicious (Bowen, 2009: 202). These conditions compromised training and recruitment (Bowen, 2009: 202)[32].

Equally problematic, ISF forces also experienced regular externally perpetrated attacks to decrease the number of recruits and undermine troop morale (Sly and Salman, 2010)[33]. Such attacks frequently manifested in shootings and bombings of training or recruitment centers. Despite their regular perpetration, the Department of Defense (2010: viii) claims they had no significant impact on the quality of ISF training or readiness. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that such events might have discouraged individuals from joining Iraq's security forces, which reduced the speed at which these institutions could be reconstructed.

1.3.3.2 Advancing regional cooperation

The coalition prioritized the enhancement of regional cooperation to reduce cross-border interference and infiltration by foreign state and non-state entities (Brandon, 2006a: 1-3; 2006b: 128-133; Perito, 2005: 8; United States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 2). Regional cooperation was advanced for two broad reasons. On the one hand, there were mutual security concerns among neighboring countries since (non-) state actors moved across Iraq's borders to conduct (counter)attacks and/or find sanctuary (Brandon, 2006a: 1; 2006b: 128-133). More specifically, freelance warriors were infiltrating Iraq's borders to fight the United States and instigate sectarian violence, as denoted in section 1.3.2.2. At the same time, Iran and Turkey reported armed incursions by Kurd organizations, notably the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) or the Party for Freedom and Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) that were allegedly operating from inside Iraq's frontiers (Brandon, 2006a: 1-3; 2006b: 2-3; Katzman, 2014: 32). In response to the Kurd attacks, Turkey and Iran made several military incursions into Iraq's territory to undermine Kurdish operations launched from the Mount Qandil area (Brandon, 2006a: 2-3; Cordesman, 2010: 8-9; United Nations, 2012: 4)[34]. Accordingly, it was essential to establish regional dialogue to discuss border security to protect the interests of all stakeholders involved.

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[32] For example, on January 15, 2011 a recruit-in-training smuggled live ammunition onto a firing range in Mosul and killed two of his U.S. trainers (CNN News, 2011).

[33] An August 17, 2010 attack on a recruitment center in Baghdad serves as a case in point when a suicide bomber killed 51 recruits and injured more than one hundred others (Sly and Salman, 2010). However, the population did not support such attacks. For instance, a May 2004 survey found that an overwhelming majority (91%) of Iraqis perceived attacks on Iraq's police forces unjustifiable (Burkholder, 2004d).

[34] For instance, Turkey's military attacked Kurdish forces based inside Iraq in mid-October 2011 following violent clashes between Kurdish "rebels" and Turkey's military (Katzman, 2014: 32), operations which continued into 2012 (United Nations, 2012: 4).

On the other hand, and stated above, neighboring countries, such as Iran, were intervening in Iraq (assisting Shi‘a groups) to influence social-political developments during the occupation (Cordesman, 2010: 62-64; Katzman, 2014: 30). Iran’s overt and covert activities, in particular, raised considerable concern among U.S. politicians, coalition military officials, and Iraq’s Sunni population alike (Cordesman, 2010: 62-64). For these reasons, and others, it was determined that the development of regional security cooperation was essential to stabilizing Iraq and reducing tensions throughout the region (United States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 1). To this end, various efforts were implemented at the interstate level.

For example, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) sponsored and hosted a “non-official dialogue” in 2007 (United States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 1). At the conference, six regional neighbors, including Iran and Syria, negotiated a framework to enhance Iraq’s security and that of the wider region (United States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 2-4). The dialogue ended with the signing of the Marmara Declaration for regional cooperation and security (United States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 2-4). The declaration emphasizes that participants should not incite (ethnic-sectarian) violence within their neighbors’ borders and underscores the mutual value of promoting political and social stability in Iraq (United States Institute of Peace and Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, 2007: 2). Correspondingly, the United Nations continues to function as a third party to promote regional peace and security through continued bilateral dialogue between Iraq and its neighbors (United Nations, 2012: 5).

The relative utility of regional dialogue, however, appears to be marginal. On the one hand, Iran continues to intervene in Iraq. It most recently has been supplying weapons and intelligence to Shi‘a militias engaged in civil unrest during 2013 and 2014 (Katzman, 2014: 30). On the other hand, Iraq’s Shi‘a have been supporting anti-government fighters in Syria to undermine Syria’s government (Ali, 2014: 18-19). Both examples challenge national sovereignty and manufactures bilateral friction between these countries.

1.3.3.3 (Re) Construction

In addition to kinetic operations and the promotion of regional cooperation, the coalition engaged in reconstruction of Iraq’s governing institutions and infrastructure to restore the functioning of the state and to address social needs and grievances. Stuart Bowen (2009: 259) defines reconstruction in Iraq as: “the restor[ation of] the core capacities of government—its

strategic and policy-planning ability, as well as its financial, information, and human resources management." Reconstruction, according to the quote, thus broadly refers to institution building (governing bodies) and infrastructural development (construction of roads and the provision of utilities), in conjunction with assistance (financing) to achieve these objectives (Bowen, 2009: 187-192; Iraq Study Group, 2006: 25-26). The United States, its coalition allies and other international actors (the UN and other NGOs) have been involved in the reconstruction effort (Bowen, 2009: 187-192; Iraq Study Group, 2006: 25-26). Their operations continued throughout the duration of the occupation and persisted following the departure of U.S. military forces.

Reconstruction was implemented at multiple levels by numerous actors (Power, 2014: 347-348). These actors utilized both a top-down and bottom-up approach, rebuilding central government capacity, in addition to the structural capacities at the local level (Bowen, 2009: 10-23). Activities include the reconstruction of power plants, water treatment facilities, the refurbishment and supplying of schools and the establishment and training of local and national governing institutions and members (Bowen, 2013). Such measures were foremost believed to enhance internal stability and bring a measure of GOI legitimacy through the provision of representation, public goods and services (Bowen, 2013: 10; Brennan and others, 2013: 15; Iraq Study Group, 2006: 25; Levi and others, 2009: 356). Efforts were likewise designed to improve the humanitarian/living conditions inside Iraq by (re)building social and governing structures and their capacities (the provision of basic services) (Bowen, 2009: 23).

Reconstruction was, nonetheless, fraught with multiple problems. The first notable challenge was post-war violence (Bowen, 2013: 14-85). For example, targeted attacks complicated the rehabilitation of Iraq's dilapidated or damaged infrastructure, hindering the production and distribution of basic services, such as water and electricity (Bowen, 2013: 14; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256; Hashim, 2006: 34; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 40). Insurgents' purposeful targeting of Iraq's infrastructure, including oil and electrical facilities, had noteworthy consequences (Bowen, 2013: 75; Kepel, 2004: 222; Tripp, 2007: 289). The targeting of oil production throughout Iraq, for instance, problematized delivery of petroleum at the local level creating fuel shortages, while simultaneously reducing GOI revenue by limiting the amount of petroleum available for sale on the international market (Allawi, 2007: 175; Bowen, 2013: 84; Hafez, 2007: 97). Moreover, the quality and quantity of attacks forced the coalition to reallocate fiscal appropriations from one sector to another because essential infrastructure was continuously damaged or destroyed and thereby required additional funding for repairs (Bowen, 2009: 170). The volume and persistence of the violent and devastating

cycle reached a point where finances, previously earmarked for reconstruction projects, had to be re-appropriated to the security sector to protect functioning installations and undermine the cycle of destruction (Bowen, 2009: 170). In this manner, some reconstruction projects were shelved so that security at functioning sites could be funded.

Setbacks were also experienced as a result of insurgents' targeting of foreign and domestic contractors (Bowen, 2009: 75, 179; 2013: 75; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256). Such attacks were designed to undermine the reconstruction effort by striking at contractors' ability to operate safely while compromising staff morale. Similarly, insurgents attacked essential indigenous human resources, including translators, police, and public officials, to discourage cooperation with the coalition (Allawi, 2007: 373; Burkholder, 2004d; Kepel, 2004: 238). The insurgent strategy was successful. The hazards manufactured problematized reconstruction, resulting in work stoppages and difficulties in recruiting staff (Bowen, 2009: 75, 179; 2013: 75).

Combined, insurgent operations complicated reconstruction, while underscoring the fallibility of the coalition and Iraq's governing bodies. Persistent violence demonstrated that the coalition and Iraq's government were ineffective, and unable to provide security or basic utilities (Bowen, 2013: 40-41; Garfield, 2007; Gunarantna, 2007: 197). Nevertheless, ineffectiveness against violence was not the only means of demonstrating coalition and GOI ineffectiveness, as much of the reconstruction program was beleaguered with problems manufactured by those charged with reconstruction.

Figure 2 ABC News and others (2009) Post-war Living Conditions



Figure 2 cites ABC News and others (2009: 13), which trends the provision of services during the occupation. The graph depicts the absence of basic services, including potable water and electricity, while the insurgency intensified, which demonstrates that targeted violence had an impact on reconstruction between November 2005 and February 2008.

In particular, scholars characterize U.S. planning and implementation of reconstruction as "poorly conceived, overambitious, and often at cross-purposes" (Bowen, 2009: 327), an assertion endorsed by others (Benjamin and Simon, 2005: 187; Flavin, 2013: 178; Gunarantna, 2007: 197; Hoffman, 2004: 109). Poor design was partly the result of a U.S. failure "to consult sufficiently with Iraqis to understand what they really wanted from the reconstruction program" (Bowen, 2009: 327). These failures emphasized in Bowen's quotes resulted in instances of infrastructural projects that consumed millions of dollars in revenue that were unwanted by the population or never completed (Bowen, 2013: 4). It likewise alludes to the lack of oversight of the overall reconstruction program. Consequently, there are numerous instances of U.S. mismanagement of Iraq's oil revenue and corrupt behavior by U.S. contractors and decision-makers, some of who have been found guilty of criminal behavior (Bowen, 2009: 154-327). The systematic relegation of local ownership, the inability to properly plan, implement and oversee reconstruction, as well as the misappropriation of resources, increased local suspicion and exacerbated negative popular sentiment (Bowen, 2009: 327; Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1061; Stover and others, 2005: 834-835).

Combined, the challenges denoted profoundly hindered reconstruction, since only slight progress was recorded despite several years of efforts (Bowen, 2009: 232; O'Hanlon and Livingston, 2010). Delays in turn had a social impact. In 2005, for example, 39% of Iraqis perceived reconstruction as ineffective (Oxford Research International, 2005: 10). Three years later, ABC News and others (2008: 2) found that 88% of respondents still lacked electricity in their homes, and oil production remained markedly below pre-war production levels (ABC News and others, 2009: 5, 13; O'Hanlon and Campbell, 2008). Figure 2 trends the availability of basic goods and services between 2004 and 2009, which is graphed by ABC News and others (2009: 13). It also demonstrates a decline in services as the insurgency strengthened and repeatedly targeted reconstruction efforts, events that exacerbated poor planning.

Despite modest improvement, the reconstruction of Iraq remained lethargic throughout the occupation. As late as mid-2010, sixty-six percent of Iraqis felt that the provision of basic services continued to be the greatest challenge facing the country (International Republican Institute, 2010: 15, 30, 32). That same year, another survey found that respondents lacked sufficient personal funds to purchase food (18%) and 13% alleged they still did not have water in their neighborhoods (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 65). Hence, reconstruction in Iraq was hindered by numerous challenges and the impediments created social deprivations. Prevalent conditions affected popular sentiment toward occupying forces, and later Iraq's

governing institutions. Consequently, some scholars emphasize that the inability to reconstruct Iraq constitutes structural violence (Tripp, 2007: 292-293).

1.3.3.4 National reconciliation

The coalition and other third parties (the United Nations, Arab League) promoted peacebuilding and nation building in Iraq, concepts which need to be defined. Peacebuilding "underpins the work of peacemaking and peacekeeping by addressing structural issues and the long-term relationships between conflictants" (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 32)[35]. Ramsbotham and others' definition identifies measures for managing roots causes of the conflict as well as manufacturing nonviolent relations between rival groups as peacebuilding. Comparatively, Miller (2005: 56) defines peacebuilding as "[p]olicies, programs, and associated efforts to restore stability and the effectiveness of social, political, and economic institutions in the wake of a war or some other debilitating or catastrophic event." According to Miller's (2005: 58) broad understanding, peacebuilding "encompass[es] democracy, development, gender, human rights, and justice," to name a few objectives. Extrapolating from the definitions provided, it is clear that the peacebuilding is a holistic approach of stabilizing and restructuring a country to prevent conflict continuation (Hellmüller, 2013: 221-222; Miller, 2005: 58). By comparison, nation building is the process of forging a common national identity and cooperative behavior among a heterogeneous population within a given territory to reduce the potentiality of conflict between those entities (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 199). Both strategies were implemented in occupied Iraq.

Coalition members, led by the United States, in addition to other parties including the United Nations, spearheaded peacebuilding and nation building in Iraq (Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1073; Triponel, 2007: 277-319). Amalgamated these practices were broadly designed to reconstruct social relationships and political institutions (Allawi, 2007: 127; Triponel, 2007: 308-309; Ucko, 2008: 354-355). For instance, third parties tried to broker political compromise on contentious issues, such as oil wealth distribution (Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1073; Triponel, 2007: 277-319). For the moment, suffice it to say that such approaches were designed to stabilize Iraq, and were generally incorporated into a transitional justice and national reconciliation program.

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[35] Peacemaking is the process of facilitating warring parties in their settlement of a given conflict, including a change in the attitudes of belligerents (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 32). Peacekeeping utilizes international military and/or police forces to separate and monitor warring parties to qualitatively and quantitatively reduce violent interaction (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 32).

1.4 Transition of authority

Following exploration of the CPA and its tenure, the violence that gripped occupied Iraq, and several tools used to stabilize the country, our analysis turns to recounting transfer of sovereignty from the United States to Iraq. The following subsections describe the time-line of transfer, the governing bodies involved, and several events and circumstances that manifested between July 2003 and December 2011. The present section covers the Iraqi Governing Council, the Iraqi Interim Government, the Transitional National Assembly, and the Government of Iraq respectively. In addition to highlighting the social and political challenges, outlining these institutions underscores that Iraq's transitional institutions were confronted with instances of structural violence perpetrated by the United States, which included the appointment of representatives, and the imposition of policies and benchmarks.

1.4.1 Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) (July 2003-June 2004)

As mentioned beforehand, the CPA was not well received by Iraqis. Comparable sentiment was expressed at the regional and international levels, where criticism was rampant against the United States for establishing the CPA (Allawi, 2007: 107; Tripp, 2007: 285). The Arab League, for example, argued that the U.S. should not impose a government or prolong the occupation, but should instead allow an elected government of Iraq be established immediately (Allawi, 2007: 107; Tripp, 2007: 285). In the face of mounting criticism, and reinforced by a U.S. desire to expedite the transfer of governance back to Iraq, the CPA appointed a provisional governing body in July 2003 to give the impression Iraqis were involved and authority was being transferred (Allawi, 2007: 107; Tripp, 2007: 285). The body referenced was labeled the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC).

David Ucko (2008) explains the origination and composition of the IGC. He writes:

> the CPA appointed a body of Iraqi authorities to the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which was to advise the CPA and lend an Iraqi face to the occupation. The US wanted the IGC to be established quickly and for its membership to reflect Iraq's ethnic composition—as a body founded by the US, this was to be its claim to legitimacy. Problematically, the US was in too much of a hurry to allow and encourage truly representative leaders to emerge from the clean slate that was Iraqi civil society in 2003. Instead, CPA officials distributed political power to "twenty-five Iraqi leaders well-known to them" and who appeared to represent the ethnic

> constituents of Iraq—that is, the leaders of the political wings of the country's various militias (Ucko, 2008: 350)[36].

Ucko's quote underscores several salient points. First, the IGC was appointed and not elected, which fell short of calls for an elected body to assume control. Second, although the composition of the IGC "appeared to represent" the demographic distribution of the country, it instead represented the armed factions within Iraq. As a result, the United States was criticized for creating a body whose members inadvertently infused ethnic-sectarian division into Iraq's first post-war governing body (Dobbins and others, 2009: 33; Tripp, 2007: 284). As highlighted throughout the remainder of this chapter, politics and Iraq's governing bodies quickly espoused sectarian identity, creating ethnic-sectarian dissension that became institutionalized in Iraq's social and political structures.

During its tenure, the IGC served in conjunction with the CPA from mid-July 2003 to June 2004 in a restrained capacity (Allawi, 2007: 203; Brennan and others, 2013: 30; Dobbins and others, 2009: 46; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 251; Tripp, 2007: 284-285). For the most part, the CPA maintained control of decision-making while the IGC was subordinated. Among its accomplishments, the IGC selected individuals to temporarily head Iraq's government ministries (Dobbins and others, 2009: 47). Additionally, in late 2003, the IGC assisted the CPA in establishing benchmarks for the creation of a democratically elected Government of Iraq (GOI) (Allawi, 2007: 216-226; Brennan and others, 2013: 30; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 258). The arrangement negotiated was called the November 15 Agreement, and it outlined the transitional framework which demarcated benchmarks such as national elections of a transitional body, the writing of a constitution, and election of a permanent governing body (Allawi, 2007: 216-226; Brennan and others, 2013: 30; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 258). However, the manner in which these provisions were to be achieved was unspecified and constricted by a rigorous schedule of transition (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 258).

The schedule and benchmarks were legislated as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) on March 8, 2004 (Allawi, 2007: 224). To summarize, the TAL established an 18-month deadline that consisted of a series of progressive phases (Brennan and others, 2013: 30-31). The first phase of the transfer dictated the establishment of an Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) that would replace the CPA and the IGC simultaneously (Dobbins and others, 2009: 12; Global Security, 2011; Katzman, 2008: 1; Tripp, 2007: 286). Once the IIG assumed control, it would theoretically govern the country independent of foreign influence.

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[36] In terms of IGC composition, it consisted of 13 Shi‘a, 5 Kurd, 5 Sunni, 1 Turkmen and 1 Assyrian Christian, a composition which the U.S. administration thought represented the demographic composition of Iraq (Tripp, 2007: 284-285).

As the CPA and IGC's tenure neared its end, there was rampant popular criticism of both bodies (Allawi, 2007: 286-287). On the one hand, an April 2004 poll found that forty-two percent of respondents assessed the CPA's performance as "poor" or "very poor" (Burkholder, 2004e). On the other hand, on June 1, 2004, the IGC received a thirty-five percent positive performance rating, sentiment which may be attributed to the fact that a majority of Iraqis (79%) believed that "its policies and decisions (are) mostly determined by the coalition's own authorities" (Burkholder, 2004a). Similarly, scholars also criticize the CPA and IGC. For instance, Allawi (2007: 286) asserts IGC members tasked with drafting the TAL were "exiles" who "had no feel for the prevailing sentiments of the majority of Iraqis," a weakness he blames on the U.S. for appointing IGC representatives (Allawi, 2007: 221-222). Allawi's insight underscores the lack of representation of the local indigenous population.

At the same time, Allawi (2007: 222) lambastes the TAL as "utterly alien in construction and phraseology from the Arabic language and the Iraqi experience." He adds to this criticism that the framework "embodied western, specifically American notions" such as "gender rights" and "separation of powers." Allawi's critical assessments, as articulated in the quotes, emphasize the degree of influence the U.S. exerted over the IGC and its drafting of the TAL. Demonstrating the negative perceptions generated by the TAL's content and design, Allawi (2007: 224) concludes, "the TAL was deeply resented by a large majority of Iraqis" that could not identify with its content and perceived it as manipulated and imposed by U.S. authorities. Despite the degree of unpopularity noted in the quote, the TAL established the guidelines upon which post-war governance in Iraq was transferred. In short, the TAL's designers, and its controversial and alien nature, guaranteed the population would question the legitimacy of each subsequent governing body as transfer of sovereignty progressed.

1.4.2 Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) (June 2004-May 2005)

The TAL ordained that the IGC and the CPA formally transition their authority to an appointed provisional governing body titled the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) (Allawi, 2007: 286; Tripp, 2007: 292). That transfer occurred on June 28, 2004 (Allawi, 2007: 286; Tripp, 2007: 292). At this time, the IGC and CPA were dissolved, completing the first phase of Iraq's transition to a popularly elected GOI (Allawi, 2007: 286; Global Security, 2011; Tripp, 2007: 286). According to the U.S. military, when the IIG acquired control, the formal occupation of Iraq ended (Brennan and others, 2013: 32-33). The military, nonetheless, remained, and Iraqis still considered the country under foreign military occupation.

According to polling, a majority of Iraqis initially approved the transfer of CPA and IGC authority to a temporary governing body (Burkholder, 2004a; 2004c). Nonetheless, respondent simultaneously expressed pessimism toward the ultimate degree of autonomy that such a governing body would enjoy (Burkholder, 2004a). Only forty percent of Iraqis believed that the transfer would officially grant complete sovereignty to the IIG (Burkholder, 2004a). Most perceived transition was only a symbolic formality and expected the U.S. would continue to exert control over the country (Burkholder, 2004a). As noted below, respondents' assumptions were accurate since the United States continued to exercise authority over political developments in occupied Iraq.

Following its establishment, IIG members nominated Ayad Allawi as interim Prime Minister (Allawi, 2007: 285). Once Allawi had been appointed, the IIG (June 2004-May 2005) was authorized to manage daily affairs and oversee the continual achievement of TAL benchmarks (Allawi, 2007: 214-215; Global Security, 2011). Among the latter, the IIG supervised a national census and national elections to determine the composition of the forthcoming Transitional National Assembly (TNA), which would supplant the IIG (Allawi, 2007: 214-215)[37]. Following the conduct of a census, the IIG oversaw national elections on January 30, 2005, to select the 275 members of the TNA (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 269; Katzman, 2008: 1). However, two issues problematized the elections: increased insecurity and sectarian divisions (Brennan and others, 2013: 39).

On the one hand, some recommended that elections be postponed, since it was feared that insecurity was too great to permit Iraqis to safely visit the polls (Fattah and Caso, 2009). On the other hand, the Sunni were disgruntled at their marginalization hitherto and threatened to boycott the elections. Sunni grievances included persistent U.S. influence in Iraq's domestic political affairs and Sunni under-representation in the provincial governing councils (Katzman, 2008: 1). Both concerns were relegated by the U.S., which pressured compliance to the election schedule (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 260; Ucko, 2008: 352). Escalating sectarian tensions and disgruntlement ultimately occasioned the Sunni to boycott the elections (Allawi, 2007: 389-392; Ucko, 2008: 352). As a result, Shi'a and Kurdish candidates obtained a majority of seats in the TNA while the Sunni were under-represented due to self-marginalization via the boycott (Allawi, 2007: 389; Katzman, 2008: 1; Ucko, 2008: 352). As

[37] Comparatively, when questioned which powers the IIG should possess in a 2003 survey, a majority of Iraqi respondents suggested that it should be given the authority to replace ministers and governors, disarm and demobilize militias, tax and eject coalition troops from Iraq (Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 20). The latter task confirms that Iraqis perceived themselves under occupation.

denoted in the next subsection, volatile conditions and the election outcome required the TNA to later compromise in the distribution of seats to avoid a debilitating political deadlock.

Concerning its responsibilities, the IIG unsuccessfully tried to suppress sectarian and insurgent violence through the use of Iraq's security institutions (Allawi, 2007: 429). However, once the IIG had acquired control, Iraq's evolving security institutions had become disproportionately sectarian in composition with either Sunni or Shi'a operating through them (Allawi, 2007: 429). Disproportional ethnic-sectarian composition was a result of the politicization and institutionalization of identity, whereby representatives who acquired positions in respective ministries filled those ministries with individuals from their own sectarian group (Allawi, 2007: 429). Due to their disproportional composition, the activities of some institutions were perceived to be directed by sectarian interests (Allawi, 2007: 429). Consequently, popular suspicion increased, undermining the popular legitimacy of Iraq's ministries and security forces, and exacerbating ethnic-sectarian tensions and mistrust at the political and social levels, which fed back into a conflict spiral (Allawi, 2007: 429).

By way of conclusion, a great deal of criticism has been leveled against the IIG. Both the Arab League and Iraqis deemed the body as illegitimate since its members had not been popularly elected (Allawi, 2007: 301). Allawi (2007: 334) critically identifies the IIG as "an unnecessary interlude" between the CPA and the establishment of a legitimate government of Iraq. Following its eleven-month tenure, the IIG transferred its authority as stipulated by the TAL.

1.4.3 Transitional National Assembly (TNA) (May 2005-May 2006)

Following national elections, members of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) gathered to select leaders. On April 6, 2005, TNA members selected Kurd Jalal Talabani as its President and Shi'a Ibrahim al-Jaafari as Prime Minister (Allawi, 2007: 393). On May 3, 2005, the IIG transferred its authority to the TNA, commencing the second phase of transition to a permanent elected government (Global Security, 2011). Polling at this time suggests that Iraqis initially perceived the transitional government as representative of the country, and a majority expressed confidence in its ability to govern (International Republican Institute, 2005: 19-20). With an apparent popular mandate, the TNA assumed its responsibilities.

One fundamental TNA responsibility was the forming of a committee who would draft Iraq's permanent constitution (Allawi, 2007: 214-215). According to the TAL, that draft constitution was then subject to a national referendum whereby Iraqis could accept or reject the document (Allawi, 2007: 214-215). The Constitutional Committee was established on

May 10, 2005, and was composed of 55 TNA members (Allawi, 2007: 404; Katzman, 2008: 1; Tripp, 2007: 296-303). Public opinion polls found that Iraqis felt that the two principle things a constitution should do were: "define and protect the rights of the people" (38.6%) and "define the structure of government" (22.3%) (International Republican Institute, 2005: 23). Despite the public's simplified conceptualizations, as outlined in the quote, the drafting of a constitution proved laborious and polarizing among Constitutional Committee members.

While fulfilling its mandate, the Constitutional Committee faced several obstacles (Allawi, 2007: 214-215, 404-406). Foremost, it was tasked with drafting Iraq's constitution within a five month time period (Allawi, 2007: 406). The imposed time frame added pressure and urgency to a process that was already challenged by the body's ethnically diverse membership who embraced different conceptualizations of how the governing framework should manifest. Secondly, there were numerous and salient contentious issues concerning the appropriate design of Iraq's governing framework that needed to be negotiated and resolved (Allawi, 2007: 214-215; Tripp, 2007: 300-301). Polarizing issues included the applicability of federalism, oil wealth distribution and the status of Kirkuk (Brennan and others, 2013: 148-150; Katzman, 2008: 2; Ryan, 2010: 69). Finally, the lack of Sunni representation became a subject of contention; since "[o]nly two of the original fifty-five members were Sunni Arabs" as a result of the Sunni boycott of the January 2005 TNA elections (Allawi, 2007: 404). The unrepresentative composition of the committee created deadlock and a compromise had to be reached to increase Sunni representation.

The marginalization of Sunni within the committee provoked Sunni protest and dissatisfaction, sentiment that was shared by U.S. authorities who feared that a constitution might not be drafted or ratified within the time frame allocated if the issue was not resolved (Tripp, 2007: 300). Consequently, the Sunni and the United States pressured the TNA to increase the number of Sunni representatives on the Constitutional Committee (Tripp, 2007: 300). The TNA acquiesced, increasing the number of Sunni representative by fifteen permanent members and ten advisers (Katzman, 2008: 2; Tripp, 2007: 300). With a more representative committee established, the assembly began negotiating a draft constitution (Katzman, 2008: 2). Despite the more representative nature of the committee, the draft constitution produced was subject to criticism for numerous reasons, including its sectarian nature.

The first criticism leveled at the draft constitution centered on the representative nature of the constitutional committee. More specifically, the Sunni continued to perceive that they were under-represented in government and thereby dubbed the October 2005 draft

constitution a “sectarian text” (Ucko, 2008: 353). Succinctly, the Sunni argued that the constitution failed to adequately address their needs. Secondly, several divisive issues remained unresolved because of an inability of committee members to achieve compromise within the allotted time frame (Katzman, 2008: 2). Unresolved issues included oil revenue distribution and the status of Kirkuk within Iraq’s federation (Brennan and others, 2013: 148-150; Katzman, 2008: 2; Ryan, 2010: 69). Unable to achieve compromise, the Constitutional Committee elected to transfer responsibility for resolving divisive issues to the forthcoming GOI (Katzman, 2008: 2; Ryan, 2010: 69). The general frame of the draft constitution was also subject to criticism. Pascual and Pollack (2007: 9), for example, argue that the “constitution that the United States helped to broker” was a manipulated text, which the U.S. perceived necessary “to demonstrate the progress of democracy.” The quote emphasizes U.S. interference in the design and content of the draft, which raised issues of legitimacy (Pascual and Pollack, 2007: 9) since the United States continued to repeatedly intervene.

Despite its shortcomings, a popular referendum on the draft constitution was held on October 15, 2005 (Allawi, 2007: 416; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 261). According to referendum criterion, the draft would be rejected if two-thirds of the population in three of Iraq’s eighteen provinces voted no (Katzman, 2008: 1-2). In the run-up to the referendum, sectarian divisions were demonstrated in a Sunni Arab call to reject the draft (Allawi, 2007: 416; Katzman, 2008: 4; Tripp, 2007: 301). Nevertheless, more than sixty percent of eligible voters participated in the plebiscite (Allawi, 2007: 416; Katzman, 2008: 4; Tripp, 2007: 301). While exercising their right, polling results indicate that voters cast their ballots according to ethnic-sectarian affiliation (Allawi, 2007: 416; Katzman, 2008: 4; Tripp, 2007: 301).

Referendum results demonstrate polarization across Iraq’s society, since majorities in the predominantly Kurd and Shi‘a provinces approved the draft constitution, while most voters in predominantly Sunni provinces rejected it (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 262; Tripp, 2007: 301). Concerning the latter, “The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% ‘no’ vote, respectively” (Katzman, 2008: 2). However, the predominantly Sunni province of Nineveh voted 55% “no,” thereby missing the threshold for rejecting the draft (Katzman, 2008: 2). Consequently, Katzman emphasizes that the draft constitution was narrowly ratified, despite being rejected by most Sunni voters.

With the constitution approved by most of Iraq’s provinces, the TNA supervised parliamentary elections, the next step according to the TAL, for transferring governance (Allawi, 2007: 441). On December 15, 2005, approximately eighty percent of eligible voters elected 275 representatives to the GOI (Allawi, 2007: 441; Tripp, 2007: 301). According to

election guidelines, twenty-five percent of those selected had to be female (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 262). The latter was a provision advocated by the United States. Like the constitutional referendum, Iraqis largely voted according to sectarian affiliation (Katzman, 2008: 2; Tripp, 2007: 301). Once tallied, final election results awarded the Shi'a political conglomeration, the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), with almost half of the parliamentary seats (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 263; Katzman, 2008: 2). To its credit, analysts commend the election results, noting that the distribution of seats were demographically more representative than the IIG had been (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 263; Katzman, 2008: 2). With members elected to parliament, and no clear majority in control, negotiations had to be conducted to form a coalition government (Allawi, 2007: 442).

Formation of a government proved challenging and controversial, taking parliamentarians nearly four months to appoint a Prime Minister due to inter-factional and sectarian quarreling among members (Allawi, 2007: 442-443; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 265). On February 12, 2006, a secret ballot was held in parliament and Ibrahim al-Jaafari won a slight majority and technically should have been appointed Prime Minister (Allawi, 2007: 442; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 260). Dissatisfied by the ballot results, some Shi'a, Kurd and U.S. officials expressed "that [al-Jaafari] was [a] divisive figure" and insisted he was unacceptable to lead the GOI (Allawi, 2007: 442). These actors applied pressure on Jaafari to reject the post, and ultimately he conceded to allow another to assume the position (Allawi, 2007: 443). Another round of negotiations led to UIA's representative, Nuri Jawad al-Maliki, being selected (Allawi, 2007: 443; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 260). Al-Maliki's appointment was, therefore, another instance of U.S. interference in Iraq's democratic political processes (Allawi, 2007: 442; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 265). The forced compromise undermined the democratic process in Iraq, while U.S. intervention frustrated politicians and civilians alike.

1.4.4 Government of Iraq (GOI) (May 2006-December 2011)

The TNA was replaced by the GOI on May 20, 2006 (Aljazeera, 2010). During the four and a half years of GOI tenure under the occupation, the body was plagued by sectarian and political infighting among the three major ethnic-sectarian groups (Allawi, 2007: 446-460; Katzman, 2008: 2-4; Roy, 2007: 108). These experiences reflect the magnitude of divisions at the societal level as Iraq edged closer to civil war. Increased sectarian tensions and the decreasing security situation at this time prompted the U.S. to surge, or increase, coalition troops as one technique of reversing the spiral of violence (Brennan and others, 2013: 52;

Rodano, 2012: 38)[38]. The surge, in combination with other internal events, successfully managed to reverse the escalation of violence.

While violence was eventually curbed, the GOI lacked popular legitimacy (Brennan and others, 2013: 51). For instance various ministers were repeatedly accused of advancing sectarian interests from within their given ministries (Allawi, 2007: 446-460; Katzman, 2008: 4). Simultaneously, polarizing issues, including the depth and scope of de-Ba'athification and the status of Kirkuk, continuously plagued the GOI (Katzman, 2008: 2-3). The combination of GOI failure to provide security or basic services, its partisan actions, and inability to achieve compromise, undermined popular trust and reinforced ethnic-sectarian divisions.

The degree of factionalism within the GOI was demonstrated repeatedly throughout the first few years of the GOI. In 2006, for instance, the formation of government was delayed for months by sectarian and inter-party rivalry and their inability to achieve compromise (Katzman, 2014: 2-5). Some compromises were eventually reached in 2008 that aided to the reduction of sectarian tensions and violence (Katzman, 2014: 5). One of those issues, which had been outstanding following the Constitutional Committee's inability to reach compromise, was resolved when the Provincial Powers Law (Law Number 21) was agreed upon (Katzman, 2014: 5). This piece of legislation granted provinces the authority to form their own governments, enforce laws and spend fiscal appropriations (Katzman, 2014: 5). While a significant achievement in terms of national reconciliation benchmarks, the law continued to be popularly criticized as insufficient.

Sectarian and political divisions again manifested during the 2010 national elections. With tensions rising within the Shi'a political coalition, support for al-Maliki declined (Katzman, 2014: 6). Prior to the election, al-Maliki used his authority to purge candidates from the January 2010 ballot using the de-Ba'athification law (Katzman, 2014: 7). This action was designed to augment al-Maliki's chances of retaining office, but it exacerbated sectarian tensions. During the elections, 62% of Iraqis went to the polls, but no political party obtained a clear majority (Katzman, 2014: 7). As a result, power grabbing by politicians, including al-Maliki, commenced and the GOI experienced difficulty determining and establishing a government (Katzman, 2014: 7).

Due to political wrangling, it took the parliament an unprecedented eight months to agree on the distribution of positions in government following the elections (Brennan and others, 2013: 98). The episode set a historical record among democratic parliamentary governing

[38] The surge increased U.S. soldier presence by 30,000 troops (Katzman, 2014: 4).

systems for the length of time necessary to form a governing coalition (Muir, 2010). After prolonged political horse-trading, a compromise was ultimately reached. Part of the November 2010 compromise was that al-Maliki would retain his position of power in exchange for the breadth of de-Baʻathification being minimized (Katzman, 2014: 7). While Ahmed Ali (2014: 9) conjectures that the 2010 elections hinged on competition between the three major sectarian and ethnic groups, who were acting in identity-based political coalitions, sectarian cooperation declined as frustration became rampant within political parties.

In conclusion, Iraq's permanent government was paralyzed by partisanship and needed to learn how to cooperate and compromise across parties and sects. However, the complex social-political environment created by the removal of Saddam Hussein, including the violence, sectarian fracturing, and the imposition of a U.S. framework, made cooperation and compromise difficult (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259). Therefore, equitable social and political resolutions, broadly defined as one that is mutually acceptable and beneficial to relevant stakeholders, proved challenging (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259). In this dissonant environment, scholars emphasize the importance of achieving compromise to resolve issues and cultivate public trust (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259). Unable to reach compromise, the United States frequently forced political compromise through exertion of pressure on the GOI and its leaders.

One example of U.S. pressure on the GOI was its push for the pursuit of national reconciliation (Katzman, 2008: 3). Pressure in this frame was applied through the establishment of standards, which predicated continued U.S. financial assistance on the achievement of reconciliation benchmarks (Katzman, 2008: 3). Benchmarks included legislation on oil wealth distribution, a constitutional review, and the granting of amnesty to former insurgents, some of the many issues that created perpetual political deadlock within Iraq's government (Katzman, 2008: 5-6). Realization of these standards was periodically evaluated prior to disbursement of U.S. financial assistance (Katzman, 2008: 3). In this case, the United States used its purse strings to muscle Iraq's government into making compromises, an outcome the U.S. deemed necessary to stabilize Iraq socially and politically. Nonetheless, Iraq's government has failed to meet many of the benchmarks established prior and subsequent to U.S. withdrawal (Katzman, 2012: 14-17).

1.4.5 Post-occupation GOI and contemporary developments

While this thesis concentrates primarily on U.S.-Iraq relations and events up to December 2011, the present section highlights social and political events subsequent to the end of the

U.S. occupation to contextualize contemporary conditions inside Iraq. Following the withdrawal of U.S. troops in late 2011, internal political and social tensions continued to persist. Within the GOI, power arrangements agreed upon during the paralyzing 2010 elections proved short-lived. These resulted in the manifestation of regular popular protests against the GOI in December 2012, and a re-escalation of sectarian violence, which assisted the spread of IS violence as Sunnis became disgruntled (Ali, 2014: 29). To minimize IS influence and undermining reversion back to civil war, the U.S. pressured al-Maliki to make political compromises in 2012, including the release of Ba‘ath prisoners (Katzman, 2014: 15). Although al-Maliki conformed, by late 2012 he was again targeting Sunni political opponents and this action generated additional Sunni demonstrations (Katzman, 2014: 16). Sunni grievances included the desire for more prisoners to be released, the process of de-Ba‘athification be reformed, and improvements in public services (Katzman, 2014: 16). However, no meaningful compromises were forthcoming.

Consequently, popular uprisings continued into early 2013, and IS continued to make territorial gains. Persistent internal disorder prompted al-Maliki to dispatch the ISF to quell the popular protests (Katzman, 2014: 16). The ISF’s use of disproportional force, including the killing of protesters, however, exacerbated popular dissatisfaction (Katzman, 2014: 16). Events thereby culminated in a resurgence of sectarian violence as Sunni militias were mobilized against the Shi‘a dominated ISF (Ali, 2014: 9; Katzman, 2014: 16). With sectarian violence continuing to escalate throughout the spring of 2013, and Sunni forces joining IS ranks, the United States became increasingly involved (Katzman, 2014: 4).

The U.S. again urged al-Maliki to make political compromises, leading to a mid-2013 settlement whereby concessions were made on the Provincial Law and de-Ba‘athification reforms were established (Katzman, 2014: 17). Concerning the former, the amending of the provincial powers law imparted additional authority to provinces, including increased responsibility for security and fiscal spending (Ali, 2014: 28; Katzman, 2014: 5). The political compromises reached, unfortunately, had no obvious effect on the security situation. IS, Sunni and Shi‘a violence continued to proliferate (Katzman, 2014: 17).

By late 2013, IS was an important stakeholder as it increasingly gained control over territory throughout Iraq (Ali, 2014: 21; Katzman, 2014: 9). Hoping to boost his image, al-Maliki dispatched the ISF and it reclaimed some territory from IS (Ali, 2014: 16; Katzman, 2014: 15). Thereafter, al-Maliki undermined his political gains when he turned his attention to weakening the Sunni through arrests (Ali, 2014: 16; Katzman, 2014: 15). The latter strategy produced a social and political crisis that evolved from street protests into an armed Sunni

revolt (Ali, 2014: 16-21, 18-24). Some of these Sunni forces joined IS, creating a more formidable opponent for the GOI (Ali, 2014: 21, 24; Katzman, 2014: 10-11).

As a result, the GOI increasingly experience defeats to IS, losing control of Fallujah in early 2014 (Ali, 2014: 12). IS continued to make territorial headway on two fronts, nearing Baghdad and simultaneously moving into Iraq-Kurdistan in the fall of 2014 (Katzman, 2014: 19). ISF forces proved incapable of containing or defeating IS on their own, with the ISF experiencing mass desertions of soldiers who abandoned equipment and hardware that was then captured by IS fighters (Katzman, 2014: 19). Simultaneously Shi‘a militias continued to join IS, further augmenting its strength in Iraq (Katzman, 2014: 19-20).

Meanwhile, on April 30, 2014, parliamentary elections were held (Katzman, 2014: 20). The 2014 election cycle witnessed the implosion of the larger sectarian political coalitions that had cooperated in 2010. Analysts suggest that al-Maliki’s long-reign of power[39] and his brutal efforts to consolidate authority by undermining political opponents led to stringent opposition among the Shi‘a (especially the Sadr), Sunni and Kurd political parties (Ali, 2014: 9-10). Nonetheless, al-Maliki managed to win the largest portion of votes during the election (Katzman, 2014: 20). Albeit, persistent IS gains in Iraq undermined al-Maliki’s acquisition of another term in office (Katzman, 2014: 20). In an effort to stabilize Iraq against the IS threat, the United States urged a rapid formation of a new government whereby political compromise could be achieved and energy directed toward defeating IS as opposed to sectarian wrangling (Katzman, 2014: 20-21). A coalition government was eventually established, but Iraq continues to experience sectarian divisions and violence, exacerbated in part by IS operations.

Al-Maliki’s political activities, undoubtedly, have played a notable role in increasing sectarian tensions and the advancements made by IS. He has used the judiciary, ISF and other security forces for his own political gain (Ali, 2014: 19-21). His tactics have included arrests and disqualification of political opponents, actions that has earned him many political opponents (Ali, 2014: 19-21). Al-Maliki’s activities likewise have had a social impact. There still continues to be a general lack of public trust in the government and its institutions, for reasons including GOI inability or unwillingness to provide security to all Iraqis, problems of political corruption, and stagnation in reconstruction (Ali, 2014: 9-10). Public disgruntlement subsequently feeds into the civil unrest, violence and the appeal of IS.

To inhibit IS gains in Iraq, the U.S. has dispatched hundreds of advisers and a contingent of troops to assist ISF and *Peshmerga* troops (Katzman, 2014: 22-24). The advisers are

[39] Nuri al-Maliki has ruled for eight years between 2003 and 2014 (Ali, 2014: 9).

involved in training and these U.S. forces are immune from prosecution (Katzman, 2014: 24). The U.S. has also been assisting through military airstrikes and the provision of weapons and equipment (Katzman, 2014: 19-24). Other European countries have likewise been providing assistance to Iraq, including Germany and the United Kingdom. At the time of writing, ISF and the *Peshmerga* are making advances against IS, reclaiming territory.

Overall, IS has created several dilemmas for Iraq should IS influence be dislodged from the country. While it has hastily united the ISF and *Peshmerga* against a common enemy, foreign assistance is being provided to both the ISF and the *Peshmerga*. Assistance offered to the latter will likely increase its relative strength *vis-à-vis* the ISF, which could produce future tensions, since the Kurds will have the a stronger militia to confront centralized rule originating in Baghdad once the common IS threat has been reduced or eliminated.

Additionally, there has been increasing tensions between the GOI and the Kurds, with rhetorical references to Kurdish independence. Of particular interest, Kurds began exporting oil through Turkey against GOI directive in May 2014 (Ali, 2014: 19, 24; Katzman, 2014: 13-14). Direct sales give Iraq-Kurdistan the opportunity to earn direct revenue by circumventing Baghdad. Following tensions concerning the trade arrangement, a compromise was reached which states that all oil income generated by the Iraq-Kurdistan be routed through Baghdad (Ali, 2014: 19, 24; Katzman, 2014: 13-14). Direct Kurd sale of petroleum, nonetheless, is another step toward increased autonomy. Finally, subsequent to the ISF's retreat from Kirkuk, the *Peshmerga* captured Kirkuk after it ejected IS (Katzman, 2014: 13). This acquisition places the disputed area of Kirkuk firmly under the control of the Kurds. The two circumstances compound preexisting tensions between the GOI and Iraq-Kurdistan, and will have to be added to the list of issues that must be managed once Iraq's interior is secured. Simultaneously, they demonstrate that Iraq-Kurdistan is edging closer to independence, which remains a sticking point for the Sunni and Shi'a who do not desire Iraq's territorial disintegration.

1.5 Qualitative summary of the war and occupation

Scholars assert that 9/11 changed U.S. domestic and foreign policy (Haass, 2009: 186; Kepel, 2004: 5). Following that event, the George W. Bush administration prioritized the use of military force to pursue U.S. security interests and to counter terrorism (Roy, 2007: 13). One component of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy was the use of military force to proliferate democratic forms of governance through regime change and state building campaigns (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 223-224; Roy, 2007: 29). This U.S.

(counterterrorism) strategy was implemented foremost in Afghanistan in 2001 (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 223; Rogers, 2008: 163; Roy, 2007: 11; Rubin, 2003: 46), and repeated through the U.S. unilateral and preventive invasion and occupation of Iraq in March 2003 (Carty, 2011: 80; Johansen, 2004: 4; Kepel, 2004: 197-198; Lieberfeld, 2005: 3; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 223; Roy, 2007: 13; Rubin, 2003: 46; Tripp, 2007: 273).

As noted above, the invasion of Iraq was advocated, among other reasons, to remove Saddam Hussein from political power because of his alleged support of international terrorism and pursuit of WMD (Jackson and Towle, 2006: 111-112; Kam, 2011: 97). Adhering to its democratic-proliferation (counterterrorism) strategy, the Bush administration later argued that in addition to securing the U.S. and countering the WMD-terror nexus, the U.S. invasion would extend democratic governance to Iraq and the Middle East (Brennan and others, 2013: 8; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 53; Kepel, 2004: 6). To maintain domestic approval, the Bush administration argued that the overall strategy would increase U.S. security, improve the lives of Iraqis, and advance regional and international peace (Renshon, 2007: 20)[40]. As outlined, events on the ground did not generate peace or security, and the durability of Iraq's weak democratic framework is uncertain and will have to be evaluated in the future.

Scholars, hitherto, criticize the U.S. war on terrorism and its manifestation in Iraq as ineffective and problematic for numerous reasons (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 223-224; Steele, 2008: 2). Foremost, critics discredit it as a counterterrorism campaign (Allawi, 2007: 10; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 111), since Iraq became a sanctuary of terrorism following the invasion (Sageman, 2008: 91). Succinctly, the invasion of Iraq did not minimize the use of terrorism but proliferated violence. Secondly, U.S. credibility was called into question when no WMD were found (Allawi, 2007: 338; Suskind, 2006: 239) and its peace enforcement, nation building and state building efforts failed (Etzioni, 2007: 14; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 136; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 199-207). Most important in the context of this research is the production of insecurity, factionalism, and the manufactured humanitarian crisis that produced a staggering degree of death, injury, displacement and deprivation. In hindsight,

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[40] Strategic thinking among some in the George W. Bush administration held that deposing "rogue leaders," such as Saddam Hussein, would complicate or deter state sponsorship of terrorism (Hobsbawm, 2007: 115-119; Kam, 2011: 88). It was also hypothesized that extending democracy and increasing counterterrorism capabilities of particular Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia, would strengthen international political will and capacity to eradicate the use of terrorism *vis-à-vis* the United States (Kam, 2011: 88). George W. Bush's (2003, 2006) National Strategy to Combat Terrorism (NSCT) illustrates the importance of democracy as a component of his counterterrorism strategy. For instance, the NSCT (Bush, 2006: 9-10) presents democracy as a long-term antidote to terrorism because it promotes international stability and peace (Bush, 2006: 16). As witnessed in Iraq, Brennan and others (2013: 8-9) suggest that policymakers paradoxically have a tendency of expanding motivations and goals during a mission that is subject to failure since they have invested a great deal into initiating the war and want it to end as a success.

U.S. objectives had a low probability of success because they were imposed through the use of military force, haphazardly planned and implemented, and had not considered indigenous needs and desires (Etzioni, 2007: 14; Haass, 2009: 136; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 136; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 199-207).

Much of the literature associated with the occupation emphasizes the responsibility of the United States for the social and political conditions manufactured inside Iraq (Allawi, 2007: 202; Commonwealth Institute, 2008: 9; Stover and others, 2005: 857). Forgoing discussion on the legality and legitimacy of intervention, the deteriorating social and political circumstances created by the United States undermined the reconstitution of security, governance and basic services (Kilcullen, 2009: 152; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 199); marginalized indigenous input from Iraqis (Stover and others, 2005: 834-835); and suffered from an acute lack of understanding and appreciation of political, cultural, and religious nuances which influence contemporary politics, society and culture inside Iraq (Allawi, 2007: 286; Dobbins and others, 2009: 8; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 268-270; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 166). Within this milieu, an internal conflict spiral was created, which compromised public support, increased tensions and violence and thereby expanded the coalition's momentous tasks of peacebuilding and state building to include counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations as violence escalated (Kilcullen, 2009: 152; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 199).

The coalition gradually came to realize that these objectives were fused and self-reinforcing. More specifically, the systemic nature of peacebuilding, state building, reconstructing and stabilization in Iraq was confirmed as setbacks in one sector problematized advancements in another, demonstrating the mutual dependence and complexity of such processes in post-conflict settings (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 210). For instance, coalition inability to contain insurgent violence, especially violence targeting essential services, hindered the provision of public goods (an effort of state building), for which the coalition and GOI were responsible (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 256; Hashim, 2006: 34). Reversely, as security increased, it was possible to increase the provision of basic services.

In hindsight, insurgency against the coalition should have been expected and planned for, as a quick historical review of the region confirms. Nonetheless, antipathy toward the coalition was exacerbated by factors including the prolongation of the occupation, prevailing insecurity, the inability to provide basic services, and the imposition of decisions and benchmarks (Allawi, 2007: 178, 270-271). The combination deepened anti-occupation sentiment and hastened an insurgency; it likewise precipitated sectarian fracturing that, when left unaddressed, transformed into civil war (Allawi, 2007: 178, 270-271). Hence, the United

States invasion was subject to rebellion, and its failures in planning and recognizing the interplay of peacebuilding and state building exacerbated the situation.

In conjunction with insecurity and the challenging living conditions, U.S. authorities also negatively influenced the capability and legitimacy of Iraq's evolving governing framework through the setting of standards and repeat intervention in the development and composition of elements of the governing framework (Allawi, 2007: 136; Kilcullen, 2009: 50-52; Roy, 2007: 40-41; Ryan, 2010: 69; Ucko, 2008: 351). For instance, the imposition of the IGC and the benchmarks and timetables for transition abetted the institutionalization of an unsound governing framework with questionable legitimacy and representation (Allawi, 2007: 136; Kilcullen, 2009: 50-52; Roy, 2007: 40-41; Ryan, 2010: 69; Ucko, 2008: 351). While interference produced what the U.S. perceived as proportional representation and adherence to democratic practices, scholars criticize the governing framework and the ideals it imposed as alien and unwanted (Allawi, 2007: 222). Combined, U.S. intervention produced a system that is not considered representative of Iraq's interests and needs.

Equally problematic, while establishing Iraq's governing framework, critics suggest that the United States fostered sectarian tensions. Sectarian relations fractured when the CPA appointed IGC members (Dobbins and others, 2009: 33; Tripp, 2007: 284; Ucko, 2008: 350). These divisions compounded imposed policies, such as de-Ba'athification, whose depth likewise created ethnic/sectarian divisions and serve as an example of structural violence perpetrated by U.S. authorities (Allawi, 2007: 150-152; Galtung, 1969: 4-8; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 207). Concerning the latter, the disproportional punishment and marginalization of the Sunni through vetting, inevitably led the Sunni to conclude that the U.S. favored one group over another (Ucko, 2008: 350-351). Assured that favoritism was driving U.S. policy and exacerbated by the unpopular changes being institutionalized, violent popular backlash manifested in the form of an insurgency (Allawi, 2007: 150-152; Terrill, 2003: 13). At the same time, U.S. inability to provide post-war security inevitably allowed individuals and collectives to engage in retributive and sectarian targeting (Allawi, 2007: 94-95, 170, 276). These conditions equally increased civil distrust, aggravated tensions and produced violence.

By way of conclusion, the United State socially and politically destabilized Iraq. Many scholars emphasize that Iraqis do not feel that the GOI operates according to collective interest, but rather for self-interest (corrupt) (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 33, 65), and the interest of their sectarian-based constituents, as identity became politicized early in the occupation and persists at the time of writing (Allawi, 2007: 53, 127, 228; Möckli, 2012: 3-4; Serwer and Parker, 2008: 4; Ucko, 2008: 363; Visser, 2007: 809). Reflecting on the GOI in

2008, Serwer and Parker (2008: 2) profess that the "political reality in Iraq is a weak and divided central government with limited governing capacity. Mistrust among leaders in Baghdad remains high." Supporting the authors' conclusion, polling in 2010 found a majority of Iraqis (59%) were pessimistic about the trajectory of the country (International Republican Institute, 2010: 12-14). The assessment suggests that the future of Iraq is bleak, unless politicians and civilians can find a way to prioritize collective interests over partisanship and reform the social/political framework established during the occupation. However, these changes do not appear to be on the horizon.

Subsequent to the December 2011 U.S. military withdrawal, sectarian and political turmoil persists (Al-Ansary, 2012; Möckli, 2012: 4). For example, the Kurds continue to assert their right to self-determination, and insist on maintaining or expanding their autonomy (Katzman, 2012: 21; Möckli, 2012: 2-3; Tripp, 2007: 309-311). Autonomy would dissolve Iraq. However, there are sticking points to the dissolution of Iraq, particularly Kurd claim of the oil-rich area of Kirkuk (Terrill, 2003: 26). Resolving outstanding issues will have to be balanced within discussions of increased autonomy or possible independence (Terrill, 2003: 26-27). Caution will have to be applied as the combination of issues have a high probability of producing a hostile response from Iraq's Sunni and Shi'a population, many of whom do not wish to compromise the territorial integrity of the country (Terrill, 2003: 26-27). Although the GOI agreed to schedule a census and conduct a referendum on the status of Kirkuk in late 2007, the referendum has been postponed repeatedly due to internal divisions and increasing instability caused by sectarian divisions and IS operations since the U.S. withdrawal (Katzman, 2014: 13).

In short, the long-term stability of Iraq is indeterminable (Möckli, 2012: 1; Roy, 2007: 119-120). Anthony Cordesman (2010: 6) optimistically predicts it will take five to ten years for Iraq to make the necessary social and political transformation to reduce sectarian tensions. However, this assessment was made prior to the advances made by IS in Iraq and the increase in sectarian tensions and violence subsequent to the U.S. withdrawal. Other analysts pessimistically suggest a longer period is necessary to stabilize Iraq since stability is predicated on internal and external regional factors (Möckli, 2012: 3-4; Timberg, 2011). The immediate threat of IS, the associated turmoil in Syria, and Iran's operations in Iraq, all have a systemic effect on the stability and integrity of Iraq. The resources devoted to combating IS prolongs the incubation period scholars suggest is necessary to root and stabilize Iraq socially and politically. Moreover, due to the gravity of the persistent sectarian divisions in the political and social spheres, reconciling internal divisions and increasing popular trust in

government and its institutions equally require a significant amount of time and effort to alter (Al-Ansary, 2012; Möckli, 2012: 4). While these internal and external events unfold, it is difficult to predict what further social and political challenges will manifest.

1.6 Conclusion

The primary objective of the present chapter was to reconstruct the contemporary role of the United States in the evolution of the state of Iraq between 2002 and 2011. Its contents, therefore, mapped the conflict between the U.S. and Iraq as violence escalated between the two countries following the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. In addition to highlighting U.S. activity during this period, contents detail some of the political and social consequences of the U.S. intervention. A more in-depth analysis of the social impact of the war and occupation is conducted in the next chapter.

Chapter 1 demonstrates an escalation in the conflictual relationship between the United States and Iraq following the 1991 Persian Gulf War and sanctioning, and simultaneously provides insight into the typology and degree of violence perpetrated. On the one hand, between 2003 and 2011, the U.S. perpetrated direct physical violence in its overthrow of Iraq's government. Direct physical violence continued as the U.S. implemented its counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations throughout the duration of the occupation. Military force was frequently disproportional, as detailed later, and produced significant casualties that compromised Iraqi opinion. On the other hand, the United States perpetrated structural violence through its imposition of benchmarks and policies, for instance de-Ba'athification and the dissolution of Iraq's security forces. Other examples of structural violence include the U.S. failure to provide security, the poorly planned and implemented reconstruction program, failure to provide basic services, and U.S.-imposed decisions of post-war governing frameworks, to name a few. These activities impacted on internal dynamics and general public opinion. While not exhaustive, decisions and events analyzed herein confirm Hypothesis 1—that there is a long-standing conflict relationship between the United States and Iraq that has produced bilateral animosity between the respective societies. The degree of social animosity is further qualified in the next chapter.

Similarly, the present chapter likewise denotes how identity continued to impact political-social developments in Iraq in two ways. Firstly, it was demonstrated how the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein violently fractured Iraq's society, exacerbating historical and preexisting identity-based tensions. Fracturing produced unprecedented ethnic, sectarian, and tribal turbulence as actors engaged in retributive justice and competed for scarce resources in the

vacuum created by the invasion and occupation. These tensions transformed into full-scale social-political competition and civil war among the three primary groupings: Kurd, Sunni and Shi‘a. Its manifestation undermined political and social stability throughout the occupation and persists in contemporary Iraq.

Secondly, there was a general repugnance towards external (U.S.) intervention. In the context of historical analysis excluded from this thesis, U.S. intervention exacerbated preexisting anti-Western and anti-U.S. sentiment rooted in historical experiences (such as Britain’s mandate). Indigenous response to the occupation was initiated by protests and later a violent insurgency designed to hasten the end of the occupation. It was, nonetheless, explained that the insurgency was limited predominantly to the Sunni and Shi‘a. Combined with the challenges of rebuilding Iraq’s political and social structures, the U.S.-led coalition had to deal with an insurgency and a civil war which was produced in the wake of the security vacuum the invasion created. Both forms of internal violence compounded the challenges faced by coalition forces as they simultaneously embarked on peacebuilding and nation building campaigns. The systemic nature of peacebuilding, nation building and security provision was demonstrated since failures on one front undermined advances in another. Further complicating peacebuilding and nation building, the poor performance and decisions imposed by the U.S. had a clear impact on the welfare of Iraqis and their perceptions, through the perpetration of structural violence.

Chapter one began by sketching the prelude to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. It highlighted preexisting frustration with the containment of Iraq among some U.S. politicians and their avocation for regime change. The events of 9/11 provided momentum to calls for policy change in the form of military intervention. Once the George W. Bush administration had decided to intervene, it emphasized that Saddam Hussein was an existential threat to the United States and its interests, in addition to a destabilizing force to regional and international peace. While the administration’s justifications for intervention, including links to terrorism and possession of WMD, were partly accepted by U.S. citizens, the international community and many foreign leaders rejected the idea and protested against an invasion. Absent broad international support, and the United Nations’ failure to endorse intervention, the U.S. assembled an *ad hoc* coalition and conducted a preventive invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003.

After highlighting the invasion, the chapter delineated how the U.S.-led coalition arrogated control as the occupying power and slowly transitioned authority back to an elected government of Iraq. The account began with the creation of a temporary governing body, the

ORHA. While Garner, as head of the ORHA, had determined to rapidly transition sovereignty and to involve indigenous input and assistance, his tenure was prematurely terminated because of the proliferation of civil unrest. Substituting the ORHA, the CPA was dispatched to rule Iraq until stability was established and an indigenous government could be elected. Introduction of the CPA thereby prolonged the occupation for an undetermined period of time.

The U.S. decision to install the CPA was not well accepted by the local population or the international community, and criticism of the prolongation of the occupation was rampant. In sectarian terms, the arrival of the CPA produced serious concern among the Sunni, whom came to realize the gravity of changes the United States was about to implement. This realization precipitated a violent reflexive response, instigating an insurgency and compounding mounting sectarian violence as retributive acts and competition arose in the security vacuum. Persistent U.S. failures to curb initial lawlessness allowed insurgent and sectarian conflict dynamics to mature, producing a full-scale insurgency in conjunction with civil war.

Overall, scholars and analysts criticize the U.S. occupations for multiple reasons, including its failure to (contingency) plan, lack of coordination among institutions involved, and the small number of troops committed to Iraq. Concerning the latter, several institutions had recommended a larger number of troops be deployed to provide policing during the occupation, but the Department of Defense rejected these suggestions. The security vacuum meant that looting, lawlessness, and sectarian targeted killings were left unattended. It was not until 2006 that an increase in the number of troops was implemented. Associated U.S. failures meant that responses to rapidly transforming conditions on the ground were *ad hoc* and poorly coordinated. Other critics argue that indigenous actors should have been engaged in the reconstitution of Iraq's political and social framework, but those suggestions were generally dismissed or rejected by the Department of Defense.

In conjunction, the CPA made two profound decisions that impacted on Iraq's political and social trajectory. First, de-Ba'athification, or vetting, was a form of structural violence perpetrated by the CPA that intentionally marginalized and punished high-ranking Sunni members of the Ba'ath Party, even if they had not been found guilty of wrongdoing. While vetting was necessary, the depth and breadth of its implementation had numerous social effects, including forced unemployment, the marginalization of the Sunni, and the marginalization of potential government and civil service employees. Due to the breadth of its implementation, vetting was no longer viewed as a tool for advancing transitional justice but

rather punishment of the Sunni. Second, the dissolution of Iraq's security forces enraged soldiers because they were forcefully unemployed and not provided compensation.

Prior to their implementation, analysts had discouraged both decisions because of the social-political implications they were projected to generate. Nonetheless, decision-makers overlooked their warnings and implemented the orders. By way of summary, the dissolution of security services and de-Ba'athification measures are examples of structural violence. Simultaneously, the measures were counterproductive to social unification, peacebuilding and nation building in occupied Iraq. Both decisions humiliated and enraged party members and soldiers respectively, who protested nonviolently and violently against the occupation, further destabilizing the country. Indicating its salience, the issue of de-Ba'athification continues to be a sticking point in contemporary Iraq, and has been frequently utilized throughout the occupation, and by politicians who seek to advance individual political interests through the marginalization of the Sunni. Finally, de-Ba'athification and the dissolution of security forces are suggested to have attributed to the decline in security and the proliferation of sectarian tensions inside Iraq.

Afterward, the deteriorating security situation in Iraq was qualified. Due to the combination of failures and decisions outlined, the United States military was slow to counter the social disorder that manifested early in the occupation. Failure to provide initial security and quell lawlessness allowed retributive killings, looting and crime to flourish in occupied Iraq. Over time, a complex conflict emerged which included insurgent, ethnic-sectarian fighters, foreign infiltrators and criminal elements. The combination of these forces wreaked havoc at the societal and political levels. As security continued to decrease and the occupation endured, local animosity and grievances toward sectarian rivals and the United States-led coalition amplified violence throughout the country.

As part of its peacekeeping, nation building and state building campaigns, the United States utilized four broad strategies to stabilize Iraq. The strategy involved kinetic military operations targeting insurgents and the training of a reconstituted Iraq military; advancing regional cooperation; reconstruction; and a national reconciliation program. Many of these programs were improperly planned, subject to setbacks, and frequently imposed. Due to their failures, ethnic-sectarian social-political tensions and violence, and poor living conditions persisted throughout the eight-year occupation as governance and security responsibility was gradually transferred from the United States to an elected GOI. Prevailing conditions undermined popular perceptions of the United States and Iraq's governing bodies.

Meanwhile, as political institutions at the local and national level were revived and staffed, often according to coalition pronouncement, ethnic-sectarian strife became institutionalized and politicized. Political and social strife played out in government and on the streets making social and political compromise difficult, since groups coalesced around identity and community interests. As Iraq's leaders assumed increased responsibility for governance, sectarian identity and division became institutionalized. Sectarianism became institutionalized as politicians filled ministry posts with sectarian affiliates, and then used those ministries to act in accordance with partisan interests. As events continued to evolve, identity-based mistrust expanded, ultimately undermining the legitimacy of Iraq's emerging governing framework and representatives, many of whom seemed more interested in advancing sectarian interests than creating mutually acceptable compromises and improvements that promoted collective, national interests.

In total, the transition of Iraq's governing bodies from the CPA and IGC to the IIG, TNA and the GOI required three years. The process involved two different sets of national elections and the writing of a constitution. These transitional benchmarks were established in the TAL, and have been criticized for numerous reasons. Among the criticisms analyzed, it was highlighted that the framework was heavily influenced by U.S. ideals and interests, and was subject to strict time restraints and marred by sectarian divisions. Partisanship, corruption, weakness, and repeat U.S. interference led the population to perceive Iraq's evolving governing bodies as illegitimate.

Meanwhile, civil violence and the insurgency persistently challenged each governing body. The combined violence not only impacted the evolution of politics, but it wrought humanitarian calamity from the human toll (death and displacement). Violence further undermined the haphazard efforts made by the coalition to reconstruct Iraq's infrastructure. It was not until late 2007 that a downward trend in violence was qualified. Around the time of the 2011 U.S. withdrawal, violence had been markedly reduced but sectarian tensions were simmering. At the same time, the reconstruction effort had made only marginal improvements, with some Iraqis complaining that they lacked basic services and the means to provide for their families. Since the 2011 coalition withdrawal, security has again deteriorated as a result of IS forces and sectarian disgruntlement, which frequently manifests in violence.

Although we limit our evaluation to the end of the occupation in December 2011, we noted that political and social tensions have again increased to the point of steady violence since 2012. Sectarian groups have once again mobilized their militias to provide security and engage their rivals. Contemporary events are partly a result of the high degree of Sunni

popular frustration at government activities, including the use of the Shi‘a-led ISF against protesters, and the feeling that governing and security institutions do not act in the interest of all Iraqis. Political corruption and power consolidation have likewise undermined popular trust in the GOI. Nuri al-Maliki has been one contributor to internal turmoil, using his authority to weaken the political opposition through arrests and his manipulation of de-Ba‘athification to purge candidates from competing against him. His actions have ensured politics and society remain fractured and Iraqis frustrated at government. Al-Maliki's activities have equally prompted repeat U.S. demands for compromise. Some compromises have been made, such as increased provincial authority and a review of de-Ba‘athification, but those actions appear to be temporary and insufficient as dissension persists.

In short, political and social divisions that manifested during the occupation and subsided prior to the U.S. withdrawal have once again become overt. Popular disgruntlement frequently turns violent, and the numbers of issues that must be resolved to stabilize Iraq politically and socially are multiplying. For example, while the ISF and Kurds are united against IS, political chasms have emerged between the GOI and Iraq-Kurdistan's government. In addition to calls for independence, Kurdistan has been selling oil directly to Turkey, and it acquired Kirkuk following ISF retreat against IS advances. Such disputes compound preexisting political and social problems facing Iraq should IS be expelled. Resolution of these issues in the future will require additional compromises be made among a government that has demonstrated great difficulty with brokering mutually satisfactory settlements. The United States has responded to the sectarian divisions and the gains by IS by repeatedly recommending compromises be made and by dispatching air support, weapons, trainers and troops to aid Iraq. Similarly, Germany, the United Kingdom and other governments have equally become involved in the fight against IS.

The chapter concluded with a condensed review and critique of the invasion and occupation to underscore the overall significance of events. Combined, mapping of the occupation demonstrates four salient points. First, it demonstrates a continuation of the violent relations from 1991 to 2011, thereby supporting Hypothesis 1, that there is a long-standing conflict relationship between the U.S. and Iraq. Second, it denotes the adverse political and societal effects the occupation had on Iraq's political and social framework. Third, and a component of the second, it qualifies the degree of ethnic-sectarian rupture in Iraq's previously strained relations. Lastly, it provides insight into the quality and roots of deep anti-American sentiment, as the United States is held responsible for political and social outcome that has manifested.

The next chapter continues our qualification of U.S.-Iraq conflict relations by quantifying popular opinion of Iraq and U.S. citizens in particular, and Arab/Muslim opinion throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in general. This information will demonstrate that the decades-long conflict between the United States and Iraq has had an impact on societal perceptions at the micro and macro levels, allowing us to complete our testing of Hypothesis 1. Analysis provided in the next chapter proves the existence of bilateral grievances and animosity, which is rooted in society, and is a result of the protracted conflictual relationship between the U.S. and Iraq. Their existence suggests that conflict between these two entities is likely to continue. The likelihood of conflict continuation suggests the U.S. and Iraq should pursue a process of conflict resolution at the societal level.

Chapter 2 Qualifying the Bilateral Impact of U.S.-Iraq Conflict Relations

The previous chapter mapped U.S.-Iraq conflict relations during the 2003 war that had been preceded by a 1991 war and twelve years of economic sanctioning and containment. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was then followed by eight years of U.S. military occupation. Our objective in the present chapter is to further test Hypothesis 1, and to prove that the long-standing conflict relationship between the United States and Iraq has produced bilateral animosity between these respective societies. Using open-source data and scholarly literature in the English language from a variety of sources, popular sentiment is qualified at the micro and macro levels. Our literature review confirms that historical experience outlined negatively influences bilateral perceptions of the “other.”

Chapter 2 contains three sections. The first provides a general qualification of the impact of the U.S. invasion on Iraqis. It initially qualifies public opinion of the 2003 invasion and trends deepening animosity as the occupation persisted. Next, the human and social impact of the war and occupation, including estimates regarding death and displacement associated with the war and occupation, are analyzed to emphasize the human toll. Attention thereafter turns to qualifying Iraqi perceptions of U.S. military conduct and the security situation during the occupation. Incorporation of the issues listed provides insight into how Iraqis rate U.S. military performance, and underscores which concerns they prioritized during the occupation. Next, opinion of sectarian violence is examined. Iraqis’ opinion concerning violence is included because responsibility for shattering internal relations inside Iraq is attributed to the United States, as denoted in the previous chapter. Finally, section one closes with a brief examination of general suspicions of the U.S.-led invasion and occupation. At this point, we mention some of the objectives Iraqis felt were driving U.S. policy in Iraq. Combined, it is demonstrated that Iraqis widely hold negative opinions of the United States and its occupation.

The second section analyzes U.S.-Iraq relations through the lens of U.S. citizens. Since the invasion and occupation was asymmetrical in terms of military capability, venue, and effect, our assessment reflects this reality. Mirroring our analysis of Iraq, the second section examines public opinion about the war and the human cost on the United States. It is determined that most U.S. citizens felt that the war was counterproductive and ineffective. Analysis then dovetails into qualifying aspects different from those experienced in Iraq.

Among the latter aspects, the price of the war in terms of the quality and integrity of the armed forces is explored, opinions which reflect the structural problems produced by the invasion. Next, we include the ballooning of the federal deficit. Due to intentional U.S. policy, the fiscal burden of the war was postponed to counteract potential popular frustration. In addition, citizens were exposed to increased media censorship that was either imposed at the federal level or self-imposed by the media outlets. As a result, the mainstream U.S. media failed to critically analyze events, sometimes providing biased reports or misinformation. Lastly, we explore the negative sentiment held by U.S. citizens and soldiers. Here we demonstrate that negative sentiment towards Iraq has been long-standing.

The final section included in the present chapter analyzes macro level perceptions through the lens of inhabitants from the Middle East and Western countries. This analysis is incorporated to demonstrate parallels with micro level opinion (conducted in the previous two sections). The first two subsections explore Arab/Muslim opinion of the United States and the West respectively to reiterate the existence of a conflictual relationship at the macro level and to qualify points of inter-cultural dissension. Reversely, the last subsection comparatively analyzes U.S. opinion of Arab/Muslims, further underscoring that a majority of U.S. citizens perceive there is an antagonistic relationship between Iraq and the United States.

The inclusion of macro level opinion is theoretically advantageous for two fundamental reasons. Foremost, some scholars call for conflict resolution to be pursued between the West and the Middle East. While the petition is warranted, I perceive the approach is too broad, and I have selected to narrow my focus to analyzing conflict resolution between the U.S. and Iraq. Nevertheless, since conflict and conflict resolution literature is compared across cultures in the second part of this research, and its theories are predicated on macro level relations (generalized) as opposed to micro level (relations between specific countries), the second value of this section is to demonstrate the parallels between micro and macro sentiment, and hence confirm conflict resolution as advocated by scholars at the macro level is equally relevant and necessary at the micro level.

Amalgamated, the chapter qualifies and quantifies the existence of cross-cultural animosity and distrust at two levels. Foremost, it demonstrates a deconstructive conflict relationship and the associated negative perceptions between the United States and Iraq. The typology of sentiment qualified proves that decades of violent interaction between the United States and Iraq, especially the 2003 occupation, has produced animosity and distrust, confirming Hypothesis one. Secondly, contents herein prove the existence of a conflict relationship between Arab/Muslims and the West in general, and between Arab/Muslims and

the United States in particular. The existence of the latter deconstructive relationship is well documented in the literature, and scholars go on to advocate conflict resolution be pursued at the macro level. Once I have proven the existence of a deconstructive conflictual relationship between the United States and Iraq, the research enters into its second part, where Western and Arab/Muslim theory and practices of conflict resolution can be introduced and comparatively analyzed as part of my call for conflict resolution to be pursued between the United States and Iraq.

2.1 Effects of the 2003 war on Iraqis

Violent conflict produces negative consequences including death, injury, physical and psychological suffering, in addition to associated grievances resulting from these experiences (Galtung, 1969: 169-174; Parent, 2012: 26-30; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 32; Shriver, 1995: 125-130). Forgoing a discussion on specific traumas, Donald Shriver (1995: 127) emphasizes the psychological element of war when he writes: “War wounds every side’s capacity for empathy.” With Shriver’s insight in mind, our interest centers on qualifying some psychological consequences of the historical relationship between the U.S. and Iraq, notably those associated with the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War and occupation. Nonetheless, some of the physical manifestations of the occupation will likewise be denoted in our treatment below.

The following subsections briefly outline distinct social-psychological implications of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War on citizens of Iraq by qualifying effects and quantifying their impact on public opinion when possible. For the sake of space, we have selected a few of the most recognizable exemplars so the reader can observe how the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq has had a direct social-psychological impact on Iraqis. Our qualification of perceptions is designed to test the hypothesis that the U.S.-Iraq conflictual relationship has had a social impact, and, consequently, has produced grievances and negative sentiment toward the United States. The existence of said sentiment confirms the conflict relationship is rooted at the societal level and needs to be resolved or transformed.

2.1.1 Public opinion of the war and occupation

Some Iraqis initially supported the military overthrow of Saddam Hussein (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 246). Support was most prominent among the Shi‘a and Kurd populations, as well as among exiled Iraqis (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 246). Concerning the latter, exiles participated in pre- and post-war U.S. planning, and even publicly endorsed the invasion prior to its implementation, arguing that the operation would be beneficial to Iraq (Fattah and Caso,

2009: 246; Rathmell, 2005: 1021). Following the invasion, Iraq's society became increasingly apprehensive of the potential political and social effects the invasion was having on politics and society (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 246). As the occupation endured, and internal political and social stability deteriorated, negative opinions across society proliferated (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 247).

Independent researchers began trending public opinion subsequent to the invasion. The data they acquired allows us to trend perceptions throughout the occupation. In February 2004, Oxford Research International (2004: 4) found that only 41.8% of Iraqis felt that the invasion "liberated Iraq," while 41.2% believed it "humiliated Iraq." Their finding suggests a near polarization in terms of perceptions toward the invasion. Similarly when the invasion was viewed from a moral perspective, Iraqis were likewise torn on its value. More specifically, 19.6% of Iraqis viewed the U.S.-led invasion as "absolutely right" and 28.6% perceived it as "somewhat right" (Oxford Research International, 2004: 3). Comparatively, 39.1% thought the invasion was "wrong" or "absolutely wrong," while 12.7% suggested it was "difficult to say" (Oxford Research International, 2004: 3). Opinion, nevertheless, fluctuated from month to month as conditions deteriorated and the occupation endured.

In late April 2004, a Gallup poll found that most Iraqis felt that the U.S. invasion to remove Hussein had been worth the effort (Burkholder, 2004e). It should, however, be emphasized that sectarian and insurgent violence was just beginning to escalate. It should equally be highlighted that ethnic-sectarian identity influenced responses. In particular, the Shi'a and Kurd populations predominantly viewed the overthrow of Hussein more positively compared to Sunni respondents (Burkholder, 2004e). Divergences across ethnicity and sectarian identity would be expected since the Sunni generally rejected U.S. intervention and the changes the event wrought.

Despite the generally positive attitude expressed to Gallup in April 2004 concerning the overthrow, respondents were extremely pessimistic when considering the intervening military forces. In fact, seventy-one percent of respondents viewed coalition forces as occupiers rather than liberators (Burkholder, 2004e). Occupation carries with it negative connotations, especially considering regional historical experience under colonial powers such as Britain. Reinforcing perceptions of disdain, twenty-nine percent of Iraqis at that time believed that attacks on coalition forces were morally justified (Burkholder, 2004e). Gallup polling thus demonstrated that while some Iraqis may have thought the removal of Saddam Hussein was positive, many respondents did not embrace the occupation, and a minority believed violence was justified to hasten its termination.

By May 2004, a poll found that 92% of Iraqis perceived the coalition as “occupiers” (Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 35). The data demonstrates there was a sizable increase from the Gallup findings one month previous. Simultaneously, rejection of the occupation was obvious, with 41% of respondents expressing a desire for the coalition to leave Iraq immediately (Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 36). Escalation in sectarian and insurgent violence around this period is thought to have attributed to the rapid decline in public sentiment toward the occupation (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 259). The establishment of the CPA that same month would have equally influence public sentiment.

In November 2005, Oxford Research International (2005: 21) qualifies a further increase in opposition to U.S. presence. Likewise, there was a change in sentiment toward the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. At this point, half of respondents (50.1%) expressed that it was wrong for the U.S. to invade the country (Oxford Research International, 2005: 3). As the security situation continued to deteriorate, and the occupation persisted, it clearly influenced popular perceptions.

That Iraqis held the U.S. responsible for the violence that proliferated during the occupation is evident in polling conducted in late 2006 and early 2007. In September 2006, a slight majority (61%) of Iraqis believed that the withdrawal of U.S. forces would reduce violence (Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2006: 9). Disapproval of the occupation likewise remained high and violence against the coalition became more acceptable. For instance, a March 2007 survey found that 78% of Iraqis opposed U.S. presence and 51% believed that it was acceptable to attack coalition forces to hasten their withdrawal (ABC News and others, 2007: 2). Hence, a clear majority perceived the presence of coalition forces was counterproductive, and toleration of violence against the coalition had markedly increased.

In mid-March 2009, at a time when security was improving, fifty-six percent of Iraqis continued to perceive that it was wrong for the United States to invade their country (ABC News and others, 2009: 3-4). In fact, only 18% of respondents expressed a positive view of the United States (ABC News and others, 2009: 3-4). Perceptions in these instances were influenced by sectarian identity (ABC News and others, 2009: 8-9). For instance, Sunni were more likely to view the invasion in negative terms (89%), while the Shi‘a were polarized (49%) and Kurd populations were positive in their assessments (with only 19% critical) (ABC News and others, 2009: 20). By comparison to earlier assessments, the U.S. had lost some Shi‘a and Kurd support due to the experiences endured under occupation.

Even as the U.S. withdrawal neared and security continued to improve, Iraqi sentiment remained negative. Around mid-2010, forty-four percent of respondents perceived the U.S. invasion was harmful to Iraq (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 13). However, the Shi'a did not share the perception of the invasion as harmful, and contrariwise expressed the invasion had been worth the cost (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 13, 61-62). The latter perception was undoubtedly influenced by social-political changes engendered, as the Shi'a had managed to consolidate their hold over Iraq's governing framework, and, therefore, perceived the invasion beneficial. The data thereby provides some insight into how Iraq's diverse groupings held conflicting views of the invasion, the U.S., and the changes the overthrow institutionalized.

Overall, Iraqis remained divided on the perceived benefits and necessity of the invasion during the early months of the occupation (ABC News and others, 2009: 3-4). As the occupation endured, clear majorities repeatedly expressed their desire for an immediate U.S. withdrawal, regardless of whether they felt the invasion had been positive or negative (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 13, 63; Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 36). Desire for the occupation to end spanned ethnic and sectarian divisions. The anti-occupation sentiment was dangerous because high percentages of Iraqis condoned the use of violence against occupying troops to hasten their withdrawal (ABC News and others, 2007: 2). As qualified in the following subsections, animosity toward the occupation and the United States was complex and intertwined with popular sentiment on other issues, including the human toll experienced as a result of the invasion and occupation.

2.1.2 The human cost

The 2003 U.S.-Iraq War and occupation resulted in the death and injury of a large portion of Iraq's society (Commonwealth Institute, 2008: 8). At the time of the invasion, the United Nations Population Division estimated that 26 million people lived in Iraq (United Nations, 2003). Although no official records were maintained, various independent organizations published assessments of the human cost throughout the occupation. One of the first estimates to emerge was conducted by Defense Alternatives Research, which released its findings in October 2003 (Conetta, 2003: 2-3). It calculates that between 11,000 and 15,000 Iraqis were killed between April and October 2003. Among those fatalities, it projects that 30% of these deaths were civilians (Conetta, 2003: 2-3).

Approximately one year later, the British Medical Journal, *The Lancet*, published a report estimating 100,000 Iraqis had died between 2003 and 2004 as a result of the war, insurgency, militia and/or criminal violence (Exoo, 2010: 137; Roberts and others, 2004: 1; Tripp, 2007:

295). *The Lancet*'s estimate received stark criticism for its extraordinary figures (Exoo, 2010: 138). Subsequently, it produced a 2006 (re-) calculation that estimated 650,000 Iraqis had died between 2003 and 2006 (Exoo, 2010: 138). Meanwhile, in 2005, independent research group Opinion Research Business estimated the Iraqi death toll at 1.2 million (Exoo, 2010: 138). The extraordinarily high figures referenced are concerning as they only calculate deaths for about half of the duration of the occupation, and violence in Iraq actually peaked between 2006 and 2007, prior to or when these figures were published. Variations across estimates equally highlight the challenges of estimating the death toll when no accurate records were being kept.

Another estimate released in 2008 by Commonwealth Institute (2008: 8) suggested that "at least 83,000 Iraqi non-combatants have died in the continuing conflict since the U.S. invasion, [although] the actual number is probably in the hundreds of thousands." Although Commonwealth Institutes estimate followed the peak in violence between 2006 and 2007, and is centered on civilian deaths, it acknowledged the difficulty of calculating the human toll. By comparison to previous estimates, this figure seems modest, especially concerning that approximately one hundred Iraqi civilians were being killed each day during the peak of violence (Tripp, 2007: 308).

Finally, Hagopian and others (2013: 9-10) published the most recent approximation of the human cost. Their assessment projects almost half a million people died during the war and occupation. With these diverging figures in mind, scholars acknowledge that it is impossible to precisely determine the human cost of the Iraq War and occupation (Exoo, 2010: 138; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 267). Competing figures are a result of diverging research methodology and the lack of accurate documentation (Exoo, 2010: 138). However, when considering even the most conservative assessments, most agree that hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were killed or injured between 2003 and 2008 (Exoo, 2010: 138; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 267). Converting the examined data to a percentage, Commonwealth Institute (2008: 8) conservatively estimates that approximately one-fifth of Iraq's total population were killed. The figures provided are extraordinary and have far-reaching social implications.

For instance, it was projected in December 2007 "that as many as 5 million Iraqi children had been orphaned, accounting for nearly 35 percent of the child-age population," as a result of the war and occupation (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 267). The social implications of the cost of the war as underscored in the quote are staggering and long-term. Equally demonstrating the breadth of the social impact, an ABC News and others (2009: 4) poll found that "one in six Iraqis said someone in their own household had been hurt or killed; more than half reported an

immediate relative or close friend harmed" by violence during the occupation. The gravity of these losses qualified by ABC News and others' polling illustrates the degree to which violence affected society, an outcome that is expected to endure for generations.

While this section is restricted to presenting unverifiable estimates of the death toll, culpability for civilian deaths is explored below to demonstrate that many Iraqis hold the U.S. responsible. This conviction is partially based on the disproportional violence coalition troops deployed during the occupation (section 2.1.4) and the unwillingness or inability of coalition forces to contain and reduce violence through the provision of security (section 2.1.5).

2.1.3 Internal and external displacement

In addition to the death toll, the invasion and occupation of Iraq displaced citizens on a magnificent scale. An independent U.S. task force to Congress introduced its 2008 recommendations for U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq by emphasizing the quantity of death and displacement caused by invasion and occupation (Commonwealth Institute, 2008: 8). Concerning displacement, the task force's report states: "The UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that perhaps two million Iraqis have fled their country and that a further 2.7 million have left their homes for safer locales within Iraq" (Commonwealth Institute, 2008: 8). The quote indicates that nearly five million Iraqis were internally or externally displaced because of the invasion and occupation. By comparison, Fattah and Caso (2009: 267) approximate that "4 million, or 16 percent of the total population," were displaced. These statistics are concerning when combined with the estimated death toll outlined earlier.

As denoted, approximately half of the number of Iraqis displaced (about 2 million) fled Iraq finding refuge in other countries (Amnesty International, 2010: 23; Fattah and Caso, 2009: 267). Some relocated to neighboring countries, including Syria or Turkey (International Rescue Committee, 2011; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2010), while others moved to Europe and elsewhere. The remaining 2.7 million largely relocated inside Iraq, becoming internally displaced, to avoid battles between coalition forces and insurgents, or they were subject to ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods through the (threatened) use of force. In the latter case, sectarian violence created buffers according to identity.

In terms of social buffering, defined here as a process where groups are isolated from one another, it increasingly occurred as sectarian violence, or the threat of violence, intensified (Ryan, 2010: 68). For instance, the Mahdi Army has been accused of ethnic cleansing in areas under its control during peak of the civil war in occupied Iraq (Ali, 2014: 28). As a result of real or threatened violence, social enclaves were created, redistributing Iraq's population

according to ethnicity or religion affiliation (Ryan, 2010: 68). Researchers have qualified the demographic repercussions of the buffering phenomenon.

For instance, in February 2008, ABC News and others (2008: 3) found that 6 in 10 Iraqi respondents proclaimed that they could not live where they wanted without facing persecution, especially in the areas of Baghdad and Basra. Follow-up research released in March 2009 found that the number of Sunnis and Shi'a who claimed to live in neighborhoods completely inhabited by their sectarian counterparts increased from 27 to 36 percent (ABC News and others, 2009: 5). The study also found that "nearly six in 10 Iraqis say they only have friends of the same doctrine as their own" (ABC News and others, 2009: 5). The quote illustrates a marked degree of political and social gravitation toward the "in-group," which is likewise denoted by military analysts (Kilcullen, 2009: 125). Combined, the statistics provide a snapshot into the degree to which ethnic cleansing and (forced) internal displacement altered Iraq's demographic distribution.

Buffering, nonetheless, was not only precipitated by threats and violence between sectarian groups; it was equally facilitated by the coalition military response to the volume of sectarian violence (Kilcullen, 2009: 142-143). For example, the U.S. military facilitated demographic separation in residential quarters of Baghdad by erecting concrete barriers to provide neighborhood security to isolate communities from one another (Kilcullen, 2009: 142-143; MacAskill, 2007). While military strategists argue such measures were efficacious and necessary to increase security by decreasing cross-sectarian infiltration into predominantly Shi'a or Sunni neighborhoods (Kilcullen, 2009: 142-143), they equally attracted international criticism because they isolated communities and were disruptive to everyday life (Kilcullen, 2009: 142-143; MacAskill, 2007). In this frame, the U.S. was guilty of physically creating buffered communities, as was sectarian violence.

Once displacement occurred, neither the United States government nor the GOI made significant efforts to provide aid to, or support the return of, those internally or externally displaced (Cordesman, 2010: 59-60; International Rescue Committee, 2011). Many of those displaced from the war and occupation continue to remain in the locales where they sought refuge. Persistent instability, in addition to limited opportunities in terms of housing and employment, among other issues, has undermined repatriation subsequent to the U.S. withdrawal (International Rescue Committee, 2011; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2010). Due to the lack of employment and living arrangements, the literature suggests that the displaced are hesitant to return (International Rescue Committee, 2011;

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2010). At the time of writing, IS activity in Iraq and Syria are further displacing citizens from both countries, exacerbating the situation.

Displacement of this magnitude is certain to have profound long-term social and political implications. Its impact is obvious when one observes the demographic nature of those who relocated prior to and during the occupation. In terms of human capital, for instance, those displaced "include large percentages of Iraq's former political elite, professionals, doctors, lawyers, engineers, and technocrats" (Cordesman, 2010: 33). Fattah and Caso (2009: 267) project approximately "40 percent of Iraq's middle class had fled." A closer examination of just one of those fields of expertise, the medical profession, suggests a significant strain on Iraq's infrastructural capacity. More specifically, Fattah and Caso (2009: 266) estimate that 25% of Iraq's medical staff fled Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion. The displacement of these individuals no doubt complicated the reconstruction of Iraq (Cordesman, 2010: 33) and is expected to have long-term effects.

2.1.4 Disproportionate use of force

Criticism of U.S. military conduct during the war and occupation of Iraq is common in the literature. Paul Kennedy (2004), for instance, argues that the Iraq War is an example of the degeneration of war[41]. Similarly, Kilcullen (2009: 124), a military analyst, condemns United States brutality which he suggests could have been minimized if the U.S. had adapted military tactics in a manner congenial to counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy and urban warfare. Overall, it is generally conceded that U.S. military forces deployed indiscriminate and a disproportionate quantity of violence in urban areas, resulting in preventable civilian casualties during major combat operations and the occupation (Alvord and others, 2003; Amnesty International, 2003: 5; Hicks and others, 2011: 12; Human Rights Watch, 2003: 5; Roth, 2005: 10). While condemnation is common across fields of study, some military analysts believe that civilian casualties are inevitable in combat (Flavin, 2013: 175-176), and attempt to minimize the gravity of civilian deaths through its use of substitute terminology.

In particular, some pundits and military officials apply the sterile idiom "collateral damage" to identify civilian casualties (Calhoun, 2005: 89; Kiernan, 2003: 847). Collateral

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[41] Martin Shaw (2003: 25) defines the "degeneration of war" as trend of increased brutality and expansion of scope. He identifies four components of degeneration which are quoted at length: "(1) the extension of the definition of the enemy to include civilians as well as the military; (2) the deliberate targeting of elements of the civilian population as well as military forces; (3) intensified means of destruction which kill a large number of people more rapidly and efficiently; (4) but also increasingly indiscriminate slaughter which kill people across broader areas with little precision as to their membership of any enemy group" (Shaw, 2003: 25).

damage is broadly defined by the U.S. military as the unintentional injury or death of civilians and/or damage to civilian structures as a result of a military operation (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 18). The application of this terminology eliminates references to the human element. Despite the terminology applied, according to Article 57 of Protocol 1, of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, written in 1977, a military should take precautionary measures to minimize civilian deaths, including the cancellation or postponement of an attack if it is projected to cause “excessive” loss of civilian life or property “in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 18-19; United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1977). This internationally recognized and accepted standard for military conduct during wartime requires a military to accurately assess their targets, and weigh the tactical advantage of a given strike with the projected cost in human life, before force is deployed. Consequently, proportionality is supposed to be balanced with military objectives to ensure civilian casualties are minimized to some degree[42].

While Human Rights Watch (2003) acknowledges that the U.S. military made efforts to reduce civilian casualties while operating in Iraq, they argue that increased precautions were warranted. In some instances, they suggest the tactical advantage of particular targets did not outweigh its human cost (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Hence, it is argued that some targets or operations should have been removed or postponed to protect civilians, or that a proportional degree of military force be deployed. For example, rather than deploying artillery or bombing urban areas, troops should be deployed. These precautionary and proportional measures, however, contradict the propensity of a Western military to minimize the risks to their own soldiers by increasing the quality and quantity of force deployed (Rogers, 2008: 7; Shaw, 2003: 157). In this sense, military and political leaders perceive it more advantageous to deploy a disproportional degree of force, even at the cost of civilians, to minimize the risk to one’s own troops and to ensure the military objective is accomplished.

The military expression for protecting one’s troops is “force protection” (Cambell, 2008: 37-53; Record, 2000: 5). A brief discussion of the doctrine is relevant as it has direct repercussions on civilian welfare in war zones, since risk is inevitably transferred from troops to civilians in an area of operations (AO) when force protection is indiscriminately applied (Cambell, 2008: 37-53; Record, 2000: 5). Contemporary force protection in United States military parlance is commonly known as the “Wineberger-Powell Doctrine” or simple the

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[42] Obviously the protocol is not without its flaws. For example, it fails to provide guidelines for how the calculation should be made, and the given weight of each component. Nonetheless, in spirit, it advocates for militaries to deploy force in a calculated, proportional and responsible manner.

"Powell Doctrine" (Record, 2007: 81)[43]. The doctrine is rooted in U.S. military experience in Vietnam (1959-1975) and the ambition to prevent the U.S. from improperly engaging in warfare which politicians or planners have no political intentions of winning (Record, 2000: 5-6; 2007: 80). The Powell Doctrine emphasizes four standards when military force is deployed, and adherence to its principles was observable in Iraq.

To summarize, the doctrine prescribes that: 1) military force be applied decisively; 2) force be deployed *en mass*; 3) U.S. military casualties be kept to an absolute minimum; and 4) political and military planners must be determined to win the war (Record, 2007: 81-83). When warfare adheres to the given standards, it is thought that the United States government will commit sufficient resources to the campaign and not imprudently sacrifice U.S. (human) resources. Such military strategies are not limited to the United States. Analogous policies are widely practiced by other Western countries, which likewise attempt to reduce their military casualties when deployed in conflict zones (Shaw, 2003: 157).

While the military value of force protection is apparent, there are political dividends—namely that the reduction of troop casualties diminishes the chances of popular support for a given conflict being compromised (Shaw, 2003: 202). The assumption that there is political value in reduced troop casualties is rooted in the theory that the Western public is adverse to troop casualties, which suggests that as the numbers of fatalities increase popular support for the military campaign will decrease (Shaw, 2003: 202). Succinctly, elected Western officials (political) recognize domestic constituents will not tolerate prolonged military engagements resulting in significant and sustained deaths of military personnel (Shaw, 2003: 91). Shaw's hypothesis is, nonetheless, subject to debate since the exact influence of troop casualties on public opinion of a war is uncertain.

Contradicting Shaw, other researchers suggests that populations utilize complex analytic processes when evaluating success during war, including political affiliation, total combat casualties, and a strategic calculation of those casualties *vis-à-vis* the overall stated political objectives of the military campaign (Boettcher and Cobb, 2006: 839, 849; Gelpi, 2010: 93). Under this framework, the volume of combat casualties alone does not significantly increase or decrease popular support for a given war (Boettcher and Cobb, 2006: 839, 849; Gelpi, 2010: 93). Instead, calculations are made according to objectives, advancement toward those objectives and the cost of the war. Hence, while some scholars believe that troop casualties

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[43] The doctrine's namesake derives from its designers, former Secretary of State Casper Wineberger and General Colin Powell (Record, 2007: 79). For additional information on force protection, see Record (2007) and Cambell (2008). For an alternative view of how Colin Powell aided in the demise of his own doctrine in Iraq, see LaFeer (2009). For a critique of the Powell Doctrine and force protection, see Record (2000).

significantly influence popular opinion of a war, others believe that it is one component in a complex calculation and casualties alone have limited impact on domestic popular opinion.

Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to untangle the relative impact of troop casualties on the voting public, or critique the practice of force protection in detail, it is important to contextualize the strategy's affects in Iraq, especially since military strategists (Galula, 2006; Kilcullen, 2009) and the most recent United States Army (2006: Chapter 2.6) *Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24* acknowledge that force protection should be balanced with the proportional deployment of military power during COIN operations. A central reason for minimizing force protection and deploying military power proportionally is to reduce the risk to civilians, whose casualties' forfeit popular support among the occupied population as a result of the military's failure to protect citizens (Galula, 2006: v-vi). Clearly stated, purposeful protection of troops, which is inevitable when adhering to the Powell Doctrine, by default increases the risk of civilian casualties in urban warfare because disproportional force is deployed as a means of self-protection, and troops are subject to refraining from engaging in combat when the risk is high (Gage and others, 2003: 9; Kuehl, 2010: 13). Within the presented paradigm, a paradox is created since both the deployment of disproportional force and inaction for fear of troop casualties undermine trust among the occupied population, thereby engendering anger and producing grievances toward occupying troops that deploy excessive force at the expense of civilians and/or fail to provide security to the occupied population (Gage and others, 2003: 9; Kuehl, 2010: 13). In a nutshell, COIN strategy recommends minimizing risk to civilians under occupation by curbing force protection and deploying a proportional degree of force, whereby the population is protected and popular support is augmented because the inherent risk of the insurgency is absorbed by the military.

This approach is not without criticism, with some analysts questioning the relative utility of a human-centered approach to COIN. Dunlap (2013: 140-143), for example, argues that the counterinsurgents objective should not be to win "hearts and minds," but to ensure the unconditional defeat of the insurgents and population alike. Failure to defeat the military and citizens in Iraq, he argues, was the obvious mistake made by the coalition, which ultimately prevented the unconditional capitulation of insurgents and society (Dunlap, 2013: 140-143). Subsequent to the coalition failure to outright defeat Iraqis, civilian or otherwise, an insurgency and resistance was permitted to foment. By comparison to most civilian-centric COIN literature, Dunlap is extreme in his assertion that capitulation of the insurgents and civilians is necessary to undermine an insurgency.

Adopting a civilian-centered approach, David Kilcullen (2009: 149) maintains that COIN principles were applicable in Iraq, despite the fact that the occupation was not a traditional insurgency but rather a hybrid form of warfare—including insurgency, terrorism, communal conflict, and criminal elements. In this environment, he concludes that the coalition and Iraq's security forces needed to combine military tactics such as counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism, peace enforcement, and traditional policing practices to be effective (Kilcullen, 2009: 146-150; Williams, 2010: 39). Foregoing a discussion on the assortment of tactics mentioned, Kilcullen (2009: 146-150) emphasizes the importance of classical COIN principles in Iraq to promote amiable military-civilian relations through the regular provision of security and the reduction of civilian casualties. To this end, COIN tacticians endorse soldiers living among and continuously interacting with the occupied population to develop and maintain a cooperative relationship and secure environment for civilians (Brennan and others, 2013: 45; Kilcullen, 2009: 124)[44]. The strategic advantage of establishing direct, affable relationships with civilians is that it undermines insurgent-civilian interaction by restricting the insurgents' ability to gain authority or control over civilians and territory, while it creates a direct relationship between the occupier and the occupied (Brennan and others, 2013: 45; Gage and others, 2003: 8-10; Hull, 2009: 6-8). However, a civilian-centered strategy increases risk to troops because they are forced to coexist in a manner that exposes them to threat and requires them to act in a manner that prioritizes the protection of civilians. These practices inevitably distribute risk to the troops and are expected to increase their casualties.

With this in mind, the U.S. occupation of Iraq was challenged at the strategic level by the general remoteness of coalition forces to Iraq's population and its disproportional use of force (Hull, 2009: 6-7). Concerning the former, Hull (2009: 6-7) cautions that COIN operations are challenging in general, but the counterinsurgent is placed at an increased disadvantaged if

[44] COIN literature emphasizes the importance of a counterinsurgent to acquire and maintain (indigenous) public opinion for successful counterinsurgency (Gage and others, 2003: 6-9; Kienscherf, 2011: 520). Public opinion in an insurgency is complex, since all actors involved in the campaign, including the insurgents, the counterinsurgents, the local population (the occupied) and a foreign population where applicable, seek to acquire popular support at multiple levels (Gage and others, 2003: 6-7; Shaw, 2003: 202). In the case of Iraq, the insurgent and counterinsurgent competed for popular opinion on at least two fronts. First, both sides struggled for the popular support (and control) of the occupied population—in this case the citizens of Iraq—with the counterinsurgents and the insurgents demonstrating their strength and resolve to militarily protect and politically control Iraq's citizens (Gage and others, 2003: 4-5). Second, both parties tried to influence U.S. popular opinion (Gage and others, 2003: 4-5). The United States, as the counterinsurgent, sought to demonstrate its probable success in Iraq to obtain/maintain U.S. domestic support for the occupation, while the insurgents attempted to demonstrate the futility of that occupation and thereby undermine U.S. popular support by increasing the costs of occupation (Gage and others, 2003: 6-7; Shaw, 2003: 202). Combined, U.S. military officials, U.S. politicians, and insurgents predicted that U.S. popular opinion would wane in a prolonged campaign that inflicted heavy casualties (Gage and others, 2003: 4-7).

they are foreign outsiders who are unknown or distrusted. Distrust among the occupied population is frequently rooted in, and can be exacerbated by, the counterinsurgent's unfamiliarity with the political, cultural and historical intricacies that produce an insurgency (Hull, 2009: 6-7). Due to the occupiers' unfamiliarity with the environment, civilians under occupation frequently perceive the counterinsurgent with suspicion, and are skeptical of the counterinsurgent's capability or determination to maintain a mid- to long-term presence (Hull, 2009: 6). Unconvinced of the occupier's commitment, a population will hesitate to align themselves (Gage and others, 2003: 8-9; Hull, 2009: 6-8). The United States was an ill-informed outsider in the case of Iraq, and Iraqis lacked trust and confidence in the U.S. prior to and throughout the occupation (Hull, 2009: 6-7). Suspicion was further exacerbated by U.S. inability to provide security and its disproportional use of force (Kilcullen, 2009: 124-150).

Hence, the U.S. started at a disadvantage since it was perceived as an unwanted occupier (outlined in 2.1.1) (Burkholder, 2004e; Hull, 2009: 6-8; Oxford Research International, 2004: 4), and its actions during the war and occupation further undermined its appeal through counterproductive behavior. Concerning the latter, coalition troops were perceived disinterested and/or impotent against initial civil unrest and criminal activity that emerged following the arrogation of U.S. control (Allawi, 2007: 94), and later ineffective against sectarian and insurgent violence (Perito, 2005: 7). These failures gave the impression that coalition forces were unable or unwilling to provide security to the population (Allawi, 2007: 94). Returning our attention to the issue at hand, U.S. military preoccupation with force protection and its deployment of disproportional violence, as components of force protection, further compromised popular sentiment (Barakat, 2005: 579; Kilcullen, 2009: 124; Kuehl, 2010: 13). The combination of elements eliminated Iraqi tolerance of the occupation.

Diverting our attention from theory to practice, preventable civilian casualties were common as a result of U.S. military operations (Hicks and others, 2011: 12; Human Rights Watch, 2003: 16), particularly during counterinsurgency campaigns in Baghdad (Alvord and others, 2003) and Fallujah (Iraq Analysis Group, 2005). Disproportional force utilized by coalition forces include the deployment of weapons including dispensers, more commonly known as cluster munitions (Federation of American Scientists, 1999), in residential neighborhoods (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 5-7; Roth, 2005: 11). While engaged in urban combat, U.S. ground troops requested Indirect Fire (IDF), defined as artillery or close air support, which sometimes deployed clusters to the urban AO (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). The deployment of such weapons substantially increased the risk to civilians living in those areas.

To provide clarification, once clusters are dispensed, the bomblets scatter and either detonate or remain “live,” functioning as landmines or unexploded ordinance (UXO). Bomblets are impossible to contain and control, and their dispersing poses an enduring threat to combatants and civilians. For example, UXO is subject to detonation when, for example, a child or civilian tampers with the explosive (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 54-60). The deployment of these weapons in populated areas draw stark criticism because of their indiscriminate nature and the distinct increase in civilian casualties their use generates (Alvord and others, 2003; Calhoun, 2005: 94; Human Rights Watch, 2003: 54-60).

In such instances, civilian casualties could have been reduced if military SOP had minimized force protection and power had been projected in a discriminate manner (Barakat, 2005: 579; Kilcullen, 2009: 124; Kuehl, 2010: 4-5). Examined from another angle, in many instances, U.S. troop risk was purposefully transferred from U.S. soldiers to the “enemy” and “civilians” in AOs by deploying disproportional degrees of force with notable consequences on the latter (Hashim, 2006: 92-102; Kilcullen, 2009: 38). As a result of its tactics, Hagopian and others (2013: 6) suggest, “coalition forces were reported to be responsible for the largest proportion of war-related [civilian] violent deaths (35%), followed by militia[s] (32%).” This quote suggests that the highest percentage of civilians killed in Iraq died at the hands of coalition forces rather than sectarian violence committed by militia members. High rates of deaths, injuries and grievances associated with the occupation compromised popular sentiment, encouraged mistrust and facilitated the armed insurgency because civilians wanted to retaliate against the coalition (Allawi, 2007: 244, 276; Gerges, 2009: 265; Hashim, 2006: 92-102).

A souring in Iraqi opinion toward U.S. military conduct is noticeable in polling. During the invasion, Iraqis expressed that the United States military maintained a semblance of professionalism and proportionality (Burkholder, 2004e). During the spring of 2003, a majority of Iraqis perceived that U.S. forces had conducted themselves well (Burkholder, 2004e). That positive sentiment reversed in April 2004 when 58% of respondents expressed the opinion that U.S. forces were conducting themselves badly (Burkholder, 2004e). At this time, sixty-seven percent of respondents stated that U.S. troops were using indiscriminate force and not doing enough to protect civilians (Burkholder, 2004e). To contextualize, the survey was conducted at about the time that the insurgency and sectarian violence was beginning to root itself and intensify. Approximately one year later, Iraqis rated U.S. forces as doing “quite a bad” (18.8%) and “very bad job” (39.8%) while performing “their responsibilities in Iraq” (Oxford Research International, 2005: 21). Combined, not only was

the coalitions' disproportional use of force blamed for claiming the lives of civilians, those same forces were perceived to be failing to provide security to civilians from sectarian and insurgent violence. These perceptions add credence to the theory that COIN practices should have been observed—military force should have been deployed in a manner that protected civilians from both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents.

Nevertheless, there were other noteworthy forms of disproportional violence deployed. For instance, the incarceration and interrogation techniques utilized by military and intelligence personnel (CIA) in Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere, which garnered international condemnation, were also forms of disproportional violence (Benjamin and Simon, 2005: 128; Gerges, 2009: 265; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 200; Kepel, 2004: 5; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014)[45]. Such acts, including indefinite incarceration and mistreatment (stress positions, water boarding) of prisoners, violated U.S. civil law (the right to a trial and legal representation) and international conventional norms (Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions)[46] (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2008: 63-69; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014). Such practices damaged foreign perceptions of the United States (Carty, 2011: 101; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 187; Kepel, 2004: 5), and contradict the U.S. moral justification of deposing Saddam Hussein due to his human rights violations (Allawi, 2007: 459; Kepel, 2004: 237; Roy, 2007: 46). Critics conclude that their use was politically and morally counterproductive because they galvanized Iraqi-Arab public opinion and called U.S. integrity and intentions into question (Allawi, 2007: 185-186; Carty, 2011: 101; Gerges, 2009: 265; Hashim, 2006: 102; Kepel, 2004: 237; Riedel, 2008: 135).

An examination of public opinion supports the analysis that internment and interrogation techniques were unpopular and counter-intuitive in Iraq. Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (2004: 44) quantified 48% of Iraqis believed Abu Ghraib humiliated Iraqis. Equally problematic, the actions of a few U.S. personnel were transposed onto broader society. Demonstrating their low expectations of U.S. citizens based on historical experience, Iraqi respondents claimed they were not surprised by events in Abu Ghraib because they "expect the worst from Americans" (Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 45). A slight majority of those same respondents (51%) believed that "all Americans" act in an inhumane manner similar to those

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[45] For a detailed account of interrogation techniques applied by the U.S., see Danner (2004). For an extensive review of U.S. legal documents on interrogation practices post-9/11, see Greenberg and Dratel (2005). For a U.S. Congressional inquiry of U.S. interrogation methods, see Senate Armed Services Committee (2008). For a concise review of the policies and implications of Guantánamo Bay detention facility, see Ratner and Ray (2004).
[46] See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (1977).

at Abu Ghraib (Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 46). In this case, inappropriate, illegal, and immoral behavior perpetrated by a few was perceived to represent U.S. society in general.

The last word concerning disproportional force and its effects on Iraqi perceptions is given to Tripp (2007), who adeptly summarizes:

> U.S policy between 2001 and 2011 galvanized Iraqi opinion for several reasons through its utilization of physical and structural violence. Physical violence was exerted through policies such as: the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq and the indiscriminate application of force during that campaign. Structural violence was exhibited under occupation by: the U.S. inability to provide security or basic services; the imposition of post-war policies (e.g. dissolution of security forces); the imposition of timetables (e.g. for drafting a constitution); and the favoritism displayed toward the Shi‘a. Moreover, even after sovereignty was returned to Iraqis, the United States continued to “undermine their authority” (Tripp, 2007: 292-293).

Tripp’s quote succinctly outlines the various types of violence perpetrated by the United States during the occupation. Within this environment, negative sentiment and suspicion of the U.S. military, government and citizens proliferated among Iraqis.

2.1.5 Security concerns

Associated with the failures just noted, the literature on conflict resolution and humanitarian intervention underscores the importance of security in (post-) conflict settings (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 213). Some scholars advocate physical security as the paramount objective when foreign countries intervene and embark on peace-, state- and/or nation building campaigns (Etzioni, 2007: 1-2; Kaldor, 2007: 191-197; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 213). Contrariwise, other scholars question the theoretical and practical value of prioritizing security for reasons including the challenge of providing security and the associated risks of social-political manipulation of (human) security by intervening referents (defined here as individuals, groups, societies or countries) (Calhoun, 2005: 108; Kienscherf, 2011: 530-531; Rathmell, 2005: 1015-1016). Within this frame, the United States military and governing authorities (rhetorically) placed a high priority on establishing security in Iraq (Ucko, 2008: 357). However, as denoted in the previous chapter, the U.S. experienced acute challenges providing security, for a variety of reasons including the complex nature of the conflict environment and the lack of planning or resources (Hashim, 2006: 339; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 167).

The theoretical and practical value of human security is relevant to the case of Iraq, and before examining Iraqi public opinion on the issue, we momentarily introduce the concept of human security, its history and a critique. “Human security is commonly understood as prioritising the security of people, especially their welfare, safety and well-being, rather than that of states” (Duffield, 2006: 11). While most scholars adhere to a similar conceptualization as provided in the quote (Duffield, 2006: 21; Hudson, 2005: 163; McCormack, 2008: 115; Newman, 2001: 239), there is no consensual definition of the concept or practice (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 126). Further complicating the matter, a range of issues falls under the rubric of human security (Duffield, 2006: 23-24; King and Murray, 2002: 585-589; Newman, 2001: 243-247; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 121). Among its many objectives include individual physical security, disease prevention, in addition to the promotion of human rights, democracy and access to education (Duffield, 2006: 23-24; King and Murray, 2002: 585-589; Newman, 2001: 243-247). By addressing these multifarious issues, intervention is estimated to protect and improve the quality of human life. Moreover, the proliferation of human security is thought to generate a spillover effect, because fulfillment of human needs reduces local frustration and violence, which in turn augments local, regional and international security (Duffield, 2006: 12; Newman, 2001: 241). According to this conceptualization, human security is a public good.

With a basic understanding of how human security is conceptualized, it is equally edifying to examine how the international political environment has aided in the development of the concept and practice. The human security movement debuted in the mid-1990s (Duffield, 2006: 21; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 121) in response to political changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Duffield, 2006: 12; Miklian, 2014: 494; Newman, 2001: 241). The 1990s experienced an international re-orientation of attention from the fear of nuclear annihilation toward the provision of public needs (social, economic) of individuals, especially those residing in countries perceived to have weak or ineffective governments (Duffield, 2006: 12; Newman, 2001: 241). Within a few years of its introduction, the concept of human security was widely embraced by many scholars, policymakers, and institutions as a fundamental component of peacebuilding in (post) conflict zones (Duffield, 2006: 12).

In theoretical and practical terms, human security rests upon the premise that: “Those who have the capacity to extend security to people perilously lacking in security have a basic human obligation to do so” (Newman, 2001: 240). The ideology emphasized in Newman’s quote led to the development of an intervention framework outlined by a 2001 report written by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) called *The*

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Duffield, 2006: 25; Miklian, 2014: 499; Rotmann and others, 2013: 363). In the R2P report, the ICISS theoretically divides the international community into a dichotomy of countries that effectively provide human security to their populace and those which do so ineffectively (Duffield, 2006: 25; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 162; Rotmann and others, 2013: 359). In the case of the latter group, R2P envisions external intervention by the former group to manage the assortment of issues, including poor governance, humanitarian catastrophes, disease, or civil instability, through strategies including the dispatching of aid or peacekeepers (Duffield, 2006: 25; Liotta, 2002: 483; Miklian, 2014: 494-499; Rotmann and others, 2013: 359).

Therefore, under the R2P framework, national sovereignty is privileged on the condition that countries uphold their responsibility to secure their inhabitants (McCormack, 2008: 122-123; Miklian, 2014: 499; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 127; Rotmann and others, 2013: 363-364). If a country is deemed in non-compliance, R2P declares the international community has a responsibility to respond to provide human security, and that the breadth of responsibility might require preemptive action in certain cases to protect human life (McCormack, 2008: 122-123; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 127; Rotmann and others, 2013: 363-364). Unsurprising, the conceptualized framework generates a great deal of criticism at multiple levels since, among other reasons, the prospect of intervention is subject to exploitation by (stronger) countries which might intervene in another country's sovereign affairs for selfish purposes while falsely claiming to be doing so to advance human security (Miklian, 2014: 499-502; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 127). Although there are many critiques, which we examine below, the framework remains operational in theory despite international disagreement over many of its concepts and practices, and few direct instances of its actual deployment (Rotmann and others, 2013: 366).

In the post-9/11 environment, human security theory underwent another change. Duffield (2006: 26-27) argues that the objective of human security expanded to include "securing failed and fragile states" which were identified as threatening to international stability or potential safe havens to individuals involved in international terrorism. At the same time that weak and failing states were prioritized, interest also shifted to homeland and border security (Duffield, 2006: 32-33; Hudson, 2005: 155; Liotta, 2002: 473; McCormack, 2008: 120). In fact, many of the undercurrents in human security theory, both in terms of fragile states and homeland security, are observable in the National Security Strategy (Duffield, 2006: 26-27) and rhetoric of George W. Bush during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, as Liotta (2002: 483) cautions: "military security, most especially intervention, can – and

often does – aggravate human security issues and can be more the cause of rather than the solution to human security dilemmas.” Liotta’s warning came to fruition in Iraq following the 2003 invasion, creating insecurity rather than security. For this reason, and others, some scholars adamantly criticize human security.

There are numerous and scathing criticisms of the human security articulated in the literature. For the sake of space, four are briefly noted. First, the concept and practice has “universalizing tendencies” because it presupposes that individuals and groups are homogenized and have the same needs across countries and cultures (Chandler, 2008: 429; Hudson, 2005: 157). Despite its alleged universal applicability, human security research and policy in practical terms have been predominantly concentrated in non-Western countries, partially because of the interconnection of security with economic and social development (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 123). Hence, its universal applicability in theory has been reduced to research and implementation in mainly economically less-developed regions, such as Africa or Latin America. One exception is the contemporary emphasis on homeland security into human security discourse that incorporates Western countries.

A second criticism is that implementation of human security policy requires capable and willful actors (institutions, countries, NGOs) that will responsibly realize policy (Hudson, 2005: 165). The arrangement predisposes that the more powerful countries and actors in the international community are the primary instruments for ensuring human security is provided, which elevates their authority and status *vis-à-vis* their weaker neighbors (Hudson, 2005: 165). Simultaneously, the theory equally assumes that actors are responsible and will respond when necessary. Yet, there are not always responsible and willful actors, as seen in contemporary Syria where the international community remained relatively aloof from the humanitarian calamity in 2013 and 2014.

Linked to the former, a third criticism of human security is that the arrangement creates a “binary universalism (‘us versus them’)”, consisting of the developed and under-developed, the powerful and weak (Hudson, 2005: 166). The latter dichotomous arrangement raises two salient sticking points. On the one hand, Duffield (2006: 12) argues a range of problems (mainly present in under-developed countries), which have been identified by the stronger of the binary groups, is perceived as threating (to the developed) and, therefore, requires a response. Hence, the stronger set the agenda and enforce it on the weaker. On the other hand, since the stronger in this binary have the capacity and set the agenda, human security policy is perceived as neo-colonialism, or an alternative tool of exerting dominance over others (Duffield, 2006: 12; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 129). In simple terms, human

security is a technique, which some countries can exploit to take control/advantage over others through enforcement of external norms and agendas.

The last criticism denoted here is that the arrangement has an integrated double standard that permits stronger countries to hold weaker countries accountable, while the actions of those stronger agents go unchecked (McCormack, 2008: 123). Hence, the countries that intervene to provide human security are not held to account for their actions and may not be accepted by the individuals being assisted. Failures and wrongdoing in these areas simply go unnoticed. McCormack's criticism certainly applies to U.S. intervention in Iraq, assuming that the provision of human security was a policy driver. To overcome this and other criticisms, Brazil proposed an alternative policy dubbed "responsibility while protecting" which was rejected due to the polarization it created within the United Nations; particularly its emphasis on holding intervening countries to account for their actions (Rotmann and others, 2013: 368-369). To date, the concept and practice of human security remains controversial and inconsistently endorsed and applied by members of the international community (Rotmann and others, 2013).

Returning our attention to Iraqi public opinion of the security situation during the occupation, an examination of multiple surveys illustrates that public opinion concerning the quality of security provided by coalition troops fluctuated. In February 2004, Oxford Research International (2004: 6-7) found that sixty percent of Iraqis believed that security in their neighborhood was "good" or "very good." Approximately three months later, sixty percent reported security as an urgent concern (Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 3). This trend continued as the security situation deteriorated. In June 2004, twenty-eight percent expressed concern about the possibility of sectarian violence escalating into civil war (Burkholder, 2004b). At approximately the same time, another poll found that sixty-nine percent of Iraqis feared for their individual and familial welfare and safety, especially if they were perceived to be collaborating with the coalition (Burkholder, 2004d). The increase no doubt compromised cooperation with the coalition.

Confidence in coalition forces also fluctuated across time and surveys. Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (2004: 6-7) found more than three quarters of those polled expressed minimal confidence in the coalition. By November 2005, half of respondents (54.6%) expressed a complete lack of confidence in U.S. and Britain's security forces (Oxford Research International, 2005: 13). Perito (2005: 7) suggests the lack of confidence is associated with the perception that the U.S. was either unwilling or incapable of providing security. By November 2006, Iraq Centre for Research and Strategic Studies

(2006: 6-7, 9) found that more than three quarters of respondents felt that the security, political and economic conditions were worse than before the 2003 invasion. As violence continued to escalate, a March 2007 survey qualified that the two greatest concerns expressed by Iraqis were the general lack of security (13%) and terrorism (12%) (ABC News and others, 2008: 17). That same year, ABC News and others (2007: 6-8) qualified a general lack of confidence (82%) in U.S. and British forces. Eight out of ten respondents actually "disapproved of the way that the United States and coalition forces have carried out their responsibilities in Iraq" (ABC News and others, 2007: 6). Hence, the magnitude of insecurity appears to parallel expressed disgruntlement toward the coalition.

Increased animosity directed at the coalition, and the degree of concern qualified, likewise parallels personal experience during the occupation. ABC News and others (2008: 34-37), for instance, quantifies the breadth of respondent exposure to violence throughout Iraq. At that time, 40% of Iraqis stated they had experienced some type of violence (a car bombing, terrorist attack, kidnapping) near their place of residence (ABC News and others, 2008: 34-37). High incidents of violence coincide with a marginal degree of confidence in coalition security forces. In fact, approximately 33% of Iraqis stated they did "not [have] much confidence" in U.S. military forces while 46% claimed they had "no confidence at all" (ABC News and others, 2008: 26). In short, sixty-one percent of Iraqis perceived the U.S. military presence worsened the security situation rather than improved it (ABC News and others, 2008: 5), sentiment that corresponds with increased incidents of violence.

The intractability and intensity of the conflict in Iraq, the dislike of the occupation, and the weakness of Iraq's institutions produced a dilemma for Iraqis (Dobbins and others, 2009: 96-97). While many felt that U.S. presence exacerbated the security situation, and the occupation was largely perceived as unwanted, Iraqis simultaneously feared a coalition withdrawal (Dobbins and others, 2009: 96-97). This conundrum was acute since insecurity remained throughout the duration of the U.S. occupation, although incidents of violence began to diminish between 2007 and 2010. Nevertheless, it was not until mid-2010 that over seventy percent of respondents reported that security was improving (International Republican Institute, 2010: 26-27).

In conclusion, Iraqis placed a high priority on security during the occupation. However, they felt that the U.S. military was incapable or unwilling to increase security. The security situation presented a paradox, since Iraqis wanted the unpopular occupation to end, but likewise feared an early withdrawal of U.S. troops would exacerbate the security situation. The United States continued to be held responsible for the quality and quantity of violence

experienced in occupied Iraq between 2004 and the military drawdown in 2010 (International Republican Institute, 2010: 16-27).

2.1.6 Sectarian divisions

The 2003 invasion of Iraq exacerbated internal political and social divisions, thereby increasing the likelihood of sectarian violence between Iraq's heterogeneous communities (Roy, 2007: 110-113; Steele, 2008: 1-2). This outcome was expected, as Dobbins and others (2009: 398) note: "Any representative government in Iraq was going to shift power, wealth, and influence from the Sunni to the Shi'ite and Kurdish communities." Disgruntlement and backlash at the overthrow of Iraq's government was thus inevitable since the Sunni did not constitute a majority of the population, which meant that its traditional over-representation in political and civilian structures prior to the invasion would be curtailed. Once the U.S.-led coalition overturned the *status quo*, a violent competition for control was expected (Allawi, 2007: 11; Brennan and others, 2013: 147). Social-political competition played out at the local and national levels and incorporated numerous contingents.

For example, the three major ethnic-sectarian groupings mobilized to protect and assert their authority subsequent to U.S. intervention. From fielding their own militias and death squads, to usurping positions of power at the local and national levels, sectarian division and rivalry became acute (Allawi, 2007: 91; Pascual and Pollack, 2007: 10-17; Ucko, 2008: 353-354). As individuals and collectives, members prioritized the welfare of themselves or their community, and distributed goods, services and positions of authority according to identity (Allawi, 2007: 91; Pascual and Pollack, 2007: 10-17; Ucko, 2008: 353-354). The (violent) conflict compromised stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq on multiple levels (Allawi, 2007: 91; Pascual and Pollack, 2007: 10-17; Ucko, 2008: 353-354).

Aside from the obvious physical effects of the conflict (death and displacement), sectarian violence and turmoil equally influenced popular perceptions of (il)legitimacy and political (im)potence of coalition forces as well as Iraq's governing and administrative bodies following their establishment (Pascual and Pollack, 2007: 10-17; Ucko, 2008: 344). Popular disgruntlement and suspicion were partially a result of the coalition and indigenous governing bodies' inability to contain the violence or manage events on the ground. Moreover, as politicians and officials assumed positions, or were appointed, they acted in accordance with sectarian interests rather than the interests of Iraqis. Prevailing circumstances had profound social implications; for instance, it precipitated distrust of the GOI and perceptions of its illegitimacy (Cordesman, 2010: 16; DeYoung, 2007; Möckli, 2012: 2; Ryan, 2010: 72;

Williams and Simpson, 2008: 240). Paradoxically, while sectarian divisiveness persisted on the streets and in the halls of government, polling of Iraqis suggests that citizens were opposed to the dismemberment of Iraq according to ethnic or sectarian identity (Williams and Simpson, 2008: 201).

In terms of responsibility for the sectarian rift created, many insist the United States is responsible for sectarian fracturing and its (violent) manifestation in occupied Iraq (Ryan, 2010: 66). Ahmed Hashim (2006: 280-289), for example, criticizes that U.S. marginalization of the Sunni was an inextricable motivation for the invasion and occupation. He hypothesizes that "Sunniphobia" and "Shi'aphilia" within the George W. Bush administration convoluted U.S. policy from its inception. Summarizing his theory, Hashim (2006: 280-289) explains U.S. decision-makers designed and implemented policy around their narrow conceptualization of conditions inside Iraq. Notably, they inaccurately identified the Sunni as the demographic minority who supported Saddam Hussein—and were hence antagonists of the United States—while perceiving the Shi'a as the demographic majority and the obvious social-political alternative for restructuring post-war Iraq (Hashim, 2006: 280-289). These misconceptions resulted in two strategic errors.

The first mistake in U.S. policy was that it underestimated the potential for a violent Sunni backlash against the invasion which produced an insurgency (Hashim, 2006: 280-282). Second, U.S. officials assumed that by supporting the Shi'a, they would espouse the occupation and the changes implemented (Hashim, 2006: 280-282; Roy, 2007: 39). The latter misconception disregarded preexisting mistrust Iraq's Shi'a had of the United States government, sentiment rooted in historical feelings of betrayal in 1991 when the U.S. failed to assist the armed uprising George H.W. Bush had promoted (Hashim, 2006: 286). Both inaccuracies precipitated an (un)expected insurgency that consisted of Sunni and Shi'a elements. Despite evolving events on the ground, the U.S. generally maintained its strategy of favoring the Shi'a while marginalizing and punishing the Sunni through violent policies, such as de-Ba'athification (Allawi, 2007: 89-152). The prejudiced approach instilled and institutionalized sectarian division within post-war politics and society (Simon, 2008: 57-74).

Demonstrating implementation, the U.S. awarded political control over specific territory to warlords and sectarian leaders willing to cooperate with the coalition (Allawi, 2007: 91; Roy, 2007: 43). Accordingly, socially or politically well-positioned Iraqis (rhetorically) willing to pursue goals comparable to those of the U.S. were awarded with political (positions in government at the local and national levels) and social benefits (the provision of aid) (Allawi, 2007: 91; Roy, 2007: 43; Serwer and Parker, 2008: 3; Simon, 2008: 61). In many

instances those individuals would have been Shi‘a, since the Sunni widely rejected the occupation. Whatever their identity, U.S. appointment of individuals allowed those selected to sequentially distribute benefits into the community through sectarian-based favoritism (Allawi, 2007: 91; Roy, 2007: 43; Serwer and Parker, 2008: 3; Simon, 2008: 64-68). By way of example, a Sunni who agreed to cooperate with the coalition as a representative of a village was inclined to favor other Sunni while performing his duties. Such activity divided populations at the local level as opposed to uniting them, creating grievances and competition.

An April 2008 USIP briefing paper to Congress acknowledges the counterproductive nature of such practices, stating that by cooperating "with those who can control their respective areas and whose interests are not out of line with those of the U.S.," U.S. decision makers "reinforced Iraq's political fragmentation, which may work against efforts to forge a truly national political compact, at least in the near term" (Serwer and Parker, 2008: 3). Iraqis equally concur with the sentiment articulated in the quote. Summarizing popular perceptions, Missy Ryan (2010: 66) asserts, "Many Iraqis blame the United States for empowering the religious and identity-based parties that presided over the governance disaster that followed the early [2003] military success." Both quotes demonstrate the (perceived) role that the United States played in institutionalizing social and political fracturing in post-war structures at the local and national levels. As detailed elsewhere, many coalition-imposed policies, including de-Ba‘athification and the appointment of representatives at the local and national level, exacerbated social tensions and aided in the politicization of identity in Iraq's social and political frameworks.

2.1.7 General suspicion and enmity

This subsection devoted to Iraqi sentiment subsequent qualifies the degree of suspicion and enmity leveled at the United States. In general terms, Iraqis expressed a marked degree of distrust of, and animosity towards, the U.S. following the 2003 invasion (Kull, 2007: 5). However, suspicion of the United States did not suddenly manifest as a result of the invasion. Instead, and outlined in the historical account in chapter one, the roots of mistrust are embedded in a combination of historical experiences and events that coalesced with experiences during the occupation (International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 30). Most importantly, enmity and suspicion was produced by decades of violent policy, especially the containment of Iraq throughout the 1990s.

Considering sentiment prior to the 2003 invasion, Edward P. Djerejian and Frank G. Wisner (2003) noted the paradox facing the George W. Bush administration if it chose to intervene in Iraq. Prior to the invasion they counseled:

> Achieving security and stability in the Middle East will be made more difficult by the fact that short-term necessities will seem to contradict long-term goals. For example, the strong American presence that will be needed to establish and maintain law and order immediately after conflict will appear at odds with the long-term goal of a sovereign Iraq. Similarly, protecting Iraq's oil fields from sabotage will likely confirm the worst fears that America is pursuing war in order to steal local resources rather than convince skeptical audiences that such tactics directly benefit the Iraqi people (Djerejian and Wisner, 2003: 14).

As the authors predicted, the invasion and occupation of Iraq was difficult to legitimize among Iraq's population since the occupation was unwanted, prolonged, and subject to suspicion, and thereby was guaranteed to produce local grievance and discontent (Djerejian and Wisner, 2003: 14; Enterline and Greig, 2008: 888-889).

As projected, the occupation exacerbated suspicion and mistrust, which is well qualified. In the spring of 2004, seventy-one percent of respondents viewed coalition forces as occupiers and 29% believed that attacks on coalition forces were morally justified (Burkholder, 2004e). At that same time, respondents believed Iraq's government and its citizens should independently manage post-war efforts including the economy, security and the pursuit of transitional justice (Oxford Research International, 2004: 6-11). Iraqis, therefore, wanted immediate and complete control over the trajectory of their country. At its maxim, Iraqis were open to foreign assistance conditioned that providers of that support adhered to parameters Iraqis established (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 267).

Popular reservations were reinforced by U.S. activity during the occupation (Abdallah, 2003: 65-66; Bowen, 2009: 73). For instance, Bowen (2009: 73) reports that "Iraq's indigenous tribal, political, and religious leadership" were apprehensive when the CPA assumed control over Iraq rather than establishing a provisional governing assembly comprising of Iraqis. The decision to install the CPA gave the impression that the United States intended to stay indefinitely. Similarly, U.S. failure to provide security and protect infrastructure and cultural heritage, and instead concentrating on securing oil fields, seemingly confirmed Iraqi suspicion that U.S. ambitions were to obtain control over Iraq's oil reserves and to undermine its government and society (DeYoung, 2007; Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 41; University of Michigan and Eastern

Michigan University, 2006; Zogby, 2008)[47]. At its extreme, Amit Paley's (2007) independent research found respondents believed that the U.S. was deliberately sabotaging the country to serve its own interests. Comparable opinions were expressed in Basrah where British troops patrolled (Opinion Research Business, 2007). Such mistrust was reinforced by the prolongation and violent occupation and the innumerable calamities produced.

In closing, International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and Human Rights Center (HRC) (2004) brilliantly summarizes Iraqi suspicion:

> Comments indicated distrust of the U.S. relating to two main issues: the nation's history in supporting Saddam Hussein's regime and the collapse of order and the difficult conditions of daily life that emerged with the fall of the regime and the beginning of the occupation. The failures of postwar planning in Iraq appear to have left a legacy of bitterness and suspicion concerning the U.S. motives, while the daily friction of being under occupation by a foreign military force seem to have eroded goodwill flowing from the overthrow of the regime. An undercurrent in negative attitudes toward the U.S. is the sense of humiliation and wounded national pride arising from the being under occupation (International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 30).

As denoted in the quote, suspicion and grievance toward the United States is rooted in historical and contemporary actions. It is not a product of the invasion alone but a result of the long-standing violent relationship between the United States and Iraq.

This section demonstrates how events delineated hitherto constitute a protracted conflict that has effected Iraqis' perceptions of the United States. Equally relevant, several scholars note that Iraqis hold the U.S. morally responsible for Iraq's current political, economic and social predicament (DeYoung, 2007; Gatehouse, 2011), including the country's geopolitical weakness *vis-à-vis* neighbors, namely Iran (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 166; Tripp, 2007: 310). Amalgamated, our historical analysis and the sentiment traced herein confirm Hypothesis 1: the protracted violent relationship has produced an acute degree of negative sentiment toward the United States among Iraq's society.

2.2 Effects on the United States

It is a recognized truism that there are "victims" among all stakeholders engaged in a violent conflict (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Montville, 1999: 326; Rosoux, 2009: 550; Shaw, 2003: 187). The present section outlines some of the effects the war and occupation of Iraq

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[47] Sixty-six percent of Iraqis believed the coalition wanted to steal Iraq's oil (Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 41).

had on the United States. Nonetheless, the impact of the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq produced very different consequences in many respects. We make this assumption for obvious reasons, including the asymmetrical military power ratio between the two countries and the location of hostilities. Concerning the latter, since the war and occupation occurred in Iraq, its infrastructure and society experienced the most obvious and devastating effects.

Due to the asymmetrical nature of the war and occupation, and since it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to articulate all of the incalculable negative effects of the war, the issues examined herein center on the most recognizable effects that had extensive social impact. Several highlighted issues parallel those denoted in Iraq, while others are unique to the United States. Comparable issues include our examination of public opinion of the war and the human cost. Aspects which diverge include military overstretch, ballooning of the federal deficit, increased media censorship, and the long-standing animosity toward Iraq.

2.2.1 Public opinion of the war

In the fall of 2002, prior to the invasion, one survey conducted in the United States asked respondents if they would support military operations in Iraq if it "would result in substantial Iraqi civilian casualties" (Kiernan, 2003: 853-854). Nearly half of all respondents—forty-nine percent—"said that they would favor such a war" despite the casualties (Kiernan, 2003: 853-854). Acceptance of the war is likely influenced by the security debate prevalent at the time. Most notably, respondent who believed that Iraq possessed WMD are expected to agree that the most effective means of eliminating the "threat" posed by Iraq was through the removal of Saddam Hussein (Smidt, 2005: 247). When the date of the invasion approached, U.S. citizens became slightly more cautious in their assessment.

In February 2003, support for a hypothetical invasion dropped three percentage points when the U.S. citizens were again queried on their support for the invasion (Kiernan, 2003: 853-854). Similarly, another poll found that most respondents supported U.S. collaboration with the United Nations to peacefully resolve issues with Iraq as opposed to war (Kull and others, 2004: 570). In this sense, it was agreed that the United States should not act alone and that a peaceful solution was preferable. However, once the President decided to invade Iraq in the spring of 2003, in collaboration with his small coalition, a majority of respondents supported the decision (Kull and others, 2004: 570). The shift in favor is most likely a result of citizens deciding to support the President in his decision, as opposed to outright support for the invasion. In short, respondents ceased expressing their opinion about a hypothetical invasion and selected to support the decision to implement the policy.

Once the occupation was underway, U.S. polling showed a decline in popular approval (Brennan and others, 2013: 8). For example, "by the summer of 2004, a majority […] called the war a mistake" (Dugan, 2013). The shift in public opinion is suggested to be a result of the increasing violence and the perception that the occupation would be more costly than initially anticipated (Brennan and others, 2013: 8). The trend of negative sentiment held into 2005, when more than half of U.S. respondents continued to perceive the invasion of Iraq as a mistake (Dugan, 2013). Nevertheless, U.S. popular opinion in these polls is divided according to political affiliation, with Democrats being likely to support the war than Republicans (Gelpi, 2010: 93, 108). It is believed that Republicans likely felt that they had to support the war because it was a Republican President that initiated the operation.

In addition to evaluating popular sentiment towards the war and occupation, polling research qualifies the prevalence of misinformation among U.S. citizens prior to and after the invasion (Kull and others, 2004: 569-598). For instance, a majority of citizens falsely believed a link between Iraq and organizations using terrorism was firmly established by the U.S. government, and a plurality (68%) incorrectly believed Iraq was closely associated with events of 9/11 (Kull and others, 2004: 571-572). Polling, therefore, suggests that citizens were convinced that the two primary justifications for the invasion were validated. Misinformation also spanned other aspects of the war. For instance, a May 2003 poll qualified 34% of U.S. respondents falsely believed that WMD had been found in Iraq (Kull and others, 2004: 572). Further analysis of the data showed that individuals who held these misconceptions were more likely to support the war than their better-informed counterparts (Kull and others, 2004: 569-572).

In terms of the perceived effects of the war and occupation on the United States, periodic research between 2003 and 2006 trend a gradual increase in the number of U.S. respondents who observed the Iraq War was having a negative effect on their personal lives (Carrol, 2006). In April 2003, 16% held that opinion, and the figure doubled to 39% by March 2006 (Carrol, 2006). Similar trending is also observable in respondents' reporting that the war was having a negative impact on the United States (Carrol, 2006). In 2003, eighteen percent of the U.S. population perceived that the war had a negative impact on the United States, and the number of individuals who expressed corresponding opinions increased to fifty-eight percent by March 2006 (Carrol, 2006). See Figure 3. While the data shows that increasing numbers of citizens felt that the war was having a negative impact on personal lives and the country, the research does not qualify which negative effects respondents thought the war was having at either the individual or collective levels.

Figure 3 Effects of Iraq War on Personal Life



Figure 3 is Gallup's trending of U.S. respondents' perception of whether the Iraq War had a positive, negative, or not much effect at all, on the respondent's life (Carrol, 2006). The data quantifies how an increasing number of respondents between 2003 and 2006 reported that the Iraq War was having a negative impact on their individual lives (Carrol, 2006).

As the occupation endured, perception of the futility of U.S. intervention in Iraq increased (USA Today and Gallup, 2009). Between 2008 and 2009, half of U.S. respondents continued to perceive the invasion of Iraq as a mistake (USA Today and Gallup, 2009). Perceptions of ineffectiveness influenced opinion of which future policies respondents preferred. By mid-2009, a majority (78%) felt that U.S. military forces should be withdrawn from Iraq by December 2011 (CBS News and The New York Times, 2009a; USA Today and Gallup, 2009). Interestingly, it was not until August 2010, as complete U.S. troop withdrawal neared, that attitudes shifted and a slight majority of U.S. respondents (57%) felt progress was being made in Iraq (CBS News, 2010). Positive perceptions at this point were held regardless of political affiliation (CBS News, 2010). While improved perceptions correspond with improving conditions, optimism did not translate into popular acceptance of the war.

Contrary, U.S. citizens remained markedly pessimistic about the war and its outcome (CBS News, 2010). Despite perceiving progress, more than seventy percent of those polled believed the war was not worth the cost, compared to twenty percent who determined it appropriate (CBS News, 2010). Perhaps accounting for the perception of failure, CBS News (2010) found a majority of U.S. respondents did not believe that the United States had achieved its stated objectives in Iraq. For instance, only one quarter felt that the United States was safer compared to eighty percent which perceived the invasion had made the United States less safe (CBS News, 2010). Hence, respondents did not believe that the war in Iraq increased U.S. national security, one of the several justifications advanced for the invasion.

The perception of the occupation as a failure remained steady following the complete military withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011. A March 2013 poll, for instance, found a slight majority (53%) of U.S. citizens continued to perceive the Iraq war as a mistake (Dugan,

2013). That opinion was divided according to political affiliation (Dugan, 2013). A majority of Republicans (66%) believed the decision to go to war in Iraq was appropriate in contrast to a plurality of Democrats (73%) who perceived it inappropriate (Dugan, 2013). Once again, it is surmised that political party members retained their partisan opinions since a Republican president was ultimately responsible for committing troops (Dugan, 2013).

Before turning our attention to the impacts of the war, we wish to introduce another line of questioning found in the available literature. CBS News and The New York Times (2009b) asked U.S. respondents to speculate about Iraqis' perceptions of the war. When asked how they thought Iraqis felt about the 2003 invasion, forty-four percent of U.S. respondents admitted that Iraqis were probably "resentful" (CBS News and The New York Times, 2009b). The question was repeated one year later and fewer (37%) felt that Iraqis were resentful while 41% predicted that Iraqis were grateful (CBS News, 2010). The combination suggests that a clear majority of U.S. citizens thought that Iraqis were grateful for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. We, however, have demonstrated that nearly half of all Iraqis viewed the invasion as deconstructive in 2010 (2.1.1). Unfortunately, further elicitation of U.S. opinion pertaining to this topic was not pursued leaving critical questions unanswered, such as how U.S. respondents formed their conclusions.

2.2.2 The human cost

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) (2008) estimates that 1.1 million U.S. military personnel served in Iraq between 2003 and 2008. A more recent estimate projects that the total number of U.S. military personnel that served in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 is approximately 1.5 million soldiers (Möckli, 2012: 1)[48]. All U.S. soldiers were volunteers who upon enlistment in the Armed Forces, whether active duty or reservists, are obligated to fulfill their duty, including wartime deployment (Defense Technical Information Center, 2013). The vast majority of soldiers serving in the armed forces between 2003 and 2011 obeyed their orders to deploy to Iraq (Christenson, 2011; McMichael, 2007)[49]. Once deployed, soldiers were prone to death or injury.

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[48] According to Martinez and Bingham (2011), an estimated 2,333,972 soldiers served in the U.S. armed forces between September 11, 2001 and August 30, 2011 and were deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq or both countries.

[49] There were numerous incidents of soldiers refusing to obey orders to avoid (repeat) deployment to Afghanistan or Iraq (Christenson, 2011; McMichael, 2007). In 2006 alone, the DOD estimates that a total of 5,361 U.S. soldiers were military deserters (McMichael, 2007). For instance, André Shepard, a veteran of the Iraq War, deserted the U.S. Army following orders to return to Iraq for a second tour (Meyer and Kaiser, 2008). He applied for asylum in Germany in November 2008 (Meyer and Kaiser, 2008). Hundreds of active U.S. soldiers also

Of the estimated 1.5 million who served, official sources indicate there were 4,356 U.S. combat deaths and over 30,000 service members wounded between March 19, 2003 and October 23, 2009 (Department of Defense, 2008). That figure increased to 4,488 combat deaths by the December 2011 U.S. withdrawal (Möckli, 2012: 1). By comparison to Iraq's casualty estimates, the U.S. casualty figures are low (2.1.2). Nonetheless, the low numbers produced a disproportionally high rate of social effect. While only 0.75% of the U.S. population (according to the 2010 census) was active military personnel between 2003 and 2010 (Martinez and Bingham, 2011), a Gallup survey in 2006 found that 58% of U.S. citizens "report[ed] personally knowing someone who ha[d] served in the U.S. military in Iraq since the war started" (Carrol, 2006). Of the majority denoted in the quote, 12% knew someone who had been wounded or killed (Carrol, 2006). Polling, thus, suggests that approximately half of all U.S. citizens knew someone who served, while a minority knew someone who were killed or injured.

Beyond combat casualties, the social-psychological effects of the Iraq (and Afghanistan) war on veterans have become a serious public health concern in the United States (Tanielian and Jaycox, 2008: 4-5). Military veterans have suffered psychological health problems, manifesting in high rates of post-traumatic stress being reported among soldiers and repatriated veterans (Alvarez and Frosch, 2009; Bilmes, 2013: 5-6). According to Bilmes (2013: 5) "one-third of returning veterans are being diagnosed with mental health issues – suffering from anxiety, depression and/or post-traumatic stress disorder." The high rates of social-psychological issues Bilmes refers to in the quote strain the health care system and directly impact society. For instance, combat related physical complications and psychological trauma are being associated with an increasing number of suicides among veterans (Alvarez and Frosch, 2009; Bilmes, 2013: 5; Korb and others, 2007: 11; Tanielian and Jaycox, 2008: 128-129). Similarly, there has been a quantified increase in incidents of domestic violence and divorce among military families since 2001 (Tanielian and Jaycox, 2008: 201). As a result, the health and welfare of repatriated veterans and their families have become a public concern among health care professionals and the United States military (Alvarez and Frosch, 2009). The implications of the human toll are expected to affect the United States for many years.

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escaped to Canada seeking political refuge, although Canada's government repatriated most (Montreal Gazette, 2008). Those captured are subject to prosecution under military law (Montreal Gazette, 2008).

2.2.3 Military overstretch

Our analysis now modifies to qualifying U.S. perceptions of, and action during, the war, since the war was asymmetrical in its impact when compared to that experienced by Iraqis. The first of these issues examined is U.S. military overstretch, defined here as exceeding the Armed Forces' capability to recruit or maintain sufficient troop levels and their equipment/supplies as necessitated by ongoing operations. Overstretch was encountered because of the simultaneous occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan (Korb and others, 2007: 1-13). Our interest here is not on fiscal appropriations or logistics, but rather how overstretch negatively impacted military effectiveness and readiness, which in turn impacted on soldiers and society (Korb and others, 2007: 7-11; Roy, 2007: 2). More specifically, the U.S. military was unable to provide appropriate equipment and supplies to an estimated one-quarter of troops deploying to Iraq in the fall of 2003 (Moss, 2006; USA Today, 2004).

Consequently, troops were deployed without being provided the sufficient quality or quantity of personal equipment, such as body armor (Moss, 2006; USA Today, 2004). To compensate for the over-extension, individual soldiers and their families were forced to purchase protective equipment directly from distributors to guarantee it was immediately available to their family member being deployed (Moss, 2006; USA Today, 2004). Hence, the only way to guarantee that a soldier had what s/he needed was for the soldier or their family to purchase equipment independently since the military was unable to provide said material. Similar qualitative and quantitative oversights were made concerning the availability of sufficiently armored vehicles during the run-up to the war, and once the errors were recognized, delays and backlogs occurred as manufacturers were unable to meet the abrupt military demand (Moss, 2006). While small ticket items such as body armor could be purchased independently, individual soldiers and their families were unable to compensate for military failures for larger items. The combination of oversight and failure on the part of the Department of Defense compromised public confidence in the U.S. military and compromised troop morale (USA Today, 2004).

In addition to supply issues, once the Iraq war was underway, the military encountered a significant decline in military recruits (Korb and others, 2007: 10-11). The recruitment deficit challenged U.S. military capacity to maintain dual occupations (Iraq and Afghanistan), which prompted political and military officials to take extreme measures to avoid making the domestically unpopular decisions of instilling conscription to fill military ranks (Korb and others, 2007: 10-11; Lieberfeld, 2005: 11). Among its controversial decisions, the U.S. Army, for example, parted with its policy which assures the general integrity of military troops, by

demanding its soldiers serve repeat tours in a combat zone without receiving recuperation and retraining between deployments (Korb and others, 2007: 10). Under customary guidelines, U.S. Army wartime deployment policy dictates at least one year of recuperation followed by an additional year of (re)training before soldiers are returned to combat duty (Korb and others, 2007: 4). Due to the insufficient quantity of new military recruits, in combination with a high attrition rate, the duration of troop deployments were prolonged and regular troop rotations at the company and regimen levels were modified to offset the quantitative deficit (Korb and others, 2007: 10-11). In short, troops were forced to serve repeat tours without standard recuperation and/or retraining periods.

Simultaneously, a "stop loss" policy was imposed by the military to sustain the necessary quantity of personnel (Korb and others, 2007: 6). Stop loss is the process of denying a soldier the right to depart the military despite fulfillment of their military contract (Korb and others, 2007: 6). By preventing soldiers from leaving the armed services and return to civilian life, and by altering troop rotation schedules, the U.S. Army was able to maintain a sufficient quantity of troops at the expense of reduced troop morale (Garfield, 2007; Korb and others, 2007: 4-10). In addition to the reduction of morale, prolonged and repeat deployments are hypothesized to have increased the probability of a service member's suffering from war-related psychological complications, including post-traumatic stress disorder (Korb and others, 2007: 6). Nevertheless, these counterproductive policies were implemented to preserve troop numbers despite the effects it had on troop readiness and capability. Military overstretch and the tactics deployed to compensate for the deficiencies were equally responsible for reduced confidence in the military among soldiers and civilians alike.

2.2.4 Ballooning federal deficit

Insulating U.S. civilians from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars was domestic fiscal policy (Kennedy, 2013: 84; Lieberfeld, 2005: 11; Roberts, 2010: 44-50). Alasdair Roberts (2010: 44-50) demonstrates that the George W. Bush administration reduced the potential negative effects of the wars on the U.S. public through the maintenance of low taxation and the encouragement of public spending. The Bush administration's approach contradicts the historic economic practices of increasing taxes to generate federal revenue and the encouragement of personal savings during wartime (Kennedy, 2013: 84; Roberts, 2010: 44-50). These customary practices were avoided by the administration to avert popular opposition to the wars due to fiscal over-burdening (Roberts, 2010: 44-50; Shaw, 2003: 157).

While keeping taxes low and encouraging spending may have softened public sentiment, the downside of this fiscal policy was that the administration simply postponed the tax burden since the U.S. government was required to bankroll both wars with limited resources (Kennedy, 2013: 84). Consequently, the U.S. federal deficit dramatically increased (Bilmes, 2013: 1-4; Lieberfeld, 2005: 11; Möckli, 2012: 1). Combined, 2013 estimates project the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have contributed an estimated “$2 trillion to the national debt” (Bilmes, 2013: 3)[50]. While the Bush administration successfully managed to distance the general public from the war and occupation in the short term, it simply deferred responsibility for payment.

2.2.5 Media censorship and disinformation

Although U.S. citizens frequently pride themselves on the right to freedom of the press, they were purposefully insulated from the war through federally imposed restrictions and self-imposed media censorship that diluted or distorted U.S. media coverage (Exoo, 2010: 181)[51]. For example, the George W. Bush administration banned the practice of showing flag-draped coffins of soldiers who had died in Afghanistan and Iraq (D. Kennedy, 2008). By forbidding the publication or broadcasting of such images, the administration believed that it could manage the erosion of popular support for those military campaigns (D. Kennedy, 2008). In essence, the practice was designed to moderate references to the U.S. lives being lost in the Iraq war and occupation.

Censorship of images was, nonetheless, domestically unpopular. A 2009 poll determines that 69% of the U.S. public felt that they should be allowed to see images of deceased U.S. soldiers (CBS News and the New York Times, 2009a). Nevertheless the ban remained in force, and most U.S. media outlets continued to self-censor coverage to appease corporate sponsors *in lieu* of providing impartial news and information (Exoo, 2010: 4-18).

Additionally, the U.S. media did not broadcast images of civilians who died during the invasion of Iraq (Calhoun, 2005: 99). Once again, censorship reduced (visual) references to the impact of the war and occupation on Iraqis, sanitizing the operation. Nonetheless, censoring images of deceased and badly injured people has been a long-standing tradition within U.S. media coverage from my experience. While a means of sanitizing the news, this is equally a long-standing tradition in U.S. journalism.

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[50] Comparatively, Möckli (2012: 1) estimates the cost of the Iraq war at 3 trillion U.S. dollars. Similarly, Amy Belasco (2011: 17) estimates that the appropriations earmarked for Iraq during fiscal year 2012 alone was 800 billion U.S. dollars.

[51] For assessment of the U.S. media’s role in the prelude to and coverage of the 2003 Iraq War and occupation, see Exoo (2010).

At the same time, some of the larger mainstream, or popular, U.S. media corporations have been criticized for their general reluctance to produce critical reporting which resulted in a lack of information or the production of disinformation (Johansen, 2004: 6). This is especially the case by certain media outlets, such as FOX News, which maintained a pro-war stance throughout the occupation (Kull and others, 2004: 581-598). Consequently, Kull and others (2004: 581-598) assert these media outlets were guilty of misinforming or misguiding the public on the war through their vague or biased reporting. As denoted in section 2.2.1, a large percentage of the U.S. population incorrectly believed that WMD had been found in Iraq and that Saddam Hussein was linked to groups that use terrorism (Kull and others, 2004: 569-572). Precise and factual reporting, it is believed, would have reduced the percentage of misinformed citizens.

Another external technique of regulating the quality and quantity of information provided to and distributed by the U.S. media was accomplished through the DOD's practice of "embedded journalism" (Exoo, 2010: 106). Embedded journalists are assigned and integrated into military combat units, a practice that naturally encourages the war correspondent to bond with the troops they are reporting on (Exoo, 2010: 105-106; Mann, 2006: 119-121). Under this arrangement, the journalist's safety is contingent upon the soldiers s/he is covering which can produce reporter bias (Mann, 2006: 119-121). Equally problematic, the practice of embedding enables the DOD to screen and censor journalist's reports, since journalists must have their submissions vetted and they are forbidden to publish information the DOD deems sensitive, inappropriate or threatening to "the mission" (Exoo, 2010: 105-106). A journalist determined in violation of DOD protocol are immediately removed from their combat unit and denied future access (Exoo, 2010: 105-106). To maintain their privilege, journalists censor their reports or are subject to report in a biased manner because of the arrangement.

Combined, there were numerous ways in which information provided by the mainstream media was censored. Some forms of censorship were imposed by the administration, while individual media outlets themselves equally and voluntarily implemented others. Despite its origins, censorship resulted in sanitized, sometimes biased, journalistic practices that undermined the freedom of the press. It is equally attributed to the high percentage of a misinformed public. In summary, predominant wartime media practices in the United States reduced partiality, and sometimes compromised the information provided by the free press. Consequently, sanitized and biased reporting affected popular opinion of the war and occupation, because citizens lack accurate knowledge or are exposed to misinformation.

2.2.6 Negative perceptions of Iraqis

U.S. citizens have perceived Iraq negatively for over a decade. Between 1990 and 2003, U.S. respondents expressed an overwhelmingly negative opinion of Iraq (averaging 90%) (Gallup, 2014). The period covers Saddam Hussein's annexation of Kuwait, the 1991 Persian Gulf War and containment policy that followed. While opinions fluctuated afterward, a slight majority (averaging 66%) of respondents continued to express negative perceptions toward Iraq between 2003 and 2013 (Gallup, 2014). At the time of writing, the most recent poll registered 80% of the U.S. population continues to hold a negative opinion of Iraq (Gallup, 2014). Gallup's trending confirms two decades of suspicion and dislike.

Soldiers carried existing negative sentiment, reinforced by a general lack of awareness, into theatre, which was sometimes partly bolstered there. Gage and others (2003: 2), for instance, call attention to the insufficient linguistic and cultural training given to U.S. soldiers and the negative implications this deficit had. Soldiers not only lacked language skills, but also did not understand important cultural nuances, such as honor, in terms of Iraq's history, society or culture. In their ignorance, female soldiers were, for example, used to direct traffic or present orders to Iraqi men (Fontan, 2006: 219-220). Such practice clashed with the patriarchal social norms present in Iraq and offended or humiliated Iraqi men (Fontan, 2006: 219-220). This produced social tensions.

Equally problematic, preexisting negative sentiment and misconceptions were unfortunately rarely challenged while the soldiers were deployed in Iraq due to military SOP. Recalling the challenges associated with utilizing force protection (2.1.4), we analyze the phenomena from the reverse angle to demonstrate how those same policies affected U.S. soldier proximity to violence and their cross-cultural interaction with, and perceptions of, Iraqis. Concerning the former, although U.S. soldiers serving in Iraq were exposed to the atrocities of war, most were likewise granted significant advantages over civilians in Iraq (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). In particular, U.S. troops had regular opportunities to insulate themselves since most combat units returned to forward operating bases on a daily basis after "commuting" to and from their AO (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). For example, troops patrolling Baghdad generally returned to "safe" areas, such as the "Green Zone", where a measure of refuge was afforded inside fortified perimeters (Brennan and others, 2013: 54; Kilcullen, 2009: 124). In hardened positions, U.S. troops had the possibility to (albeit temporarily) disassociate themselves from the war, a practice that facilitated intervals of regeneration and the creation of a sense of normalcy within the war (Kilcullen, 2009: 124-125). This advantage was unavailable to most Iraqis (Kilcullen, 2009: 124-125). However, from a strategic military

perspective, the act of isolating troops is counterproductive since their absence is associated with a failure to provide security to civilians and there is reduced interaction between the troops and civilians (Kilcullen, 2009: 124; Krepinevich, 2005: 92).

Consequently, force protection ensured occupying troops remained physically, socially and politically detached from Iraqis even when on missions (Kilcullen, 2009: 124; Krepinevich, 2005: 92). As explained earlier, the U.S. military over-relied on its power projection capabilities to ensure force protection even in residential neighborhoods (Gage and others, 2003: 4-5; Kilcullen, 2009: 124; Perito, 2005: 7). By projecting power and maintaining distance from civilians, it was possible to minimize U.S. troop casualties (Shaw, 2003: 202). However, since U.S. troops rarely loiter near, or intermingle with Iraqis, soldiers not only shifted the risk of combat to civilians but often failed to obtain a general understanding of Iraqis in terms of their livelihood, culture, needs and desires (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). Separation thereby breeds disconnect, allowing misconceptions to take root, grow and solidify.

The significance of distance and misconceptions between those engaged in a violent conflict is emphasized by Galtung (2004: 78), who argues that individuals develop opinions according to the quality and quantity of (inter)actions. Because a disconnection existed between the occupier and the occupied, compounded by the asymmetrical power balance of the occupier-occupied dyad in this particular context and the general lack of knowledge of the "other", both parties often failed to closely interact which might have otherwise falsified (pre)existing stereotypes and enhanced cross-cultural understanding and appreciation (Kilcullen, 2009: 124; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 73). The interaction-knowledge deficit led U.S. military personnel to generalize that every Iraqi was a potential "enemy," either an insurgent or a collaborator, and thereby a threat to their welfare (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). Those misconceptions reinforced self-preservation tendencies whereby the pattern of maintaining distance and deploying disproportional force were justified (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). Such reinforcing patterns are problematic because it can cultivate a false understanding of the relational counterpart, and at its extreme, makes it easier to dismiss the "other" as being subhuman or evil (Flavin, 2013: 169; Maoz, 2004: 230; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 73). In the latter instance, disconnect absolves empathy and responsibility, which can significantly impact the trajectory of a relationship and is problematic for developing constructive relations

and undermining suspicion and violent behavior (Flavin, 2013: 169; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 31, 58-60)[52].

An additional problem these deconstructive perceptions present are that once developed at the individual level, attitudes are subject to broad transfer onto society at large (Bar-Tal, 2000: 358). On the one hand, and recalling a previous example, most Iraqis believed that actions performed at Abu Ghraib prison were representative of all U.S. citizens (Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 44-46). On the other hand, it was just noted that U.S. soldiers had a tendency of viewing all Iraqis as insurgents or sympathizers (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). Such Manichean world-views are conducive to a continuation of conflict relationships and the utilization of violence (Bar-On, 2005: 13; Calhoun, 2005: 104; Maoz, 2004: 231-232; Marsella, 2005: 663-664). They reinforce a collective conflict narrative that can be transferred to others, and can harden and escalate deconstructive patterns of thought and behavior.

2.2.7 General assessment

By way of summary, this section approached the effects of the war on the U.S. from two angles. On one hand, we illustrated certain outcomes parallel those experienced by citizens of Iraq. We first looked at U.S. public opinion toward the war. It was demonstrated that while support was nearly polarized prior to the war, sentiment rapidly converted to support the war once the campaign had been launched. Subsequent to the invasion, popular endorsement waned as the occupation continued and the security situation declined. Several years after troop withdrawal, nearly half of all U.S. citizens believed that war was a failure. However, the quality of sentiment expressed was influenced by political affiliation, with Republicans generally perceiving the war as necessary and achieving its objectives while Democrats largely hold opposing views.

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[52] From the military's perspective of peacekeeping operations, analysts criticize the common practice of over-expecting the military to have complete situational awareness on deployment. Although military analysts recognize the importance of the military possessing local political, historical, cultural knowledge during operations (Alamir, 2013: 247; Flavin, 2013: 162), some suggest that it is inevitable that an intervening military will have inadequate knowledge and skills when deployed abroad (Flavin, 2013: 159-160). This hypothesis is based on a combination of reasons including military culture, mentality and objectives. For instance, military practices, including troop rotation patterns, undermine the construction of knowledge in theater because troops are rotated at regular intervals, thereby withdrawing with them the experience and familiarity the rotating troops have acquired (Flavin, 2013: 161, 178). Similarly, the military's primary objective is to locate and manage individual threats as opposed to a general population, which means it spends most of its resources on the enemy (Flavin, 2013: 161, 178). For these reasons, it is suggested that every effort should be made to educate and inform troops, under the full realization that expectations should be realistic since there will be unavoidable knowledge gaps. The recommendation further raises important structural and operational questions that the military should consider when contemplating operations of foreign intervention.

We then examine the human costs of the war. Over four thousand soldiers died in Iraq and tens of thousands were wounded. Interestingly, while these figures are minor in relation to the estimates from Iraq, and small in terms of the number of soldiers who actually served in theatre, nearly half of all U.S. citizens claimed to know someone whom had served in Iraq. At the same time, we examined several social-psychological effects of the war namely high rates of suicide among U.S. veterans and increasing instances of domestic violence in military families. The combination of traumas is expected to endure into the foreseeable future.

Next we analyzed (fiscal) overstretch of the military and U.S. federal budget, which produced negative consequences. On the one hand, citizens and soldiers were forced to purchase personal protective equipment to be used during deployment to compensate for DOD mismanagement and oversight. The necessity to independently purchase equipment, combined with other policy decisions made by the U.S. military to reduce the military attrition rate and offset the inability to recruit new soldiers, compromised public support, troop morale and the soldier's welfare. On the other hand, the fiscal cost of the war was purposefully postponed by the George W. Bush administration due to its reluctance to impose a tax burden. Hence, the policy discreetly deferred the cost of the war, and increased the federal deficit.

Then we examined censorship and misinformation. Although United States citizens frequently pride themselves for upholding constitutional rights, such as freedom of the press, during the Iraq war censorship and misinformation was common. The Bush administration, for example, imposed bans on photos and film footage of deceased soldiers. Similarly, many war correspondents were embedded into combat units, a practice that censors information and encourages the journalist to bond with the unit they are attached to. The combination of measures produces biased reporting. At the same time, many mainstream media corporations' self-censored information and/or provided disinformation. As a result, mainstream news coverage was frequently biased. These practices undermine disclosure of the truth, limit public awareness and freedom of the press.

Finally, we examined U.S. public perceptions of Iraq. It was denoted that citizens have held predominantly negative opinions of Iraq since the 1990s. Associated with media censorship outlined earlier, we highlighted that there was a tendency for U.S. citizens to falsely believe in the validity of justifications proffered for the invasion (Iraq's possession WMD and links to terrorism). At the same time, we analyzed the perceptions of soldiers and their activities. The literature confirms a lack of basic understanding of Iraq and its population (culture, history) soldiers, buttressed by avoidable military practices that were culturally insensitive. Moreover, soldiers failed to interact with Iraqis, in part a result of the practice of

force protection, a phenomenon that led to soldiers stereotyping Iraqis as either insurgents or sympathizers. Such negative perceptions and the distance maintained from an adversary foster misconception, alienation, and at its extreme, Manichean world-views that justify the use of violence.

Amalgamated the present section confirms some of the negative consequences of the Iraq war, and demonstrated that U.S. citizens hold negative opinions of Iraq, thereby confirming Hypothesis 1 from the U.S. perspective. In the final section, we will explore relationships from the macro level. The following analysis parallels the micro opinions explored in the previous hitherto and is valuable for reiterating the existence of a conflict relationship at both the macro (West versus Middle East) and micro levels (Iraq versus the U.S.).

2.3 Macro opinion

With micro level public sentiment among Iraq and U.S. citizens qualified, attention turns to macro level opinion. We will analyze Arab/Muslim and U.S. opinion to: a) qualify U.S.-Arab relations is influenced by micro level conflict; b) compare macro Arab/Muslim opinion to micro level opinion observed in Iraq; and c) underscore the importance of historical events and their systemic influence on Middle Eastern perceptions of the West in general, and the United States in particular, as explained by Funk and Said (2004). Inclusion of macro opinion, thus, demonstrates commonalities between micro and macro level sentiment, while simultaneously providing an opportunity to interject scholarly research and discourse on relations between the Middle East and West. Moreover, much of the research conducted in conflict resolution occurs at the micro level, or Arab/Muslim and Western cultures, as opposed to the micro level. For instance, most of the conflict resolution literature examined for this research centers on Arab/Muslim and Western traditions, as articulated in the forthcoming part of this thesis.

With this in mind, scholars emphasize that Western intervention (Britain and the U.S.) in the region influences how inhabitants conceptualize their relational counterpart (Funk and Said, 2004: 10; Goldschmidt, 2004: 49-50). For example, historical experiences that influence sentiment include colonialism, the imposed demarcation of territory (creating territories/countries and appropriating authority over them as colonial powers), and exploitation of resources (petroleum) found in the Middle East (Funk and Said, 2004: 10;

Tétreault, 2004: 133-138). Such events, among others, have impacted perceptions of inhabitants in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)[53].

The following subsections follow a theoretical framework constructed upon Nathan Funk and Abdul Aziz Said's (2004) essay, "Islam and the West: Narratives of Conflict and Conflict Transformation," which qualifies contemporary relations between the United States/Western societies and Arab/Muslim societies. In their analysis, the authors underscore similarities across cultural perceptions and provide evidence to support the hypothesis that these societies are engaged in an epic struggle against the "other" (Funk and Said, 2004: 4). Summarizing the quality of the relationship, the authors write: "On both sides of the troubled relationship between Americans and the Muslim Middle East, there is deep estrangement and a growing belief in the futility of communication" (Funk and Said, 2004: 1). The deep estrangement denoted by Funk and Said, I believe, is observable at the micro level (U.S.-Iraq relations), and is subject to conflict continuation or escalation. We first analyze Arab/Muslim opinion of the U.S., then address Middle Eastern perceptions of the West, U.S./Western perception of Muslims and conclude with a general assessment of the findings presented.

2.3.1 Arab/Muslim opinion of the U.S.

Muslim enmity toward the United States is a long-standing phenomenon (Abdallah, 2003: 62). However, negative sentiment deepened following the military intervention and subsequent occupations of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), as demonstrated in periodic polling (Jackson and Towle, 2006: 17; Pew Research Center, 2013; 2007: 14-15; University of Michigan and Eastern Michigan University, 2006). Between 2003 and 2009, a majority of respondents throughout the Middle East expressed negative opinions of the United States (Telhami, 2009: 2; Zogby and Zogby, 2009: 2). Following the election of Barack Obama, the U.S. enjoyed marginal improvement in public opinion throughout the world, including the Middle East, although a majority of Arab/Muslim respondents in the latter region continued to hold an "unfavorable" opinion (77%) of the United States (Telhami, 2009: 2-9). This minor alteration in sentiment correlates with an expected change in Obama's foreign policy style, as 51% of respondents in the MENA expected policy changes (Telhami, 2009: 2-9). Hence, there was an initial lull in popular sentiment, yet the MENA region continued to hold a predominantly negative opinion of the United States.

[53] The use of the phrase North Africa in this text denotes the geographic region of northern Africa that borders the Mediterranean Sea. This region includes the recognized countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Western Sahara. Because Egypt straddles the North Africa-Middle Eastern divide, it is included in both categories

The adjustment in popular opinion following the election of Barack Obama was, nonetheless, temporary. BBC News (in collaboration with GlobeScan and Program on International Policy Attitudes [PIPA]), for instance, found no observable increase in regional opinion of the United States (BBC News and others, 2010). Contrary, they found a majority of respondents from Turkey (70%) and Egypt (52%) continued to express negative sentiment toward the U.S. (BBC News and others, 2010)[54]. Follow-up surveys similarly demonstrate marginal fluctuation in general opinion of the United States throughout the region (Telhami, 2011: 24-27). For instance a 2011 study shows a continuation in the predominant trend of enmity toward the United States (Telhami, 2011: 3).

With a clear majority of inhabitants in predominantly Arab/Muslim countries throughout the MENA holding negative views of the United States for a prolonged period of time, we wish to examine the source of animosity. Root causes are generally divided into two categories: U.S. policy and cultural differences. On the one hand, some researchers suggest U.S. regional policy influences popular perceptions. In terms of policy objectives, surveys conducted between 2006 and 2008 found a majority of MENA respondents believe the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq sought: to control Iraq's oil supply (Abdallah, 2003: 63; DeYoung, 2007; Telhami, 2009: 17; University of Michigan and Eastern Michigan University, 2006); to establish a permanent military presence in Iraq (Abdallah, 2003: 69-70; Kull, 2007: 7), and/or; to acquire complete control of Iraq (Abdallah, 2003: 62; Tripp, 2007: 282). Popular suspicions were reinforced by U.S. policies during the occupation, such as the introduction of the CPA (chapter 1, section 3) and the protection of Iraq's oil production facilities, rather than ensuring civil order (chapter 1, section 2). The sentiment qualified also mirrors that expressed by Iraqis outlined in chapter 2, section 1.7.

Later surveys conducted between 2009 and 2011 illustrate that regional respondents believed that U.S. interests in the Middle East were driven by the desire to control oil and protect Israel (Telhami, 2011: 31)[55]. These perceived strategic objectives are problematic for U.S.-Middle East relations because they contradict Arab/Muslim economic, social, political, and religious needs and aspirations (Abdallah, 2003: 62). U.S. regional policy also lends credence to suspicion. For instance, the U.S. occupied Iraq, it maintains tight relations with oil producing countries, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and it provides weapons and aid to Israel. For these reasons, it is logical that Arab/Muslims conclude corresponding interests

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[54] Exhaustive results of the survey are available at BBC News and others (2010).

[55] Comparatively, Telhami (2009: 17) found respondents believed the protection of Israel (52%); controlling the regional supply of oil (43%); weakening the Muslim world (38%); and preserving U.S. regional and global dominance (24%) were priorities of the United States.

drive U.S. policy; objectives that place the United States at odds with Arab/Muslim interests who generally desire for a complete withdrawal of U.S. influence from the region.

Centering our attention on perceptions of U.S.-Iraq relations, most Muslims believe the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was unjustified and detrimental to Iraq and its inhabitants (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 61). Negative perceptions were exacerbated by U.S. implementation of controversial policies such as de-Ba'athification and the utilization of indiscriminate violence that claimed civilian lives and trampled (individual and collective) honor (Fontan, 2006: 220-227). Combined, U.S. policy contradicted the Bush administration's stated objectives of providing humanitarian assistance, or promoting democracy and human rights in Iraq in the eyes of Arab/Muslims (Abdallah, 2003: 62; Kepel, 2004: 238). Contrary, the U.S. created a humanitarian crisis, institutionalized sectarianism, and violated basic human rights (incarceration and internment) during the occupation. Its policies, therefore, did not correspond to the stated intentions of the administration and increased regional suspicion.

The impact of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq on regional sentiment was profound. As observed during our analysis of public opinion in Iraq, the degree of macro level negative sentiment expressed toward the U.S. occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan led Arab/Muslims throughout the region to condone the use of violence against U.S. military forces to hasten their withdrawal (Kull, 2007: 7; Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2006: 2). Steve Kull (2007) qualifies Arab/Muslim endorsement of attacks against the U.S.-led coalition as follows:

> On average […] approximately half favored such attacks, with three in ten opposed, but there were substantial variations between countries. Very large majorities in Egypt said they supported such attacks, as did robust majorities in Morocco. Pakistanis tended to be divided and Indonesians were mostly opposed (Kull, 2007: 7).

The condoning of violence throughout the MENA, as articulated in the quote, is dangerous and concerning since approximately half of the region advocated violence against U.S. targets. These figures demonstrate the degree to which Arab/Muslims in the region were opposed to U.S. intervention and the magnitude of dissatisfaction and suspicion they felt.

Therefore, Telhami (2004) deduces that U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East is an influential referencing point when Arab/Muslim respondents formulate their opinions of the United States. Instructively, polling demonstrates that seventy-eight percent of Middle East respondents claim that their opinion of the United States is contingent on U.S. foreign policy rather than on what are (often ambiguously) described as "American values" (for instance, freedom of speech or the press) (Telhami, 2004: 38). Providing additional insight, polling

conducted between 2009 and 2011 determines which U.S. policies respondents claimed would alter their perception of the United States. One study found that Arab/Muslims in the Middle East desire: 1) a withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq (25%) and, 2) a U.S. military withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula (25%) (Telhami, 2009: 16). The third most popular policy change that respondents stated the U.S. could take to improve their opinion was to broker an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement (41%) (Telhami, 2009: 16). Others surveys likewise found that regional respondents' favor reduced United States military presence in predominantly Muslim countries (BBC News, 2010d; Finel and Gell, 2007: 15-18; Funk and Said, 2004: 12; Telhami, 2011: 28). Combined, polling suggests that U.S. action influences regional opinion (Telhami, 2004: 38; 2011: 28; Zogby and Zogby, 2009: 6), which implies that the U.S could pursue policies that would reverse the degree of regional enmity expressed toward the United States.

On the other hand, there is a cultural element that must likewise be considered when contextualizing Arab/Muslim perceptions of the United States. Research, for instance, shows that most MENA inhabitants believed that U.S. policy in the Middle East was designed to "weaken and divide the Islamic world" (79%) and to "spread Christianity" (64%) (Kull, 2007: 5). Therefore, Arab/Muslims perceive U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq as threatening to Islam and Muslims, or their identity (Abdallah, 2003: 67; Jackson and Towle, 2006: 134). Such perceptions are disconcerting since they suggest the United States is an existential threat to MENA identity. Consequently, the sentiment is problematic for bilateral relations as identity impacts on perceptions and behavior, and has the potential to induce conflict continuation or escalation (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 13; Funk and Said, 2004: 6; Galtung, 2004: 141; Lederach, 1995: 18).

Reference to identity introduces complex evaluative parameters that include both positive and negative aspects in this particular instance. Abdallah (2003: 63) and Funk and Said (2004: 11), for example, acknowledge the complexity of perspectives in the MENA, as inhabitants view both positive and negative aspects of Western society and culture. Summarizing a dichotomy of "envy and fear, admiration and suspicion," Funk and Said (2004: 11) state that "Western technological, economic and political achievements are appealing, while the assertion of Western military, political, and economic power creates feelings of distrust and resentment." The quotes emphasize that Arab/Muslims observe both admirable and distasteful qualities in the West (Abdallah, 2003: 63). One potential value of appreciating the complexity of Arab/Muslim perceptions of the West is that it demonstrates there are avenues for pursuing cross-cultural discourse, cooperation and practices for fostering improved relations (Funk and

Said, 2004: 15-18). Pursuit of improved relations requires dialogue, defined here as a symmetrical discussion on issues which aids in the enhancement of mutual awareness and understanding, problem solving and increased trust (Head, 2012: 41), to determine which U.S. actions would change attitudes and under which conditions and circumstances the region prefers to interact with the United States.

The potential for productive dialogue naturally necessitates stakeholders view the "other" as a trustworthy partner. Unfortunately, as expressed above, regional experience and U.S. duplicitous behavior has compromised bilateral trust (Funk and Said, 2004: 12). For example, there are obvious contradictions between U.S. policy and its stated policy objectives and values as evident in Iraq. Most notably, the George W. Bush administration's rhetorical promotion of democracy and human rights (which Arab/Muslim populations admire) was contradicted through practices such as the use of torture and illegal detention (Abdallah, 2003: 66; Amnesty International, 2008; 2013: 12-13; Kepel, 2004: 237). Similarly, Abdallah (2003: 68-70) includes U.S. support for undemocratic and oppressive governments throughout the Middle East, which equally contradicts political assertions by U.S. leaders that they desire to proliferate democratic governance or human rights internationally. In this latter instance, U.S. support for unpopular and undemocratic leaders in the Middle East, and mismanaged or misinformed policies, gives the impression of duplicity. Such sentiment, in turn, undermines Arab/Muslim popular trust because behavior does not correspond with rhetoric (Abdallah, 2003: 68-70; Calhoun, 2005: 104; Marsella, 2005: 665), giving credence to the perception that the United States is untrustworthy and not a respectable counterpart for conducting dialogue.

Exacerbating popular mistrust, the predominance of popular suspicion is often monopolized on by political or religious leaders and the media in the MENA, who aggravate or manipulate preexisting stereotypes of the U.S. to their advantage (Abdallah, 2003: 69; Funk and Said, 2004: 6; Gage and others, 2003: 3-4). For instance, Funk and Said (2004: 6) suggest: "Middle Eastern programming […] often provides grist for the mill of defeatist, conspiratorial theories of American foreign policy making." Such propaganda, as outlined in the quote, is utilized to refocus attention away from Arab/Muslim leaders and onto the West (Funk and Said, 2004: 6-7). When MENA leaders and respected figures transfer responsibility for prevalent political-social conditions in the region to Western countries, focus and accountability is reallocated away from local representatives (Funk and Said, 2004: 6-7). While not always accurate, such excuses are widely accepted by local populations, as they are consistent with preexisting stereotypes of the West and/or the United States (Funk and Said, 2004: 6-7).

In summary, there is a high degree of distrust and suspicion in the MENA of the United States. These qualities undermine bilateral relations and appeals for dialogue, scuttling hopes of establishing trust and pursuing mutual understanding. It was, however, noted that MENA inhabitants recognize both admirable and deplorable qualities when contemplating the United States government and society. The existence of admirable qualities may provide avenues for pursuing improved relations across cultures, should they be examined and monopolized upon.

2.3.2 Middle Eastern perception of the West

Funk and Said (2004: 14) argue the derivation of the conflictive relationship between Arab/Muslims and the West is mainly identity-based rather than associated to foreign policy in general. The authors emphasize identity as a source when articulating the dichotomous relationship between Arab/Muslims and Westerners with the "other." They write:

> The problem […] has nothing to do with what we are doing, and everything to do with who they are and what motivates them – for example, hate, greed, and antipathy to our values. They are different from us; we value reasonable, peaceful approaches to problems while they seek to impose their own culture by force. The conflict is about identity, not policies – about opposed values but not about concerns, interests, and needs that often overlap (Funk and Said, 2004: 14).

Funk and Said thus regard identity as the foundation of conflict between the West and Arab/Muslim communities, which challenge the hypotheses offered by Telhami (2009), Gage and others (2003), Mogahed (2006) and others that anti-Western/American perceptions are rooted in (U.S.) foreign policy, as emphasized in the previous subsection. The practical and theoretical implications of Funk and Said's (2004: 14) assertion are that foreign policy alteration alone is insufficient for improving cross-cultural perceptions. Contrary, perceptions of the "other" should be the focal point to ensure cognitive reframing.

Testing this theory, available open-source literature qualifies how Arab/Muslims conceptualize the conflict relation with the West. Polling data provides support Funk and Said's (2004) hypothesis that negative perceptions are identity-based. For instance, Esposito and Mogahed (2010: 35) asked respondents to identify the roots of cross-cultural conflict, and found that respondents from MENA countries ranked religion (40%), political (40%) and cultural (9%) differences respectively. Of these, religion and culture are identity-based (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 35). Fortunately, their research includes a sample of Iraq citizens, so it is possible to isolate their opinions. At the micro level, Iraqis perceived the roots of conflict between the Arab/Muslims and the West as 45% political, 36% religious and 10% culture (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 41), suggesting some variation between micro and

macro level sentiment. Nonetheless, nearly half of MENA and Iraqi respondents indicate the roots of conflict are identity-based (religion and culture), as opposed to policy based.

Identifying the typology of roots is important since they qualitatively influence how current and future bilateral relations are perceived and how they might be altered (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 35-41). On the one hand, those respondents who view conflict as rooted in religion and/or culture are increasingly likely to predict conflict between Muslims and the West is unavoidable (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 36). In short, identity-based sources of conflict complicate the potential of implementing and achieving conflict resolution. On the other hand, those who view cross-cultural conflict as politically motivated tend to be more optimistic about the probability that future conflict can be avoided (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 35-41), as it is easier to alter policy than identity.

From these findings, it can be surmised that singular efforts to alter policy has the potential of mollifying respondents whom believe conflict is politically rooted (Gage and others, 2003: 2-3). Nevertheless, policy change will be less effective for altering opinions of those who perceive the conflict is rooted in cultural or religious differences (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 35-41). In this latter instance, conflict runs deeper and requires cognitive alterations. Hence, the emphasis on religion and culture as being sources of conflict indicates that conflict across the examined cultures is more resistant to conflict resolution or compromise (Svensson, 2013: 413-414). Conflict resilience is couched on the premise that alteration of deeply rooted and/or identity-based issues requires changing the perceptions of both parties to effect cognitive transformation.

Despite the qualified root causes of conflict across cultures, researchers optimistically suggest that conflict resolution is still possible in this instance. Esposito and Mogahed (2010: 21), for example, found that 61% of MENA respondents believe that the quality of Muslim-West relations is pertinent to them. Equally positive, half of them (55%) feel that conflict between Arab/Muslim and Western culture can be avoided (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 35). Respondents also overwhelmingly agree that Muslims respect the West (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 23), and sixty-one percent perceive the international Muslim community is committed to improving relations with the West (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 21). While the qualified opinions provide reasons for optimism among the "in-group", Muslim respondents are less optimistic when projecting "out-group" opinion of Muslims or their interest in altering cross-cultural relationships (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 52).

Although a majority of MENA respondents believe conflict between Muslims and the West is avoidable, "most did not believe conflict is being avoided currently" (Esposito and

Mogahed, 2010: 19). Hence, the quote emphasizes that responsibility for not avoiding conflict is transferred to the West. For instance, 65% of MENA respondents claim the West does not respect Muslims (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 52). Disrespect is problematic for building constructive relationships as it produces mistrust and grievances. In a similar vein, half of Arab/Muslim respondents believe that Muslims residing in the West are not "treated as equal citizens" and are instead "excluded from social, political and civic life" (Gallup, 2011: 6). The perceived grievances outlined in the quote are associated with inequality and exclusion; discriminatory practices which Muslim respondents desire the West to alter (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 24-55).

In closing, the survey goes on to query those changes Arab/Muslim respondents deem necessary. To bridge cross-cultural differences, 63% of MENA citizens believe that increased social interaction would improve the quality of Muslim-West relations (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 24). Interaction is naturally expected to impart increased understanding and appreciation. Additional, a majority expresses a desire for inhabitants in the West to: respect Islam and its symbols; to treat Muslims fairly; and properly depict Muslims in film and media (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 55; Gallup, 2011: 7). Once again, these are identity-based issues that cause Muslims to feel victimized by the West due to stereotypes and their treatment. However, completing our discursive circle, Mogahed (2006: 3) also found that Muslims want the West to "stop interfering in the internal affairs of predominantly Muslim states." This discovery suggests that policy decisions, as well as identity-based issues, equally influence how Arab/Muslim and Western/U.S. conflict relations are formed and conceptualized. Conclusively, while foreign policy alterations are necessary, they need to be administered in conjunction with an alteration in cross-cultural perceptions and behavior to change the quality of bilateral relations across these cultures.

2.3.3 U.S./Western perceptions of Muslims

From the reverse angle, U.S./Western perceptions of the "other" mirror Arab/Muslim conceptualizations noted in the previous subsections. At the micro-level, anti-Muslim feelings among U.S. citizens increased subsequent to 9/11 (Mogahed, 2006: 1). Dalia Mogahed (2006: 1) discovered that 39% of U.S. citizens admit to having "felt some prejudice" toward Muslims. Prejudice may correlate with Tessler's (2003: 175) finding that 54% of U.S. citizens perceived the 9/11 attacks as a conflict between Christianity and Islam. Hence, U.S. negative opinion of Arab/Muslims is high, and respondents perceive religion is an important root in the contemporary cross-cultural conflict.

Other researchers have found that negative perceptions are rooted in the Western conceptualization of Arab/Muslims as being inferior and responsive only to coercion and violence (Hashim, 2006: 211; Lieberfeld, 2005: 13). The danger of such perceptions is that it degrades and demonizes the "other" while suggesting that violence is necessary to manage the quality and trajectory of the relationship (Galtung, 2004: 78). Further explaining the roots of negative sentiment, Funk and Said (2004: 4-14) accuse the West of misinterpreting and misunderstanding inhabitants of the Middle East and followers of Islam. Prevalent misinterpretation and misunderstanding is attributed to a general lack of knowledge or interest in Islam and the Middle East (in terms of history, culture, and so forth) (Fattah and Caso, 2009: 268; Funk and Said, 2004; Mogahed, 2006: 2). Such bold accusations are supported by research data. For example, a majority of U.S. respondents openly admit to knowing very little about Islam (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 37; Mogahed, 2006: 2). Consequently, a knowledge deficit is projected to increase the likelihood of instances of racism (Hashim, 2006: 287), distrust and hatred (Funk and Said, 2004: 4-14; Mogahed, 2006: 2-3).

Demonstrating the subversive effects of the knowledge deficit, a 2002 survey found 39% of U.S. respondents perceive Islam as "more prone than other religions to encourage violence in defense of their faith" (Smidt, 2005: 249). The perceptions outlined in the quote are rooted in the stereotype that Arab/Muslims are religious radicals, and the common association of radicalism with terrorism as broadcast by Western media (Funk and Said, 2004: 4-14). Popular stereotypes of Arab/Muslims are, therefore, derived from a crude reduction of a complex community.

Within this discourse, Funk and Said (2004) assert:

> The dominant image of Islam in the West conveys the idea that the religion of approximately one fifth of humanity is an intolerantly ideological and prone to violence. Instead of taking critical analyses of Western attitudes toward Islam and the Middle East seriously, many who claim knowledge of the Islamic world focus overwhelmingly on threads of hatred and fear articulated through religious discourse, without reflection on the complex and deeply conflicted situations in which these sentiments emerge. This reinforces a background of deep suspicion against which Muslims must acquit themselves in order to be heard in policymaking circles (Funk and Said, 2004: 13).

The quote emphasizes how U.S. citizens crudely reduce Islam into a collective body of religious radicals, an inaccurate starting point from which Muslims are forced to escape.

Complicating objectivity, the perception of Muslims being violent is propagated by political rhetoric and the mass media to which "the average Westerner" is exposed (Funk and Said, 2004: 12-13). In this manner, a complex social and religious system is reduced to "a

simple ‘moderate vs. extremist’ dichotomy, typically leaving the impression that the most ‘strict’ and even disturbing interpretations of Islamic values are the most authentic and widely accepted” (Funk and Said, 2004: 6). The quote accentuates that the rudimentary manner in which Muslims and Islam are often presented by politicians and the media reinforces popular notions of an Arab/Muslim proclivity for violence. These notions are promoted through excessive media coverage of violence, terrorism, and radicalism that produce and reinforce stereotypes, while ignoring the fact that “radicals” in the Middle East have minor social, political and religious influence (Funk and Said, 2004: 12-15; Gerges, 2009: 290). As misconceptions proliferate, Western recipients “retreat into defensiveness rather than seek the reasons for passionately held Muslim views” (Funk and Said, 2004: 13). Western citizens are thus suggested to neglect acquiring increased knowledge of drivers of Arab/Muslim grievances and animosity toward the West, and contrary absolve responsibility by conjecturing that all Muslims are violent radicals.

Upon this foundation, we redirect our attention to further examining how U.S. citizens conceptualize the root causes of cross-cultural violence. When qualifying root causes of conflict between Arab/Muslims and the West, 35% of U.S. citizens feel inter-cultural divisions are politically based, 36% that they are religiously, and 26% believe they are cultural (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 38, 41; Gallup, 2011: 4). Here, we observe that a majority of U.S. citizens perceive divergences are culturally and religiously influenced which suggest the conflict is identity based rather than policy based (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 28-41). At its extreme, twenty percent of U.S. respondents feel that “most Muslims around the world are not accepting of other religions and of people of different races other than their own” (Gallup, 2011: 12). While a small percentage express such radical opinions, their accusatory approach, combined with the identity-based roots of the conflict, makes bridging relations across these cultures more challenging than resolving political differences (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 28-41).

By way of conclusion, U.S. respondents are pessimistic that relations between Arab/Muslims and the West can become constructive (Mogahed, 2006: 1-2). Justification for pessimism is found in the fifty-eight percent of respondents who believed that Arab/Muslims are disinterested in improving relations with the West (Mogahed, 2006: 2). Like Arab/Muslims, U.S. respondents project blame for the quality of U.S.-Middle East relations onto the “other”. For example, “one-third of Americans say they think Muslim countries have a very unfavorable opinion of the U.S,” and they believe such sentiment is a result of “misinformation” (Gallup, 2011: 18-19). This sentiment creates a relational impasse.

Nonetheless, Western perceptions are not completely fatalistic. U.S. citizens, for example, perceive value in maintaining a relationship with Muslims. Approximately three quarters of U.S. respondents feel Muslim-Western interaction is beneficial (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 22, 29). Moreover, those respondents who view a future relationship positively far outweigh the twenty-one percent that perceive Muslims as a threat (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 29-30). Equally positive, 53% of U.S. citizens acknowledge, "the West does not respect the Muslim world" (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 52-53)[56]. This finding alone suggests that U.S. citizens recognize their contribution to the deconstructive relationship. The combination of findings denoted here are reassuring in terms of proclivity for cultivating improved relations, suggesting that there is a foundation upon which constructive relations could be established.

2.3.4 General assessment

This section qualified macro level sentiment between the West and the Middle East. We demonstrated that there has been long-standing Arab/Muslim enmity toward the U.S. and the West, of which negative sentiment toward the former was exacerbated by the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. We also illustrated that scholars suggest animosity across Western and Arab Muslim cultures is rooted in policy and identity. On the one hand, U.S./Western policy is suggested by Arab/Muslims to demonstrate that the United States/West is trying to undermine Islam and take control of the region. Such sentiment, it was demonstrated, suggests that policy changes would help to alter popular sentiment.

On the other hand, some scholars emphasize that the conflictual relationship between the West and Arab/Muslims is deeply rooted and identity based. Funk and Said (2004) brilliantly accentuate the depth of conflict at the macro level in this frame. They summarize: "The Western idea that Islam is violence-prone finds its Muslim counterpoint in the notion that the West is viewed as inherently oppressive; both views are rooted in particular ways of construing history—ways that are intended to legitimize warfare" (Funk and Said, 2004: 15). The present quote accentuates the existential nature of the conflict and the cross-cultural parallels in perceptions, which suggests that identity, behavior and cognitive processing all play a role in the construction and maintenance of the conflictual relationship.

Qualifying the roots of conflict is essential for understanding how conflict resolution might be approached across cultures. If conflict is identity based, policy changes alone are insufficient because Arab/Muslims and Westerners perceive the cross-cultural conflict is

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[56] Acknowledged disrespect remained consistent between 2008 and 2011 (Gallup, 2011: 3).

rooted primarily in religious and cultural divergences. Consequently, mutual cognitive and behavioral changes must occur. Contrary, when conflict is rooted in political differences, it is considered less problematic by comparison to religious and cultural divergences, since it requires policy changes. In conclusion, it appears that both policy and identity influences bilateral perceptions and both should be addressed to resolve the conflict at the macro level.

Finally, we briefly outlined U.S./Western perspectives of Muslims. It was demonstrated that U.S. citizens express enmity toward Muslims, while admitting that they have limited knowledge about Islam. Our analysis also qualified U.S./Western tendencies to stereotype Muslims as violent radicals. Such trends increase the propensity for suspicion and violence. Moreover, U.S./Westerners view religion as a primary root of conflict, since Islam is commonly perceived as promoting intolerance. It is expected to be difficult to pursue conflict resolution, because the conflict is rooted in identity rather than policy.

Summarizing bilateral conflict sentiment, Funk and Said (2004) emphasize: “This idea of the ‘other’ as an inferior rival or shadow of the ‘self’ has led to dehumanizing stereotypes as well as to habits of selective perception in which negative interactions are remembered while more positive encounters are forgotten” (Funk and Said, 2004: 4-5). As denoted, these dichotomous and violent perceptions make conflict continuation across cultures likely. It is, therefore, necessary to alter the identity, perceptions, and behavior to advance conflict resolution.

The depth of conflict within society complicates the probability of resolving the conflict. For instance, one recognized practice of improving relations is dialogue where discussions can be held on conflict roots and possible techniques of resolving outstanding, conflict-generating divergences (Calhoun, 2005: 105; Funk and Said, 2004: 16; Head, 2012: 41; Ropers, 2003: 2-4). However, Funk and Said (2004: 1) caution, “[o]n both sides of the troubled relationship between Americans and the Muslim Middle East, there is deep estrangement and a growing belief in the futility of communication.” Funk and Said’s quote suggests a methodological paradox, since dialogue is thought useful for designing a framework (Bar-On, 2004: 251; Kriesberg, 2004: 103-105) but is rejected by both cultures. While the depth of cross-cultural conflict is obvious, and practices to advance it are fraught with challenges, Funk and Said remain optimistic about the utility of conflict resolution in context as long as the program is not used “to establish the rightness of existing positions,” or convert the other (Funk and Said, 2004: 13). Rather than using a process of conflict resolution to project and prove one’s rightness, as articulated in the quote, the authors argue that cognitive transformation should occur symmetrically whereby mutual change and amity can be advanced.

The former paragraph raises two issues. On the one hand, Funk and Said's reference to conflict resolution raises an important conceptual and theoretical question: namely, is conflict resolution conceptualized and practiced in similar manners across these cultures? This question is examined in the second part of the research when conflict resolution is analyzed through a literature review of Western and Arab/Muslim scholars' conceptualizations to qualify convergences and divergences across cultures. On the other hand, Gallup research found that most respondents throughout predominantly Western and Muslim countries "were neither receptive nor rejecting of Muslim-West relations" (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 49). Hence, at the macro level, both groupings can be most appropriately described as indifferent toward improved relations across cultures (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 49). Despite the suggested indifference, we argue that conflict resolution is necessary at the micro level and will test cross-cultural conceptualizations and openness to conflict resolution between the United States and Iraq through survey research in chapter 6.

2.4 Conclusion

The objective of the present chapter was to present numerous political, social and economic consequences of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War and their repercussions on micro and macro level public opinion. Utilizing open source data and scholarly literature available in the English language, we were able to construct a snapshot of cross-cultural public opinion. Our analysis demonstrates there are social implications of historical and contemporary interaction between the United States and Iraq at the micro level, as well as between the U.S. and MENA at the macro level. The contents of this chapter, in addition to chapter 1, prove Hypothesis 1, that the long-standing conflict relationship between the United States and Iraq has produced bilateral animosity between the two societies, which is most easily qualified subsequent to the 2003 war and occupation.

The chapter opened by qualifying popular opinion in Iraq. It demonstrated that sentiment toward the invasion was initially polarized and then rapidly became negative as the occupation endured. It was simultaneously illustrated that perceptions initially diverged according to ethnic or sectarian affiliation, notably that the Sunni were usually more negative in their assessments than the Shi'a and Kurds. However, by the end of the war, negative sentiment toward the occupation increased among all major identity groups in Iraq, signifying that events had decreased the quality of perceptions. The increased animosity expressed toward the U.S. and coalition forces as the occupation endured is determined a result of the conditions experienced, for instance increased sectarian violence and the insurgency. Equally

problematic in terms of the quality of bilateral relations, as negative popular sentiment increased, it is paralleled by increased acceptance of attacks on coalition forces.

Increased avocation of attacks against the coalition is rooted in the perceptions of the occupation as unwanted, the U.S. as disinterested in the welfare of the country and its citizens, and the placement of blame for conditions experienced during the occupation squarely onto the United States. In particular, many Iraqis blame the U.S. for the prevailing insecurity and other problems experienced during the occupation. These include responsibility for increased sectarian divisions, the proliferation of insecurity, and the relative instability of Iraq in current geopolitical terms. At its extreme, Iraqis perceive that the U.S. purposefully sabotaged Iraq, stole its resources and functioned to undermine Islam. By the end of the occupation, most Iraqis, regardless of their identity, perceived the U.S. invasion was more harmful than helpful.

Thereafter, we examined the human and social impact of the war and occupation on Iraq. While there are diverging estimates concerning the quantity of death produced, most agree that a minimum of 100,000 Iraqi civilians died as a result of the war and occupation. Similarly, a large portion of Iraq's society was internally or externally displaced as a result of the war. Among the displaced, some citizens escaped prior to the invasion, while others were forced to relocate during the occupation. Included in the statistics examined, Iraq lost a respectable portion of middle class citizens and professionals that would have been beneficial to the reconstruction of the country. Displacement was caused by a combination of factors including U.S. military operations and (forced) ethnic cleansing of areas by sectarian militias. Irrespective of its origins, the pervasiveness of these human and social tragedies affected society at large, since at least one-fifth of the population are estimated to have died or been displacement as a result of U.S. intervention between 2003 and 2011.

Attention then turned to Iraqi perception of U.S. military conduct. We illustrated that many Iraqis prioritized security, although most felt that the U.S. military performed inadequately and were responsible for the insecurity that proliferated. Our qualification of sentiment provides insight into Iraqi mistrust of the U.S. military which corresponds with their desire for a rapid end to the occupation and endorsement of violence against them to hasten a withdrawal. Overall negative sentiment expressed toward U.S. military performance is attributed to the unwanted occupation as well as its failure to provide security. In addition, the U.S. military's prioritization of force protection, whose implementation witnessed troops protecting and isolating themselves, transferred risk to civilians.

At this point, our literature review emphasized that force protection in Iraq was counterproductive as it undermined COIN strategy and failed to establish constructive

relationships between occupying force and the occupied. Such failures increased insecurity, placed the population at increased risk and undermined military-civilian interaction which otherwise might have increased trust, mutual awareness and cross-cultural understanding. Similarly, we noted that the projection of disproportional force is another component of force protection that equally transfers the risk of combat from the troops to civilians. By projecting power, military forces are able to reduce troop casualties, but the tactic has the propensity of increasing civilian casualties in urban combat. Combined, U.S. military practices during the occupation produced civilian casualties, humiliated and incensed Iraqis, and exacerbated anti-occupation sentiment.

Thereafter, security concerns were explored. To contextualize security in contemporary scholarly discourse, we briefly examined human security, as it is associated with the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Subsequent to a brief outline of human security, its history and shortcomings, we explored Iraqi opinion concerning security. It was noted that while the U.S. and Iraqis placed a high priority on security, the U.S. failed to deliver. Rampant insecurity caused the number of Iraqi civilian deaths to swell, which further undermined popular confidence in the coalition. Ultimately, prevalent insecurity placed Iraq in a dilemma, where Iraqis wanted the U.S. to withdraw immediately, but they simultaneously feared U.S. departure would intensify violence. Nevertheless, it was not until 2010 that Iraqis expressed the opinion that security was improving. However, these gains were reversed in 2012 when sectarian violence and IS operations caused another spike in insecurity.

Exacerbating the social and political turmoil inside Iraq was the manifestation of (violent) sectarian division and competition. As denoted, sectarian fracturing first manifested in retributive killings and isolated violence, and later transformed into ethnic cleansing and competition for positions of authority at the local and national levels, which coalition forces failed to curb. The competition for authority witnessed individuals assuming posts and then distributing positions, goods and services according to sectarian identity. The United States is held responsible for producing sectarian conflict for two reasons. First, analysts and Iraqis perceive U.S. policy was driven by pro-Shi‘a and anti-Sunni sentiment, with the U.S. favoring the former over the latter, a (perceived) tendency that exacerbated preexisting social tensions. For instance, de-Ba‘athification, as noted in chapter 1, is perceived a demonstration of favoritism. Second, the United States also aided and rewarded those who embraced goals similar to the occupier. In this manner, the U.S. appointed individuals to posts at the local and national levels who appeared to adhere to similar objectives. In many cases, the Sunni had refused to cooperate and thereby were marginalized. Combined, such policies benefited

particular identity groups, institutionalized sectarianism in Iraq's political and social structures, and are believed to have augmented insecurity and violence between Iraq's heterogeneous groups as competition escalated.

Finally, analysis of opinion in Iraq closed by noting the general suspicions of the U.S. subsequent to the invasion and occupation. Here, we underscored several objectives Iraqis perceive were driving U.S. policy, such as the desire to acquire Iraq's natural resources or counter Islam. We also noted that anti-Americanism was rooted in distrust of the United States as a result of historical experiences endured, including U.S. failure to aid rebellions following the 1991 War and the decade of sanctioning endured during the 1990s. Augmented by unpopular decisions made during the occupation, there was a persistent degree of negative opinions toward the United States across a spectrum of issues.

The second section of chapter two qualified the effects of the war on the U.S. and its citizens. Since the invasion and occupation was asymmetrical both in terms of military capability, venue and effects, our assessment reflects this reality. We began by analyzing public perceptions of the war. While the issue divided popular opinion in the run-up to the invasion, once the invasion was underway, a majority of U.S. citizens supported the endeavor. However, as the occupation endured, many U.S. citizens reversed their opinion and determined that the war was a mistake. Subsequent to the end of the occupation, many citizens believed the operation in Iraq did not achieve its goals.

Focus then shifted to the human cost of the war, in addition to the impact of the war on society. While U.S. casualties were quantitatively smaller than those experienced in Iraq, their social impact is quite profound. In fact, about half of U.S. citizens claim to have known someone who served in Iraq and twelve percent knew someone whom had been killed or injured while serving. The statistics are extraordinary considering that less than one percent of the U.S. population was active duty military personnel between 2003 and 2011. At the same time, we denoted the psychological complications experienced among veterans and their families. There has been a significant increase in the rates of suicide and domestic violence among soldiers and veterans of the war, creating long-term social concerns.

We then examined the cost of the war in terms of military overstretch and the quality and integrity of the armed forces. Here it was demonstrated that U.S. military capacity was over-extended, which pressured the DOD to make controversial decisions and implement critical measures that directly impacted on soldiers and society. On the one hand, the military lacked the necessary resources to provide personal protective equipment to troops deployed to Iraq, and in some instances, soldiers and citizens had to privately purchase such equipment to

ensure its availability. In this instance, military overstretch put the lives of U.S. soldiers at increased risk. On the other hand, the military was pressured to adapt wartime best practices through policies such as stop loss. Combined, these shortcomings undermined troop morale, popular trust, and are suggested to have impacted the psychological well-being of soldiers who served.

Next, we analyzed the ballooning U.S. federal deficit. It was outlined that the fiscal cost of the war was purposefully postponed by the George W. Bush administration due to its reluctance to increase taxes. Rather than increase taxes and encourage savings, the generally accepted fiscal approach during wartime, citizens were encouraged to spend and taxes were kept to a minimum. While his policy may have reduced popular backlash throughout the occupation, it discreetly deferred the cost of the war and increased the federal deficit.

We then examined media censorship and misinformation. Although U.S. citizens frequently prioritize (individual) constitutional rights such as freedom of the press, these valued principles were not observed during wartime. For instance, the Bush administration imposed bans on photos and film footage of deceased U.S. soldiers. Similarly, many war correspondents were embedded into combat units, a practice that censors information and encourages the journalist to bond with the unit they are attached to, thereby producing biased journalism. At the same time, mainstream media corporations self-censored information and/or provided disinformation, or failed to provide objective reporting. Accordingly, freedom of the press and objective reporting were undermined.

Lastly, we examined U.S. public perceptions of Iraq. It was denoted that since the 1990s, a majority of U.S. citizens have expressed negative views of Iraq. In association with media censorship outlined earlier, it was also illustrated that there was a tendency for U.S. to falsely believe in the validity of justifications proffered for the 2003 invasion (Iraq's possession WMD and links to terrorism). At the same time, we viewed perspective from the vantage point of the soldier, their actions and perceptions. The literature confirms soldiers lacked of basic understanding of Iraq's history and its population (culture, history), which resulted in potentially avoidable culturally insensitive practices. At the same time, the failure of soldiers to interact with Iraqis, in part a result of the practice of force protection, led to U.S. soldiers stereotyping Iraqis as either insurgents or sympathizers. Corresponding negative perceptions and the distance maintained from an adversary is suggested to foster misconceptions, alienation, and at its extreme, Manichean world-views that justify the use of violence against the "other."

Combined, our examination of the literature proves the war has affected popular sentiment among citizens of the U.S. and Iraq. The deconstructive sentiment associated with historical experiences proves Hypothesis 1, which states the protracted conflict relationship has produced bilateral animosity between these respective societies. The existence of social animosity, grievance, dislike and distrust indicates that conflict resolution is necessary to transform the relationship between these two countries. To reinforce this assumption and demonstrate parallels at the micro and macro levels, we examined macro level opinion, where most theory and research hitherto has been concentrated and where scholars insist that conflict resolution between the U.S./West and Arab/Muslims is necessary.

We first qualified micro level animosity expressed by the Arab/Muslim community toward the United States. Here, it was illustrated that there has been long-standing enmity expressed toward the U.S., which was exacerbated by the 2003 occupation of Iraq. There are diverging perceptions concerning the exact roots of animosity. On the one hand, some scholars suggest that enmity is rooted in U.S. foreign policy. Undoubtedly, U.S. policy reinforces popular suspicions that the United States is trying to undermine Islam and/or acquire control of the Middle East region and its resources. Those suspicions are understandable when one objectively considers U.S. policy, which frequently deploys pressure and coercion to achieve its goals in the region, and seldom takes local popular opinion into consideration. Equally problematic, there are elements of hypocrisy, where U.S. representatives rhetorically promote one policy, such as the expansion of democracy, while implementing counter intuitive policies, including the support for authoritarian regimes, which contradicts official rhetoric. In short, these contradictions worsen popular mistrust. It can, therefore, be concluded that policy changes are warranted, and regional respondents have suggested in polling that certain policy changes would aid in the reversal of their opinion of the United States. Nonetheless, we recognize that policy changes alone are insufficient for altering the quality of the relationship.

On the other hand, it was also determined that policy changes alone are insufficient for altering the conflictual relationship at the macro level. Instead, other Arab/Muslims perceive cross-cultural conflict is rooted in religious and cultural divergences. While political differences are less problematic to resolve, since they can be negotiated or avoided through policy change, religious and cultural divergences produce serious challenges as they originate in identity. The latter insight suggests that social/cognitive changes must occur to modify perceptions and behavior if conflict resolution is to be pursued. Necessity for such changes reinforces our call for conflict resolution, and the need to advance cognitive transformation,

defined in the subsequent chapter, to improve bilateral relations across cultures. While overall prognosis of the quality of future relations appears pessimistic, Muslim respondents claim they are optimistic that the quality of the relationship can change if Westerners become more respectful of Islam and Arab/Muslim culture.

Finally, we briefly outlined U.S./Western perspectives of Muslims. It was illustrated that U.S. citizens express enmity toward Muslims, but admit that they have limited knowledge about Islam. It was also demonstrated that U.S./Western countries tend to stereotype Muslims as violent radicals. Associated deconstructive perceptions are frequently promoted through political rhetoric and the mass media, which are problematic because they increase the propensity for defensive posturing, negative sentiment and violent responses since the worst is assumed. Predictably, when qualifying the root causes of the cross-cultural conflict relationship, U.S. citizens perceive that religion and politics are fundamental catalysts of the cross-cultural conflict. The former is especially problematic, as many U.S. citizens perceive Islam as an intolerant religion and Muslims as disinterested in resolving the conflict. In this manner, we demonstrate that each side of the conflict relationship blames the other for the quality of the current relationship, indicating the importance of including society into a conflict resolution program. On a positive note, U.S. citizens widely believe that U.S.-Muslim relations are valuable, and they admit that they do not respect Muslims.

The quantification and qualification of macro and micro bilateral perspectives articulated in this chapter confirms the existence of a conflictive relationship between the U.S./West and Middle East in general, and the U.S. and Iraq in particular. The latter theory was supported by the introduction of scholarly analysis of macro level relations, reinforced by survey research. Our literature review also demonstrates that the conflictual relationship between the United States and Iraq is long-standing and has affected perceptions in both countries. Based upon our findings, we emphasize the scholarly recommendation that protracted, violent relations that become rooted in society (cognitively and behaviorally), need to be altered to reduce the probability of a continuation of violent conflict. Since scholars argue that conflict and conflict resolution are conceptualized and practiced differently across cultures, the second part of this dissertation reviews English language literature to comparatively analyze how Western and Arab/Muslim scholars conceptualize associated concepts and practices. The information provided in the subsequent part comparatively analyzes concepts, principles and practices at the macro level, and later uses some identified benchmarks to measure how a sample of laypersons conceptualize conflict resolution at the micro level in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations in the third part of this research.

PART 2: CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SCHOLARLY CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Chapter 3 From Conflict to Conflict Resolution: Western Lexicon, Conceptualization and Framework

Subsequent to conflict mapping and qualifying public opinion that proves the existence of a protracted conflictual relationship between U.S.-Iraq, we examine how a conflict relationship between two countries can be altered. More specifically, this part of the research examines how scholars in Arab/Muslim and Western cultures conceptualize conflict and conflict resolution. The present chapter provides an overview of "Western" understanding by defining associated terms and concepts as elucidated in the English language literature. The literature reviewed herein consists predominantly of resources from the U.S. and the United Kingdom. From the sources referenced, a wide conceptual framework is built and then expanded upon in chapter 4. Subsequent to delineating the Western approach, chapter 5 elaborates our comparative analysis of "Arab/Muslim" conceptualizations of conflict resolution. Several findings extracted from our literature review in this chapter are operationalized in the third part of our research to qualify Iraqi and U.S. citizens' conceptualization and bilateral support for conflict resolution at the interstate level in general and in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations.

With this overview in mind, the primary objective of the present chapter is to qualify conflict and conflict resolution as articulated by Western scholars. The literature review herein establishes a theoretical framework upon which lexicon, principles and practices of conflict resolution can later be compared across cultures. The framework utilized accommodates three recognized Western schools of peacebuilding: conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation, whereby a variety of Western theory and practices are accommodated. Our wide framework accommodates later comparisons across cultures among scholars and a group of laypersons' in forthcoming chapters of this research.

Chapter 3 opens by contextualizing how the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq impacted perceptions of conflict resolution in theory and practice. Because U.S. representatives occasionally portrayed the invasion as necessary for humanitarian reasons, as a means of proliferating democracy, and/or as an exercise in state building—practices scholars frequently associate with conflict resolution and peacebuilding at the intrastate and interstate levels—the Iraq war incited criticism of contemporary conflict resolution in theoretical and practical terms. While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to address associated criticisms in depth, their impact on discourse must be noted. Despite the critiques generated, scholars

continue to endorse conflict resolution as a viable process for improving deconstructive relationships at the intrastate and interstate level when implemented in an objective, sensitive and inclusive manner.

In agreement that conflict resolution remains a viable practice, despite its challenges, the text then reiterates and qualifies the existence of a conflictual relationship between the United States and Iraq by denoting cognitive, behavioral and effective elements in context. Our references reiterate and build upon findings articulated in chapter four, buttressing our supposition that the conflict relationship between Iraq and the U.S. needs to be resolved. Necessity is warranted in light of the theoretical supposition that deconstructive, protracted conflict relationships have a high potential to continue or escalate conflictual patterns. From this point, we then delve into Western conflict resolution literature to examine how scholars conceptualize conflict and resolution by defining fundamental terminology.

The first term to be defined and analyzed is conflict. We denote the elements of a conflict, behavioral typologies and the negative effects produced by conflict. Outlining components of a conflict underscores the fluidity and complexity of the phenomenon, which is commonly depicted in dichotomous terms: as either constructive or destructive. Classifying relational typology depends on cognitive, behavioral and discursive nuances, which frame and define a given relationship. Afterward, we examine how conflict components interact and can perpetuate a continuation of (de)constructive perceptions and behavior. These elements, compounded by the negative effects of violent interaction and their potentiality of reinforcing relational patterns, reiterate why Western scholars recommend that deconstructive conflict relationships be altered or resolved.

The next term analyzed is conflict resolution, or the theory and practice of altering a deconstructive conflict relationship to create a constructive relationship. It is at this point that the three Western peacebuilding schools of thought are introduced. Each school of thought conceptualizes conflict differently and establishes diverse objectives when managing or resolving conflict. However, as exhibited, there is theoretical and practical overlap across the schools, and scholars sometimes utilize terminology that blurs the boundaries between the three disciplines. Consequently, and for the purposes of creating a holistic framework where converging Western theory can be amalgamated, we adopt a broad understanding of conflict resolution that accommodates conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Hence, our conflict resolution framework encompasses conflict termination at one end of the resolution spectrum and reconciliation at the other.

Subsequent to defining recurring terms and their associated processes, Kriesberg's concise analytical framework of conflict resolution is introduced. The theoretical value of his framework is that it simplistically reduces conflict resolution to three components: the units, dimensions and degree. Units represent the referents engaged in a resolution process, which range from individuals to entire societies. Dimensions are the techniques used to advance transformation of the quality of a deconstructive relationship. Degree qualifies the changes experienced by comparatively analyzing the past, present and future trajectory of a given relationship and evaluating referents' commitment to the process.

Amalgamated, chapter 3 transitions our attention from mapping the U.S.-Iraq protracted conflict relationship, to understanding how conflicts develop and progress, and then to examining techniques for managing or advancing conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels. Upon the basic Western framework, we later add principles, practices, approaches and problems in chapter 4. We begin our analysis by recalling the quality of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations.

3.1 Contextualizing the improvement of U.S.-Iraq relations

In instances of protracted violent relationships, as highlighted between Iraq and the United States in chapters 1 and 2, scholars hypothesize that individuals or collectives subjected to comparable experiences are increasingly probable to construct negative opinions of their adversary who is frequently deemed responsible for the wrongdoing, harms or humiliation endured (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354; Rosoux, 2009: 550). Paraphrasing Galtung's (2007: 16) assessment of deconstructive relational patterns, he suggests "where there is conflict there may be frustration," frustration leads to polarization, polarization can produce existential worldviews, existential perceptions can manifest in violent behavior and violent interaction produces trauma and aspirations for revenge. As the processes articulated in the quote evolve, deconstructive perceptions and behavior proliferate, protracting or escalating conflict, creating further animosity, trauma and destruction (Galtung, 2007: 16; Steele, 2008: 1-7).

Contextualizing these tendencies, chapter 2 qualified and quantified the effects of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq war at the micro and macro level, verifying the existence of a conflict relationship that negatively impacts on public opinion of the "other" (Hypothesis 1). The combination of experience and sentiment associated with them is problematic for the quality of future bilateral relations between these two entities. As Vasquez (2009: 171) emphasizes: "The history of prior interactions, particularly since the last major war, establishes a set of expectations and a reservoir of psychological hostility or friendship." In the case of U.S.-Iraq

relations, the quote is validated through the demonstration of animosity and blame rooted in more than twenty years of deconstructive interaction that is likely to persist unless addressed.

Conflict perpetuation, in such instances, is likely to occur for multiple reasons. Providing one explanation, Martin Shaw (2003: 120) posits: “In every active conflict, states, parties and movements construct and disseminate their own, highly partisan version of history.” Shaw here illustrates that perceptions are formulated and then dispersed through the collection, interpretation and dissemination of what occurred in the past, which may include real or perceived injustices (Boulding, 1978: 49; Parent, 2012: 30-31; Wilmer, 1998: 106-108). As negative perceptions are continuously (re-) processed and disseminated through stories, books, rituals, media and so forth, conflicts become entrenched and are subject to escalation (Parent, 2012: 30-31; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 34-35; Worthington, 2006: 262). Over time, events impact and become part of the identity of those involved (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 34-35). Through such processes, a conflict perpetuates itself, rooting in the psyche and behavior of those engaged, which makes resolving the conflict increasingly more difficult.

Deconstructive perceptions and behavior are often produced by distrust and fear of an adversary (Parent, 2012: 31-35). Fear and distrust are natural byproducts of (prolonged) exposure to conflict, and their perpetuation deepens and solidifies negative perceptions of the “other” (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354; Parent, 2012: 30-31; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 34). Fear and distrust thereby taint referents’ interpretation of existing conflict circumstances, including the perceived value of a given relationship and an opponent’s intentions (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354; Parent, 2012: 30-36; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 34). Consequently, referents often overlook or misinterpret their adversary’s positive qualities or actions, instead magnifying negative attributes (R. Fisher, 2001b: 32-33; Lederach, 1995: 17-18; Parent, 2012: 34; Worthington, 2006: 127-128). Daniel Bar-Tal (2000: 352-353) hypothesizes that these distorted tendencies are a result of referents selectively processing (conflict-related) inputs in an effort to simplify complex relationships for the sake of minimizing uncertainty and increasing their perceived understanding of existing circumstances. Despite the counter-intuitive nature of selective processing, referents believe they have the capacity to understand a complex situation and predict the future, albeit subjectively, when they simplify inputs (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-353). In short, referents are under the impression that they are objectively rationalizing, although their judgment is clouded by fear, fixation on past experiences, anger and incorrect or incomplete observations or beliefs.

Providing supplementary insight into the narrow and subjective cognitive processing common in such deconstructive relations, Ronald Fisher (2001b) interjects:

> Among the most pervasive cognitive errors that individuals, and thereby groups, involved in destructive conflict make are misattributions about the characteristics and motives of the other side. Attribution is the process by which we infer causation about the behavior of another actor, and these judgments are critical, because they tend to guide both our immediate reaction and our future behavior toward that actor (R. Fisher, 2001b: 32).

Fisher's quote identifies the conflict-perpetuating cognitive reductionist processing as "attribution" while correspondingly emphasizing its deconstructive nature.

When attribution evolves, in-group identity strengthens as a means of coping with the (perceived) outside threat that the "other" represents, a processes which inevitably impacts relational quality (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354). Since conflict continuation leads to entrenchment, referents cognitively prepare to protect their interest and endure the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354). Within this environment, corresponding inputs are continuously processed and re-processed, stored and disseminated at the individual and collective levels, further reinforcing *status quo* relational patterns which are probable to generate a relational impasse (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-354; Wilmer, 1998: 106-108). At its extreme, referents comparatively define themselves as the direct opposite of their adversary, perceiving the "other" as evil or untrustworthy (Funk and Said, 2004: 8; Galtung, 2007: 19-20), or de-humanizing them and identifying them as an existential threat (Boulding, 1978: 53-54; Galtung, 2007: 19-20; Kelman, 2004: 120-121; Long and Brecke, 2003: 30; Parent, 2012: 37; Staub, 2003: 8-12).

When the maxim is obtained, deployment of violence is likely. Herbert Kelman (2004: 121) explains the increased propensity for violence occurs because "it becomes easier for each party to minimize guilt feelings for acts of violence and oppression against the other and to avoid seeing itself in the role of victimizer, rather than only the role of victim." Clearly stated, the quote explains that attribution, at its extreme, makes the perpetration of violence justified and increasingly likely to be deployed by those engaged in a conflict. Due to these pervasive tendencies, alteration of the quality of the relationship is hypothesized essential to improve the long-term quality of a given relationship and circumvent violence (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 64; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 13; Bar-Tal, 2000: 356-357; Lederach, 1995: 17-19). The interplay and depth of the highlighted processes in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations can be observed in human research studies, as introduced in chapter 2.

To contextualize the existence of conflict between the United States and Iraq, we first address the issue of cognitive framing and its tendency of perpetuating deconstructive behavior. Research conducted by Wohl and Branscombe (2009) examines in-group forgiveness, where members of the same collective are asked to extend forgiveness to their

fellow members for the wrongdoing they have committed against an out-group member, the latter of whom is perceived to be an existential threat. Their research centered on U.S. citizens and their perceptions of U.S. soldiers' activity in Iraq. The study found that U.S. respondents are more likely to forgive their compatriots for wrongdoing committed against Iraqis when exposed to references of 9/11 prior to completing the survey (Wohl and Branscombe, 2009: 209-211). Wohl and Branscombe's (2009: 211-213) findings demonstrate that in-group forgiveness has the propensity to increase popular endorsement of or justification for violence perpetrated, as demonstrated in the in-group acceptance or legitimization of wrongdoing against the out-group due to the (perceived) threat the out-group posed. Such perceptions affirm that individuals are apt to dismiss or justify wrongdoing committed by the in-group when the "other" is perceived in a negative context.

In light of this basic understanding of how conflict influences individuals and societies, we simultaneously wish to emphasize that the end of combat operations and the removal of military forces does not constitute a transformation of a conflictual relationship, nor does it guarantee the construction of peaceful relations (Lambourne, 2004: 2). While these measures are indicative of the end of occupation and a termination of direct physical violence, conflict is not synonymous with armed confrontation, violence or war, as outlined below (Wilmer, 1998: 105). Consequently, two issues should be considered when thinking about violent conflict and its impact on societal perceptions in the context of Iraq and U.S. relations.

Firstly, the United States government should appreciate that most of its activities during the occupation were narrowly focused and largely imposed, and thereby constitutes structural violence, as illustrated in chapter one (Bowen, 2013: 11; Stover and others, 2005: 831-857). For instance, the U.S. applied pressure during the drafting of Iraq's constitution, encouraged the establishment of a liberal democracy, and hastened the conduct of democratic elections, to name a few examples (Allawi, 2007: 9; Haass, 2009: 262-278; Pascual and Pollack, 2007: 9). Such activities connote the marginalization of Iraqi needs and desires in exchange for promoting U.S. interests (establishing a new government and stabilizing Iraq to hasten U.S. military withdraw). Iraqis, as articulated elsewhere, view such policies as an imposition, hence violent and subjected to rejection or resistance (be it violent or passive). This suggests that not only was direct physical violence perpetrated, but also structural violence, which equally influences popular sentiment. Secondly, chapter two demonstrates that long-standing negative sentiment exists across these groups, and is likely to endure, given the trajectory of U.S. relations with Iraq and other countries in the Middle East (Funk and Said, 2004: 1-3). For these reasons, we argue that conflict resolution should be pursued.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, altering the quality of a relationship and social perceptions requires the U.S. embark on a complex campaign of sustained and palpable modification of behavior and perceptions aimed at changing years of mistrust and animosity between both societies (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 249). This suggests, on the one hand, that policy changes are necessary. In particular, the combination of occupation, U.S. maltreatment of Arab/Muslims in places like Guantánamo Bay or Abu Ghraib, and the continual projection of military force and political influence in the Middle East understandably give the impression that the U.S. is at war with Islam and Arabs (Sageman, 2008: 73-175). However, U.S. leaders repeatedly discount the latter claim while pursuing policies, which contradict their rhetoric (Obama, 2009c; 2010b). Therefore, policy must be addressed.

On the other hand, there are equally identity-based influencers of conflict in this instance. For example, we demonstrated above that there are cultural and religious elements, which influence the quality of bilateral relationships. These components must likewise be addressed, since they similarly influence the trajectory of a given relationship.

Consolidated, conflict relationships incorporate cognitive, behavioral and affective components (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-359; Parent, 2012: 30-37). We wish to quickly acknowledge the existence of these components in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. Concerning the cognitive component, negative sentiment exists on both sides of the relationship, as qualified in chapter 2. On the one hand, anti-American/occupation sentiment was high in Iraq prior to and throughout the duration of the occupation (ABC News and others, 2009: 3-20; Burkholder, 2004e; Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 36; Oxford Research International, 2004: 3; 2005: 3-21; Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2006: 6). This sentiment included a high degree of distrust of the United States and its agents during the occupation (Abdallah, 2003: 65-66; Bowen, 2009: 73; DeYoung, 2007; Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, 2004: 41; International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 30-41; Kull, 2007: 5; University of Michigan and Eastern Michigan University, 2006; Zogby, 2008). On the other hand, U.S. soldiers were generally suspicious of all Iraqis, classifying them as either insurgents or collaborators (Kilcullen, 2009: 124). Among the general U.S. public, there has been prolonged and rampant negative opinion of Iraq trended by open source surveys over the past two decades (Gallup, 2014).

In behavioral terms, the United States physically occupied Iraq, and Iraq's population countered their presence with techniques ranging from street protests to physical resistance in the armed insurgency (Allawi, 2007: 158-243; Dobbins and others, 2009: 59-62; Fattah and

Caso, 2009: 256; Fontan, 2006: 227-235; Hashim, 2006: 92-97; Ucko, 2008: 344-345). Hence, both groups employed violence to achieve their objectives *vis-à-vis* the other (Alvord and others, 2003; Amnesty International, 2003: 5; Burkholder, 2004e; Calhoun, 2005: 94; Fontan, 2006: 220-227; Hicks and others, 2011: 12; Human Rights Watch, 2003: 5-60; Roth, 2005: 10; Tripp, 2007: 292-293). On the one hand, Iraqis viewed violence appropriate to hasten the end of the U.S.-led occupation and their influence (ABC News and others, 2007: 2). On the other hand, U.S. citizens judged the military invasion and occupation of Iraq essential to increase U.S. national security (Tripp, 2007: 272-273).

Finally, concerning the affective component, disagreement between the two countries broadly existed over the political and social trajectory of Iraq. Most notably, the United States deemed it necessary to invade and occupy Iraq to transform Iraq politically (remove Hussein and install a democratic government) and socially (overturn Ba'ath Party leadership and Sunni control of government) (Allawi, 2007: 459). However, it was demonstrated in chapter 2 that many Iraqis rebuffed these objectives and condemned the United States for overturning preexisting social-political structures (Ryan, 2010: 66). The policy, thus, increased animosity toward the United States, whom Iraqis blame for the conditions endured and the contemporary predicament Iraq finds itself in. Amalgamated, all three components of a deep conflict relationship are present which reinforces the need for resolving or transforming the conflict.

Although we have proved the existence of a protracted conflict relationship, the literature on conflict resolution does not discuss U.S.-Iraq relations in particular, but rather concentrates attention at the regional level. Accordingly, it is necessary to reference macro level theory when considering conflict resolution at the micro level. Contemplating the depth of the cross-cultural conflict relationship at the macro level, Funk and Said (2004) construct a pessimistic image of bilateral relations between the United States and Arab/Muslim countries of the Middle East. Due to its relevance, their assessment is quoted at length. They surmise:

> As distasteful as crude enemy images may appear to the moderate and largely apolitical majorities in both cultural regions, the preoccupation of image-makers and sensationalists with instances of confrontation and cultural divergence has fostered widespread attitudes of distrust and resignation to the seeming "inevitability" of conflict stemming from irreconcilable differences. These attitudes have become increasingly compelling to many in the wake of two Persian Gulf wars, the attacks of September 11, and the escalation of Israeli-Palestinian violence that followed the breakdown of the Oslo [peace] process. As a result, competition and violence are taken for granted as part of the natural state of things, rather than regarded as problems worthy of fact-finding and soul-searching investigation. All who would seek to understand conflict between Middle Eastern Muslims and the West must

> therefore face widespread and powerful perceptions that "our reality" and "their reality" cannot meet, and that authentic security is to be found in cultural retrenchment combined with vigorous efforts to repress, repel, or convert the adversary (Funk and Said, 2004: 7).

Their quote reiterates that cross-cultural conflict in this instance is deeply rooted within both societies, founded upon historical experience and alternative goals. Depth of the conflict within society is equally witnessed in the manner in which the "other" is depicted.

The authors, for instance, articulate that Manichean perspectives of the "other" are mutually embraced. Manichean perspectives complicate conflict resolution because:

> conventional discourse on "Islam and the West" is deeply laden with presuppositions of irreconcilable "otherness," and tends to reinforce the idea that "we" cannot work with "them" until "they" become like "us." "Islam" and "the West" are regarded as exclusive, static categories; cultural and religious factors are obstacles to peacemaking, not resources. A "clash" is inevitable, and can only be managed (Funk and Said, 2004: 22).

The quote illustrates how said sentiment undermines the quality of relations. In such circumstances, scholars recommend conflict resolution be pursued to alter discursive narratives, perceptions and behavior, whereby the predominant and (deep) rooted nature of the conflict relationship can be altered over time.

Advocating conflict resolution at the macro level, Funk and Said (2004: 22-23) prescriptively suggest efforts be made to "counteract misperceptions and double standards" that exist within both referent groups (among governments, societies and scholarship). Here the authors are suggesting a twofold, interrelated approach. One the one hand, cross-cultural misconceptions needs to be addressed. These include, for example, addressing the popular inaccuracy that all Muslims are violent radicals. On the other hand, rhetoric and actions have to parallel one another. For instance, the United States should more clearly articulate its objectives in the Middle East, and, thereafter, ensure that stated policy goals are reinforced by actions which adhere to those articulated objectives (Funk and Said, 2004: 22-23). In this manner, action would corroborate rhetoric, thereby surmounting one of the Arab/Muslim complaints (duplicity) emphasized and providing an environment where trust can be earned. This macro level assessment parallels our micro level assessment noted earlier.

Hence, many scholars recommend implementing conflict resolution to manage conflict continuation or escalation by deconstructing negative psychological, behavior and social components and their effects (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 12-17; Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-359; Hartwick and Barki, 2002: 5; Kriesberg, 2001: 60-61; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 6-7, 35-62; Worthington, 2006: 9-16). The minimal objective, in context, should be the neutralization

of arguments favoring the use of coercion and violence *vis-à-vis* the other (Funk and Said, 2004: 1-23). Reference to conflict resolution in the U.S. and Iraq context, however, presents three fundamental theoretical dilemmas that must be contemplated and addressed. First, the invasion and occupation of Iraq exacerbated criticism of conflict resolution as a theory and practice (Johansen, 2004: 1-4; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 3). The critiques proffered will be briefly analyzed below. Second, there are imperative theoretical and epistemological divergences within the field of conflict resolution in the West that require clarification (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 30; Reimann, 2004: 2). Several differences within Western theory are examined in this chapter and the next. Lastly, theoretical and practical divergences across cultures are suggested to exist, and these must equally be qualified to determine how interstate conflict resolution might be pursued across these cultures (Avruch, 2003: 2; Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006: 53-54; Reimann, 2004: 11). Cross-cultural comparisons are examined in the forthcoming chapters 5 and 6 of this research.

Returning our focus to the first dilemma, the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq had negative implications on contemporary conflict resolution and peacebuilding discourse (Johansen, 2004: 1-4; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 3). Since conflict resolution has been closely associated with practices such as the international proliferation of democratic governance and humanitarian intervention, both of which fall under rubric of peacebuilding, the George W. Bush administration's commandeering of corresponding objectives to justify the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq had profound implications on how the discipline and practice is appraised (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 3). Most importantly, the militarization of state building and the proliferation of democracy in Iraq discredited peacebuilding within scholarship and among the international community (Johansen, 2004: 1-4; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 3). According to Ramsbotham and others (2011: 6), critical scholarly discourse can be reduced to three critiques which hypothesize conflict resolution: (1) is impotent for resolving conflict (the Realist critique); (2) its practices are implemented in an uncritical, unbalanced and unjust manner (the Marxist critique); and (3) it is inapplicable or inappropriate across cultures because its theories and practices are predominantly perceived as Western in style and approach. While these criticisms have merit, and should be contemplated, they are not irrefutable.

In my opinion, U.S. operations in Iraq fall victim to critique number two. The United States implemented its reconstruction and peacebuilding strategies in Iraq in an uncritical, unjust and unbalanced manner, as outlined in chapter 1. Among other faults, the policy was imposed, culturally insensitive and ineffective due to the high degree of popular rejection of

the program, an approach I strongly criticize and discourage. However, the objectives of proliferating democracy, human rights and other associated peacebuilding goals, I believe, were included into the Bush administration's list of justifications because the WMD-terror arguments failed to garner sufficient popular support. Therefore, I would argue that peacebuilding objectives were secondary to the removal of Saddam Hussein, and the Bush administration was less concerned with pursuing peacebuilding as a theory and practice, and more interested in exploiting the theory to advance U.S. geopolitical interests and garner international support. While my assumption might explain the administration's limited attention given to peacebuilding in Iraq, it is not designed to justify U.S. actions or deflect warranted criticism. Instead, I wish simply to highlight that I conjecture U.S. prioritization of peacebuilding was limited in nature, as associated principles and practices were simply enticing justifications for garnering support for the deposing of Saddam Hussein. Therefore, I have mixed opinions about the applicability of critique number two in context.

The third critique of conflict resolution following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, introduced above, likewise has merit. Conflict resolution, as practiced in the West, is not always applicable or acceptable in other cultures. Chapter five demonstrates that some scholars emphatically insist that Western approaches to conflict resolution are inapplicable in Arab/Muslim culture. Nonetheless, Arab/Muslim and Western conflict resolution practices at the intrastate and interstate levels, it will be demonstrated actually share many objectives, principles and tools for advancing resolution. Further cross-cultural compatibility will also be demonstrated in chapter six when we examine opinion among a convenience sample of laypersons from the United States and Iraq. Nonetheless, the findings outlined in forthcoming chapters do not suggest that a Western approach to conflict resolution should be prioritized or imposed. Contrary, we argue that cross-cultural approaches share more commonalities at the intrastate and interstate level than is commonly accredited, and we believe that symmetrical adaptations of existing theory and practice can be blended to produce mutually acceptable techniques when implementing conflict resolution across cultures. This point will be highlighted in the *Conclusions and Recommendations* chapter. Therefore, we believe that cultures practice conflict resolution differently, and these divergences should be measured and respected.

Finally, concerning the first scholarly critique, Ramsbotham and others (2011: 4, 269) convincingly argue that conflict resolution theory and practices remain viable for altering contemporary deconstructive conflict relations at the intrastate and interstate levels when implemented appropriately. Acceptable implementation requires accommodative actions,

including taking into consideration the needs and desires of stakeholders and exercising cultural sensitivity (denoted in the previous critique) (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 60-61, 236). We similarly maintain that conflict resolution, despite its flaws, many of which are outlined throughout this part of the thesis, retains the potential to transform the way societies and governments interact, and hence can alter the quality of relations.

Maintaining the position that conflict resolution is viable at the intrastate and interstate levels, our analysis, takes into consideration the critiques of imbalance (critique 2) and inappropriateness (critique 3) just described. To minimize the risk that our call for conflict resolution falls victim to these critiques, we conduct a comparison of scholarly understanding of conflict resolution across Arab/Muslim and Western culture at the macro level in chapter five. To measure the appropriateness of theory at the micro level, we qualify how conflict resolution is conceptualized in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations among a small sample of citizens from each country in chapter six. In this manner, we do not limit analysis to Western scholarship, but comparatively analyze conceptualizations of conflict resolution among scholars and at the micro level to identify cross-cultural convergences and divergences.

With the necessity of U.S.-Iraq conflict resolution contextualized and several critiques introduced, our investigation now turns to more deeply analyzing how Western scholars conceptualize conflict. The following section defines the term conflict, examines its elements, and examines behavior and effects of the phenomenon. Then we examine conflict resolution.

3.2 Conceptualizing conflict

Analyzing how conflict is conceptualized from a Western perspective is theoretically necessary for two reasons. First, our exploration of scholarly literature in the English language, broadly referred to hereafter as “Western,” underscores violent conflict relations have adverse physical, social and cognitive effects on referents, which need to be addressed (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4). Second, conflicts are perceived and managed differently across cultures (Lederach, 1995: 9-10). Thus, the provision of a Western definition facilitates later juxtaposing of Western and Arab/Muslim understanding of terminology. Moreover, a definition is valuable in any cross-cultural treatment since the manner in which conflict is conceptualized influences how conflict resolution is conceptualized (Avruch, 2002: 2).

We begin our analysis by noting the term “conflict” as applied in Western academic literature is conceptually ambiguous (Aubert, 1963: 26; Lederach, 1995: 74; Rosoux, 2009: 543; Schmidt and Kochan, 1972: 359; Wilmer, 1998: 102). In political science, for instance, conflict is sometimes used as a synonym of war between societies or countries (Galtung,

1969: 167; Wilmer, 1998: 103, 105). Others scholars criticize that conflict is often applied as an antonym of cooperation (Aubert, 1963: 29; Deutsch, 2005: 2; Schmidt and Kochan, 1972: 359; Vasquez, 2009: 83-84). Concerning the latter, Morton Deutsch (2005: 2-3) laments "conflict" and "competition" are theoretically interchanged, a misnomer he attributes to the influences of the field of social psychology during the 1920s and 1930s, and the adaptation of theories posited by Charles Darwin, Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. Similarly, Schmidt and Kochan (1972: 361) opine that the term conflict is erroneously utilized as a synonym of competition, while further interjecting that it is a value laden (customarily negative) concept absent qualitative reference to behavioral typology (violent or nonviolent). Combined, scholarship widely rejects narrow conceptualizations of conflict as war, an antonym of cooperation, or as synonymous with competition.

Taking the denoted critiques into consideration, definitions found in Western conflict and conflict resolution literature demarcate conflict, foremost, as a natural type of relationship in which referents are engaged in an incompatibility or clash (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 5; R. Cohen, 2004: 179-180; Deutsch, 2005: 2; Galtung, 2007: 15; Lederach, 1995: 9; Mason, 1993: 14-15; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 7-8; Vasquez, 2009: 83-84; Wallensteen, 2003: 16). The incompatibility or clash is usually rooted in competition for limited resources and/or manifests due to unfulfilled needs or grievances (Irani, 1999: 2-3; Irani and Funk, 2000: 30; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 17-21; Swanström and Weissmann, 2005: 7-8; Wilmer, 1998: 102-103). Avruch (2002: 2), therefore, summarizes that a conflict is a combination of competition and referents' perceptions of the relationship and their adversary. The insights proffered here not only emphasize that referents are engaged in a competition or dispute, but highlight the interplay of perceptions and objectives held by referents engaged in a conflict relationship. Nevertheless, reference to, or the existence of, a clash or incompatibility, as elucidated hitherto, does not indicate behavioral typology according to the Western understanding (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 9; Deutsch, 2005: 1; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 1-4; Mason, 1993: 14-15; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 7-8; Vasquez, 2009: 25).

Nonetheless, behavior is a fundamental component of conflict and, therefore, must be factored into a definition. Producing a simple framework for classifying behavioral typology, the literature suggests that a conflict can incorporate constructive or destructive behavior (Deutsch, 2005: 2; Marsella, 2005: 653; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 8; Svensson, 2013: 415). Its typology is qualitatively determined by the typology of interaction utilized by those engaged in the incompatible relationship (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 9; Deutsch, 2005: 1; Lederach, 1995: 18; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 126-127). Interactive typology can be

simplistically depicted on a spectrum ranging from nonviolent (or constructive) to violent (or destructive) behavior (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 8, 126).

At the destructive end of the conflict behavioral spectrum, referents deploy violence (physical, structural, and cultural) and coercive behavior to pursue goals or to address/express grievances *vis-à-vis* their relational counterpart (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). At the other extreme of the spectrum, they utilize specific techniques, such as negotiation or rewards, to affect a mutually satisfactory nonviolent arrangement or compromise as a means of negotiating or resolving the incompatibility (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 9; Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). While simplistic, this dichotomous framework is useful for classifying conflict relationships as constructive or destructive. If violent behavior predominates, the relationship is defined as deconstructive (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). Conversely, if constructive behavior predominates, the conflict is referred to as nonviolent (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). Through this dichotomy, we observe that a conflict relationship can incorporate non-violent and/or violent behavior (Deutsch, 2005: 26). Our attention now turns to explaining how behavioral typology is selected by referents engaged in a conflict.

Louis Kriesberg creates a model that contains three practices that actors utilize when engaged in a conflict relationship to achieve their goals (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 9). According to Kriesberg, responses include persuasion, reward or coercion (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 9). The model defines the noted concepts using the following terms: first, persuasion nonviolently appropriates cognitive reasoning to alter opinions or change goals among adversaries; second, rewards tender perceptible incentives to influence the behavior or goals of an adversary; and third, coercion deploys violence, or the threat of violence, to precipitate desired changes to the *status quo* (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 9). While the first two actions are deemed non-violent, the latter is violent.

When referents select to deploy violence, it can manifest in several manners. Johan Galtung (1998: 4-5) identifies three types of violence: physical, structural and cultural. Physical violence is overt and its manifestation results in death, maiming or damage to the physical body, psyche and spirit. Structural violence is obscurely perpetrated through institutionalized structures, governance and societal norms marginalizing and oppressing others (Galtung, 1998: 5-7; Reimann, 2004: 9). For example, structural violence can manifest in the form of alienation, exploitation or repression of particular individuals or groups (Galtung, 1998: 5-7). By comparison, cultural violence delineates the normalization and social justification, and at its extreme the glorification, of violence through practices including patriarchy, patriotism or nationalism (Galtung, 1998: 5-6; Reimann, 2004: 9). Cultural

violence, thus, incorporates ideologies that can be manipulated and propagated to justify the projection of violence onto others (Galtung, 1998: 5-6). All forms of violence are destructive in some capacity and, therefore, deconstructive for relationships and those exposed. To summarize our analysis hitherto, conflict is depicted as a clash or incompatibility, which can include constructive or deconstructive behavior determined by referent behavior.

Upon this theoretical foundation, four additional Western theories associated with conflict can be deduced from the literature. We include these into our assessment due to their relevance when making cross-cultural comparisons later. Abridged, Western scholars are suggested to perceive conflict as: universal; able to produce positive benefits; resolvable; and as having an impact limited to those referents immediately involved (Irani, 1999). Each assertion is critically examined in turn to determine its applicability in Western theory.

First, it is suggested that Western scholars perceive conflict as universal. Confirming the theory, Kenneth Boulding (1978: 132) articulates, "Conflict is a universal phenomenon in social systems; it exists within the individual, within the family, in all organizations, between individuals, between organizations, between states, and so on." According to Boulding, conflict is ordinary and inevitable at all levels. This hypothesis is shared in both the natural (Aureli and de Waal, 2000: 3), political and social sciences (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 3; Boulding, 1978: 132; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 1-3; Lederach, 1995: 9; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 7), as well as among military analysts (Dunlap, 2013: 137). Hence, Western scholars generally perceive conflict is normal.

Second, some Western scholars suggest that conflict can generate positive outcomes (Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Galtung, 1998: 3-4; Irani, 1999: 3; Lederach, 1995: 17; Reimann, 2004: 9-10). For instance, conflict is perceived as a vehicle for producing positive social changes, such as increased suffrage; a theory prompting Lederach (1995: 17) to state that conflict is (sometimes) necessary. The conceptualization of conflict as natural and having the potential to generate positive outcomes explains why some Western scholars hypothesize that conflict *per se* should not be eschewed, but its violent manifestations neutralized (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 3; Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Galtung, 2007: 19; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 3-4; Lederach, 1995: 17; Reimann, 2004: 9-10). Thus, some Western scholars prioritize the neutralization of violent interaction rather than eliminating conflict because they view conflict as a catalyst for positive change (Lederach, 1995: 16; Spangler, 2003). Consequently, some Western scholars view conflict as having a potential to produce positive benefits.

Third, Western scholars are suggested to perceive conflicts are resolvable (Irani, 1999: 2). With this mindset, resolution practitioners analyze a violent conflict relationship to identify

structural, cognitive and discursive elements that precipitate incompatibility (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-356; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 8-15). Once identified, it is believed that these elements can be manipulated, changed or managed to alter the quality of a relationship (Bar-Tal, 2000: 356-359). For example, if misunderstanding among adversaries is a key instigator of the conflict, a third party can take up a mediating role to increase mutual understanding (Kelman, 2004: 112). Nonetheless, other scholars hypothesize that not all conflicts are subject to resolution and are thereby intractable (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 61, 377; Rosoux, 2009: 557-559). Thus, some Western scholars perceive conflicts are resolvable while others recognize they can become intractable.

Finally, Western scholars are suggested to conceptualize conflict as a struggle, or incompatibility, limited to those referents directly involved (Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Irani, 1999: 3-4). The perception that conflict is restricted in its effects and referents has theoretical and practical implications since it confines conflict resolution to those immediately engaged (Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Irani, 1999: 3-4). However, containment of resolution to immediate referents is contentious in Western literature, as other scholars and practitioners recognize the systemic nature of conflict and advocate resolution be focused on a wider spectrum than those immediately engaged (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 65; Stover and others, 2005: 852-853). Namely, the conflict resolution and conflict transformation schools—as introduced in section 3.3 of the present chapter—conceptualize conflict as systemic in nature and implement resolution strategies accordingly (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 62; Bar-Tal, 2000: 352; Lederach, 1995: 18).

Amalgamated, the Western conceptualizations presented broadly identify conflict as a universal, complex, incompatible social-political relationship that can manifest in numerous ways (economic, social and political), among diverse referents (individuals, groups, societies), utilizing multiple typologies of interaction (violent or nonviolent). Conflict, according to the literature examined, is also sometimes viewed as capable of producing positive effects, while its violent manifestation should be curtailed or eliminated. With conflict defined, we revisit the components of a conflict and how the phenomenon can produce negative effects. The insight provided aids in the understanding of how conflicts evolve, factors which impacts how resolution is conceptualized and implemented.

3.2.1 Elements of a conflict

Conflicts are complex, unpredictable and subject to escalation and de-escalation since they are in a constant state of flux (Lederach, 1995: 15; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 12-13; Wilmer, 1998: 105). Nonetheless, subsequent to the development of a conflictual relationship

at the societal level, engaged referents are expected to consolidate around issues and pursue their interests with "hostile attitudes and conflictual behaviour" (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 11). When time elapses and hostile attitudes and behavior, noted in the quote, persist, referents can become entrenched in their conflict ideology, behavior and position, and these outcomes can cause conflict relationships to become protracted and destructive (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 11). Under prolonged conditions, the conflictual relationship is expected to deepen hostile perceptions within society, and those attitudes are subject to be disseminated (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 11). Nevertheless, for the moment, our interests remain centered on the factors that produce a conflict.

The literature broadly identifies internal and external factors which produce a deconstructive conflict, albeit whose implications can be influenced by other environmental factors including third party intervention, a change in the relative status of one or more of the referents engaged, or a change in referent motivations and/or objectives (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 13). Awareness of relational complexities and their interplay are essential to understanding the manner in which referents are presumed to interact while engaged in a conflict, and how (de)constructive behavior feeds back into conflict discourse (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 69-71; Bar-Tal, 2000: 351-354). Since our research focus is on U.S.-Iraq relations, our interests remain centered on conflict relationships at the intrastate and interstate levels.

Designing a framework, social psychologist Herbert Kelman theorizes that four elements amalgamate to produce a conflict at the higher levels between two adversarial groups (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). First, one or both of those engaged in a conflict must envisage that they have a unique collective identity (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). Second, one or both must perceive they have a legitimate grievance or that they are experiencing unfair conditions under the *status quo* (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). Third, one or both referents must believe that the "other" is the source of their grievance (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). Lastly, one or both of those who perceive they have been wronged, must perceive that they possess the capacity to induce change in the "other" to minimize the perceived injustices committed against them (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). When these circumstances coincide, a conflict has developed (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). While each element is observable in the U.S.-Iraq relationship, as alluded to in the first part of this thesis, alternative, and more simplified, theoretical models exist and are introduced to provide a wide theoretical framework.

For instance, Bercovitch and others (2009: 8) and Hartwick and Barki (2002: 5) identify three attitudinal dimensions which produce conflict. The dimensions include:

> (a) the cognitive, (b) the affective, and (c) the behavioural. The cognitive dimension refers to the parties' beliefs and ideas about their environment [including the relationship]; the affective dimension refers to the parties' feelings and emotions and the behavioural dimension refers to their specific readiness to respond (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 8).

Although these dimensions were introduced in the first section of the present chapter, and contextualized in the case of U.S.-Iraq relations, the manner in which they interrelate, and the techniques utilized, determines the quality and typology of the relationship (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 8).

Correspondingly, Johan Galtung (2007: 17, 22) defines the three conflict-producing elements as "conflict attitude", "conflict behavior" and "conflict contradiction," depicting them on a "conflict triangle." Ramsbotham and others (2011: 10-11) abridge Galtung's conceptualization stating:

> Contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived 'incompatibility of goals' between the conflict parties […] In a symmetrical relationship, the contradiction is defined by the parties, their interests and the clash of interests between them. […] Attitude includes the parties' perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves. These can be positive or negative, but in violent conflicts parties tend to develop demeaning stereotypes of the other, and attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred. Attitude covers emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and conative (desire, will) elements. […] Behaviour is the third component. It can involve cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 10-11).

According to Galtung's conceptualization, as articulated in the quote, a full-scale conflict has manifested when these three elements concur (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 10-11)[57].

The commonality among the three frameworks introduced is their recognition of the inter-relation and interaction of the components of attitude, belief and behavioral, which not only influence conflict typology, but simultaneously has a qualitative impact on social perceptions. Moreover, recognizing the elements of attitude, belief and behavior has theoretical and practical implications on how conflictual relationships can be altered, as these elements are hypothesized fundamental entry points and targets whereby a conflict can be managed or resolved, as detailed below (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 12-13). We next revisit conflict

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[57] Constructive theoreticians, such as Duffield, interject that "conflict is not a breakdown in essentially peaceful social systems or a temporary abnormality, but is instead rooted in the structures, practices and conditions of social existence" (Jackson, 2009: 181). They depict conflict as containing "three broad elements […]: the construction and manipulation of identity; the co-constitution of structures and agents; and the construction of society-wide conflict discourses" (Jackson, 2009: 177).

behavior to reiterate that referents have options outside of violence when engaged in a conflict relationship, before we examine the negative effects of a deconstructive conflict.

3.2.2 Conflict behavioral typologies

It was explained previously that conflicts are classified as constructive or deconstructive depending on the quality of referents' perceptions and behavior. This subsection explains how referents engaged in a conflict relationship select interactive typology through complex evaluative processes, including assessment of stakeholders' strengths and weaknesses. Through evaluation, referents engaged in a conflict decide which strategy to incorporate. As emphasized elsewhere, the behavioral typology selected and deployed subsequently determines whether a conflict becomes constructive or deconstructive. These patterns can be self-reinforcing.

John Vasquez (2009: 84) hypothesizes that three interrelated and dichotomous factors determine conflict relationship typology. He identifies the elements as: (1) agreement vs. disagreement; (2) positive vs. negative behaviors; and (3) friendship vs. hostility. The systemic interplay between the components listed influences cognitive, attitudinal and behavioral patterns within a given relationship (Vasquez, 2009: 84). Demonstrating qualitative dynamics, Vasquez (2009: 84-86) suggests that bargaining and conciliatory behavior encourages constructive relationships among referents since actions reinforce amity through cooperation and the proliferation of trust over time. Contrary, disagreement and (perceived) deconstructive tendencies encourage negative relational patterns because repeat deconstructive interaction deepens suspicion, hostility and grievances (Vasquez, 2009: 84-86). The theoretical value of the behavioral model is its 1) articulation of the fluidity and complexity of relationships, and 2) its illustration of how behavioral and attitudinal typology constructively or destructively feedback while influencing the quality of a relationship.

Other models exist, although they emphasize similar patterns. Anthony Marsella (2005: 653), for example, explains that similar evaluative processes influence the probability of violence being used in a conflict relationship. According to Marsella (2005: 653), deconstructive behavior is most probable when referents perceive: they are engaged in an existential relationship; the other is threatening; the *status quo* is unjust or humiliating; themselves as moral or superior; that all nonviolent interactive options have been exhausted; and they possess the capability to perpetrate violence. When fulfilled, these self-explanatory inputs are thus hypothesized to lead referents to utilize violence because the (perceived) threat is deemed significant, necessary, and/or simply because they have the capability or no

alternative options. Overall, both frameworks illustrates that referents undertake complex, calculated evaluations of multiple inputs when selecting the practices they determine most effective and applicable to achieve their desired ends within the conflictual relationship (Kriesberg, 2004: 90-91). At the same time, the models emphasize that inputs are self-perpetuating across referents. For instance, if the threat or perpetration of violence is instituted by one referent, their counterpart is probable to respond accordingly.

Once a conflict manifests, deconstructive interaction risks further convolute and exacerbating preexisting cognitive, effective and behavioral elements of those engaged in the relationship by systematically feeding adverse sentiment and grievances back into the relationship cycle (Bar-Tal, 2000: 361-362; Galtung, 1998: 5-6; Parent, 2012: 30-37; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 49; Vasquez, 2009: 84-86; Wilmer, 1998: 105-108). Within this deleterious cyclical process, conflict behavior begets analogous behavior (creating a conflict spiral) (Galtung, 2004: 78; Parent, 2012: 32; Vasquez, 2009: 84-86). If a conflict proceeds to its deconstructive extreme where adversaries are perceived as existential threats, there is a risk of generating proactive hostility and physical violence (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 23; Bar-Tal, 2000: 356-359; Boulding, 1978: 53-54; Long and Brecke, 2003: 30; Parent, 2012: 33-34; Staub, 2003). Such processes increase the likelihood of conflict continuation or escalation, while the perpetration of violence increases the costs of the conflict.

3.2.3 Negative effects of violent conflict

Regardless of whether violent conflict manifests in its physical, structural or cultural form, scholars agree it produces deconstructive or destructive consequences. Deconstructive consequences include physical, cognitive, emotional and spiritual suffering on individuals and collectives exposed (Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 3-4; Marsella, 2005: 652; Wilmer, 1998: 105). Violence likewise has deleterious systemic effects on the structures, societies and environments exposed (Galtung, 2007: 21; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 3-4; Wilmer, 1998: 105). In short, the effects of violence on humans are detrimental and tenacious in physical and psychological terms (Wilmer, 1998: 105-106). Chapter 2, for example, demonstrated the human and psychological toll the 2003 war and occupation had on the United States and Iraq.

Our focus, nonetheless, centers on the cognitive and social effects experienced, as they are equally theoretically and practically relevant when contemplating U.S.-Iraq relations. Concerning the psychological impact, Wilmer (1998: 105) tersely states: “When conflicts turn violent, grievances come to include not only the strategic issues articulated before the onset of violence, but also grievances arising from the physical, emotional, and psychological

experience of violence itself." As Wilmer explains, the conflict is no longer couched on the original differences and grievances that initiated the struggle, and instead multiply to include the grievances and harms perpetrated during violent interaction. The accumulation of issues complicates resolution because it expands the issues at stake, and as outlined above, generates cognitive and behavioral tendency that can feed back into the conflict cycle.

Following the manifestation of violence in a conflictual relationship, the literature provides several options by which individuals can respond to (perceived) transgression. Simplistically articulated, those transgressed against can: (sub-) consciously deny or psychologically suppress the wrongdoing (Long and Brecke, 2003: 29; Montville, 1999: 325); they can take revenge; hold a grudge; resolve the conflict and/or seek forgiveness (Worthington, 2006: 9). Scholars perceive the first four responses are harmful to stakeholders and the quality of a given relationship due to their repressive, deconstructive and/or violent nature (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 70; Worthington, 2006: 9-16). For example, recalling the conflict behavioral typological frameworks noted earlier (3.2.2), violent interaction convolutes and exacerbates preexisting conflictual relationships by systematically feeding adverse sentiment and grievances back into the relationship cycle (Bar-Tal, 2000: 361-362; Galtung, 1998: 5-6; Parent, 2012: 30-37; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 49; Vasquez, 2009: 84-86; Wilmer, 1998: 105-108). Among the options presented, therefore, seeking to resolve a conflict or pursue forgiveness are the preferred approaches to circumvent the continuation of violent behavior, whereby harm is reduced and effects are managed. The remaining sections of this chapter explore conflict resolution as the ideal option, as conceptualized by Western scholars.

3.3 Conceptualizing conflict resolution

Since conflict is conceived and managed differently within and across cultures, measures to resolve or manage conflict are likewise conceptualized and practiced differently (Lederach, 1995: 38-43). In the Western fields of international relations and conflict studies, scholars use diverging terminology to articulate theory and processes of reducing or eliminating violent conflictual relationships and its outcome. Ramsbotham and others (2011) broadly refer to such practices as conflict resolution. Other scholars, such as Paffenholz (2009), refer to them as peacebuilding practices. Both terms are used interchangeably throughout this text.

We launch our exploration of conflict resolution by first examining the three Western schools of thought that concentrate on managing or resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels. The three recognized peacebuilding approaches at the higher levels include: conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation (Paffenholz, 2009: 3;

Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 29). These terms are commonly utilized to reference both the schools of thought and the ideology and processes they embrace. Each school of thought is examined in turn.

While it is beyond the scope of the thesis to detail the history of the three schools or theories associated with them, we believe it is important to provide a basic overview for analytical purposes. Examination is especially valuable to demonstrate theoretical and etymological overlap across the schools of thought (Botes, 2003; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 30-32). We should also note that the three schools have largely originated in North American and continue to be heavily influenced by scholars, theories and practices from this origination (Lederach, 1995: 5). These roots, naturally, produce theoretical and practical problems, notably the inaccurate assumptions that theory and practices are universally applicable, and that associated theories and practices can be transposed onto other cultures (Lederach, 1995: 5-6). This critique was noted in subsection one. Nevertheless, although we explore Western theory, and construct a framework around it for comparative purposes, we do not believe that the theory and practices articulated herein are the only tools available or that they should be uncritically transferred or imposed onto other cultures.

3.3.1 Conflict management

Brad Spangler (2003) identifies conflict management as a process implemented when conflicts have become intractable. Conflict management is, therefore, generally applied to deep-rooted deconstructive relationships that are frequently the result of an incompatibility in "fundamental values and/or non-negotiable human needs" (Spangler, 2003). Accordingly, values and needs have created a conflict that has proven resilient and efforts are made to control the intensity and violent nature of the conflict. The objective is, thus, to transform deconstructive manifestations of conflict energies to constructive behavior, with its practices framed around the theory that conflicts adhere to patterns of escalation and de-escalation that can be managed (Lederach, 1995: 16). In short, the objective of conflict management is to reduce violence and negative effects of an ongoing conflict. The process does not deal with the "underlying causes" of the conflict, so a conflict that has been managed continues to exist and is thereby subject to continuation or escalation (Kelman, 2004: 119; Spangler, 2003).

Peter Wallensteen (2007: 50) similarly conceptualizes conflict management as focused "on the armed aspect of the conflict: bringing the fighting to an end, limiting the spread of the conflict and, thus, containing it." Wallensteen's definition, as noted, emphasizes the reduction or arresting of violence. Concurrently, Swanström and Weissmann (2005: 25) suggest conflict

management "limit[s], mitigate[s] and/or contain[s] a conflict without necessar[ily] solving it". Due to its limited nature, as denoted in the previous quotes, some scholars define conflict management as a perpetual process of controlling violence and its effects on referents (Miller, 2005: 23). Using alternative lexicon, Reimann (2004: 8) preferences the term conflict settlement, defining it as an "outcome oriented strategies for achieving sustainable win-win solutions and/or putting an end to direct violence, without necessarily addressing the underlying conflict causes." Whether scholars define the practice conflict settlement, as Reimann chooses, or conflict management, they agree that the process does not deal with root causes of a conflict, but contrary reduces or arrests its violent expression.

Since attention is centered on reducing violence, conflict management predominantly utilizes structural techniques that target elite decision makers. For instance, it commonly includes the proctoring of mutual agreements between governments (Miller, 2005: 23). Agreements can include negotiated ceasefires or truces (Paffenholz, 2009: 3; Reimann, 2004: 9, 16; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 44). These processes are frequently Track 1[58] approaches focused at political, social or military elites centered on ending the violence (Kelman, 2004: 119; Paffenholz, 2009: 3; Reimann, 2004: 8-9). Additional techniques utilized to manage a conflict include the dispatching of peacekeeping forces to oversee implementation of a ceasefire or to create a buffer between belligerents (Spangler, 2003).

Due to its narrow focus some scholars chastise conflict management as insufficient for two broad reasons. On the one hand, as repeatedly emphasized, the root causes of the conflict are not managed (Paffenholz, 2009: 3; Lederach, 1995: 17). It is, thus, a short-term solution since grievances and conflict causes persist. On the other hand, the management process is criticized for centering on elites and decision-makers and not society at large (Paffenholz, 2009: 3). The limited approach, therefore, fails to address the concerns and interests of society at large. This can be problematic for long-term stability.

3.3.2 Conflict resolution

Conflict resolution is an ambiguous term utilized in scholarly literature (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31; Reimann, 2004: 2; Wallensteen, 2007: 50), which can signify three things (Miller, 2005: 25). The term can denote "a result, and an identified field of academic study as

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[58] Track I diplomacy operates at the structural level (Paffenholz, 2009: 3; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 29; Reimann, 2004: 4-5). It is a top-down approach implemented at the official level, targeting the political elite and governing institutional bodies using tools which include arbitration, negotiation and peace-keeping (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 11-12; Paffenholz, 2009: 3; Reimann, 2004: 4-5). Ramsbotham and others (2011: 14) define the approach as "elite peacemaking" since it is centered on the higher levels of governing and social frameworks.

well as an activity which persons and communities engage every day without ever using the term" (Miller, 2005: 25). As the quote emphasizes, the term conflict resolution can refer to a discipline, a process of altering a conflict, and the outcome of that process (Hermann, 2004: 46; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31). We first concentrate on the discipline before examining how scholars of the discipline conceptualize conflict and how conflicts are thought altered.

Conflict resolution as a discipline, or field of study, emerged in the 1950s for the purpose of understanding and resolving violent conflict between and within societies (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 4, 35; Reimann, 2004: 3). The discipline consisted of researchers who appropriated theoretical and practical input from other research disciplines (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 4, 35; Reimann, 2004: 3). Among its influences, contemporary conflict resolution combines theory and practice from disciplines including psychology, sociology, peace studies and international law (Reimann, 2004: 3). Accordingly, conflict resolution combines theory and practices designed for resolving conflict at the inter-personal, group, intrastate and interstate levels (detailed in 3.4.1) (Miller, 2005: 25). Some of these theories are criticized when they are transferred from the lower levels onto the higher levels. For instance, some scholars advocate forgiveness be applied at the intrastate and interstate level, although other scholars criticize transference is inapplicable and theoretically impractical among a collective, and contradictorily is better suited for individuals and small groups. Theoretical dissension on the issue of forgiveness is detailed in chapter 4, section 3.11.

Further dissension within the field of conflict resolution is observable when examining how scholars conceptualize conflict, since some theorize conflict is positive while others perceive conflict as negative (discussed in 5.2). Among the former, Reimann (2004: 9-10), for instance, suggests conflict resolution scholars perceive conflict is natural and potentially positive. Consequently, the objective of these scholars is not to eliminate conflict but to manage violence and encourage non-violent accommodation while resolving issues and meeting needs. Among the latter, Spangler (2003) contradicts Reimann insisting: "'Conflict resolution' implies that conflict is bad, and is therefore something that should be ended." Supporting Reimann's theory, Lederach (1995: 16) similarly states that some conflict resolution scholars depict conflict as detrimental.

There is also dissention among scholars about the duration of conflict resolution. On one hand, conflict resolution scholars sometimes conceptualized conflict as "a short-term phenomenon that can be 'resolved' permanently through mediation or other intervention processes" (Spangler, 2003). According to Spangler's theory, conflict resolution is a

temporary or finite process. On the other hand, some scholars argue conflict resolution, as a process, is infinite since relationships are continuously changing and being re-evaluated (Auerbach, 2004: 153). Foregoing a discussion that resolves whether most scholars associated with the field of conflict resolution perceive conflict is positive or negative, or capable of being permanently resolved, most concur that managing a conflict is insufficient for securing a long-term solution (Spangler, 2003). They, consequently, suggest that more needs to be done to address the root causes of a conflict to secure peace by resolving conflict issues.

Emphasizing its derivation, Spangler (2003) summarizes conflict resolution scholars and practitioners generally perceive conflict as durable and rooted in "non-negotiable issues such as fundamental human needs, intolerable moral differences, or high-stakes distributional issues regarding essential resources, such as money, water, or land." The competition to fulfill needs or correct moral differences, as denoted in the quote, gives the impression that referents are engage in a competition for scant resources. Because conflict is theorized as rooted in needs, conflict resolution scholars argue that stakeholders' needs should be identified and addressed when resolving a conflict.

Concerning overall objectives of the resolution approach, scholars agree that conflict resolution theories and practices seek to terminate violence between referents engaged in conflict while resolving the underlying issues (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4, 75; Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1995: 16; Paffenholz, 2009: 4; Ross, 2004: 201). By addressing the structural and cultural roots of a conflict, and pursuing a mutually satisfactory resolution, it is believed that constructive relationships can be established over time (Miller, 2005: 26; Reimann, 2004: 9; Wallensteen, 2007: 8). Stated clearly, conflict resolution is a process that centers on the "interests, needs, perspectives, and continued existence" of the referents at the unofficial level (Miller, 2005: 26). Practices utilized to achieve these quoted objectives include Track II[59] approaches, which include workshops, peace education and capacity building (Burgess and Burgess, 2010; Paffenholz, 2009: 4-10). Many of these tools are implemented by NGOs that operate at the local, national and international levels (Paffenholz, 2009: 4).

While conflict resolution processes are broader and deeper than conflict management, a group of scholars criticize the practice as shallow. For instance, it is argued that conflict resolution fails to address long-term structural and relational issues (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1995: 16). In particular, it is hypothesized that conflict resolution neglects to transform the

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[59] Track II diplomacy targets academics, religious leaders and persons involved in business (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 42; Paffenholz, 2009: 4; Reimann, 2004: 5). Track II are unofficial processes that utilize particular techniques, such as problem-solving workshops, to forge greater awareness and understanding beyond governing elites (Paffenholz, 2009: 4; Reimann, 2004: 5; Ropers, 2003: 1).

relationship through the adjustment of how referents perceive and interact with one another (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1995: 16). Moreover, it is suggested that approaching resolution at the official or unofficial level is insufficient for transforming societal perceptions (Lederach, 1995: 18). The identified shortcomings have led to the development of the third school of theory and practice: conflict transformation.

3.3.3 Conflict transformation

The third Western peacebuilding school of thought is conflict transformation. This approach was developed in the 1990s, following John Paul Lederach and others' theory and practices (Botes, 2003). As denoted, scholars associated with the conflict transformation school of thought perceive conflict resolution and conflict management as insufficient for qualitatively altering relationships or institutionalizing long-term positive changes among former adversaries (Bar-Tal, 2000: 351-354; Botes, 2003; Kelman, 2004: 115; Kriesberg, 2001: 61; Lederach, 1995: 17; Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 4-7; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31-32; Reimann, 2004: 8-9). Accordingly, they recommend that social relationships, behavior and opinions be altered to deepen the degree of change experienced when changing deconstructive conflictual relationships (Bar-Tal, 2000: 351-354; Botes, 2003; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31-32).

Explaining its theoretical and practical basis, Lederach (1995: 18) suggests conflict transformation is both prescriptive and descriptive. Conflict transformation is identified as an analytical approach that perceives conflict as a natural occurrence that effects, and is affected by, referents engaged (Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 7; Spangler, 2003). Its objective is to address deconstructive conflict aspects through the transformation of "self-images, relationships, and social structures" (Botes, 2003). Altering perceptions, structures and behavior, as noted in the quote, is considered the most appropriate foundation where upon amicable relations can be established and solidified (Avruch, 2010: 39; Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1995: 18; Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 7; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31-32; Spangler, 2003). Conflict transformation is, consequently, determined a deeper approach than resolution or management.

The depth of change articulated by scholars is noticeable in definitions provided for the process. For instance, Miller (2005: 26) suggests conflict transformation changes "the general context or framing of the situation, the contending parties, the issues at stake, the processes or procedures governing the predicament, or the structures affecting any of the aforementioned." Miller's description clearly articulates the depth and breadth transformation desires.

Comparatively, Reimann (2004: 10) defines conflict transformation as "outcome, process and structure oriented long-term peacebuilding efforts, which aim to truly overcome revealed forms of direct, cultural and structural violence." Conflict transformation, as quoted, addresses issues, changes attitudes, and operates to neutralize and eliminate all forms of violence (Reimann, 2004: 13). These elements are managed through a "fair, respectful and inclusive process as a way of life and envisions outcome as a commitment to increasing justice, seeking truth, and healing relationships" (Lederach, 1995: 22). Lederach's quote emphasizes fundamental peacebuilding principles, which are examined in chapter four.

The process of reconfiguring deconstructive structural, cognitive, effective and behavioral nuances to constructive ones is, unsurprisingly, referred to as conflict transformation (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1995: 17; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31-32). According to theory, conflict transformation as a process is necessitated because: "In any situation of intense conflict, there is a tendency among disputants to become trapped inside their own stories of threatened identity, justified fear, and unjustifiable suffering" (Funk and Said, 2004: 2). To reverse the impact of such stories, and release disputants from the deconstructive conflict and its effects noted in the quotation, change must occur at the structural, social and individual levels (Botes, 2003).

Therefore, conflict transformation, as a peacebuilding strategy, is broadly summarized in structural and social terms as the (re)construction of institutional, infrastructural, and social bonds (de la Rey and McKay, 2006: 143; Reimann, 2004: 10-13). Through structural and attitudinal changes made at multiple levels, conflict transformation develops, roots and solidifies positive, sustainable relationships by modifying mutual structures, perceptions and behavior (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31-32; Reimann, 2004: 10-13). Alteration is operationalized in a manner that considers present relations and their desired future trajectory, while recognizing the dynamic interplay between the two (Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 8-9). Stated differently, conflict transformation theory is rooted in the realization that relationships change and are dynamic, so conflict transformation must be adaptive and flexible. During implementation, care is taken to effectuate transformation in a culturally sensitive manner (Paffenholz, 2009: 5; Reimann, 2004: 11-13; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 86). Emphasis on cultural sensitivity addresses critique number three proffered subsequent to the invasion and occupation of Iraq by scholars, noted in section 3.1 of the present chapter.

Combined, the conflict transformation approach is presented as superior to the other schools of thought in that it is a holistic approach whose outcomes are deeper and more sustainable since they are constructed upon alterations made to structures, behavior and

perceptions among society and its members (Reimann, 2004: 10-11). To achieve its objectives, conflict transformation is conceptualized as an inclusive approach that incorporates Track III[60] strategies to address conflict causes and effects among a wide swath of society (Paffenholz, 2009: 5; Reimann, 2004: 11-13). The theoretical and practical advantage of including society is that amicable relations become sustainable since more individuals are directly involved and affected by the transformation process (Lederach, 1995: 8-19). By comparison, other scholars advocate conflict resolution be pursued utilizing all three Tracks: official, unofficial and societal (Reimann, 2004: 11-13).

While Lederach (1995), among others, advocates the transformation approach, there is an ongoing debate in the literature about when a bottom-up strategy should be introduced (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 222). Hermann (2004: 46-48) questions whether it should be introduced first, simultaneously, or subsequent to a structural approach. Providing a potential solution to this dilemma, Ramsbotham and others (2011: 222) suggest conflict resolution should be administered structurally first to safeguard conditions which will ensure the desired societal transformation later. By comparison, Lederach (1995: 8-19) embraces implementing transformation at the structural and social levels simultaneous.

By way of concluding our analysis of conflict transformation, and introducing other important concepts defined below, Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma Bennink (2004) propose specific conditions that indicate when conflict transformation is necessary. They suggest:

> when the societies involved in a conflict evolve widely shared beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and emotions that support adherence to the conflictive goals, maintain the conflict, de-legitimize the opponent, and thus negate the possibility of peaceful resolution and prevent the development of peaceful relations (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 13).

When the degree of deconstructive perceptions and behavior become predominant in society, as the quote emphasizes, conflict transformation is determined necessary because of the increased probability of conflict continuation or escalation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 64; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 13; Bar-Tal, 2000: 356-357; Lederach, 1995: 17-19). Reference to altering conflict perpetuating beliefs and attitudes, prompts us to temporarily digress from our discussion on the three schools of thought, to define two additional terms: cognitive transformation and reconciliation. By their nature, both terms are intertwined with conflict transformation, in that they are associated with deep and sustainable improvements between

[60] Track III diplomacy is focused at the societal level (Paffenholz, 2009: 5). It enhances social understanding and cohesion (among and between social groupings) while expanding and rooting transformation among the population (Lederach, 1995: 8-19; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 29).

belligerents. Subsequent to defining these two terms, our attention will return to the three schools of thought so that we can position ourselves within the theory analyzed above.

3.3.3.1 Cognitive transformation

Since conflict alters relationships, perceptions, behavior and structural aspects, parties engaged are expected to feel threatened and reflexively become suspicious of or aggressive against those perceived to represent a threat (Lederach, 1995: 18). These deconstructive tendencies need to be reversed to secure and stabilize constructive relationships to counter (the justification of) violence. Altering perceptions and behavior requires cognitive transformation (Bar-Tal, 2000: 356-357). Its theory is rooted in the assumption that humans can circumvent deconstructive relational tendencies, at all levels, by (re-) learning how to approach conflict in a creative and positive manner (Boulding, 1978: 62; Lederach, 1995: 17-19; Mead, 1940: 402-405). Parent (2012: 27) goes one step further arguing cognitive transformation "allows the victim's pain to be acknowledged and for the latter to apologize." Hence, altering cognition and behavior is believed an avenue of circumventing conflict, while allowing transformation of the relationship to occur, perhaps to the point of forgiveness.

Scholars use diverse terminology when referencing the phenomenon. Anatol Rapoport, for example, conceptualizes similar processes as second-order learning, "which requires a willingness and capacity for challenging assumptions" (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 48)[61]. Challenging assumptions, as referenced in the quote, indicates there is an alteration of perspectives. Comparatively, John Paul Lederach (1995: 18) defines the process of changing attitudes and behavior as "transformation." Other scholars simplify comparable processes as a "coming to terms with" what has occurred during the conflict (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Kelman, 2004: 113; Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1035). Despite the lexicon deployed, a simple framework is available in the literature that classifies which changes are determined necessary.

In simplistic terms, cognitive transformation consists of an alteration, or reframing, of a referent's (mis-) perceptions about: a) their environment; b) "self," and; c) the "other" (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 18; Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-359; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 3-4). Changes made to the three elements are projected to alter perceptions and behavior (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 73-75; Long and Brecke, 2003: 36; Shriver, 1995: 114). Thus, cognitive transformation, as utilized hereafter, broadly refers to a process of

[61] Comparatively, according to Anatol Rapoport, first-order learning is mechanistically implemented according to prior experience and social-cultural norms with minimal critical evaluation and creativity (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 48).

counteracting deconstructive cognitive and behavioral dispositions that attribute to de-escalation or termination of violent perceptions and behavior (Jackson, 2009: 177; Kriesberg, 2004: 82; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 2-3; Lederach, 1995: 18). Beliefs necessitating deconstruction, among others, include: the perceived justness of one's goals; over-emphasis of personal and/or national security; a positive self-image; the belief of one's own victimhood; and a de-legitimization of the other (Bar-Tal, 2000: 354-355; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 12). While space does not permit an analysis of these factors individually, their influencing capacity on interactive conflict typology is noteworthy (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 74), and was referred to in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Each perception, nevertheless, is hypothesized to negatively impact on the quality of a given relationship, and at their extreme, can justify the use of violence against an adversary.

Accordingly, cognitive transformation reverses deconstructive cognitive factors over time, thereby changing opinions and approaches whereupon amicable relations can be forged. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 74) emphasizes the importance of these changes when he writes: "Only a mutual change of these beliefs, which are the cognitive foundation of the conflict, may enable the forming of new goals and beliefs, which may in turn justify and rationalize the need of maintaining and consolidating peaceful relations with the former enemy." The quote illustrates how cognitive transformation instills new beliefs and goals, which aid in the creation of a constructive relationship. While it is clear that changes are necessary, the question becomes: to what degree does such transformation have to occur?

Providing one solution, Herbert Kelman (2004: 119-121) suggests that the degree of transformation sought should ensure "that the other is not a threat to one's own identity." However, the concept of non-threatening is relatively vague, because threats will vary from one relationship to the next. Other scholars offer more insight into the intended degree of transformation. Three benchmarks of successive cognitive transformation can be extracted from the literature. They include: 1) legitimizing the adversary; 2) enhancing self-awareness; and 3) behavioral alteration whereby referents approach the relationship in a nonviolent or constructive manner (Bar-Tal, 2000: 356; Kaufman, 2006: 212; Ross, 2004: 200; Rouhana, 2004: 35). These interrelated objectives are analyzed in greater detail in the following paragraphs.

First, legitimizing the "other" is an essential component of conflict transformation. Bargal and Sivan (2004: 130-134) suggest legitimization means accepting the adversary as human (at minimum) or an equal (maximally), regardless if they have perpetrated violence or wrongdoing (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 20; Saunders, 2009: 381).

Its objective is thus to reverse the tendency of seeing the other as subhuman, radically different or threatening. In short, legitimization is conceptualized as the cultivation of an objective humanistic perception of an adversary (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 73-74; Rouhana, 2004: 41). Through humanization and legitimization, accommodation of the "other," their needs and desires are facilitated (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 73-74; Rouhana, 2004: 41). Other scholars refer to legitimization and humanization as extending "mutual recognition" to an adversary (Bar-On, 2005: 17). Once extended, there is an increased chance of creating constructive relationships.

The literature accentuates the challenges entailed in legitimizing the other (Bar-On, 2005: 14; Buckeye, 2010: 43), while underscoring its necessity to counter violent interaction whereby accommodation can manifest (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357; Bercovitch and others, 2009: 544; Kriesberg, 2004: 87-95; Parent, 2012: 37). Rothman, for example, suggests that one fundamental component of legitimization is the separation of the wrongdoer from the wrongs they have committed (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 45). Extending recognition in such cases is a challenging but necessary process, since people engaged in conflict experience difficulties separating the individual as a human from the inhumane acts they may have perpetrated. Without re-conceptualization of the "other," deconstructive cognitive and behavioral patterns are expected to continue (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Long and Brecke, 2003: 30). Therefore, difficult as it may be, mutual recognition and acceptance is essential to creating amity.

The second cognitive transformation benchmark found in the literature is the enhancement of self-awareness. Enhanced self-awareness is a prerequisite because the manner in which an individual (or group) perceives themselves, qualitatively influences cognitive and interactive predispositions within a given relationship (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 32; Boulding, 1978: 15; Staub, 2003). For example, adversaries engaged in a violent conflictual relationship are prone to identify themselves as a "victim" rather than a "perpetrator" of violence (Bar-Tal, 2000: 354; R. Fisher, 2001b: 33; Kriesberg, 2004: 102; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 12; Staub, 2003: 12). The common tendency is thus to blame the other for wrongdoing and to emphasize the wrongs the other has committed, while perceiving oneself as the innocent victim. Such subjective inclinations are biased and counterproductive to advancing amicable relations (Bar-Tal, 2000: 354; R. Fisher, 2001b: 33; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 12; Staub, 2003: 12). This proclivity to demonize and blame is reversed when objective self-awareness is cultivated (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 32; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 3-4).

Improving self-awareness requires the propagation of objectivity where an unbiased perception of the "in-group" and/or "self" can be cultivated (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 20).

In this context, cognitive transformation necessitates that conflict parties recognize the contributions that the "in-group" or "self" have made to a conflictual relationship, and/or accept/share responsibility for the deconstructive quality of the relationship (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 20-23; Maoz, 2004: 225-237; Rouhana, 2004: 41). Therefore, transformation of self-awareness may necessitate the "in-group" recognize and accept that they have likewise perpetrated wrongdoing and produced grievances, which has equally impacted on the quality of the relationship (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 73-77; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15-20; Kriesberg, 2004: 96; Rouhana, 2004: 41). Many times, both referents engaged in a conflict are guilty of wrongdoing, and recognition of that culpability engenders perceptive changes toward "self" and the "other". When fault is mutually shared, there should be an increased likelihood of neutralizing deconstructive prejudices. Combined, enhanced self-awareness is suggested to counteract ideology and behavior that occasions relational impasses and restricts accommodative perceptions and behavior (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-359; R. Fisher, 2001b: 33; Kriesberg, 2004: 102; Staub, 2003: 13-19). Counter-balancing (existential) deconstructive conflict discourses (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-359; Kelman, 2004: 121; Maoz, 2004: 225-237), thus neutralizes: a) the tendency to perceive the "other" in negative terms; and/or b) perceive "self" as innocent victim and the other as the guilty party (Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-359; Kelman, 2004: 121; Ross, 2004: 208).

As the re-formulation of cognitive perceptions are forged through adversaries' acknowledgment of the "other" and objective perceptions of "self" and "other" are attained, transformations, as articulated hitherto, produces a third cognitive transformation benchmark: altering how the relationship itself is perceived, and which behavioral typology is selected (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-359). More specifically, as cognitive transformation progresses, adversaries are expected to alter their perception of the relationship (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-359; Hermann, 2004: 46; Kaufman, 2006: 202; Maoz, 2004: 229). Primarily, referents should discontinue perceiving themselves engaged in an existential conflictual relationship (broadly defined as perpetually counterproductive or dangerous), and come to recognize that development of a constructive relationship offers stakeholders mutual benefit, defined here as an outcome that is determined acceptable by both parties involved (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15-23; Kaufman, 2006: 206-210; Long and Brecke, 2003: 35-36). By perceiving value in the development and maintenance of a constructive relationship, former adversaries become increasingly prone to nonviolent interaction (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 23; Long and Brecke, 2003: 35-36). Rather than seeing deconstructive behavior as the only option, they become aware of the

benefits that a constructive relationship would produce and adopt alternative techniques of interaction.

Consequently, when cognitive transformation progresses, changes are expected to augment constructive interactive behavior, including practices such as dialogue or cooperation (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-On, 2005: 10-11; Lederach, 1995: 12-13). Because the other is now legitimized, is no longer perceived as threatening, and the relationship is discerned to offer benefits, continued changes in perceptions and behavior are projected. Transformation, in this frame, is partly expected since trust will be cultivated during a period of positive interaction (Bar-On, 2005: 10-11; R. Cohen, 2004). As outlined in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, constructive interfacing usually contributes to the production of cyclical interactive and cognitive patterns, and generates positive cognitive and behavioral feedback (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66-77; Head, 2012: 33-41; Kelman, 2004: 118-119; Ropers, 2003: 7). Hence, it is through the amalgamation of cognitive (and behavioral) transformation, as outlined in this subsection, which conflictual relationships are restructured and constructive relations sustained. When these changes become broad or deep enough, reconciliation becomes a potential outcome.

3.3.3.2 Reconciliation

At its zenith, peacebuilding processes embraced by the conflict transformation approach pursues reconciliation (Kelman, 2004: 119; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 32, 246). The English word "reconciliation" derives from the Latin term *reconcilare*. *Reconcilare* is formed by combining the Latin prefix *re-* "again" and *concilare*, which means to "make friendly," or "to bring together again" (Harper, 2001). Cambridge Learner's Dictionary (2014) defines reconciliation as "a process in which two people or groups of people become friendly again after they have argued; or the process of making two opposite beliefs, ideas or situations agree." Cambridge's definition is generally representative of scholars' conceptualizations.

Natural scientists, for instance, define reconciliation as a common practice utilized by primates to repair disturbed relationships in the aftermath of conflict (de Waal, 1993: 113). The processes involved, nevertheless, fluctuate across the animal kingdom and are determined by factors such as species, environment, culture and age (de Waal, 2000: 24; 1993: 113). Chimpanzees, for instance, have been observed performing rituals including kissing or embracing following conflict within the group (de Waal and van Roosmalen, 1979: 56). Frans B.M. de Waal and Angeline van Roosmalen (1979: 60-65) suggest that these rituals decrease social tension by defusing conflict situations and restoring harmony.

Although the term reconciliation is utilized across multiple disciplines (Adelman, 2005: 287; Avruch, 2010: 39), we concentrate on fractured social relations subsequent to (violent) conflict between two societies or countries. In this frame, contemporary conflict resolution literature attests that there is no accepted definition of reconciliation (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Avruch, 2010: 39; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4; Bloomfield and others, 2003: 12; Hermann, 2004: 41; Skaar, 2013: 64-65). Accordingly, Tamar Hermann (2004: 41) posits that reconciliation is "little more than a buzzword," and an "under-theorized" field of research (Long and Brecke, 2003: 147). The question becomes: why is reconciliation an ambiguous term within the conflict resolution literature?

There are multiple explanations for reconciliation's conceptual ambiguity within conflict resolution (Hermann, 2004: 41-47; Rouhana, 2004: 34). Foremost, the term is used to describe both a process and an outcome (Bloomfield, 2006: 6; Kriesberg, 2004: 82; Skaar, 2013: 65). Next, Sarkin (2008: 14) underscores the subjective nature of the term, noting that different societies and cultures uniquely conceptualize reconciliation. Since its processes and outcomes vary, the manner in which it is conceptualized contrast. Moreover, reconciliation, as conceptualized in conflict resolution literature, is convoluted by the numerous disciplines attributing to theory and practices (Bloomfield, 2006: 4-10). Although Terrence Buckeye (2010: 5) claims "John [Paul] Lederach laid the foundation for current studies of reconciliation with his 1997 book, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies," numerous scholars from various fields have since expanded upon Lederach's conceptual framework at all levels.

The coalescence of disciplines is problematic because theories originating in theology, psychology, sociology, political science and economics, which prioritize different referents (individuals, couples, groups, societies and states) and tools, are frequently accompanied by the avocation of diverging outcomes, all of whose techniques and objectives are sometimes intermingled (Bloomfield, 2006: 4-10). Consequently, theories and practices established by disciplines centered on interpersonal or group relationships are not always applicable for resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels (Bloomfield, 2006: 4-10). For instance, theory and practices implemented to advance reconciliation among a married couple is inapplicable for promoting reconciliation between two countries[62].

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[62] Further demonstrating how diverging disciplines can influence conceptualization, some scholars apply terminology from supplementary disciplines to elucidate their understanding of reconciliation in the field of politics. For instance, Christopher Coyne (2007: 78), an economics professor, advances an economic-based lexicon where terms such as "incentives" and "opportunity costs" are suggested to illustrate the conditions and challenges of reconciling referents at the societal level. Coyne (2007: 78) also utilizes related vocabulary,

Equally impeding theoretical agreement, Adelman (2005: 287-307) creates a framework containing four types of reconciliation. He includes the "Restorative," "Revolutionary," "Counter-Revolutionary" and "Liberal Reconciliation" forms. According to Adelman (2005: 287-307), each approach is viable for a specific type of conflict that is determined by the nature of the polity involved. While a theoretical attempt to differentiate and clarify reconciliation, the definition Adelman (2005: 287-288) provides for reconciliation vaguely states it is "the restoration of fractured relationships" across these typologies. In this frame, Adelman simply complicates theory by creating four various types of reconciliation which essentially share the same objective.

Forsaking an exhaustive exploration of reconciliation, definitions extracted from the literature are generally vague. For instance, some scholars claim it (re-) builds trust through cooperation (Kelman, 2004: 119-120; Worthington, 2006: 197). Similarly, William Long and Peter Brecke (2003: 1) define reconciliation as a process of "mutually conciliatory accommodation between former antagonists" which reduces the probability of future violence by renovating relationships. Long and Brecke's definition is equally vague and could be generally applied to a process of conflict resolution. What differentiates reconciliation from conflict resolution, however, is the degree to which relationships are restored.

A cursory review of the literature on reconciliation suggests that restoration of a positive relationship is the ultimate goal (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-359; R. Fisher, 2001b: 26; Kelman, 2004: 119-120; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 246). There is debate over the degree of reconciliation that should be expected. Hamber (2007: 122), for instance, summarizes: "Genuine reconciliation is not about the outcome of 'harmony,' as many fear, or cheap forgiveness, but a multifaceted and complex process that includes accounting for past crimes." Therefore, Hamber intertwines reconciliation with a balance of principle of justice and accountability. As explained, reconciliation does not require forgiveness in Hamber's understanding, but rather something more constructive than nonviolent coexistence.

By comparison, Elin Skaar (2013: 65) depicts reconciliation on a sliding scale, with coexistence on one side, and healing and harmony established through mercy and forgiveness, on the other. Accordingly, the process functions at multiple levels (interpersonal or societal) and can be implemented from the top-down or the bottom-up (Skaar, 2013: 66). Providing insight, the author emphasizes that "reconciliation requires mutuality," suggesting that both

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including "bankruptcy," which he describes a situation where reconciliation proves problematic or unachievable. By conceptualizing reconciliation in economic terms, the author posits that its overall processes are easier to apply and understand by laypersons (or those outside of scholarship) (C. Coyne, 2007: 3).

parties are fundamental participants in the process (Skaar, 2013: 66). After all, not every conflictual relationship can be transformed to produce reconciliation (Skaar, 2013: 66) since referents may not be open to it in certain contexts.

Due to the complexities and ambiguities alluded to above, Jeremy Sarkin (2008: 14) hypothesizes that it is impossible to construct one all-encompassing definition of reconciliation that would obtain general acceptance. Notwithstanding this challenge, I believe it is essential to provide a basic definition for theoretical purposes. Thus, reconciliation, as used herein, is defined as the "long-term process of overcoming hostility and mistrust between divided peoples," whereby transformation is rooted and expressed among former adversaries and constructive, amicable relations at the societal level are solidified (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 32). In short, reconciliation is "the ultimate goal" of conflict resolution or transformation (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 246). Nonetheless, it is believed that reconciliation can be obtained without necessitating the act of forgiveness (Sarkin, 2008: 17-21; Skaar, 2013: 12). In the remainder of this thesis, I will sometimes refer to reconciliation as deep, or a deepening of, conflict resolution.

With terminology clarified, processes explained, and the fields of peacebuilding introduced, I now position myself within contemporary conflict resolution discourse before highlighting several fundamental objectives of conflict resolution in the context of intrastate and interstate relations.

3.3.4 Positioning the research approach

As denoted, the terms conflict management, resolution and transformation are terms that frequently differentiate practices and depths of intervention, although there is some theoretical and practical overlap. John Paul Lederach insists these terms be appropriately differentiated due to the vast differences he perceives in approaches (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 9). More specifically:

> Lederach […] downgrades conflict resolution in comparison with conflict transformation on the grounds that it is content-centered rather than relationship-centered, aims at immediate agreement rather than long-term process, and is committed only to de-escalation rather than also including escalation to pursue positive change (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 9)[63].

However, I disagree with Lederach's differentiation as denoted in the quote.

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[63] Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 4) similarly segregates terminology, stating: "although conflict resolution terminates a conflict, it does not necessarily stabilize the peace or prevent the emergence of a new conflict in the future, which may even lead to renewed violence." The limited approach to conflict resolution was outlined above.

One reason why I disagree with rigid differentiation is because conflict resolution, management and transformation are sometimes interchangeably referred to in the literature (Botes, 2003; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 30; Swanström and Weissmann, 2005: 24). Bercovitch (2005), for example, combines lexicon and theory when he writes:

> Successful conflict management in the context of intractable conflicts implies achieving some transformation in (1) the basic structure of a conflict (e.g., change in incompatible goals and relations), (2) the issue structure (e.g., change in salience of issues), or (3) actor transformation (e.g., change of leadership) (Bercovitch, 2005: 106).

In the quote, Bercovitch overlaps theory and terminology, suggesting conflict management incorporates conflict transformation, which in Lederach's differentiated framework is theoretically and discursively inappropriate and inapplicable. However, because scholars intertwine concepts and practices when articulating their theory, as demonstrated, it becomes problematic to differentiate.

Another reason I feel that differentiation is problematic, is because I perceive that there is greater theoretical and practical value in combining terms and theories rather than isolating them. As Ramsbotham and others (2011: 9) convincingly argue, conflict resolution and conflict transformation are linguistically diverse manners of speaking about the same theoretical and practical processes at varying depths. They, consequently, present conflict resolution as a scale with "'conflict settlement' at one end of the spectrum and 'conflict transformation' at the other" (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 10). According to their conceptual framework, conflict settlement is a peacemaking process effectuating an agreement that temporarily reduces or eliminates violent interaction among adversaries (Avruch, 2010: 39; Kelman, 2004: 119; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31-32). This definition falls somewhere near the discipline of conflict management, as articulated in section 3.3.1. By comparison, conflict transformation reframes structural, cognitive and behavioral aspects, as Lederach advocates, leading to profound alterations within the relationship that root transformation (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 9), as articulated in 3.3.3. The elastic framework has the advantage in that it neatly integrates all Western theories and practices under the rubric conflict resolution.

Hence, the elastic framework of conflict resolution combines conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation as complimentary practices (Botes, 2003; Reimann, 2004: 8-15; Swanström and Weissmann, 2005: 28). Accordingly, the three approaches can be singly applied or combined depending on needs and circumstances within a given relationship (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 27; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 29).

Accordingly, peacebuilding practices can be tailored and harmonized to increase the viability of resolution by targeting different levels and depths simultaneously as needs and conditions require (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 27; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 29). Moreover, amalgamation of approaches that target the structural and societal levels concurrently is suggested able to increase the probability of conflict resolution becoming rooted through broad application (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 27; R. Fisher, 2001b: 26-28). Combining the three Western theories under the rubric of conflict resolution, thus, creates a holistic approach.

For these reasons, I select to adhere to Ramsbotham and others' (2011) broad understanding of conflict resolution as a sliding scale. I favor the approach for three reasons. First, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation are best understood and applied in combination rather than independently (Reimann, 2004: 12). Secondly, by utilizing a wide conceptual framework, it is possible to synthesize inter-related Western theories and practices running the gamut from conflict management to conflict transformation (Reimann, 2004: 12). Finally, a wide framework of analysis allows for a holistic comparison of conflict resolution across cultures at the theoretical and practical levels, which is a fundamental objective of my research. In particular, a wider framework ensures that all Western conflict resolution theory and practices are represented when making comparisons with the Arab/Muslim understanding of the process and practice, as conducted in chapters five and six.

With this in mind, hereafter, the term conflict resolution broadly refers to a multidisciplinary (for example, political science, peace studies, international relations, strategic studies) conglomeration of theories and practices utilized for the purpose of mitigating or eliminating violent conflict at multiple levels (interpersonal, group, intrastate and interstate). When administered as a verb, it delineates a process that includes all tools and theories applicable for managing, resolving or transforming conflict. The potential outcomes of such processes range from conflict termination to reconciliation depending on the referents, needs and circumstances encountered.

3.3.5 Objectives of conflict resolution in context

With conflict and conflict resolution detailed, and in consideration of the wide theoretical framework I have selected, it is fundamental to establish some general objectives of conflict resolution at the interstate level. Constructed upon the examined understanding of conflict and its elements, particularly the interplay of human response, perceptions, environmental conditions, and experiences which impact on the development and continuation of conflictual

relationships (Bar-Tal, 2000: 351-365), we argue that a process of conflict resolution should *ideally* accomplish several things. It should: address root causes (Kelman, 2004: 111-114; Reimann, 2004: 11), grievances (Auerbach, 2004: 149), empower individuals or collectives (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1995: 21; Reimann, 2004: 11), and alter or transform relationships to some degree (Botes, 2003). These issues are addressed in turn and are repeatedly referenced throughout the remainder of the thesis.

To begin, conflict resolution, in its broad sense, should identify and address core incompatibilities, or root causes, of conflict to manage or terminate a prolongation of deconstructive behavior (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 5; Galtung, 1998: 4-8; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 4; Reimann, 2004: 11). Within each case, root causes are expected to be multiple including structural, cultural, and/or economic issues or needs (Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 4; Reimann, 2004: 13). Addressing roots requires an objective, balanced and mutual investigation of, and dialogue into, which issues are producing the conflict (Head, 2012: 41). Once identified, efforts should be made to address the root causes of the conflict in a manner that satisfies the interests and needs of stakeholders. Nonetheless, conflicts and their causes are not static and will expand and mutate throughout the duration of the (conflict) relationship (Galtung, 1969: 102; Reimann, 2004: 4; Swanström and Weissmann, 2005: 9). Thus, issues that are deemed the root causes of a given conflict are expected to change over time since the relationship progressively alters. Fluidity thereby requires regular evaluations to ensure changing needs and objectives are factored into the equation as time passes.

Next, due to their salience, conflict resolution requires grievances be addressed (Auerbach, 2004: 149; Lederach, 1995: 14). The necessity of addressing grievances is obvious. Ronald Fisher (2001b: 26), for example, succinctly admonishes that wrongs committed “by one generation become the basis for retributive, vengeful atrocities perpetrated by the next generations.” Here Fisher is underscoring the pervasive and influential nature of grievances on the quality of relationships, and their propensity for being transmitted through and across generations. As noted in section 3.2.3 of the present chapter, violent conflicts produce real and perceived grievances and injustices that are discerned as inexcusable and unacceptable (Kriesberg, 2004: 83-84; Worthington, 2006: 7-8). In some instances, these (perceived) grievances increase adversaries’ distrust and hatred of the “other” and occasion conflict-propagating thoughts and behavior, that are then disseminated throughout society (Bar-Tal, 2000: 361-362). Grievances, therefore, need to be addressed to aid in the transformation of the adversaries and the quality of the relationship.

Then, conflict resolution should empower (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1995: 14-21; Reimann, 2004: 11). Harold Saunders posits that the empowerment of individuals or groups involved in a conflictual relationship is vital for resolving deconstructive conflict (Hermann, 2004: 40). In terms of objectives, Lederach (1995: 21) suggests empowerment should create "mutuality" and "community" whereby interaction and cooperation nurtures constructive relationships. Empowerment, as emphasized by Lederach, is defined as the act of extending political or social power (or voice) to (comparatively weaker or marginalized) individuals and groups regardless of their distinguishing characteristics (race, socioeconomic status, ethnicity), to create a symmetrical and just social/political arrangement. Empowerment affords stakeholders an opportunity to have both their grievances articulated and needs addressed (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Botes, 2003; Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 176; Reimann, 2004: 11). Needs, as applied herein, likewise incorporate an accommodation of individuals' input on how, when, and under which conditions conflict resolution occurs (Botes, 2003; Stover and others, 2005: 835). The latter is essential because parties will have to determine a mutually satisfactory approach and common objectives when resolving conflict (Bar-On, 2004: 251; 2005: 9; Bloomfield and others, 2003: 12-16; Rosoux, 2009: 559; Sarkin, 2008; Stover and others, 2005: 834-836; Winslade and Monk, n.d.: 3). This form of empowerment addresses the criticisms of conflict resolution outlined in section 3.1.

Thereafter, and inseparably linked to empowerment in social-political terms, a process of conflict resolution should be inclusive since the inclusion of most relevant stakeholders, regardless of their ethnic, political, social preference, is essential to achieve and root conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 49). The importance of inclusion as a complementary component of empowerment are noteworthy since, in its absence, conflict resolution will have minimal and/or short-term effects, and the process will be subject to rejection, setback and failure due to limited popular endorsement (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 30; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 49). For example, by limiting inclusion, there is a risk that "spoilers," broadly defined here as referents who seek to undermine the conflict resolution process, will derail a process from dissatisfaction and marginalization (Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 49). Reversely, inclusion allows for all stakeholders to be brought into the resolution process, which reduces the probability of outright popular rejection and limits opportunities spoilers can monopolize upon to derail the process.

Lastly, and linked to the above, the literature advocates social inclusion when resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels (Shriver, 1995: 91). Lipschultz, for example,

asserts: “Relationships among people, among individuals, are the fundamental basis of the state; restoring only the institutions of the state (and the economy) will not restore those relationships rent by years of violence and war” (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 17). Restating their quote, structural methodologies frequently included into conflict management are insufficient for addressing societal grievances and needs. As a result, Harold Saunders emphasizes the importance of establishing a “human dimension” in conflict resolution theory at the intrastate and interstate levels (Hermann, 2004: 40). Saunders notes that a conflict is not simply a dispute between institutions and representatives of a country, but simultaneously incorporates the respective communities whom must likewise be included in any resolution process for its realization (Hermann, 2004: 40). Social inclusion is so fundamental to success, scholars hypothesizing that without social involvement, a conflictual relationship will not experience an adequate depth of transformation and the conflict will remain subject to continuation or escalation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 11-13; R. Cohen, 2004: 179; R. Fisher, 2001b: 25; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 23, 48, 211; Shriver, 1995: 6-9). These five interconnected components are emphasized when resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate level, further underscoring the need to amalgamate structural and societal level approaches when resolving conflict at these levels.

3.4 An analytical framework of conflict resolution

With our broad theoretical understanding of conflict resolution articulated, attention turns to elucidating a practical understanding of conflict resolution as a process. Louis Kriesberg, whom is generally recognized to adhere to the conflict resolution school of thought, provides a concise framework beneficial due to its simplification of a complex process. He divides conflict resolution into three elements: *who* is being reconciled, *how* reconciliation is pursued, and to what *degree* it is accomplished (R. Fisher, 2001b: 27). Utilizing Kriesberg’s terminology, the first contains the “units” or referents involved in the process. The second is defined as the “dimension” or techniques (for instance, reparations and apologies) applied to advance a process. The third element is the “degree” to which resolution is pursued and achieved (qualifying the outcome) (R. Fisher, 2001b: 27). Each component is explored in the following subsections.

3.4.1 Units or levels

As indicated, scholars across theoretical disciplines conceptualize conflict resolution divergently and focus their theories on numerable referents (Ramsbotham and others, 2011:

35-61). For instance, religious scholars, such as Doherty and others (2011), focus on resolving conflict among individuals or couples. Comparatively, social-psychological scholars, such as Kelman (2004) or Kriesberg (2004), apply their theories to resolve conflict at the societal level. For theoretical purposes, and due to the disparate nature of the fields and theories involved, this text condenses referents to four broad categories: individual; group; societal and international. These are brusquely defined below.

3.4.1.1 Individual

At the lowest level, conflict resolution is administered to transform conflicts among individuals. For instance, a married couple can be reconciled following an argument or separation (Worthington, 2006). At this level, social and psychological attributes of the conflict are of theoretical and practical importance, for instance how a conflict affects individual cognition and welfare (Worthington, 2006). Techniques for advancing conflict resolution at the individual level include counseling and/or individual psychological or religious-based therapy (Worthington, 2006: 203-253). While theories and practices associated with the individual level center primarily on interpersonal relationships, theories originally developed at this level have been transposed onto conflict resolution at the higher levels (Bloomfield, 2006: 4-10). For instance, references are sometimes made to social practices of forgiveness and healing, as explored in greater detail in chapter 4, section 3.11.

3.4.1.2 Group

Scholars in a range of disciplines including sociology and business management argue that groups can and should resolve conflicts among and between members (Rahim, 2002: 207; Worthington, 2006: 256-271). For instance, business management literature emphasizes conflict among coworkers negatively affects employees' overall productiveness (Rahim, 2002: 210). Management literature recommends the introduction of tools and practices, including lectures or instructional videos that educate employees on the importance of teamwork and impart conflict resolution techniques (Rahim, 2002: 226). Maintaining the present example, managers can also function as intermediaries and/or be charged with imparting knowledge of techniques, such as negotiations, to increase harmony in the workplace and minimize the counterproductive effects of conflict among coworkers (Rahim, 2002: 210-226).

3.4.1.3 Societal-National

Scholars hypothesize that conflict resolution at the societal (or intrastate) level is possible and necessary following (violent) conflict (Hamid, 1983: 320; Kelman, 2004: 115; Long and Brecke, 2003: 147-158; Oberg, 2007: 80). Mohammad Beshir Hamid (1983: 320) summarizes that the roots of "[i]nternal conflict or confrontation [at the state level] mainly arises from the tensions of identity and national integration, from the monopoly of power, in one form or another, by one party or ethnic group, or from the breakdown, or the lack, of institutionalised forums for power politics." The proliferation of these deconstructive internal processes identified in the quote have generated increased instances of violent intrastate conflicts since the 1980s (Lia, 2005: 25; Long and Brecke, 2003: 6). The trend has subsequently fostered research and augmented the practical application of conflict resolution at the societal level, including international intervention under the rubric of human security denoted in chapter 2, section 1.5 (Humphrey, 2005: 203-220; Long and Brecke, 2003: 5-6). As highlighted previously in this chapter, representatives of the United States and Britain offered international intervention and state-building as excuses for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 230-233).

At the societal level, conflict resolution practices have generally manifested in the form of national reconciliation programs, as implemented in countries including Chile, Rwanda and Uganda (Hayner, 1994: 599-600)[64]. The examples provided are societal-based arrangements sometimes implemented in transitional justice programs, designed to transform social relations following intrastate conflict while transitioning society into new social and political structures. Among the list of national reconciliation programs implemented to date, the high-profile Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (1995-2003) in South Africa has received a great deal of scholarly attention and is frequently presented as one example of a successful conflict resolution program at the societal level (Hayner, 1994: 625-626). The South Africa program was designed to transform perceptions among diverse members of society, as well as between society and government, mixing practices including truth commissions, amnesty and traditional justice mechanisms, following the end of apartheid (Long and Brecke, 2003: 59-60; Skaar, 2013: 78-79). Hence, the process was implemented following a change in government and objectively sought to restore social relations and faith in the governing framework as politics and society underwent a transition to a new social and governing framework.

[64] For a general overview of these national reconciliation programs, see Hayner (1994).

Nonetheless, scholars continue to debate the relative utility of the TRC. Some negatively assess the program claiming that it failed to bridge existing gaps between the perpetrators and victims involved (Chapman, 2007: 52-53; Gibson, 2002: 540-541, 553-554; Rothfield, 2008: 16-20; Sarkin, 2008: 20-22). Contrary, others argue it is premature to make meaningful assessments (Verdoolaege, 2005: 197). While it is impossible to examine the successes and failures of national reconciliation in South Africa, similar societal-based reconciliation programs have been implemented elsewhere.

3.4.1.4 International/Interstate

David Bloomfield (2006: 5) and Louis Kriesberg (2004: 82) suggest that conflict resolution within international relations discourse has been on the increase over the past few decades. However, theorization at the interstate level is limited and replete with contention. Bloomfield (2006: 10), among others (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 72; Long and Brecke, 2003: 154), laments that theory and practice at the higher levels have been inspired by "the thinking, vocabulary, and approach" at the individual level and is frequently inapplicable. Hermann (2004: 47), therefore, cautions that "transferability from the small-group level to the larger ones" is problematic. The futile theoretical and practical attempts to transpose conflict resolution from the lower to the higher levels, as noted in the quote, and the relative lack of theory at the interstate level, prompt scholars to call for increased research at the interstate level (Long and Brecke, 2003: 147), and to reassess theory and practices developed at the lower levels and transferred to the higher levels (Bloomfield, 2006: 10).

Despite existing theoretical inconsistencies, scholars hypothesize conflict resolution to some degree is possible between two countries (Mendeloff, 2004: 264; Rosoux, 2009: 556-558). One critique found in the literature proposes that citizens in the affected countries would have to subscribe to membership of an "international society" in order for conflict resolution to occur at the interstate level (Long and Brecke, 2003: 75-76). Long and Brecke test the theory.

When exploring the potential of interstate conflict resolution, Long and Brecke (2003) apply Hedley Bull's definition of international society, which states:

> A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions (Long and Brecke, 2003: 76).

As denoted in the quote, international society consists of diverse communities sharing interests and values at the higher level. When inhabitants subscribe to parallel notions of rules

and association, it is argued there is an increased chance that interstate conflicts can be resolved or transformed, framed around these commonalities.

Accordingly, Long and Brecke (2003: 114) conclude that identification with international society is limited and quantitatively different from that found among national societies. They also find that conflict resolution at the interstate level is conditioned on the perceived utility and/or possibility of administering particular techniques such as truth telling or offering forgiveness across societies (Long and Brecke, 2003: 119). When practices can be agreed upon, resolution is more probable. Ultimately, the authors conclude that while certain challenges exist, conflict resolution between two countries is possible (Long and Brecke, 2003: 119). Other scholars from the conflict management and conflict resolution school of thought likewise believe interstate conflicts can be resolved (Gardner Feldman, 1999: 336, 354-355; Kriesberg, 2001: 60).

In fact, there has been an increasing degree of acceptance of conflict resolution theory and practice at the interstate level and the trend is expected to continue (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 269-291). Creating further appeal, there are several historical instances of successful, intrastate conflict resolution programs. For example, Germany has conducted one of the most sustained efforts in contemporary history (Gardner Feldman, 1999: 354-355; Ross, 2004: 203). Since the 1950s, consecutive German governments have made, or continue to make, efforts to improve Germany's relationship with neighboring countries, namely France and Poland following World War II (1939-1949) (Gardner Feldman, 1999: 334-355). Germany's conciliatory actions have enhanced the quality of bilateral relations with France and Poland, and are confirmation of how two countries can transform their relationship over an extended period of time (Gardner Feldman, 1999: 354-355; Long and Brecke, 2003: 115).

To provide a more detailed understanding of how conflict resolution is most effectively accomplished between states, the following subsections explore guidelines extracted from Long and Brecke's (2003) research. The guidelines they propose are valuable when contemplating conflict resolution between the United States and Iraq.

3.4.1.4.1 General viability

In their seminal work, *War and Reconciliation*, William Long and Peter Brecke (2003) explore (deep) conflict resolution through "reconciliation events" at the intrastate (post-civil war) and interstate (post-war) levels to qualify how and why these events have succeeded in the past. The authors "define a reconciliation event as one that includes the following elements: direct physical contact or proximity between opponents, usually senior

representatives of respective factions; a public ceremony accompanied by substantial publicity or media attention that relays the event to the wider national society; and ritualistic or symbolic behavior that indicates the parties consider the dispute resolved and that more amicable relations are expected to follow" (Long and Brecke, 2003: 6). Their study examines "reconciliation events" because: 1) it is less problematic to identify a reconciliation event as opposed to reconciliation since the latter occurs cognitively in the minds of individuals; and 2) because a "reconciliation event" naturally instigates and illustrates a move toward (deep) conflict resolution (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Long and Brecke, 2003: 7). According to this criterion, conflict resolution is generally measured at the structural level, although elements of social inclusion are also present.

Querying whether "societal forgiveness or costly signaling" models function best for altering intrastate or interstate conflicts, Long and Brecke's (2003: 111) study explores multiple cases of civil and interstate wars followed by reconciliation events. Societal forgiveness implies a degree of transformation and possible reconciliation while the costly signally model, defined below, and signifies particular structural components that indicate a degree of commitment to resolution. By way of summary, the authors conclude there are empirical and epistemological differences between the approaches at the two levels (Long and Brecke, 2003: 111). Most importantly, they determine that the forgiveness model, which broadly extends forgiveness among former belligerents, is better suited to transform intrastate relations rather than interstate (Long and Brecke, 2003: 114). The utility of forgiveness at the societal level is obvious, because groups forming society are obliged to coexist (Long and Brecke, 2003: 111-114). By comparison, extending forgiveness at the interstate level is problematic since there may be geographic distances and thereby less perceived urgency.

Nevertheless, Long and Brecke (2003: 114) determine that conflict resolution at the international level is possible, with its probability being increased by two factors. First, it is more probable when adversaries share geographic proximity (Long and Brecke, 2003: 114-118). For instance, neighboring countries have greater incentive and opportunity to pursue conflict resolution because proximity increases the importance of, and the possibilities for, positive interaction (Long and Brecke, 2003: 114-118). Second, conflict resolution at the international level functions better when "effective bargaining" is utilized (Long and Brecke, 2003: 118; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 20). For this reason, Long and Brecke (2003: 18-23) create a model for effective bargaining called the "costly signaling model," which they hypothesize increases the chances of conflict resolution between two countries. The model's precepts are outlined below.

3.4.1.4.2 Costly signaling model

To successfully transform conflictual relations between two countries, Long and Brecke's (2003: 20, 111-116) "costly signaling model" contains four elements for successful negotiated bargaining. These elements are: costly, novelty, voluntary, and irrevocable (Long and Brecke, 2003: 111-116). Each concept is explained in turn.

First, the authors stress the importance of vulnerability as a component of conflict resolution at the interstate level, defined as the "costly" nature of a reconciliation act (Long and Brecke, 2003: 18-20). Vulnerability underscores that the country demonstrating interest in improving relations is incurring risk and is subject to exploitation (Long and Brecke, 2003: 18). The authors summarize:

> [A] reconciliation event (and the reconciliation it symbolizes) is a costly (or potentially costly) signal that the other party is likely to interpret as a genuine offer to improve relations and thus may break a deadlocked conflictual situation. Because of associated costs of backing away from the event, it may also buttress initial attempts of the parties at cooperative interaction (Long and Brecke, 2003: 18).

As noted in the quote, the utility of deliberately making oneself vulnerable *vis-à-vis* the other demonstrates a genuine eagerness and commitment to improve relations. The importance of the costly nature is so valuable that the authors hypothesize the higher the risk, the greater the payoff in terms of degree of resolution achieved (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Long and Brecke, 2003: 20).

Risk is inevitable in conflict resolution because success hinges on adversaries' mutual willingness to resolve a conflict and effect simultaneous change (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 74; Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 37). Ideally, action by one adversary should provoke a reciprocal response (Long and Brecke, 2003: 20). However, reciprocity is not guaranteed. Adversaries, therefore, take appreciable risk when proposing or implementing conflict resolution, since one referent may not alter their attitude or behavior despite those rendered by their adversary (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 74; Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 37; Kriesberg, 2004: 96-97; Long and Brecke, 2003: 20; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 185).

The second component of successful conflict resolution between states is novelty. Novelty is defined as a radical and unexpected break with former behavioral patterns (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Long and Brecke, 2003: 20). A profound qualitative alteration in behavior, it is suggested, fosters cognitive re-assessment of the "other" since it reduces perceptions of threat, can build trust and visibly exhibits interest in altering conflictual relations (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Head, 2012: 33-38; Long and Brecke, 2003: 20-30). In essence, a novel change

demonstrated by an adversary challenges previously held perceptions of the “other” and thus demands re-evaluation.

Thirdly, a “reconciliation event” must be seen as voluntary or not coerced (Long and Brecke, 2003: 30-36). More precisely, the event must occur absent pressure from intervening or mediating third parties. The voluntary character of the action demonstrates an observable change in the cognitive and performance capacities of the initiating actor, thereby illustrating that the “other” is both capable of change and prepared to behave differently (Long and Brecke, 2003: 30-36). In short, the voluntary nature of an act increases the perception that transformation is possible and the initiator is both capable and willing to change.

Finally, Long and Brecke (2003: 20) suggest that a reconciliation event must be irrevocable, or cannot be reversed once it has been extended. The authors provide the example of Egypt’s President Anwar al-Sadat’s actions in the 1970s, a period of heightened political tension and violence between Egypt and Israel (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Long and Brecke, 2003: 84-91). At this time, Sadat publicly proclaimed his willingness to establish peace with Israel before Egypt’s parliament (Long and Brecke, 2003: 84-91; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 53). Through his proclamation and associated efforts to ensure its implementation, Sadat placed himself outside of the will of Egypt’s public and Arab leaders throughout the Middle East who adamantly refused to recognize the state of Israel (Long and Brecke, 2003: 84-91). Sadat’s statement, and his later visit to Jerusalem to speak before the parliament of Israel, was thus “irrevocable because once Sadat proclaimed his serious intentions toward reconciliation, he put too much at stake to back away from the attempt” (Long and Brecke, 2003: 90). In a nutshell, the quote highlights it was impossible for Sadat to reverse his decision, because his demonstrated commitment to establishing peace with Israel could not be rescinded.

Irrevocable actions illustrate an initiator’s commitment, willingness and determination to transform the conflictual relationship, and reinforce the vulnerable and costly nature of the reconciliation event (Long and Brecke, 2003: 20). In instances where these combined precepts are observed, Long and Brecke (2003: 153) assert that costly signaling can transform bilateral relations between two countries. Nonetheless, they caution “there is no free lunch: to make credible and effective signals capable of furthering peacemaking and peacekeeping requires that the parties voluntarily and irrevocably make novel and costly concessions” (Long and Brecke, 2003: 153). Their quote accentuates that all four points should act in unison to demonstrate commitment, and that the effort requires sacrifice. In conclusion, we believe that conflict resolution between two countries is possible, and that the principles ascribed to the

costly signaling model are indispensable in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations due to their recognized potential for altering relations between two states.

3.4.2 Dimensions (or tools)

Transitioning our analysis back to Kriesberg's concise framework of conflict resolution, the second element in his simple framework of conflict resolution is the dimensions, or tools/techniques utilized, to promote transformation of a conflictual relationship (R. Fisher, 2001b: 26-27). Numerous tools are available at the social and international level, with the literature emphasizing positive and negative attributes of each (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 29-34; Hermann, 2004: 41). For the sake of space, these include acts such as the payment of reparations, provision of an apology and the utilization of truth commissions (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 29-34). For a non-exhaustive list of tools identified during the course of this research, see Appendix 1. The techniques articulated therein frequently overlap, reinforce or compliment each other (Lederach, 1995: 14).

Nevertheless, the literature underscores that conflict resolution mechanisms, and their potential combinations, vary across the spectrum of cultures, conflicts and referents (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 12; Rosoux, 2009: 559). Divergence is a result of the diversities found across the spectrum of conflict inputs, including diverse referents, perceptions of history, the intensity of the conflict, and requirement or objectives pursued by referents. As a result of diversity, the literature recommends conflict resolution processes be conceptually and pragmatically customized to meet the needs of affected stakeholders (Bar-On, 2004: 251; 2005: 9; Bloomfield and others, 2003: 12-16; Rosoux, 2009: 559; Sarkin, 2008; Stover and others, 2005: 834-836; Winslade and Monk, n.d.: 3). Customized approaches imply practices and tools cannot be carbon-copied wholesale since two conflicts are never precisely similar (Bar-On, 2005: 9; Bekdash, 2009; Crocker, 2003: 42; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3; Keranen, 2014: 127; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 211-212; Sarkin, 2008: 27). Most importantly, mechanisms should not be imposed (Rosoux, 2009: 553).

To ensure the appropriateness of practices in context, Stover and others (2005: 834-836) recommend that stakeholders' opinions be qualified to determine which issues and techniques are mutually acceptable. Consultation is necessary because intervening third parties and/or indigenous actors frequently construct conflicting perceptions of conflict and conflict resolution (Hellmüller, 2013). Non-consultation, therefore, increases the probability of a resolution process failing or having limited utility since extensive participation or acceptance of the program and its mechanisms will likely be marginal (Dunlap, 2013: 135-136; Kennedy,

2013: 75-76; Stover and others, 2005: 834-836). Stated another way, in the absence of popular support for principles and practices, the perceived legitimacy of a program and its mechanisms will be minimal because intentions, tools and objectives will be continuously questioned or rejected by society (Stover and others, 2005: 834-836). Local ownership of the program is, thus, fundamental and essential (Alamir, 2013: 247; Dunlap, 2013: 135-136; Flavin, 2013: 187, 247; Kennedy, 2013: 75-76; Stover and others, 2005: 834-836).

In the same vein, and to ensure the widest approach possible, other scholars recommend increasing the flexibility and popular acceptance of a resolution program by combining and balancing practices (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 75, 154; Sarkin, 2008: 20-23; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 16, 33-34), and/or implementing them at multiple levels (Alamir, 2013: 258). For instance, Timor–Leste utilized a truth and reconciliation commission in tandem with international tribunals, thereby combining and balancing both distributive and retributive justice (Sarkin, 2008: 23). Mixing techniques and tools is praised for its ability to meet diverse needs and appeal to a wider section of society. A wide breadth and depth, it is suggested, increases popular acceptance, meets a range of needs, and augments the overall potentiality of the resolution program as the process incorporates and affects more stakeholders.

3.4.3 Degree

The last element of conflict resolution according to Louis Kriesberg's concise framework is degree, or the qualification of referent commitment to a conflict resolution process and/or the depth to which referents/the relationship have/has transformed (outcome) (R. Fisher, 2001b: 27). Scholars acknowledge that the degree of resolution achieved will inevitably vary since referents, commitment, environment, and other relational intricacies affect the potential outcome of a conflict resolution process (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Avruch, 2002: 3; Kriesberg, 2001: 60). For instance, stakeholders may inconsistently commit themselves to the program, ranging from disinterest to absolute commitment, for innumerable reasons (Kriesberg, 2001: 60). Due to these intricacies, acts of resolution may not always be reciprocated or effectively implemented (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 37; Kriesberg, 2004: 97). Qualities such as lack of sincerity and poor implementation naturally undermine the degree to which resolution or transformation can be expected (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 37; Kriesberg, 2004: 97).

In terms of qualitatively assessing a program, it is believed that the efficaciousness of a program can be assessed (Hermann, 2004: 46-47). Gardner Feldman's (2008: 6-19) research

on “German-Polish Reconciliation” suggests corresponding parameters for measuring commitment and outcome of conflict resolution among countries at the structural level. For instance, the establishment and qualitative functionality of joint (governmental or societal) organizations or institutions and exchanges provide parameters by which commitment and outcome can be measured (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 11-16). Specifically, Gardner Feldman (2008: 16) argues that the more institutionalized and integrated institutions are, the greater the depth of commitment and the greater the expected outcome of the resolution process. For example, regular bilateral exchanges of representatives and/or meetings of joint institutions illustrate a commitment to the process. Similarly, the style and substance of official statements is argued to be indicative of the degree to which relations have improved and the likelihood of a continuation of a resolution process (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 5-8). According to Gardner Feldman (2008: 16-17), the less confrontational and more conciliatory a leader’s language is, the higher the degree of resolution achieved and the more probable continued conciliatory behavior would endure.

Secondly, the frequency and timing of interaction also provides insight into referents’ commitment to, and the depth of conflict resolution achieved (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 16). For instance, if bilateral visits occur frequently, they illustrate a high degree of transformation and a resolute determination to maintain the conflict resolution process (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 16-17). Contrary, the fewer the visits the more indicative circumstances are of a limited commitment to the process. Lastly, Gardner Feldman (2008: 19) argues that while any conflict resolution process evolves, disagreements between referents will inevitably emerge. The qualitative manner in which these divergences are dealt with is equally indicative of participants’ dedication to improving the relationship (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 19). For instance, referents might publicly minimize the disagreements’ long-term effects, thereby affirming their (mutual) commitment to the relationship and the resilience of the process (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 6-19). Although her precepts offer potential insight into the degree of conflict resolution, they are not perfect parameters.

Associated with the element of degree, the literature is replete with diverging perceptions of the overall capacity of conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4). Capacity and outcome are examined in the following subsections.

3.4.3.1 Capacity

The capacity of conflict resolution varies according to scholars. For instance, scholars disagree whether conflict resolution is necessary for, or capable of, resolving all conflicts

(Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4). Conceptual divergence on this point is influenced by the perceived utility of conflict resolution; with some hypothesizing potentiality is premised on prevailing conflict conditions (such as timing or duration) rather than the potentiality of conflict resolution as a practice (Rosoux, 2009: 557-559).

For instance, Worthington (2006: 247-248) argues that conflict resolution is necessary and possible in all instances to prevent or minimize conflict since cognitive re-framing is required because a conflict inevitably produces wounds and grievances, regardless of its intensity or duration. Accordingly, all conflicts are subject to resolution. However, Worthington's council is theoretically applicable, but not practically, as he does not address instances where referents may not be inclined to participate. In certain cases, referents simply may not wish to reconcile (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 17-18). When disinterest prevails, conflict resolution is impossible, since referents are not committed to the process. Nonetheless, such constraints do not reflect on the overall utility of conflict resolution as a discipline or practice, but rather on referent interests or commitment.

By comparison, Rosoux (2009: 557-559) suggests that not all conflicts are malleable to conflict resolution, and therefore, resolution is not always applicable or capable of success. Those conflicts falling beyond its scope can be classified as intractable. In instances of intractability, referents might desire to resolve their conflict, but be limited by conflict complexity or root causes that prove insurmountable to achieve resolution. Thus, while conflict resolution might be preferred in some instances, mutually acceptable resolution may not be possible because referents uncompromisingly adhere to non-negotiable objectives. In this case, mitigating factors undermine a potential process of conflict resolution, but do not necessarily reflect poorly on the process itself.

For these reasons, Ramsbotham and others (2011: 377-380) argue that qualities, including the identity of the referents, their history and culture are influential determinants for if, when and how conflict resolution can be introduced or pursued. The utilization of such evaluations makes it possible to determine conflict conditions whereupon particularities can be evaluated, such as the degree of commitment of referents and the issues at stake, prior to estimating the relative utility of conflict resolution in a given relationship. Rather than determining conflict resolution is viable in all cases, the latter approach advocates comprehensive evaluation of each conflictual relationship to determine the applicability of conflict resolution according to particularities within a given relationship. When circumstances are congenial, a process of conflict resolution can be implemented.

3 4.3.2 Expected outcome

Related to capacity, theoretical divergence abounds in the literature over which outcomes (or degree) can be expected from a process of conflict resolution (Hermann, 2004: 46-47). Western literature categorizes potential outcomes of a successful conflict resolution process in dichotomous terms: non-violent coexistence (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 36-37; Ross, 2004: 201) or stable peace (Kelman, 2004: 112-113). On the one hand, Rosoux (2009: 553-559) and Gardner Feldman (2008: 2) argue that non-violent coexistence is more probable subsequent to resolution since adversaries could maintain irreconcilable differences. Angela Nyawira Khaminwa (2003) defines coexistence as "a state in which two or more groups are living together while respecting their differences and resolving their conflicts nonviolently." Stated differently, nonviolent coexistence is the condition where adversaries do not deploy violence against each other but persist in their negative views of one another (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 19; Booth, 2007: 449; Kriesberg, 2004: 102). Resolution at this degree falls at or near conflict management on our broad conflict resolution spectrum, temporarily preventing violent interaction (Khaminwa, 2003; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31-32).

On the other hand, critics argue that non-violent coexistence is a minimal and shallow outcome since it only produces "negative peace" (Galtung, 1969: 183), defined as "the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict, and war" (Boulding, 1978: 3), because grievances and animosity remain despite the arresting of physical violence. John Paul Lederach (1995: 17), among others, argues that conflict resolution should surpass the establishment of non-violent coexistence and result in conflict transformation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 62; Galtung, 1969: 183-186; Gopin, 2001; Parent, 2012: 28; Rigby, 2001). Boulding (1978: 13) similarly contends that conflict resolution should at minimum produce stable peace, defined as "a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved." According to Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 62), stable peace is achieved when adversaries are "satisfied with the peace agreement and after the underlying structural-institutional, cognitive, and emotional conditions of a protracted conflict have been transformed to the mutual satisfaction" of those referents involved. Conditions identified in the quote, produce stable peace and imply that cognitive, behavioral and effective changes occur, which in turn creates conditions congenial to the establishment of positive peace. In this frame, the outcome of conflict resolution can produce reconciliation.

Within the theoretical debate, Rosoux (2009: 553-559) suggests that conflict resolution outcomes are indeterminable. She argues that factors such as referents' willingness to participate in the process, or the duration and intensity of the conflict, impact upon the

outcome and are subject to variation (Rosoux, 2009: 553-559). Hence, ascribing standard outcomes to conflict resolution is challenging since each conflict differs in typology and complexity (Rosoux, 2009: 553-559). We select to adopt the latter approach, since we believed that referents themselves should determine if, and to what degree, resolution is pursued (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 377-380). By adopting a flexible position, all possibilities are viable depending upon the needs and desires of affected stakeholders, and by default, accommodations are made according to diverse conflict circumstances (duration). Hence, while our framework accommodates outcomes of conflict resolution ranging from non-violent coexistence to reconciliation, we simultaneously believe principles, tools and objectives should be determined by the affected referents instead of scholars or policymakers.

By way of conclusion, we have provided a general overview of Western scholarly conceptualization of conflict and conflict resolution. The next chapter continues our analysis of conflict resolution as conceptualized by Western scholars by introducing principles, approaches and problems. Combined, chapters 3 and 4 provide a framework by which a cross-cultural comparative analysis of Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict resolution can be conducted in chapter 5, to identify convergences and divergences in cultural approaches of conflict resolution across Western/U.S. and Middle Eastern/Iraq cultures.

3.5 Conclusion

Chapter 3 provides an overview of Western understanding of conflict resolution by defining conflict resolution-associated terms and concepts as elucidated in English language literature. From among the diverse perspectives, a broad conceptual framework was constructed for resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels. This framework will be enhanced in chapter 4 when we examine Western principles, approaches and problems. Once the Western approach has been delineated, chapter 5 articulates our comparative analysis of Arab/Muslim perceptions of conflict resolution. Findings extracted are utilized in the third part of our research to qualify a sample of Iraqi and U.S. citizens’ conceptualizations and bilateral support for conflict resolution in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations to introduce laypersons’ opinion into theoretical discourse.

Nonetheless, the primary objective of chapter three was to analyze conflict and conflict resolution as articulated by Western scholars in the English language. During our review of the literature, I incorporated a broad framework whose lexicon, principles and practices of conflict resolution can later be comparatively analyzed across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures. The theoretical framework selected accommodates a broad understanding of Western

conflict resolution practices and is necessary for two reasons. On the one hand, it allows us to qualify convergences and divergences as articulated by scholars within and across Arab/Muslim and Western cultures, by reducing the impact of theoretical divergences found across the three Western schools of thought: conflict management, resolution and transformation. On the other hand, the framework accommodates comparisons of laypersons' opinion at the micro level, which is conducted in the final part of this research.

Chapter three opened by reiterating and contextualizing contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations in consideration of the historical analysis provided in the first part of our thesis. Because U.S. representatives sometimes portrayed the 2003 invasion as a necessary intervention, and a means of proliferating democracy and/or an exercise of peacebuilding and state-building—practices associated with conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels—these associations increased criticism of contemporary conflict resolution in both theoretical and practical terms. Nevertheless, it was demonstrated that scholars continue to believe that conflict resolution remains a viable process for altering deconstructive relationships when implemented in an objective, accommodating and inclusive manner. Among other things, the latter recommendations suggest that techniques, timing and practices should be agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders and not be imposed, whereby consultation ensures practices applicable and acceptable techniques for resolving conflict are utilized across cultures.

Afterward, we re-examined the existence of a conflictual relationship between the United States and Iraq by exploring the cognitive, behavioral and effective elements present in context. We illustrated the U.S.-Iraq relationship is replete with suspicion and distrust, the use of violence, and the belief that violent interaction is necessary or inevitable to secure diverging interests. Necessity of conflict resolution in the case of United States and Iraq relations is warranted because the two countries have been engaged in a protracted deconstructive relationship that produced bilateral animosity and grievances (Hypothesis 1, confirmed in the previous part of the research). Their existence, in addition to the historical trend of conflict, indicates the potential for conflict continuation or escalation is high. Further supporting my assertion, I borrow and reformulate macro level theory and the argument conflict resolution between Arab/Muslims and the West is necessary to reinforce micro level assumptions.

Subsequently, we defined and analyzed conflict resolution and recurrent lexicon associated with its theory and practice for the purpose of rooting research in contemporary scholarly discourse and to provide benchmarks whereupon cross-cultural comparisons will be conducted later. The first term analyzed was conflict. It was demonstrated that scholars

perceive conflict as an ambiguous term with multiple meanings across diverse disciplines. Nonetheless, conflict at the societal and state level, was defined as an incompatibility or clash whose typology can be constructive or destructive depending on the typology of interaction utilized by affected referents. Constructive practices includes, among others, dialogue, while deconstructive practices includes coercion or physical violence. Additional attributes delineated above include the perception of conflict as natural and capable of producing positive benefits. Likewise, Western scholars frequently perceive that conflicts are resolvable and direct conflict resolution techniques toward those immediately involved. These are beneficial parameters when we later explore conflict resolution from the perspective of Arab/Muslim scholars.

Upon this theoretical foundation, the elements of a conflict were examined. Combined, Western scholars widely consent that conflict contains cognitive, effective and behavioral elements that influence, and are influenced by, conflict. The qualitative composition of elements and their systemic interaction influence both perceptions and behavior *vis-à-vis* a conflict adversary. After examining the elements, conflict behavior was classified. Scholars generally depict conflictual relationships in dichotomous terms: either constructive or deconstructive depending on cognitive, behavioral and discursive nuances associated with a given relationship. When constructive behavior predominates, the conflict is deemed constructive. Contrary, when deconstructive behavior predominates, the conflict is defined as deconstructive.

We then explained how relationship typologies are established through perceptions and behavioral patterns which have the potential to self-perpetuate conflict typology. For example, nonviolent perceptions and behavior increase the likelihood of referents maintaining constructive interaction, while violent actions and perceptions tend to produce further deconstructive behavior. As a result of these elements, and the negative physical and psychological effects that violent interactions produce, scholars recommend that deconstructive conflicts be resolved and the relationship transformed to undermine a continuation or escalation of the conflict.

Logically, the next term explored was conflict resolution, or the theory and practice of altering a deconstructive conflictual relationship. At this point, the three schools of peacebuilding were introduced: conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Each school of thought conceptualizes conflict differently, and establishes objectives accordingly. Conflict management restrains physical violence but does not address the roots of conflict. Its processes are centered at the structural level and thereby do not

include society. By comparison, conflict resolution seeks to resolve conflict and address the root causes using a Track II (unofficial) approach. It aims to prevent the use of violence while addressing the needs and roots of the conflict. Finally, conflict transformation objectively seeks to alter the structural, behavioral, cognitive and effective elements of a deconstructive conflict where the discursive nature of relationships are altered at the Track III level concentrating on society. Its processes are spread wider and deeper into society, modifying structural, cognitive and behavioral aspects of the conflict to solidify positive relations through transformation.

Next, cognitive transformation was introduced as an associated concept of conflict transformation. Cognitive transformation is defined as the process of altering the cognitive, effective and behavioral aspects of referents involved in a conflictual relationship. Its objectives include alterations of collective understanding and behavior including a legitimization of the other, enhanced self-awareness and changes in behavioral typology. As these issues are managed during cognitive transformation, they have a systemic effect on the relationship cycle and its quality. Theoretically, the alteration of cognitive, behavioral and effective elements nurtures and solidifies long-term constructive relations. One of the many values of the conflict transformation approach is its emphasis on cultural sensitivity, suggesting the program is adapted to the interests and needs of affected stakeholders.

At its extreme, conflict transformation, and successful cognitive transformation can produce reconciliation. Reconciliation as used herein is defined as a prolonged process of conflict transformation where the cognitive, effective and behavior changes are rooted among former adversaries and constructive relations are stabilized. Reconciliation is thus the maximum possible outcome of a deep conflict resolution process. The term signifies that a constructive relationship has progressed beyond peaceful coexistence to include the absence of negative sentiment among adversaries, or positive peace.

Combined, our analysis of the three Western schools of peacebuilding demonstrates parallels in theory and practice. Moreover, scholars sometimes use terminology that blurs the boundaries between disciplines. To create a representative framework, I adopt a holistic understanding of conflict resolution where these examined theories can be amalgamated. Accordingly, the theoretical framework borrowed accommodates conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation simultaneously. Correspondingly, conflict resolution, as referred to hereafter, encompasses all efforts to manage conflict on one end of the resolution spectrum and reconciliation at the other. The framework not only permits the

use of a wider array of theory from the three schools of thought, but also holistically encapsulates Western theory whereupon cross-cultural comparisons can be made later.

Adding dimension to the theoretical framework, four fundamental objectives of conflict resolution were introduced. Among them, it is suggested that conflict resolution address root causes and grievances associated with a conflict, empower referents and transform relationships. Addressing root cause and grievances, and transforming the relationship refers to adjustments in the structural quality of a relationship, elements deemed essential during relational and/or cognitive transformation. Empowerment emphasizes the process be inclusive to ensure the widest possible representation of stakeholders. Combined, these recommendations help us to condense the objective of conflict resolution to four broad objectives, which are theorized to increase the probability of conflict resolution reaching broadly and deeply into the affected societies.

Subsequent to outlining essential terminology and associated processes, Kriesberg's concise analytical framework of conflict resolution was introduced. His framework simplistically reduces a complex process into three components: the units, dimensions and degree. Accordingly, the units represent the referents engaged in a resolution process. Units range from individuals, to groups, societies and countries. While each unit frequently receives independent attention by scholars of various disciplines, there is fundamental theoretical and practical overlapping across units. For instance, it was noted that some concepts, such as forgiveness, designed at the individual level have been transferred to the collective levels. Several theory and concepts are further explored in chapter 4.

Due to the context of the present research, additional focus was placed on resolving conflict at the interstate level. While contentious, some scholars suggest that countries can undergo a process of bilateral conflict resolution following a violent conflict. As a means of advancing conflict resolution at the interstate level, Long and Brecke's (2003) costly signal model was introduced. The model posits that referents moving toward conflict resolution should utilize particular strategies, including making reconciliation gestures that are costly, novel, voluntary, and irreversible. Combined, it is argued that such qualities increase the likelihood of a reconciliation event being accepted by an adversary. The components of their model are considered valuable and will be mentioned in the research conclusion.

The second component of Kriesberg's concise framework of conflict resolution examined was dimensions. Dimensions are the tools used to transform deconstructive relations. These include, among others, truth commissions, apologies or reparations. To determine the most appropriate practices in context, scholars recommend that stakeholders engage in dialogue

about which techniques are appropriate as each conflict and referent combination will hold diverging needs and goals. Through consultation and dialogue, the most appropriate practices can be determined to tailor the program accordingly. At the same time, scholars also recommend that tools and approaches be mixed to increase the breadth and depth of a conflict resolution process among affected stakeholders. By balancing the spectrum of acceptable techniques and levels of approach, more stakeholders' needs and desires can be met. As a result, the effects of a program can more deeply permeate society.

The third component of Kriesberg's concise model is degree. Degree qualifies the changes referents experience by assessing the past, the present and future trajectory of a given relationship. In terms of resolution between states, scholars suggest a quantitative and qualitative analysis of phenomenon, for example calculating the number and scope of joint institutions or the quality of bilateral rhetoric, to determine the trajectory of a given relationship. In this context, resilience and determination to adhere to a conflict resolution process is demonstrated through events such as joint meetings or positive rhetoric during periods of contention. Reversely, a lack of commitment to the process is evidenced by infrequent interaction or deconstructive rhetoric. Combined, the denoted qualitative elements, among others, provide insight into the (potential) quality of the relationship and the degree to which transformation has occurred.

Nevertheless, within the discourse on degree, there is a qualified debate among Western scholars as to the overall utility and expected outcome of conflict resolution processes. On the one hand, some scholars suggest only violent conflicts need to be resolved, while others suggest that all conflicts should undergo a process. We select to leave the decision to pursue conflict resolution to the relevant stakeholders. It is, after all, they whom will have to determine whether, how and to what depth conflict resolution is pursued. Absent their participation or needs being met, a resolution process is subject to rejection and failure.

Lastly, we addressed the potential outcomes of a hypothetical conflict resolution process. Western literature projects that conflict resolution can produce an outcome ranging from non-violent coexistence to reconciliation. On the one hand, referents coexist absent violent interaction but continue in their negative perceptions. This amounts to negative peace. On the other hand, referents live in conditions of positive peace, absent physical, structural and cultural violence. As mentioned earlier, we do not advocate one outcome over another, since it is believed that referents themselves should determine ultimate objectives. By adopting a flexible position, all possibilities across the Western peacebuilding disciplines and theory are viable depending upon the needs and desires of affected stakeholders.

Hitherto, our research has illustrated the existence of a deconstructive conflictual relationship between the United States and Iraq, and provided a basic understanding of conflict resolution as a theorized and practiced from a Western perspective. Now our attention turns to adding flesh to our Western conflict resolution framework as conceptualized by scholars in the English language. The next chapter qualifies core principles, approaches and problems of conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate level as articulated in the respective literature. The combination provides additional insight into how conflict resolution is conceptualized and practiced, while demarcating additional benchmarks whereupon a cross-cultural comparative analysis can be executed.

Chapter 4 Conflict Resolution in the West: Principles, Approaches and Problems

The present chapter continues our analysis of conflict resolution as conceptualized in Western English language literature. Our objective is to explore the literature to extract principles, practices and problems to enhance our conceptual framework. It respectively qualifies several prerequisites for introducing conflict resolution, three principled approaches and multiple precautions and problems associated with the theory and practice. Many of these insights are beneficial when making cross-cultural comparisons of conceptualizations of conflict resolution between scholarly and laypersons in forthcoming chapters.

We begin our analysis by introducing Bar-Siman-Tov's prerequisites for conflict resolution. It should be noted that Bar-Siman-Tov adheres to the conflict transformation school of thought and his prerequisites, therefore, are subject to contention. His prerequisites include: conflict termination; mutual satisfaction with the peace arrangement; viable structures and institutions; a climate conducive to resolution; domestic support for the program; legitimate and accountable leaders and/or facilitators; developing shared identities and integration among stakeholders; accommodation of the other; and education and public events. While conceptually broad and reemphasizing theory outlined in the previous chapter, Bar-Siman-Tov's overlapping and mutually reinforcing prerequisites provide insight into the conditions Western scholars perceive should be present for a process of conflict resolution to begin at the intrastate and interstate levels.

Following the introduction of prerequisites, this chapter explores three mainstream approaches to conflict resolution found in the literature to extract principles. These include the structural, social-psychological and spiritual approaches that are broadly based on the three schools of peacebuilding outlined in the previous chapter. The structural approach is implemented from the top-down to restore relationships at the higher or official level. It can be generally classified as a conflict management strategy. The social-psychological approach prioritizes a bottom-up strategy targeting individuals and groups at the societal level. It is a conflict resolution strategy. Finally, the spiritual approach (which likewise adheres a bottom-up strategy) objectively seeks to achieve positive peace by broadening and deepening a process of conflict resolution through the incorporation of certain principles, including forgiveness and healing, to strengthen societal relations following violent conflict. The spiritual approach falls under the rubric of conflict transformation. During the qualification of these approaches, several overlapping principles and practices are highlighted.

Thereafter, eleven precautions and problems extracted from the literature are introduced. Each emphasizes intricacies and weaknesses associated with a conflict resolution process. For instance, there is overwhelming agreement that conflict resolution's processes cannot be hastily implemented or imposed. Instead, the process should be slowly implemented and tailored to the needs of affected stakeholders. Once again, some points reiterate theory introduced in chapter three while underscoring contention in Western conflict resolution discourse. In addition, we denote that scholars disagree over the applicability of certain principles, namely forgiveness and healing, at the higher levels. Some argue that these theory and practices are better suited at the individual level and are inapplicable at higher levels. Combined, the precautions and problems outlined ground theory and expectations by reinforcing the inherent challenges and difficulties of resolving or transforming deconstructive relationships. They also provide additional benchmarks whereupon cultural comparisons can be made in subsequent chapters.

Chapter four concludes with a review of the principles guiding conflict resolution as extracted from our analysis of Western theory. Among others, these include truth, justice, legitimacy and forgiveness. The recount of principles is useful for reiterating their analytical importance since they are revisited during our cross-cultural comparisons in chapter five when conflict resolution from an Arab/Muslim perspective is examined.

4.1. Requirements for implementation

The English language resources examined for the present research express diverging opinions concerning when and how conflict resolution can or should be introduced at the intrastate and interstate levels (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 26). When agreement can be reached on prerequisites, disagreement abounds over the sequential order prerequisites should be satisfied (Hermann, 2004: 46-47). Forsaking a comprehensive analysis of all of the possible prerequisites and their suggested order, we elect to introduce Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 75) shortlist of ten interrelated requirements for advancing conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels for simplification purposes. Once prerequisites have been attained, he suggests that transformation has an increased probability of success.

Prior to analyzing theoretical requirements, three issues need to be denoted. First, Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 4, 75) is an adherent to conflict transformation theory and believes that conflict resolution should be differentiated from conflict transformation. However, since we adopt Ramsbotham and others (2011: 10) broad framework of conflict resolution for conceptual purposes, we reference a wider set of prerequisites to accommodate theoretical

input from a variety of sources (Rosoux, 2009: 553). Albeit, there is dissension in the literature over certain prerequisites, as denoted below. Second, his final two "prerequisites" are better classified as tools, or dimensions in Kriesberg's terminology, rather than circumstances or relational conditions that indicate a process of conflict resolution can begin. While Bar-Siman-Tov's latter two prerequisites are included below to respect his theory, we classify them as tools as opposed to prerequisites. Lastly, I believe that all of the prerequisites analyzed are theoretically valuable for conceptual purposes, although I contend that referents alone should determine the timing and techniques of advancing conflict resolution, and hence prerequisites are practically less valuable since they are expected to diverge from one conflict to the next. Nevertheless, Bar-Siman-Tov's (2004: 75) shortlisted requirements are theoretically valuable for making cross-cultural comparisons later.

4.1.1 Pre-/Post-conflict termination

Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 72-75) argues that a conflict should be terminated before conflict resolution is implemented. However, the prerequisite of conflict termination generates dissension in the literature, with disagreement abounding over whether a process should begin prior to, or subsequent to, the termination of a conflict (Hermann, 2004: 46-47). Within this debate, the literature can be classified into two categories. On one hand, some contend that resolution can begin prior to conflict termination (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 72-75; Kriesberg, 2003: 332; Reimann, 2004: 5; Ross, 2004: 201). For example, Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma Bennink (2004: 26) claim that conflict resolution commences when adversaries begin to change their perceptions of the other. Perceptive change, they argue, often precede conflict termination. They further posit that perceptive changes have the added value of advancing conflict termination (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 26). Amalgamated, efforts toward resolution build trust among adversaries when implemented prior to conflict termination, which in turn nurtures conflict termination, resolution and transformation (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 26).

On the other hand, others hypothesize that conflict termination must precede conflict resolution (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 138; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76-77; Bar-Tal, 2000: 361; Kelman, 2004: 114; Long and Brecke, 2003: 11; Rosoux, 2009: 553). For instance, Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 76-77) recommends that time be allowed to elapse between conflict termination and the implementation of conflict resolution. The waiting period allows for trust to be established between the referents, making them malleable to resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76-77). Similarly, Valerie Rosoux (2009: 553) argues that without peaceful coexistence, cognitive transformation is improbable, an assertion supported by others (Bar-Siman-Tov,

2004: 76-77; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 248-249; Stover and others, 2005: 834). The crux of this hypothesis is that the briefer the period between conflict termination and the introduction of resolution, the greater popular resistance will be to the process as stakeholders are less probable to desire or support resolution (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 249; Rosoux, 2009: 553). The absence of support or openness to the program undermines the potentiality of a conflict resolution process.

William Zartman (2000: 228-229; 2003) likewise espouses prerequisites for conflict resolution through his theory of conflict ripeness. Zartman (2000: 228-229) defines ripeness when "(two) parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution." Maintaining Zartman's (2003: 228) terminology, the quote suggests that adversaries reach a "mutually hurting stalemate" (MHS), defined as a referent's recognition that it is no longer in their best interest to continue the conflict. Once a MHS has been reached, referents are susceptible, or open, to a process of conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76; Brahm, 2003; Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 71; Zartman, 2000; 2003: 228). Moreover, Ronald Fisher (2001a: 21) suggests that ripe moments can be created through innovative maneuvering of the referents and circumstances during third party intervention. In both instances, the challenge is for astute referents and/or intervening third parties to create, or recognize, and monopolize upon ripe moments (Zartman, 2003: 245). These "ripe" conditions are expected to vary and could manifest at various stages of the conflict.

4.1.2 Mutual satisfaction with the peace agreement

Related to the above, the literature emphasizes the importance of mutual satisfaction with the peace agreement for successful conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 64; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 12; Lederach, 1995: 14; Mitchell, 2002: 10; Reychler, 2002: 30; Rouhana, 2004: 41; Wallensteen, 2007: 38-39). Mutual satisfaction suggests the conflict has been terminated in the short-term. Without mutual satisfaction with the peace agreement, it is surmised that outstanding conflict issues will hamper a resolution process (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 64-66). Ideally, satisfaction should not be limited to the structural level, but should expand to include widespread popular support (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 65). The emphasis on popular support clearly represents the conflict resolution or transformation schools of thought, while the conflict management school of thought would remain centered on mutual satisfaction at the higher levels.

4.1.3 Structures and institutions

As part of a conflict resolution process, referents are encouraged to manufacture a common definition of, and a desire for, peaceful relations, and then simultaneously act to normalize them (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 73-75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15; Bar-Tal, 2000: 358; Hermann, 2004: 46; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 33). Normalization is especially important at the structural level, since it guides and institutionalizes the overall political objective, but is equally relevant at all levels. To this end, Christopher Coyne (2007: 78) recommends adversaries develop rules for controlling non-conflictive interaction "that simultaneously signal a break from the past *and* a credible commitment that those rules will be followed in the future" (his emphasis). Upon Coyne's (2007: 78) theoretical foundation, conflict resolution or transformation can progress according to the objectives and guidelines established by the referents and gradually become institutionalized. Establishment and institutionalization may require reforming existing institutions or creating new ones, whereupon constructive principles and practices can be promoted and institutionalized.

Institutionalization occurs as a conflict resolution program is built into social and political structures of adversaries. Structures and institutions can be organized in numerous manners and can operate at the societal or structural levels (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75-76; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 17, 33; Long and Brecke, 2003: 37-76; Rosoux, 2009: 544). For example, structures or institutions can be constructed jointly or independently, and can be imparted with the capacity to perform a variety of functions including the provision of oversight and guidance, or they can be tasked with implementing select aspects of a program, including the distribution of reparations or the rewriting of textbooks (Rosoux, 2009 544)[65]. Such frameworks can be preexisting, bolstered or newly established, and include civil or religious organizations (student unions, clergy); nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), such as judicial courts; or regional and internationally recognized organizations (African Union or the United Nations) (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75-76; Long and Brecke, 2003: 37-76; Rosoux, 2009: 544). Institutionalization of these frameworks ensures both constructive interaction and the longevity of a program.

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[65] Another equally important task emphasized by the literature is post-war reconstruction (Stover and others, 2005: 835-836). In this frame, Stover and others (2005: 835-836) recommending that conflict resolution process "be accompanied by programs that promote political reconstruction of a legitimate and capable state." Post-war reconstruction, as noted in the quote, is necessary to re-institutionalize a functioning social and political infrastructure so a legitimate government can be founded to operate and provide for the needs of its citizens. Such projects could likewise be institutionalized into bilateral frameworks.

Ideally, the institutionalization of cooperative structures and associated practices create a framework whose constructive and robust interaction serves to establish and pursue common objectives and collective benefit (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66-68; Bar-Tal, 2000: 362; C. Coyne, 2007: 1-4; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3, 10; Kriesberg, 2004: 99-100). Constructive interaction, of this magnitude, manufactures a self-reinforcing cycle that strengthens mutual confidence, builds trust and augments amity (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66-75; Horstkotte, 2009). Such experiences, in turn, reframe cognitive perceptions, further increasing constructive behavior and transforming perceptions (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66-68; Bar-Tal, 2000: 362; C. Coyne, 2007: 1-4; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3-10; Kriesberg, 2004: 99-100). Combined, the institutionalization of structures and practices that advance conflict resolution guarantees interaction, provides a venue where concerns and disagreements can be jointly communicated and issues resolved in a cooperative, constructive manner (Horstkotte, 2009; Rosoux, 2009: 544). In short, through development of structures and practices, and their institutionalization, the foundation of new relational patterns is established and highly probable to endure (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 74-77; Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-362).

However, care has to be taken when establishing institutions and objectives. Most importantly, it is necessary to ensure actors/institutions share goals and do not work in overlapping or cross-purposes (Alamir, 2013: 253). In such cases, resources could be squandered or conflicting goals advanced. Such self-defeating qualities undermine the overall peacebuilding program, and risks institutionalizing policies subject to failure. Well-considered and well-designed structures and institutions should also be established with coordination and communication between them. It is likewise recommended that the program and its objectives are regularly reviewed and adapted to meet inevitable changing needs (Alamir, 2013: 253).

4.1.4 Climate/Environment

Building constructive relationships requires an environment conducive to a process of conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 17-20). Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 75) refers to this element as "climate" which identifies both local and international environments. Several noteworthy factors must be considered when evaluating if a climate is conducive to a process of conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75-76). In particular, there should be no internal or external support for a continuation of conflict (provided to one or more of the adversaries), or powerful internal or external spoilers, since their activity decreases the probability of resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75-76). Other influential environmental factors outlined below include the internal and external support structures

(subsection 4.1.5), and the existence of leaders that are accountable (subsection 4.1.6) (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75)[66]. These components are essential to instigating and buttressing a conflict resolution program because they can facilitate and augment program legitimacy.

4.1.5 Domestic support

Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 75) and Stover and others (2005: 834-836) emphasize the importance of obtaining domestic support for resolving a conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels. The quality of support must be sufficiently robust to persuade a majority of the population to embrace the processes, which is compulsory to minimize any existing opposition to the process (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75). The literature accentuates that absent popular willingness and commitment (at the structural and societal levels), conflict resolution becomes increasingly improbable (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 70; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 18; Stover and others, 2005: 834-836). Without domestic support, the process will be unable to acquire a sufficient degree of public legitimacy or the depth of societal transformation determined necessary to sustain the program (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 70; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 18; Stover and others, 2005: 834-836). Succinctly, the higher the degree of popular disapproval or disinterest, the higher the probability that conflict resolution processes will not take root, will stall, be rejected or abandoned.

4.1.6 Leaders/facilitators

Leaders or facilitators, as mentioned in 4.1.4, are essential to instigating and promoting conflict resolution. Western literature recommends that conflict resolution programs be headed by (a) respectable, determined leader(s) who is/are accountable for developing and maintaining constructive relations with the "other" (Bargal and Sivan, 2004 131-143; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 5, 75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 27-28; Feste, 2011: 9-11; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-19). Their significance is emphasized; with the literature suggesting leaders are invaluable for both acquiring and generating popular support among their constituents and

[66] It is argued that the likelihood of conflict resolution's success is higher if there are no conflict sponsors that promote the continuation of the conflict (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75-76). For example, Mohammad Beshir Hamid (1983: 322) posits that "Ethiopia, the Congo, and Chad" supported Southern Sudan's opposition movements and thereby complicated conflict resolution between Southern and Northern Sudan in the mid-1960s. Similarly, Scott Snyder (2003: 33) illustrates how the United States has influenced relations between North and South Korea since the 1950s through its repeat intervention. Finally, Joseph Alpher (1994: 233-240) argues that the Israel-United States relationship influences the quality of relations Israel has with its neighbors (such as Lebanon). The latter we demonstrated in chapter 2 creates Arab/Muslim animosity toward the United States.

perhaps among those of the adversary (Bargal and Sivan, 2004 131-143; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 5, 75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 27-28; Feste, 2011: 9-11; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-19). The quality of leadership (such as its measure of respectability), and their power of influence (Do they have the capacity to minimize existing opposition to the resolution process?), must thereby be sufficient enough to foster, and then monopolize upon, constituents' interests and needs to foment popular support (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 131, 142-143; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Bar-Tal, 2000: 354; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-19). Aggregated, influential and accountable leadership that demonstrates a genuine dedication to the program is thought capable of garnering support among the in-group and out-group (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 142-143; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-19).

Within the discourse, the literature notes three historical manners in which conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels has been introduced: internally (Long and Brecke, 2003: 18-22); externally (by a third party) (Long and Brecke, 2003: 116); or in combination (Long and Brecke, 2003: 62-63). Hence, leaders and facilitators of conflict resolution can include individual politicians, NGOs, or grassroots efforts operating at all levels of society or governance. They can be indigenous or external. Examples and brief descriptions of the three manners of instigation are provided respectively.

Foremost, post-World War II Germany's conflict resolution initiatives began endogenously when a few representatives from Germany (for instance Willie Brandt) made concerted efforts to improve interstate relations with their geographic neighbors despite public uncertainty about the endeavor (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 2-10; Long and Brecke, 2003: 97-113). In this instance, the presence of respected, popular leadership added legitimacy and momentum to the processes by mustering support on all sides over time (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 2-10; Long and Brecke, 2003: 97-113). For example, Willie Brandt was respected among constituents in Germany and other countries, so his actions were able to garner popular support for the program. Nonetheless, domestic initiators could also include social movements, social elites (or business persons), organizations (NGOs, IGOs), or grassroots movements (Long and Brecke, 2003: 152). These can span Track I, II, and III, although each approach possesses varying degrees of strength and influence, and all are expected to adhere to best practices associated with leadership.

Secondly, third parties can exogenously instigate conflict resolution (Deutsch, 2005: 16-18; R. Fisher, 2001a: 4-9). For instance, the United States brokered the Dayton Accords (1995) that ended the Bosnia War (1991-1995) and began a process of national reconciliation between Muslim, Croat and Serb populations in Bosnia (Keranen, 2014: 132; Malek, 2005;

Ramsbotham and others 2011: 202). In many instances, third parties are valuable resources, and are likely to include individuals and/or institutions with expertise in conflict resolution. They can assist referents by establishing lines of communication or facilitating meetings, building capacity and augmenting trust among belligerents (Ramsbotham and others 2011: 181). While functioning in this capacity, and detail below in section 4.3.6, Western scholars propose that intervening third parties "facilitate" the process rather than dictate its principles, objectives or choice of mechanisms (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 23-166; R. Fisher, 2001a: 1-21; Lederach, 1995: 56).

Lastly, a program can be launched endogenously and exogenously to advance conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels (Long and Brecke, 2003: 62-63). For instance, President Rafael Callejas of Honduras was pressured in the 1990s to begin a resolution process by both his constituents (internal) and the United States (external) (Long and Brecke, 2003: 62-63). Pressure from both directions caused Callejas to adopt a process he had initially been hesitant to implement. Thus, a combination of actors can exert influence on political leaders or local constituents to pursue conflict resolution, yet these actors will equally have to be accepted as legitimate third parties (Long and Brecke, 2003: 62-63). There is considerable risk with pressuring, especially when the pressure is applied externally, since it can cause superficial or improperly planned and implemented pursuits that are apt to abandonment, rejection and failure (denoted in 4.3.9).

4.1.7 Shared identities and integration

Identity-based conflict is challenging to transform by comparison to needs-based conflict (Burgess and Burgess, 2010). Therefore, some scholars argue that the development of shared identities, buttressed by an advanced degree of integration among referents, is indispensable for constructing and rooting conflict transformation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Kriesberg, 2004: 94; Lederach, 1995: 9). As noted in chapter 3, the effects of transformation are ideally expressed in cognitive, behavioral and effective changes whereby perceptions and behavior are modified, differences are bridged, commonalities established and trust fostered (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 18; Lederach, 1995: 18). When perceptions of "self" and "other" are reframed through cognitive transformation, commonalities will emerge (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 73-75; Long and Brecke, 2003: 36; Shriver, 1995: 114). Upon cognitive reframing, constructive relations can be nurtured.

The model referenced here implies that shared identities are easier to integrate and unify as commonality constructs a foundation whereupon congenial perceptions and behavior can

be constructed upon (Kriesberg, 2004: 94; Lederach, 1995: 9). Transformation thus instigates those modifications and constructive ties. When modifications in the relationship are pursued and experienced, they should be institutionalized, for instance by creating social, economic and/or political cooperation through techniques such as the construction of joint institutions or joint ventures, permitting referents to regularly work together to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes and resolve issues (Kriesberg, 2004: 94). Nevertheless, reference to the construction of "commonalities" does not suggest radical changes to identity, but rather changes should be sufficient enough for constructing peaceful coexistence at minimum (Kriesberg, 2004: 84).

4.1.8 Accommodating goals and mutual benefit

Denoting another component of cognitive transformation, Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 75) suggests that referents must adapt their objectives to ensure that each adversary's existence and goals can be accommodated. Adaption of objectives is especially necessary in needs-based conflict where scarce resources are at issue, but equally relevant in identity-based conflict where annihilation of the other might be an objective. Subsequent to parties adjusting their objectives so that the "other" is nonviolently accommodated, dialogue, compromise and mutually beneficial goals can be negotiated (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75). Upon determining common or accommodative objectives, constructive perceptions and behavior can be established and institutionalized around the pursuit of those goals (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Rosoux, 2009: 544). When goals are shared and/or mutually beneficial, the probability of mutual acceptance of objectives, and the other, is increased, in conjunction with the chances that conflict resolution will be willfully pursued (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75).

4.1.9 Education aimed at transformation

Education, broadly defined here as intellectual, moral or social instruction, in the frame of conflict resolution has multiple values. For instance, it can be utilized to impart knowledge to individuals, communities or representatives about (obscure) injustices or provide insight into how more just societies can be created and managed (Lederach, 1995: 12). It can likewise be utilized to elicit the needs and desires of affected stakeholders, whereby perceptions, behavior and structures can be reformulated within a given environment or relationship to advance relational symmetry, justice and peace (Lederach, 1995: 12-13). In short, education through the lens of conflict transformation is designed to increase awareness of injustices, needs and desires, and advance structural, perceptive and behavioral alterations to limit physical, structural and cultural violence.

Education is not limited the practice of experts imparting knowledge, but likewise includes processes whereby a given community or society provides knowledge or is elicited to acquire insight (Lederach, 1995: 26). In fact, Lederach (1995: 26-29) emphasizes the importance of utilizing and building upon conflict transformation practices that exist within a given community. Rather than imposing foreign teaching and techniques, local knowledge should be harnessed, whereby local ownership and the applicability of techniques and theory are assured. Therefore, indigenous practices should be appropriately taught and deployed within a given community for the purposes for which they were designed. In essence, cultural needs and differences must be recognized and considered when sharing or imparting knowledge in general, and when practicing of conflict resolution in particular (Lederach, 1995: 26-29).

Similarly, Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 68-75) recommends that educational practices be designed and implemented, to impart "new beliefs and values that can support" conflict transformation. Educational practices, when designed to impart knowledge, should teach, expand, institutionalize and root constructive beliefs and values at all levels of society (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31). Among the accepted practices, peace education is commonly recognized. Peace education is a peacebuilding practice designed to stimulate non-violent perceptions and behavior through the establishment of a curriculum where values and techniques can be imparted to students of all ages (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31; Hinds and Oliver, 2009; Jackson, 2009: 183; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 226; Stover and others, 2005: 853). While education is essentially a dimension, or tool, for achieving conflict resolution, its addition here reinforces the importance of pursuing cognitive transformation at all levels, of empowering indigenous actors, rooting and deepening conflict resolution knowledge, practices and skills within society (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 68-75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31).

4.1.10 Public events and ceremonies

Cultures have unique techniques for dealing with violence, such as expressing grief or triumph, and these activities are fundamental to conflict resolution (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 75). For instance, Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 75) suggests that "public events such as ceremonies and parades" can be held to reinforce collective unity and generate popular support for conflict resolution. Such activities are hypothesized to root transformation in the target community, impart ownership and give the community a stake in the outcome, since the event or ceremony is most likely familiar, generally accepted, and can incorporate a large

number of participants (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 75). Providing an example, Long and Brecke (2003: 57) reference the traditional healing ceremonies of Mozambique that purify and appease past transgressions by local leaders in rural communities. While events and ceremonies are also better classified as tools for advancing conflict resolution, their reference reinforces the importance of collective support and participation, and they provide the community with a physical demonstration of the program and its effects (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 75; Long and Brecke, 2003: 57). It will be noted in chapter 5, that such ceremonies are an essential component of conflict resolution in Arab/Muslim culture.

4.2 Three Western approaches to conflict resolution

Subsequent to the exploration of prerequisites for a conflict resolution program, focus now transfers to extracting principles that guide conflict resolution in the Western approach. The following analysis refers to the three Western peacebuilding schools of thought introduced in chapter 3: conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Throughout this section, we continue to examine English language literature to extract the basic principles and objectives embraced by these approaches. In many instances, the principles mentioned will reiterate those inadvertently outlined hitherto.

Figure 4 Rosoux's (2009) Approaches to Conflict Resolution



Figure 4 cites Rosoux's (2009: 545) illustration of the three approaches to conflict resolution, noting their function and objectives.

Valerie Rosoux (2009) claims there are three prominent approaches of conflict resolution found in Western theory. Among them are the structural, social-psychological and spiritual approaches (Rosoux, 2009: 545). Each respective approach advocates four primary principles, some of which intersect with those found in other approaches. Consequently, we can reduce associated principles to six: justice, truth, regard, security, mercy and peace. See Figure 4 for

an overview of the three conflict resolution approaches and their function, as outlined by Rosoux (2009).

The first approach is top-down, or “structural.” Scholars who favor the structural approach prioritize managing or resolving conflict among social and political elites, or Track 1, which establishes constructive formal relations through institutional interaction and structural interdependence (Bargal and Sivan, 2004; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; Gardner Feldman, 2008). The structural approach falls somewhere between the conflict management and conflict resolution schools of thought. The second approach is the bottom-up or “social-psychological” approach (Rosoux, 2009: 545). Its advocates argue that the individuals creating society are indispensable for rooting and proliferating conflict resolution (Bar-On, 2004; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004; Kriesberg, 2004). It is essentially a Track II approach and falls under the rubric of conflict resolution. Finally, other scholars add a third category, the “spiritual” approach (Hermann, 2004: 45; Rosoux, 2009: 545). The spiritual approach parallels the social-psychological practice but pursues deep conflict resolution by emphasizing the principles of forgiveness and reconciliation (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 19; Lederach, 1997). Scholars generally perceive the spiritual approach accommodates Track III approaches, although others suggest it could involve Track I, II and III simultaneously (Paffenholz, 2009: 5; Reimann, 2004: 11-13).

It should be cautioned that the classifications are not concrete since other scholars utilize diverging terminology to identify similar approaches (Amstutz, 2005: 99-100), and this practice obscures categorization. Moreover, as denoted in the previous chapter, some scholars suggest combining approaches to make a program more holistic which likewise obscures categorization (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 23; Kriesberg, 2001: 61; Rosoux, 2009: 552-533). Nevertheless, as noted in chapter 3, section 4.2, combining tools and approaches increases the popular appeal and capacity because more people are involved, additional needs are met, which increases the popular support and legitimacy of a given program.

The three primary approaches and their respective four principles are outlined in the following subsections. Our introduction of the three approaches ensures that we maintain a wide framework while exploring conflict resolution principles. Rather than limiting our attention to the Western structural approach alone, which has frequently been the case when Arab/Muslim scholars compare and critically analyze Western approaches, this text extends consideration to the social-psychological and spiritual approaches as well. The wide framework we utilize, therefore, permits a more representative comparison of Western theory with Arab/Muslim theory whereby parallels and divergences can be better articulated.

Moreover, introducing the three approaches provides a range of alternatives for pursuing conflict resolution that can be tailored to the needs and objectives of affected stakeholders. When it is decided that focus should be limited to the governing structures and representatives, the structural approach can be applied. Contrary, when deep conflict resolution is sought, the spiritual approach can be applied. Equally important, these approaches can be mixed to increase the depth and breadth of a program. Whether implemented individually or combined, there is latitude whereby affected stakeholders can select which approach or approaches most appropriately serves their needs and interests.

4.2.1 Structural Approach

Structural approaches to conflict resolution center on increasing formal constructive political, economic and security cooperation among former belligerents as a means of transforming perspectives, establishing interdependence and improving trust (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15-17; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-17; Hermann, 2004: 48; Rosoux, 2009: 545). It is achieved by altering cognitive perceptions and behavioral patterns among social/political elites so that formal relations between institutions and representatives are improved (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15-17; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 23-24). By concentrating efforts at the structural level, it is argued that conflict resolution can occur more rapidly and be rooted in the political and social framework of representatives, institutions and structures (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 1-17). The effects of the structural process are thereafter projected to filter from official structures into respective societies (the general public) over a period of time (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15-17; Dwyer, 1999; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-17; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 210). The structural approach can generally be categorized as falling under the conflict management school of thought, although structural strategies are commonly bundled into other approaches, and references to a resolution of the conflict and even elements of transformation might be noted in the literature associated with the structural approach.

Critics, nonetheless, posit that while valuable, the structural approach marginalizes the needs of those individuals making up society at large, thereby relegating the participation and interests of the masses (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 11-13). However, it was noted that marginalization of society is projected to have negative implications on a conflict resolution process. Albeit, top-down advocates retort that the structural approach is more realistic by comparison to other approaches, since it is difficult to transform collective cognitive and behavioral aspects of a group or society as a whole, and when possible, scholars suggest that

obtaining social transformation requires stable structural relations to create a congenial environment for administering bottom-up approaches (Dwyer, 1999; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 210). Concisely, it is argued that the structural approach provides the stable conditions necessary for improving relations at lower levels.

Gardner Feldman (1999: 334-354; 2008: 3-19) is one adherent of the structural approach and provides a conceptual framework from which the process can be analyzed. She asserts that there are four (principled) dimensions to a conflict resolution process at the structural level: history, leadership, institutions and international context. The degree of attention, resources and devotion attributed to these elements, she argues, influence the degree or quality of transformation (Gardner Feldman, 1999: 334-354; 2008: 3-19). Each element is examined respectively.

4.2.1.1 History

Gardner Feldman (2008: 3-9) divides the dimension of "history"[67] into three stages: "past as stimulus," "acknowledgement of grievances," and "past as present." The referenced stages represent a natural or logical progression of how historical events are perceived, processed and resolved over time (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 3-9). Systematically, her "past as stimulus" stage begins when an inimical relationship influenced by a moral desire to alter a conflictual relationship through constructive interaction (an expression of a desire to reconcile through, for instance, dialogue) (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 3-6). When the adversaries engage in constructive behavior over time, referents progress to a "grievance stage" where they convert the "affective, moral component into pragmatic and material needs and formal political commitment" (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 4). Simply stated, during the second stage, referents refer to and discuss the past in public through "treaties, agreements, statements, symbolic acts that acknowledged past misdeeds, memorialized historical events or asserted a fresh start in relations compared to [those of the] past," events which are symbolic gestures of conflict resolution (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 6). As pragmatic and tangible efforts manifest and transpire, they provide opportunities to address and fulfill existing needs (for instance, the need to discuss wrongdoing or to discover the truth) while demonstrating that both referents possess the potential and will to change (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 3-6). If processes continue, referents are drawn closer together through their constructive and cooperative behavior (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 3-6).

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[67] Montville (1999: 331) likewise adds History as an essential component to conflict resolution, illustrating an overlap of the structural and psychological-social approaches to reconciliation.

In the last stage of history, "past as present" two events occur. These include:

> (1) debates about the past, which can be divisive but necessary to authenticate the relationship; and (2) affirmative commitments in joint efforts to confront the past [occur]. The past is neither forgotten nor represents a mere footnote; rather it is a "productive irritant" to be confronted constantly (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 6).

As noted in the quote, debates will inevitably emerge about past events and the constructive management of those debates demonstrates a) the degree of change that has occurred, and b) a commitment to proceeding with the resolution process. Moreover, the author argues that at the latter stage, historical events remain in the present, they are not forgotten, but become enduring elements in the public and political realm, persisting until all outstanding contentious points are resolved to mutual satisfaction (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 6-9). The past is, therefore, not forgotten but encountered and discussed repeatedly until a satisfactory resolution is produced. Overall, the process incorporates salient principles including the disclosure of truth, the meeting of needs, the building of trust, dialogue and joint problem solving (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 3-9), to name a few.

4.2.1.2 Leadership

Gardner Feldman's (2008: 9-11) second dimension, "leadership," is posited as an influential factor for the success of conflict resolution (and is a reiteration of section 4.1.6). She argues that leadership must be "visionary, willing to overcome domestic opposition, and capable of creating leadership duos, often based on personal chemistry with political leaders in the other country, and often spanning ideological lines" (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9). The quote depicts leaders as essential catalysts of a process, taking on the role of a facilitator, spokesperson and representative for the advancement of conflict resolution at home and abroad (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 28; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-11). If leadership succeeds in obtaining legitimacy and support among their constituents, and perhaps promoting it among those of the adversary, Gardner Feldman (2008: 9-11) argues the process is more probable to advance. In this instance, numerous principles, including honesty, mutual acceptance and accountability, can be deduced.

However, other scholars caution that responsibility should be collective and not placed on a single individual or institution. Sarkin (2008: 22-23), for example, insists one leader or institution should not be charged with overseeing and implementing a conflict resolution process. Rather responsibility should be shared and diversified among numerous stakeholders, including governmental members and the general public, since the latter are prime

determiners for the viability of the overall process (Sarkin, 2008: 22-23). Accordingly, responsibility and ownership of the program are distributed rather than being isolated.

4.2.1.3 Institutions

Gardner Feldman's (2008: 11-17) third dimension, "institutions" are designed to conjoin former adversaries through the construction of a shared framework that functionally addresses preexisting and future problems while buttressing cooperation (as noted in section 4.1.3). Institutions come in a variety of forms, including societal organizations, inter-governmental, or non-governmental types, which can comprise joint projects, such as partner cities, economic and education cooperation or professional exchanges (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 11-17; Hermann, 2004: 46). Institutions and programs can be (re-) formed, founded and managed at both the structural and societal levels and can possess diverse mandates and specializations, including operating in the fields of political, defense, economic, and legal affairs (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 11-17). Singularly or jointly constructed, scholars argue that institutions provide venues where interdependence can be rooted and institutionalized, contentious issues voiced and addressed, interaction promoted, and trust built, (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 11-17; Ross, 2004: 197-223). These outcomes are suggested to advance the cultivation of constructive and robust relationships.

4.2.1.4 International Context

Gardner Feldman's (2008: 17-18) final dimension, "international context," refers to the broader environment in which relationships exist at the national and international levels (outlined in section 4.1.4). Logically, an environment can have a positive or negative impact on the progression and depth of conflict resolution (Auerbach, 2004: 163; Bercovitch and others, 2009: 7). Where local, regional or international actors' (non-) interaction produces an environment conducive to resolution, for instance through the encouragement and facilitation of constructive relationships between referents, a conflict resolution process can proceed unhindered by interveners or spoilers (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 17-18). Contrary, if outside interveners continue to influence one or all of the referents involved to maintain the conflict, thereby spoiling the process, there is a high probability that the transformation process will be undermined (Bar-Tal, 2000: 361; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 17-18; Hamid, 1983: 320). Ideally, the local and international environment will be congenial to conflict resolution.

4.2.2 Social-Psychological Approach

The next recognized Western approach to conflict resolution is the social-psychological (Rosoux, 2009: 545). It is implemented from the bottom-up, centering on the societies involved in intrastate or interstate conflict (Bloomfield, 2006: 28). Its maximum objective is to establish positive peace (Bloomfield, 2006: 28) while, at minimum, it pursues non-violent coexistence, which is defined as negative peace (Kriesberg, 2001: 61). To accomplish its goals, attention is centered on transforming the "cognitive and emotional aspects" among a majority of referents in each affected society (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 62; Bar-Tal, 2000: 352). The social-psychological approach can be categorized under the conflict resolution paradigm, but it is prone to contain elements of conflict transformation.

Critics of conflict resolution argue that the approach is too broadly applied to achieve significant results (Dwyer, 1999). More specifically, it is perceived impossible to meet the multitude of needs and desires represented within a given society (Dwyer, 1999). Thus, although the social-psychological approach targets society as a whole, it is impossible for it to reach everyone (denoted in 4.3.2 below). Nonetheless, advocates of the approach emphasize that absent popular support for conflict resolution, and their involvement, its potentiality will be marginal at best (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 18). As mentioned earlier, the lack of social support or involvement is expected to marginalize the effects of conflict resolution through the absence of depth and legitimacy.

Louis Kriesberg (2004: 83) is one adherent of the social-psychological approach. He suggests truth, justice, regard and security are the main components/principles of a conflict resolution process (Kriesberg, 2004: 83).

4.2.2.1 Truth

Kriesberg (2004: 83) defines "truth" as "the development of shared beliefs about what happened in the past and what is happening currently in the relations between different sides." Rephrased, truth refers to the (construction of a) common understanding of historical events among referents. In general terms, truth is conceptualized as wrongdoers acknowledging responsibility for their actions/crimes and being held accountable (Kelman, 2004: 122-124; Rouhana, 2004: 36-37). Truth is advanced through various techniques including truth commissions or judicial trials where verdicts and sentencing are transparent (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 28-34; Kriesberg, 2004: 98-100; Rouhana, 2004: 36-37). Through these measures, and others, an official version of what occurred can be produced and a semblance of justice provided.

There are, nevertheless, multiple challenges to pursuing and obtaining the truth. For example, acknowledgment and acceptance of responsibility is not always forthcoming because perpetrators of wrongdoing may not willfully admit their culpability. Likewise, truth is subjective, so those involved are expected to express several version of what occurred, a probability which implies that its pursuit has divisive potentiality (Lederach, 1997; Lerche, 2000; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 254-255). Diverse versions of the truth will, inevitably, have to be consolidated to mutual satisfaction. Another problem is that when truth is pursued excessively, it can fracture society as opposed to unite it (Skaar, 2013: 75). In this case, pursuit of the truth becomes counterproductive, since it creates divisions or exacerbates preexisting fissures. Finally, while scholars underscore the importance of truth for changing perceptions and transforming relationships (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 29; Kelman, 2004: 122-124; Rosoux, 2009: 550), there is general consensus in the literature that uncovering truth is only one element in a conflict resolution process, and alone is insufficient for altering cognitive, effectual and behavioral aspects fundamental to the establishment of constructive relationships (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Rosoux, 2009: 555).

4.2.2.2 Justice

Scholars suggest that humans perceive injustice far more readily than they perceive justice (Boulding, 1978: 71-72). Consequently, the principle of justice is an essential aspect of conflict resolution. In fact, following violent interaction at the intrastate or interstate levels, justice is often demanded by those adversely affected, so that order and balance are restored to the political and social systems (Anderlini and others, 2004: 1-2; Kriesberg, 2004: 82; Rouhana, 2004: 36). By (re-) introducing justice into the post-conflict structural, it is though that legitimacy and faith in a country’s social, political and judicial systems can be restored (Anderlini and others, 2004: 2; Steele, 2008: 1-3). It is likewise suggested an important means of reconstructing the past, or the truth (Boulding, 1978: 71-86; Steele, 2008: 3).

The relative utility of justice for conflict resolution is highlighted in the literature (Hamber, 2007: 122). For example, Montville (1999: 321) outlines five contributions that justice makes toward the achievement of conflict resolution. First, it exposes the individual perpetrators and their guilt and holds them accountable (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Montville, 1999: 321). Hence, justice identifies the wrongdoing committed and those responsible for its perpetration, and then punishes them to eliminate impunity. Second, justice documents and records the truth for public record (Montville, 1999: 321). Documentation creates a historical record of injustices, perpetrators and punishment, which contribute to dissemination and

preservation of justice and the truth. Third, it acknowledges the transgressions committed against victims (Montville, 1999: 321). The act, in essence, recognizes the suffering of victims as a consequence of the transgressions perpetrated. Fourth, it disassembles the institutions that advanced, or supported, the conflict or the perpetration of violence (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Montville, 1999: 321). For instance, if state institutions and representatives were involved in the justification or perpetration of violence, they should be exposed, replaced or reconstructed to prevent a repetition of events. Restructuring also restores faith in the social and political representatives and structures (Adelman, 2005: 287-307). Lastly, justice operates as a deterrent for future perpetrators by demonstrating that transgressions are subject to consequences (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Montville, 1999: 321; Triponel, 2007: 282). Combined, justice, functions to acknowledge and document the past, secures balance and faith in the system, and discourages a replication of events.

With this in mind, there are diverging means of pursuing justice. Ramsbotham and others (2011: 249-250) emphasize that justice can be pursued using vengeance, amnesia or the use of legal practices. We briefly explore each in turn. Firstly, and least desirable from a conflict resolution standpoint, referents can seek personal revenge that reciprocates violence (R. Cohen, 2004: 178; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 250; Steele, 2008: 7). Retributive behavior implies that the conflict continues or escalates (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 250). While utilization of violence is one means of exacting justice, it undermines the possibility of resolving a conflict.

The second means of pursuing justice implements a “forgive and forget” approach to forego continued conflict behavior and physical violence (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 250). When forgiving and/or forgetting are applied, stakeholders effectively disregard or suppress the episode and its implications for the sake of moving forward and advancing constructive relations (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 250). While forgetting minimizes deconstructive behavior, it is criticized, as outlined in section 4.3.11, for its tendency of marginalizing victims’ needs and interests (Rothfield, 2008: 16-20). In short, events and their consequences are suppressed rather than constructively managed.

Lastly, justice can be pursued through the punishment of perpetrators. As noted, punishment is often demand by victims to restore balance to, and faith in, the system (Anderlini and others, 2004: 1). If justice is pursued on this front, it can be implemented in two manners: restorative or retributive. On the one hand, retributive (or distributive) justice is designed to punish wrongdoing, for instance human rights violations (Anderlini and others, 2004: 2; Avruch, 2010: 36). These punishments are usually handed down through a judicial

system, whether traditional or otherwise, that determines equitable and fair punishment by comparison to the wrong(s) committed (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 66). Under the retributive framework, perpetrators can be punished through tools including fines, serving jail or prison sentences, or performing community services (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 66).

The benefits of retributive justice are several. Most importantly, the public prosecution of perpetrators of wrongdoing helps to bridge relational divisions by first acknowledging misconduct and then punishing its perpetration (Anderlini and others, 2004: 2). Acknowledgment and punishment were acknowledged above. Nevertheless, among numerous complications, critics argue that retributive justice is violent since coercion and force are used to deter or punish certain individuals/groups and their actions (Anderlini and others, 2004: 2; Avruch, 2010: 36; Galtung, 2001: 12; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 13). In this instance, the pursuit of justice creates new injustices since others suffer from the penalties imposed by its processes (judicial verdicts), thereby becoming a means of punishment or a tool of violence, which some suggest could protract the conflict and generate additional grievance (Boulding, 1978: 86; Deutsch, 2005: 13-14). Such outcomes can sabotage the pursuit of constructive post-conflict relations and compromise institutional legitimacy, as punishment appears to be favored (Anderlini and others, 2004: 2; Avruch, 2010: 36; Galtung, 2001: 12; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 13; Skaar, 2013: 61). Hence, there is a risk that retributive justice can be perceived as violent, and its pursuit could compromise conflict resolution.

On the other hand, and in direct response to the weaknesses of retributive justice just outlined, restorative techniques can be implemented (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Anderlini and others, 2004: 2; Humphrey, 2005: 203-220; Marshall, 1999: 6-7). Tony Marshall (1999: 5) defines restorative justice as “a problem-solving approach to crime which involves the parties themselves, and the community generally, in an active relationship with statutory agencies.” Thus, retributive justice is a practice that permits relevant stakeholders to determine how justice should be administered. Marshall (1999: 5) goes on to emphasize that the term does not refer to a particular set of practices, “but a set of principles which may orientate the general practice of any agency or group in relation to crime.” Restorative justice is, therefore, a vague term used to identify any non-violent approach to justice designed to acknowledge wrongdoing.

By comparison, other scholars offer alternative definitions of restorative justice. Humphrey (2005: 203-220), for example, surmises that restorative justice seeks to heal individuals and society following violent conflict. Similarly, Anderlini and others (2004: 2) define restorative justice as “a systematic means of addressing wrongdoings that emphasizes

the healing of wounds and rebuilding of relationships." In short, the quote emphasizes that wrongdoers are not punished but subject to penance through alternative forms (Marshall, 1999: 6-7; Rosoux, 2009: 549-558). Through non-violent responses, wounds are healed and constructive relationships established, as emphasized in Humphrey and Marshall's quotes.

In simple terms, restorative justice utilizes mechanisms which protect the rights and well-being of the wrongdoer, ultimately restoring that individual back to society rather than punishing or isolating them (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Galtung, 2001: 8-13; Marshall, 1999: 2-11; Worthington, 2006: 247-248). Examples of restorative justice techniques include having the offender temporarily work for the victim, his family, or the community; or having them pay financial restitution or attend counseling as a means of reprimand (Anderlini and others, 2004: 2; Marshall, 1999: 11). Other possibilities available include the use of traditional ceremonies[68] (Sarkin, 2008: 23), truth commissions (Rosoux, 2009: 549) and apologies (R. Fisher, 2001b: 27; Gibney and Roxstrom, 2001: 913; Parent, 2012: 28; Shriver, 1995: 138). In these instances, there is no punishment *per se*, but symbolic acts of restitution are expected.

Naturally, there are guidelines that scholars recommend that restorative justice programs adhere. Eric Stover and others (2005: 835-836) outline three essential principles when implementing restorative justice in post-war societies. They argue that: 1) "implementing authorities" be considered "both legitimate and impartial"; 2) "a genuine process of consultation with those most affected by the violence" occur; and 3) "measures must be accompanied by programs that promote political reconstruction of a legitimate and capable state, economic and social reconstruction, freedom of movement, security and the rule of law, access to accurate and unbiased information, educational reform, and cross-ethnic engagement" (Stover and others, 2005: 835-836). Overall, the guidelines mentioned by Stover and others reiterate the importance of legitimacy, impartiality, consultation, reconstruction and institutionalization of post-conflict changes. Within this frame, restorative justice offers multiple benefits. *Inter alia*, it is argued to enhance the legitimacy and acceptance of a resolution program and tools; it provides a degree of closure (Liddick and Gagnon, 2009: 80); and it can be implemented through preexisting social and/or governing structures to ensure

[68] For example, Rwanda used the *gacaca*, which means grass(roots), or people's trial, to supplement modern techniques following the April 1994 genocide (Gloppen, 2005: 25; Sarkin, 2008: 24). Buckeye (2010: 46) defines gacaca as "literally grassroots, community-based justice mechanisms that combine aspects of restorative and retributive justice to promote reconciliation within the community. Prisoners are brought before a *gacaca* tribunal in the community where they were alleged to have committed their crime (Buckeye, 2010: 46). An innovative aspect of the *gacaca* tribunals is the confession procedure, a process where prisoners who confess receives greatly reduced sentences (Buckeye, 2010: 46).

impunity does not persist or reoccur (Anderlini and others, 2004: 2; Humphrey, 2005: 203-220; Montville, 1999: 320-333).

In closing, there is one salient problem associated with the application of justice. Most notably, justice is relative, since adversaries may perceive it in different ways (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66). The relative nature of justice presents two obvious problems. On the one hand, identifying what constitutes injustices may be problematic because stakeholders might be unable to agree on its tenets (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 12). Achieving agreement is further complicated by the fact that all referents involved in a conflict perceive that injustices have been committed against them, and are probable to overlook or excuse the injustices perpetrated by the in-group against the other (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 12). In instances of diverse conceptualizations, adversaries will have to negotiate parameters for defining justice and identifying what constitutes an injustice.

On the other hand, the relative nature of justice likewise creates problems when determining mutually acceptable tools for pursuing justice (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66). In this case, referents will likewise have to establish consensus on how justice can be pursued. Ideally, scholars recommend that justice and forgiveness be balanced (R. Cohen, 2004: 178; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 250-251), since "the passage from negative to positive peace runs through justice" (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 251). The quote suggests that pursuit of justice will have to be weighed according to stakeholders' interests and needs, to ensure the act of implementing justice meets needs but simultaneously does not become perceived as violent, which ultimately undermines the pursuit of peace.

4.2.2.3 Regard

Kriesberg's (2004: 84) third component of conflict resolution is "regard." Regard is defined as the recognition of an adversary's "humanity and identity." Simply articulated, regard alludes to acknowledgment and accommodation of the other (Kelman, 2004: 122; Kriesberg, 2004: 84). Regard can be expressed through recognition of the other or nonviolent coexistence, at one end of the spectrum, and reconciliation, or positive peace, at the other (Kriesberg, 2004: 84). In some instances, achieving regard may necessitate cognitive transformation (3.3.3.1) (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-362; Hermann, 2004: 45), or reframing, conditions that are influenced by conflict specifics, such as the duration and intensity of the conflict (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Kriesberg, 2001: 60). Once the "other" has been accommodated, efforts can be redoubled to improve the quality of the relationship and institutionalize those cognitive changes. Regard can be advanced through various tools

including dialogue, official recognition, education, an apology, and/or the extension of forgiveness, to name a few (Kriesberg, 2004: 84).

4.2.2.4 Security

Kriesberg's (2004: 85) final principle is "security." Security, as conceptualized by Kriesberg, delineates the quality of the environment in which referents interact and coexist, and parallels section 4.1.4. At minimum, security suggests that referents do not feel physically threatened by their adversary (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76-77; Kriesberg, 2004: 85). Absent threat, referents can begin to constructively interact and transform their perceptions of the "other", building a relationship within a secure environment (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76-77; Kriesberg, 2004: 85). Louis Kriesberg (2004: 85) acknowledges that the downfall of his narrow conceptualization is that it is minimalistic, as focusing strictly on the absence of mutual threat qualifies as negative peace. In such instances, peaceful coexistence is the most probable outcome. Nonetheless, when conditions permit, positive peace is advocated—which, among other things, includes the absence of structural violence (Galtung, 1969: 183-184; Kriesberg, 2004: 85). Security can be promoted via structural interfacing including economic or military cooperation, which can be reinforced through tools comprising of cultural exchanges or joint institutions at both the structural and societal levels (Kriesberg, 2004: 85).

4.2.3 Spiritual Approach

The final Western approach to conflict resolution is the spiritual approach. It advocates conflict transformation be implemented to stabilize long-term constructive relationships. The reason for the depth and breadth advocated is embedded in the manner in which conflict transformation scholars perceive conflict. Worthington (2006: 267), for instance, asserts: "When conflict has resulted in hurts being inflicted on group members, people need to heal from those hurts in order to move past the hurts and live in peace." The quote suggests that healing is necessary following conflict, a hypothesis supported by other scholars (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 19; Lederach, 1997). Similarly, Johan Galtung (1998: 65) uses a simplified formula: "Reconciliation = Closure + Healing, closure in the sense of not reopening hostilities, healing in the sense of being rehabilitated." Achieving reconciliation, as conceptualized by Galtung, is, however, challenging and controversial at the higher levels. The depth referenced implies conflict transformation, and perhaps reconciliation, as the ultimate objective of the spiritual approach (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 19; Lederach, 1997).

In general, the spiritual approach emulates the social-psychological approach in that its primary referents are individuals and societies (Rosoux, 2009: 545). The spiritual differs in that it aspires for a deeper outcome of healing and forgiveness. Albeit, as detailed in section 4.3.11 of this chapter, the incorporation of forgiveness in conflict resolution discourse at the societal and international levels engenders significant scholarly debate (Bloomfield, 2006: 12-29; Wohl and Branscombe, 2009: 195). Postponing discussion on dissention for the moment, John Paul Lederach (1997) is a persuasive advocate of the spiritual approach to conflict resolution. Lederach (1997) classifies truth, justice, mercy and peace as the four primary components of deep conflict resolution[69].

4.2.3.1 Truth

There are obvious parallels between how truth is conceptualized by the spiritual and social-psychological approaches. Lederach (1997) defines "truth" as an objective exploration of what transpired in the conflict: who was involved, what happened and so forth. The importance of truth in these instances is discernible, with the author suggesting that the emergence of truth is the first step toward conflict transformation. However, the pursuit of truth is problematic. Truth is subjective, which implies that all stakeholders will have their own, and sometimes competing, versions (Kriesberg, 2004: 83; Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 254-255; Rouhana, 2004: 42-43; Worthington, 2006: 262). To surmount inevitable divergences, reciprocal open dialogue is counseled to facilitate expression of the varied accounts (Head, 2012: 41; Lederach, 1997). Through dialogue, Lederach (1997) suggests that the adversaries can work through and construct a common truth that balances the versions.

In this frame, Lederach (1997) cautions that the jointly constructed truth that emerges should not be accusatory. Accusations are counterproductive and divisive, so truth should be constructed around a version of events that unites the adversaries rather than divides them (Lederach, 1997). Truth is, therefore, not simply concerned about recounting events from the past, but it becomes the foundation for establishing amicable relations in the present and future (Adelman, 2005: 287-307). After all, it is upon the truth that is constructed that relationships will be reformulated and managed.

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[69] Correspondingly, Long and Brecke (2003: 28-31) offer a "forgiveness model" which parallels Lederach's framework. It likewise has four components: acknowledging harm or truth telling; forgiveness of the wrongdoer and not the wrong by reframing the perception of one's own identity and how the other is perceived; foregoing the desire for revenge; and establishing a new more peaceful relationship (Long and Brecke, 2003: 28-31). Due to their similarities, only Lederach's (1997) framework is explored.

4.2.3.2 Justice

The principle of "justice" aims at correcting wrongs of the past, by dealing with both injustices and the root causes of the conflict, whereby transformation can advance (Lederach, 1997; Liddick and Gagnon, 2009: 45-72; Montville, 1999: 321). Paralleling the social-psychological approach, justice holds perpetrators accountable, addresses root causes, and provides some form of compensation to the victims (Lederach, 1997). Through a systematic pursuit of justice, deconstructive structural and discursive elements are also countered, which should aid in the development of constructive perceptions, behavior and structures that undermine the potentiality of a repetition of the cycle of violence or oppression (Lederach, 1997; Rouhana, 2004: 37). Justice is therefore broad, and may even require that former social and political structures (laws, court systems, governing framework) be restructured or rehabilitated to augment their capacity and legitimacy (Humphrey, 2005: 203-220; Lerche, 2000; Long and Brecke, 2003: 149). While the holistic approach advocated by those who adhere to the spiritual approach is complex, Lederach (1997) and Montville (1999: 318) assure peace cannot be obtained without the administration of justice. In this light, Lederach (1995: 14) bluntly warns that when justice no longer guides conflict resolution, its actors, processes and objectives should be called into question.

4.2.3.3 Mercy

Lederach (1995: 20; 1997) describes "mercy" as a "new beginning" in the relationship. Mercy suggests the relationship transforms from one based on accusations motivated by past wrongdoing and enmity, to a relationship of amity and forgiveness in pursuit of a collective future (Lederach, 1997). This conceptualization implies the principles of compassion, amnesty and forgiveness (Lederach, 1995: 20). Unsurprisingly, Lederach describes mercy with expressions such as "steadfast" and "eternal grace" signifying the influence of Christianity on his theory. These nuances similarly imply healing (outlined in section 4.3.11). Once mercy has been extended through forgiveness and healing, the relationship moves into positive peace (Lederach, 1997; Worthington, 2006: 7-9). In this manner, depth and longevity of transformation is emphasized in both theory and practice.

References to justice and mercy, however, are seemingly contradictory components. Lederach (1995: 20-21; 1997) and Gopin (2001: 88) acknowledge the existence of paradoxes in the spiritual approach when they denote the contradictions between the principles of truth, justice and mercy, recognizing that the pursuit of one principle seemingly undermines the others. In this context, the pursuit of justice and mercy are subject to discord since mercy

suggests forgiveness, while justice demands retribution. To overcome these inevitable incompatibilities, scholars advocate all components be represented and balanced within the program (Gopin, 2001: 88; Lederach, 1995: 20-21; 1997). Through balance, harmony can be established and the impact of the contradictions minimized.

4.2.3.4 Peace

Lederach's (1997) final component is "peace," which he conceptualizes as a complex amalgamation of principles including individual welfare, security and respect. Peace is depicted as a state where referents coexist in a safe and cooperative manner. Within this frame, threats to individuals have been removed and respect is expressed, partly mirroring the social-psychological components of regard and security. Nevertheless, Lederach's (1997) understanding of peace shifts the scale from nonviolent coexistence towards positive peace because mercy and forgiveness are advocated.

Interestingly, the principle of peace is paradoxically conceived of as both a precursor of and a successor to the components of truth, justice and mercy (Lederach, 1997). On the one hand, without peace, Lederach (1997) assures that the emergence of truth, justice and mercy will be undermined. On the other hand, he argues peace is a byproduct of the implementation of truth, justice and mercy, with their manifestation assisting in the production of amicable relations (Lederach, 1997). Here, Lederach is emphasizing the interconnection and mutually reinforcing aspects of conflict resolution principles and practices. Under ideal conditions, Lederach's reference to peace implies positive peace, or harmonious nonviolent relations.

4.3 Precautions and problems

With Western conceptualizations of prerequisites for conflict resolution elucidated, and an exploration of principled approaches complete, we redirect our attention to fundamental challenges associated with a process of conflict resolution. The following subsection details eleven interrelated precautions and problems found in Western literature that must be considered when designing and implementing resolution programs. Challenges articulated are partially explained by the complexity of dealing with (conflictual) relationships (Rosoux, 2009: 558-559). The precautions and problems analyzed insinuate that conflict resolution: is reactionary; is limited in scope; must be appropriately timed; is a long process; requires legitimacy; should be facilitated; is subject to setbacks; has a limited capacity; is subject to false reconciliation; is subject to exploitation, and; incorporates theories, including forgiveness and healing, which are controversial. Amalgamated, the precautions and problems

presented complete our analysis of conflict resolution as conceptualized by Western scholars in the English language. Inclusion of these weaknesses into our framework underscores the problems and challenges associated with resolving conflicts at the higher levels.

4.3.1 Reactionary rather than proactive

While scholars, such as Humphrey (2005: 203-220), proclaim that, "[t]he primary aim of reconciliation is to prevent conflict rather than to address its causes," this assessment is only partially accurate. Since conflict resolution, at any degree or level, is implemented *ex post facto*, it only prevents violence from recurring since (violent) conflict has already occurred (Lerche, 2000). Lerche (2000) acknowledges that conflict resolution, as a practice, is reactionary rather than proactive. Succinctly, conflict and violence are present, or have previously occurred, when resolution is introduced. All three theoretical approaches to peacebuilding are implemented subsequent to a conflict and thereby fail to actively prevent conflict.

4.3.2 Limited scope

Despite which level or approach is utilized when implementing conflict resolution, its scope is limited. Clearly stated, conflict resolution processes cannot permeate entire societies (Humphrey, 2005: 203-220; Kriesberg, 2001: 60; Lerche, 2000). This warning emphasizes that not every stakeholder who endures a conflict, whether classified as perpetrator, victim or bystander, will be exposed to resolution or transformation measures (Humphrey, 2005: 203-220; Kriesberg, 2001: 60; Lerche, 2000). Inevitably portions of society will be alienated or marginalized since attention is generally directed toward those who have been most involved or affected (Humphrey, 2005: 203-220). While limited scope is expected when structural approaches are applied, spiritual approaches will equally be unable to reach every member of a given society. Absolute inclusion is effectively impossible at the higher levels.

Included in the quantity of unaffected, or non-included, referents are those stakeholders who do not wish to cooperate, and may even preference conflict continuation (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 17; Bloomfield, 2006: 6-7; Hayner, 2002: 157-161; Lerche, 2000; Rothfield, 2008: 19-20). Disinterest or refusal to participate in conflict resolution can manifest for multiple reasons, including distrust or hatred of the "other" (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 17; Bloomfield, 2006: 6-7; Hayner, 2002: 157-161; Lerche, 2000; Rothfield, 2008: 19-20). Reluctance is generally the result of deep wounds or an uncongenial environment that undermines the appeal of resolution (Rosoux, 2009: 559). In such circumstances, the pursuit

of conflict resolution may have to be postponed until attitudes or circumstances have changed, whereby a latter pursuit might allow more individuals to become involved in the process while the influence of potential spoilers is correspondingly reduced.

4.3.3 Scheduling

As just noted, scholars emphasize that conflict resolution should not be hastily pursued and must be properly timed (Rosoux, 2009: 559; Ross, 2004: 216). Proceeding cautiously is especially warranted when a majority of society and/or leadership do not support conciliation, because under these pervasive conditions, successful implementation will be complicated or outright improbable (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 137). For these reasons, it is suggested that a period of time be observed between conflict termination and the initiation of conflict resolution (Worthington, 2006: 203). Observing a waiting period allows for wounds to heal, losses to be mourned and opinions to soften, whereby referents might become increasingly amenable to non-conflictive interaction and conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76-77; Rosoux, 2009: 553; Worthington, 2006: 203). Contrariwise, an abrupt pursuit of conflict resolution is suggested to have an increased probability of being perceived as premature, illegitimate and inappropriate since stakeholders are not cognitively prepared (Rosoux, 2009: 559). Assessments should be periodically made to gauge openness, and the scheduling of a process should be the prerogative of affected stakeholders rather than external parties.

4.3.4 Lengthy and complex process

Scholars universally consent that conflict resolution is a long, arduous process (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 23; Bloomfield, 2006: 7; Botes, 2003; Flavin, 2013: 177). Its duration is predicated on the time necessary for transforming relationships, especially cognitive, effective and behavioral aspects, building trust, and institutionalizing those changes within a given relationship. Due to the degree and complexities of changes sometimes required, Kriesberg (2003: 331) asserts a process could take generations before resolution or transformation occurs. Therefore, those contemplating or engaged in the process need to be patient and persistent, persevering in their endeavor to develop and institutionalize constructive relationships.

Therefore, it is impossible to establish time frames because of the intricacy of relationships and their fluctuant nature over time (Botes, 2003; Kriesberg, 2004: 96). Since (conflict) relations are complex and highly individualized, a process of conflict resolution will have to take into account the referents, preferred tools and the amount of support and

commitment volunteered (Crocker, 2003: 42; Reimann, 2004: 4; Rosoux, 2009: 559). Each conflict will have to be approached differently, and will require diverging periods of time to resolve, and an extensive amount of consideration, consultation and planning needs to be devoted to the designing and implementation of a program (Crocker, 2003: 42; Reimann, 2004: 4; Rosoux, 2009: 559). Simultaneously, a program should be flexible, since the quality of the relationship is expected to experience fluctuation over time, which likewise suggests practices and timing will have to undergo periodic evaluations to determine which, if any, changes are necessary or expected (Rosoux, 2009: 559). As a consequence of these elements, it is impossible to set time frames, but referents should be certain that the pursuit of conflict resolution is time consuming and complicated.

4.3.5 Legitimacy

The literature underscores the significance of a conflict resolution process and its implementers being perceived as legitimate by affected stakeholders (Stover and others, 2005: 835). Obtaining a sufficient degree of legitimacy among the general population and/or leaders requires certain conditions be fulfilled. First, stakeholders can only pursue resolution as a result of a conscious decision (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 76; Lerche, 2000; Rosoux, 2009: 553). There is general consensus in the literature that an internal or external actor cannot impose a process because it may not meet the needs or desires of affected stakeholders (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 73-76; Hayner, 2002; Kelman, 2004: 112; Rosoux, 2009: 553; Stover and others, 2005: 834-858). Absent general support, a (forced) program is subject to failure partly due to the lack of legitimacy. Similarly, the initiator, be they local representatives or intervening third parties, will have to be perceived as legitimate by the affected population(s) as popular sentiment is expected to be projected onto the program itself.

That said, not all scholars agree that internal or external parties cannot pressure referents into conflict resolution. Kelman (2004: 117), for instance, advises that third parties can often impose a conflict settlement whereupon conflict resolution can be fabricated. However, the literature suggests that while conflict settlement might reduce violence, resolution or transformation will require popular support, perseverance and legitimacy to successfully address needs and alter the quality of the long-term relationship. Imposing conflict resolution following a settlement, therefore, will be challenged, as these qualities may be absent and difficult to manufacture.

Obtaining legitimacy also requires stakeholders' needs be met. When stakeholders' needs and grievances remain unchecked and/or unfulfilled, including popular interests concerning timing and techniques associated with the process, the probability that a conflict resolution process will be rejected increases (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 76; Kelman, 2004: 112; Stover and others, 2005: 834-858). To compensate, scholars recommend allowing internal forces dictate when and how conflict resolution is pursued (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 132-143; Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 73-76; Rosoux, 2009: 533; Stover and others, 2005: 834-858). Under such circumstances, stakeholders can reach a mutually acceptable arrangement that is more likely to be perceived as legitimate and acceptable by both parties (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 73; R. Fisher, 2001a: 4-7; Lerche, 2000; Maoz, 2004: 233; Rosoux, 2009: 553). In this manner, stakeholders maintain ownership, while the program is perceived as legitimate, and is more likely to be pursued and/or maintained (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 132-143; Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 73-76; Rosoux, 2009: 533; Stover and others, 2005: 834-858).

One final warning concerning legitimacy in peacebuilding relates to the perceived commitment of an intervening third party. Military analysts suggest that citizens in a host country recognize that intervening third parties will inevitably limit their commitment in terms of time frames, a reality that can undermine third party legitimacy among the populations they are assisting (Flavin, 2013: 164). Recognition of the short-term commitment of intervening peace builders can, therefore, produce popular reluctance to buy into the program (Flavin, 2013: 164). To overcome this obstacle, it is recommended that local ownership be assured, and indigenous capacity building occurs, to ensure indigenous buy-in and long-term success (Alamir, 2013: 247; Flavin, 2013: 187, 247). Through these measures, the local population acquires complete control of the program, including being imparted with the knowledge and capacity necessary to implement the program, whereby legitimacy and sustainability resides in local structures rather than the intervening third party.

4.3.6 Facilitation and neutrality

In certain instances, as just mentioned, third party involvement is useful for advancing conflict resolution (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 391). According to the literature, the entry of a third party into a given conflict naturally changes conflict dynamics (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 21). Nonetheless, two recommendations, or admonishments, can be extracted from the literature regarding third party intervention. Firstly, the third party will need to possess the authority and legitimacy to guide referents toward conflict resolution. Secondly, Western scholars emphasize that a third party should be neutral.

Concerning the former, the literature accentuates that third parties be responsible, "implementing authorities" who are viewed "as both legitimate and impartial" by referents (Fisher, 2001a: 19-20; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 216; Stover and others, 2005: 835-836). Ronald Fisher (2001a: 19-20), for instance, perceives impartiality and legitimacy of a third party are necessary to increase the probability of adversaries accepting their intervention and any brokered arrangements produced during their facilitation. Concerning the latter, if third parties are perceived as biased, as opposed to neutral, the legitimacy and sincerity of their efforts will be persistently questioned by referents (R. Fisher, 2001a: 19-20; Stover and others, 2005: 835-836). Thus, absent neutrality and legitimacy, there will be a general deficiency of trust in the third party, as well as their actions and the overall conflict resolution process they endorse (R. Fisher, 2001a: 19-20; Stover and others, 2005: 835-836).

As an associated component of neutrality, Mica Estrada-Hollenback (2001: 76) warns that third parties should not impose labels, such as identifying a "victim" or "perpetrator," when intervening because assigning labels will be perceived by referents as a passing of judgment and/or a taking of sides. In such instances, a third party's "neutrality" is compromised (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 76). Moreover, judgments and labels are determined counterproductive to because they encourage stakeholders to defend themselves against perceived accusations or judgments, which can protract the conflict and undermine facilitation through biasness (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 76; R. Fisher, 2001a: 19-20)[70]. Labels, therefore, should be avoided as they undermine third party neutrality and cultivate dissension.

Nevertheless, being perceived as neutral is not always possible. Ramsbotham and others (2011: 216) warn that in the case of intense conflict, "no intervener will be seen as impartial." Contrary, they suggest that one side or the other will inevitably perceive any intervener as taking sides. Perceptions of bias are anticipated because of the cognitive and behavioral influences and experiences endured when engaged in conflict, namely referents become rooted in their patterns of suspicious thought and behavior. Similarly, Rifkind and Picco (2014: 35) note that belligerents seldom perceive third parties who become involved as neutral. Contrary, the tendency is to dismiss interveners as biased. Perceptions of a third party as biased can be problematic for implementing a sustainable resolution program, because one or more referents are likely to express dissatisfaction with the outcome or consider the process illegitimate (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 216; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 35).

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[70] For further information on third party intervention in conflict resolution, see Fisher (2001a). For a concise overview of inside-partial and outside-partial mediators and their advantages and disadvantages, see Svensson and Lindgren (2013).

Nevertheless, not all Western scholars believe that partiality can be detrimental to conflict resolution. Ronald Fisher (2001a: 20) suggests that a biased third party might be acceptable to referents if the mediator carries sufficient influence to broker mutually acceptable terms. This suggests the intervener possess a sufficient degree of trust and authority to influence stakeholders (Feste, 2011: 3-6). At the extreme, Raymond Cohen (2004: 180) argues that third parties should not be viewed as "neutral observers but as agents that crucially affect the definition of a dispute and the behavior of the disputants." Here, Cohen emphasizes that third party neutrality is of less importance as their capacity to affect change in the disputants.

Cohen's theory challenges the generally accepted role of an intervening third party, since most Western scholars recommend third parties "facilitate" conflict resolution, defined here as assisting or enabling referents, rather than dictating its implementation, structure and processes (Lederach, 1995: 56; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 32). For instance, a third party can provide financial or intellectual resources to aid in the construction of joint institutions (political, economic), or they could facilitate dialogue to ascertain the needs and desires of affected stakeholders (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 163; Fisher, 2001a: 5). While facilitation is possible at all levels, and actors of all types (independent, state, regional or international actors) can become engaged, facilitation also demands that the referents themselves must ultimately decide to pursue resolution, approve the facilitation of the third party, in addition to agree to the terms of the program (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 163; Rosoux, 2009: 559; Stover and others, 2005: 857; Winslade and Monk, n.d.: 3). A similar warning concerning facilitation is that third parties not present themselves as "experts" with ready-made solutions (Winslade and Monk, n.d.: 3). Adherence to this recommendation, it is argued, ensures the third party is perceived as a necessary and legitimate facilitator, and not director of the resolution process endowed with solutions (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 163; Stover and others, 2005: 857).

By way of conclusion, Morton Deutsch (2005: 15-18) denotes four necessary skill sets that a third party should possess. His recommendations parallel several points outlined above, but are, nonetheless, quoted at length:

> Third parties (mediators, conciliators, process consultants, therapists, counselors, etc.) who are called upon to provide assistance in a conflict require four kinds of skills if they are to have the flexibility required to deal with the diverse situations mediators face. The first set of skills are those related to the third party's establishing an effective working relationship with each of the conflicting parties so that they will trust the third party, communicate freely with her, and be responsive to her suggestions regarding an orderly process for negotiations. The second are those related to establishing a cooperative problem-solving attitude

> among the conflicting parties toward their conflict [...] Third are the skills involved in developing a creative group process and group decision making. Such a process clarifies the nature of the problems that the conflicting parties are confronting (reframing their conflicting positions into a joint problem to be solved), helps to expand the range of alternatives that are perceived to be available, facilitates realistic assessment of their feasibility as well as desirability, and facilitates the implementation of agreed-upon solutions. And, fourth, it is often helpful for the third party to have considerable substantive knowledge about the issues around which the conflict centers. Substantive knowledge could enable the mediator to see possible solutions that might not occur to the conflicting parties and it would permit her to help them assess proposed solutions more realistically (Deutsch, 2005: 16).

According to the quote, third parties should possess the capacity to work effectively with relevant stakeholders; be able to garner cooperation; be able to guide referents through dialogue and negotiations to identify and resolve issues; and be familiar with the intricacies of the conflict and its stakeholders. The latter component is generally best fulfilled by inside-partial mediators, who are apt to possess an increased degree of understanding of the conflict particularities and the referents involved, compared to outside-partial mediators (Svensson and Lindgren, 2013: 701-704). Deutsch (2005: 17-18) explains that, because third parties will differ in the quality of the skills they possess, facilitator's/intervener's should correspond to the given circumstances and needs of stakeholders involved. Hence, depending on the circumstances, the situation may call for a facilitator or an intervener.

4.3.7 Setbacks

A conflict resolution process is subject to (inevitable) setbacks (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 18; Kelman, 2004: 87-113). In short, setback is normal as circumstances and referents evolve over a period of time. The manifestation of setbacks can produce stagnation or regression in the nurturing of constructive relationships if not managed appropriately (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 15-19). Nevertheless, setbacks are not necessarily detrimental. Contrary, if referents remain persistent and committed to transforming relations, and persevere in the conflict resolution program, it is possible to minimize or reverse stagnation or a regressive trajectory (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 15-19). For instance, Gardner Feldman (2008: 15) illustrates how reconciliation between Germany and Poland stalled between 2005 and 2007 due to bilateral contention over negotiations between Germany and Russia for the construction of an oil pipeline. Despite the setback, the German-Poland process remained resilient and ultimately recovered. Reversal was possible due to the persistent determination of leadership on both

sides of the relationship, who persevered in their determination to improve bilateral relations (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 15).

Setbacks, and other impediments, occur for multiple reasons, including a shift in public or leaders' opinions (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 144), or weak institutional capacity (absence of know-how) (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 15-19). Similarly, referents may become dissatisfied with the resolution process (Kelman, 2004: 113), or reluctant to abide by the terms of the settlement (Kriesberg, 2004: 87). Concerning the latter, a referent could perceive that circumstances have shifted to their favor and they now possess the capacity to overturn objectionable conditions under the *status quo* (Kriesberg, 2004: 87; Wohl and Branscombe, 2009: 193-194). Influenced by these pervasive perceptions, the actor might be tempted to take advantage of a strategic opportunity to increase personal benefits, which can reinstitute the conflict (Kriesberg, 2004: 87; Wohl and Branscombe, 2009: 193-194). Whatever the catalyst, when resolution stalls or is terminated, there is an increased probability that the conflict will resume or escalate.

Another explanation for the recurrence of conflict following the implementation of a conflict resolution process is provided by Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004: 12-13) and Bar-Siman-Tov (2004: 4-5) who theorize that conflict resolution at the intrastate level is often directed at the structural level, and/or minimally applied within a society. In such instances, conflict resolution does not extend beyond structural peacemaking and, therefore, will have marginal impact at the societal level (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 12-13). Absent societal inclusion, or popular acceptance of the process, popular dissatisfaction could mount and produce backlash or outright rejection of a resolution process (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 12-13). There is also increasing likelihood that the program will be perceived as unwelcome or illegitimate.

In general, poorly lead, designed or timed programs, and those absent popular support, will lack the durability and scope to produce and institutionalize sustainable resolution or be able to build constructive relationships (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 4-5; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 12-13). Said another way, "[h]ow grievances - both strategic and emotional are reconciled at one point in time determines the probability and shape of subsequent conflicts" (Wilmer, 1998: 105). Hence, the quote underscores there is an obvious risk that poorly designed and implemented programs will produce minimal results because it will fail to transform relations or permeate society. For example, when conflict resolution neglects the needs and opinions of the societies involved, inevitable future differences between the two belligerents will exacerbate the quality of relations, as the degree of resolution was fragile at

best (Kriesberg, 2004: 94). In this case, setbacks aggravate underlying and unresolved issues, rekindling deconstructive perceptions and behavior.

4.3.8 Limited capacity

Rosoux (2009: 558-559) admonishes a program of conflict resolution not be idealized as a "magical solution" which effortlessly converts conflict relations into amicable ones. Similarly, Kriesberg (2004: 96-97) lucidly warns that, "Not every action taken with the ostensible purpose of moving the reconciliation process forward actually does so." Due to its limited capacity, as expressed by Kriesberg, it is advised practitioners be cognizant of conflict particularities, including the referents involved and the duration and intensity of the conflict, to determine objectives and realistic expectation (Rosoux, 2009: 559). For instance, not all conflicts are susceptible to reconciliation, and may only be open to conflict management or peaceful coexistence. Awareness of conflict particularities, and the referents involved are fundamental for establishing realistic goals and selecting appropriate and applicable means to meet existing needs and achieve desired objectives.

There are, nonetheless, practices that can augment the capacity of a process. Among them, it is suggested that mixing techniques increases the appeal and utility of conflict resolution, whereby scope and capacity are widened (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 75, 154; Sarkin, 2008: 20-23; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 16, 33-34). Other recommendations include identifying and addressing root causes (Kelman, 2004: 111-114; Reimann, 2004: 11); addressing grievances (Auerbach, 2004: 149); empowering weaker stakeholders (Botes, 2003; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3-30; Lederach, 1995: 21; Reimann, 2004: 11; Stover and others, 2005: 835); and creating an inclusive program that involves relevant stakeholders in the design and implementation of the process (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3-30; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 49). This combination of recommendations has been emphasized.

4.3.9 "False Reconciliation"

Associated with the warning above, the literature cautions that it is plausible for adversaries to falsely or prematurely believe their relationship has been reconciled, whereby the implementation of a conflict resolution program is scaled back or terminated (Hamber, 2007: 119). Michael Ignatieff defines the condition as "false reconciliation" because referents "indulge in the illusion that they had put the past behind them" (Hamber, 2007: 119). Under Ignatieff's false reconciliation, defined by the quote, conciliatory activity is precipitately relaxed or halted, and adversaries coexist under the pretense that the relationship has entered a

constructive phase (Hamber, 2007: 119). However, their "papered over" grievances, defined as issues that have not been properly addressed, will (re-) emerge when future divergences surface between the two referents (Hamber, 2007: 119-122). When these inevitable disparities manifest (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 19), their expression has the potential of escalating into renewed conflict because the divisiveness encountered reopens old wounds and grievances (Hamber, 2007: 119-122). Succinctly, a once dormant conflict is resurrected.

Providing additional insight into the phenomenon, Ignatieff surmises that "false reconciliation" is more probable in asymmetrical relationships, especially in cases where disproportionate power advantages allows a referent, usually the one responsible for committing injustices and likely the most powerful of the pair, to impose a "forgive and forget attitude" on their weaker adversary (Hamber, 2007: 119). Such policy is problematic because it has an increased probability of generating failure or outright rejection by the weaker party who does not buy into the program (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 76; Head, 2012: 41). Caution is, therefore, advised when resolving conflicts involving asymmetric relations, as the program could perpetuate inequality in the relationship (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 76; Head, 2012: 41). Accordingly, efforts should be made to create a symmetrical relationship, thereby ensuring the weaker party is empowered and can express their interests and needs and have them addressed[71]. Engaged parties should have insight into the referents and conflict history, and should establish relational parity to ensure power is balanced. Simultaneously, care must be taken when evaluating the progression of the relationships so that resolution is not prematurely relaxed.

4.3.10 Exploitation

Sarkin (2008: 16) warns that political leaders can misuse and/or manipulate conflict resolution as a means of attaining domestic popular support or to trap a relational counterpart. In these instances, conflict resolution is fraudulently exploited to advance individual goals, whereupon the initiator has limited or no intentions of altering their behavior or advancing a constructive relationship (Sarkin, 2008: 16). Insincerity is problematic and a real challenge for referents.

In his discourse on exploitation, Sarkin (2008: 16) questions how referents can be confident of the genuineness of a particular reconciliation gesture or proposal. Most scholars

[71] Nonetheless, Zartman (2009: 325-326) asserts that all relationships are asymmetrical since even hypothetical equals are never absolutely certain of their position *vis-à-vis* their adversary. Hence it is recommended that care be taken, while being cognizant that achieving perfect congruity in relationships is implausible

surmise that uncertainty is inevitable since it is impossible to know the precise intentions of referents (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 9; Long and Brecke, 2003: 19-20; Sarkin, 2008: 16). Consequently, only sustained behavior over time can authenticate one's commitment to the process (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 9; Long and Brecke, 2003: 19-20; Sarkin, 2008: 16). Nonetheless, there is some criterion that could be applied to evaluate the sincerity of intentions.

Recalling Long and Brecke's (2003: 19-20) "costly signaling" model (chapter 3, section 4.1.4.2), the four criteria established hypothetically minimize concern about exploitation. In particular, the qualities of a novel, costly and irrevocable "reconciliation event" provides some credence to an initiator's intention when the principles are observed. Nevertheless, the costly signaling model does not completely eliminate the risk of exploitation (Long and Brecke, 2003: 19-20). Hence, while particular actions may add credibility to an initiator's actions, there is an inevitable risk of exploitation.

4.3.11 Forgiveness and healing

The last precaution and problem addressed revolves around the principles of forgiveness and healing, which produces a significant quantity of debate in Western conflict resolution literature (Bloomfield, 2006: 23-25). The inclusion of these principles into theory and practice at the higher levels is premised on their perceived value for the social and psychological welfare of individuals and collectives exposed to, or suffering from, harm/grievances as a result of (violent) conflict (Worthington, 2006: 7-9). Literature associated with this theoretical debate can be dichotomously divided into advocates or detractors. Most advocates adhere to the conflict transformation approach of peacebuilding. Each position is articulated below.

4.3.11.1 Advocates

Some argue that forgiveness and/or healing are fundamental components for, or prerequisites of, "effective" conflict transformation (Avruch, 2010: 40; Gopin, 2001: 87; Lederach, 1995: 21; Maamri, 2010: 142-146; Parent, 2012: 30-37; Shriver, 1995: 6; Wohl and Branscombe, 2009: 193-194; Worthington, 2006: 7-9). Marc Gopin (2001: 87) suggests forgiveness is an "age-old practice that appears in numerous religious traditions across the globe." The quote emphasizes both the historic tradition of the practice and the religious connotations associated with the term. Before examining the theoretical debate, we will first define forgiveness.

Avruch (2010: 40) defines forgiveness as "the relinquishment of the desire for vengeance." Avruch's narrow conceptualization implies that the impulse to retaliate is inhibited. Similarly, and at the emotive level, Everett Worthington (2006: 17) defines "[e]motional forgiveness" as the "replacing □of□ negative, unforgiving stressful emotions with positive, other-oriented emotions" by an individual who has, or perceives to have been, wronged. According to the two definitions, the act of forgiveness implies that past wrongdoing and deconstructive convictions no longer taint contemporary perceptions of the adversary, and the desire for revenge has been forsaken.

The relative value of offering forgiveness is suggested the psychological benefit provided to stakeholders (Worthington, 2006: 17). In short, forgiving is considered to be a healthy response, at the interpersonal and collective levels, whereupon a congenial relationship can be constructed, since it implies cognitive transformation is experienced (Worthington, 2006: 17). Albeit, some scholars consider forgiveness most applicable at the individual or group level, while others suggest that the principle and practice is equally applicable at the intrastate and interstate levels (Kira and others, 2009: 388; Long and Brecke, 2003: 115; Shriver, 1995: 6). For example, Long and Brecke (2003: 115), advocate forgiveness at the intrastate level, determining that civil war adversaries "may have greater motivation and preexisting institutional mechanisms to forgive as a means of settlement" as a result of "the longevity, intimacy, vulnerability, and inescapability associated with the relationship." Due to the relational conditions denoted, the authors posit that forgiveness can be, and has been, extended in cases of intrastate conflict (Long and Brecke, 2003: 115). According to the latter interpretations, forgiveness is a fundamental transformative practice for advancing resolution in interpersonal relationships as well as societal relations.

From this point, the question becomes to what degree forgiveness should be extended. Shriver (1995: 176) warns that forgiveness should not be perceived at its theoretical extreme. He defines the concept as such: "never forgetting the past, but seeking to overcome it, to transform its meaning through the creation of a new future" (Shriver, 1995: 176). Concisely, Shriver (1995: 7) does not believe that exercising forgiveness suggests a "forgive and forget attitude," nor requires referents "to abandon primary concern for the crimes of an enemy." Instead, he argues, "[f]orgiveness begins with a remembering and a moral judgment of wrong, injustice, and injury" (Shriver, 1995: 7). In these instances described by Shriver, forgiveness does not eliminate justice, but moderates and balances justice with forgiveness (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 5; Kriesberg, 2004: 84; Lederach, 1997). Succinctly, integration of the principles of justice and forgiveness is expected to add equilibrium to a conflict resolution process, as

opposed to imbalance that preferences punishment, on one hand, or amnesia, on the other hand.

There is, nonetheless, some hesitancy among scholars as some who advocate forgiveness in theory, acknowledge that extending mercy may not always be applicable in its ideal form (Auerbach, 2004: 157; Galtung, 2001: 4; Worthington, 2006: 199). Louis Kriesberg (2004: 84), for example, maintains that although forgiveness is essential for achieving positive peace, it should not morally oblige conflicting referents to “forgive” or “adore” the other. Instead, referents may only be willing to resolve a conflict to the point of achieving peaceful coexistence, an outcome that must be accommodated (Dwyer, 1999; Kriesberg, 2004: 84). According to this tempered approach, forgiveness is advantageous, even if it is shallow, although the principle’s promotion or achievement may not always be applicable at its extreme (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Auerbach, 2004: 153-163; Dwyer, 1999; Kriesberg, 2004: 84; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 258). Its implementation should, therefore, be dependent on conflict circumstances and the interests of stakeholders.

Under ideal conditions, once forgiveness has been extended, scholars argue that adversaries can move into a healing process (Long and Brecke, 2003: 28-31; Montville, 1999: 332; Worthington, 2006: 257). Healing, as conceptualized here, is defined as a therapeutic recovery or restoration of emotional health. Healing is suggested a physical and psychological necessity since conflicts produce physical and emotional injury which needs to be managed (Avruch, 2010: 42; Worthington, 2006: 257-262). Healing is thus an outcome of the extension of forgiveness.

Transcending mainstream discourse on the avocation of forgiveness, a few scholars suggest that healing and forgiveness alone are insufficient for transforming relationships (Halpern and Weinstein, 2004: 567-569). Halpern and Weinstein (2004: 567), for example, argue that empathy must likewise be displayed between conflict adversaries to ensure a re-humanization of the “other”. The authors define empathy “as a process in which one person imagines the particular perspective of another person. This imaginative inquiry presupposes a sense of the other as a distinct individual” (Halpern and Weinstein, 2004: 568). To achieve the suggested alteration the quote emphasizes, three changes are expected. These are summarized as: (1) improving the perception of the “other” and marginalizing stereotypes; (2) showing a genuine interest and curiosity in the other; and (3) displaying empathy both emotionally and cognitively (Halpern and Weinstein, 2004: 568-569). Absent empathy being expressed in the manner delineated, it is hypothesized the transformation of perceptions will be inadequate to alter the quality of relations, even if forgiveness has been extended (Halpern and Weinstein,

2004: 567-569; Head, 2012: 38). According to their theory, the extension of empathy and forgiveness constitute genuine conflict transformation[72].

Forsaking exploration of the utility of empathy in conflict resolution, and redirecting our attention back to forgiveness and healing, scholars suggest forgiveness and healing can be obtained or extended through various mechanisms, for instance, an apology (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 29; R. Fisher, 2001b: 27; Shriver, 1995: 222-223; Worthington, 2006: 204), and/or through reparations to compensate those negatively affected (Long and Brecke, 2003: 49-51; Shriver, 1995: 224-225; Worthington, 2006: 204). Regardless of their manifestation, the timing, degree and value of forgiveness and healing are expected to vary across referents and conflicts (Shriver, 1995: 226). Similar to other aspects of conflict resolution, referents should be consulted to determine the desired depth and appropriate mechanisms prior to implementation (Bar-On, 2004: 251; 2005: 9; Bloomfield and others, 2003: 12-16; Rosoux, 2009: 559; Sarkin, 2008: 11-28; Winslade and Monk, n.d.: 3). In this manner, forgiveness can be accepted or rejected as a component of conflict resolution by stakeholders.

4.3.11.2 Detractors

Reversely, other scholars question the theoretical and operational value of forgiveness and healing as principle components of conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels for multiple reasons. Foremost, they suggest that the introduction of interpersonal technique is idealistic and impractical (Bloomfield, 2006: 23-24; Dwyer, 1999; Rothfield, 2008: 15-16). Simply stated, while interpersonal healing may be possible following a conflict between a few individuals, given that single individuals or small groups can extend forgiveness more readily, its transference to the collective level is complicated, if not inconceivable (Mendeloff, 2004: 364). Moreover, there will be individuals who have personally suffered from violence who will not support conflict resolution at any degree (Lerche, 2000; Rosoux, 2009: 557; Rothfield, 2008: 15-16). In these instances, reference to forgiveness and healing is unpalatable.

Next, detractors criticize that the principle of forgiveness has a pejorative impact on how conflict resolution is conceptualized by experts and laypersons alike (Bloomfield, 2006: 25). Philipa Rothfield (2008: 15-16), for instance, persuasively argues that forgiveness is an "exceptional and extraordinary" concept laden with Christian nuances that are unappealing to some stakeholders. Many agree that healing and forgiveness carry connotations of the sacred,

[72] For more information on empathy as a component of reconciliation, see Halpern and Weinstein (2004). Rifkind and Picco (2014: 34) likewise advocate empathy in conflict resolution.

especially in Christian, Islamic and Jewish cultures (Auerbach, 2004: 153; Bar-On, 2005: 6-7; Bloomfield, 2006: 24; Hermann, 2004: 45; Rothfield, 2008: 16-20). Accordingly, some referents may find the principle is inapplicable or undesirable due to personal, religious, cultural or aspirational differences.

Illustrating the pejorative influence of forgiveness on South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Rothfield (2008: 16-20) argues that advancement of forgiveness in this case mandated Christian values be observed at the expense of the conflict's victims. By insisting on the inclusion of forgiveness and institutionalizing it into the program's structures, Rothfield criticizes that victims were denied an opportunity to pursue litigation, and/or were morally deprived of their right to remain bitter or unforgiving. Concisely, South Africans who had suffered under apartheid were implored to marginalize their personal experience as a victim so that national reconciliation could be promoted (Rothfield, 2008: 19-20). In these instances, forgiveness relegates individual needs for the advancement of collective interests (Rothfield, 2008: 19-20). Nevertheless, the overall value of forgiveness in this case appears to have been marginal when assessed through the perspective of society. In her analysis of the South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission utilizing hearings and focus groups, Audrey Chapman (2007: 51-53) found that participants rarely perceived forgiveness or reconciliation as priorities. Hence, although architects of the program, namely Archbishop Desmond Tutu, promoted forgiveness, the public does not appear to have prioritized its achievement.

Nevertheless, detractors insist that victims have a right to decide whether they wish to subjugate their own victimhood, and/or their existing grievances/needs, without being morally pressured to do so by those who insist on the inclusion of forgiveness as a principle of conflict resolution (Bloomfield, 2006: 1-25; Lerche, 2000; Rothfield, 2008: 19-20). At its extreme, there are additional arguments for why forgiveness should not be combined with conflict resolution. Most noteworthy, Howard Adelman (2005: 287-307) forcefully proclaims that victims should not extend forgiveness or recognition to perpetrators of gross human rights violations (such as genocide), since the act recognizes the "other" and the wrongdoing they have committed. Scholars justify this recommendation by accentuating that particular crimes do not warrant forgiveness (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Lerche, 2000).

Adelman's counsel partially reflects the inherent contradictions encompassing forgiveness and its variance with the provision of justice in post-conflict environments (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 19). On the one hand, justice seeks to correct past wrongs through "acknowledgment" and "rectification" (Kriesberg, 2004: 84; Lederach, 1997; Montville,

1999). Justice, therefore, generally includes some form of punishment or retribution, be it restorative or retributive. On the other hand, forgiveness is rooted in compassion and acceptance of the "other" in pursuit of a positive future relationship (through the extension of forgiveness and/or restorative justice) (Lederach, 1995: 20). Avocation of forgiveness is thus frequently interpreted to indicate that punishment for wrongdoing is forsaken or minimized, whereby justice and mercy compete (Lederach, 1997). This paradox was mentioned in section 4.2.3.3. Once again, conflict transformation scholars advise principles to be balanced, as Lederach (1995: 20) indicates, since excessive emphasis on forgiveness compromises the pursuit of justice because both principles operate at cross-purposes. Contrary, over-emphasis of justice can be perceived as violent (Boulding, 1978: 86; Deutsch, 2005: 13-14).

By way of conclusion, due to the degree of dissension within Western literature, it is unsurprising that consensus on the appropriateness of forgiveness is not forthcoming (Rosoux, 2009: 545). As noted above, it is a religiously laden concept (Bar-On, 2005: 6-7), which detractors argue invokes a sense of idealism (Rosoux, 2009: 559) and/or a "forgive and forget" attitude that scholars and stakeholders often find unappealing or unacceptable (Bloomfield, 2006: 23-25; Rothfield, 2008: 559). In particular, Bloomfield (2006: 23-25) hypothesizes that popular ideals distort public opinion in two distinct manners. They either falsely increase popular expectations of the capacity of a conflict resolution process, or they can advance general skepticism of the process because it is deemed idealistic or inappropriate (Bloomfield, 2006: 23-25). In the former case, individuals expect too much from the program and are later disappointed, while in the latter they express disinterest because it does not appeal to their needs (Bloomfield, 2006: 13-16, 23-25). It is, consequently, argued that references to forgiveness and healing be discarded from conflict resolution discourse at the higher levels, an approach which is theorized to increase popular willingness to establish a shared constructive relationship unhindered by idealistic notions of the projected outcome (Bloomfield, 2006: 13-16; Lerche, 2000)[73]. Nonetheless, while forgiveness is clearly problematic at the higher levels, we select not to dismiss the principle and practice, and contrary maintain our wide theoretical framework. This arrangement affords referents the possibility to choose to include or reject its application, as they deem appropriate.

[73] Bloomfield (2006: 13-16) proposes substituting the term reconciliation with coexistence. He argues that the latter does not contain the negative connotations associated with the former (Bloomfield, 2006: 13-16). Lacking a synonymous relationship to concepts such as love and forgiveness, coexistence is argued to offer a more appropriate description of what reconciliation objectively seeks to obtain, which in turn is argued acceptable by post-conflict parties (Bloomfield, 2006: 13-16).

4.4 Summary of guidelines and principles

This section summarizes our analysis of conflict resolution as conceptualized by Western scholars. Since our attention shifts to comparatively analyzing Western and Middle Eastern approaches in the next chapter, it is important to recapitulate some of the guidelines and principles extracted from the present chapter. For the sake of space and to minimize repetition, theoretical highlights are only listed and are not exhaustive.

The chapter opened with Bar-Siman-Tov's (2004: 72-75) ten prerequisites for (deep) conflict resolution. They included: conflict termination (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 138; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76-77; Bar-Tal, 2000: 361; Kelman, 2004: 114; Long and Brecke, 2003: 11; Rosoux, 2009: 553); mutual satisfaction with the peace arrangement (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 62-75; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 12; Mitchell, 2002: 10; Reychler, 2002: 30; Wallensteen, 2007: 38-39); viable structures and institutions (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66-68; Bar-Tal, 2000: 362; C. Coyne, 2007: 1-4; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3, 10; Kriesberg, 2004: 99-100); a climate conducive to conflict resolution (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 17-20); domestic support for the program (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 70; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 18; Stover and others, 2005: 834-836); legitimate and accountable leaders and/or facilitators (Bargal and Sivan, 2004 131-143; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 5, 75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 27-28; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-19); shared identities and integration among stakeholders (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Kriesberg, 2004: 94; Lederach, 1995: 9); accommodation of goals and mutual benefit (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Rosoux, 2009: 544); education to advance transformation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31); and ceremonies or events to demonstrate and root transformation at the grassroots level (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 75; Long and Brecke, 2003: 57). While there is a degree of dissension concerning some components, such as timing, order of implementation or whether a conflict must be terminated before conflict resolution can be implemented, a majority of the prerequisites examined are embraced in some form or fashion by most scholars.

In addition to prerequisites, numerous principles can be extracted from our literature review. The most obvious are those denoted in the three principled approaches of conflict resolution, which simultaneously reinforce ideas denoted by Bar-Siman-Tov's (2004: 75) prerequisites. Accumulated, these principles include truth, justice, security, leadership, regard, international context and institutions (R. Coyne, 2005: 15; Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9-18; Kriesberg, 2004: 83-85; Lederach, 1997). In addition, Lederach's (1997) mercy and peace are equally important, although controversial, principles.

Nevertheless, the three approaches incorporate additional principles than those four suggested. For instance, Lederach's (1997) principle of "justice" not only distributes justice, but also reforms the political and social structures that attributed to the conflict. Similarly, Gardner Feldman's (2008: 3-9) component "history" contains salient principles including truth, the meeting of needs, and the building of trust through cooperation, dialogue and joint problem solving. Hence, the three Western approaches are not limited to the four component principles each broadly promulgates, but involve additional principles.

Supplementary principles extracted from the present review also include Eric Stover and others (2005: 835-836) call for "implementing authorities" to be viewed "as both legitimate and impartial." Additionally, they recommend "a genuine process of consultation with those most affected by the violence" (Stover and others, 2005: 835-836). As reiterated throughout the present chapter, the practices emphasized in the previous quotes increase popular support, while ensuring local ownership of the resolution program. Shortlisting further principles articulated, we identified the principles of respect (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 20; Calhoun, 2005: 105; Donohue, 2009: 444; Funk and Said, 2004: 16; Head, 2012: 41; Lederach, 1997; Ropers, 2003: 2, 4; Winslade and Monk, n.d.: 3); addressing root causes (Kelman, 2004: 111-114; Reimann, 2004: 11); addressing grievances (Auerbach, 2004: 149); empowerment (Botes, 2003; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3-30; Lederach, 1995: 21; Reimann, 2004: 11; Stover and others, 2005: 835); inclusiveness (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3-30; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 49); and facilitation (Lederach, 1995: 56; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 32; Rosoux, 2009: 559). Many of these principles were denoted in chapter 3. Finally, Long and Brecke's (2003: 35) costly signaling model suggests the principles of "vulnerability, novelty, voluntarism and irrevocability" should be observed when implementing a "reconciliation event" at the international level. The latter principles demonstrate willingness and capacity for change, while providing some indication of the genuine nature of the reconciliation act.

The next chapter introduces the Arab/Muslim scholarly conceptualization of conflict and conflict resolution. While we examine Arab/Muslim understanding, theories and practices across cultures are juxtaposed to qualify theoretical and practical parallels and divergences.

4.5 Conclusion

The primary objective of chapter four was to expand our theoretical framework of conflict resolution as conceptualized in Western English language literature that began in chapter three. The present chapter examined several prerequisites for conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels, introduced three principled approaches, as well as outlined

several precautions and problems associated with its theory and practice. Combining information deduced from our literature review in chapters three and four, we create a wide comparative framework whose lexicon, principles and practices span conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation approaches to peacebuilding. The broad framework is valuable when comparing Western and Arab/Muslim approaches as cross-cultural similarities and differences are better qualified. Unfortunately, most cross-cultural comparisons of Arab/Muslim understanding of conflict resolution conducted hitherto have been limited to the Western structural approach alone. Parting with this trend, our theoretical framework includes parameters extracted from these three Western approaches, which better represent the complexity of Western theory and practice. These benchmarks are later used in our comparative analysis of scholars' conceptualization of conflict resolution and those of a sample of laypersons in the forthcoming chapters.

Chapter four opened with the introduction of ten prerequisites recommended by Bar-Siman-Tov prior to implementing (deep) conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate level. The first prerequisites concerned conflict termination, a requirement that garners contention among scholars. Some scholars argue that conflict termination is necessary before implementing conflict resolution, while others hold that resolution can begin before, and may actually advance, conflict termination. In the end, conflict particularities, including the duration and intensity of the conflict, in addition to stakeholders' perception and behavior, determine when a resolution process may commence.

Second, and linked to the first, scholars argue that mutual satisfaction with the peace arrangement is fundamental for pursuing conflict resolution. Without satisfaction amongst most affected stakeholders, it is suggested that a resolution process will be subject to rejection and failure. Mutual satisfaction implies that the conflict has been terminated, which naturally counters the notion that conflict resolution can begin prior to conflict termination.

Third, scholars suggest that viable structures and institutions are essential for designing and establishing sustainable conflict resolution programs. Ideally, these will become institutionalized and normalized conflict within social and political structures. Structures and techniques can be established and utilized at all levels of government and society, and these can perform a variety of functions, and can operate independently or jointly in pursuit of collective goals and constructive relations. The value of institutions and structure are their advancement of cooperation, provision of a venue where interaction can occur, as well as the knowledge and change imparted, and trust built.

Fourth, the literature recognizes that there must be a climate conducive to resolution. At the extreme, if there are stakeholders (or third parties) who act as spoilers, at the local or international level, then conflict resolution will be hampered by their activity. Contrary, when the environment is congenial, a process is more likely to succeed. Two palpable options are recommended to increase the favorability of an environment. On the one hand, an inclusive process should be designed to bring potential spoilers into the resolution process. In this manner, their needs and desires can be voiced and met. On the other hand, when spoilers are unwilling to join a conflict resolution process, time should be allowed to elapse before implementing the process. Postponement allows for wounds to heal, positions to soften, and ideally opinions to change, which suggests that conflict resolution could be embraced and pursued at a later date.

Fifth, it is suggested that there be sufficient domestic support for a conflict resolution program. Absent domestic support, a resolution program will not take root and will be subject to popular rejection. Popular rejection can occur due to unfulfilled needs or grievances, or disinterest in pursuing conflict resolution prompted by animosity or hatred. One suggested means of augmenting popular support is to consult stakeholders to determine program objectives, practices and timing.

Sixth, conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels needs to be advanced and implemented by legitimate and accountable leaders and/or facilitators who can guide/command and promote the program. Leaders/initiators that possess such traits add credibility to the overall resolution process and augment popular support. A leader can assume multiple roles, including being a spokesperson or representative of the program, or function as an implementer or overseer of (portions of) the process itself. Nonetheless, some scholars caution that one individual or institution should not be charged with conflict resolution, but rather responsibility and duties should be distributed broadly. By diversifying responsibility, more actors become involved and responsibility for the program is not placed on one individual or group.

Seventh, it is argued that shared identities and integration among stakeholders should be constructed. Shared identities, as referenced, do not indicate that overt similarities must be forged, but rather that referents transform to a sufficient degree that their identities allow for coexistence and cooperation with the other. In instances where the other is considered an existential threat to identity or needs, for example, establishing shared identities may require cognitive transformation. Nevertheless, stakeholders will ultimately have to decide to what degree they wish to alter their relationship, and hence to what extent they are prepared to

change. At minimum, changes should manifest to the degree that nonviolent coexistence can be achieved.

Eighth, scholars suggest that the needs and desires of relevant stakeholders be accommodated and that mutual benefit be pursued. These recommendations are repeated throughout the literature in relation to many aspects of conflict resolution. Ensuring that needs and desires are met requires stakeholders be provided the opportunity, even empowered, to express and pursue their interests. Once articulated, compromises may be necessitated to reduce potential friction and establish equilibrium between the relative power balance and needs of referents. Once needs and desires have been established, efforts must be taken to ensure their fulfillment. The viability of conflict resolution rests on these issues being accommodated and met.

The final two prerequisites provided by Bar-Siman-Tov are tools, or dimensions, of conflict resolution. They include educating affected stakeholders and the conducting of public events or ceremonies. Such mechanisms are designed to enhance popular awareness and root transformation through the involvement of the population. Their observation permits the resolution process to permeate into society and fosters local ownership. Combined, Bar-Siman-Tov's ten prerequisites serve as identifiers that circumstances are congenial for implementing conflict resolution. It is necessary for referents and/or third parties to independently evaluate associated factors when contemplating the introduction of a conflict resolution process to determine if circumstances are congenial and/or necessary in each context.

Following examination of prerequisites, our attention moved to the three principled approaches of conflict resolution found in Western literature: the structural, social-psychological and spiritual approaches and their associated principles. The three approaches broadly represent the three Western schools of peacebuilding: conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict termination respectively. While there are similarities across each approach, there are likewise differences in terms of the level at which the process is applied and the outcome expected.

The structural approach utilizes top-down approaches to restore formal relationships at higher levels. Its referents are thereby limited to political and social elites, which parallels conflict management in many respects. While articulating the process, Gardner Feldman references the principles of history, leadership, institutions and international context as fundamental to a conflict resolution process. History entails the reconstruction of truth and a continuous process of working through events until outstanding issues are resolved to mutual

satisfaction. In this sense, the past is continuously processed until resolution is achieved. Leadership and institutions emphasize the principles of resilience, legitimacy, knowledge and commitment, as well as the development of institutions whereby change can be promoted, advanced, institutionalized and normalized. Finally, international context refers to the climate in which conflict resolution is pursued. It likewise emphasizes the prerequisite of a congenial environment, which implies, among other things, there are no spoilers or lack of resources to undermine the success of a resolution process. With these parameters in mind, the suggested weakness of structural approach is that it is limited primarily to the higher levels of government, which marginalizes public participation.

Next, the social-psychological approach was introduced. It prioritizes a bottom-up strategy targeting individuals and groups at the societal level. In general terms, the approach adheres to conflict resolution. Kriesberg suggests that the fundamental guiding principles of this approach are: truth, justice, regard and security. Here it is possible to observe an overlap of principles, as truth centers on the development of a common account of what occurred, as observed in the structural approach. Justice utilizes retributive or restorative mechanisms to address wrongdoing, compensate those wronged and to deter a repetition of associated misconduct. Regard refers to the manner in which former adversaries interact. It aims at proliferating constructive perceptions and behavior with the minimum objective of achieving nonviolent coexistence. Lastly, security suggests the absence of threat, or that the relational climate is congenial for developing constructive relations. The component of security thus parallels the structural approach's principle of international context. At minimum, referents should not feel threatened by their adversary because such perceptions undermine the development of trust, constructive perceptions and behavior. While the social-psychological approach is focused on society and seeks to address issues and needs of relevant stakeholders, it is criticized for not doing enough to transform the quality of relationships in the long-term.

The last Western approach to conflict resolution explored was the spiritual approach, which falls under the rubric of conflict transformation. It objectively seeks to generate positive peace by broadening and deepening the process of conflict resolution through the incorporation of principles including forgiveness and healing. While articulating the approach, Lederach provides four principles including: truth, justice, mercy and peace. While truth and justice parallel those outlined in the social-psychological approach, mercy and peace add greater depth to the program. On the one hand, mercy is defined as the expression of forgiveness and healing, which are perceived as healthy for referents and congenial for rooting transformation. It is a principle influenced by religion. On the other hand, peace

defines the quality of the environment, relationship and interaction in which referents (harmoniously) coexist. Peace can be minimally conceptualized as nonviolent coexistence, although, ideally, positive peace is advocated. However, there are inherent contradictions between the principles included in Lederach's approach, especially that between justice and mercy. For this reason, it is argued that principles and their pursuit must be balanced, since they are codependent. For instance, mercy should be pursued to the degree where it is not perceived as violent, wherein violence undermines the expression of justice.

The three Western approaches, I believe, provide a range of principles and depth by which conflict resolution can be tailored to the needs and objectives of relevant stakeholders. When focus is desired to be limited to structural resolution, the structural approach can be applied. Contrary, when deep conflict resolution is sought, the spiritual approach can be applied. Moreover, these approaches can be combined to increase the depth and breadth of a conflict resolution program. Applied individually or in tandem, the inclusion of these approaches into our framework allows us to make broad comparisons of Western conceptualizations of conflict resolution with Arab/Muslim traditions.

Following the review of principled approaches, attention transferred to articulating several precautions and problems extracted from Western conflict resolution literature. Each issue provides deeper insight into how conflict resolution is conceptualized by scholars, highlighting particular fallibilities. Several of these denoted qualities likewise emphasize principles and best practices that should be incorporated when considering, or implementing, conflict resolution. Our discussion highlighted eleven interrelated issues.

Foremost, it was noted that the practice of conflict resolution is reactionary rather than proactive. Its implementation always follows a conflict and any wrongdoings associated with it. The process is, therefore, not proactive. While it may prevent conflict continuation or escalation, it has not prevented (violent) conflict. Stated differently, conflict resolution, in its broadest sense, is reactionary despite which approach (conflict management, conflict resolution or conflict transformation) is applied.

Second, scholars suggest that conflict resolution's scope is limited. Even under ideal conditions, individuals or groups will fall beyond the scope of the process. For example, while conflict transformation is implemented at the societal level, and depth and breadth is emphasized, its processes, while broad, will not touch everyone affected by the conflict. Inevitably, there will be outliers who have been (purposefully) excluded from the process. Exclusion may include those who were not interested in participation as well as those who

were not exposed. Hence, conflict resolution should not be conceptualized as a practice that permeates entire societies and unanimously alters their thoughts and behavior.

Third, scholars do not agree on the appropriate timing of a process. In particular, there is disagreement about whether conflict resolution can precede conflict termination or if it must follow. Some scholars recommend that a conflict be terminated, and that time be allowed for wounds to heal and attitudes to become congenial to a process of conflict resolution, prior to implementation. Contrary, others argue that conflict resolution is designed to alter attitudes, and that its implementation hastens the conflict termination. One obvious solution is to permit stakeholders to decide when they wish to implement the process while continuously monitoring and probing the degree of interest expressed.

The fourth precaution and problem denoted in the literature emphasizes that conflict resolution processes are time-consuming and lengthy. Programs, consequently, cannot be hastily designed and implemented in the hopes of advancing rapid resolution. Instead, those engaged in the process need to be patient and persistent, persevering in their endeavor to institutionalize constructive relationships. Moreover, it is likewise recommended that persistent evaluation of the program, including its objectives, mechanisms and time frames, be conducted to ensure necessary adjustments are made. In short, altering individuals and relationships requires time and endurance to effect, principles and practices are subject to variability, and the duration of time needed in each instance will contrast because of the fluidity and complexity of relationships.

The fifth precaution noted was the importance of legitimacy of the process and actors involved among the affected populations. This observation has been noted elsewhere. In summary, absent legitimacy of the process or actors involved, the probability of success is minimal.

Sixth, when third parties choose to intervene, whatever their form (country, NGO, IGO), most scholars suggest that they facilitate a process rather than dictate its precepts. Succinctly, interveners are cautioned to assist the parties in whatever capacity, while allowing stakeholders to determine timing, conditions and tools. At this time, we discussed third party neutrality, where scholars recommend interveners remain impartial, although some scholars prefer third parties who are partial. Both approaches offer advantages. For instance, neutral parties can more easily acquire acceptance by both parties engaged in a conflict. By comparison, a partial actor may not be viewed as neutral but comes equipped with increased knowledge of the conflict and the referents. Others recommend that third party skills be matched to the needs in a given context. Skills denoted include the ability to muster support

and the possession of understanding about conflict (parties involved, their history). By way of summary, most Western scholars prefer a third party to be a neutral assistant equipped with the appropriate skills to facilitate the process, while others are open to partial actors who have the authority to sway opinion and direct referents.

Seventh, scholars acknowledge that there is a high probability of setbacks occurring during a resolution process. Setbacks manifest for multiple reasons ranging from a lack of commitment among stakeholders to inevitable problems and differences arising in the relationship over time. While these events can stall or terminate a process, they do not necessarily guarantee a failure of the program. Contrary, if referents remain committed and persistent in their efforts, setback can be temporal and have limited, short-term effects on the overall trajectory of the conflict resolution process.

Eighth, some scholars warn that conflict resolution as a practice has a limited capacity. Distinctly, the literature emphasizes that conflict resolution is not a miraculous solution, but rather an intricate process for managing and altering complex relationships. In this sense, the process should not be conceptualized as theoretically or practically capable of altering all relationships or establishing positive peace. While observation of certain principles, such as inclusiveness and empowerment, can increase the depth and breadth of a process, and thereby augment capacity to some degree, it is recommended that scholars and laypersons be realistic about their overall expectations. In short, conflict resolution should not be presented as a fail-safe, miraculous process that will inevitably transform every conflictual relationship.

Ninth, false reconciliation was introduced. False reconciliation is defined as the phenomenon of referents incorrectly and prematurely concluding that a relationship has been transformed. However, future challenges between the parties will demonstrate the fallacy of those presumptions. Upon the manifestation of inevitable differences in a case of false reconciliation, referents will revert back to deconstructive perceptions and behavior, thereby exposing the reality that any transformation experienced was only superficial. Awareness of false reconciliation underscores that care must be taken when evaluating relationships and that conflict resolution practices not be prematurely relaxed. It was also suggested that false reconciliation is increasingly likely to occur when one party has been coerced into conflict resolution, a phenomenon that highlights the importance of symmetrically pursuing and applying conflict resolution, as well as accommodating all effective stakeholders through consultation and involvement as a means of empowering and balancing power across the parties engaged.

The tenth precaution denoted is the risk of conflict resolution being exploited for political advantage. In this instance, referents disingenuously proclaim interest in transforming relationships in order to ensnare their adversary and/or advance selfish interests. While abuse is problematic, it is impossible to verify the true intentions of an initiator, which indicates that risk is inherent in any conflict resolution process. There are, nonetheless, some tools offer a degree of reassurance. Notably, the concepts of novel and irreversible acts of conciliation may indicate a referent's genuine interest. However, only time can verify genuine commitment.

The final problem introduced was the polarizing concepts of forgiveness and healing. At one extreme, scholars recommend the inclusion of forgiveness and healing to transform conflict because of their social and psychological benefits. At the higher levels, these concepts are most likely to be advocated by those who adhere to the conflict transformation approach. Reversely, others criticize that their inclusion imposes unwanted or impractical objectives. Since they are religiously influenced and idealistic, many scholars eschew their reference at the higher levels. We recommend that referents be permitted to select the depth to which they wish to pursue resolution, and therefore allow for the inclusion of these principles.

The chapter concluded with a summary of numerous principles extracted from the literature review. Among them are truth, justice and other principles found in the three Western approaches examined. In addition, vulnerability, reconciliation, legitimacy and forgiveness, to name a few, were also mentioned. Combined, the principles and practice elicited herein provide some benchmarks and measurements for delineating a holistic Western approach to conflict resolution, which includes components of conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Many of the Western concepts, principles and practices extracted from the previous two chapters will now be compared across cultures as we examine the Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict resolution in the next chapter. Our objective is to qualify cross-cultural convergences and divergences using our wide conceptual framework.

Chapter 5 Arab/Muslim Conceptualization of Conflict Resolution

Some Arab/Muslim scholars hypothesize that Western conceptualizations and practices of conflict resolution are inappropriate or inapplicable across cultures. However, comparative analyses conducted by Arab/Muslim scholars hitherto are based on narrow comparisons of Western structural approaches, and this practice minimizes or omits (aspects from) the social-psychological and spiritual approaches. The objective of the present chapter is to comparatively analyze conflict resolution as articulated by Arab/Muslim scholars, in the English language, while comparing lexicon, principles and practices with our broad Western framework constructed in the previous two chapters. In this manner, we retest comparisons. As demonstrated below, the Western social-psychological and spiritual approaches share increasing degrees of similarities with Arab/Muslim theory. Accordingly, our holistic comparison made below identifies additional parallels in theory and practices between Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations of conflict resolution than generally acknowledged in the literature. Many of the findings extracted from this chapter are later tested when we explore laypersons' opinion utilizing an online questionnaire (chapter six).

Guiding the literature review herein, Hypothesis 2 states that Western and Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict resolution as articulated in the respective literature will generally converge when our broad theoretical framework of conflict resolution is applied. Our testing begins by outlining Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict and conflict resolution while juxtaposing findings with Western understanding of associated concepts. We then comparatively analyze principles and practices to determine convergences and divergences across cultures. We determine there are striking degrees of theoretical and practical convergences between Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations that are frequently overlooked by previous researchers due to their narrow comparative framework.

The contents of chapter five are organized as follows. The first section provides a basic overview of Arab/Muslim versus Western practices as extracted from the literature. Here it is demonstrated how historical, religious and cultural nuances unique to the Middle East, and some of which were denoted in chapters 1-2, affects Arab/Muslim understanding of concepts and principles associated with conflict resolution. In particular, unique characteristics, including strong familial or community ties, and Islamic principles and teachings, influence how concepts such as conflict, peace and resolution are understood, managed and practiced. Because of the profound influence these characteristics have on cultural traditions, scholars

accentuate collective interests and religion be accommodated when engaging in conflict resolution.

The literature review conducted determines that Arab/Muslims perceive conflicts as normal, negative and potentially intractable, with such qualities implying that conflicts should be managed or transformed. Moreover, conflicts in the Arab/Muslim context are viewed as systemic, or affecting more than those directly involved, since the effects of a conflict are perceived to extend into the family and/or wider community. Because of the robust familial association and the view of conflicts as systemic, conflict resolution, broadly defined as the process of terminating or transforming a conflict, occurs at the community level rather than the individual or higher levels. For instance, a conflict limited to two individuals is perceived to have an impact on families or clans. Therefore, conflict resolution practices are implemented at the group level, as opposed to the lower level, to advance resolution and counter its effects among the community.

Within this frame, and contrary to Western practices, Arab/Muslim culture prescribes conflict be terminated or resolved for the benefit of the community rather than those referents immediate engaged in an incompatibility. Thus, resolution is pursued, not to benefit individual referents immediately engaged, but rather to advance familial and community interests. The communal approach, therefore, not only affects the level at which conflict is managed or transformed, but also equally the manner in which a conflict is resolved. Nevertheless, following implementation of a conflict resolution process, a conflict is ideally transformed and peace established, but the Arab/Muslim tradition accommodates two potential outcomes: peaceful coexistence (or negative peace) and positive peace.

Following the general outline of conflict and conflict resolution, attention centers on delineating guiding principles and tools, used in Arab/Muslim society, for advancing conflict resolution. Fundamental principles extracted from the literature include truth, justice and mercy, among others. By comparison, tools utilized to resolve a conflict include truth seeking, reparations and arbitration, to identify a few. At this juncture, we will illustrate that many principles and tools advocated by Arab/Muslim scholars have parallels in the West. Combined, the descriptive analysis below demonstrates that cross-cultural similarities exist across fundamental concepts, principles and techniques for pursuing conflict resolution. At the same time, there are, obvious discrepancies, noticeably the prioritization of religion and the level at which conflict resolution is applied.

The chapter concludes with a review of one community-based technique of conflict resolution as practiced in Arab/Muslim societies: the *sulh* ritual. Since the *sulh* is unique to

Muslim culture, its processes are explained to demonstrate how resolution is advanced at the community level, and as a means of continuing our cross-cultural comparative analysis of tools and principles. This section includes the function of the *sulh*, the formation of a committee called the *jaha*, their activities to broker a termination of the conflict, discover the truth, determine the terms of resolution, and ultimately, efforts used to manage or resolve the conflict. Following this overview, several weaknesses of the *sulh* are elaborated. Some of its flaws include the leveraging capacity endowed onto the *jaha*, the inaccessibility of the *sulh* to outsiders, and its marginal utility for resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels.

Our analysis of the *sulh* likewise reiterates similarities and divergences between Arab/Muslim and Western theories and practices of conflict resolution. Combined, cross-cultural incompatibilities identified include the *sulh*'s religious influence and its concentration at the community level. These differences are expected, because they are cornerstones of conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim tradition. By comparison, compatibility of principles are also present, namely truth, justice and restitution. In addition, there are likewise similarities in terms of tools utilized, such as the use of arbitration and dialogue. The comparisons and contrasts articulated throughout the present chapter demonstrate Western and Arab/Muslim approaches parallel one another when our wide Western framework is considered. This finding confirms Hypothesis 2.

The chapter closes by highlight that there is no traditional mechanism for resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate level in Arab/Muslim culture. This void presents a theoretical and practical dilemma when contemplating conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels in this context. Clearly stated, the absence of a traditional mechanism introduces the problem of whether conflict resolution as practiced at the higher levels adhere to the same principles and practices as applied at the community level. While some scholars insist they do, we test this supposition. More specifically, several of the concepts, principles and practices articulated herein are later utilized to construct a questionnaire on conflict resolution at the interstate level in chapter 6. Prior to testing, we must first determine how Arab/Muslim scholars conceptualize conflict resolution, while juxtaposing finding with our Western theoretical framework delineated.

5.1 Cross-cultural comparative overview

Arab/Muslim scholars and practitioners study conflict resolution from primarily two theoretical approaches (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 74). On the one hand, some adopt a theological approach, analyzing sacred Islamic texts and traditions to scrutinize, extricate and develop

theory and practice. On the other hand, there is a tradition that comparatively analyzes Arab/Muslim approaches through a Western lens to articulate how conflict resolution is conceptualized and practiced in the Arab/Muslim tradition (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 74). Since I am not educated in, or qualified to interpret, sacred Islamic texts, the literature reviewed below relies entirely upon the work of scholars who follow the latter analytical approach and produces works in the English language. I recognize that referencing the latter scholarly works is beneficial because it facilitates cross-cultural comparisons of theories and practices, since concepts and terminology are frequently borrowed or shared across cultures.

Throughout the literature review below, several Arab/Muslim scholars' theoretical contributions are instructive. In particular, George E. Irani, Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said provide frequently referenced essays concerning Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict and conflict resolution in the English language. Their independent (Irani, 1999) and collaborative research (Funk and Said, 2004; Irani and Funk, 2000; Said and Funk, 2001), therefore, formulates the bulwark of our analysis in this chapter. Additionally, supplementary insight is acquired from alternative scholars including Mohammed Abu-Nimer (2000; 2001; 2010), Doron Pely (2009) and others to demonstrate convergence and divergences between Arab/Muslim and Western conflict resolution theory when applicable.

Our analysis begins with George Irani's (1999) "Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflicts," which provides a general comparison of Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations of conflict resolution. In his essay, the author suggests several salient factors influence how Arab/Muslims define and conceptualize terms including peace, conflict and conflict resolution (Irani, 1999: 1-2). Influential factors include the specific historical, cultural, geographic, religious and philosophical environment and experiences that are unique to the Middle East (Abdalla and others, 2002: 11; Irani, 1999: 1-2), some of which were highlighted in chapters one and two. Associated historical, social and cultural nuances likewise have a distinguishable effect on cross-cultural relations (Abdalla and others, 2002: 9-13; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006: 53-54; Reimann, 2004: 11).

Historical experiences and cultural divergences not only affect individual/collective behavior or the quality of bilateral interaction, they equally impact the way in which conflict is perceived, negotiated and resolved (Ashki, 2006: 15; Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 226; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 45). For instance, events such as colonialism and foreign occupation, taints contemporary perceptions of the "other" as articulated in chapter two (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 75). Concisely, Arab/Muslims are skeptical and suspicious of Western intervention and policies in the Middle East.

The impact of culture on how conflict and conflict resolution is conceptualized and practices is noted in the literature. For example, a seemingly trivial difference, such as the manner in which referents communicate (directly or indirectly), can facilitate misunderstanding and produce conflict and distrust across cultures (Ashki, 2006: 15; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006: 53-54; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 45). In terms of cultural typology, Ashki (2006: 13) classifies Arab/Muslim culture as a "traditional, high-context culture." The classification broadly implies "hierarchy, community welfare, birth status, cooperation, historical interpretation, formality, indirect communication, and patriarchal and spiritual values" are significant social-identity markers informing the way that relationships are managed and transformed (Ashki, 2006: 13). The markers listed in the quote developed over the centuries, and many, as elaborated below, are hypothesized to contradict those found in Western culture.

By comparison, Ashki (2006: 13) identifies Western culture as a "low-context culture" where "[i]ndividualism is emphasized over the traditional family; […] and communication is more direct and more verbal, versus the use of indirect body language." In summary, Western culture prioritizes the individual and communicates in a direct manner, while Arab/Muslim culture preferences the community and communicates indirectly. Such conflicting nuances, among other influences, complicate communication and must be considered and accommodated when engaged in cross-cultural relationships for the purpose of minimizing misunderstanding and misinterpretation which can produce conflict (Ashki, 2006: 13). Comparable processes and nuances equally impact on how conflict resolution is conceptualized and practiced (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 73-74; Ashki, 2006: 13).

Exacerbating suspicion, Western conflict resolution researchers and practitioners in the past have generally ignored cultural differences and nuances prior to the 1990's, and rather imposed external models abroad (Avruch, 2003: 2). This means that Western practices disregard(ed) indigenous principles, practices and needs, while imposing their own theory and practices on other cultures. As a consequence, Arab/Muslim practices and opinions were marginalized, and best practices such as consultation and empowerment, were overlooked. This approach undermined popular acceptance of Western-initiated programs since, among other reasons, the techniques are suggested to have been inappropriate and undesirable (Avruch, 2003: 2).

For these reasons, Arab/Muslim scholars generally conclude that Western practices are viewed with suspicion and/or are popularly unacceptable in Arab/Muslim culture (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 75). While this hypothesis is reasonable, and scholars support their theories

through theoretical comparative analysis, we wish to re-analyze cross-cultural compatibility of scholarly conceptualizations using our wider Western framework. Since Arab/Muslim scholars hitherto have frequently failed to acknowledge fundamental aspects of the social-psychological and spiritual approaches in their cross-cultural comparisons, the accuracy of their theoretical findings is questionable. Stated bluntly, their research has marginalized two of the three recognized Western approaches and theories associated with them.

Nonetheless, not all scholars believe that cultural differences directly impact on the quality of interfacing. Contrary, some researchers suggest that the existence of culture incongruities do not guarantee incompatibilities or misunderstanding of interactive norms and practices across cultures (Rubinstein, 2003: 38). Instead, it is argued that referents engaged in a cross-cultural relationship evaluate contextual and cultural differences, and when it is determined that incompatibilities exist, they frequently explore alternative and accommodating tactics to interact, other than conflict, to fulfill their needs (Rubinstein, 2003: 38). This hypothesis suggests that referents are capable of constructively navigating cultural diversities. According to this theory, cultural divergences do not guarantee incompatibility or conflict across cultures, nor does it invariably undermine a process of cross-cultural conflict resolution, since individuals are capable of constructively managing or navigating relationships in the face of cultural differences (Rubinstein, 2003: 38). Despite the capacity to negotiate cultural dissimilarities constructively, scholars representing the Western (Bar-On, 2005: 6-7; Rubinstein, 2003: 38) and Arab/Muslim (Irani, 1999: 2-10) traditions of conflict resolution recommend qualifying convergences and divergences when contemplating cross-cultural conflict resolution to minimize potential friction.

Established upon the theoretical foundation that cultures interact in sometimes unique manners, but have the capacity to do so constructively, the following two subsections analyze two of the most recognized cross-cultural divergences denoted in Arab/Muslim literature that compares conflict and conflict resolution across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures: tribal identity and religion. Appreciating the importance and interplay of these elements in Arab/Muslim tradition is essential, since they are commonly suggested as two of the irreconcilable divergences across these respective cultures.

5.1.1 Tribal-based identity

Irani (1999: 1-2) argues that one of the most fundamental cross-cultural variances between Arab/Muslim and Western societies is the former's robust patriarchal and tribal association. More specifically, it is generalize that inhabitants of predominantly Arab/Muslim countries

frequently identify themselves according to kinship or clan, rather than the Western tendency toward individualism or nationalism (Abdalla and others, 2002: 6-11; Abu-Nimer, 2010: 74; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 17-18; Irani, 1999: 9-10). Communal association in the Middle East is a long-standing tradition since historically "it was from the tribe that protection of interests was obtained" (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 3). As emphasized in the quote, reliance on the tribe is rooted in historical, collective experience, influence how historical and contemporary social relationships are conceptualized, function and are interpreted (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 1-17; Irani, 1999: 6-13).

Influenced by the tendency to identifying oneself with the family or community, conflicts between individuals in the Arab/Muslim tradition are automatically transferred and managed at the community (family or tribal) level (Abdalla and others, 2002: 43-44; Irani, 1999: 9-11). As noted in the previous paragraph, preference for managing relations at the family and tribal levels is a consequence of the established patriarch social structures and other cultural traditions that have developed in the Middle East (Abdalla and others, 2002: 26-28; Irani, 1999: 11). Moreover, they are equally a product of the influence of Islam, because Muslims are considered a member of a body of believers, the *ummah*, which suggests the collective share responsibility for maintaining a moral, just and amiable society (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 85; Kalin, 2010: 25). According to Islam, incompatibilities between individuals are generally resolved utilizing intermediaries, such as family members or tribal elders (Al-Ramahi, 2008:4; Irani, 1999: 1-14). As a consequence, Irani (1999: 11) postulates that conflict resolution originates in: "local religious or political *zaim* (leaders)." Irani here emphasizes the importance of religious or community representatives in the Arab/Muslim context, who are responsible for managing or resolving a dispute and for disseminating conflict resolution into the community through their decisions and actions (Irani, 1999: 9-11; Said and Funk, 2001; Soliman, 2009).

The actions and decisions of family representatives and community leaders in this capacity is equally designed to enforce tribal law in conjunction with established religious and social norms, which reinforces adherence to the communal approach (Irani, 1999: 9-11; Said and Funk, 2001; Soliman, 2009). Stated differently, tribal customs and laws are enforced as conflicts are resolved, and the actions of these elders or leaders reinforce cultural conceptualizations of how relationships within Arab/Muslim culture develop and are managed. Emphasizing the principle underpinnings of these practices, Al-Ramahi (2008) summarizes:

> Tribal law is built upon two basic principles: (1) the principle of collective responsibility; and (2) the principle of retribution or compensation. The objective of tribal law is not merely to punish the offender but to restore the equilibrium between the offending and the offended families and tribes (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 3).

Two noteworthy observations associated to conflict and conflict resolution can be extracted from Al-Ramahi's observation.

First, individuals in Arab/Muslim culture are both independently and collectively responsible for ensuring justice and peace within their community (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 3-18). According to this tradition, collective responsibility is observed whether the effects of accountability are constructive or deconstructive (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 5). On the one hand, a physical attack on one member of the group, for example, is interpreted as an attack on the collective (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 5). In this instance, the collective unites to protect its members and itself. On the other hand, wrongdoing committed by one member can initiate a demand for restitution from the collective (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 5). In the latter instance, a family or community becomes accountable for wrongdoing committed by one of its members (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 3-18). Once again, the individual is embedded into the collective.

Second, Al-Ramahi's (2008: 3) quote highlights that referents can select how to deal with a conflict, choosing between retributive or conciliatory responses. While the option of retribution is present in Arab/Muslim culture (Abu-Nimer and Nasser, 2013: 483-484), and likewise observable in Western practices (R. Cohen, 2004: 178; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 250; Steele, 2008: 7), Arab/Muslim culture and tradition, as it is in Western culture, recognize retribution will prolong a conflict despite its provision of a form of justice (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 4-6). Deconstructive responses, therefore, are discouraged because they undermine collective harmony and welfare that is highly esteemed in Arab/Muslim tradition. Although retribution remains a viable response to those engaged in a conflict, the collective preference in Arab/Muslim tradition is for the conflict to be managed and/or transformed for the benefit of the collective (Abu-Nimer and Nasser, 2013: 483-484; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 4-6). The notable challenge in the retribution/conciliation dichotomy is to establish equilibrium between retributive justice, which may provide some satisfaction to the individual transgressed against, and the preservation of communal stability and welfare (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 4-6). This conundrum is equally identified in Western theory (R. Cohen, 2004: 178; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 250-251).

With the importance and functioning of tribal identity highlighted, the durability of this complex traditional framework in Arab/Muslim culture has several explanations. Foremost,

principles and practices are/have been continuously taught to youth which are/have been observed across generations (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 4). In this manner, customary practices are transferred from one generation to the next. Second, the traditional customs and practices of resolving conflict at the communal level, such as the use of *zaim*, reinforce group identity, tribal law, religious decrees and collective responsibility, which become self-perpetuating (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 4). Stated simply, ties to the community are buttressed by tribal and religious norms that repeatedly center on the community. Finally, the longevity of these practices is explained by the limited infiltration of the institutions and authority of centralized governing structures, and the resilience of tribal identity in Arab/Muslim society (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18).

These highlighted influences naturally guide which tools and objectives are utilized when resolving conflict. Notably, securing collective welfare and harmony is prioritized in Arab/Muslim culture, whereas Western practices are suggested to prioritize the benefit and well-being of an individual (Abdalla and others, 2002: 26-27; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2-19). In this frame, Al-Ramahi (2008) abridges:

> The Arab's Islamic and tribal history places collective interest as the highest principle in a hierarchy of values in both dispute resolution and everyday dealings. The maintenance of relationships and the restoration of harmony is a duty on all members of the group as well as the third party intervener, whether he be a judge (a qadi), an arbitrator (a hakam) or a conciliator. Therefore, collective interests and sulh (amicable settlement) are the cores of any dispute resolution system in Islam in order to maintain the ties of family, brotherhood, and community (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2)-

The quote clearly articulates the importance of community and Islam in the Arab/Muslim context when conceptualizing and implementing conflict resolution in its broadest sense.

Said and Funk (2001) similarly emphasize Islamic and tribal nuances and collective welfare when conflict management or resolution is contemplated. However, they further insist that its processes should be attentive "to 'face'-related issues (public status, shame, and reputation for generosity) and the achievement of restorative justice within a context of continuing relationship" (Said and Funk, 2001). The quote emphasizes that principles of honor, shame and restorative justice are essential to conflict resolution. These principles are examined below.

Attention now turns to the second fundamental cultural divergence noted in Arab/Muslim critiques of Western conflict resolution theory and practice. It is the influence of religion on how conflicts and conflict resolution are conceptualized and practiced in Arab/Muslim societies.

5.1.2 Religion

A second fundamental divergence between Western and Arab/Muslim cultural traditions emphasized in the literature is the significance of religion. Although religious interpretations and practices contrast (Abdalla and others, 2002: 50; Abu-Nimer, 2000: 220), the Arab/Muslim literature examined presents Islam as an inextricable component of Arab/Muslim culture and society (Abdalla and others, 2002: 9-13; Abu-Nimer, 2000: 246-247; 2008: 3; Gulam, 2003: 3-7; Irani, 1999: 7; Safa, 2007: 5; Soliman, 2009). Within this frame, scholars assert that Islam has a deeply rooted tradition of conflict resolution (Abdalla and others, 2002: 49; Abu-Nimer, 2000: 246-247; Safa, 2007: 5; Soliman, 2009). The robust cultural association with religion implies Islam cannot be extracted from all aspects of daily life as understood and practiced in predominantly Muslim societies (Gulam, 2003: 5-6; Irani, 1999: 7-10). Scholars support their hypothesis stating Islam regulates human's relationship with Allah, in addition to human-to-human relationships (Abdalla and others, 2002: 25; Gulam, 2003: 5-6; Irani, 1999: 2-10). Accordingly, Islam is not exclusively perceived as guidelines for an interpersonal relationship with God, but also a set of parameters for managing daily affairs of the individual and the community (Abdalla and others, 2002: 25; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2).

Most Arab/Muslim conflict resolution scholars emphasize Islam's authority (tradition and law) in matters of conflict (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 219-220; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2-7; Gulam, 2003: 5). Two sacred manuscripts inform Muslim understanding (Abdalla and others, 2002: 62; Gulam, 2003: 5). "The main source of Islamic law (*Shariah*) is the Qu'ran, which, according to Muslims, is the embodiment of the Divine word that was revealed in stages to Prophet Muhammad […] by the Angel Gabriel." (Gulam, 2003: 5). The *Sunna* is the second influential resource (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 7; Gulam, 2003: 5). "The *Sunna* refer[s] to the normative behaviour, decisions, actions, and tacit approvals and disapprovals of the Prophet. The *Sunna* was heard, witnessed, memorized, recorded, and transmitted from generation to generation" (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 7). Both *Shariah* and the *Sunna*, as defined in the quotes, provide guidelines for Arab/Muslim approaches of managing or resolving conflict.

While theological and juridical divergences exist across Muslim cultures, Al-Ramahi (2008: 9-10) claims that all Muslim approaches recognize the Qu'ran and the *Sunna* are fundamental resources. Combined, Islamic sacred texts and teachings inspire Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict, conflict resolution, peace and reconciliation (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 220; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2; Ashki, 2006: 26-28; Gulam, 2003: 5). They likewise influence which resolution principles and practices have become institutionalized in contemporary

Arab/Muslim culture (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 220; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2; Ashki, 2006: 26-28; Gulam, 2003: 5). In instances where Islamic sources do not provide direct insight, religious scholars "resort to extrapolating and deducing from the" principles found in the Qu'ran and the *Sunna* (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 8). Hence, Islamic teachings and practices are fundamental to conflict resolution as conceptualized and practiced in Arab/Muslim culture, whether overtly presented or extrapolated through research and theological deliberation, as the quote denotes.

The Arab/Muslim prioritization of religious-based principles and practices, according to scholars, therefore, produces a second major divergence articulated in the literature between Western and Arab/Muslim conflict resolution theories and practices (Gulam, 2003: 5-6; Irani, 1999: 2-10). Contrary to Arab/Muslim tradition, scholars criticize that religion is omitted from most mainstreams Western approaches (Gulam, 2003: 5-6; Irani, 1999: 2-10). Its absence is at the higher levels is partially attributed to Western scholarly condemnation, as outlined in chapter 4, section 3.11 (Bloomfield, 2006: 23-24; Dwyer, 1999; Rothfield, 2008: 15-16). Summarizing their interpretation of the Western approach, Gulam (2003: 5-6) and Abu-Nimer (2010: 74) argue that individualistic Western theory and practices are dictated by regulations and punishments designed and enforced by a secular state, whom the law is understood to represent. Consequently, individuals in the West commit transgressions against state-established laws and are punished according to those laws (Gulam, 2003: 5-6). Moreover, in cases of dispute management between parties in the West, for instance, both referents and third parties are encouraged to execute their duties in a manner beneficial and mutually acceptable to those directly involved (Irani, 1999: 2). Due to these tendencies, Al-Ramahi (2008: 2) tersely deduces: "Whereas, westerners know the primacy of law, the Arabs know the primacy of interpersonal relationships." To summarize, Arab/Muslim scholars criticize that Western practices for prioritizing the principles of secularism, mutual benefit and individualism.

By comparison, Arab/Muslim techniques combine legalistic and traditional (Islamic) techniques centered on communal interests (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 74). Succinctly, in Arab/Muslim culture "the interests of the individual are protected only in so far as they do not come into conflict with the general interest" (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 9). Al-Ramahi's quote demonstrates that conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim context is implemented to preserve harmony among the collective rather than to advance individual interests (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2, 9; Gulam, 2003: 5-6). Simultaneously, conflict resolution in Arab/Muslim tradition is implemented in the name of Allah because He has given the law (Gulam, 2003: 5). In arbitration, for example, Islamic law and local traditions guide and inform juridical

proceedings (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2-9). Combined, Islamic norms and practices, in conjunction with collective interests, are prioritized in Arab/Muslim approaches as opposed to secularism, the state and individualism.

Therefore, the inclusion of religion is frequently cited as a primary theoretical and practical divergence between Arab/Muslim and Western conflict resolution theory and practice (Gulam, 2003: 5-6; Irani, 1999: 2-10). Among predominantly Muslim communities, conceptualizations of conflict and conflict resolution, and their management, are rooted in and guided by Islamic traditions and teachings, a component suggested absent in the West (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2-9; Gulam, 2003: 5-6; Irani, 1999: 2-10). Both Islam and cultural traditions and norms prioritize a communal approach that benefits the collective. However, as denoted in chapter 4, a spiritual approach to conflict resolution is available in the West, although Arab/Muslim comparative analyses frequently overlook these nuances. We have demonstrated that the spiritual approach, championed by scholars such as Lederach (1997) and Worthington (2006), embrace and incorporate religion and society when resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels.

Consequently, while the Western structural approach to conflict resolution does not accommodate religion or society, and is frequently implemented when resolving conflict at the higher levels, the spiritual approach theoretically parallels the Arab/Muslim approach. Hence, the frequently cited criticisms of the Western prioritization of secularism articulated by Arab/Muslim scholars, particularly the absence of societal interests and religion, are addressed when cross-cultural comparative analysis incorporates a wide Western framework. With two primary critiques of Western approaches to conflict resolution qualified and theoretically isolated, attention now turns to defining concepts and comparing Arab/Muslim literature with that articulated in our Western theoretical framework.

5.2 Conceptualizing conflict

Our cross-cultural comparative analysis continues by exploring how conflict is conceptualized in Arab/Muslim culture. Abdalla and others (2002: 26) define conflict as "a situation in a specific context in which two or more relatively independent disputant parties perceive mutually incompatible goals or interests." The quoted perception of conflict as a relationship in which incompatibility between referents exists, mirrors Western theory examined in chapters three and four (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 5; R. Cohen, 2004: 179-180; Deutsch, 2005: 2; Galtung, 2007: 15; Lederach, 1995: 9; Mason, 1993: 14-15; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 7-8; Svensson, 2013: 415; Vasquez, 2009: 83-84;

Wallensteen, 2003: 16). Theoretical commonality is likewise observable in Abdalla and others' (2002: 26) construction of a framework for understanding the phenomenon that corresponds to Western theory as articulated in chapter 3, section 2. In addition to conceptualizing conflict as containing an incompatibility, Abdalla and others likewise include components of behavior, attitudes and perceptions, in addition to the factors of location and identity of referents engaged.

Abdalla and others' (2002: 26) conceptual framework of conflict, therefore, shares complex and notable similarities with Western theory. On the one hand, consideration for the location of the conflict is valuable since this component impacts on form, or typology, of a given conflict (Abdalla and others, 2002: 26). Location, therefore, identifies at which level the conflict is occurring, which resources are involved, and, consequently, which measures will be necessary to manage or resolve the issue. On the other hand, their identification of referents draws attention to the actors involved, and/or who is affected by the conflict (Abdalla and others, 2002: 26). These components are equivalent to the units or levels of conflict resolution articulated by Kriesberg (3.4.1) or Galtung (1969: 170). The combined framework is theoretically relevant since they determine particularities such as the level, actors and intensity of a given conflict.

Supplementary cross-cultural parallels in the conceptualization of conflict can be found when analyzing other Arab/Muslim scholars' work. For instance, Sohail Hashmi suggests that "conflict is a natural phenomenon and it will always be part of the human reality" (Abu-Nimer, 2001: 616). The perception of conflict as a natural phenomenon parallels Western theory advanced by John Paul Lederach (1995: 9) and others (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 3; Boulding, 1978: 132; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 1-3; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 7). Furthermore, and alluded to in the previous paragraph, Arab/Muslim scholars perceive conflict occurs at multiple levels, which include the interpersonal, group, intrastate and interstate levels (Abdalla and others, 2002: 15-24). As noted in chapter 3, section 4.1, Western scholars similarly perceive conflict occurs at multiple levels.

There is equally a degree of optimism shared by scholars across cultures when conflict is conceptualized. Although conflict is perceived as natural and inevitable in Arab/Muslim culture, and generally perceived as deconstructive, Arab/Muslim scholars optimistically propose "humans can learn to be peaceful and change their wrongdoing since they are born innocent and not evil" (Abu-Nimer, 2001: 616). Through alteration of deconstructive perceptions and behavior, the quote underscores the theory that conflict can be managed, reduced or avoided. The supposition that humans can circumvent conflict by relearning how

to constructively approach conflictual relationships finds its parallel in the works of Western scholars including Margaret Mead (1940), Kenneth Boulding (1978: 62) and John Paul Lederach (1995: 17-19).

A final cross-cultural similarity deduced from the literature is that some Arab/Muslim scholars and practitioners recognize that conflicts are non-static and their typology varies across referents and circumstances (Abdalla and others, 2002: 136-137). As a result, it is argued that conflict resolution has to be flexible and adaptive to meet referent needs and conflict circumstances (Abdalla and others, 2002: 136-137). These Arab/Muslim conceptualizations parallel Western theory which depict conflict as fluid (Galtung, 1969: 102; Reimann, 2004: 4), and correspond to the Western theory that variation in conflict intensity and typology is not only common, but requires diverse responses (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 75, 154; Sarkin, 2008: 20-23; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 16, 33-34). In basic comparative terms, hitherto, many aspects of the Arab/Muslim conceptualization of conflict are paralleled in Western theory as articulated in chapter three, section two.

Despite these general similarities, Arab/Muslim scholars hypothesize that stark divergences exist in the way that conflict is conceptualized across these cultures. Providing direct cross-cultural contrasts, George Irani (1999: 2-4) summarizes four contradictions between Western and Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict[74], which were included into our literature review in chapter 3, section 2. Foremost, Arab/Muslim comparative critiques argue that Western scholars and laypersons perceive conflict as having a positive dimension (Abdalla and others, 2002: 94; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18-19; Irani, 1999: 1-4). More specifically, conflict can be perceived to produce positive benefits. The perception that conflict has a positive dimension is generally held across the conflict resolution and conflict transformation schools of thought, although not all Western scholars share this opinion. Of theoretical significance, Arab/Muslim scholars' acknowledgement of Western scholars' perception of conflict as being conceptualized as positive, is one of the few episodes a fundamental theory of the conflict transformation or conflict resolution schools of thought is referenced during comparisons. Although most Arab/Muslim scholars reduce Western practices to conflict management, or the structural approach, most scholars of the management school of thought do not conceptualize conflict as positive (see 3.3.1).

[74] Irani (1999: 4) supports his hypothesis by providing findings elicited from a three-day workshop conducted at the Lebanese American University in April 1994. Participants of the workshop included lawyers, NGO workers, students and government officials (Irani, 1999: 2-4).

Nonetheless, the Western perception of conflict as having a positive dimension is suggested to contradict Arab/Muslim conceptualization, which is hesitant to associate conflict with positive attributes (Irani, 1999: 3; Irani and Funk, 2000: 6-8). Al-Ramahi (2008: 18), for example, asserts conflict is viewed as "negative, threatening and destructive to the normative order and needs to be settled quickly or be avoided." Substantiating the claim that conflicts are perceived as deconstructive, Kalin (2010: 11) summarizes that "[w]ar, conflict, violence, injustice, discord, and the like are seen as general extensions of the general problem of evil." Hence, the quote emphasizes that these interrelated conflict phenomena are considered deconstructive and rooted in evil.

However, not all Arab/Muslim scholars share the perception that conflict is deconstructive or a byproduct of evil. Contradicting their colleagues, Abdalla and others (2002: 94-95) acknowledge that a conflict has the potential to produce positive benefits. For instance, the civil rights struggle in the United States in the 1960s expanded individual rights to the African-American community (Abdalla and others, 2002: 95). Hence, while most of the Arab/Muslim literature perceives conflict as negative, which contradicts Western theory (Bercovitch and others, 2009; Briggs, 2003; Galtung, 2007; Lederach and Maiese, 2003; Lederach, 1995; Reimann, 2004); there are some Arab/Muslim scholars who believe that conflict has the potentiality to produce positive benefits when violence can be managed.

A second divergence in how conflict is conceptualized across these cultures is the suggestion that Western scholars frequently conceptualize conflict as a struggle or incompatibility strictly limited to those individuals, or groups, directly involved (Irani, 1999: 1-4; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 57). As outlined in the previous section, the assumption is that Western scholars perceive conflict as affecting only those immediately engaged, and conflict is thereby managed or resolved by singularly targeting affected referents. However, in the Arab/Muslim context, conflict is conceptualized as a systemic phenomenon (Irani, 1999: 4; Irani and Funk, 2000: 14-17). More specifically, Arab/Muslim theory and practice does not treat conflict as limited to those directly involved, but perceives conflict broadly affects the family, community, and society, as outlined above (Gulam, 2003: 7; Irani, 1999: 14). In comparative terms, Irani (1999: 14) asserts, "the conceptual category of the individual does not have the same validity and importance as in Western cultures. The [Arab/Muslim] individual is enmeshed within his or her own group, sect, tribe, or millet" (Irani, 1999: 14). Due to the robust communal association emphasized in Irani's quote, and outlined in section 5.1.1, conflicts in the Middle East—even those limited to two individual—are inevitably

perceived as familial or clan feuds and managed or resolved accordingly (Gulam, 2003: 7; Irani, 1999: 14; Pely, 2009: 80).

To recap, the explanation provided for conceptualizing conflict as a phenomenon which impacts the collective, emanates in the Arab/Muslim prioritization of Islam, tribal identity as well as the emphasis on collective harmony, responsibility and welfare (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2). Collective interest is further emphasized by the belief that harming an individual produces systemic effects (Pely, 2009: 82). For these reasons, conflict is conceptualized as a collective and systemic problem whose effects should be counteracted for the benefit of the community (Gulam, 2003: 7; Irani, 1999: 14; Pely, 2009: 82). Hyder Gulam (2003: 7) brusquely emphasizes the alleged cross-cultural divergence when he notes: "The good of the community is far more important than that of the individual." As mentioned previously, the prioritization of the collective noted by Gulam contradicts Western structural theory, and the Arab/Muslim practice is self-reinforcing because it impacts the level and manner in which conflicts are managed and resolved (Gulam, 2003: 7; Irani, 1999: 14; Pely, 2009: 82). Nonetheless, we have demonstrated that the Western social-psychological and spiritual approaches emphasize the inclusion of society when resolving conflict (see 4.2.2; 4.2.3).

Third, it is suggested that Western scholars perceive that conflicts can be resolved (Irani, 1999: 2-4; Pely, 2009: 86). Once again, the perception of conflict as being resolvable is rooted in the Western conflict resolution schools of thought, presenting a second instance of Arab/Muslim referral to Western theory outside the structural approach. However, aside from recognizing that conflict is perceived as positive and that conflicts can be resolved, other equally relevant theory from the resolution and management schools, such as their incorporation society and/or openness to religion, are overlooked by Arab/Muslim scholars. With this theoretical weakness in mind, Arab/Muslim scholars argue that conflicts can frequently only be managed as opposed to resolved (Irani, 1999: 2).

Conceptualization of conflict as merely manageable has numerous theoretical and practical implications. For instance, Arab/Muslim scholars perceive that conflicts can become intractable (Irani and Funk, 2000: 6). Intractability occurs for multiple reasons, including an inability to identify or successfully manage the effects or root causes of a conflict (Irani and Funk, 2000: 5-11). In such instances, a conflict endures. Simultaneously, Arab/Muslim scholars believed that one conflict could be systemically linked to another, implying that successful resolution of the first conflict is codependent upon the resolution of a second (Irani and Funk, 2000: 6-7). These arguments are, however, are not alien to Western theory, especially conflict management (chapter 3, section 3.1), although scholars from other schools

of thought equally acknowledge these particularities; for instance Rosoux (2009: 558-559) and Crocker and others (2005: 84) acknowledge that conflict are complex and can be intractable.

A final diverging cultural nuance influencing how conflict is perceived in Arab/Muslim society is the precept of honor (Irani, 1999: 2; Pely, 2009: 86; Steele, 2008: 4). Arab/Muslim societies place a significant amount of weight on individual and family honor (or its opposite shame), and it has a direct impact on individual and collective social standing (Irani, 1999: 2; Pely, 2009: 86; Steele, 2008: 4). More specifically, conflicts in Arab/Muslim culture is suggested to produce individual shame, and wrongdoing committed and/or experienced by one individual can shame their entire family or clan (Gulam, 2003: 7; Hassan, 2007: 3; Irani, 1999: 2; Pely, 2009: 86). This portent necessitates conflict resolution be administered at the communal level rather than at the individual level since honor is collectively shared (Gulam, 2003: 7; Hassan, 2007: 3; Irani, 1999: 2; Pely, 2009: 86). Respectively, conflict resolution principles and practices in Arab/Muslim culture have to take honor into account (Pely, 2009: 86). By comparison, direct references to honor are largely absent from Western theory (Irani, 1999: 2). Nevertheless, while the Western literature examined does not address honor forthright, I believe it is implied in principles including respect, mutually beneficial solutions, consultation and empowerment, to name a few. Nonetheless, honor functions in a unique manner in Arab/Muslim cultures, which emphasizes it must be considered and accommodated.

By way of summary, Arab/Muslim scholars conceptualize conflict as a non-static, natural, deconstructive phenomenon rooted in incompatibility between referents that occur at multiple levels, yet can be managed or averted through constructive practices. Since conflicts vary in nature, management or resolution requires flexible and adaptive approaches. These concepts have parallels in Western theory. Despite these basic similarities, cross-cultural divergences are suggested to exist. George Irani (1999: 2-4) theorizes there are four contradictions between Western and Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict. First, Arab/Muslim scholars perceive conflict is negative and rooted in evil, and most suggest that conflict does not contain a positive dimension. However, all Arab/Muslim scholars do not perceive conflict as deconstructive or rooted in evil.

Second, it is suggested that Western scholars frequently conceptualize conflict as a struggle or incompatibility strictly limited to those individuals or groups directly involved. The conceptualization of conflict being limited to those immediately engaged contradicts the Arab/Muslim tendency of viewing it as a systemic phenomenon that affects the collective and

is managed or resolved at the collective level. Third, Arab/Muslim scholars suggest that Western scholars perceive that all conflicts can be resolved, whereas Arab/Muslim scholars perceive that conflicts are subject to intractable. However, Arab/Muslim assumptions of cross-cultural incompatibility on the issue at hand, are derived from the conflict resolution school of thought, and overlook that some Western scholars perceive that a conflict can be intractable. Lastly, and a notable incompatibility, Arab/Muslim culture incorporates honor into conflict and conflict resolution discourse. This precept is not directly referenced in Western literature.

From this comparison, we demonstrate that Arab/Muslim scholars sometimes acknowledge aspects of conflict resolution and/or conflict transformation theory. However, other important theories and practices found in these Western approaches are marginalized and dismissed. This theoretical weakness prompts Arab/Muslim scholars to inappropriately identify greater degrees of cross-cultural divergence than generally exists when conflict resolution and conflict transformation theories are holistically analyzed. Circumventing this weakness, our wide theoretical framework permits appears to reduce the number of cross-cultural divergences identified by Arab/Muslim theoretical comparisons conducted hitherto. With conflict qualified from the Arab/Muslim perspective, and comparatively analyzed with our Western framework, we examine how conflicts are resolved according to Arab/Muslim scholars.

5.3 Resolving conflict

This section defines important conflict resolution terminology according to Arab/Muslim literature prior to our exploration of Arab/Muslim principles and practices. Our analysis of how conflicts are managed or resolved begins with Abdalla and others (2002: 94) emphasis that "[c]onflicts naturally cause negative feelings and emotions, which in turn may lead to taking actions that would make the conflict more intense." The negative attitudes and experiences caused by conflict, and mentioned in the quote, are prone to perpetuate deconstructive behavior (Abdalla and others, 2002: 95-97). Such qualitative perceptions and interaction in conflict scenarios protracts or escalates a given conflict (Abdalla and others, 2002: 95-97). To undermine comparable deconstructive tendencies, Arab/Muslim scholars recommend intervention to change the relational dynamics (Abu-Nimer, 2001; Irani, 1999, Said and Funk, 2001). Intervention to reverse deconstructive aspects of a relationship is broadly conceptualized as conflict resolution.

Correspondingly, Irani (1999: 11) hypothesizes that a process of conflict resolution is necessary to resolve conflict because Arab/Muslim understanding of conflict presumes that

past injuries produce grievances that can “fester”. Festering, he suggests, sequentially instigates conflict continuation or escalation. While contemplating the endeavor of resolution, Bekdash (2009) emphasizes that conflicts are unique and thereby require individual techniques to advance resolution. It can, therefore, be deduced that conflict resolution is necessary to resolve conflict, and their processes will vary across conflicts. These conceptualizations are mirrored in Western theory outlined in chapter three, section two.

Upon the theoretical foundation that conflicts should be managed or resolved, we explore terminology utilized by Arab/Muslim scholars. However, prior to reviewing the concepts of conflict management, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, reconciliation and peace, as articulated by Arab/Muslim scholars in the English language, I first suggest several reasons why care must be taken when comparatively analyzing the vocabulary deployed and/or attempting to classify Arab/Muslim literature into one of the three Western peacebuilding schools of thought.

5.3.1 Terminology

As denoted in chapter 3, there are three primary Western peacebuilding schools of thought: conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Terms, theories and practices that parallel these schools of thought are observable in Arab/Muslim literature because the scholars referenced herein are educated in Western practices. In most instances, the Arab/Muslim scholars referenced are professors and practitioners based in the Western educational framework. However, despite their familiarity with Western theory and practice, and their use of associated terminology, it is challenging to categorize Arab/Muslim scholars into one of the three Western schools of thought. More importantly, I believe, it is inappropriate for me to do so for four reasons.

Foremost, Arab/Muslim scholars reference and deploy terminology commonly used in the West, but its application in context is not centered on promoting a Western school of thought or technique. Instead, according to my interpretation, Arab/Muslim academics and practitioners harness the vocabulary at their disposal when analyzing conflict resolution from the Arab/Muslim perspective in the English language. In short, they are deploying the terminology available to them. Secondly, Arab/Muslim scholars commonly mix vocabulary, with a single author sometimes integrating the ideas of conflict management, resolution and/or transformation within a given text. Irani (1999), for instance, interchangeably refers to conflict resolution, conflict control, and conflict management in the same text.

Next, and theoretically debilitating, Arab/Muslim scholars, namely Abu-Nimer (2000, 2001, 2008), Al-Marashi and Keskin (2008) and Irani and Funk (2000), reference the works of John Paul Lederach, while simultaneously failing to acknowledge fundamental aspects of his theoretical framework. As noted in section two of the present chapter, although it is recognized that conflict transformation believes that conflicts can be resolved, Arab/Muslim researchers who reference Lederach fail to acknowledge the importance that religion and society has in Lederach's conflict transformation framework. References to Lederach's work are instead generally footnoted, thereby omitting deep analysis. Consequently, Arab/Muslim comparative analyses generally compartmentalize all Western scholars regardless of the approach they associate themselves with, neatly into the structural approach. The single exception found during the present literature review is Abdalla and others (2002), who not only reference Lederach's work, but also accurately depict conflict transformation as a religiously influenced approach for managing social relations.

Finally, because Arab/Muslim scholars do not openly associate themselves with a given Western school of thought, I will refrain from (inaccurately) pigeonholing them into one of the three Western approaches. To depict Arab/Muslim theory as appropriately as humanly possible, I have attempted to maintain the vocabulary scholars utilize when articulating their theory. The vocabulary should, therefore, be taken at face value and not interpreted as reflecting adherence to a particular Western school of thought. We now briefly examine recurrent terminology, including: conflict management, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, reconciliation and peace.

5.3.1.1 Conflict management

Abdalla and others (2002: 38) define conflict management as "intervention [which] does not address the sources of conflict, but focuses on adjusting conflict behavior and addressing some conflict issues to the extent needed to ensure that parties will avoid hostile or violent behavior." The quote emphasizes that conflict management does not deal with the root causes of a conflict but rather modifies behavior within a conflictual relationship. By comparison, Huda (2010b: 243) defines conflict management as "efforts to limit or contain conflict, particularly violent ones." According to both conceptualizations, conflict management predominantly deals with the behavioral components of the conflict, seeking to reduce its intensity or the deployment of violence (Abdalla and others, 2002: 38; Huda, 2010a: 243). Conflict management does not deal with the underlying causes of a given conflict. This conceptualization of conflict management parallels the Western conflict management

approach that fails to deal with the structural and relational aspects of a conflict relationship, and instead centers on reducing or arresting violence (Avruch, 2010: 39; Kelman, 2004: 119; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 31-32).

5.3.1.2 Conflict resolution

Unfortunately, most of the Arab/Muslim literature analyzed fails to provide a clear, precise definition of conflict resolution. The minimal attention given to defining or articulating the concept is partially justified by Safa (2007: 4), who suggests that tribal norms and practices are not always codified and rather exist in the oral tradition. In addition, others suggest that heterogeneity across Islamic cultural and religious practices have produced variations of traditions and standards (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2-19; Özçelik, 2007: 7). These theoretical discrepancies are magnified by the scarcity of research and literature (in the English language) on the topic (Özçelik, 2007: 7). Nonetheless, there are some scholars who provide a basic delineation of how the term is conceptualized.

For instance, Abdalla and others (2002: 26) conceptualize conflict resolution as "a complex process, which requires collaborative efforts of various parties to reach a reasonable resolution or satisfactory outcome that suits the conflicting parties who are disputing over a particular issue." The definition is broad and emphasizes the importance of resolving a conflict, and when possible, of achieving mutual satisfaction. Their conceptualization seemingly implies that resolution involves addressing root causes of the conflict, which mirrors Western understanding. One noteworthy cross-cultural difference, however, is that the authors are clear and adamant in their determination to prioritize Islamic values and collective needs when articulating conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim context (Abdalla and others, 2002: 127). The importance of Islam in this instance was accentuated in section 5.1.2.

By comparison, Huda (2010a: 243) defines conflict resolution as "efforts to address the underlying causes of a conflict by finding common interests and grander goals. These include fostering trust through reconciliation initiatives and strengthening institutions and process through which the parties engage one another." Two characteristics are noteworthy in Huda's quotation. First, addressing underlying causes and objectives are the focus of conflict resolution, which parallels Western conceptualizations. Secondly, there is also a reference to reconciliation, an outcome commonly associated with the conflict transformation tradition. Huda's conceptualization, therefore, illustrates how Arab/Muslim scholars interchange vocabulary and concepts when articulating theory. In this instance, reconciliation is purposed

as a potential outcome of conflict resolution, demonstrating an overlap of Western conflict resolution and conflict transformation theory.

Providing an alternative conceptualization, Mohammed Abu-Nimer (2001: 689) illustrates conflict resolution on a triangle whose points represent the head, heart and hand (defined as the 3Hs). The three elements are the target of a resolution process. Accordingly, conflict resolution is understood as the alteration of adversaries' manner of thinking (head), their "emotional experience" (heart), and their deeds and actions (hand) (Abu-Nimer, 2001: 689). Abu-Nimer's trilateral approach is comparable to the cognitive, effective and behavioral aspects of conflict transformation as conceptualized by Western scholars including Bar-Tal (2000: 356) and Kaufman (2006: 212). Consequently, conflict resolution, as defined by Arab/Muslim scholars analyzed herein, combine theory from the Western schools of conflict resolution and conflict transformation.

By way of conclusion, further cross-cultural similarities and contrasts are evidenced in the perceived objectives of conflict resolution. Özçelik (2007: 9-12), for instance, summarizes that the primary objective of conflict resolution is to restore positive or constructive relations. Likewise, Al-Ramahi (2008: 19) theorizes conflict resolution in Arab/Muslim tradition is a practice of restoring social order by utilizing local/traditional norms and practices to guide, and sometimes pressure, referents engaged to resolve issues. Al-Ramahi's observation reiterates the communal approach of Arab/Muslim practices and that fact that pressure can be applied on referents during its processes. Finally, according to Arab/Muslim literature, a process of conflict resolution can produce an outcome ranging from conflict settlement to reconciliation (Bekdash, 2009; Irani, 1999: 11). Combined, the goals and outcomes identified generally parallel the broad Western framework of conflict resolution, as constructed in this thesis, with local traditions and norms being emphasized by Arab/Muslim scholars.

5.3.1.3 Conflict transformation

The term conflict transformation is sometimes applied in Arab/Muslim literature, for example by Abu-Nimer (2000, 2001, 2008) and Bekdash (2009), but is never clearly defined. The overall utility of such a process is, nevertheless, recognized. Bekdash (2009), for instance, argues that absent conflict transformation "historic grievances and systemic injustices [remain] embedded in collective memory and narratives which often may lead to prolonged cycles of violence." Bekdash's quote emphasizes conflict transformation produces stable outcomes with long-term effects, a result manufactured by addressing grievances and structural injustices which advance cognitive transformation.

Correspondingly, Huda (2010b: 243) defines conflict transformation as a process that "address[es] structural roots of conflict by changing existing patterns of behavior and fostering a culture of nonviolent approaches." Huda's definition likewise centers of structural issues and cognitive transformation, similar to the manner in which Western scholars conceptualize conflict transformation. Reinforcing cross-cultural parallels, Abu-Nimer (2008: 13) mentions the necessity of structural alterations, while Ashki (2006) alludes to the importance of individual, structural, or behavioral transformation when discussing conflict resolution.

Alternatively, Abdalla and others (2002: 38) deduce conflict transformation is a process that "attempts to positively change parties' relationship, conflict attitudes and behaviors. Here the purpose is to help parties to transform their relationship from a conflictual one to an amicable one, by addressing deep-rooted conflict sources and issues." The quote emphasizes the depth of transformation and the objective of securing sustainable constructive relations. Combined, the numerous descriptions examined imply structural, attitudinal and behavioral alterations are the ultimate goals of conflict transformation. These conceptualizations imply deep relational and structural changes occur, whereby the solidification of peacebuilding is secured and sustainable, constructive relationships are established. Arab/Muslim utilization of the term conflict transformation, therefore, seemingly parallels the Western conceptualization as elucidated in chapter 3, section 3.3.

Another critical parallel in how conflict transformation is articulated is found in the restrictive nature by which some scholars conceptualize outcomes. Most notably, Bekdash (2009) warns that forgiveness is not a requirement for achieving conflict transformation. Contrary, Bekdash insists that referents can undergo a degree of transformation absent the exercise of forgiveness. In such instances, nonviolent coexistence would appropriately describe the quality of the relationship. Western scholars, such as Louis Kriesberg (2004), share the conceptualization of conflict resolution outcomes as a sliding scale, where the degree of conflict transformation, or conflict resolution, achieved is determined by conflict circumstances and referents. Overall, the use of the term conflict transformation by Arab/Muslim scholars appears to be comparable to that articulated by Western scholars.

5.3.1.4 Reconciliation

Under ideal conditions, a process of conflict resolution can lead to a deep change in the quality of a conflictual relationship, referred to in the literature as reconciliation. Bekdash (2009) suggests that reconciliation is a restorative justice process that transforms

relationships. Its "aim" is "to form new relationships among divided groups by addressing historical grievances and systemic injustices while working toward future cooperation" (Bekdash, 2009). The definition provided mirrors that specified for a conflict transformation process, and parallels Ramsbotham and others' (2011: 32) definition of reconciliation where structural, attitudinal and behavioral changes are forged. Similarly, Huda (2010b: 244) defines reconciliation as "the long-term process by which the parties to a violent conflict build trust, learn to live cooperatively, and create stable peace." Both definitions correspond to Western understanding of reconciliation as a process that roots and stabilizes peace by transforming relationships (Bar-Tal, 2000: 357-359; R. Fisher, 2001b: 26; Kelman, 2004: 119-120; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 246). Nonetheless, Abu-Nimer and Nasser (2013: 481-483) insist that Arab/Muslim literature on conflict resolution does not mandate forgiveness to achieve reconciliation. We equally demonstrated that some Western scholars believe reconciliation can be obtained without necessitating forgiveness (Sarkin, 2008: 17-21; Skaar, 2013: 12). Therefore, there are numerous parallels in how the term reconciliation is conceptualized across cultures.

5.3.1.5 Peace

References to reconciliation naturally incorporate the term peace, which must be defined. In his exploration of the general concept of peace in Mesopotamia, Benjamin Foster (2007: 70) determines that the term has multiple meanings. Among its uses, peace was historically perceived "as an internal state [of stability] within a unified group." In this sense, communal stability equates peace. By comparison, other scholars emphasize the religious, legal and political precepts of the term (Kalin, 2010: 5-6). In the latter instances, Islam and its teachings are considered "peace," and those who obey Islamic precepts are suggested to live in peace. These conceptualizations emphasize the importance of community and Islam in conflict resolution in Arab/Muslim communities, as articulated above.

In social and political terms, the literature depicts peace as a natural, harmonious condition manifesting as a result of obedience to God (Abu-Nimer, 2008: 18; Foster, 2007: 71; Tibi, 2002: 181). Peace, therefore, delineates an interpersonal, as well as a collective, forsaking of violence accompanied by obedience to God (Abu-Nimer, 2008: 18). At the same time, Arab/Muslim understanding of accommodates both positive and negative peace (Kalin, 2010: 7-8). Positive peace depicts the prevalence of a morally and socially just society that is absent physical and structural violence (Kalin, 2010: 25). Comparatively, negative peace is broadly

conceptualized as peaceful coexistence, whereby adversaries nonviolently live in close proximity but maintain negative opinions of the "other" (Tibi, 2002: 181).

The Arab/Muslim conceptualization of peace as containing a positive and negative dimension is comparable to positive and negative peace as articulated in the West by scholar such as Johan Galtung (1969: 183-184). Moreover, the establishment of peace as the ultimate objective of a conflict resolution process is equally similar. What is dissimilar is the conspicuous association of obedience to God as articulated in the works of scholars such as Said and Funk (2001) or Kalin (2010). Providing a direct comparison, Said and Funk (2001) summarize cross-cultural divergences stating: "the Western approach points to political pluralism, individual rights and consumerism as the substance of peace, the Islamic perspective affirm cultural pluralism, communal solidarity, social justice and faith." Said and Funk's quote emphasizes several contrasts between Arab/Muslim and Western approaches, namely individualism and the absence of religion in the Western tradition, and communal interest and faith in the Arab/Muslim tradition. These critiques were noted elsewhere.

Following our brief comparative analysis of relevant concepts and lexicon, whereby many parallels and several divergences have been denoted, attention now turns to examining twelve principles and practices of conflict resolution as extracted from Arab/Muslim literature. As precepts are explored, we will continue to juxtapose theory *vis-à-vis* Western conceptualizations.

5.3.2 Guiding principles and tools of conflict resolution

Arab/Muslim literature has contradictory perspectives on the relative utility and compatibility of conflict resolution across Arab/Muslim and Western culture. On the one hand, Abdalla and others (2002: 6-13) argue Western theory is useful for both (re-) conceptualizing and enhancing Muslim conflict resolution theory and practice. Hence, rather than dismiss Western theory and practice wholesale, Abdalla and others believe that analyzing, extracting and adapting Western theory and practice is invaluable for buttressing Muslim conflict resolution traditions. As a result, they recommend that Arab/Muslims borrow and/or reformulate theory and practices by referencing Western approaches. One of the values of this practice is that it prevents a reinvention of theory, while permitting Arab/Muslims to dismiss those Western aspects or components that are inapplicable or inappropriate in context. Through theoretical and practical tailoring, it is argued that Western guidelines and insight can provide a template for improving Arab/Muslim traditional approaches, all the while

ensuring local applicability and ownership as changes and adaptions are made (Abdalla and others, 2002: 6-13).

On the other hand, other Arab/Muslim scholars insist that the degree of cross-cultural differences influence Arab/Muslims to perceive that Western principles and practices are "a false panacea" and "insensitive" to local needs in the Arab/Muslim context (Irani, 1999: 1-2; Irani and Funk, 2000: 1-2). For instance, Irani and Funk (2000: 15) opine: "[Western approaches] are either too mechanistic or based on therapy-oriented formulas that do not correspond with the idiom of daily life." According to this critique, individualistic and impersonal Western approaches do not function in Arab/Muslim culture. Similarly, Said and Funk (2001) criticize: "From a Muslim perspective, the Western approach puts too much faith in institutional formulas and the 'invisible hand' of competition, and too little emphasis on communal cooperation in the conscious pursuit of values." Once again, these assumptions are rooted in narrow comparisons of Arab/Muslim practices with the Western structural approach, which we have demonstrated is unrepresentative of the field of peacebuilding as conceptualized by Western scholars. By way of summary, the latter group of Arab/Muslim scholars perceive Western theory and practice as excessively mechanistic, individualistic, lacking emphasis on the community and religious principles, and thereby inapplicable or undesirable in the context of Arab/Muslim culture (Irani, 1999: 10; Irani and Funk, 2000: 1-5; Marsella, 2005: 664; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 45; Safa, 2007: 14).

Combined, scholars theorize that the level and practices utilized in conflict resolution in Arab/Muslim culture problematize applicability of Western conflict resolution practices at the intrastate and interstate levels in several manners (Irani, 1999: 1-14). Firstly, as noted, contemporary Arab/Muslim culture lacks a strong association to state citizenship, defined here as the practice of identifying one's self as a member of a particular country, by comparison to that found in the West (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18; Irani, 1999: 9-14). Because Arab/Muslim identity markers gravitate around family or clan in most instances, conflict resolution at the interstate level is impacted by communal identity-association, and these tendencies dictate how traditional resolution mechanisms are utilized, namely their targeting of the community (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18; Irani, 1999: 9-10). Accordingly, traditional conflict resolution as conceptualized by Arab/Muslim occurs primarily at the community level.

Second, and perhaps, correspondingly, there is no traditional conflict resolution technique available at the intrastate and interstate levels in Arab/Muslim culture (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 140-141; Irani, 1999: 9-14). Since resolution centers on the community, and there has traditionally been a weak association with a centralized state-

governing framework, techniques for resolving conflict at the higher levels have not developed. Exacerbating this deficiency, the West has frequently imposed/utilized a structural approach to resolve conflicts at the higher levels in and between predominantly Arab/Muslim countries (Irani, 1999: 1-10). As detailed in chapter 3, a structural approach concentrates its processes on social and political elites, institutionalizing conflict termination or resolution within the state's governing framework (Gardner Feldman, 2008). Such practices inadequately function in the Arab/Muslim context for reasons including popular rejection of the practices utilized, compounded by the limited social inclusion or infiltration of such practices as the influence of centralized structures are marginal at the micro level (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 140-141; Irani, 1999: 9-10). Due to these divergences outlined, Irani (1999: 1-10) posits that Western (structural) resolution approaches are viewed as an imposition and alien to Arab/Muslim citizens.

Equally suggested to undermine cross-cultural acceptance, Irani (1999) highlights additional failures of Western conflict resolution practices associated with intrastate and interstate conflicts in the Middle East. He explains:

> Peace treaties based solely on economic and political enticements, coercion or purely strategic considerations cannot last if they are not accompanied by a sincere, profound exploration of the underlying, emotional legacies of fear, hatred, sorrow, and mistrust resulting from decades of warfare and unending cycles of victimization and vengeance. In order to bring peace to the Middle East, policymakers must foster and encourage a dialogue that takes into consideration indigenous rituals and processes of reconciliation (Irani, 1999: 1).

Irani's quote reinforces the notion that the Western structural approach is problematic in context, and introduces two contradictory cultural approaches when conflict resolution is conceptualized at the national and international levels in predominantly Arab/Muslim societies.

Firstly, Irani (1999: 1) reiterates that structural conflict resolution does not address societal needs. Societal inclusion, it is argued, is necessary to root resolution and stabilize relationships in the context of Arab/Muslim culture (Irani, 1999: 1). However, as noted in chapters three and four, some Western scholars likewise criticize the limited nature of the structural approach (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 11-13). More specifically, the Western social-psychological (Kriesberg, 2001: 61; Rosoux, 2009: 545) and spiritual (Lederach, 1997) approaches condemn the singular implementation of a structural approach as shallow and incomplete. Like the Arab/Muslim approach, the social-psychological (4.2.2) and spiritual

approaches (4.2.3) advocate societal involvement in conflict resolution to varying degrees to deepen and broaden the viability and saturation of a resolution process.

The second challenge denoted in Irani's quote is that Western conflict resolution, as implemented in the Arab/Muslim context, frequently marginalizes indigenous concepts and practices (Irani, 1999: 1). However, condemnation of such culturally insensitive and violent policies is not limited to Arab/Muslim scholars. Simultaneously, marginalization of indigenous practices is equally condemned by numerous Western scholars (Lederach, 1995: 55-62; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 339; Stover and others, 2005: 835). In fact, critics in both Arab (Irani, 1999: 1) and Western traditions (Lederach, 1995: 55-62; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 339; Stover and others, 2005: 835) argue that affected stakeholders should be consulted and empowered when resolving conflict. For instance, they should be consulted about which principles and practices society deems applicable and acceptable in each context. Once identified, and agreed upon, relevant principles and practices should be accommodated to enhance social legitimacy, popular acceptance and the overall effectiveness of a given program (Irani, 1999: 1-14; Lederach, 1995: 55-62; Stover and others, 2005: 835).

Providing a comparative overview of cross-cultural approaches as conceptualized by Said and Funk (2000), see Figure 5. Irani and Funk's (2000: 29-30) table permits straightforward theoretical comparisons of both techniques and principles. For the sake of space, some of divergences are only noted in the table. Noteworthy is that a cursory comparison of the contents of the table demonstrates that many principles and techniques emphasized in the Arab/Muslim column are at least mentioned in the Western column. Simultaneously, it should be emphasized that Irani and Funk, like most other Arab/Muslim scholars, neatly condense Western peacebuilding approaches into the structural approach, thereby minimizing direct reference to the social-psychological and spiritual approaches. The prominent exception, however, is the reference to Westerners perceiving conflicts as resolvable and positive (Irani and Funk, 2000: 6), which falls under the rubric of conflict resolution and/or transformation.

However, to their credit, in another collaborative essay, Funk and Said (2004) indirectly admit some principles and practices are shared across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures. In fact, some acknowledge that Western and Arab/Muslim traditions share specific values and techniques (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 233-262; Mogahed. 2006: 2; Pely, 2009: 86-87). Nevertheless, Funk and Said (2004) go on to emphasize the incompatible nature of both cultural approaches. Hence, despite admitting that Arab/Muslim and Western approaches are not always diametrically opposed, some Arab/Muslim scholars choose to emphasize the divergences and

incompatibilities as opposed to the similarities (Abdalla and others, 2002: 6-13; Funk and Said, 2004: 25; Mogahed, 2006: 2).

Figure 5 Irani and Funk's (2000) Cross-Cultural Comparisons

Western/U.S.-Based Approaches	Traditional Arab-Islamic Approaches to Conflict Resolution
primacy of individual choice in the process; individuals are free agents	communally oriented process; individuals are enmeshed in webs of relationships
mediation or arbitration services provided by formally certified professional facilitator	community legitimizes arbitration/mediation through respect for age, experience, status, and leadership in communal affairs
ideal third party as a neutral, unaffiliated outsider	preferred third party as an unbiased insider with ongoing connections to all parties
legal system or individual participants themselves legitimize and guarantee the negotiation and settlement process	community and village elders (the *jaha*) legitimize and guarantee the process of acknowledgment, apology, compensation, forgiveness, and reconciliation
third party relies on a secular idiom, with reference to personal anecdotes and experiences	language and ritual of reconciliation draws freely on explicit religious ideals, texts, stories and examples
guidelines derived from a specialized field of study and practice	precedence of local history and custom, encompassing relationships between kinship groups, and shared norms and values
process reflects a preoccupation with "win-win" scenarios	process manifests concern with cultivating the established "wisdom" gained through collective experience
process is future-oriented: history is a problem to overcome	process is continuity-oriented: history is a source of stability and guidance that presents lessons for shaping a common future
efforts are intended to empower individuals in relation to the legal system, gaining control over their problems while achieving greater efficiency	efforts are intended to empower individuals in relation to the legal system, gaining control over their problems while achieving greater efficiency
	efforts are intended to empower families and the community to participate directly in matters of common concern
	third parties promote direct, collaborative, step-by-step problem solving to isolate and confront discrete issues
	third parties emphasize the need to restore harmony and solidarity and secure cooperative relationships
emphasis on utilitarian goals and on satisfaction of interests, needs, and/or rights of all individuals involved	emphasis on honor, face, dignity, prestige, just compensation, and respect for individuals and groups
conflict resolution used to attain a fair deal in which interests, needs and rights of disputants are not compromised	intervention to prevent conflict escalation and disruption of communal symbiosis in a context of scarce resources
process typically ends with a formal written agreement	process completed with a powerful ritual that includes *sulh* (settlement), *musalaha* (reconciliation), *musafaha* (exchange of handshakes), and *mumalaha* (breaking bread together)

Figure 5 is Irani and Funk's (2000: 29-30) table of comparisons. It provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of Western conflict resolution techniques with those available in Middle East/Arab communities.

To (re-) qualify cross-cultural parallels in relation to observed principles using our wide Western framework, this section references Mohammed Abu-Nimer's (2000: 233-262) essay, *A Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam*, to extract some principles prioritized by Arab/Muslim scholars. In a reprint of his detailed analysis of conflict resolution, Abu-Nimer (2008: 4) concludes: "Islam yields a set of peacebuilding values that, if consistently and systematically applied, can transcend and govern all types and levels of conflict, values such as justice (*adl*), beneficence (*ihsan*), and wisdom (*hikmah*) which

constitute core principles in peacemaking strategies and framework." In the quote, Abu-Nimer emphasizes that numerous principles influence Arab/Muslim conflict resolution traditions and practices, and these principles are applicable at all levels of conflict. To list a few, Abu-Nimer (2000: 233-262) includes:

accountability	peace and peace-making	forgiveness
deeds	social empowerment	justice and persuasion
equality	universality and human dignity	patience
free will	collective action and solidarity	sacredness of human life
mercy	democracy[75]	truth

While cursory reading of the principles suggests cross-cultural parallels, a selection of examples denoted in Abu-Nimer's essay are detailed below to juxtapose cross-cultural approaches.

The following subsections analyze the principles of: peacemaking and negotiations; truth; justice; arbitration; amnesty and forgiveness; empowerment and consultation; dialogue; third party intervention; deeds; collectively beneficial solutions; compensation/restitution; and flexibility. The relative importance of several of these principles is later tested at the interstate level in chapter six when general openness is qualified in our cross-cultural survey.

5.3.2.1 Peacemaking and negotiations

Abu-Nimer (2000: 231) suggests a process of conflict resolution begins with "[p]eacemaking and negotiation." Peacemaking, or the act of establishing peaceful relationships subsequent to a conflict, is an essential step toward advancing conflict resolution in Arab/Muslim culture (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 231). Once (a temporary) peace has been established, negotiation, or discussion, of divisive issues is pursued. According to Abu-Nimer's conceptualization, conflict behavior is arrested prior to negotiations, however, it will later be demonstrated that according to other Arab/Muslim traditional practices, intervention can occur prior to the termination of violence (5.4.1). Nevertheless, negotiation is perceived as "more productive than avoidance of problems or the use of violence to resolve them" (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 231). Thus, negotiation between conflict parties is preferred over the use of violence, the latter of which are perceived as counterproductive and violent. These

[75] Abu-Nimer (2000: 256-257) cites the *Shura* (mutual consultation) model as an example of the democratic nature of Arab/Muslim society, suggesting the *Shura* is utilized to seek advice from constituents (or the *umma*) and is thereby democratic. Without the faith, support and trust of the community, Gellman and Vuinovich (2008: 138) argue that local leadership will be unable to maintain their authority and will ultimately be replaced.

Arab/Muslim conceptualizations and practices mirror those articulated in chapters 3, section 2.2 (constructive and deconstructive responses to conflict) and chapter 4, section 1.1 (timing).

There is, however, dissention in the literature. Notably, Arab/Muslim scholars disagree how peacemaking and negotiations should be implemented. Demonstrating inconsistency, Abu-Nimer (2000: 231) suggests "[o]pen communication and face-to-face confrontation" are necessary components of negotiation. The preference for open and face-to-face communication is thought more productive since referents can directly express their positions and work together to resolve differences. The precepts raise two theoretical discrepancies, one of which is presented by Arab/Muslim scholars (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19), and the other by Western scholars (Ashki, 2006: 4). Concerning the former, Al-Ramahi (2008: 19) warns: "Face to face bargaining or negotiation could be perceived by the parties as antagonising the situation or as a humiliating act for the victim." Recalling that Arab/Muslim culture prefers indirect communication (chapter 5, section 1), it is suggested that direct communicative approaches are not always appropriate (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19). Contrary, those practices could be offensive, producing shame among the parties and thereby undermining conflict resolution (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19). Erring on the side of caution, consultation with affected referents, as underscored by Abu-Nimer (2000: 256), would be the most logical means of determining if referents are inclined to engage in face-to-face communication. Through consulting, affected stakeholders are given a voice to minimize or circumvent antagonistic or humiliating circumstances.

Concerning the latter discrepancy associated with open and direct confrontation, open and direct confrontation seemingly contradicts Western conceptualizations of negotiations/dialogue (Abu-Nimer, 2008: 19). More specifically, conflict resolution literature in the West emphasizes adversaries should be provided an opportunity to express their needs and concerns utilizing non-confrontational practices, such as active listening (Irani, 1999: 3; Irani and Funk, 2000: 29-30). During active listening, referents are permitted to express opposing views in turn while the other is requested to listen silently (Irani, 1999: 3). In the West, such processes may transpire between the referents themselves or could be assisted by a neutral third party who specializes in mediation (Irani, 1999: 3). The theoretical value of such non-confrontational dialogue allows affected referents to 1) express their needs and fears, and 2) increase their understanding and trust of the other (Irani, 1999: 3-5). Ideally, discussions will allow referents to mutually acknowledge the others' needs and concerns, whereupon a negotiated arrangement, which is perceived mutually beneficial, can be pursued (Irani, 1999: 3). However, this approach is not always accepted in Arab/Muslim cultures.

Contrary, Irani (1999: 4-5) contends that active listening is rejected in the Arab/Muslim context. He posits that Arab/Muslim culture perceives silence as weakness and disadvantageous since opinions and needs cannot be properly expressed or rebuttals offered in the context of dialogue and discussion. Instead, Arab/Muslim disputants engage one another in discussion and negotiation, frequently incorporating interruptions to express opposing views (Irani, 1999: 4-5). Active listening is, therefore, eschewed because it demonstrates weakness. What can be gleaned from our brief comparison is that while there is cross-cultural agreement on the need for peacemaking and discussion as principle a means of advancing conflict resolution, there are diverging opinions pertaining to how such practices should be implemented within and across cultures. In essence, peacemaking and dialogue are fundamental principles across cultures, but there are potential divergences in how they might be appropriately deployed. Establishing mutually acceptable techniques and guidelines upon the inception of peacebuilding and negotiations would reduce potential friction.

5.3.2.2 Truth

The next principle embraced by Arab/Muslim conflict resolution tradition is truth. Truth, or the establishment of a detailed account of what has occurred in the past, is determined essential to advancing conflict resolution (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 252; Ashki, 2006: 15; Bekdash, 2009; Said and Funk, 2001). Articulating its function, Ashki (2006: 18) summarizes: "Striving for truth in Islamic dialogue utilizes proof, documentation from the Qu[']ran and Hadith, and also allows for the exploration of personal experience and narrative." Ashki here emphasizes that Arab/Muslim truth seeking is informed and guided by Islam and its teachings, a practice largely absent from Western approaches (Irani, 1999: 1-10; Said and Funk, 2001).

Nevertheless, the value of truth in the Arab/Muslim context is obvious. Said and Funk (2001) proclaim truth "is regarded as a source of stability and guidance that provides lessons for shaping a common future for the society. Efforts aim to protect and empower families and the community as a whole to participate in a resolution process." The authors here qualify truth as the foundation upon which constructive relationships are established. Simultaneously, it meets and protects the interests of those involved, but is not limited to those engaged in the conflict, but rather extending to community members. Finally, truth is suggested to empower through the investigation and communication of past events (Said and Funk, 2001).

In terms of practices, truth in Arab/Muslim culture is pursued utilizing truth commissions, inquiries, trials and so forth (Bekdash, 2009). These mechanisms uncover, articulate and re-evaluate the truth according to cultural and religious decrees, norms and traditions (Ashki,

2006: 15-18; Said and Funk, 2001). In this context, Arab/Muslim scholars likewise recognize that truth will have multiple versions that must be clarified and bridged to formulate a common understanding (Bekdash, 2009). Upon the foundation of truth, and subsequent to the provision of justice and restitution (forthcoming principles examined), it is hypothesized that deconstructive relationships can be restructured and reformulated into constructive ones (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 237-239; Ashki, 2006: 15-20; Said and Funk, 2001).

The general prioritization and characterization of truth as found in Arab/Muslim literature has its parallel among the theories and practices advocated by Western scholars, for example John Paul Lederach (1997) (4.2.3.1) or Louis Kriesberg (2004: 83) (4.2.2.1). In particular, Western literature advocates the pursuit of truth to acquire an understanding of both the root causes of a conflict and the establishment of an account about what occurred (Kelman, 2004: 122-124; Lederach, 1997). Western scholars simultaneously recognize that numerous versions of the truth can be expected, so a common version will have to be established (Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 254-255). Amalgamated, there are remarkable cross-cultural similarities between how truth and its value to conflict resolution is conceptualized, as well as mechanisms for its pursuit. The most obvious divergence is the reference to Islam, which is largely absent from Western theory.

5.3.2.3 Justice

Islam advocates the pursuit of justice in the daily life of the Muslim believer (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 234; 2010: 77; Ashki, 2006: 24-25; Bekdash, 2009; Foster, 2007: 70). Succinctly, Abu-Nimer (2000: 234) claims: “Justice is an absolute and not a relative value, and it is the duty of the believer to seek justice and apply it.” As emphasized in the quote, Muslims are actively instructed to seek and apply justice at the individual and societal levels (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 233-236; 2010: 77). When injustices are discovered, they should be made evident and countered for the benefit of those who have been transgressed against and for the greater good of the community (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 233-236). John Paul Lederach (1995) similarly advocates an active pursuit of justice to advance conflict resolution (4.2.3.2).

Techniques of pursuing justice in the Arab/Muslim context include retributive and restorative techniques, such as tribunals and traditional ceremonies (Bekdash, 2009). When justice is distributed, conflicts are expected to transform (Bekdash, 2009). Overall, the importance of justice in the context of conflict resolution is obvious. According to Abu-Nimer (2000: 234), “Peace is the product of order and justice.” Hence, Arab/Muslim scholars directly link justice to peace (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 233-236; 2010: 77; Kalin, 2010: 8).

In cross-cultural comparative terms, there are multiple and obvious parallels. For example, it was demonstrated in chapter 4 that justice is emphasized in Western approaches by both social-psychological (Anderlini and others, 2004: 1-2; Kriesberg, 2004: 82; Montville, 1999: 321) and spiritual scholars (Lederach, 1997). Another cross-cultural parallel is Lederach (1997), Montville (1999: 318) and Ramsbotham and others' (2011: 249-250) intertwining of the principles and justice and peace for advancing and rooting conflict transformation. Finally, the utilization of restorative and retributive justice practices to resolve, or transform, a conflict is also observable in Western literature (Avruch, 2010: 36; Rosoux, 2009: 549). Combined, there is uniformity in how Arab/Muslim and Western scholars conceptualize the principle and practice of justice. The obvious difference is, once again, the overt emphasis of religion on the concept of justice, which are at best implied in the Western spiritual approach.

5.3.2.4 Arbitration

Abu-Nimer (2000: 247) suggests that arbitration can be implemented in Arab/Muslim culture as part of an informal communal procedure or through a formal *Sharia* court. In most instances, affected stakeholders are permitted to determine which procedure(s) appropriately satisfies their needs (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 247). In general terms, arbitration, as practiced in the Middle East, shares similarities with retributive judicial practices, including criminal proceedings (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 247; Özçelik, 2007: 8-10), which are legally binding (Özçelik, 2007: 8-9). However, there are several differences between Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations and practices of arbitration (Irani, 1999: 2-8).

The foremost discrepancies, which are expected, are that juridical proceedings in Arab/Muslim communities emphasize the importance of Islam and largely operate at the community level (Irani, 1999: 7-8). Cultural differences in this regard prompt Arab/Muslim scholars to criticize Western arbitration for limiting (or eliminating) religion and for concentrating on resolving conflict at the individual, rather than the community, level (Irani, 1999: 2-8). The points mentioned have been repeatedly referenced hitherto. Further cross-cultural differences include the characteristics and role of the arbitrator (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 233-262; Irani, 1999: 3-4; Özçelik, 2007: 13-14). In the West, arbitrators are expected to be seasoned, knowledgeable and educated in their profession, with the capacity to guide referents to a mutually beneficial arrangement (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 74; Özçelik, 2007: 13-14). Alternatively, in Arab/Muslim communities, arbitrators consist of the upstanding, influential and esteemed males within a community (Özçelik, 2007: 13-14). The latter are not expected to be experienced or educated in legal proceedings or negotiations, but are instead recognized

and respected men who decide cases according to religious and traditional norms to restore order to the community (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 74-75; Özçelik, 2007: 13-14).

By way of summary, both Western and Arab/Muslim cultural approaches to conflict resolution deploy arbitration as a tool for advancing conflict resolution. However, there are cross-cultural divergences in how arbitration is implemented. Diverging characteristics, for instance, include the Arab/Muslim inclusion of religion and the Western preference for qualified arbitrators. Here, the principle and practice of arbitration is recognized across cultures, but there are cultural divergences in how the practice is appropriately applied.

5.3.2.5 Amnesty/forgiveness

Conceptually and practically, Arab/Muslim approaches to conflict resolution esteem the principles of amnesty, mercy and forgiveness (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 227-233, 248; Ashki, 2006: 23; Soliman, 2009). According to the literature, the Qu'ran extols believers to exercise mercy and forgiveness in instances of conflict (Abdalla and others, 2002: 66; Abu-Nimer, 2000: 248; Abu-Nimer and Nasser, 2013: 476-490; Soliman, 2009). The suggested value of these principles reside in their capacity to break cycles of violence and wrongdoing, while restoring collective harmony since transgressions are not reciprocated (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 248; Soliman, 2009). Techniques for extending mercy and forgiveness include amnesty or an apology (Irani, 1999: 14). An apology, for instance, is one component of a traditional reconciliation ceremony called the *sulh*, which is detailed in section 5.4 below.

While forgiveness in Arab/Muslim culture is not clearly defined, it has noteworthy benefits (Abu-Nimer and Nasser, 2013). Forgiveness is represented as an act of empowerment because those who have been transgressed against have the authority to decide whether to extend or withhold forgiveness (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 248; Bekdash, 2009; Soliman, 2009). Concisely, conflict resolution, in Arab/Muslim culture, does not mandate forgiveness, so stakeholders exercise a degree of free will and have the authority to decide whether it should be extended (Abu-Nimer and Nasser, 2013: 480; Bekdash, 2009; Soliman, 2009).

Within the frame of exercising mercy and forgiveness, Hisham Soliman (2009) articulates a "justice-compassion relationship." Paralleling Lederach's (1997) theory, the combination is hypothesized to advance resolution for the benefit of collective interests. Soliman writes:

> It is in the interest of the community and all its members to reintegrate the transgressors and wrongdoers through forgiveness; it is in everyone's interest to restore or maintain the smooth interaction between victim and offender. Offenders should not be isolated or alienated from the community, as this would hurt both them and the community in the long run (Soliman, 2009).

Justice, compassion and forgiveness are therefore combined through restorative justice, as the quote indicates, a practice asserted to "alleviate human suffering and build peace" (Soliman, 2009). Through the extension of mercy, Soliman suggests that suffering is ended and peace proliferated since transgressors are reintegrated back into society rather than being subjected to retributive justice.

In total, there are multiple similarities in how amnesty and forgiveness are perceived and practiced in the Arab/Muslim and Western traditions. First, the Western spiritual approach advocates forgiveness, as outlined in chapter 4, section 2.3.3. Next, there are cross-cultural similarities in terms of the tools utilized to acquire and extend forgiveness, such as the use of amnesty or an apology (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 244; Irani, 1999: 14; Safa, 2007: 10). Likewise, the notion of empowerment in terms of extending forgiveness finds its equivalent among Western scholars who argue that while forgiveness is preferred, victims should be permitted to determine whether they wish to forgive, and how justice (restorative or retributive) is pursued (4.3.11) (Lerche, 2000; Rosoux, 2009: 557; Rothfield, 2008: 19-20). Lastly, Soliman (2009) argues that the admixture of justice and compassion "resembles that of restorative justice in the modern Western discourse, which aims to repair broken social relationships between offenders, victims, and their communities." His quote emphasizes that the integration of justice and compassion, for the purpose of repairing relationships, is equally available in Western theory, as demonstrated in Lederach (1997) and Gopin's (2001: 88) call to harmonize mercy and justice in conflict resolutions processes.

5.3.2.6 Empowerment and inclusion

As just mentioned, social empowerment and inclusion are esteemed principles and practices of conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim tradition (Abdalla and others, 2002: 59; Abu-Nimer, 2000: 237-239; 2010: 78, 86-87). The literature defines empowerment as "[s]truggling against oppression (zulm), assisting the poor, and pursuing equality among all humans [which] are core religious values emphasized throughout the Qu'ran and *Hadith*" (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 237). The benefits of empowerment, denoted in Abu-Nimer's quote, are its potentiality to restore justice and equilibrium to an unjust and oppressive system. Abu-Nimer (2010: 77) goes on to state, "[e]conomic and social empowerment are so important in Islam that they are even equated with worshipping God." The quote accentuates the extraordinary value placed on empowerment in Arab/Muslim culture, while emphasizing their association with Islamic teaching.

Empowerment manifests in conflict resolution discourse in various manners, including empowering individuals to ensure justice is pursued and provided (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 233-236), allowing referents to decide whether to extend forgiveness (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 248; Bekdash, 2009; Soliman, 2009), and through traditional mechanisms which provide society with an opportunity to voice their opinion. Concerning the latter, the *Shura*, or "mutual consultation", is practiced at the community level in Arab/Muslim culture (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 256). It is a social practice that is "based on the principle of free consultation and genuine dialogue, reflecting equality in thinking and expression of opinion" (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 256). The quote underscores that the *Shura* is accessible to all community members, and thereby empowers them by providing an opportunity for individual expression (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 256-257). *Shura* is both an empowering and inclusive practice because voice is not limited to village elders or family representatives on this occasion, but is granted to all community members regardless of their status (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 256-257; 2010: 86-87).

By comparison, empowerment and inclusiveness are equally noted in Western literature, as outlined in chapter 3, section 3.5. On the one hand, Western scholars advocate empowerment of individuals when resolving conflict (Hermann, 2004: 40). In the context of Western theory, referents are empowered through practices such as consultation, a practice that allows them to express their needs and desires, and which ensures a broad and long-term resolution is established (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 30; Lederach, 1995: 14-15; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 49; Stover and others, 2005: 835-836). Lederach (1995: 15) likewise states that referents should be empowered to change the structural injustices that may exist. In cases where stakeholders are excluded or relations are asymmetrical, Western scholars hypothesize that a conflict resolution process is subject to rejection, setback and failure due to its restrictiveness in terms of depth and practices (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 30; Lederach, 1995: 14-15; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 49).

5.3.2.7 Dialogue

Miriam Sabirah Ashki (2006) claims dialogue is difficult to define across cultures because of linguistic differences. She supports this hypothesis noting the term dialogue "is often used incorrectly to describe forms of communication that are actually debates, negotiations, mediations, discussions" (Ashki, 2006: 4). Compounding confusion over lexicon just mentioned, Ashki emphasizes that forms of communication fluctuate. For instance: "A discussion may transform itself into constructive dialogue or escalate into a debate—or even an argument—and transition back to a dialogue" (Ashki, 2006: 18). Taking Ashki's

combination of intricacies, as outlined in the quotes, into consideration, she broadly defines dialogue as a constructive, "transformative" discussion in which referents "search for common ground, with the possibility of combined solutions" (Ashki, 2006: 7). These parameters are mirrored in Western prioritization of the principles of dialogue and truth.

During these discussions in pursuit of commonality and resolution, the author proclaims there are additional principles that must be observed in Arab/Muslim culture. Among them, Ashki (2006: 8) recommends that dialogue transpire in "a safe, neutral environment, which does not favor one individual or group over another." Ashki's quote suggests that neutrality and security are necessary preconditions for successful dialogue.

In addition, while engaged in dialogue, Ashki (2006: 7) claims that referents are expected to listen "with compassion" and observe the principles "of understanding, respect, acceptance of differences." The principles of compassion, understanding and so forth, mirror those advocated in the Western practices of active listening and dialogue. Combined, Arab/Muslim scholars denote that dialogue should incorporate principles including power symmetry (Ashki, 2006: 8), a (re-) humanization of the other (Ashki, 2006: 10) and enhanced self-awareness (Ashki, 2006: 15). The latter principles are likewise emphasized in our broad understanding of conflict resolution as articulated in the West, including references to cognitive transformation and power symmetry (chapter 3, section 3.3.1; chapter 4, section 3.9).

5.3.2.8 Third party intervention

Abu-Nimer (2008: 19) asserts a third party is "an integral part of peacebuilding intervention" and their task "is mainly to facilitate communication, reduce tension, and assist in rebuilding relationships." According to the quote, the third party is a facilitator that aids respondents on the path to conflict resolution. Western scholars similarly view third parties as essential components of conflict resolution, whose objective is equally to facilitate or direct improved relations (chapter 4, section 3.6). Nonetheless, dissenting views on the nature of the third party exist in Arab/Muslim literature.

On the one hand, Al-Ramahi (2008: 17, 23) emphasizes that mediators and arbitrators should exercise neutrality in their actions and decisions. Hence, the third party should take on a facilitative role and guide referents through the conflict resolution process (Abdalla and others, 2002: 37-38; Abu-Nimer, 2008: 19; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 17, 23). However, Arab/Muslim scholars place distinguishing limitations on third party neutrality. In particular, Abdalla and others (2002: 113) proclaim that third parties can only be neutral "so long as Islam is neutral." Since Islamic law and custom cannot be contradicted, third party neutrality is restricted, as

conflict resolution must adhere to Islamic principles and practices. For example, "if there is injustice, the mediator must stand for justice" (Abdalla and others, 2002: 113). As the quote summarizes, neutrality must be relinquished to uphold Islamic standards and to advance justice.

On the other hand, some Arab/Muslim scholars reject third party neutrality as a practice (Abdalla and others, 2002: 113; Irani, 1999: 5; Irani and Funk, 2000: 7-8). There are several reasons for its rejection. Firstly, Irani (1999: 5) hypothesizes that "neutral facilitators" are perceived as either secretly biased, or their facilitative work is perceived as impractical, since the Arab/Muslim cultural preference is for assertive and resourceful interveners who can provide advice, solutions and persuade referents. Succinctly, there is a cultural preference for "inside-partial mediators" with knowledge and authority, as they are familiar with the disputing parties and are more inclined to possess a basic understanding of the referents, and can more readily interject themselves, obtaining trust, legitimacy and providing solutions (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 137; Svensson and Lindgren, 2013: 701-702).

Moreover, Abu-Nimer (2010: 74) cautions that neutral facilitation can fortify the "status quo and preserv[e] asymmetric power relations." Such counterproductive outcomes are especially probable where injustices are present but overlooked in the interest of maintaining neutrality. Associated practices not only counter Islamic principles but also are counterproductive to the pursuit of conflict resolution. In these instances, neutral third parties fail to address structural issues that produced, and potentially could prolong, the conflict (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 74). For those reasons, Arab/Muslim scholars advocate third parties depart with neutrality and advance resolution by proffering solutions to problems, or possibly even pressure referents into a just resolution utilizing their intimate knowledge of, and relationship with, the referents (Funk and Said, 2004; Irani, 1999: 5; Irani and Funk, 2000: 7-8).

Amalgamated, there are similarities and divergences across and between Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations of third party intervention. On the one hand, avocation of the third party as a neutral facilitator corresponds with the theory of Western scholars, such as Ronald Fisher (2001a: 8, 19-20) and others (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 163; Stover and others, 2005: 857), outlined in chapter 4, section 3.6. However, there are stark differences in that third party neutrality is subjugated when Islamic (or religious) teachings and practices are being violated, whereas most Western scholars emphasize that sides should not be taken, or judgment and labels passed. According to the Arab/Muslim approach, neutrality is trumped by the primacy of Islamic principles and the practices it endorses.

Nevertheless, there is dissension over the relative value and necessity of neutral facilitation within and across both cultural approaches. For instance, R. Cohen (2004: 180) embraces a more active approach for interveners, who should use their authority and resources to direct a process. In this case, facilitation and neutrality are subject to compromise. Likewise, some Arab/Muslim scholars argue that third parties should not be neutral facilitators, since neutrality is allegedly unacceptable in Arab/Muslim culture. Contradicting Arab/Muslim theory, Gellman and Vuinovich (2008: 137) argue that Western intervention as a third party in cases involving predominantly Arab/Muslim countries has historically resulted in failure because the third parties were perceived as biased outsiders. The explanation offered for this trend is that, despite efforts to maintain a semblance of neutrality, the intervening Western party was perceived as biased. This perception of biasness, they argue, undermined the conflict resolution process. Albeit, perhaps Gellman and Vuinovich (2008) are over-emphasizing the importance of neutrality as a catalyst of past failure, and should instead contemplate the general perception of Western representatives as being perceived as illegitimate and untrustworthy brokers, which would ultimately produce comparable results.

Aware of the limitations of the outsider-impartial approach, Western scholars, such as Raymond Cohen (2004: 180) and Morton Deutsch (2005: 16), expand the Western framework of third party intervention beyond the impartial outsider by suggesting one possess necessary skills and inside knowledge of the parties and conflict. Equally relevant, Western scholars insist that neutrality will be difficult to acquire or maintain in some instances (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 216; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 35). Consequently, it appears some Western scholars would willfully marginalize impartiality for the benefit of promoting resolution. Consequently, while Western scholars prefer neutral facilitation, whether the intervener is an insider or outsider, some seemingly recognize that neutrality may not always be possible or advantageous. Arab/Muslim scholars are equally undecided on standards for third party intervention since some advocate neutrality while others criticize it.

5.3.2.9 Deeds

Deeds, defined as conscious, intentional actions, are more esteemed in Arab/Muslim culture than words, distinguished here as speech or rhetoric (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 249; 2010: 84)[76]. Emphasizing their significance, Abu-Nimer (2000) conjectures:

> Deeds are central in measuring the person's obligation in meeting the[ir] responsibilities. Similarly, the emphasis on "actions and doing" is

[76] Marsella (2005: 659) defines deeds as "non-verbal cues," while words are defined as "verbal cues."

> central in peacebuilding, particularly when parties attempt to go beyond the dialogue and exchange of opinions. Believing in the importance of behavioral changes and implementation of values through specific actions is a central factor that promotes peacebuilding and change. Moving the other by persuasion and allowing him the free will to make a choice are two important principles in Islam (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 249).

The quote emphasizes that actions carry more weight than rhetoric, especially in the context of conflict resolution, as practiced in Arab/Muslim culture (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 249; 2010: 84; Funk and Said, 2004: 22; Marsella, 2005: 659). Deeds reinforce words and demonstrate the capacity and willingness to change.

Arab/Muslim elevation of deeds, as a principle and practice, accentuates that rhetoric alone is insufficient for transforming relationships, perceptions or reciprocal behavior (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 249). Clearly stated, words must be reinforced by obvious and tangible action (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 249). In cross-cultural comparative terms, the behavioral aspect in conflict resolution is present in Western literature (Bar-Tal, 2000: 356; Kaufman, 2006: 212), notably as an aspect of cognitive transformation (3.3.3.1), in addition to scholarly emphasis on how behavioral typology tends to reinforce the quality of a given relationship (3.2). Likewise, Long and Brecke's (2003: 18-20, 111-116) "costly signaling model" accentuates the behavioral aspect in the theory that "costly" and "novel" actions pays high conciliatory dividends because those actions demonstrate a determination and ability to change (3.4.1.4.2). Hence, both Arab/Muslim and Western scholars emphasize the importance of deeds in conflict resolution.

5.3.2.10 Collective benefit

As repeatedly mentioned throughout this chapter, the Arab/Muslim approach to conflict resolution is suggested to prioritize collective benefit, whereas Western culture embraces mutual benefit directed toward stakeholders immediately engaged in conflict (Irani, 1999: 2-10; Irani and Funk, 2000: 20; Said and Funk, 2001). According to Arab/Muslim theory, collective identity and the influence of Islam demand communal interests trump the interest of individual stakeholders (Irani, 1999: 2-10; Irani and Funk, 2000: 20-21; Said and Funk, 2001). While Arab/Muslim comparative critiques fail to acknowledge that Western approaches to conflict resolution accommodates society, it was demonstrated that the social-psychological (4.2.2) and spiritual approaches (4.2.3) integrate the collective into their frameworks.

When considering mutual benefit, some Arab/Muslim scholars argue that mutually beneficial outcomes are inappropriate in Arab/Muslim culture (Irani, 1999: 2-10; Irani and Funk, 2000: 20-21; Said and Funk, 2001). This assumption is rooted in the role of Islam and

the interplay of other principles, including truth and justice. To illustrate functionality in Arab/Muslim understanding, if a conflict is asymmetrical in nature and effect, according to Islamic conflict resolution tradition, the power-wielder may not be entitled to benefit from the resolution process (Said and Funk, 2001). Instead, *Sharia* law, and/or societal norms, may dictate the aggressor be penalized for their actions as a means of restoring justice, on the one hand, and honor to those subjected to wrongdoing in particular and society in general, on the other (Said and Funk, 2001). Hence, Islam and tradition may warrant some form of punishment in asymmetrical relations (Said and Funk, 2001); a practice that ensures mutually beneficial solutions is implausible in some instances, because few referents, be they aggressor or not, would elect to endure punishment.

Arab/Muslim emphasis on establishing symmetry, as the example indicates, seemingly contradicts the Western preference for "win-win" resolution outcomes (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 62-75; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 12; Mitchell, 2002: 10; Reychler, 2002: 30; Wallensteen, 2007: 38-39). The Western prioritization of mutual benefit is argued invaluable in for advancing conflict resolution because it strengthens the probability of achieving a solution that is more likely to be accepted and upheld by stakeholders (Irani, 1999: 2-10; Irani and Funk, 2000: 20; Said and Funk, 2001). Nonetheless, the literature does not clarify how Arab/Muslim tradition manages asymmetrical relations and there is some dissention among Arab/Muslim scholarship. For example, some Arab/Muslim scholars note that traditional practices espouse "amicable resolution" (Abdalla and others, 2002: 30; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 12), which is argued capable of terminating dispute and undermining acts of vengeance (Tarabeih and others, 2009: 53). In these latter instances, mutually acceptable solutions appear to be tolerable, most likely under the condition that Islamic principles and practices are upheld.

However, if the predominant opinions expressed by Arab/Muslim scholars on this topic are accepted as representative, we must concluded that there are distinct cross-cultural differences concerning the prioritization of communal interests and collective benefit at the lower levels. Contrary, when the social-psychological and spiritual approaches to conflict resolution are considered, and the level in which Western resolution is theorized and practiced is shifted to the intrastate or interstate levels, there are potential parallels across cultures. On the one hand, conflict transformation theory, for example, would recommend consultation of society when resolving intrastate and interstate conflict. Under these conditions, mutual satisfaction of the resolution would be promoted through the incorporation of popular opinion. On the other hand, it is unclear how, or if, mutual satisfaction functions at higher levels when Islamic values and asymmetrical relations are inserted into the same equation, since traditional

theories and practices at this level do not exist. It should, nevertheless, be recalled that Abu-Nimer (2008: 4) insists that the principles and practices applied at the community level are applicable at all levels of conflict resolution.

Ultimately, Arab/Muslim literature is vague regarding how Islamic values and principles, including both justice and mercy, are balanced in cases of asymmetrical relations at any level. The literature indicates that regardless of the disproportional nature of the outcome, prioritization of conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim tradition is placed predominantly on upholding Islamic and communal norms and the restoration of harmony and justice to the community (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12). We will acquire more insight into the effects of Arab/Muslim practices at the community level, in the next section, when we explore the *sulh* process and how collective interest frequently undermines mutual benefit. Nevertheless, some Arab/Muslim scholars refer to mutually beneficial solutions. I deduce that as long as Islamic values are upheld, the community will accept the resolution process as proportional and appropriate regardless of the outcome. That said, asymmetrical resolution arrangements are practiced in Western and Arab/Muslim culture to varying degrees, for instance retributive justice can be applied in both cultures as part of a conflict resolution program without being perceived as violent by society at large. In this latter instance, punishment is distributed, although Western scholars recommend that parity between mercy and justice be established (Gopin, 2001: 88; Lederach, 1995: 20-21).

5.3.2.11 Compensation/restitution

Another principle advocated by Arab/Muslim conflict resolution tradition is compensation to those who have suffered wrongdoing (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 236; Bekdash, 2009). For instance: “Diyah (blood money), which obligates the family of the criminal offender to pay money to the victim’s family,” can be imposed (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 236). According to the literature, compensation, such as *Diyah* introduced in the quote, serves several purposes (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 236). First, it symbolically remunerates those who have suffered from wrongdoings committed by others (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 236). Second, compensation restores dignity and honor to those who have endured transgression (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 236). Finally, compensation or restitution penalizes those responsible for perpetrating transgressions, holding the wrongdoer(s) accountable for their actions through the provision of justice (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 236; Bekdash, 2009). Thus, compensation in Arab/Muslim understanding functions to ensure justice and accountability, as well as restore honor.

Western approaches likewise utilize restitution (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 30; Kriesberg, 2004: 100; Rosoux, 2009: 546). For instance, Abu-Nimer (2000: 236) asserts restitution, as theorized and practiced in the Middle East, mirrors that advocated and deployed in the West. Restitution is thereby an intricate part of conflict resolution in both Arab/Muslim and Western traditions.

5.3.2.12 Flexibility and adaptability

One final characteristic extracted from Arab/Muslim conflict resolution literature is flexibility. Scholars recognize that elasticity is essential for adapting and accommodating diverse interests and needs when resolving conflictual relationships (Abdalla and others, 2002: 134-135). Flexibility is, therefore, a component of Arab/Muslim conflict resolution practices. For example, many existing Arab/Muslim frameworks combine traditional and contemporary conflict resolution tools that can be utilized singularly or in tandem (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 131-132; Gulam, 2003: 11; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 59). Demonstrating the flexibility of Muslim conflict resolution programs, Hyder Gulam (2003: 11) declares there is a growing trend in predominantly Muslim countries throughout the world to create "hybrid" systems. Several countries in the Middle East, including Yemen, Jordan and Lebanon have created systems mentioned by Gulam (Safa, 2007: 4).

Scholars argue that the broadening of traditional Arab/Muslim conflict resolution frameworks produces two fundamental advantages (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 130-132; Gulam, 2003: 11). Firstly, Arab/Muslim societies have adapted their justice systems in a manner that upholds the precepts of Islam while integrating non-traditional practices which increases the potentiality and appeal of conflict resolution (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 130-132; Gulam, 2003: 11). Secondly, and related to the first, the synthesis of practices provided by the hybrid systems yields structural and practical flexibility since modern and traditional tools can be used in tandem or independently, depending on the demands of affected stakeholders (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 130-132; Gulam, 2003: 4). According to Magid Shihade, such hybrid systems are (cross-culturally) extremely accommodating since Arab/Muslims, Christians and Jews can utilize the range of tools to resolve conflict in a manner deemed acceptable to relevant stakeholders (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 130).

In comparative terms, accommodation and fraternization of diverse principles and techniques are similarly emphasized in Western literature (chapter 3, section 4.2), where the practice is advanced as a technique of expanding viability and acceptability of a resolution process (Bloomfield and others, 2003: 75, 154; Sarkin, 2008: 20-23; Snyder and Vinjamuri,

2004: 16, 33-34). In the West, for instance, scholars acknowledge that each conflict is unique and requires diverse approaches to advance resolution (Bar-On, 2005; Bekdash, 2009; Hinds and Oliver, 2009; Rifkind and Picco, 2014; Sarkin, 2008). Moreover, some recommend consultation with stakeholders to ensure utilization of tools and accommodation of needs when designing and implementing conflict resolution (Stover and others, 2005: 835). Consultation is likewise emphasized in the Middle East where scholars correspondingly recommend external interveners consult with Arab/Muslim stakeholders to identify their needs and expectations in context (Irani, 1999: 1-2). Flexibility is, thus, observable in both Arab/Muslim and Western approaches.

5.3.3 Cross-cultural comparative analysis of principles

The comparative analysis provided in this section demonstrates that Arab/Muslim approach shares many concepts, principles and practices with our broad Western framework. Despite the high degree of commonalities articulated hitherto, some Arab/Muslim scholars contend that Western conflict resolution theories and practices are unacceptable or problematic in Arab/Muslim culture (Irani, 1999: 1-8; Irani and Funk, 2000: 1-20; Said and Funk, 2001). According to these critics, existing differences connote momentous theoretical and practical divergences (Irani and Funk, 2000: 1-20). In fact, the degree of divergence suggested by these scholars lead them to suggest that Western and Middle East theory and practices have contradictory purposes (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18; Bar-On, 2005: 6; Funk and Said, 2004: 1; Irani, 1999: 2-10). However, I have demonstrated that Arab/Muslim comparative analyses hitherto frequently reduce Western conflict resolution to the structural approach, while simultaneously making direct references to Western conflict resolution/transformation schools of thought. However, aside from noting that Western scholars sometimes conceptualize conflict as positive and resolvable, deeper analyses of conflict resolution or conflict transformation theories are predominantly absent from cross-cultural comparisons made in Arab/Muslim literature. Considering the degree of homogeneity demonstrated in this chapter, I believe that preexisting comparative critiques overstate divergences due to their inappropriate reduction of Western theory to the structural approach alone.

According to these faulty analyses, the most frequently cited cross-cultural discrepancies denoted in the literature are the Arab/Muslim prioritization of community and religion (Irani, 1999: 2-10). Nevertheless, we have demonstrated that these components are accommodated when the Western social-psychological and spiritual approaches are factored into the comparative equation. We briefly summarize each once more to reinforce our conclusion.

Foremost, the community level at which conflict resolution is promoted and practice in Arab/Muslim culture is suggested non-viable in Western conflict resolution (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 219; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 128). However, the social-psychological and spiritual approaches accommodate society into their frameworks. Secondly, while religion is an inextricable component of conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim tradition, it is theoretically accommodated by the Western spiritual approach. While critics will argue that the issues then becomes one between Islam and Christianity, my later *Conclusions and Recommendations* chapter will argue that emphasis should be placed on the principles and norms as opposed to religious orthodoxies. In this manner, the principles and norms that are shared across these faiths can be prioritized while minimizing direct reference to religious dogma.

With that said, there are some fundamental conceptual and practical differences. Among them, we highlighted that honor is esteemed in Arab/Muslim tradition, while not openly denoted in Western theory. Similarly, there are divergences in how certain tools are applied. For instance, dialogue and third party intervention are principles that are embraced across cultures, but their implementation is subject to variations according to some scholars.

At the same time, there remains one contradiction that must be addressed in the context of our research. Due to Arab/Muslim concentration of conflict resolution at the group or familial level, there is no traditional mechanism available for dealing with conflict at the higher levels (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 219; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 128). Partially as a result, conflict resolution tools and practices, has generally been imported or imposed, and largely favoring a Western structural approach, which Arab/Muslim scholars claim is an imposition or unacceptable in context (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 137; Irani, 1999: 1-10). Imposition is equally perceived due to the false Western assumption that theories and practices are universally applicable (Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Flavin, 2013: 165). This supposition, and the imposition of external techniques, is naturally violent as it minimizes or eliminates inevitable cross-cultural dissimilarities while devaluing supplementary theories and practices that might otherwise be more appropriate in context (Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Flavin, 2013: 165; Irani, 1999: 1-5). There are obvious repercussions for imposing foreign practices, which were noted in the general critique of conflict resolution, in chapter 5, section 1.

In short, Western-advocated conflict resolution programs in the Middle East have repeatedly failed or been rejected by Arab/Muslim communities (Bar-On, 2005: 6-7; Funk and Said, 2004: 2; Irani, 1999: 1-10; Irani and Funk, 2000: 1-13; Said and Funk, 2001). This outcome is suggested to demonstrate that transferability is minimal. Incredulity is further

exacerbated by the qualified degree of Arab/Muslim suspicion of the West, which is a consequence of the deconstructive historical interaction, as traced in the first part of our thesis (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 21). Combined, inhabitants of the Middle East are either suspicious of or adverse to conflict resolution programs as promoted by countries in the West. These points emphasize the need for resolving conflict between Western and Middle Eastern culture, and simultaneously the necessity to uncover mutually acceptable means of practicing resolution.

However, in light of Arab/Muslim perceptions of incompatibility, buttressed by animosity and distrust of the West, third parties/stakeholders engaging Arab/Muslim stakeholders in conflict resolution, whether intrastate or interstate, should respect cross-cultural diversity by querying and accommodating Arab/Muslim societies politically, culturally and religiously when designing and implementing resolution processes (Irani, 1999: 1). Accommodation requires that conflict resolution programs consider indigenous opinions and utilize local practices rather than supplanting them with external incompatible or unacceptable theory and practices (Irani, 1999: 1-2). Rephrased, scholars argue that theories and practices implemented in the Middle East should be cognizant of, and acclimatize to, local needs and particularities to acclimatize to the unique cultural, historical and religious nuances prevalent in the region.

Simultaneously, Arab/Muslim scholars are calling for reform of their approaches. More specifically, the lack of theory and practices for resolving conflict at the higher levels, among other reasons, has led scholars to call for reform of how conflict resolution is theorized and practiced in the Arab/Muslim culture. The next subsection briefly summarizes these calls for reform and outlines some of the challenges they acknowledge hampers modification.

5.3.4 Reform and revision

Arab/Muslim scholars argue that traditional systems and practices need to be revised and expanded to increase their viability in contemporary social and political conditions. For example, Abu-Nimer (2008: 3) argues scholars and religious leaders need to (re-) evaluate and adapt Muslim traditional approaches at all levels. In his opinion, Islamic conflict resolution has not attained its fullest potential as further theory and alterations are imperative (Abu-Nimer, 2008: 3). One significant practical void in traditional Arab/Muslim conflict resolution strategies, noted above, is the absence of theory and practices that can be operationalized at the intrastate and interstate levels (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 219; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 128). This vacuum, Abu-Nimer (2000: 219) hypothesizes, could be filled by adapting and modifying practices from outside Arab/Muslim tradition. Adaptation of externally adopted theory and practices could, it is argued, could aid in the creation of a cross-culturally

accommodative process at the higher levels (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 219; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 128). According to Abu-Nimer, adaptation and modification of external practices would circumvent the need for Islamic clerics, scholars and/or policymakers to reinvent conflict resolution to function at this level, since theory and tools could be cherry-picked from external sources and tailored to produce culturally, socially and politically applicable and acceptable techniques within the Muslim context.

Similarly, reform is also called for at the societal level. By way of example, Huda (2010a: 211) suggests that the traditional approach of using local arbiters, who are not educated in practices such as conflict analysis and negotiations, should be reconsidered and revised. Accordingly, valuable knowledge and skills could be imparted and institutionalized, a process that is argued capable of increasing the effectiveness of conflict resolution at the societal level. Among additional priorities identified, Huda (2010b: 217-221) stresses the need to promote general understanding of conflict resolution among religious and community leaders, and simultaneously provide them with the skills necessary for intervening in conflict. Skills thought beneficial include conflict mediation, negotiation, management and other expertise whereby conflict prevention, resolution and transformation can be dispersed into local leadership and thereafter the community (Huda, 2010b: 220). Nevertheless, implementing comparable reforms, at any level, are complicated by contemporary internal and external social, political, economic and historical factors that undermine the propensity for change.

Among the hindrances to reform outlined in the literature, scholars suggest that prominent political and social practices, including authoritarian governing structures, the lack of accountability, the suppression of populations and their rights, the promotion of social and political nepotism and identity-base loyalties, undermine both implementation of existing peacebuilding processes and their potential to undergo alteration (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 76; Huda, 2010b: 212). To elaborate on one example, Abu-Nimer (2010: 76) suggests the educational system in many Arab/Muslim countries is insufficient for promoting peacebuilding, due to copious problems including the lack of "economic resources or deliberate political policy." The quote emphasizes that the resources necessary to change or advance conflict resolution is absent or marginalized, while religious leaders and institutions essential to altering, developing and proliferating conflict resolution are frequently compelled by political leaders to promote the regime through corruption or pressure (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 76). These circumstances undercut religious leaders' duty to advance improvements that would benefit society.

Equally problematic, and related, religious (*madrasa*) educational frameworks are suggested to be outdated and in need of reform (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 76; Huda, 2010b: 212). However, in many instances, scholars contend that religious leaders are disinterested in relinquishing the *status quo* because change might undermine their authority and/or that of political leaders, or out of fear of change (Abu-Nimer, 2010: 76; Huda, 2010b: 212). These challenges compromise efforts to reform, at all levels.

Despite the challenges noted, Huda (2010a: 210) optimistically suggests that the underdeveloped and heterogeneous nature of conflict resolution in the Islamic tradition presents opportunities. According to his optimistic perspective, Arab/Muslim theory and practice is ripe for change. However, like his colleagues, it is recognized that the greatest challenge is to convince politicians and religious leaders of its necessity. At the same time, it is cautioned that as adaptations of theory and practice are approved and implemented through reform, the process must adhere to Islamic principles and traditions, and that local stakeholders be engaged to direct developments (Huda, 2010b: 218). Accordingly, concepts and practices could be modified or established that accommodate and represent the societies they are designed to represent (Huda, 2010b: 218). In short, desired reforms are necessary at all levels, but adherence to Islam and local ownership must be assured.

Subsequent to the review of concepts, principles, tools, and the call for reform, the next section explores one unique conflict resolution technique available in Arab/Muslim culture: the *sulh*. Outlining this traditional practice demonstrates how conflicts are resolved at the community level. At the same time, the overview reiterates cross-cultural parallels of many of the principles and practices.

5.4 The *sulh* ceremony

To contain violence and feud at the familial-clan level, Arab/Muslim communities use an informal traditional ritual called a *sulh*, which is often translated into English as “settlement” (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 2; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 129-130; Irani, 1999: 2, 11-17; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 80). According to the literature, the *sulh* is a two-thousand-year-old practice that remains a cornerstone of conflict resolution in the contemporary Middle East (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 131), and is encouraged by the Qu’ran (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 10). This traditional technique offers an alternative to, or can function in conjunction with, the *Sharia* judicial system in circumstances where formal arbitration is not desired/or is deemed insufficient (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 11; Pely, 2009: 80; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 53-54).

Historically, the *sulh* has fallen under the control of "chieftains (sheikhs), soothsayers and healers (kuhhān), and influential noblemen [who] played an indispensable role as arbiters in all disputes within the tribe or between rival tribes" (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 4). Due to their elevated position in the community, the men denoted in the quote have wielded significant degrees of authority in matters of conflict. However, the relative value of verdicts rendered by these community representatives is subject to interpretation. While considered "final," they are "not legally enforceable," but contrary represent "an authoritative statement as to what the customary law was or should be and later of Islamic principles" (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 4). Thus, verdicts proffered by community representatives during a *sulh* should be accepted and implemented, although, aside from indirect pressure exerted from the representatives and the community (detailed below), these individuals lack the capacity to enforce decisions.

Despite these limitations, Al-Ramahi (2008: 11) insists that the *sulh* is usually preferred in Arab/Muslim culture over judicial practices because a "trial process is not regarded as an ultimate truth-finding mechanism that will lead to substantive justice." Justification provided articulating the perceived weaknesses of judicial practices include that they "can be tainted and subverted by the imperfect nature of man, [and] therefore, it should be avoided when possible" (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 11). According to the quote, formal judicial practices are criticized because their primary actors (judges, arbitrators) are subject to bias and probable to impose decisions that oppress referents, which preserve the conflict (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 11). Broadening criticism, Tarabeih and others (2009: 54) add that formal judicial procedures are frequently time-consuming and unappealing. By comparison, a *sulh* offers a viable alternative and is considered superior since it is rooted in tradition.

According to the literature, the overall objective of a *sulh* is to generate compromise, mediation and harmony for the benefit of the community (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 10-11; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136). To this end, the traditional practice espouses "an amicable resolution" among conflicting referents (Abdalla and others, 2002: 30; Al-Ramahi, 2008: 12), which is designed to terminate dispute and undermine acts of vengeance (Tarabeih and others, 2009: 53). Amicability, as utilized here, suggests that the resolution is mutually acceptable to stakeholders and the community. In addition to terminating hostility, the *sulh* should also restore honor and dignity to those families involved in a conflict (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 128-130, 146; Irani, 1999: 11-17; Özçelik, 2007: 9-13; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 53-54). Since honor and shame are fundamental components of identity and culture in the Middle East, as emphasized previously, these issues must likewise be addressed when resolving a conflict (Irani, 1999: 1, 10; Wyatt-Brown and Fontan, 2005). Because of its informal

structure, and emphasis on amicability and conciliation, the *sulh* is more appealing compared to judicial procedures.

Nevertheless, there are reported variations in how a *sulh* is implemented across Muslim communities (Safa, 2007: 4) and which outcomes are expected. Concerning the latter, Irani (1999: 11-17) identifies two forms of *sulh*: a public and private version, although he denotes only minute differences between the two versions. The most obvious differences between the versions are that the public *sulh* can be performed in instances where wrongdoers have not been identified (Irani, 1999: 12). Contrariwise, a private *sulh* is viable only when both the wrongdoer(s) and their crime(s) have been disclosed (Irani, 1999: 12). Forsaking discussion on the vaguely articulated differences between the versions, the following subsections outline and analyze the basic steps of a *sulh* process.

5.4.1 Steps of the *sulh*

Mneesha Gellman and Mandi Vuinovich (2008: 136-138) summarize three primary steps of the *sulh*. These include the establishment of the "*jaha*" (a mediating body); the brokering of the "*hodna*" (or truce); and the "*sulh*" ceremony. The consecutive steps are traced below to illustrate the process and its guiding principles[77]. Our analysis begins with the establishment of the *jaha*.

In most instances, the *jaha* is formed after the family of an offender approaches a community elder, requesting their intervention in a conflict on their family's behalf (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 82). Impetuous for the offending family to approach community elders to resolve an outstanding conflict is not simply rooted in the desire to terminate the conflict, but to restore their family's honor (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Pely, 2009: 82). Hence, family interest in resolving a conflict and restoring their honor is suggested to drive an individual to request *jaha* intervention.

In extreme cases, a *jaha* can be organized independently, whereupon the *jaha* has the authority to approach an offender's family unsolicited to make a formal request of pursuing conflict resolution, especially in cases where the body believes that the family should have already contacted them to mediate an ongoing conflict (Pely, 2009: 82-83). Thus, although the offending family normally requests *jaha* intervention, a *jaha* can be formed, and has the authority, to apply pressure on a reluctant family when it recognizes that conditions are deteriorating and a request for mediation is unlikely to be immediately forthcoming (Pely,

[77] Pely (2009) provides a detailed account of the *sulh* ritual as it is practiced in Israel.

2009: 82-83). In these instances, community interest drives the *jaha* to intervene to terminate and resolve the conflict for the benefit of community interests (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 82-83).

Before examining the *jaha's* function, it is imperative to denote the body's composition. A *jaha* is composed of the upstanding—defined as honest, decent and moral—men from within the community (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 82; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 54-55). Its members are not neutral outsiders, but respected and recognized partial insiders whom have knowledge of the conflict particularities and the referents involved (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Pely, 2009: 82). The significance of their composition is obvious, because the credibility and legitimacy of *jaha* members is rooted in their position within the community and through bonds of kinship (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19). *Jaha* members, however, are not expected to possess specific educational background, training, skills or even experience (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 55), because their moral and social position within the community is deemed sufficient for mediating.

To ensure its capacity to mediate, the size of a *jaha* committee is also flexible, and is generally determined by the severity of the conflict at hand (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Pely, 2009: 82). Flexibility in size and composition likewise ensures that the *jaha* possesses a degree of influence over conflicting parties (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Pely, 2009: 82). Notably, *jaha* size must correspond to the degree of authority thought necessary to guide mediation or coerce referents into resolution should this be deemed necessary (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 82-83). After all, the *jaha's* objective is not centered on promoting individual-family interests, but on the re-establishment of familial dignity and social harmony (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19-20). Finally, its tenure is flexible and is dependent upon the complexity of the conflict. Consequently, a *jaha's* function can last for a minimum of a day to a maxim of several years (Pely, 2009: 84).

Returning our attention to the function of the *jaha*, subsequent to its establishment following a request by the offending family or spontaneous intervention, its first task is to acquire the offended family's agreement to their mediation (Pely, 2009: 82). To obtain this endorsement, the *jaha* approaches the offended family and requests them to transfer responsibility for the conflict to the committee (Pely, 2009: 82). When forthcoming, acceptance of responsibility to the *jaha* symbolically transfers liability to the group, an act that is suggested to motivate the *jaha* to resolve the issue since it has assumed a stake in the conflict (Pely, 2009: 82). The literature suggests that not only is the burden of the conflict

symbolically transferred from the affected families and onto *jaha* members, but also the shame associated with the conflict (Pely, 2009: 82).

Following assumption of responsibility, the next task of the *jaha* is to instill a *hodna* (or truce) to guarantee a (temporary) termination of violence between stakeholders (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 137-138; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 83). Thus, in some instances, the process of conflict resolution at the community level begins before the conflict has actually been terminated (Pely, 2009: 82-83). Cross-cultural divergence is obvious here. Although some Western scholars hypothesize conflict resolution can hasten conflict termination (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 72; Kriesberg, 2003: 332; Reimann, 2004: 5), it was highlighted that numerous Western scholars believe that conflict termination should occur before a process of conflict resolution is undertaken (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 138; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 76-77; Bar-Tal, 2000: 361; Kelman, 2004: 114; Long and Brecke, 2003: 11; Rosoux, 2009: 553).

Nevertheless, to reach agreement on a truce, *jaha* mediators utilize "shuttle diplomacy, akin to [Western] mediation" to negotiate a(n) (temporary) end to the conflict (Pely, 2009: 83). In some instances, the progress of shuttle mediation may be buttressed by requiring the offending family to provide some form of immediate restitution to the victim's family (Pely, 2009: 83). The gesture functions as symbolic restitution proffered in remorse, and is likewise a valuable leveraging mechanism for encouraging the offended family to agree to a truce and pursue settlement (Pely, 2009: 83).

Once a truce has been negotiated, the *jaha* commences its fact-finding mission (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 137-138; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 52). Through consecutive, usually independent, meetings with affected referents and their families, the jaha reconstructs the truth about what occurred (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 137-138; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 83; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 52). The advantage of privately held meetings is that referents can recount events, and express themselves freely, to the *jaha* without escalating tensions or offending their counterparts (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 137-138; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 83; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 52).

Consequently, while performing its truth seeking duties, the *jaha* utilizes practices akin to nonviolent communication (Pely, 2009: 86-87). For instance, *jaha* members listen to, and then "reframe aggressive statements," which "allow[s] the disputing clans to vent their emotions" without escalating tensions. The quote demonstrates the *jaha* censors and reformulates the quality of information exchanged between referents to deescalate tensions, and in this manner, provides a benign outlet for the expression of frustration and anger (Pely, 2009: 86). In addition to the principle of nonviolent communication, *jaha* work is also directed by the

principles of truth, the restoration of honor and dignity, and maintenance of confidentiality (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136-138; Pely, 2009: 83-87; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 51-54). Deploying its indirect approach, the *jaha* reconstructs events and determines facts about the conflict and its implications on stakeholders (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 137-138; Pely, 2009: 83). These truths are later used to determine parameters for conflict resolution.

Once events have been reconstructed and facts determined, the *jaha* negotiates with referents to identify an acceptable resolution to the conflict (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136-140; Pely, 2009: 83-87). During negotiations, the *jaha* has the authority to determine or negotiate "appropriate compensation" for wrongdoing committed, whose quality and quantity is concluded utilizing the information gleaned during fact-finding (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 86). Similarly, prior precedent may also be discussed to determine appropriate settlement arrangements (Pely, 2009: 86). Thus, the *jaha* usually negotiates settlements with referents, but it likewise possesses the authority to impose conditions, which can incorporate retributive or restorative justice practices, ranging from reparations to alternative forms of sanctioning, if deemed appropriate (Irani, 1999: 12). According to Arab/Muslim scholars, the incorporation of compensation or restitution "create[s] a climate for reconciliation" (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138). As emphasized above (5.3.2.11), and in the previous quote, compensation provides restitution and justice, while ensuring accountability and restoring honor.

Following acceptance/determination of the agreement, a *sulh* ceremony is conducted (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-139; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 85-86). The ceremony includes the families of the offended and the offender, and is performed before the community to publicly demonstrate that the conflict has been resolved (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-140; Pely, 2009: 85-86). One component of the ceremony is a public handshake between former adversaries, which signifies a termination of hostilities and the establishment of a non-conflictive relationship (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 85). In some instances, reparations might also be paid publicly to restore honor to affected families (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-140; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 54).

The final act of the *sulh* is a symbolic meal hosted by the offending family (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-139; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 85-86). The event again demonstrates conciliation between families, and is a pertinent tradition in Arab/Muslim culture (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-139; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 85-86), as sharing a meal symbolizes hospitality and friendship (Ashki, 2006: 19; Gellman and

Vuinovich, 2008: 138-139; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 85-86). At the conclusion of a *sulh* process, Gellman and Vuinovich (2008: 138) summarize "honor" is restored and "forgiveness" granted, although this degree of conciliation is not guaranteed.

In terms of outcome, Irani (1999: 12) asserts there are two possibilities: a total and a partial. A total *sulh* permanently ends the conflict with the stakeholders agreeing not to hold grudges against one another (Irani, 1999: 12). In its robust form, a definitive agreement is reached and the relationship is transformed with a pledge that everything will be forgiven (Irani, 1999: 12; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12). Referents subsequently approach their former adversary in a constructive manner (Irani, 1999: 12; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12). The inclusion of forgiveness and transformation among former adversaries corresponds with positive peace as articulated in the West (Galtung, 1969: 183-184; Kriesberg, 2004: 85). Comparatively, a *sulh* in its partial or conditional format terminates a conflict "according to conditions agreed upon during the settlement process" (Irani, 1999: 12). While the conditions denoted by Irani are negotiated by the *jaha* and affected stakeholders, forgiveness among referents is not expressed (Irani, 1999: 12). The partial *sulh* establishes negative peace, with referents consenting to non-violently coexist, but not to forgive (Irani, 1999: 12).

5.4.2 Weaknesses

While a beneficial technique for resolving conflict, there are multiple weaknesses attributed to a *sulh* articulated in the literature (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 140; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 55). We briefly examine eight of them. Foremost, the process does not address the "root causes of conflict" but restores harmony/order to the community (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 140; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 55). While facts are found, restitution made and relationships improved to varying degrees, the process fails to challenge structural violence because it is not designed to alter preexisting social, political, or economic structures that produce the conflict, but rather seeks to terminate a conflict for the benefit of the greater community (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-141). Hence, in general terms, a *sulh* is a more akin to conflict management than resolution or transformation.

Second, and linked to the first, a *sulh* minimally "recalibrates communities for peaceful coexistence" (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 140). As denoted in the quote, while violent hostilities cease and relationships are symbolically restored, in some instances, the arrangement only produces negative peace (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-139). Summarily, a *sulh* does not guarantee a complete transformation of the quality of the relationship (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-139). As a consequence, resentment can

persist in instances where only nonviolent coexistence is produced, which can hypothetically lead to a continuation of conflict behavior in the future (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 138-139; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 55).

Third, while Al-Ramahi (2008: 11-12) criticizes arbitration for its vulnerability to bias, he likewise notes two advantages arbitration has over a *sulh*. First, arbitration can be utilized prior or subsequent to the development of a conflict (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 11-12). Thus, arbitration is proactive and can settle issues before a conflict develops. Alternatively, a *sulh* is reactive since it can only be implemented subsequent to the manifestation of a conflict (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 12; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 55). A second advantage of arbitration over the *sulh* is that the disputing parties accept third party involvement and its decisions are binding (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 11-12; Pely, 2009: 86). By comparison, *jaha* members are not selected and its decisions are not formally binding (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 12; Pely, 2009: 86). Nonetheless, as mentioned, Pely (2009: 86) argues the decisions of a *jaha* can be indirectly imposed through pressure exerted by the community and its elders. For instance, when a family does not abide by the *jaha's* decision, their reluctance can bring shame to the family (Pely, 2009: 86). This pressure thereby provides a degree of enforcement.

The potential to pressure referents introduces a fourth weakness of a *sulh* process, namely the leveraging capacity wielded by the *jaha* and the community (Pely, 2009: 82-83). J*aha* authority, on the one hand, is acquired by its members' position within the community, while its actions are performed in the service of restoring community harmony and family honor, on the other hand (Pely, 2009: 82-83; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 59). The combination functions to pressures families to participate in a *sulh*, since rejection risks placing additional shame upon those involved (Pely, 2009: 82-83). Providing insight, Pely (2009: 83) claims "taking too long to authorize the *Jaha* to act may appear to be a sign of disrespect to the offender's family." Pely's quote demonstrates that social pressure is indirectly applied on referents to force participation or adhere to the *sulh* since the interests of the community are considered more important than those of the individual or their families (Pely, 2009: 82-83, 86). Therefore, (indirect) pressure is applied to promote and enforce a *sulh* process.

A sixth criticism leveled at the *sulh* is its gender bias (Pely, 2009: 82). More specifically, females are not permitted to serve as *jaha* representatives (Pely, 2009: 82). Since Arab/Muslim culture is patriarchal, positions of authority are reserved for males. Females are, however, allowed to interact with the *jaha* during its mediation processes (Pely, 2009: 82). This is problematic in context, as Arostegui (2013: 535) denotes, since women are essential to peacebuilding, as they frequently possess the influence necessary to proliferate peace within

their communities. While patriarchal tendencies found in predominately Arab/Muslim societies draws criticism (Ahmed-Ghosh, 2003: 1-14; Mukhopadhyay and Singh, 2007), Lerche (2000) and Reimann (2004: 17) argue that gender bias likewise exists in Western conflict resolution strategies.

Seventh, and relevant in the context of this research, the *sulh* is not open to individuals outside the community (Kilcullen, 2009: 169). While it is impossible for outsiders to participate in an official *sulh* process, Kilcullen (2009: 169) explains that some coalition military commanders in Iraq, who were aware of the *sulh* practice and its cultural importance, "emulated" certain aspects of its processes in an unofficial manner as a gesture of respect and goodwill toward communities under their jurisdiction (Kilcullen, 2009: 169). These unofficial acts engendered local appreciation and respect among Iraqis and their tribal representatives (Kilcullen, 2009: 169). For example, restitution and apologies were offered in the spirit of *sulh* to advance reconciliation between the occupying forces and the indigenous population. However, official *sulh* processes are not open to individuals outside the community.

The final weakness of the *sulh* noted herein is that the mechanism, in its traditional form, is incapable of being utilized at the intrastate and interstate levels (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 140-141; Irani, 1999: 14; Kilcullen, 2009: 169). The *sulh* is specifically designed as a conflict resolution strategy at the community level, and has no efficacy at the higher levels. However, Arab/Muslim scholars petition that the *sulh* be adapted to function at higher levels (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 140-141). Adaptation requires qualified Muslim political and religious decision-makers to agree on its necessity, and then decide how the process could be adapted within the confines of Islamic principles and practices to function at the higher levels (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 140-141; Irani, 1999: 14). As noted in section 5.3.4, there are numerous impediments to securing the desired quality of reform, but scholars remain optimistic that change will eventually occur.

5.4.3 Comparative analysis of principles and techniques

To finalize our comparative analysis of Arab/Muslim and Western conflict resolution techniques, the *sulh* is a unique practice for moderating conflictive behavior and resolving conflict at the community level (Gerner, 2004: 86; Irani, 1999: 11-17; Özçelik, 2007: 9-12; Pely, 2009: 80). Its primary goals of terminating conflict and transforming relations (Gerner, 2004: 86; Pely, 2009: 86-87) are paralleled in Western theory. In addition to sharing objectives, cultures also share tools (Pely, 2009: 86-87). For example, mediation is used by the *jaha* to negotiate a truce and the terms of the resolution, as well as shuttle negotiations and

nonviolent communication (Pely, 2009: 86-87). These practices are equally applied in Western traditions (Pely, 2009: 86-87).

Additional cross-cultural similarities are emphasized by Pely (2009), who summarizes:

> The fact-finding, deliberations and verdict stages [of the *sulh*] are more like arbitration, with touches of mediation. For example, although the *Jaha* determines the facts and decides the verdict (like arbitration), it will avoid coming up with a verdict that would not be acceptable to both disputants. Its goal is to generate a narrative that both sides can agree with (like mediation), as well as an acceptable verdict that both families will abide by. It will negotiate the verdict with a family that is dissatisfied with the verdict (Pely, 2009: 86).

The quote emphasizes that Arab/Muslim practices during the *sulh* have equivalences in the West, and the mechanisms are driven by compatible principles, including the pursuit of truth, justice and mutual acceptance of an agreement. Once again, it should be recalled that embraced principles must follow the edicts of Islam and cultural traditions. Therefore, mutual benefit may not always be applicable in some instances (5.3.2.10). Nevertheless, our analysis demonstrates that many principles and practices utilized in the *sulh* are shared across cultures.

That said dissimilarities between the *sulh* and most Western approaches are equally observable. Dissimilarities can be reduced to the level at which resolution is approached, the importance of religion, and the characteristics of third parties interveners. Firstly, the *sulh* is implemented at the community level (Gerner, 2004: 86) rather than being limited to those directly involved—with the latter being a practice suggested most common in the West (Irani, 1999: 2-3; Irani and Funk, 2000: 29-30). Concentration at this level underscores that conflict resolution is traditionally conducted for the benefit of the community. However, as explained above, the Western social-psychological and spiritual approaches accommodate the societal level, unlike the structural approach.

Equally relevant, it was denoted that Arab/Muslim techniques for resolving conflict are absent at the higher levels (5.3.3), an actuality that prompts some scholars to call for an adaptation of existing traditional techniques to fill this practical void (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 219; Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 128). By re-conceptualizing and adapting of existing theory and processes, Gellman and Vuinovich (2008: 139) argue that the *sulh* could be modified to accommodate conflict resolution at the higher levels. They partially base their conclusion on the fact that there is overlap between Western and Islamic principles and practices, whereupon cross-cultural compatibly at the higher levels could be established under the appropriate conditions and guidelines (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 142-144). As revealed (5.3.4), reform would require religious experts contemplate and design hybrid tools and practices that

could accommodate the higher level, adhere to local needs and religious traditions, in addition to accommodate external actors (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 142-144). Hence, while many principles and practices are shared across cultures, care would have to be taken when designing mechanisms for resolving conflict at the higher levels.

The second broad cross-cultural difference between the sulh and Western practices concerns the roles of religion. More specifically, religious practices and traditions are fundamental to Arab/Muslim conflict resolution (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19). These elements are hypothesized absent from Western theory and practice (Irani, 1999: 1-10). However, we again reiterate that this assumption is made when comparing the Arab/Muslim practices with Western structural method alone. It has been demonstrated that the Western spiritual approach theoretically accommodates the influence of religion and offers an increased degree of cross-cultural compatibility compared to the structural approach. The spiritual approach thus shares some commonality in terms of conceptualizations and practices, which suggests that this approach might be most effective for bridging existing differences.

Lastly, there are cross-cultural discrepancies concerning the role of third party interveners. Foremost, the *jaha* are not neutral third parties, which contradicts the Western preference for neutral facilitation (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19; Funk and Said, 2004; Irani and Funk, 2000: 7-8). Instead, members of the *jaha* are partial, influential insiders recognized within the community (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136; Pely, 2009: 82). Their authority is rooted in their social position (Pely, 2009: 82-83). Next, *jaha* members are unlikely to possess skills, unlike the training and experience preferred by Western counterparts (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 19; Tarabeih and others, 2009: 55). Untrained and inexperienced mediators in the West would be considered unacceptable, although it was demonstrated that some Western scholars are open to inside partial mediation.

Amalgamated, we conclude that Western and Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict resolution, as articulated in the respective literature, generally converge when a broad Western understanding of conflict resolution is applied. Succinctly stated, we believe there are more similarities than differences when the Western structural, spiritual and social-psychological approaches are compared to Arab/Muslim principles and practices. It is, therefore, concluded that Hypothesis 2 is confirmed when my wide framework of comparative analysis is utilized. Nevertheless, while we have qualified more cross-cultural similarities than differences in terms of concepts, principles and tools, we do not wish to diminish the quality of divergences. Contrary, we emphasize that these divergences should be considered and respected. Our conclusion is simply that scholars frequently overstate cross-cultural divergences because of

the narrow comparative frameworks utilized. This is especially true when conflict resolution is contemplated at the higher levels.

5.5 Conclusion

The objective of the present chapter was to comparatively analyze conflict resolution, as articulated by Arab/Muslim scholars in the English language, to qualitatively measure its cross-cultural compatibility with our Western framework articulated. Our cross-cultural comparison is fundamental to counter scholarly criticism that conflict resolution is frequently implemented uncritically, while re-testing if Western theory and practices are radically different or inapplicable across cultures (noted in chapter five, section one). Concerning the latter, chapter five tests Hypothesis 2, which states that Western and Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict resolution, as articulated in the respective literature, generally converge when a broad Western framework of conflict resolution is applied. Overall, our comparison demonstrates that there are copious lexical, theoretical and practical convergences across Arab/Muslim and Western cultures when comparisons incorporate the Western social-psychological and spiritual approaches.

Consequently, the theoretical advantage of our approach is its use of a framework that is wider than most when comparatively analyzing Western and Arab/Muslim theory. More specifically, we extend our comparisons beyond the Western structural approach, by integrating the social-psychological and spiritual approaches found in Western discourse. Despite Arab/Muslim scholars/practitioners' occasional reference to Western theory associated with these schools of thought, for instance John Paul Lederach, they fail to justly articulate and contextualize any approach aside from the Western structural approach. The obvious theoretical exceptions, which are only mentioned to emphasize cross-cultural divergence, are the Arab/Muslim insistence that most Western scholars believe that a conflict can have a positive dimension and can be resolved.

Aside from these references to conflict resolution and conflict transformation theories, no other theories or practices are deeply analyzed by Arab/Muslim comparisons. For example, the religious and/or social elements of these approaches are not mentioned. In short, Arab/Muslim literature written in the English language discount essential theory associated with the social-psychological and spiritual approaches through their crude reduction of Western theory to the structural approach. Such crude theoretical reductions diminish salient commonalities between Arab/Muslim and Western theory and practice. However, we re-qualify the degree of cross-cultural commonality by comparing Arab/Muslim lexicon,

principles and practices with our broad Western framework, which includes the social-psychological and spiritual approaches. In this manner, we are able to increase the number of similarities between Arab/Muslim and Western theory, by marginalizing several fundamental criticisms generally proffered by Arab/Muslim critiques. Accordingly, we challenge the theoretical assumption that Western and Arab/Muslim traditions of conflict resolution are incompatible or possess contradictory purposes. While this hypothesis stands when only the structural approach is considered, it is weakened when all three Western approaches are considered.

The present chapter opened with a general overview of theoretical and practical differences between the Arab/Muslim and Western approaches according to Arab/Muslim scholars. The first section underscored how historical, religious and cultural nuances influence the way conflict, conflict resolution and peace are conceptualized and practiced by Arabs and Muslims. At this time, it was noted that Arab/Muslim culture is a "traditional" and "high context" culture, implying characteristics such as patriarchy, indirect communication and the prioritization of collective unity and interests over those of the individual. Among these divergences, we concentrated on how identity and religion influence the manner in which conflict resolution is conceptualized and practiced. Religion and identity were addressed because both points are commonly included in Arab/Muslim critical assessments of Western practices, and because such cultural norms are a consequence of the regional historical developments outlined in the first part of the thesis.

In this context, it was first demonstrated that tribal/community based identity affects Arab/Muslim societal norms in numerous and complex manners. Most notably, conflict in the Arab/Muslim context is not limited to individuals directly involved, but is perceived to affect families or clans as a collective. Contrary, Western society is suggested to prioritize the individual. Since collective welfare is prioritized in Arab/Muslim culture, it has an impact on the means by which conflict resolution is conceptualized and practiced. Unsurprisingly, mechanisms for resolving conflict are implemented at the community level. Simultaneously, traditional principles utilized to advance conflict resolution have a well-established history and continue to be taught to children and observed across generations. The combination of traditions, religious decrees, principles and practices are self-reinforcing, ensuring that conflict continues to be managed or resolved at the community level.

Traditional and religious norms likewise promote a balance between collective interests, justice and peace. For example, while Arab/Muslim culture accommodates retribution as a response to conflict, nonviolent resolution is preferred since communal welfare is prioritized

over the interests of the individuals/families immediately engaged in the conflict. Thus, conflicts are resolved for the benefit of the collective, while the interests of those engage in the conflict are relegated. As a consequence, Arab/Muslim implementation of conflict resolution at the community level is correctly noted as contradicting the Western structural approach. However, the social-psychological and spiritual approaches accommodate conflict resolution among communities or societies, a theoretical oversight found in most Arab/Muslim literature analyzed herein, since these Western approaches are usually marginalized during cross-cultural comparisons.

Next, we established how Islam is an inextricable component of Arab/Muslim culture, and thereby of conflict resolution. Nonetheless, Islam, in combination with other cultural norms, prioritizes conflict resolution for the benefit of the collective, and delineates tools and principles of the process. Within Islamic teachings and practices, certain principles, including justice, truth and forgiveness, are emphasized as a means of restoring order to society and advancing justice. In cross-cultural comparative terms, religion is largely absent from the mainstream Western structural approach, while the Western spiritual approach theoretically accommodates religion in general, and religious principles, namely mercy and forgiveness, in particular. This actuality, however, is not acknowledged by most cross-cultural comparative analyses conducted hitherto.

With religion and the level of approach addressed, focus then turned to defining relevant terms and concepts associated with conflict resolution theory and practice. Our comparative analysis of lexicon began with conflict. Arab/Muslim scholars conceptualize conflict as a systemic, deconstructive, normal phenomenon, which can sometimes only be managed. Since conflicts are perceived to have a deconstructive and systemic nature, Arab/Muslim scholars suggest they be terminated or transformed at the collective level to prevent a continuation or escalation. While the degree of transformation possible depends on conflict particularities, for instance the referents and type of conflict, it was demonstrated that Arab/Muslim scholars perceive referents can circumvent conflict by (re-) learning to live in peace. In general terms, these conceptualizations of conflict correspond with those articulated in the Western literature review in chapters three and four.

Deepening our analysis of conflict, we reviewed four cross-cultural differences commonly referenced in the Arab/Muslim literature. First, Western scholars are suggested to perceive conflict can have a positive dimension, a perception suggested absent among Arab/Muslim scholars. Our analysis, however, demonstrated there are discrepancies within the Arab/Muslim literature, since some Arab/Muslim scholars equally believe that conflict can

produce positive benefits. It was, nonetheless, noted in chapter three that many Western scholars perceive conflict has a (potentially) positive dimension, especially those that adhere to conflict resolution or conflict transformation schools of thought.

Second, Western scholars are accused of perceiving conflict as limited to those directly involved, an unacceptable notion in Arab/Muslim culture since it contradicts the individual's place within the community. Although the structural approach to conflict resolution in general, and Western culture in particular, is individualistic, and therefore frequently narrows focus onto those stakeholders immediately engaged, the social-psychological and spiritual approaches advocate the incorporation of society, including their interests and needs, when designing and implementing conflict resolution. Societal inclusion is, thus, accommodated by some Western approaches when conflict is being resolved or transformed at the intrastate and interstate levels. These scholars recognize that conflict impacts on society at large, and thereby requires social involvement and support to increase the changes that resolution will succeed.

The third cross-cultural difference commonly referred by Arab/Muslim scholars when analyzing conflict, is that Western scholars frequently theorize that conflicts can be resolved. This conceptualization contradicts Arab/Muslim perceptions that conflict can be intractable and systemic. The assumption that most Western scholars perceive conflict can be resolved is rooted in the Western conflict resolution tradition, and its reference is one of the few times that a theory alternative to the Western structural approach is acknowledged in Arab/Muslim literature. Nevertheless, it was demonstrated that some Western scholars, such as Valerie Rosoux, acknowledge that conflicts can sometimes only be managed, and are thereby perceived as intractable.

The final divergence in how conflict is conceptualized across cultures centers on honor and shame, both of which are essential components of Arab/Muslim culture, because honor impacts on identity and social status. Since conflict impacts on individual and family honor, it must be integrated when resolving conflict. By comparison, honor is not addressed forthright in Western conflict resolution literature, but I believe that its value is implied in principles such as regard. In this case, I concede that Western scholars do not forthright address honor, which therefore contradicts Arab/Muslim practice.

To review how conflict is conceptualized across cultures, I believe that Arab/Muslim scholars can accurately state that there are significant cross-cultural divergences when crude and narrow comparisons are made with the Western structural approach alone. The structural approach marginalizes fundamental Arab/Muslim precepts such as society or religion.

However, at minimum, many differences are neutralized when a wide Western conflict resolution framework, which incorporates the social-psychological and spiritual approach, is utilized to make cross-cultural comparisons. Since the structural approach is not the only Western approach available, we believe that our wider framework provides a more appropriate structure by which to compare lexicon, principles and practices.

The third section of our chapter began by analyzing terminology associated with resolution of conflict. It included the terms conflict management, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, reconciliation and peace. According to our literature review, conflict management appears to be understood as a minimal outcome of a resolution process where violent interaction is terminated, but root causes are not addressed and no transformation in perceptions or attitudes has taken place. Consequently, the Arab/Muslim conceptualization of conflict management shares many parallels with the Western conceptualization articulated in chapter three.

The next concept analyzed was conflict resolution. While there are limited Arab/Muslim resources pertaining to the subject, and no precise definition of conflict resolution is available in the literature explored, three objectives are evident. Conflict resolution is designed to end a conflict, transform relations for the benefit of the community and restore honor of those involved. These objectives have their parallels in Western theory outlined in chapters three and four. Providing dimension to Arab/Muslim understanding of conflict resolution, Abu-Nimer's framework for conflict resolution was introduced. It depicts conflict resolution as consisting of three components: the head, hands and heart (3H). Abu-Nimer's three components signify elements that must be transformed to advance conflict resolution. His 3H triangle corresponds to the Western conceptualization of cognitive transformation that contains a cognitive, behavioral and emotive aspect. Through transformation of the three aspects, both cultural approaches theorize that conflicts can be resolved and relationships altered to degrees that range from nonviolent coexistence to positive peace. In these instances, there are numerous similarities in how conflict resolution is conceptualized across Arab/Muslim and Western culture.

While general conceptualizations of conflict resolution are shared, there are fundamental and important differences. For example, the characteristics and role of a mediator or third party sometimes contrast across cultures. On the one hand, Arab/Muslim tradition manages conflict within the community through elders and respected men whom have no specialized knowledge or skills in terms of conflict or its resolution. Moreover, inside-partial mediators function to terminate or resolve a conflict for the benefit of the community, while Islamic and

traditional norms guide their approach throughout the process. On the other hand, a Western approach preferences implementation by knowledgeable and experienced experts in the field. Equally problematic according to Arab/Muslim scholars, resolution in the West is usually implemented at the level at which the conflict has occurred. In this frame, and contrary to the Arab/Muslim approach, if two individuals were engaged in a conflict, attention in the West is centered on those immediately involved, whereas the Arab/Muslim approach to this same situation would resolve the issue at the family or community level. These are important theoretical differences, although their impact is marginalized when consideration is given to the social-psychological and spiritual approaches, and when conflict resolution is implemented at the intrastate and interstate levels.

Because resolution is implemented at the familial or community level in Arab/Muslim tradition, conflict resolution at the individual, intrastate and interstate levels are relegated or nonexistent. More specifically, resolving conflict between individuals is accommodated at the group level, while alternatively, there are no traditional techniques of resolving conflict available to Arab/Muslim societies at the higher levels. The absence of practices for resolving intrastate and interstate conflict within the Arab/Muslim tradition makes it difficult to comparatively analyze approaches, and demonstrates a theoretical and practical void in Arab/Muslim resolution structures. The latter void prompts scholars to call for reform of traditional customs and practices, including a call to expand knowledge, tools and practices to enhance the Arab/Muslim conflict resolution framework. Although conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim context is theorized and practiced at the group level, scholars insist that the same principles and practices are relevant at higher levels, while they advocate theoretical and practical reforms to improve traditional mechanisms at the group level and to expand practices into the higher levels.

By comparison, conflict resolution in the West is applicable at four core levels: individual, group, intrastate and interstate. According to our wide framework, conflicts can be managed, resolved or transformed at all of these levels. The means and outcome, it is recommended, should be determined by conflict particularities, including the needs and interests of the stakeholders engaged. As such, Arab/Muslim tradition manages or resolves conflict at the group level alone, whereas Western practices can be implemented at multiple levels.

Thereafter, conflict transformation and reconciliation were defined. While no clear definitions are available for either concept, a general understanding can be gleaned from the literature. Conflict transformation is articulated as a deep process that manages root causes of a conflict and changes behavior and perceptions of stakeholders. Arab/Muslim

conceptualizations emphasize the deep relational and structural changes necessary, whereupon the solidification of peacebuilding is secured and long-term constructive relationships established. The conceptualization echoes Western understanding noted in chapter three.

By comparison, reconciliation is articulated as the formation of a new, stable, and cooperative relationship that manifests following structural, attitudinal and behavioral changes. Pursuing structural, attitudinal and behavioral alterations is a holistic approach that simultaneously addresses grievances and injustices to root amity. Nevertheless, Arab/Muslim references to reconciliation do not suggest that forgiveness is necessary, since positive or negative peace is accommodated. Reconciliation, as conceptualized in the Arab/Muslim literature, is thus comparable to that articulated in the West, as outlined in chapter three.

Peace was the final concept defined in our review of conflict resolution lexicon. Although the term has multiple meanings in Arab/Muslim culture, conflict resolution scholars suggest peace is a state of harmony where God's precepts are followed. Within this frame, peace is articulated as a sliding scale ranging from nonviolent coexistence to positive peace. On the one hand, positive peace depicts a just world where individuals obey Gods commands, forsake the use of violence and live in harmony. On the other hand, peaceful coexistence is when referents nonviolently live in close proximity. While Western scholars infrequently associated peace with religious faith, they depict peace in terms of a sliding scale. In this sense, both Arab/Muslim and Western scholars agree that peace can range from nonviolent coexistence to harmony, but Western conceptualizations generally minimize religion.

Following our review of terminology, attention turned to qualifying and comparing some interconnected principles and practices advanced by Arab/Muslim scholars. The principles and practices outlined, among others, are hypothesized to be applicable at all levels of conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim tradition. During analysis, we juxtaposed these benchmarks to those examined in our Western framework. In this manner, it was possible to qualify many cross-cultural similarities and some divergences in theory and practice.

The first principles and practices explored were peacemaking and negotiations. Peacemaking, or the act of ending violence, establishes a nonviolent environment where negotiations, or discussions, on divisive issues can be pursued to resolve the conflict. In the Arab/Muslim tradition, peacemaking practices are suggested to be the first steps toward resolving a conflict. Accordingly, cross-cultural perspectives converge in the general appreciation and acceptability of the principle. However, there are some cross-cultural divergences in terms of implementation. For instance, the West favors active listening while some Arab/Muslim scholars view such approaches as a sign of weakness. Discrepancies in

Arab/Muslim theory were also noted since some scholars advocate direct, face-to-face dialogue, while others suggest such measures could be perceived as offensive. Those holding the latter opinion contend that indirect approaches function better in Arab/Muslim society.

Next, Arab/Muslim scholars view truth as an essential component of conflict resolution. Truth recounts the past for the purpose of acknowledging wrongs committed. It is thus utilized to direct justice. Islamic precepts heavily influence how truth is understood and practiced in the Arab/Muslim context. Nonetheless, aside from the direct reference to religion, the Arab/Muslim conceptualization of truth is comparable to that articulated in our review of Western practices, especially the social-psychological and spiritual approaches.

Thereafter, justice was analyzed. It is an esteemed principle embedded in Islam, and is fundamental in Arab/Muslim day-to-day life. Acting justly is not only a command for Muslims in general, but identifying and responding to injustices is equally expected. As a social and spiritual value, justice is strongly associated with peace. In terms of conflict resolution, justice can be implemented in a restorative or retributive manner depending on conflict typology and stakeholders' needs. In cross-cultural terms, there are many parallels across cultures, including the Western prioritization of justice, as well as means of implementation and its association with peace.

Then, arbitration or retributive legal processes were explored. These can be conducted through a *Sharia* or contemporary judicial court systems, with referents frequently being permitted to choose. We concentrated primarily on the act of arbitration, which shares similarities across cultures, however, it was noted that some Arab/Muslim scholars do not believe that arbitration always produces just and sustainable outcomes. Instead, decision-makers could pronounce fallible decisions, which risks aggravating or prolonging a conflict. Additional cross-cultural divergences manifest in the level at which arbitration is applied, the importance of Islam, and the qualities of the mediator. Hence, the principle is shared across cultures, while practices and associated parameters are subject to variation across cultures.

The principles of amnesty and forgiveness were then analyzed. In essence, scholars emphasize that Islam and local cultural norms prefer violators be restored to the community, similar to the manner restorative justice is conceived in the West, as opposed to being subjected to retributive punishment. Scholars emphasize the need to balance justice with compassion, to ensure that justice is restored while harmonizing the practice with the expression of compassion. Therefore, amnesty and forgiveness are valuable measures to advance restoration of the individual. Interestingly, Arab/Muslim scholars articulate forgiveness as an act of empowerment because a victim has the authority to decide whether to

extend forgiveness. Although some Western scholars criticize amnesty and forgiveness as a component of conflict resolution at the higher levels, the spiritual approach embraces it when our broad Western framework is taken into consideration. By comparison, amnesty is practiced cross-culturally at all levels.

Discussion of amnesty and forgiveness transitioned our attention to the principles of empowerment and consultation. Empowerment and consultation are suggested necessary to promote equality, justice and accommodation in the Arab/Muslim tradition. They broadly establish power symmetry and provide voice to effected stakeholders. Our review of Western theory likewise emphasizes the importance of empowerment, consultation and inclusiveness, recognizing their value for establishing and sustaining conflict resolution.

The next principle and practice outlined was dialogue. While cross-cultural and intercultural divergence over how dialogue is appropriately defined or pursued exists, most Arab/Muslim and Western scholars agree that belligerents should come together to express their needs and desires in a symmetrical and respectful manner. Ultimately, the process should increase mutual understanding, which is expected to aid in the transformation of the relationship. Nevertheless, it was equally accentuated that while the principle is accepted across cultures, cultural differences in how dialogue is practiced are common.

Afterward third party intervention was analyzed. While third parties are perceived favorably and utilized in both cultures, their functions are subject to divergences. For example, the Arab/Muslim approach is suggested to favor insider-partial interveners who have the capacity to influence and direct referents to achieve resolution. Contrary, in the West, neutral facilitation is usually prioritized, which indicate that facilitators impartially assist referents, the latter of which have absolute ownership and control over the process. Nevertheless, some Western scholars recognize the benefits of insider knowledge and close proximity to referents when engaging as a third party, and council that interveners should have intimate knowledge of the referents and conflict. A few simultaneously accept that third parties can pressure referents to resolve issues.

Subsequently, the importance of the principle and practice of deeds, or behavior over rhetoric, was introduced. In the Arab/Muslim context, deeds are essential catalysts for a conflict resolution process. Actions substantiate rhetoric, demonstrating a capacity and determination to change the quality of a relationship in cognitive and behavioral terms. Hence, it is simply not enough to speak of change, but corresponding actions are required. A similar emphasis on deeds exists in the West, as articulated in Long and Brecke's "costly signaling

model." Long and Brecke's model underscores the importance of action for instigating and maintaining momentum of a conflict resolution process.

Afterward, the Arab/Muslim prioritization of collective benefit was juxtaposed against the Western preference for mutually beneficial solutions. Due to religious and cultural influences, conflict resolution in the former case is designed to benefit the collective rather than an individual. In some instances, settlements or resolution in Arab/Muslim society are asymmetrical depending on religious principles and traditions. More specifically, community interests and the precepts of Islam determine how conflicts are settled, as well as whether punishments are mandated; especially in instances were injustices violated Islamic creed or cultural norms. However, it is unclear how the principles of justice and mercy are balanced in instances of asymmetrical conflicts. In any event, Arab/Muslim scholars insist that their cultural approach contradicts the Western preference for "win-win" solutions.

Then, the principle of compensation or restitution was explored. Its utility for conflict resolution is argued its capacity to restore honor and advance justice in the Arab/Muslim tradition. Both Western and Arab/Muslim traditions observe the principle of restitution, and both deploy associated practices, including the payment of reparations. Hence, Arab/Muslim and Western cultures conceptualize and practice this principle similarly.

Finally, the flexibility of Arab/Muslim conflict resolution was noted. It was here demonstrated that some communities are adapting and integrating non-traditional approaches into their traditional resolution frameworks to create hybrid systems. Through hybridity, systems become more accommodative and flexible, which allows them to be utilized by any referent, and deployed singularly or in tandem, meeting the interests and needs of stakeholders. It is argued that hybrid systems demonstrate the flexibility and openness of Arab/Muslim conflict resolution. Nevertheless, the structures are flexible insomuch as Islam permits. Changes made or alternative techniques utilized cannot subjugate or infringe on Islamic law or traditions. By comparison, some Western scholars emphasize flexibility when conceptualizing conflict resolution. Most notably, Western scholars recommend conflict resolution programs be specifically tailored to meet the diverging needs of affected stakeholders, which implies flexibility and accessibility in terms of principles and practices.

Amalgamated, the comparative analysis of principles and techniques demonstrates overwhelming cross-cultural convergences on the principles themselves, although there are some noteworthy divergences in how these principles are implemented. It is here that the Arab/Muslim criticisms leveled against Western practices resound; especially concerning the latter's mechanistic and individualistic natures, as well as their omission of religion. For

example, the role of active listening or third party intervention is commonly cited contradictions across these cultures. In these instances, the basic principles are shared but standard practices sometimes diverge. Since the principles are shared, I will later argue that cross-cultural commonality should be further examined whereupon symmetrical and mutually acceptable approaches could be designed to use across cultures. The flexibility of both Western and Arab/Muslim practices suggest dialogue could be conducted, and that a degree of adaptation is possible.

Overall, it is concluded that there are many cross-cultural similarities in terminology, principles and in practices, when Arab/Muslim conflict resolution approaches are compared to our wide Western framework. Parallels in principles comprise, but are not limited to, the prioritization of truth, justice, mercy, empowerment, respect and peace. Among the practices shared are dialogue, arbitration, reparations, arbitration, negotiation and amnesty, to name a few. However, we acknowledge that there are some discrepancies in the manner in which they are implemented across cultures.

Despite drawing the conclusion there are many similarities across cultures, we contend that Western interveners/stakeholders should respect cross-cultural divergences. Respect means that Arab/Muslim political, cultural and religious practices be valued and accommodated through processes of consultation and inclusion. In cross-cultural situations, this requires Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict resolution be treated as equally valuable and relevant. Hence, it is our recommendation that the similarities described herein should not be inferred, or exaggerated, but rather they should be examined on an individual basis and considered to demonstrate that there are more similarities in how conflict resolution is conceptualized and practiced than divergences. Nevertheless, through mutual consultation and dialogue, we believe that it is possible to preclude imposition of principles and practices while simultaneously empowering stakeholders. The literature examined emphasizes that empowerment increases popular support through meeting needs, interests and promoting social involvement.

The section analyzing conflict resolution closed by denoting scholarly calls for reform traditional conflict resolution theory and practice in Arab/Muslim culture. Due to existing weaknesses, such as the absence of a conflict resolution practices that function at the higher level, reform is advocated. Through modifications and alterations of existing structures, it is thought that Arab/Muslim practices could increase their potential, while tools and practices are updated and/or created for managing or resolving conflict at all levels. Types of reform suggested include increased education among leaders of all levels and the general population,

proliferation of skills, and revisions of traditional practices. As part of the reformation process, scholars suggest that external practices could be examined, adopted and adapted to increase cross-cultural compatibility and eliminate the need to reform and construct Arab/Muslim resolution structures from the ground up. However, government and religious leaders' interference, general apprehensiveness toward change, and a lack of resources, among other issues, stymie reformation. Overcoming these challenges, scholars argue, is important and necessary to improve upon the existing conflict resolution system at all levels.

Subsequent to examining Arab/Muslim principles and tools, the last section of the chapter reviewed the Arab/Muslim practice of the *sulh*. Our analysis was designed to demonstrate how conflict resolution is practiced at the community level, and to reiterate specific principles and practices. The *sulh* is an ancient traditional conflict resolution technique utilized at the community level, and is available in two forms: public and private. The essential difference between the two is whether information regarding the perpetrator and deeds are disclosed. In either case, the *sulh* process begins when the *jaha*, an assembly of influential community members, is requested, or decides, to intervene to terminate and resolve a conflict. Following their formation, the *jaha* negotiates a truce, using shuttle negotiations between the conflicting families. Once a truce has been established, a fact-finding mission is undertaken to determine what occurred, and then to decide the terms of a settlement. The settlement is designed to compensate victims, while restoring order to the community and honor to affected stakeholders.

The *jaha* has significant influence and can pressure referents into the process and/or impose resolution terms. In either case, once terms of settlement have been established, a public ceremony is held to signify resolution of the conflict. The ceremony is followed by a meal hosted by the offending family. Both the ceremony and the meal demonstrate to the community that the conflict has been resolved or transformed. Within this frame, *sulh* outcomes range from nonviolent coexistence to the extension of forgiveness. Overall, the *sulh* process reinforces principles outlined above, including truth, justice, mercy and honor. It similarly utilizes many of the same techniques including peacemaking, dialogue, arbitration, reparations and forgiveness, to name a few.

Notwithstanding its advantages, the *sulh* has several weaknesses. Most notably, it does not deal with the root causes of the conflict, and thereby sometimes produces only negative peace. Failure to address root causes implies that conflicts could reappear and that structural issues remain. Additionally, the *jaha* has the authority to influence the process for the benefit of community. The social pressure applied hinges primarily on shame, whereby referents' lack

of cooperation dishonors their family in the eyes of the community. In such instances, a referent may not agree to the resolution or its terms, but feels obliged to do so to preserve their family honor. Among other weaknesses, it was noted that a *sulh* process is not open to individuals outside the community and it does not function at the intrastate or interstate levels in its existing format. However, it was noted that some U.S. military commanders utilized similar, albeit unofficial, techniques when conflict resolution was necessary during the occupation of Iraq. It was equally highlighted that some Arab/Muslim scholars advocate the *sulh* be adapted for utilization at the higher levels to fill the existing practical void. Such alterations would require scholars and religious experts to contemplate and design a hybrid system that could accommodate the higher level, as well as external actors.

Pursuant the delineation of conflict resolution as conceptualized by Arab/Muslim scholars, which is primarily designed to resolve conflict at the community level, and the demonstration that Arab/Muslim and Western traditions share many concepts, principles and practices (confirming Hypothesis 2), we turn our attention to investigating how conflicts are managed or resolved at the higher levels. In the next chapter, we comparatively analyze conflict resolution at the interstate level utilizing a convenience sample of laypersons' from the United States and Iraq to determine convergences and divergences at the micro-level across respective cultures.

PART 3: CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION AMONG A SAMPLE OF U.S. AND IRAQ RESPONDENTS

Chapter 6　Survey of Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Conflict Resolution: Questionnaire Design, Methodology and Findings

Following the mapping of U.S.-Iraq conflict relations since 2003, and the exploration of conflict resolution in Western and Arab/Muslim culture, we hypothesize that bilateral conflict resolution should be explored to transform U.S.-Iraq relations. Transformation is argued essential for countering the probability of a continuation of violence between the United States and Iraq. Unfortunately, scholars hitherto have failed to address U.S.-Iraq bilateral conflict resolution outright, and most literature associated with Iraq emphasizes national reconciliation. While I believe that national reconciliation is crucial and necessary for stabilizing Iraq in social and political terms, the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations, I believe, are equally significant. In short, I hold that the United States has a moral obligation and geopolitical interest in establishing a nonviolent, symmetric and amicable relationship with a sovereign Iraq. The violent relationship between these two entities suggests that this process is necessary.

To address outstanding grievance and the ruptured relationship between the U.S. and Iraq, and recalling the theories outlined in part two of this thesis, we argue that bilateral conflict resolution should be explored since scholars believe that animosity and grievances will persist between belligerents engaged in a conflict unless measures are taken to alter perceptions and behavior. In this frame, and because Western scholars frequently emphasize the importance of inclusion and consultation of society when theorizing about conflict resolution, we measure respondents' receptiveness to, and the perceived applicability of, particular principles and tools outlined in our conflict resolution theoretical framework. Through survey research, it is possible to qualify respondent openness to principles and practices deemed applicable at the interstate level, and in this manner, we circumvent imposition of techniques by stakeholders and/or third parties. In essence, our survey empowers a group of respondents from both countries to articulate their perceptions of conflict resolution at the interstate level and how they believe it is most appropriately pursued.

The objective of chapter six is, therefore, to qualify laypersons' conceptualization of conflict resolution at the interstate level. To this end, a survey is conducted to understand how a small convenience sample of U.S. and Iraq citizens conceptualize resolution between two countries. The questionnaire asks respondents about their opinions of conflict and conflict resolution in general, and then examines tools and principles for promoting conflict resolution

between two countries as well as in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Once data is collected, it is analyzed and compared in two manners: across samples and *vis-à-vis* the Western and Arab/Muslim literature. The theoretical value of our survey research is twofold. Firstly, it allows us to make cross-cultural comparisons of laypersons versus scholars' opinions when resolving conflict between two states, and layperson *versus* laypersons' opinion across cultures. The research, therefore, increases our understanding of how conflict resolution between two countries is conceptualized at the micro level, while testing Arab/Muslim and Western theoretical assumptions outlined in part two of this research. Through our survey, we are able to qualify both convergences and divergences in how laypersons across the two samples generally conceptualize conflict resolution at the interstate level, and can compare those with our literature review. Secondly, our survey provides preliminary insight into how laypersons' conceptualize conflict resolution in the context of U.S. and Iraq. More specifically, we embark on an exploratory examination of stakeholders' opinion of conflict resolution in the case of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. By narrowing our analysis to this particular case, we are able to gauge respondents' openness to a conflict resolution program in this context, and to determine which tools respondents perceive as acceptable.

Our utilization of survey research at the micro level makes a theoretical contribution to contemporary conflict resolution discourse because it introduces laypersons' perceptions of conflict and conflict resolution. Ironically, Western scholars emphasize the importance of inclusion and consultation of society when resolving conflict, however, scholars and policymakers seldom incorporate the practice. The introduction of laypersons' opinion temporarily shifts discourse away from conventional generalizations (West versus Arab/Muslim approaches), and focuses it explicitly on our sample of U.S. and Iraq citizens. Consequently, we can juxtapose general scholarly understanding of conflict resolution with opinions expressed by our samples isolated to one instance. Since the primary concern of this research is on how the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations might be altered, it is logical that we restrict our analysis to these stakeholders.

Combined, research findings elucidated in the present chapter test four hypotheses. Firstly, Hypothesis 3 states that a majority of U.S. and Iraqi respondents from our research sample will similarly embrace sixteen conflict resolution principles. Next, Hypothesis 4 states that a majority of those same respondents will support a selection of eleven tools applied at the interstate level. Our hypotheses are tested by providing respondents with a condensed list of principles and practices deemed relevant in the context of United States and Iraq relations.

Subsequently, Hypothesis 5 is tested. It states that following decades of deconstructive and violent relations between the United States and Iraq, confirmed in the first part of our thesis, and exemplified by the 2003 Iraq War and occupation, a majority of respondents from our convenience samples will agree that conflict resolution is necessary to improve contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. To test this hypothesis, respondents are queried about whether or not they would support conflict resolution between the two countries. Finally, Hypothesis 6 suggests that a majority of our research participants will predominantly agree on thirteen conflict resolution tools to transform the quality of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Allowing respondents to rate the acceptability of particular tools in context directly tests the hypothesis. With these in mind, the chapter is designed as follows.

We open by exploring the potential of a conciliatory move by the U.S. following the election of Barack Obama as U.S. President. Scholars and laypersons initially perceived his election as an opportunity of altering U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. More specifically, it was perceived that Obama would be more conciliatory when interacting with other countries than his predecessor. The assumption was instigated by Obama's conciliatory rhetoric. Obama rhetorically made references to qualitative alterations in the manner in which the United States interacted with Arab/Muslim countries, however, no significant changes manifest during his presidency. As a consequence, the need to improve U.S.-Iraq relations by pursing conflict resolution at the structural and societal level continues to be relevant.

With this in mind, and in recognition that some steps have been implemented to improve U.S.-Iraq relations subsequent to the invasion and occupation, we explore techniques implemented as modes of advancing conflict resolution between these two countries. While exploring tools utilized hitherto, we explain how our questionnaire was designed. Our evaluation of conflict resolution practices used up to this point begins with a reference to the non-exhaustive list of tools outlined in Appendix one. The list of conflict resolution tools was extracted during the course of our research. Using the list in the Appendix, we extract from the literature which measures have hitherto been deployed to improve contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations during and after the occupation. Our comparative analysis demonstrates that structural approaches have been prioritized, for example political and economic cooperation, while social-psychological aspects of conflict resolution have received a marginal degree of attention. Recalling theory from the previous part of our research, some scholars argue that conflict resolution needs to occur at the societal and structural level to root and institutionalize change. In this instance, it appears that more bottom-up modes should be implemented in tandem with the structural tools.

The creation of a draft questionnaire begins with a dichotomous classification of conflict resolution tools from Appendix 1 as either relevant or irrelevant in the case of U.S.-Iraq relations. Combined, thirty-seven practices extracted from Appendix 1 were deemed relevant in context, but for the sake of designing a questionnaire, mechanisms were further reduced to the eleven most recognizable and contextually relevant conflict resolution mechanisms according to pilot participants. Once mechanisms were condensed through piloting, the selected tools were combined with conflict resolution principles extracted from part two of the thesis to create a questionnaire. While explaining which tools were selected and which were not, we simultaneously outline the development of the research questionnaire, including its composition and piloting.

The third section of this chapter outlines survey methodology. Here we provide an overview of how the questionnaire was launched and implemented. It similarly outlines research ethics, target populations and distribution. Then, we address crucial research weaknesses, including our small n-sample and the inability to have the survey translated into the Arabic language. Thereafter, data collection, compilation, and testing of reliability are explained. Following this methodological assessment, we introduce our research findings.

When comparatively analyzing the research data, the survey is broken down into five segments. These include: the general conceptualization of conflict; general perception of conflict resolution principles; general perceptions of conflict resolution tools; perceptions of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War and occupation; and conflict resolution tools in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations, respectively. As we analyze respondents' perceptions across our samples on these issues, their opinions are simultaneously compared with the literature review conducted in part two. Survey findings confirm that many of the cross-cultural compatibility articulated above in the literature review are shared by laypersons. In addition, our survey findings also raise several theoretical and practical issues. Most importantly, there are instances where scholarly conceptualizations of conflict and conflict resolution (across cultures) are not reflected in the opinions of our research sample. These anomalies introduce questions that require additional cross-cultural research.

6.1 Potential for conflict resolution

Anne-Marie Slaughter argued in 2008 that George W. Bush's successor should acknowledge that the United States government had "made serious, even tragic, mistakes in the aftermath of September 11" (Slaughter, 2008). Slaughter recommends this acknowledgement to demonstrate U.S. political humility, self-criticism, and a desire to

transform its foreign policy approach, which she theorizes would demonstrate U.S. respect for international opinion and norms (basic human rights and international law) and augment declining international sentiment (Slaughter, 2008). Admission of wrongdoing and the qualitative transformation associated with a public admission were theorized to positively impact on international opinion of the United States following more than a decade of aggressive U.S. foreign policy perpetrated during the global war on terror. From this perspective, the 2009 inauguration of Barack Obama as U.S. President presented an opportunity for qualitative and practical alteration of U.S. foreign policy and international standing.

The propensity for qualitative change in international sentiment was initially anticipated since Obama was rhetorically softer when articulating his foreign policy, especially regarding Middle East-U.S. relations, by comparison to George W. Bush (BBC News, 2009; Feste, 2011: 2-21; Obama, 2009b). For instance, during a speech to U.S. Marines in 2009, Barack Obama (2009c) asserted that the United States and Iraq "can build a lasting relationship founded upon mutual interests and mutual respect." A similar conciliatory reference to macro level relations was made during a speech to an audience in Cairo, Egypt in June 2009, when Obama (2009a) acknowledged that the "cycle of suspicion and discord [between Arab/Muslims and the United States] must end". To circumvent the trends of discord and suspicion denoted, Obama emphasizes the need for "a sustained effort to listen to each other; to learn from each other; to respect one another; and to seek common ground" (Obama, 2009a). These quotes make it clear that Obama recognizes the need for alteration of bilateral perceptions and behavior, and the creation of a symmetrical relationship with countries in the Middle East. Simply stated, President Obama demonstrates acute awareness of the importance of the cognitive and behavioral components of U.S.-Middle East bilateral relationships and their importance for transforming the quality of contemporary bilateral relations (Feste, 2011: 17-22). Obama's message seemingly acknowledges the need to resolve the long-standing deconstructive relationship between the United States and Arab/Muslim countries in the Middle East in general, and the necessity for both parties to demonstrate willingness and capacity to transform as a means of altering interstate perceptions and behavior.

Arab/Muslims throughout the Middle East welcomed Obama's message of conciliation in Cairo (BBC News, 2009; Feste, 2011: 13). Anticipation of change was reinforced in Jakarta, Indonesia in November 2010, when Obama again spoke of his determination to alter the manner in which his administration interacted with Arab/Muslims (Obama, 2010a). A further example was provided when his administration released the 2010 National Security Strategy

(NSS), which echoed the non-confrontational and accommodating tone. Barry Buzan (1991: 331) defines a national security strategy as a policy "that focuses on reducing the vulnerabilities of the state." Obama's NSS objectives emphasize the importance of "soft power" techniques available to the United States for pursuing its national interests (Obama, 2010b: 16)[78]. One soft policy tool articulated in the NSS is "Strategic Communication" (Obama, 2010b: 16).

The NSS explains strategic communication in the following manner:

> Across all of our efforts, effective strategic communications are essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our policy aims. Aligning our actions with our words is a shared responsibility that must be fostered by a culture of communication throughout government. We must also be more effective in our deliberate communication and engagement and do a better job understanding the attitudes, opinions, grievances, and concerns of peoples—not just elites—around the world. Doing so allows us to convey credible, consistent messages and to develop effective plans, while better understanding how our actions will be perceived. We must also use a broad range of methods for communicating with foreign publics, including new media (Obama, 2010b: 16).

The concept of strategic communication, as outlined in the quote, affirms the Obama administration recognizes: a) the importance of accommodating indigenous needs in terms of U.S. foreign relations; and b) the importance of transforming relations, including the need to adjust behavior.

Accordingly, strategic communication is Obama's preferred technique of institutionalizing the qualitative changes deemed essential to improving U.S. bilateral relations and international opinion of the United States (Obama, 2010b: 16). Nonetheless, embarking on such transformative endeavors requires popular and political support for the program, since approval and societal buy-in is essential to generate tangible alterations in perceptions and behavior, whereby bilateral transformation can be rooted and institutionalized within relevant structures and society (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 62; Bar-Tal, 2000: 352; Feste, 2011: 9-13; Lederach, 1995: 18). Advancing this depth of conflict resolution at the interstate level is, however, challenging. It is challenging primarily because individual leaders can advocate a particular policy, but they have a limited capacity to aggregate political and public support for

[78] Joseph Nye (2002) speaks of "hard" and "soft power." Hard power incorporates coercive measures, or sticks, used by a government to coerce or force desired change on an adversary. Comparatively, soft power employs persuasive methods, or carrots, to entice change rather than coerce. Generally speaking, soft power tactics offer long-term potential because they are slower to produce results, while hard power tactics provide short-term solutions with faster results (Nye, 2002).

that program (Feste, 2011: 9). Concerning the latter, and as outlined in the second part of our research, absent popular support, the probability of achieving conflict resolution is reduced.

While its reasons cannot be qualified, Barack Obama's conciliatory rhetoric lessened over time and there has been a general failure to implement the behavioral and relational changes articulated. In the context of U.S.-Iraq relations, the asymmetrical power balance between Iraq and the United States has continued throughout Obama's presidency. For instance, U.S. political interests eclipsed those of Iraq on April 8, 2011 when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates advised the GOI that U.S. troop presence would only be extended beyond December 2011 if the GOI made a formal request and met specific U.S. conditions (Timberg, 2011). Although the GOI had been discussing deferment of a full U.S. military withdrawal scheduled for December 2011, for the purpose of continuing U.S. training of the ISF, the GOI simultaneously expressed its unwillingness to extend legal immunity to those same U.S. troops (Brennan and others, 2013: 13; Katzman, 2012: 38-39). Absent the extension of immunity, however, President Obama declined to grant an extension since U.S. soldiers would be legally accountable for their actions while deployed beyond 2011 (Brennan and others, 2013: 13; Katzman, 2014: 34-35). Equally influential to the decision to withdraw U.S. troops was Muatada al-Sadr's threat to mobilize the Mahdi Army if the United States military were not removed (Katzman, 2014: 11, 34). In both cases, U.S. self-interest (notably its desire to circumvent soldiers' accountability and prevent a re-emergence of the insurgency) trumped GOI interests (the continued training of the ISF) regardless of the implications the decision might have on the political and social stability of Iraq. Therefore, U.S. interests continued to offset those of Iraq, demonstrating the relationship between the United States and Iraq remained asymmetrical.

Since there was no obvious behavioral change in U.S. foreign policy following the election of Barack Obama, there was a decline in the approval of Barack Obama among Iraqis, as qualified by a 2010 poll (Esposito and Mogahed, 2010: 25; Slaughter, 2008: 1-3). As Obama (2010b: 16) implied in his rhetoric, concrete steps are necessary to demonstrate that the United States government is willing to acknowledge past wrongdoing and change its modes of interaction with Arab/Muslims communities. His failure to reinforce initial rhetoric with deeds, a fundamental component of Arab/Muslim conceptualization of conflict resolution, and outlined above, resulted in a decline of popular support. In essence, Obama had been expected to improve cross-cultural relations between the U.S. and Iraq, but he failed to take concrete steps that would alter public opinion in Iraq or the Middle East. For this

reason, conflict resolution between the United States and Iraq remains necessary and relevant at the micro level.

Analyzing bilateral relations through this conceptual lens, we hypothesizes that an adaptation of U.S. bilateral approach, in particular a reduction or avoidance of policies and tools that would be perceived as negative, threatening or violent by Iraqis, remains valid. Behavioral alterations, as Obama acknowledges, should be one component of a process of transforming the quality of U.S. and Iraq relations. Our recommendation for alteration in behavior is deduced from the expectations that such efforts would establish a congenial environment where relational symmetry could be established for building trust, stabilizing cooperation, reducing tensions and minimizing the perceived utility of violence (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 18; Bar-Tal, 2000: 352-359; Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 4-7). A recent example of bold move toward interstate conflict resolution implemented by Barack Obama is his December 2014 announcement that U.S. relations with Cuba would undergo alteration (Obama, 2014). This move modifies decades of hostility and sanctions between the two countries (Renwick, 2014) and appears to be supported by citizens of the United States (Latin America Working Group, 2012: 1). A similar approach, we hypothesize, is necessary in regards to U.S.-Iraq relations, and U.S.-Middle East relations, and we believe would pay dividends if determination and commitment were demonstrated.

Recalling our findings from chapter 2, Iraqi animosity and distrust of the United States exists (section 1) and scholars suggest under comparable conditions, conflict resolution should be pursued (section 4) (Funk and Said, 2004: 1-24). We believe that the potential for pressing further toward conflict resolution exists. For instance, although Iraqi respondents expressed "unfavorable" opinions of the U.S. in 2008, that same research found respondents were not adverse to certain types of cooperation and assistance (ABC News and others, 2008: 5)[79]. However, research specifically directed at evaluating receptiveness to conflict resolution, or a spectrum of techniques in this particular case have not been conducted to the author's knowledge. We seek to fill this theoretical void.

As noted in chapters 3 and 4, conflict resolution is determined theoretically possible at the interstate level in the West, with Long and Brecke (2003: 119) suggesting events are "turning points in the relations of the belligerents." Unfortunately, the authors conclude that alterations

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[79] Comparable findings are observable in Pakistan, a country where the United States suffers a severe and persistent deficit of trust and has a dismal approval rating (Pew Research Center, 2013: 12-14). Despite, 64% of respondents "consider[ing] the U.S. an enemy," citizens of Pakistan remain open to cooperation according to their terms. For instance, Pew Research Center (2013: 14) found that 53% of respondents from Pakistan desire U.S. "financial and humanitarian aid in areas where extremist organizations are active" and 44% "want the U.S. to provide intelligence and logistical support to Pakistani troops fighting extremists."

are more likely to occur if the belligerents live in close proximity (Long and Brecke, 2003: 114). According to this finding, the great geographic proximity between Iraq and the United States reduces the probability of conflict resolution being pursued (Long and Brecke, 2003: 114). However, the United States government accentuates the importance of the Middle East to U.S. geopolitical interest, and the United States maintains a persistent presence in the region, which suggests that the United States will be engaged in the region for the foreseeable future (Iraq Study Group, 2006: 2). We, therefore, concluded that U.S. geopolitical interests reduce the significance of close geographical proximity since U.S. interaction in the region is expected to persist.

Upon this theoretical foundation, we examine the potentiality of cross-cultural conflict resolution at the interstate level in general and in context of U.S.-Iraq relations. Our micro level study deploys a survey to measure laypersons' conceptualization of conflict and conflict resolution principles and practices. Survey design, methodology and findings are respectively articulated in the following sections.

6.2 Questionnaire design and piloting

Since Western theory and practice dominate conflict resolution in international relations, indigenous opinion and techniques in non-Western countries are often marginalized or completely subordinated (Irani, 1999: 1-5; Lederach, 1995: 16-17). As a result, imposition of external theory and practices at the intrastate and interstate level is common; despite the increased probability imposition has on a program being perceived as inappropriate or unacceptable by those upon whom the program is forced (Irani, 1999: 1-5). This possibility is especially salient in asymmetrical relations. Due to the asymmetrical tendencies of the U.S.-Iraq relationship, we contend that policies and tools perceived as unwanted, negative, threatening or violent by Iraqis should be avoided because such practices undermine public support and the overall viability of conflict resolution (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 23-25). To enhance symmetry, scholars argue that stakeholders' opinions should be qualified to determine the acceptability of principles and practices of conflict resolution, whereby individuals are empowered, their needs are met and local ownership is ensured (Funk and Said, 2004: 22-26; Irani, 1999: 1).

In this spirit, our survey objectively seeks to qualify stakeholder opinion to determine which principles and practices of conflict resolution are deemed acceptable in the context of transforming interstate relations between the United States and Iraq. Insight obtained from our findings thereby gives respondents a voice to decide which principles and practices are

mutually acceptable. We believe that such consultation not only provides insight into tools, but illustrates a willingness to engage the other in equal partnership and to take their opinion into consideration, as scholars such as Funk and Said (2004: 22-26) or Hinds and Oliver (2009: 3-30) recommend. There is also theoretical value since our survey allows us to qualify laypersons' conceptualization of conflict resolution at the interstate level, whereupon comparisons can be made across samples as well as with scholarly theory.

The literature review conducted in chapters 3 through 5 traces how Western and Arab/Muslim scholars conceptualize conflict resolution in the English language, identifying associated concepts, principles and tools. Several benchmarks extracted from that review are used to create a questionnaire qualifying if a sample of respondents from Iraq and the United Our questionnaire is designed to test four working hypotheses.

Firstly, Hypothesis 3 states that a majority of U.S. and Iraqi respondents from our research sample will embrace a preponderance of sixteen conflict resolution principles. Similarly, Hypothesis 4 states that a majority of respondents from both countries will support a majority of eleven conflict resolution tools utilized at the interstate level in general. Our hypotheses are tested by providing respondents with a condensed list of principles and practices deemed relevant in the context of conflict resolution between the United States and Iraq, and asking them to rate their degree of approval or disapproval. In addition, Hypothesis 5 states that subsequent to decades of deconstructive relations between the United States and Iraq, exemplified by the 2003 Iraq War, a majority of respondents from our convenience sample will agree that conflict resolution is necessary to improve contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Lastly, Hypothesis 6 states that a majority of our research participants will predominantly agree on thirteen conflict resolution tools (truth commissions, inquiries, reparations) to transform the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations. Approval or disapproval of these practices is qualified by asking respondents to rate the acceptability of tools in context.

To test the four inter-connected hypotheses, a preliminary questionnaire was drafted. Its contents were designed from principles and concepts elicited from part two, and from the non-exhaustive list of 59 conflict resolution tools found in Appendix 1. Concerning the former, many concepts, principles and benchmarks were extracted from our theoretical framework of conflict resolution, as articulated in chapters three through five. In this manner, concepts and terminology can be evaluated and compared across our samples of laypersons, and between laypersons and scholarly theory. Concerning tools, Appendix 1 was developed during the course of our research by recording conflict resolution tools utilized at the interstate level as referenced in the literature. The list of tools was then analyzed to determine which have been

used in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations and which have not been used but are perceived valuable. Combined, our list of mechanisms, in conjunction with numerous benchmarks extracted from part two, serves as the foundation whereupon our questionnaire was designed.

Figure 6 Evaluations of Tools in Context of U.S.-Iraq Context

<table>
<tr><th>hitherto applied</th><th colspan="2">appropriate</th><th>irrelevant</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="5">aid/assistance
economic cooperation
establishing channels of communication
formal agreements or treaties
gestures of solidarity
joint institutions/cooperation
joint projects/ reconstruction
military signaling
official state visits
political cooperation
security cooperation</td><th>selected</th><th>omitted</th><td rowspan="3">adjudication
arbitration
holding new elections
mutual recognition
opening borders
peaceful partition
legal/political reform
release of political prisoners
symbolic restoration
vetting government
refraining</td></tr>
<tr><td>apologies
international tribunals
promoting religious and cultural awareness
restitution/reparations
third party intervention
truth commissions</td><td rowspan="4">archiving testimonies
amnesty
exchange of representatives
face-to-face encounters
films/documentaries
good governance and accountability
joint or hybrid tribunals
joint memorials or ceremonies (events)
legislative admission of wrongdoing
opening archives and records
peace education
regular joint meetings
(re)writing history
special courts
theatre and storytelling
traditional methods
travel/tourism
workshops/dialogue
media
criminal trials</td></tr>
<tr><th>reintroduced to measure openness</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">continued security cooperation
an Iraq and U.S. inquiry into the war
economic cooperation
political cooperation</td><th>untimely</th></tr>
<tr><td>art, dance and music
asking for forgiveness
awards and scholarships
entertainment and sports
memorials/monuments (structures)
modifying educational curriculum
museums
parks
revising text books</td></tr>
</table>

Figure 6 categorizes overlapping conflict resolution tools in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. The left hand column contains those tools hitherto used. The next column lists those that deemed appropriate and are included in the research. The third column lists those identified as useful but not included in the study for reasons outlined below. Finally, the far right column holds those tools that were deemed irrelevant to U.S.-Iraq relations or unattractive in this particular context.

After extracting several important concepts (conflict, conflict resolution), theoretical assumptions (a conflict can be resolved, or two countries can resolve a conflict), and principles (truth, justice) from chapters three through five, attention turned to creating a list of

tools that promote conflict resolution that are viable and easily recognizable in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. To this end, each tool in Appendix 1 was first analyzed by the researcher and organized into three broad categories depicted in Figure 6: tools "hitherto applied," those deemed "appropriate" and those "irrelevant." Once classified by the researcher into the three categories, and because the survey would be administered across cultures, it was essential to validity to select tools and concepts that were easily recognizable and were projected to share meaning across target populations (Johnson, 1998: 11-29). Hence, the number of tools had to be reduced to a manageable quantity while maintaining relevance in context and cross-cultural validity. To accommodate this qualitative and quantitative reduction, pilot research was conducted to reduce those tools deemed "appropriate" into a manageable and recognizable selection for our questionnaire. Further explanations for why conflict resolution tools were categorized in the manner expressed in the figure above, in conjunction with practices associated with research piloting (participant selection), are provided in the following subsections.

6.2.1 Tools hitherto utilized

Conflict resolution tools found in Appendix 1 that have been implemented hitherto in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations are listed in the left hand column of Figure 6. Mechanisms placed in this category were identified through a literature review and are accounted for as follows. Foremost, the George W. Bush administration initiated tools to improve the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations during the occupation. Attention was initially confined to the structural level through "security", "economic" and "political cooperation," as articulated in the *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* (National Security Council, 2005). In 2008, the *Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Iraq* enhanced the administration's efforts to improve bilateral relations and institutionalize cooperation between the governments of Iraq and the United States (Brennan and others, 2013: 60-64; Katzman, 2014: 39; Strategic Framework Agreement, 2008). Those agreements were followed by the *Security Agreement* (in effect between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2011), which dictated complete transfer of sovereignty to the GOI and imposed restrictions on unilateral U.S. military operations in Iraq (Brennan and others, 2013: 65-66). The combination of agreements established the framework for bilateral relations between the U.S.-Iraq, and several of their components remain in effect (Katzman, 2014: 39).

In conjunction with the structural practices denoted, cooperation at the societal level has also been established, including a joint cultural and educational collaborative framework. As of October 2009, five Joint Coordination Committees (JCCs) had been founded for the purpose of enhancing bilateral cooperation between institutions in the United States and Iraq (Department of Defense, 2010: 39). JCC committees collaborate on: "economic and energy cooperation; cultural, educational, and scientific cooperation; services and information technology cooperation; law enforcement and judicial cooperation; and political and diplomatic cooperation" (Department of Defense, 2010: 39). JCC's cooperative framework across these sectors, denoted by the DOD quote, includes both structural and societal level approaches, and is still being utilized at the time of writing (Department of State, 2014; Katzman, 2014: 39). While beneficial for enhancing cooperation and trust, it was denoted that mainly structural approaches alone are unsatisfactory for generating and rooting conflict transformation at the societal level (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259). Social participation is essential; as we demonstrated in chapter two that the quality of relations have impacted on society in both countries, suggesting that transformation of societal perceptions and behavior is similarly necessary. Moreover, it is unclear how citizens from both countries view the existing arrangements, since there is no indication that the publics were consulted.

In addition to these measures, other conflict resolution tools have been implemented, as listed in the "hitherto applied" category of Figure 6. More specifically, acts signaling improved relations have occurred. Acts of signaling encompass the multiple "official state visits" by representatives from Iraq and the United States. For example, Vice President Joe Biden met with Iraq's leaders on several occasions in 2009 and 2010 (Department of Defense, 2009; Katzman, 2014: 39; Miles, 2010). Reversely, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki traveled to the United States to meet with Barack Obama in 2011 and 2013 (BBC News, 2013). Likewise, representatives from both countries have signaled "gestures of solidarity" and emphasized the need for bilateral cooperation. On the one hand, President Obama (2011) commented that the United States "will be proud to stand with" Iraq "as a steadfast partner." On the other hand, Ayad Allawi publicly advocated an increase in U.S. assistance with Iraq's national reconciliation program, suggesting, at least in certain instances, he perceives cooperation with the United States essential to improving social-political conditions inside Iraq (Fadel, 2010). In conjunction, channels of communication have been established at multiple levels, including the appointment of Vice President Biden as special envoy (Quinn, 2009; Ryan, 2010). To these channels of communication, we can also re-list the regular state visits and the establishment of JCCs (Department of Defense, 2010), as outlined previously.

Next, "military signaling" occurred gradually. The U.S. first reduced troop activity in Iraq, handing over responsibility for security to ISF, and thereafter, U.S. troops assumed a training role until complete troop withdraw in 2011 (Logan, 2011). Transition of security responsibility was partially dictated by the 2009 Security Agreement, which limited unilateral U.S. military operations in Iraq unless otherwise requested by the GOI (Brennan and others, 2013: 65-66). Although U.S. military forces were permanently removed in December 2011, a contingent of trainers have returned at the request of the GOI to train Iraq's forces to fight IS. The expected duration of their deployment is unclear.

Finally, Iraq and the U.S. cooperated on "reconstruction" and "joint projects" throughout the occupation (Bowen, 2013: 37-113). Reconstruction and joint projects are observable in United States activity including the allocation of financial assistance in grants and loans to Iraq to underwrite multiple (joint) infrastructural/reconstruction projects (Bowen, 2013: 37-113); assistance with conducting political elections at the local and national levels (Bowen, 2013: 105-108); and, the introduction of legal reform and legislative revision, the latter of which was purported to advance accountability, fairness and transparency within Iraq's judicial framework (Bowen, 2013: 101-104). While the noted tools have encountered varying degrees of success, and are subject to criticism (outlined in 1.3.3.3), the GOI eventually assumed absolute control over respective projects and institutions (Bowen, 2013: 28). In summary, tools which prepare the way for conflict resolution which have been utilized hitherto include aid/assistance, economic cooperation, establishing channels of communication, formal agreements or treaties, gestures of solidarity, joint institutions/cooperation, joint projects/ reconstruction, military signaling, official state visits, and political and security cooperation have been utilized to alter the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations. It should be noted, however, that although all of these mechanisms have been implemented in context, several were copied into the "appropriate" category of Figure 6, to provide our survey participants an opportunity to rate their acceptability as practices. In this manner, we can gauge if our samples value these tools in general terms, an in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations.

6.2.2 Tools excluded in context

The right hand column of Figure 6 contains tools deemed "irrelevant" and "untimely" in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations, and was categorized as such for two broad reasons. On the one hand, eleven mechanisms were determined nonviable because of their lack of substance or applicability in context. For example, peaceful partition, arbitration, holding new elections,

social shaming, symbolic restoration or vetting, among others, are inapplicable for resolving U.S.-Iraq conflict relations. While some were utilized at the intrastate level (new elections, social shaming, vetting), the tools are irrelevant when contemplating U.S.-Iraq relations. On the other hand, nine additional tools were determined untimely. Those deemed untimely include the arts, adapting the educational curriculum or textbooks, offering educational awards and scholarships, and establishing parks or memorials, all of which are deemed inappropriate gestures in the absence of more discernible enterprises. The latter set is, therefore, deemed irrelevant momentarily, but these recognized tools could be reconsidered in the future to pave the way for transformation following more tangible efforts being pursued.

6.2.3 Piloting the survey

Following the reduction of conflict resolution mechanisms identified in Appendix 1 into the three categories, the 37 tools listed in the “appropriate” columns of Figure 6 were reduced to eleven core mechanisms utilizing piloting to filter the quality and quantity. Piloting was, nonetheless, not only beneficial for reducing techniques to the most recognizable, it was equally useful for evaluating and improving our questionnaire quality in terms of composition, layout and wording (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266; Krosnik, 1999: 541). Piloting occurred in three stages between September 2010 and March 2011 in Innsbruck, Austria. The three phases included 10, 10, and 5 pilot participants respectively. Pilot participants were selected from a convenience sample that consists predominantly of U.S. study abroad students in Innsbruck, and expatriates living in the area, whose acquaintance were made through the Austro-American Society Innsbruck. Lastly, 5 personal acquaintances were contacted in the United States to increase the number of pilots without a university degree.

One primary weakness of piloting was the inability to locate participants from Iraq. Despite three attempts to network through an acquaintance employed at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the researcher was unable to pilot more than one citizen from Iraq. Consequently, pilot participants consist of twenty-four U.S. citizens and one citizen from Iraq. Pilot participants in general have diverse educational and social backgrounds. Participants included one degree-seeking employee at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, while U.S. pilots contain ten degree-seeking undergraduates, nine with Masters, and five blue-collar workers. Our pilot sample consists of fifteen male participants. Their age ranges are 18-25 (n = 6), 26-35 (n = 6), and 36-45 (n = 3). Ten females likewise participated. Their ages are 18-25 (n = 3), 26-35 (n = 4), and 36-45 (n = 3).

All potential pilot respondents consented to participation after being contacted by the researcher. The anonymity of participants was ensured, and for the purposes of confidentiality, each was assigned a Pilot Number (1-25) according to their order of participation. Pilot surveys were administered using face-to-face interviews, face-to-face survey completions (n = 20) and email correspondence (n = 5). Face-to-face interviewing occurred at the convenience of the pilot participant, at a time and location they selected. Locations for interviewing included the Innsbruck university library (n = 7), in someone's residence (n = 8), in a park (n = 2) or restaurant (n = 3), and online (n = 5). The average duration of the interviews was 60 minutes for the first ten pilots, 30 minutes for the second group, and 15 minutes for the third set. The five internet-based questionnaire completions were conducted by forwarding a draft survey to a respondent, allowing the pilot to complete the survey and provide additional feedback.

The three stages of piloting complimented each other in terms of content and presentation, as detailed below. During the first phase, face-to-face semi-structured interviews included an electronic draft of the survey with 130 open questions. We also provided a printed chart of 5, 7 and 11 point Likert Scales for rating items, such as conflict resolution principles and practices, should the participant request. The researcher preferred the Likert scales due to their ease of construction, utilization and reliability (Bertram, 2007: 7). However, we initially used open-ended questions to understand how pilots would respond to the questions and to obtain potential answers should closed questions be integrated into the survey.

As stated, the primary objective of the first and second piloting phases was to narrow questions and tools to a manageable number. Survey questions during the first phase contained 37 potential tools for advancing conflict resolution, 16 principles and included questions pertaining to general perceptions of conflict and conflict resolution as extracted from the literature review. Pilot participants were given two opportunities to rank this list of tools: once in general terms at the interstate level and in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. This two-fold approach allowed us to compare if pilot participants accepted or rejected certain principles in general and in the case of the U.S. and Iraq.

During phase one face-to-face interviews, the researcher presented questions orally and answers were elicited. Pilots were encouraged to not only provide answers to the questions, but also to critique questions and provide general feedback on potential responses, question wording and so forth (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). As participants responded, the researcher took digital notes (see Appendix 6). Since the researcher read the questions from a computer, grammatical and lexical corrections were made in real-time for the purpose of

ensuring clarity. Although phase one preliminary interviews were time consuming and only conducted in English, their advantage is their semi-structured nature that allowed participants freedom of response and the opportunity to interact with the researcher (Oppenheim, 2008: 184-185). Nonetheless, pilot responses tended to be curt, and they seldom provided in-depth insight into their opinions even when the researcher tried to elicit additional information. In most instances, it appeared that the respondents had not given much thought to conflict or conflict resolution prior to their agreement to participate.

After ten individuals had been piloted, data and feedback obtained from each semi-structured interview were comparatively analyzed and harmonized to reduce the number of questions and improve the draft questionnaire. More specifically, several tools were combined (criminal trials, hybrid tribunals) to reduce, what respondents perceived was, repetition in the survey. For example, respondents felt that criminal trials and tribunals could be combined, thereby reducing duplication. In addition, virtually all of the first ten pilots recommended the introduction of a permanent rating scale rather than open-ended questions, which respondents found time consuming and exhausting. Nonetheless, the improvements generated from the first pilot group increased the quality of the questionnaire's content and design since issues and response categories that might have otherwise been overlooked or omitted were elicited (Oppenheim, 2008: 184-185).

Subsequent to the first stage of piloting, it was also determined that open-ended questions should be avoided for four reasons. First, it would be challenging to code and translate responses (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266; Oppenheim, 2008: 101-102). Second, closed questions increase statistical reliability and validity, making it easier to make comparisons across samples (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). Third, a structured questionnaire would assure standardization of the survey process, guaranteeing the same questions were asked in the same manner from all respondents (Schaeffer and Maynard, 2001: 579). Fourth, while the first ten pilot participants recognized the value of open-ended questions, they overwhelmingly (80%, n = 8) expressed discontent with the amount of time required to complete the survey when expected to produce every answer. While closed questions limited the potential range of responses (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266; Oppenheim, 2008: 101-102), their advantages outweighed their disadvantages in regards to the present research. Consequently, a printed survey with closed questions was produced for the second phase of piloting.

In terms of reducing the conflict resolution tools, the first ten pilots' preference for techniques, in a general context, gravitated around fifteen of the thirty-seven potential practices incorporated into the draft survey. Among those, economic cooperation, truth

commissions and apologies were unanimously embraced over other tools, namely amnesty or peace education. It was also clear that some tools were vague and less recognized. In several cases, respondents had to request a definition for particular tools, such as hybrid tribunals, military signaling or joint commemorations. Requests for definitions prolonged the duration of the interview and indicated that numerous mechanisms were obscure to laypersons. However, these obstacles were expected, as one of the goals of piloting was to select tools that respondents recognized and felt were beneficial to advancing interstate conflict resolution.

One nearly unanimous complaint expressed by pilot participants during the first phase was the length of the survey. This complaint was expected, since there were 37 tools that needed to be reduced. The theoretical and practical issues faced were how to reduce survey length to limit respondent fatigue (Krosnick and others, 2002: 382), while preserving research value and reliability. To reduce the length of the pilot survey, it was decided to temporarily remove the rating of principles. Likewise, as noted elsewhere, techniques were reduced to 31, because respondents considered six tools overlapping or redundant and were, therefore, combined. With the slightly condensed version of the draft survey complete with closed questions and scales, phase two piloting began.

During phase two, eighty topic-related questions with Likert Scales (with "two fixed points") were provided (Hinken, 1998: 109-110; Saris and Gallhofer, 2007: 118) on a printed questionnaire administered by the researcher. During this phase of piloting, attention remained largely centered on reducing the remaining 31 conflict resolution mechanisms to eleven and evaluating the viability of Likert scales. The ten participants were again encouraged to answer the question posed and provide feedback as they worked through the questionnaire. To improve the clarity and presentation of each survey, vocabulary and grammar mistakes identified during piloting were corrected between pilot participants, although no content changes were made.

Combining the results from the first two pilot groups, thirty-one conflict resolution tools were reduced to eleven that were easily recognized by pilot participants and suggested beneficial for altering conflict between two countries. Table 1 indicates the number of acceptances and rejections each tool received during the first and second phases of piloting. Our findings led to the reduction of tools to eleven. Increased analysis as to why techniques were accepted or rejected is provided in sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4. Survey responses and comments acquired from the second phase of piloting are available in Appendix 7.

Table 1 Rating of Conflict Resolution Tools from Piloting Phases 1 and 2

conflict resolution tools	phase 1		phase 2		outcome	
	support	reject	support	reject	supported	rejected
third party intervention	10	0	10	0	✓	
security cooperation	2	8	10	0	✓	
political cooperation	1	9	10	0	✓	
reparation payments	6	4	7	3	✓	
court (or judicial) proceedings	5	5	10	0	✓	
public apology	6	4	6	4	✓	
economic cooperation	10	0	10	0	✓	
truth telling/commission	7	3	8	2	✓	
cultural exchanges/awareness	7	3	6	4	✓	
positive media coverage	10	0	9	1	✓	
international tribunals	6	4	5	5	✓	
gestures of solidarity	4	6	0	10		✗
official state visits	3	7	0	10		✗
joint institutions/cooperation	5	5	1	9		✗
military signaling	5	5	0	10		✗
joint projects/ reconstruction	5	5	2	8		✗
archiving testimonies	0	10	0	10		✗
granting amnesty	2	8	0	10		✗
exchange of representatives	3	7	0	10		✗
face-to-face encounters	0	10	0	10		✗
films/documentaries	0	10	0	10		✗
good governance and accountability	2	8	0	10		✗
joint or hybrid tribunals	1	9	0	10		✗
joint memorials or ceremonies	0	10	0	10		✗
peace education	0	10	1	9		✗
regular joint meetings	2	8	0	10		✗
(re)writing history	0	10	0	10		✗
theater and storytelling	0	10	0	10		✗
traditional methods	0	10	0	10		✗
travel/tourism	1	9	0	10		✗
legislative admission of wrongdoing	0	10	0	10		✗
opening archives and records	0	10	0	10		✗
showing forgiveness	3	7	added as a question in final draft			
economic assistance	10	0	merged with economic coop.			
channels of communication	10	0	merged with political cooperation			
treaties and formal agreements	8	2	merged with political cooperation			
special courts	1	9	merged with court proceedings			
workshops	5	5	merged with cultural exchanges and interaction			

Table 1 qualifies pilot participants' aggregated approval or disapproval of conflict resolution tools from phases one and two piloting. It demonstrates that the first eleven practices were widely supported, while the remainder was predominantly rejected. The last six tools were merged, as indicated, following phase one to reduce repetition within the survey.

In addition to reducing the number of tools, pilot participants in the second phase also made recommendations to enhance the quality of the questionnaire. In terms of scales, seven

out of ten second phase participants preferred Likert Scales with at least 7 options, and there was unanimous preference for the 11-point scales when rating principles and tools. Respondents found, as the literature suggests, that Likert Scales were easy to use, they ensured parsimony, and provided sufficient flexibility in response (Hinken, 1998: 109-110; Saris and Gallhofer, 2007: 118). Next, participants assisted with the rewording and overall presentation of questions to increase flow and understandability. Recommendations were also made concerning grammar and lexicon. Simultaneously, respondents recommended adding alternating background colors on the question sets to increasing legibility.

In terms of criticism, the most prominent complaint gravitated around survey length. Six out of ten participants perceived the questionnaire was "too long", averaging 35 minutes, and another complained that it was "entirely too long." However, respondents realized that the final survey would naturally be reduced since the primary objective of second phase was to aid in the reduction of mechanism included into the final draft. Equally valuable, phase two pilot participants suggested that brief definitions for concepts such as "conflict resolution" be added. They also recommended that short descriptions for mechanisms be introduced into the survey to ensure (cross-cultural) clarity and validity. Through the provision of definitions, participants felt that all respondent doubt and confusion would be significantly reduced.

Following content adaptations made subsequent to phases one and two piloting, including the reduction of the number of tools and the introduction of definitions for relevant terms, five additional pilot probes were conducted to evaluate the final draft of the questionnaire. Pilots during phase three concentrated on the presentation and style of the survey. Hence, focus was placed entirely on the aesthetics of the survey, understandability, grammar and general presentation. Their survey responses are available Appendix 8.

Overall, phase three participants expressed positive feedback on the structure and presentation of the questionnaire. For instance, the eleven-point rating scale were commonly praised and respondents enjoyed alternating between Likert Scales, finding they contained clear symmetrical, easy-to-use response ranges (Johnson, 1998: 17; Krosnik, 1999: 544). Similarly, pilot participants unanimously agreed that the definitions provided were useful, and only 1 of 5 pilot respondents expressed concern about the survey length (averaging 18 minutes). However, at this stage, four out of five respondents criticized the inclusion of the "don't know" response category, which no pilot participant had utilized hitherto. They recommended this category be eliminated. Aside from removing the "don't know" responses from the survey, only minor corrections were made to question wording.

Subsequent to making the necessary alterations after the third phase piloting, the questionnaire was finalized in early 2011. As a means of quality control, the researcher contacted the political science department of the University of New Orleans in the U.S. state of Louisiana to have the finalized survey reviewed by a methodology professor. A university representative recommended Assistant Professor Dr. Matt Jacobsmeier, who was teaching research methodology and political science courses at the time, be contacted. Contact with Dr. Jacobsmeier was made via email. The researcher had no prior affiliation with the assistant professor. Upon initial contact, Dr. Jacobsmeier (2011) agreed to review the questionnaire and draft research methodology in early February 2011. His response came on March 28, 2011, recommending minor structural changes to several questions and the re-introduction of the "don't know" category throughout the survey (which had been removed during the third phase) (Jacobsmeier, 2011).

The former suggestions were promptly addressed. By comparison, Dr. Jacobmeier's (2011) latter recommendation raised a theoretical issue within survey literature, namely that scholars disagree over the relative utility of "don't know" categories in surveys and its effects on research validity. Krosnick and others (2002: 396), for example, argue that: "Inclusion of no-opinion option" does "not reliably improve the quality of the data obtained." They go on to criticize the inclusion of no opinion "systematically encourages low-education respondents to avoid the effort of deciding how to answer the question, thereby reducing the impact they have on survey results" (Krosnick and others, 2002: 398-399). As emphasized in the quote, their inclusion is hypothesized to induce respondents' random selection of answers on topics they have not given much consideration (Krosnick and others, 2002: 372). Since the literature suggests the inclusion of the "don't know" category is problematic for the reasons stated above, and no pilot participants had utilized them, but rather criticized their inclusion, and since Likert Scales with clear neutral positions were provided, it was decided not to re-introduce the "don't know" categories in the final draft of the survey.

In terms of methodology, Dr. Jacobsmeier (2011) denoted the inherent difficulties of acquiring a high n-value with no funding, assistance or possibility of traveling to the United States or Iraq. He thus suggested I attempt to solicit assistance with survey distribution. Simultaneously, he recommended that should both sample populations remain small, I should weigh my samples through purposeful (or quota) sampling whenever possible (Jacobsmeier, 2011). Quotas are used to target respondents according to particular stratum as a means of increasing the representativeness of the sample (Jacobsmeier, 2011; Patton, 2002: 46; Schofield, 1996: 36). For instance, if female respondents outnumbered male respondents, an

increased number of males should be purposefully sampled to create a more representative sample. Quota sampling, he argued, would be one potential means of controlling for over-representation of respondents according to gender, age or education (Jacobsmeier, 2011). However, as articulated later, this valuable methodological insight was difficult to implement.

With piloting methodology delineated, our attention turns to demonstrating how piloting affected the contents of the final survey. The following two subsections explain why and how the researcher categorized tools from Appendix 1 into Figure 6, and summarizes pilot participants' opinion on the tools during the first two phases of piloting.

6.2.4 Thirty-seven potentially applicable tools

Several criteria were used to determine which conflict resolution tools noted in the "appropriate" category of Figure 6 would be included in the research. Foremost, it was imperative to include techniques that were recognized by pilot participants. With the increased ease of identification it was hypothesized respondents would have a higher probability of possessing a basic understanding of each tool, which in turn would enable them to form an opinion about their relative utility for improving relations at the interstate level. Second, the researcher wanted to integrate tools spread across the spectrum, including structural, societal-based, as well as restorative and retributive justice techniques. Through diversification, it would be possible to comparatively analyze how respondents perceived the array of tools in general terms and in then in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. Finally, the research wanted to test Irani's (1999) hypothesis about the general acceptability of certain techniques commonly utilized at the international level. This section outlines those tools extracted from Appendix 1, and deemed applicable in context.

The tools located in the "omitted" sub-column of the "applicable" category of Figure 6 were excluded for the following combination of reasons. First, "legislative acknowledgment" of wrongdoing and the "opening of archives" were excluded due to the actions of the U.S. Congress between 2001 and 2014. For instance, Congress has been criticized for not doing enough to prevent the war or to objectively investigate wrongdoing after-the-fact (Amnesty International, 2008; L. Fisher, 2003: 389-390). Although Amnesty International (2013: 14-18) has emphasized the importance of U.S. government accountability in relation to the war in Iraq, no discernible actions have occurred hitherto. For example, no senior ranking military or government representative has been held responsible for the promotion of the 2003 invasion or wrongdoing associated with implementation. By way of example, Paul Wolfowitz, one staunch advocated of the invasion and promoter of its necessity, has not been held to account

and instead was installed as President of the World Bank between June 2005 and June 2007 (Cassidy, 2007).

To its credit, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2014) publicly released a condemning report in December 2014, criticizing CIA detention and interrogation techniques deployed during as a part of the Global War on Terrorism. It is doubtful, however, that justice in this instance will be pursued against individuals involved with the design and implementation of such policies. We, therefore, deem it unlikely that the U.S. government will make any efforts at ensuring accountability, providing legislative acknowledgment or opening of agency archives in the short-term, since such tools require congressional support. For similar reasons, congressional (in)actions underscore the non-viability of practices such as "good governance and accountability" which were equally omitted for the reasons enumerated. Confirming our reservations, most pilot participants rejected these practices as displayed in Table 1. They likewise did not perceive the United States government would budge on such issues.

Next, justice based tools, such as the "prosecution of criminals" or the use of "special courts" (retributive), and offering "amnesty" (restorative), appeared biased and impractical initially in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. On the one hand, the United States demand the immunity of its citizens at the hands of foreign governments and international institutions, and the Strategic Framework Agreement (2008) contains blanket immunity for U.S. citizens serving in Iraq[80]. On the other hand, it was not expected that Iraqis would (or should) offer amnesty to U.S. government representatives or its citizens who committed wrongdoing during the 2003 War and subsequent occupation, since they were reluctant to do so with criminal wrongdoing committed under Saddam Hussein (International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 51). Since the war was preventive, and the arguments posed for its necessity were erroneous (for example the possession of WMD) (Carty, 2011: 80; Johansen, 2004: 4; Kepel, 2004: 197-198; Lieberfeld, 2005: 3; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 223; Roy, 2007: 13; Tripp, 2007: 273), it was deemed morally inappropriate and potentially offensive to refer to the granting of amnesty until the truth is told and wrongdoings are documented. Interestingly, we found during piloting that U.S. citizens were equally offended by these references. For example, 14 out of 20 pilot participants suggested that the inclusion of criminal trials in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations was offensive, and they argued that their

[80] The U.S. government's determination to prevent prosecution was demonstrated when it intervened to prevent Blackwater's private security employees from being prosecuted in Iraq for their actions in the 2007 shooting of civilians in Nisoor Square (Chen, 2009; 101-106). Eventually, Blackwater employees involved in this incident were tried and convicted in the United States in October 2014 (Apuzzo, 2014).

inclusion implied that wrongdoing had been committed. It was, therefore, determined that reference to criminal trials would be sensitive to both sample populations, and that their reference risked inducing non-response by offending respondents (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007: 860). For this reason, these were eliminated from the final draft.

Thereafter, "traditional methods" were excised from the research for several reasons. Foremost, Kilcullen (2009: 169) asserts that the *sulh* is not open to foreigners. Next, the *sulh* is a mechanism utilized at the familial or clan levels and is inapplicable at the interstate level (Pely, 2009: 82-83). The final reason that traditional mechanisms were omitted was due to the inherent challenges of reducing complex practices, such as the *sulh*, to one or two sentence for the purposes of creating a definition or explanation for survey respondents. During piloting, definitions were provided orally to all respondents because none recognized traditional methods. Once defined, no pilot participant favored its inclusion.

By comparison, "travel/tourism" was excluded since pilot participants unanimously recognized the difficulties of traveling between the United States and Iraq. Most notably, it is improbable that travel and tourism will take root in Iraq in the short-term until internal stability has been established. Travel and tourism was thereby determined premature. Nevertheless, the potential value of travel for enhancing mutual awareness in the future is recognized (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 34; Boulding, 1978: 63). Simultaneously, "face-to-face" meetings, such as those between war veterans, and the building of "casual relationships" or (student) "exchange programs," were equally excluded for corresponding reasons. However, we wish to highlight that independent organizations, such as "Right to Heal," sponsor activities of this nature between Iraq and the United States (Brooks and Cassano, 2013), and there is a JCC centered on cooperation in the field of education, so their value is recognized and some limited measures are underway, nonetheless, pilot participants overwhelmingly rejected these tools.

"Peace education" (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 20-26; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 226) and community "workshops" (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 217; R. Fisher, 2001b: 26; Maoz, 2000: 720-723) were difficult to dismiss since they seek to transform perspectives and to impart skills at the societal level. However, due to their obscure nature, their inclusion required detailed definitions that would have increased survey length and the probability of respondent fatigue, which in turn would have a negative impact on research validity and reliability (Krosnick and others, 2002: 382). Moreover, a clear majority of pilot participants were unaware of peace education, and pilot participants recommended merging workshops into cultural exchanges,

although we recognize that both are, in reality, stand-alone tools that generally target diverse groups.

A similar obstacle was encountered with the inclusion of creating and maintaining "archives and testimonials." Few participants were aware of archiving and testimonial collection, few pilot participants supported it, and many concluded that the processes would be inextricably linked to truth commissions rather than stand-alone mechanisms. Summarizing pilot opinion, most believed archives and testimonials are a linear product of a trial or truth commission. Archiving and documenting testimonials were, therefore, excluded.

Correspondingly, "joint meetings" and the "exchanges of representatives" were unpopular during piloting. They were thus jettisoned in favor of re-introducing the general practices of "economic, political and military cooperation," which are already in use in the case of U.S.-Iraq relations. In short, a majority of participants perceived that the tools of joint meetings and exchanges fit neatly under the rubric of economic, political and military cooperation. Lastly, "rewriting history," "joint commemoration or ceremonies," "theatre," "story telling," "films and documentaries" are equally useful alternative tools for advancing conflict resolution that are focused at the community level. However, these were rejected since most pilot participants lacked a general knowledge of these practices, and those whom recognized them, prioritized alternative tools. One astute pilot participant suggested that the inclusion of these lesser-known tools risked "making light" of their real potential to transformation relations (Pilot Number 12, 2010). Hence, due to their obscure nature, and their potential of being misinterpreted by those unfamiliar with their processes, these tools were excluded from the final survey.

After explaining why some tools were excluded, the next subsection explains why individual tools were included in the final draft of the survey.

6.2.5 Selected conflict resolution tools

As elaborated above, numerous criteria aided in the selection of the eleven primary tools incorporated into the final draft of the research survey. Four our research purposes, the tools selected had to be applicable in the U.S.-Iraq context, easily recognizable across cultures, and supported by pilot participants. The present subsection details why the eleven mechanisms selected were deemed most applicable. We begin our analysis with the structural practices, including cooperation in "security," "economic" and "political" terms. These were added since they are common conflict resolution practices at the interstate level. Moreover, they are currently in use in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. With this in mind, their inclusion in the

survey provides laypersons an opportunity to rate the practices in general and in context. Furthering this position, a clear majority of pilot participants accepted the structural practices in general and in context. They were easily recognizable among our pilots.

Next, “third party intervention” was included because the U.S., NGOs and IGOs have been actively involved in Iraq at the intrastate and interstate levels. These actors have engaged with local stakeholders through strategies including brokering negotiations on contentious issues, assisting with national elections, hosting interstate dialogue, and have been engage with meeting the needs and representing interests of internally displaced persons in Iraq (United Nations, 2012: 4-12). The researcher wanted to qualify openness to third party intervention in terms of interstate conflict resolution. Furthermore, most pilot participants recognized that third parties frequently intervene in conflicts and determined third party intervention was one of the most easily recognizable and commonly utilized of the mechanisms included in the draft survey.

Thereafter, justice based tools were integrated into the survey, including restorative and retributive techniques. The relative utility of justice mechanisms, including its retributive and restorative forms, is noted in the Arab/Muslim and (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 247; International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 25; Özçelik, 2007: 8-10) Western literature (Anderlini and others, 2004: 1-2; Kriesberg, 2004: 82; Rouhana, 2004: 36). Nonetheless, to minimize respondent bias and the potential of non-response, we did not incorporate trials for criminal wrongdoing, since it was feared Iraqis would take offense. Likewise, and noted above (6.2.3), reference to criminal trials were eliminated due to the sensitive nature of the question, as many pilot participants argued the inclusion of such tools were accusatory and inflammatory to U.S. respondents. In short, U.S. pilot participants felt the reference implied that wrongdoing had been perpetrated, and no consensus could be reached on restructuring or rewording of the question.

Our piloting found that a majority of respondents involved in the first two phases were open to “judicial proceedings” and “international tribunals” in general, and more than half advocated restorative tools, namely “reparations,” “truth commissions” and “apologies”. This combination of justice-based mechanisms were included because pilot participants recognized the tools, and found the techniques less offensive in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations than direct references to amnesties or criminal trials, which respondents perceived implied guilt.

We also incorporated “reparations” (Brooks and Cassano, 2013) and “truth commissions” since international organizations (Amnesty International, 2008) and scholars (Benjamin,

2008: 5, 11; Galtung, 2009: 140; Gareau, 2004: 231) advocate their use[81]. Similarly, a 2006 survey found that a majority of Iraqis (86.3%) embraced the idea of compensation being paid to those harmed by coalition forces (Iraq Centre for Research and Strategic Studies, 2006: 19), a call more recently echoed by media conglomerate Aljazeera USA (Brooks and Cassano, 2013). Similarly, truth commissions were advanced as a potential tool to advance transitional justice in Iraq, although no official program was implemented (Al-Marashi and Keskin, 2008: 243-259) and Iraqis expressed limited knowledge of the mechanism (International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 37-56). The tools were, nonetheless, included to quantify respondent opinion at the interstate level. Overall, we found that pilot participants generally recognized reparations and truth commissions as practices, with a majority advocating for their utilization in general to resolve interstate conflict.

Simultaneously, a "public apology" was incorporated, because the practice is a recognized conflict resolution mechanisms sometimes utilized at the higher levels. It is also associated with forgiveness. While most pilot participants accepted apologizing as a general practice, it was rejected during piloting in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. Its inclusion in the survey was, nonetheless, purposefully retained since it allowed further qualification of laypersons' opinion on the use of an apology in general and in context.

Finally, "positive media coverage" and "raising cultural awareness" were included into the study because of their relevance and ease of recognition across cultures. On the one hand, positive media coverage was included since it is an alternative mode of targeting society at large and because Funk and Said (2004: 6-20) emphasis the role of the media in reinforcing conflict narratives in the West and Middle East conflictual relationship. Moreover, a majority of pilot participants endorsed the tool. On the other hand, increasing cultural awareness was included since Dalia Mogahed (2006: 1-2) draws attention to the fact that U.S. citizens know very little about Muslims, as elucidated in chapter two. Furthermore, a majority of pilot respondents recognized the tools and supported its inclusion since it would augment cultural understanding. With the piloting methodology and findings explained, attention now turns to articulating survey implementation and statistical evaluation of the final research questionnaire.

[81] For a radical call for U.S. reparations, among other recommended punishments in the case of U.S. action in Iraq, see Corlett (2012).

6.3 Research methodology and ethics

Our descriptive and normative research of personal disposition toward conflict resolution involving human subjects (Schwarz, 2007: 639), administered by internet to a convenience sample of Iraq and U.S. citizens, adheres to the ethical guidelines endorsed by the American Association for Public Opinion Research (2010), American Psychological Association (2010) and the British Psychological Society (2010). Quality control of the research process, including methods and means of soliciting respondents, as well as questionnaire design and content, was persistent from the questionnaire's inception to the termination of data processing. Regardless of the phase of research, potential issues encountered or concerns voiced (such as cultural insensitivity) were promptly rectified to protect survey participants and to safeguard the quality and integrity of the study. For the purposes of accountability and transparency, survey protocol was designed and observed as follows.

6.3.1 Questionnaire availability and distribution

Due to the researcher's location in Italy, and the lack of resources and possibility to travel, several techniques were attempted and/or utilized to acquire a representative sample from both countries. Foremost, the researcher attempted to have the questionnaire translated into Arabic to increase the availability of the survey to respondents from Iraq. In mid-2011, several attempts were made to hire Arabic-English translators working at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad through the assistance of a former study colleague. Unfortunately, a pair/team of translators could not be assembled due to employment restrictions and translator workload, so the idea was abandoned. Inability to recruit Arabic speaking translators decreased the probability that a representative sample of citizens living in Iraq could be acquired and meant that respondents from Iraq would have to complete the survey in a second language.

As an alternative means of increasing the potential pool of Iraqi respondents, it was decided to have the questionnaire translated into German and Italian during 2012, a method that would allow Iraqis residing in Italy, Germany, Austria, Belgium and/or other European countries to be solicited. Translation of the original English questionnaire into Italian and German was performed and quality controlled by three Italian native speakers with either a Bachelor (n = 1) or Master degree (n = 2) in English-Italian-German interpreting and translating from the University of Innsbruck. The translation process required several months to complete and was initiated by one translator who translated the original English questionnaire into German and Italian (Harkness and Schoua-Glasberg, 1998: 88-105). Once

the preliminary translations had been completed, two separate translators, one at the time, working in tandem with the first, controlled the original and translated versions. When discrepancies and errors were discovered, the translators engaged in discussions to agree on the most appropriate solution (Harkness and Schoua-Glasberg, 1998: 88-105; Johnson, 1998: 19). Once the first pair of translators unanimously agreed, the same process was utilized with a third translator. The finished products were then quality controlled by an Italian and German native speaker to ensure clarity of the finished translations respectively.

Meanwhile, attempts were made to collaborate with professionals and institutions in the U.S., Iraq and Europe, to broadcast the research and solicit assistance with distributing the questionnaires. Collaboration is a technique deemed acceptable in qualitative research (American Psychological Association, 2010: 6; Johnson, 1998: 13; Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). Unfortunately, collaboration was difficult to acquire. Between May 2, 2013 and October 15, 2013, the researcher solicited independent assistance with promoting the research via telephone or email from institutes of higher learning in Iraq (for instance, University of Sulaimani, University of Baghdad) (n = 4), NGOs working with Iraqis, in the Middle East, the United States and Europe (Caritas, Refugee International, Refugee Action, among others) (n = 23), and independent associations (Muslim American Society, Muslim Student Association) (n = 10). Of the thirty-seven attempts made during this six-month period, only two institutions responded, both rejecting requests for assistance (see Appendix 4). Sasha Crow (2013), at Collateral Repair Project, provided the most detailed explanation for non-collaboration. She claimed that Iraqis assisted by her organization had initially expressed great enthusiasm for participating in academic research in the early years of the U.S. occupation, but rapidly became frustrated by continuous research which produced no tangible improvements to their individual welfare (Crow, 2013). Accordingly, Collateral Repair Project discontinued assisting all researchers because they found the process frustrated the individuals they were assisting.

As a result of the difficulties experienced recruiting assistance, it was decided that a snowball and convenience sample would have to be utilized, which virtually guaranteed that a representative sample would not be acquired. However, in order to expedite the research, the researcher primarily relied on networking friends and acquaintances to solicit potential respondents (Singleton and Straits, 2001: 87). The latter practice yielded a measure of success thanks to the social networking site Facebook. Simultaneously, the survey was made accessible online using Google Docs survey application, whereby online users could log in at their convenience and complete the questionnaire in anonymity. Facebook and Google Doc as

research platforms proved invaluable to our study for multiple reasons including its affordability, in addition to its ease of accessibility and convenience to respondents, as outlined below. Through these technologies, respondents were solicited directly or snowballed indirectly by networking friends, colleagues and acquaintances (Singleton and Straits, 2001: 87). No respondents were solicited using spamming, advertisements, repeat contact or other forms of electronic harassment (internet trolling) (American Psychological Association, 2010: 5-6).

Around the same period, there was a breakthrough following continued attempts at networking. Through a family acquaintance, I was able to locate invaluable assistance with reaching refuges from Iraq living in Italy. With the cooperation of Pietro Benedetti, an expert with 15 years' experience working with refugees in Rome, Italy and founder and coordinator of *Servizio Salute Migranti Forzati* (SAMIFO), an independent NGO, he facilitated contact with the small quantity of refugees from Iraq he worked with in Italy. Benedetti's assistance was conditioned on vetting the questionnaire and personally meeting with the researcher. After scrutinizing the questionnaire's contents and cultural sensitivity, Benedetti approved the survey in its original format on September 10, 2013. The following day, Benedetti began soliciting refugees from Iraq he came into contact with at SAMIFO. At the same time, a face-to-face meeting was scheduled, and held on September 23, 2013, whereupon his continued collaboration was guaranteed until late December 2013 (Benedetti, 2013).

With the questionnaire made accessible online in the English, German and Italian languages, solicitation of respondents through SAMIFO and social networking commenced. When making initial contact with potential respondents, whether directly or indirectly, individuals were offered an opportunity to complete an online questionnaire and provided a brief description of the researcher, accompanied by a concise description of the research (American Psychological Association, 2010: 10). The research description identified the study as a comparative analysis of cross-cultural perceptions of interstate conflict resolution. Additionally, an estimated duration (American Psychological Association, 2010: 10) of fifteen minutes for completing the survey was explained. Potential respondents were also informed that they could freely opt for (non-) participation absent reward or penalty for their (non-) cooperation (American Psychological Association, 2010: 10). Those adults who expressed interest in participating were then provided with an electronic link and/or direct access to the survey.

At this juncture it is imperative to emphasize that only partial disclosure of the research objective and target populations were transmitted to potential respondents (The British

Psychological Society, 2010: 24-25). Participants were not informed that citizens from the U.S. and Iraq were the target populations, nor were they informed that the research centered on comparatively analyzing U.S. and Iraqi perceptions. The decision to limit disclosure was determined necessary to minimize response bias (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). Our limited disclosure approach was based on the assumption that if the target populations were aware of which respondents were being targeted, participants might modify their responses due to social bias (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). In particular, it was feared that respondents might accept or reject conflict resolution according to preconceived notions of how they believed they should responded subsequent to the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Therefore, non-disclosure of the authentic target groups, in exchange for a generic research description, was deemed ethically appropriate since no harmful repercussions would come to respondents (The British Psychological Society, 2010: 24-25).

Returning our attention to those who elected to participate in the survey, consenting respondents were required to access the Internet and connect to the questionnaire, in one of the three languages, using an HTTP link provided. In this manner, initial consent to participate occurred through a participant's activation of the electronic survey via a web browser. While this practice adheres to The British Psychological Society's (2010: 15) ethical practices, which assert that "anonymised-at-source [online], non-sensitive data, consent may be considered to have been given by the act of participation," a request for informed consent was also placed at the end of the online survey, as detailed below.

Once a (potential) respondent had launched the online questionnaire in their language preference, a research title and two explanatory paragraphs were visible in the upper half of the Internet browser window. The first paragraph reiterated pertinent information, including recapping the research purpose and methodology. A projection of the time required to complete the survey was also repeated. In addition, viewers were informed that their anonymity was assured since no personal contact information would be requested and Internet proxy (IP) addresses were not tracked or stored by the survey host (American Psychological Association, 2010: 7). Confidentiality was further assured since no names, dates of birth, or comparable personal data that could be used to identify participants was collected (American Psychological Association, 2010: 7).

Rather than using sensitive personal data, participants who submitted their survey were automatically provided a time-date stamp by Google Docs, and this time-date stamp served as the respondent's identification number during data processing. Therefore, the researcher did not acquire, disclose or put at risk any personal information which could be used to identify

participants or link them to their opinions (American Psychological Association, 2010: 7). Moreover, the autonomous data that was collected following the submission of a completed survey was saved on a secure Google Internet database. The data was protected by a 15 character alphanumeric password and a unique six-digit secondary "security access code." The security code changed each time the database was accessed, and Google Docs forwarded each new access code to the researcher's personal mobile phone.

Returning to the launched survey, in the second introductory paragraph of a launched online survey, respondents were informed that they could exit the survey without consequence at any time simply by closing the Internet browser window (American Psychological Association, 2010: 10). The hitherto keyed data of those "opting out" of the survey was not saved since the non-participant would not have activated the "submit" button located at the end of the questionnaire. Data that was not submitted was not stored, and thereby was not retrievable by the researcher, because closing the browser window prior to submission expunged any data that had been entered by non-respondents. Consequently, incomplete questionnaires could not be submitted, a technique which making it impossible to qualify how many respondents opened the survey, and/or partially completed it, but never submitted.

Nonetheless, following the introductory paragraphs just detailed, the Internet survey presented respondents with 76 topical questions arranged in seven question sets. See Appendix 2 to view the questionnaire. All topical questions were provided with Likert Scales for responses, while classification questions generally included selection boxes and/or a text box respondents could use in case the answers provided were inadequate. Combined, questions were distributed as follows: fifty questions were related to participants' perceptions of conflict and conflict resolution in general; twenty were related to conflict resolution in terms of U.S.-Iraq relations subsequent to the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War; and six were classification questions (age, gender). Questions sets were separated by introductory sentences and instructions. The questionnaire ended with a set of classification questions.

The survey concluded by thanking participants for their cooperation. Contact information was then provided to participants so (non-) respondents could contact the researcher for additional information about any aspect of the research should they desire, or to make special requests such as purging submitted data (American Psychological Association, 2010: 10). Lastly, there was a "submit" button. Viewers were informed that by depressing the "submit" button, the act formally provided their consent to participate in the research (American Psychological Association, 2010: 10; Schmidt, 1997: 4). Once the submit button was

activated, a time-date stamp was provided and the data was transferred and saved directly onto a linked, secured excel file.

In terms of ethical standards, no participants were expected to experience psychological harm from the survey process or research content (The British Psychological Society, 2010: 11-12). Similarly, the issue of (cultural) sensitivity was projected to be minimal with those who had English as a second language (The British Psychological Society, 2010: 13). To circumvent cultural insensitivity, question phrasing, vocabulary and cultural nuances were taken into consideration when drafting and piloting the survey. The survey was also screened to verify its cultural sensitivity. Items identified (potentially) culturally sensitive were either omitted from the questionnaire or rephrased with the assistance of pilot participants. Moreover, Mr. Benedetti's quality control of the survey yielded no suggestions or complaints regarding cultural sensitivity. Despite these practices, our study does suffer from several obvious weaknesses.

6.3.2 Weaknesses of the research

The present research suffers from apparent weaknesses, primarily due to the size and non-representative nature of our convenience samples (Norman, 2010: 4) due to the challenges of reaching respondents from the U.S. and Iraq. Absent a significant degree of external assistance, it was impossible to acquire a representative samples from the United States or Iraq, and, accordingly, the survey populations were reduced to a convenience sample of citizens residing in their native country, or abroad, which is neither random nor representative (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266; Schmidt, 1997: 2; Schofield, 1996: 29). However, use of convenience and snowball sampling techniques were necessary to expedite the research in consideration of the resources available. As a result of the sample type and size, research findings have to be interpreted with caution and should not be considered representative (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). While efforts were made to weigh the sample, for instance by encouraging acquaintances to target respondents with particular demographic characteristics (for instance more males) (Jacobsmeier, 2011; Schofield, 1996: 36), our efforts failed to provide demographic representativeness. Despite the recognized problems our sample presents, small *n* samples can be found in peace and conflict resolution literature, whose sample sizes range from eighteen to one hundred thirty-one (Basedau and De Juan,

2008: 13; Halperin, 2008: 717; Maoz, 2000: 724; Mayer and Boness, 2011: 67; Ron and Maoz, 2013: 281)[82].

Next, because of security, financial, technological and geographic limitations, face-to-face contact with respondents was impossible. Inability to conduct face-to-face querying restricted modes of data collection and eliminated the potential of eliciting supplementary information, for instance through follow-up questioning (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). This practice restricts the range of possible questions, responses and a deeper qualification of attitudes (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). Although attempts were made to conduct face-to-face interviews with Iraqi refugees in Italy, for example, scheduling issues and concerns for refugee privacy undermined the possibility. Consequently, all questionnaires completed were administered via the Internet and contained closed questions.

Thereafter, the use of the Internet creates associated research weaknesses. For instance, the use of the social networking site Facebook and Google Docs eliminates the possibility of determining non-response rates. While survey researchers should qualify non-response rates (Singleton and Straits, 2001: 62-87), the use of these technologies makes it impossible to know with certainty how many people were informed of the survey, or may have launched the survey, and then declined to participate. The absence of non-response rates is problematic for accurately determining survey reliability, and for qualifying differences between those who responded and those who did not (Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266; Singleton and Straits, 2001: 62-87). In spite of these problems, the online survey was the most effective means of distributing the survey to as many potential respondents in our case and its guaranteed anonymity.

Another weakness associated with the implementation of the research via the Internet is that it limits access since those without computers or Internet cannot participate (Schmidt, 1997: 1-2). These limitations, however, were partially controlled since Internet access was granted to Iraqi refugees in Italy who consented to participate. In all instances, Pietro Benedetti, whom also made himself available to assist with the completion of the survey via computer, provided refugees access to the Internet survey if they wished to participate. In a private interview with Mr. Benedetti, he praised the use of technology-based surveying over the standard practice of paper, suggesting it was more convenient and functional for facilitators, researchers and respondents. We agreed, and hence, the advantages of Internet

[82] In alphabetical order, Basedau and De Juan's (2008: 13) research contains 28 cases. Eran Halperin's (2008: 717) is based on 30 in-depth interviews. Maoz's (2000: 724) study consists of 131 workshop participants of two different nationalities. By comparison, the Mayer and Boness (2011: 67) study included 18 interviews. Finally, Ron and Maoz's (2013: 281) research contains 20 interviews.

surveying outweighed its limitation of accessibility in this particular study because refugees, whom risk having limited access to the Internet, were provided the resources and assistance with utilizing this technology (Mann and Stewart, 2003: 245-246; Schmidt, 1997: 2-4)[83].

The next weakness was the potential sensitive nature of some survey questions. While efforts were made to eliminate sensitive questions, disclosure of personal opinions on issues such as U.S.-Iraq relations was potentially invasive to some respondents. The literature suggests that integration of sensitive questions into surveys is problematic for numerous reasons (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007: 860). First, sensitive questions, "tend to produce comparatively higher non-response rates or larger measurement error in responses than questions on other topics" due to their "intrusiveness" (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007: 860). In this instance, respondents either refuse to answer, or randomly select answers, because of the sensitive nature of the topic. Second, sensitive questions have an increased tendency of prompting socially desirable responses (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007: 860). Here, respondents select an answer they perceive is most acceptable by their peers. While socially desirable answers compromise the quality and reliability of survey research, the literature suggests that respondents are increasingly likely to complete a survey containing sensitive questions when it is self-administered and anonymity is ensured (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007: 863). In consideration of these findings, hosting the survey online ensured respondents' anonymity while adhering to survey best practice for minimizing non-response and social bias with sensitive questions since the survey was self-administered. Moreover, as mentioned, only partial disclosure of the target populations was provided to reduce the probability of generating social bias answers.

Another weakness of our study is that it is opinion based; hence its findings offer only a snapshot into a narrow sample's attitudes toward a complex set of issues and circumstances (van Schalk and Aureli, 2000: 309). The theoretical foundation of this weakness is rooted in the recognition that opinions are subject to fluctuation determined by time, context, wording, and even the state of mind of the respondent at the time she completes the survey (Schwarz, 2007: 644-645). In full recognition of the fluidity of opinions, we emphasize that our findings qualifies non-crystallized opinions of a non-representative sample of U.S. and Iraq citizens (the latter mainly residing in Europe). We, therefore, acknowledge that the opinions and

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[83] For example, online surveys are convenient to respondents since they can activate and complete a survey at will (Mann and Stewart, 2003: 245-246). It is also more economical than printing questionnaires and reduces the time dedicated to soliciting potential respondents (Mann and Stewart, 2003: 245-246; Schmidt, 1997: 1-4). Finally, data transfer is safer since the information is directly uploaded into a database minimizing the risk of transposing or other errors by the research (Mann and Stewart, 2003: 245-246).

values measured by the survey are subject to alteration over time should contextualized inputs (experience, information) change (Schwarz, 2007: 642-644; van Schalk and Aureli, 2000: 309).

Nevertheless, the realization that opinions are subject to modification over time is not problematic for several reasons. First, we maintain that our research makes valuable theoretical contributions to cross-cultural understanding of conflict resolution and at times challenges preexisting theoretical conceptualizations when comparing Arab/Muslim-Western understandings of conflict resolution at interstate level. Accordingly, the research is a theoretical milestone. Second, we recognize that fluctuation of opinion on such topics is natural, and conflict resolution scholars emphasizes "peacebuilding enterprises needs to be under constant review, to be adjustable as events and outcomes unfold, and to include as many constituencies as possible in the ongoing evaluation process" (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 241). Persistent review is necessary because attitudes, the quality of the relationship and environmental changes are expected over time, and these inputs produce modifications of opinion toward conflict resolution. Hence, opinions on the necessity or effectiveness of conflict resolution, and its principles and practices, are subject to change, because fluctuation in opinion is an inevitable aspect of survey research.

Lastly, and noted elsewhere, there was a lack of resources necessary for hiring professional translators to design and quality control a questionnaire in the Arabic language (Harkness and Schoua-Glasberg, 1998: 87-128; Kelley and others, 2003: 261-266). This resource deficit unfortunately hindered distribution and availability of the survey to respondents from Iraq. The restrictions were partially circumvented by the creation of Italian and German versions to accommodate Iraqis residing in Europe. The Italian and German versions were translated, crosschecked and re-evaluated to ensure accuracy as well as to vet the content, style and understandability (Johnson, 1998: 12). We do, however, recognize that completing a questionnaire in a second language limits participation and risks misunderstanding or misinterpretations of the questions and thereby validity (Johnson, 1998: 12; King and others, 2004: 193-199; Oppenheim, 2008: 184; Ryen, 2003: 429).

Language concerns were managed in several manners. On the one hand, they were partially controlled in Italy since Mr. Benedetti was acquainted with the respondents and knew refugees' language capabilities (English or Italian). Additionally, Mr. Benedetti facilitated questionnaire completion by making himself available to respondents should language assistance be required. On the other hand, issues of comprehensibility and validity were minimized by incorporating simplified question wording, providing definitions of terms,

and utilizing parsimonious Likert Scales (Johnson, 1998: 12). The combination increases cross-cultural understandability and validity. Subsequent to outlining survey methodology and research weaknesses, we now address how the data collected was analyzed.

6.3.3 Data analysis

Completed survey data were automatically coded and transferred into a Microsoft Excel file by Google Docs when the respondent submitted their completed questionnaire. Following closure of the survey, the data were then transferred into an R programming language (http://www.r-project.org) for analysis (Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, 2014), and is available as an Excel file called "Combined Data Set". Subsequent to making the data uniform (spelling and capitalization) in terms of classification questions (such as religious affiliation), statistical analysis was conducted on responses. For analytical purposes, the data was processed as eight test sets. The sets include: S1 (Q [questions] 4-7); S2 (Q 8-15); S3 (Q 16-23); S4 (Q 24-39); S5 (Q 40-50); S6a (Q 51a, 52a, 53-57); S6b (Q51b, 52b); and S7 (Q 58-68). Question sets were established according to survey layout, content and shared Likert Scale design[84]. Our framework of questions sets was purposefully designed, with the questionnaire opening with general "funneling" questions to get the respondent accustomed to the survey, topic, and the scales (Oppenheim, 2008: 109-111). Questions then narrowed to evaluating respondents' opinion of conflict resolution principles and practices, before ending with classification questions (Oppenheim, 2008: 109-111).

With this in mind, question sets were designed as follows. S1 questions deal with religiosity and general perceptions of conflict. S2 questions further explore respondents' conceptualization of conflict. The two question sets are designed to funnel the respondents' attention toward conflict resolution. S3 questions center on general perceptions of conflict resolution. At this point, focus is predominantly on conflict resolution. S4 allows respondents to rank the value of sixteen principles of conflict resolution. S5 asks respondents to rank the eleven conflict resolution tools (listed in section 6.2.4) in general. S6a and S6b qualify participants' opinion of conflict resolution in the case of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations, and simultaneously requests they conjecture about the perceived effects the 2003 War has had on societal opinion. Finally, S7 requests respondents to rank thirteen conflict resolution mechanisms in the context of improving contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations.

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[84] Questions 1-3 were only available on the U.S. survey and queried whether the respondent or one of their family members had served in some capacity in Iraq. No respondent had served in Iraq, and due to the small number of respondents who had a family member serve, there was an insufficient quantity of respondents to make meaningful comparative analysis.

Once the data collected was made uniform, responses were treated as ordinal so non-parametric tests were utilized (Gadermann and others, 2012: 2). Reliability of the data was, therefore, tested using three techniques: Cronbach's alpha, Cronbach's standard alpha and Guttman's Lambda 6. Reliability is defined by Jum C. Nunnally as "the extent to which [measurements] are repeatable and that any random influence which tends to make measurements different from occasion to occasion is a source of measurement error" (Cortina, 1993: 98). Reliability, according to the quote, thus statistically estimates the likelihood that responses could be reproduced if the research were conducted again.

The reliability of our online survey data is arranged into four columns in Table 2, and is tested by question set. The first column identifies the test set (set). The second identifies Cronbach's Alpha (raw.alpha) returns. Cronbach's Alpha quantifies the internal consistency of the data, and is the most widely utilized test of internal reliability (Cortina, 1993: 98-100; Gadermann and others, 2012: 1-2; Revelle, 2013). According to strict research standards, a value of 0.7 or higher is preferred for reliability (Garson, 2009). The third column in Table 2 shows the returns from the second reliability measurement used, Cronbach's standardized alpha (std.alpha) (Mehra, 2003; Revelle, 2013). Cronbach's standardized alpha measures variance and covariance of the data, with variance indicating how the data are distributed, and covariance the relationship between two random variables from the data. Lastly, Guttman's Lambda 6 (lambda) is found in the fourth column. Guttman's Lambda 6 (G6) is suggested more appropriate for evaluating reliability for small research samples (Revelle, 2013). See Table 2 for reliability values from our data sets according to the three measures utilized.

Table 2 Reliability by Question Set

set	raw.alpha	std.alpha	lambda
S1	0.4428710	0.4507927	0.3957005
S2	0.5209050	0.5372211	0.5655851
S3	0.5859031	0.5689824	0.6185759
S4	**0.8519466**	**0.8662757**	**0.9092379**
S5	**0.8513191**	**0.8511812**	**0.8673065**
S6a	**0.7611463**	**0.7637947**	**0.7825412**
S6b	**0.7408743**	**0.7480498**	0.5975076
S7	**0.9074280**	**0.9101671**	**0.9297009**

Table 2 illustrates the reliability of each question set using three measures of reliability. Returns with a high level of reliability are printed in bold.

We can deduce several conclusions from the values in Table 2. First, S1, S2 and S3 data (the latter of which contains four questions) falls below the generally accepted reliability threshold. Our findings related to these question sets must, therefore, be interpreted with

caution. Nonetheless, their low level of reliability has no significant effect on our research since these question sets were designed as funnel questions. A similar issue that must be mentioned is that while S6b has a high rate of reliability using the raw and standardized Alpha, the question set contains only two questions, which makes its statistical reliability fragile, as the low lambda return indicates. Most importantly for our research, the values in Table 2 illustrate that question sets S4-S6a and S7 have a high level of statistical reliability. These high rates of reliability are crucial to our research because these question sets measure respondents' perceptions of conflict resolution principles and tools in general, and in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. Data extracted from these question sets test Hypotheses 3, 4 and 6.

After testing reliability, single item testing was performed on each question to evaluate differences between answers provided according to country of origin. Once again, we utilized three different measures to quantify differences between responses according to country of origin. We first used a Pearson chi-square (chi.sq) test, since it is the most common test utilized for comparing variables by category (Iorga and others, 2003; McDonald, 2013: 70-75, Newsom, 2014). Its findings are presented as p-values, which either exceed or fall below a given threshold to accept or reject our null hypothesis. Rejection of the null hypothesis for the chi-square test is set at 0.01, where if the p-value is smaller than the level of significance, the null hypothesis has to be rejected. Succinctly, our null hypothesis states there is no significant difference between U.S. and Iraqi responses in our data set when a p-value is lower than 0.01. When calculated values fall below the threshold of our null hypothesis, the more evidence there is that there is a significant difference between respondents' answers across samples. To understand how to interpret p-values, see Appendix 5 that explains how to calculate p-values.

Table 3 Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test by Set

set	country
S1	3.587491e-01
S2	1.685651e-02
S3	8.480372e-01
S4	2.377548e-02
S5	5.810763e-03
S6a	5.834242e-06
S6b	1.996018e-04
S7	2.013188e-02

Table 3 provides the p-values of question sets following the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test.

Second, we measured the difference between responses of individual questions using Fisher's exact test (fis). While the Fisher test likewise measures differences between response

categories, it calculates levels of significance according to the Likert scale ranges actually utilized by respondents (McDonald, 2013: 70-75). More specifically, unlike the chi-square that measures responses across the entire range of response possibilities, Fisher more accurately calculates responses according to the response categories on the Likert scale actually utilized by respondents (McDonald, 2013: 70-75; Newsom, 2014). The p-values from our chi-square and Fisher testing of individual questions are located in Tables throughout the next section entitled “Levels of Significance for Individual Questions.” We will briefly analyze the data each time respective question sets are introduced.

Lastly, we comparatively analyzed the significance of differences between responses by country of origin according to question sets using a Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test. In order to perform the Wilcoxon test, we first aggregated the answers provided for each question set by category and country of origin. We then calculated their median values across categories. The Wilcoxon test was then used to estimate the difference of the set aggregates. Its p-value provides a simplistic comparative overview of the differences between aggregated median responses within a question set between our U.S. and Iraq samples. Table 3 illustrates the p-values of the Wilcoxon test for the 8 sets of questions analyzed by country. It illustrates that the most significant difference across cultural responses are found in question sets S3, S5 and S6a. Interpreting our table, there is statistical evidence of a degree of discrepancy between respondents’ answers across our two samples on the S2, S4, S6b and S7 questions, as detailed below. Nonetheless, these aggregated differences diminish when questions are assessed independently (using the Pearson and Fisher), as demonstrated in the Tables of “Tests for Individual Questions” presented below.

6.4 Comparative research findings

Before examining our research findings, we must first qualify our research samples. Our research samples consist of a convenience sample of respondents from Iraq (n = 51) and the United States (n = 58) solicited through snowball and convenience sampling by networking friends and acquaintances (Singleton and Straits, 2001: 87). The U.S. sample is composed of 21 males (36%) and 37 females (64%), whereas the actual U.S. population is 50.8% and 49.2% respectively (Howden and Meyer, 2011: 2). Hence, as indicated above, our U.S. sample is not demographically representative of the U.S. population.

Figure 7 U.S. Respondents’ Ethnicity and Age



Figure 7 illustrates the demographic distribution of U.S. respondents by ethnicity and age.

Nonetheless, the ethnic composition of our U.S. sample includes 69% Caucasian (n = 40); 10% African-American (n = 6); 7% Native American (n = 4); 4% Hispanic (n = 2); and 10% who classify themselves multiracial or made no distinction (n = 6). Age distribution comprises 8 respondents between the ages of 18-25 (14%); 13 between 26 and 35 (22%); 21 between 36 and 45 (36%); 3 between 46 and 55 (5%); 12 between 56 and 65 (21%); and one between 66 and 75 (2%). See Figure 7 for ethnic and age distribution of the U.S. sample by percentage. Eleven respondents (19%) had an immediate family member serve in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, but no respondents were military veterans or civilians who had served in Iraq between 2003 and 2011.

Table 4 Iraq Respondents' Location and Gender Distribution

	Iraq Sample By Location and Gender						
	Austria	Germany	Iraq	Italy	U.S.	unknown	*total*
male	1	10	1	22	1	1	36
female	0	7	3	5	0	0	15
	1	17	4	27	1	1	51

Table 4 illustrates the location from which our Iraq sample was reached in addition to gender distribution.

Comparatively, between September 11 and December 11, 2013, Iraqi respondents were solicited on two fronts. On the one hand, they were petitioned online through networking on Facebook. This portion of the convenience sample includes citizens of Iraq living, studying and working in Europe (n = 18) and the United States (n = 1) who were solicited through Facebook and networking acquaintances. Additionally, 4 citizens living in Iraq were snowballed using a contact at the U.S. Embassy and one respondent did not specify his location. On the other hand, Mr. Benedetti facilitated 27 Iraqi refugees residing in Italy to complete the online questionnaire. Five refugees in Italy refused to participate equaling an 84% response rate from our group of refugees residing in Italy. Combined, the convenience sample of Iraq citizens contains 51 adults.

Figure 8 Iraq Respondents' Ethnicity and Age

Figure 8 illustrates the distribution of our Iraq sample by ethnicity and age.

As a result of the inclusion of refugees from Iraq residing in Italy, our sample contains twice as many male respondents (70.5 %, n = 36) as female (29.5 %, n = 15). For a distribution of the Iraq sample by gender and current residence, see Table 4. Nevertheless, the ethnic distribution of the sample is as follows: 51% are Arab (n = 26); 45% are Kurd (n = 23); 2% are Assyrian (n = 1); and 2% claim no affiliation (n = 1). Kurds, which accounts for 15-20% of Iraq's overall population, are, therefore, over-represented because they account for 20 of the 27 refugee participants (74%) from Italy, while Arabs, which account for 75%-80% of Iraq's population, are under-represented (World Factbook, 2014). In terms of age, the sample of respondents from Iraq includes: 21% from the ages of 18-25 (n = 11); 63% from 26-35 (n = 32); 14% from 36-45 (n = 7); and 2% from 46-55 (n = 1). See Figure 8 for ethnic and age distribution of the sample from Iraq by percentage.

Next, the religious affiliation of respondents from both countries is distributed as follows. On the one hand, U.S. respondents are predominantly (64%) Christian (n = 37); 26% claim no affiliation (n = 15); 5% claimed amalgamate or mixed (n = 3); followed by 2% Jewish (n = 1); and 3% other (n = 2). In terms of religiosity (Q4), U.S. respondents (n = 26) are polarized with 45% agreeing that "religion is a very important influencer in my everyday life" while 47% disagree (n = 27). On the other hand, 39% of participants from Iraq affiliate themselves with Shi'a Islam (n = 20); 19% with Sunni Islam (n = 10); 18% with Sufi Islam (n = 9); 6% with Christianity (n = 3); and 18% claim no religious affiliation (n = 9). Compared to Iraq's demographics, Shi'a (60-65%) and Sunni (32-37%) are under-represented in our survey while Christian (0.8%) and Sufi are over-represented (World Factbook, 2014). Albeit, fifty-nine percent of the Iraq sample (n = 29) agrees that religion is an important influence in their daily life while thirty-five percent disagree (n = 19). See Figure 9 for religious affiliation of both the U.S. and Iraq convenience samples by percentage.

Figure 9 Respondents' Religious Affiliation

Figure 9 illustrates the religious affiliation of research participants from the United States and Iraq.

Finally, both populations were asked to indicate their highest completed level of education. Among our U.S. sample, 14% have a high school degree (n = 8); 9% have an associate's degree (n = 1); 34% of have a Bachelor degree (n = 19); 33% have a Master (n = 19); 9% have a doctorate (n = 1); and 2% are a Doctor of Medicine (n = 1). By comparison, our Iraq sample consists of 27% who completed middle school (n = 14); 31% have a high school diploma (n = 16); 4% a technical degree (n = 2); 12% a Bachelor (n = 6); 20% have a Master (n = 10); and 6% a doctorate (n = 3). Overall, both samples have a high rate of complete education.

With the demographic nature of our U.S. and Iraq survey samples clarified, we now comparatively analyze how these samples conceptualize conflict in general, conflict resolution principles, general perceptions of eleven tools of conflict resolution, perceptions of the societal effects of the 2003 Iraq War, and, thereafter, how respondents conceptualized thirteen conflict resolution principles in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. The graphed comparative analysis of responses to all of the questions from our survey is available in Appendix 3. Appendix 3 is arranged according to question sets and question numbers.

6.4.1 General conceptualizations of conflict

Our first comparative analysis explores cross-cultural conceptualizations of conflict according to our sample populations (S1, S2). It should be recalled that S1 and S2 question sets have a low rate of internal reliability, but our findings are, nonetheless, presented for the purpose of discussion. Table 5 shows the p-values of our chi-square and Fisher tests which measures the level of significance between country of origin for individual questions in sets S1 and S2. Our null hypothesis threshold was set at $p < 0.01$.

Table 5 indicates high levels of significant between answers provided for three questions in question set one across both the chi-square and Fisher tests, most notably questions 4, 5 and

7 according to the chi-square. In question Set 2, questions 9, 12 and 14 have the greatest degree of difference across our samples according to our chi-square and Fisher tests. It should be recalled that Pearson chi-square and Fisher exact test measure levels of significance differently, with the former calculating for the entire range of possible responses while the latter calculates according to the response ranges utilized. Attention now turns to analyzing responses.

Questions in set 1 are funneling questions designed to initiate contemplation on conflict, whereupon focus can be narrowed to conflict resolution. Question set one qualifies respondents' general conceptualization of conflict. Our analysis begins by examining the importance of resolving a conflict. The first question concerning conflict asked respondents to rate the importance of resolving a dispute with a friend. A majority of respondents from our samples, that is 84% of the U.S. sample (n = 49) and 75% of those from Iraq (n = 38), claims that resolving a conflict with their close friend was important (Q5). Question number five was designed to evaluate respondents' general prioritization of resolving conflict by rooting it in common phenomenon. Next, we measured respondent optimism toward conflict resolution. Research findings demonstrate that a slight majority (64%) of U.S. respondents (n = 37) believes that conflictual relationships can be resolved (Q6). By comparison, 61% of respondents from Iraq (n = 31) agree that conflict relationships can be resolved, while 24 % disagree (n = 12). Sixteen percent are undecided (n = 8). Similarly, when queried if all conflict should be resolved (Q7), 78% of those from the Iraq sample (n = 40) and 72% of U.S. respondents (n = 42) affirm that they should. In the three cases, a majority of our respondents value conflict resolution in their personal life, perceives that conflict can be resolved and asserts that they should.

Table 5 Levels of Significance for Individual Questions (S1, S2)

set	item	chi.sq	fis
S1	Q4	8.193967e-02	8.266618e-02
	Q5	6.439935e-01	6.746553e-01
	Q6	1.456061e-01	1.533878e-01
	Q7	4.124852e-01	4.220188e-01
S2	Q8	2.676891e-01	2.662088e-01
	Q9	2.235904e-03	6.562777e-04
	Q10		3.441517e-04
	Q11	6.348014e-02	4.881398e-02
	Q12	7.266076e-04	2.411068e-04
	Q13	1.620392e-02	1.250876e-02
	Q14	2.419261e-07	6.838325e-09
	Q15	2.336015e-01	2.143087e-01

Table 5 shows the p-values of the chi-square and Fisher tests on individual questions from question sets S1 and S2.

The next measured perception relates to whether conflict is perceived as a systemic phenomenon. Recalling the hypothesis that Western scholars view conflict as an incompatibility or struggle strictly limited to those individuals or groups directly involved, a conceptualization argued to contradict Arab/Muslim understanding of conflict as a systemic phenomenon which affects the community at large (Irani, 1999: 1-4, 14-17), the survey sought to qualify popular opinion on whether laypersons perceive conflicts have systemic effects (Q8). Contradicting the hypothesis that Westerners do not see conflict as systemic, an overwhelming majority of our U.S. sample (91%, n = 53) and a clear majority from Iraq (78%, n = 40) perceive a conflict affects more than those immediately involved. In this sense, conflict is viewed by both samples as having a systemic effect. Therefore, our finding contests Irani's (1999) assertion that Westerns do not view conflict as systemic. Nevertheless, due to the low level of reliability, our findings should be interpreted with great caution.

Another theory tested in the S2 question set is whether conflict is perceived to have a positive dimension. It was noted in the second part of this research that Arab/Muslim scholars criticize that Westerner scholars perceive conflict has a positive dimension (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18-19; Irani, 1999: 1-4). Contrary, Arab/Muslim scholars claim that individuals in the Middle East are hesitant to associate conflict with positive attributes (Al-Ramahi, 2008: 18; Irani, 1999: 3; Irani and Funk, 2000: 6-8). Our research (Q9) supports Arab/Muslim theory. 88% of U.S. respondents (n = 51) perceive a conflict can produce positive benefits compared to only 51% of respondents from Iraq (n = 26). The data supports the theory that Westerners perceive conflict can produce positive benefits, while it qualifies a polarization of our Iraq sample on the issue.

The next theory tested was the perceived normality of conflict (Q10). According to the literature, both Arab/Muslim (Abu-Nimer, 2001: 616) and Western scholarship (Bercovitch and others, 2009: 3; Boulding, 1978: 132; Lederach, 1995: 9; Lederach and Maiese, 2003: 1, 3; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 7) perceive conflict as natural. Most respondents from our samples identify conflict as natural, with an overwhelming 95% of U.S. respondents (n = 55) agreeing versus 76% of those from Iraq (n = 39). Hence a clear majority from both sample groups believes conflicts are natural phenomenon. Afterward, Q14 asked respondents if conflicts could be nonviolent. An overwhelming ninety-eight percent of U.S. respondents suggest conflicts can be nonviolent (n = 57), compared to forty-nine percent of those from the

Iraq sample (n = 25). Consequently, a plurality of U.S. respondents perceives conflicts can be nonviolent, while our Iraq sample is polarized on the issue.

Thereafter, we tested the perceived inevitability of conflict (Q11). A slight majority of all respondents, 60% of U.S. (n = 35) versus 61% Iraq (n = 31), agrees that conflict cannot be prevented. By comparison, when questioned if conflicts should be avoided (Q12), only 47% of U.S. respondents (n = 27) believe avoidance is important compared to a clear majority from the Iraq sample (82%, n = 42) that shares this sentiment. Finally, when making comparisons between conflict at the upper and lower levels (Q15), only 37% of our sample from Iraq (n = 19) agree with the statement "a conflict between two people has the same characteristics as a conflict between two states." Comparatively, U.S. respondents (47%) are slightly more likely to believe that the two levels of conflict share characteristics (n = 34). Combined, most respondents believe that conflicts should be prevented and a majority of the Iraq sample believes it is crucial to avoid conflict. Less than half of both samples believe conflict at the individual and international level share characteristics.

6.4.2 General perception of conflict resolution and principles

The present section analyzes how respondents perceive conflict resolution (S3) and associated principles (S4) for resolving a conflict in general. Table 6 reports the p-values of the chi-square and Fisher tests by country for questions in S3. The table illustrates that questions 18, 21 and 23 have the highest levels of significance between countries with both the chi-square and Fisher test. It should be recalled that the internal reliability of question set three was low (see section 6.3.3). Our data is, nevertheless, presented for the benefit of comparative discourse, although we believe that findings associated with the question set should be interpreted with caution.

Table 6 Levels of Significance for Individual Questions (S3)

set	item	chi.sq	fis
S3	Q16	4.273100e-02	3.189397e-02
	Q17	1.266111e-01	1.221079e-01
	Q18	8.147106e-02	6.806479e-02
	Q19	2.904845e-03	1.280497e-03
	Q20	1.795339e-01	1.367299e-01
	Q21	4.712892e-02	3.577881e-02
	Q22	5.875506e-02	4.461478e-02

	Q23	1.125655e-01	1.081381e-01

Table 6 contains the p-values of the Pearson chi-square and Fisher test by country.

S3 questions funnel our respondents' attention from conceptualizing conflict resolution in general toward questions related to conflict resolution at the interstate level. Overall, our findings indicate that conflict resolution is a practice that respondents perceive important. In terms of which conflict relations should be resolved, a majority of U.S. (90%, n = 52) and Iraq (71%) respondents (n = 36) disagrees that only violent relationships must be resolved (Q18). Contrary, 78% of U.S. (n = 45) and 59% of our Iraq sample (n = 30) express that even nonviolent conflict relations must be resolved (Q19). While conflict resolution is widely embraced for resolving conflicts, both samples measure their expectations when conceptualizing the process. A slight majority of U.S. respondents from our sample (64%, n = 37) perceives that all conflicts are resolvable (Q16) by comparison to 49% of those in the Iraq sample (n = 30). Here, it is possible to see less optimism among our Iraq sample, which Irani (1999: 1-10) suggests is common among Arab/Muslims. Correspondingly, 71% of U.S. respondents (n = 41) perceive that nonviolent coexistence is the most probable outcome than peace when resolving violent conflict relations (Q20). This is slightly more than the 61% from our Iraq sample (n = 31) who express the equivalent opinion. Hence, a clear majority from both samples expresses that nonviolent coexistence is more probable than positive peace when resolving conflict.

Table 7 Levels of Significance for Individual Questions (S4)

set	item	chi.sq	fis
S4	Q24	1.853580e-01	1.456862e-01
	Q25		6.460608e-01
	Q26		1.702114e-01
	Q27		2.610094e-01
	Q28		6.771486e-02
	Q29		2.307894e-01
	Q30	6.397891e-03	3.931907e-03
	Q31		8.799321e-02
	Q32		7.202310e-02
	Q33	4.405605e-01	4.147962e-01
	Q34		9.477902e-02
	Q35		6.269683e-02
	Q36		1.811886e-01
	Q37		4.821093e-01
	Q38		1.793575e-04
	Q39	2.046814e-01	2.120113e-01

Table 7 depicts the p-values of the chi-square and Fisher tests for S4 question set, which measures respondent opinion of sixteen conflict resolution principles.

Next, we explored conflict resolution at the intrastate level. Data illustrates that an overwhelming number of respondents from both countries optimistically state that two countries involved in war can improve their relationship (Q22). However, there is a sizable discrepancy when comparing responses across cultures. 91% of U.S. participants (n = 53) feel two countries can resolve their conflictual relationship, compared to 75% of those from Iraq (n = 38). In short, our U.S. sample is more optimistic about conflict being resolved at the interstate level than our Iraq sample, although a clear majority of the latter perceives resolution is possible. The last question in S3 classifies respondents' perception of reconciliation (Q23). It demonstrates that U.S. respondents (47%, n = 27) are less likely to perceive reconciled relations as peaceful relations, compared to their counterparts from the Iraq sample (65%, n = 33). Stated differently, our Iraq sample is more inclined to believe that reconciliation and peaceful relations are synonymous, while a clear majority from our U.S. sample disagrees.

Prior to evaluating respondents' rating of sixteen principles (question set S4) when resolving a conflict between two countries, we refer to our p-values. Table 7 depicts the levels of significance between our U.S. and Iraq samples. It is possible to see there is a significant difference between our sample groups pertaining to question 30 using the chi-square.

To begin our analysis, we recall that scholars assert that Arab/Muslim societies preference the principle of religion as a component of conflict resolution while many Western scholars minimizes it (Gulam, 2003: 5-6; International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 1-26; Irani, 1999: 7-10). As expected, when conceptualizing conflict resolution in general (Q17), a majority of U.S. (57%) respondents (n = 33) rejects the influence of religion. Comparatively, the Iraq sample is polarized with 51% of respondents (n = 26) stating that religious values should not guide conflict resolution. Similarly, when rating religious values as a principle of conflict resolution (Q39), a minority of U.S. respondents (43%) supports its influence (n = 25). Contrary, 38% of our U.S. sample (n = 22) opposes the principle of religion in conflict resolution and 19% are undecided (n = 11). By comparison, 65% of respondents from Iraq believe that religion is a fundamental principle of conflict resolution (n = 33), with 23% opposed (n = 12) and 12% undecided (n = 6). These findings demonstrate that our Iraq sample is more inclined to support the principle of religion in conflict resolution, while the U.S. sample rejects it as Irani (1999: 7-10) surmises.

The second principle qualified is forgiveness. The principle of forgiveness was tested due to the dissension it produces in Western literature, and in order to introduce laypersons' opinion into the discourse. Recalling the critiques proffered by Western scholars, forgiveness

is suggested to be a religiously laden concept (Bar-On, 2005: 6-7) that invokes a sense of idealism (Rosoux, 2009: 559) and/or a "forgive and forget" attitude (Bloomfield, 2006: 23-25; Rothfield, 2008: 559). By comparison, our U.S. sample does not appear to be adverse to forgiveness at the interstate level contrary to the theory offered by Bloomfield (2006: 20-24) and others (Dwyer, 1999; Lerche, 2000; Rothfield, 2008: 15-16). Instead, a majority of respondents from the U.S. (72%, n = 42) agrees that showing forgiveness is essential to resolving a conflict (Q21). Their endorsement suggests that some Western scholars, namely Bloomfield (2006: 23-25), may be misrepresenting laypersons' receptiveness to forgiveness and thereby may be devaluing the principle's relative utility. Our U.S. sample, therefore, advocates forgiveness as a principle and practice of conflict resolution similar to Western scholars, including John Paul Lederach (1995: 21) and others (Avruch, 2010: 40; Gopin, 2001: 87; Parent, 2012: 30-37; Wohl and Branscombe, 2009: 193-194; Worthington, 2006: 7-9).

By comparison, eighty percent of the Iraq sample (n = 41) supports forgiveness. The prioritization of forgiveness among our Iraq sample confirms Arab/Muslim scholars' theory that forgiveness is an essential component of conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim context (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 227-233, 248; Ashki, 2006: 23; Soliman, 2009). Affirming our collective findings denoted hitherto, when forgiveness is rated as a principle of conflict resolution (Q38), 81% of U.S. participants (n = 47) advocate its use. Comparatively, an overwhelming majority (98%) of respondents from Iraq (n = 50) embraces the principle. Combined, a clear majority of our US and Iraq samples embraces forgiveness as a component of conflict resolution.

The next principle analyzed was honor (Q24). As noted in chapter five, section two, Arab/Muslim societies place a significant amount of weight on individual and family honor since it impacts individual and collective identity and social status (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136-138; Irani, 1999: 2; Pely, 2009: 83-87). It was simultaneously conjectured that while honor is not directly referenced in Western literature, it is implied in principles and practices such as regard. Nonetheless, according to our survey findings, honor is an esteemed principle in terms of conflict resolution across cultures. Combined, 84% of participants from the U.S. (n = 49) and 88% from Iraq (n = 45) favor the principle. Interestingly, nearly thirty-eight percent of U.S. respondents (n = 22) give honor the highest ranking on the Likert scale versus twenty-three percent of those from Iraq (n = 12). Overall both samples largely support its application.

Dignity (Gellman and Vuinovich, 2008: 136-138; Irani, 1999: 1-10; Pely, 2009: 83-87) and respect (Irani, 1999: 1-10) are also venerated principles in Arab/Muslim conflict resolution literature, and were likewise included in the survey. Our findings indicate that 90% of participants from Iraq (n = 46) and 86% of U.S. respondents (n = 50) agree that dignity (Q25) is a valuable principle, with response distribution of the Iraq sample (39%, n = 20) weighing more favorably than the U.S. (29%, n = 17) in absolute terms. Concerning the principle of respect (Q26), majorities from both sample populations agree that respect is crucial to conflict resolution. An overwhelming 98% of U.S. (n = 57) and 100% of the Iraq sample (n = 51) positively rate the principle, with more than fifty percent from each sample group qualifying respect as absolutely imperative. Thus, both samples overwhelmingly support respect and dignity as principles of conflict resolution.

Afterward, we explored the principles of satisfaction of interests and needs of stakeholders as advocated by Western scholars (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Botes, 2003; Briggs, 2003: 287-306; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 176; Reimann, 2004: 11). It should be recalled that Arab/Muslim scholars express diverse views toward satisfaction of interests, because they must be considered in relation to Islamic teachings and norms. On the one hand, a clear majority of respondents from our U.S. (78%, n = 45) and Iraq samples (86%, n = 44) asserts that satisfaction of the "interests" of those involved in a conflict is indispensable for resolution (Q27). On the other hand, 92% of respondents from Iraq (n = 49) prioritize satisfaction of stakeholders' "needs" versus 84% of U.S. participants (n = 47) (Q28). Hence clear majorities across both sample populations support the satisfaction of stakeholders' interests and needs when resolving a conflict, with our Iraq sample expressing more support than our U.S. sample.

Then, Arab/Muslim (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 234; Ashki, 2006: 24-25; Bekdash, 2009; Foster, 2007: 70; International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 1-26) and Western (Anderlini and others, 2004: 1-2; Kriesberg, 2004: 82; Rouhana, 2004: 36) scholars prioritize the principle of justice. Unsurprisingly, a clear majority from both samples favors the principle of justice in conflict resolution (Q35). There are, however, noticeable discrepancies across cultures. Foremost, 88% of U.S respondents (n = 51) favor the pursuit of justice compared to a plurality (96%) of those from our Iraq sample (n = 49). There is also a marked distribution difference, with forty-five percent of those from Iraq (n = 23) making justice an absolute priority versus twenty-seven percent among respondents from the United States (n = 16). Amalgamated, our data illustrates that our Iraq sample is more inclined to embrace justice than our U.S. sample.

Subsequently, perceptions of truth as a principle were qualified (Q36). Truth, or the establishment of an objective, detailed account of what has occurred in the past, is hypothesized as essential to conflict resolution according to Arab/Muslim (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 252; Ashki, 2006: 15; Bekdash, 2009; Said and Funk, 2001) and Western scholars (Adelman, 2005: 287-307; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 29; Kelman, 2004: 122-124; Lederach, 1997; Rosoux, 2009: 550). Our data confirms this. A plurality of respondents from Iraq (96%, n = 49) prioritizes the principle. By comparison, a clear majority of U.S. respondents (88%, n = 51) equally favors the inclusion of the principle of truth. Both samples, therefore, embrace truth as a principle, while our Iraq sample expresses an increased degree of support.

Similarly, we measured respondent perceptions of accountability when resolving conflict. We found overwhelming majorities across cultures advocate accountability as a principle (Q37). 95% of participants from the U.S. (n = 55) and 96% from Iraq (n = 49) favor accountability. However, our Iraq sample ranks accountability higher than their U.S. counterparts, with forty-three percent of respondents from Iraq (n = 22) ranking accountability as an absolute priority versus thirty-two percent of respondents from the U.S. sample (n = 19). Nevertheless, a clear plurality of respondents from both samples embraces accountability in conflict resolution.

The next principle considered was the protection of individual rights, which Abu-Nimer (2000) suggests is essential to Arab/Muslim conceptualizations and practices of conflict resolution. Our data demonstrates that absolute majorities from both countries positively rate the protection of individual rights (Q29). 95% of participants from the U.S. (n = 55) and 100% from Iraq (n = 51) claim that the protection of stakeholders' individual rights should be prioritized when resolving conflict. Hence, the principle of protecting individual rights is likewise shared across cultures.

The most noteworthy difference in perceptions of principles qualified between our U.S. and Iraq samples revolves around the importance of compensation extended to those who have suffered during a conflict (Q30). Although compensation or restitution is a recognized principle and practice of conflict resolution in Arab/Muslim (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 236; Bekdash, 2009) and the Western theory and practice (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 30; Goschler, 2007; Kriesberg, 2004: 100; Rosoux, 2009: 546), there is a noteworthy cross-cultural discrepancy between how our respondents rate restitution. Although a plurality (94%) of participants from Iraq (n = 48) supports the payment of reparations, only 67% of U.S. respondents (n = 39) express the same opinion. U.S. respondents are not only less supportive of the tool, 22% reject the principle (n = 13) compared to two participants from our Iraq

sample (4%). Thus, although a majority from both samples approves the principle of restitution, our Iraq sample is more inclined to embrace the principle and practice compared to our U.S. sample.

Then empowerment was evaluated. Empowerment is a principle embraced by Arab/Muslim (Abu-Nimer, 2000: 237-239) and Western (Botes, 2003; Lederach, 1995: 21; Reimann, 2004: 11) scholars, and support for it was measured using multiple scenarios. First, respondents were asked whether the opinion of those involved in a conflict should be consulted when constructing conflict resolution between two countries (Q31). A plurality of participants from Iraq (98%, n = 50) agrees that getting the opinion of those involved is crucial when resolving conflict. Comparatively, 86% of U.S. respondents (n = 50) share this sentiment. Next, respondents were queried about the importance of listening to the other (Q32). Once again, a plurality from both samples agrees on the importance of listening with 97% of U.S. (n = 56) and 96% of our Iraq sample (n = 49) expressing support.

Linked to the above, respondents were then asked if practices and techniques acceptable to affected stakeholders should be incorporated into conflict resolution (Q34). As outlined elsewhere, consultations to identify methodology in conflict resolution are advocated by Western scholars, including Stover and others (2005: 834-836). Our data show a majority of U.S. participants (93%, n = 54) agrees conflict resolution practices should be acceptable to affected stakeholders. By comparison, 86% of respondents from Iraq (n = 44) believe practices should be mutually acceptable. Our latter finding supports International Center for Transitional Justice's (2008) hypothesis that found Iraqis advocated individual empowerment through "inclusiveness" and "comprehensive consultation" when designing conflict resolution strategies. Accordingly, we found that our samples think citizens should be consulted on conflict resolution, they felt that listening to the other was important and that practices utilized to resolve a conflict should be mutually acceptable.

Table 8 Respondents' Support for Principles in General

S4	principle	U.S. sample		Iraq sample	
Q24	honor	84%	✓	88%	✓
Q25	dignity	86%	✓	90%	✓
Q26	respect	98%	✓	100%	✓
Q27	satisfaction of interests	78%	✓	86%	✓
Q28	satisfaction of the needs	84%	✓	92%	✓
Q29	protection of individual rights	95%	✓	100%	✓
Q30	appropriate compensation	67%	✓	94%	✓
Q31	consultation (getting opinions)	86%	✓	98%	✓
Q32	listening to the "other"	97%	✓	96%	✓
Q33	mutual benefit	88%	✓	82%	✓
Q34	acceptable practices	93%	✓	86%	✓

Q35	justice	88%	✓	96%	✓
Q36	truth	88%	✓	96%	✓
Q37	accountability	95%	✓	96%	✓
Q38	forgiveness	81%	✓	98%	✓
Q39	religion	43%	✗	65%	✓

Table 8 provides the percentage of respondents from our survey who supported conflict resolution principles in general. Check marks indicate that a majority of respondents in the sample supported the principle in question.

Lastly, we explored the principle of mutual benefit. Although Arab/Muslim culture is suggested to minimize the importance of mutual benefit *vis-à-vis* their prioritization of collective interests during the resolution of a conflict (Irani, 1999: 2-10; Irani and Funk, 2000: 20; Said and Funk, 2001), we measured respondent openness to mutual benefit (Q33). Our data illustrate that 88% of U.S. (n = 51) and 82% of respondents from Iraq (n = 42) perceive mutual benefit as an essential principle of conflict resolution at the interstate level. Thus, both our samples advocate mutually beneficial resolutions when resolving conflict between two countries.

Combined, our survey of principles demonstrates that most respondents in the U.S. and Iraq samples esteem similar principles. Only the principle of religion is rejected by a majority of U.S. respondents. See Table 8 for a summary of our research findings according to the percentage of support each population expressed for conflict resolution principles. Our findings confirm Hypothesis 3, demonstrating that a majority of U.S. and Iraqi respondents from our research sample similarly embraces sixteen conflict resolution principles.

6.4.3 General perception of tools

The questionnaire then asked respondents to rank the usefulness of eleven conflict resolution tools for resolving conflict between two countries. To enhance survey validity across samples, brief descriptions of each tool were provided to ensure clarity. Table 9 depicts the p-values of the chi-square and Fisher tests that measure level of significance by country of origin. It illustrates that many questions failed to meet our null hypothesis when using the chi-square, although the Fisher exact test (fis) was able to confirm our null hypothesis for all questions. The table likewise indicates that there are quantifiable levels of significance across our samples, namely for question 45.

Table 9 Levels of Significance for Individual Questions (S5)

set	item	chi.sq	fis
S5	Q40		2.799935e-01
	Q41		8.301667e-02
	Q42		9.760462e-01

	Q43	1.732218e-03	6.040850e-04
	Q44	1.528302e-02	5.732632e-03
	Q45		3.667446e-02
	Q46		1.700800e-01
	Q47	5.131155e-01	6.090232e-01
	Q48		5.948527e-01
	Q49	8.064941e-01	8.569325e-01
	Q50		1.234266e-01

Table 9 shows the p-values of individual questions in set S5, which measures respondent openness to eleven conflict resolution mechanisms.

Our survey finds that structural practices for interstate conflict resolution are overwhelmingly supported by both samples. In particular, a plurality of respondents supports political cooperation (Q42), defined as government representatives from two adversarial countries agreeing to work together, for example by holding joint meetings to resolve issues. More specifically, 96% from the Iraq sample (n = 49) and 93% of those from the U.S. (n = 54) rate political cooperation positively. Among those, 48% from the U.S. rank political cooperation in the two highest categories (n = 28), which is comparable to 49% of those from Iraq (n = 25). Similarly, 84% of U.S. respondents (n = 49) and 88% of those from Iraq (n = 45) espouse economic cooperation (Q46), defined as two adversarial countries agreeing to work together to improve economic relations and increase dependency. Finally, security cooperation (Q41), defined as two adversarial countries working together to increase mutual security, is favored by an absolute majority of respondents from the Iraq sample (96%, n = 49) compared to 86% of those from the United States (n = 50). While 19% of U.S. respondents rank security cooperation at the highest level, only 10% from the Iraq sample rate it at the maxim. In conclusion, clear majorities from both samples support economic, political and security cooperation, which are structural-based techniques for advancing conflict resolution between two countries.

The next tools analyzed are associated with justice, and included both retributive and restorative mechanisms. Concerning the former, ninety-four percent of respondents from the Iraq sample (n = 48) support retributive justice through court (or judicial) proceedings, defined as the prosecution of criminal wrongdoing according to state or international law (Q44). U.S. counterparts, however, express less support compared to those from Iraq, although seventy-eight percent (n = 45) supported judicial proceedings at the interstate level. In distributive terms, 53% of those from Iraq (n = 27) rank judicial proceedings in the two highest categories on the scale while only 21% of U.S. respondents (n = 12) do the same.

Concerning the later, restorative justice mechanisms score comparatively well across techniques and study samples. For instance, 90% of respondents from Iraq (n = 46) and 76%

of those from the United States (n = 44) advocate truth telling (Q47), defined as a process where individuals who have committed wrongdoing are asked to tell the truth before a committee in exchange for amnesty or reduced sentencing. Hence, our Iraq sample is more inclined to embrace truth telling compared to the U.S. sample although a clear majority of the latter supports both techniques.

Similarly, 90% of respondents from Iraq (n = 46) embrace a public apology (Q45), where one or more representatives publicly apologize for wrongs committed against another group. By comparison, 66% of the U.S. sample (n = 38) expresses the same opinion. Next, reparation payments (Q43), demarcated as one country paying compensation to citizens of another for wrongdoings committed, are supported by 88% of participants from Iraq (n = 45) and 67% of those from the U.S. (n = 39). Of those, 47% of respondents from Iraq (n = 24) rank reparations with the highest two ratings. Only 17% of U.S. respondents (n = 10) do the same. That a majority of the sample from Iraq expresses support for reparations was expected since restitution was embraced in the context of transitional justice in Iraq (International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center, 2004: 19; Stover and others, 2005: 854). Combined, both samples approve public apology and reparations; but by comparison, our Iraq sample expresses greater support for restitution and an apology than their U.S. counterparts.

Thereafter, third party intervention (Q40), identified as representatives from another country or organization assisting countries to improve their relations, was evaluated. Our data illustrates that third party intervention likewise receives widespread support. 84% of respondents from Iraq (n = 43) support third party involvement compared to 78% of those from the United States sample (n = 45). While our finding suggests cross-cultural receptiveness to third party intervention at the international level, it was beyond the scope of the research to analyze how third party intervention is conceptualized.

Then we explored empowerment. Unsurprisingly, pluralities from both samples agree that stakeholders should be empowered, or permitted to decide on how conflict resolution is pursued (Q50). In fact, 90% of the U.S. (n = 52) and 86% of the Iraq samples (n = 44) favors empowerment for guiding conflict resolution practices. Our finding reinforces scholars' emphasis on particular principles, including inclusiveness and consultation, when designing and implementing conflict resolution (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 3-30).

Finally, the questionnaire asked participants to rank tools purported to increase bilateral (cross-cultural) awareness. These were represented first by cultural exchanges, defined the act of facilitating work, study or travel to another country for a period of time to increase mutual knowledge of other cultures (Q48). Ninety-six percent of respondents from the Iraq sample (n

= 49) support cultural exchanges versus eighty-three percent of those from the United States (n = 48). Correspondingly, respondents were queried about positive media coverage, defined as the dissemination of positive news, reports and documentaries about an adversary to enhance public awareness (Q49). Once again, clear majorities from the U.S. (86%, n = 50) and Iraq samples (88%, n = 45) embrace positive media coverage in general. Accordingly, both sample groups support cultural exchanges and positive media coverage as tools of enhancing cultural awareness and transforming conflict at the interstate level.

Amalgamated, the eleven mechanisms presented in our survey are broadly supported by both samples. Within this frame, the Iraq sample is more inclined to support the eleven tools tested at the interstate level than our sample of respondents from the United States. In particular, U.S. participants are, at minimum, ten percentage points less likely to advocate cultural exchanges, reparations, apology, court proceedings, truth commissions and security cooperation compared to their counterparts from Iraq. Table 10 summarizes the percentage of respondents who supported each tool by country of origin. The research findings extracted from this section confirm Hypotheses 4. More specifically, a clear majority of U.S. and Iraqi respondents from our research sample embraces (similar) conflict resolution tools at the interstate level in general.

Table 10 Respondents' Support for Tools in General

S5	tools in general	U.S. sample		Iraq sample	
Q40	third party intervention	78%	✓	84%	✓
Q41	security cooperation	86%	✓	96%	✓
Q42	political cooperation	93%	✓	96%	✓
Q43	reparation payments	67%	✓	88%	✓
Q44	court proceedings	78%	✓	94%	✓
Q45	public apology	66%	✓	90%	✓
Q46	economic cooperation	84%	✓	88%	✓
Q47	truth telling	76%	✓	90%	✓
Q48	cultural exchanges	83%	✓	96%	✓
Q49	positive media coverage	86%	✓	88%	✓
Q50	empowerment	90%	✓	86%	✓

Table 10 summarizes the percentage of respondents from our survey who supported conflict resolution tools in general. Check marks indicate that a majority of respondents in a given sample supported the tool in question.

Following our general analysis of conflict and conflict resolution, our survey refocused attention onto contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. The next section measures laypersons' opinion concerning the effects of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003.

6.4.4 Perceptions of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War

Question set S6 qualifies respondent perception of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War and occupation. Table 11 provides the p-values of the Pearson chi-square and Fisher tests of question sets S6a and S6b. The table illustrates levels of significance across populations (Q54, 56) with both tests on questions 51a, 52a, 52b and 56. In both cases, there are also divergences in how respondents utilized the Likert Scale to answer the question as indicated by our Fisher p-values. The graphed responses are available in Appendix 3.

Table 11 Levels of Significance for Individual Questions (S6a, b)

set	item	chi.sq	fis
S6a	Q51a	4.807480e-08	1.860677e-09
	Q52a	9.855349e-05	1.994498e-05
	Q53	1.773895e-01	1.558847e-01
	Q54	7.182300e-01	7.196149e-01
	Q55	1.438633e-01	1.375660e-01
	Q56	7.060544e-03	5.240604e-03
	Q57	4.497644e-01	4.263657e-01
S6b	Q51b	1.250968e-01	9.985587e-02
	Q52b	3.423902e-02	2.414743e-02

Table 11 shows the p-values of chi-square and Fisher testing on question sets S6a and S6b.

Questions regarding perceptions of the conflict began by querying respondents on the perceived impact of the 2003 war on public opinion. When asked if the war affected U.S. citizens' opinion of Iraqis (Q51a), 84% of U.S. citizens (n = 49) agree it has, with 60% (n = 35) stating that it "definitely" affects U.S. opinions of Iraqis. By contrast, only 47% of respondents from Iraq (n = 24) perceive the war affected U.S. citizens' opinion of Iraqis, and only six percent perceive this is "definitely" the case (n = 3). Our data illustrates that our Iraq population is less likely to believe that the war had an impact on U.S. perceptions of Iraqis, while the U.S. respondents perceived otherwise.

Figure 10 Perceptions of Effects of 2003 War on Iraqis



Figure 10 depicts respondents' answer to the question: "Do you think that the 2003-2011 invasion and occupation of Iraq affected Iraqis' opinion of U.S. citizens?" A clear majority of U.S. citizens perceives events influence opinion, while a slight majority from our Iraq sample shares this sentiment.

When asked to qualify the affects the war had on U.S. citizens' perception of Iraqis (Q51b), 64% of U.S. participants (n = 36) say the event had a negative impact on U.S. opinion of Iraqis while 41% of the Iraq sample (n = 21) agree with the assertion. The undecided rates from both countries range from particularly high (17% from the U.S., n = 10), to extremely high (35% from Iraq, n = 18). The high rate of undecided is thought a result of respondents having not given much consideration to how the war has impacted popular opinion of the "other".

Figure 11 Effects of the 2003 War on Iraqis



Figure 11 depicts respondents' answer to the question: "How would you rate the affect this event had on Iraqi opinion of U.S. citizens?" The graph illustrates that most U.S. respondents perceive the affects as negative while less respondents from Iraq expressed corresponding sentiment.

Approaching the question from the reverse angle, respondents were asked if they felt that the war affected Iraqi opinion of U.S. citizens (Q52a). Ninety-three percent of U.S. respondents (n = 54) agree that the war and occupation has affected Iraqi perceptions of U.S. citizens. Seventy-one percent state this is a definite fact (n = 41). By comparison, fifty-five percent of from the Iraq sample (n = 28) perceive the war and occupation affect Iraqi perceptions of U.S. citizens. Of those, thirty-five percent (n = 18) express that Iraqi opinion of the U.S. was "definitely" affected. See Figure 10 for the distribution of responses by country of origin.

When asked to qualify the affect the 2003 invasion has had on Iraqi opinion of U.S. citizens (Q52b), 72% of participants in the U.S. sample (n = 42) and 45% in the sample from Iraq (n = 23) say the invasion had a negative impact on Iraqi opinion of U.S. citizens. See Figure 11 for the distribution of responses. Thus, a majority of U.S. respondents perceives that the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War has had a negative effect on popular opinion in both countries. Comparatively, our Iraq sample is less likely to perceive that the war affected opinion of U.S. or Iraqi citizens. The notably high rates of negative perceptions registered here support our findings in chapter 2, emphasizing the need for conflict resolution to be pursued between the two countries. The remaining questions contained in S6a (Q53-57) are outlined in the next subsection as they concern conflict resolution tools in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations.

6.4.5 Tools in context of U.S.-Iraq relations

Building upon the theory that conflict resolution should be pursued between the United States and Iraq following the analysis conducted in the first part of our research, we queried respondents about the necessity of conflict resolution and their receptiveness to such a program subsequent to the 2003 War and occupation. Our analysis begins by qualifying general openness to the program before transitioning to respondents' rating of tools for achieving this purpose. Here we test Hypothesis 5, which states that subsequent to decades of deconstructive and violent relations between the United States and Iraq, exemplified by the 2003 Iraq War, a majority of respondents from our convenience sample will agree that conflict resolution is necessary to improve contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations, is tested. When questioned if respondents believe that the Iraq and U.S. governments should reconcile their relationship (Q53), 79% of U.S. (n = 46) and 63% of those from the Iraq sample (n = 32) agree conflict resolution is necessary. Hence, a clear majority of respondents from both samples advocates conflict resolution between the United States and Iraq. Our finding confirms Hypothesis five.

Subsequently, the questionnaire qualifies laypersons' openness to particular tools in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Table 12 shows the p-values from the chi-square and Fisher test for the last question set (S7). It illustrates that the highest levels of significance between study populations concern questions 59, 60, 63, 66 and 68 using our chi-square. With divergences in responses in mind, our survey produced the following results. According to our Fisher, there are notable differences in the way that respondents on questions 60, 62, 63, 67 and 68 utilized the Likert scales.

Table 12 Levels of Significance for Individual Questions (S7)

set	item	chi.sq	fis
	Q58		2.614458e-01
	Q59	2.986714e-02	2.043799e-02
	Q60	1.618971e-03	5.898965e-04
	Q61	1.102052e-01	1.086794e-01
	Q62	3.949311e-02	4.009818e-02
S7	Q63	3.279916e-03	1.998474e-03
	Q64	3.538400e-01	3.341372e-01
	Q65	2.747491e-01	2.991858e-01
	Q66	6.673873e-01	7.249286e-01
	Q67		9.158203e-01
	Q68	2.123496e-06	1.483074e-07

Table 12 illustrates the p-values of the chi-square and Fisher tests of question set S7, which include eleven conflict resolution mechanisms evaluated in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations.

When asked if U.S. politicians should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting U.S.-Iraq policy (Q57), 83% of U.S. (n = 48) and 76% of respondents from Iraq (n = 39) agree such consultation should take place. More specifically, 35% of our Iraq sample (n = 18) express that politicians should "definitely" take opinions into consideration when drafting U.S. policy, compared to 52% of U.S. respondents (n = 30) holding the same opinion. Respondent sentiment reiterates one of the lessons learned from U.S. government analysis of occupied Iraq is that the host population should be engaged to determine their needs and desires (Bowen, 2013: xii). It was also noted in part two that scholars emphasize that such inquiries would augment popular support.

Next, focus was placed on structural tools used to advance conflict resolution in context. We found that pluralities support continued economic cooperation between the United States and Iraq (Q64). 86% of our Iraq (n = 44) and 81% of our U.S. sample (n = 47) advocate the tool. Support for economic cooperation was expected since majorities in Iraq had previously stated that the U.S. should provide financial resources to reconstruct Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 war (ABC News and others, 2008: 38; Iraq Centre for Research and Strategic Studies, 2006: 19). Similarly, increased political cooperation (Q67) is advocated by a clear majority of citizens from Iraq (84%, n = 43) and the U.S. (88%, n = 51). Hence, clear majorities from our samples embrace economic and political cooperation between the United States and Iraq as tools of altering their relationship.

In addition, respondents widely support security cooperation (Q61). Seventy-two percent of U.S. respondents (n = 42) support security cooperation in context, which is slightly less than our Iraq sample (84%, n = 43). While a clear majority of U.S. respondents advocates security cooperation, the tool is less appealing by comparison to our Iraq sample. Support among the Iraq sample was expected as ABC News and others (2008: 5) found that seventy-six percent of respondents from Iraq thought that the United States should train and equip the ISF. Moreover, a majority of Iraqi respondents had expressed interest in United States assisting Iraq with national security against neighboring countries such as Turkey and Iran (ABC News and others, 2008: 5).

The survey then measured respondents' receptiveness to retributive justice mechanisms in context. Seventy-eight percent of respondents from Iraq (n = 40) support an international tribunal (Q56) to investigate wrongdoing committed during the 2003 War in Iraq. Of those, 37% of participants from Iraq (n = 19) "definitely" support an international tribunal compared to 41% (n = 21) who claim they would "probably" support such an inquiry. A total of 20% of the Iraq sample is undecided about the utility of an international tribunal. By comparison,

sixty-nine percent of all U.S. respondents (n = 40) support an international tribunal in context. Thirty-eight percent (n = 22) of our U.S. sample proclaims they would "definitely" support such a tribunal and thirty-one percent (n = 18) claim they would "probably" support the practice. Nevertheless, twenty-four percent of U.S. respondents (n = 14) reject tribunals in context compared to only two percent of those from Iraq (n = 1). Amalgamated, a clear majority from our samples supports an international tribunal as a means of transforming U.S.-Iraq relations, however our U.S. sample is less likely to support the practice and nearly one-quarter reject the tool in context.

When asked to rate the viability of an international tribunal in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations on a Likert Scale (Q59), 92% of participants from Iraq (n = 47) support its use to investigate wrongdoing. Support among our respondents from Iraq was expected as the International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Center (2004: 25-26) found that Iraqis embraced the pursuit of retributive justice as a transitional justice mechanism on the condition that any "punishment matched the offense and the crimes and those who committed them would be publicly exposed." By way of contrast, 67% of those from the U.S. (n = 39) positively rate an international tribunal in context. Thus, there is noticeably more support for an international tribunal among our sample from Iraq than the United States, and the U.S. sample is relatively consistent in their acceptance or rejection of international tribunal across two questions (Q56 and Q59).

Similarly, respondents were queried about government inquiries into the 2003 War. Inquiries were incorporated to determine the potential value of the mechanism by comparison to other forms of determining the truth (such as trials or truth commissions). On the one hand, a U.S. government inquiry into the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War (Q55) is supported by 62% of U.S. respondents (n = 36) compared to 49% from our Iraq sample (n = 25). A surprising forty percent of those U.S. respondents (n = 23) "definitely" support a U.S. government inquiry compared to eighteen percent of those from Iraq (n = 9). Although our figures indicate that a majority of U.S. respondents supports a U.S. government inquiry, the Iraq sample is generally polarized on the issue. Demonstrating a high degree of uncertainty, twenty-five percent of our Iraq sample (n = 13) is undecided on the utility of a government inquiry. While the survey unfortunately could not qualify the reasoning behind their indecision or reluctance, we hypothesize that our Iraq sample distrusts the U.S. government would objectively conduct an inquiry.

Reversely, respondents were asked if they would support a Government of Iraq inquiry into the 2003 war (Q62). In this instance, our U.S. participants (66%, n = 38) express slightly

less support for an Iraq inquiry into the war versus 78% of participants from Iraq (n = 40). Together, our data indicate that clear majorities from both populations support the use of an Iraqi inquiry, but our Iraq population expresses more support. It can also be surmised that our Iraq sample has more faith in a GOI inquiry than one conducted by the United States government.

Afterwards, attention turned to qualifying support for restorative justice mechanisms in context. The data shows there are some discrepancies across our population samples. Firstly, a plurality (96%, n = 49) of participants from Iraq supports a truth commission (Q63) compared to 69% of U.S. respondents (n = 40). The nearly unanimous support expressed by the Iraq sample dwarfs that expressed by the U.S. sample. An analogous discrepancy is found in the appropriateness of a U.S. apology for its actions in Iraq (Q60). Ninety percent of those in our Iraq sample (n = 46) favor the use of an apology compared to only fifty percent of U.S. respondents (n = 29). Consequently, a clear majority of respondents from Iraq supports an apology while the U.S. sample is polarized on the mechanism in context. Lastly, nearly twice as many respondents from Iraq (96%, n = 49) favor the payment of reparations by the U.S. (Q68), compared to 53% of their U.S. counterparts (n = 31). It should be recalled that U.S. participants gave the three tools marginally positive rating in general terms (section 6.4.3). Hence, clear majorities from our Iraq sample support the three restorative justice tools in context, while U.S. respondents clearly embrace a truth commission, but support is (nearly) polarized on reparations and apology.

Table 13 Respondents' Support for Tools in Context

S6a*, 7	Tools in context	U.S. sample		Iraq sample	
Q55*	a U.S. inquiry	62%	✓	49%	✗
Q57*	consultation with Iraqis	83%	✓	76%	✓
Q58	cultural exchanges	81%	✓	96%	✓
Q59	international tribunal	67%	✓	92%	✓
Q60	a U.S. apology	50%	✗	90%	✓
Q61	security cooperation	72%	✓	84%	✓
Q62	an Iraq inquiry	66%	✓	78%	✓
Q63	truth commission	69%	✓	96%	✓
Q64	economic cooperation	81%	✓	86%	✓
Q65	third party intervention	69%	✓	69%	✓
Q66	positive media coverage	81%	✓	84%	✓
Q67	political cooperation	88%	✓	84%	✓
Q68	reparations	53%	✓	96%	✓

Table 13 provides the percentage of respondents from our survey who supported conflict resolution tools in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Check marks indicate that a majority of respondents in a given sample supported the tool in question. The * indicates questions in question set 6a.

The next mechanism examined was third party intervention. Two questions were asked concerning third party intervention. Firstly, when queried if respondents would support conflict resolution if a third party proposed it (Q54), 69% from the U.S. (n = 40) and 57% from Iraq (n = 29) assert that they would. Among those, twenty-four percent of U.S. participants (n = 14) say they would "definitely" support conflict resolution if a third party proposed it versus eighteen percent of those from Iraq (n = 9). However, 14% of U.S. (n = 8) and 16% of respondents from Iraq (n = 8) state that they would not support conflict resolution if proposed by a third party. Nonetheless, a majority of respondents from both countries would support conflict resolution if proposed by a third party. Secondly, respondents were asked to rate third party intervention as a tool in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations (Q65). A slight majority from our Iraq (69%, n = 35) and the U.S. samples (69%, n = 40) rate third party involvement positively. Hence, both sample populations similarly embrace the mechanism in context.

Finally, tools for advancing cultural awareness were integrated into the survey to measure respondent rating of their utility for altering U.S.-Iraq relations. On the one hand, clear majorities advocate positive media coverage (Q66). Eighty-four percent of the Iraq sample (n = 43), and eighty-one percent of U.S. participants (n = 47), perceive positive media coverage as beneficial for transforming U.S.-Iraq relations. Thirty-three percent of U.S. respondents (n = 19) give positive media coverage the highest priority versus 19% of those from Iraq (n = 10). On the other hand, clear majorities express interest in cultural exchanges (Q58). An overwhelming 96% of participants from Iraq (n = 49) approve cultural exchanges compared to 81% of those from the U.S. (n = 47). Both positive media coverage and cultural exchanges are supported by our U.S. and Iraq samples.

Combining our survey findings from this question set demonstrates that both samples approve a plurality of the conflict resolution tools introduced in this section in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. See Table 13 for a summary of the percentage of respondents who supported conflict resolution practices to improve contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Our Iraq sample only rejected a U.S. government inquiry, while our U.S. samples rejected a U.S. apology and narrowly approved the U.S. payment of reparations. In 9 of 13 instances, the sample from Iraq views the listed conflict resolution mechanisms more favorably in context than their U.S. counterparts. Accordingly, Hypothesis 6 is confirmed as a

majority of our research participants agrees on thirteen conflict resolution factors to transform the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations.

6.5 Conclusion

The present chapter outlines methodology and findings of our questionnaire that comparatively analyzes perceptions of conflict and conflict resolution in general terms, as well as in the context of United States and Iraq relation across a convenience sample of U.S. and Iraq respondents. The overall objective of the survey was to qualify convergences and divergences in conceptualizations of conflict and conflict resolution across our samples by eliciting and quantifying respondents' opinion of related concepts, principles and factors. Our survey is a theoretical milestone since it comparatively analyzes micro level conceptualizations of conflict resolution across U.S. and Iraq samples, and between scholarly perceptions articulated in part two of the present thesis with that of laypersons. Simultaneously, the survey measures respondent receptiveness to a hypothetical conflict resolution program between the United States and Iraq, and laypersons' receptiveness to thirteen factors in that context. Four interrelated Hypotheses were tested and confirmed throughout our examination of the survey data.

Chapter 6 opened by reiterating the need for conflict resolution in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. While scholars and citizens alike initially expressed optimism at the potential for change in U.S. foreign policy approach toward the Middle East following the election of Barack Obama, positive sentiment gradually waned. Although Obama's rhetoric was conciliatory in nature, and emphasized the need for improved relations across these cultures, his administration failed to make meaningful policy adjustments to lend credence to rhetoric. Confirming the trend, Iraq experienced a temporary rise in popular opinion of Obama, which later declined. Alteration in popular sentiment is proposed to be a result of there being no increased or tangible efforts to reconcile U.S.-Iraq relations or alter public opinion. With sentiment remaining predominantly negative, we determined that conflict resolution is still necessary and relevant in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations, as animosity and grievance still exist.

Upon the theory that conflict resolution is necessary in this context, we produced a survey to measure how laypersons from the United States and Iraq conceptualize conflict and conflict resolution. The survey was designed around our analysis of conflict resolution in part two of our research and Appendix 1. Concerning the former, many concepts, principles and tools were extracted from our theoretical framework of conflict resolution as articulated in the

literature review of Western and Arab/Muslim scholars in chapters three through five. These included concepts and terminology that could be evaluated and compared between our samples of laypersons, and across our samples and scholarly theory. Concerning the latter, Appendix 1, a non-exhaustive list of tools, was developed during the course of our research by recording conflict resolution tools utilized at the interstate level as referenced in the literature. This framework was used to determine which mechanisms have been implemented in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations, which are not viable, and which are considered viable.

Succinctly, referencing the non-exhaustive list of conflict resolution tools outlined in Appendix 1, the research categorized the mechanisms according to those "hitherto applied," "relevant" or "irrelevant" in context. Those applied included mainly structural techniques, for instance, political and security cooperation. Tools deemed irrelevant included practices including partition or holding new elections, practices that are irrelevant in context, in addition to techniques, such as forgiveness or modifying textbooks, which are determined untimely. Following this preliminary analysis, mechanisms determined relevant totaled 37, which included several structural practices from the "hitherto applied", namely political, and economic and security cooperation, which were transposed to evaluate their acceptability among our samples. Due to their large quantity, the thirty-seven "relevant" tools had to be further reduced through two phases of piloting. Subsequent to pilot work, the list of relevant tools was condensed to eleven of the most recognizable and relevant conflict resolution mechanisms for resolving interstate conflict.

The second section of chapter six provided detailed explanations as to why conflict resolution tools were inserted or eliminated from the final draft of the survey. Reasons for pilot rejection of tools include their obscure nature, their perceived inappropriateness absent implementation of other techniques, or the belief that respondents would misperceive the practice. Concerning the latter, for example, it was feared that respondents might mistake techniques, such as theatre or storytelling, for entertainment rather than recognizing their relative utility for resolving and transforming conflictual relationships. In this manner, eleven mechanisms were overwhelmingly selected by pilot participants as applicable and easily recognizable, and were, therefore, incorporated into the final draft of the questionnaire.

While explaining how relevant principles and mechanisms were determined, the chapter outlined the development and design of the questionnaire. Our overview includes a brief history of questionnaire construction, composition and piloting. Although piloting occurred over three stages and was limited to 25 participants, who were predominantly U.S. citizens,

the process proved invaluable. The first two phases (20 respondents total) aided in the reduction of tools which advance conflict resolution, and assisted with improving questionnaire layout and presentation. Phase one of piloting consisted of ten respondents who were asked open questions and a response elicited. Notes were taken, and the data and feedback collected aided in the reduction of the length of the survey and to the establishment of a written questionnaire with closed questions. The decision to shift from an open-question interview to a written survey was recommended to expedite the survey process, reduce respondent fatigue and ensure comparability across research samples. Once corrections acquired from phase one was made, and a written survey was produced, phase two was implemented.

Phase two likewise consisted of ten pilot participants. During phase two, the survey was presented in printed format by the research and consisted of 80 questions. Again, respondents were asked to provide answers to questions as well as provide general feedback on language, presentation and design. Once complete, data from phases one and two were analyzed and the most popular mechanisms were selected for inclusion in the final survey. When a survey had been designed around the eleven most relevant and recognizable conflict resolution factors, the final draft of the survey was presented to five additional pilot participants who completed the survey. The last five participants' primary contribution to the survey was their critique of questionnaire language, format and design.

Subsequent to piloting, the survey was forwarded to an assistant professor of politics and methodology that provided additional feedback. Among minor recommended changes to the wording of some questions, the assistant professor warned the researcher of the challenges of administering the survey and acquiring a representative sample from both target population groups. He recommended that if assistance with distribution could not be solicited, that the research sample be weighed to improve representativeness. Additionally, he recommended that the "don't know" categories be re-introduced into the survey. This latter suggestion was not adopted, however, for several reasons, including pilot participants' criticism of its inclusion, and survey literature suggesting that "don't know" categories increase the likelihood of respondents not giving much consideration to the questions asked.

Once the survey had been controlled and finalized, the researcher sought to make it available and promote it with U.S. and Iraq citizens. On the one hand, attempts were made to recruit Arab translators through a contact at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. However, a team of translators could not be hired due to work restrictions and/or time restraint issues. As an alternative, the survey was translated into German and Italian to accommodate Iraqis living

abroad. These translations aided in the availability of the survey. On the other hand, assistance with promoting the research was solicited, namely from NGOs and universities, was not forthcoming. It was denoted that most individuals and organizations solicited were not supportive, although the prominent exception was Pietro Benedetti at *Servizio Salute Migranti Forzati*, who was essential to the advancement of our research in terms of reaching respondents from Iraq. Nonetheless, absent large-scale assistance, and subsequent to the inability to recruit Arab translators and target Arabic speaking Iraqis, it was decided to jettison hopes of acquiring a representative sample from either the U.S. or Iraq population. To compensate, snowball and convenience sampling became the primary recruiting methods, and to enhance availability, whereby the survey was launched online in three languages to augment accessibility and convenience to potential respondents from each sample.

Subsequent to outlining questionnaire construction and distribution, we explained several research weaknesses. Among its weaknesses, our survey sample is small and unrepresentative due to the inability to recruit assistance or travel to the United States or Iraq. For this reason, we caution that our research findings not be used to make generalizations about opinion held by U.S. or Iraq citizens, but rather our research provides insight into the opinions of our sample groups. In addition, due to the use of Internet technologies, it is impossible to determine the non-participation rate or provide insight into why potential respondents chose not to participate. Due to these weaknesses, and others, we again emphasize that research findings are not representative of the populations in general.

However, despite its weaknesses, we contend that our research findings are valuable for understanding how conflict resolution is conceptualized by laypersons across U.S. and Iraq culture at the micro level. To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study of micro level opinion in this context. Consequently, we believe that our survey research offers an alternative approach to analyzing conflict resolution theory and practices across cultures, which is typically generalized at the macro level. It thereby offers a fresh perspective into cross-cultural conflict resolution discourse. Moreover, due to its unique approach, our survey findings both confirm and contradict theories extracted from our literature review of Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations as articulated by scholars.

We, therefore, believe that the utilization of survey research at the micro level, despite its unrepresentative nature, makes a theoretical contribution to contemporary discourse because it introduces laypersons' perceptions of conflict and conflict resolution into scholarly discourse while empowering relevant stakeholders. Our selected methodology, therefore, shifts discourse away from conventional scholarly generalizations at the macro level (West versus

Arab/Muslim approaches), and refocuses it on the opinions of our samples of U.S. and Iraq citizens. In this manner, general scholarly understanding of conflict resolution of macro level approaches is juxtaposed with the opinion of affected laypersons at the micro level. Another notable advantage of our approach is that members of the affected societies were given an opportunity to express their opinions on conflict, conflict resolution and principles and factors associated with its processes. In essence, respondents could express their opinion on theoretical and practical aspects of conflict resolution between two countries in general, and in the case of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations.

Thereafter, we outlined data collection, compilation and analysis. Simultaneously, methodology was explained, including how the survey was broadcast and administered online and how respondents were recruited. On the one hand, Iraq refugees, or immigrants living in Europe, were solicited. On the other hand, personal acquaintances and Facebook respondents were networked to acquire both U.S. and Iraq respondents online. The latter method increased availability, and convenience, although Internet surveys are considered potentially restrictive in nature, since not everyone has access to a computer. However, in the case of Iraq refugees or immigrants living in Italy, refugees were provided with Internet access and assistance, if necessary, to complete the survey. Hence, we managed to reach some respondents who would have otherwise not have been able to participate.

Following elucidation of survey implementation and availability, we explained how the collected data was analyzed. Subsequent to making the data uniform, for instance spelling, we explained how reliability and levels of significance were tested utilizing three separate measures respectively. Concerning reliability, our analysis found that question sets 1-3, which are our funnel questions concerning general perceptions of conflict and conflict resolution, are statistically unreliable. Nevertheless, the data was introduced for the sake of discussion. Alternatively, the remaining question sets essential to testing our four working hypothesis have a high rate of reliability across the three measures used. Albeit, we also explained that due to the small size and non-representative nature of our sample, it was only possible to analyze the date descriptively, and we again emphasized that generalizations of our findings should proceed with caution as our findings represent our samples and not populations.

Thereafter, comparative findings extracted from our survey were examined in the last section of the chapter. Our questionnaire contains seven topical question sets. The first two question sets deal with how our sample conceptualizes conflict and conflict resolution. Through questioning, we find similarities and differences across cultures (or our samples) concerning how conflict is conceptualized. For instance, we find that most respondents from

our U.S. and Iraq samples agree that conflicts are normal, and that a majority of respondents from our samples perceives conflict resolution as important in their daily lives. Similarly, a slight majority of respondents agrees that conflict cannot be prevented, although a slight majority of respondents from both samples believes that conflictual relationships can be resolved, and most believe that conflicts should be resolved. Finally, there was consensus across cultures that there is a difference between conflict resolution between two individuals and conflict resolution between two states. However, these findings had a low degree of reliability.

Nevertheless, there were equally noteworthy differences in how our samples conceptualize conflict. Foremost, an overwhelming percentage of U.S. respondents say conflicts can be nonviolent, compared to less than half of those from the Iraq sample. In this frame, our U.S. sample perceives conflict could manifest nonviolently while our Iraq sample disagree. This finding reinforces Arab/Muslim theory outlined in chapter five, although the reliability of these question sets is low. In addition, when questioned if conflicts should be avoided, slightly less than half of all U.S. respondents believe avoidance is necessary compared to a clear majority from the Iraq sample. Unfortunately our survey does not permit an opportunity to ask follow-up questions to determine why these differences exist. Nonetheless, these question sets are designed to funnel our respondents' attention to conflict resolution, and despite their low reliability, we qualify many similarities and some divergences in how conflict is conceptualized across our research samples by comparison to our literature review of cultural approaches.

In short, our research findings pertaining to conflict both challenge and confirm scholarly conceptualizations outlined in the second part of our research. However, we recommend that more thorough and representative research be conducted to verify our findings. We make this recommendation because our data generates some interesting findings but is unreliable. On the one hand, we found an overwhelming majority of our sample from the U.S., and a clear majority from the Iraq, perceives a conflict affects more than those immediately involved. Respondent opinions on this topic contradicts the Arab/Muslim hypothesis that Westerners do not see conflict as systemic, and indicates that laypersons in our U.S. sample appreciates the systemic nature of conflict and its effects. On the other hand, our research finds that a clear majority of the U.S. sample perceives a conflict can produce positive benefits compared to only about half of those from Iraq. In this instance, our data confirms the Arab/Muslim theory that Westerners perceive conflicts is generally perceived as having a positive dimension.

However, the polarization of our Iraq sample on this issue suggests further research is necessary to better qualify how Iraqis conceptualize conflict.

Subsequent question sets examined respondents' perceptions of conflict resolution. Through our questionnaire, we found that a majority of U.S. and Iraq respondents believes that all conflicts should be resolved. Interestingly, only a slight majority of U.S. respondents perceives that all conflicts are resolvable compared to a polarized Iraq sample. Here, it is possible to observe limited optimism among our Iraq sample, which confirms scholars' hypothesis that Arab/Muslims generally perceive conflict is challenging to resolve. Nonetheless, both samples measure their expectations when conceptualizing the relative capacity of conflict resolution. Similarly, slight majorities from our U.S. and Iraq samples perceive that nonviolent coexistence is the most probable outcome than peace when resolving violent conflict relations. Despite their limited expectation concerning probable outcomes, an overwhelming number of respondents from both samples optimistically state that two countries involved in war can improve their relationship following conflict. This finding suggests that both samples believe conflicts can be resolved, although they limit their expectations. Lastly, when classifying reconciliation, we found that U.S. respondents are less likely to perceive reconciled relations is synonymous to peaceful relations, compared to their counterparts from Iraq, who are more inclined to believe that reconciliation and peaceful relations are synonymous.

Attention then turned to qualifying respondent perceptions of conflict resolution principles. Among the principles analyzed, we included: honor; dignity; respect; satisfaction of interests; satisfaction of the needs; protection of individual rights; appropriate compensation; consultation; listening to the "other"; mutual benefit; acceptable practices; justice; truth; accountability; forgiveness; and religion. Most of the principles examined are referenced by Arab/Muslim scholars, and emphasized or implied in the Western literature, as analyzed elsewhere. Our survey indicates that clear majorities of laypersons from both samples embrace 15 of the 16 principles analyzed. Amalgamated, a minimum of sixty-five percent of respondents from our samples support a majority of the principles introduced including justice, truth and honor. The single exception was the rejection of religion by our U.S. sample. This finding supports Arab/Muslim theory that Westerners reject religion as a principle of conflict resolution. However, some Western scholars advocate religion be incorporated, so the principle remains theoretically applicable. Nevertheless, our data evaluating laypersons' opinions towards principles confirms Hypothesis 3, which projected

that respondents across cultures would similarly embrace sixteen principles of conflict resolution. In this case, our U.S. and Iraq samples embraced fifteen of sixteen principles.

Our attention then turned to testing whether tools were equally embraced. To test Hypothesis 4, we qualified perceptions of eleven conflict resolution tools in general. The tools selected were extracted from Appendix 1, as outlined in section two of this chapter. The tools included are: third party intervention; security cooperation; political cooperation; reparation payments; court proceedings; public apology; economic cooperation; truth telling; cultural exchanges; positive media coverage; and empowerment. Our data confirms a majority of laypersons' from both samples embraces a majority of the conflict resolution tools introduced. More precisely, over 65% of all U.S. respondents support each tool, compared to over 80% of our Iraq sample. Our data, therefore, confirms Hypotheses 4, which suggests that modes of conflict resolution would be shared across our sample populations.

Subsequently, our survey qualified perceptions of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War among our samples. We found that most respondents from Iraq did not perceive that the war affected U.S. or Iraqi opinion of the other. By comparison, a majority of U.S. respondents perceives that the invasion had a negative effect on both the U.S. and Iraqi opinion of the other. Thereafter, respondents were asked whether they believe that conflict resolution is necessary between the United States and Iraq following the 2003 invasion and occupation. In response to this question, more than half of respondents from both sample groups believe that conflict resolution should be pursued between the two countries. This data confirms Hypothesis 5, which states a majority of respondents would agree that conflict resolution between the United States and Iraq is necessary to transform the quality of the relationship.

Finally, we asked respondents to rate thirteen tools for promoting conflict resolution in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Among those selected were: a U.S. inquiry into the war; consultation with Iraqis; cultural exchanges; an international tribunal; a U.S. apology; security cooperation; an Iraq inquiry; truth commission; economic cooperation; third party intervention; positive media coverage; political cooperation; and reparations. Of those thirteen introduced, each sample reject one method. U.S. respondents do not support an apology, and respondents from Iraq do not endorse a U.S. government inquiry into the war. Our U.S. sample was also nearly polarized on the issue of payment of reparations, which was supported by slightly more than half of participants (53%). Aside from these instances, a minimum of 65% of U.S. respondents supported each of the remaining twelve tools, compared to at least 75% of respondents from Iraq who supported the remaining twelve.

Consequently, our data confirms that our U.S. and Iraq samples largely approve the use of eleven of thirteen tools presented in the context of improving contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. Our research findings, therefore, confirm Hypothesis 6, which states that a majority of respondents will support the use of a majority of thirteen conflict resolution techniques to transform the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations. Combined, our survey demonstrates that both samples predominantly embrace nearly the same conflict resolution principles and practices in general, and the same conflict resolution mechanism in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations. With this knowledge in mind, we present several recommendations concerning future cross-cultural studies of conflict resolution between Arab/Muslim and Western culture in theory and practice, as well as summarize the findings of this research, in the next chapter.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The present research accomplished several objectives. First, it qualified the existence of a protracted conflictual relationship between the United States and Iraq, a relationship that needs to be transformed to minimize the potential for future conflict. Second, it juxtaposed Western and Arab/Muslim scholarly conceptualizations of conflict and conflict resolution, written in the English language, to qualify similarities and divergences of lexicon, principles and practices. Lastly, it examined laypersons' general conceptualizations of conflict resolution between two countries and in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations among a convenience sample of U.S. and Iraq citizens. The survey allowed us to comparatively analyze responses provided by our samples, and to juxtapose their opinions against scholarly theory. Amalgamated, we proved the existence of a protracted conflictual relationship, and demonstrated a high degree of cross-cultural similarity between conceptualizations of conflict resolution across the literature analyzed and our research samples. While reviewing our research findings in this section, we will revisit the six hypotheses that guided the present research, and introduce existing research gaps and policy recommendations deduced from this study.

U.S.-Iraq (conflict) relations matured following the withdrawal of Britain's influence from the Middle East in the mid-1900s. At this point, the United States and the Soviet Union became increasingly involved in the Middle East, with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaging regional leaders to selfishly augment the hegemons' relative influence. As part of its strategy, the United States utilized enticements, and sometimes violence, to coerce Iraq's leaders to conform to policies the U.S. determined favorable to its regional interests, which, among others, were designed to undermine the regional influence of the Soviet Union, and to secure the flow of Middle East petroleum onto the international market. From its utilization of covert operations supporting Kurd rebels in Iraq, to offsetting Iraq-Soviet relations by courting and assisting Iran, the United States regularly implemented policies which counteracted Iraq's leaders when they acted contrary to the desired objectives of the standing U.S. administration. The U.S. government deployed analogous policies throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, generally perceiving Iraq as a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Subsequent to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in September 1980, the Ronald Reagan administration officially adopted a neutral position. Unofficially, however, the U.S. administration provided military and intelligence support to warring Iraq throughout the 1980s. Nonetheless, it was later disclosed that the Reagan administration was simultaneously aiding Iran as part of a clandestine negotiated arrangement to have U.S. hostages in Lebanon

released from captivity. U.S. duplicitous behavior, once disclosed, exacerbated preexisting regional distrust of the U.S. government, especially in Iraq. The act confirmed Saddam Hussein's suspicions that the United State government could not be trusted, and led credence to the perception that the single U.S. policy objective was to undermine Iraq. Nonetheless, once U.S. covert support for Iran had been publicized, the Reagan administration supported only Iraq for the remainder of the Iran-Iraq War. Although trust between the Iraq and the United States had been severely compromised, Saddam Hussein continued to accept assistance from the U.S. to augment his military capacity *vis-à-vis* Iran.

Following the termination of the Iran-Iraq War in late 1988, Iraq emerged as a frail military power in the Middle East. Frailty of the country was a result of tremendous economic debt accumulated during the Iran-Iraq War, most of which was bankrolled by Iraq's regional neighbors. Equally problematic, Iraq's infrastructure had been damage or deteriorated. At this time, the price of petroleum on the international market declined, which strangled Iraq's economic revenue. Saddam Hussein's hopelessly negotiated assistance from his neighboring lenders, yet they were uncooperative and would not implement measures to ease Iraq's economic burden. Frustrated, Saddam Hussein harshened his rhetoric, trying to coerce concessions. Meanwhile, the George H.W. Bush administration attempted to improve U.S.-Iraq relations at this time, even securing U.S. economic assistance to aid Iraq's recovery, but the degree of assistance procured was insufficient.

As frustration turned to determination and desperation, Iraq's President, Saddam Hussein, invaded neighboring Kuwait in 1990. It is argued that Iraq's annexation of Kuwait was a form of punishment, which allowed Iraq to absorb the emirate's natural resources as a means of loosening Iraq's debt burden. Following the annexation, the Bush administration scuttled efforts to maintain amicable relations, and Iraq was again viewed as a threat to U.S. geopolitical interests. In short, the eight years of cooperation between these two countries during the Iran-Iraq War was reversed, and a conflictual relationship between the United States and Iraq reemerged. After diplomatic measures failed to compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw its military forces from Kuwait, the 1991 Persian Gulf War was launched under the auspice of the United Nations. Subsequent to the U.S.-led coalition's decisive defeat of Iraq's military, a ceasefire agreement was brokered.

The ceasefire agreement, however, did not end violence, because it contained (violent) provisions, namely economic sanctions, whereby the United States and other countries were able to continue to perpetrate physical and structural violence against Iraq as components of a broad containment policy. Combined, the containment of Iraq endured between 1991 and

2003. The strategy included international weapons inspections, economic sanctioning, military strikes and assistance to political opponents. While the policies were designed to weaken Saddam Hussein's grip on power, and curtail Iraq's military capability, they likewise produced a humanitarian crisis. Among the devastating humanitarian consequences manufactured by sanctioning, Iraqis endured shortages of medical supplies and food. These circumstances were exacerbated by regular aerial bombardments from coalition military operations and high rates of unemployment. Those acts of physical and structural violence negatively impacted on popular opinion, producing acute animosity and grievances among Iraq's society toward the United States and the international community for imposing sanctions and containment.

Although the population endured hardship resulting from the containment policy throughout the 1990s, Saddam Hussein remained firmly in control. He expelled international weapons inspectors, promoted black market trading, and generally scoffed at the United Nations and the United States. Hussein's ability to retain authority, in turn, frustrated some U.S. politicians who insisted direct military intervention was necessary to remove him from power. The persistent impulse to depose Iraq's leader by military force was bolstered within the U.S. government by the September 11, 2001 attacks. Subsequently, tensions between Iraq and the United States escalated since some administration officials, with the assistance of the Department of Defense, manufactured a case for war. Founded upon false accusations and exaggerated threat assessments, the U.S. public generally accepted the administration's assertion that intervention was necessary. By comparison, most of the international community rejected and condemned a possible invasion. Absent international support, nevertheless, determined to implement regime change, an *ad hoc* coalition led by the United States was formed. The invasion to depose Saddam Hussein was perpetrated in April 2003.

The 2003 U.S.-Iraq War escalated and protracted the deconstructive relationship between the two countries. The operation ushered in eight years of U.S.-led occupation, bolstered by the sustained deployment of physical and structural violence between these two entities. Physical violence during this period, for instance, is observable in the use of the military to overthrow Hussein, and its deployment to combat the insurgency against coalition forces and sectarian violence the occupation inevitably produced. Structural violence was deployed in the imposition of U.S. political objectives designed to refashion Iraq's political and social structures between 2003 and 2011. The combination created an insurgency to hasten the withdrawal of U.S. forces, while fracturing Iraq's society. The latter produced internal ethnic and sectarian conflict at the political and social levels on an unprecedented scale in Iraq's

history. Prevalent insecurity was compounded by U.S. inaction, one the one hand, (for example, its failure to provide security or basic services), and its actions, one the other hand (imposition of social and political benchmarks during the occupation).

As a consequence of more than two decades of violent interaction, articulated in our conflict mapping, we demonstrated how the protracted conflictual relationship between the United States and Iraq has negatively influenced societal perceptions. The societal impact was qualified through the referencing of public opinion polling collected by various research groups, media corporations and scholars. In short, the sustained deconstructive relationship between the United States and Iraq produced distrust and grievances within both societies, and at the macro level. One the one hand, in Iraq and the Middle East, frustration and outrage at the United States has persisted since the 1990s sanction of Iraq. This sentiment was exacerbated by the 2003 occupation, manifesting in popular espousal, at the micro and macro levels, of violence against occupying U.S. military forces. Tenacious negative sentiment was manufactured by a combination of factors, including preexisting animosity, abhorrence of the occupation and the (asymmetrical) physical and structural violence perpetrated by the United States, to name a few. On the other hand, we illustrated how popular U.S. negative sentiment toward Iraq has been acute since the 1990s, and persists at the time of writing. Combined, the historical analysis and conflict mapping provided, supported by polling data, proves the protracted violent conflict between the United States and Iraq has produced a negative social impact, including animosity and grievances, findings which prove Hypothesis 1 of our research.

With the conflict relationship qualified, we turned our attention to how the quality of protracted, deconstructive relationships between referents can be altered. According to scholars, alteration is necessary because, in instances of long-term and/or socially rooted deconstructive interaction, especially at the intrastate and interstate levels, these types of relationships are subject to conflict continuation or escalation since the effects of conflict become embedded within social, cultural and political structures. To reverse these trends, scholars advocate conflict resolution be pursued. The applicability of this recommendation is obvious in the case of U.S.-Iraq relations, with some scholars hypothesizing that as long as the U.S. is perceived as predominantly responsible for the religious, political and social problems experienced in the Middle East, and the malefactor or initiator of the social and political turmoil experienced in the region, the potential for violent conflict between the U.S. and Arab/Muslim countries remains. From the reverse angle, politicians and the public in the U.S.

continue to feel that they have interests in the Middle East, which must be secured and protected.

Transferring these macro level assumptions to the micro level, we argue that the end of combat operations, and the removal of military forces from Iraq constitute the most appropriate time when conflict resolution between these two countries can be pursued. To this end, some efforts have been made to repair U.S.-Iraq relations hitherto. However, measures implemented thus far have been mainly structural in nature, which scholars argue are insufficient for generating transformation of the conflictive relationship between Iraq and the United States at the societal level. Succinctly, structural techniques are useful, but inadequate for addressing conflict structures, and thereby are unlikely to produce long-term constructive relations that target and become rooted in society. While structural measures implemented have, among other things, reduced direct physical violence, conflict is not synonymous with armed confrontation, violence or war. Consequently, we believe both governments need to appreciate that the conflict relationship between the two countries is deeper than the 2003 war and occupation, as it has impacted on society. In short, the deconstructive relationship is rooted in historical experience, reinforced by sustained structural and physical violence, which acutely impact cognitive, effective and behavioral aspects of individuals and collectives exposed.

Since bilateral negative sentiment between Iraq and U.S. societies is high, it is suggested a process of conflict resolution aimed at altering social perceptions and behavior is warranted. However, avocation of conflict resolution is problematic, because the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq amplified scholarly critique of conflict resolution as a practice. By way of summary, three prominent critiques examined insinuate conflict resolution: is impotent for resolving conflict; its practices are implemented in an uncritical, unbalanced and unjust manner; and it is inapplicable or inappropriate across cultures because its theories and practices are predominantly perceived as Western in style and approach. However, since many scholars continue to believe that conflict resolution is viable at the intrastate and interstate levels, in spite of its faults, we believe the process should be pursued. This verdict marginalizes the first critique.

To address the latter two critiques, our research transitioned to comparatively analyzing conflict resolution as a theory and practice across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures in the English language. Comparisons were designed to qualify similarities and differences between lexicon, theory and practices across cultures. To this end, our research made cross-cultural comparisons in two manners: across scholarship, and across a sample of laypersons. Through

this combination of approaches, we are able to determine a high degree of cross-cultural compatibility, which contradicts the assumption that conflict and conflict resolution, when conceptualized and practiced at the interstate level, are predominantly divergent. Addressing the latter two critiques, we test cross-cultural compatibility between Arab/Muslim and Western approaches between two countries, while giving a sample of laypersons' the opportunity to provide insight into how they conceptualize lexicon, principles and practices. The latter is relevant for empowering individuals and allowing them to express how they believe conflict resolution should be pursued.

The methodology we utilized for comparing Western and Arab/Muslim approaches to conflict resolution diverges from comparable research conducted hitherto in two important respects. First, we utilized a broad Western framework of conflict resolution whereupon lexicon, principles and practices could be extracted and compared across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures. More precisely, our theoretical framework contains elements from all three Western peacebuilding approaches: conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Operationalizing this broad framework fills a conspicuous research gap, since Arab/Muslim scholars conduct most comparative analysis in this instance, and generally, albeit inappropriately, reduce Western principles and practices to the structural approach alone.

The aforementioned narrow Arab/Muslim comparisons with Western approaches have, as a result of their limited framework, suffers from one striking theoretical contradiction. While isolating the Western social-psychological and spiritual approaches during their analysis, those same appraisals emphasize two recognized theories largely rooted in those same Western approaches. More specifically, Arab/Muslim comparative literature accuses most Western scholars of believing that conflicts can produce positive benefits and for believing that all conflicts can be resolved. Despite accurately referencing these two theories associated with conflict resolution and/or conflict transformation theory, Arab/Muslim scholars fail to further acknowledge, let alone evaluate, other salient theoretical and practical contributions these approaches offer. Namely, scholars do not make references to conflict resolution being implemented at the societal level, as embraced by both the social-psychological and spiritual approaches, nor do they allude to religious influence found in the spiritual approach. Nevertheless, based on their narrow and unrepresentative comparisons, these scholars go on to criticize Western approaches for, among other reasons, failing to accommodate society and religion. Trapped in their narrow theoretical framework, it is concluded that Western and Arab/Muslim approaches are largely incompatible and function at cross-purposes. However,

by incorporating theory associated with the spiritual and social-psychological approaches into the comparative discourse, our comparative analysis is better able to represent Western theory, and consequently, whereby we are able to qualify increasing degrees of theoretical and practical convergences across Western and Arab/Muslim scholarly conceptualizations of conflict resolution in theory and practice.

The second manner in which our comparative approach differs from its predecessors is that we incorporate micro level input into comparative conflict resolution discourse by querying two convenience samples of laypersons. Surveying allows us to qualify perceptions of conflict and conflict resolution at the interstate level. Scholars and policymakers alike have generally overlooked quantitative research of this nature despite Western scholarships' reference to the importance of inclusion and consultation of society when contemplating conflict resolution. Through the evaluation of laypersons' opinion, we obtain insight into how a sample of U.S. and Iraq citizens conceptualize conflict resolution between two countries in general, and in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations.

After collecting our survey data, we descriptively analyze it to compare perceptions of lexicon, principles and practices, as extracted from Arab/Muslim and Western literature, at two levels. On the one hand, we make comparisons across our U.S. and Iraq convenience samples. Through our comparisons, we are able to qualify numerous similarities and some differences in conceptualizations among immediate stakeholders in the case of U.S.-Iraq relations. Once again, our methodological approach addresses the aforementioned critiques of cross-cultural applicability and representativeness. On the other hand, we are able to juxtapose laypersons' opinion with scholarly theory. Succinctly, the combined approach permits us to qualify theoretical convergence and divergence across our samples, and between our samples and scholars.

The present comparison of conceptualizations of conflict resolution was structured around a framework of lexicon, principles and tools extracted from an assortment of Western scholars adhering to diverse approaches. Using this framework, our comparative analysis determines that there are striking theoretical and practical convergences between Arab/Muslim and Western conceptualizations when incorporating the Western spiritual, social-psychological, and structural approaches. Most importantly, similarities include shared lexicon and numerous principles. Likewise, both cultural approaches share many tools in general, although there are some discrepancies as to how these tools are applied. The high degree of commonality qualified in our study is only possible because we include the Western social-psychological and spiritual approaches, which more directly correspond to Arab/Muslim conceptualizations

of conflict resolution than the Western structural approach. In the following paragraphs, we will review our research findings, referencing both our literature review and survey samples.

Our comparative analysis of lexicon began by examining the term conflict as utilized by scholars. Arab/Muslim scholars conceptualize conflict as a systemic, deconstructive, normal phenomenon, which can only be managed. Since conflicts are perceived to have a deconstructive and systemic nature, Arab/Muslim scholars suggest conflicts be terminated or transformed at the community level to prevent a continuation or escalation. Summarily, excluding the Arab/Muslim predominant belief that conflicts are always deconstructive, the manner in which Arab/Muslim scholars articulate conflict corresponds to the theories found in the Western literature we analyzed. Hence, we found that Western scholars are more apt to categorize conflict as constructive, although there are exceptions to this rule.

As part of our comparisons of how conflict is conceptualized across these cultures, we reviewed three commonly referenced divergences that Arab/Muslim critiques often level against Western theory. Among the criticisms, is the argument that Western scholars frequently perceive conflicts: can have a positive dimension; are limited to those directly involved; and can be resolved. Our analysis of these judgments demonstrates that while many Western scholars ascribe to them as accused, not all Western scholars and/or Arab/Muslim scholars uniformly accept these precepts. First, we conclude that while Western scholars do generally perceive conflict can contain positive attributes, both Western and Arab/Muslim scholars conceptualize violent conflict as deconstructive and requiring management or transformation. Second, Western scholars are accused of viewing and approaching conflict as if it were limited directly to those immediately engaged. While there are some examples of Western scholars perceiving a conflict is limited to those directly involved, and implementing resolution accordingly, scholars adhering to the conflict resolution or conflict transformation see thing differently. Those who adhere to the latter schools of thought argue that conflict produces systemic effects, and at the interstate and international levels, that societies need to be involved in conflict resolution since they likewise have been affected. Finally, Arab/Muslim comparisons usually assume that Western scholars perceive that conflicts can be resolved. However, not all Western scholars perceive conflicts are resolvable, since some recognize that conflicts can become intractable, and, thereby, not subject to resolution. Accordingly, when the complex and wide range of Western approaches are included into our comparison, it is possible to see that there is an array of theory and practices available exceeding that articulated by scholars who preference a structural approach.

Transferring our attention to how laypersons in our sample perceive conflict, we identify many cross-cultural similarities. Among those, we notice that most respondents from our U.S. and Iraq samples agree that conflicts are normal and have systemic effects. Concurrently, a majority of respondents from both samples agree that conflict cannot be prevented; although most respondents likewise believe that conflictual relationships can and should be resolved. Equally relevant, there was consensus across our sample groups that there is a difference between conflict resolution between two individuals and conflict resolution between two states. This differentiation is fundament, and suggests that both groups recognize that conflict resolution practices are subject to variation between the lower at the higher levels. We deduce that the conceptualization of conflict is, therefore, largely comparable across our samples.

When comparing laypersons' conceptualization of conflict with those presented in the literature review, our survey both challenges and confirms important scholarly theory across cultures. It confirms preexisting theory on three points. First, an overwhelming percentage of U.S. respondents say conflicts can be nonviolent compared to less than half of those from our Iraq sample. This theory is one of the few cross-cultural divergences qualified across our samples when conflict is conceptualized, and confirms the U.S. participants differentiate between constructive and deconstructive conflicts, whereas respondents in our Iraq sample view conflict as predominantly deconstructive. Second, our research shows that a clear majority of respondents from our U.S. sample perceives a conflict can produce positive benefits compared to only about half of those from Iraq. In this instance, another difference is qualified across our samples, with our U.S. sample perceiving potential positive outcomes can manifest from conflict, while our Iraq sample is more pessimistic. This finding equally reinforces Arab/Muslim generalizations about how Westerners conceptualize conflict. Finally, when questioned if conflicts should be avoided, nearly half of all U.S. respondents believe avoidance is necessary compared to a clear majority from our Iraq sample. Once again, the sample from Iraq view conflict negatively, perceiving it should be avoided, while the U.S. sample is divided on the issue. These findings reinforce Arab/Muslim criticism of Western theory, but once again, it should be reiterated that there are exceptions among scholars and laypersons across both cultures. It should also be reiterated that our sample was small, and statistical reliability concerning the question set associated with conflict was low.

By comparison, our survey also contradicts some preexisting Arab/Muslim theories concerning conflict. For instance, our data challenges the hypothesis that Westerners do not perceive conflict as systemic. In fact, an overwhelming majority of our U.S. sample, and a clear majority from the Iraq sample, perceives conflict affects more than those immediately

involved. Our sample of U.S. respondents, thereby, challenges Arab/Muslim assumptions, because they appear to view conflict as systemic in nature. Equally relevant, we found that a majority of respondents from our Iraq and the U.S. samples believe that social inclusion is important when resolving conflict. However, since our survey data measuring perceptions of conflict have a low rate of statistical reliability, once again, we recommend a larger, representative research sample be conducted to better qualify laypersons' conceptualization of conflict. A large, representative sample would provide more definitive qualifications concerning cross-cultural convergences and divergences on the topic more accurately.

Following our analysis of conflict, attention turned to articulating and comparing conceptualizations of conflict resolution across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures, once again utilizing a literature review and our samples of laypersons. While there is unanimous cross-cultural recognition of the importance of resolving conflict among scholarship and the samples we analyzed, there are equally some theoretical and practical discrepancies identified. Beginning with convergence, the scholarly work analyzed share general lexicon, and refer to concepts such as conflict management, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, reconciliation and peace in somewhat comparable manners. Additionally, numerous concepts, including cognitive transformation, are also referenced in the literature. For example, Abu-Nimer's framework illustrates the process as the 3H's, where the head, hands and heart of those involved in a conflict are transformed. The 3H triangle corresponds to the Western conceptualization of cognitive transformation that contains a cognitive, behavioral and emotive aspect. By focusing transformation on the three primary aspects listed, both cultural approaches theorize that conflicts can be resolved and relationships altered to degrees that range from nonviolent coexistence to positive peace.

There are, nevertheless, fundamental cross-cultural divergences that must equally be acknowledged. By way of summary, conflict resolution according to Arab/Muslim theory is rooted in Islamic tradition and decrees. It occurs at the community level and is designed to manage a conflict, or transform relations, for the benefit of the community, while restoring honor to those involved and correcting injustices. The practice is driven by numerous principles, including truth, justice and mercy, and its implementation cannot oppose the precepts of Islamic teachings. Religious input is, therefore, essential to the management or resolution of a conflict in the Arab/Muslim tradition. When injustices are present, Islamic law and tradition dictate they are corrected, and this precept often weakens the neutrality of a third party, as well as the potential to achieve mutually beneficial solutions, two practices that are frequently prioritized by Western approaches.

Because implementation is usually applied at the familial or community level in Arab/Muslim tradition, conflict resolution at the individual, intrastate and interstate levels are relegated or nonexistent. Within the existing Arab/Muslim framework, resolving conflict between individuals is accommodated at the group level, while alternatively there are no traditional techniques for resolving conflict at the higher levels. Despite these particularities, Arab/Muslim scholars insist that the same principles and practices embraced at the community level are applicable at the higher levels.

By contrast, conflict resolution in the West is applicable at multiple levels: individual, group, intrastate, interstate, or in combination. According to our wide Western framework, conflicts can be managed, resolved or transformed, at all levels, according to conflict nuances. For example, the needs and interests of the stakeholders engaged must determine how resolution should be approached, and to what degree it can ultimately be achieved. Thus, the level at which resolution is theorized and applied varies across Western and Arab/Muslim culture. Conflict resolution in Arab/Muslim communities is generally approached at the family or community level, while the Western theorizes and implements conflict resolution at the individual, group, intrastate and interstate levels.

The absence of indigenous approaches for resolving conflict at the higher levels in Arab/Muslim traditions, offset by Western tendencies to prioritize their theories and techniques, have resulted in Western principles and practices frequently being imposed onto Arab/Muslim communities. Imposition is naturally problematic, foremost, because it is violent, but it is uniformly problematical since Arab/Muslim scholars insist that foreign principles and techniques are not always accepted or wanted by Arab/Muslims exposed. Concurrently, imposition of foreign practices marginalizes indigenous concepts and techniques, thereby muting local customs and tools that might otherwise have an increased probability of being accepted by stakeholders. Both imposition and the marginalization of indigenous practices undermine the potential for resolving conflict within and across Arab/Muslim cultures and, therefore, should be avoided at all cost. As we have illustrated, and will detail below, there are sufficient parallels in principles and practices across cultures that we believe could be exploited to create mutually acceptable approaches.

However, before exploring these similarities, we wish to continue examining divergences. Another cultural difference in approaches extracted from the literature is the Arab/Muslim prioritization of Islam/religion when conceptualizing conflict resolution. Although, our research interest concentrated on resolving conflict at the intrastate and interstate levels, Arab/Muslim direct reference to Islam/religion when conceptualizing conflict resolution,

which they assert is applicable at all levels, contradicts most Western approaches. There is, nevertheless, some room for maneuvering when the spiritual approach is considered. The spiritual approach, after all, accommodates practices such as forgiveness, which the structural approach condemns.

There were also additional divergences found across these two cultures. They include, for example, the characteristics and role of a mediator or third party. In the Arab/Muslim tradition, elders and respected men, whom are not expected to have specialized knowledge or skill set, in terms of conflict resolution, manage conflicts within the community. These inside-partial mediators function to terminate or resolve a conflict for the benefit of the community, while Islamic and traditional norms guide their activity. According to the Western approach, partial, knowledgeable and experienced experts in the field are preferences to implement conflict resolution. At the same time, the Western program is largely secular, and most scholars recommend that neutral third parties facilitate the process while immediate stakeholders maintain ownership of the program. But these cultural arrangements are broad stereotypes, and, as was demonstrated, there are scholars who are outliers from both the Arab/Muslim and Western mainstream. For instance, there are Western scholars who incorporate religious principles in to their theories, or advocate for third parties who have the capacity to nudge and coerce belligerents into conflict resolution. In short, in many instances, these Western scholars prescribe to the social-psychological or spiritual approach. Similarly, in the Arab/Muslim context, some scholars believe that community leaders should possess skills sets and be trained in conflict resolution, and even call expansion and reform of local traditions and practices.

With these issues in mind, we paid special attention to the two dominant Arab/Muslim critiques leveled against Western practices during our comparison of scholarly conceptualizations: the alleged absence of religion and the lack of a societal approach. Through our analysis of the scholarly literature, we demonstrated that religion and society are accommodated by the spiritual approach, and, to some degree, by the social-psychological. Concerning religion, some Western scholars minimize, even criticize, religious input in conflict resolution at the higher levels. However, the Western spiritual approach is religiously influenced and accommodates religion as a component. More precisely, the conflict transformation framework accommodates fundamental religious precepts, namely forgiveness and healing. As a consequence, the spiritual approach contains components of religion, which emulates the Arab/Muslim prioritization of Islamic principles, by comparison to other Western approaches, especially the structural approach.

Concerning societal incorporation, Arab/Muslim scholars criticize Western approaches for concentrating their efforts at the individual and/or structural levels. According to this critique, Western practices lack a systemic approach that targets the group or society, which are alternatively prioritized in Arab/Muslim culture. Contrary to this assumption, we illustrated that the Western social-psychological and spiritual approaches both recognize that conflict affects society and, therefore, needs to be resolved or transformed at the collective level. In particular, the conflict transformation approach is tailored to addressing the interests and needs of society. Therefore, when Arab/Muslim conceptualizations are compared with a broad Western conflict resolution framework, religion and society are better accommodated, most notably by conflict transformation/spiritual approach spearheaded by John Paul Lederach. By way of summary, although there are some cross-cultural divergences concerning how conflict resolution is conceptualized in the scholarly literature, most of the lexicon and theory we analyzed confirms that Arab/Muslim and Western traditions share an increased degree of parallels than has been acknowledged by previous comparisons.

Reinforcing this conclusion, cross-cultural similarities are equally observable when we examine laypersons' understanding of conflict resolution using our samples. Although our question set pertaining to conceptualizations of conflict resolution in general suffers from low levels of reliability, and, consequently, should be retested, our data suggests there are multiple parallels across our samples. Among them, we discovered a majority from our U.S. and Iraq samples believes that all conflicts should be resolved. Another notable parallel is that both samples perceive a process of conflict resolution has limited capability at the interstate level. More precisely, slight majorities from both samples believe that nonviolent coexistence is the most probable outcome than positive peace. Despite the limited projected outcome, an overwhelming number of respondents from both samples optimistically proclaim that two countries involved in war can, and should, improve their deconstructive relationship. Hence, most of our respondents value, and endorse, conflict resolution, but measure their expectations pertaining to the projected degree to which a conflict at this level will be resolved. We deduce that our respondents believe that conflict management or resolution is the most probable outcome at the interstate level, and that few perceive conflict transformation, namely the development of positive peace, is likely. Once again, there are more similarities than differences in the way that our samples perceive conflict resolution.

Following our comparative review of terminology and concepts associated with conflict resolution, we dedicated our attention to qualifying and comparing numerous interconnected principles and tools advanced across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures. Maintaining our

comparative methodology, we utilized a literature review and the questionnaire to make theoretical comparisons. During our cross-cultural comparative analysis of the literature, we introduced and examined principles including: peacemaking and negotiations; truth; justice; arbitration; amnesty and forgiveness; empowerment and consultation; dialogue; third party intervention; deeds; collectively beneficial solutions; compensation/restitution; balance; and flexibility. Additional principles mentioned by Arab/Muslim scholars, and (in)directly denoted in the Western literature that were considered include: honor, dignity, respect, individual rights, accountability, forgiveness and religion. Arab/Muslim scholars embrace those outline, and further hypothesize they are applicable at all levels of conflict resolution in the Arab/Muslim tradition. By comparison, Western scholars either directly, or indirectly, make a similar assertion in most instances.

Thus, our comparison of the literature found that most principles just listed are shared across cultures, yet there are some incongruities. The most noteworthy exceptions are two fundamental principles prioritized in Arab/Muslim traditions, namely religion and forgiveness. As mentioned previously, these are subject to criticism by some Western scholars when applied at the intrastate and interstate levels. Hence, the tendency for some Western scholars to minimize the importance of "religion" and criticize the inclusion of "forgiveness" in conflict resolution, once again stands as important divergences across these cultures. Nevertheless, we again refer back to the spiritual approach, since it better accommodates both religion and forgiveness at all levels of application. Accordingly, we determine that Western and Arab/Muslim scholars largely embrace most principles evaluated, with the Western spiritual approach repeatedly minimizing or eliminating cross-cultural discontinuity when it is factored into the Western comparative framework.

From this point, we conduct a preliminary evaluation to determine the applicability of conflict resolution principles in the Arab/Muslim context at the higher levels, since there are no practices or theories directly associated with intrastate or interstate conflict resolution. We double-check applicability by briefly examining three cases of transitional justice/national reconciliation programs implemented in predominantly Arab/Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa. In particular, we examined the programs administered in Morocco, Algeria and Iraq. Our review was designed to test whether some principles and practices predominantly applied at the community level are applicable at the higher levels. Our brief analysis demonstrates that Arab/Muslim principles and practices utilized at the community level seem to transfer to the intrastate level, as Arab/Muslim scholars hypothesize. Most

prominently, we found that the populations in the three case studies analyzed prioritized truth, justice, restitution, mercy and a balancing of those mechanisms.

With the Arab/Muslim theory of transferability validated, analysis reverts to micro level comparisons appropriating our survey samples. Among laypersons, we tested the relevance of a selection of principles extracted from the literature review. We found that among sixteen principles evaluated, including: honor; dignity; respect; satisfaction of interests; satisfaction of the needs; protection of individual rights; appropriate compensation; consultation; listening to the “other”; mutual benefit; acceptable practices; justice; truth; accountability; forgiveness; and religion, only the principle of religion was rejected by our U.S. sample when conceptualizing conflict resolution between two countries. Nonetheless, while our sample of U.S. laypersons rejected religion as a principle of conflict resolution at the interstate level, a clear majority of those same respondents endorsed forgiveness as a principle. Nevertheless, our convenience sample of laypersons from the U.S. and Iraq embraces a plurality of the sixteen principles reviewed, which corresponds to our conclusion that Arab/Muslim and Western scholarly theory share many principles.

Subsequent to determining there are notable cross-cultural parallels in conflict resolution principles as articulated in the literature and expressed by our convenience samples, we measured cross-cultural comparability concerning conflict resolution tools across these entities. During our literature review, we comparatively analyzed mechanisms including: negotiations, dialogue and consultation, third-party intervention, education and empowerment. We likewise measured retributive mechanisms, for example, vetting, arbitration and trials, and restorative techniques, including truth seeking, amnesty, and restitution, to name a few. The literature analyzed demonstrates that the practices themselves are generally acceptable at the community, intrastate and interstate levels across Western and Arab/Muslim cultures. Nevertheless, there are some noticeable variations in how certain tools are implemented in a given culture. To summarize, most tools evaluated are shared, but consideration should be given when implementing practices to ensure cultural interests and needs are accommodated. We recommend consultation, careful selection and perhaps modifications of the practices deployed to ensure interests and needs are met.

Similar conclusions are drawn when we examine our samples of laypersons. When evaluating the acceptability of some conflict resolution mechanisms at the interstate level among our samples, we concentrated on: government inquiries, consultation of the population, cultural exchanges, international tribunals, apology, security cooperation, truth commissions, economic cooperation, third party intervention, positive media coverage, political cooperation

and reparations. The mixture of mechanisms allows us to test various approaches. Overall, we find that a clear majority of respondents from our U.S. and Iraq samples support a plurality of the practices examined in general, and again for resolving the conflict relationship between the United States and Iraq. Among the collection of mechanisms, the only tool rejected by our U.S. sample, in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations, is an apology, while the U.S. sample is polarized on the use of reparations to advance conflict resolution between the United States and Iraq. By comparison, our Iraq sample only rejects a U.S. government inquiry.

Nevertheless, since our survey qualifies laypersons' opinion of the applicability of mechanisms at the interstate level in a general sense, and in the case of U.S.-Iraq relations, we can deduce that respondents are not rejecting the mechanisms, but rather their use in the context of contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. More specifically, our U.S. sample espouses reparations and apology in general to resolve conflict between two countries, and only perceives a U.S. apology to Iraq is inappropriate. Likewise, our Iraq sample supports an Iraq government inquiry into the 2003 War, but rejects a U.S. inquiry. This finding suggests that it is not the mechanism being rejected but rather the U.S. utilization of the mechanism. Therefore, all of the mechanisms analyzed in our survey research for resolving conflicts at the interstate level in general are perceived as accepted across our convenience samples. Once more, a clear majority of the practices for resolving conflict are embraced across Arab/Muslim and Western culture according to our literature review and survey research.

Our combination of literature review and survey research, therefore, suggests there is a higher degree of cross-cultural compatibility across Western and Arab/Muslim scholarship, when conceptualizing conflict resolution, namely at the intrastate and interstate levels, than generally acknowledged in the literature. Our testing of numerous working hypotheses proves this theory. Revisiting our hypotheses, hypothesis two projected that Western and Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict resolution, as articulated by scholars in the respective literature, would generally converge when a broad understanding of conflict resolution is applied. We found that lexicon, principles and practices do largely converge when a wide Western framework is utilized. As a consequence, we conclude that Arab/Muslim scholars' previous narrow comparisons have marginalized some Western approaches, since we qualify an increased degree of convergences from the literature when the social-psychological and spiritual approaches are factored into the comparative equation.

Correspondingly, at the micro level, we equally qualified a high degree of cross-cultural agreement when conflict resolution is considered at the interstate level among our group of laypersons. Our questionnaire proves this through the measuring of four additional

hypotheses. In particular, we found that a majority of respondents from our U.S. and Iraq convenience samples embrace sixteen conflict resolution principles (Hypothesis 3), while a majority embraces thirteen tools for resolving conflict, at the interstate level, in general terms (Hypothesis 4). Our research focus then shifted to the perceived necessity of pursuing conflict resolution to improve contemporary U.S.-Iraq relations. In this case, a majority of respondents from our samples agree that conflict resolution between the two countries is necessary (Hypothesis 5). Afterward, and building upon our findings from Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4, we evaluate which mechanisms our survey respondents support in the context of improving U.S.-Iraq relations. As expected, a majority of thirteen conflict resolution techniques were approved by a majority of our respondents as a means of altering the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations (Hypothesis 6). Hence, our comparative research, consisting of a literature review and a questionnaire targeting a sample of laypersons, demonstrates there are many parallels in how conflict and conflict resolution are conceptualized across cultures and entities, and ubiquitous accord in the principles and tools deemed viable for transforming conflict between two countries.

Our combined findings, contradict the common Arab/Muslim assessment that Western conflict resolution theory and practice is incompatible and unacceptable. Contradicting the critiques frequently leveled, we determine that "Western" practices are not "at cross-purposes" or "unacceptable" to all Arab/Muslims scholars or laypersons. While the existing Arab/Muslim critique might be applicable when contemplating conflict resolution at the community level with the Western structural approach, our literature review and questionnaire indicates that perceptions of conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels are more comparability across cultures than usually accredited. We are able to qualify a higher degree of similarities because Arab/Muslim scholars hitherto have failed to holistically analyze Western conceptualizations of conflict resolution, and rather limit their comparisons to Arab/Muslim community approaches with the Western structural approach. This practice crudely reduces three Western approaches to one, which in turn, overstates cross-cultural convergences.

We have demonstrated that, on the one hand, there are three Western approaches to conflict resolution which must be considered when comparatively analyzing. In this frame, it was demonstrated that the social-psychological and spiritual approaches are more comparable with Arab/Muslim principles and practices. On the other hand, Arab/Muslim scholars frequently compare different levels, since the Arab/Muslim approach is predominantly practiced at the community level, with the Western structural approach, which is

predominantly practiced at the higher level. However, our use of samples and concentration of questioning focused at resolving conflict between two countries shows that the Iraq sample not only recognize there are differences between how conflicts at the lower and higher levels can be dealt with, but it equally indicates that they share similar understandings of conflict and conflict resolution with our U.S. respondents when contemplating conflict at the higher levels. This latter finding suggests that Arab/Muslim critiques should be reconsidered as we find significantly higher degree of compatibility at the higher levels than they acknowledge.

We wish to be, nonetheless, cautious in our assertions. Although our literature review and survey research qualifies an increased degree of cross-cultural compatibility between Western and Arab/Muslim theory and practice, we do not wish to over-exaggerate commonalities deduced subsequent to a literature review of a limited number of Arab/Muslim resources in the English language, or through a small, non-representative sample of survey respondents. Contrary, we will later recommend that further research be conducted to better qualify similarities and divergences. At this juncture, we simply wish to emphasize that the gradation of cross-cultural similarities qualified in this research is higher than generally acknowledged by Arab/Muslim scholars' hitherto. In this frame, the degree of criticism and outright rejection of Western theory, principles and practices by Arab/Muslim scholars, we believe, is inflated when conceptualizations of conflict resolution are compared at the higher levels, and all Western approaches are considered. Thus, we hypothesize that Arab/Muslim scholars inappropriately reduce Western theory to the structural approach, and thereby misrepresent the degree of potential compatibility when comparing cross-cultural approaches at the intrastate or interstate levels.

That said, we equally and emphatically state that this research should not be interpreted as suggesting that Western conflict resolution standards and practices should be prioritized or imposed. Contrary, we renounce such activities in theory and practice. Rather than promoting Western standards, we wish to demonstrate that the potential for traversing cross-cultural divergences across Arab/Muslim and Western cultures is greater than previously articulated. Hence, this research and its associated findings are not designed to thrust Western theory and practices to the forefront of conflict resolution discourse, or marginalize alternative approaches by emphasizing cross-cultural commonalities and acceptance among Arab/Muslim scholars and/or laypersons. Instead, we simply want to expose the increased potential for bridging cultural approaches at the intrastate and interstate levels and to encourage discourse and research to determine asymmetrical, mutually acceptable approaches for resolving conflict between these two cultures.

The high potential of bridging cross-cultural differences in the case of Arab/Muslim and Western traditions, we believe, is evidenced in the qualified sharing of general principles and tools across scholarly literature and our research samples. In practical terms, virtually all of the principles and tools we analyzed are shared, while there are some cross-cultural discrepancies in how certain tools are implemented. Because principles and practices fundamentally correspond in theory, we believe that establishing methodological convergence across cultures can be facilitated if emphasis is placed on respective commonalities rather than divergences, the latter of which has been the standard in previous comparative analyses. For instance, we believe that Western rejection of the principle of religion, a fundamental divergence according to Arab/Muslim scholars, could be tempered by diminishing direct reference to religious dogma and faith, and instead concentrating on associated, fundamental and cross-culturally acceptable faith-based principles, including forgiveness, justice, and truth. In this instance, direct reference to religion could be modulated while, while Islamic values are respected and maintained. Succinctly, it is our belief that accentuating jointly embraced principles, and the inherent flexibility in the conflict resolution approaches in both cultures, is a more effective strategy for discovering mutually acceptable cross-cultural techniques, than over-emphasizing incompatibilities and cultural divergences. While the latter naturally must be contemplated and accommodated, they seem a counterproductive manner in which to begin cross-cultural discourse on how conflict across these cultures can be resolved.

When examining discourse on potential tools and principles for designing mutually acceptable approaches, Lederach's elicitive style is pertinent because it aims to monopolize upon local customs, values and norms. Moreover, the elicitive approach seeks to discover or create relevant and mutually acceptable techniques that accommodate cross-cultural needs and desires, while advancing constructive relationships. In pursuit of acceptable practices, we recommend further comparative (survey) research, theoretical debate, and dialogue, to more deeply probe and qualify cross-cultural conceptualizations. Through these processes, it will be possible to increasingly identify similarities and differences between Arab/Muslim and Western conflict resolution conceptualizations and practices at the higher level.

Therefore, we recommend that more thorough research be conducted to better qualify how scholars and laypersons conceptualize conflict resolution across Arab/Muslim and Western cultures, and by default, to (re-) evaluate the degree of cross-cultural compatibility qualified by our research and that produced by its predecessors'. Ideally, we encourage collaborative qualitative and quantitative research between Arab/Muslim and Western scholars, to both deepen and broaden our findings. Cross-cultural collaboration would fill two theoretical

weaknesses found in the present research. First, collaboration would allow scholarly and religious literature in the Arabic language, to be incorporated into the comparative analysis. This practice would enhance theoretical understanding of Arab/Muslim conceptualizations of conflict resolution in their native tongue. In this manner, the Arab/Muslim conflict resolution framework could be more appropriately and holistically represented. Second, cross-cultural collaboration would allow survey research to be conducted in Arabic and/or other relevant languages, eliminating the necessity to survey in a second language. Incorporation of alternative languages would simultaneously foster acquisition of representative research samples at the micro and/or macro levels. It is, therefore, our recommendation that collaborative, supplementary research be conducted to enhance our understanding of conflict resolution as articulated by scholars, in addition to querying representative samples of laypersons (at the micro and/or macro levels), to acquire more insight into how U.S./Western and Iraq/Arab/Muslim scholars and laypersons conceptualize conflict resolution at the intrastate and interstate levels. From large-scale, collaborative research, a more precise framework of convergences and divergences could be constructed at the macro and/or micro levels.

This research recommendation affords us the opportunity to close the present research by revisiting the driving force of our thesis, namely resolving the protracted conflictual relationship between the United States and Iraq. Our research demonstrated that this conflict, which has affected both societies, is rooted in policy and identity. For this reason, we believe that conflict resolution should be pursued between the two countries at the societal level. Our survey research qualifies general support for a conflict resolution program across our U.S. and Iraq convenience samples. It equally qualifies a high degree of support for the same principles and tools in this context.

While some efforts have been made to transform relations following the 2003 War and occupation, there are three fundamental problems with the program implemented hitherto. First, attention has been limited primarily to transforming relationships at the structural level. Unfortunately, such efforts have marginalized principles such as truth seeking or justice as advocated across cultures by our literature review and our sample of laypersons. Moreover, the approach implemented hitherto has not placed focus on transforming bilateral societal perceptions and relationships. The second problem is that societal consultation has not taken place, so the tools implemented thus far are valuable for improving structural relations, but we believe that focus should be shifted onto societal perceptions, needs and desires. Third, a

serious pursuit of conflict resolution in this case will require U.S. policy change, since U.S. foreign policy is a harbinger of conflict resolution as articulated in the body of the thesis.

Consequently, we believe that more needs to be done to minimize or eliminate existing animosity and grievances accumulated at the societal level following the protracted conflict relations between the United States and Iraq. Our cross-cultural analysis of scholarly literature, buttressed by our micro level survey research, indicates that conflict resolution is necessary and possible. Optimistically, this thesis simultaneously suggests that there are many shared conflict resolution principles and tools across U.S. and Iraq culture, and we believe these similarities should be further explored and implemented.

The timing of this call appears to be appropriate. Some of Bar-Siman-Tov's prerequisites for conflict resolution have been met in the case of U.S.-Iraq relations. Foremost, the conflict has been terminated. In fact, several years have passed since the end of occupation, which scholars suggest allows opinions of the "other" to soften. Second, some joint structures have been designed and are operating, such as the JCCs. Many of these target the structural level, but some are implemented at the societal level. These could be vital foundations upon which further structures could be established and institutionalized. Third, there seems to be some popular support for the program. Our convenience samples are open to conflict resolution in this instance, although we recommend a representative sample be surveyed to verify our findings.

Concerning the other remaining prerequisites, more research would have to be conducted to qualify which prerequisites both societies believe are important, and evaluate if they have or have not been achieved. Among them, the contemporary climate or environment might be appropriate, but would have to be confirmed. One obvious challenge to the environment is the operation of Islamic State in Iraq, and internal sectarian-political divisions, which may make the environment uncongenial. More specifically, improved bilateral relations with the United States may not be a priority of Iraqis at the moment. Accordingly, it might be more appropriate to postpone consideration for exploring conflict resolution until the threat from IS has been eliminated, and Iraq manages to stabilize politically and socially. While unfortunate, an additional waiting period would allow more time for positions to soften, and more time for continued structural cooperation whereby amity can be deepened.

Similarly, the prerequisite of leaders/facilitators, we believe, was ideal early in Barack Obama's presidency, and we perceived he had the essential qualities to advance conflict resolution. However, the window of opportunity is rapidly closing. A new U.S. administration is scheduled to be elected in 2016, which suggests that the current administration does not

have ample time to explore and institutionalize a campaign. At the time of writing, it is unclear who will succeed the current administration, and, therefore, it is impossible to predict how Iraqis will perceive them. Consequently, evaluations of the leadership in both Iraq and the United States will have to occur to determine if they are perceived as acceptable and legitimate for advancing conflict resolution, in both Iraq and the United States. Naturally, this means that we have to see who is elected U.S. president.

With several prerequisites addressed, we offer two recommendations associated with the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations. First, we endorse comprehensive, representative research in the United States and Iraq to further qualify openness to such a program, and to increase our understanding of associated principles and practices each society deems appropriate for bilateral conflict resolution. The value of such research would not only inform bilateral U.S.-Iraq relations, but would likewise provide substantial theoretical and practical insight into macro level cross-cultural conceptualizations of conflict resolution at the interstate level. Such research, ideally, might serve as a framework for establishing and enhancing symmetrical relationship between the United States and Iraq. Failure to consult and meet the needs of affected stakeholders, as emphasized in our literature review and our case studies, is expected to compromise the effectiveness of any program due to its inability to garner popular support and participation, or meet collective needs.

Second, we recommend the United States articulate and pursue a foreign policy congenial to resolving conflict with Iraq at the structural and societal level. One fundamental component of any resolution program must be behavioral change on the part of the United States. Behavioral change is mandatory to reverse years of distrust, and because actions are an esteemed principle in Arab/Muslim culture. As Barack Obama experienced, conciliatory rhetoric alone is insufficient for changing perceptions in the Middle East, let alone for generating trust and improving relations. Contrary, deeds must accentuate and reinforce rhetoric if conflict resolution and/or cognitive transformation are going to occur. Therefore, we believe the U.S. government should undertake an objective review of U.S. geopolitical policies and aspirations in the Middle East, and establish a non-violent foreign policy influenced by a knowledge of, and serious consideration for, domestic and foreign public opinion, as a means of advancing conflict resolution.

Locating a nonviolent foreign policy will require symmetrical dialogue and compromise on both sides. Establishing relational symmetry, and finding mutually acceptable compromise, necessitates respecting diverse goals, priorities and opinions, and designing foreign relations and policy around such nuances, even when they contrast or are at cross-purposes with those

of the United States or Iraq government. To make the necessary changes and compromises, the United States government needs to appreciate the systemic and complex nature of relationships, and responding in accordance. The United States will be required to engage Iraq and the Middle East on multiple fronts simultaneously, because singular, or focused policy changes are unlikely to produce results. It will equally have to engage other countries as equals, whereby they are given an opportunity to express their interests and needs. These conditions necessitate that the United States government alter its perceptions, become more flexible and accommodative in its policies and approach, and concentrate on long-term U.S. objectives rather than pursuing immediate, self-gratifying dividends that produce frustration and grievance among inhabitants of the Middle East.

In our opinion, Barack Obama's conciliatory movement toward Cuba was notably a symmetrical and bold policy change, breaking a long-standing cycle of enmity by thinking outside the box and acting accordingly. Considering the United States has isolated and sanctioned Cuba for fifty years, we think that Obama's actions in this instance represents a prime example of how conflict resolution with Iraq could be approached. More specifically, Obama's policy reversal with Cuba was "novel" and "irrevocable", borrowing Long and Brecke's terminology. It appears that he is committed to improving relations, and is following up his initial move toward Cuba with corresponding, reinforcing maneuvers. Such activity is necessary to sustain the momentum, change opinions and build trust over time. We, therefore, recommend a similar approach in U.S.-Iraq relations, which might pay significant dividends over the long-term. Since many of the prerequisites denoted in the literature have been met, bold and novel actions by a respected leader could instigate a program that alters the quality of U.S.-Iraq relations, not just at the structural level, but also at the societal level in both countries.

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Appendix 1: Tools of Conflict Resolution

During the course of our research, conflict resolution tools were extracted from the literature. The techniques contained herein, while not exhaustive and difficult to categorize due to their comparable and overlapping nature, have been implemented at the intrastate and interstate. For simplicity's sake, these tools are listed alphabetically. Citations in the present appendix are available in the "Sources" section above.

adjudication Adjudication is a judicial process presided over by a judge/decision-maker who offers a verdict that can be legally enforced (Fry, 2000: 336). West's Encyclopedia of American Law (1998) claims that all parties involved are permitted to submit evidence and present their arguments. "Its objective is to reach a reasonable settlement of the controversy at hand. A decision is rendered by an impartial, passive fact finder, usually a judge, jury, or administrative tribunal" (West's Encyclopedia of American Law, 1998). Once the case has been presented and a decision issued, the litigants are expected to abide by the ruling.

aid/assistance Former adversaries can offer assistance to a former belligerent as a means of demonstrating their desire to cultivate a new relationship (Kriesberg, 2004: 100). Assistance can be extended in multiple forms, including financial (loans or grants), expertise (including institution building), humanitarian or otherwise (Wilmer, 1998: 7). For example, the United States has assisted Iraq, offering loans, expertise and humanitarian assistance during and after the occupation.

amnesty Judicial amnesty can be granted to perpetrators of wrongdoing under certain conditions as a means of conflict resolution (Gibson, 2002: 540; Long and Brecke, 2003: 71-72). Some scholars advocate their utility claiming amnesties are sometimes necessary to advance transformation despite its apparent contradictions with the provision of justice (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 5-44). Amnesties are

especially pertinent in instances where prosecution is not possible or desired especially when the depth and breadth of actors involved and wrongdoing perpetrated is immense in scale (Gibson, 2002: 540-544).

The degree of amnesty extended to perpetrators can vary. It can range from full, near total or partial amnesty and can be introduced at any stage of the conflict resolution process (Long and Brecke, 2003: 71). Nevertheless, the literature recommends balancing the provision of justice with the granting of amnesty since individuals affected by violence often demand that justice be served (Anderlini and others, 2004: 1; Skaar, 2013: 83-85). Through a balancing of these principles, a wider range of needs can be met while avoiding the extreme perceptions that justice is either being disproportionately applied or impunity is prevailing. Albeit, Long and Brecke (2003: 71-72) optimistically assert, "people appear able to tolerate a substantial amount of injustice wrought by amnesty in the name of social peace." This quote suggests that society will accept injustice when it is perceived to advance peace.

apologies

Through the extension of an apology, wrongdoing is acknowledged and the confession serves as a step toward altering previous behavior and admitting its unacceptability (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 29; Rouhana, 2004: 34). Shriver (1995: 138) suggests that, "As a political people, we would be better served by politicians who confessed our collective sins once in a while, even when our sins are enmeshed in the sins of others." Hence, Shriver believes that politicians do not use apologies frequently enough.

Apologies can be official or unofficial, and extended by high-ranking public officials or proffered at lower levels (R. Fisher, 2001b: 27). Although sincerity is subject to interpretation, if properly timed and convincingly enacted, an apology is thought a very useful tool (Ross, 2004: 206). President Bill Clinton's expression of regret to Uganda for the slave trade is one example of a high-ranking U.S. official (nearly) apologizing (Avruch, 2010: 41; Gibney and Roxstrom, 2001:

913). At the individual level, a former U.S. Marine apologized for his actions and those of his comrades who served at Guantánamo Bay detention facility (BBC News, 2010a). This apology was passed on directly to two former British nationals who had been held captive and later released from the facility (BBC News, 2010a). Not all scholars endorse the use of apologies as a way of reconciling. Galtung (2001: 7-8) is critical of apology since it neither deals with the origins of the conflict nor offers more than words to those who have suffered.

arbitration Some countries have used arbitration to solve ongoing disputes. In arbitration, litigants present their case to a third party, or an arbitrator, who does not have the power to enforce its decision (Fry, 2000: 336; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 277). Thus litigants agree to voluntarily abide by the decision passed down (Fry, 2000: 336; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 277). Honduras and El Salvador turned to the International Court of Justice in 1987 to arbitrate a border dispute whose verdict was passed down in 1992 (Long and Brecke, 2003: 109).

archiving testimonies and wrongdoing Archiving the wrongs committed is an intrinsic aspect of conflict resolution for two reasons. First, it gives voice to those which otherwise may have been silenced. Second, it provides a personal and historical account of the past (Opgenhaffen and Freeman, 2005: 2-3; Urschel, 2005). Stated differently, suffering is provided an outlet and the truth is recounted when victims' experiences are documented and preserved (Opgenhaffen and Freeman, 2005: 2-3). Morocco, for example, established a database containing the testimony of thousands of victims of the "years of lead" as part of its national reconciliation campaign (Opgenhaffen and Freeman, 2005: 2-3).

art, dance and music The arts can be used in multiple ways to transform relationships, whether through increased cultural understanding or expression of feelings (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 34; C. Cohen, 2004: 3-53; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 347-351). The expressiveness of the

arts is thought constructive and therapeutic (Urschel, 2005). Art, as conflict resolution, can be promoted through individual or joint exhibitions or projects (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 33-34). Urschel (2005), for instance, denotes the Samputu-Ingeli Dance Troupe in Rwanda that contained dancers from the three main ethnic groups of Rwanda (Hutu, Tutsi and Twa). This team traveled the country performing together as a means of building cooperation following genocide (Urschel, 2005). The arts have likewise been utilized in other post-conflict settings including Timor-Leste, Morocco, Peru (Sarkin, 2008: 25) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Zelizer, 2003: 62-75).

asking for forgiveness

An acknowledgment of wrongdoing and/or a request for forgiveness for wrongdoing can be made as a means of advancing conflict resolution (Hermann, 2004: 45-46; Lederach, 1997). Similar to an apology, the request is perceived to demonstrate regret while simultaneously admitting that wrongs were committed (Hermann, 2004: 45-46). Nevertheless, whether or not forgiveness is granted rests entirely on those who have been wronged (Bar-On, 2004: 247-248). It was demonstrated in the body of our thesis that forgiveness is perceived as a mode of empowerment in Arab/Muslim culture.

awards, scholarships and educational exchanges

Financial assistance through awards and scholarships can be offered to students to promote and assist student exchanges, through internships, awards or research scholarships that promote exchanges and institutionalizes cooperation (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 34; Kriesberg, 2004: 98). The implementation of these tools not only ensures a regular exchange of individuals and ideas and increases cross-cultural awareness and interaction, but also acts as a symbolic gesture of cooperation and invitation to the "other" (Kriesberg, 2004: 98, 104). For example, joint summer camps that bringing diverse groups together could be established to promote awareness and interaction across groups (Urschel, 2005). In such camps, a safe and controlled environment congenial to advancing education, awareness, interaction and entertainment can be established (Urschel, 2005). Such programs are suggested to overwrite preconceived

misconceptions and stereotypes of the "other" through regular and prolonged cooperative interaction that proliferates trust and mutual understanding (Urschel, 2005). However, in the case of Northern Ireland, this type of "contact work had little impact" on changing mutual attitudes or increasing understanding between Protestants and Catholics (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 28).

ceremonies and rituals

Various cultures have unique means of dealing with social issues, expressing grief or triumph, and these activities can be incorporated into conflict resolution (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 75; Galtung, 2001: 3-4). Conducting such rituals and ceremonies are proposed useful for rooting transformation in a target community and aiding in the process of restoration or healing of society through the experience itself and by giving the community a stake in what occurs (Long and Brecke, 2003: 57). Long and Brecke (2003: 57) provide the example of traditional healing techniques utilized by local leaders in rural communities in Mozambique to purify and appease past transgressions.

criminal trials

Criminal trials are retributive justice techniques designed to punish wrongdoers for the crimes they committed (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 30; Worthington, 2006: 248). Through the prosecution of criminals, a measure of faith in the system of justice is restored to individuals and communities who have suffered as a result of wrongdoing (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 30; Worthington, 2006: 248). Scholars counsel retributive justice be implemented while adhering to principles including transparency, proportionality and balance (Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1062-1065; Stover and others, 2005: 836-856). Argentina used public trials in 1985-1986 for crimes committed during the "Dirty War" by Argentina's military and police (Long and Brecke, 2003: 45).

economic cooperation

Linking countries or communities together economically has proven a very popular and effective means of uniting former adversaries throughout history (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 25). As economic

inter-dependence develops, the likelihood of conflict is projected to recede since war thereafter would be economically deconstructive (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 25). Europe was economically united following the termination of World War II as a means of unifying former enemies and this arrangement transmogrified into the institution of the European Union (Buzan and others, 1998: 54-64).

entertainment and sports

Various types of entertainment and sports can be utilized to bring former conflicting parties together (Dae-seok, 2002: 107-113; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 351-356). From music concerts to scrimmage sports competitions, these events provide an opportunity for illustrating the possibility of interaction in an atmosphere controlled by sportsmanship, rules and a common interest (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 351-356). North and South Korea have played soccer matches against one another on several occasions, respectively altering venues in the capital cities of Pyongyang and Seoul (Dae-seok, 2002: 107-113).

establishing channels of communication

The creation of a formal channel where (former) belligerents maintain immediate contact ensures that upper-level communication is always possible and readily available (Donohue, 2009: 447-448; Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 37-38; Rosoux, 2009: 544). Its potential usefulness is obvious in critical situations where the ability to communicate in real-time reduces the probability of one or both belligerents misinterpreting the actions of the other, which reduces the likelihood a misinterpretation leads to an inappropriate rise in tension or escalation of violence (Saunders, 2009: 386-388). For example, direct phone communication between the United States and the Soviet Union was established during the Cold War to demonstrate a commitment to dialogue and to provide a vital connection between the two countries during times of tension (Saunders, 2009: 386-388).

exchange of representatives (structural level)	Former belligerents can exchange representatives from countless institutions, including political, military, education, culture or religion, as a way of promoting dialogue, understanding, interaction and confidence through organized and sustained interaction (Rosoux, 2009: 546-548). These exchanges also permit adversaries to share expertise, assist one another, or collaborate to solve common problems (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 37-38; Rosoux, 2009: 544). Over time, understanding, respect and cooperation are fostered as these exchanges endure and are institutionalized (Rosoux, 2009: 546-548). Germany and France have regularly exchanged representatives across diverse fields, including politics, economics and education since the 1963 signing of the Élysée Treaty (Goethe Institut, 2009).
face-to-face encounters of civilians/veterans	Face-to-face encounters of former belligerents can occur through the initiative of one member who decides to make contact, or can be facilitated by third parties (Ropers, 2003: 5). These encounters generally occur many years subsequent to the end of a conflict (Ropers, 2003: 5). Their overall purpose is to promote dialogue and understanding among participants at a non-official level (Ropers, 2003: 5). For instance, some U.S. military veterans who served in Vietnam later re-visited the country to encounter their former adversaries as an act of healing (Calloway, 1996: 124).
films and documentaries	Films have the potential to document or educate and are useful for advancing conflict resolution and transformation (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31). They likewise increase the opportunity for reaching a wider audience, through screening for audiences in established cinemas or the use of traveling cinemas. For instance, Cynthia Connop (2007) produced a documentary called "Bloodlines" which traces the meeting of a descendant of a Nazi leader with a descendant of a Holocaust survivor. Similarly, Beth Davenport and Elizabeth Mandel directed "Pushing the Elephant," a story of Rose Mapendo and her family's experience in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1990s (Independent Television Service, 2011). In Iraq, USIP circulated a film produced by York Zimmerman and Peter

Ackerman titled "Confronting The Truth: Truth Commissions and Societies in Transition" as a means of promoting popular awareness of truth commissions (Sterling, 2009). The latter film was designed to educate viewers about the value and functionality of truth commissions with the hope of encouraging popular support for a similar program in Iraq as part of a national reconciliation program (Sterling, 2009).

formal agreements or treaties

Formal agreements or peace treaties are structural tools that formally signal the end of hostilities and extend recognition to the "other" by default (Long and Brecke, 2003: 89). Treaties or agreements likewise formally and publicly illustrate a change in the *status quo* relationship is desired and/or underway (Long and Brecke, 2003: 89). Among such treaties, one could include weapons reduction treaties, treaties of recognition, and so forth (Rosoux, 2009: 544). Such formal agreements are common between states, for example the peace treaty signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979 (Long and Brecke, 2003: 89).

gestures of solidarity

There are instances where former conflicting parties make public gestures, for example, through the expression of shared grief with the "other" to advance conflict resolution (Dynkin, 2010). Such gestures demonstrate mutual support, solidarity and sympathy. Russia's designation of April 12, 2010 as a national day of mourning following the death of Poland's President and other representatives in a plane crash in Russia on April 10, 2010 serves as an example (Dynkin, 2010). This action was well received by the Polish community and immediately followed Russia's acknowledgment of atrocities in a joint commemoration of the 1940 massacre of 22,000 Polish troops in Katyn (BBC News, 2010b; Gentle, 2010; New Poland Express, 2010: 1-2).

good governance and accountability

Accountability and good governance, especially in the case of transitional justice, are necessary following conflict to demonstrate a government's commitment to transformation through measures such

as abandoning previous policies of marginalization or repressive behavior (Bächler, 2004: 2-18; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 131-132). Other demonstrations of good governance or accountability include the re-institution of democratic instruments, the reinstatement of a state constitution if it had been suspended under dictatorship or military *coup*, the restructuring or reformation of organizations or structures to ensure representativeness, justice and equality (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 131-132). Such undertakings illustrate a government's commitment to effect change and thereby elevates popular trust in the new governing institutions and their representatives (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 131-132). Accountability and good governance measures were used in both Eritrea and Ethiopia (Bächler, 2004: 8).

holding (new) elections

Conducting elections following intrastate conflict allows political representatives to illustrate their willingness to submit to the will of constituents (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 24), and are thereby catalysts for advancing transitional justice in post-conflict settings (Sarkin, 2008: 17). Holding new elections permits constituents a voice in two manners. First, they can choose representatives, and second, they can decide which topics are of politically, economically and socially relevant by voting accordingly (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 24). Elections were effectively used in Angola in 1991 and Mozambique in 1992 following intrastate conflict (López-Pintor, 1997: 43).

international tribunals

International tribunals are distributive justice mechanisms where high-ranking security officials or politicians are brought to trial for human rights violations committed under their direction (Kriesberg, 2004: 99; Méndez, 2001: 25). High-level prosecutions are thought to reinforce internationally accepted standards and practices, for example international human rights law, and to deter future events (Kaminski and others, 2006: 295-296; Kriesberg, 2004: 99; Méndez, 2001: 25-26). Nevertheless, international tribunals are not without their critics. According to Minow, tribunals do not reconcile victims

with perpetrators but provide punishment (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 68). Consequently, the process is sometimes deemed counterproductive for restoring relationships (Brants and Klep, 2013: 40; Méndez, 2001: 27-28). Equally these institutions favor Western theory and practices when implementing justice, thereby marginalizing indigenous alternatives (Sharp, 2013: 161-165). The trial of Slobodan Milosevic for his responsibility for crimes against humanity at the Hague, Netherlands is one example of an international tribunal (Malek, 2005; Worthington, 2006: 265).

joint institutions Joint institutions are designed to increase and institutionalize regular, bilateral interaction at the social and structural levels (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66; Horstkotte, 2009; Rosoux, 2009: 544). These can be implemented at the structural and societal levels (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66; Horstkotte, 2009; Rosoux, 2009: 544). Their aim is to enhance interdependence, cooperation and provide a forum for exchanging and discussing ideas (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 66; Rosoux, 2009: 544). Ideally, their construction and utilization will institutionalize cooperation and erode negative perceptions and distrust (Boulding, 1978: 50; Worthington, 2006: 266). The German-Poland Institute, for example, promotes literature from Poland in the German language as an instrument of increasing German understanding and appreciation of culture in Poland (Horstkotte, 2009).

joint memorial or ceremonies Former adversaries can jointly commemorate a given day or action as a means of illustrating cooperation (Liebes and Katz, 1996: 235-257). In general, both groups can mourn or celebrate in unison, expressing a common perception of a given event (Liebes and Katz, 1996: 235-257). History is replete with joint commemorations that had a positive impact on the trajectory of post-war relationships. For instance, German chancellor Willie Brandt's attendance of the 1970 Memorial Day celebration of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising became a landmark event when Brandt fell to his knees during the ceremony

(Long and Brecke, 2003: 98).

Not all scholars agree that commemoration ceremonies are beneficial for conflict resolution. Marcus Hawel (2007), for example, argues that reification is counterproductive because these practices "do not contain true history and do not penetrate into consciousness, but contribute to forgetting and neglect." Hence, Hawel perceives such events as constructed realities that diminish historical occurrences. This, he argues, is because the ceremony occurs in political, social and economic isolation, and thereby is limited in scope and capacity (Hawel, 2007).

joint or hybrid tribunals

Joint tribunals consist of international and domestic judges who jointly conduct hearings and render verdicts (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 17-18). The combination of internal and external legal representatives is hypothesized to enhance the legitimacy and fairness of the trials, as well as ensure the observation of both domestic and international legal norms (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 17-18). They are also hypothesized capable of "build[ing] the institutional capacity of local judiciaries and thereby strengthen the rule of law" (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 17-18). It is likewise suggested that the practice promotes the perception of impartiality, though it is doubtful that impartiality can be guaranteed in every instance (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004: 17-18). Joint tribunals were utilized in several countries including Sierra Leone, Iraq, and East Timor subsequent to intrastate conflict (Gloppen, 2005: 25).

joint (reconstruction) projects

In the aftermath of violence, establishing joint projects to reconstruct what has been devastated by violence is a way of signaling an end to hostilities and a commitment to a constructive future (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 68; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 33; Rosoux, 2009: 546). By establishing working relationships, on reconstruction or other projects, the short-term goal of institutionalizing positive interaction is developed while the long-term objective of ameliorating mutual trust is fostered (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 33; Galtung, 2001: 16;

Rosoux, 2009: 546). While lives and communities are rebuilt, and cooperation and assistance rendered, perceptions of the "other" are challenged through the experience of working together to achieve common objectives (Rosoux, 2009: 546).

legislative admission of wrongdoing The act of legislatively confessing to wrongdoing signals a change in the way that a country's government views past actions, notably by accepting responsibility for wrongdoing whereupon conflict resolution can advance (Ropers, 2003: 3). In 2010, Serbia's parliament passed a resolution that acknowledged the 1995 Srebrenica massacre (BBC News, 2010c). While the resolution failed to recognize the atrocity as genocide, the action was an extraordinary step toward acknowledging Serbia's military forces had perpetrated a massacre (BBC News, 2010c).

media The importance of the media (newspaper, radio, television, and internet) in modern society is recognizable, with these tools being capable of informing and mobilizing the masses to violence (such as in Rwanda) or peace (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 32; Long and Brecke, 2003: 68; Price and others, 2009: 1-20; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 285; Rifkind and Picco, 2014: 227). Media's versatility and popularity suggest it is a valuable tool for promoting conflict resolution (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 285). Properly timed, adapted and conveyed messages (symbolic, visual and audio), for instance, are capable of raising awareness, altering perceptions and advancing constructive relationships and behavior (Liebes and Katz, 1996: 235-257). The media was used to broadcast and promote truth and reconciliation in South Africa (Verdoolaege, 2005: 190-196).

memorials and monuments Monuments serve as a reminder of the past, and a place where patrons can visit to come to terms with historical events through emotions such as grieving (Gloppen, 2005: 38; Marschall, 2004: 78-80; Stover and others, 2005: 853). Scholars likewise argue that "recognition and acknowledgement" are intrinsic to individual and collective transformation, although the theory is subject to debate in

the literature (Marschall, 2004: 79-82). Accordingly, monument and memorials can symbolize the events for which they were constructed. The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin, Germany, is a monument that honors the victims of the Holocaust and stands as a reminder to the world of the atrocities committed by Nazi German forces during World War II (Public Broadcast Service, 2005).

military signaling This broad category of techniques include activity that illustrates a military threat has been reduced or is nonexistent (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 16). Signals include the demobilization of the armed forces, weapons reduction, the abandonment or withdrawal of the military from contentious area or the creation of buffer zones (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 16; Rosoux, 2009: 544). Such signaling reduces the perceived threat to an adversary and demonstrates the political will to develop peaceful coexistence, which can lead to increased cooperation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 77). Disarmament and demobilization of forces was one component of post-conflict transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was a process designed to reduce mutual threat (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 500).

modifying the educational curriculum Students can be conditioned or taught to hold specific deconstructive beliefs because of a given education curriculum (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 26-28; Jackson, 2009: 183; Stover and others, 2005: 853). Hence, education can purposefully be deployed to reinforce national myths, beliefs and stereotypes, which increases the probability of a continuation of deconstructive thoughts and behavior (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 26-27; Keranen, 2014: 130-132). For example, violence committed by the in-group may be excluded from the curriculum while the wrongdoing of an “enemy” emphasized (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 26). For these reasons, adaptations of education curriculum should be objectively evaluated and altered to undermine conflict continuation (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 26-28). Similarly, Worthington (2006: 266) recommends including educational courses on peacemakers as heroes, rather than

the tendency to elevate war heroes.

museums Museums can be dedicated to peace (Marschall, 2004: 78; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 347-348; Stover and others, 2005: 853). In such facilities, patrons can learn about peace events, peacemakers and so forth. Peace museums are thereby viable substitutes to the glorification of violence (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 348). Japan's Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museums, for example, raises awareness of the U.S.'s use of the atomic bomb against Japan and the destructiveness of nuclear weapons (Mehdi, 2005: 116).

mutual recognition Since conflict often results in the denial of the "other's" existence or humanity, reversing these tendencies are invaluable tools for improving relationships (Kelman, 2004: 122). Mutual acknowledge is, therefore, considered an intrinsic step in (re-) humanizing a former enemy (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 19; Hermann, 2004: 46; Kelman, 2004: 122; Kriesberg, 2004: 103). Recognition includes acts of accommodating the "other's" pain and their right to exist (Kriesberg, 2004: 103). Recognition can be expressed in numerous ways, such as through a leader's speech, via a state visit or a piece of legislation (Kriesberg, 2004: 103). Germany and Czech Republic, for example, mutually codified their acknowledgment of wrongdoing during and after World War II in the 1997 Czech German Declaration on Mutual Relations and Their Future Development (Rosoux, 2009: 546). This document addressed outstanding mutual concerns and grievances, and extended mutual apologies for wrongs perpetrated (Rosoux, 2009: 546).

official (state) visits Official visits are salient political statement of acknowledgment of the other and they demonstrate a willingness to engage in dialogue at the structural level (Liebes and Katz, 1996: 235-257; Long and Brecke, 2003: 89-90). For instance, Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel in 1997 not only legitimized Israel in the eyes of Egypt's leader, albeit by default, it likewise illustrated Sadat's political commitment to

improved relations (Liebes and Katz, 1996: 235-257; Long and Brecke, 2003: 89-90). That the political maneuver was out of step with regional public sentiment is demonstrated by the controversy that Sadat's visit sparked in Egypt and throughout the Middle East (Long and Brecke, 2003: 89-90). The event was, nonetheless, a landmark visit that advanced conflict resolution.

opening archives and records

As part of restoring trust through the promotion of truth, opening classified government archives is one practice a government can implement to demonstrate their commitment to truth and/or justice (Rosoux, 2009: 554). The value of revealing classified information that would otherwise have remained beyond public view precipitates the emergence of truth and allows issues to be discussed and processed publicly (Rosoux, 2009: 554). Opening archives and records likewise signals a commitment to transparency and can build public confidence (Rosoux, 2009: 554). Scholars recommended archives be opened in eastern Europe subsequent to the demise of the communist bloc as a means of coming to terms with events that occurred under communism (Gábor Tóth, 2010: 2, 23-24).

opening borders

Opening borders or frontiers to allow the free movement of individuals is another mode of extending acknowledgment, increasing cooperation (economic, security, political), raising cultural awareness and advancing conflict transformation (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 16). By allowing individuals to reciprocally move across borders, individuals are afforded an opportunity to travel, visit relatives, or interact with the "other," whereby confidence can be constructed (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 16). North and South Korea have opened their borders to allow families to unite.

parks

In some instances, territory has been set aside geographically to serve as a reminder of conflict, or as a location of physical or emotional restoration (Stover and others, 2005: 853; van Amerom and Büscher, 2005: 1-24). Such places can take the form of a public park, national wildlife refuge or sanctuaries (Fischer, 2007: 195; van Amerom and

Büscher, 2005: 7-8). In some instances, disputed territory has been converted into neutral or shared property, for instance as a national park (Fischer, 2007: 195; van Amerom and Büscher, 2005: 7-8). This practice, for example, was utilized to end a border dispute between Ecuador and Peru in 1998 (Fischer, 2007: 195; van Amerom and Büscher, 2005: 7-8) and between Africa and Botswana in May 2000 (van Amerom and Büscher, 2005: 7-8).

peace education Peace education is a peacebuilding practice designed to stimulate non-violence through the establishment of a curriculum of peace. A peace curriculum imparts values and conflict resolution techniques, which ideally promotes a culture of peace (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 75; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31; Danesh, 2006: 55-78; Hinds and Oliver, 2009; Jackson, 2009: 183; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 226; Stover and others, 2005: 853). Peace education can be included into a standard educational curriculum and can target students of all ages (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31; Hinds and Oliver, 2009; Jackson, 2009: 183; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 226; Stover and others, 2005: 853). By way of example, UNICEF implemented peace education in Lebanon and Rwanda's standard educational framework (Maynard, 1997: 215).

peaceful partition Partition or demarcation of territory is an option for improving conflict relations centered on territorial disputes (Matejova, 2014: 60-76; Tir, 2005: 713). Partitions can be approved as a means of avoiding or resolving violent conflict, and is thereby a means of addressing ethnic differences, or a desire for economic, political or ethnic autonomy (Tir, 2005: 714-715). However, partition does not guarantee long-term stability as conflict over territory or other issues could re-surface (Tir, 2005: 721). Among numerous examples, former Czechoslovakia's peacefully division into Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992 under mutually acceptable terms serves as an example (Matejova, 2014: 60; Tir, 2005: 713, 738-739).

political cooperation States and communities can cooperate politically, whereby bonds are

created and trust built (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 5; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15). Structural cooperation can include regular meetings between heads of state or other representatives, political assistance, dialogue and a number of other cooperative measures (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 5; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15). These acts increase structural ties, promote political collaboration and simultaneously build trust at the structural level (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 5; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 15). The Strategic Framework Agreement (2008) between the United States and Iraq includes political cooperation as a component.

promoting religious and cultural awareness

Promoting cultural and religious awareness between parties at the structural and grassroots levels is a broad technique helpful for bridging gaps and countering misconceptions (Lederach, 1995: 12). General awareness can be raised through education, public seminars and other outlets, providing individuals an opportunity to experience and understand the "other" (Lederach, 1995: 12). Numerous mechanisms can be used to promote awareness, from the arts and media to educational exchange programs.

reform of legal and political systems

Legal and political reform is essential to institutionalizing conflict resolution for multiple reasons (Adelman, 2005: 302; Bloomfield, 2006: 9; Crocker, 2003: 53). On the one hand, reform can be used to extend legal protection to minority groups previously denied such safeguards (Kriesberg, 2004: 105). In other cases, legal reform might include the writing, or the re-institution, of preexisting legislation (Bargal and Sivan, 2004: 143). On the other hand, manifestations could include the reduction of executive power, or the introduction of power sharing arrangements within a governing framework (Kriesberg, 2004: 104-105; Rouhana, 2004: 39). Ultimately, reform should: ensure the rights of all stakeholders; hold political leadership accountable; empower the marginalized; and alleviate excessive abuse of power (Kriesberg, 2004: 104-105). Morocco undertook modest legal reforms to re-brand itself (Slyomovics, 2001: 18).

refraining

The act of halting or refusing to continue certain acts or rituals is a means of demonstrating a willingness to transform relations. For instance, Shriver (1995: 5) informs his readers that Ulysses S. Grant halted Union soldiers from commencing with their celebratory gun salute following the end of the U.S. Civil War. Grant asked union soldiers to refrain from this common ritual out of respect to their southern comrades who, following the war, were once again considered members of the United States of America (Shriver, 1995: 5). It is challenging to identify unless on is familiar with the culture and norms of a given society.

regular (joint) meetings

Political leaders and other state representatives (or institutions) can establish regular meetings with counterparts to discuss topics, resolve issues, hold workshops, or even exchange information (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 32-33). Through institutionalized regularity, these groups or institutions have the opportunity to work together on a wide range of issues for an extended period of time (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 32-33). Interaction allows for the exchange of ideas, encourages the formation of working partnerships, and serves to demonstration that regular, positive interaction among the parties is not only possible, but can be mutually beneficial (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 32-33). Germany and France, for instance, held joint cabinet meetings as a manner of promoting reconciliation (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 15).

releasing (political/war) prisoners

The liberation of political prisoners is another measure of indicating a government's willingness to reverse its former policies and/or demonstrate a disposition toward transitional justice and/or reconciliation (Long and Brecke, 2003: 40). Releasing political prisoners signifies the importance of the "other" by allowing their reintegration into politics and society (Long and Brecke, 2003: 40). Simultaneously, the act demonstrates that these individuals (and their supporters) are no longer viewed as an existential threat (Long and Brecke, 2003: 40). Under French pressure, for example, the government of Chad released political prisoners in 1971 to promote

national reconciliation in the aftermath of decades of civil strife (Long and Brecke, 2003: 40). The act can likewise occur between countries when prisoners of war are released or exchanged (Kriesberg, 2004: 82). Prisoner release was utilized by Britain as a conflict resolution tool in Ireland during “The Troubles” (Lundy and McGovern, 2001: 29).

restitution/ reparations

Reparations or compensation can be paid to victims on multiple levels and are hypothesized to restore “the identity and good name of the victim” (Long and Brecke, 2003: 69). A government can pay restitution to its citizens, or to those of another country, for wrongs committed (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 30; Goschler, 2007; Kriesberg, 2004: 100; Rosoux, 2009: 546). Reparations need not come simply in the form of financial payment (Gloppen, 2005: 38; Stover and others, 2005: 853). Rather, they can take the form of improved education, access to health services or even physical or psychological rehabilitation (Gloppen, 2005: 38).

However, the literature identifies many disadvantages with the payment of restitution. Foremost, reparations raise complex questions such as “who should pay what to whom under which conditions” (Lerche, 2000). Next, reparations may not be acceptable in certain contexts (Galtung, 2001: 6-7). More specifically, victims may deem reparations inappropriate (an unacceptable form of punishment) or the act may be interpreted as insincere or a means of purchasing forgiveness (Galtung, 2001: 6-7). Thus, Galtung (2001: 6-7) asserts that victims must want reparations and “the act must convey the correct symbolic message.” Germany paid reparations to Israel for confiscating Jewish property in the 1930s and 1940s and for the suffering caused by the Holocaust (Goschler, 2007).

reviewing and/or rewriting text books

To prove an objective education to students, textbooks can be reviewed or rewritten, removing potential content that promotes imbalanced historical accounts or glorifies the in-group *vis-à-vis* the out-group (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 26-27; Stover and others, 2005:

853). Such revisions performed singularly or jointly, can undermine preexisting stereotypes and national myths that may attribute to conflict continuation (Hinds and Oliver, 2009: 26-27). Germany, France and Poland worked together after World War II to produce school textbooks that balanced what students were taught about in-group and out-group history and culture (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 1-19; Höpken, 2004).

re-writing history There is more than one version of history as Mona Sue Weissmark found when she brought adult children of Holocaust survivors and Nazi soldiers together (Worthington, 2006: 259-260). According to Weissmark, both victims and perpetrators construct their own versions of history often creating conflicting accounts (Worthington, 2006: 259-260). Accordingly, scholars advocate writing a common history to facilitate conflict resolution by minimizing or eliminating the proliferation of two competing versions of history (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31; Jackson, 2009: 183). Through collective effort, referents can determine and produce a common history that represents a unified view of the past (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 31; Jackson, 2009: 183). The German-Czech Historians Commission (*Deutsch-Tschechische Historiker-kommission*) is one example of bilateral coordination for rewriting history (Gardner Feldman, 2008: 9).

security cooperation Former conflicting parties can partner in the pursuit of mutual security interests (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 5). Ideally, over time, this type of cooperation will increase mutual trust and cooperation between former belligerents (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004: 5). Security cooperation was a cornerstone of post-World War II European cooperation as European states worked together under the auspice of NATO against the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Bloc (Wallensteen, 2007: 255).

special courts Special courts can be temporarily established for the purposes of providing justice within a given time and context (Schabas, 2004: 3-

5; Triponel, 2007: 296-315). Ideally, these special courts will combine existing traditional justice and restorative justice systems to provide a holistic approach between retributive and restorative techniques (Triponel, 2007: 296-315). One example of a special court was established in Sierra Leone in 2002 (Schabas, 2004: 4-5; Triponel, 2007: 297). Its legal jurisdiction was restricted by design and limited in size and scope, which meant that it could only prosecute a limited number of defendants (Triponel, 2007: 296-315).

symbolic restoration

Gloppen (2005: 38) identifies "symbolic restoration" as one means of transforming relationships. These include gestures which range from changing street names to reinstating or recognizing suppressed languages or formerly prohibited cultural practices (Alcock, 2001: 1-5). Symbolic restoration was implemented in South Tirol in 1946 following the De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement, which reversed the suppression of the German language and culture in South Tirol (Alcock, 2001: 4-5).

theatre and storytelling

Rustom Bharucha (2001: 3763-3773) argues that theatre and storytelling are empowering practices. Theatre or storytelling, like films and other expressions of art, is suggested to provide a safe forum for dealing with post-conflict issues and sometimes affords the viewers and/or participants the opportunity to confront the past and express their feelings about what has occurred (Bharucha, 2001: 3763-3773; C. Cohen, 2004: 1-53; Galtung, 2001: 3-4; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 349-351). In certain cases, participants are permitted to take control and perhaps even hypothetically alter outcomes by adapting a story or play to produce a more positive outcome (Bharucha, 2001: 3763-3773). Theatre has been used as a conflict resolution tool in countries including South Africa, India and the United States (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 351).

third party intervention (NGOs/IGOs/ etc.)

Third parties often become involved in conflicts that do not involve them, or may not pertain to them, for the sake of promoting peace and stability (R. Fisher, 2001a: 4-23). For instance, a neighboring

country may decide to work with two belligerents to bring about an end to hostilities. Equally probable, a regional body (for instance the European Union) or an international body (the United Nations) may become engaged as a third party (R. Fisher, 2001a: 4-23). In general terms, third party involvement can be useful for encouraging referents to pursue conflict resolution by providing political assistance or incentives and/or by providing a venue or mediating body which permits dialogue to begin (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 33; R. Fisher, 2001a: 4-23).

Third parties can become involved in conflict resolution at many levels (grassroots, structural) and can provide innumerable resources (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 33; R. Fisher, 2001a: 4). For instance, they can broker peace arrangements, oversee their implementation and monitor reconciliation projects and their progression (R. Fisher, 2001a: 4). Third parties can likewise provide necessary resources and expertise to assist referents, and can thereby increase the probability that resolution is achieved (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 33; R. Fisher, 2001a: 15). Numerous third parties, including NGOs and IGOs, became involved in Iraq during the occupation, trying to advance national reconciliation (Sarkin and Sensibaugh, 2009: 1034, 1061; Stover and others, 2005: 841).

traditional methods / practices

Traditional methods are indigenous conflict resolution practices that have a long and respected traditional history within a given community (Gloppen, 2005: 38; Sarkin, 2008: 23). These processes are familiar to the community, have the potential to increase the "cohesiveness" of community members, and their utilization can encourage popular participation and increase program legitimacy (Sarkin, 2008: 23). In this manner, any outcome achieved through the utilization of traditional techniques is more likely to be endorsed by the general public. Sarkin (2008: 23) suggests these practices can use retributive or restorative justice, and hence could include concessions such as an apology, reparations, or other tools according to community norms and tradition (Kriesberg, 2004: 100-103).

Rwanda used the *gacaca*, which means grass(roots) (Buckeye, 2010: 46) or people’s trial, to supplement modern judicial practices following the April 1994 genocide (Gloppen, 2005: 25; Sarkin, 2008: 24; Sharp, 2013: 166). However, the international community expressed outrage at their use claiming that it was insufficient for providing justice in light of the atrocities committed (Gloppen, 2005: 25; Sarkin, 2008: 24; Sharp, 2013: 166-167). Nevertheless, scholars argue that traditional practices, if accepted by the affected community at large, offer viable tools of restoring society and acting as a point from which relationships can be re-structured (Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 257).

travel and tourism Tourism allows individuals to confront, experience and celebrate diversity, and has the potential to alter perspectives (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 34; Boulding, 1978: 63). Since diverse individuals meet and interact, previously held (mis-) conceptions can be challenged and adapted from first-hand experience (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 34; Lederach, 1995: 12). Travel and tourism also establish an economic connection between formerly conflicting parties, creating economic interdependence (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 34). The United Kingdom and Argentina lifted a travel ban to the Falkland/Malvinas Island in 1999 as an expression of reconciliation following military conflict over the Island in early 1982 (Long and Brecke, 2003: 102-103).

truth commissions A substantial amount of ink has been spilled on truth commissions as a transitional mechanism in post-conflict settings (Brahm, 2004; Chapman, 2007: 52; Hayner, 1994; Sarkin, 2008: 19-20). Chapman (2007: 52) defines a truth commission as “temporary, usually official bodies, vested with the responsibility to investigate the causes and sources of the violence and human rights abuses.” Goschler (2007) goes on to emphasize these temporary investigative bodies, “[a]s a rule, […] serve as an alternative to the criminal persecution of former perpetrators.” Hence, truth commissions commonly adopt a median approach between broad amnesty and retributive justice (Brants and

Klep, 2013: 38; Ramsbotham and others, 2011: 252-253; Schabas, 2004: 8).

Gibson (2006: 428) summarizes that a truth commission aids in the societal re-conceptualization of a conflict through the use of "strict condemnation of all who violate universal human rights standards but without extensive prosecution." In short, wrongdoing is condemned but not necessarily punished harshly. Similarly, Michael Humphrey (2005: 203-220) and Randall Coyne (2005: 19) suggest that truth commissions refocus public attention and energy away from retribution and onto reconciliation. Long and Brecke (2003: 68), nonetheless, emphasize the paradoxical implications of truth telling, particularly its value for promoting truth and forgiveness *vis-á-vis* its potential for creating further caveats among adversaries and thereby prolonging or re-activating conflict.

The objectives of a truth commission include exploring the past, documenting human rights abuses and (sometimes) punishing those determined responsible (Avruch, 2010: 34; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 29; Brahm, 2007: 10-25; Chapman, 2007: 51-69). However, the depth of their mandate varies (Humphrey, 2005: 203-220; Skaar, 2013: 76). Upon completion, a truth commission's findings and/or recommendations are released to the government or public (Brahm, 2007: 22-25). While processes diverge, Everett Worthington (2006: 265) summarizes the processes of the TRC in South Africa in three phases: victims told their story, amnesty hearings were held, and reparations were distributed.

vetting government

Confidence may be restored in governing institutions and leadership if vetting, also referred to as lustration, occurs to remove former elites responsible for wrongdoing from office and limiting their eligibility for holding office in future (Gloppen, 2005: 25-26). Vetting, as utilized here, includes judicial reviews of political leaders and their temporary or permanent removal from office for wrongful activity including corruption or advancement of violence (Gloppen, 2005: 25-26). Following their removal from office, criminal trials

may be pursued to ensure accountability and justice (Gloppen, 2005: 25-26). Vetting occurred in Greece (1975) and Argentina (1983) as part of transitional justice programs (Goschler, 2007).

workshops, dialogue and training programs

Some scholars view workshops, dialogue projects and training programs as modes of establishing contact and raising mutual awareness in a controlled environment (R. Fisher, 2001b: 29; Lederach, 1995: 48-62; Maoz, 2000: 721-726; Ropers, 2003: 2-12). Morton Deutsch (2005: 18) summarizes “training programs seek to instill the attitudes, knowledge, and skills which are conducive to effective, cooperative problem solving and to discourage the attitudes and habitual responses which give rise to win–lose struggles.” These events can be prescriptive, where knowledge and skills are imparted, or through an elicitive approach, where participants actively participate and contribute to the process (Lederach, 1995).

These mechanisms usually unite representatives from the various sides in an official or non-official capacity for dialogue, discussion, confidence building or skills training (Ropers, 2003: 1). One problem with workshops is their targeting of high- and mid-level public officials and marginalization of society (Galtung, 2001: 17). However, they have been utilized at the grassroots level as a means of coping with individual and collective trauma (Bharucha, 2001: 3763-3773; Montville, 1999). Another problem is that the process tends to be prolonged and time-consuming, therefore, it “does not provide quick solutions” (Estrada-Hollenback, 2001: 79). These techniques have been used in the Palestine-Israel context, for example (Lumsden, 1996: 36-66).

Appendix 2: Questionnaire/Log Book

This survey explores how people perceive popular methods of improving international relationships following a military conflict between two states. Your participation in this study is very important for making cultural comparisons. The questions below will ask for your opinion on certain terms, values and concepts of conflict resolution. You will also be asked to rate various social and political methods or practices often used for improving relationships between two states following a conflict. Your responses are completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 20 minutes to complete. Please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

1. As a U.S. citizen, did you work or serve in Iraq at any time between April 2003 and December 2011? (**U.S. Respondents ONLY**)

Yes 1 ☐ (Answer only the "a" questions in this section)

2a. Which type of employer did you work/serve for in Iraq?

- the U.S. military ☐ 1
- the U.S. diplomatic service ☐ 2
- a private U.S. company ☐ 3
- an international organization ☐ 4
- as an independent or freelancer ☐ 5
- other (specify)

3a. For about how many months in total were you in Iraq?

- 1-3 months ☐ 1
- 4-8 months ☐ 2
- 9-12 months ☐ 3
- 13-16 months ☐ 4
- 17 months or more ☐ 5

No 0 ☐ (Answer only the "b" questions in this section)

2b. If you have not personally worked/served in Iraq, did one of your immediate family members (a parent, a child, or a sister or brother) work in Iraq (in the military or as a civilian) between April 2003 and December 2011?

Yes 1 ☐

No 0 ☐ **Go to question 4.**

3b. For about how many months did your family member work in Iraq?

- 1-3 months ☐ 1
- 4-8 months ☐ 2
- 9-12 months ☐ 3
- 13-16 months ☐ 4
- 17 months or more ☐ 5

(BEGIN QUESTIONS FOR IRAQ AND U.S. RESPONDENTS)

The next set of questions asks for your general opinion. Please carefully read the questions and mark the answer that best expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	Always Disagree	Mostly disagree	Sometimes Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Sometimes Agree	Mostly Agree	Always Agree
4	Religion is a very important influencer in my everyday life	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6	All conflicts can be resolved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7	All conflicts should be resolved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

The following questions concern your view of conflict. Please read the questions carefully and answer whether you believe the statement to be false, mostly false, undecided, mostly true or true.

	When thinking about conflict, do you believe…?	Always False	Mostly False	Sometimes False	Unsure	Sometimes True	Mostly True	Always True
8	Conflicts only affect those individuals directly involved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9	Conflicts can produce positive benefits	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10	Conflicts between people are normal	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11	Conflict cannot be prevented	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12	Conflicts should be avoided	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13	Conflicts are always violent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14	Conflicts can be nonviolent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15	A conflict between two people has the same characteristics as a conflict between two countries	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

For the purposes of this survey, *conflict resolution* is broadly defined as an action taken to end a conflict and improve the relationship between former adversaries. Please read the following statements and mark the most appropriate answer according to your opinion of reconciliation.

	When thinking about conflict resolution, do you believe…?	Always False	Mostly False	Sometimes False	Unsure	Sometimes True	Mostly True	Always True
16	All conflict relationships can be resolved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17	Religious values must guide conflict resolution	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18	Only violent relationships must be resolved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19	Nonviolent conflict relationships must be resolved	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20	Nonviolent coexistence is more probable than peace when resolving violent relations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21	Showing forgiveness is essential to resolve conflict	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22	Two countries involved in war can improve their relationship	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
23	Reconciled relationships are synonymous with peaceful relationships	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Using the scale, please indicate how important or unimportant you believe the following methods are for resolving a conflict in general. “0” indicates that they are “unimportant” for resolving conflict, “5” indicates a “neutral” effect and “10” indicates they are “very important.”

	In general, how would you rate the following principles for reconciling relations after a conflict…?	Unimportant 0					Neutral 5	Very important 10				
24	honor	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
25	dignity	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
26	respect	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
27	satisfaction of interests of those involved	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
28	satisfaction of the needs of those involved	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
29	protection of individual rights of those involved	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
30	appropriate compensation given to those who suffered	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
31	getting the opinions of those involved	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
32	listening to the “other”/adversary	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
33	mutual benefit to those involved	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
34	the use of practices acceptable to those involved	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
35	justice	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
36	truth	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
37	accountability	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
38	forgiveness	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
39	religion	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

The next section deals with resolving conflict between two countries. Using the scale, please indicate how useful or un-useful you believe the following methods are for improving relations following a conflict between two countries "0" indicates that they are "very un-useful" for improving relations, "5" indicates a "neutral" effect and "10" indicates they are "very useful." Brief definitions of each method are provided.

	How would you rate the following mechamisms…?	Very un-useful 0					5	Very useful 10				
40	**Third party intervention** (another country or organization steps in to help two states find ways to improve relations between the two countries)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
41	**Security cooperation** (two states agree to work together to increase their security)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
42	**Political cooperation** (two states agree to work together politically, for example by holding joint political meetings to discuss issues important to both states)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
43	**Reparation payments** (state A pays compensation to citizens of state B who have been wrongfully harmed or injured as a result of state A's previous action)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
44	**Court** (or judicial) **proceedings** (criminal wrongdoing is prosecuted according to state or international law and punishment is passed down if guilt is determined)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
45	**Public apology** (One or more representatives publicly apologize for wrongs committed against another group)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
46	**Economic cooperation** (two states agree to work together economically as a way to improve relations and increase economic dependency on one another)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
47	**Truth telling** (a process where individuals who have committed wrongdoing are asked to tell the truth [admit wrongdoing] before a committee in exchange for amnesty or reduced sentences)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
48	**Cultural exchanges** (provides an opportunity for individuals to work, study or travel to another country for a period of time to learn about other cultures)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
49	**Positive media coverage** of the other state (more positive news, reports and documentaries should be given on a country to increase public awareness)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
50	**Empowerment** (allowing the people involved to decide on how reconciliation is pursued)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

In the last part of this survey, you are asked to turn your attention to Iraq-U.S. relations. The first set of questions asks about the effects of the war and occupation. The next questions ask for your opinion about how conflict resolution between the U.S. and Iraq could hypothetically be pursued. Carefully read and answer each question.

		Definitely not	Probably not	Unsure	Probably yes	Definitely yes
51a	Do you believe that the 2003-2011, invasion and occupation of Iraq affected U.S. citizens' opinion of Iraqis?	1	2	3	4	5
52a	Do you think that the 2003-2011 invasion and occupation of Iraq affected Iraqis' opinion of U.S. citizens?	1	2	3	4	5

		Negative 0	1	2	3	4	Neutral 5	6	7	8	9	Positive 10
51b	How would you rate the affect this event had on U.S. citizens' opinion of Iraqis…?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
52b	How would you rate the affect this event had on Iraqi opinion of U.S. citizens?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

		Definitely not	Probably not	Unsure	Probably Yes	Definitely yes
53	Do you think that it is necessary for the Iraq and U.S. Governments to reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	1	2	3	4	5
54	Would you support reconciliation between the U.S.-Iraq if a third party proposed it?	1	2	3	4	5
55	Would you support a U.S. government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War?	1	2	3	4	5
56	Would you support an international tribunal to investigate wrongdoing during the 2003 war in Iraq?	1	2	3	4	5
57	Do you think that U.S. politicians should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting U.S.-Iraq policy?	1	2	3	4	5

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations, please rate the following methods according to how acceptable you think they are for improving this relationship. On the scale, "0" means that you find the item "completely unacceptable," "5" that you are "neutral" and "10" that you find it "absolutely acceptable" in context.

	Rate the following mechanisms according to your opinion of their acceptability for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Completely unacceptable "0"					Neutral					Absolutely acceptable "10"
58	… cultural exchanges to increase understanding	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
59	… an international tribunal to investigate wrongdoing	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
60	… a U.S. apology for its actions in Iraq	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
61	… continued security cooperation	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
62	… an Iraq inquiry into the war	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
63	… use of truth commissions to disclose wrongdoing	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
64	… continued economic cooperation	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
65	… third party intervention	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
66	… positive media coverage of the other country	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
67	… increased political cooperation	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
68	… payment of reparations by the U.S. to Iraq	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

(DEMOGRAPHICS)

In this final section you are asked to provide some personal information. The answers that you provide to the following questions will help the researcher to classify the data and make statistical comparisons.

69. What is your gender?

1 Male 0 Female

70. With which race do you identify?

U.S. Respondents:

☐ African American ☐ Native American ☐ Hispanic/Latino

☐ Caucasian ☐ None Other, please specify:

Iraq Respondents:

☐ Arab ☐ Kurdish ☐ Turkoman ☐ Yazidis ☐ Assyrian

☐ Chaldeans ☐ None Other, please specify:

71. How old are you?

☐15-25 ☐ 26-35 ☐ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 or older

72. How many children do you have?

☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 or more

73. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Middle School ☐ High School ☐ Associates Degree ☐ Bachelor

☐ Master ☐ Ph.D.

74. Which religion do you identify with?

☐ None ☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☐ Christianity ☐ Judaism

Other, please specify:

75. Nationality **(IRAQ ONLY)**

76. Questionnaire Language **(IRAQ ONLY – Not a question)**
English (1) German (2) Italian (3)

Appendix 3: Bar Graphs of Responses




view of the conflict (by nation)
Q8
Q9
Q10
Q11
Q12
Q13
Q14
Q15
USA
Iraq
100
50
0
50
100
Percentage
Response
1
2
3
4
5
6
7


conflict resolution (by nation)
Q16
Q17
Q18
Q19
Q20
Q21
Q22
Q23
USA
Iraq
100
50
0
50
100
Percentage
Response
1
2
3
4
5
6
7


methods for resolving a conflict (by nation)
Q24
USA 7% 9% 84%
Iraq 8% 4% 88%
Q25
USA 7% 7% 86%
Iraq 0% 10% 90%
Q26
USA 0% 2% 98%
Iraq 0% 0% 100%
Q27
USA 9% 14% 78%
Iraq 4% 10% 86%
Q28
USA 3% 12% 84%
Iraq 2% 6% 92%
Q29
USA 2% 3% 95%
Iraq 0% 0% 100%
Q30
USA 22% 10% 67%
Iraq 4% 2% 94%
Q31
USA 3% 10% 86%
Iraq 0% 2% 98%
Q32
USA 0% 3% 97%
Iraq 0% 4% 96%
Q33
USA 7% 5% 88%
Iraq 10% 8% 82%
Q34
USA 5% 2% 93%
Iraq 4% 10% 86%
Q35
USA 7% 5% 88%
Iraq 2% 2% 96%
Q36
USA 2% 10% 88%
Iraq 2% 2% 96%
Q37
USA 0% 5% 95%
Iraq 2% 2% 96%
Q38
USA 5% 14% 81%
Iraq 2% 0% 98%
Q39
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Iraq 24% 12% 65%
100 50 0 50 100
Percentage
Response 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10


methods for improving relations (by nation)
Q40
USA 7% 16% 78%
Iraq 6% 10% 84%
Q41
USA 2% 12% 86%
Iraq 0% 4% 96%
Q42
USA 0% 7% 93%
Iraq 0% 4% 96%
Q43
USA 16% 17% 67%
Iraq 8% 4% 88%
Q44
USA 10% 12% 78%
Iraq 6% 0% 94%
Q45
USA 19% 16% 66%
Iraq 4% 6% 90%
Q46
USA 7% 9% 84%
Iraq 8% 4% 88%
Q47
USA 14% 10% 76%
Iraq 2% 8% 90%
Q48
USA 9% 9% 83%
Iraq 2% 2% 96%
Q49
USA 5% 9% 86%
Iraq 6% 6% 88%
Q50
USA 2% 9% 90%
Iraq 2% 12% 86%
100 50 0 50 100
Percentage
Response 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10


effects of war U.S.–Iraq (a) (by nation)
Q51a
USA
5%
10%
84%
Iraq
35%
18%
47%
Q52a
USA
2%
5%
93%
Iraq
29%
16%
55%
Q53
USA
7%
14%
79%
Iraq
12%
25%
63%
Q54
USA
14%
17%
69%
Iraq
16%
27%
57%
Q55
USA
19%
19%
62%
Iraq
25%
25%
49%
Q56
USA
24%
7%
69%
Iraq
2%
20%
78%
Q57
USA
9%
9%
83%
Iraq
8%
16%
76%
100
50
0
50
100
Percentage
Response
1
2
3
4
5



effects of war U.S.−Iraq (b) (by nation)
Q51b
USA
64%
17%
19%
Iraq
41%
35%
24%
Q52b
USA
72%
10%
17%
Iraq
45%
20%
35%
100
50
0
50
100
Percentage
Response
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10



method acceptability for U.S.−Iraq relations (by nation)
Q58
USA 12% 7% 81%
Iraq 2% 2% 96%
Q59
USA 24% 9% 67%
Iraq 2% 6% 92%
Q60
USA 31% 19% 50%
Iraq 6% 4% 90%
Q61
USA 19% 9% 72%
Iraq 6% 10% 84%
Q62
USA 24% 10% 66%
Iraq 4% 18% 78%
Q63
USA 24% 7% 69%
Iraq 2% 2% 96%
Q64
USA 12% 7% 81%
Iraq 6% 8% 86%
Q65
USA 24% 7% 69%
Iraq 16% 16% 69%
Q66
USA 7% 12% 81%
Iraq 4% 12% 84%
Q67
USA 5% 7% 88%
Iraq 6% 10% 84%
Q68
USA 36% 10% 53%
Iraq 0% 4% 96%
100 50 0 50 100
Percentage
Response 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Appendix 4: Contact Log

date	institution	Mode of contact	time	response
May 2, 2013	Iraq University Sulaimani, Kirkuk Main Road Sulaimani, Iraq	info@auis.edu.iq	11:15	no response
May 2, 2013	University of Baghdad	http://www.en.uobaghdad.edu.iq/ contactus.aspx	11:20	no response
May 2, 2013	University of Al-Qadisiyah, Iraq	info@qadissuni.edu.iq	11:25	no response
May 2, 2013,	Salahaddin University College of Postgraduate Studies | Zanko Street | Erbil | Kurdistan Region | Iraq	http://www.suh-edu.com/	11:30	no response
May 12, 2013	Iraqi American Society for Peace, Phoenix	tpaetschow@iaspf.org	16.52	no response
May 12, 2013	Iraqi American Association, Pomona, CA	admin@iraqiamerican.org	16.55	no response
May 12, 2013	Iraqi American Council, Annandale, VA	IRAQ@AL-IRAQ.ORG	16.56	no response
May 12,	Iraqi American Association of North Texas, 13524 Quarry Trace, Euless, TX. 76040	info@iaant.org	16.58	no response

June 8, 2013	Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) 6500 Greenville Avenue, Dallas, TX 75206	Plainfield, Indiana 46168	19.00	no response
May 27, 2013	International Rescue Committee 122 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10168 USA	+1 212 551 3000	9: 45	no response
May 27, 2013	Refugees International (RI), 2001 S Street NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20009,	ri@refugeesinternational.org Phone: 202.828.0110, Fax: 202.828.0819	9:55	no response
May 26, 2013	Collateral Repair project	http://www.collateralrepairproject.org/#!__contactus	10:19	Sasha Crow responded on May 27, 5:20
August 18, 2013	Iraqi Network for Social Media	Iraqi.network.4.social.media@gmail.com	8:48	no response
August 20, 2013	Refugee Action (UK)	refugeeactioninfo@refugee-action.co.uk	12:10	August 20 declining any offer of assistance
August 20, 2013	Refugee Council (UK)	020 7346 6700	12:20	no response
Sept. 4, 2013	Caritas (Italy)	immigrazione@caritasitaliana.it	13:58	no response
Sept. 4, 2013	Associazione delle ONG Italiane	ong@ong.it	13:35	no response

Sept. 4, 2013	International Organization for Migration OIM Ufficio di coordinamento per il Mediterraneo	iomrome@iom.int	14:00	no response
Sept. 4, 2013	Il Quartier Generale dell'OIM è in Svizzera , in Route des Morillons, 17□CH-1211 Ginevra 19	info@iom.int	14:01	no response
Sept. 4, 2013	centro ambrosiano di dialogo con le religioni	cadr@cadr.it	14:03	no response
Sept. 4, 2013	Caritas der Diözese Innsbruck Heiliggeiststraße 16, 6020 Innsbruck	Tel.: (0512) 72 70-0□Fax: (0512) 72 70-5	14:15	left message- no response
Sept. 4, 2013	Islamisches Zentrum Tirol Innsbruck Wilten Andreas-Hofer-Straße 17a	Moussa_shawki@hotmail.com	14:30	no response
Sept. 4, 2013	International Center for Muslim and Non-Muslim Understanding, Australia	http://www.unisa.edu.au/Research/International-Centre-for-Muslim-and-non-Muslim-Understanding/Contact-us/	14:14	no response

Sept. 4, 2013	IslamiCity	www.islamicity.com/support/#All-other	14:21	no response
Sept. 4, 2013	Deutscher Caritasverband e.V., Referat Migration und Integration, Karlstraße 40, 79104 Freiburg	Roberto.Alborino@caritas.de Telefon: 0761/200-375	14:40	no response by phone or email
Sept. 14, 2013	Islamic Society of North America, P.O. Box 38 Plainfield, IN 46168	http://www.isna.net/contact.html	11:05	no response
Sept. 14, 2013	Muslim American Society 1010 W 105th Street Overland Park, KS 66212 Phone: 913-888-5555	Info@MuslimAmericanSociety.org	11:06	no response
Sept. 14, 2013	American Society for the Advancement of Muslims, 475 Riverside Drive Suite 248 New York, NY 10115	Phone: 212-870-2552 Fax: 212-870-2540	11:17	no response to phone call
Oct. 11,	Muslim Student	http://msanational.org/contact/	18:22	no response

2013	Association			
Oct. 11, 2013	Northern Virginia Community College	Karla Vasconez, international student advisor mailto:kvasconez@nvcc.edu	18:56	no response
Oct. 15, 2013	International Catholic Migration	secretariat.be@icmc.net	11:05	no response
Oct. 15, 2013	Caritas Belgium, Brussels,	www.caritas-int.be	11:12	no response
Oct. 15, 2013	Dutch Refugee Council	info@vluchtelingenwerk.nl	11:17	no response
Oct. 15, 2013	Danish Immigration Service	study@us.dk	11:24	no response
Oct. 15, 2013	Refugio	info@refugio-muenchen.de	12.15	no response
Oct. 15, 2013	Caritas DE	info@caritas.de	12.18	no response

Appendix 5: How to Interpret p-values

This provides basic instructions for understanding and interpreting the p-values provided by our R software package. This process is relevant for all of our p-values, regardless if they were generated from the Wilcoxon Rank Sum, Chi Square or the Fisher Exact Test. Recall that the lower the number, the more confident we are that there are differences between response categories being compared. The p-value, however, does not indicate what the difference is or how it manifests.

Example 1.

For our first illustration, we use the p-value from the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test of Question Set 1 from Table 3, on page 562.

- Our p-values returned from the R software package are presented with a whole number. This value needs to be converted to its decimal form to test the null hypothesis. Our value for this example is: **3.587491e-01**
- First we **separate** the p-value **into** its **two parts.** S*ince we are not statisticians, we can likewise reduce the size of the value for our research purposes*. When we reduce the p-value into its two parts, we get: **3.58** (~~7491~~) **e-01**
    - **3.58** = is our value with a whole number, and **e-01** is our **negative exponent**, or (10^{-1}). The latter is necessary to convert the value to its decimal form.
- **Calculate:** $3.58 \times 10^{-1} = 0.358$
- **Compare:** $0.358 > 0.01$ (*threshold of null hypothesis*)
- **Conclude:** The p-value indicates that we are confident there is only slight difference between U.S. and Iraq respondents' answers to the combination of questions included in Question Set 1.

Example 2

This time we refer to the p-value generated from our Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test of Question Set 6b from Table 3, on page 562.

- **Value with a whole number:** 1.996018e-04
- **Separate and calculate:** 1.99 … e-04 (10^{-4}) = 0.000199
- **Compare:** $0.000199 < 0.01$ (threshold of null hypothesis)
- **Conclude:** We are confident that there is a difference in how the compared samples answered the questions in this set.

Appendix 6: Combined Pilot 1-10

Pilot Questions **Pilot Number 1** **Date: Sept. 13, 2010**

Location: Researcher's flat

I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel free to ask questions at any time.

1. What is your nationality? USA

2. Gender: male

3. Age: 22

4. Level of education: high school

5. Ethnicity: white

6. Religion: Christian

7. Is it important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend? Most of the time

8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday life? Very important with good friends. Not so much with others.

9. Are conflicts normal? I suppose.

10. Do you think all conflicts are violent? Maybe. Complicated.

11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive? Both, depends of the goals. Sometime need to fight for what you want.

12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? Both. Like I said.

13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved? Are there solutions? Most of the time I think so.

14. Should a conflict be solved? Yes, it possible.

15. Can a conflict be prevented? In many cases, I think so. Have to work at it.

16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits? Sure. Positive and negative.

17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states? Sort of. They are fighting for something they want...usually someone wins.

18. Do you think that it is *possible* for two states to resolve a conflict after violence? Yes.

19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence? It is probably best.

20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution? Maybe. I guess.

21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation? (requests a definition) No, not very likely.

When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the following methods are for improving relations?

22. showing forgiveness not between states

23. economic aid/assistance very

24. economic cooperation important

25. establishing channels of communication yes, talking is important

26. formal agreements or treaties yeah, normal

27. gestures of solidarity (request definition) not really

28. joint institutions/cooperation (request definition) maybe, but not really

29. joint projects/ reconstruction not useful

30. military signaling not really

31. official state visits no

32. political cooperation yes

33. security cooperation okay

34. apologies no

35. international tribunals yes

36. promoting religious and cultural awareness sometimes

37. restitution/reparations maybe

38. third party intervention maybe

39. truth commissions (request definition) no

40. archiving testimonies (request definition) no

41. granting amnesty no, counterproductive

42. exchange of representatives no

43. face-to-face encounters useless

44. films/documentaries a waste

45. good governance and accountability inside a country, not between

46. joint or hybrid tribunals (request definition) no

47. joint memorials or ceremonies definitely not

48. legislative admission of wrongdoing definitely not

49. opening archives and records (request definition) useless

50. peace education (request definition) no, not for interstate

51. regular joint meetings maybe

52. (re)writing history (request definition) no

53. special courts no

54. theater and storytelling of course not

55. traditional methods (request definition) no

56. travel/tourism good for economy and awareness

57. workshops/dialogue (request definition) maybe

58. positive media coverage might help

59. criminal trials in some cases could be important (NOTE: recommends a likert scale for section)

How important do you think these are to conflict resolution?

60. Honor perhaps

61. dignity sure

62. respect very

63. satisfaction of interests when possible

64. satisfaction of the needs when possible

65. mutual benefit yes, it would help

66. justice important

67. truth important

68. accountability important (NOTE: likert scale)

Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer the following questions.

69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it? Maybe, but I am not sure

70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens? No

71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed? ---

72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens? I don't think so.

73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed? -----

74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you? Not at all

75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government? Pretty important

76. … are to Iraqi citizens? Under occupation, important

77. … are to the U.S. Government? very—why else are we there

78. … are to U.S. citizens? Not at all

79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states? Would be nice, but unrealistic

80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations? Of course

81. Do you think that it is *necessary* for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations? Yes

82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence? maybe

83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence? I think it is.

Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?

84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing? Maybe

85. maintaining economic relations? Not really

86. maintaining political relations? yes

87. establishing channels of communication yes

88. formal agreements or treaties No, it's just paper.

89. gestures of solidarity no

90. joint institutions/cooperation no

91. joint projects/ reconstruction maybe, who pays? Not the US

92. military signaling no

93. official state visits maybe-but that is just meetings, not change much

94. political cooperation yes

95. security cooperation yes

96. apologies no

97. showing forgiveness no

98. international tribunals No, but many states would want this.

99. promote religious and cultural awareness maybe would be useful

100. restitution/reparations Guess Iraq would want, not sure I would want to pay.

101. third party intervention maybe

102. truth commissions might be useful

103. archiving testimonies no

104. granting amnesty no, seems unfair

105. exchange of representatives no

106. face-to-face encounters no, useless

107. films/documentaries useless

108. good governance and accountability useless

109. joint or hybrid tribunals no, but others might want

110. joint memorials or ceremonies no thanks

111. legislative admission of wrongdoing no, congress agreed to go there

112. opening archives and records can't image that happening

113. peace education no

114. regular joint meetings no

115. (re)writing history to say what, no

116. special courts no, too many references to courts (wants to know if I think wrongdoing was committed, the question seems biased)

117. theater and storytelling no

118. traditional methods no

119. travel/tourism no

120. workshops/dialogue no

121. positive media coverage sure

122. criminal trials no, there it is again (LIKERT)

123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting its Middle East policy? They probably should, but the government doesn't ask me. So no.

124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Sure, definitely not war

125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Not at all

126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration? yes

127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations? In an ideal world--definitely

128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War? Should help

129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.? I don't know, maybe

130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War? No, what would they determine...what would it matter. It is done.

131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war? No, they were involved.

Notes: consider giving selection of answers to reduce time needed to complete.

Pilot Questions **Pilot Number 2** **Date: Sept. 16, 2010**

Location: Researcher's flat

I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel free to ask questions at any time.

1. What is your nationality? USA
2. Gender: female
3. Age: 20
4. Level of education: high school
5. Ethnicity: white
6. Religion: Catholic
7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend? yes
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday life? It is. We should be kind to others.
9. Are conflicts normal? Yes, unfortunately.
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent? No, I fight with my sister but we aren't violent..
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive? It is both. Depends on perspective.
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? Negative
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved? If you work at it, yes..
14. Should a conflict be solved? Yes.
15. Can a conflict be prevented? Probably, if you try.
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits? Yes. Compromise.
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states? Yes and no. Broadly sense they share similarities...disagree, want something, sometimes are violent.
18. Do you think that it is *possible* for two states to resolve a conflict after violence? Of course.
19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence? Yes.
20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution? I suppose it might help.

21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation? maybe.

When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the following methods are for improving relations?

22. showing forgiveness kind of important
23. economic aid/assistance important
24. economic cooperation important
25. establishing channels of communication very important
26. formal agreements or treaties important
27. gestures of solidarity (request definition) maybe, not sure
28. joint institutions/cooperation (request definition) perhaps
29. joint projects/ reconstruction sometimes important
30. military signaling (request definition) yes
31. official state visits maybe
32. political cooperation yes
33. security cooperation maybe
34. apologies maybe, but is it real
35. international tribunals maybe
36. promoting religious and cultural awareness yes—could be
37. restitution/reparations sometimes
38. third party intervention maybe
39. truth commissions maybe
40. archiving testimonies (request definition) no
41. granting amnesty could be, but not sure...make others angry
42. exchange of representatives maybe
43. face-to-face encounters not a priority
44. films/documentaries not a priority
45. good governance and accountability maybe

46. joint or hybrid tribunals (request definition) perhaps

47. joint memorials or ceremonies not a priority

48. legislative admission of wrongdoing no

49. opening archives and records (request definition) no

50. peace education (request definition) not a priority

51. regular joint meetings not sure, maybe

52. (re)writing history (request definition) not the most important

53. special courts could be

54. theater and storytelling (request definition) not a priority

55. traditional methods (request definition) not a priority

56. travel/tourism not a priority

57. workshops/dialogue (request definition) could be useful

58. positive media coverage this might be useful

59. criminal trials may be needed (NOTE: recommends scale and definitions)

How important do you think these are to conflict resolution?

60. honor very

61. dignity very

62. respect very

63. satisfaction of interests very

64. satisfaction of the needs very

65. mutual benefit very

66. justice if possible

67. truth important

68. accountability important when possible (NOTE: recommends a rating scale)

Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer the following questions.

69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it? Yes

70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens? No

71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed? ---

72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens? No.

73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed? -----

74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you? Kind of important, we are at war

75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government? Very important

76. . … are to Iraqi citizens? Very important

77. . … are to the U.S. Government? Very. Sadly, not sure reason is positive. Oil.

78. . … are to U.S. citizens? Probably not important

79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states? Yes

80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations? Yes, definitely

81. Do you think that it is *necessary* for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations? Yes

82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence? Yes

83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence? Yes

Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?

84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing? sure

85. maintaining economic relations? yes

86. maintaining political relations? yes

87. establishing channels of communication yes, helps to talk

88. formal agreements or treaties maybe

89. gestures of solidarity no

90. joint institutions/cooperation maybe

91. joint projects/ reconstruction probably, but not sure

92. military signaling maybe

93. official state visits sure

94. political cooperation yes

95. security cooperation yes

96. apologies maybe

97. showing forgiveness maybe but that is a long way off

98. international tribunals maybe

99. promote religious and cultural awareness sure

100. restitution/reparations maybe

101. third party intervention maybe

102. truth commissions maybe

103. archiving testimonies no

104. granting amnesty no

105. exchange of representatives no

106. face-to-face encounters no

107. films/documentaries no-entertainment

108. good governance and accountability not in this case

109. joint or hybrid tribunals no

110. joint memorials or ceremonies no

111. legislative admission of wrongdoing no

112. opening archives and records not useful

113. peace education don't think so, but maybe in the future

114. regular joint meetings no

115. (re)writing history no

116. special courts no

117. theater and storytelling no

118. traditional methods no, don't know enough about it

119. travel/tourism no

120. workshops/dialogue no

121. positive media coverage yes

122. criminal trials maybe (recommends a scale so pilot can rank, too many methods.)

123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting its Middle East policy? Yes

124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Yes

125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Not very. We could live together without forgiving. Idealistic.

126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration? The government should consider public opinion...guess polling does influence some.

127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations? That would be great. But also the government can't always ask the people everything. It's difficult.

128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War? Yes, we should contribute.

129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.? Of course not!

130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War? Maybe, but it doesn't change anything.

131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war? Yes. It should be looked into.

Notes: Pilot emphasizes there are too many methods. Suggests that by eliminating less-recognizable methods, the length of the survey would be reduced as well. Open questions drags the survey process out too long.

Pilot Questions **Pilot Number: 3** **Date: Sept. 16, 2010**

Location: UIBK library

I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel free to ask questions at any time.

1. What is your nationality? USA
2. Gender: female
3. Age: 24
4. Level of education: high school
5. Ethnicity: white
6. Religion: Protestant
7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend? yes
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday life? Important
9. Are conflicts normal? Yes.
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent? No, not always.
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive? Negative I think.
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? Negative
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved? No, probably not.
14. Should a conflict be solved? When possible.
15. Can a conflict be prevented? Sometimes yes.
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits? Maybe, but not often.
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states? In some respects...two parties are at odds and looking out for their interests.
18. Do you think that it is *possible* for two states to resolve a conflict after violence? Yes
19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence? Yes.
20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution? Maybe, but it can cause problems too.
21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation? perhaps

When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the following methods are for improving relations?

22. showing forgiveness not so much – anyway, how would it work?
23. economic aid/assistance somewhat important
24. economic cooperation somewhat important
25. establishing channels of communication sure important
26. formal agreements or treaties can be, but can be broken too
27. gestures of solidarity (request definition) no, just a show
28. joint institutions/cooperation (request definition) no, not really
29. joint projects/ reconstruction could be useful, but not most important
30. military signaling (request definition) no
31. official state visits no
32. political cooperation maybe
33. security cooperation no
34. apologies maybe
35. international tribunals sometimes
36. promoting religious and cultural awareness maybe
37. restitution/reparations maybe
38. third party intervention sometimes
39. truth commissions (request definition) not so much
40. archiving testimonies (request definition) not at all
41. granting amnesty no
42. exchange of representatives not important
43. face-to-face encounters not important
44. films/documentaries not important
45. good governance and accountability no
46. joint or hybrid tribunals (request definition) no

47. joint memorials or ceremonies (request definition) not at all important

48. legislative admission of wrongdoing no

49. opening archives and records (request definition) no

50. peace education (request definition) no

51. regular joint meetings no

52. (re)writing history (request definition) no

53. special courts no

54. theater and storytelling (request definition) no, is this a method?

55. traditional methods (request definition) no, too complicated

56. travel/tourism no

57. workshops/dialogue (request definition) maybe

58. positive media coverage sure

59. criminal trials no (NOTE: requests a scale, definitions, less methods)

How important do you think these are to conflict resolution?

60. honor not so important

61. dignity important

62. respect important

63. satisfaction of interests if you can

64. satisfaction of the needs if possible

65. mutual benefit whenever possible

66. justice important

67. truth sort of important

68. accountability if you can (NOTE: recommends a rating scale with positive and negative range)

Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer the following questions.

69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it? Yes

70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens? Not personally

71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed? ---

72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens? Sort of.

73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed? I feel sorry for them.

74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you? Not at all.

75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government? Really

76. . … are to Iraqi citizens? Maybe

77. . … are to the U.S. Government? Important, they went to war.

78. . … are to U.S. citizens? Not important.

79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states? I wish.

80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations? Yes

81. Do you think that it is *necessary* for the Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations? Yes

82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence? Yes

83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence? Yes

Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?

84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing? maybe

85. maintaining economic relations? yes

86. maintaining political relations? yes

87. establishing channels of communication yes

88. formal agreements or treaties no

89. gestures of solidarity no

90. joint institutions/cooperation maybe

91. joint projects/ reconstruction yes

92. military signaling no

93. official state visits no

94. political cooperation yes

95. security cooperation no

96. apologies no

97. showing forgiveness no

98. international tribunals maybe

99. promote religious and cultural awareness no

100. restitution/reparations maybe not

101. third party intervention maybe

102. truth commissions perhaps

103. archiving testimonies not at all

104. granting amnesty no at all

105. exchange of representatives no

106. face-to-face encounters no

107. films/documentaries no

108. good governance and accountability no

109. joint or hybrid tribunals no

110. joint memorials or ceremonies no

111. legislative admission of wrongdoing no

112. opening archives and records no

113. peace education no

114. regular joint meetings no

115. (re)writing history no

116. special courts no (politely suggests questions of this nature might cause US respondents to stop)

117. theater and storytelling no

118. traditional methods no

119. travel/tourism no

120. workshops/dialogue no

121. positive media coverage maybe

122. criminal trials no (complains about length, wants a scale-warns about offending US with certain methods that implies wrongdoing)

123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting its Middle East policy? To some degree

124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Sure

125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Not at all.

126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration? Yes.

127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations? Not really feasible.

128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War? Maybe.

129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.? Why? No.

130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War? Maybe.

131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war? Yes.

Notes: lots of methods, many of which are not very well known. Requests a reduction in these. Providing a scales is recommended to make survey taking faster.

Pilot Questions **Pilot Number: 4** **Date: Sept. 20, 2010**

Location: Researcher's flat

I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel free to ask questions at any time.

1. What is your nationality? USA
2. Gender: male
3. Age: 31
4. Level of education: high school
5. Ethnicity: white
6. Religion: none
7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend? sometimes
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday life? Not so important, they are strangers.
9. Are conflicts normal? I suppose so,
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent? No.
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive? Either, depends on the type.
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? Negative
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved? No.
14. Should a conflict be solved? Sure, if that is a possibility.
15. Can a conflict be prevented? On occasion. I suppose.
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits? Sure. Change. An oppressed group could win control or get what they want.
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states? Vaguely yes...they share characteristics such as opposition, needs, etc., but its more complex between states. More people involved.
18. Do you think that it is *possible* for two states to resolve a conflict after violence? Yes
19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence? Yes. Whenever possible.
20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution? No.

21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation? doubtful

When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the following methods are for improving relations?

22. showing forgiveness not at all

23. economic aid/assistance could be important

24. economic cooperation could be important, sort of like the earlier question

25. establishing channels of communication important

26. formal agreements or treaties maybe

27. gestures of solidarity (request definition) no, waste of time

28. joint institutions/cooperation (request definition) no

29. joint projects/ reconstruction no

30. military signaling (request definition) only in war

31. official state visits no

32. political cooperation no

33. security cooperation no

34. apologies no

35. international tribunals no

36. promoting religious and cultural awareness no

37. restitution/reparations no

38. third party intervention yes – happens all the time

39. truth commissions (request definition) no

40. archiving testimonies (request definition) no, what a joke

41. granting amnesty no – might make others angry

42. exchange of representatives no

43. face-to-face encounters no

44. films/documentaries no

45. good governance and accountability no

46. joint or hybrid tribunals (request definition) no

47. joint memorials or ceremonies (request definition) no

48. legislative admission of wrongdoing no

49. opening archives and records (request definition) no

50. peace education (request definition) no

51. regular joint meetings no

52. (re)writing history (request definition) no

53. special courts (request definition) no

54. theater and storytelling (request definition) no

55. traditional methods (request definition) no

56. travel/tourism no

57. workshops/dialogue (request definition) no

58. positive media coverage maybe

59. criminal trials no (NOTE: too many complicated ideas)

How important do you think these are to conflict resolution?

60. honor sort of

61. dignity a bit

62. respect a bit

63. satisfaction of interests important

64. satisfaction of the needs important

65. mutual benefit ideally should be a goal

66. justice probably

67. truth probably

68. accountability linked with justice (NOTE: wants a scale)

Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer the following questions.

69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it? Maybe

70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens? No, don't know anyone there

71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed? ---

72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens? no

73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed? ---

74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you? Kind of important, we are at war

75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government? Very - occupation

76. . … are to Iraqi citizens? Very - occupation

77. . … are to the U.S. Government? Very – at war

78. . … are to U.S. citizens? Not so much.

79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states? Not really. Too many people.

80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations? Sure, why not?

81. Do you think that it is *necessary* for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations? Yes

82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence? Ideally yes.

83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence? Sure

Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?

84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing? no

85. maintaining economic relations? maybe

86. maintaining political relations? maybe

87. establishing channels of communication maybe

88. formal agreements or treaties maybe

89. gestures of solidarity no

90. joint institutions/cooperation no

91. joint projects/ reconstruction maybe

92. military signaling no

93. official state visits no

94. political cooperation maybe

95. security cooperation maybe, the region is important to the U.S.

96. apologies no

97. showing forgiveness no

98. international tribunals no

99. promote religious and cultural awareness no

100. restitution/reparations no, we are reconstructing the country

101. third party intervention not really

102. truth commissions no

103. archiving testimonies no, not very helpful

104. granting amnesty no

105. exchange of representatives no, not helpful

106. face-to-face encounters no

107. films/documentaries no

108. good governance and accountability no

109. joint or hybrid tribunals no (assumes wrongdoing, wont win US friends with line of questioning)

110. joint memorials or ceremonies no

111. legislative admission of wrongdoing no

112. opening archives and records no

113. peace education no

114. regular joint meetings no

115. (re)writing history no

116. special courts no

117. theater and storytelling no

118. traditional methods no

119. travel/tourism no

120. workshops/dialogue no

121. positive media coverage maybe

122. criminal trials no (recommends deleting some of the references to trials, adding a scale, too long)

123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting its Middle East policy? No

124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Of course.

125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Not important.

126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration? Yes.

127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations? No. Impossible.

128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War? No.

129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.? No.

130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War? No.

131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war? No.

Notes: too long, lots of methods. Thinks scales would be more useful as opposed to open questions. Insistent that reference to trials could be misunderstood as implying wrongdoing had been committed by the US.

Pilot Questions **Pilot Number: 5** **Date: Sept. 30, 2010**

Location: Researcher's flat

I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel free to ask questions at any time.

1. What is your nationality? USA
2. Gender: male
3. Age: 44
4. Level of education: bachelor
5. Ethnicity: white
6. Religion: Christian
7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend? yes
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday life? Not important
9. Are conflicts normal? Of course.
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent? No, they can be nonviolent.
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive? Both possible.
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? Negative. It injures people and destroys things.
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved? No. Some not. Parties may not want to.
14. Should a conflict be solved? Of course it should.
15. Can a conflict be prevented? I don't think that all can. Some. If you can see things moving in that direction. Maybe it can be headed off..
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits? Yes.. An argument with my wife produced a positive outcome...personal.
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states? Yes and no. Same basic interaction, but the magnitude is bigger with states..
18. Do you think that it is *possible* for two states to resolve a conflict after violence? Yes.
19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence? When that is an option..

20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution? Sometimes. Depends on the conflict and parties.

21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation? (request definition) Not very likely. People get angry and hurt.

When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the following methods are for improving relations?

22. showing forgiveness not important

23. economic aid/assistance sometimes important

24. economic cooperation sometimes important

25. establishing channels of communication important

26. formal agreements or treaties sometimes important

27. gestures of solidarity (request definition) no importance at all

28. joint institutions/cooperation (request definition) could be important

29. joint projects/ reconstruction could be important - constructive

30. military signaling (request definition) perhaps, shows a change

31. official state visits maybe

32. political cooperation maybe

33. security cooperation maybe

34. apologies could be, but they are only words

35. international tribunals no, punishing more people might prolong

36. promoting religious and cultural awareness might be if the conflict is based on these issues

37. restitution/reparations no, punishment

38. third party intervention Maybe, happens often between states

39. truth commissions (request definition) maybe

40. archiving testimonies (request definition) no – not sure this meets immediate needs

41. granting amnesty no – it's the same problem as trials

42. exchange of representatives no

43. face-to-face encounters (request definition) no- that would take time and would need to include lots of people.

44. films/documentaries no

45. good governance and accountability no

46. joint or hybrid tribunals (request definition) no

47. joint memorials or ceremonies (request definition) no – you see this sometimes-like Germany attending D-day ceremonies in France.

48. legislative admission of wrongdoing (request definition) no

49. opening archives and records (request definition) no

50. peace education (request definition) Not really, takes a long time and lots of people.

51. regular joint meetings (request definition) no

52. (re)writing history (request definition) no

53. special courts (request definition) no

54. theater and storytelling (request definition) No, definitely not. Entertainment.

55. traditional methods (request definition) No, complicates an already complicated situation.

56. travel/tourism No, most people wouldn't travel to their rival's country anyway.

57. workshops/dialogue (request definition) No. Again need too many people and too much time.

58. positive media coverage It would help, but in the U.S., its more about advertising.

59. criminal trials No, punishment wont be accepted by everyone. (NOTE: too many items, need definitions)

How important do you think these are to conflict resolution?

60. honor somewhat

61. dignity somewhat

62. respect important

63. satisfaction of interests very important, but sometimes idealistic.

64. satisfaction of the needs very important, also idealistic.

65. mutual benefit important, idealistic

66. justice important

67. truth Important, but what is truth? No doubt both sides in WWII held different truths about the what happened and why.

68. accountability Important, but you need the truth.

Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer the following questions.

69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it? I think so. Something needs to be done.

70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens? Not really.

71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed? Seem a bit aggressive.

72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens? No

73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed? ---

74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you? Not so important.

75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government? Very important – whether they want it or not. We are there at war.

76. . … are to Iraqi citizens? Very – the U.S. is everywhere they look.

77. . … are to the U.S. Government? Must be important, they have sent troops.

78. . … are to U.S. citizens? Not important at all. Iraq is a long way off.

79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states? Maybe. But how much do I know and how would I share this opinion with government?

80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations? Of course. Shouldn't keep fighting. But don't have to be best friends.

81. Do you think that it is *necessary* for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations? Yes

82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence? To stop the conflict, yes. To be best of friends--rarely.

83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence? Yes, I think so.

Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?

84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing? no

85. maintaining economic relations? Maybe. Guess we need the oil.

86. maintaining political relations? Why not.

87. establishing channels of communication yes, but related to above

88. formal agreements or treaties no

89. gestures of solidarity no – in my opinion

90. joint institutions/cooperation maybe

91. joint projects/ reconstruction maybe

92. military signaling no

93. official state visits no – not so important

94. political cooperation maybe

95. security cooperation maybe

96. apologies no

97. showing forgiveness no – with people, not with states

98. international tribunals no

99. promote religious and cultural awareness no – long-term maybe

100. restitution/reparations no, we are spending billions at the moment

101. third party intervention no

102. truth commissions from Iraq's standpoint, yes

103. archiving testimonies waste of time

104. granting amnesty a sore spot- no

105. exchange of representatives no, sounds like item earlier (political cooperation)

106. face-to-face encounters no

107. films/documentaries no, no, no

108. good governance and accountability not really-matters more internally than between

109. joint or hybrid tribunals no

110. joint memorials or ceremonies not at all

111. legislative admission of wrongdoing no

112. opening archives and records waste

113. peace education no

114. regular joint meetings no – again like above

115. (re)writing history no

116. special courts no – warns to be careful of adding such questions, the survey appears biased

117. theater and storytelling no

118. traditional methods no

119. travel/tourism no

120. workshops/dialogue no

121. positive media coverage Perhaps, both sides might benefit

122. criminal trials no (NOTE: wants a scale, too many items, methods are similar)

123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting its Middle East policy? Maybe, but what about my opinion? I should be prioritized. Same in Iraq—do you think Iraq's government should phone me up to make its decisions?

124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Absolutely.

125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Not even a little.

126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration? Yes. Why not. I could set the rules and say when and when not.

127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations? In a perfect world, yes.

128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War? No. We're spending a lot as it is.

129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.? No. They didn't start the war.

130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War? No. What would it determine?

131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war? Maybe. We should know more.

Notes: too long, lots of methods, lots of repeat. Recommends scales, removing open questions, condensing the survey.

Pilot Questions **Pilot Number: 6** **Date: Sept. 30, 2010**

Location: Researcher's flat

I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel free to ask questions at any time.

1. What is your nationality? USA

2. Gender: male

3. Age: 32

4. Level of education: bachelor

5. Ethnicity: white

6. Religion: Christian

7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend? yes

8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday life? Not at all. I should respect, but not be friendly with people I don't know.

9. Are conflicts normal? Yes.

10. Do you think all conflicts are violent? No.

11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive? Either. Both exist.

12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? Negative. Causes problems, destroys things. People suffer.

13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved? No. Idealistic.

14. Should a conflict be solved? Whenever there is that possibility, yes.

15. Can a conflict be prevented? Sometimes. Depends on issues and those involved.

16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits? Sure. Student protests in the 1970s.

17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states? In some cases, yes. People are involved, disputing something, causing problems.

18. Do you think that it is *possible* for two states to resolve a conflict after violence? Yes.

19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence? Whenever possible.

20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution? My personal opinion, no. Causes enough problems.

21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation? Unlikely. Takes lots of time and work.

When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the following methods are for improving relations?

22. showing forgiveness not at all

23. economic aid/assistance somewhat

24. economic cooperation somewhat

25. establishing channels of communication somewhat

26. formal agreements or treaties unlikely – these are subject to being broken

27. gestures of solidarity (request definition) unimportant

28. joint institutions/cooperation (request definition) somewhat, but no

29. joint projects/ reconstruction somewhat, but no

30. military signaling (request definition) unimportant

31. official state visits doubtful

32. political cooperation somewhat-thought we had that earlier

33. security cooperation sometimes, in some cases

34. apologies no

35. international tribunals maybe

36. promoting religious and cultural awareness perhaps

37. restitution/reparations one side might want that, but the other side not

38. third party intervention sometimes

39. truth commissions (request definition) maybe

40. archiving testimonies (request definition) no, don't think so

41. granting amnesty no – linked to trials

42. exchange of representatives no - repeat

43. face-to-face encounters (request definition) no – everyone can't meet, you already asked if the politicians should meet

44. films/documentaries not at all – few people would probably find it entertaining or interesting.

45. good governance and accountability not really

46. joint or hybrid tribunals (request definition) no - punishment

47. joint memorials or ceremonies (request definition) no – usually officials meeting, so same as above

48. legislative admission of wrongdoing (request definition) no

49. opening archives and records (request definition) no

50. peace education (request definition) no

51. regular joint meetings (request definition) no – lots of government interaction (repeat idea)

52. (re)writing history (request definition) no

53. special courts (request definition) no

54. theater and storytelling (request definition) no.

55. traditional methods (request definition) no.

56. travel/tourism No. Who would visit their enemy?

57. workshops/dialogue (request definition) No. Usually officials go to these.

58. positive media coverage Maybe.

59. criminal trials No, punishment wont be accepted by everyone. (NOTE: reduce and consolidate items. Do this by taking out the least recognizable items and stop the repetition.)

How important do you think these are to conflict resolution?

60. honor sometimes

61. dignity sometimes

62. respect sure, important

63. satisfaction of interests important, everyone is happy.

64. satisfaction of the needs important, still everyone happy.

65. mutual benefit important, everyone is happy.

66. justice important

67. truth Important, people often want to know what happened.

68. accountability important

Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer the following questions.

69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it? Yes

70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens? No.

71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed? ----

72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens? No, I don't think.

73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed? ---

74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you? Not a priority.

75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government? Very important. Here we are.

76. . … are to Iraqi citizens? Very – the military is breaking down their doors and patrolling streets.

77. . … are to the U.S. Government? Important, they've committed to the Iraq war.

78. . … are to U.S. citizens? Not important. Unless they know someone in Iraq, then maybe.

79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states? Would be nice.

80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations? Yes. Without doubt.

81. Do you think that it is *necessary* for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations? Yes

82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence? Maybe, depends on the states and their problems, desire.

83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence? Sure, anything is possible.

Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?

84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing? no

85. maintaining economic relations? yes

86. maintaining political relations? yes

87. establishing channels of communication yes, repeat

88. formal agreements or treaties yes, but linked to cooperation...the rules of that cooperation

89. gestures of solidarity no

90. joint institutions/cooperation perhaps

91. joint projects/ reconstruction yes, we are doing it anyway

92. military signaling no

93. official state visits not really

94. political cooperation sure - repeat

95. security cooperation maybe

96. apologies no

97. showing forgiveness No, how would that function?

98. international tribunals maybe, for the sake of Iraq

99. promote religious and cultural awareness might be useful

100. restitution/reparations maybe, for the sake of Iraq

101. third party intervention yes, it happens, sometimes works

102. truth commissions maybe

103. archiving testimonies no

104. granting amnesty No, don't U.S. troops already have amnesty?

105. exchange of representatives Yes, but a repeat.

106. face-to-face encounters no

107. films/documentaries no

108. good governance and accountability no

109. joint or hybrid tribunals maybe, trials has been said

110. joint memorials or ceremonies no

111. legislative admission of wrongdoing no

112. opening archives and records no

113. peace education not so important in my opinion

114. regular joint meetings no – you have said that

115. (re)writing history no

116. special courts no - repeat

117. theater and storytelling no – sort of like films

118. traditional methods no

119. travel/tourism no

120. workshops/dialogue no

121. positive media coverage Sure. I can see FOX news doing that. (laugh)

122. criminal trials maybe-repeat (NOTE: too many repeating ideas, too long)

123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting its Middle East policy? They would not doubt appreciate that.

124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Yes.

125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Not important.

126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration? Yes.

127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations? As much as possible. People should have a say.

128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War? No.

129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.? No. No one should pay.

130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War? No.

131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war? Yes, it would have a better chance of determining facts than an Iraqi...due to proximity.

Notes: too long. Reduce size by eliminating unknown methods and create one category for those that seemingly repeat. Wants scales not open questions.

Pilot Questions **Pilot Number: 7** **Date: Oct. 2, 2010**

Location: Respondent's apartment

I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel free to ask questions at any time.

1. What is your nationality? USA

2. Gender: female

3. Age: 19

4. Level of education: high school

5. Ethnicity: white

6. Religion: Catholic

7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend? yes

8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday life? Yes, I think so. I try to treat others nicely.

9. Are conflicts normal? Yes. A sad reality.

10. Do you think all conflicts are violent? No. Of course not.

11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive? Both. Depends on how it is expressed.

12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? Negative. It huts people.

13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved? Maybe. It would be nice.

14. Should a conflict be solved? Yes. It should not be let to continue.

15. Can a conflict be prevented? In some instances. If you can see it forming.

16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits? I guess so.

17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states? I suppose they are similar.

18. Do you think that it is *possible* for two states to resolve a conflict after violence? Yes.

19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence? Yes

20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution? I think so.

21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation? Ideally it should. But that is not always possible.

When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the following methods are for improving relations?

22. showing forgiveness maybe a little

23. economic aid/assistance a bit

24. economic cooperation a bit

25. establishing channels of communication important

26. formal agreements or treaties maybe

27. gestures of solidarity (request definition) maybe

28. joint institutions/cooperation (request definition) important

29. joint projects/ reconstruction might be important

30. military signaling (request definition) important if a military conflict

31. official state visits maybe

32. political cooperation somewhat

33. security cooperation could be

34. apologies sometimes

35. international tribunals somewhat

36. promoting religious and cultural awareness in some instances

37. restitution/reparations sometimes, in certain cases – human rights violation or abuse

38. third party intervention it is commonly used

39. truth commissions (request definition) sometimes

40. archiving testimonies (request definition) no value

41. granting amnesty perhaps, but could easily cause more problems

42. exchange of representatives (request definition) somewhat

43. face-to-face encounters (request definition) not so important

44. films/documentaries not so important

45. good governance and accountability sometimes

46. joint or hybrid tribunals (request definition) no

47. joint memorials or ceremonies (request definition) no

48. legislative admission of wrongdoing (request definition) no

49. opening archives and records (request definition) no

50. peace education (request definition) no

51. regular joint meetings (request definition) no

52. (re)writing history (request definition) no

53. special courts (request definition) no

54. theater and storytelling (request definition) No. Is this really used?

55. traditional methods (request definition) no

56. travel/tourism no

57. workshops/dialogue (request definition) perhaps

58. positive media coverage may be useful

59. criminal trials in some instances. (NOTE: too long, some ideas repeat, ranking scale)

How important do you think these are to conflict resolution?

60. honor important

61. dignity important

62. respect important

63. satisfaction of interests very important

64. satisfaction of the needs Very important, reduces reasons for dispute.

65. mutual benefit Important, whenever this is possible.

66. justice important

67. truth important

68. accountability important

Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer the following questions.

69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it? I would.

70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens? No. Not that I am aware.

71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed? ----

72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens? No, not at all.

73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed? ---

74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you? Honestly, not much. Embarrassing when I say that out loud.

75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government? I am sure important.

76. . … are to Iraqi citizens? With the U.S. there, important. Otherwise, I don't think so much.

77. . … are to the U.S. Government? Clearly important. We are there fighting a war.

78. . … are to U.S. citizens? Not important.

79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states? Yes. I mean I wish.

80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations? I do think this.

81. Do you think that it is *necessary* for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations? Absolutely

82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence? Maybe, depends on the states and their problems, desire.

83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence? Yes, if they work at it and want it.

Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?

84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing? maybe

85. maintaining economic relations? I think so.

86. maintaining political relations? I think so.

87. establishing channels of communication Yes, that is like political relations.

88. formal agreements or treaties sure

89. gestures of solidarity not really

90. joint institutions/cooperation I think so.

91. joint projects/ reconstruction yes

92. military signaling maybe important

93. official state visits not a priority

94. political cooperation perhaps – I thought you said that earlier

95. security cooperation maybe

96. apologies maybe

97. showing forgiveness maybe

98. international tribunals maybe

99. promote religious and cultural awareness maybe

100. restitution/reparations I might.

101. third party intervention Perhaps I would.

102. truth commissions perhaps

103. archiving testimonies I do not see the value.

104. granting amnesty no

105. exchange of representatives that is cooperation, so maybe

106. face-to-face encounters I wouldn't, but those people should decide

107. films/documentaries No. No clear value to me.

108. good governance and accountability no

109. joint or hybrid tribunals Maybe. I thought you mentioned trials?

110. joint memorials or ceremonies no

111. legislative admission of wrongdoing no (denotes assumes wrongdoing)

112. opening archives and records No. I sadly don't see its value.

113. peace education Nice idea, but no.

114. regular joint meetings perhaps – but haven't you have said that

115. (re)writing history no

116. special courts no – I thought you also mentioned that (suggests this line of questioning risks offending)

117. theater and storytelling no

118. traditional methods no

119. travel/tourism no

120. workshops/dialogue no

121. positive media coverage I think I would support this.

122. criminal trials maybe (repeat) (NOTE: repeating ideas)

123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting its Middle East policy? Sure, but how? Who will keep track and ask questions?

124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Yes.

125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? At this level, I suppose not important.

126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration? Yes.

127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations? Whenever possible people should be heard.

128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War? Maybe.

129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.? Of course not.

130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War? I don't think so..

131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war? Yes. More facts should be made available.

Notes: pilot sees repeat, length, and open questions a problem. Recommended rewording of some questions. Definitions of terms or practices requested. Do away with open-ended questions as this would speed up the process of completing.

Pilot Questions **Pilot Number: 8** **Date: Oct. 2, 2010**

Location: UIBK library

I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel free to ask questions at any time.

1. What is your nationality? USA

2. Gender: female

3. Age: 26

4. Level of education: high school

5. Ethnicity: white

6. Religion: Christian

7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend? It is.

8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday life? Somewhat important. This is not always possible. Can't please everyone.

9. Are conflicts normal? Yes

10. Do you think all conflicts are violent? No. A disagreement is a conflict.

11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive? It can be either. It can benefit or not. Help or hurt.

12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? Violence is never good...in my opinion.

13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved? Probably. If people want to take the time.

14. Should a conflict be solved? I think it should.

15. Can a conflict be prevented? Sometimes, but not always.

16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits? Sure. We can learn from them.

17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states? In some ways they are. Disagreement, violence, people...scale is different though.

18. Do you think that it is *possible* for two states to resolve a conflict after violence? Yes.

19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence? Yes, I think it is more productive.

20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution? When this is important to those involved.

21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation? Honestly, probably unlikely. Tensions are still likely.

When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the following methods are for improving relations?

22. showing forgiveness could be

23. economic aid/assistance sure- it is a way of showing you want to help

24. economic cooperation sure

25. establishing channels of communication talking is positive

26. formal agreements or treaties sometimes, when they are agreed

27. gestures of solidarity (request definition) not really important

28. joint institutions/cooperation (request definition) important

29. joint projects/ reconstruction in some instances, but like assistance said earlier

30. military signaling (request definition) maybe reduces threat

31. official state visits not so much

32. political cooperation sometime, if possible

33. security cooperation sometimes, if possible

34. apologies maybe, but might not be accepted anyway, sounds good in principle

35. international tribunals sometimes might be useful

36. promoting religious and cultural awareness if this is an issue, maybe

37. restitution/reparations sometimes

38. third party intervention could be - depends on parties involved

39. truth commissions (request definition) maybe

40. archiving testimonies (request definition) I don't think this is important

41. granting amnesty not so important

42. exchange of representatives (request definition) somewhat

43. face-to-face encounters (request definition) not so important

44. films/documentaries unimportant

45. good governance and accountability no

46. joint or hybrid tribunals (request definition) no

47. joint memorials or ceremonies (request definition) no

48. legislative admission of wrongdoing (request definition) no

49. opening archives and records (request definition) no

50. peace education (request definition) no

51. regular joint meetings (request definition) no

52. (re)writing history (request definition) no

53. special courts (request definition) no

54. theater and storytelling (request definition) No. Is this really used?

55. traditional methods (request definition) no

56. travel/tourism no

57. workshops/dialogue (request definition) perhaps

58. positive media coverage may be useful

59. criminal trials in some instances (NOTE: lengthy, repetitive, reduce size, definitions)

How important do you think these are to conflict resolution?

60. honor important

61. dignity important

62. respect important

63. satisfaction of interests important

64. satisfaction of the needs important,

65. mutual benefit important

66. justice important

67. truth important

68. accountability important

Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer the following questions.

69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it? Yes

70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens? No. Not personally.

71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed? ----

72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens? No.

73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed? ---

74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you? Not at all.

75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government? Very important. The U.S. is a powerful and influential country. Look what we are doing. (Iraq)

76. . … are to Iraqi citizens? Somewhat. We have invaded.

77. . … are to the U.S. Government? Very important. We are at war.

78. . … are to U.S. citizens? Not really important. People are busy with their daily lives. Iraq is distant to most of us.

79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states? Why not?

80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations? Sure.

81. Do you think that it is *necessary* for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations? I do.

82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence? If they wish for it and commit, yes.

83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence? Yes. Same as the states.

Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?

84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing? might

85. maintaining economic relations? maybe

86. maintaining political relations? maybe.

87. establishing channels of communication maybe

88. formal agreements or treaties maybe

89. gestures of solidarity I don't see it as so important

90. joint institutions/cooperation maybe, we will see in the future

91. joint projects/ reconstruction we are doing reconstruction at the moment

92. military signaling for me, its unimportant

93. official state visits unimportant

94. political cooperation maybe

95. security cooperation maybe (repeat?)

96. apologies perhaps

97. showing forgiveness not sure it works here

98. international tribunals maybe, complicated

99. promote religious and cultural awareness that might be useful

100. restitution/reparations not completely convinced

101. third party intervention maybe.

102. truth commissions maybe

103. archiving testimonies no

104. granting amnesty no

105. exchange of representatives maybe

106. face-to-face encounters no, only helps those involved

107. films/documentaries no

108. good governance and accountability no

109. joint or hybrid tribunals maybe

110. joint memorials or ceremonies no value

111. legislative admission of wrongdoing no

112. opening archives and records no

113. peace education don't think so

114. regular joint meetings maybe

115. (re)writing history not valuable in my opinion

116. special courts maybe (does not like what this implies, repeat)

117. theater and storytelling not valuable

118. traditional methods No. It sounds good, but just something else to disagree about.

119. travel/tourism no

120. workshops/dialogue no

121. positive media coverage useful

122. criminal trials maybe (repeat) (NOTE: recommends reducing linking items)

123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting its Middle East policy? maybe

124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? I would.

125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Probably not too much.

126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration? Yes.

127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations? Ideally, yes.

128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War? perhaps

129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.? No. They have done nothing wrong.

130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War? maybe

131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war? I would. Accountability.

Notes: too long, repeats, definitions. Eliminate open questions for likert scales.

Pilot Questions **Pilot Number: 9** **Date: Oct. 2, 2010**

Location: UIBK library

I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel free to ask questions at any time.

1. What is your nationality? USA
2. Gender: male
3. Age: 27
4. Level of education: high school
5. Ethnicity: white
6. Religion: none
7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend? Most of the time. Depends on how close we really are and what happened.
8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday life? Not so much. I don't know them, they don't know me.
9. Are conflicts normal? yes
10. Do you think all conflicts are violent? no
11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive? Both. Sometimes it hurts, sometimes it helps. My parents and I don't always agree, but it is not necessarily bad that we don't.
12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? Negative in the sense that it hurts people.
13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved? No. Unrealistic.
14. Should a conflict be solved? Whenever this can be done.
15. Can a conflict be prevented? In some instances.
16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits? Sometimes. I've got what I wanted sometimes.
17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states? They share thing...differences, people, and wants.
18. Do you think that it is *possible* for two states to resolve a conflict after violence? Yes.

19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence? Yes,.

20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution? Not so important whether values are religious or not. Even atheists have values.

21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation? Not so much.

When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the following methods are for improving relations?

22. showing forgiveness not

23. economic aid/assistance sort of

24. economic cooperation sort of

25. establishing channels of communication talking is positive

26. formal agreements or treaties maybe

27. gestures of solidarity (request definition) no

28. joint institutions/cooperation (request definition) no

29. joint projects/ reconstruction no

30. military signaling (request definition) no

31. official state visits not really

32. political cooperation maybe

33. security cooperation maybe

34. apologies doubtful

35. international tribunals doubtful

36. promoting religious and cultural awareness no

37. restitution/reparations No. one side will want, the other side not.

38. third party intervention maybe

39. truth commissions (request definition) maybe

40. archiving testimonies (request definition) no

41. granting amnesty no

42. exchange of representatives (request definition) no

43. face-to-face encounters (request definition) no

44. films/documentaries definitely not

45. good governance and accountability doubtful

46. joint or hybrid tribunals (request definition) no

47. joint memorials or ceremonies (request definition) definitely not

48. legislative admission of wrongdoing (request definition) no

49. opening archives and records (request definition) definitely not

50. peace education (request definition) not really

51. regular joint meetings (request definition) no (repeat idea)

52. (re)writing history (request definition) no

53. special courts (request definition) no

54. theater and storytelling (request definition) no

55. traditional methods (request definition) no

56. travel/tourism no

57. workshops/dialogue (request definition) no

58. positive media coverage maybe

59. criminal trials no (NOTE: suggests there are too many unknown methods and some of those are repeated in the survey (e.g. trials or exchanges). Suggests tables so respondents can rank.)

How important do you think these are to conflict resolution?

60. honor not important

61. dignity a little

62. respect important

63. satisfaction of interests if you can

64. satisfaction of the needs if possible

65. mutual benefit if possible

66. justice when possible

67. truth when possible

68. accountability same (when possible)

Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer the following questions.

69. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it? maybe

70. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens? no

71. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed? ----

72. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens? no

73. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed? ---

74. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you? Not important

75. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government? Important. We are intervening there.

76. . … are to Iraqi citizens? Not so much.

77. . … are to the U.S. Government? Important. Oil.

78. . … are to U.S. citizens? Not important. Too far away.

79. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states? Maybe. But how?

80. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations? Yes

81. Do you think that it is *necessary* for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations? They should..

82. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence? A slight possibility.

83. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence? probably

Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?

84. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing? no

85. maintaining economic relations? I might.

86. maintaining political relations? I might..

87. establishing channels of communication perhaps

88. formal agreements or treaties doesn't help much

89. gestures of solidarity no

90. joint institutions/cooperation might be helpful

91. joint projects/ reconstruction aren't we reconstructing, so yes

92. military signaling no

93. official state visits no

94. political cooperation maybe

95. security cooperation it is in our interest-Middle East

96. apologies no

97. showing forgiveness no

98. international tribunals no

99. promote religious and cultural awareness no

100. restitution/reparations no

101. third party intervention a remote possibility

102. truth commissions remote

103. archiving testimonies no

104. granting amnesty no

105. exchange of representatives no

106. face-to-face encounters no, only helps those involved

107. films/documentaries no

108. good governance and accountability no

109. joint or hybrid tribunals no

110. joint memorials or ceremonies no

111. legislative admission of wrongdoing no – they put us here

112. opening archives and records no

113. peace education no – don't understand idea

114. regular joint meetings no

115. (re)writing history no

116. special courts no (repeat, not overjoyed by reference)

117. theater and storytelling no

118. traditional methods no

119. travel/tourism no

120. workshops/dialogue no

121. positive media coverage maybe

122. criminal trials no (repeat) (NOTE: repeats, long)

123. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting its Middle East policy? no

124. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Yes. No war.

125. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Not at all.

126. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration? Yes.

127. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations? Sounds good.

128. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War? No, we have been doing that.

129. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.? No. Why?

130. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War? no

131. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war? Maybe.

Notes: Survey too long and repeats, need many definitions. Likes idea of providing scales rather than open-ended questions.

Pilot Questions **Pilot Number: 10** **Date: Oct. 3, 2010**

Location: UIBK library

I am going to ask you a series of questions about conflict and resolving conflict between people and countries. Some of these are general questions others are specific. Please take a few moments to think about each question and then provide a response that best describes your opinion at the moment. Feel free to ask questions at any time.

1. What is your nationality? USA

2. Gender: male

3. Age: 21

4. Level of education: high school

5. Ethnicity: white

6. Religion: none

7. Is important to improve relations after a conflict with a close friend? Yes

8. How important is it for you to maintain positive relationships with strangers in your everyday life? Not at all. I don't interact with them.

9. Are conflicts normal? yes

10. Do you think all conflicts are violent? No. An argument is a conflict but not violent.

11. Do you think conflict (e.g. an argument) is negative or positive? Either. Depends on how it is expressed.

12. Do you think violent conflict (e.g. physical aggression or war) is negative or positive? Negative. Destructive.

13. Do you think that all conflict can be solved? No. Impossible to solve all problems.

14. Should a conflict be solved? Yes. I can see benefits from this.

15. Can a conflict be prevented? Sometimes, yes.

16. Do you think conflicts can produce positive benefits? Anything is possible.

17. Do you think a conflict between two people is the same as a conflict between two states? No. Different magnitude.

18. Do you think that it is *possible* for two states to resolve a conflict after violence? Yes

19. Should two states resolve a conflict after violence? Yes

20. Should religious values influence conflict resolution? No. Definitely not.

21. In your opinion, how likely is it that conflict resolution will result in reconciliation? Not very likely.

When thinking about conflict resolution between two countries, how important do you think the following methods are for improving relations?

22. showing forgiveness not
23. economic aid/assistance sort of
24. economic cooperation sort of
25. establishing channels of communication talking is positive
26. formal agreements or treaties maybe
27. gestures of solidarity (request definition) no
28. joint institutions/cooperation (request definition) maybe
29. joint projects/ reconstruction perhaps
30. military signaling (request definition) maybe
31. official state visits no
32. political cooperation maybe
33. security cooperation perhaps
34. apologies perhaps
35. international tribunals no
36. promoting religious and cultural awareness no
37. restitution/reparations no
38. third party intervention no
39. truth commissions (request definition) no
40. archiving testimonies (request definition) no
41. granting amnesty no
42. exchange of representatives (request definition) no
43. face-to-face encounters (request definition) no
44. films/documentaries definitely not
45. good governance and accountability no

46. joint or hybrid tribunals (request definition) no

47. joint memorials or ceremonies (request definition) no

48. legislative admission of wrongdoing (request definition) no

49. opening archives and records (request definition) no

50. peace education (request definition) no

51. regular joint meetings (request definition) no

52. (re)writing history (request definition) no

53. special courts (request definition) no

54. theater and storytelling (request definition) no

55. traditional methods (request definition) no

56. travel/tourism no

57. workshops/dialogue (request definition) no

58. positive media coverage perhaps

59. criminal trials no (NOTE: very long, mix ideas to reduce size)

How important do you think these are to conflict resolution?

60. honor not very important

61. respect maybe important

62. satisfaction of interests important

63. satisfaction of the needs important

64. mutual benefit important

65. justice sometimes important

66. truth if it can be revealed

67. accountability same (when possible)

Thinking about U.S.-Iraq relations and the current war and occupation of Iraq. Please answer the following questions.

68. Would you support actions to improve U.S.-Iraq relations if a third party proposes it? maybe

69. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive U.S. citizens? no

70. If the War has affected your perceptions of U.S. citizens, has it changed? ----

71. Has the 2003 War in Iraq affected the way you perceive Iraqi citizens? Not important.

72. If the War has affected your perceptions of Iraqi citizens, has it changed? ---

73. How important are U.S.-Iraq relations to you? Not at all

74. How important do you think U.S.-Iraq relations are to the Iraqi Government? Important. We are intervening there. Must mean it is important.

75. . … are to Iraqi citizens? No

76. . … are to the U.S. Government? Important. Middle East. Political and economic interests.

77. . … are to U.S. citizens? No

78. Should your opinion influence government relations with other states? Yes, it should.

79. Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work to improve their relations? Yes

80. Do you think that it is *necessary* for Iraq and the U.S. to improve their relations? Yes

81. Is it possible for two states to reconcile after violence? maybe

82. Is it possible for two communities to reconcile after violence? maybe

Thinking only about U.S.-Iraq relations. Would you support these mechanisms for improving U.S.-Iraq relations after the invasion of 2003?

83. politicians apologizing for wrongdoing? no

84. maintaining economic relations? yes

85. maintaining political relations? yes

86. establishing channels of communication yes

87. formal agreements or treaties no

88. gestures of solidarity no

89. joint institutions/cooperation no

90. joint projects/ reconstruction no

91. military signaling no

92. official state visits no

93. political cooperation no

94. security cooperation maybe

95. apologies no

96. showing forgiveness no

97. international tribunals no

98. promote religious and cultural awareness no

99. restitution/reparations no, reconstruction is enough

100. third party intervention no

101. truth commissions no

102. archiving testimonies no

103. granting amnesty no

104. exchange of representatives no

105. face-to-face encounters no

106. films/documentaries no

107. good governance and accountability no

108. joint or hybrid tribunals no

109. joint memorials or ceremonies no

110. legislative admission of wrongdoing no

111. opening archives and records no

112. peace education no

113. regular joint meetings no

114. (re)writing history no

115. special courts no

116. theater and storytelling no

117. traditional methods no

118. travel/tourism no

119. workshops/dialogue no

120. positive media coverage perhaps

121. criminal trials no (NOTE: too much information, shorten)

122. Do you think that the U.S. government should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting its Middle East policy? Ideally, yes. They might appreciate that.

123. Would you like to see improved relations between the U.S. and Iraq? Yes.

124. How important is forgiveness to improving state relations after a conflict? Not important.

125. Would you support conflict resolution if it takes your opinion into consideration? Naturally..

126. Should popular opinions influence bilateral relations? Whenever possible. People should have a say.

127. Should the U.S. pay to rebuild Iraq following the 2003 War? No.

128. Should Iraqis pay reparations to the U.S.? No.

129. Would you support an Iraqi Government inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War? No.

130. Would you support a U.S. Government inquiry into the 2003 war? Maybe.

Notes: respondent believes there are too many unrecognizable methods, which slows down survey process for questions to be asked. Recommends reducing number of items and the survey by eliminating these obscure items, consolidated methods to avoid repeat of basic ideas, provide scales rather than open-ended questions.

Appendix 7: Combined Pilot 11-20

Pilot Questionnaire

Pilot Number: 11 **Location:** UIBK Library **Date:** Oct. 9, 2010 **Nationality:** US

This study explores your opinion of popular methods of improving international relationships following a conflict between two states. The questions below will ask you for your opinion on certain ideas or practices. You will also be asked to rate various mechanisms or practices used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

The first set of questions asks for your opinion in general. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
1	Religion is a very important to me	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
2	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
3	A conflict can produce positive benefits	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
4	I believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
5	Not all conflicts are violent	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how useful you think the following tools are for improving relations between states following a conflict. "0" indicates that the technique is not very useful, while "10" indicates that you are very useful.

	How useful or these methods are…	Not useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
6	third party intervention	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
7	security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
8	political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
9	reparation payments	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
10	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
11	public apology	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
12	economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
13	truth telling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
14	cultural exchanges	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
15	positive media coverage	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

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	How useful are these methods	Very un-useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
16	gestures of solidarity	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
17	international tribunals	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
18	official state visits	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
19	joint institutions/cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
20	military signaling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
21	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
22	archiving testimonies	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
23	granting amnesty	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
24	exchange of representatives	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
25	face-to-face encounters	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
26	films/documentaries	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
27	good governance and accountability	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
28	joint or hybrid tribunals	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
29	joint memorials or ceremonies	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
30	peace education	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
31	regular joint meetings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
32	(re)writing history	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
33	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
34	traditional methods	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
35	travel/tourism	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
36	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
37	opening archives and records	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

Please read the following questions and mark the response which best describes your opinion.

	Do you agree or disagree …	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
38	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
39	It is possible for two states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
40	My opinion of bilateral relations should influence my government's foreign relations	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
41	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about conflict resolution between two states. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	How important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimporta	Neither	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
42	… for two states to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
43	… to avoid violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
44	…for religious values to influence conflict resolution between states	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
45	…for governments to take your opinion into consideration when drafting foreign policy?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic.**

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
46	Would you support conflict resolution between the U.S.-Iraq if a third party proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
47	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
48	Do you think conflict resolution between two states will reconcile relations?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
49	All conflicts can be solved?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, "0" means that you find the item "completely unacceptable" and "10" that you find it "absolutely acceptable" in this particular context.

	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
50	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
51	cultural exchanges	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
52	economic cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
53	gestures of solidarity	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
54	granting amnesty	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
55	international tribunals	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
56	joint institutions/cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
57	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
58	military signaling	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
59	official state visits	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
60	political cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
61	positive media coverage	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
62	public apology	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
63	reparation payments	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
64	security cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
65	third party intervention	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
66	truth telling	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
67	exchange of representatives	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
68	face-to-face encounters	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
69	films/documentaries	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
70	(re)writing history	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

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	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
71	good governance and accountability	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
72	joint memorials or ceremonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
73	joint or hybrid tribunals	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
74	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
75	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
76	peace education	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
77	regular joint meetings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
78	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
79	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
80	travel/tourism	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In this last section, you are asked to please provide some personal information.

81. What is your gender:

☒ Male ☐ Female

82. How old are you?

☒18-25 ☐ 26-35 ☐ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

83. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☒ High School ☐ Bachelor's Degree ☐ Master's Degree ☐ Ph.D.

84. Which religion do you affiliate with?

☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☒ Catholic ☐ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☐ Other ☐ None

Thank you very much for your assistance.
Please take a moment to provide any feedback to the researcher about the content, form and style of this draft survey.

Recommends definitions for terms since some methods were unknown, likes likert rating scales, was offended by inclusion of criminal trials in reference to U.S.-Iraq War.

Pilot Questionnaire

Pilot Number: 12 **Location:** Researcher's flat **Date:** Oct. 9, 2010 **Nationality:** US

This study explores your opinion of popular methods of improving international relationships following a conflict between two states. The questions below will ask you for your opinion on certain ideas or practices. You will also be asked to rate various mechanisms or practices used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

The first set of questions asks for your opinion in general. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
1	Religion is a very important to me	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
2	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
3	A conflict can produce positive benefits	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
4	I believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
5	Not all conflicts are violent	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how useful you think the following tools are for improving relations between states following a conflict. "0" indicates that the technique is not very useful, while "10" indicates that you are very useful.

	How useful or these methods are…	Not useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
6	third party intervention	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
7	security cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
8	political cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
9	reparation payments	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
10	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
11	public apology	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12	economic cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
13	truth telling	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
14	cultural exchanges	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
15	positive media coverage	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐

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	How useful are these methods	Very un-useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
16	gestures of solidarity	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
17	international tribunals	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
18	official state visits	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
19	joint institutions/cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
20	military signaling	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
21	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
22	archiving testimonies	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
23	granting amnesty	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
24	exchange of representatives	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
25	face-to-face encounters	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
26	films/documentaries	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
27	good governance and accountability	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
28	joint or hybrid tribunals	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
29	joint memorials or ceremonies	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
30	peace education	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
31	regular joint meetings	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
32	(re)writing history	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
33	theater and storytelling	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
34	traditional methods	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
35	travel/tourism	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
36	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
37	opening archives and records	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Please read the following questions and mark the response which best describes your opinion.

	Do you agree or disagree …	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
38	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	⊠	☐ DK
39	It is possible for two states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	⊠	☐ DK
40	My opinion of bilateral relations should influence my government's foreign relations	☐	☐	☐	☐	⊠	☐ DK
41	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	⊠	☐	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about conflict resolution between two states. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	How important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimporta	Neither	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
42	… for two states to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	⊠	☐ DK
43	… to avoid violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	⊠	☐	☐ DK
44	…for religious values to influence conflict resolution between states	☐	☐	☐	☐	⊠	☐	☐	☐ DK
45	…for governments to take your opinion into consideration when drafting foreign policy?	☐	☐	☐	☐	⊠	☐	☐	☐ DK

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic**.

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
46	Would you support conflict resolution between the U.S.-Iraq if a third party proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☐	⊠	☐ DK
47	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☐	⊠	☐ DK
48	Do you think conflict resolution between two states will reconcile relations?	☐	☐	⊠	☐	☐	☐ DK
49	All conflicts can be solved?	☐	☐	☐	⊠	☐	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, “0” means that you find the item “completely unacceptable” and “10” that you find it “absolutely acceptable” in this particular context.

	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable “0”					Neutral “5”					Unacceptable “10”	Don’t know
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
50	court (or judicial) proceedings								X				
51	cultural exchanges							X					
52	economic cooperation									X			
53	gestures of solidarity					X							
54	granting amnesty				X								
55	international tribunals					X							
56	joint institutions/cooperation							X					
57	joint projects/ reconstruction					X							
58	military signaling		X										
59	official state visits		X										
60	political cooperation							X					
61	positive media coverage							X					
62	public apology									X			
63	reparation payments							X					
64	security cooperation								X				
65	third party intervention							X					
66	truth telling								X				
67	exchange of representatives					X							
68	face-to-face encounters				X								
69	films/documentaries		X										
70	(re)writing history		X										

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	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
71	good governance and accountability	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
72	joint memorials or ceremonies	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
73	joint or hybrid tribunals	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
74	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
75	opening archives and records	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
76	peace education	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
77	regular joint meetings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
78	theater and storytelling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
79	traditional methods	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
80	travel/tourism	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In this last section, you are asked to please provide some personal information.

81. What is your gender:

☐ Male ☒ Female

82. How old are you?

☐ 18-25 ☒ 26-35 ☐ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

83. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☒ High School ☐ Bachelor's Degree ☐ Master's Degree ☐ Ph.D.

84. Which religion do you affiliate with?

☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☐ Catholic ☐ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☐ Other ☒ None

Thank you very much for your assistance.
Please take a moment to provide any feedback to the researcher about the content, form and style of this draft survey.

Pilot warns that some methods, for instance theater, risks not being taken seriously. Could cause participants not to take the survey seriously. Also warned that U.S. citizens would take offense to reparations and criminal trials. Thinks definitions would be useful. Claims the survey should be reduced in length.

Pilot Questionnaire

Pilot Number: 13 **Location:** Researcher's flat **Date:** Oct. 11, 2010 **Nationality:** US

This study explores your opinion of popular methods of improving international relationships following a conflict between two states. The questions below will ask you for your opinion on certain ideas or practices. You will also be asked to rate various mechanisms or practices used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

The first set of questions asks for your opinion in general. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
1	Religion is a very important to me	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
2	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
3	A conflict can produce positive benefits	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
4	I believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
5	Not all conflicts are violent	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how useful you think the following tools are for improving relations between states following a conflict. "0" indicates that the technique is not very useful, while "10" indicates that you are very useful.

	How useful or these methods are…	Not useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
6	third party intervention	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
7	security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
8	political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
9	reparation payments	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
10	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
11	public apology	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
12	economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
13	truth telling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
14	cultural exchanges	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
15	positive media coverage	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

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	How useful are these methods	Very un-useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
16	gestures of solidarity	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
17	international tribunals	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
18	official state visits	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
19	joint institutions/cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
20	military signaling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
21	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
22	archiving testimonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
23	granting amnesty	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
24	exchange of representatives	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
25	face-to-face encounters	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
26	films/documentaries	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
27	good governance and accountability	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
28	joint or hybrid tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
29	joint memorials or ceremonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
30	peace education	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
31	regular joint meetings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
32	(re)writing history	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
33	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
34	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
35	travel/tourism	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
36	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
37	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

Please read the following questions and mark the response which best describes your opinion.

	Do you agree or disagree …	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
38	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
39	It is possible for two states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
40	My opinion of bilateral relations should influence my government's foreign relations	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
41	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about conflict resolution between two states. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	How important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimporta	Neither	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
42	… for two states to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
43	… to avoid violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
44	…for religious values to influence conflict resolution between states	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
45	…for governments to take your opinion into consideration when drafting foreign policy?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic.**

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
46	Would you support conflict resolution between the U.S.-Iraq if a third party proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
47	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
48	Do you think conflict resolution between two states will reconcile relations?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
49	All conflicts can be solved?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, "0" means that you find the item "completely unacceptable" and "10" that you find it "absolutely acceptable" in this particular context.

	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
50	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
51	cultural exchanges	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
52	economic cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
53	gestures of solidarity	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
54	granting amnesty	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
55	international tribunals	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
56	joint institutions/cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
57	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
58	military signaling	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
59	official state visits	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
60	political cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
61	positive media coverage	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
62	public apology	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
63	reparation payments	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
64	security cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
65	third party intervention	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
66	truth telling	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
67	exchange of representatives	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
68	face-to-face encounters	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
69	films/documentaries	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
70	(re)writing history	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

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	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
71	good governance and accountability	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
72	joint memorials or ceremonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
73	joint or hybrid tribunals	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
74	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
75	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
76	peace education	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
77	regular joint meetings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
78	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
79	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
80	travel/tourism	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In this last section, you are asked to please provide some personal information.

81. What is your gender:

☐ Male ☒ Female

82. How old are you?

☐ 18-25 ☐ 26-35 ☒ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

83. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☐ High School ☒ Bachelor's Degree ☐ Master's Degree ☐ Ph.D.

84. Which religion do you affiliate with?

☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☐ Catholic ☒ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☐ Other ☐ None

Thank you very much for your assistance.
Please take a moment to provide any feedback to the researcher about the content, form and style of this draft survey.

Wants definitions, thinks the survey is a bit long, questions the utility of some of the items listed since they are not well known.

Pilot Questionnaire

Pilot Number: 14 **Location:** restaurant **Date:** Oct. 13, 2010 **Nationality:** US

This study explores your opinion of popular methods of improving international relationships following a conflict between two states. The questions below will ask you for your opinion on certain ideas or practices. You will also be asked to rate various mechanisms or practices used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

The first set of questions asks for your opinion in general. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
1	Religion is a very important to me	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
2	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
3	A conflict can produce positive benefits	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
4	I believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
5	Not all conflicts are violent	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how useful you think the following tools are for improving relations between states following a conflict. "0" indicates that the technique is not very useful, while "10" indicates that you are very useful.

	How useful or these methods are…	Not useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
6	third party intervention	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
7	security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
8	political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
9	reparation payments	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
10	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
11	public apology	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
12	economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
13	truth telling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
14	cultural exchanges	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
15	positive media coverage	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

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	How useful are these methods	Very un-useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
16	gestures of solidarity	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
17	international tribunals	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
18	official state visits	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
19	joint institutions/cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
20	military signaling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
21	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
22	archiving testimonies	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
23	granting amnesty	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
24	exchange of representatives	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
25	face-to-face encounters	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
26	films/documentaries	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
27	good governance and accountability	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
28	joint or hybrid tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
29	joint memorials or ceremonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
30	peace education	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
31	regular joint meetings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
32	(re)writing history	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
33	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
34	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
35	travel/tourism	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
36	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
37	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

Please read the following questions and mark the response which best describes your opinion.

	Do you agree or disagree …	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
38	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
39	It is possible for two states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
40	My opinion of bilateral relations should influence my government's foreign relations	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
41	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about conflict resolution between two states. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	How important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimporta	Neither	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
42	… for two states to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
43	… to avoid violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
44	…for religious values to influence conflict resolution between states	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
45	…for governments to take your opinion into consideration when drafting foreign policy?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic**.

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
46	Would you support conflict resolution between the U.S.-Iraq if a third party proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
47	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
48	Do you think conflict resolution between two states will reconcile relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
49	All conflicts can be solved?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, "0" means that you find the item "completely unacceptable" and "10" that you find it "absolutely acceptable" in this particular context.

	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
50	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
51	cultural exchanges	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
52	economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
53	gestures of solidarity	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
54	granting amnesty	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
55	international tribunals	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
56	joint institutions/cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
57	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
58	military signaling	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
59	official state visits	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
60	political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
61	positive media coverage	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
62	public apology	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
63	reparation payments	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
64	security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
65	third party intervention	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
66	truth telling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
67	exchange of representatives	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
68	face-to-face encounters	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
68	films/documentaries	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
70	(re)writing history	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

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	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable “0”					Neutral “5”					Unacceptable “10”	Don’t know
71	good governance and accountability	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
72	joint memorials or ceremonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
73	joint or hybrid tribunals	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
74	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
75	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
76	peace education	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
77	regular joint meetings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
78	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
79	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
80	travel/tourism	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In this last section, you are asked to please provide some personal information.

81. What is your gender:

☒ Male ☐ Female

82. How old are you?

☐ 18-25 ☐ 26-35 ☒ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

83. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☒ High School ☐ Bachelor’s Degree ☐ Master’s Degree ☐ Ph.D.

84. Which religion do you affiliate with?

☐ Shi’a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☐ Catholic ☐ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☒ Other ☐ None

Thank you very much for your assistance.
Please take a moment to provide any feedback to the researcher about the content, form and style of this draft survey.

Expressed that there were many methods that were unknown. Noted definitions would be useful. Was slightly offended by references to trials and reparations in the U.S.-Iraq context. Claims survey is entirely too long.

Pilot Questionnaire

Pilot Number: 15 **Location:** internet **Date:** Oct. 13, 2010 **Nationality:** US

This study explores your opinion of popular methods of improving international relationships following a conflict between two states. The questions below will ask you for your opinion on certain ideas or practices. You will also be asked to rate various mechanisms or practices used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

The first set of questions asks for your opinion in general. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
1	Religion is a very important to me	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
2	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
3	A conflict can produce positive benefits	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
4	I believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
5	Not all conflicts are violent	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how useful you think the following tools are for improving relations between states following a conflict. “0” indicates that the technique is not very useful, while “10” indicates that you are very useful.

	How useful or these methods are…	Not useful “0”					Neutral “5”					Very useful “10”	Don't know
6	third party intervention	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
7	security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
8	political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
9	reparation payments	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
10	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
11	public apology	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
12	economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
13	truth telling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
14	cultural exchanges	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
15	positive media coverage	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

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	How useful are these methods	Very un-useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
16	gestures of solidarity	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
17	international tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
18	official state visits	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
19	joint institutions/cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
20	military signaling	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
21	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
22	archiving testimonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
23	granting amnesty	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
24	exchange of representatives	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
25	face-to-face encounters	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
26	films/documentaries	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
27	good governance and accountability	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
28	joint or hybrid tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
29	joint memorials or ceremonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
30	peace education	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
31	regular joint meetings	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
32	(re)writing history	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
33	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
34	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
35	travel/tourism	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
36	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
37	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

Please read the following questions and mark the response which best describes your opinion.

	Do you agree or disagree …	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
38	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
39	It is possible for two states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
40	My opinion of bilateral relations should influence my government's foreign relations	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
41	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about conflict resolution between two states. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	How important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimporta	Neither	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
42	… for two states to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
43	… to avoid violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
44	…for religious values to influence conflict resolution between states	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
45	…for governments to take your opinion into consideration when drafting foreign policy?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic.**

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
46	Would you support conflict resolution between the U.S.-Iraq if a third party proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
47	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
48	Do you think conflict resolution between two states will reconcile relations?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
49	All conflicts can be solved?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, "0" means that you find the item "completely unacceptable" and "10" that you find it "absolutely acceptable" in this particular context.

	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
50	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
51	cultural exchanges	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
52	economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
53	gestures of solidarity	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
54	granting amnesty	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
55	international tribunals	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
56	joint institutions/cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
57	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
58	military signaling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
59	official state visits	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
60	political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
61	positive media coverage	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
62	public apology	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
63	reparation payments	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
64	security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
65	third party intervention	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
66	truth telling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
67	exchange of representatives	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
68	face-to-face encounters	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
68	films/documentaries	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
70	(re)writing history	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

Continued on next page

	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
71	good governance and accountability	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
72	joint memorials or ceremonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
73	joint or hybrid tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
74	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
75	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
76	peace education	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
77	regular joint meetings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
78	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
79	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
80	travel/tourism	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In this last section, you are asked to please provide some personal information.

81. What is your gender:

☒ Male ☐ Female

82. How old are you?

☐ 18-25 ☒ 26-35 ☐ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

83. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☒ High School ☐ Bachelor's Degree ☐ Master's Degree ☐ Ph.D.

84. Which religion do you affiliate with?

☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☐ Catholic ☐ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☐ Other ☒ None

Thank you very much for your assistance.
Please take a moment to provide any feedback to the researcher about the content, form and style of this draft survey.

Too long, did not like the reference to trials or reparations in Iraq-U.S. case, requests definitions for the many unknown methods.

Pilot Questionnaire

Pilot Number: 16 **Location:** UIBK library **Date:** Nov. 8, 2010 **Nationality:** US

This study explores your opinion of popular methods of improving international relationships following a conflict between two states. The questions below will ask you for your opinion on certain ideas or practices. You will also be asked to rate various mechanisms or practices used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

The first set of questions asks for your opinion in general. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
1	Religion is a very important to me	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
2	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
3	A conflict can produce positive benefits	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
4	I believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
5	Not all conflicts are violent	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how useful you think the following tools are for improving relations between states following a conflict. "0" indicates that the technique is not very useful, while "10" indicates that you are very useful.

	How useful or these methods are…	Not useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
6	third party intervention	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
7	security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
8	political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☒ 10	☐ DK
9	reparation payments	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
10	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
11	public apology	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
12	economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
13	truth telling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
14	cultural exchanges	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
15	positive media coverage	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

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	How useful are these methods	Very un-useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
16	gestures of solidarity	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
17	international tribunals	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
18	official state visits	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
19	joint institutions/cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
20	military signaling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
21	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
22	archiving testimonies	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
23	granting amnesty	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
24	exchange of representatives	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
25	face-to-face encounters	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
26	films/documentaries	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
27	good governance and accountability	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
28	joint or hybrid tribunals	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
29	joint memorials or ceremonies	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
30	peace education	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
31	regular joint meetings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
32	(re)writing history	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
33	theater and storytelling	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
34	traditional methods	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
35	travel/tourism	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
36	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
37	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

Please read the following questions and mark the response which best describes your opinion.

	Do you agree or disagree …	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
38	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
39	It is possible for two states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
40	My opinion of bilateral relations should influence my government's foreign relations	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
41	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about conflict resolution between two states. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	How important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimporta	Neither	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
42	… for two states to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
43	… to avoid violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
44	…for religious values to influence conflict resolution between states	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
45	…for governments to take your opinion into consideration when drafting foreign policy?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic.**

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
46	Would you support conflict resolution between the U.S.-Iraq if a third party proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
47	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
48	Do you think conflict resolution between two states will reconcile relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
49	All conflicts can be solved?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, "0" means that you find the item "completely unacceptable" and "10" that you find it "absolutely acceptable" in this particular context.

	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
50	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
51	cultural exchanges	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
52	economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
53	gestures of solidarity	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
54	granting amnesty	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
55	international tribunals	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
56	joint institutions/cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
57	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
58	military signaling	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
59	official state visits	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
60	political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
61	positive media coverage	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
62	public apology	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
63	reparation payments	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
64	security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
65	third party intervention	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
66	truth telling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
67	exchange of representatives	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
68	face-to-face encounters	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
68	films/documentaries	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
70	(re)writing history	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

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	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
71	good governance and accountability	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
72	joint memorials or ceremonies	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
73	joint or hybrid tribunals	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
74	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
75	opening archives and records	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
76	peace education	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
77	regular joint meetings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
78	theater and storytelling	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
79	traditional methods	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
80	travel/tourism	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In this last section, you are asked to please provide some personal information.

81. What is your gender:

☒ Male ☐ Female

82. How old are you?

☒18-25 ☐ 26-35 ☐ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

83. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☒ High School ☐ Bachelor's Degree ☐ Master's Degree ☐ Ph.D.

84. Which religion do you affiliate with?

☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☐ Catholic ☒ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☐ Other ☐ None

Thank you very much for your assistance.
Please take a moment to provide any feedback to the researcher about the content, form and style of this draft survey.

Feels there are some repeating concepts. Many unknown methods. Definitions would be nice for those that are not well known.

Pilot Questionnaire

Pilot Number: 17 **Location:** online **Date:** Nov. 12, 2010 **Nationality:** US

This study explores your opinion of popular methods of improving international relationships following a conflict between two states. The questions below will ask you for your opinion on certain ideas or practices. You will also be asked to rate various mechanisms or practices used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

The first set of questions asks for your opinion in general. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
1	Religion is a very important to me	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
2	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
3	A conflict can produce positive benefits	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
4	I believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
5	Not all conflicts are violent	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how useful you think the following tools are for improving relations between states following a conflict. "0" indicates that the technique is not very useful, while "10" indicates that you are very useful.

	How useful or these methods are…	Not useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
6	third party intervention	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
7	security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
8	political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
9	reparation payments	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
10	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
11	public apology	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
12	economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
13	truth telling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
14	cultural exchanges	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
15	positive media coverage	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

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	How useful are these methods	Very un-useful “0”					Neutral “5”					Very useful “10”	Don’t know
16	gestures of solidarity	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
17	international tribunals	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
18	official state visits	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
19	joint institutions/cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
20	military signaling	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
21	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
22	archiving testimonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
23	granting amnesty	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
24	exchange of representatives	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
25	face-to-face encounters	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
26	films/documentaries	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
27	good governance and accountability	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
28	joint or hybrid tribunals	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
29	joint memorials or ceremonies	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
30	peace education	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
31	regular joint meetings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
32	(re)writing history	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
33	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
34	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
35	travel/tourism	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
36	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
37	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

Please read the following questions and mark the response which best describes your opinion.

	Do you agree or disagree …	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
38	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
39	It is possible for two states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
40	My opinion of bilateral relations should influence my government's foreign relations	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
41	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about conflict resolution between two states. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	How important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimporta	Neither	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
42	… for two states to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
43	… to avoid violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
44	…for religious values to influence conflict resolution between states	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
45	…for governments to take your opinion into consideration when drafting foreign policy?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic.**

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
46	Would you support conflict resolution between the U.S.-Iraq if a third party proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
47	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
48	Do you think conflict resolution between two states will reconcile relations?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
49	All conflicts can be solved?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, “0” means that you find the item “completely unacceptable” and “10” that you find it “absolutely acceptable” in this particular context.

	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable “0”					Neutral “5”					Unacceptable “10”	Don’t know
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
50	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
51	cultural exchanges	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
52	economic cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
53	gestures of solidarity	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
54	granting amnesty	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
55	international tribunals	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
56	joint institutions/cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
57	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
58	military signaling	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
59	official state visits	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
60	political cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
61	positive media coverage	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
62	public apology	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
63	reparation payments	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
64	security cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
65	third party intervention	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
66	truth telling	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
67	exchange of representatives	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
68	face-to-face encounters	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
68	films/documentaries	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
70	(re)writing history	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

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	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
71	good governance and accountability	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
72	joint memorials or ceremonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
73	joint or hybrid tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
74	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
75	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
76	peace education	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
77	regular joint meetings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
78	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
79	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
80	travel/tourism	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In this last section, you are asked to please provide some personal information.

81. What is your gender:

☒ Male ☐ Female

82. How old are you?

☐18-25 ☒ 26-35 ☐ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

83. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☐ High School ☒ Bachelor's Degree ☐ Master's Degree ☐ Ph.D.

84. Which religion do you affiliate with?

☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☒ Catholic ☐ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☐ Other ☐ None

Thank you very much for your assistance.
Please take a moment to provide any feedback to the researcher about the content, form and style of this draft survey.

Lots of unknown methods. Thinks definitions would be useful. Survey too long. Questions the reference to trials...said it seems accussatory.

Pilot Questionnaire

Pilot Number: 18 **Location:** restaurant **Date:** Dec. 5, 2010 **Nationality:** US

This study explores your opinion of popular methods of improving international relationships following a conflict between two states. The questions below will ask you for your opinion on certain ideas or practices. You will also be asked to rate various mechanisms or practices used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

The first set of questions asks for your opinion in general. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
1	Religion is a very important to me	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
2	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
3	A conflict can produce positive benefits	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
4	I believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
5	Not all conflicts are violent	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how useful you think the following tools are for improving relations between states following a conflict. "0" indicates that the technique is not very useful, while "10" indicates that you are very useful.

	How useful or these methods are…	Not useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
6	third party intervention	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
7	security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
8	political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☒ 10	☐ DK
9	reparation payments	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
10	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
11	public apology	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
12	economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
13	truth telling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
14	cultural exchanges	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
15	positive media coverage	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

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	How useful are these methods	Very un-useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
16	gestures of solidarity	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
17	international tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
18	official state visits	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
19	joint institutions/cooperation	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
20	military signaling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
21	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
22	archiving testimonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
23	granting amnesty	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
24	exchange of representatives	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
25	face-to-face encounters	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
26	films/documentaries	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
27	good governance and accountability	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
28	joint or hybrid tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
29	joint memorials or ceremonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
30	peace education	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
31	regular joint meetings	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
32	(re)writing history	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
33	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
34	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
35	travel/tourism	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
36	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
37	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

Please read the following questions and mark the response which best describes your opinion.

	Do you agree or disagree …	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
38	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
39	It is possible for two states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
40	My opinion of bilateral relations should influence my government's foreign relations	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
41	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about conflict resolution between two states. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	How important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimporta	Neither	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
42	… for two states to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
43	… to avoid violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
44	…for religious values to influence conflict resolution between states	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
45	…for governments to take your opinion into consideration when drafting foreign policy?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic.**

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
46	Would you support conflict resolution between the U.S.-Iraq if a third party proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
47	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
48	Do you think conflict resolution between two states will reconcile relations?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
49	All conflicts can be solved?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, "0" means that you find the item "completely unacceptable" and "10" that you find it "absolutely acceptable" in this particular context.

	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
50	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
51	cultural exchanges	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
52	economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
53	gestures of solidarity	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
54	granting amnesty	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
55	international tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
56	joint institutions/cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
57	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
58	military signaling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
59	official state visits	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
60	political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
61	positive media coverage	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
62	public apology	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
63	reparation payments	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
64	security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
65	third party intervention	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
66	truth telling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
67	exchange of representatives	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
68	face-to-face encounters	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
68	films/documentaries	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
70	(re)writing history	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

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	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
71	good governance and accountability	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
72	joint memorials or ceremonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
73	joint or hybrid tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
74	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
75	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
76	peace education	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
77	regular joint meetings	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
78	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
79	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
80	travel/tourism	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In this last section, you are asked to please provide some personal information.

81. What is your gender:

☒ Male ☐ Female

82. How old are you?

☐18-25 ☒ 26-35 ☐ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

83. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☒ High School ☐ Bachelor's Degree ☐ Master's Degree ☐ Ph.D.

84. Which religion do you affiliate with?

☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☐ Catholic ☐ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☐ Other ☒ None

Thank you very much for your assistance.
Please take a moment to provide any feedback to the researcher about the content, form and style of this draft survey.

Definitions for methods, concerned about how U.S. respondents will respond to some questions about reparations or criminal wrongdoing.

Pilot Questionnaire

Pilot Number: 19 **Location:** internet **Date:** Dec. 15, 2010 **Nationality:** US

This study explores your opinion of popular methods of improving international relationships following a conflict between two states. The questions below will ask you for your opinion on certain ideas or practices. You will also be asked to rate various mechanisms or practices used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

The first set of questions asks for your opinion in general. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
1	Religion is a very important to me	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
2	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
3	A conflict can produce positive benefits	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
4	I believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
5	Not all conflicts are violent	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how useful you think the following tools are for improving relations between states following a conflict. "0" indicates that the technique is not very useful, while "10" indicates that you are very useful.

	How useful or these methods are…	Not useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
6	third party intervention	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
7	security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
8	political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
9	reparation payments	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
10	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
11	public apology	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
12	economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
13	truth telling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
14	cultural exchanges	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
15	positive media coverage	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

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	How useful are these methods	Very un-useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
16	gestures of solidarity	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
17	international tribunals	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
18	official state visits	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
19	joint institutions/cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
20	military signaling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
21	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
22	archiving testimonies	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
23	granting amnesty	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
24	exchange of representatives	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
25	face-to-face encounters	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
26	films/documentaries	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
27	good governance and accountability	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
28	joint or hybrid tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
29	joint memorials or ceremonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
30	peace education	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
31	regular joint meetings	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
32	(re)writing history	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
33	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
34	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
35	travel/tourism	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
36	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
37	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

Please read the following questions and mark the response which best describes your opinion.

	Do you agree or disagree …	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
38	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
39	It is possible for two states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
40	My opinion of bilateral relations should influence my government's foreign relations	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
41	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about conflict resolution between two states. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	How important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimporta	Neither	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
42	… for two states to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
43	… to avoid violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
44	…for religious values to influence conflict resolution between states	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
45	…for governments to take your opinion into consideration when drafting foreign policy?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic.**

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
46	Would you support conflict resolution between the U.S.-Iraq if a third party proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
47	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
48	Do you think conflict resolution between two states will reconcile relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
49	All conflicts can be solved?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, "0" means that you find the item "completely unacceptable" and "10" that you find it "absolutely acceptable" in this particular context.

	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
50	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
51	cultural exchanges	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
52	economic cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
53	gestures of solidarity	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
54	granting amnesty	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
55	international tribunals	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
56	joint institutions/cooperation	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
57	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
58	military signaling	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
59	official state visits	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
60	political cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
61	positive media coverage	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
62	public apology	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
63	reparation payments	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
64	security cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
65	third party intervention	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
66	truth telling	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
67	exchange of representatives	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
68	face-to-face encounters	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
68	films/documentaries	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
70	(re)writing history	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

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	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
71	good governance and accountability	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
72	joint memorials or ceremonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
73	joint or hybrid tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
74	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
75	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
76	peace education	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
77	regular joint meetings	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
78	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
79	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
80	travel/tourism	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In this last section, you are asked to please provide some personal information.

81. What is your gender:

☐ Male ☒ Female

82. How old are you?

☐18-25 ☒ 26-35 ☐ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

83. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☐ High School ☒ Bachelor's Degree ☐ Master's Degree ☐ Ph.D.

84. Which religion do you affiliate with?

☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☒ Catholic ☐ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☐ Other ☐ None

Thank you very much for your assistance.
Please take a moment to provide any feedback to the researcher about the content, form and style of this draft survey.

Internet survey, had some trouble with the identifying methods. explain definitions. Too long.

Pilot Questionnaire

Pilot Number: 20 **Location:** internet **Date:** Dec., 20, 2011 **Nationality:** Iraq

This study explores your opinion of popular methods of improving international relationships following a conflict between two states. The questions below will ask you for your opinion on certain ideas or practices. You will also be asked to rate various mechanisms or practices used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

The first set of questions asks for your opinion in general. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following statements…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
1	Religion is a very important to me	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
2	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
3	A conflict can produce positive benefits	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
4	I believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
5	Not all conflicts are violent	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how useful you think the following tools are for improving relations between states following a conflict. "0" indicates that the technique is not very useful, while "10" indicates that you are very useful.

	How useful or these methods are…	Not useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
6	third party intervention	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
7	security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
8	political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
9	reparation payments	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
10	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
11	public apology	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
12	economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
13	truth telling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
14	cultural exchanges	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
15	positive media coverage	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

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	How useful are these methods	Very un-useful "0"					Neutral "5"					Very useful "10"	Don't know
16	gestures of solidarity	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
17	international tribunals	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
18	official state visits	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
19	joint institutions/cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
20	military signaling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
21	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
22	archiving testimonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
23	granting amnesty	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
24	exchange of representatives	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
25	face-to-face encounters	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
26	films/documentaries	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
27	good governance and accountability	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
28	joint or hybrid tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
29	joint memorials or ceremonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
30	peace education	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
31	regular joint meetings	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
32	(re)writing history	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
33	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
34	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
35	travel/tourism	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
36	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
37	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

Please read the following questions and mark the response which best describes your opinion.

	Do you agree or disagree …	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
38	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
39	It is possible for two states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
40	My opinion of bilateral relations should influence my government's foreign relations	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
41	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about conflict resolution between two states. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	How important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimporta	Neither	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
42	… for two states to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
43	… to avoid violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
44	…for religious values to influence conflict resolution between states	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
45	…for governments to take your opinion into consideration when drafting foreign policy?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic.**

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
46	Would you support conflict resolution between the U.S.-Iraq if a third party proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
47	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
48	Do you think conflict resolution between two states will reconcile relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
49	All conflicts can be solved?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, "0" means that you find the item "completely unacceptable" and "10" that you find it "absolutely acceptable" in this particular context.

	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
50	court (or judicial) proceedings	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
51	cultural exchanges	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
52	economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
53	gestures of solidarity	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
54	granting amnesty	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
55	international tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
56	joint institutions/cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
57	joint projects/ reconstruction	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
58	military signaling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
59	official state visits	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
60	political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
61	positive media coverage	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
62	public apology	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
63	reparation payments	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
64	security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
65	third party intervention	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
66	truth telling	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
67	exchange of representatives	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
68	face-to-face encounters	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
68	films/documentaries	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
70	(re)writing history	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

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	Rate how acceptable these are for improving U.S.-Iraq relations…	Acceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Unacceptable "10"	Don't know
71	good governance and accountability	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
72	joint memorials or ceremonies	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
73	joint or hybrid tribunals	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
74	legislative admission of wrongdoing	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
75	opening archives and records	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
76	peace education	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
77	regular joint meetings	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
78	theater and storytelling	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
79	traditional methods	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
80	travel/tourism	☒ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In this last section, you are asked to please provide some personal information.

81. What is your gender:

☐ Male ☒ Female

82. How old are you?

☐ 18-25 ☐ 26-35 ☒ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

83. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☐ High School ☒ Bachelor's Degree ☐ Master's Degree ☐ Ph.D.

84. Which religion do you affiliate with?

☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☒ Sunni Islam ☐ Catholic ☐ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☐ Other ☐ None

Thank you very much for your assistance.
Please take a moment to provide any feedback to the researcher about the content, form and style of this draft survey.

Likes the rating scales, largest issue with overlap in methods, too many methods, many of them were unknown. Survey is taxing due to length, risks incompletion.

Appendix 8: Combined Pilot 21-25

Pilot No. 21 **Location:** library **Date:** Jan. 22, 2011 **Nationality:** U.S.

This study explores how people view and value popular methods of improving international relationships following a military conflict between two states. Your participation in this study is very important for making comparisons between how citizens think about international relations versus politicians. The questions below will ask you how important certain items or circumstances are to you personally. You will also be asked to rate various social and political mechanisms or practices often used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

1. As a U.S. citizen, have you traveled to and worked in Iraq (in the military or as a civilian) since April 2003?

Yes ☐ (Answer only the "a" questions in this section)

No ☒ (Answer only the "b" questions in this section)

2a. Would you mind telling me which type of employer did you work for in Iraq?

the U.S. military ☐
the U.S. diplomatic service ☐
a private U.S. company ☐
an international organization ☐
as an independent or freelancer ☐
a university ☐
other (specify) ☐

3a. For about how many months in total did you work in Iraq?

1-3 months ☐
4-8 months ☐
9-12 months ☐
13-16 months ☐
17 months or more ☐



2b. If you have not personally worked in Iraq, has one of your immediate family members (a parent, a child, or a sister or brother) worked in Iraq (in the military or as a civilian) since April 2003?

Yes ☐ No ☒

Stop

3b. For about how many months did your family member work/serve in Iraq?

1-3 months ☐
4-8 months ☐
9-12 months ☐
13-16 months ☐
17 months or more ☐

The next set of questions will ask you about how important certain things are to you personally. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
4	Religion is a very important influence in my everyday life	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
5	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
6	I find it very important to maintain positive relationships, even with strangers	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
7	I strongly believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
8	My country should always work hard to maintain positive relations with other countries	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how familiar you are with the following tools which can be used to improve relations following a conflict between two communities or states. "0" indicates that you have never heard of a particular topic, while "10" indicates that you are very familiar with it. Brief definitions are provided.

	How familiar or unfamiliar are you with…	Very unfamiliar "0"					Aware "5"					Very familiar "10"	Don't know
9	**Third party intervention** (another country or organization steps in to help two states find ways to improve their relations)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
10	**Security cooperation** (two states agree to cooperate militarily to ensure their national security)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
11	**Political cooperation** (two states agree to work together politically, for example by holding joint political meetings to discuss issues important to both states)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
12	**Reparation payments** (a state decides to pay compensation to citizens who have been wrongfully injured as a result of previous action)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
13	**Court** (or judicial) **proceedings** (criminal wrongdoing is prosecuted according to state or international law and punishment is passed down if guilt is determined)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
14	**Public apology** (one or more political representatives publicly apologize for any wrongs committed against another group)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
15	**Economic cooperation** (two states agree to work together economically as a way to improve relations and increase economic dependency on one another)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
16	**Truth telling** (a process where the history of violence is traced. Those who have committed wrongdoing are asked to admit their wrongs before a committee in exchange for amnesty or reduced sentences)	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
17	**Cultural exchanges** (provides opportunities for individuals of different cultures to work, study or travel to another country for a period of time)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
18	**Positive media coverage** of the other state (a shift from no or only negative coverage of a given country to positive news, documentaries and reports on that state)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

For the remainder of this questionnaire, *reconciliation* is defined as actions taken to improve a relationship following a conflict. To *reconcile* means to develop strong, positive relations with another party. Please read the following questions and mark the one response which best describes your opinion about each topic.

	Do you agree or disagree ...	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
19	My opinion of the "other" person would permanently change after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
20	A foreign government should not impose its will on the citizens of another country no matter what its intentions are	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
21	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
22	It is possible for two nation-states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
23	My opinion of bilateral relations should be an important influencer on my government's foreign relations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
24	I could never have a good relationship with someone who has used violence against me	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
25	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
26	Religion influences every aspect of my life	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

Please rate the following statements according to your personal opinion. Using the 0-10 scale provided, rate each item where "0" means "definitely not true", "5" means "neutral" and "10" means "definitely true".

	Rate the following according to your opinion...	Definitely Not "0"					Neutral "5"					Definitely "10"	Don't know
27	The media should focus more on positive news about other countries	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
28	It is possible for different religious groups to build positive relations with other religious groups following violence	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
29	Only politicians should make decisions about my country's bilateral relations, not citizens	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
30	It is absolutely necessary for two states to reconcile after a violent conflict	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
31	I would be very supportive of my government if it considered my opinion when reconciling with another state	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
32	In general, citizens should be satisfied with methods used to improve state relations if they are to be successful	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
33	Violent conflict would inevitably lead me to dislike the other despite any of their attempts for reconciliation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about reconciliation and some methods of improving relations between two groups following a conflict. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	In your opinion, how important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
34	… for two communities to reconcile after a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
35	… that your government listen to the opinion of citizens from other countries to prevent conflict?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
36	…that economic relations are used for building positive relations between two states?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
37	…to work together to increase two countries' security for improving state relations?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
38	… for two states to reconcile following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
39	… for two states to work together politically to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
40	…for an international court litigation to provide justice to citizens after a conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
41	… for neutral parties, such as the United Nations, to successfully promote peaceful state relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
42	…to have cultural exchanges between two countries to improve cultural understanding between two states which had a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
43	…to pay compensation to citizens who have been harmed by violence for improving relations between two states?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
44	…the public disclosure of the full truth for improving state relations following a violent conflict between states?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
45	…to improve state relations when a government representative says he or she is "sorry"?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Please rate the following reconciliation mechanisms according to how useful you think they would be for your country to improve relations with another state following a violent conflict. On the scale, “0” means you think that a mechanism is useless while “10” indicates that you think that it is useful for improving state relations. **Rate the following according to your opinion of their usefulness for your country…**

		Useless “0”					Neutral “5”					Useful “10”	Don’t know
46	…economic cooperation …	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
47	…political cooperation …	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
48	…security cooperation …	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
49	…justice administered through an international court …	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
50	…truth telling…	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
51	…third party intervention…	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
52	…cultural exchanges…	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☒ 10	☐ DK
53	…payment of reparations…	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
54	…a public apology by a politician…	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
55	…positive media coverage of the other state	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to please turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. The questions below are designed to gain insight into if and how you would like to improve relations between the governments and citizens of the United States and Iraq. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic**.

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don’t know
56	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
57	Do you think that Iraq-U.S. economic cooperation is important to improve existing relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
58	Is it important to maintain Iraq-U.S. security cooperation?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
59	Is it important to improve the current level of Iraq-U.S. political cooperation?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
60	Would you support reconciliation between the U.S.-Iraq if the UN proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
61	Would you support the U.S. government paying reparations to Iraqis?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
62	Would you support a truth commission following the 2003 Iraq War?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

	Please answer the following …	Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
63	Would you support an international tribunal to prosecute wrongdoing during the 2003 war in Iraq?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
64	How useful do you think positive media coverage would be for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
65	Do you think that U.S. politicians should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting policy toward Iraq?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
66	How useful do you think cultural exchanges between the U.S. and Iraq would be for improving mutual understanding?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
67	Would you endorse an apology by the Iraqi government to the U.S. people for the 2003 war?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
68	Would you endorse an apology by the U.S. government to the Iraqi people for the war?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
69	Do you think that Iraq shares responsibility for the 2003 War?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your perceptions about reconciliation and some methods of improving relations between the United States and Iraq. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic.

		Un-important	Slightly unimpor-tant	Neither important nor un-important	Slightly important	Important	Don't know
70	Do you think that it is important or unimportant for the U.S. and Iraq to improve their current relations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
71	Do you think that it is important or unimportant to always avoid violent conflict	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
72	How important is religious teaching for guiding your everyday life?	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
73	Do you think that economic relations are important for building positive relations between Iraq and the U.S.?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
74	Do you think that it is important for the U.S. and Iraq to work together to increase Iraq's security?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
75	Do you think that positive media coverage of the other country would help improve US-Iraq relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
76	Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work more together at the political level to improve relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, "0" means that you find the item "completely unacceptable" and "10" that you find it "absolutely acceptable" in this particular context. **Rate the following according to your opinion of their acceptability in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations…**

		Completely unacceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Absolutely acceptable "10"	Don't know
77	… cultural exchanges to increase understanding	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☒ 10	☐ DK
78	… an international tribunal to investigate wrongdoing	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
79	…a U.S. apology for its actions	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
80	…increased security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
81	… Iraqi not taking some responsibility for the 2003 War	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
82	…use of truth commissions to disclose wrongdoing	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
83	…increased economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
84	… third party action to improve U.S.-Iraq relations	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
85	… positive media coverage of the other country	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
86	… more political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
87	… payment of reparations by the U.S. to Iraqis	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
88	…for my country to reconcile with Iraq	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In your honest opinion, how important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between these two states? Please choose the most appropriate answer.

	In your opinion, how important or unimportant is/are…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very important	Don't know
89	…international court proceedings for providing post-conflict justice to Iraqi citizens?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
90	…international court proceedings for providing post-conflict justice to U.S. citizens?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
91	…intervention by another party, such as the United Nations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
92	…cultural exchanges between Iraq and the U.S. for improving state relations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK

In your honest opinion, how important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between the two states? Please choose the most appropriate answer.

	How important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between the two states?	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
93	…U.S. paying reparations to Iraqi citizens	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
94	…public disclosure of the full truth in a truth commission	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
95	…for Iraq to take some responsibility for the 2003 War	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
96	…for a U.S. government representative to apologize for the 2003 war in Iraq	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
97	…for an Iraqi government representative to apologize for the 2003 war	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

In this final section, you are asked to please provide some personal information. The answers that you provide to the following questions will help the researcher to classify the data and make statistical comparisons of all the information that you have so generously provided above. All information provided in this survey is completely confidential and will not be shared with others.

98. What is your gender:

☒ Male ☐ Female

99. How old are you?

☒15-25 ☐ 26-35 ☐ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

100. If you are a parent, how many children do you have?

☒ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ 11 or more

101. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☒ High School ☐ Bachelor's Degree ☐ Master's Degree ☐ Ph.D.

102. If you affiliate yourself with a particular religion, please choose the most appropriate?

☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☐ Catholic ☒ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☐ Other ☐ None

Thank you very much for your assistance. Your responses are completely confidential. If you are interested periodic updated about the status of this research and its findings, please provide an e-mail address. Please send regular updates to:

Pilot No. 22 Location: restaurant Date: Feb. 20, 2011 Nationality: U.S.

This study explores how people view and value popular methods of improving international relationships following a military conflict between two states. Your participation in this study is very important for making comparisons between how citizens think about international relations versus politicians. The questions below will ask you how important certain items or circumstances are to you personally. You will also be asked to rate various social and political mechanisms or practices often used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

1. As a U.S. citizen, have you traveled to and worked in Iraq (in the military or as a civilian) since April 2003?



Yes ☐ (Answer only the "a" questions in this section)

No ☒ (Answer only the "b" questions in this section)

2a. Would you mind telling me which type of employer did you work for in Iraq?

- the U.S. military ☐
- the U.S. diplomatic service ☐
- a private U.S. company ☐
- an international organization ☐
- as an independent or freelancer ☐
- a university ☐
- other (specify) ☐

2b. If you have not personally worked in Iraq, has one of your immediate family members (a parent, a child, or a sister or brother) worked in Iraq (in the military or as a civilian) since April 2003?

Yes ☐ No ☒

Stop

3a. For about how many months in total did you work in Iraq?

- 1-3 months ☐
- 4-8 months ☐
- 9-12 months ☐
- 13-16 months ☐
- 17 months or more ☐

3b. For about how many months did your family member work/serve in Iraq?

- 1-3 months ☐
- 4-8 months ☐
- 9-12 months ☐
- 13-16 months ☐
- 17 months or more ☐

The next set of questions will ask you about how important certain things are to you personally. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
4	Religion is a very important influence in my everyday life	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
5	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
6	I find it very important to maintain positive relationships, even with strangers	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
7	I strongly believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
8	My country should always work hard to maintain positive relations with other countries	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how familiar you are with the following tools which can be used to improve relations following a conflict between two communities or states. "0" indicates that you have never heard of a particular topic, while "10" indicates that you are very familiar with it. Brief definitions are provided.

	How familiar or unfamiliar are you with…	Very unfamiliar "0"					Aware "5"					Very familiar "10"	Don't know
9	**Third party intervention** (another country or organization steps in to help two states find ways to improve their relations)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
10	**Security cooperation** (two states agree to cooperate militarily to ensure their national security)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
11	**Political cooperation** (two states agree to work together politically, for example by holding joint political meetings to discuss issues important to both states)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
12	**Reparation payments** (a state decides to pay compensation to citizens who have been wrongfully injured as a result of previous action)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
13	**Court** (or judicial) **proceedings** (criminal wrongdoing is prosecuted according to state or international law and punishment is passed down if guilt is determined)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
14	**Public apology** (one or more political representatives publicly apologize for any wrongs committed against another group)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
15	**Economic cooperation** (two states agree to work together economically as a way to improve relations and increase economic dependency on one another)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
16	**Truth telling** (a process where the history of violence is traced. Those who have committed wrongdoing are asked to admit their wrongs before a committee in exchange for amnesty or reduced sentences)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
17	**Cultural exchanges** (provides opportunities for individuals of different cultures to work, study or travel to another country for a period of time)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
18	**Positive media coverage** of the other state (a shift from no or only negative coverage of a given country to positive news, documentaries and reports on that state)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

For the remainder of this questionnaire, *reconciliation* is defined as actions taken to improve a relationship following a conflict. To *reconcile* means to develop strong, positive relations with another party. Please read the following questions and mark the one response which best describes your opinion about each topic.

	Do you agree or disagree …	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
19	My opinion of the "other" person would permanently change after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
20	A foreign government should not impose its will on the citizens of another country no matter what its intentions are	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
21	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
22	It is possible for two nation-states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
23	My opinion of bilateral relations should be an important influencer on my government's foreign relations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
24	I could never have a good relationship with someone who has used violence against me	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
25	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
26	Religion influences every aspect of my life	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK

Please rate the following statements according to your personal opinion. Using the 0-10 scale provided, rate each item where "0" means "definitely not true", "5" means "neutral" and "10" means "definitely true".

	Rate the following according to your opinion…	Definitely Not "0"					Neutral "5"					Definitely "10"	Don't know
27	The media should focus more on positive news about other countries	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
28	It is possible for different religious groups to build positive relations with other religious groups following violence	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
29	Only politicians should make decisions about my country's bilateral relations, not citizens	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
30	It is absolutely necessary for two states to reconcile after a violent conflict	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
31	I would be very supportive of my government if it considered my opinion when reconciling with another state	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
32	In general, citizens should be satisfied with methods used to improve state relations if they are to be successful	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☒ 10	☐ DK
33	Violent conflict would inevitably lead me to dislike the other despite any of their attempts for reconciliation	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about reconciliation and some methods of improving relations between two groups following a conflict. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	In your opinion, how important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
34	… for two communities to reconcile after a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
35	… that your government listen to the opinion of citizens from other countries to prevent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
36	…that economic relations are used for building positive relations between two states?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
37	…to work together to increase two countries' security for improving state relations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
38	… for two states to reconcile following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
39	… for two states to work together politically to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
40	…for an international court litigation to provide justice to citizens after a conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
41	… for neutral parties, such as the United Nations, to successfully promote peaceful state relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
42	…to have cultural exchanges between two countries to improve cultural understanding between two states which had a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
43	…to pay compensation to citizens who have been harmed by violence for improving relations between two states?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
44	…the public disclosure of the full truth for improving state relations following a violent conflict between states?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
45	…to improve state relations when a government representative says he or she is "sorry"?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Please rate the following reconciliation mechanisms according to how useful you think they would be for your country to improve relations with another state following a violent conflict. On the scale, "0" means you think that a mechanism is useless while "10" indicates that you think that it is useful for improving state relations. **Rate the following according to your opinion of their usefulness for your country…**

		Useless "0"					Neutral "5"					Useful "10"	Don't know
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
46	…economic cooperation …	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
47	…political cooperation …	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
48	…security cooperation …	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
49	…justice administered through an international court …	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
50	…truth telling…	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
51	…third party intervention…	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
52	…cultural exchanges…	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
53	…payment of reparations…	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
54	…a public apology by a politician…	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
55	…positive media coverage of the other state	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to please turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. The questions below are designed to gain insight into if and how you would like to improve relations between the governments and citizens of the United States and Iraq. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic**.

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
56	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
57	Do you think that Iraq-U.S. economic cooperation is important to improve existing relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
58	Is it important to maintain Iraq-U.S. security cooperation?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
59	Is it important to improve the current level of Iraq-U.S. political cooperation?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
60	Would you support reconciliation between the U.S.-Iraq if the UN proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
61	Would you support the U.S. government paying reparations to Iraqis?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
62	Would you support a truth commission following the 2003 Iraq War?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

	Please answer the following …	Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
63	Would you support an international tribunal to prosecute wrongdoing during the 2003 war in Iraq?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
64	How useful do you think positive media coverage would be for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
65	Do you think that U.S. politicians should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting policy toward Iraq?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
66	How useful do you think cultural exchanges between the U.S. and Iraq would be for improving mutual understanding?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
67	Would you endorse an apology by the Iraqi government to the U.S. people for the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
68	Would you endorse an apology by the U.S. government to the Iraqi people for the war?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
69	Do you think that Iraq shares responsibility for the 2003 War?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your perceptions about reconciliation and some methods of improving relations between the United States and Iraq. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic.

		Un-important	Slightly unimpor-tant	Neither important nor un-important	Slightly important	Important	Don't know
70	Do you think that it is important or unimportant for the U.S. and Iraq to improve their current relations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
71	Do you think that it is important or unimportant to always avoid violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
72	How important is religious teaching for guiding your everyday life?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
73	Do you think that economic relations are important for building positive relations between Iraq and the U.S.?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
74	Do you think that it is important for the U.S. and Iraq to work together to increase Iraq's security?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
75	Do you think that positive media coverage of the other country would help improve US-Iraq relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
76	Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work more together at the political level to improve relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, “0” means that you find the item “completely unacceptable” and “10” that you find it “absolutely acceptable” in this particular context. **Rate the following according to your opinion of their acceptability in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations…**

		Completely unacceptable “0”					Neutral “5”					Absolutely acceptable “10”	Don’t know
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
77	… cultural exchanges to increase understanding	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
78	… an international tribunal to investigate wrongdoing	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
79	…a U.S. apology for its actions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
80	…increased security cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
81	… Iraqi not taking some responsibility for the 2003 War	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
82	…use of truth commissions to disclose wrongdoing	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
83	…increased economic cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
84	… third party action to improve U.S.-Iraq relations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
85	… positive media coverage of the other country	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
86	… more political cooperation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
87	… payment of reparations by the U.S. to Iraqis	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
88	…for my country to reconcile with Iraq	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐

In your honest opinion, how important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between these two states? Please choose the most appropriate answer.

	In your opinion, how important or unimportant is/are…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very important	Don’t know
89	…international court proceedings for providing post-conflict justice to Iraqi citizens?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
90	…international court proceedings for providing post-conflict justice to U.S. citizens?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
91	…intervention by another party, such as the United Nations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
92	…cultural exchanges between Iraq and the U.S. for improving state relations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK

In your honest opinion, how important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between the two states? Please choose the most appropriate answer.

	How important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between the two states?	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
93	…U.S. paying reparations to Iraqi citizens	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
94	…public disclosure of the full truth in a truth commission	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
95	…for Iraq to take some responsibility for the 2003 War	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
96	…for a U.S. government representative to apologize for the 2003 war in Iraq	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
97	…for an Iraqi government representative to apologize for the 2003 war	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

In this final section, you are asked to please provide some personal information. The answers that you provide to the following questions will help the researcher to classify the data and make statistical comparisons of all the information that you have so generously provided above. All information provided in this survey is completely confidential and will not be shared with others.

98. What is your gender:

☐ Male ☒ Female

99. How old are you?

☐ 15-25 ☒ 26-35 ☐ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

100. If you are a parent, how many children do you have?

☒ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ 11 or more

101. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☐ High School ☒ Bachelor's Degree ☐ Master's Degree ☐ Ph.D.

102. If you affiliate yourself with a particular religion, please choose the most appropriate?

☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☒ Catholic ☐ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☐ Other ☐ None

Thank you very much for your assistance. Your responses are completely confidential. If you are interested periodic updated about the status of this research and its findings, please provide an e-mail address. Please send regular updates to:

Pilot No. 23 Location: park Date: Mar. 25, 2011 Nationality: U.S.

This study explores how people view and value popular methods of improving international relationships following a military conflict between two states. Your participation in this study is very important for making comparisons between how citizens think about international relations versus politicians. The questions below will ask you how important certain items or circumstances are to you personally. You will also be asked to rate various social and political mechanisms or practices often used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

1. As a U.S. citizen, have you traveled to and worked in Iraq (in the military or as a civilian) since April 2003?

Yes ☐ (Answer only the "a" questions in this section)

No ☒ (Answer only the "b" questions in this section)

2a. Would you mind telling me which type of employer did you work for in Iraq?

- the U.S. military ☐
- the U.S. diplomatic service ☐
- a private U.S. company ☐
- an international organization ☐
- as an independent or freelancer ☐
- a university ☐
- other (specify) ☐

2b. If you have not personally worked in Iraq, has one of your immediate family members (a parent, a child, or a sister or brother) worked in Iraq (in the military or as a civilian) since April 2003?

Yes ☐ No ☒

Stop

3a. For about how many months in total did you work in Iraq?

- 1-3 months ☐
- 4-8 months ☐
- 9-12 months ☐
- 13-16 months ☐
- 17 months or more ☐

3b. For about how many months did your family member work/serve in Iraq?

- 1-3 months ☐
- 4-8 months ☐
- 9-12 months ☐
- 13-16 months ☐
- 17 months or more ☐

The next set of questions will ask you about how important certain things are to you personally. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
4	Religion is a very important influence in my everyday life	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
5	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
6	I find it very important to maintain positive relationships, even with strangers	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
7	I strongly believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
8	My country should always work hard to maintain positive relations with other countries	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how familiar you are with the following tools which can be used to improve relations following a conflict between two communities or states. "0" indicates that you have never heard of a particular topic, while "10" indicates that you are very familiar with it. Brief definitions are provided.

	How familiar or unfamiliar are you with…	Very unfamiliar "0"					Aware "5"					Very familiar "10"	Don't know
9	**Third party intervention** (another country or organization steps in to help two states find ways to improve their relations)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
10	**Security cooperation** (two states agree to cooperate militarily to ensure their national security)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
11	**Political cooperation** (two states agree to work together politically, for example by holding joint political meetings to discuss issues important to both states)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
12	**Reparation payments** (a state decides to pay compensation to citizens who have been wrongfully injured as a result of previous action)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
13	**Court** (or judicial) **proceedings** (criminal wrongdoing is prosecuted according to state or international law and punishment is passed down if guilt is determined)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
14	**Public apology** (one or more political representatives publicly apologize for any wrongs committed against another group)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
15	**Economic cooperation** (two states agree to work together economically as a way to improve relations and increase economic dependency on one another)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
16	**Truth telling** (a process where the history of violence is traced. Those who have committed wrongdoing are asked to admit their wrongs before a committee in exchange for amnesty or reduced sentences)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
17	**Cultural exchanges** (provides opportunities for individuals of different cultures to work, study or travel to another country for a period of time)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
18	**Positive media coverage** of the other state (a shift from no or only negative coverage of a given country to positive news, documentaries and reports on that state)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

For the remainder of this questionnaire, *reconciliation* is defined as actions taken to improve a relationship following a conflict. To *reconcile* means to develop strong, positive relations with another party. Please read the following questions and mark the one response which best describes your opinion about each topic.

	Do you agree or disagree …	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
19	My opinion of the "other" person would permanently change after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
20	A foreign government should not impose its will on the citizens of another country no matter what its intentions are	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
21	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
22	It is possible for two nation-states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
23	My opinion of bilateral relations should be an important influencer on my government's foreign relations	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
24	I could never have a good relationship with someone who has used violence against me	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
25	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
26	Religion influences every aspect of my life	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

Please rate the following statements according to your personal opinion. Using the 0-10 scale provided, rate each item where "0" means "definitely not true", "5" means "neutral" and "10" means "definitely true".

	Rate the following according to your opinion…	Definitely Not "0"					Neutral "5"					Definitely "10"	Don't know
27	The media should focus more on positive news about other countries	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
28	It is possible for different religious groups to build positive relations with other religious groups following violence	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
29	Only politicians should make decisions about my country's bilateral relations, not citizens	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
30	It is absolutely necessary for two states to reconcile after a violent conflict	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
31	I would be very supportive of my government if it considered my opinion when reconciling with another state	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
32	In general, citizens should be satisfied with methods used to improve state relations if they are to be successful	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
33	Violent conflict would inevitably lead me to dislike the other despite any of their attempts for reconciliation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about reconciliation and some methods of improving relations between two groups following a conflict. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	In your opinion, how important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
34	… for two communities to reconcile after a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
35	… that your government listen to the opinion of citizens from other countries to prevent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
36	…that economic relations are used for building positive relations between two states?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
37	…to work together to increase two countries' security for improving state relations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
38	… for two states to reconcile following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
39	… for two states to work together politically to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
40	…for an international court litigation to provide justice to citizens after a conflict?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
41	… for neutral parties, such as the United Nations, to successfully promote peaceful state relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
42	…to have cultural exchanges between two countries to improve cultural understanding between two states which had a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
43	…to pay compensation to citizens who have been harmed by violence for improving relations between two states?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
44	…the public disclosure of the full truth for improving state relations following a violent conflict between states?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
45	…to improve state relations when a government representative says he or she is "sorry"?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

Please rate the following reconciliation mechanisms according to how useful you think they would be for your country to improve relations with another state following a violent conflict. On the scale, "0" means you think that a mechanism is useless while "10" indicates that you think that it is useful for improving state relations. **Rate the following according to your opinion of their usefulness for your country…**

		Useless "0"					Neutral "5"					Useful "10"	Don't know
46	…economic cooperation …	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
47	…political cooperation …	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
48	…security cooperation …	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
49	…justice administered through an international court …	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
50	…truth telling…	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
51	…third party intervention…	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
52	…cultural exchanges…	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
53	…payment of reparations…	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
54	…a public apology by a politician…	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
55	…positive media coverage of the other state	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to please turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. The questions below are designed to gain insight into if and how you would like to improve relations between the governments and citizens of the United States and Iraq. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic**.

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
56	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
57	Do you think that Iraq-U.S. economic cooperation is important to improve existing relations?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
58	Is it important to maintain Iraq-U.S. security cooperation?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
59	Is it important to improve the current level of Iraq-U.S. political cooperation?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
60	Would you support reconciliation between the U.S.-Iraq if the UN proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
61	Would you support the U.S. government paying reparations to Iraqis?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
62	Would you support a truth commission following the 2003 Iraq War?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

	Please answer the following …	Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
63	Would you support an international tribunal to prosecute wrongdoing during the 2003 war in Iraq?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
64	How useful do you think positive media coverage would be for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
65	Do you think that U.S. politicians should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting policy toward Iraq?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
66	How useful do you think cultural exchanges between the U.S. and Iraq would be for improving mutual understanding?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
67	Would you endorse an apology by the Iraqi government to the U.S. people for the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
68	Would you endorse an apology by the U.S. government to the Iraqi people for the war?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
69	Do you think that Iraq shares responsibility for the 2003 War?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your perceptions about reconciliation and some methods of improving relations between the United States and Iraq. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic.

		Un-important	Slightly unimpor-tant	Neither important nor un-important	Slightly important	Important	Don't know
70	Do you think that it is important or unimportant for the U.S. and Iraq to improve their current relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
71	Do you think that it is important or unimportant to always avoid violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
72	How important is religious teaching for guiding your everyday life?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
73	Do you think that economic relations are important for building positive relations between Iraq and the U.S.?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
74	Do you think that it is important for the U.S. and Iraq to work together to increase Iraq's security?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
75	Do you think that positive media coverage of the other country would help improve US-Iraq relations?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
76	Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work more together at the political level to improve relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, "0" means that you find the item "completely unacceptable" and "10" that you find it "absolutely acceptable" in this particular context. **Rate the following according to your opinion of their acceptability in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations…**

		Completely unacceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Absolutely acceptable "10"	Don't know
77	… cultural exchanges to increase understanding	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
78	… an international tribunal to investigate wrongdoing	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
79	…a U.S. apology for its actions	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
80	…increased security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
81	… Iraqi not taking some responsibility for the 2003 War	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
82	…use of truth commissions to disclose wrongdoing	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
83	…increased economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
84	… third party action to improve U.S.-Iraq relations	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
85	… positive media coverage of the other country	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
86	… more political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
87	… payment of reparations by the U.S. to Iraqis	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
88	…for my country to reconcile with Iraq	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In your honest opinion, how important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between these two states? Please choose the most appropriate answer.

	In your opinion, how important or unimportant is/are…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very important	Don't know
89	…international court proceedings for providing post-conflict justice to Iraqi citizens?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
90	…international court proceedings for providing post-conflict justice to U.S. citizens?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
91	…intervention by another party, such as the United Nations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
92	…cultural exchanges between Iraq and the U.S. for improving state relations?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

In your honest opinion, how important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between the two states? Please choose the most appropriate answer.

	How important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between the two states?	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
93	…U.S. paying reparations to Iraqi citizens	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
94	…public disclosure of the full truth in a truth commission	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
95	…for Iraq to take some responsibility for the 2003 War	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
96	…for a U.S. government representative to apologize for the 2003 war in Iraq	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
97	…for an Iraqi government representative to apologize for the 2003 war	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK

In this final section, you are asked to please provide some personal information. The answers that you provide to the following questions will help the researcher to classify the data and make statistical comparisons of all the information that you have so generously provided above. All information provided in this survey is completely confidential and will not be shared with others.

98. What is your gender:

☒ Male ☐ Female

99. How old are you?

☐15-25 ☐ 26-35 ☒ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

100. If you are a parent, how many children do you have?

☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☒ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ 11 or more

101. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☐ High School ☒ Bachelor's Degree ☐ Master's Degree ☐ Ph.D.

102. If you affiliate yourself with a particular religion, please choose the most appropriate?

☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☐ Catholic ☐ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☐ Other ☒ None

Thank you very much for your assistance. Your responses are completely confidential. If you are interested periodic updated about the status of this research and its findings, please provide an e-mail address. Please send regular updates to:

Pilot No. 24 **Location:** park **Date:** Mar. 27, 2011 **Nationality:** U.S.

This study explores how people view and value popular methods of improving international relationships following a military conflict between two states. Your participation in this study is very important for making comparisons between how citizens think about international relations versus politicians. The questions below will ask you how important certain items or circumstances are to you personally. You will also be asked to rate various social and political mechanisms or practices often used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

1. As a U.S. citizen, have you traveled to and worked in Iraq (in the military or as a civilian) since April 2003?



Yes ☐ (Answer only the "a" questions in this section)

No ☒ (Answer only the "b" questions in this section)

2a. Would you mind telling me which type of employer did you work for in Iraq?

- the U.S. military ☐
- the U.S. diplomatic service ☐
- a private U.S. company ☐
- an international organization ☐
- as an independent or freelancer ☐
- a university ☐
- other (specify) ☐

2b. If you have not personally worked in Iraq, has one of your immediate family members (a parent, a child, or a sister or brother) worked in Iraq (in the military or as a civilian) since April 2003?

Yes ☐ No ☒

Stop

3a. For about how many months in total did you work in Iraq?

- 1-3 months ☐
- 4-8 months ☐
- 9-12 months ☐
- 13-16 months ☐
- 17 months or more ☐

3b. For about how many months did your family member work/serve in Iraq?

- 1-3 months ☐
- 4-8 months ☐
- 9-12 months ☐
- 13-16 months ☐
- 17 months or more ☐

The next set of questions will ask you about how important certain things are to you personally. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
4	Religion is a very important influence in my everyday life	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
5	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
6	I find it very important to maintain positive relationships, even with strangers	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
7	I strongly believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
8	My country should always work hard to maintain positive relations with other countries	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how familiar you are with the following tools which can be used to improve relations following a conflict between two communities or states. "0" indicates that you have never heard of a particular topic, while "10" indicates that you are very familiar with it. Brief definitions are provided.

	How familiar or unfamiliar are you with…	Very unfamiliar "0"					Aware "5"					Very familiar "10"	Don't know
9	**Third party intervention** (another country or organization steps in to help two states find ways to improve their relations)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
10	**Security cooperation** (two states agree to cooperate militarily to ensure their national security)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
11	**Political cooperation** (two states agree to work together politically, for example by holding joint political meetings to discuss issues important to both states)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
12	**Reparation payments** (a state decides to pay compensation to citizens who have been wrongfully injured as a result of previous action)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
13	**Court** (or judicial) **proceedings** (criminal wrongdoing is prosecuted according to state or international law and punishment is passed down if guilt is determined)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
14	**Public apology** (one or more political representatives publicly apologize for any wrongs committed against another group)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
15	**Economic cooperation** (two states agree to work together economically as a way to improve relations and increase economic dependency on one another)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
16	**Truth telling** (a process where the history of violence is traced. Those who have committed wrongdoing are asked to admit their wrongs before a committee in exchange for amnesty or reduced sentences)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
17	**Cultural exchanges** (provides opportunities for individuals of different cultures to work, study or travel to another country for a period of time)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
18	**Positive media coverage** of the other state (a shift from no or only negative coverage of a given country to positive news, documentaries and reports on that state)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

For the remainder of this questionnaire, *reconciliation* is defined as actions taken to improve a relationship following a conflict. To *reconcile* means to develop strong, positive relations with another party. Please read the following questions and mark the one response which best describes your opinion about each topic.

	Do you agree or disagree …	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
19	My opinion of the "other" person would permanently change after a violent conflict	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
20	A foreign government should not impose its will on the citizens of another country no matter what its intentions are	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
21	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
22	It is possible for two nation-states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
23	My opinion of bilateral relations should be an important influencer on my government's foreign relations	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
24	I could never have a good relationship with someone who has used violence against me	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
25	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
26	Religion influences every aspect of my life	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Please rate the following statements according to your personal opinion. Using the 0-10 scale provided, rate each item where "0" means "definitely not true", "5" means "neutral" and "10" means "definitely true".

	Rate the following according to your opinion…	Definitely Not "0"					Neutral "5"					Definitely "10"	Don't know
27	The media should focus more on positive news about other countries	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
28	It is possible for different religious groups to build positive relations with other religious groups following violence	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
29	Only politicians should make decisions about my country's bilateral relations, not citizens	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
30	It is absolutely necessary for two states to reconcile after a violent conflict	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
31	I would be very supportive of my government if it considered my opinion when reconciling with another state	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
32	In general, citizens should be satisfied with methods used to improve state relations if they are to be successful	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
33	Violent conflict would inevitably lead me to dislike the other despite any of their attempts for reconciliation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about reconciliation and some methods of improving relations between two groups following a conflict. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	In your opinion, how important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
34	… for two communities to reconcile after a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
35	… that your government listen to the opinion of citizens from other countries to prevent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
36	…that economic relations are used for building positive relations between two states?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
37	…to work together to increase two countries' security for improving state relations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
38	… for two states to reconcile following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
39	… for two states to work together politically to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
40	…for an international court litigation to provide justice to citizens after a conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
41	… for neutral parties, such as the United Nations, to successfully promote peaceful state relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
42	…to have cultural exchanges between two countries to improve cultural understanding between two states which had a violent conflict?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
43	…to pay compensation to citizens who have been harmed by violence for improving relations between two states?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
44	…the public disclosure of the full truth for improving state relations following a violent conflict between states?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
45	…to improve state relations when a government representative says he or she is "sorry"?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK

Please rate the following reconciliation mechanisms according to how useful you think they would be for your country to improve relations with another state following a violent conflict. On the scale, "0" means you think that a mechanism is useless while "10" indicates that you think that it is useful for improving state relations. **Rate the following according to your opinion of their usefulness for your country…**

		Useless "0"					Neutral "5"					Useful "10"	Don't know
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK
46	…economic cooperation …	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
47	…political cooperation …	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
48	…security cooperation …	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
49	…justice administered through an international court …	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
50	…truth telling…	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
51	…third party intervention…	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
52	…cultural exchanges…	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
53	…payment of reparations…	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
54	…a public apology by a politician…	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐
55	…positive media coverage of the other state	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to please turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. The questions below are designed to gain insight into if and how you would like to improve relations between the governments and citizens of the United States and Iraq. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic**.

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
56	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
57	Do you think that Iraq-U.S. economic cooperation is important to improve existing relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
58	Is it important to maintain Iraq-U.S. security cooperation?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
59	Is it important to improve the current level of Iraq-U.S. political cooperation?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
60	Would you support reconciliation between the U.S.-Iraq if the UN proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
61	Would you support the U.S. government paying reparations to Iraqis?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
62	Would you support a truth commission following the 2003 Iraq War?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

	Please answer the following …	Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
63	Would you support an international tribunal to prosecute wrongdoing during the 2003 war in Iraq?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
64	How useful do you think positive media coverage would be for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
65	Do you think that U.S. politicians should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting policy toward Iraq?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
66	How useful do you think cultural exchanges between the U.S. and Iraq would be for improving mutual understanding?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
67	Would you endorse an apology by the Iraqi government to the U.S. people for the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
68	Would you endorse an apology by the U.S. government to the Iraqi people for the war?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
69	Do you think that Iraq shares responsibility for the 2003 War?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your perceptions about reconciliation and some methods of improving relations between the United States and Iraq. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic.

		Un-important	Slightly unimpor-tant	Neither important nor un-important	Slightly important	Important	Don't know
70	Do you think that it is important or unimportant for the U.S. and Iraq to improve their current relations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
71	Do you think that it is important or unimportant to always avoid violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
72	How important is religious teaching for guiding your everyday life?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
73	Do you think that economic relations are important for building positive relations between Iraq and the U.S.?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
74	Do you think that it is important for the U.S. and Iraq to work together to increase Iraq's security?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
75	Do you think that positive media coverage of the other country would help improve US-Iraq relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
76	Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work more together at the political level to improve relations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, "0" means that you find the item "completely unacceptable" and "10" that you find it "absolutely acceptable" in this particular context. **Rate the following according to your opinion of their acceptability in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations…**

		Completely unacceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Absolutely acceptable "10"	Don't know
77	… cultural exchanges to increase understanding	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
78	… an international tribunal to investigate wrongdoing	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
79	…a U.S. apology for its actions	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
80	…increased security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
81	… Iraqi not taking some responsibility for the 2003 War	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
82	…use of truth commissions to disclose wrongdoing	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
83	…increased economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
84	… third party action to improve U.S.-Iraq relations	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
85	… positive media coverage of the other country	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
86	… more political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
87	… payment of reparations by the U.S. to Iraqis	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
88	…for my country to reconcile with Iraq	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☒ 10	☐ DK

In your honest opinion, how important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between these two states? Please choose the most appropriate answer.

	In your opinion, how important or unimportant is/are…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very important	Don't know
89	…international court proceedings for providing post-conflict justice to Iraqi citizens?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
90	…international court proceedings for providing post-conflict justice to U.S. citizens?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
91	…intervention by another party, such as the United Nations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
92	…cultural exchanges between Iraq and the U.S. for improving state relations?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

In your honest opinion, how important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between the two states? Please choose the most appropriate answer.

	How important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between the two states?	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
93	…U.S. paying reparations to Iraqi citizens	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
94	…public disclosure of the full truth in a truth commission	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
95	…for Iraq to take some responsibility for the 2003 War	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
96	…for a U.S. government representative to apologize for the 2003 war in Iraq	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
97	…for an Iraqi government representative to apologize for the 2003 war	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK

In this final section, you are asked to please provide some personal information. The answers that you provide to the following questions will help the researcher to classify the data and make statistical comparisons of all the information that you have so generously provided above. All information provided in this survey is completely confidential and will not be shared with others.

98. What is your gender:

☐ Male ☒ Female

99. How old are you?

☐15-25 ☐ 26-35 ☒ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

100. If you are a parent, how many children do you have?

☐ 0 ☐ 1 ☒ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ 11 or more

101. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☒ High School ☐ Bachelor's Degree ☐ Master's Degree ☐ Ph.D.

102. If you affiliate yourself with a particular religion, please choose the most appropriate?

☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☐ Catholic ☒ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☐ Other ☐ None

Thank you very much for your assistance. Your responses are completely confidential. If you are interested periodic updated about the status of this research and its findings, please provide an e-mail address. Please send regular updates to:

Pilot No. 25 **Location:** online **Date:** Mar. 29, 2011 **Nationality:** U.S.

This study explores how people view and value popular methods of improving international relationships following a military conflict between two states. Your participation in this study is very important for making comparisons between how citizens think about international relations versus politicians. The questions below will ask you how important certain items or circumstances are to you personally. You will also be asked to rate various social and political mechanisms or practices often used for improving relationships between states. Your responses are also completely confidential. The questionnaire will take about 40 minutes to complete and you are asked to please answer all of the questions. Your time, honesty and assistance are greatly appreciated!

1. As a U.S. citizen, have you traveled to and worked in Iraq (in the military or as a civilian) since April 2003?

Yes ☐ (Answer only the "a" questions in this section)

No ☒ (Answer only the "b" questions in this section)

2a. Would you mind telling me which type of employer did you work for in Iraq?

- the U.S. military ☐
- the U.S. diplomatic service ☐
- a private U.S. company ☐
- an international organization ☐
- as an independent or freelancer ☐
- a university ☐
- other (specify) ☐

2b. If you have not personally worked in Iraq, has one of your immediate family members (a parent, a child, or a sister or brother) worked in Iraq (in the military or as a civilian) since April 2003?

Yes ☐ No ☒

Stop

3a. For about how many months in total did you work in Iraq?

- 1-3 months ☐
- 4-8 months ☐
- 9-12 months ☐
- 13-16 months ☐
- 17 months or more ☐

3b. For about how many months did your family member work/serve in Iraq?

- 1-3 months ☐
- 4-8 months ☐
- 9-12 months ☐
- 13-16 months ☐
- 17 months or more ☐

The next set of questions will ask you about how important certain things are to you personally. Please read the following questions and mark the answer that best answer expresses how you feel about the issue.

	Do you agree or disagree with the following…	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
4	Religion is a very important influence in my everyday life	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
5	I find it very important to improve my relations with a close friend after a conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
6	I find it very important to maintain positive relationships, even with strangers	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
7	I strongly believe that violent conflict should be avoided at all cost	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
8	My country should always work hard to maintain positive relations with other countries	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Using the scale, please indicate how familiar you are with the following tools which can be used to improve relations following a conflict between two communities or states. “0” indicates that you have never heard of a particular topic, while “10” indicates that you are very familiar with it. Brief definitions are provided.

	How familiar or unfamiliar are you with…	Very unfamiliar “0”					Aware “5”					Very familiar “10”	Don’t know
9	**Third party intervention** (another country or organization steps in to help two states find ways to improve their relations)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
10	**Security cooperation** (two states agree to cooperate militarily to ensure their national security)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
11	**Political cooperation** (two states agree to work together politically, for example by holding joint political meetings to discuss issues important to both states)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
12	**Reparation payments** (a state decides to pay compensation to citizens who have been wrongfully injured as a result of previous action)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
13	**Court** (or judicial) **proceedings** (criminal wrongdoing is prosecuted according to state or international law and punishment is passed down if guilt is determined)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
14	**Public apology** (one or more political representatives publicly apologize for any wrongs committed against another group)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
15	**Economic cooperation** (two states agree to work together economically as a way to improve relations and increase economic dependency on one another)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
16	**Truth telling** (a process where the history of violence is traced. Those who have committed wrongdoing are asked to admit their wrongs before a committee in exchange for amnesty or reduced sentences)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
17	**Cultural exchanges** (provides opportunities for individuals of different cultures to work, study or travel to another country for a period of time)	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
18	**Positive media coverage** of the other state (a shift from no or only negative coverage of a given country to positive news, documentaries and reports on that state)	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

For the remainder of this questionnaire, *reconciliation* is defined as actions taken to improve a relationship following a conflict. To *reconcile* means to develop strong, positive relations with another party. Please read the following questions and mark the one response which best describes your opinion about each topic.

	Do you agree or disagree …	Fully disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Fully agree	Don't know
19	My opinion of the "other" person would permanently change after a violent conflict	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
20	A foreign government should not impose its will on the citizens of another country no matter what its intentions are	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
21	It is possible to improve relations between two communities following violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
22	It is possible for two nation-states to improve their relations after a violent conflict	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
23	My opinion of bilateral relations should be an important influencer on my government's foreign relations	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
24	I could never have a good relationship with someone who has used violence against me	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
25	Two states should always reconcile their relations following a violent conflict	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
26	Religion influences every aspect of my life	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

Please rate the following statements according to your personal opinion. Using the 0-10 scale provided, rate each item where "0" means "definitely not true", "5" means "neutral" and "10" means "definitely true".

	Rate the following according to your opinion…	Definitely Not "0"					Neutral "5"					Definitely "10"	Don't know
27	The media should focus more on positive news about other countries	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
28	It is possible for different religious groups to build positive relations with other religious groups following violence	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
29	Only politicians should make decisions about my country's bilateral relations, not citizens	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
30	It is absolutely necessary for two states to reconcile after a violent conflict	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☒ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
31	I would be very supportive of my government if it considered my opinion when reconciling with another state	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
32	In general, citizens should be satisfied with methods used to improve state relations if they are to be successful	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
33	Violent conflict would inevitably lead me to dislike the other despite any of their attempts for reconciliation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your general perceptions about reconciliation and some methods of improving relations between two groups following a conflict. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on the topic.

	In your opinion, how important or unimportant is it…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
34	… for two communities to reconcile after a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
35	… that your government listen to the opinion of citizens from other countries to prevent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
36	…that economic relations are used for building positive relations between two states?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
37	…to work together to increase two countries' security for improving state relations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
38	… for two states to reconcile following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
39	… for two states to work together politically to improve their relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
40	…for an international court litigation to provide justice to citizens after a conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
41	… for neutral parties, such as the United Nations, to successfully promote peaceful state relations following a violent conflict?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
42	…to have cultural exchanges between two countries to improve cultural understanding between two states which had a violent conflict?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
43	…to pay compensation to citizens who have been harmed by violence for improving relations between two states?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
44	…the public disclosure of the full truth for improving state relations following a violent conflict between states?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
45	…to improve state relations when a government representative says he or she is "sorry"?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

Please rate the following reconciliation mechanisms according to how useful you think they would be for your country to improve relations with another state following a violent conflict. On the scale, “0” means you think that a mechanism is useless while “10” indicates that you think that it is useful for improving state relations. **Rate the following according to your opinion of their usefulness for your country…**

		Useless “0”					Neutral “5”					Useful “10”	Don’t know
46	…economic cooperation …	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
47	…political cooperation …	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
48	…security cooperation …	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
49	…justice administered through an international court …	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
50	…truth telling…	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
51	…third party intervention…	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
52	…cultural exchanges…	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
53	…payment of reparations…	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
54	…a public apology by a politician…	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
55	…positive media coverage of the other state	☐ 0	☐ 1	☒ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In the second half of this survey, you are asked to please turn your attention to U.S.-Iraq relations since 2003. The questions below are designed to gain insight into if and how you would like to improve relations between the governments and citizens of the United States and Iraq. **Please read each of the following questions and mark the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic**.

		Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Probably Yes	Definitely yes	Don’t know
56	Do you think that it is *necessary* that the Iraqi and U.S. Governments reconcile their relations following the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
57	Do you think that Iraq-U.S. economic cooperation is important to improve existing relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
58	Is it important to maintain Iraq-U.S. security cooperation?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
59	Is it important to improve the current level of Iraq-U.S. political cooperation?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
60	Would you support reconciliation between the U.S.-Iraq if the UN proposed it?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
61	Would you support the U.S. government paying reparations to Iraqis?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
62	Would you support a truth commission following the 2003 Iraq War?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

	Please answer the following …	Definitely not	Probably not	Maybe	Yes	Definitely yes	Don't know
63	Would you support an international tribunal to prosecute wrongdoing during the 2003 war in Iraq?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
64	How useful do you think positive media coverage would be for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
65	Do you think that U.S. politicians should take Iraqi public opinion into consideration when drafting policy toward Iraq?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
66	How useful do you think cultural exchanges between the U.S. and Iraq would be for improving mutual understanding?	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
67	Would you endorse an apology by the Iraqi government to the U.S. people for the 2003 war?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
68	Would you endorse an apology by the U.S. government to the Iraqi people for the war?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK
69	Do you think that Iraq shares responsibility for the 2003 War?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐ DK

The next set of questions concern your perceptions about reconciliation and some methods of improving relations between the United States and Iraq. Please read each question and choose the answer that best describes your opinion on each topic.

		Un-important	Slightly unimpor-tant	Neither important nor un-important	Slightly important	Important	Don't know
70	Do you think that it is important or unimportant for the U.S. and Iraq to improve their current relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
71	Do you think that it is important or unimportant to always avoid violent conflict	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
72	How important is religious teaching for guiding your everyday life?	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
73	Do you think that economic relations are important for building positive relations between Iraq and the U.S.?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
74	Do you think that it is important for the U.S. and Iraq to work together to increase Iraq's security?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
75	Do you think that positive media coverage of the other country would help improve US-Iraq relations?	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK
76	Do you think that the U.S. and Iraq should work more together at the political level to improve relations?	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

Still thinking about U.S.-Iraqi relations, please rate the following instruments according to how acceptable you think they are for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations. On the scale, "0" means that you find the item "completely unacceptable" and "10" that you find it "absolutely acceptable" in this particular context. **Rate the following according to your opinion of their acceptability in the context of U.S.-Iraq relations…**

		Completely unacceptable "0"					Neutral "5"					Absolutely acceptable "10"	Don't know
77	… cultural exchanges to increase understanding	☐ 0	☒ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
78	… an international tribunal to investigate wrongdoing	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
79	…a U.S. apology for its actions	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
80	…increased security cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
81	… Iraqi not taking some responsibility for the 2003 War	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
82	…use of truth commissions to disclose wrongdoing	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☒ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
83	…increased economic cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
84	… third party action to improve U.S.-Iraq relations	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
85	… positive media coverage of the other country	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☒ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
86	… more political cooperation	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☒ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
87	… payment of reparations by the U.S. to Iraqis	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☒ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK
88	…for my country to reconcile with Iraq	☐ 0	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6	☐ 7	☐ 8	☒ 9	☐ 10	☐ DK

In your honest opinion, how important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between these two states? Please choose the most appropriate answer.

	In your opinion, how important or unimportant is/are…	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very important	Don't know
89	…international court proceedings for providing post-conflict justice to Iraqi citizens?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
90	…international court proceedings for providing post-conflict justice to U.S. citizens?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
91	…intervention by another party, such as the United Nations?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
92	…cultural exchanges between Iraq and the U.S. for improving state relations?	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ DK

In your honest opinion, how important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between the two states? Please choose the most appropriate answer.

	How important or unimportant are the following in the U.S. – Iraq context for improving relations between the two states?	Very unimportant	Unimportant	Slightly unimportant	Neither important nor unimportant	Slightly important	Important	Very Important	Don't know
93	…U.S. paying reparations to Iraqi citizens	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
94	…public disclosure of the full truth in a truth commission	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐ DK
95	…for Iraq to take some responsibility for the 2003 War	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
96	…for a U.S. government representative to apologize for the 2003 war in Iraq	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK
97	…for an Iraqi government representative to apologize for the 2003 war	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐ DK

In this final section, you are asked to please provide some personal information. The answers that you provide to the following questions will help the researcher to classify the data and make statistical comparisons of all the information that you have so generously provided above. All information provided in this survey is completely confidential and will not be shared with others.

98. What is your gender:

☒ Male ☐ Female

99. How old are you?

☒ 15-25 ☐ 26-35 ☐ 36-45 ☐ 46-55 ☐ 56-65 ☐ 66-75 ☐ 76 +

100. If you are a parent, how many children do you have?

☒ 0 ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ 6 ☐ 7 ☐ 8 ☐ 9 ☐ 10 ☐ 11 or more

101. What is your highest level of completed education?

☐ Elementary School ☐ Middle School ☐ High School ☒ Bachelor's Degree ☐ Master's Degree ☐ Ph.D.

102. If you affiliate yourself with a particular religion, please choose the most appropriate?

☐ Shi'a Islam ☐ Sufi Islam ☐ Sunni Islam ☐ Catholic ☒ Protestant ☐ Judaism ☐ Other ☐ None

Thank you very much for your assistance. Your responses are completely confidential. If you are interested periodic updated about the status of this research and its findings, please provide an e-mail address. Please send regular updates to: