



## CLAIMING INDEPENDENCE IN 140 CHARACTERS. USES OF METAPHOR IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCOTTISH AND CATALAN POLITICAL DISCOURSES ON TWITTER

Carlota Maria Moragas Fernández

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USES OF METAPHOR IN THE CONSTRUCTION  
OF SCOTTISH AND CATALAN  
POLITICAL DISCOURSES ON TWITTER

DOCTORAL THESIS

Supervised by Dr Arantxa Capdevila Gómez

Department of Communication Studies



UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA i VIRGILI

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UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

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## UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

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FAIG CONSTAR que aquest treball, titulat "Claiming independence in 140 characters. Uses of Metaphor in the construction of Scottish and Catalan political discourses on Twitter", que presenta Carlota M. Moragas Fernández per a l'obtenció del títol de Doctor, ha estat realitzat sota la meua direcció al Departament d'Estudis de Comunicació d'aquesta universitat i compleix els requeriments per optar a Menció doctor/a Internacional.

---

HAGO CONSTAR que el presente trabajo, titulado "Claiming independence in 140 characters. Uses of Metaphor in the construction of Scottish and Catalan political discourses on Twitter", que presenta Carlota M. Moragas Fernández para la obtención del título de Doctor, ha sido realizado bajo mi dirección en el Departamento de Estudios de Comunicación de esta universidad y cumple con los requerimientos para optar a Mención doctor/a Internacional.

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I STATE that the present study, entitled "Claiming independence in 140 characters. Uses of Metaphor in the construction of Scottish and Catalan political discourses on Twitter", presented by Carlota M. Moragas Fernández for the award of the degree of Doctor, has been carried out under my supervision at the Department of Communication Studies of this university and fulfils all the requeriments for being awarded the distinction of International doctor.

---

Tarragona, 12 May 2016

La directora de la tesi doctoral  
La directora de la tesis doctoral  
Doctoral Thesis Supervisor

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'A. Capdevila', written over a vertical line.

Arantxa Capdevila Gómez

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Tomas did not realize at the time  
that metaphors are dangerous.  
Metaphors are not to be trifled with.  
A single metaphor can give birth to love.

Milan Kundera, *The unbearable lightness of being*



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## ABSTRACT

The ability to “simplify and make understandable political events” (Mio 1997:121) and to “present political ‘reality’ in a specific way” (Cammaerts 2012:244) transforms metaphor into a useful tool for political actors that struggle for imposing their view on contested issues, as independence processes in Scotland and Catalonia are. Through the use of metaphor, the present research analyses in which terms did pro-independence political actors construct their discourse on the independence processes carried out by Scotland and Catalonia. It focuses on Twitter as one of the platforms politicians use to spread their political ideas and maintains that the tool’s 140 character-long statements seem to adapt perfectly to the use of metaphor as the main goal is to say as much as the speaker can in the fewest words.

The present research works with two different samples (n1, n2), which are connected to two main objectives: to analyse the discursive representation of the independence processes carried out by Scotland and Catalonia through the use of metaphor (1) and to evaluate the extent to which these metaphorical expressions influenced the way other users understood and explained political issues (2). Sample (n1) was made up of the statements tweeted by twenty-five political actors (political parties, political leaders and civil movements) considered as the main moulders of pro-independence discourses in both countries during twelve key dates in each independence process. This research has been completed with an analysis of the online debate that surrounded Scottish and Catalan independence processes in the same dates, which made up Sample (n2). A qualitative methodology approach based on Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA) was used for analyzing the 6026 collected tweets. CMA is specially designed for working with particular lexemes, rather than larger texts, and is applied in three stages: the identification of metaphors (A), their interpretation (B) and their explanation (C). This thesis has contributed to address the methodological gap when dealing with stages B and C and proposes a simplified version of narrative semiotics in order to provide a proper method for constructing the scenario that guides the interpretation and the explanation of the identified metaphors.

Results show that the independence processes carried out by both countries were mainly conceptualized in terms of a JOURNEY while the relationship between the stateless nation and the nation state was presented as a BREAK UP followed by a future and secured FRIENDSHIP. The CONFLICT/WAR and the GAME/SPORT source domains were also used for comparing the political situation faced by both countries with a battle or a match that had to be won. However, the scenarios drawn through the use of the above mentioned source domains indicate meaningful differences in how independence processes were framed in Scotland and Catalonia. These discursive differences fell mainly on a relevant contextual factor: Scottish pro-independence political actors



defended a Yes vote within an agreed and binding referendum whereas Catalonia spend nearly two years claiming the nation's right to decide and finally held a non-binding consultation. The uncertainty of Catalonia's political situation and the lack of a real debate could explain the higher percentage of metaphor use among Catalan political actors with respect to Scottish political actors, as the former needed to put a greater emphasis on promoting their views. The analysis of users' statements shows that the trend among digital audiences was to back political actors' discourses rather than using the 2.0 environment for broadening the debate, which still presents a high polarization.

## ACRONYMS

Assemblea Nacional Catalana – ANC  
Associació de Municipis per la Independència – AMI  
Candidatura d'Unitat Popular – CUP  
Comissions Obreres / Workers' Commission – CCOO  
Conceptual Metaphor Theory – CMT  
Convergència i Unió – CiU  
Critical Discourse Analysis – CDA  
Critical Metaphor Analysis – CMA  
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya – ERC  
Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds - Esquerra Unida Alternativa – ICV-EUiA  
Partido Popular – PP  
Partit Socialista de Catalunya – PSC  
Scottish Green Party – SGP  
Scottish National Party – SNP  
Unió Democràtica de Catalunya – UDC  
Unión General de Trabajadores / General Union of Workers – UGT  
United Kingdom – UK

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## Introduction

No és millor ni pitjor aquest país;  
molt senzillament és el nostre,  
el teu, el meu.  
No el defensem encara;  
tractem només, tu, jo i aquell,  
d'afirmar-lo,  
de dir-lo.

Vicent Andrés Estellés, *Mural del País Valencià*<sup>1</sup>

How is a country defined? What terms are used to talk about a country carrying out a process that may involve a change in its political status? And, last but not least: Who is responsible for defining and redefining one of the possible outcomes of this process? These were the main questions that prompted me to start the present research in an attempt to analyse how an event that has determined the recent history of Scotland and Catalonia was explained and by whom. Since my research interests focused on the field of political communication and discourse analysis, I thought it would be interesting to analyse the way in which political actors talked about such a controversial issue as initiating a secession process.

The present study, therefore, is framed in what Umberto Eco (2015:32) defined as “direct participation in the contemporary world” and so involves two potential risks: it can quickly become obsolete as independence processes pass through various phases, and the subject matter is constantly evolving. Nonetheless, it also makes the issue more interesting because it is rooted in the present and turns the approach to the object of study into a challenge for the researcher.

---

<sup>1</sup> A version in English of this poem was not available, so the translation was done by the author herself: This country is not better nor worse;/ it is simply our country,/ yours, mine./ We are not defending it yet;/ we are only trying, you, me and that one,/ to affirm it,/ to say it



## Thesis topic and justification

Although the starting point of this study was the researcher's personal interest in the topic, as soon as the research moved forward, the scope rapidly broadened and the processes of independence in Scotland and Catalonia became the case studies for a wider investigation into the role metaphor plays in defining conflictual issues. The present research assumes that conflict is the basis of most everyday political and social issues. The controversy underlying these issues makes it difficult to define them clearly, as various voices compete to make one view prevail over another. Among these voices, political actors and the media are the ones that have traditionally been given the role of public opinion moulders within the public sphere. In the case of political actors, successfully managing to position their view on a conflictive issue is often linked with their goals of being legitimated to take political decisions and gain access to power. For political actors, discourse plays a fundamental role in sharing viewpoints and persuading the public that their focus on the issue that is being discussed is the most appropriate. And this makes discourse a powerful instrument for preserving the status of political actors and for spreading ideology-based principles that can make it easier to be given the consent of the governed. Even though "ideologies result from discursal and social practices" at the same time they "determine and constrain these practices" (Semino 2008:90) and this is an engaging perspective from which to approach our object of study.

The main idea of this dissertation is that metaphor, because of its ability to simplify complex political issues and generate meanings is a widely used mechanism in political discourses. In this thesis, we deal with a double dimension of metaphor, as we consider this rhetorical figure as both a persuasive and cognitive tool. The former function has been acknowledged since Greek and Roman times whereas the latter was not recognized by the scientific community until the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. From the perspective of political communication, we believe that it makes no sense to consider these dimensions separately, since the act of choosing the two nouns whose analogical relation

generates a metaphor is itself persuasive and the images conjured up by the use of a particular metaphor are often linked with the way we conceptualize our world. Moreover, this study focuses on metaphor in its mediated dimension. It is not restricted to its linguistic form, since it does not focus on it in isolation, but as a device that is used in a deliberate manner. For this reason, we take into account the extralinguistic elements that may influence the choice of a particular metaphorical expression for defining a controversial political event. Hence, the present research looks at metaphor as a key element for spreading political ideas and as a device that can be appropriately used in 2.0 discussions because it is linguistically economical.

We have chosen to look at political discourses that are generated in a 2.0 environment, as this is an opportunity to determine whether the social media have developed a new and specific language for talking about politics. As mentioned above, metaphorical expressions seem to be suitable for the micro-discursive structure of political discourses that emerge on Twitter, but there are other devices that are more relevant to how the tool works and which can be used to see if political actors make a mature use of social media. Following the premise that “digital devices allow populations –individuals and collective actors– to perform proactively in political communication, not merely as passive and reactive receivers as in the classic model” (Sampedro 2011:433) this research also seeks to confirm whether participants in the independence debate used Twitter to promote alternative views to the elite discourse or if they tended to frame the debate about the independence processes of Scotland and Catalonia in the same way as political actors did. The performance of both political actors and users on Twitter is also relevant as online campaigns do also “reach people who are not politically affiliated or interested in politics” (Buchanan 2016:72).

So this dissertation revolves around three main subjects: (1) the relevance of political discourses to the creation and/or the maintenance of a hegemonic view on a particular issue; (2) the use of metaphor to achieve this purpose; (3) the new places where these discourses are made public and the opportunities for a

real democracy that the appearance of tools like Twitter may entail. The case studies this work focuses on have enabled us to look at two events that have historically and discursively evolved during a period of three or four years. In fact, they are still underway, at least as far as Catalonia is concerned. What is interesting about this work is that we have analysed this period of time and gone beyond a two-week election campaign, which is the standard unit of analysis for most research articles on political communication. This was possible thanks to the selection of Twitter as the medium in which we study political actors' discourses, since it has allowed us to look at a wider range of dates and dissect the main topics on which the pro-independence campaign was based.

### ***Personal justification***

T'adones, company,  
que hem de sortir al carrer  
junts, molts, com més millor,  
si no volem perdre-ho tot,  
t'adones, amic.

Raimon, *T'adones, amic*<sup>2</sup>

I remember becoming interested in politics when I was thirteen. It was 2001 and, in Spain, President José Maria Aznar was leading the Spanish government for a second term in office. He governed with an overall majority, which let him take decisions like supporting the George Bush administration in the Iraq war despite the fact that 91 per cent<sup>3</sup> of Spaniards were against participating in the conflict. Since then, and after attending several demonstrations against the war and other political injustices, I now think of myself as a “political animal.”

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<sup>2</sup> A version in English of this song was not available, so the translation was done by the author herself: Do you realise, my friend/ that we need to go out into the streets/ together, lots of us, the more the better/ if we do not want to lose everything/ do you realise, my friend.

<sup>3</sup> Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) (2003). BARÓMETRO DE FEBRERO. Estudio nº 2.481. Retrieved from: [http://www.cis.es/cis/export/sites/default/-Archivos/Marginales/2480\\_2499/2481/Es2481.pdf](http://www.cis.es/cis/export/sites/default/-Archivos/Marginales/2480_2499/2481/Es2481.pdf)

What I did not know until I reached university was that I would become fascinated by the communication apparatus surrounding political decisions and determining the political destiny of the country we live in. This dual interest has accompanied me during the present research and the reader will see it reflected, for instance, in the approach Chapter 3 takes to Web 2.0 as a democratic and strategic tool.

My interest in this research was also connected to strategic communication and how it is expressed through language use in political discourses. And I also wanted to explore how the choices made by politicians when presenting their view on a controversial issue influenced the electorate's reaction. However, as I have previously mentioned, my main motivation for carrying out this thesis was a personal one. Around 2010, something was changing in Europe and various stateless nations belonging to European Union member states started questioning the extent and the appropriateness of the devolved competencies they had been enjoying till then. Scotland and Catalonia were among those countries and, when I started this thesis (November 2013), they were about to embark on independence processes. As a Catalan citizen who was just starting to consider independence as an option for Catalonia, I felt it was important to know how the political actors who defended this process were explaining it. I also wondered whether there really is anything to say about an independent Catalonia beyond the simple fact of becoming independent. The thought of comparing what was happening in Catalonia with the situation in Scotland was in my mind from the very beginning of this thesis. But I was sure that I would not be comfortable writing about a country and a process I was not familiar with.

Thanks to the Department of Communication Studies at the Universitat Rovira i Virgili, I had the opportunity to live in Scotland for the four months prior to the day of the referendum, during which time I participated in various campaign and academic events and tried to find out as much as I could about what was going on as if I were to vote. I remember the first advice I received from Dr Nicola McEwen

of the University of Edinburgh: you cannot look at the Scottish independence process through a Catalan lens. It was not easy, but I tried to follow her advice. Nevertheless, I think it was only at the end of my research visit when I realized that there was indeed an essential difference between independence processes in each country: the normalization of the debate.

It was 19 September 2014. My partner and I were walking outside our home in Edinburgh when a sheet hanging from one of our neighbours' windows attracted our attention. They had voted for independence and they regretted the result of the referendum but, even so, they said they were happy because the referendum had changed Scotland forever. After my experience there, I would say that I agree. I came back to Catalonia envying Scottish people and what they had experienced during their "normal" referendum campaign; and it made me want the same for my country. I am not even thinking of a binding referendum, or of the possibility of a different state. I would be content with a real debate and, consequently, an opportunity to engage people in a nation-wide discussion about policy and governance issues. I believe the outcome of the Scottish referendum was not as simple as staying in the Union: it was a democratic challenge that made citizens question the country they wanted to live in. Time will tell if this was a true debate that can be materialised in tangible political actions.

All things considered, my experience there together with the research I have been engaged in for the last two and a half years have led me to focus on what I will refer to as "the contextual factor." It was precisely the appearance of context on the stage of political discourse that reaffirmed the relevance of undertaking research that put (political) communication at the centre of metaphor analysis. In conclusion, I believe that it was the conjunction of the various motifs I have mentioned above that inspired this dissertation, always guided by the –perhaps egoistical– certainty that a thesis is useful "for our future work (be it professional or political) not so much for the chosen topic, but instead for the training that it demands, for the experience of rigor it provides, and for the skills required to organize the material" (Eco 2015:33).

## Research objectives

This research aims to investigate the role metaphor plays in defining new realities in the independence processes of Scotland and Catalonia. It considers independence as a political and structural status each country had experienced in some way in their past history, but also as a new governance model they need to define to persuade the electorate to vote for or against it. In order to narrow the focus of the study, the research only considers those discourses that contributed to the definition of independence and not those that define the benefits of the current status quo. This decision was taken not only to limit the dimensions of the thesis, but also because the contextual differences of the independence processes of Scotland and Catalonia made it difficult to compare the “No camp”, as in the latter there was not a No side identified as such. Therefore, the general research objective this thesis aims to fulfil is to analyze in which terms pro-independence political actors constructed political discourses about the independence processes on Twitter. And, secondly, to evaluate the extent to which these political discourses influenced the way other users understood and explained those processes.

The more detailed objectives are the following:

1. To resolve the methodological gap for scenario construction and find a suitable method for analysing scenarios from a semiotic perspective rather than a linguistic one.
2. To describe the source domains used by pro-independence political actors to talk about the independence processes in Scotland and Catalonia and compare the use of metaphor made by all the political actors during the analysed dates.

3. To identify the strategic positioning of Scottish and Catalan political actors on independence issues by developing scenarios that delimit the narratives generated around the conceptualized target domains. The revision of the literature on metaphor use in political discourses will reveal the relevance of metaphor as an ideology-shaping tool. Because ideology is transmitted through metaphorical entailments, the narrative overlapping political actors' views on a particular issue must be inferred by constructing the scenario.
4. To compare users' reactions to the independence debate on Twitter with the political discourses of pro-independence actors in order to determine the extent to which they reproduced them or created an alternative view about the process analysed. The comparison is made in terms of the metaphorical expressions used.
5. To determine, in general terms, the characteristics of Twitter use by political actors in Scotland and Catalonia during the period of time analysed and verify if the discursive trends detected in them are also present in the tweets made by users. Understanding the changes Web 2.0 has brought to the traditional public sphere and approaching social media both as a new platform for spreading political discourses and engaging citizens in politics will show us if there is a virtual public sphere and, if so, whether it functions in a different way from the classic model.
6. To contribute to the theoretical framework of metaphor studies from a political communication perspective.

The objectives listed above are resolved by various means. Objective 1 is resolved by the methodological design described in Chapter 5, which reinterprets Critical Metaphor Analysis methodology in order to bring it closer to communication studies and proposes to approach the stage of metaphor

interpretation from narrative semiotics. Objectives 2 to 4 are resolved by applying this methodology to the identification of metaphorical expressions and the construction of scenarios. Objective 5 is resolved by closely reading the analysed samples and analysing the characteristics of Twitter use by political actors and users. Finally, the theoretical contribution to the field of political communication (objective 6) is resolved by revising the literature and drawing conclusions.

### **The structure of the thesis**

The present dissertation is structured in five different parts (Introduction, Part I, Part II, Part III and Conclusions). The present chapter serves as an introduction to the object of study and the surrounding controversy and states the general and specific objectives the researcher aimed to fulfil while approaching the construction of the theoretical framework, methodological proposal and the analysis of the object of study. After this introductory explanation, Part I discusses the theoretical framework underlying metaphor use in the pro-independence political discourse of political actors in Scotland and Catalonia on Twitter.

Because different theoretical concepts are linked with the construction of discourse in the processes studied, Part I is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 defines the paradigm in which the research is framed: the achievement of power through persuasion rather than domination. This is a condition that could not be achieved before the appearance of democratic societies, in which the public is in charge of supervising the government and deciding whether the political representatives are legitimated to rule. Hence, persuasion is presented as fundamental if those governed are to give their consent and political discourse is the main tool by which this can be done. For this reason, this chapter underlines the relevance of political discourses from a political communication perspective, as they are assumed to be the basis on which political decisions are taken. In the



same vein, it also reviews the role language and discourse have been given in the legitimation of power and concludes that the study of metaphor can provide evidence of the underlying strategic positioning.

Chapter 2 describes the changes in how metaphor has been understood since Aristotle first systematized it in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. The chapter discusses the various approaches to metaphor adopted by different academic fields in order to build a suitable definition of metaphor, its properties and the way in which it functions. After this question is resolved, the chapter goes on to delimit the applications of metaphor in political discourses and ends up by reviewing the main targeted concepts in politics, as well as the principal source domains used to conceptualize them.

In Chapter 3 we describe the environment in which the discourses we are going to analyze are produced. The chapter reviews the origins of Web 2.0 and its implications in the generation of a virtual public sphere, where citizens are given the chance to create their own content and to actively engage in politics in order to influence political actors' decisions. Within this context, social media as a product of Web 2.0 are assumed to favour the creation of counter-hegemonic discourses but they are also perceived as a new non journalistic-mediated channel to broadcast political messages directly to the audience. Because of this research's interest in analysing how political actors explain each independence process on Twitter, the chapter discusses the tool's main characteristics and how they can be used in political communication.

The case studies are presented in Chapter 4, which goes over the definition of stateless nation and reviews the cases of Scotland and Catalonia as an example of it. In order to determine what led both countries to start secession processes in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the chapter also briefly reviews their historical background. This serves also to show the similarities and differences between both countries and the contextual factors that motivated the call of a referendum. Since the process that drives Scotland and Catalonia to consult people is the framework in

which we study the use of metaphor in political discourses, the last section of Chapter 4 discusses the distinctive features of referendum campaigns.

Part II contains Chapter 5, which describes the methodology used to analyse 140-character discourses. First, the chapter outlines how Sample 1 (political actors) and Sample 2 (users) were selected. Then, it discusses the use of Critical Metaphor Analysis as an appropriate methodology for identifying metaphorical expressions in microdiscourses and addresses the methodological gap related to the analysis and the construction of scenarios.

Part III consists of three chapters, which present the results of the analysis of the case studies. By way of introduction, Chapter 6 discusses how political actors used Twitter as a communication tool and outlines other discursive mechanisms related to civic nationalism that can be found in their statements. Then it moves on to analyse metaphorical expressions and concludes that there were similarities in the use of source domains between Scotland and Catalonia, but that there is a major difference in the targeted concepts due to contextual factors.

Chapter 7 describes the scenarios for the source domains most commonly used by political actors in Scotland and Catalonia in an attempt to identify their communication strategies and the underlying ideological values. The information in Chapters 6 and 7 reveals the similarities and differences between the two independence processes and provides some concluding remarks.

Chapter 8 focuses on users' reactions to political actors' discourses and contrasts the results obtained with those of political actors displayed in Chapter 6. This comparison shows whether political actors' discourses were reproduced or if users had alternatives to debate the independence process in each country.

Chapters 6, 7 and 8 work with expressions in Catalan or Spanish that have been translated into English by the author, always trying to preserve their original

meaning and being as accurate as possible. If the reader wants to look up the original expressions in Catalan or Spanish, they can be found in the appendices, where their translation into English is also provided.

The conclusions section reviews the most important items identified in Parts I to III and relates them to the theoretical and methodological framework of this thesis. It also describes the main contributions of the present research and its limitations, which may be addressed in future research in this field.

# **PART I**

## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

CLAIMING INDEPENDENCE IN 140 CHARACTERS. USES OF METAPHOR IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCOTTISH AND CATALAN P

Carlota Maria Moragas Fernández

# Chapter I

## Towards a proper definition of political discourse

Power does not prohibit or negate, but produces:  
it produces identities, knowledge and possibilities for behaviour  
and it does this through discourse.

*Andrea Mayr, Language and Power: An Introduction to Institutional Discourse*

The object of study of this PhD thesis is political discourse in a broad sense. As I have pointed out above, the present research focuses on how political actors, in both Scotland and Catalonia, construct their messages around independence processes through the use of metaphor. However, I think it is advisable to go over the concept “political discourse”, because it will determine the selection of the sample on which I base my study of the role of metaphor as an ideology-shaping tool. What does “political discourse” mean exactly? Or, as Teun Van Dijk (1997) wonders: How can we determine which discourse is political and which is not?

### 1.1. Formal and content aspects of political discourse

Any attempt to define political discourse is by nature controversial; it is difficult to assign a clear meaning to a kind of discourse that tends to be defined by different features. As far as its more formal aspects are concerned, some definitions of political discourse focus on the people who make it whereas others focus on the different formats in which it can be presented.

Van Dijk (1997:12), for instance, focuses more on the people behind this kind of discourse when he states that “political discourse is identified by its actors or

authors:” namely, politicians. Yet, the same author reminds us that politicians are not the only political actors; there are also “all those who are ‘engaged in politics’, those who take political action such as demonstrators, lobbyists and strikers.” From a political communication viewpoint, Brian McNair (2007:5) defines political actors as “those individuals who aspire through organisational and institutional means to influence decision-making process.” The same author distinguishes the following groups: political parties, public organizations, pressure groups and terrorist organizations. Internet users could be added to this list because, for some authors (Loader and Mercea 2011, Veenstra et al. 2015), Web 2.0 has broadened and encouraged political engagement. However, although a wide range of people and groups can be political actors, they need to act politically –that is, participate “in political actions, such as governing, ruling, legislating, protesting, dissenting or voting” (Van Dijk 1997:14)– if they are to be regarded as such.

As far as the format in which discourse can be presented is concerned, Albaladejo (2000) refers to political discourse as “political text.” According to this author (2000:3), political texts are such that “con una construcción lingüística fundamentalmente orientada al receptor, se ocupa[n] de cuestiones de interés para los ciudadanos como integrantes de una sociedad organizada institucionalmente.”<sup>4</sup> These texts include not only parliamentary speeches, but “todos aquellos textos en los que se expone teoría política o en los que se mantienen determinadas posiciones políticas”<sup>5</sup> (Albaladejo 2000:3) like “propaganda, political advertising, political speeches, media interviews, political talk shows on TV, party programs, ballots, and so on” (Van Dijk 1997:18).

In an attempt to narrow the definition, other authors go beyond formal features and focus on the content of political discourses. For instance, Ana Mancera and

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<sup>4</sup> “Together with a linguistic construction basically oriented to receiver, deals with public matters which are of citizens interest, as part of an institutionally organized society.”

<sup>5</sup> “All texts that present political theory or those that serve to maintain certain political positions.”

Ana Pano (2013:129) following Marina Fernández Lagunilla's work (1999), define political discourse on the basis of its persuasive<sup>6</sup> intentionality:

Rasgos del discurso político:<sup>7</sup>

1. *carácter polémico, relacionado con la construcción del adversario*<sup>8</sup>
2. *intención agitadora, cuando se quiere convencer por medio de la persuasión i la seducción*
3. *carácter ambiguo o doble del lenguaje usado*

Other authors such as María José Canel also define political discourse on the basis of its content. According to Canel (2006:27) political messages need to be understood as interactive activities, which implies “una concepción circular del proceso de comunicación (abandonando la concepción tradicional clásica de emisor y receptor); y está abierta al dinamismo con que los protagonistas están constantemente generando significados.”<sup>9</sup> The new meanings generated in the exchange of political messages are the basis on which political decisions are taken and applied in society. Hence, according to Canel (2006) the relevance of political discourses lies in their content, as it is this that inspires the course of action. This is an important contribution since, as we will see throughout this chapter, discourse is not only used to explain, but to do things, and political actors, being aware of the power of discourse, know how to prepare it. So, political communication and, therefore, political discourse, can be planned. And it is precisely this certainty that there is a strategy underlying every word they say that led me undertake the present research. Antonio Reyes (2011) refers to the strategic aims of political discourses when he says that they are an example of persuasive speeches, whose main objectives are to spread political information and to legitimize the goals of political actors’.

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<sup>6</sup> These features are also shared with other kind of persuasive discourses, e.g. advertising discourses.

<sup>7</sup> “Features of political discourses: controversial character, related to adversary’s construction (1); agitator intention, when it is about convincing through persuasion and seduction (2); ambiguous or double character of the language used (3).”

<sup>8</sup> Original italics.

<sup>9</sup> “A circular conception of the communication process (abandoning the traditional classical conception of communicator and receiver); and it is open to the dynamism within which its protagonists are constantly generating meanings.”



As Reyes (2011:783) underlines, this legitimization, “deserves special attention in political discourse because it is from this speech event that political leaders justify their political agenda to maintain or alter the direction of a whole nation [...]” McNair (2007), for instance, points out that the legitimacy of liberal democratic governments underlies the consent of the governed, which can be manufactured.

## 1.2. Political discourse as a key element in manufacturing consent

To better understand how politicians legitimate themselves through the use of political discourse, I will briefly review the way in which liberal democratic societies work. To do so, I will use Jürgen Habermas’ Public Sphere thesis. The German sociologist describes this theory in one of his most prominent works: *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962). Habermas (1991)<sup>10</sup> understands the public sphere as the place that promotes and articulates political participation in modern societies. Therefore, the public sphere becomes “the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, hence, an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction” (Fraser 1990:57). This deliberative space binds together the private sphere –“a sphere in which private people pursued their affairs with one another free from impositions by estate and state” (Habermas 1991:75)– and the sphere of public authority, embodied by the state, where political decisions are taken. As Habermas (1991:222) reports:

In the first modern constitutions subdivisions in the catalogues of basic rights were the very image of the liberal model of the bourgeois public sphere. They guaranteed society as a sphere of private autonomy. Confronting it stood a public authority limited to a few functions, and between the two, as it were, was the realm of private people assembled into a public who, as the citizenry, linked up the state with the needs of civil society according to the idea that in the medium of this public sphere political authority would be transformed into rational authority.

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<sup>10</sup> The original version of this work is from 1962.

In the political public sphere, “people in their roles as citizens have access to what can be metaphorically called societal dialogues, which deal with questions of common concern: in other words, with politics in the broadest sense” (Dahlgren 1995:9). As we can see, in the public sphere “el público es el depositario de las estructuras y de los procesos de democracia, es decir, del control de la gestión del poder, de la representación de la voluntad popular, de la discusión y la opinión pública y de la publicidad”<sup>11</sup> (Mazzoleni 2010:22). Habermas (1991), in line with the liberal conception of democracy, understands the public as the central axis of political and mediated interactions and presupposes that informed citizens, who care about political issues, will do everything that Gianpietro Mazzoleni says. However, this utopian view of an educated and knowledgeable citizenry has been questioned because the exchange of ideas and rational discussion are considered elitist acts (Mazzoleni 2010).

If we agree with Habermas and follow the premise that citizens need to have free access to the information that lets them make their political choices, the media become a central component in the public sphere. In this regard, Víctor Sampedro and Jorge Resina de la Fuente (2010:5) consider media as a key element by which individuals who say that they belong to a particular group “contribuyen a la generación de un discurso sobre este espacio que termina por tener efectos reales en la cotidianidad de sus enunciadores.”<sup>12</sup> On the issue of deliberative democracy, as citizens need to engage in the debate on the issues that rule their daily lives, they must “have equal access to communication that is both independent of government constraint, and through its deliberative, consensus-building capacity, constrains the agendas and decisions of government in turn” (Bennet and Entman 2001:3). As McNair (2007:18) points out, since the 18th century, “the mass media have evolved into the main source and focus of a society’s shared experience.”

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<sup>11</sup> “The public is the depositary of democracy structures and processes, i.e., control of power management, representation of the popular will, discussion and public opinion and advertising.”

<sup>12</sup> “They contribute to the generation of a discourse on this space that ends up having a real impact on the daily lives of their senders.”

For Winfried Schulz (2004:91), “the media’s publishing capacity enables citizens to observe the political discourse and thus contributes to the mediation of politics. Mediation in this sense is conceptually close to participation.” Therefore, the media are depicted as important actors in the definition of public opinion, formed by individual political opinions which become public, and, as a result, in the evaluation of the discussion of political topics. In this context, McNair (2007:18-19) proposes five functions of the communication media in ideal democratic societies:

- First, they must inform citizens of what is happening around them. [...]
- Second, they must educate as to the meaning and significance of the ‘facts’ [...]
- Third, the media must provide a platform for public political discourse, facilitating the formation of ‘public opinion’, and feeding that opinion back to the public from whence it came. This must include the provision of space for the expression of dissent, without which the notion of democratic consensus would be meaningless.
- The media’s fourth function is to give publicity to governmental and political institutions [...] to the extent that ‘the acts of whoever holds supreme power are made available for public scrutiny, meaning how far they are visible, ascertainable, accessible, and hence accountable’ (Bobbio, 1987, p. 83). [...]
- Finally, the media in democratic societies serve as a channel for the advocacy of political viewpoints. Parties require an outlet for the articulation of their policies and programmes to a mass audience, and thus the media must be open to them. [...]

Because of the media’s leading role in the functioning of the public sphere, and, thus, in deliberative democracies, Manuel Castells (2007) confers on them the ability to shape and decide power relations while Canel (2006) talks about them as agents of power with a status comparable to that of political institutions. For this reason, the media, which are supposed to be merely broadcasters of political information, do not always share with citizens just facts, but “the product of several mediating processes which are more or less invisible” (McNair

2007:23). McNair (2007) claims that these processes start with politicians, whose main goal is to preserve their legitimacy through the manufacture of consent. And this is why I focus on political discourses rather than mediated discourses.

The idea that consent can be manufactured was first put forward by Walter Lippmann (1920) in his work *Public Opinion*. He stated that, far from disappearing with the arrival of modern democracies, the creation of consent “has, in fact, improved enormously in technique, because it is now based on analysis rather than on rule of thumb” and “[...] persuasion has become a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government” (Lippmann 2014:634-635). From a utilitarian viewpoint, if a stable government depends on the ability to generate a consensus that legitimates it, political actors must know how to influence public opinion. According to Víctor Sampedro and Jorge Resina de la Fuente (2010:3) controlling and following public opinion will enable leaders:

[...] generar una serie de procesos de enmarcado, a partir de dinámicas de largo recorrido de carácter psico-social, donde además de lo racional, entran en juego emociones y distintos tipos de conexiones neuronales, que frente a unos estímulos en forma de ideas (imágenes al interior del sujeto) evocan significados concretos.<sup>13</sup>

Hence, political discourse, quite apart from its formal features, is a valuable tool for shaping public opinion and, consequently, generating consent and preserving pre-existing power. In Mayr’s (2008:14) words, “subordinate groups are said to consent to the existing social order because it is effectively presented by the state and its institutions as being universally beneficial and commonsensical.” So, the way in which political actors exert their power to maintain the status quo has nothing to do with coercion, but with presenting their “own moral, political

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<sup>13</sup> “[...] To generate a series of framing processes, based on long-distance dynamics of a psycho-social nature, in which, in addition to what is rational, emotions and different types of neural connections come into play, which react to stimuli in the form of ideas (images inside the subject) to evoke specific meanings.”

and cultural values and their institutions” as the public’s. Antonio Gramsci<sup>14</sup> (1999:81) defines this condition as hegemony, which combines:

[...] la fuerza y el consenso que se equilibran diversamente, sin que la fuerza domine demasiado al consenso, incluso tratando de obtener que la fuerza parezca apoyada en el consenso de la mayoría, expresado por los llamados órganos de la opinión pública -periódicos y asociaciones los cuales, por lo tanto, en ciertas situaciones, son multiplicados artificialmente.<sup>15</sup>

Gramsci’s statements show that the media contribute to the maintenance of consent<sup>16</sup> by giving preponderance to hegemonic discourses rather than illegitimate political discourses, which are excluded from the public sphere (McNair 2007). Unavoidably, this has an effect on the public, as they can only access public discourse through media corporations and public broadcasting organizations (Androutsopoulos 2013).

As we will see in Chapter 3, Web 2.0 provides new opportunities for counterpower discourses and the creation of a truly public opinion (discursive rather than aggregate<sup>17</sup>), since citizens acquire a real voice and can express

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<sup>14</sup> Antonio Gramsci wrote his *Quaderni del carcere* between 1929 and 1935, although they were not published until the end of the 1940s, after his death in 1937.

<sup>15</sup> “[...] Force and consent variously balancing one another, without force exceeding consent too much, indeed one tries to make it appear that force is supported by the consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion –newspapers and associations– which are therefore, in certain situations, artificially increased in number.”

<sup>16</sup> Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky exemplify this process in *Manufacturing consent. The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, in which they analyze how the official storytelling of conflicts around the world broadcast by the American media is closely related to the interests of the USA’s economic and military elites.

<sup>17</sup> Sampedro and Resina de la Fuente (2010:4) underline that “La OP agregada tiene más probabilidades de ser construida artificialmente que la OP discursiva, puesto que la primera es la expresada por medios, sondeos y urnas y la expuesta a un mayor nivel de control por parte de las distintas burocracias y élites político-institucionales dominantes tanto en el Estado como en el Mercado. Mientras que la segunda no sería una mera agregación de actitudes de la masa frente a asuntos políticos sino, más bien, el producto emergente de una conversación colectiva en expansión, enmarcada en el ámbito de la sociedad civil, como fenómeno que permitiría a ésta adaptarse a los cambios de circunstancias (Blumer, 1946).” | “Aggregate PO is more likely to be artificially constructed than discursive PO, since the former is expressed by media, surveys and polls and exposed to a higher level of control by the various bureaucracies and political and institutional elites ruling both the state and the market. While the latter would not be a mere aggregation of mass attitudes on

themselves through their own media.<sup>18</sup> Mazzoleni (2010:51), in this respect, reminds us that in the traditional public sphere:

[...] el intercambio entre los tres actores está desequilibrado a favor de la interacción de los dos primeros –el sistema político y los medios— mientras que el tercer actor, el público de los ciudadanos, se ve relegado a desempeñar un papel residual hasta el extremo de que algunos autores han considerado que el ciudadano es más espectador que un actor de la comunicación política.<sup>19</sup>

Now that I have shown how the public sphere works and indicated one of the main functions of political discourse, which is to legitimate those who govern, I would like to move on to the role language plays in perpetuating ideology and power. On this matter, Elena Semino (2008) stresses that language is one of the main tools used for political persuasion (that is, to affect other's views and behaviour on policy issues). For her, it is “not surprising that language plays a central (if not always recognised) role in politics, and that much political action is, either wholly or partly, a linguistic action” (Semino 2008:85). In keeping with Mazzoleni (2010:28), who affirms that “la actuación política pública se produce en la actualidad dentro del espacio mediático”<sup>20</sup>, I would even say that political action is both a linguistic and a communication action.<sup>21</sup>

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political affairs, but the emergent product of an expanding collective conversation, framed in the field of civil society, as a phenomenon that would allow it to adapt to changing circumstances (Blumer, 1946).”

<sup>18</sup> Dahlberg (2007:56) reports that the Internet “provides communication spaces for members of groups associated with marginalized discourses to develop counter-publics [...]” as well as “its interactivity and reach assists politically diverse and geographically dispersed counter-publics in finding shared points of identity and forming counter-public networks and coalitions (or articulations) of radical discourses” and “supports online and offline counter-public contestation of dominant discourses, and hence the contestation of the deliberations of the mainstream public sphere.”

<sup>19</sup> “[...] The exchange between the three actors is unbalanced and favours the interaction of the first two –the political system and the media– whereas the third actor, the public, is relegated to a residual role, to such an extent that some authors have considered that citizens are spectators rather than actors of political communication.”

<sup>20</sup> “Public political action occurs today in the media space.”

<sup>21</sup> Likewise, Canel (2006) explains that some authors understand politics as communication since the social order they aspire to achieve can only be reached through the transaction of symbols between community members; that is, whether political actors want to govern, influence citizens, achieve authority or negotiate with others, there must be communication.

### 1.3. The role of language in the legitimation of power

So far, I have dealt with the formal characteristics and the content of political discourse: who takes part in it, what it is about, what kind of language it uses and what it is like. I have also reflected on the space in which it is produced, the public sphere, and on its role in perpetuating the existing social structures. Nevertheless, we may also ask ourselves if political discourse is limited to what we know as “text”, if it only refers to a written, pre-planned speech. As I have remarked above, political actions are performed through political discourses, which entail both linguistic and communication actions. According to Mazzoleni (2010:120), we talk about political discourse when referring to the “conjunto de intercambios comunicativos entre los distintos actores de la vida política, en resumen, el debate político, aunque también a la información política y, por tanto, a los aspectos no estrictamente lingüísticos de la comunicación política.”<sup>22</sup> So, can we just look at its syntactic and semantic dimension without considering the pragmatic one [which in Rhetoric is known as the “rhetoric fact” (Albaladejo 1990)]? Mayr (2007) suggests not, as “text refers to ‘the observable product of interaction’ whereas discourse is ‘the process of interaction itself: a cultural activity’ (Talbot 2007:9).”

Van Dijk (1997:15) also sheds light on these questions when he says “the study of political discourse should not be limited to the structural properties of text or talk itself, but also include a systematic account of the context and its relations to discursive structures.” This has to do with the Foucauldian conception of discourse as going beyond text and regarding it as “a system of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak” (Lessa 2006:285). Although different, both definitions suggest that discourses go beyond what we can read, hear or watch; they also include everything that

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<sup>22</sup> “Set of communication exchanges between the various actors in political life –in short, the political debate– and also to political information and, therefore, to aspects of political communication that are, strictly speaking, not linguistic.”

surrounds their production, or in other words, their context.<sup>23</sup> Focusing on political discourses, Van Dijk (2003, 2005:26) talks about context/s as mental models of political situations, which are “definiciones subjetivas propias de los participantes en situaciones comunicativas y ellos controlan todos los aspectos de producción de discurso y su comprensión.”<sup>24</sup> Therefore: “el discurso político, así, no es sólo definido en términos de estructuras de discurso político sino también en términos de *contextos políticos*” (Van Dijk 2005:26).<sup>25</sup> The mental models Van Dijk mentioned are an important part of discourse’s ability to influence social representations and ideologies. And it is precisely this ability to enable forms of reproduction or maintenance of power as well as forms of critique and resistance (Foucault 2009) that makes discourses and, of course, political discourses so interesting.

In a broader sense, Castells (2007:238) highlights communication and information as “fundamental sources of power and counter-power.” In the same vein, Siegfried Jäger (2003:68) states that as “agentes de conocimiento (válido en un determinado lugar y en un determinado momento) los discursos ejercen el poder. Son ellos mismos un factor de poder, ya que son capaces de inducir comportamientos y de generar (otros) discursos.”<sup>26</sup> Political discourses are the tool by which political actors transmit their ideologies, “en el sentido que es sólo en el discurso que ellas pueden ser explícitamente ‘expresadas’ y ‘formuladas’”<sup>27</sup> (Van Dijk 2005:26). Hence, ideology needs political discourse if it is to be disseminated, just as politics need ideology since it is somehow its *raison d’être*. Elena Semino (2008:90) qualifies this relationship as a dynamic

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<sup>23</sup> The reader will see that this dichotomy between text and context, between semantics and pragmatics, is also present when talking about Metaphor and Critical Metaphor Analysis in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5.

<sup>24</sup> “Subjective definitions that are typical of participants in communicative situations who control all the aspects of discourse production and comprehension.”

<sup>25</sup> “Political discourse, then, is defined not only in terms of political discourse structures, but also in terms of political contexts.”

<sup>26</sup> “Knowledge agents (valid in a particular place at a particular time ) discourses exercise power. They are themselves a factor of power, as they are capable of inducing behaviours and generating (more) discourses.

<sup>27</sup> “In the sense that it is only in discourse that they may be explicitly ‘expressed’ and ‘formulated.’”



one, as “discourses reflect particular ideologies, but also contribute to shape them and change them.”

Language must be used in political discourses. It is the tool that enables political actors to do politics, as language not only says things, but also does things (Austin 1990). In John E. Richardson (2007:24) words: “language is used to mean something and to do something.” The dichotomy between these two understandings of language has been classified by linguistics into two different paradigms: structuralism and functionalism. The first “focuses on the form which ‘language above the sentence’ takes, looking at structural properties, such as organization and cohesion, but paying little attention to the social ideas that inform the way people use and interpret language.” On the other hand, functionalism claims that “the analysis of language cannot be divorced from the analysis of the purpose and functions of language in human life” (Mayr 2008:7). I assume that, when doing research on communication studies, I must deal with the latter.

As stated by Mayr (2008:17), all languages are considered to be shaped and organised in terms of three functions or metafunctions. She summarizes these functions, originally proposed by the English linguist Michael Halliday, as follows:

1. *IDEATIONAL FUNCTION*.<sup>28</sup> Language is used to organize, understand and express our perceptions of the world. [...]
2. *INTERPERSONAL FUNCTION*. Language is also used to enable us to communicate with other people to talk about roles and to express and understand feelings, attitudes and judgements. [...]
3. *TEXTUAL FUNCTION*. Language is used to create coherent and cohesive texts, both spoken and written. [...]

Since the ideational function of language examines how beliefs and ideologies are encoded in language, it best suits the way in which I approach language and

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<sup>28</sup> Italics are mine.

discourse in the present research. However, although the linguistic viewpoint is relevant, we must not forget communication. Murray Edelman, cited by Mazzoleni (2010) as a researcher of political language, remarked that political facts are often understood in terms of the language used to describe them and that the way in which they are explained is more useful for the public to draw conclusions. This is why both authors consider political language as political reality. Edelman (1985) also classified political language into four distinctive functional types: hortatory (1), legal (2), administrative (3) and (4) bargaining. This research is framed within the first type. Mazzoleni (2010:124) says:

Constituye una categoría bastante amplia, en la que cabe gran parte de la comunicación producida por los emisores políticos, que integra los registros de la ideología y de la retórica, los objetivos de la persuasión y los efectos de la estabilidad y del consenso. Es el lenguaje político por excelencia, el de las campañas electorales, la propaganda y el marketing de los partidos y de los candidatos incluso fuera de campaña y el de los políticos que participan en las discusiones parlamentarias públicas [...]. Los rasgos constitutivos de este tipo de lenguaje son la dramatización y la emotividad, dos registros esenciales para la conquista de la atención y el consenso del público.<sup>29</sup>

In the public sphere, power is achieved through persuasion, and the main goal is to be given the consent of the governed. The conception of power as persuasion rather than domination is what gives relevance to the discursive strategies of power maintenance and ideological transfer –in which language has a key role. For instance, Jonathan Charteris-Black (2011:32) mentions that “by becoming aware of linguistic choices we are also becoming aware of the political choices that they imply and their underlying ethical assumptions.”

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<sup>29</sup> “It is a broad category that contains almost all communication produced by political senders, which includes the registers of ideology and rhetoric, persuasion goals and the effects of stability and consensus. It is the political language par excellence, the language of election campaigns, propaganda and marketing of political parties and candidates even outside the campaign and the language of politicians who participate in parliamentary discussions [...]. The constituent elements of this kind of language are dramatization and emotionality, two essential registers for conquering public attention and consent.”

Regarding these linguistic choices, which, as I will explain below, are at the heart of persuasion, Van Dijk (1997:25) states that “lexical items not only may be selected because of official criteria of decorum, but also because they effectively emphasize or de-emphasize political attitudes and opinions, garner support, manipulate public opinion, manufacture political consent, or legitimate political power.” As a result, texts usually become fighting arenas that show the footprints of discourses and ideologies, which contended and struggled to predominance (Wodak 2003). Metaphor, as one of these footprints, will reveal how linguistic and semiotic choices help represent ideology within political discourses (Androutsopoulos 2013).

In order to better understand the role of metaphors in political discourses, the following chapter describes how the thesis approaches this rhetorical device and reflects on the reasons that drive political actors to use it in their speeches.

# Chapter 2

## On how metaphor works in political discourses

The fundamental power struggle is the battle  
for the construction of meaning in the minds of the people.

Manuel Castells, *Holberg Prize award ceremony speech*

### 2.1. What is metaphor?

If we were to ask what a metaphor is, the answer would probably be a figure of speech. The traditional definition of metaphor has always been associated with text embellishment (Eco 1989). This was largely how it was regarded until the 20th century, although Aristotle had pointed out that it was also a figure of thought. The paradigm of the definition of metaphor was changed by Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), which defined metaphors as conceptual structures that “are not merely linguistic in nature, although, of course, they are normally realized linguistically” (Croft and Cruse 2004:197). However, the idea that metaphor was something more than a superficial device related to poetics was not exclusively promoted by Cognitive Linguistics. Stefano Arduini (1993:8), for instance, thinks about this from a rhetorical perspective. He goes further than the Rhetoric of Groupe  $\mu$  (1970), which only studies figures of speech,<sup>30</sup> and proposes:

Un tratamiento de la figura retórica [...] que no se limite simplemente a ver en ella [...] un componente de la elocutio del texto de naturaleza puramente microestructural, sino algo más complejo que implica los diversos planos

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<sup>30</sup> Martínez Dueñas (1993:61) summarizes the theoretical assumptions of Groupe  $\mu$  by saying that: “para algunos autores, por ejemplo, el cambio de la metáfora radica en la referencia, la denotación, y no en el sentido.” (For some authors, for example, the change in metaphor is rooted in reference, denotation, and not in meaning). This refers to a change in a term’s semantic content at the superficial level, which has nothing to do with an alteration at the deep level of speech.

retóricos y que atañe a una modalidad de nuestro pensamiento (la modalidad retórica) que está junto a la lógico-empírica.<sup>31</sup>

By talking about “planos retóricos” (rhetorical levels), Arduini is setting the origin of metaphor not just at the surface level of speech (*elocutio*), but also at the deep level (*inventio*). In his opinion (1993:11), “[...] la figura no hace otra cosa que acoger sobre el plano de la cohesión potencialidades más profundas.”<sup>32</sup> This is possible because of the coherence between these levels, which allows us to approach the study of metaphor as an analogy that proceeds from the deep level of discourse and to focus on what we have noted in the previous chapter: the ideological use of language. To understand that a metaphor identified in the surface stage of discourse is based on an idea thought to be transmitted in the deepest stage is basic for considering metaphor both as a persuasive and an ideological tool. This, then, is the most relevant contribution from a political communication point of view.

Although this is not a linguistics thesis, I ought to stress the central role Conceptual Metaphor Theory has played in research about metaphor in the last thirty-six years. Since it defines metaphor as a means by which we structure our thought and, consequently, how we understand our world, it also becomes a key element in political discourses. Developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980), CMT has undoubtedly influenced the various academic approaches to metaphor. For instance, Arduini (1993:15) points out that “las figuras son los medios con los que ordenamos el mundo y lo podemos relatar, los medios con los que nosotros mismos nos construimos y relatamos.”<sup>33</sup> In this regard, he says that figures allow us to make one “possible reading”, that goes further than the reading offered by Groupe  $\mu$ . Of course, I argue that figures allow us to make

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<sup>31</sup> “A treatment of the rhetorical figure [...] that is not restricted to seeing it [...] as merely a microstructural component of *elocutio*, but as something more complex that involves the various rhetorical levels and that is concerned with a modality of our thought (the rhetoric modality), which is next to the logical-empirical modality.”

<sup>32</sup> “[...] Figures just portray on the level of cohesion deeper potentialities.”

<sup>33</sup> “Figures are the means by which we organize our world and explain it, the means by which we construct and explain ourselves.”

one “possible reading” but also a reading that would not be possible without them. As Eco (1989:390) states, using rhetorical figures creatively helps to “delinear un contenido diferente”<sup>34</sup> and, the idea that lies at the very heart of this thesis: “designar las realidades que no pueden tener un término propio”<sup>35</sup> (Le Guern 1990:82).

Metaphor has the power to explain complex realities, to name controversial issues and to persuade, which is why it is used so frequently by politicians in their speeches. To completely understand how metaphor works, in the sections below I shall try to shed light on the various features related to metaphor as well as how it is used in political communication.

### 2.1.1. Defining metaphor: an integrated approach

It is commonly known that metaphor was first codified by Aristotle in two of his main works: *Rhetoric* and *The Poetics*. In the latter (Aristotle; Poet. 2015:63<sup>36</sup>), he refers to metaphor as “the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion.” Hence, metaphor is the tool that gives new meaning to a word, a meaning that is completely different than its literal one. As we can see, the author describes four different types of metaphor: transference from genus to species (1), from species to genus (2), from species to species (3) or by analogy (4). The first three types are, according to José Miguel Gamba (1990:55), “una translación que no involucra una razón análoga, sino unívoca.”<sup>37</sup> Several authors (Jakobson 1976; Todorov 1981; Eco 1989; Gamba 1990) understand this unambiguous relation to be a synecdochial one. So, even though these types of metaphor are also based on a relation between two meanings associated to the name, the Aristotelian tradition has always considered metaphor by analogy as the “perfect metaphor” (Femenías 1998).

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<sup>34</sup> “Change the way in which the content is taken into consideration.”

<sup>35</sup> “Names the realities that cannot have a proper term of their own.”

<sup>36</sup> The original versions of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* date from the 4th century BC.

<sup>37</sup> “A translation that does not involve an analogical reason, but a univocal one.”

It was the Ancient Greek philosopher (Ret. 2015:364) who described this kind of metaphor as the most *taking* one. So, we will only talk about metaphor when the relation between two meanings is based on analogy and not on contiguity. We shall refer to the latter as metonym (Eco 1989; Arduini 2000).

But what is Aristotle referring to when he talks about metaphor by analogy? In his words (Poet. 2015:63), “analogy or proportion is when the second term is to the first as the fourth to the third. We may then use the fourth for the second, or the second for the fourth.” The author (Poet. 2015:64) explains this double metonymic relation with the following example: “the cup is to Dionysus as the shield to Ares. The cup may, therefore, be called ‘the shield of Dionysus’ and the shield ‘the cup of Ares’.” Since the name “cup” shares the same relation with Dionysus as the name “shield” does with Ares, “tanto es la copa el escudo de Dioniso como el escudo la copa de Ares”<sup>38</sup> (Femenías 1998:36). Umberto Eco (1989:390-391) sums up this relation from a semiotic perspective by defining metaphor as “la estructura de dos sememas que tengan marcas en común,”<sup>39</sup> which clearly exemplifies the analogical nature of the metaphor structure.

The present research also understands metaphor as an analogical proceeding that occurs in the deep level of discourse (Arduini 1993; Capdevila 2004), which corresponds to the rhetorical operation of *inventio*. In this phase, the speaker uses analogy as a resource to build up its persuasive strategy, which is one of the proceedings that Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1989) outline in “The New Rhetoric. A treatise on Argumentation.” The authors talk about metaphor as a “condensed analogy,” as an analogy in the deep level of discourse becomes a metaphor in the surface level: this is, in *elocutio*, the stage in which macrostructures of the discourse are rendered visible. Along the same lines, Arduini (1993), following Antonio García-Berrio and Tomás Albaladejo (1983), argues that the rhetoric of figures cannot only think of them as

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<sup>38</sup> “The cup is just as much the shield of Dionysus as the shield is the cup of Ares.”

<sup>39</sup> “Two sememes some of whose readings have semantic markers in common.”

displacements and modifications of the semantic-intensional level (*elocutio*), but that they need to involve the semantic-extensional level and the reference (*intellectio*). Coherence between the various levels of discourse and, especially between analogy –a reasoning procedure in the deep level– and metaphor –a figure of speech in the surface level–, reinforces our decision to look at metaphors built on analogy in order to narrow the focus of the present study.

Jonathan Charteris-Black (2011) goes beyond the Aristotelian definition of metaphor, which, as pointed out above, focuses on the relation between two meanings, and thinks about the literal dimension of meaning. The author (2011:31) simplifies it by presenting metaphor “as a word or phrase that is used with a sense that differs from another more common or more basic sense that this word or phrase has.” Conceptual Metaphor Theory refers to the meaning that differs from common sense as “source domain.” Going back to the etymological origin of metaphor (*metaphorá* – μεταφορά), Charteris-Black (2011:31) states that:

Metaphor is a shift in the use of a word or phrase by giving it a new sense. If the innovative sense is taken up, it will eventually change the meaning of a word that is used metaphorically. It is the shift in meaning that enables metaphors to evoke emotional responses and we should recall that ‘motion’ and ‘emotion’ have the same etymological source and so we may think of metaphors as bearers of affective meaning.

The ability to evoke emotional responses is part of metaphor’s nature and this is exactly the function Aristotle confers on it. From the very beginning of its history to late 20<sup>th</sup> century AD metaphor has always been considered a figure of the speech whose main purpose is to give “style clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can” (Aristotle; Rhet. 2015:325). In this sense, metaphor is used to persuade, to convince an auditorium by being “beautiful to the ear, to the understanding, to the eye or some other physical sense” (Aristotle; Rhet. 2015:329). However, as noted above, we are not going to consider metaphor only as an ornamental tool. It is not only a matter of language, but a matter of thought



(Lakoff 1993). Although authors such as Donald Davidson (1987:32) have said that “metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more”, I will use the definition of metaphor that has reached the greatest consensus among scholars nowadays. That is, it is a rhetorical device that not only embellishes persuasive discourses but also creates new meanings that are related to the way we understand our world. Therefore, this thesis will deal with these two approaches.

These two approaches have not always been studied together. In his book *Metaphor: a practical introduction*, Zoltan Kövecses (2010: *preface*) argues that metaphor was regarded as “a linguistic phenomenon [...] that [was] used for some artistic and rhetorical purpose”. He also describes the nature of metaphor understood in an Aristotelian way, and says that it “is based on a resemblance between two entities that are compared and identified”. By presenting metaphor as “a conscious and a deliberate use of words” that requires a special talent “to do it and to do it well” traditional theoretical approaches have thought about it as “figure of the speech that we can do without.” For instance, Gamba (1990:58) points out that “en cuanto la metáfora en sentido estricto tiene como fundamento la analogía, puede ser eliminada si en lugar del término transferido se emplea un nombre homónimo basado en la misma analogía.”<sup>40</sup> But this conception of metaphor changed completely when George Lakoff and Mark Johnson wrote *Metaphors we live by* (1980). The publication of this research was the starting point for what we now know as Conceptual Metaphor Theory, the main contributions of which are the following (Kövecses 2010:X):

- Metaphor is a property of concepts, not of words.
- The function of metaphor is to better understand certain concepts, and not just some artistic or aesthetic purpose.

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<sup>40</sup> “As far as metaphor in the strict sense is concerned, it is based on analogy and it can be removed if instead of the transferred term we use a homonymous noun based on the same analogy.”

- Metaphor is often not based on similarity.<sup>41</sup>
- Metaphor is used effortlessly in everyday life by ordinary people, not just by special talented people.
- Metaphor far from being a superfluous though pleasing linguistic ornament is an inevitable process of human thought and reasoning.

In this study I will look at the persuasive and cognitive strength of metaphor, which has been focused on by the Rhetoric Argumentative Theory and the Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Presenting metaphor as a persuasive tool or as a linguistic tool separately makes no sense, since the act of choosing a source domain to represent a target domain is in itself a persuasive act. Hence, I will go into the literature on metaphor as a figure of the speech and metaphor as a cognition tool.

### 2.1.2. Metaphor and persuasion

Few rhetorical figures are as persuasive as metaphors (Van Dijk 2005) and in this section I aim to explain why. As stated above, by choosing from which elements of reality they will draw the strategy to convince their audience, speakers make a persuasive act. Analogy and, consequently, metaphor, are also part of this act, as “by focusing on one aspect of something, other aspects are downplayed and ignored” (Stenvoll 2008:34)<sup>42</sup>. In Elena Semino’s (2008:32-33) words: “metaphors ‘highlight’ some aspects of the target domain and ‘hide’ others.” It is precisely this choice which makes discourse persuasive, because it implies a conscious selection of agreements and proceedings that sustain the argumentation (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1989). Analogy, as one of them, is a useful tool that enables speakers to explain a new reality from the basis of another that is known to the audience and to decide which elements of this

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<sup>41</sup> Even though I will keep these points in mind in my approach to the metaphors used in Catalan and Scottish pro-independence discourses, I do not agree with the proposal Kövecses makes on this particular point. Since metaphor draws on analogy, it is always based on a similarity, which, of course, does not need to be a physical one.

<sup>42</sup> Umberto Eco (1989) works on this idea in “El trabajo retórico” in *Tratado de Semiótica general* Barcelona: Lumen pp. 386-403. The author explains that, by choosing which *semes* are shared by the *sememes* that form a metaphor, some elements prevail over others.

reality they want to highlight. By appealing to a known reality, which is mostly accepted by the audience, the new reality speakers want to share will presumably be accepted too. Since the point of departure is a domain of knowledge that is presupposed by the auditorium, not only logically deduced, the authority of the argumentation is transmitted automatically to the ending point: the new domain of knowledge the speaker wants to share with the audience. In Aristotle's words (Gambra 1990:54): "una buena metáfora implica la percepción intuitiva de la semejanza de los desemejantes."<sup>43</sup> And seeing this similarity, results in sharing and accepting it, if it is constructed properly. Hence, "metaphors can elicit an assimilation effect wherein evaluation of the topic is assimilated toward evaluation of the vehicle"<sup>44</sup> (Ottati and Renstrom 2010:785). To insist on looking at a source domain that can effectively present a target domain is a constant in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Among other things, he (*Rhet.* 2015:328) warns speaker about the correct use of metaphors: "In using metaphors to give names to nameless things, we must draw them not from remote but from kindred and similar things, so that the kinship is clearly perceived as soon as the words are said."

In this respect, Victor Ottati and Randall Renstrom (2010:785) point out that, to increase its persuasive value, the speaker has to bear in mind that "metaphor is most effective at producing persuasion when the message recipient is knowledgeable with regard to the topic domain." Likewise, Jeffery Scott Mio (1997:120) states that deductive reasoning is used to interpret metaphors: "Metaphor is a minor premise; if accepted as such, it proves the major premise, and the conclusion is the course of action." The ability to prove a major premise and to have an effect on those who accept the reasoning –that is, the course of action– gives metaphor an accentuated persuasive component (Le Guern 1990).

Inés Olza (2008) introduces the kinds of text in which metaphorical expressions can do the most in persuasive terms. She says (2008:214) that "las expresiones

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<sup>43</sup> "A good metaphor involves an intuitive perception of the similarity of the dissimilarities."

<sup>44</sup> Topic and vehicle are other terms used to refer to target domain and source domain

metafóricas pueden contribuir a lograr determinados fines persuasivos en textos originalmente concebidos para la argumentación –textos de comunicación política y determinados géneros periodísticos: editoriales, columnas de opinión, comentarios políticos–.”<sup>45</sup> Hence, when we find metaphorical expressions in texts that have been planned in some way, like political discourses, we ought to think that they have been conceived as reasoning devices whose main goal is to convince the receiver of these texts.

Moreover, because metaphor is based on the relation between two different meanings, metaphorical expressions often have a high denotative or connotative charge, since a term is used instead of the original name and this replacement may distort its principal meaning. Ottati and Renstrom (2010) point to coherence as the key element for the effectiveness of metaphor. They (2010:789) state that a “metaphor that semantically ‘fits’ the literal statements should produce a coherence effect, whereas a metaphor that is irrelevant to the literal arguments might be expected to elicit a distraction effect.” Actually, Aristotle indicates in his *Rhetoric* (2015:363) that it is good to use metaphorical words, “but the metaphors must not be far-fetched, or they will be difficult to grasp, nor obvious, or they will have no effect.” So, the use of metaphor needs to be appropriate in order to persuade. Appropriateness is often given by the words or expressions that are close to the audience’s domains of knowledge (Musolff, 2004). Gabra (1990) reflects on the imperfect audience presented by Aristotle, who considered that the receivers of the message only admitted truisms and other propositions everybody could accept, since they did not know anything about the principles of sciences. So, to be effective, metaphors and other rhetorical devices must be understandable and coherent with the audience’s universe. As Bart Cammaerts (2012:233) argues, “the power of the metaphor thus lies foremost in its subliminal character, in its ability to express apparent taken-for-grantedness and common sense.”

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<sup>45</sup> “Metaphorical expressions can contribute to the attainment of persuasive goals in discourses that have been originally conceived for argumentation –political communication texts and certain journalistic genres: editorials, opinion columns, political comments–.”

As a device that helps speakers share their ideas with the audience, metaphors also support the arguments developed in speech (Bosman 1987). Siltanen (1981:73), quoted by Bosman (1987:98), explains that: "metaphor could facilitate persuasion because it is perceived as a culmination or economic statement of the arguments, developed in the body of speech". Olza (2008) specifies that the leading role metaphor plays in the argumentation process relates to the higher evaluative load lexemes have when they are used metaphorically. The author also underlines another important element related to the persuasiveness of metaphor: intensification. This concept, developed by Antonio Briz (1998), presents metaphor as a discursive intensification mechanism, which reinforces speakers and the content of their discourse.

From a psychological point of view, Ottati and Renstrom (2010:791-792) point out three psychological processes that back up persuasion if undertaken successfully:

First, metaphorical statements can activate information that is directly applied to the communication topic and thereby influence attitudes toward the communication topic. Second, metaphorical language may influence impressions of the communication source and thereby impact attitudes toward the Communications topic. Third, metaphors may affect attitudes toward the communication topic by influencing the direction or amount of elaboration that takes place when recipients process literal statements contained in the communication.

Metaphor, as a persuasive tool, is no longer conceived as a merely ornamental figure, but as a discursive mechanism (Lopez 2003). Its ability to persuade cannot be dissociated from its cognitive dimension, as Zouhair Maalej (2007:151) underlines:

What constitutes this 'persuasive power' of metaphor is other powers that Lakoff and Turner (1989: 64-65) sum up as *the power to structure* (i.e. imparting to a concept structure that cannot exist independent of the metaphor), *the power of options* (i.e. the options of filling in the slots of the

TD), *the power of reason* (i.e. the capacity to borrow patterns of inference from the SD), *the power of evaluation* (i.e. the power to carry over the way we evaluate the SD), and *the power of being there* (i.e. the fact that conceptual metaphors are so automatic and unconscious makes them less questionable).

Likewise, Femenías (1998) stresses the need to understand that discourse integrates knowledge, ornament and emotion, and metaphor is the kind of discursive mechanism that tends to bring these three aspects together. Le Guern, for instance, (1990:81) relates these three components to the classical functions of language: *docere* (to transmit information – knowledge), *placere* (to express the aesthetic function – Ornament) and *movere* (related to the persuasive function – Emotion).

As I have argued above, I understand metaphor as a system of both language and thought. Just as metaphor cannot only be understood as a figure of speech, it cannot be studied solely from a cognitive approach either (Charteris-Black 2004). Metaphor as a discursive mechanism plays an important role in discursive strategy and this means that it cannot be understood in isolation. It is linked to an argumentative procedure –analogy–, so it is related to all the other components in a speech. Charteris-Black (2004:11) summarizes this as follows:

One of the limitations of metaphor analysis when the cognitive approach is isolated from the pragmatic one is that the only explanation of metaphor motivation is with reference to an underlying experiential basis. This assumes that metaphor use is an unconscious reflex, whereas a pragmatic view argues that speakers use metaphor to persuade by combining the cognitive and linguistic resources at their disposal.

Metaphor, then, should be used for its expressive ability and as a conceptual assumption from which the audience can draw conclusions (Olza 2008). Hence, persuasion (pragmatic approach) and cognition (cognitive approach) must go together. George Lakoff and Mark Turner (1989:63) also recognise that “for the

same reasons that schemas and metaphors give us power to conceptualize and reason, so they have power over us”. Now I have attempted to shed light on the persuasive dimension of metaphor, I will move on to its cognitive dimension.

### 2.1.3. Metaphor as a matter of thought: Conceptual Metaphor Theory<sup>46</sup>

The theoretical framework surrounding metaphor shifted at the beginning of the 80s. Although Max Black (1967) had started to question the ornamental function of metaphors by showing that they were able to create insights or new meanings, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) were the first to observe the influence metaphor had on the way people conceived their world (Kövecses 2010; Longa and López Rivera 2011; Cammaerts 2012). Before their study “Metaphors we live by” (1980) appeared, classical theory was taken for granted, which meant “metaphorical expressions were assumed to be mutually exclusive with the realm of ordinary everyday language” (Lakoff 1993:202). The starting point in Lakoff and Johnson’s CMT (1980) is that our conceptual system plays a central role in defining our everyday realities and language is an important source of evidence on how this system works. For these authors, metaphors are possible as linguistic expressions because they already exist in a person’s conceptual system:

The generalizations governing poetic metaphorical expressions are not in language, but in thought: they are general mappings across conceptual domains. Moreover, these general principles, which take the form of conceptual mappings, apply not just to novel poetic expressions, but to much of ordinary everyday language (Lakoff 1993: 203).

The relation established between language and knowledge is one of Lakoff’s greatest contributions to linguistics according to Maria Elvira Teruel Planas (1997).

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<sup>46</sup> As I have explained in the introduction to this chapter, this is not a linguistics thesis, but a communication thesis. This is why I am not going to focus on other theories derived from CMT, such as the Conceptual Blending Theory developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner.

She underlines Lakoff's new vision of language use, which is related to the idea of users' linguistic competence. For Lakoff, achieving this competence not only involves controlling the rules of language, but recognizing the world we live in through their use. In view of this, figurative language, which has been regarded "as special rhetorical devices for communication", is now also understood as "reflecting pervasive figurative schemes of thought" (Gibbs 2001:318). Lakoff and Johnson rebelled against "the trend of classifying metaphor and figurative speech as a semantically and/or pragmatically 'extraordinary' phenomenon" (Musolff 2012:302) and considered figurative language as a kind of language we use to communicate with others and, of course, to understand our world. Because of this paradigm shift, figurative language "ha de rebre un tractament teòric equiparable a qualsevol altra manifestació de la llengua"<sup>47</sup> (Teruel Planas 1997:146). As Goatly (1997:3) says: "the only difference between literal language and metaphorical language is that, in literal use, we adhere to conventional criteria for classification, whereas in metaphorical use, the similarities, the criteria for interpretation are relatively unconventional."

Charteris-Black (2011) also deals with the relation between language and knowledge and the use of figurative language as a means for understanding our world. The author (2010:31) states "metaphor arises from our *expectations* about meaning that are based on our knowledge of how words have previously been used." Breaking away from the original meaning of words and, because of that, the ordinary understanding of the text, results in what semiotics defines as breaking isotopy (Greimas 1987<sup>48</sup>) or the "direction that a text exhibits when submitted to rules of interpretative coherence" (Eco 1980:153). According to Le Guern (1990:19):

[...] la metáfora, a condición de que sea viviente y produzca imagen, aparece inmediatamente como extraña a la isotopía del texto en el que está inserta. La interpretación de la metáfora es posible gracias únicamente a la

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<sup>47</sup> "Must be given the same theoretical treatment as every manifestation of language."

<sup>48</sup> The original version of this work is from 1966.



exclusión del sentido propio, cuya incompatibilidad con el contexto orienta al lector o al oyente hacia el proceso particular de la abstracción metafórica.<sup>49</sup>

Arduini (1993) perceives that the breaking of the isotopy deviates from the norm and establishes a new use. Although this deviation provides some practical applications in the detection of metaphors, the author (1993:10) warns us about relegating them to deviations from the norm: “las figuras representan [...] unas estructuras universales de organización expresiva del pensamiento no reducibles a la simple dialéctica norma-desvío.”<sup>50</sup> This suggests that, although we detect metaphor in the surface level of discourses, we cannot completely understand it without focusing on the analogy that takes place in the deep level of discourse, which leads us to its meaning and the reasoning why it is used.

Mio and Katz (1996:X) go beyond the linguistic consideration of figurative language to ask a rhetorical question about the intention that underlies this kind of language: “Why and when would a person prefer to use a figurative statement when the same point can be made by use of a literal statement?” Intentionality takes us back to the previous section: persuasion and the need to understand metaphor, or, at least, metaphor use in political discourses, in its pragmatic and cognitive dimension. As Charteris-Black (2011:32) points out: “In political rhetoric the primary purpose of metaphors is to frame how we view or understand political issues by eliminating alternative points of view.” Or what amounts to the same, by making a choice of which ideas will structure the speaker’s discourse in order to convince the audience.

The nature of metaphor is analogical, which determines its structure and functioning. As it involves two different names, one from which we depart so

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<sup>49</sup> “[...] Metaphor, in order to be living and generate an image, appears immediately as odd to the isotopy of the text in which it is inserted. The interpretation of metaphor is possible only and exclusively thanks to the exclusion of the literal sense, whose incompatibility with the context guides the reader or the hearer towards the particular process of metaphorical abstraction.”

<sup>50</sup> “Figures represent [...] universal structures of expressive organization of thought, which are not reducible to simple norm-deviation reasoning.”

that we can understand the meaning of the other, it has two clear parts. These are the “source domain” and the “target domain”, also known as “vehicle” and “tenor” (Richards 1976; Cameron 1999) or “focus” and “frame” (Black 1967). Kövecses (2010:4) defines the first as “the conceptual domain from which we draw metaphorical expressions to understand another conceptual domain”. This other conceptual domain, the target, is, then, “the domain that we try to understand through the use of the source domain” (Kövecses 2010:4). This results in “the adoption of a familiar source or experience to serve as a base analog that is then mapped onto an unfamiliar target analog” (Bougher 2012:146). For Kövecses (2005:6) the choice of these particular domains of knowledge to create a metaphor is motivated by an experiential basis, an embodied experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). He argues that “the relation of the source and the target is such that a source domain can apply to several targets and a target can attach to several sources” (Kövecses 2005:6) and this derives in a diversity of pairings of source and target domains. Such different correspondences between the source and the target domain are called “mappings”. For instance, in the metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY, “love” is the target domain and is understood in terms of the conceptual domain of “journey” (source domain). Thus, as stated by Kövecses (2005:6), the travellers will be the lovers, the vehicle its love relationship and the obstacles along the way the difficulties encountered in the relationship.

As well as these basic correspondences, source domains also map other ideas, known as “entailments” or “inferences”. In Lakoff’s words (1993:210): “each mapping defines an open-ended class of potential correspondences across inference patterns. When activated, a mapping may apply to a novel source domain knowledge structure and characterize a corresponding target domain knowledge structure.” Hence, we have to take into consideration that when we conceptualize love as a journey and the vehicle as love relationship, our knowledge about the vehicle can be used to understand love relationships (Kövecses 2005:7).

Depending on which entailments we use to structure a metaphor, we will map different alternatives to our “love story”. These alternatives or “extensions of general mappings that underlie a whole domain” are known as “scenarios” (Musolff 2006:25). Scenarios are relevant when talking about metaphor since they “provide, as it were, the main story-lines or perspectives along which the central mappings are developed and extended” (Musolff 2004:18). The ability to create “mini-narratives” (Mottier 2008:191) by telling a story in a concentrated format results in fitting a “specific political interpretation on the topic” (Musolff 2004:22). It is the influence they have on the audience’s interpretation of political dispositions that what makes scenarios decisive in political discourses.

As pointed out by Kövecses (2005, 2010), the cognitive theory of metaphor “rests on an experimentalist framework” (Zinken 2003:507). In Alan Cienki’s words (2008:241) it “builds on the premise that many expressions in everyday language reflect deep-seated ways of characterising one conceptual domain, often a more abstract notion, in terms of a different domain, one which is often more closely related to our physical, embodied experience.” This links with the foundational idea of CMT, which is that our way of thinking is determined by the way our bodies interact with our minds. We shape our knowledge from our daily experience, which has to be understood not only “as individual experience alone, but also as sociocultural experience” (Zinken 2003:507). However, although authors like Michael O’Mara-Simek et al. (2015) assert “experiences derived from the body facilitate abstract conceptualization”, we cannot omit context from the interpretation of metaphor. On this matter, Van Dijk (2005) indicates metaphors in discourse are always embedded in a specific communicative context. When using metaphor in a discourse, we have to bear in mind that “the spelling out of the full story is done by the audience, which draws upon their tacit knowledge of the historical, social or political context to do so” (Mottier 2008:191). Likewise, Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson (1988) underline the importance of context in the mental representation of individual forms of the world and in the correct decoding of a message. So, when looking at political discourses that have a clear receiver, context gains in importance.

Charteris-Black (2011:50) has analysed these kinds of discourse and argues that “cognitive characteristics of metaphor cannot be treated in isolation from other persuasive rhetorical features in the discourse context”, and stresses the need to complement conceptual metaphor analysis “with a summary of the social context in which the speeches were made and of the overall verbal context of metaphor.” Dolores Porto and Manuela Romano (2012:62) discuss Kövecses’ concept of “context induced creativity”, which shows that the choice of a specific source domain is prompted by contextual factors such as “the immediate cultural context, the immediate social setting and the immediate linguistic context itself, as well as the immediate physical setting and what we know about discourse participants.”

The introduction of context into the way we define cognitive metaphor also has to do with the different kind of conceptual metaphors Lakoff and Johnson described in their foundational work: ontological, orientational and structural. Before defining them in this section, we must take into account Stenvoll’s (2008) considerations about metaphorical thought. He says (2008:34) that: “Metaphorical thought has a ‘neural basis’, in the sense that primary categories, or ‘sensory-motor concepts’, arise from sensory-motor experiences like moving in space and dealing with physical objects.” We have dealt with this understanding of metaphor and thought above and have mentioned that it is not possible to interpret metaphors without also focusing on the context that surrounds them. However, ontological and orientational metaphors seem to be the only ones that can be understood in this way. The former can be grouped into the kind of metaphors that conceive our experiences in terms of objects. For Kövecses (2010:38) “Since our knowledge about objects, substances, and containers is rather limited at this general level, we cannot use these highly general categories to understand much about target domains.” The same can be said of orientational metaphors, which have to do with basic human spatial orientations (HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN: I’m feeling up today. He’s really low these days.). On the other hand, structural metaphors, in which the source domain provides a relatively rich knowledge structure for the target concept,

provide what we know as metaphorical reasoning, which is based on the model outlined before (source domain – target domain – mappings – entailments – scenarios).

## 2.2. Uses of metaphor in political discourses. A political communication perspective

The study of metaphor in political discourses is not new, but little research has been done in the field of communication studies. This could be explained by the difficulties the communication researcher finds when embracing a device that has mostly been studied by such other disciplines as semiotics, linguistics or psychology. The studies that have dealt with metaphor in political discourses have been carried out by political scientists (Yanow 2000; Carvell and Pikalo 2008), psychologists (Mio & Katz 1996, Ottati and Renstorm 2010) or linguists (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Goatly 1997; Grady 2005; Charteris-Black 2006, 2011; Kövecses 2006, 2010; Musolff 2004, 2006; Semino 2008). Few researchers have focused on metaphors from the field of political communication. So, in this section I attempt to look through the existing literature to revise what has been said about the role it plays in political discourses and reveal how it could fit into the scope of communication studies.

As Mio (1996:130) states: “political events are inherently complex, given the many competing voices that want to be heard on the issues.” These issues must be simplified when they are presented to an audience considered to be incapable of understanding political events in all whole complexity. So, there is a need to show public opinion, the “average citizen”, how they should perceive political decisions. Semino (2008:32) confers metaphor with this ability when she says “constructing something in terms of something else results in a particular view of the ‘something’ in question, often including specific attitudes and evaluations.” And politicians use metaphors because they “can act both as filters that screen out

much of the available information, leaving only the core ideas [...] and to collapse disparate information into smaller, more manageable packets” (Mio 1996:130).

We cannot omit the consideration of the audience as an imperfect group, as “unsophisticated individuals” (Mio 1996:134), who can be more easily persuaded by metaphorical manipulations. As we have indicated in the previous sections, this was an Aristotelian reflection, which related to the way in which metaphors had to be used in rhetoric. Rhetoric, whose main goal is to persuade an audience who does not know the principles of the science (Gambra 1990), needs to make deductions about truisms. So, for politicians, “metaphor is an effective means [...] to develop persuasive arguments by applying what is familiar, and already experienced, to new topics to demonstrate that they are thinking rationally about political issues” (Charteris-Black 2011:35). To draw from what is already known (Bougher 2012) makes metaphors “invisible”, since we understand them without needing to pay attention to their metaphorical character (Grey 2000). This understanding of the public’s role has to do with a traditional model of the public sphere (Habermas 1991). As we will see in Chapter 3, the irruption of Web 2.0 and, consequently, the development of social media tools question this model, so we need to check whether these tools also alter politicians’ discourses and the role metaphor plays in them. Mio’s contribution to the importance of metaphor is *The political cognition theory* (1997). This theory understands that the public requires “schemas or political maps that simplify the confusing array of potential political information” (Mio 1997:117). It does not believe voters to be uninterested or to have unbreakable pre-existing beliefs who cannot be persuaded, as *The uninformed voter theory* did, but neither does it assume that they can influence political issues.

Cammaerts (2012:244) regards metaphors as the schemas or political maps used “to shape public discourse” and “to present political ‘reality’ in a specific way.” As I have argued above, this “specific way”, the ability to choose how the speaker, and in this case, the politician or the political party, wants to present an issue is what makes metaphor so attractive.

In addition to the ability to connote a particular reality, Stenvoll (2005) introduces the storytelling dimension metaphors have in political struggles, which involves Musolff's concept of "scenario." The author (2005:2) declares that "they [...] 'set the scene': what is an issue, what is the issue about and what is it not about, how does it link to other issues, and why must we or must we not therefore take this or that political action." Likewise, Mio (1996), quoting Stone (1988), states that political problems are connected to story narratives, since they involve the key elements of a story (heroes, villains, helpers, etc.). He regards metaphors as devices that, at first sight, "simply draw a comparison between one thing and another, but in a more subtle way, they usually imply a whole narrative story and prescription for action" (Stone 1988:118). And what is a politician's biggest wish if not a "prescription for action?" How could they manage without a tool that can be used for "convey[ing] policies, convinc[ing] or persuad[ing] the public of a plan of action or [for] characteriz[ing] political opponents" (Mio 1996:127)?

Metaphors are also an effective problem-solving tool, since they "provide *specific* guidance on how to deal with novel situations" (Bougher 2012:146). In William Grey's (2000) words, metaphor is not only a "tool of conceptual economy", but also "a tool of discovery, providing a way of imposing or discovering structure within novel or unfamiliar situations". For all this, metaphors become "a convenient and natural way through which political leaders communicate their beliefs, identity, and ideology" (Hellín García 2009:130). From the perspective of political communication, it is the ability to communicate the ideology of political parties that makes sense of metaphor in political discourse. In the final analysis, the use of metaphor is itself ideological, since it is not chosen arbitrarily (Hellín García 2009). Carolyn Straehle et al. (1999:68) point out another feature of metaphor, –its framing ability– when they state that "using metaphor to manage meaning is an expression of power through which reality is defined for others," which perpetuates a hegemonic vision of power in a Gramscian sense.

However, beyond framing reality in a certain way, what makes metaphor ideological are entailments, because “according to the choice of source domain, characteristics of the target domain are selected or rejected for inclusion in how concepts are interpreted” (O’Mara-Shimek et al. 2015:107). So, depending on which source domain the politician draws the target from, the audience will understand it in one way or another, but it will be the inferences they make that will set up the ideological position behind a particular metaphor.

Because ideology is represented through discourse (Fairclough 2001, Van Dijk 2005), politicians need to be aware of “using the language in order to communicate with the prospect audience” (Rozina and Karapetjana 2009:112), and metaphor proves to be a linguistic strategy that is suitable for doing so (Wei-Lun Lu and Ahrens 2008). Marina Fernández Lagunilla (1999:69) refers to metaphor as a verbal strategy “que permite al político hablar de cuestiones delicadas al tiempo que le dota de una cierta inmunidad comunicativa.”<sup>51</sup> For Cammaerts (2012:244), however, metaphor is not a strategy itself, but part of a wider discursive strategy that is “highly ideological, historically and cognitively embedded and amplified through mediation [...]” and which entails having a “precise strategic aim and intent in mind”. The same author (2012) argues that metaphor cannot only be seen as a descriptive mechanism that helps us “simplify[ing] and mak[ing] understandable political events” (Mio 1997:121). Metaphors generate categories, organize processes, and establish oppositions and hierarchies (Scolari 2012:206). In this regard, they are also tools used “to promote one view against another or to discredit or humiliate political adversaries or enemies” and “can be approached as discursive weapons in a war of position between often divergent and conflictual conceptions of the organization of society, of the role and nature of the state, and in relation to identities and citizenship” (Cammaerts 2012:234,244). Van Dijk (1997:24) also emphasizes metaphors’ ability to frame “we, our people and our actions and properties” that “derive from conceptual fields with positive associations,

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<sup>51</sup> “That allows a politician to talk about delicate issues at the time that gives him/her a certain communicative immunity.”



whereas the opposite is true for the description of our political opponents or enemies.” On this point, Semino (2008:33) also stresses the use of metaphor for shaping public opinion:

When particular uses of metaphor become the dominant way of talking about a particular aspect of reality within a particular discourse, they may be extremely difficult to perceive and challenge, since they come to represent the ‘commonsense’ or ‘natural’ view of things. In such cases, conventional conceptual metaphors can be seen as an important part of the shared sets of beliefs, or ‘ideology’, that characterize a particular social group.

Hence, we should conclude that the effectiveness of metaphor in political communication relies on its ability to “provide cognitively accessible ways of communicating policy through drawing on ways of thinking by analogy” (Charteris-Black 2011:321). Mio (1997:118) considers that this resource is specially used in “times of heightened public anxiety, when the public needs to be reassured that there is some sense or organization to the problem at hand and that government is addressing it,” which could be the case of our object of study. In view of this, we should reflect on why metaphor is so often used in political speeches. Charteris-Black (2011:312) seems to provide an appropriate answer to this question when he establishes that “metaphor is especially persuasive because it influences evaluation and creates sets of associations that have both emotional meanings but also contain implicit cause and effect arguments.” As metaphors “can stir emotions or bridge the gap between logical and emotional (rational and irrational) forms of persuasion” (Mio 1997:121), they give politicians the unique opportunity to influence voters’ judgement on a topic based not only on feelings (*pathos*), but also on arguments (*logos*). Because what is analogy if not a comparison between two arguments, which share an argumentative structure based on similarity? If politicians succeed by sounding trustworthy (*ethos*), they will be able to persuade.

As one of the few scholars who have investigated metaphor from the perspective of communication studies, Cammaerts (2012) points out a key element in the use of metaphor in political discourses: mediation. In recent years, both traditional and new media have become central to political strategies. At present, the media play a key role in constructing the discourses of political parties and candidates. There even exists a “spectacularization of politics” (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999, Kellner 2003), which directly opts for performances that are specifically designed for broadcast.<sup>52</sup> In this way politicians can reach much larger audiences than can be attracted to rallies, so the media appear to be appropriate channels for political discourse. Schultz (2004:92) believes that “communication can only succeed if the messages are encoded and formatted in a way suitable for human perception and information processing.” Since metaphors “heighten the ethical qualities of the speaker by self-representation as a judge of ethical issues who is ethically close to his audience and shares their intention” (Charteris-Black 2011:320), it is important for discourse to be legitimized through the proper platform.

Of the platforms politicians use to spread their political ideas, the social media and specially Twitter with its 140 character-long statements seem to adapt perfectly to the use of metaphor because the main goal is to say as much as the speaker can in the fewest words. In Chapter 3, I will return to the important function the media has in creating public opinion, as it plays a central role in the public sphere by regulating the relation between the public and the political sphere. Although journalists do not mediate the political discourse generated on Twitter, I firmly believe that political discourse would not really reach the audience if it were not broadcast through the media.

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<sup>52</sup> According to Schulz (2004:89) “political actors adapt to the rules of the media system trying to increase their publicity and at the same time accepting a loss of autonomy”, which generates the spectacularization phenomenon. Spectacularization needs to be understood within a media logic (Altheide and Snow 1979) context, that assumes that social order is increasingly mediated, “which simply means that social action is shaped and informed by media technologies and the logics that orient behavior and perceptions” (Altheide 2013:225) Therefore, social order can be regarded as “the rules and logics of the underlying formats of communication have reshaped many activities, and have initiated numerous others” politics being one of them” (Altheide 2013:223)

From a political communication viewpoint, political discourses achieve their objectives (focused on maintaining power or on creating the basis for establishing a sort of counter-power) when legitimized by the public, as we have seen in Chapter 1. Similarly, metaphors in political discourses and consequently their persuasive and cognitive effects, make sense when decodified by the electorate. For this reason, communication studies can contribute to the study of metaphor in what goes beyond the semantic level. And this means that, although it must not forget this semantic level, communication research on metaphor needs to focus on its pragmatic dimension. Or what amounts to the same, on how the public perceive what political actors intend to say.

### 2.2.1. Source domains in politics

As I will argue in Chapter 5, I am not going to focus on specific source domains when I look at the sample selected for the analysis. However, I think it is necessary to review which source domains have most been used in political discourses to frame political targets. But, before we do so, we should also pay attention to some target domains that tend to be constructed metaphorically:

- The current state of affairs, and, particularly the problems that need to be solved;
- Causes and solutions to problems;
- Plans and policies;
- Future state of affairs, including positive scenarios (resulting from one's policies), and negative scenarios (resulting from the opponents' policies);
- Various types of participants and entities in the political domains (including private citizens, parties, organizations, institutions, states);
- The 'in-group' (oneself, one's party, government, social group, nation or race), as opposed to the 'out-group' (other individuals, other parties, social groups, nations or races).
- Politics and political actions themselves.

(Semino 2008:91)

All the items cited above are not only difficult to understand but also controversial. Thus, the controversies set out to voters, necessarily force them to take a position on a particular issue. As we have seen in the section above, the main goal of metaphor is to define which position people should take on controversial issues. Some source domains are better than others for shaping voters' political minds (Lakoff 2008).

#### JOURNEY/PATH/WAY metaphors

For instance, JOURNEY/PATH/WAY metaphors tend to be used to shape political purposes (Semino 2008). A political objective is often represented as a destination that has to be reached. As a result, constructing goals as destinations also involves presenting “ways of reaching goals as movement forwards, problems as obstacles to movement, and success or failure as reaching, or failing to reach, a destination” (Semino 2008:92). Likewise, Charteris-Black (2011:316-317) points out that “metaphorical choices may contribute to the ‘framing’ of issues in particular ways, facilitating some inferences and making others more difficult to draw.” For instance, when this source domain is used to conceptualize a political decision as a movement forward, the implied meaning is related to success. Moreover, JOURNEY/PATH/WAY metaphors can also “represent politicians and their policies as guides, and may systematically be used to give positive evaluations of political leadership and negative evaluations of absence of leadership” (Charteris-Black 2011:318).

To ensure that voters properly understand the meaning of the metaphor employed, it is important for the speaker to bear in mind that the more the source domain relates to a familiar bodily experience the more expressive force it has. In this respect, Charteris-Black (2011:324) underlines that journeys and paths are a “highly expressive source domain for political metaphor because they integrate basic cognitive schematic knowledge of daily experience of movement with other rich and varied knowledge of experiences that only sometimes occur when we go on journeys.” The same author (2011:47) reveals what interests us the most by arguing that:

The journey schema is rhetorically attractive to politicians and leaders because it can be turned into a whole scenario when they represent themselves as ‘guides’, their policies as ‘maps’ and their supporters as ‘fellow travelling companions’. All of these entailments of the source domain contribute to the trust they seek to establish. Identification of conceptual metaphors assists in explaining the ideological motivation of language use.

### PERSONIFICATION metaphors

Personification allows us to talk about political issues in human terms, and, therefore, it is an interesting source domain for political actors since it is regarded as “a way of making abstract ideological issues meaningful and is therefore a major leadership strategy during times of national crisis” (Charteris-Black 2011:314). Semino (2008:101) remarks that it “is a particularly important and pervasive type of metaphor, since it involves the use of our experience and knowledge of human beings as source domain.” This enables political actors, for example, to make nations or countries, such as Catalonia or Scotland (or Spain and the United Kingdom), “represent in relatively simple terms a wide variety of actions and processes involving large numbers of people” (Semino 2008:102). In this case, nations or countries are presented as anthropomorphic entities, which make it easier to identify citizens, get emotionally involved, “promote feelings of sameness and homogeneity” and “play down differences and dissent” (Semino 2008:103). As stated by Charteris-Black (2011:320): “nations, political parties, particular systems of political belief (e.g. socialism or democracy) or particular abstract nouns (e.g. freedom, tyranny, progress) become more emotionally arousing by thinking of them as good or bad people.”

### GAME/SPORT metaphors

This source domain is used in controversial situations and takes advantage of voters’ interest in this field, rather than in politics, to “provide familiar and clear-cut scenarios, with clearly identifiable participants aiming for an unambiguous goal (winning)” (Semino 2008:97). Cammaerts (2012:247), for instance, exemplifies politics as sports construction by providing a series of

elements they both share: “the struggle for victory, teams pulling together, falling apart, competitiveness and endurance.” But sports metaphors are not only used to depict difficult policy issues by bringing the discussion to uninterested voters. They are useful tools for politicians too, since they help to shorten the distance between them and ordinary citizens, as they are depicted as sports leaders and not as decision-making elective representatives. Nevertheless, the use of this sort of source domain may result in an oversimplification of the topics discussed (Semino 2008).

### CONFLICT/WAR metaphors

Conflict and war metaphors are also used to frame difficult situations and this is why they are as familiar as sports<sup>53</sup> metaphors. When a controversial issue is presented as a war, it immediately activates our knowledge in this field; we know, for example, that “in conflicts there is an enemy, a territory that is fought for, allies, and an ultimate purpose of victory” (Charteris-Black 2011:322). Confrontational politics is commonly conceptualized as this (Kövecses 2009). It is used in political discourse “to dramatize the opposition between different participants in politics (who are constructed as enemies) and to emphasize the aggressiveness and seriousness of political debates, conflicts and elections” (Semino 2008:100). This source domain is said to be effective when building national identities and its pervasiveness benefits from combining it with personification metaphors. Hence, if we construct our story on the basis of the concept THE REGION IS A PERSON “we may develop a political rhetoric that [is] more favourable towards regions that are struggling for greater recognition of their identity” (Charteris-Black 2011:322). Because this thesis deals with the construction of discourses around independence processes in Catalonia and Scotland, two stateless nations struggling for self-government (Keating 1997, Guibernau 2006), conflict/war metaphors are especially significant in the case studies chosen.

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<sup>53</sup> Kövecses (2009:17) notes this similarity in the use of both source domains when explaining that “what is common to the war, sports, and games metaphors is, of course, that they all focus on and highlight the notion of winning in relation to the activity to which they apply.”

### *Other source domains*

Among other source domains used in politics there are container, health-illness and family-love metaphors. Container metaphors are conceptual in nature as they are closely related to ontological metaphors, which conceive the target domain in terms of an object. They are widely used in discourses about immigration issues and international relations (Charteris-Black 2006, Semino 2008). In line with Semino (2008:95), container metaphors have an interior, an exterior and boundary surfaces used to conceptualize “a wide variety of entities (e.g. our bodies)” that derive in “the creation of a contrast between what is ‘inside’ and what is ‘outside’.” Conversely, health-illness metaphors tend to be used to refer to economic problems and policies. According to Charteris-Black (2011:180):

It seems that the power of health metaphors derives from a basic paired set of fundamental human experiences: life and death. Between these extremes, there are degrees of health so that metaphors can be graded anywhere on a scale of good and bad health according to the strength of the intended evaluation. [...] It is the underlying bodily experience of health and illness – rooted in the deeper biological facts of life and death – that provide the potential for health metaphors to be persuasive because they automatically imply that anyone who is seeking to restore health has the right intentions and is thinking right.

The last source domain mentioned above, family-love, is rooted in our everyday relations with our family setting and our understanding of love relationships. Lakoff (1996) quickly noticed the power of this source domain for structuring our political beliefs. In his book *Moral politics: what conservatives know that liberals don't* the author argues that conservative and liberal ideologies are based on what he defines as “the strict father model” and “the nurturant parent model.” By comparing nation with family and government with parents, Lakoff argues that the nurturant parent model followed by the liberals, which presumes that the government has to take care of the people it is responsible for and assumes that citizens are good and will act responsibly too, does not entail a unified worldview

and a unified political structure. On the other hand, conservatives have no doubt about what characterizes them, so they have coined terms and images that have pervaded the popular imaginary and, therefore, effectively spread their message. Among other uses of the family-love source domain, Musolff (2004) highlights the conceptualization of international relations, which may also be applied to the Catalan and Scottish cases.

Although they cannot always be considered metaphorical, there are expressions that indicate the presence of a GROUP-CLUB-CLASS source domain (Musolff 2004). We usually identify these expressions by focusing on deictics such as “we” in contrast to “them”. They are used in political discourses to make positive evaluations of the policies made by “us” (the government) as opposed to the negative evaluations of “them” (the competitors) (Van Dijk 1997). In the same way, Reyes (2011), following Van Leeuwen and Wodak, assigns the speaker and the audience to the “us-group”, while the social actors presented negatively form the “them-group.” As they belong to a community, citizens have always experienced what it means to be part of a group and normally nobody wants to be excluded. Therefore, voters always tend to feel closer to political options that make them feel part of a group and politicians are very careful to “make sure their proposals do not appear driven only by personal interests” and present themselves “as serving their voters, and therefore they legitimize proposals as a common good that will improve the conditions of a particular community” (Reyes 2011:787).

I will now focus on the medium which I am going to study for its use of metaphor in Catalan and Scottish pro-independence political discourses: Twitter. In Chapter 3, I will deal with the characteristics of this new tool and explain how the emergence of Web 2.0 has revolutionised the public sphere and, consequently, how it alters political discourse.



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CLAIMING INDEPENDENCE IN 140 CHARACTERS. USES OF METAPHOR IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCOTTISH AND CATALAN P

Carlota Maria Moragas Fernández

## Chapter 3

### Twitter as a new place for building political discourses

Politicians should use Twitter to engage more, and broadcast less

Ali Stoddart

Various authors (Enli and Moe 2013, Jeffares 2014) agree that nowadays the social media are surrounded by hype. This has to do with the extent to which we have incorporated the electronic media into our lives (Tannen and Tresten 2013). Meeting old friends on Facebook, falling in love on Meeting.com or participating in politics through Twitter has increased interest in how these tools work and the extent to which they are essential. As a result, researchers from different fields have started to consider social media as an important object of study. We can find, for instance, studies on education research, informatics, healthcare and the social sector. And of course, studies on the media. In this field, Stephen Jeffares (2014) proposes two perspectives –commercial and democratic– to focus on the literature on the social media. He analyses 114 articles indexed in Thomson Reuters Web of Social Science in November 2012, and draws valuable conclusions about the main topics communication scholars have investigated. Jeffares (2014:75) states that literature driven by commercial interests focuses on “synthesising and defining the terrain (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010) and on case studies of campaigns that successfully combine social media platforms into a valuable ‘social media ecosystem’ (Hanna et al., 2011; Kaplan and Haenlein, 2012)” while literature on democratic issues “highlights or questions the democratic potential of social media use” (Jeffares 2014:76). Other authors like Daniel Trottier and Christian Fuchs (2013) state that the research carried out on internet and social media can be divided into the administrative approach and critical internet studies. The former deals with “how digital social media are used, by whom, for what purpose, addressed to which audience, bearing which content, and having

which effects” while the latter “always situate[s] such analysis in theorising and analysing larger contexts, such as power structures, the state, capitalism, gender relations, social struggles, and ideologies, which shape and are shaped by the digital media landscape in dialectical processes” (Trottier and Fuchs 2013:3).

The interaction between social media and political communication presents an encounter between both fields.<sup>54</sup> It is democratic insofar as the social media give a voice not only to social movements and individuals who do not usually play a predominant role in the sphere of policy (Bennett and Entman 2001), but also to the commercial dimension, since social media use is strategic for political actors. Linh Dang-Xuan et al. (2013: 795) justify this strategic value by arguing that “social media have experienced tremendous growth in user base and are said to have an impact on the public discourse and on communication.” The aim of this research is, then, to determine how political discourse is shaped in this new environment and, specifically, the way Twitter modifies how it functions.

We cannot understand this social media tool without knowing what Web 2.0 is and how it has modified the public sphere. This chapter is going to review the recent literature and provide a concrete definition of what I understand social media to be. I will also present Twitter as a clear example of the Web 2.0 mindset shift in network functioning and I will argue why it is a better place to study online political discourse. That is why I will focus on how politicians use Twitter and how they take advantage of it.

Michael Gurevitch et al. (2009:167-168) understand that “the gate-keeping monopoly once enjoyed by editors and broadcasters is waning” because of citizens’ ability “to generate their own content and create alternative networks of information dissemination.”

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<sup>54</sup> Andreas Jungherr (2014b) discusses this in more detail in an extensive literature review based on 115 studies of Twitter in politics in his article “Twitter in Politics: A Comprehensive Literature Review” available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2402443>

In view of this changing paradigm, politicians need to adapt “the channels of their message delivery to connect with Internet users wherever they may surf.” Of course this has led politicians and their communication staff to think about how to adapt off-line discourses to 2.0 dynamics. As Gunn Enli and Hallvard Moe (2013:637-638) point out, although “different social media are by now routinely ascribed key roles during election campaigns [...], it nevertheless remains unclear to what extent they are used – by whom and for what purposes – and how they relate to the overall media landscape.” Therefore, as I have said above, the aim of this study will also be to reflect on the extent to which they have successfully achieved this goal.

### 3.1. Web 2.0 and changes in the public sphere

As indicated in the introduction to this chapter (and I would even say throughout this PhD thesis), it is impossible to understand a particular phenomenon without considering the context on which it occurs (Van Dijk 2012). Understanding what Web 2.0 is and how it has contributed to the way we communicate nowadays is fundamental to understanding the birth of the social media.

In 2016 nobody seems to question the possibilities the 2.0 environment offers citizens. For instance, Víctor Sampedro (2011:433) defines it as a provider of “autonomous platforms of communication” where “personal media can become mass media.” However, there has never been complete agreement about the definition of the term “Web 2.0”. As Susan Herring (2013:2) argues: “from the outset, the notion of Web 2.0 was controversial.” The term “Web 2.0” was coined by a web entrepreneur, Tim O’Reilly from O’Reilly Media, who first defined it in a conference held in California in 2005. O’Reilly (2007) explains that, together with web pioneer Dale Dougherty, they decided the term Web 2.0 was suitable for the new scenario that arose after the dotcom collapse in 2001. In this new scenario “the web was more important than ever, with exciting new applications and sites popping up with surprising regularity” (O’Reilly 2007:17).

Most of the websites that survived this setback were considered part of a new business strategy that “involve[d] viral marketing rather than advertising and a focus[ed] on services over products” (Herring 2013:2). It was precisely this business component that attracted some criticism of O’Reilly’s concept, as they said “it was just a marketing buzzword or perhaps a meme<sup>55</sup> –an idea that is passed electronically from one internet user to another– rather than a true revolution in web content and use as its proponents claimed” (Herring 2013:2). For Felicia Wu Song (2010:250), “the problem lies in precisely defining what the nature of that change actually entails.”

### 3.1.1. Web 2.0: A device for maintaining democracy or hegemony?

In an attempt to refute this criticism and to prove that Web 2.0 was something deeper than what their critics claimed, O’Reilly further discussed what he understood by Web 2.0 in an article entitled “What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software.”<sup>56</sup> There the author emphasizes what he believes to be the core competencies of Web 2.0 companies (O’Reilly 2007:37):

- Services, not packaged software, with cost-effective scalability,
- Control over unique, hard-to-recreate data sources that get richer as more people use them,
- Trusting users as co-developers,
- Harnessing collective intelligence,
- Leveraging the long tail through customer self-service,
- Software above the level of a single device,
- Lightweight user interfaces, development models, and business models.

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<sup>55</sup> Richard Dawkins coined the word "meme" in 1976. In his work *The Selfish Gene* the word “meme” is assigned to an idea, behaviour or style that spreads from person to person within a culture. Nowadays, it has been reappropriated by the internet to name a concept that spreads rapidly from person to person via the Internet, largely through Internet-based social networking sites.

<sup>56</sup> O’Reilly, T. (2007) What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software, *Communications & Strategies*, 65:1, 17-37

The next time a company claims that it's "Web 2.0," test their features against the list above. The more points they score, the more they are worthy of the name. Remember, though, that excellence in one area may be more telling than some small steps in all seven.

As we can see, O'Reilly mainly describes changes related to the use of website platforms, rather than to the technology that runs them, which is what makes sense of 2.0 environments. So Web 2.0 is presented as a changing paradigm based on multimediality, hypertextuality and interactivity, which leads to an increase in user participation on the network. Users are also at the heart of content production. In Wu Song's words (2010:250) "the term Web 2.0 functions to represent a promising new way of 'doing' the Internet" for the industry, which also entails a new use of the Internet that is "quickly developing into new social practices and new forms of knowledge exchange". With this in mind, nobody questions the good intentions of Web 2.0. However, some scholars have harshly criticized Web 2.0 because of its "capitalist and exploitative character" (Barassi and Treré 2012:1271). They believe that, as well as its ability to promote participation "Web 2.0 technologies also enable an increased flow of personal information across networks, the emergence of powerful tools for peer surveillance, the exploitation of free labour for commercial gain and an increased corporatization of online social spaces and outputs" (Barassi and Treré 2012:1271). Anja Bechmann and Stine Lomborg (2012) synthesize this debate by classifying the different aspects of Web 2.0 within a user-centric perspective or an industry-centric perspective. It is the strain between these opposed perspectives "what makes the concept of Web 2.0 so culturally powerfully and so analytically problematic" (Wu Song 2010:252).

As I have pointed out at the beginning of this section, an important tendency in the academic world is to consider that these technologies "offer unprecedented democratic possibilities for individual engagement and empowerment" (Barassi and Treré 2012:1272) and should be viewed from the user-centric perspective. This suggests that the two considerations about Web 2.0 are not mutually

exclusive. In fact, they complement and support each other through power relations. Henry Jenkins (2006:245) emphasizes the tension between the two ideas at the end of “Convergence Culture”, when he says that “this emerging power to participate serves as a strong corrective for those traditional sources of power, though they will also seek ways to turn it toward their own needs.” So Web 2.0 is a platform for counter-power, too, and this leads us on to the next section of this chapter, which reviews the main ways in which this environment can promote changes in the public sphere.

### 3.1.2. Is there a truly new public sphere?

Andrea Mayr (2008:1) states that “institutions power and politics are frequently exercised through the discourse of their members”. This discourse is essentially mediated in order to communicate its main ideas to the desired audience (McNair 2007). Before the emergence of Web 2.0, it was difficult for citizens to respond bidirectionally to these discourses. The chances of participating in the creation of public opinion were essentially restricted to voting, even though Josef Ernst, quoted by McNair (2007:18), defined the public sphere as the “distinctive discursive space within which individuals are combined so as to be able to assume the role of a politically powerful force.” Nowadays, we seem to be moving towards a model in which people are given the opportunity to actively participate in democracy. As Jenkins (2006:245) says: “we are just learning how to exercise that power [...] and we are still fighting to define the terms under which we will be allowed to participate.” This necessarily entails a learning based on how to use the Web 2.0 technologies that enable users – networked movements and activists among them – to effectively explore all the participation possibilities these new tools offer. For instance, Brian D. Loader and Dan Mercea (2011:760) clearly state that: “The acquisition of an iPhone or access to a social networking site does not determine the engagement of citizens.”

If traditional media emerge in the public sphere because of “la necesidad de articular algún mecanismo de mediación entre el público y sus representantes”<sup>57</sup> (López García 2006:234), the appearance of the Web 2.0 environment is destined to make this interaction real. And it is crucial to achieve this purpose as “civic discussion is seen as constitutive of publics, which are both morally and functionally vital for democracy” (Dahlgren 2005:156).

In terms of interaction, everything before this new media landscape is related to the role traditional media played in the mediation between the sphere of public authority and the public (Habermas 1991), as they promoted “la vigilancia del poder por parte del público”<sup>58</sup> and made “las decisiones y discusiones desarrolladas por los representantes políticos”<sup>59</sup> (López García 2006:234) public. However, as López García (2006) recognises, the information broadcast by media is given in a single direction, which supposes an asymmetry that favours the political-economic elites in charge of shaping such information. Dahlgren (1995), when revising Habermas and Dewey’s understanding of publics, states that they exist as discursive interactional processes. In other words: “atomized individuals, consuming media in their homes, do not comprise a public” (Dahlgren 1995:19). As pointed out above, the shift to the 2.0 environment presupposes an active public who create their own content. This, then, is the most important contribution of Web 2.0: a heterogenic formation of public opinion, which will no longer be unidirectional, but truly dialogical.

Dahlgren (2005:152) stated that the Internet promoted a pluralisation of sites related to the “political realm”, which “not only extends but also disperses the relatively clustered public sphere of the mass media.” Web 2.0 goes one step further and promotes the emergence of peripheral public spheres, which interact with political and economic power and force them to lose opacity and transform aggregate public opinion into a multidirectional discursive process (López García 2006).

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<sup>57</sup> “The need to articulate some mediation mechanism between the public and their representatives.”

<sup>58</sup> “Public’s surveillance of power”

<sup>59</sup> “The decisions and arguments of political representatives.”



In this new scenario, social media play an important role, since “citizens no longer have to be passive consumers of political party propaganda, government spin or mass media news, but are instead actually enabled to challenge discourses, share alternative perspectives and publish their own opinions” (Loader and Mercea 2011:759). Crispin Thurlow (2013) insists that social media are a catalyst of Web 2.0 features [content creators (as opposed to users) and content sharing and collaboration] and Jannis Androutopoulos (2013:49) conceives online participatory culture as enlarging the chance that “within a specific (say, political) discourse, contributions from below will be heard and potentially play a role in the unfolding of discourse.” In keeping with this conceptualization, I will argue why they cannot be dissociated from the creation of a virtual public sphere.

### 3.1.3. Social media and the virtual public sphere. Broadening participation and engaging citizens in offline political activities

Julian Ausserhofer and Axel Maireder (2013:291) explain that “the rapid growth of the Internet and especially of the WorldWideWeb has led social practices to become increasingly digitized.” Most of these social practices are implemented through social media tools, the main objective of which is to improve democratic governance by promoting an “open and equal deliberation between citizens, representatives and policy-makers” as Loader and Mercea (2011:757) state. The same authors (2011:758) point out what the most important achievement of social media is: “the displacement of the public sphere model with that of a networked citizen-centred perspective providing opportunities to connect the private sphere of autonomous political identity to a multitude of chosen political spaces.” Consequently, politicians need to bear in mind that, in these new circumstances, “si no hacen política con los ciudadanos, los ciudadanos harán política sin ellos”<sup>60</sup> (Gutiérrez-Rubí 2014:105) and this also involves meaningful changes in the way politicians do politics today.

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<sup>60</sup> “If they do not do politics with citizens, citizens will do politics without them.”

But what are social media and how do they work? Andreas Kaplan and Michael Haenlein (2010:61) describe them as “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content.” This creation and exchange of information is what makes them different from what we know as social network sites, which are defined as web-based services that allow individuals to “(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system” (boyd and Ellison 2008:211). While social networks just try to connect people, social media encourage users to share information and ideas, and engage in public discussion.

Social media, then, become places where users can debate and exchange opinions in a virtual public forum, which is a great opportunity for making changes in the public sphere. Among other things, social media let citizens “coordinate opposition or express dissent in the public sphere” (Veenstra et al. 2015:491). Although this is understood as a great opportunity for participatory democracy, it presupposes that the user is regarded:

- a. As someone who interacts and connects with fellow users, drawing from these relationships a sense of social belonging;
- b. As someone who engages actively and sometimes creatively with technologies to express and explore their senses of self;
- c. As someone using social media more instrumentally as a source of information and expertise in everyday life.

(Bechmann and Lomborg 2012:768)

These requirements are not always applicable to all users, which has led to some criticism of the utopian expectations citizens truly participating in the creation of virtual public opinion. In this respect, several authors (Margolis and Resnick 2000; Ausserhofer and Maireder 2013; D’heer and Verdegem 2014; Klinger and Svensson 2015) have argued that, although the Internet has made it easier to

hold a broader public discussion, the virtual public sphere continues to mirror the existing social structures.

Nevertheless, we must point out that, thanks to social media, lots of users are now engaged in political debates (Sup Park 2013) and have participated in offline political activities (Veenstra et al. 2015). Dahlgren (2005:151) expects those citizens “who have access and the political motivation, and who are living within open, democratic societies” to open up the path for civic interaction, even though this does not necessarily imply “a quick fix for democracy.” As Loader and Mercea (2011:762) state:

To date, perhaps the most obvious impact of social media upon democratic politics has been its disruptive capacity for traditional political practices and institutions. Divisions have become blurred, for example, between mainstream news media increasingly reliant upon political blogs and citizens-user content. While the potential power of collaborative sharing has been demonstrated by the Wikileaks disclosure of US government foreign policy statements online. Different in style from earlier forms of civic participation, such disruption is affected by enabling citizens to critically monitor the actions of governments and corporate interests.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of the Internet and social media is that they have enabled citizens who otherwise would have not participated in a political discussion to engage in debate and to act politically. In this respect, social media have also promoted new ways of doing politics. For instance, Jenkins (2008:222) points out that the practice of sending pictures containing some kind of political idea to a friend is highly persuasive: “passing such images to a friend is no more and no less a political act than handing them a campaign brochure or a sticker.” Just think of the ten or so memes we receive every day on WhatsApp, Twitter or Facebook that joke about a political bungle. Maybe this is why Dahlgren (2005:155) understands politics to be “not only an instrumental activity for achieving specific goals, but also an expressive activity, a way of asserting, within the public sphere, group, values, ideals, and belonging.”

And doing this publicly on the social media may be more attractive than wasting hours distributing flyers.

As I have stated at the beginning of this chapter, I have decided to focus on the two dimensions of the Web 2.0 and social media; the commercial (industry-centric) and the democratic (user-centric) one. I strongly believe that, in terms of political communication and, consequently, the battle to fix public opinion, the strategic aspect of Web 2.0 cannot be disassociated from the empowering one. As Andreas Jungherr (2014:239) states: “Political actors integrate these services [social media] into their campaigns, journalists use them as sources and topics of political news coverage, and the public uses them to comment on political events and to discuss politics.” So, I will approach Twitter not only as a tool that facilitates citizen participation in political issues, but also as a political communication tool. The first part of this chapter has discussed the democratic dimension of Web 2.0 and, thus, of social media. Hence, the following section, will explore the commercial dimension of Twitter.

### 3.2. Uses of Twitter in political communication

Evelien D’heer and Pieter Verdegem (2014) show that the success of Obama’s 2008 social media campaign was the starting point of scholars’ interest in the use of social media, and particularly Twitter, in political discussion. By that time, Twitter had been in existence for two years. It was in 2006 when four young entrepreneurs (Evan Williams, Biz Stone, Jack Dorsey and Noah Glass) who worked at Odeo<sup>61</sup> created what was going to be one of the most used social networks in 2016. Their original idea was to generate an interface that would let them share a sort of SMS to say “what they were doing” to their group of friends. Since then, every year millions more users have started using it and

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<sup>61</sup> Odeo was to become Obvious Corporation in October 2006 when it was acquired by Stone, Williams, Dorsey and other members of Odeo.

today it has about 320 million users.<sup>62</sup> Of these, 63 per cent state they use Twitter as a source of news and nearly 50 per cent follow politicians or have been involved in some political activity.

Of its main features, the one that formally defines Twitter must be stressed: the 140-character messages. This length restriction is not a problem, though, since users “are able to include hyperlinks to content on the internet such as pictures, looping videos, blogs, articles or websites” (Jeffares 2014:69). Ulrike Klinger and Jakob Svensson (2015:1252) point out that “on social media platforms, the network is part of the content displayed.” Twitter is a sort of technical tool that lets users share contents of other Internet platforms and upload their own pictures or videos. One of the main features that differentiates it from Facebook, for instance, is that most of the material shared by users is publicly accessible (Jungherr 2014, Veenstra et al. 2015) and that public messages can be read by anybody, even if they are not on Twitter (Aragón et al. 2013, Jeffares 2014). Pablo Aragón et al. (2013) insist that the way in which Twitter is designed encourages interaction between users and converts it into a proper space of debate, since it becomes “a venue for public political dialogue” that helps “users publicly affirm positions, reinforce political opinions and thoughts, and exchange opinions with others” (Veenstra et al. 2015). In this respect, Chang Sup Park (2013:1641) recognises that Twitter “has particular potential to be a strong force in adding to political discourse due to its open, horizontal, and broadly-networked architecture.”

Twitter also lets users have a sort of direct relation with politicians. Instead of sending an e-mail –which is a private form of communication– “tweeting at a politician, takes this initial communication [...] and makes it publicly visible, potentially accessible by all Twitter users and by anyone else reading tweets on the Twitter website itself” (Bruns and Highfield 2013:671).

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<sup>62</sup> Source: <http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/march-2013-by-the-numbers-a-few-amazing-twitter-stats/10/>

There are some other formal conventions that govern Twitter's functioning, like "retweets" (RT), "hashtags" (#) or "mentions" (@). The first (RT) is used to share with your followers a message written by another user, without modifying it, which means that "a message can spread virally through Networks of followers within minutes of the original tweet" (Jeffares 2014:69). Users' messages often include a hashtag (#), which gives other users the opportunity to engage to the current issue that is being discussed, adds them to a stream of content and makes them easily searchable (Jeffares 2014). Finally, mentions (@) are used to call on other users, to reply to them, or to start a conversation as well. In Julian Ausserhofer and Axel Maireder's (2013:292) words: "Twitter is one consequence of the web's unique characteristics. The speed, the public nature of communication and the manifold possibilities to link messages to users (@-mentions), external content (hyperlinks) and topics (hashtags) have attracted many different actors."

Social media have played an increasingly important role in electoral campaigns in recent years (Aragón et al. 2013) and they have become the ideal medium for reaching the electorate. As Klinger and Svensson (2015:1245) stress "there is little doubt that social media platforms and their mobile accesses are changing the media and communication landscape." They are far cheaper than traditional media and their ability to engage with their audience is greater than politicians' interviews in newspapers (Lee and Shin 2012). In addition, their dialogical dimension increases their credibility as media and makes e-campaigning "more likely to persuade citizens" (Vaccari, 2012:4). Gunn Enli and Eli Skogerbø (2013: 763-766) give three different motives that make politicians choose social media for their political campaigns. First, they see them as "another place to promote their politics and one in which they could reach other groups of voters." Secondly, they think of social media as a tool for mobilizing and engaging the electorate in campaign-related activities. And, finally, they understand social media as providing "new opportunities for connecting with the voters, getting feedback on political issues, discussing politics more continuously, and engaging more voters than previous media."

Therefore, political parties are aware of the importance of being active on social media (Klinger and Svensson 2015) and, specifically, on Twitter. As the world's largest microblogging service, it has become the most appropriate platform on which to interact with supporters, journalists and users in general due to its ability to integrate the key principles that define the Web 2.0 environment (hypertextuality, multimediality, interactivity) and to broadcast politicians' messages directly, without their being edited by a journalist. So, the emergence of Twitter has brought about a significant change in the mechanisms for getting messages across: non-journalistic mediation in contents and direct communication with the audience (Lee and Shin 2012). Political actors have now gained "total control over their self-representation and the content and initial dissemination of their campaign messages" (Buchanan 2016:70). This, plus the speed with which messages can be broadcast and the high interaction ability that Twitter offers, has given rise to a network debate about the various issues that concern citizens' lives, as independence processes in Scotland and Catalonia did.

Sampedro (2011) points out that the Internet and web 2.0 provide new opportunities for making political processes public. Twitter has played an important role in the referendum debate in both Catalonia and Scotland, since it has not only provided information about the process but has also given voice to all interested citizens. This network is a civil mobilization tool (Sampedro and Sánchez 2011; Anduiza et al. 2013) that uses its own language to protest<sup>63</sup> and which gives political activists and the public the opportunity "to inform, to mobilize, and to create media attention for their topics" (Jungherr 2014:242), but it is also a place where political actors can construct their own discourses.

As well as electoral campaigns, politicians have used Twitter to reinforce their everyday discourse in other media. This has led them and their community

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<sup>63</sup> Hashtags are a great example of Twitter language. Hashtags like #indyref, #viacatalana, #9N2014, #sísi, #noupais are used to mobilize the network and to calculate the impact of an event on Twitter's public opinion.

managers to adapt their discourses so they can communicate their ideas in 140 characters using such features as hashtags (#), mentions (@) or retweets (RT). The emergence of smartphones (Mancera and Pano 2013) and familiarity with the use and dynamics of this social network have made Twitter an excellent space for online political communication. But for political parties and candidates it is not simply a question of producing a particular number of tweets per day or retweeting a tweet sent by a user close to their organization. Participation in the network has to be preceded by a properly designed strategy.

Sup Park (2013) points out that Twitter provides users with opportunities to become opinion leaders if only they are able to produce information that can attract public attention. Thanks to the possibilities and dynamics of this social medium, Twitter users can influence their environment with the qualitative dimension of their opinions. Rodríguez and Ureña (2012) define this kind of user as informed, cosmopolitan people, who are organized and active in generating debate, and who understand that politics is more than just voting every four years. These users have largely emerged as a result of this social media site and the possibilities it offers. As Jungherr (2014a:242) points out, for these users Twitter works both as a “channel for getting political information and interacting with political elites” and as “a platform for expressing political convictions” and exchanging opinions about political topics. In this regard, the use of hashtags promoted by TV and radio programs to engage their audiences has also proved to be an interesting way of encouraging users to share their opinions while creating what is known as “viewertariats” (Castelló-Martínez 2013, Jeffares 2014).

The fact is that Twitter has become so popular among different sectors of our society that it has turned into a shop window of what is being said in the streets. For Williamson (2011:60): “Both Twitter and Facebook were useful indicators of broader opinion. Both channels displayed broadly similar trends to the sentiment tracking from the debates themselves and aligned closely with the post-debate polls.”



It is true that this social medium cannot replace polls (Larsson and Moe 2011), but it allows us to see the trends and issues in which users are interested. As Congosto et al. (2011) stress, polls are conducted at a single moment in time and they only set out a series of concrete questions. On the other hand, Twitter acts as a sounding board, because it measures opinion continuously and over a much longer period of time. Among other things, some authors (Tumasjan et al. 2010, Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan 2012, Guerrero-Solé et al. 2014) have attributed Twitter with predictive power, although they also state that there is still a long way to go before the predictive capacity of tweets will be fully understood. However, political parties need to be able to monitor public opinion since it is a useful element for constructing or reshaping their discourses and for being part of the users' conversation. In this respect, Gutiérrez-Rubí (2014:105) says that, on Twitter, we are building public opinion in real time as well as “influyendo en los medios de comunicación tradicionales y creando los marcos mentales de percepciones e imágenes públicas muy poderosas.”<sup>64</sup> Likewise, it must be highlighted that those mental frameworks are implemented by the use of discourse on Twitter rather than by the social media dynamics.

Mancera and Pano (2013) have suggested that politicians' communication style lies somewhere between the public and the formal, the private and the colloquial, a register that the 2.0 environment has normalized. As John B. Thompson (2001) argues, the appearance of mass media changed the nature of public life and made politicians visible to society, which changed the relations between public and private life. Just like Thompson, Enli and Moe (2013) talk about the “semi-private politician” who “commonly tweet[s] about personal content as well as their ongoing activities to appear as down-to-earth human beings and get closer to voters” (Lee and Shin 2012:5). This humanization of politicians in Twitter is translated into users' greater ability to empathize with them, which reinforces the tool's effectiveness and credibility as a medium and makes it a perfect place for constructing their discourse.

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<sup>64</sup> “Influencing traditional media and creating new mental frames of powerful perceptions and public pictures.”

Ausserhofer and Maireder (2013:292) likewise stress “tweeting may intensify the relationship between political actors with other stakeholders, as it facilitates an easy and continuous discourse free from the constraints of official (and unofficial) gatherings.” However, politicians do not always do this properly as they often choose quantity (number of tweets per day, number of followers, etc.) over quality (interacting with those followers) when talking about political communication online (Castillejo and Semova 2012).

The personalization of political campaigns is one of the three main tendencies outlined by Enli and Moe (2013) when they discuss political communication and social media. They explain that social media strengthen personalization (which was already a part of the second age<sup>65</sup> of political communication), “meaning that sharing of private images and messages containing non-political information have become more common in tandem with the spread of social media” (ibid. 2013:640). However, this personalization through social media does not necessarily mean any increase in dialogue with voters and politicians tend to use Twitter merely to broadcast their own messages. In view of this, they insist that “new digital communication technology has imposed changes on political campaigns, but not to an extent that contradicts traditional media campaign strategies” (ibid. 2013:641). Finally, they (ibid. 2013:641) also state that context matters, “as we cannot look at social media use for political communication [...] as an isolated phenomenon with a set of internal and deterministic rules.” The socio-demographic situation in which a campaign unfolds also influences how politicians use social media and the strategy they follow in other media. As Jungherr (2014:240) states: “We have to move beyond treating political communication in traditional and in social media as inherently

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<sup>65</sup> In their article “The Third Age of Political Communication: Influences and Features” Jay G. Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh (1999) suggest that advances in political communication can be seen through a temporal perspective and propose three different moments between the end of World War II and the present that bring together the main changes in the ways of communicating politics. These three stages can, of course, be understood in terms of what Pippa Norris (2000:137-140) defines as premodern, modern and postmodern campaigns, which are related to “evolutionary processes of modernization that simultaneously transform party organizations, the news media, and the electorate.”

different and start treating them as interconnected and mutually dependent.”<sup>66</sup> But how do all these features influence the way in which politicians plan their political communication on Twitter? Axel Bruns and Tim Highfield (2013) have detected different styles of tweeting that vary according to the interests and the situation of each political party. They state that we can find “from broadcast-only models of sharing messages without responding to other comments, to attempts to foster a wider dialogue among Twitter users” (Bruns and Highfield 2013:668). As I have mentioned, the extent to which politicians use social media tends to depend on their situation prior to election day:

Politicians who are all but assured of winning their local electoral contest, or even overall power in a state, may see social media equally as much as an opportunity to connect with voters as it presents a threat of making inappropriate statements which could be exploited by the political opponent, and may therefore choose to develop a minimal social media presence only. Conversely, politicians who are likely to be defeated at the ballot box may choose to utilize social media as a last-ditch means to mobilize supporters and campaign vigorously on Twitter. Candidates locked in a tight electoral contest may use the medium to engage and challenge their opponents, hoping to win the debate or goad the other side into tweeting in anger.

(Bruns and Highfield 2013:673)

Jeffares (2014) pays particular attention to the creation of policy hashtags as one of the tools by which politicians can set the Twitter agenda. Of course, launching a new hashtag and encouraging an open debate entails such risks as being unable to manage the consequences of users’ criticism. However, he (2014:79) states that “judging by the growth in use of Twitter among government departments and politicians, it seems many see more benefits than pitfalls.”

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<sup>66</sup> Likewise, Scott Wright (2011) criticizes the trend within the scientific community to look at social media through the revolution/normalization frame and suggests how scholars can take online deliberation research forward.

Although some authors have tried to shed light on political e-campaigning from a qualitative perspective, the truth is that there is not much literature on how to adapt longer discourses to 140 character-long statements. At the end of this section, we have seen several authors looking at the new 2.0 logic and analyzing the network from a media-centric point of view. We have noted some characteristics of Twitter that can encourage political parties to use it, but it is hard to find a guide they can follow to succeed in their campaign strategy. I believe the logic that governs media –social media, in this study– is important, but not as important as the content users generate and share. We need to know how the network works because this obviously determines the way in which the content is shaped. However, what is relevant to the present research is politicians build their political ideas through metaphor. So I should point out that this study does not focus on Marshall McLuhan’s premise even if it recognises that although we do not approach the medium as the message, it affects it.

UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

CLAIMING INDEPENDENCE IN 140 CHARACTERS. USES OF METAPHOR IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCOTTISH AND CATALAN P

Carlota Maria Moragas Fernández

## Chapter 4

### The processes of Scottish and Catalan independence

Ce qui constitue une nation, ce n'est pas de parler la même langue,  
ou d'appartenir à un groupe ethnographique commun,  
c'est d'avoir fait ensemble de grandes choses dans le passé  
et de vouloir en faire encore dans l'avenir.

Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*

Despite the quote that initiates this chapter, it is not the aim of this thesis to delve into disputed concepts such as nation, nationalism, secessionism or self-determination, as there are authors with backgrounds in political sciences or law that can better shed light on these issues. For instance, like the case studies I will focus on, there have been recent academic debates on the role of the European Union in the secession processes in Scotland and Catalonia (Vaubel 2013, Bourne 2014, Oskam 2014) and in the cases in which secession can be legitimized (López et al. 2010, Pérez and Sanjaume 2013). I will not look at identity construction processes in these countries either, even though I am aware that identity plays an important role in nationalist or pro-independence discourses. Enric Castelló (2007), Marina Dekavalla (2010) and Sabina Mihelj (2011) provide interesting insights into how identity and nationhood are shaped by the media.

However, I assume that dealing with political discourses from nationalist forces or from civil society movements whose main goal is to achieve independence (and, therefore, secession from the nation-state they belong to) necessarily involves a definition of how the researcher approaches some of the concepts that are key –for contextual and structural reasons in the construction of pro-independence discourses– to the case studies analysed.

For this reason, I will first explain how Scotland and Catalonia fit in with what Michael Keating (2001) and Montserrat Guibernau (1999) consider “nations without states” or “stateless nations”. Then, I will go on to review the key moments in both countries’ history, the main periods that have altered their course as nations. Finally, I will explain how Scotland and Catalonia’s claims for greater self-government led to the start of each independence process.

#### 4.1. Key concepts for approaching independence claims in stateless nations

To understand what a “nation without state” is we must first define what a nation is, bearing in mind Scott Greer’s warning (2007:1) that “the idea of a correspondence between nation and state, that nations have states and states have nations, has been remarkably diminished by experiences of recent decades.” In his conference “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?”, Ernest Renan (2001)<sup>67</sup> points out that the concept of “nation” is quite new. He (2001:23) argues that “la antigüedad clásica conoció repúblicas y realezas municipales, confederaciones de pequeñas repúblicas, e imperios; pero nunca conoció la nación tal y como la entendemos,”<sup>68</sup> and concludes that “la nación moderna es por tanto un resultado histórico inducido por una serie de hechos que convergen en un mismo sentido”<sup>69</sup> (Renan 2001:39). Eric Hobsbawm (1992:14) introduces modernity as “the basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it.” This necessarily entails that nobody can claim that a nation existing nowadays has been a nation for hundreds of years, even if its origin is rooted in a historical experience (Keating 1996).

But, apart from the novelty of the concept, how can we define a nation? The automatic answer may be to stress the common ethnic bonds between the people

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<sup>67</sup> The original lecture was given in 1882 at the Sorbonne University in Paris and later (1887) compiled into a book under the title *Discours et conférences*. Paris: Calmann Lévy.

<sup>68</sup> “Classical antiquity had republics, municipal kingdoms, confederations of local republics and empires, yet it can hardly be said to have had nations in our understanding of the term.”

<sup>69</sup> “Modern nation is a historical result brought about by a series of convergent facts.”

who integrate it. Renan, however, encourages a civic understanding of nation, as his definition focuses not on the ethnic component but fosters the idea that what constitutes a nation is the free choice of its members. Contemporary scholars, like Guibernau (1999:14), bring together both dimensions –the ethnic and the civic– when referring to “nation” as:

A human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself.

Keating (1996:9) drawing on Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau’s social contract adds that “the nation is constituted by the voluntary consent on those who comprise it”, an idea that is also present in Renan’s work. Although these definitions help us understand the different items on which the concept nation is based, Benedict Anderson’s (1991:6) work introduces a valuable element (especially in terms of the construction of political discourses) because he approaches nation as “an imagined political community– and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” Anderson (1991:6) conceives the nation as imagined “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” Even though the author uses the term “imagined”, which entails an understanding of the nation as a socio-political construction, there is no negative connotation. Indeed, Anderson (1991:6) questions Ernest Gellner’s (2006) views on nationalism since the latter believes this political ideology “[...] masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’, rather than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation.’”

The discussion around nation also concerns its relation with the state. In a leading contribution to the relatively recent literature, Keating (1996) dissociates the definition of nation from the notion of state, and disagrees with Hobsbawm (1992:9-10), who looks at nation as a social entity “insofar as it relates to a certain



kind of modern territorial state, the nation-state.” Likewise, Guibernau (1999:13) states that what makes the concept of nation so contested is probably “the link which has been established between nation and state, and the common practice of using the nation as a source of political legitimacy.” The author (1999:13) acknowledges that:

To be or not to be recognized as a nation entails different rights for the community which claims to be one, since being a nation usually implies attachment to a particular territory, a shared culture and history and the assertion of the right of self-determination. To define a specific community as a nation involves the more or less explicit acceptance of the legitimacy of the state which claims to represent it, or if the nation does not possess a state of its own, it then implicitly acknowledges the nation’s right to self-government involving some degree of political autonomy which may or may not lead to a claim for independence.

As we can see, she identifies three important elements that interact to shape their individual definitions: state, nation and nationalism. The first describes “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Guibernau 1999:13) while the second defines this community in terms of its members’ will to remain together. The third element noted by Guibernau (1999:14), “nationalism”, refers to “the sentiment of belonging to a community whose members identify with a set of symbols, beliefs and ways of life, and have the will to decide upon their common political destiny.” In his famous work *Nations and Nationalism*, Gellner’s (2006:4) definition of nationalism also links to the terms nation and state, as he argues that nationalism does not appear in a state whose reality is questioned, but in a state that is clearly there: “It was its boundaries and/or the distribution of power, and possibly of other advantages, within it which were resented.” So, as Guibernau (1999:14) resolves, “nation, state and nationalism form a triad characterized by a constant tension between its three components”, which is what makes “the definition of the group that is entitled to self-determination and the conditions under which these demands are formulated” a contested object (Keating 1996:1).

### Nation-states versus stateless nations

If “nation” is a modern concept, nation-state, or the way in which we understand it these days, is also a relatively recent notion. Actually, it is the result of the last two hundred years and “[...] represents a concentration of authority within territorial boundaries and the imposition of common values on the society” (Keating 1996:27). Guibernau (1999:14) coincides with this vision of the Nation-state when defining it as “a kind of state which has the monopoly of what it claims to be the legitimate use of force within a demarcated territory and seeks to unite the people subject to its rule by means of cultural homogenization.” Nicola McEwen (2006:41) also adds that in this kind of state, “the boundaries of the state are presented and represented as marking the boundaries of a nation or a people.” In this light, although a nation can sometimes coincide with the state to which it belongs, there are only a few cases of homogeneous nation-states and within most of them there are groups that have their own national aspirations (Keating 1996). Scotland and Catalonia, for instance, belong to this group, and the independence processes they initiated in 2011 and 2012 respectively could have corresponded to the culmination of these aspirations. Both countries can be classified as stateless nations or nations without states that “in spite of having their territories included within boundaries of one or more states, by and large do not identify with them” (Guibernau 1999:16). In these particular kinds of nation:

The members [...] regard the state containing them as alien, and maintain a separate sense of national identity generally based upon a common culture, history, attachment to a particular territory and the explicit wish to rule themselves. Self-determination is sometimes understood as political autonomy, in other cases it stops short of independence and often involves the right to secede.

(Guibernau 1999:16)

Guibernau (1999:17) attributes the rise of stateless nations to two interrelated factors: the intensification of globalization processes (which have driven states to give away some aspects of their sovereignty) and the transformations affecting the

nation-state. The latter results from the difficulties the state has to fulfil citizens' needs and forces them to look for alternative institutions that can solve their problems, which is what autonomous/regional governments do. On this issue, McEwen (2006:119) points out that:

Social and ideological change at the centre of a multinational state can have territorial consequences. Where the welfare state helped to maintain inter-regional solidarity and national unity, we might expect that its retrenchment would weaken that solidarity and undermine the territorial and political legitimacy of the state in question.

It is in this context that the new politics of nationalism in stateless nations appears. Nationalism “emerges as a socio-political movement that defends the right of peoples to decide [...]” (Guibernau 1999:18). This political doctrine, “which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 2006:1), sees recognition (both by the nation-state the stateless nations belong to and by the international community) as one of its main goals. Nations without states tend to be included “within the boundaries of states which are reluctant to acknowledge their status as nations” and have tried to “generate a single nation living within the state’s territory to legitimize their power over an originally heterogeneous population” (Guibernau 1999:25). While being part of a plurinational state, stateless nations wish “to be regarded and treated as an equal, as someone who has a voice and is able to participate in the political processes affecting his or her future” (Guibernau 1999:26). This recognition is compatible with the nation-state; as Keating (1996:23) says, unlike what has traditionally been said, nationalist ambitions can be negotiated, though it depends “both on the character of the majority nationalism which they are confronting and on the circumstances of the time.”

Although there are different types of nationalism, those that prevail in plurinational states such as the United Kingdom or Spain can be labelled as ethnic and/or civic nationalism. They are different in that ethnic nationalism “presents membership to the national community as given, or ascriptive”

whereas civic nationalism “sees individuals constituting themselves as a collectivity” (Keating 1996:4). I am going to focus on this second kind of nationalism because although Scottish and Catalan nationalisms assume an ethnic component (common culture, language, etc.) both countries have based their sense of belonging on values and common institutions rather than on individuals’ ethnic origin. According to Keating (1996:6), civic nationalism is “based upon territorially defined community, not upon a social boundary among groups within a territory” which entails that “there needs to be a structured set of political and social interactions guided by common values and a sense of common identity.”

As we shall see in this chapter, although they are rooted in historical experience, Scottish and Catalan nationalisms have adapted their strategies to a contemporary reality (Keating 1996), and have consciously adopted the civic formula in order to be more inclusive. This leads us to reflect on Anderson’s view of nation as a socio-political construction and, thus, on the power of political and media discourses as nation moulders. Nevertheless, Keating (1996:263) warns us about the construction of nations, which “has not been the work only of conscious nationalists. Much of it has been a response to policy problems and the search for pragmatic solutions to territorial or cultural questions.” National identity is therefore perceived as an organizing principle of the societies of stateless nations’, even when not everybody is a committed nationalist (Keating 1996). Within this paradigm, secession is not necessarily presented as a requirement by those stateless nations that wish to govern themselves. Unlike Gellner (2006), Smith (2001) and Kedourie (1966), Keating (2001:19) stresses that “we need to unpack the concepts of nation and state, and explore forms of self-determination other than classical statehood”, such as regional or devolved governments.

“Secession” is the term used to refer to “the creation of an independent state out of a territory previously included within another state from which it now has separated” (Guibernau 1999:27). It is the last step that stateless nations take on

their way to independence, but has traditionally not been a priority in Western European nationalisms, (which does not mean they renounce to their right to self-determination). Before the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, only Quebec had held a referendum –actually, it held two, one in 1980 and the other in 1995– on independence (McEwen 2006), but it was not a priority on the Scottish and the Catalan agenda (Keating 2001). However, the debate on the appropriateness of secession in a globalized world has been reactivated in recent years. According to Roland Vaubel (2013:288) “whether secession is desirable or not depends on the circumstances. [...] If the answer is to be based on some sort of consequentialist ethic or economic cost–benefit analysis, the right of secession may be justified.” Still, Guibernau (2006:69) points out that “there is a strong reluctance on the part of Western nation-states to contemplate the possibility of new states emerging out of the break-up of their own territories” and the question is treated as a “taboo”. The recent cases of Scotland and Catalonia have forced EU representatives to take a stance on the issue. In this respect, Lluís Pérez and Marc Sanjaume (2013:4) remark that “although secession has been neglected in political theory, it is important to consider its relevance in the real world.” And they assume that “nowadays there are secessionist movements (with more or less force) in almost all liberal democracies.” This is relevant since “a newly created state, to function as such, requires the international recognition of its status as an equal partner by the international community of nation-states” (Guibernau 2006:69). Even so, Vaubel (2013:294) states that:

In the case of secession, there is no impartial arbiter because international organisations have a vested interest in centralisation. They are biased against secession. There are two reasons for this. First, the bureaucrats in international organisations expand their power and prestige by preaching the virtues of political centralisation. Second, the representatives of the member states are representatives of the majorities in their countries.

Pérez and Sanjaume (2013:4) state that there are two major ways of confronting secession from a normative viewpoint: “by discussing (1) a universal (normally unilateral) right of secession; and (2) a constitutional (normally negotiated) right

of secession.” The former understand secession as a fundamental right of nations, while the latter understand it as a tool or a mechanism to overcome a problem. Bearing all this in mind, López et al. (2010:25) affirm that an up-to-date understanding of these theories allows us to interpret the right of secession in terms of “una via de darrera opció per fer front a les fallides d’articulació institucional en les democràcies liberals plurinacionals.”<sup>70,71</sup> For these authors, present reality has features that do not coincide with traditional theories, especially in the cases “on no existeix una violació sistemàtica dels drets humans o una invasió militar que justifiqui el dret a la secessió unilateral, sinó que són l’expressió continuada i democràtica de societats madures i que participen de la xarxa de relacions internacionals”<sup>72</sup> (López et al. 2010:24).

Sanjaume (2013:176) concludes that this is the position adopted by Catalonia, where political actors try to legitimize a referendum on secession in different ways:

Firstly, primary right theories are used for legitimising a referendum on secession and defining a political subject as *demos*, not *ethnos*. Secondly, national self-determination theories are related to the right to secede from a remedialist perspective, blaming Spanish institutions of a lack of recognition and accommodation, especially since the ruling of the Constitutional Court on the Statute of Autonomy, and pursuing policies of assimilation (appealing language policies). This remedialist approach is also related to fiscal mistreatment (fiscal deficit, unjust redistribution) and lack of efficiency in infrastructure policies among other grievances.

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<sup>70</sup> “The last opportunity to face up the unsuccessful institutional articulation in plurinational liberal democracies

<sup>71</sup> In the white paper “Your Scotland. Your Referendum”, Alex Salmond clearly exemplified this when he said: “Scotland is not oppressed and we have no need to be liberated. Independence matters because we do not have the powers to reach our potential. We are limited in what we can do to create jobs, grow the economy and help the vulnerable. We shouldn’t have a constitution which constrains us, but one which frees us to build a better society. Our politics should be judged on the health of our people, the welfare of young and old and the strength of our economy.”  
<http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2012/01/1006/1>

<sup>72</sup> “In which there is no systematic violation of human rights or a military invasion that justifies the right to unilateral secession, but that are represented by the continuing and democratic expression of mature societies that participate in the network of international relations”

The Scottish referendum on independence, however, is more similar to a constitutionally based right to secede, as the United Kingdom agreed to negotiate a transfer of powers so that the Scottish Parliament could hold it. As I have indicated in the introduction to this chapter, I do not think it is the purpose of this thesis to delve into the legal aspects of the independence processes analysed, at least as far as the study of pro-independence discourses is concerned. As I have pointed out above, the next section in this chapter studies Scotland and Catalonia's resort to secessionism. I believe that a proper understanding of these nations needs to focus on the key events that brought them to their present situation. In order to do this, the following section briefly reviews their history as well as the recent events that have led them to polarize their positions towards independence.

#### 4.2. Scotland and Catalonia from a historical perspective

Scott Greer (2007:15) states that Scotland and Catalonia are frequently compared because of their similarities: “they are middle-sized nations [...] in Western Europe with old identities, relatively recent regional autonomy, nationalist parties that grew from the late 1960s onward, and many exponents of a ‘civic nationalism’ that asks for autonomy and inclusiveness...”. All these elements make them a desirable object of study for comparative research. However, the two countries present differences in the way they have evolved as nations, and also in the way they have carried out their independence processes, which I think are present in their discursive practices as well.

We cannot look at Scotland through a Catalan lens and vice versa. Firstly, as Keating (1996) notes, Scotland is one of the less controversial examples of stateless nations. Catalonia, on the contrary, has never been recognized as a stateless nation by the Spanish state. There are other differences that I will summarize below, following Greer (2007:20-21):

1. Language. It is key to Catalan nationalism and identified as a major explanatory variable by Conversi (1997) while Scotland has no major language. Scots has been limited to popular uses and literature and Gaelic is only used in the Highlands and the Hebrides, so they have not been emphasized as a sign of Scottish identity.
2. Religion. Scotland is mainly Presbyterian while the United Kingdom is Anglican; Catalonia, on the contrary, does not have a religion that is different from that of the Spanish state, which is mainly Catholic.
3. Scotland has periodically been poorer than the rest of the UK and has often had lower wage rates. Catalonia is unquestionably overdeveloped relative to Spain, although this has changed in recent decades, and this gap has been reduced.
4. The UK has been a parliamentary democracy with mass suffrage for almost a century, and was a democracy of sorts long before that. It has not seen any dramatic regime changes in a very long time. Spain, by contrast, entered the twentieth century as a weak monarchy and passed from an eccentric dictatorship to an unstable republic ended by a bloody civil war that led to the yet bloodier victory of a “national-catholic” dictator who presided over rapid development and systematic repression of minority nations. (Cau and Fusi 1979).

What unites them is that they formally resemble each other as they “both have strongly enunciated claims for statehood, established nationalist parties [...] that explicitly demand it, and regular public discussion about the issue” (Greer 2007:25). In order to go deeper into these similarities and differences, I shall briefly review their history, from the medieval period to the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. In this latter period they both achieved self-government and started what we now know to be their independence processes.

### **Scotland**

Scotland has traditionally been regarded as one of the first European states, whose origins go back to the ninth century. The Kingdom of Scotland resulted from the union of the antagonistic tribes that lived in the country, the Picts and the Gaels (Scots), who forgot their enmity to fight against the Viking invaders. Kenneth MacAlpin is considered to be the first king of the united Scotland and



the founder of the House of Alpin, a dynasty that was followed by the House of Dunkeld. The granddaughter and only heir of the last Dunkeld king (Alexander III), Margaret, Maid of Norway, died while she was en route to Scotland. This was the starting point of the dynastic disputes between the House of Balliol and the House of Bruce in which Edward I of England was appointed referee. He proposed John Balliol as the new king of Scotland, and managed to undermine his authority. However, Scotland's refusal to support the English army and participate in the war against the French resulted in Edward I deposing King John and the outbreak of the Wars of Scottish Independence. These wars were fought in the late thirteenth century and early fourteenth and confronted the kingdoms of England and Scotland. The first of these wars (1296-1328) ended with the signature of the Treaty of Edinburgh–Northampton between the new King Robert the Bruce and Edward II in representation of both kingdoms and recognised the Kingdom of Scotland as fully independent. At the end of this first war, the Parliament of Scotland was founded (1326) and joined together the three estates that represented Scottish society: the nobility, the clergy and the burghs. The Second War of Independence (1332-1357) triggered by the English invasion on the pretext of restoring the House of Balliol to the Scottish throne, ended with the Treaty of Berwick that restored David II, son of Robert the Bruce, as king of Scotland. After this period, Scotland managed to secure its own monarch and parliamentary institutions until 1560, when the Protestant Reformation led by John Knox “titled the balance decisively in favour of the English party” (Keating 1996:199).

In 1603, with the death of Elizabeth I of England, James VI, King of the Scots, was crowned James I King of England and Ireland, which resulted in the Union of Crowns. The dynastical union did not mean the creation of a single state, which was to come nearly a century later, with the signature of the Acts of Union in 1707. The union of both Parliaments represented the birth of Great Britain, not without wide popular opposition (Keating 1996), as Scottish society believed this agreement only favoured the economic interests of the elites. Still, by then Scotland was a poor agricultural society that had contracted a big debt

because of the failure of its colonial adventure and access to English markets provided an opportunity to begin its economic recovery and paved the way for Scottish Enlightenment. Keating (1996:200) states that Great Britain did not become a unitary state or a federal system but a “Union State”, “with a new unitary parliament for Great Britain, while preserving many of the features of Scottish civil society and administration” like “the church, the legal and education systems, and the system of local government” (McEwen 2006:29).

During the nineteenth century, the British Empire tried to assimilate Scottish identity into the British one, considering that it was not a synonym for English identity. Despite these efforts, Scotland always maintained a distinctive character within the Union, which was partly represented by different social and labour movements. Their protests against the power lost by civil society within the new context of the United Kingdom as a nation-state ended with the designation of a secretary of state for Scotland in 1885. This also entailed the creation of a Scottish Office, which was the body that exercised governmental functions until the Scottish Parliament was re-established in 1999. In Keating’s words (1996:205) there existed a “Scottish political arena, with its own actors, albeit playing out a script written in London.” By the end of the nineteenth century, not a single party had its roots in Scotland or defended a position other than that of commitment to the Union status quo. In 1886, the Scottish Home Rule Association was set up. This nationalist organization, close to the Liberal Party, asked for a Parliament responsible for Scottish domestic affairs, but was against ending the Union. It was not until 1934 that the Scottish National Party was founded after the National Party of Scotland and the Scottish Party decided to join forces. Although this party was not a principal actor in Scottish Politics before World War II, the situation began to change after the 1950s, when nationalism became a reliable option for the Scottish electorate. Devolution became more popular and, in 1979, a minority Labour government in Westminster was forced to call a referendum to decide whether there was enough support for a devolved deliberative assembly for Scotland. Despite the 51.6 per cent of voters who said Yes, the Labour government argued that the

result did not show the support of 40 per cent of possible voters, as the Yes vote represented only 32.9 per cent of the registered electorate as a whole.<sup>73</sup>

The Thatcher administration, which governed the United Kingdom between 1979 and 1990, was especially hard on Scotland. The privatization of water and the introduction of the Poll Tax a year before the rest of the UK found strong opposition within Scottish local government (Greer 2007) and also within Scottish society, who firmly rejected neoliberal policies. According to Keating (1996:211), Scottish hostility was “addressed rather to the English-dominated political union” as “the national conflict in Scotland is closely tied to perceptions of class struggle and opposition to the Conservative government with its English base.” During this period the number of campaigns supporting some form of devolution for Scotland increased and, in 1989, the Scottish Constitutional Convention was created to prepare a scheme for a Scottish Assembly or Parliament. In 1997, after winning the elections with a manifesto<sup>74</sup> that promised the restoration of the Scottish Parliament, the Tony Blair-led Labour government held a referendum on devolution. The referendum was set for 11 September 1997 and the result was in favour of a devolved Parliament with tax-varying powers. After the Scotland Act had been passed (1998), the first parliamentary election took place on 6 May 1999. The result was a coalition government formed by Scottish Labour and the Liberal Democrats that would last until 2007 (after the formula was repeated in the 2003 election).

### **Catalonia**

The origins of Catalonia as a social and political entity can be traced back to the tenth century, when the Count of Barcelona, Borrell II, broke his ties of vassalage with the French king. Although the noun ‘Catalan’ “was not actually used to denote the population of the area until the end of the eleventh century [...] Catalonia as an autonomous political entity was already in existence” (McRoberts 2001:9).

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<sup>73</sup> <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/scottish-politics/9609417/Scottish-independence-referendum-a-timeline.html>

<sup>74</sup> The Labour Party (1997). *Because Britain deserves better*. Retrieved from: <http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm>

After confederating with the Kingdom of Aragon (1137), Alfons the Chaste promoted the Catalan “Usatges” (1150), the first written compilation of laws that ruled Catalan society and, during the thirteenth century, the Catalan “Corts” were created. This organism functioned as a general assembly that provided representation for the nobility, the clergy and the burghers, the three main estates in society, who negotiated with the King the approval of new laws in what laid the foundations for a culture of “pactisme” (Keating 1996, McRoberts 2001) that would remain in place throughout the coming centuries. According to Keating (1996:142), Catalonia preserved “this concept of divided and shared sovereignty, against the efforts both of monarchical absolutism and liberal state-building, right into the modern era.” Hence, the Catalan Corts continued to enjoy an autonomous government when the dynasties of Aragon and Castile joined in 1474 until 1716, when the absolutist monarch Philip V of Bourbon proclaimed the Nueva Planta decree after winning the War of Succession against Archduke Charles of Austria in 1714. With this proclamation, the Corts, among other Catalan institutions, were abolished and the Catalan language was set aside for domestic uses.

Nevertheless, the Spanish monarchy was unable to create a centralized state during the following years, due to governmental instability caused by dynastic disputes and military insurrections. Neither were the liberal governments that governed in the aftermath of the French Revolution any more successful (Keating 1996). Moreover, “the industrialization of Catalonia and the Basque country generated a scenario in which the most economically developed parts of the state were politically subject to an anachronistic and backwards Castile” (Guibernau 2014:10). This situation encouraged the emergence of national awareness.

After a cultural renaissance in the middle of the nineteenth century, Catalanism acquired its political manifestation at the end of the century with the first manifestos that denounced the situation in Catalonia and became the foundational political principles of the Catalan nationalist movement. After the disappointment of the end of First Spanish Republic, the “Memorial de greuges” (1885), promoted by “Centre Català” (a left-wing Catalanist party), and the

“Bases de Manresa” (1892) prepared by the *Unió Catalanista* (conservative Catalanist party) gave rise to “a pattern of separate Catalan political parties which has persisted ever since” that “broke the clientelist system of *caciquismo*” (Keating 1996:145). However, it was not until 1914 that Catalonia recovered a certain degree of autonomy with the creation of the “*Mancomunitat de Catalunya*”, which grouped together the provinces of Tarragona, Barcelona, Lleida and Girona and effectively signified the recognition of territorial unity in Catalonia by the Spanish state. This period was short lived as the “*Mancomunitat*” was suppressed during Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship (1923-1930) and it was not until the approval of the *Estatut de Núria* (1932), after the Second Spanish Republic had been proclaimed, that the country recovered the modern version of the main institutions abolished by the *Nueva Planta Decree*: the Parliament (*Corts*) and the Government (*Generalitat*).

Franco’s victory in the Spanish Civil War (the result of the coup d’état against the Republican Government in 1936), and the resulting 40 years of dictatorship, led to the suppression of all Catalan governmental bodies. The adverse situation, though, united the whole opposition (from the far left to the Catholic conservatives):

[...] Catalan Nationalism persisted. But it took a new form, sheltered by the Church, which was the one Catalan institution the Franco regime could not suppress. And it was strengthened by the Communists and other left-wing forces that had always been uneasy with the Republican nationalism of the 1930s. Though they had even less in common with the new Catholic nationalists, the Franco regime made them allies.

McRoberts (2001:43)

The Spanish transition to democracy began with Franco’s death in 1975 and involved, after a long campaign for “freedom, amnesty, and statute of autonomy” –which was also the motto of a massive demonstration held in Sant Boi de Llobregat on 11 September 1976– the creation of a provisional autonomous Catalan government on 19 September 1977 and the restoration of the *Generalitat* on 24 October 1977, with Josep Tarradellas as its president.

As McRoberts (2001:48) points out, for Catalonia “re-establishing the Generalitat was one thing; defining its place within Spain was another.” The Spanish Constitution, approved in 1978, responded to the demand for recognition by the three historic nations (Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia), “but it does so in terms carefully framed so as not to offend Spanish nationalism; there is no clear recognition of a multinational state” (McRoberts 2001:51). For instance, the Spanish Constitution explicitly recognises the “indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles, y reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas ellas”<sup>75</sup> (Article 2). In accordance with the law, nationalities and regions are organized in an autonomous system that does not recognize any nation but Spain. In practice, this implied that, instead of treating Catalonia, the Basque Country<sup>76</sup> and Galicia differently, the Spanish state assimilated them to the other regions under the name of ‘autonomous communities’:

Once full autonomy has been achieved, the Constitution makes no distinction between the different communities; rather it places nationalities with a strong distinctive identity embedded in a common culture, language and past on the same level as artificially created ‘communities’, lacking any previous sense of identity.

Guibernau (2014:12)

Be that as it may, Catalonia held its first democratic Catalan Parliamentary election in 1980. The elected president was Jordi Pujol, who had participated with the nationalist movement under the Franco dictatorship. At the head of *Convergència i Unió* (Convergence and Union), the coalition formed by *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* and *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya*,

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<sup>75</sup> “Indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible country of all Spaniards; it recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and the solidarity amongst them all.”

<sup>76</sup> However, even sharing the status of autonomous communities with the other 17 regions of the Spanish state, both Navarre and the Basque Country obtained an economic agreement, which is regulated in the 1st Additional Regulation of the 1978 Constitution that recognizes and protects the Historical Rights of the Foral Territories.

he uninterruptedly governed the Generalitat between 1980 and 2003 playing “a key role in building Catalan institutions, language and culture after 40 years of repression” (Guibernau 2104:12).

### Reaching self-government: Regional governments at the end of the 20th century

For both nations the achievement of regional or devolved governments represented the opportunity to work more closely with their societies. Regionalization gave them the chance to act at the meso level between the central state and the local level (Greer 2007). Greer (2007:15) notes that Scotland and Catalonia are “clear cases of ‘bottom-up’ regionalization, driven initially by social and political forces rather than imposed by the state.” Between the 1980s and the beginning of the twenty-first century this proved to be a suitable form of government, which enabled these nations to participate in the nation-state as “separate and self-governing societies” with “distinct and self-governing cultures” (Kymlicka 2001:206-207). This situation contrasted with Ellie Kedourie’s envisioning of nationalism. For her (1966:1), nationalism is a doctrine that believes “[...] que la humanidad se encuentra dividida naturalmente en naciones, que las naciones se distinguen por ciertas características que pueden ser determinadas y que el único tipo de gobierno legítimo es el autogobierno nacional.”<sup>77</sup>

The autonomous government in Catalonia and the devolved Parliament in Scotland were the example that an intermediate solution could be found for stateless nations, whose interests lay in “environmental stability and their own autonomy [which opposed them to] both centralization and secession” (Greer 2007:3). For instance, in the 2007 Scottish election campaign, the SNP “said relatively little about independence and focused instead on emphasising its ability to provide Scotland with effective (devolved) government” (Curtice et al. 2009:5). This frustrated the Labour strategy of fostering fear of independence, which they associated with the nationalist party. At that time, nationalism was

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<sup>77</sup> “That humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations have certain features that can be specified, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.”

still viewed by the electorate as a means of obtaining better treatment from the central state rather than as a political option that pursued secessionist objectives.

What put a stop to this situation, then? When and why did Scotland and Catalonia begin their transition to independence? In 2007, Greer pointed out that there were two paths to secession in stateless nations that had no intention of pursuing independence at that time, such as Scotland and Catalonia. He (2007:182) argued that the first was that pro-independence parties would “gain such strength that they can force secession” while the second was a “shift in the calculus of regional organizations” which “would have to see either such a threat to their own organizational bases from the central state, or so little cost to independence, that it would be beneficial.” To discern those factors that led Scotland and Catalonia to bringing secessionism into their political agenda and which steps these processes took once they had started we must look again at their political contexts between 2006 and 2014.

#### 4.3. From autonomy to secession. Scotland and Catalonia: stateless nations towards independence processes<sup>78</sup>

As mentioned above, the “independence debates in Scotland and Catalonia are the highest profile cases of secession movements within the EU at present” (Bourne 2014:26). Although on 18 September 2014 Scottish voters said No to independence, the result by no means represented the end of the debate in Scotland. David Cameron’s failure to fulfil the promises of more devolution if Scotland voted No, together with the binding referendum in which British citizens will decide about whether they stay or leave the European Union, have maintained the possibility for a second independence referendum on the agenda. As David Torrance recalled after the SNP had won 56 of the 59 possible seats in Scotland during the UK General Election (7 May 2015):

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<sup>78</sup> The leading political actors in the independence processes in Scotland and Catalonia will be briefly defined in Chapter 5 as their statements on Twitter make up Sample 1 in this study.



So the union is safe, for now, but it goes without saying that if parties of the union lose support – as they all have in Scotland – then so does the union. And from the SNP’s point of view, several bogeymen remain in place: a Tory government, more austerity, renewal of Trident and the heightened prospect of an in/out EU referendum. As a result, winning another Holyrood majority next year will most likely be a walk in the park, especially for a campaigner as talented as Sturgeon.<sup>79</sup>

Indeed, Scotland has held parliamentary election on 5 May 2016 and, despite having stressed during the pre-campaign that “the fate of a second referendum lay in the hands of the Scottish people,”<sup>80</sup> SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon will have to confront the issue in the next term in office if Westminster does not comply with the devolution commitments on further powers for the Scottish Parliament negotiated within the framework of The Smith Commission.

In Catalonia, after 30 years of devolved government, “the question of self-government and self-determination remains at the centre of the political debate” (Serrano 2013:525). The Catalan case, though, is quite different, as a binding referendum on the country’s independence has never been held, so the discussion of the issue could not be more alive. Once the consultation planned for 9 November 2014 had been celebrated under the legal form of a participatory consultation, the Government led by Artur Mas called an early election, which was presented by pro-independence parties as a plebiscite on the independence of Catalonia. The outcome of the 27 September 2015 election was destined to decide if Catalan voters wanted to start a “disconnection process” with the Spanish state, by following an eighteen-month route map endorsed by the Junts pel Sí coalition (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and independent candidates from civil society).

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<sup>79</sup> “This election has deepened the psychological break over Scotland” Retrieved from: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/08/snp-scotland-independence-election-unionists>

<sup>80</sup> “Fate of second Scottish independence referendum 'in hands of the people'” Retrieved from: <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/oct/15/second-scottish-independence-referendum-hands-people-nicola-sturgeon-snp>

After winning the election with 62 seats in the Parliament and with the limited support of *Candidatura d'Unitat Popular*'s 10 deputies, Carles Puigdemont was named First Minister of the *Generalitat* in January 2016.

Although both processes coincide in their timelines (and in the uncertainty of their future inside the United Kingdom and Spain), their similarities do not go much further. They can both be classified as 'emancipatory nationalism movements' using the definition by Guibernau (2013) who suggests that this kind of nationalism emerges "in nations included within larger states who do not identify with them, do not feel represented by the state of which they are a part and do not feel politically and culturally recognized as nations by the state containing them" (2013:372).

As we shall see, one of the main differences between the Scottish and the Catalan case is the way in which this type of nationalism has evolved in each society. Whereas in Catalonia civil society has played a major role in the politicians' move towards independence (Rico and Liñeira, 2014), in Scotland it seems clear that this has not been a social demand, but a primarily political process (Saunders 2013).<sup>81</sup> A decision taken by the SNP was what motivated the debate around Scottish independence and what led civil society to take up positions on this issue. Nevertheless, in both cases it is clear that, since every social process is controversial, political actors –among other participants in the public sphere– were forced to construct discourses that could convince their voters of supporting independence.

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<sup>81</sup> As Cristina Perales (2014:332) indicates: "In the cases of Scotland and Catalonia, nationalist movements – which are also social – have articulated actions, from their social base, to redefine their territory and, ultimately, their identity. Collective actions in both cases were conducted from disparate fields (in Scotland, promoted by campaigns and political parties; in the Catalan case derived from grassroots movements mainly organized through civil associations and cultural entities) and have revealed the structural crisis of traditional political institutions."


### 4.3.1. Scotland: a top-down negotiated referendum

We will bring forward our proposals to give Scots a vote  
on full economic powers through an independence referendum  
We can enhance the Bill and give our nation the freedom  
it needs to flourish by taking on more responsibilities here in Scotland.  
The independence we propose for Scotland is exactly for this purpose.  
It is with independence – the natural state for nations like Scotland –  
that we will have the ability to determine our own destiny  
and build the best future for our country.  
We, the people of Scotland, have the greatest stake in our future.  
That is why we are best placed to govern ourselves.

*Scottish National Party Manifesto (2011)*

In 2007, a country traditionally ruled by Labour saw their voters elect Alex Salmond as First Minister at Holyrood. One of the key factors of the Scottish National Party's (SNP) victory was the unpopularity of the then UK Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair and the electorate's opposition to UK involvement in the Iraq war (Curtice et al. 2009). This, together with the SNP's ability to present itself "as an effective alternative government rather than as a movement campaigning for independence" (Curtice et al., 2009:120), caused Labour voters to shift their allegiance to the nationalist party. However, something was changing in Scottish voters electoral preferences and, after eight years of a devolved parliament they felt that "Holyrood was the place where most decisions about their country's domestic affairs should be taken; and the impression they had formed was that in practice it was London that often still had the larger say" (Curtice et al. 2009:183). As Figure 1 shows, support for independence decreased after the Scottish Parliament was restored. Hence, independence was not a popular government option for the Scottish people until the referendum issue was put on the agenda.

Figure 1. Support for independence between 1978 and 2014 in Scotland



Source: Scottish Public Opinion Monitor (Ipsos MORI)

On 5 May 2011, Alex Salmond was re-elected on a manifesto providing a clear mandate for the next term: the call for a referendum to decide the future of Scotland. This had been one of the options debated in the “National Conversation” that was held by the Scottish National Party between 14 August 2007 and 30 November 2009 that concluded there were four possible scenarios for Scotland’s future in a white paper entitled “Your Scotland. Your Voice. A National Conversation:”

2.6. There are four broad options for Scotland’s future:

- The *status quo*: Scotland retains its current responsibilities with gradual evolution in response to particular events or pressures
- Implementing the recommendations of the Commission on Scottish Devolution
- Full devolution of the maximum range of responsibilities to Scotland while remaining in the United Kingdom (sometimes called “devolution max”)
- Independence: Scotland has all the rights and responsibilities of a normal independent state.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Article 2.6 of “Your Scotland. Your Voice. A National Conversation” Retrieved from: <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/293639/0090721.pdf>

The overall majority achieved by the SNP in the 2011 elections allowed the Scottish First Minister to start the negotiations with the Westminster Government in order to obtain the legislative competence needed to call a referendum. The next step for the nationalist party was to debate the details of the referendum's organization of its annual conference, held in Inverness on 23 October 2011. Even though Prime Minister David Cameron was at first reluctant to allow the referendum to be held, Alex Salmond stood firm and insisted that it be held before the end of its mandate in 2016.

On 10 January 2012, the Scottish First Minister announced a referendum on independence for autumn 2014 and, on 25 January, he set up the question proposed by SNP in a white paper entitled "Your Scotland. Your Referendum", which ensured that the referendum would be held "in the same way as any Scottish election, to the same standards and with the same guarantee of fairness. We will decide our future in a vote which is beyond challenge or doubt."<sup>83</sup> The tenacity of the SNP and the need for the UK government to launch its own consultation process (Tierney 2013) brought the Scottish Secretary, Michael Moore, to meet Salmond during the following months, to reach agreements and to discuss the extraordinary transfer of powers to Holyrood that would let it hold the ballot.

On 25 May 2012, the Yes Scotland campaign for independence was launched. Its main goal was to achieve a million signatures asking for a binding referendum in autumn 2014. The Better Together campaign to keep the Union launched a month later. Negotiations between Westminster and the Scottish Government continued during the following month and both parts finally reached a deal on 15 October 2012. The Edinburgh Agreement, signed by Prime Minister David Cameron and First Minister Alex Salmond, paved the way for the vote in autumn 2014:

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<sup>83</sup> "Your Scotland. Your Referendum" Retrieved from:  
<http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2012/01/1006/1>

The governments have agreed to promote an Order in Council under Section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998 in the United Kingdom and Scottish Parliaments to allow a single-question referendum on Scottish independence to be held before the end of 2014. The Order will put it beyond doubt that the Scottish Parliament can legislate for that referendum.<sup>84</sup>

As a result, on 30 January 2013 the Scottish Government agreed on a single question, now official, based on the suggestions of the Electoral Commission. This was: ‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’ and there were only two possible answers (Yes/No). On 21 March 2013 FM Alex Salmond announced the date on which this question would be put to Scottish society: 18 September 2014. At that time, it was nearly a year since the Yes campaign and the Better Together had been launched. Finally, on 14 November 2013 the Scottish Parliament unanimously passed the Referendum Bill, which set out the rules governing the referendum. From that moment onwards, the campaign for staying in the Union, which had been largely positive, changed its tone and there were a proliferation of aggressive statements (for example, George Osborne, the UK Chancellor, said that Scotland would lose the pound<sup>85</sup>). The official campaign period began on 30 May 2014 and the referendum finally took place on 18 September 2014. The “No” vote won the referendum on independence with 55.3 per cent of votes while the “Yes” was the preferred option of 44.7 per cent of the electorate.<sup>86</sup> The 84.6 per cent turnout proved that holding the referendum had politically mobilized a country that only two years before, in the local election, had barely had a turnout of 40 per cent.

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<sup>84</sup> The Edinburgh Agreement. Retrieved from:  
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0040/00404789.pdf>

<sup>85</sup> “The SNP says that if Scotland becomes independent there will be a currency union and Scotland will share the pound. People need to know - that is not going to happen. If Scotland walks away from the UK, it walks away from the pound.” Retrieved from:  
[http://www.heraldsotland.com/news/13145744.Osborne\\_\\_If\\_Scotland\\_walks\\_away\\_from\\_the\\_UK\\_\\_it\\_walks\\_away\\_from\\_the\\_UK\\_pound/](http://www.heraldsotland.com/news/13145744.Osborne__If_Scotland_walks_away_from_the_UK__it_walks_away_from_the_UK_pound/)

<sup>86</sup> “Scotland rejects independence with No winning 55% of vote.” Retrieved from:  
<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/19/scotland-independence-no-vote-victory-alex-salmond>

What about the future? As I have pointed out at the beginning of this section, 18 September 2014 was not the end of independence claims in Scotland. Its uncontested status as a nation (Castelló and Capdevila 2013) and the predisposition of the Conservative Government led by David Cameron made it possible to ask Scottish citizens whether they wanted to stay in the Union that they created when they joined England, Ireland and Wales in the birth of Great Britain in 1707. Despite their desire to remain in the United Kingdom, Scotland has shown that it does not want to be ruled by Westminster and wants more devolution after the referendum. In Marina Dekavalla's (2016b:4) words: "behind the pressure for independence lay a perception that there was a political, social and ideological gap between Scotland and Westminster", which David McCrone (2001) had already underlined. As Nicola McEwen and Bettina Petersohn (2015:200) have indicated, "revising intergovernmental relations would not require new legislation, but it would require a cultural change in the relationship between the UK and Scottish governments," which has still not happened.

#### 4.3.2. Catalonia: a bottom-up claim for self-determination

Recognizing the existence of multiple nationalities  
within the state may be the first step to addressing the problem,  
but resolving it requires that this be given practical and institutional expression.  
Paradoxically, most states have found it easier to countenance secession  
than to recognize internal pluralism.

Michael Keating, *Plurinational democracy: stateless nations in a post-sovereignty era*

The change in Catalonia's political landscape came with the first tripartite government in 2003. The coalition formed between the Partit Socialista de Catalunya (PSC), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) and Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds – Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (ICV-EUiA) ended with 23 years of Convergència i Unió hegemony. Under the leadership of Pasqual Maragall, the Generalitat wrote a new proposal for Catalonia's Statute of Autonomy that

on 30 September 2005 was passed with 120 votes in favour and 15 against. The aim of the new Statute, as summarized by Marta Montagut (2012), was:

1. To increase the density of Catalan self-government through its recognition as a nation and the recognition of its own language, rights and symbols
2. To extend the competences of the autonomous government
3. To structure Catalonia's own institutional system
4. To improve Catalonia's financial system

The text was then submitted to the Spanish Parliament, but it was not approved until March 2006, after the Government led by José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero had come to an agreement with CiU and modified several of the original articles (among them Article 1, which defined Catalonia as a nation). This controversial process ended with a referendum that passed with a Yes vote (73.9 per cent), but with a low turnout (only 49 per cent of the electorate voted).<sup>87</sup> The next four years were marked by what Lars Blichner and Anders Molander (2005) call the judicialisation of politics, after the Partido Popular (PP) presented an appeal to the Spanish High Court about the unconstitutionality of the approved text, which affected a total of 126 articles (Montagut 2012). The final sentence<sup>88</sup> arrived on 28 June 2010. Nearly two weeks later, on 10 July 2010, over one million people protested in the streets of Barcelona against the Spanish High Court's decision to suppress 14 articles of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy and modify a further 30 (Guibernau 2014). The demonstration was organized by Òmnium Cultural under the motto "We are a nation. We decide." Before that moment:

By and large, the Catalan nationalist movement had never been overwhelmingly secessionist. Since its inception in the late nineteenth century, secession from Spain had not been the objective of its leaders, instead, different alternative options –ranging from federation to political autonomy– have embodied the main Catalan nationalist projects.

Guibernau (2014:14)

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<sup>87</sup> <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2006/06/18/espana/1150653842.html>


<sup>88</sup> Sentencia 31/2010, de 28 de junio de 2010. Retrieved from:

<http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/Paginas/Sentencia.aspx?cod=16119>



In this respect, Ivan Serrano (2013:542) presents the controversial results of the Statute of 2006 as the turning point for independence, which gained visibility on the political agenda. There were, however, other contextual factors that are key to explaining the progressively increasing support for independence between 2005 and 2012,<sup>89</sup> which can be seen in Figure 2. The first one was the victory of the Partido Popular in the Spanish Parliamentary election of 2011, which entailed increasingly tougher and systematic attacks on Catalan culture and language and made any possible Constitutional reform even more difficult. The exacerbation of the 2008 economic crisis, which highlighted Catalonia's fiscal deficit with the central administration (Guibernau 2014), has also been stressed as an independence fostering aspect.

**Figure 2. Evolution of the constitutional preferences for Catalonia according to survey respondents, 2005-2012**



Source: Public Opinion Barometer (Opinion Studies Centre), 2005-2012

From that moment on, the possibility of improving Catalonia's self-government and its territorial accommodation inside the Spanish state seemed increasingly

<sup>89</sup> El suport a la independència de Catalunya. Anàlisi de canvis i tendències en el període 2005-2012 (Support for the independence of Catalonia. Changes and trends analysis between 2005-2012). Retrieved from: [http://ceo.gencat.cat/ceop/AppJava/export/sites/CEOPortal/estudis/monografies/contingut/premi\\_maquetat\\_def.pdf](http://ceo.gencat.cat/ceop/AppJava/export/sites/CEOPortal/estudis/monografies/contingut/premi_maquetat_def.pdf)

less possible.<sup>90</sup> Anthony Dowling (2009:194) highlights “demographic changes, comparative economic decline and an inchoate sense of dissatisfaction” as contributors to “the plethora of organizations of civic society that have emerged in Catalonia.” Between 2006 and 2012, several “demonstrations were organized claiming Catalonia was a ‘nation’ with its own ‘right to decide’, and popular non-binding consultations on independence were held in more than 500 municipalities between 2009 and 2011, with more than 800 000 participants” (Serrano 2013:523-524).

Nevertheless, the massive rally demanding a “New State in Europe” on Catalonia’s National Day in 2012 is generally regarded as the definitive turning point in Catalonia’s ambitions for sovereignty (Guibernau, 2013). According to Kathryn Cramer (2015:112), by that date support for independence had risen further than at any other time since comparable records began in 2005. The fact that nearly 1.5 million people<sup>91</sup> decided to fill the streets of Barcelona and demand their country’s independence did not go unnoticed by Catalan politicians. This is why Artur Mas, Catalonia’s Prime Minister, decided to make a last attempt to negotiate with the Spanish Government over a better system of devolution for Catalonia, which had been the key issue in his 2010 electoral programme (Rico and Liñeira 2014). But his meeting with Spanish Primer Minister Mariano Rajoy met with a negative and set in motion a series of events that led to the call for a non-binding referendum on 9 November 2014. If the 2012 demonstration was considered the trigger for change in Catalan society’s perception of the creation of a new independent state, on a political level this change was reflected in holding early elections on 25 November 2012 and the formation of a parliamentary arc<sup>92</sup> that was favourable to the right to decide.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Liñeira and Cetrà (2015: 263) conclude that “any reform to enhance self-government and the recognition of Catalonia’s national distinctiveness looked less likely after this, damaging the political opportunities of those groups in favour of a federal reform of the constitutional framework [...]”

<sup>91</sup> According to the Ministry of Home Affairs of Catalonia and the Municipal Police of Barcelona.

<sup>92</sup> The parliamentary groups that were favourable to the right to decide make up a total of 87 MPs out of the 135 present in the Chamber [http://www.gencat.cat/governacio/resultats-parlament2012/09AU/DAU09999CM\\_L2.htm](http://www.gencat.cat/governacio/resultats-parlament2012/09AU/DAU09999CM_L2.htm) In Scotland, there were 71 out of 129 [http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/Electionresults/2011%20election/1\\_Summary\\_of\\_Seats.pdf](http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/Electionresults/2011%20election/1_Summary_of_Seats.pdf)

This political move was reflected in the agreement between the Catalan Government and the parliamentary forces of CiU, ERC, ICV-EUiA and CUP to push ahead with the self-determination process. On 23 January 2013 these four political parties voted for a declaration of sovereignty that aimed to hold “a referendum through which Catalan citizens could decide on the status of Catalonia vis-à-vis the Spanish state, including the option for independence” (Castillo Ortiz 2015:1). Even though the Spanish government opposed the content of the declaration, the four parties mentioned above finally signed, on 12 December 2013, an agreement to hold the referendum on 9 November 2014. They set out the two questions that were going to be put to the Catalan people: “Do you want Catalonia to become a State? (Yes/No)” and “If so, do you want this State to be independent? (Yes/No)”

The consultation was finally neither official nor binding, because the Catalan government was unable to get the Spanish government to grant them the competence to authorize, call and hold a referendum on Catalonia’s future. In a plenary session celebrated on 8 April 2014, Jordi Turull (CiU), Marta Rovira (ERC) and Joan Herrera (ICV-EUiA) formally asked the Spanish Parliament to pass the bill that would authorize the 9 November referendum. The result was 299 votes against, 47 in favour and 1 abstention.<sup>94</sup> This forced the Catalan parliament to create their own legislation for holding a consultation. As a result, in 19 September 2014, the Catalan Law of Consultation Votes<sup>95</sup> was passed and, on 27 September 2014, President Artur Mas signed the decree that called for a referendum on self-determination on 9 November 2014.

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<sup>93</sup> This is the expression most commonly used to refer to the Catalans’ right to self-determination

<sup>94</sup> “La Constitución frena la consulta” Retrieved from:

[http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/04/08/actualidad/1396986575\\_704072.html](http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/04/08/actualidad/1396986575_704072.html)

<sup>95</sup> This law developed Article 122 of the Statute of Autonomy, which states that “Correspon a la Generalitat la competència exclusiva per a l’establiment del règim jurídic, les modalitats, el procediment, l’acompliment i la convocatòria per la mateixa Generalitat o pels ens locals, en l’àmbit de llurs competències, d’enquestes, audiències públiques, fòrums de participació i qualsevol altre instrument de consulta popular, salvant el que disposa l’article 149.1.32 de la Constitució.” | “The Generalitat has exclusive power to establish the legal system, the types, procedures, compliance and announcement by the Generalitat itself or by local bodies, in the field of their powers, of surveys, public hearings, participation forums and other instruments of popular consultation, excepting the provisions of Article 149.1.32 of the Spanish Constitution.”

The Spanish Constitutional Court suspended this non-binding referendum vote two days later and, in response, the Catalan government decided to support the organization of a participatory process on the same date led by 20,000 volunteers throughout Catalonia. The process culminated on 9 November 2014, when more than 2 million citizens voted in the consultation. The result, with an estimated turnout of 36 per cent, was 80.76 per cent who voted in favour of independence, 4.54 per cent against and 10.7 per cent in favour of a non-independent state (the federal solution).<sup>96</sup>

In a process whose main purpose was to allow the Catalan people to decide whether they wanted to be an independent state, the political actors have also constructed a discourse about what the hypothetically independent Catalonia would be like. This discourse belongs not only to the political actors involved in the “double yes” campaign (“yes” to each of the question mentioned above), but also to those civil society organizations that had led the process in parallel with the political parties in power. According to Keating (1997:696), Catalan nationalism “has always had a strong civic dimension and since the 1960s this has been dominant.” This civic character not only takes place at the ideological level, but also in the role the civil society has played in the demands for self-government. Hence, it is not surprising that the move towards independence has emanated from Catalan society at large and has been articulated through such platforms as the *Assemblea Nacional Catalana* (Catalan National Assembly), *Òmnium Cultural* (an association that promotes Catalan language and culture), *Súmate* (Spanish speakers from Catalonia who support Independence) or the *Associació de Municipis per la Independència* (Association of Towns for Independence), which have also emerged as generators of discourse on the process.

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<sup>96</sup> <http://www.participa2014.cat/resultats/dades/en/escr-tot.html>

These organizations have actively participated in and even organized multitudinous acts mirroring the first great demonstration of 2012. The same numbers took part in the Catalan Way on 11 September 2013, which joined the Valencian village of Vinarós with El Pertús in France with a human chain, and the Catalan “V” which a year later formed the huge “V” for victory, vote, etc. by filling the Diagonal Avenue and Gran Via in Barcelona. Crameri (2015:117-118) recognises the leading role social movements have played in the independence process when stating that “it has been the conversion of the Catalan middle classes to support independence rather than ‘pragmatic Catalanism’ that has turned what was hitherto a minor component of Catalan nationalism into a mass secession movement.” However, her research shows that the cultural and intellectual elites that are at heart of these movements have undoubtedly influenced them.

The future in Catalonia depends both on the new Generalitat led by Carles Puigdemont and the “Junts pel sí” (Together for yes) coalition that has just started to take steps to provide the country with such state structures as its own treasury and effective international representation. The uncertainty over how the new Spanish Government will react to “the Catalan question” and the impossibility of holding a binding referendum, for the moment, prevents any predictions about Catalonia’s road to independence from being made. Although Roberto Liñeira and Daniel Cetrà (2015:257) state that the Scottish independence referendum “has set a precedent for political actors who seek to channel their secession demands through an independence referendum” we must bear in mind that the not all nation-states are like the United Kingdom.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> According to David Martí (2014:16) view, “the decision of the British government to accept a referendum in Scotland is grounded both on institutional and strategic factors. Amongst the former there is the long democratic tradition in the UK and the commitment to respect the will of the Scottish people that gave a clear democratic mandate to the SNP to hold the referendum [...] On the other hand, the Spanish government has blocked, and will continue to do so, any attempt by the Catalan institutions to hold a referendum on independence.”

#### 4.4. Referendum campaigns; a political communication viewpoint

As Bourne (2014:96) points out, “the public sphere, and democratic process of deliberation therein, have become important fora in which secession outcomes are negotiated.” Scottish and Catalan pro-independence political actors have managed to tilt the balance towards a “Yes” vote and, as stated throughout this thesis, they have used political discourses to do so. But they have not been campaigning for the customary fortnight before an ordinary electoral process; they have been campaigning for long periods of time prior to holding a referendum/consultation.

Political discourse has been analysed in depth during periods of electoral campaigning (Aragón et al., 2013), but it is also a powerful tool in non-official campaigns over long periods of time such as the Catalan and the Scottish pro-independence ones. In both independence processes, campaigning is no longer “confined to a small number of weeks prior to election day” (Vergeer et al. 2013:485), so it is essential to reinforce key ideas on the Yes and the No sides through the media in order to build public support. Hence, for referendums, campaigns are more important than in other electoral situations because of their “volatile electorates, uncertainty in elite cues and issue complexity” (de Vreese and Semetko 2004a:9).

Claes de Vreese and Holli Semetko (2004a:171) present the referendum as a multi-faceted and “increasingly popular instrument in political decision-making”, despite the simplistic nature of the YES/NO vote (de Vreese and Semetko 2004b). In their view, referendums mobilize the electorate and increase civic participation, as in the independence referendums in Catalonia and Scotland. The latter, which did not have a previous pro-independence social movement, saw how several groups were created to campaign both for the Yes and the No camps as soon as the referendum date was announced. Werner Wright et al. (2010:330) have noted that these camps “are usually created by forming naturally predictable, pragmatic, or even ‘strange’ strategic alliances.

Thus, political parties are not the only actors involved in a campaign.” Keating (1997:694) had already pointed out this trend when he stated that “the reconstruction of political space is occurring as much within the realm of civil society as that of the state.” One example of this is the civic platform Women for Independence that was created in Scotland in order to close the gap between the vote preferences of women and men by campaigning about the benefits of an independent Scotland.

This situation drives political parties to work further on their image and positioning (Wright et al 2010), because although a referendum “presents a somewhat different set of choices to the voter than does an election” as “no political parties or candidate names appear on the ballot” (LeDuc 2000:2), the referendum message “over the course of the campaign is interpreted and delivered by participants who are familiar to the voter, primarily the political parties and their leaders” (Pammett and LeDuc 2010:272). Therefore, campaigning during a referendum is of utmost important, even more so if we consider that campaigns can last weeks or months during which time public opinion can often shift dramatically (LeDuc 2000). As Wright et al. (2010) point out, “referendum campaigns are about arguments” and political actors’ ability to transmit them “will be decisive for the campaign outcome.” In keeping with this, de Vreese and Semetko (2004a:184) highlight that “the campaign and the news reporting of the events, parties, leaders, and aspects of the referendum issue that it brings to prominence, can crystallize opinions and even affect the outcome in a close race.” The camp “with the most salient and thus most compelling arguments” (Wright et al. 2010:331) will be better positioned to win the referendum.

The referendum campaign and the context in which it is framed, “is thus potentially important for the vote because party attachments often mean less in these campaigns” (de Vreese and Semetko 2004b:700). This leads LeDuc (2000:3) to conclude that, “the political context of the referendum therefore itself becomes a variable, which in turn will affect the weight which even

familiar variables such as partisanship or ideology might carry in explaining behaviour and outcomes.” For instance, the high support received by the SNP in the first parliamentary election after the referendum vote has shown that part of the electorate did not back independence, but now supports how the nationalist party manages public governance in Scotland.

According to de Vreese and Semetko (2004b:701), the variables that influence the outcome of a referendum campaign are: “ideology or party identification, evaluations of or feelings about political elites, government performance or government approval, perceptions of the economy, issue-related contextual evaluations, political cynicism, political efficacy, political knowledge and political interest, and demographic and regional characteristics.” Although the present research does not attempt to analyze if these variables affected how Twitter users talked about independence processes, I will take them into account when dealing with the discursive attitudes of political actors.

This chapter has reviewed what stateless nations are and how they can be integrated in a plurinational state. It has presented Scotland and Catalonia as an example of stateless nations that were benefitting from a particular level of autonomy in their political decisions and which were more or less comfortable with their regional governments. Further on the chapter has dealt with the elements that drove Scotland and Catalonia to start secession processes that culminated in the call for self-determination referendums. With the aim of identifying how these processes were explained, the following chapter displays the methodological proposal that has been used to approach Scottish and Catalan political actors’ discourses on independence.



UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

CLAIMING INDEPENDENCE IN 140 CHARACTERS. USES OF METAPHOR IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCOTTISH AND CATALAN P

Carlota Maria Moragas Fernández

# **PART II**

## **METHODOLOGY**

UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

CLAIMING INDEPENDENCE IN 140 CHARACTERS. USES OF METAPHOR IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCOTTISH AND CATALAN P

Carlota Maria Moragas Fernández

## Chapter 5

### Methodological proposal

The present section aims to construct a proper methodological framework for analysing the metaphorical expressions detected in Catalan and Scottish pro-independence discourses. To fulfil this objective, it is basic to define which kind of metaphorical expressions fit into this research and which do not. This is important because of the nature of rhetorical figures, which can be understood as generative schemes or as ready-made expressions (Eco 1989). The former, “proporcionan las reglas para sustituir una palabra determinada (y el concepto correspondiente) por otras palabras y otros conceptos”<sup>98</sup> whereas the latter are pre-established elements that are the result of a “hipercodificación milenaria que ha producido ampliamente sus propias catacresis [...] expresiones que han alcanzado tal nivel de institucionalización, que pierden definitivamente el significante al que sustituían”<sup>99</sup> (Eco 1989:388-389). Le Guern (1990) talks about the latter as a result of a lexicalization process that occurs when metaphor becomes a proper word and we no longer give it a metaphorical sense. Croft and Cruse (2004) refer to this kind of metaphorical expression as “idioms” and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1989) qualify as “erosion” the process through which metaphor is no longer experienced as metaphorical. Because metaphors that have become lexicalized do not work as I have described in Chapter 2,<sup>100</sup> I have only dealt with those that work as generative schemes.

Another question I had to address when deciding how to approach political discourses that occur in dialogical platforms was what I wanted to know about these discourses. Since my objective was to see how they produce social

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<sup>98</sup> “Provide the rules for replacing a particular word (along with corresponding concept), for other words and concepts.”

<sup>99</sup> “Millenary overcoding that has in some cases produced catachreses: that is, figures of the speech so strictly coded that the entity for which they stood has definitely lost its proper sign-vehicle.”

<sup>100</sup> Lakoff and Johnson (1980) refer to them as literal expressions structured in terms of metaphorical concepts that function like everyday language.

knowledge, Conversational Analysis, which “has traditionally been applied to the analysis of naturally occurring talk-in-interactions” (Steensen 2014:1202) and works as a resource for understanding the roles participants play in a conversation did not seem to be a suitable methodology. In Chapter 1, I described the conception of discourse as “socially situated and institutionally regulated language practice with reality-constructing capacity” (Androutsopoulos 2013:48), which I regarded as belonging to the ideational function of language rather than the interpersonal function. This is why, although we are looking at computer-mediated discourses here, the way in which human-to-human communication develops via computer networks goes beyond the scope of this study. Hence, although Conversational Analysis and Computer-mediated analysis are valuable tools for looking at how users organize themselves and create tools for overcoming handicaps such as time-lag conversations, they do not cover the content of these conversations or the extent to which they influence political actors’ messages on Twitter. This is why I have approached discourse from the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis, because it looks at discourse as a social practice. Moreover, in the following sections I have also dealt with the main problems of focusing on micro-discourses and the role of metaphor in them.

## 5.1. Sample selection

In order to analyze how metaphor works in political “micro-discourses”, I needed to look into the tweets produced by Catalan and Scottish pro-independent political actors during the key dates (Table 1) of the two independence processes. All of the tweets selected during these periods made up the population of the present study.

The sample was selected from the main political parties and social movements who specifically promoted independence<sup>101</sup> in Catalonia and Scotland. This is

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<sup>101</sup> In the Catalan independence process some parties like *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya* or *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds – Esquerra Unida i Alternativa* are not unionist, but do not support independence

why I decided to analyze both the political party and the leader/s who represented it and also the principal social movements that were carrying out an active campaign on the streets and social networks. As pointed out in Chapter 1 political actors are not only “paid, elected representatives (‘politicians’)” (Van Dijk 1997:17), but also those citizens or groups who participate in politics. The political actors analysed in this research have been chosen on the basis of these criteria.

To find out which metaphors were used most to talk about the independence process and the creation of a new independent state, I focused on the most significant dates in each process and analysed all the statements tweeted by the selected users during these days. This did not include retweets and replies, even though Christian Christensen (2013:651), among other authors, has said that “the communicative act of retweeting is both the relaying of a given message, but also an act that could be construed as an attempt to persuade other voters to support a candidate, or other candidates to adjust or modify an existing position.” Nevertheless, Guerrero-Solé (2015:4) also states that “this conjecture is debatable since many Twitter users publicly state that retweet is not equal to endorsement (Freelon 2014) but just a forward of an information that the receiver will be able to interpret (in terms of endorsement or not).” So, all tweets posted during the dates selected as political actors’ own statements were included in the analysis, which was limited to the day on which the event happened because of the speed of discourse production on Twitter. Political messages are generated every minute, since tweets are constantly emerging in a medium where immediacy is one of the premises that govern how it functions.

In Chapter 4, I have argued that one of the similarities between the two independence processes is their timeline. This can be checked in Table 1, which contains the twenty-four key dates on which I will focus.

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either. They call for a “third way” (*tercera via*), which would be closer to a federal solution, so I have opted not to select them as part of the sample.

Table 1. Independence processes' key events analyzed

| Scottish independence process   | Catalan independence process  |
|---|---|
| <p><b>5 May 2011</b> – SNP win majority government at Holyrood. The party bags 69 seats, Labour win 37, the Tories 15, the Lib Dems 5 and the Scottish Green Party 2. The nationalists' manifesto clearly proposed an independence referendum.</p>  | <p><b>11 September 2012</b> – The demonstration "Catalunya, nou estat d'Europa" (Catalonia, new state in Europe), organized by ANC, takes place in Barcelona on Catalonia's National Day.</p>   |
| <p><b>23 October 2011</b> – At its annual conference, the SNP officially launches its drive for independence and announces the details of an unprecedented effort to win the referendum.</p>  | <p><b>25 November 2012</b> – Catalonia holds early elections. The results lead to a Parliament with a majority of deputies favourable to the Right to Decide and the government is committed to hold a consultation on the country's independence.</p>  |
| <p><b>10 January 2012</b> – FM Alex Salmond announces a referendum for autumn 2014. Scottish Secretary Michael Moore makes a statement saying the Scottish government does not have legal powers to hold the ballot. He offers to resolve the issue by transferring powers to Holyrood.</p>   | <p><b>23 January 2013</b> – The Catalan parliament passes the "Declaration on the sovereignty and right to decide of the people of Catalonia" that acknowledges the Catalan people as legally and politically sovereign. With this declaration, the parliament agrees to start a process to implement the Right to Decide, with 85 votes in favour, 41 against and 2 abstentions.</p> |
| <p><b>25 January 2012</b> – SNP sets out its question in a white paper: The Scottish government calls for public feedback on the question it wants to put to voters in a Scottish independence referendum. It asks: "Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent country?"</p>  | <p><b>11 September 2013</b> – ANC organizes the Catalan Way (Via Catalana), which joins Vinaròs (north Valencia) and El Pertús (south France) with a chain of nearly 2 million people). It is the second massive demonstration on Catalonia's National Day after the one in September 2012.</p>   |
| <p><b>25 May 2012</b> – The Yes Scotland campaign launches with the aim of encouraging one million Scots to sign a declaration of support by the time of the referendum in the autumn of 2014.</p>  | <p><b>12 December 2013</b> – The four pro-referendum parties sign an agreement that sets the date (9 November 2014) and the question that the Catalan people will be asked: "Do you want Catalonia to become a State? (Yes/No)" and "if so, do you want this State to be independent? (Yes/No)".</p>  |
| <p><b>15 October 2012</b> – After a few months of negotiations the final issues of a referendum on independence are settled between the UK government and the Scottish government. Prime Minister David Cameron and First Minister Alex Salmond sign the historic Edinburgh Agreement, which paves the way for a vote in autumn 2014.</p> | <p><b>8 April 2014</b> – The Spanish parliament votes on a bill approved by the Catalan parliament, that asks the Central government to transfer to the Generalitat the competence to authorize, call and hold a referendum on Catalonia's future. The bill is not passed by a margin of 299 votes against, 47 for and 1 abstention.</p>  |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <p><b>30 January 2013</b> – The Scottish government agrees to change the wording of its proposed question, after concern from the Electoral Commission that it may lead people to vote “Yes”. SNP ministers agree to ask the yes/no question: “Should Scotland be an independent country?” instead of the one proposed by the Scottish government.</p> | <p><b>11 September 2014</b> – During Catalonia’s National Day, ANC and Òmnium Cultural organize a concentration between Diagonal Avenue and Gran Via in Barcelona, forming a huge “V” (for vote) to demand that a referendum be held on the independence of Catalonia.</p>   |
| <p><b>21 March 2013</b> – Referendum date revealed. The Scottish independence referendum will take place on 18 September 2014.</p>   | <p><b>19 September 2014</b> – The Parliament of Catalonia approves the Catalan Law of Consultation Votes, which was designed as the legal framework to organise November’s independence vote.</p>  |
| <p><b>14 November 2013</b> – The Scottish independence referendum bill, which legislates everything to do with the holding of the Scottish independence referendum, is passed unanimously by the Holyrood parliament.</p>  | <p><b>27 September 2014</b> – Catalan President Artur Mas signs a decree calling for a self-determination referendum vote on 9 November.</p>   |
| <p><b>13 February 2014</b> – UK Chancellor George Osborne ruled out a formal currency union in the event of independence, saying: “If Scotland walks away from the UK, it walks away from the UK pound.”</p>   | <p><b>29 September 2014</b> – The Constitutional Court suspends Catalonia’s self-determination referendum vote.</p>  |
| <p><b>30 May 2014</b> – A formal 16-week campaign period begins, during which time the amount of money registered campaigners can spend is limited.</p>  | <p><b>16 October 2014</b> – Artur Mas announces that Catalans will still be able to cast a vote in a “participatory process” on 9 November 2014. 20,000 volunteers throughout the entire Catalonia will run the polling stations, located in Catalan Government venues. There will not be a previously published electoral census and Catalans will register just before voting, while an electronic system will make sure that people do not cast their vote twice.</p> |
| <p><b>18 September 2014</b> – Referendum takes place. The “No” side wins, with 2,001,926 (55.3 per cent) voting against independence and 1,617,989 (44.7 per cent) voting in favour. The turnout of 84.6 per cent was the highest recorded for an election or referendum in the United Kingdom since the introduction of universal suffrage.</p>       | <p><b>9 November 2014</b> – The participatory process on independence takes place without any noteworthy incidents. 2,236,806 people took part in the consultation and 80.72 per cent answered “Yes” to both questions. Just over 10 per cent voted “Yes” for the first question and “No” for the second and about 4.5 per cent voted “No” to both questions.</p>  |



As stated above, I analysed all the tweets produced by the following Twitter accounts (Table 2), considering that they are the main moulders of pro-independence discourses in Scottish and Catalan independence processes:

| <b>Table 2. Twitter accounts of political actors</b>                |  |
|---|--|
| <b>Scottish political actors:</b>                                   | <b>Catalan political actors:</b>   |
| @theSNP (Scottish National Party)                                   | @ciu (Convergence and Union)   |
| @AlexSalmond<br>(First Minister of Scotland and Leader of the SNP)  | @joseprull<br>(President of Convergence and Union)                         |
| @NicolaSturgeon<br>(SNP Deputy Leader, Deputy First Minister)       | @Esquerra_ERC<br>(Republican Left of Catalonia)                            |
| @scotgp (Scottish Green Party)                                      | @junqueras<br>(President of Republican Left of Catalonia)                  |
| @patrickharvie<br>(Co-convenor Scottish Green Party)                | @cupnacional (Candidacy of Popular Unity)                                  |
| @scotreferendum<br>(Scottish Government's vision for the future)    | @higiniarioig (David Fernández,<br>MP for the Candidacy of Popular Unity)  |
| @scotgov (Scottish Government)                                      | @govern (Catalan Government)   |
| @ScotParl (Scottish Parliament)                                     | @parlament (Catalan Parliament)  |
| @YesScotland<br>(Campaign for an independent Scotland)              | @assemblea (Catalan National Assembly)                                     |
| @Radical_indy (Radical Independence Campaign)                       | @omnium (Association that promotes Catalan<br>language and culture)        |
| @WomenForIndy (Women for independence)                              | @sumate_asoc (Spanish speakers from<br>Catalonia who support Independence) |
| @WeAreNational<br>(The cultural movement for Scottish Independence) | @AMI_cat<br>(Association of Towns for Independence)                        |
| @BizforScotland<br>(Pro-independence business network)              | —  |

## Who campaigned for the Yes camp in Scotland?

- **The Scottish National Party (SNP)** → It was the main party campaigning for independence in Scotland. Actually, the referendum on independence was one of its election promises when it won the greatest number of seats in Holyrood in 2011.
- **Alex Salmond** → Scottish First Minister when the independence referendum was called. He insisted on moving the referendum forward and finally reached an agreement with the UK government.
- **Nicola Sturgeon** → Before being named Scottish First Minister in November 2014, she was the Deputy First Minister of Scotland and actively campaigned for the independence vote.
- **Scottish Green Party (SGP)** → Despite having only two seats in Holyrood, the “greens” increased their importance in the political sphere, as they supported a Yes vote in the referendum.
- **Patrick Harvie** → The co-convenor of the Scottish Green Party along with Maggie Chapman. Mr. Harvie was also MSP for Glasgow and actively campaigned for independence.
- **Scotreferendum** → The Scottish Government created this platform specially to communicate its vision about an independent Scotland to the public.
- **Scottish government** → Its role in the campaign was secondary, but we must not forget it was the political organization that called the referendum.
- **Scottish parliament** → Represents the democratically elected body that is in charge of legislating on the devolved matters specific to Scotland, among them the referendum bill.
- **Yes Scotland** → Refers to the organisation representing the parties, organisations, and individuals campaigning for a Yes vote in the Scottish independence referendum.

- **Radical Independence Campaign** → Defined as a non-party-political campaign organization that also campaigned for a Yes vote in the Scottish independence referendum. It promoted both independence as well as left-wing policies.
- **Women for independence** → This network of women, who aimed to promote independence and other causes likely to contribute to greater democracy and home-rule for Scotland, gender equality and social justice, was created specifically for the independence referendum.
- **National Collective** → Was an open and non-party group of artists who stood for independence. One of the organization's goals was to help shape the vision of a new society and nation.
- **Business for Scotland** → This organization was defined as a business network and business policy think tank that was agenda setting, independent and political-party neutral. It was one of the main Yes campaigners for the Scottish independence referendum.

### Who campaigned for the Yes camp in Catalonia?

- **Convergència i Unió (CiU)** → The main nationalist party in Catalonia that had uninterruptedly ruled the country since 2010. Despite internal divisions, which led the party coalition to break up in June 2015, CiU decided to stand for independence as the best option for Catalonia's constitutional future and to campaign for a Yes vote in November 2014.
- **Josep Rull** → Artur Mas has never had a Twitter account and other Twitter users refer to him with the hashtag #presidentMas. For this reason, I decided that the best option was to focus on the CiU party president, Josep Rull.
- **Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)** → Since it was founded in 1931, ERC has traditionally been the left-wing social-democrat pro-independence party in Catalonia. For this reason, it has always backed the holding of an independence referendum.

- **Oriol Junqueras** → President of ERC and one of the visible faces of Catalonia's independence process. Despite not entering the government between 2012 and 2015, Junqueras supported the parliamentary decisions about holding the referendum.
- **Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP)** → A far left-wing political organization, whose decisions are taken by an assembly, and which works for an independent, socialist and feminist Catalan Countries. In 2012 it gained three seats in the Catalan parliament and, therefore, become an active actor in the Yes campaign.
- **David Fernández** → Although the CUP claims it has no leaders, David Fernández, who was an MP for Barcelona, played a leading role in the process towards independence. Fernández became the most appreciated political leader in Catalonia due to his fight against political corruption and his support to organize the consultation on 9 November 2014.
- **Catalan government** → Also known as the Generalitat, it is the executive organism of Catalonia's devolved government. Its functions were to promote and organize the independence referendum.
- **Catalan parliament** → Is the unicameral legislature of Catalonia. Of its 135 members, 87 were in favour of holding a referendum on Catalonia's future in 2012, although only 74 clearly backed independence. Between 2012 and 2015, it approved the Declaration of Sovereignty, the law for transferring the legislative competences to call on a referendum and the Catalan Law of Consultation Votes.
- **Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC)** → The ANC is a popular, unified, plural and democratic organisation working for Catalonia to become a new European state. Since its creation in March 2012, it has promoted several initiatives to engage Catalan citizens in the independence movement. One of its goals is to act as a guarantor of Catalonia's independence process, which is why it encourages Catalan political parties not to deviate from the citizens' 25 November 2012 mandate to convene a consultation to exercise the right of Catalans to decide their own future.
- **Òmnium Cultural** → One of the most long-standing civil society associations in Catalonia, which has been working to promote Catalan language and culture for

more than fifty years. In recent years one of Òmnium's aims has been to assist Catalonia on its way to becoming a new independent state.

- **Súmate** → The aim of this non-party entity was to explain and promote the Yes vote in an independence referendum among those citizens whose language and culture is Spanish. It was created in October 2013, a year before the participatory process on 9 November 2014.
- **Associació de Municipis per la independència (AMI)** → This association is made up of various local government institutions whose main objective was to combine efforts in order to create the independent state of Catalonia in the framework of the European Union.

Sample (n1) was made up of 2426 tweets, of which 728 were produced by the Scottish political actors indicated above. The remaining 1698 were produced by Catalan political actors.

Although tools such as Topsy<sup>102</sup>, Snapbird or Storify have been specially developed to look for particular issues on Twitter, they do not enable the whole range of tweets transmitted by political actors to be selected. This was a problem when starting a research project whose object of study was the content generated in this medium on dates that go back to 2011. The change that made it easier to find the data came from Twitter itself, when Twitter Advanced Search was developed in the summer of 2014. Even though this tool makes it possible to select all the statements tweeted by an account between specific dates, the sample still has to be selected manually.

On the basis of the literature on metaphor reviewed in Chapter 2, I assume that I cannot directly link the metaphorical domains identified in Sample (n1) to how metaphor works in the minds of citizen. To prove there is a direct relation between the way political actors use metaphor and the way people think about independence processes necessarily demands doing reception analysis.

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<sup>102</sup> This tool does no longer exist.

Although I have not opted to do it *stricto sensu*, in a research project that deals with a 2.0 instrument such Twitter as that encourages interaction between users, I needed to look at the reaction of non-political actors to what was being said by political actors about independence. This is especially important since the effectiveness of persuasive discourse (and of metaphors as persuasive devices) is measured by the influence it has on the audience (that is, on other Twitter users). One of the ways in which I could check this influence was the extent to which users had assimilated political actors' discourses and talked about independence processes in the same manner their leaders did. Realising that the sample for studying this would be too extensive, I decided to choose the most common hashtags per day in Sample (n1) and to see how they were using the same metaphors on the same dates. As Guerrero-Solé et al. (2014) have suggested, valuable information can be obtained by simply analyzing the most influential users.

Of course, my method can be criticized since it does not represent users who do not tweet regularly or who are not included in the parameters of what is popular according to Twitter. However, as pointed out in Chapters 1 and 3, this method could also reveal the extent to which Web 2.0 has altered the existing social structures in the virtual public sphere. For this reason, I believe it is also interesting to look at users' profiles as suggested by Graham et al. (2013) in order to see whether the opinions that get most repercussion are those of elite opinion leaders (other politicians, journalists, media channels, lobbyists, etc.).

Because hashtags are used to tag content for discussion and navigation (Jeffares 2014), they are a useful tool for studying debate on independence issues. The challenge is to see not only what users say about independence processes, but also whether Twitter users use hashtags in the same way as political actors do or if they use them to criticize their discourses. Therefore, I used Twitter's Advanced Search tool (<https://twitter.com/search-advanced>) and I made the search using the following criteria:

#### WORDS

- HASHTAGS > e.g. #indyref (Scotland) | #9N2014 (Catalonia)

#### DATES:

- E.g. from this date 30/01/2013 to 31/01/2013 (Scotland)
- E.g. from this date 12/12/2013 to 13/12/2013 (Catalonia)

#### USERS:

- Top users<sup>103</sup> (Up to 150 tweets per date were randomly selected)

Sample (n2) was made up of 3600 tweets. All the tweets collected contained the most used hashtag by political actors to discuss about the independence process during each analysed date.

## 5.2. Adapting Critical Discourse Analysis to 140 character discourses

In recent years there have been several studies and methodological approaches to Twitter as a political communication tool (Larsson and Moe 2011; Graham et al. 2013; Vergeer, et al. 2013), as we have seen in Chapter 3. Although they are interesting because they explore its value as a campaign tool, they focus on quantitative aspects rather than qualitative ones. The authors mentioned above suggest that future research efforts should focus on qualitative ways of approaching the data. In view of this, I concluded that a productive method to analyze the sample, in relation to what I was looking for, was Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Although Twitter devices like retweets, mentions or responses tell us about the influence or the degree of interaction of a specific user, they don't tell us anything about discourse itself. Apart from hashtags, which have an obvious semantic component, we cannot consider other Twitter instruments as discourse moulders.

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<sup>103</sup> Top tweets show popular statements that many other Twitter users have engaged with and thought were useful. According to Twitter, they are selected algorithm that finds the Tweets that have caught the attention of other users.

Since CDA allowed me to focus on ideological texts –which is what political discourses are–, analyze their content, categorise important results and generate conclusions, I thought it was the most appropriate way of finding out what was being said on the network. However, this is a methodology that has usually been tested in discourses longer than 140 character-long statements. This, together with the aim of the study, which is to analyze how metaphor works in political “micro-discourses”, led me to keep searching for a method that would let me focus “on what structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events” take part in the reproduction of dominance (Van Dijk, 1993:250) while suiting shorter texts.

As Christopher Hart (2008:92) points out, “cognitive linguistics, like sociocognitive CDA, explores the relations between language, cognition, and culture. Furthermore, cognitive linguistics provides insights into the pervasiveness and persuasiveness of metaphor.” Critical Metaphor Analysis (CMA), developed by Charteris-Black (2004:34), seems to be an appropriate method for analyzing metaphors in political discourses, since it makes it possible to “identify the intentions and ideologies underlying language use”, by focusing on the conceptual dimension of metaphors as well as on the context in which they are used. As I have mentioned in Chapter 2, metaphor is a mechanism used to “simplify and make understandable political events” (Mio 1997:121). Its economic nature, from a linguistic viewpoint, makes it a suitable device to be used in “micro-discourses”. CMA is, in some way, a form of CDA (Cammaerts 2012), which makes it possible to work with particular lexemes, the ones that disrupt the meaning –that is, the ones that mark the presence of a metaphorical expression– without renouncing an analysis of the ideological features underlying language use in political discourses. I agree with Charteris-Black (2011:48) when he says that the approach taken in his study of political discourses “is not directly oriented to power abuse of specific groups, it is motivated by providing insight into how power is maintained in democracies.” I will even go farther, since I am not analyzing politicians who are trying to maintain its power, but political actors who fight for legitimating a position that can make them access to this power.



In Chapter 1, I remarked that one of the important functions of discourse in society is that of the resistance and counter-power against forms of discursive dominance (Van Dijk 1997). I believe that, considering the object of study of the present research, dissention and legitimating discourses will prevail, as the pro-independence claims of political actors are aligned with the disruption of the status quo and the creation of a new reality. Likewise, Charteris-Black (2011:49) confirms that CMA is “a methodology for the analysis and interpretation of ideology [...]” that “illustrates how rhetoric is used for the purpose of legitimisation.” Still, maybe the most important contribution of CMA is that it “enables us to identify *which* metaphors were chosen and to explain *why* these metaphors were chosen by illustrating *how* they contribute to political myths” (Charteris-Black 2011:47).

CMA is applied in three stages: the identification of metaphors (A), their interpretation (B) and their explanation (C). The first stage relates to the breaking of isotopy I mentioned in Chapter 2, which distinguishes a metaphorical expression by identifying “a semantic and pragmatic violation” (Rozina and Karapetjana 2009:118). Charteris-Black (2004:35) defines this breaking as “the presence of incongruity or semantic tension –either at linguistic, pragmatic or cognitive levels – resulting from a shift in domain use”. Le Guern (1990:19), for instance, highlights that “la incompatibilidad semántica juega el papel de una señal que invita al destinatario a seleccionar entre los elementos de significación constitutivos del lexema a aquellos que no son incompatibles con el contexto.”<sup>104</sup>

The next step in the analysis involves the mapping of the correspondences between the source domain and the target domain, while the third stage consists of developing the implications of choosing a particular metaphorical expression in accordance with the context and the intentionality that underlies its use. In Charteris-Black’s (2011:50) words, “when analysing political speeches using

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<sup>104</sup> Semantic incompatibility plays the role of a signal that invites the receiver to select, among the constitutive elements of the lexeme, those not incompatible with the context.

critical metaphor analysis the cognitive semantic approach needs to be complemented with a summary of the social context in which the speeches were made and of the overall verbal context of metaphor.” The introduction of context as an important aspect when analyzing the meaning of discourse is a great contribution of Charteris-Black’s CMA, especially since it has not always been presented by Linguistics as an element to consider when looking at texts. As Graciela Reyes (1995:26) highlights “a la lingüística del siglo XX le ha costado mucho admitir que lo extralingüístico deba formar parte del objeto de la lingüística.”<sup>105</sup>

This third stage in CMA, the explanation of metaphors, could be criticized for a lack of reliability because the researcher plays a major role when applying it and drawing conclusions. In view of this, Cienki (2008:245) points out that Charteris-Black justifies the subjectivity inherent in this method “because of the critical discourse analytic approach in which this study is framed.” As CMA proposes a qualitative approach to the object of study, “subjectivity guides everything from the choice of topic that one studies, to formulating hypotheses, to selecting methodologies, and interpreting data” (Ratner 2002).

Some researchers have tried to add more elements to systematize the analysis of metaphorical expressions in texts. The first efforts were made by Lynne Cameron (1999) and Gerard Steen (1999), who were subsequently to be part of the Pragglejaz Group.<sup>106</sup> They both formed part of the team of metaphor researchers who, in 2007, created a “Method for Identifying Metaphorically Used Words in Discourse” (MIP), which was the title of their famous article published in *Metaphor & Symbol*.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> 20<sup>th</sup> Century linguistics has found it difficult to accept what is extra-linguistic as part of the object of linguistics.

<sup>106</sup> The original members of Pragglejaz were Peter Crisp (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Raymond Gibbs (University of California, Santa Cruz), Alice Deignan (University of Leeds), Graham Low (University of York), Gerard Steen (Vrije University of Amsterdam), Lynne Cameron (University of Leeds/The Open University), Elena Semino (Lancaster University), Joe Grady (Cultural Logics), Alan Cienki (Emory University), and Zoltan Kövecses (Eötvös Loránd University).

<sup>107</sup> Pragglejaz Group (2007) “Method for Identifying Metaphorically Used Words in Discourse” (MIP), *Metaphor&Symbol*, 22:1, pp. 1-39

This method sheds light on the operationalization of “metaphor in the wild” (2007:1), or what is the same, on metaphorical language in real discourses. The need of a proper methodology to study metaphor arose because of one of the weaknesses associated with Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Pragglejazz Group 2007:1): was that it worked only with “isolated constructed examples” instead of looking at how “speakers and writers produce it in varying contexts.” Another reason why CMT has been criticized is that researchers tend to reach conceptual mappings for linguistic expressions without explaining how they do so. Moreover, their analysis is often focused on a top-down procedure, which consists of looking for a target domain they are interested in and then looking for linguistic evidence of metaphors used to refer to it. This involves some risks: researchers may look through the object of analysis in an attempt to find what they are looking for and force their interpretation of the text.

Although I have codified both samples according to pre-established target domains, I attempted to reduce these risks by looking at micro-political discourses without any definite idea about specific source domains referring to independence processes. As stated above, I worked with real texts, so I did not use artificially constructed examples to present the corresponding metaphorical expressions, but statements by the political actors themselves. I explain how I carried out the analysis in the next section.

### 5.3. Operationalization

In the first section of this chapter (5.1), I explained how I chose the dates, the political actors and the tools with which I collected the data and, therefore, how I selected the sample. The second section (5.2) focused on the method I used to undertake the analysis. This third section (5.3) aims to explain the way in which I operationalized these data following the different phases of CMA.

## I. IDENTIFICATION (A)

Like the Pragglejazz Group (2007:2), I opted for a maximal approach, “such that a wide range of words may be considered as conveying metaphorical meaning based on their use in context.” Following Steen (2009), I considered metaphor not only as a single word, but, occasionally, as a set of words. As stated above, I looked for the linguistic forms that disrupt semantic coherence to identify “the conceptual structures that capture their meaning” (Steen, 2009:199). The unit of analysis was the individual statement of a political actor (sample n1) or of a user (sample n2), depending on the sample I was looking at, and the context unit of analysis was the thread in which it was located.

Firstly, I decided to organize the data collected by country, date and political actor so as not to interfere with how the statements are interpreted in the context in which they were made. All coding was done manually, because of “subtleties of meaning and use in context” (Cienki 2008:246). Secondly, I entered the data into a series of tables (see Appendix) and then I proceeded to analyze the most important metaphors according to the following stages of CMA (B and C). The series of metaphors identified in the first stage (A) were collected in accordance with the items proposed in Table 3<sup>108</sup> and made up a corpus of 519 metaphorical expressions.

**Table 3. Identification of metaphors in political actors’ micro-discourses (sample n1)**

| Event | Political actor | Statement | Metaphor | Source domain | Target domain | Commentary |
|-------|-----------------|-----------|----------|---------------|---------------|------------|
|       |                 |           |          |               |               |            |
|       |                 |           |          |               |               |            |
|       |                 |           |          |               |               |            |

<sup>108</sup> Tables 3 and 4 were designed following the template of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Project “The Role of Metaphor in the Definition and Social Perception of Conflict: Institutions, Media, and Citizens” (CSO2013-41661-P), in which this PhD thesis is registered.

If a statement provided exactly the same information it was only coded once:

|                 |   |  |
|-----------------|---|--|
| 23 January 2013 | Convergència i<br>Unió (@ciu)           | #PresidentMas:"Catalunya passaria aquests moments<br>díficils amb menys patiment si depenguéssim més d<br>nosaltres mateixos" <a href="http://bit.ly/YnfvUi">http://bit.ly/YnfvUi</a> (#PresidentMas<br>"Catalonia will suffer less in these difficult moments if we<br>depended more on ourselves") |
| 23 January 2013 | Government of<br>Catalonia<br>(@govern) | #PresidentMas "Catalunya passaria aquests moments<br>díficils amb menys patiment si depenguéssim més d<br>nosaltres mateixos" <a href="http://bit.ly/Wt6lLt">http://bit.ly/Wt6lLt</a> (#PresidentMas<br>"Catalonia will suffer less in these difficult moments if we<br>depended more on ourselves") |

In a different form, when a metaphorical expression referred to a target domain I was not looking at [e.g. Partit Socialista de Catalunya (PSC)], the token was not included in the corpus. For instance, the target domains I looked at when reviewing political actors' tweets were the following ones:

- **Target domains for Scotland** → Independence, independence process, Referendum, Scotland, Scottish people, Scotland/UK relationship, UK/Westminster, No vote and Unionist Campaign
- **Target domains for Catalonia** → Independence, independence process, Fiscal sovereignty, Right to decide, Demonstration, Referendum, Catalonia, Catalan people, Catalonia/Spain Relationship and Spain/Spanish state/Constitution

As the reader will see, I have decided to present the data in line with the key date in the pro-independence process, the political actor who sends the message, the 140 statement he/she has tweeted, the metaphor I have identified, the source domain the political actor has used to talk about the target domain, the target domain and a cell for commentaries if necessary.

The proceeding was pretty much the same when codifying the data related to sample n2; the only things that changed were the cell for the person who made

the statement, as it was no longer set aside for a political actor but for an “unknown” user, their affiliation/job, an added cell for the hashtag by which the user and the statement had been selected, and the attitude the user showed towards the independence process (endorsement/rejection). A corpus of 401 metaphorical expressions was collected after reviewing users’ statements.

**Table 4. Identification of metaphors in users’ micro-discourses (sample n2)**

| Event | Hashtag | User | Affiliation /Job | Statement | Metaphor | Source domain | Target domain | Endorsement/ Rejection/ Neutral |
|-------|---------|------|------------------|-----------|----------|---------------|---------------|---------------------------------|
|       |         |      |                  |           |          |               |               |                                 |
|       |         |      |                  |           |          |               |               |                                 |
|       |         |      |                  |           |          |               |               |                                 |

Once all data had been collected and entered into Tables 3 and 4 (see Appendices), I decided to group the most common source and target domains. This resulted in Table 5.

**Table 5. Metaphors classified by source domain**

| Source domain | Target domain | Metaphor |
|---------------|---------------|----------|
|               |               |          |

Before showing the results of this study, I shall explain the groups under which I classified sample 1 and sample 2.

**Sample n1**

- **Event** → The key date in the Catalan or Scottish pro-independence process that is being analysed. As we have explained, studying the statements by political actors requires both the text and the referent to be studied.
- **Political actor** → The individual or the group who sends the message.

- **Statement** → The whole sentence that either political actors or users broadcast through their Twitter profiles, their “micro-discourses”, which are our unit of analysis.
- **Metaphor** → The lexical unit(s) identified as being used metaphorically; it is the linguistic expression resulting from a cross-domain mapping in thought, which goes from a more concrete source domain to a more abstract target domain.
- **Source domain** → The domain of knowledge used to understand the target domain, from which we draw metaphorical expressions.
- **Target domain** → The domain we attempt to comprehend through the use of the source domain.
- **Commentary** → Additional information that can be useful when interpreting the metaphorical expression detected.

### Sample n2

- **Event** → The key date in the Catalan or Scottish pro-independence process that is being analysed. As we have explained, studying the statements by political actors requires both the text and the referent to be studied.
- **Hashtag** → The metadata tag we use for finding what users are saying about a specific theme (in this case, the independence processes in Catalonia and Scotland).
- **User** → The individual or group that sends the message using the hashtag promoted by political actors to engage in the debate on independence.
- **Affiliation/Job** → Tweets were coded under the following categories: (1) public/citizen, (2) journalist/media, (3) lobbyist, (4) industry, (5) authority (e.g. police, campaign regulators), (6) celebrity, (7) pro-independence politician or party not included in the sample of political actors (CiU, ERC, CUP, other party) | SNP, Greens, Socialist, other party), (8) pro-right to decide politician or party, (9) pro-union politician or party (PSC, PP, ICV-EUiA, C's, other party | Labour, Conservative, other party), (10) pro-independence activist (e.g. campaign team, volunteers), (11) pro-right

to decide activist and (12) pro-union activist. In order to classify the users, I first consulted their Twitter profile; then, if necessary, the hyperlink provided in the user's description.

- **Statement** → The whole sentence that either political actors or users broadcast through their Twitter profiles, their “micro-discourses”, which are our unit of analysis.
- **Metaphor** → The lexical unit(s) identified as being used metaphorically; it is the linguistic expression resulting from a cross-domain mapping in thought, which goes from a more concrete source domain to a more abstract target domain.
- **Source domain** → The domain of knowledge used to understand the target domain, from which we draw metaphorical expressions.
- **Target domain** → The domain we attempt to comprehend through the use of the source domain.
- **Endorsement/Rejection/Neutral** → A code that shows whether the statement we are coding is for or against independence messages or does not show any clear support or rejection towards independence.

The coding template was designed to represent all the metaphorical expressions in political actors' discourses as well as in top users' statements. Although the codification of metaphor corpus (1) gave us information about the way independence processes in Scotland and Catalonia had been conceptualized, it did not go further than the 1st stage of CMA (A).<sup>109</sup> Therefore, once I had collected the data and filled in tables 3, 4 and 5, I went on to complete the 2nd (B) and the 3rd (C) stage of CMA, which interpret and explain the metaphors in context.<sup>110</sup> Although the method is presented as sequential, it cannot be applied

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<sup>109</sup> Musolff underlines that “statistics about source concepts alone can only give a global picture of the occurrence-non-occurrence of the main source scenarios in the metaphor usage of a given discourse community.” This is why undertaking the following stages in CMA is important if we aim to know something about the argumentative function and political bias of the used conceptual domains.

<sup>110</sup> As pointed out above, these two stages will only be applied to the most important metaphors found in Stage A.



if each stage is looked at in isolation. Hence, while I was still identifying metaphors in the first stage, I was also engaged in the second. In order to link the lexical unit we identify as a metaphor with the conceptual structure that lies beneath it, we must understand why it functions as it does. Hence, interpretation in a broader sense also helps us to fill the gaps in the cells. But it is not until we put all the results together that we find out what they mean and can explain them in a qualitative way.

However, it is difficult for a communication researcher to undertake these phases of the analysis in the way Charteris-Black (2006, 2011) proposes, as he uses cognitive semantics (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) to approach metaphor interpretation. As pointed out in Chapter 2, this approach understands “the mind is inherently embodied, thought is mostly unconscious and abstract concepts are largely metaphorical” (Charteris-Black 2011:45). Thus, cognitive semantics tries to establish a relation between abstract concepts and the sensorial experiences we use to understand them: “There is a single idea (a proposition or a conceptual metaphor) linking a physical with a non-physical experience that underlies a number of different metaphoric uses of language” (Charteris-Black 2011:45).

Although I will draw the metaphorical mappings of the most important metaphors identified in the first stage (phase A) of the present analysis, phase B needs to be systematized if I am to justify my evaluations on metaphor interpretation. Therefore, I believe that the concept “scenario” is suitable for portraying how a single metaphor can lead us to a concrete interpretation.

## 2. INTERPRETATION (B)

As I indicated in Chapter 2, Musolff (2004, 2006) created a concept under which interpretation can take place: the “scenario”. Before he defines “scenario”, he asks some questions about how the inferring process works:

“How rich is the ontological structure of the subset of source concepts? Can one domain include contrastive conceptualizations?” (Musolff 2006:25). After realizing that a super-domain can be developed from different conceptual mappings and that the way in which they are constructed influences the understanding of the metaphorized topic,<sup>111</sup> Musolff (2004:13) presents scenario as “an intermediate analytical category between the level of the conceptual domain as a whole and its individual elements” which can help us draw the main storyline that will guide its interpretation. As its etymology suggests:

We can characterise a scenario as a set of assumptions made by competent members of a discourse community about “typical” aspects of a source-situation, for example, its participants and their roles, the “dramatic” storylines and outcomes, and conventional evaluations of whether they count as successful or unsuccessful, normal or abnormal, permissible or illegitimate, etc.

(Musolff 2006:25)

Thus, the scenario requires a qualitative construction since it involves defining the different actors who take part in the story that is being told, and establishing the role they perform, the goal they want to achieve and how they are going to achieve it. Although Musolff describes this analytical category, like Charteris-Black (2011) he does not provide any method other than cognitive semantics that could help us undertake the analysis and construct the scenarios. The aim of the R&D project in which this thesis is framed is to solve this shortcoming by proposing a methodological approach based on a simplified version of Greimas’ (1987, 1990) Narrative Semiotics<sup>112</sup> and Actantial Models.

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<sup>111</sup> “The identification of concept scenarios aims to determine which aspects of a metaphorical mapping can be deemed to dominate public discourse for a particular topic area [...]” (Musolff 2004:18).

<sup>112</sup> Refers to the semiotic branch that studies the “analysis of the descriptions of actions and of their concatenations, descriptions which are at the same time the place where events are organized into meaning” (Greimas et al. 1989:567)

In one of his main works, *Structural Semantics. An Attempt at a Method*<sup>113</sup> (1987), the French semiotician describes a methodological proposal to approach discourse based on narrative semiotics. The aim of the present study is not to go into this complex method in any great depth, but to take advantage of Greimas' valuable contributions to the identification of the narrative structure and the different roles that take part in it.

Drawing on the typology of *dramatis personae* developed by Vladimir Propp (1968),<sup>114</sup> Greimas proposed a total of six actants "to which he thought all particularized narrative actors could be reduced" (Herman 2009). These six actants are presented in three different pairs depending on the relationship they establish with each other, so we can distinguish between (1) Subject/Object, (2) Sender/Receiver and (3) Helper/Opponent. According to Greimas (1987:270), "un número restringido de términos actanciales basta para dar cuenta de la organización de un microuniverso."<sup>115</sup> This is primarily the reason why I believe the Actantial Model is an appropriate tool not only for analysing the scenario displayed by a particular metaphor but for building this scenario from the perspective of the audience –the public/citizens– (and, thus, for facilitating the successful assimilation of its cognitive content). Hence, the Actantial Model enables the role the different actants perform in the story to be identified and understood and, consequently, provides the information for the narrative sequence of the discourse to be reconstructed. And it does this not only on a syntactic level, but also on a semantic one.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> The original version of this work is from 1966.

<sup>114</sup> After defining the 31 functions of the Russian folktale, Propp (1968) considered the role of the actants who carry out those functions. Actually, he defines the different actants of a story in terms of the functions they carry out and the "spheres of action" in which they participate. By doing this, Propp is able to sum up the number of actants who take part in a story in seven broad character functions: the villain, the donor (provider), the helper, the sought-for-person or object (the princess or her father), the dispatcher, the hero and the false hero.

<sup>115</sup> "A restricted number of actantial terms is sufficient to account for the organization of a microuniverse."

<sup>116</sup> As Joseph Courtés (1976) points out, "el modelo actancial se basa en la articulación sintáctica tradicional al mismo tiempo que se ajusta al universo semántico que debe asumir." | "the actantial model is based on the traditional syntactic articulation at the same time that it fits into the semantic universe it needs to assume."

The semantic level is visible in Greimas' initial hypothesis, which was that "meaning is only apprehensible if it is articulated or narrativized" (Cobley 2005:194). Since I assume there could also be a "model reader" (Eco 1979) for political discourses, I believe his/her active role in textual interpretation would increase if facilitated and drawing on a narrative schema for structuring discourse does this. As Eco (1981) suggests, generating a text means applying a strategy that includes predicting the other's movements and this is, indeed, the nature of pre-planned discourse. Somehow, this concern is also present in Greimas' theory of actants which, in David Herman's (2002:125) view, is based on the following two premises:

To make sense of narratively organized discourse, interpreters must make inferences about participant roles and relations, and that to draw these inferences, interpreters extrapolate from principles used to parse the syntax and the semantics –the structure and meaning– of clauses and sentences.

These considerations mean that the interpreters/readers must share some sort of knowledge with the author of the discourse if they are to be able to understand the whole underlying meaning, a procedure which, of course, involves identifying participant roles and relations. The roles that take part in a story are known as "actants". An "actant" is defined "as that which accomplishes or undergoes an act" (Trifonas 2015:1099). It refers to the "deep-structural roles underlying the specific, particularized characters (or 'actors') populating storyworlds" (Herman 2009:81). Actants can be understood, therefore, as the story characters in a given role, and the position they occupy and the function they accomplish in a particular discourse gives rise to what Greimas (1987:276) calls the Actantial Model (Figure 2). The model in question articulates the various actants in the story<sup>117</sup> on the basis of a search for a desired object, which is part of one of the three binary oppositions identified by Greimas.


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<sup>117</sup> Some actants may not appear in the story. However, this does not mean that they are not present; as Greimas (1987:2002) points out their absence can be understood in terms of a dramatic effect produced "por la espera de la manifestación de un actante, lo cual no es lo mismo que la ausencia, sino

According to Peter Trifonas (2015:1104), the structure of the relations between these actants is quite simple. He says that “the syntactic order of the actantial categories correspond to ‘a subject wants an object, encounters an opponent, finds a helper, obtains the object from a sender, and gives it to a receiver’ sequence or variations thereof.” As a matter of fact, Greimas (1987:276) also underlined that the simplicity of the Actantial Model:

[...] reside en el hecho de que está por entero centrado sobre el objeto del deseo perseguido por el sujeto, y situado, como objeto de comunicación, entre el destinador y el destinatario, estando el deseo del sujeto por su parte, modulado en proyecciones de adyuvante y oponente.<sup>118</sup>

Figure 3. Greimas' basic actantial model



Source: author following Courtés, J. (1976)

In the present study, I have used the model above to identify the various actants in the storyline drawn by the scenario, and I have been aware at all times that “a given character may embody more than one actantial role” (Herman 2008:84). The analytical categories that allowed me to work with the second stage of CMA were:

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más bien su contrario” | “the expectation that an actant will manifest itself, which is not the same thing as absence, but rather its opposite.”

<sup>118</sup> “[...] Lies in the fact that it is entirely centered on the object of desire coveted by the subject and situated, as an object of communication, between the sender and the receiver, the desire of the subject being modulated by projections from the helper and opponent.”

- (1) **Subject and Object** → They are united by a relationship of desire that locates them on the so called desire axis. The former aims to obtain the object and, therefore, initiates the action for getting it. The object role is no other than the thing that will be obtained. As we can see, the agency level of these two actants is quite different; Greimas (1987:285) explains this difference by stating that:

Mientras el actante sujeto está dispuesto para personificar los sememas que toma a su cargo y produce efectos de sentido [...] el actante objeto concede más bien, debido a que es al mismo tiempo 'paciente' y 'actor', el efecto de sentido llamado 'simbólico' a los objetos hipotácticos.<sup>119</sup>

The relationship established between the subject and the object is called a junction. Depending on whether the object is conjoined with the subject or disjoined, it is called a conjunction or a disjunction. The object is not only an object of desire, but also an object of communication when the actant that initiates the quest for obtaining it is the sender.

- (2) **Sender/Receiver** → Their relationship belongs to the axis of knowledge or communication, as it is the sender who asks for the conjunction/disjunction to be established between the subject and the object, whereas the receiver is the element for which the quest of establishing a conjunction/disjunction between subject and object is being undertaken, the one who benefits from the conjunction/disjunction between them.
- (3) **Helper/Opponent** → These two actants belong to the axis of power, because it is in their hands to facilitate the subject's quest. The helper assists in achieving the desired conjunction/disjunction between the subject and object. The opponent aims to do the contrary, which is to prevent the conjunction/disjunction from being established. Sometimes we can also find an anti-subject, which is a variant of the opponent. The anti-subject obstructs the quest of another subject in order to achieve its goal.

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<sup>119</sup> "While the actant-subject is willing to personify the sememes that he/she takes charge of and produces effects of meaning [...], the actant-object rather concedes the effect of meaning called 'symbolic' to hypotactic objects, as it is simultaneously 'patient' and 'actor'."

As Trifonas (2015) sums up, the logic of these relationships “is based upon ‘knowledge,’ ‘desire,’ and ‘power’ where the transmission of a message can be analysed syntactically as the transferral of ‘knowledge’ and the drama of the acquisition of ‘power’ (‘desire’ being the motivating force behind the action).” Depending on the kind of relationship the actants establish within them, a narrative sequence, which “functions as a cognitive ‘macroframe’” and enables “interpreters to identify stories or story-like elements” (Herman 2009:79), is displayed in one way or another (Hawkes 1977). For instance, a conjunction between two actants (subject or object) can be the start of the mentioned sequence, which is often followed by a disjunction (such as a problem or transition phase). The latter “is reconciled in the redistribution of semantic values as a new conjunction” (Trifonas 2015). The canonical narrative schema recognises that a narrative programme can go through four different stages: contract or manipulation (1), competence (2), performance (3) and sanction (4). The first one –contract or manipulation– refers to the stage that provides the conditions that motivate the action, while the next phase –competence– is where the subject gains the abilities he/she needs to carry out the action. This action is carried out when it is performed in the third stage and its consequences are sanctioned in the fourth.<sup>120</sup>

At this point, and considering the core aspects of narrative semiotics, an analysis template was designed so that the data about the construction of the scenario could be processed. Table 6<sup>121</sup> shows a series of key questions that helped me to attribute an actantial role to the various characters that took part in the storyline

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<sup>120</sup> These different phases can also be categorized into a five-part underlying structure, which is common to every narrative (O'Donnell and Castelló 2011:203-204): (1) Status quo/given/equilibrium – normal state of affairs; (2) Disruption – Something must upset the normal state of affairs in order for there to be a story [Greimas refers to this stage as “breaking contract and alienation”. In his words, “the fact that the hero could have been victorious implies a previous confrontation between the two protagonists” (Greimas 1971)]; (3) Complication – the plot thickens (the “competence” in Greimasian terms); (4) Resolution – the problems raised by the disruption must be at least to some extent “overcome” and (5) New status quo (the last two stages are related to what Greimas calls “reintegration”).

<sup>121</sup> Table 6 was designed following the template of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness Project “The Role of Metaphor in the Definition and Social Perception of Conflict Issues: Institutions, Media, and Citizens” (CSO2013-41661-P), in which this PhD thesis is registered.

developed in the scenario. By answering these questions, I was able to delimit how they were presented in political discourses. The canonical narrative schema described above was also helpful for reconstructing the storyline generated by the use of a particular metaphorical expression and identifying the various stages in the evolution of the event analysed.

As Greimas says (1987:281), the application of the Actantial Model to other fields that go beyond the mythical folktale enables us to interpret apparently rationalized activities while illustrating “el carácter complejo –a la vez positivo y negativo, práctico y mítico– de la manifestación discursiva.”<sup>122</sup> Nevertheless, Narrative Semiotics does not go beyond syntactic and semantic aspects and deals only with the text itself, rather than with the relation between text and context. Considering that I had decided to approach scenario construction from Semiotics, I thought that the last step in this methodological proposal needed to go beyond semantics and focus on pragmatics, which cannot be ignored in metaphor analysis and explanation (Charteris-Black 2011). For instance, even Herman (2009:85) considers that ignoring context is a paradox, since it is also a variable to consider when assigning the actants of a narrative sequence: “a processor cannot assign a role to a character without already having knowledge of the overarching plot-structure of which the character is an element.”

Focusing on metaphor in political speeches, Charteris-Black (2011:323) states that the reason for critical analysis is “to have a clearer idea of the nature of politicians’ intentions.” In order to delve into the underlying purposes of political actors in metaphor use, we must look at the extra-linguistic elements that can help us explain them because “understanding ‘what is going on’ in communication and interaction is obviously more than just understanding the (semantic) meaning of discourse” (Van Dijk 2006:171).

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<sup>122</sup> “The complex character –positive and negative, practical and mythical– of discursive manifestation.”



**Table 6. Key questions when assigning actantial roles**

|                                 |  |
|---------------------------------|--|
| SENDER                          | (1) Who decides that it is necessary to act or to participate in the achievement of an object? [Manipulation]<br>(2) What drives the subject to act? [Motivations] |
| SUBJECT OF DOING <sup>123</sup> | (1) Who carries out the main action?   |
| OBJECT                          | (1) What does the subject want (or not want) to achieve?   |
| HELPER                          | (1) Does the subject receive help? Who helps him/her/it?   |
| OPPONENT                        | (1) Does anybody complicate the subject's quest? Who opposes him/her/it?   |
| SUBJECT OF BEING                | (1) Who benefits from the action?<br>(2) Who is harmed by the action?  |
| RECEIVER                        | (1) Who rewards or penalizes the final result of the action?<br>(2) How does he/she/it reward or penalize the final result of the action?                          |

<sup>123</sup> The classification of the subject into a subject of doing or a subject of being is based on Greimas (1966) division between “being” énonces (where a subject has or does not have a junction with an object) and “doing” énonces (by which one stage can move on to another). The author (1971:800) explains that:

Starting with this canonic form of the narrative *énoncé*, it is possible to establish a typology of elementary énonces

- a) either by modifying the number and position of the actants
- b) or by semantically investing the functions which specify them [...]

Such a typology can only be undertaken by first distinguishing between narrative *énonces* and non-narrative *énonces*. This is possible if one takes up again the old dichotomy between verbs of action and stative verbs and if one semantically invests the function F

- a) to obtain the narrative *énonces* EN of the minimal signification ‘doing’ and
- b) to obtain the predicative *énonces* EQ [*énonces* qualificatifs] of the minimal signification ‘being.’

As a result, there are two types of *énonces*: EN F doing (A1; A2) EQ F being (A)

### 3. EXPLANATION (C)

As stated in various parts of the present research, I understand that discourse cannot be unlinked from its socio-political conditions of production. So, having analysed the scenarios using the methodological approach described above, I proceeded to undertake the last phase of CMA (C), which is to explain how the metaphors analysed work and why they were chosen instead of other metaphors. As Chateris-Black (2011:50) observes:

In order to understand questions such as why one metaphor is preferred to another we need necessarily also consider rhetorical issues such as the leader's intentions within specific speech-making contexts: metaphors are not a requirement of the semantic system but are matters of speaker choice.

Context is then, as remarked in Chapters 1 and 2, a fundamental element that must be taken into account when drawing conclusions on metaphor use by political actors. According to Van Dijk (2006:171), “contextual control over discourse production and understanding affects all levels and dimension of text and talk.” Therefore, context can be considered as the element that allows us to connect the information gathered in the interpretation stage and explain what led political actors to select one metaphor or another.<sup>124</sup>

Considering the focus of our study, which is to analyse the use of metaphor in political discourses, I assumed that the metaphorical expressions in political actors' statements would probably not be resemblance or correlation-based metaphors, but rather novel metaphors, which “have a unique status, in that they are grounded in the context in which metaphorical conceptualization is taking place” (Kövecses 2009a:23).

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<sup>124</sup> This is the function Van Dijk (2006:165) confers on them when saying that: “contexts –defined as mental constructs of relevant aspects of social situations– influence what people say and especially *how* they do so.”

I assume that political actors make a deliberate use of metaphor in their discourses. For this reason, I have looked at the physical environment, the social context, the cultural context and the communicative situation in which the use of metaphor took place (Kövecses 2009b) rather than on the linguistic context, in order to determine the principal goal of its use. Kövecses (2009a:16) urges us to focus on knowledge about the major entities participating in discourse “that plays a role in choosing our metaphors in real discourse.” These major entities include:

- the speaker (conceptualizer)
- the hearer (addressee)
- and the entity or process we talk about (topic)

This concept is pretty much the same as the rhetorical non-discursive operation of *intellectio*, the main goal of which is to establish the bases on which the text will evolve (who is the public –the hearer–, through which media is the speaker going to broadcast his/her message and what does he/she want to talk about –the topic–). As Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber (1994) point out, relevance is key to human cognition as it helps us determine which elements are important for us in accordance with our existing assumptions about the world. They also say (1994:91) that “a communicator, by the very act of claiming an audience's attention, suggests that the information he is offering is relevant enough to be worth the audience's attention.” Hence, speakers need to know the information they will give is going to be interesting for their hearers (audience) and this undoubtedly influences not only the way in which they conceive their discourse, but also the metaphorical choices they will make.

# **PART III**

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

CLAIMING INDEPENDENCE IN 140 CHARACTERS. USES OF METAPHOR IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCOTTISH AND CATALAN P

Carlota Maria Moragas Fernández

Estamos en un punto en el que la autenticidad está definida  
a partir de la competición entre las diferentes voces  
que existen a la hora de contar una historia,  
y eso está cambiando la propia naturaleza de las elecciones.

Stephen Coleman, *La revista de ACOP – Entrevista a Stephen Coleman*<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> A version in English of this interview was not available, so the translation was done by the author herself: “We have reached a point in which authenticity is defined through the competition of the different existing voices when it comes to explaining a story and this is changing the election’s own nature.”

UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

CLAIMING INDEPENDENCE IN 140 CHARACTERS. USES OF METAPHOR IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCOTTISH AND CATALAN P

Carlota Maria Moragas Fernández

## Chapter 6

### Political actors' discourses on independence

Scotland and Catalonia have been depicted as stateless nations struggling for similar objectives (once devolution, now independence). However, as indicated in Chapter 4, their historical backgrounds are different, and this has influenced not only their evolution as nations, but also the degree of recognition from the nation-state they belong to and, thus, the very nature of their independence processes. In my review of their historical roots and the latest events that have prompted them to claim their independence, I stated that their contextual situation would unavoidably be present in political actors' statements. This chapter reports the results of the first stage of the CMA: the analysis of the metaphorical expressions identified in Scottish and Catalan pro-independence political actors' discourses. Going over the targeted concepts as well as over the domains of knowledge that have been used for conceptualizing them has let us make a first approximation to the aspects in which Scottish and Catalan pro-independence discourses were based on. Before we go any further into the interpretation of the leading metaphors and the scenario they portray, other discourse features that go beyond the use of metaphor will be reported in Section 6.1.

With the aim of providing more information about the comparative communication strategies used by Scottish and Catalan political actors, this section presents other discursive mechanisms that are related to nationalist discourses and Twitter uses. Section 6.2 gives quantitative data on the use of metaphor in political actors' statements about the twelve key events selected for each process. It also makes a qualitative comparison of the source domains used to conceptualize Scottish and Catalan independence processes, which reveals that CMA can provide various kinds of data.



## 6.1. Nationalist discourse and use of Twitter by political actors

By way of introduction, this section aims to explain relevant contextual information that has been obtained through a close reading of sample (n1) and which can be useful for understanding politicians' discourse and, particularly, online discourse. The present study does not intend to make an in-depth analysis of Twitter, but its starting point is that the medium through which political messages are broadcast determines their production and dissemination and, of course, choice of metaphor as a device for linguistic economy. As well as discussing political actors' use of Twitter, the following paragraphs also contain information that exemplifies various features of nationalism in Scotland and Catalonia and the rationale behind their claims for independence.

### 6.1.1. Dealing with the 2.0 environment: political actors use of Twitter

Generally speaking, judging by the statements collected during the period analysed, both Scottish and Catalan political actors were aware of the importance of using Twitter and of the tool's advantages and disadvantages. The following message tweeted by the SNP acknowledges the role of Twitter as a medium through which citizens can follow an election campaign and confirms that what once was a social network is now a social media:

@theSNP – 5 May 2011: At an election count tonight? Twitter only wants real results not rumours. Best wishes to all #SPI1

Recognising Twitter as a medium suited to electoral campaigns and everyday political activities is fundamental if it is to be taken seriously from a political communication point of view. Although it is still used unidirectionally –as most messages reproduced the party leader's discourse in the Parliament or his/her daily agenda as well as the strategic political claims of the organization–, we can see that some effort is being made to attain what James Grunig and the International Association of Business Communicators (IABC) Research

Foundation called the “excellence” theory in public relations, which stresses that “practitioners should focus on engagement and two-way conversations to maximize the potential for long-term relationships with stakeholders” (Waters and Williams 2011:354). Particularly noteworthy is the communication between political actors and users who backed independence:

@theSNP – 23 October 2011: Thank you from @thesnp to all those tweeting, snapping pics and spreading the word ...it's starting @ScotlandForward #SNP11

@assemblea – 11 September 2013: Thank you to all volunteers and participants that have made #CatalanWay possible. We have gone down in history!

This communication was also meaningful for the supporters of political parties, who are a basic component of political organizations. Using Twitter as a communicative device with this group shows that parties and candidates have understood the advantages of the tool as a constituent part of a community, which was key in line with the tone of the referendum campaign in Scotland and in Catalonia:

@theSNP – 5 May 2011: And a big thank you to all the candidates and activists for all your efforts this campaign. #bothvotesSNP #SP11

@theSNP – 10 January 2012: A big welcome to the 157 people who joined @theSNP online in the last 24 hours. If you want to join them go to [snp.org/join](http://snp.org/join)

@esquerra\_ERC – 25 November 2012: We are the second largest political force, the party that has grown more and we want to share this joy with all the party supporters says @junqueras #Junqueras25N #newcountry

Both Scottish and Catalan political actors showed that they knew more than just how to “retweet” and attempted to work with the tool’s features to engage users in the debate. For instance, FM Alex Salmond decided to publicly ask the

celebrities and politicians who participated in the launch of Yes Scotland to sign a declaration that aimed to obtain one million signatures from residents of Scotland supporting independence:

@AlexSalmond – 25 May 2012: Today I signed the @YesScotland declaration. Join me, @patrickharvie @alancumming, Tommy Brennan, Dennis Canavan yesscotland.net (RI)

In other cases, political actors asked their followers to agree or disagree with certain statements by using the retweet feature, an effortless way in which to participate:

@NicolaSturgeon – 30 January 2013 Should Scotland be an independent country? RT if you intend to #voteYES

@Radical\_Indy – 30 January 2013 RT if you believe Scotland should be an independent country #indyref #yesscot

In some cases, these attempts to engage citizens were accompanied by hyperlinks to media resources that reinforced the 140-character discourse:

@ciu – 8 April 2014: Let's do RT if you are one out of the 7 out of 10 Catalans that want to vote on the #9N2014 #wewanttovote



@Esquerra\_ERC – 8 April 2014: If you want more information about the consultation we are going to hold on 9 November, let's put LIKE on our Facebook page <https://www.facebook.com/Esquerra.ERC> #wewanttovote

As Cramer (2015:110) has pointed out in her research about the independence movement in Catalonia, “Catalans are consummate ‘citizens of the Information Age,’ so it is no surprise that the civil proindependence movement has been capable of ‘occupying the media and the message’ within Catalonia itself.” The following examples prove the mature use of Twitter by social pro-independence movements in Catalonia:

@AMI\_\_cat – 11 September 2014: From 6.30pm on, the hashtag #Diada2014 is Trending Topic worldwide! #Diada2014 Congratulations to all!

@assemblea – 11 September 2014: ATTENTION! In a few minutes we are going to make public the hashtag that will bring the Catalan V to the World from the @araeshora profile! #Unitedfor9N

AQUEST 11S A LES 20.14h  
**FAREM LA V**  
**TRENDING TOPIC MUNDIAL**



A LA MATEIXA HORA ANUNCIAREM  
EL HASHTAG OFICIAL A  
**@araeshora**



INSCRIU-TE A WWW.ARAESLHORA.CAT

@omnium – 29 September 2014: If today the Constitutional Court suspends the consultation, tomorrow at 7pm everybody has to be in front of their City Hall dressed in yellow. We would start the campaign for the Yes vote! RT ow.ly/i/72Pye

@omnium – 9 November 2014: And now, a new challenge: let's make #CataloniaWins TT worldwide. #WehavevotedandWehavewon and the World must know it! C/ @Araeshora

This control over the social media led to the use of hashtags that directly originated from a metaphorical expression that at some point had been used to conceptualize the independence process. This is how the 2014 demonstration was promoted with the hashtag #araéslhora, which can be translated as “now is the time” and gave birth to a Twitter account, a Facebook page and a website amongst other 2.0 platforms:

@Esquerra\_ERC – 11 September 2014: We are doing it for our future, we are doing it for our children #nowisthetimefordoingit #9N2014 #11s2014

@assemblea – 29 September 2014: Now it is the moment, now it is the time! We must not fail! Let's join us as a volunteer for a new country! araeslhora.cat

### 6.1.2. Nationalist discourses surrounding metaphorical expressions

Using hashtags, sharing hyperlinks or tweeting pictures are not the only ways in which political actors have talked about independence on Twitter. There are other discursive devices that do not specifically belong to this social media, but whose idiosyncrasy is suited to the quick and simple sharing contents on Twitter by retweeting or copy-pasting the desired information. Aware of this, some political actors seem to tweet statements they think are particularly “catchy”. This is the case of their metadiscursive references to intellectual models for the country's self-determination:<sup>126</sup>

@HiginiaRoig – 25 November 2012: Un dia no podrem més i ho podrem tot. #25N (One day we won't be able to take it anymore, and then we will overcome everything #25N)<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Because the following examples contain verses or quotes that were originally written in Catalan and that, in some cases, do not have an official translation into English, for the sake of convenience I have provided this translation.

<sup>127</sup> This verse is from the Vicent Andrés Estellés poem “Ves-te'n a casa” (Go home).

@esquerra\_ERC – 8 April 2014: @MartaRovira: "No podran res davant d'un poble, unit, alegre i combatiu" #QueremosVotar (They cannot do anything to a united, joyful and combative people #wewanttovote)<sup>128</sup>

@ciu – 8 April 2014: #Turull "Nos vamos con más afirmación. Como dijo Mandela, 'todo parece imposible hasta que es posible'" #queremosvotar (We are going back to Catalonia with greater assertion. As Mandela said, 'it always seems impossible until its done' #wewanttovote)

@HiginiaRoig – 11 September 2014: Les ciutats seran Rius plens de gent. En el dia que durarà anys braços lliure i boques i mans. #OvidiMontllor youtube.com/watch?v=vVvs44x... (The cities will be rivers full of people. In the day that will last for years free arms, mouths and hands)<sup>129</sup>

@cupnacional – 11 September 2014: David Fernàndez "La clau que obre tots els panys és a les nostres mans!" (Amb #V de Vinader) #11S2014 #9N2014 [David Fernàndez "The key that opens every lock is in our hands!" (With #V of Vinader)]<sup>130</sup>

Mancera and Pano (2013) suggest irony is a powerful political weapon on Twitter. Twitter users can play with the original statements of politicians and completely change their meaning. In our case studies, this was true for these political actors who targeted young people or who could show a more relaxed tone in their messages. This was the case for the National Collective or Business for Scotland:

@BizforScotland – 15 October 2012: Nail on head hit! RT @celebs4indy: WASHINGTON POST 'Independence for Scotland could rob the British state of a massive source of revenue'

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<sup>128</sup> This verse was also written by Vicent Andrés Estellés and can be found in the 10<sup>th</sup> volume of "Mural del País Valencià", but it was popularized by the Valencian ska-rock group Obrint Pas in their most famous song: La Flama (The Flame). This means that it is familiar to the 16-40 year old generation.

<sup>129</sup> This quote paraphrases Ovidi Montllor's song "Serà un dia que durarà anys". Montllor is a model for the independentist left, as he always defended left-wing ideas together with a national consciousness of the Països Catalans (Catalan Countries).

<sup>130</sup> This verse is from the Vicent Andrés Estellés' poem "M'aclame a tu" (I laud you), an ode to the author's land.

@WeAreNational – 13 February 2014: Don't make us come down to  
@Number10gov and give you a big hug. Sounds like you folks need one.  
#IndyRef

As we can see, Business for Scotland reacts to the Washington Post news posted on a Twitter account that gave information about Scotland's independence. After the agreement to hold a referendum on independence was reached, the newspaper article reflected on the consequences of a hypothetical Yes vote, one of them being “Edinburgh and London in fierce negotiations over the cash cow that is North Sea oil.” In view of this, Business for Scotland convincingly express their opinion with the expression “Nail on head hit”, which laughs at the worrying wording of the article and remarks “that is the question.” As far as the National Collective example is concerned, the cultural move for independence answers the “fear campaign” promoted by the No camp –in which the threats about losing the pound were key– by offering to console the Westminster Government after the increase in the polls of the Yes option. The Prime Minister, David Cameron, and UK Chancellor, George Osborne, were also the target of the irony of National Collective, who took advantage of the newspaper headline “Yes does not mean Yes” to say that they had given the worst Valentines present of the year:

@WeAreNational – 13 February 2014: @Number10gov @david\_cameron  
@GeorgeOsborne win the prize for worst Valentines present this year #indyref

The image is a screenshot of a newspaper page. The main headline is "Yes does not mean Yes" in a large, bold, black font. Below the headline, there is a sub-headline: "EXCLUSIVE: Senior Coalition member issues independence warning as Osborne rejects currency union". In the center of the page is a black and white photograph of David Cameron, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at the time, wearing a suit and tie and holding a cigarette. To the right of the photo, there is a vertical list of headlines and page numbers: "Page 67", "Page 68", "Page 69", "Page 70", "Page 71", "Page 72", "Page 73", "Page 74", "Page 75", "Page 76", "Page 77", "Page 78", "Page 79", "Page 80", "Page 81", "Page 82", "Page 83", "Page 84", "Page 85", "Page 86", "Page 87", "Page 88", "Page 89", "Page 90", "Page 91", "Page 92", "Page 93", "Page 94", "Page 95", "Page 96", "Page 97", "Page 98", "Page 99", "Page 100". At the bottom of the page, there are three smaller headlines: "Pensions firms investigated", "Chart success for Celtic fans", and "Inside".

Catalan political actors also showed a sense of humour in their tweets. David Fernández, for example, found irony to be the best tool for expressing his displeasure with the Constitutional Court's decision to suspend Catalonia's self-determination vote and compared the sentence with Franco's dictatorship:

@HiginiaRoig – 29 September 2014: One, great and constitutional: “The indissoluble unity of homeland.” Franco would not have written it better.

On the same date, Súmate, which was the political actor who made the greatest use of irony, appealed to the Spanish people and political organizations who said they wanted Catalonia to stay in Spain because they “loved” the country. They encouraged them to protest against the Spanish High Court attacks on Catalonia:

@sumate\_asoc – 29 September 2014: After what Rajoy and the High Court have done to us, has a demonstration been organized in Madrid? Just because you say that about you do not want us to leave Spain, and that you love us...

The civil movement showed that it was keen on using the expressive possibilities of 140-character-long statements and, for instance, used a play on words to defend a binding consultation for Catalonia. In the following tweet, Súmate compared ballot boxes (in Spanish *urnas*) with the similar-sounding word *armas*, (in English *weapons*). Likewise, they replaced the word *destruction* by *construction*. So the final meaning of the statement is that voting is seen as a dangerous weapon by the Spanish state, as it involves giving people the power to decide their future. Those who want to vote, however, see ballot boxes as constructive not destructive:

@sumate\_asoc – 29 September 2014: The consultation is illegal because we have WEAPONS OF MASS CONSTRUCTION. They are scared of letting people vote and decide #9N2014



The construction of the democratic Catalonia against the undemocratic Spain was the leitmotif of the messages issued by political actors in the period analysed and they really made the most of this argument once David Cameron had agreed to negotiate a binding referendum for Scotland. But, what has Scotland to do with Catalonia? This may sound strange for the Scottish electorate who pay little attention to what happens in Quebec, Flanders or Catalonia, as they assume that each country is involved in its own project. It is not the same in Catalonia, where both the political and media systems have always looked to Scotland as a mirror for the country's aspirations (Castelló et al. 2016). For instance, the literature comparing Catalonia and Scotland from a non-academic viewpoint takes this metaphor –which goes beyond the textual and can be described as a contextual metaphor in the Catalan case– as a title. Castelló et al. (2016) point to *El mirall escocés (The Scottish Mirror)*, written by Xavier Solano –who was an SNP advisor at the time of publication– in 2007, as the first book referring to the “mirror metaphor” when describing Scotland as an example for Catalonia. The Catalan journalist Esteve Soler was to follow Solano's path and entitled the book he published in 2014 on the occasion of the Scottish referendum on independence *Escòcia, joc de miralls (Scotland, a trick with mirrors)*. He was not the only one, as various media contained articles that echoed the same metaphorical expression to refer to the Catalan case. As Castelló et al. (2016:246) point out: “Scotland counts because it is a useful resource for handling the on-going territorial tensions inside Spain.” The following Twitter messages show that Catalan political actors did also see the independence process in Scotland as a model:

@ciu – 23 January 2013: #presidentMas “It would be perfect if the consultation could have a legal and agreed basis with the Spanish state, as happens in the United Kingdom”

@cupnacional – 12 December 2013: “Our question was the Scottish one. This one is not clear for the people, for the Spanish state or for the international community” @quimarrufat

@ciu – 8 April 2014: Cameron has a project for Scotland from the British perspective. Rajoy has only an alarmist discourse and a “no” for everything we request #wewanttovote

@ciu – 11 September 2014: Today the @guardian has published an article written by the Mayor @xaviertrias: As in Scotland, so in Catalonia ift.tt/1whu2B1

@cupnacional – 11 September 2014: “Greetings for the Scottish people. If they win the referendum we will have won at least half of the battle”  
@quimarrufat #11S2014 #VoteYes

@ciu – 19 September 2014: #presidentMas "What Scotland experienced yesterday is the right path. I want to congratulate them for this great lesson on democracy”

@junqueras – 19 September 2014: Cameron: “of course I was against Scotland’s independence, but I am a democrat and it was necessary to listen to the opinion of the Scottish people”

@govern – 19 September 2014: #presidentMas: "Thank you Scotland for showing that voting is the only path" bit.ly/1rkXRxL

@sumate\_asoc – 19 September 2014: Rajoy congratulates the Scottish people for the result of the referendum as he forbids Catalan people to do the same

@sumate\_asoc – 19 September 2014: In Scotland they have been given the chance to decide. We also want to have the opportunity to be able to decide if we want to build a new country together

As can be seen from the question that was to be asked –which in the Catalan case also included a federal option– to the opponents of the independence process were constructed in terms of what was happening in Scotland, so Scotland increasingly became an example of how the process needed to be taken forward. This mirroring effect will unavoidably be present when both processes

are compared, but only it is only acknowledged to exist from the Catalan perspective. The information below aims to reflect on some discursive items that influenced the way in which political actors explained the two processes to their 2.0 communities and has been analysed in line with the contextual notes on Scotland and Catalonia provided in Chapter 4.

In a statement tweeted on 10 January 2012, Patrick Harvie asked for a real debate not on the process that would take the country to hold a referendum but what Scotland's new powers would be if it became independent. And this seemed to be the general tenor of the campaign carried out by the Yes side, which concentrated on discussing how independence could be positive for the future of Scotland rather than appealing to identity issues. Economic reasons were an important focus of the debate, together with the promise of closer governmental institutions and the chance of empowering people and broadening political participation in the country's issues:

@theSNP – 25 January 2012: We are a rich country, it's time we put resources of our country to work for the people of our country

@nicolasturgeon #indyref #bigdebate

@theSNP – 21 March 2013: FM: But we don't have the ability to invest or save that money to the benefit of our future generations. #IndyRef

@scotgp – 13 February 2014: At launch in Nairn of our Renewing Local Democracy ideas. Patrick Harvie says #indyref gives a rare moment to think how we govern ourselves

@YesScotland – 18 September 2014: No-one will govern Scotland better than the people who live and work here #indyref #VoteYes

In Catalonia, however, the debate mainly focused on the struggle to hold a vote and the reasons that legitimated the country to do so. What was or not democratic and who was or not a democrat monopolised a discussion that cannot be considered as such, since the No camp never recognized that the debate truly

existed. Nevertheless, pro-independence political actors went on arguing why Catalonia should have the right to decide its own future in a binding consultation. As Cramer (2014:53) states, political actors needed to be right not only in a cognitive sense but in a moral sense, so they were able “to move people [to] care enough about the subject to bother to listen to their claims at all, especially those who ha[d] not traditionally recognised themselves as being interpellated by separatist discourse.” The only way to do this was to base the move towards independence on the rationality of the idea of secession and not to link it with a sentimental reason. The cost-benefit argument (Cramer 2014), which was already present had become lodged in the citizens’ political consciousness after the economic crisis had taken hold and the attempts to negotiate greater financial autonomy, turned out to be one of the rationales behind independence. However, it was rapidly followed by more welfare-oriented arguments that could also convert progressive citizens who were closer to left-wing movements to the independence cause. But, judging from political actors’ tweets, the claim for democracy and the extensive support it had from Catalan society was the most repeated topic, which, in fact, tells us nothing about independence but a lot about the process. Exactly what Harvie did not want for Scotland.

@Esquerra\_ERC – 8 April 2014: Today in the Spanish Congress we have said it clearly: Voting is democracy. #Wewanttovote #3DemocratsinMadrid

**VOTAR  
ÉS DEMOCRÀCIA.**

ESQUERRA  
REPUBLICANA

TOTS PER UN #NOUPAÍS  
www.votaresdemocracia.cat

Un 87% dels catalans  
acceptaria el resultat  
de la consulta

Font: Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió de la Generalitat de Catalunya

#noupaís #votaresdemocràcia  
**VOTAR ÉS DEMOCRÀCIA**  
www.votaresdemocracia.cat

\*87 per cent of Catalan people would accept the result of a consultation

One of the tendencies of the discourses of Catalan political actors was to stress the bottom-up nature of the independence process in Catalonia and claim that it was the ordinary people who were responsible for the political moves that were taking place in the country. This had first become evident in the 2012 parliamentary election campaign (Pont and Capdevila 2012). This was the strategy not only of the party in power at the time, CiU, but also of ERC and the radical left CUP and its aim was to refute the Spanish Government's argument that the move for independence was only promoted by the Generalitat and President Artur Mas:

@ciu – 23 January 2013 OPF "The statement today has been an act of sovereignty act. Election, commitment, results and a mandate. You cannot ignore the mandate of the people"

@junqueras – 12 December 2013: "Our goal is to put the future of Catalonia in the citizens hands" #tovoteistheway

@higiniarioig – 12 December 2013: #consultationtv3 The future of this country will be decided by its people. And when we can't take it anymore, then we will overcome everything: political freedom  
#wearecatalancountries

@ciu – 8 April 2014: "If you want to give a name and a surname to this process you will have to work hard, as there are thousands of names and surnames. It is a process that comes from the people" #Turull  
#Wewanttovote

@esquerra\_ERC – 8 April 2014: @MartaRovira: "We defend the referendum because that is what the people asked us to do in the last parliamentary election" #Wewanttovote

Although independence was presented as a rational process that provided a real opportunity to question and improve the governance of the country, the issue of identity appeared occasionally to ground claims for independence in the historical roots of the stateless nation, in both Scotland and Catalonia:

@AlexSalmond – 11 January 2012: "The date for the referendum has to be autumn of 2014. That's because this is the biggest decision that Scotland has made for 300 years."

@scotreferendum – 21 March 2013: FM: "Our ancient nation of Scotland is making its way in the 21st Century according to the highest possible standard." #indyref

@JosepRull – 11 September 2013: Catalan patriots from 1714, we have been worthy of your memory, but, above all, we have been loyal to our children #CatalanWay

@esquerra\_ERC – 8 April 2014: @martarovira: "Catalonia existed before the Spanish Constitution and now we have a democratic mandate to accomplish" #Wewanttovote

@JosepRull – 11 September 2014: After 300 years we are still here. We feel we are a nation more than ever and we are determined to recover our freedom #nowisthetimefordoingit #IIS #9N2014

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that these statements were tweeted on particular dates when it was easier to be patriotic, like the announcement of the referendum date in Scotland or the celebration of Catalonia's National Day. Otherwise, the majority of statements were made according to the principles of civic nationalism that the two nations consciously adopted by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century:

@theSNP – 25 January 2012: It's a fundamental principle of democracy - the people who should decide are the people of #Scotland @NicolaSturgeon #bigdebate #indyref

@theSNP – 15 October 2012 FM says @YesScotland vote will win the arguments and that Yes will set out a "positive vision for an independent Scotland" #EdAg #IndyRef

@scotgp – 21 March 2013: Scottish Greens support a Yes vote as it gives the best chance to transform our society. Find out more: [scottishgreens.org.uk/](http://scottishgreens.org.uk/)

@scotgp – 21 March 2013: Patrick says we need to move the debate on to how we make life better for the majority of ordinary people.

@cupnacional – 23 January 2013 “We need independence to change things not to change anything” @quimarrufat

@cupnacional – 19 September 2014: “The right to decide is not only for those in favour of sovereignty” @quimarrufat #consultationlaw #Parliament #9N2014

@joseprull – 27 September 2014: #wearecalledup9N to freely, peacefully and democratically decide our future as a nation. From @ConvergenciaCAT we will vote #YesYes

Both countries wish to transform their societies as part of the European Union. In the Catalan case, as Keating (2000) points out, nationalism has been presented as modernizing and European in contrast to the reactionary forces in Madrid. This strong European feeling was present in the discourses of political actors’:

@omnium – 11 September 2012: Muriel Casals says in @elsmatins “Our future is inside Europe and we can hardly do it inside Spain” #11s2012 #DiadaTV3

@ciu – 8 April 2014: In the 21<sup>st</sup>-century Europe, decisions are taken by voting #Wewanttovote <http://youtu.be/MLTAzANZOPA>

As for Scotland, who had witnessed UKIP enter mainstream politics and the Conservative Party question the UK’s membership of the EU, remaining in Europe became a reason for voting Yes to independence:

@BizforScotland – 30 January 2013: How does Scotland's referendum fit into David Cameron's EU plans? | Mike Small [gu.com/p/3dby2/tw](http://gu.com/p/3dby2/tw)

Friendliness towards the EU was used in Scotland and Catalonia to take the force out of the UK’s and Spain’s warnings about what a Yes vote would mean:

to be left out of Europe. Because the main threat for stateless nations who start a secession process is not being recognized, political actors often put their efforts into getting the attention of the international community as well as into arguing why they need to be accepted in it:

@theSNP – 25 May 2012: internationally acclaimed Scottish actor Alan Cumming: "The world is waiting for us - and Scotland is ready"  
#VoteYes

@theSNP – 14 November 2013: There are no "separate" countries in the world today. There are independent countries, @NicolaSturgeon tells @ScotParl #indyref #sp4

@omnium – 11 September 2014: We have done it and we are willing to explain it: the V has been a success and the World must know that  
#catalansvote9N ow.ly/i/6R7cT

@assemblea – 27 September 2014: The World is looking at us and the #9N2014 we will be a Worldwide model for democracy and freedom! We will vote and we will win! #Nowisthetimefordoingit

@AMI\_\_cat – 9 November 2014: Catalans have talked in the ballot boxes in a civic and peaceful manner and the World has realised that  
#CataloniaWins

In conclusion, political actors in Scotland and Catalonia have acknowledged the leading role Twitter has played as a political communication channel and have taken advantage of the features that make this tool different from traditional media. As far as possible, Scottish and Catalan pro-independence political actors tried out the interactive possibilities Twitter made available and played with the social media dynamics when it came to engaging users in the political process, which was particularly important in the case of Catalan civil movements.



Regarding the content aspects of political actors' discourses, it should be noted that irony and plays on words were used in both Scotland and Catalonia to react to conflict and to satirize it. Civic nationalism claims, which the independence movements in Scotland and Catalonia clearly inherited, were also present in the statements analysed.


Now that I have reviewed the contextual environment in which the political discourses took place, I shall move on to explain how metaphorical expressions were used to transmit the underlying ideas. The section below compares the political actors' use of Twitter during the period analysed and identifies the main topics they conceptualized and the source domains they used to do so.

## 6.2. Identifying similarities and differences in the uses of metaphor in Catalan and Scottish political actors' discourses

In the current research project, I have examined a total of 2426 statements (n1). Approximately 24 per cent of these contain metaphorical expressions. In terms of frequency of conceptual metaphors, Scottish political actors used metaphorical expressions in 15 per cent (Table 7) of the statements analysed while the frequency for Catalan political actors increased by 9.20 per cent, being the 24.20 per cent (Table 8) of all the tweets examined. Figures 4 and 5 describe the use of metaphor made by each political actor along with the number of statements they made during the period selected.

As can be seen, Catalan political actors tended to use more metaphorical expressions than the Scottish ones when referring to the different target domains chosen to conceptualize the ongoing independence process in Catalonia and made a greater use of Twitter in the period selected as well.

Figure 4. Number of metaphors identified in respect to Scottish political actors tweets



Source: Author


Table 7. Frequency of metaphor use by Scottish political actors

| Political actors              | Number of Metaphors | Total Tweets | Frequency  |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|--------------|------------|
| Alex Salmond                  | 9                   | 53           | 17%        |
| Nicola Sturgeon               | 8                   | 41           | 19.50%     |
| Scottish National Party (SNP) | 28                  | 154          | 18%        |
| Patrick Harvie                | 0                   | 27           | 0%         |
| Scottish Green Party (SGP)    | 1                   | 30           | 3.30%      |
| Scotreferendum                | 9                   | 44           | 20.50%     |
| Scottish Government           | 6                   | 39           | 15.40%     |
| Scottish Parliament           | 0                   | 63           | 0%         |
| Yes Scotland                  | 31                  | 98           | 31.60%     |
| Radical Independence Campaign | 5                   | 28           | 17.85%     |
| Women for independence        | 0                   | 18           | 0%         |
| National Collective           | 5                   | 56           | 9%         |
| Business for Scotland         | 6                   | 77           | 7.80%      |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                  | <b>108</b>          | <b>728</b>   | <b>15%</b> |

Source: Author

However, both cases agree about who is the principal actor when framing the independence debate: the main nationalist party in each country, the Scottish National Party (154 statements) and *Convergència i Unió* (305 statements). The latter was closely followed by its competitors in Catalonia’s pro-independence electoral spectrum: *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (231) and *Candidatura d’Unitat Popular* (205). In Scotland, the “Greens” were not as prolific as the SNP and the total tweets (30) they broadcast during the key dates of Scotland’s independence process were notably lower. What must be pointed out in the Scottish case is that *Yes Scotland* was the most active participant on Twitter and had the greatest frequency of metaphor use (31.6 per cent) in keeping with the total tweets made. The corresponding Catalan social movement, *Assemblea Nacional Catalana*, was also keen to get involved in the 2.0 environment and made a total of 185 interventions, 81 of which contained metaphorical expressions, resulting in a frequency of 43.80 per cent.

**Figure 5. Number of metaphors identified in respect to Catalan political actors tweets**



Source: Author

**Table 8. Frequency of metaphor use by Catalan political actors**

| Political actors                               | Number of Metaphors | Total Tweets | Frequency     |
|--|---------------------|--------------|---------------|
| Josep Rull                                     | 10                  | 25           | 40%           |
| Convergència i Unió (CiU)                      | 102                 | 305          | 33.40%        |
| <b>Oriol Junqueras</b>                         | <b>20</b>           | <b>32</b>    | <b>62.50%</b> |
| Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)        | 66                  | 231          | 28.60%        |
| David Fernández                                | 15                  | 62           | 24.20%        |
| Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP)             | 41                  | 205          | 20.00%        |
| Government of Catalonia                        | 22                  | 218          | 10.10%        |
| Catalan Parliament                             | 1                   | 180          | 0.56%         |
| <b>Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC)</b>       | <b>81</b>           | <b>185</b>   | <b>43.80%</b> |
| Òmnium Cultural                                | 19                  | 90           | 21.10%        |
| Súmate   | 15                  | 65           | 23%           |
| Assoc. de Municipis per la Independència (AMI) | 19                  | 100          | 19%           |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                                   | <b>411</b>          | <b>1698</b>  | <b>24.20%</b> |

Source: Author

Neither the Scottish nor the Catalan parliaments used conceptual metaphors in their statements. They maintained their institutional role and only gave information about independence processes when it was related to legal issues that concerned their legislative functions, as figures 6 and 7 exemplify:

**Figure 6. Scottish Parliament informing about Referendum Bill**

**Scottish Parliament** @ScotParl · 14 nov. 2013  
 The Scottish Independence Referendum Bill has been passed by the Parliament following a Stage 3 debate [ow.ly/qPek2](https://www.parliament.scot/2013-11-14)

Figure 7. Catalan Parliament informing on the Law of Consultation Votes<sup>131</sup>

**Parlament Catalunya** @parlament\_cat · 19 set. 2014  
A favor de la llei de consultes hi han votat CiU ERC PSC ICV-EUiA CUP i Elena.  
Els grups del PPC i de Cs hi han votat en contra #parlament

**Parlament Catalunya** @parlament\_cat · 19 set. 2014  
El #parlament aprova la llei de consultes per 106 vots a favor i 28 en contra


Maybe the Government's role in the two cases should have been the same, but results show it was not. However, their use of metaphors was between 10 and 15 per cent of their overall statements, less than social movement campaigners or political parties and their representatives. This is true for everybody except Patrick Harvie and the Scottish Green Party, who hardly used metaphorical expressions at all to refer to independence aspects. This is in stark contrast with the political leader regarded as his peer in Catalonia –if the electoral results of the political organisations they belong to are taken into account– David Fernández, of the CUP. Although he used conceptual metaphor at a frequency of 24.20 per cent, he was largely surpassed by Josep Rull, president of CiU, whose frequency was 40 per cent and Oriol Junqueras, the leader of ERC, who used metaphorical expressions in 62.5 per cent of his interventions. Following in the footsteps of ANC, the other social movements who tweeted about the independence process in Catalonia –Òmnium, Súmate and Associació de Municipis per la Independència– used metaphor in around 20 per cent of their statements. As for Scotland, only the Radical Independence Campaign was closer to this number, followed by National Collective (9 per cent) and Business for Scotland (7.8 per cent). When contrasting this data with the number of tweets per actor, we can conclude that the leading role in the grassroots campaign on Twitter was played by Yes Scotland and ANC.

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<sup>131</sup> “CiU, ERC, PSC, ICV-EUiA, CUP and MP Elena have voted for the Law on Consultation votes. PPC and C’s groups have voted against it #parliament” | “#parliament passes the Law on Consultation votes with 106 votes in favour and 28 against.”


Nevertheless, in general, Catalan pro-independent political actors made greater use of Twitter than their Scottish neighbours in the period when they were expected to increase their references to the independence process, as Tables 7 and 8 reveal. Also the percentage of metaphor use increased in the Catalan case, which confirms the hypothesis that conceptual metaphor use rises when political actors are forced to define their particular vision of contested political issues (such as Catalonia’s right for self-determination). As Bickes et al. (2014:428) remark, “metaphor analysis can serve as a helpful tool to identify discourse positions” and this may explain why Catalan political actors put a greater emphasis on expressing their views in the 2.0 environment. Figures 8 and 9 graphically show the number of metaphorical expressions made by each political actor. And there is not a single Twitter profile in which Scottish users surpass their corresponding Catalan *alter ego*.

**Figure 8. Number of metaphors used by Scottish pro-independence political actors**



Source: author


Figure 9. Number of metaphors used by Catalan pro-independence political actors



Source: author


Before we go into the conceptual domains used by political actors to frame independence processes, let us take a look at the periods in which the use of metaphor was prominent (Figures 10 and 11) and briefly point out the most used source domains. In Scotland, these periods coincide with the announcement of the date in which the referendum was to be held (21 March 2013), followed by 13 February 2014 when UK Chancellor George Osborne reactivated the debate about the use of the pound. The metaphorical expressions for the first of these dates belonged to the JOURNEY/PATH/WAY source domain and stressed that Scotland's journey towards independence was now in its final stage and that a self-governed country was the only "alternative" if "Westminster's ill-thought policies" (HEALTH/ILLNESS) were to be mitigated. On the other hand, the responses to Osborne's declaration about Scotland losing the pound if it became an independent state were framed in terms of CONFLICT/WAR, as UK/Westminster were said to "bully Scotland" and "spread fear," always reinforcing the association of the Better Together campaign to what Yes supporters labelled as "Project fear" (Buchanan 2016).

Figure 10. Evolution of metaphor use on key dates in the Scottish independence process



Source: author

Figure 11. Evolution of metaphor use on key dates in the Catalan independence process



Source: author



In Catalonia, the use of conceptual metaphors peaked on 8 April 2014, when three Catalan MPs went to Madrid to ask the Spanish Congress to transfer the constitutional competence to call a legal referendum. The 75 metaphorical expressions used that day referred to Catalonia's right to "freely decide its future", which encountered the Spanish state's refusal to pass the Catalan Law. The two main political parties (PP and PSOE) voted against the Catalan request and were accused of "crushing ballot boxes" (CONFLICT/WAR).

The other date on which a considerable number of metaphors was used was 23 January 2013, when the Catalan Parliament passed the Declaration of Sovereignty. Both periods coincided with parliamentary sessions, during which political actors give longer speeches than in press conferences. The statements on Twitter tended to reproduce the content of these speeches, which would explain why these dates show a larger number of statements containing metaphorical expressions. The need to impose their own view on a debate that is recorded in the weekly political and media agenda also reinforces the use of metaphor because of its ability to influence the definition of the frame within which this issue will be understood. Moreover, Twitter use as a replicator of offline discourses also corroborates social media's supplementary role when planning other political communication strategies such as political advertising or rallies or what Jungherr (2014) defined as an interconnected and mutually dependent relation.


### 6.2.1. Target domains in discourses on independence in Scotland and Catalonia

Before reviewing the source domains used by Scottish and Catalan political actors, I will look at the abstract conceptual domains that have been conceptualized in these terms and which can guide our understanding of how pro-independence discourses have been planned. The attention of the auditorium can be drawn to what independence will imply and/or the political situation that is forcing you to take one path or another can be described. Figures 12 and 13

show the target domains preferred by political actors. They show the intention behind the discourses and identify some similarities and differences between Scottish and Catalan discourses on independence.

Independence was more conceptualized in Scottish discourses than in Catalan ones, in which the ongoing independence process had twice as many mentions in statements made by political actors. The current state of affairs and the problems that needed to be solved was one of the target domains that tended to be constructed metaphorically (see Semino 2008) and is clearly used in the Catalan case, where the uncertainty about whether a referendum would finally be held dominated pro-independence discourses, while Scottish political actors chose to focus on the causes of problems and their solutions and presented independence as the answer.

**Figure 12. Metaphors per target domain in Scottish pro-independence discourses**




Source: author

In Scotland, having a legal framework that allowed a binding referendum to be held also resulted in a clearer discourse on what a Yes vote would imply.

Although there were also some uncertainties, like the use of the pound in an independent Scotland or the country's inclusion as a new EU member, political actors' statements focused on reinforcing the benefits of the new situation. Having a white paper that acted as a guide for the debate in the Yes camp required political actors –especially those linked to the Scottish government– to develop the content. Nevertheless, the campaign was not always carried out in a positive tone and the political opponents to the independence project –i.e. Westminster, Unionist Campaign or No vote– were also targeted, as was the relationship between UK and Scotland. Constructing arguments through opposition made it possible to compare the advantages and disadvantages of voting for an independent Scotland. Political actors used this strategy to highlight Scotland's progressive attitude to politics and criticize Westminster's conservatism.

Figure 13. Metaphors per target domain in Catalan pro-independence discourses



Source: author

Catalonia did not focus on the benefits of separating from Spain, but on how each country understood democracy and the consequences of this understanding. The main aim of characterizing the Spanish state and its bonds with Catalonia is to insist on its suppressive role and to legitimize a binding referendum to decide Catalonia's future on the basis of the demands of the Catalan people. The vagueness of the legality surrounding the referendum and the variety of names that designated Catalonia's self-government ambitions before independence was definitely an issue on the political agenda and resulted in three different target domains linked with the process: fiscal sovereignty, right to decide and referendum/consultation.

References to the various demonstrations that were organized during the period analysed were also noted, since Catalan political actors presented the independence of Catalonia as "the people's claim." Because of the leading role of the Catalan people in the pro-independence movement, they were frequently conceptualized as Catalonia itself –with whom Catalan people were metonymically associated– and in similar numbers as the independence process (Figure 13). The country of Scotland and the people who live there were conceptualized too and had nearly the same number of mentions as independence. In both cases, these mentions can be labelled under what Semino (2008) describes as the definition of the "in-group" (oneself, one's party, government, social group, nation or race), which political actors used to inferentially point at the collectives that belong to the "out-group."

## 6.2.2. Source domains in discourses on independence in Scotland and Catalonia


The analysis of the metaphorical expressions detected attempted to identify the appropriate source ‘concept’ in each case, and group them into larger conceptual source structures [what Musolff (2004) calls *superdomains*]. Looking at the kinds of source domain that have been used to conceptualize independence processes also provides interesting data (Figures 14 and 15). For instance, in both the Scottish and the Catalan cases, JOURNEY/PATH/WAY are some of the most prominent source domains in political actors’ discourses. This confirms what previous research on metaphor use in political discourses has shown: a trend to conceptualize politics in terms of a journey (Cibulskienė 2012). Conceptualizing the INDEPENDENCE PROCESS AS A JOURNEY also entails the use of another metaphor: the personification of Scotland or Catalonia [which follows A NATION IS A PERSON schema] which become the political subjects that start out on their “way towards freedom.”

Of course, this journey has a final stage: you can only make your way to some goal or other and you can only be closer to it when there is a moment in time by which you have to reach it. For Scotland, this moment was 18 September 2014 and for Catalonia it was 9 November 2014. Until they reached those dates, which were presented as a turning point in both countries’ destinies –because this is “a process leading to the biggest decision”–, they have to keep on the road to their final objective: independence. In order not to stray from the chosen path, Scotland and Catalonia must follow a “roadmap.”

@theSNP – 23 October 2011: Angus Robertson: Roadmap to Independence [tinyurl.com/3dm2whm](http://tinyurl.com/3dm2whm) #snp11

@ciu – 11 September 2013: We are not going to move a millimetre from the route map towards the consultation for achieving an #ownstate #11s2013

Figure 14. Metaphors per source domain in Scottish pro-independence discourses



Source: author


MOVEMENT/SPEED metaphors are closely linked to JOURNEY metaphors, as they specify the direction the independence process takes (“goes forward”, “does not and will not stop” or “takes a major step forward”) and the different rates at which progress is made (“it is unstoppable” and “goes fast”):

@ciu – 25 November 2012 – #PresidentMas "We hope the right to decide's process goes forward, the consultation remains standing even our present situation" #25N

@omnium – 29 September 2014 – On#10J2010 we went out into the streets and we have not stopped. We are a nation and we will decide our political future #Wearecalledup9N ow.ly/i/72A5C

This source was only present in the statements of Catalan political actors. The lack of an established and secure calendar like the one Scotland was given after signing the Edinburgh Agreement fostered the need for Catalan pro-independence discourses to integrate metaphorical expressions so that the uncertainty of the process could be represented as concretely as possible.

Figure 15. Metaphors per source domain in Catalan pro-independence discourses



Source: author

CONFLICT/WAR was also a recurring source for political actors when talking about their respective independence processes. Nonetheless, although both countries were in controversial situations they were reported differently. A quick glance over the amount at the number of conceptual metaphors used in each case reveals the dimension of the conflict. Although Scotland is regarded as being “under threat from Westminster”, it also “strives” for a better country, which aims to “fight for the country’s priorities” in the EU. It acknowledges that there is a problem because of how it is treated by the UK Government and states that independence “is about finding solutions” to this problem. Westminster will try to “block” Yes support for independence by “spreading fear.” However, the frame in which this battle takes place is dominated by truce:

@theSNP – 21 March 2013: FM: It is important to acknowledge the referendum bill itself is a product of consensus and co-operation #indyref

Catalonia, however, is quite a different case, and the metaphorical expressions identified reveal this. Catalonia has never been recognized as a nation by the Spanish state and this is why both the Spanish Government and the main opposition party deny Catalonia's right of self-determination. The conflict in this case is defined in terms of Catalonia being a prisoner of Spain and presents independence as the means by which the country will gain its "freedom." Catalonia "cannot surrender" to the Spanish state or "give up" its cause, since it has "no alternative but to win:"

@esquerra\_ERC – 11 September 2014: @Junqueras: 'We are not going to surrender. We are compelled to victory and we have no alternative but to win' [bit.ly/1whllnq](http://bit.ly/1whllnq) #11s2014

Although Catalonia and Spain are presented as antagonists –“there are two blocks”– the former says its hand “will continue reaching out for” an agreement for holding a referendum. For some Catalan actors, conflict is seen as positive rather than negative because it means a break with the status quo they reject. As Castelló (2012:38) stresses: “el conflicto político [...] es un motor de cambio social y su ‘mediatización’ genera narrativas de fácil acceso y entendimiento para un público amplio, lo que tiene consecuencias relevantes desde un punto de vista de la calidad democrática de un país.”<sup>132</sup> From that point of view, a battle against the Spanish state is seen as an opportunity to achieve Catalonia's independence. Fighting for the right to vote is presented as a good thing and, to this end, expressions like “democratic conflict” or “positive tension” can be found in the corpus selected:

@cupnacional – 12 December 2013: Quim Arrufat: 'There is already a countdown to start a democratic conflict with the Spanish state'

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<sup>132</sup> “political conflict is a driver of social change and its ‘mediatisation’ generates easy access narratives that are understandable for a wide public, which has important consequences regarding the democratic quality of a country”



@omnium – 12 December 2013: @murielcasals: Catalan society is in positive tension. It is really important to successfully bring the process forward #consultation2014 #consultationTV3

Lemi Baruh and Mihaela Popescu (2008:89) point out that “contemporary politics rely on a profusion of sport-related metaphors that compare political interaction to games.” If there is one image that is fully integrated into Western societies it is competition. It is the basis of our economic system and it is also one of the premises on which the most popular sports are based. This could be the reason why both Scottish and Catalan political actors used GAME/SPORT metaphors in their speeches as it is not difficult to generate meanings about an issue that is so present in everyday conversations: a winner is better than a loser, the football player who scored in yesterday’s match is glorified as a hero and it is much easier to bet on the horse that is favourite to win. So, since everybody wants to win, the campaign is set out as a game in which there are going to be winners and losers, and people in Scotland and Catalonia “risk it all.” From the political actors’ perspective, in this game, Yes was winning and challenged the No side to fight back. Hence, in Scotland, the Yes supporters hope that the No Campaign “will raise their game and meet us on a higher level of debate” while there is “foul play” in Catalonia’s independence match:

@YesScotland – 30 January 2013: @bjglasgow on @scotsmanpaper webchat: "I hope the No Campaign will raise their game and meet us on a higher level of debate" #indyref

@esquerra\_ERC – 29 September 2014: @junqueras: 'The state’s foul play will be evident in regards to #9N2014, but this foul play has always been there'

Other source domains related to everyday life experiences, like FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP, were used, especially for describing the kind of relationship established between the stateless nation and the nation-state in each country. For instance, Scottish political actors argue that “friendship will flourish” between the rest of the UK and an independent Scotland, because

“arguments will be much less likely” if each state takes its own decisions. In Catalonia, the relationship with Spain will improve too if separated, because “with the independence of Catalonia, Spain will gain a friend.” However, the COUNTRIES ARE FRIENDS metaphor is not the only one in the corpora analysed. The FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP source domain is also used to present Catalonia and Scotland as two beings that are of legal age and that have the right to decide their futures. They are no longer children, so they are able to make decisions without asking their parents, embodied in Spain and the UK respectively, for permission. This disconformity is expressed through expressions like “we are tired of being told what Scotland can't do” or “we have not come here to ask for permission” and “we are old enough to do it.” The vision of both countries as adults reinforces the idea of their ability to manage their own finances and to choose what kind of things they are going to invest their money in and is closely linked with the idea of Guibernau's emancipatory nationalism. An emancipation that in both cases is also framed in terms of a love relationship which is “not working” in the case for Scotland, and that should “be based on respect” rather than “frustration” in Catalonia:

@ciu – 30 January 2013: #presidentMas 'I was in the same register as Espriu; to help to the transformation of the Spanish state by europeanizing it, so that it will treat Catalonia with respect'

Catalan political actors tend to present the country's frustration by using CONTAINER metaphors, which appear only once in Scotland. The Spanish Government is portrayed as oppressing Catalonia, to the point of making independence supporters claim that “inside the Spanish state we can't live as Catalans.” This is the result of several attempts to “fit in” the Spanish state, which is presented as no longer possible after the Spanish High Court decision on the Estatut and the Central Government's refusal to negotiate a better system of devolution for Catalonia. The referendum has become “the key that opens every lock” and which will allow Catalonia to leave Spain and have a better future “inside Europe.”

As I have explained in Chapter 2, metaphor plays an important role in the depiction of new realities. This is important in uncertain situations such as independence. Positive reasons for voting Yes may be to decide upon one's future or to invest in welfare policies; but can these arguments sound stronger than electoral promises? Presenting the future independent state as a building under construction lets political actors talk about Scotland or Catalonia as unfinished, as a "solid and attractive project" that still has to be "built" and "erected" with "its own work tools." In A COUNTRY IS A BUILDING metaphor, the referendum and the right to decide are referred to as "the groundwork" of the country's new home. For the Scottish political actors, these foundations, which have already been "designed, built and delivered in Scotland", will provide the opportunity to "build a Scotland that is more prosperous and fair" and so leave the "failing UK structure." In the Catalan case, the BUILDING source domain is also used to conceptualize the Spanish state as an architect that raises figurative walls that hinder the construction of the independent Catalonia. The Spanish Constitution or the fear spread by those who threaten the Catalan people's right to vote are among the walls that need to be "demolished."

But, who has to demolish these walls or to design the structures that will form the new independent state? Both Scotland and Catalonia point to the people from the respective countries as the main actors in this process. Scotland and Catalonia need their citizens' support if they are to become independent states. Or, at least, this is what prevails in the discourses of Scottish and Catalan political actors. Expressions like "none of us can miss it", "together we are going to make it happen", "we count on you", "united for a new country", "we all have to be in", "it depends on us" or "making it real is our duty" imply the participation of the Catalan people in the process of achieving the right to vote, in the first place, and then independence. What's more, they conceptualize Catalan people as a group to which "the ones who back democracy" must belong. The same can be said of Scotland, where political actors aim for Scottish people to "be part of (the independent Scotland)", to "join us", since "it is your independence", so "do not wake up the day after the #indyref vote and

wish you could have done more.” All these expressions can be put in the SOCIAL GROUPING domain and reinforce the perception that all those living in Scotland or Catalonia who want the best for their country belong to an entity. Society is, therefore, perceived as a whole and it has to play an important part in the development of the new state. In order to transfer that feeling to the electorate, “persuasive linguistic devices which help invite identification and solidarity with the ‘we-group’” are used (De Cillia et al. 1990:160).

Political actors also used PERSONIFICATION metaphors as a resource to present Scotland and Catalonia (and also Westminster and the Spanish Government) as human beings. A NATION IS A PERSON metaphor repeatedly appeared in the corpus analysed and in both cases it was often used to appeal to the international community, as if stateless nations were seeking a supranational entity that could back their ambitions. For instance, Scotland argues the need for a “stronger voice” and is willing to take its “future into its own hands” and seems convinced that “the world is waiting” for it. Catalonia’s aim to be observed by the world is also present in political actors’ statements. Every step the country takes towards this goal is seen as “a powerful message” to the world and as an “act of assertion” in its attempt to be given the right to vote. Because, above all, “Catalonia wants to talk and to be listened to:”

@sumate\_asoc – 27 September 2014: #presidentMas: "Catalonia wants to talk and to be listened to; Catalonia wants to vote" #wewanttovote fb.me/6KdXOugEZ

Both nations also focus on the possibility of “deciding” about their future, which links them to the FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP domain. So, after the experience of devolved government, Scotland has reached adulthood and “has earned the right to control its own destiny.” The country is “facing choices” and must be allowed to choose “common sense” (that is, independence). In the Catalan case, the country has “looked in the mirror and has enjoyed what it has seen there”, which is its ability to organize a consultation that has “put the

country's future into the hand of the citizens” despite the threats of the Spanish Government. The nation-state is presented as “deaf, blind, stagnant and the denier of people’s rights”, someone who “disregards the Catalans’ pacific, democratic and majority will”. Instead, Spain renounces an agreement and opts to “resign, give up and refrain democracy.” The UK Government and the Unionist Campaign are also personified and described as someone whose “ugly face is being revealed” as the referendum date approaches and the fear campaign takes the stage.

Other source domains appear less frequently in the corpus analysed, but need to be reviewed as they provide curious details about independence processes or the relationships between stateless nations and nation states. For example, HEALTH/ILLNESS metaphors identify Scotland and Catalonia as patients who are not feeling well. SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA ARE ILL, because of Westminster’s “ill-thought policies”, in the case for Scotland, and the “political myopia” of the Spanish state, which makes Catalonia “suffer.” This suffering dates back a long time. The “sentence of the Constitutional Court was lethal” and has made independence the most effective medicine for treating the disease, as sovereignty is “vital.” To acknowledge Catalonia’s right to decide, a right that “does not fracture”, may also be the first step on the country’s road to recovery. For Scotland, independence is clearly the instrument that will “prevent” the “ill-thought policies” and help the country and Westminster have a “healthier relationship” that would no longer be intoxicated by governmental disputes.

Metaphorical expressions that refer to the PERFORMANCE/SHOW/CINEMA source domain were anecdotal and only occurred in the Catalan case, because of the insistence on the “starring” role people had in each of the independence processes. However, the most interesting metaphor denounced the Spanish Government’s stagnation in the face of independence by conceptualizing the Spanish state as a “black and white photograph” that needed to be coloured in.

In the same vein, NATURE/WEATHER metaphors are used to refer to Spain as an “alpha male” who does not let “freedom flow” and to report that Catalonia “is melting” in their hands. And in contrast to the inactivity of the actor who can solve the situation there is a “human tide” representing a “democratic tsunami” ready to get “soaked by memory and freedom.”

INDEPENDENCE IS A DREAM and, as such, needs those whose dream it is to “make it come true.” Despite its ethereal nature, independence is presented as a well-grounded dream in Catalonia, and not as a “delirium”, as the Spanish Government used to qualify it. In Scotland, this dream is threatened by a negative counterpart: “the Tory nightmare.” This nightmare is not part of the present dreamland, as Scotland is “paying a heavy cost” for decisions taken in Westminster, which could have been “gains” if those decisions had been taken by the Scottish people. ECONOMY/BUSINESS metaphors are also present in Catalan discourse about the Spanish state as a worker that “reneges on Catalan citizens” and points out that Catalonia “is not for sale.” RELIGION/BELIEF metaphors conceptualize Catalonia’s claim to transfer powers and call a referendum as “a humble prayer” to Spain and, in Scotland, they describe people who been convinced by the Yes arguments as having been “converted to independence.”

Finally, Catalan political actors also use SCHOOL/DISCIPLINE metaphors and say that Catalonia “is not willing to receive lessons (from Spain).” A closely related source domain, the SCIENTIFIC, is used in Scottish politics to stress the rationality of the Yes vote, arguing that Scotland’s decisions “have proven to be better” than those of Westminster and that independence is the only way to be “100% certain that the people of Scotland get the government they vote for.” And this brings us to the use of ORIENTATIONAL metaphors, by which political actors state that Westminster is “out of touch” and has brought about “the rise of inequality”; the first step in rectifying this situation is to give Scotland “a seat at the top table” in the European Union.

To sum up, the political discourses on independence in Scotland and Catalonia shared the target concepts that were linked to the process, even though they presented some differences. In Catalonia, the conceptual domain that referred to independence was accompanied by at least two other concepts that were used virtually as synonyms to talk about self-determination claims: fiscal sovereignty and the right to decide. On the other hand, Scottish pro-independence political actors never talked about anything that was not independence –as there were no mentions to a “devo-max” option–, but concentrated on defining what the No vote or the Better Together campaign meant for independence. In Catalonia, the “no side” was not defined as it was non-existent or at least not organized in campaign terms. The source domains used to talk about the independence processes in Scotland and Catalonia were mostly the same although they were not used in the same percentages or in the same terms. Chapter 7 takes a closer look at how these source domains were used and discusses why they were used in this way.

# Chapter 7

## Scenario construction in Scotland and Catalonia

Chapter 7 discusses the qualitative data obtained through the scenario construction of meaningful metaphors detected in Scotland and Catalonia (the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> stages of CMA). These meaningful metaphors have been selected from the most prominent source domains in Scottish and Catalan political actors' discourses. As Figures 14 and 15 show, the domains of knowledge that were most used to conceptualize independence processes were: JOURNEY/PATH/WAY (1), CONFLICT/WAR (2), GAME/SPORTS (3) and FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP (4). At least one scenario has been drawn for each conceptual domain in line with the metaphorical expressions obtained and their relation with the targets they mapped. In order to narrow the focus of the story, this information has been classified into more concrete conceptual elements underlying the generic source domains pointed out above. The construction of the scenario has been completed by applying the methodological tool designed for interpreting metaphorical expressions and identifying the storyline that will show “why” these metaphors were chosen.

### 7.1. Metaphor scenarios for Scottish independence

This section discusses the scenarios promoted by Scottish political actors and reflects on the extent to which the framing of this conflictive issue determined the official story about the independence process in Scotland. I picked up the lexemes that were linked to a particular source domain (e.g. JOURNEY/PATH/WAY) and then I classified them under a more concrete conceptual element (e.g. STEP, OBSTACLE, DISTANCE SIGN...) as Tables 9 to 12 show. These lexemes and their correspondence with the conceptual elements were used to develop the conceptual



mappings for the metaphorical expressions analysed and were the starting point for applying Greimas' basic actantial model for interpretation. The results are to be understood as an attempt to systematize the metaphorical entailments generated by mapping the correspondences between the source domain and the target domain and the underlying ideological implications.

#### 7.1.1. CONFIDENT SCOTLAND UNDERTAKING A QUIET JOURNEY scenario

In the INDEPENDENCE PROCESS IS A JOURNEY metaphor, Scotland is presented as the subject that undertakes the action in order to achieve the desired object, which in the political actors' narrative is attributed to independence. Independence is "a bold and transformational step" for Scotland and that converts the stateless nation both into the subject of doing and the subject of being of the action, as the country will experience the benefits from the conjunction with the desired object.

Scotland, which is "making its way in the 21<sup>st</sup> century," is defined as an ancient nation that started this journey a long time ago. A series of drawbacks made Scotland lose the desired object as a result of the Union with its historical opponent: the Kingdom of England. The referendum on independence is the opportunity to recover independence and reach the ideal conjunction between the subject and the object again. The conditions in Scotland are no longer the same conditions as they were in 1707. The country has matured and it is presented as a well-prepared society with deep democratic convictions and a left-centred mind-set –which is claimed to be very different from Westminster's. It has the resources to face a "new period" with no travel companions other than the Scottish people. The country knows how to live as an independent state and the referendum has given it the opportunity to become one.

What drives Scotland to restart the journey towards independence is the belief that there is "a new and better path" for the country. This path is rooted not in emotion and passion but in the need for power and a governance that is different from that

of Westminster. However, Scotland had limited time to “reach the final stage,” as the journey that started in May 2011 with the overall majority achieved by the SNP was to end on 18 September 2014.

**Table 9. Conceptual elements of JOURNEY/PATH/WAY metaphors**

| Conceptual elements | Lexemes  |
|---------------------|--|
| WAY, PATH           | A new and better path, road to the referendum, road to independence, roadmap, on the road to, making its way in the 21 <sup>st</sup> century |
| MOVEMENT, SPEED     | Cannot be stopped, wants to get on in the world, as we move towards, is coming   |
| DISTANCE SIGN       | Reaches the final stage, a new dawn beckons for our country, begins process leading up to biggest decision                                   |
| STEP                | Bold and transformational step, a major step forward   |
| OBSTACLE            | Stymied situation  |
| CROSSROADS          | Faces a choice of two futures, there is an alternative   |
| MARITIME JOURNEY    | (Westminster) is going south   |


But who asked Scotland to undertake the journey? Alex Salmond and the SNP were the ones acting as the mandatory senders who entered into a contract with Scotland and who encouraged the country to fight for independence. They were responding to the electoral promise they had made in their manifesto of the 2011 parliamentary election. They won the election and they had to keep the promise. To fulfil its mission, Scotland needs to get the competences that will allow it to start the journey towards independence. It has to be able to reach an agreement to hold a referendum and, meanwhile, campaign in favour of

independence. Scotland will not have to carry out these tasks alone as various civil movements reinforce the message and campaign for independence. Yes Scotland, the Radical Independence Campaign, Women for Independence, Business for Scotland, National Collective and the Scottish Green Party and their co-convenors act as the country's helpers on the journey to independence.

**Conceptual mappings for JOURNEY/PATH/WAY metaphors**

- I. INDEPENDENCE PROCESS IS A JOURNEY THAT HAS A STARTING POINT AND A DESTINATION POINT, WHICH COINCIDES WITH THE POLITICAL GOAL THAT HAS MOTIVATED THE ACTION
- II. POLITICAL ACTIONS THAT IMPEDE THE PROCESS TO MOVE FORWARD ARE OBSTACLES
- III. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS ARE THE TRAVELLERS AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH THEY TRAVEL IS PROPORTIONAL TO THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROCESS
- IV. THERE ARE SPECIFIC DISTANCE SIGNS ALONG THE PATH THAT MEASURE THE PARTICIPANTS' PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS
- V. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS MAY FIND THEMSELVES AT A CROSSROADS AND WILL BE FORCED TO CHOOSE A PATH

**Figure 16. Actantial model for CONFIDENT SCOTLAND UNDERTAKING A QUIET JOURNEY scenario**



Source: author

Some political actors aim to put obstacles in their way and create a “stymied situation.” The Better Together campaign and Westminster government –that metonymically represents the United Kingdom– embody Scotland’s opponents. The latter acts as the anti-subject, who is striving to achieve exactly the opposite to Scotland, which in this case is to keep the Union intact.

When talking about Scotland’s will, however, pro-independence political actors seem to ignore that there is another Scotland that does not back independence, which makes the electorate infer a dependent Scotland is comparable to having a non-existing political entity and, thus, to the United Kingdom or, what’s worst, to Westminster. Despite pro-union opposition, Scotland will keep on going with no setbacks of any note. The country generally goes through a calm path as a result of the conditions established by law, which regulates the terms in which Scotland can travel. Throughout this quiet path, which guarantees that Scotland can reach the desired object, we find the fact that the country “cannot be stopped”, as it is “moving towards” independence in order to “get on in the world.” These metaphorical expressions rely on the schema FORWARD MOVEMENT IS GOOD, which links the country’s progress to its ability to keep to the path of independence and to persist in the objective of getting to the last stage. If Scotland completes the journey, it will be able to take its own decisions, which at the same time, will also benefit Scottish people.

Voting in a referendum is regarded as a crossroads, since Scottish people are facing “a choice between two futures” and must pick an empowered independent Scotland or a weak Scotland dependent on Westminster.<sup>133</sup> The people’s choice will sanction Scotland’s quest for independence and so will determine if the stateless nation has successfully accomplished the task it was responsible for. Because Scotland was still in the middle of the process during

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<sup>133</sup> Basing Scotland’s decision on this opposition was also the strategy followed by political actors and, particularly, by the Scottish Government in the political advertisements broadcast during the campaign (Moragas-Fernández and Capdevila 2015b). Hence, the use of the JOURNEY metaphor transcended political actors’ discourses on Twitter and was widely used to frame the whole campaign. “A choice between two futures” even became one of Yes claims during the referendum campaign.

the period analysed, the decisive test was yet to come so the subject's performance had not been sanctioned. After the 18<sup>th</sup> September, the referendum results showed that the contract had been rejected so there was a disjunction between the subject and the object.<sup>134</sup>

Giving Scotland this level of agency and presenting it as a subject able to do things –following A NATION IS A PERSON schema as mentioned in Chapter 6– involves pro-independence political actors getting Scottish citizens to evaluate what the country could win or lose by comparing it to what they could win or lose as people. In this way, political actors refer to Scotland as a being with a will all of its own, which, of course, was linked to their strategic communication views.

#### 7.1.2. A BATTLE THAT NEEDS TO BE WON scenario

Statements that conceptualize INDEPENDENCE AS A BATTLE THAT NEEDS TO BE WON may suggest a storyline similar to that of a CONFIDENT SCOTLAND UNDERTAKING A QUIET JOURNEY, if only in this case the action is not “quiet”, as a battle necessarily entails a higher degree of action. This is not the only difference. The INDEPENDENCE IS A BATTLE THAT NEEDS TO BE WON metaphor focuses on the Scottish people who are required to rescue a country that has the disadvantage of being “under threat from Westminster.” Therefore, in this scenario, Scotland loses the agency it had as the protagonist in the JOURNEY scenario. Now, people have the power to vote for [or against] independence and, consequently, to “strive for a better country”, so they have the competence to achieve Scotland's freedom.

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<sup>134</sup> Dekavalla (2016b:53) identifies a similar narrative in her study “The Scottish press account: the narratives of the independence referendum and its aftermath” in Blain, N., Hutchison, D. with Hassan, G. (eds.) *Scotland's referendum and the media. National and international perspectives* (pp.46-58). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

**Table 10. Conceptual elements of CONFLICT/WAR metaphors**


| Conceptual elements | Lexemes   |
|---------------------|---|
| BATTLE              | Fought for, striving for a better country, let's not give Tories the victory, trying to block |
| THREAT              | Under threat from Westminster, under pressure from EC (unionist campaign), are spreading fear |
| HARASSMENT          | Bully Scotland  |
| KIDNAPPING/ARREST   | (Westminster) holds back Scotland's economy   |
| TROUBLE/SOLUTION    | Independence is about finding solutions   |

As a result, people are presented as the subject that has to carry out the quest, while Yes campaigners embody the entity that asks Scottish people “not [to] give Tories the victory.” Once more, the focus is on Westminster’s conservative government rather than on the Better Together Campaign, whose members were also Labour and Liberal Democrats. For the Yes camp, it was easier and also more effective from a political communication perspective to link unfair policies and welfare cuts, investment on nuclear weapons and privatization of public services with a No vote, than to focus on well-known approved Scottish figures campaigning for the Union like former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

***Conceptual mappings for CONFLICT/WAR metaphors***

- I. REFERENDUM IS A BATTLE BETWEEN THE YES CAMP AND THE NO CAMP
- II. INDEPENDENCE IS SOMETHING THAT HAS TO BE FOUGHT FOR
- III. PARTICIPANTS IN THE REFERENDUM ON SCOTLAND’S INDEPENDENCE ARE THE SOLDIERS FIGHTING IN THE BATTLE
- IV. INDEPENDENCE IS THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY WESTMINSTER

Figure 17. Actantial model for A BATTLE THAT NEEDS TO BE WON scenario



Source: author

Again, Westminster and pro-union political actors act as the opponents to the Yes cause, and so become the enemies to be fought in the battle for Scottish independence. They have been damaging the country by “hold[ing] back Scotland’s economy” and are now “spreading fear” of the unknown, which is their most powerful weapon to prevent Scottish people from backing independence. Pro-independence political actors challenge this threat with the positive points of independence and encourage Scottish people to complete the mission they have been entrusted with: that is, not surrender and fight for independence. The results of the 18<sup>th</sup> September referendum will determine whether the contract has been accomplished. If the Scottish people succeed in winning the battle for independence, Scotland will receive the benefits of being a free nation, with its own state and the powers to make their society better.

### 7.1.3. SPORTS COMPETITION scenario

Presenting the campaign as something that has to be won recalls the CONFLICT/WAR source used to conceptualize independence as a battle. However, in this case, political actors preferred to use the GAME/SPORTS lexicon to frame the everyday struggle of ordinary people in door-to-door campaigning, canvassing, etc. in more understandable terms. As stated in Chapters 2 and 6, the POLITICS IS SPORTS schema is a more interesting topic for population in

general. Talking about political issues as if they were sports events makes them more understandable, as they are present in citizens' everyday lives. In the CAMPAIGN IS A CHAMPIONSHIP WHERE WINNING THE REFERENDUM IS THE TROPHY metaphor, agency again falls to Scottish people or, more specifically, to those Scots who are sympathetic to independence. They are presented as “supporters that are celebrating” every victory that takes them closer to the final trophy, which is independence. However, in the “game that is now on”, the supporters who are actively campaigning are the players who have to lead the independence team to win the decisive match.

**Table 11. Conceptual elements of GAME/SPORTS metaphors**

| Conceptual elements | Lexemes  |
|---------------------|--|
| GAME                | Raise the game, meet us on a higher level, game on     |
| MATCH               | Give independence a shot, the challenges of the future |
| BOXING              | It has just hit them (unionist campaign)               |
| SUPPORTERS          | Supporters are celebrating                             |

The campaign here is regarded as a championship in which the announcement of every event –the Edinburgh agreement, the question to be asked and the date on which the referendum will be held– lets the team go through to the next qualifying stage and “hits” the rival team. Of course, this implies giving people from both sides the feeling that they have to do more for the team they support in order to win, so they do not regret in the future that they could have done more. The same applies to the players' attitude. Like every sports team, the Yes camp has a manager, Alex Salmond, who gives instructions to his players (Yes campaigners) or supporters (Yes voters) and encourages them to “do everything we can to stop” the Better Together Campaign and to vote Yes for creating a



better country. Together with his team of assistants, formed by the other politicians who campaign for independence, Salmond helps civil campaigners in their quest for winning the referendum while he also acts as the mandatory sender of the mission.

**Conceptual mappings for GAME/SPORTS metaphors**

- I. THE CAMPAIGN IS A CHAMPIONSHIP WHERE THE YES CAMP AND THE NO CAMP COMPETE
- II. THE FINAL MATCH BETWEEN THE YES CAMP AND THE NO TEAMS WILL TAKE PLACE ON THE 18<sup>TH</sup> SEPTEMBER 2014
- III. THE TWO TEAMS PLAY AT DIFFERENT LEVELS
- IV. WINNING THE FINAL MATCH IS WINNING THE REFERENDUM, WHICH IS THE CAMPAIGN'S TROPHY
- V. SYMPATHIZERS ARE SPORTS SUPPORTERS
- VI. CAMPAIGNERS ARE PLAYERS
- VII. POLITICIANS AND POLITICAL PARTIES ARE MANAGERS

**Figure 18. Actantial model for SPORTS COMPETITION scenario**



Source: author

The rival team that the Yes campaigners encounter in this championship is the one made up of the various members who belong to the Better Together campaign. They are struggling for exactly the opposite of what the Yes players are struggling for, but with the same techniques. Their level of play, however, is

not the same as the pro-independence team, as at some points in the campaign they have played dirty, and this is why they are asked to “raise the game” and meet them “on a higher level.” After the decisive match, the winner will decide what the future of Scotland is, which plays a passive role in the narrative in this scenario. The Electoral Commission is the institution that will referee the competition and, hence, is the actant competent to sanction the Yes campaigners’ contract.

#### 7.1.4. BEING OF LEGAL AGE and LOVE RELATIONSHIP scenarios

Personification perfectly expresses metaphor’s main aim to simplify complex or abstract realities. When linked to FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP source domains, then, this function is more effectively accomplished, as there is probably nothing as familiar as family-related scenarios. Two different family-related scenarios, which in both cases reinforce Scotland’s agency in the storyline, can be identified in the analysed sample. They are materialised in two different metaphors: SCOTLAND IS AN ADULT THAT CAN TAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS (1) and SCOTLAND AND UK ARE GETTING DIVORCED (2).

**Table 12. Conceptual elements of FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP metaphors**

| Conceptual elements | Lexemes   |
|---------------------|---|
| ADULTHOOD           | Gives the power to make decisions, to be given responsibility for 2014 vote                 |
| STRICT FATHER       | Tired of being told what Scotland can’t do  |
| FRIENDSHIP          | Friendly relationship with the UK, friendship will flourish                                 |
| DIVORCE/SEPARATION  | (Union) is not working, arguments are much less likely (if separated), moving further apart |


In the SCOTLAND IS AN ADULT THAT CAN TAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS metaphor, Scotland is the main subject of the action. As a young but well-prepared country, Scotland has already reached a certain degree of maturity, which makes it ready to face the circumstances of an independent state in a globalized world. Scotland no longer needs either the international experience of the Union or the economic support it once received, since it now has powerful sources of finance, such as North Sea oil and gas and tourism. Since the Scottish parliament was devolved in 1997, the country has taken decisions –like protecting the National Health Service (NHS) from being privatised or not charging young students university tuition fees– to improve the citizens’ quality of life and so has demonstrated that it is prepared to take the following step and exercise self-government “with full powers.” Scotland is sure that no one will take better decisions and this is why the country’s main goal will be to reach full independence from the state it belongs to. It is ready to fly the UK’s nest and does not want their power of decision to be limited.

***Conceptual mappings for FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP metaphors***

- I. SCOTLAND IS A PERSON
- II. SCOTLAND IS ONE OF UK’S CHILDREN
- III. SCOTLAND IS OF LEGAL AGE AND CAN MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS
- IV. SCOTLAND AND UK ARE IN A RELATIONSHIP THAT IS NOT WORKING
- V. SCOTLAND AND UK COULD BE FRIENDS AFTER A MUTUALLY AGREED BREAK UP

Because it is “tired of being told what [it] can’t do”, Scotland will have to earn the right to govern itself and, in this quest, the Yes campaigners’ help will be key in achieving the desired object. The Scottish people’s vote in the referendum is going to decide if Scotland is mature enough to become emancipated and, therefore, to determine if the mission requested by the Scottish Government has been successful. Again, the people’s support for a No vote would undermine Scotland’s possibilities of emancipation, since it would force the country to continue under UK rule. Hence, whether full independence is gained or not, Scotland will be benefited or harmed by the result.


Figure 19. Actantial model for BEING OF LEGAL AGE scenario



Source: author

Scotland and UK are also pretty much an ill-assorted marriage. From the 20<sup>th</sup> century onwards, divorce has been assumed to be the final stage in a relationship that “is not working.” Nevertheless, a non-working love relationship does not necessarily entail a non-working friendship. This is the scenario proposed by pro-independence political actors when they say that SCOTLAND AND UK ARE GETTING DIVORCED. Within this marriage, Scotland acts as the member of the couple wishing to “move further apart” in order not to harm the relationship anymore.

Figure 20. Actantial model for LOVE RELATIONSHIP scenario



Source: author

Because “arguments are much less likely [if separated]”, divorce seems to be the best solution for the country. Sick of being abused by Westminster, Scotland believes separation to be the only possibility for a future “friendly relationship with the UK.” Divorce, then, is the desired object for Scotland. Separation from the UK is, once more, promoted by the Scottish Government as a result of their promise to hold a referendum on the country’s future before autumn 2014. UK/Westminster is once more presented as the “anti-subject” who will try not to get divorced from Scotland. Despite the conservative government wants Scotland to reconsider its decision, divorce between the stateless nation and the nation state rests on a mutual agreement proceeding. The referendum will be the entity that will sanction if the separation process forwards.

## 7.2. Metaphor scenarios for the Catalan independence process

Scenario construction in Catalonia entailed more difficulties than in Scotland. Firstly, because there were noticeably more metaphorical expressions referring to the same source domain and, as a result, different narratives that contributed to the general story on the independence process. And secondly, because the actors identified by the various narrations about the process were not always the same. This resulted in a variety of stories and actants that led to different scenarios for a single source domain. In Scotland, this only happened in the case of FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP.

### 7.2.1 A DIFFICULT BUT THRILLING JOURNEY scenario

The high number of JOURNEY/PATH/WAY and MOVEMENT/SPEED lexemes identified in the corpus of Catalan political actors indicates that these source domains were particularly used to conceptualize the independence process the country started in 2012. However, independence as a real governmental project for Catalonia was not a clear and shared starting point within Catalonia’s claims for greater self-government. Although the motto of the 2012 demonstration

organized by ANC stated that Catalonia was to be “the next state in Europe”, the country’s main political party, CiU, advocated the Right to Decide in the electoral manifesto that led it to win the early election called in November 2012. Nevertheless, ERC’s rise in the polls and unfruitful attempts at dialogue with the Spanish Government, forced the party to move closer towards independence positions. This, together with the need to legitimise the Catalans’ right to vote on their future, made political actors campaigning for independence adopt two different strategies. On the one hand, they concentrated on sharing positives about independence among Catalan citizens, which was especially relevant during political events that were strictly linked to what we could call campaign acts: e.g. 11 September demonstrations organized by ANC and Òmnium. On the other hand, the emphasis was put on Catalan people’s right to decide their future when parliamentary acts were held: e.g. Declaration of Sovereignty, Law on Consultation votes, etc. These two strategies adopted by pro-independence political actors in Catalonia explain why metaphorical expressions of JOURNEY/PATH/WAY are involved in a variety of scenarios. The metaphors from which we draw the scenarios are: INDEPENDENCE PROCESS IS A DIFFICULT BUT THRILLING JOURNEY (1) and THE RIGHT TO DECIDE IS A NECESSARY STAGE IN CATALONIA’S JOURNEY TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE (2). Nonetheless, the latter supplements the former, as it strengthens pro-independence political actors’ claims for holding a binding referendum.

As far as the INDEPENDENCE PROCESS IS A DIFFICULT BUT THRILLING JOURNEY metaphor is concerned, Catalonia takes on the role of the subject that undertakes the mission leading to independence. The country becomes, thus, the main traveller on the journey towards “full sovereignty.” Catalan people act as the mandatory sender, who has requested the country to initiate this path. As a result, the process is a journey that “comes from the people” and which will move forward because the “people’s strength pushes.” In order not to “move not one millimetre” from path laid down, Catalonia will have a “route map” that will help it achieve the desired object and complete its quest, as there is “only one plan.” Political actors who back independence, along with the Catalan

people who filled the streets in the 11 September demonstrations, will also help Catalonia in its quest for its own state, because “together [they] make more and better progress.” The quickest way to reach the final destination and fulfil the people’s mandate is to hold a binding referendum on the country’s independence. By assuming that this referendum will be won and independence will solve Catalonia’s financial troubles, political actors argue that the referendum “is the vehicle that leads the way out of the crisis.” For instance, this statement shows what Charteris-Black (2011) highlighted about metaphor, which is that it can lead to ‘rational’ arguments.

**Table 13. Conceptual elements of JOURNEY/PATH/WAY metaphors**

| Conceptual elements | Lexemes   |
|---------------------|---|
| WAY, PATH           | Our own exit, Catalonia’s way towards freedom, new period, towards full sovereignty, if we go along this path, gone along a path, the path towards freedom, keep on walking along the path, way towards self-determination, ways, to vote is the way  |
| MAP                 | Route map, there is only one plan, we know where we want to go, we are not going to move one millimetre from the route map  |
| MOVEMENT, SPEED     | This country decidedly moves forward, move the process forward, advance, unstoppable, mobilization in the streets moves to the ballot boxes, the process goes forward, we will walk ahead, let’s go fast, we have not stopped, together we make more and better progress, comes from the people, does not and will not stop, it takes us to the consultation and to freedom, we will keep on until we become the next state in Europe, we will step on the gas, escape from this constitution |
| GUIDANCE            | Lead the process, we will unambiguously mark the path, people’s strength pushes the country   |
| TRANSPORT           | The vehicle that leads the way out of the crisis  |
| TIME/SCHEDULE       | It is time for independence, now it is the moment for our own state, it’s time for Catalonia to vote, the hour of Catalonia has arrived   |

|               |   |
|---------------|---|
| DISTANCE SIGN | Closer to living in a normal country, the process has started, has start with resignations, is starting, there is no turning back, does not end with the consultation, it ends with our own state, we go back a long time, we want to go further, it's not long before we can do anything we like, we are starting a new period, we've been through a really important stage, tomorrow we will continue, is not the last page in Catalonia's history, we must leave the transition culture behind us, has closed another door |
| STEP          | The transcendental step towards freedom, a step of dignity and democratic coherence, a new step within the process, a giant step  |
| OBSTACLE      | We are going to overcome all the obstacles; won't be stopped by any state, imposition or gag; does not condition or alter the path  |
| CROSSROADS    | To change the course of history, crossroads   |
| AIR TRAVEL    | Set out on the flight towards freedom   |

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### *Conceptual mappings for JOURNEY/PATH/WAY metaphors*


- I. INDEPENDENCE PROCESS IS A JOURNEY THAT HAS A STARTING POINT BUT AN UNCLEAR DESTINATION
- II. DEMOCRACY IS THE PROCESS' FINAL STAGE IN THE JOURNEY
- III. FULL SOVEREIGNTY IS THE PROCESS' FINAL STAGE IN THE JOURNEY
- IV. CATALAN PEOPLE ARE GUIDING CATALONIA'S JOURNEY TOWARDS DEMOCRACY/INDEPENDENCE
- V. POLITICAL ACTIONS THAT IMPEDE THE PROCESS TO MOVE FORWARD ARE OBSTACLES
- VI. THERE ARE SPECIFIC DISTANCE SIGNS ALONG THE PATH THAT MEASURE THE PARTICIPANTS' PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS
- VII. REFERENDUM IS CATALONIA'S VEHICLE FOR GOING ALONG THE PATH

Catalonia knows where it wants to go. The country seems to know what sort of state it wants to become if it achieves independence and it is by no means an inexperienced traveller. Catalonia "can be traced back a long way" and, just like



Scotland, this journey towards independence is not the first. This previous experience backs the current journey, which is not going to be a pleasant one. The continuous attacks from the Spanish state and the Constitutional High Court will definitely make the process a longer one. In spite of the tortuous path, the country will try “to escape from the Constitution” and “overcome” all the obstacles that may frustrate its aspirations to become an independent state. If it is able to rise to all the challenges it encounters along the way, it will achieve its new status, as it will be recognized as a nation and it will obtain full powers to decide whatever issues concern the country’s future.

Figure 21. Actantial model for A DIFFICULT BUT THRILLING JOURNEY scenario



Source: author

As for THE RIGHT TO DECIDE IS A NECESSARY STAGE IN CATALONIA’S JOURNEY TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE metaphor, the scenario involves the same actors, but Catalonia’s desired object is different. The nation’s aim is not to become an independent state, but to be able to call on a binding referendum that could let Catalan people decide which form of government they should have. In this case, the country is also responsible and encounters legal hindrances from the Spanish High Court and a lack of political will from the Spanish government to resolve

the question. However, on this occasion those in favour of the Catalan cause are numerous because there is a wide majority of Catalan people –not only independence supporters– who are in favour of holding a consultation, like ICV-EUiA, UDC, the Worker’s Commission (CCOO) or the General Union of Workers (UGT) trade unions. Nevertheless, from Catalan pro-independence political actors’ point of view, this narrative works as a helper to accomplish the quest for independence drawn by INDEPENDENCE PROCESS IS A DIFFICULT BUT THRILLING JOURNEY metaphor (Figure 21). In this sense, without voting, independence will not be possible.

### 7.2.2 CONFLICT scenarios: A BATTLE FOR CATALONIA’S FUTURE, CATALONIA IS SPAIN’S PRISONER and A CONFLICT THAT CAN BE SOLVED

There are at least three different scenarios that underlie pro-independence political actors’ metaphorical expressions on CONFLICT/WAR. These scenarios respond, as we have seen above, to different communication strategies, which in this case were used for framing a conflictual situation from three different perspectives. The first one draws on the INDEPENDENCE PROCESS IS A BATTLE metaphor and regards the relationship between Catalonia and the Spanish state as a conflict between “two blocks.” The two fronts are fighting for a different goal. For Catalonia, winning the battle would mean “to gain a better future” that could be lived in a Catalan Republic. Spain, on the contrary, wants to respect the Spanish Constitution, which says that the country’s unity cannot be dissolved. Catalonia’s claim for a self-determination referendum disrupts the current status quo Spain aims to maintain, and, therefore, is the focus of the conflict and triggers the start of the battle.

Although the fight is between the two aforementioned blocks, Catalonia does not command the pro-independence side. As in Scotland, Catalan people act as the subject in the storyline planned by pro-independence political actors. With one noteworthy difference: it was the citizens who started this battle without any mandatory sender asking them to do so or at least not a politically linked one.

**Table 14. Conceptual elements of CONFLICT/WAR metaphors**

| Conceptual elements | Lexemes   |
|---------------------|---|
| CONFLICT/BATTLE     | To gain a better future, future is a conquest, democratic conflict, battle, defend the referendum, we fight to decide, we fight for a Catalan Republic, disobey, not to resign ourselves, fight for our future, we cannot fail, we can make other walls fall, two blocks, against the demophobia of the Spanish state   |
| MILITARY            | Courage and bravery, we cannot surrender to them, we will not give out, safeguard the #9N2014, we defend the people of Catalonia, we are not willing to take away the ballot boxes, not going to surrender, obliged to achieve the victory, we have no alternative but to win, indestructible, to defeat, do not lose strength, let's march on Parliament, has occupied Barcelona, resistance ability, let's take the streets, minimize the opponent, they took our freedom by force, load, attacked, confront, trample ballot boxes, cannot avoid independence |
| SOLDIERS            | Catalan cause volunteers, volunteers army, hundreds and thousands of surnames who defend Catalonia, mobilized Catalan people  |
| THREAT/HARASSMENT   | Fear, demophobia, judicial harassment, silence Catalan people's voice, cannot prevent us from deciding our future, mutilated  |
| PENALTY             | Block the process, close or break bridges, humiliating sentence, uses their tools against the interests of our country's citizenry, absurd prohibitions, imposition, resolves the whole thing with the blow of the hammer, repress <i>estelades</i>   |
| FREEDOM             | Independence is freedom, the desire of freedom, freedom, a future of justice and freedom, people who want to be free, to be free  |
| SLAVERY/VASSALAGE   | No slave morale only the ethics of free people, we do not shrink in front of the Spanish state, we have suffered so many impositions, we are not going to be numb   |
| IMPRISONMENT        | Cut the chains, break all the chains  |
| TERRORISM           | Talibanism  |
| TROUBLE/SOLUTION    | Our hand will continue reaching out for an agreement, we are going to lend our hand, ballot boxes are the solution, resolve this challenge, resolve the future, help democracy in Catalonia, does not want to converse  |

The economic crisis and the home-rule constraints embody the abstract sender that has ordered Catalan people to fight for a better future. In an attempt to assert the bottom-up character of the independence process in Catalonia and to refute the statements made by the Madrid establishment –which insisted on seeing President Mas as a schemer manipulating the Catalan people–, appealing to the “hundreds and thousands of surnames who defend Catalonia” seemed like a good idea. Moreover, by referring to the variety of surnames that would defend Catalonia if necessary, political actors were arguing the cross-sectional nature of independence claimers and pointing out that it was not a matter of identity.


So, there is an “army of volunteers” full of “courage and bravery”, which is ready to fight for the “Catalan cause” against the Spanish state, the anti-subject or the opponent of Catalan people’s fight for independence. The Spanish state, which is moved by demophobia and, thus, will try to abort every attempt to hold a consultation, will have such weapons as “repression”, “imposition”, “fear” or “judicial harassment”, to “attack” Catalan soldiers and undermine their forces.

With these tools the enemy expects to restrict the people’s advances attempts to “defend the referendum”. But Catalan people “cannot surrender” or “give out”, because they are “obliged to achieve victory.” They need to “take the streets” every time the Spanish state tries to “prevent [them] from deciding [their] future” and to “minimize the opponent” so it cannot “trample ballot boxes.” “Safeguard[ing]” the 9 November consultation and being able to maintain and “not take away the ballot boxes” will mean that the Catalan people’s quest has been satisfactorily achieved and that the desired conjunction between the subject and the object has taken place. To successfully accomplish the contract established in this narrative program is understood as a step forward in Catalonia’s quest for being free (Figure 22) and, therefore, A BATTLE FOR CATALONIA’S FUTURE scenario turns into a helper for CATALONIA IS SPAIN’S PRISONER scenario.

**Conceptual mappings for CONFLICT/WAR metaphors**

- I. INDEPENDENCE PROCESS IS A BATTLE BETWEEN CATALONIA AND THE SPANISH STATE
- II. CATALONIA'S FUTURE IS SOMETHING THAT HAS TO BE FOUGHT FOR
- III. CLAIMANTS FOR A REFERENDUM IN CATALONIA ARE THE SOLDIERS FIGHTING IN THE BATTLE
- IV. CATALONIA IS A PRISONER WHO WANTS TO BE FREE
- V. SPANISH STATE IS THE CAPTOR THAT HAS JAILED CATALONIA
- VI. INDEPENDENCE IS FREEDOM
- VII. HOLDING A REFERENDUM IS THE SOLUTION TO A PROBLEM THAT NEEDS TO BE SOLVED

**Figure 22. Actantial model for A BATTLE FOR CATALONIA'S FUTURE and CATALONIA IS SPAIN'S PRISONER scenario**




Source: author

The second scenario presents Catalonia as being incarcerated by the Spanish state and continues to maintain the dichotomy between these two sides. Catalonia is not a *patient* object waiting for being liberated, but an active subject who will “not resign itself” and will fight for its freedom. The “desire of freedom”, thus, is what moves Catalonia to take action to reach the country’s

main goal: “to be free” again. Because the stateless nation has not always been a prisoner. Spain “took [Catalonia’s] freedom by force” and placed several impositions on it, 300 years ago. For this reason, Catalonia aims to recover the status it had enjoyed before 11 September 1714 and this is why it will struggle to “cut the chains” that keep the country handcuffed to the Spanish state. Cutting these chains and “disobeying” the “absurd prohibitions” of the Spanish state will give Catalonia the opportunity not to “be numb” anymore in front of Spain’s promises, but to be free. Somehow, the PRISONER scenario is linked to the BATTLE one, as it is the Catalan people fighting for independence who act as Catalonia’s helpers in the country’s quest to gain freedom. Their fight will help Catalonia to break free from the Spanish state.

Catalonia will truly gain its freedom when it governs itself as an independent state while the Catalan people who have fought for the country’s liberation will receive the benefits of living in it. However, Catalonia’s mission will not be sanctioned until their opponents –either the Spanish state or the International Community– recognize the country’s legitimacy to be free.

**Figure 23. Actantial model for A CONFLICT THAT CAN BE SOLVED scenario**



Source: author

The last scenario developed by CONFLICT/WAR metaphors is set out in terms of the dichotomy problem/solution. The metaphor REFERENDUM AS THE SOLUTION TO A PROBLEM THAT NEEDS TO BE SOLVED means that there is a problem that has altered the status quo and that to recover or to create a new one requires a solution. It

takes two to quarrel, so at least two different actors have to resolve the problem, as they are part of it. The problem is none other than Catalan people's claims for independence and only an agreement between the Catalan and Spanish governments can respond to them. Nevertheless, the problem is by no means easy to solve as one of the parts involved does not want to acknowledge that the problem exists. By denying people's demands for self-determination, the Spanish state does not consider the possibility that Catalonia can hold a consultation on the very issue the people voted the Catalan government into power, which brings the conflictual situation to a standstill. Even so, the Catalan government persisted in asking the Spanish state for a solution and repeatedly stated that its "hand will continue reaching out for an agreement" in order to "resolve this challenge." The Spanish government's refusal to authorize a referendum similar to the Scottish one shows that it does not think "ballot boxes are the solution," as Catalan political actors argue. This converts La Moncloa<sup>135</sup> into the Generalitat's anti-subject, since the former "does not want to converse" and so prevents Catalan people from voting on a referendum. Therefore, the central government does not allow the Catalan government to reach the desired solution to independence claims, which would be to call a legal referendum.

### 7.2.3 FOOTBALL MATCH and CARD GAME scenarios

Catalan political actors used GAME/SPORTS metaphors to conceptualize the cut and thrust of the non-existent negotiations to hold a referendum. After several attempts to get the necessary permission to organize a consultation that would meet full legal requirements, the Catalan parliament finally decided to pass its own bill that could be used as a legal framework so that the people could vote on 9 November. On 27 September 2014, President Artur Mas signed the decree calling for a self-determination referendum vote on 9 November 2014, which was the trigger of several legal disputes between the Catalan government and the Spanish government. These arguments take place in two different scenarios,

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<sup>135</sup> The Palace of La Moncloa is the official residence of the Spanish Prime Minister, but also a metonym for referring to the central government in Spain.

THE FOOTBALL MATCH and THE CARD GAME, which interact with each other under the conceptual domain of GAME/SPORTS.

Thinking about LEGAL DISPUTES AS A FOOTBALL MATCH means that there will necessarily be different participants whose abilities will influence the final result. Among them, Catalan people, who are “called up” to be members of the team that will “work to win” the match, stand out. They are “indispensable for winning” and have the moral duty to take part as the Catalan government persists in trying to hold a referendum because it was “the clamour of Catalan people.” Hence, both Generalitat and civil pro-independence associations aim for them to make “the final push” and to lead “the most important challenge” in the country’s recent history, which has been “put into [their] hands.” Political actors, therefore, become the mandatory senders of a quest in which Catalan people and the holding of a referendum vote are the subject and the object the described narrative program.

**Table 15. Conceptual elements of GAME/SPORTS metaphors**

| Conceptual elements | Lexemes  |
|---------------------|--|
| GAME                | Let’s win, we will win, is played in Catalonia, we must win, we must work to win, Catalonia has won, indispensable for winning   |
| MATCH               | A huge challenge, the most important challenge, the challenge we put into your hands, we risk it all, let’s make the final push, we are called up, referee, foul play, they will play to discredit |
| CARD GAME           | We will not show our cards, we would have won at least half of the round   |
| SUPPORTERS          | Massive clamour, people’s clamour, the clamour of Catalan people, leadership comes from the people   |
| CELEBRATION         | A burst of democracy and freedom   |



The Constitutional High Court is the referee, but will not act as such. Despite being a judicial organization, which means it should be fair-minded, it does not act impartially. For instance, it does not penalize the Spanish government's "foul play" and that makes it more difficult for Catalonia to win the match. Hence, following the political actors' reasoning, the Constitutional High Court cannot sanction the Catalan people's quest or prevent them from having a say in the referendum. The same institution that was responsible for cutting back the Statute in 2010 cannot be the receiver who sanctions the action now. This is why the Generalitat will reward the Catalan people come what may and will let them vote in a non-binding participatory consultation provided that they take charge of it.


***Conceptual mappings for GAME/SPORTS metaphors***

- I. THE LEGAL DISPUTE SURROUNDING THE 9 NOVEMBER CONSULTATION IS A FOOTBALL MATCH BETWEEN THE CATALAN AND SPANISH GOVERNMENTS
- II. CATALAN PEOPLE ARE PICKED TO PLAY IN THIS MATCH
- III. CATALAN PEOPLE ARE FOOTBALL PLAYERS
- IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL HIGH COURT IS THE REFEREE OF THE MATCH
- V. THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT BANS ARE FOUL PLAY
- VI. THE MATCH IS FIXED IN FAVOUR OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT
- VII. HOLDING A REFERENDUM IS THE TROPHY TO BE WON
- VIII. THE LEGAL DISPUTE SURROUNDING THE 9 NOVEMBER CONSULTATION IS A CARD GAME BETWEEN THE CATALAN AND SPANISH GOVERNMENTS
- IX. HOLDING A REFERENDUM IS CATALONIA'S WAGER

While the negotiation process is still on course, political actors will not throw in the towel and are going to look for alternative ways to organize the referendum vote. In their role as the helpers of the Catalan people, they will start a parallel game to see how they can hold the promised consultation. Every good play in the game against the Spanish government will be understood as a move that takes the Catalan people closer to the 9 November vote. Because they were sure they would

hold the referendum in one way or another, they said say they “will not show [their] cards” to avoid Spain’s counterattack. The Catalan government’s *royal flush* that wins the game is represented by the government’s help in the logistics of the participatory consultation without taking any further part in it (Figure 24).

Figure 24. Actantial model for FOOTBALL MATCH and GAMBLING CARD GAME scenarios



Source: author

#### 7.2.4 REACHING ADULTHOOD, MISTREATED COUPLE and DAUGHTER OF DICTATORSHIP scenarios

As in other source domains, FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP metaphors also gave rise to different scenarios within a single shared source domain. These scenarios helped to shape the main storylines for a variety of argumentative strategies carried out by pro-independence political actors. The first of these scenarios is linked to Catalonia’s claims for self-government and is presented in terms of a country that is coming of age, after more than 30 years as an autonomous community. The second one aims to explain the fruitless relationship between

Catalonia and the Spanish state through the use of MARRIAGE/DIVORCE metaphorical expressions. The third scenario is particularly interesting as it is entirely devoted to the construction of the “enemy”, which focuses on the Spanish Constitution’s illegitimacy when forbidding Catalonia to vote. In order to discredit the Magna Carta, pro-independence political actors opted to directly link the most important law in Spain with Franco’s dictatorship and, thus, present it as anti-democratic.

**Table 16. Conceptual elements of FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP metaphors**

| Conceptual elements | Lexemes   |
|---------------------|---|
| ADULTHOOD           | We have not come here to ask for permission, we are old enough to do it, wants to be governed itself, we will never ask for permission, masters of our future |
| LEGACY              | A great legacy, we are heirs  |
| LOVE                | A love message, true love is based on respect, we love Spaniards and Castilian  |
| FRIENDSHIP          | Will win a friend   |
| FAMILY              | To leave Spain without losing family bonds, our common history will continue  |
| CHILD               | Daughter of Francoism’s unpunished reform, daughter of the soldiers   |
| DIVORCE/SEPARATION  | The best for Catalonia and the State, Spain has let Catalonia down, Spain must let Catalonia go, break up, not voting separates us, frustration               |
| MARRIAGE            | Spain should treat Catalonia with respect, cannot continue this way, Catalonia belongs to Spain, voting joins us, democracy unites us                         |


In the CATALONIA IS OF LEGAL AGE AND DOES NOT HAVE TO ASK FOR PERMISSION metaphor, the country aims to demonstrate that it is ready to “be governed by itself.” Catalonia is now an adult, ready to be part of the European community and become the “master of [its] future.” What drives the country to action is inheriting “a great legacy” that has to do with the memory of a time when it was independent, and, consequently, could act as an adult. The great legacy that motivates Catalonia’s quest is also related to the 300-year struggle of the country’s ancestors for living as an independent state. Perhaps Catalonia does not have a clear idea of what it wants to become while it is growing up, but what it knows for sure is that it is “old enough”, so it “will never ask for permission.” Having competences will ensure that Catalonia will obtain the desired status and be recognised as an equal by their European peers.

*Conceptual mappings for FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP metaphors*

- I. CATALONIA IS A PERSON
- II. CATALONIA IS SPAIN’S CHILD
- III. CATALONIA IS OF LEGAL AGE AND DOES NOT HAVE TO ASK FOR PERMISSION
- IV. CATALAN PEOPLE HAVE INHERITED THEIR ANCESTORS CLAIM
- V. CATALONIA AND SPAIN ARE IN A LOVE RELATIONSHIP
- VI. SPAIN IS MISTREATING CATALONIA
- VII. CATALONIA AND SPAIN ARE GETTING DIVORCED
- VIII. THE SPANISH CONSTITUTION IS FRANCO’S DAUGHTER

The Spanish state acts here as the parent that does not agree with the son’s decision and is, therefore, presented as a strict father who does not want to persuade Catalonia to stay at their common home, but at the same time it prohibits the stateless nation to leave. Spain’s resistance to “let Catalonia go” is what will make this recognition difficult, so the Catalan government and other political actors will try to help Catalonia by convincing the Spanish state that it is ready to flee the coop and live its own life as an independent state

Figure 25. Actantial model for REACHING ADULTHOOD scenario




Source: author

The relationship with the Spanish state is also framed in terms of A COUPLE THAT IS GETTING DIVORCED. Because it has been “let down” and “cannot continue this way”, Catalonia has started the procedure to “break up” from Spain. Tired of being mistreated, Catalonia reminds Spain that “true love is based on respect” and that this has not been a feature of their relationship. Even now, when Catalonia is about to end the relationship, Spain makes no attempt at reconciliation, and the former’s desperate attempts to convince the latter that “democracy unites” and “not to vote separates us” have been a waste of time. Hence, Catalonia is “frustrated” about not being able to find a solution to this situation and is seeking divorce from Spain as “the best for [them both].”

Working in a future relationship based on friendship and “family bonds” is the only way to make sure their “common history will continue.” This belief involves reconciling the Catalan people who were born in other parts of Spain with the independence process. Like civic nationalism, the pro-independence move in Catalonia has made an effort to broaden its social basis, which necessarily involved bringing citizens into the fold who feel comfortable with their Spanish identity but see independence as an opportunity to live in a better country in economic and welfare terms.

**Figure 26. Actantial model for MISTREATED COUPLE and DAUGHTER OF DICTATORSHIP scenarios**



Source: author

Finally, the last FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP scenario compares the Spanish Constitution and, consequently, the nation state's regime to Franco's dictatorship. This historical period is still present in the minds of many people, and particularly in the minds of those who suffered repression or impositions. In Catalonia, speaking Catalan was forbidden during Franco's dictatorship and became a daily –and therefore a well-remembered– act of repression. In the SPANISH CONSTITUTION IS FRANCO'S DAUGHTER metaphor, political actors aim to highlight how the Spanish transition to democracy came about. Although it is commonly described as an exemplary transition, several critical voices point out that the Constitution's apparently open character is a concession to the reactionary establishment that did not look favourably on democracy. By associating the intransigence of a dictatorship with the way in which the Spanish government is acting, pro-independence political actors want to highlight the supposed better status for Catalonia and reinforce the claims for democracy of the pro-independence cause. This narrative is dedicated to the construction of the opponent, as Figure 26 shows.

### 7.3 Concluding remarks on the comparative analysis of discursive strategies in the independence processes of Scotland and Catalonia

As stated throughout this thesis, the most valuable contribution of describing the scenarios is that it makes it possible to go further into the political ideas underlying metaphor use. After reviewing the main thoughts associated with the scenarios constructed, I aim to compare the results displayed above and conclude if there were similarities and/or differences in the independence processes analysed.

In Scotland, the pro-independence political actors seemed to base their discourses on a governance system that rejected Westminster policies. However, the various scenarios in which metaphors are used did not reveal much about policy issues, only that if Scotland were to be independent, the future would be better. The truth is that, although there may be elaborate and well-reasoned arguments for backing independence within the Scottish debate, they were often sustained by opposition to the current (and, of course, unsatisfactory) situation the country has experienced as part of the UK. This opposition was conceptualized both in terms of a BATTLE THAT HAS TO BE WON and of a SPORTS COMPETITION, which are the two scenarios in which people get the whole agency as they are proposed as the subject responsible for the outcome of both situations. This was mainly due to the nature of the campaign, in which civil society was highly engaged (Mitchell 2016) as they had been encouraged by political actors to tip the balance in favour of the Yes vote, since electoral predictions showed tight results in the referendum vote.

In the other scenarios, Scotland tended to be presented, at the same time, as the subject who struggled to obtain the desired object and as the subject who benefited from achieving the mission's goal. This was the case for a CONFIDENT SCOTLAND UNDERTAKING A QUIET JOURNEY scenario and BEING OF LEGAL AGE, which were proposed with the objective of underlining Scotland's condition of an adult and mature country that is prepared to face the challenges that

becoming an independent country would entail. BEING OF LEGAL AGE, which was a scenario shared with Catalan political actors' discourses, can be classified under what we know as counterpower discourses. Likewise, in order to legitimate Scotland and Catalonia's will to become independent and their motives for doing so, pro-independence politicians tried to build an alternative discourse to the official version of the nation-state government, which regarded national unity as the only possible situation.

Nevertheless, claiming independence in both Scotland and Catalonia needs to be framed under the stage of the disruption of the status quo, in keeping with the narrative schema that guides both our interpretation and the scenario construction. The disruption is promoted by the wish to break up the relationship each stateless nation maintains with their corresponding nation states. In both cases, the relationship is not working as it should and the members that make up the couple do not cohabit in a healthy fashion. This is the reason given for separating and cooperating in the future as friends. Nevertheless, in Catalonia it is made clear that the country is filing for divorce because it has been mistreated, and in this it is widely supported by civil society, who act as the mandatory sender requesting Catalonia to initiate legal procedures. Discussing self-determination in terms of divorce means that both parts have the same level of agency. This was the case for Scotland after the Edinburgh agreement was signed, but the same cannot be said of Catalonia in an objective manner. And this is what made the situation there more tumultuous, as a divorce by mutual agreement is not the same as when one of the members of the couple refuses to sign on the dotted line.

Despite this situation, pro-independence political actors in Catalonia insisted on treating the separation as a bilateral matter even though they knew that it was really not in their hands to continue with the divorce demand. For this reason, considerable effort was made to stress the bottom-up character of the independence process, since it was the only way to legitimate independence claims and to promise independence supporters that maintaining the process



alive was the only way to ensure it would come to an end with a referendum vote. Hence, it was the Catalan people who fought for Catalonia's future and who were the players who had to win the match against the Spanish state. The Catalan people acted as the subject that had to resolve the current conflictual situation of Catalonia. This strategy contrasted with the one adopted by the Spanish state, which insisted that the people were manipulated by the leadership of Artur Mas and the Catalan political class who supported independence. But Catalan people, like the Scots, are also asked to exercise their commitment to the independence process by helping Catalonia and Scotland arrive at the final stage of their journey towards the own state.

It must be noted that, unlike Scotland, where the No Campaign was tagged – like Westminster – as the opponent, in Catalonia either the Spanish state or the Spanish Constitution, not the Spanish people, were highlighted as the entities aiming to undermine Catalonia's independence process. This does not mean that Scottish political actors attacked those defending a No vote. It was only that a simple binary answer and two clear camps defending one option or the other made it easier to discredit the unionist campaign without causing offence to the Scottish people who did not back independence. In Catalonia, however, where identity issues are much more complicated as there is a high percentage of people who feel both Catalan and Spanish, an effort was made to separate the demands of independence from being and feeling just Catalan. For this reason, political actors insisted on differentiating support for an independent state from identity and qualified the independence process as a reaction against the Spanish government's outrageous attitude towards Catalonia, but never against Spaniards.

The national and cultural background of both societies is, of course, relevant to any debate of their discursive differences. In general terms, Scotland freely decided to become part of a wider state and so can now decide if it wants to recover its independent status because of its disenchantment with the way it is being treated by Westminster. As for Catalonia, the country is presented as

having been captive for 300 years by the Spanish state, as it was conquered by force. Moreover, its current situation is presented as the result of a deceitful and incomplete transition to democracy, which took place under the influence of Franco's dictatorship, and this is now being denounced as undemocratic.

As well as the similarities and differences between the independence processes in the two stateless nations, it would also be interesting to compare these results with the results of what the media in each country said during the period analysed. Dekavalla (2016a), for instance, focused on the framing of the Scottish referendum campaign in the press and concludes that game and policy frames were the most prominent, while self-determination and divorce frames were less used by the media to talk about Scotland's vote. It is interesting to compare these results with the present ones, because the media discussed the independence debate within frameworks that were not so different from the ones suggested by political actors through the scenario construction. As far as Catalonia is concerned, Carlos A. Ballesteros Herencia (2015) upholds that conflict was the frame that was most used to refer to 9 November in the two weeks before the consultation. Of course the two studies are not scientifically comparable as they analyse different periods of time with different approaches, but it is not surprising that the information about an issue marked by the absence of a real debate and by an ongoing legal battle is framed in terms of conflict and not something else.

In this thesis we only reflect on the influence political discourses and the media have on forming public opinion from a theoretical perspective. Nevertheless, in our aim to evaluate if there is a correspondence between what political actors and users say about independence processes in Catalonia and Scotland, the following chapter will discuss some results that show that political actors' use of metaphor does affect users' evaluation.

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CLAIMING INDEPENDENCE IN 140 CHARACTERS. USES OF METAPHOR IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCOTTISH AND CATALAN P

Carlota Maria Moragas Fernández

## Chapter 8

### Users' reaction to independence discourses

The present chapter needs to be understood within the framework of reception studies, although the limitations of this research and the qualitative perspective I use to approach the object of study mean that the results are not generalizable. However, they do identify some interesting trends that could be helpful in future studies on the role of audience in online discussion around conflictive issues, which needs to be approached from a quantitative perspective due to the large size of the potential samples. The first section of this chapter aims to introduce these trends and explain them. This is why, with section 6.1 as a reference, section 8.1 detects and exemplifies those features that were important in terms of Twitter use and the online discussion generated around independence processes in Scotland and Catalonia. Section 8.2 provides the information gathered on metaphor use from the users' statements analysed, and the attitude (endorsement/rejection/neutral) these users showed towards independence when tweeting. The percentages are based on the corpus of all the metaphorical expressions identified in the selected sample, so the information provided below must be understood in this context.

#### 8.1. Major features in users' online debate of independence processes

When reviewing the online debate of independence in Scotland and Catalonia, I presupposed that I would find users who were skilful with 2.0 technologies. As I discuss in this section, many users were good at managing Twitter and taking advantage of its mechanisms but I also found examples of what was mentioned in Chapter 3: having a Smartphone does not make you an informed member of what Dahlgren (2005) considered the public. Even though it is true that most

citizens can access political discussions being on the network –and, from a democratic point of view, they must be encouraged to do so– they should do so in a way that fosters the comparison of different ideas, not the abrupt expression of polarized statements. The statements in the corpus show that the trend among users commenting on independence in Scotland and Catalonia was more the latter than the former. Thus, although the analysed tweets were often broadcast in a moderate tone, they tended to express either strong pro-independence or pro-union support. Nevertheless, there were exceptions to the rule, and some users refused to discuss the issue in such a limited space while others made real attempts to participate in a conversation without falling into the extreme positions the 140-character limitation seems to favour:

@soapyfrogs – 10 January 2012: When the #indyref happens I'll avoid following the debate on Twitter. The multiple 140 char 'arguments' I've seen tonight are too depressing.

@outofcat – 16 October 2014: #seeyouonSunday Twitter, like democracy, gives voice equally to smart and to stupid. So, let's vote more and tweet less #9N2014

Other users took advantage of the micro-discursive features of Twitter and explored the tool's possibilities for political engagement in offline activities. The following example shows a Twitter chain that was set in motion once President Mas had signed the decree calling for a self-determination referendum. This chain consisted of nominating other Twitter users and encouraging them to vote in the participatory consultation that was to be held on 9 November 2014:

@claudiasamperan – 27 September 2014: @teresa\_estruch has called up me #wearecalledup9N and I call up @marinagaju14 @polgaju @evampastor

These kinds of action can be understood under what Jenkins (2006) classified as new ways of doing politics. For instance, the proliferation of edited images or memes backing or rejecting independence processes in Scotland and Catalonia


(Figure 27) can be easily confirmed just by glancing at some of the statements picked out of the selected sample:

Figure 27. Edited pictures backing or refusing independence by users

@jakimccarthy – 21 March 2013: Playing your part in history in 2014 and taking Scotland forward for generations to come. Vote YES. #indyref #YES2014



@GordonAikman – 21 March 2013: It's just not true that we pay more in taxes than we get back in spending #scotnight #indyref Here are the facts:



@MiquelCAT1714 – 29 September 2014: They won't stop us #9N2014  
#YesYes #Unitedfor9N #CatalansVote9N #BallotboxesorDUI #DUI<sup>136</sup>  
#newcountry #tercentenary



The special television or radio programmes that were scheduled on the key dates analysed and their protagonists were also the object of discussion on Twitter. Going back to the concept of “viewertariat” I outlined in Chapter 3, during the period analysed a parallel debate to the one that was carried out in the media was promoted by users, who created a community around the hashtag of the TV or radio programme in question:

@dhothersall – 25 January 2012: Not watched either of tonight's TV debates, but everyone on Twitter confirms that their side won hands down, so that's super #indyref #sp4

@donaldjmunro – 25 January 2012: Poor debate on #indyref tonight. All parties need to put bickering and point scoring to one side to allow us make an informed decision

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<sup>136</sup> DUI is the acronym for “Declaració Unilateral d’Independència” which means “Unilateral Declaration of Independence” and was seen as the last option if the referendum couldn’t be held.

@neus\_pages – 27 September 2014: Great interview given by  
#presidentMasTV3 This is a committed leader and he has risen to the  
occasion! #wearecalledup9N

@sjordi – 27 September 2014: I take off my hat to #presidentMasTV3 He  
was perfect! It is clear that we are going to vote! #wearecalledup9N  
@govern

Some users also used Twitter to show their disagreement with the way political events were being covered. Participants in the online debate judged the quality of the information they received about the independence process and criticized the source that provided the information on which they were supposed to make a decision on their vote:

@ScottyC1314 – 21 March 2013: Can't face watching #bbcscotland  
coverage of #indyref date announcement. Such a historic day... wouldn't  
want the Unionist media to spoil it

In the content of the online independence debate, we must highlight the public's awareness of the use of metaphorical expressions by other users and their ideological implications:

@rattlecans – 10 January 2012: @angelasmithmp Why are you choosing  
to use the word 'defend' in relation to the Union and #indyref? Scotland is  
not attacking you #strange


@angel\_simon – 9 November 2014: A frontier is an imagined line. You  
cannot mix it up with a wall or a fence. #ChesterCatalanFrontiers  
#Cataloniawins

But, as Section 8.2 shows, users also took advantage of metaphors –and especially visual metaphors– when tweeting their opinion on the ongoing independence process, as Figure 28 shows:



Figure 28. Visual metaphors in users' statements

@ganyet – 11 September 2014: The third way<sup>137</sup> right now. #11s2014 #v  
instagram.com/p/szd2lik-Yg/



@EnriqueArduino – 29 September 2014: #wearecalledup9N We have received so much [no responses] that we don't care for another one. Now it is time to do it #9N2014 #wewillvoteandwewillwin



Likewise, if we focus on language use and the similarities between users' statements and political actors' discourses, we find that citizens also used well-known quotes in a metadiscursive way and that they were keen on using irony, plays on words or crossed references between each independence process. For instance, popular Catalan verses or internationally known statements about the

<sup>137</sup> The “third way” was the expression independence supporters used to refer the federalism option that claimed it was nonexistent, as the visual metaphor here point out.

difficulties of struggling for freedom was a frequent practice within pro-independence users' commentaries:

@ANC\_Centelles – 11 September 2013: Ens mantindrem sempre fidels al servei d'aquest poble<sup>138</sup> (We will always be devoted to serving this people). Emotion and pride @assemblea #catalanway #croquetes

@davidmarchuet – 11 September 2013: Que tremoli l'enemic, en veient la nostra ensenya. Com fem caure espigues d'or, quan convé seguem cadenes<sup>139</sup> (May the enemy tremble, on seeing our symbol. Just as we cut golden ears of wheat, when the time comes we shall cut off the chains) #catalanway #croquetes

@patricia9barris – 9 November 2014: Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre minds. Albert Einstein #CataloniaWins

However, of the language resources available to users, irony seemed to be the one they preferred judging by the number of tweets that aimed to make other users laugh:

@Official\_Grant – 10 January 2012: political party sticks to manifesto commitment. Seems to be big news, eh? #indyref

@MAQ\_Ecosse – 10 January 2012: @theSNP @NicolaSturgeon the wording of the vote question is easy – “Remember Maggie Thatcher! So Do YOU as Scots want Tory rule? #indyref

@neurotaylor – 15 October 2012: #indyref Would it help if UK government apologised for behaviour of Edward I?

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<sup>138</sup> This line is from Salvador Espriu's poem “Inici de càntic en el temple” (Beginning of a chant in the temple).

<sup>139</sup> “Els Segadors” (The reapers) is Catalonia's national anthem.

@LevNovotny – 23 January 2013: #declarationofsovereignty Fernando VII: 'Bolívar you cannot become independent, it is against the law.' Bolívar: I laugh in your face.

@Perejp – 12 December 2013: Mayas were wrong about the date, the apocalypse is scheduled for #9N2014 and we will take off towards the Milky Way

@jmas1983 – 16 October 2014: #9N2014 consequences? Sirens are wailing! The bombing is starting, let's go to the air-raid shelter

Plays on words were also common in the Catalan debate. Particularly popular was the comparison of the Empress Elizabeth of Austria (who was popularly known as Sisi) to pro-independence answer to the double question –Sí/Sí (Yes/Yes) – which was a homophone of the empress' name:

@FinaFolch – 12 December 2013: #9N2014 #sísi (#yesyes)



The “mirror metaphor” or mirror effect, which presents Scotland as a model for Catalonia, was continuously used during the period in which the Scottish independence process took place:

@dmontserratonono – 5 May 2011: First polls say SNP getting an overall majority that could let it call an independence referendum. That would be great! #SP11

@AngieBCN – 10 January 2012: Congratulations from Catalonia! Don't miss this opportunity! Go and fight for your freedom! Good luck!  
#Scotland #indyref #snp #scotfwd

@joan\_elias – 19 September 2014: Scottish people have let their train pass by. Ours is delayed and we cannot miss it #nowistimefordoingit #9N2014

@francescverdu – 19 September 2014: Catalonia cannot be compared to Scotland or Quebec for one simple reason: SPAIN IS DIFFERENT  
#cataloniascotland #9N2014 #8aldia

@anadalg – 19 September 2014: Scotland has said no to independence. Cameron offers “tea for all” instead. All in all, Catalans know how this is going to end #9N2014

What is noteworthy about the analysis of the statements made by users within the Scottish debate is that, unlike the political actors, they referred to the Catalan case and considered Catalonia as a peer that wanted to achieve a similar goal:

@SNPdavid – 11 September 2012: Awesome pictures of marches in Barcelona supporting independence; best wishes to colleagues in @Esquerra\_ERC #11s2012

@LeaskyHT – 15 October 2012: World & #indyref Nasty piece from Spanish unionists saying Scotland is a real country but Catalunya not. Hispanidad.com

Identity issues appeared more frequently in Catalan users' tweets, who pointed to the celebration of the 300th anniversary of Catalonia's defeat as the proper moment to restart the country's quest for independence:

@edicode – 11 September 2012: 300 years ago we said it in a tougher manner: 'We will live free or we will die!' Today I say this to them in their style: "Let's go!" Good night #11s2012

@pacoriviere – 11 September 2012: I am for independence because now it is time for it. Because we have been resisting 300 hundred long years, since Almansa. #freedomforCatalonia #11s2012

On the other hand, the discussion in Scotland focused on the democratic aspects of voting Yes, and the possibility of Scotland exercising its home rule without any restriction and disassociating the Yes camp from the political party that brought independence into the agenda. Moreover, the idea of having a serious and reasoned debate on such an important decision for the country was also promoted by online participants in the independence conversation:

@AngusMacNeilSNP – 25 May 2012: US Republicans would never get elected in UK. Tories not get elected to govern Scot, yet they do. Nation should get what it votes #YesScot

@JaimeMurray86 – 25 May 2012: Too many people confusing Yes vote with SNP. This is bigger than any one political party #YesScot

@AldoW83 – 15 October 2012: #indyref most important decision we will ever make! Respect that... facts and reasoned judgement, not emotion, or sentiment #tooimportant

Finally, although there were allusions to the European Union and the importance of being recognized by its members, other discursive approaches to the institution were identified:

@catdiuprou – 23 January 2013: Remember the European seed of the agreement we've seen today in the parliament, the trident @raulromeva, @ramontremosa, @junqueras #altogether #declarationofsovereignty

@polleetickle – 15 October 2012: #indyref - yes OR no [either independent with unknown status or union retained aside from possibly being a lesser or a greater part of #EU]

In the case of Catalonia, the EU recognized the declaration of sovereignty signed by CiU, ERC and ICV-EUiA as one of the outputs of the good relationship between the three MPs at the European Parliament. As for Scotland, the example presented above shows that the outcome of voting yes or no is far from clear and carries the debate beyond the polarization a binary question entails.

## 8.2. Identifying similarities and differences in the uses of metaphor within the virtual public sphere

After analysing the 3600 users' statements (n2) that were collected at random during the 12 events selected for each independence process, I determined that nearly 12 per cent used metaphorical expressions when discussing independence on Twitter. Although this percentage seems to be a long way from the 24 per cent in sample (n1), it will show whether the online debate on independence processes in Scotland and Catalonia is undertaken within the mental frameworks created by political actors. In terms of frequency, users discussing independence in Scotland used metaphorical expressions at a frequency of 7.8 per cent, while in Catalonia this percentage increased by nearly 7 per cent, with metaphors representing 14.5 per cent out of all the tweets examined. The relation between the two percentages of metaphor is the same as that of the Scottish and Catalan political actors. What must be stressed, however, is that within the corpus analysed, around 40 per cent of users commenting on the independence processes in Scotland and Catalonia were mostly public/citizens, whose profiles did not give any explicit indication of their support to pro-independence and/or pro-union causes. Although their profiles did not show which political option they stood for, in the Catalan case only 5 tweets rejected independence while the remaining 117 backed it. As for Scotland, results show that within the 55 public/citizen statements analysed, 13 defended the union or criticized independence whereas the other 41 were favourable to an independent Scotland, and only 1 statement was neutral.

**Table 17. Frequency of metaphor use per user's affiliation/job in relation to the statements analysed in the debate on independence in Scotland and Catalonia**


| User's affiliation/job                  | Scottish case | Frequency     | Catalan Case | Frequency     |
|---|---------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|
| <b>Public/citizen</b>                   | <b>55</b>     | <b>39.3%</b>  | <b>122</b>   | <b>46.7%</b>  |
| Journalist/media                        | 5             | 3.57%         | 17           | 6.51%         |
| Lobbyist                                | 0             | 0%            | 0            | 0%            |
| Industry                                | 0             | 0%            | 0            | 0%            |
| Authority                               | 1             | 0.71%         | 2            | 0.76%         |
| Celebrity                               | 1             | 0.71%         | 0            | 0%            |
| Pro-independence politician or party    | 17            | 12.14%        | 30           | 11.5%         |
| Pro-right to decide politician or party | 0             | 0%            | 3            | 1.15%         |
| Pro-union politician or party           | 8             | 5.71%         | 0            | 0%            |
| <b>Pro-independence activist</b>        | <b>36</b>     | <b>25.71%</b> | <b>76</b>    | <b>29.12%</b> |
| Pro-right to decide activist            | 0             | 0%            | 1            | 0.38%         |
| Pro-union activist                      | 8             | 5.71%         | 5            | 1.92%         |
| Unknown                                 | 9             | 6.43%         | 5            | 1.92%         |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                            | <b>140</b>    | <b>7.8%</b>   | <b>261</b>   | <b>14.5%</b>  |

Source: Author

Pro-independence activists, who actively participated in the debate, tended to follow the same pattern as public/citizens and pro-independence politicians or parties, all of whom endorsed political actors' views on independence. On the other hand, the "no side" seemed not to engage in the debate as much as their opponents did, Their tweets represented 11.5 per cent of the total tweets in Scotland and 1.92 per cent in Catalonia, where the pro-right to decide parties, politicians or activists' statements were anecdotic. This reinforces the hypothesis that online discussions tend to be polarized. The attitude towards independence and the participation in the debate on the issue in other collectives

such as journalist/media, lobbyist, industry, authority or celebrity were non-existent or not as important as the groups pointed out above.

**Figure 29. Users' political attitude towards Scottish independence based on their affiliation/job**




Source: author

The endorsement of independence presents a similar trend in Figures 29 and 30, and this endorsement is made explicit in Figure 31, which groups the number of tweets that back independence discourses. Nevertheless, we should point out two features of users' comments in the Scottish case: firstly, there is a higher number of rejection responses to independence and, secondly, unlike in Catalonia, some comments show a neutral attitude towards the referendum issue. These two features could be also an expression of the contextual situation surrounding both independence processes, as in Catalonia there was no "official" campaign to stay in Spain. The position taken by pro-union political actors was to deny the very existence of an independence movement from the citizenry so they usually refused to enter the debate when asked to do so.




**Figure 30. Users political attitude towards Catalan independence based on their affiliation/job**



Source: author

**Figure 31. Endorsement, rejection and neutral percentage of tweets in the online independence debate in Scotland and Catalonia**



Source: author

The dates on which the highest number of conceptual metaphors were used also coincided in Scotland and in Catalonia with those of the political actors, as figures 32 and 33 show. In Scotland, the announcement of the date on which the referendum would take place was the day on which the highest number of metaphorical expressions were used in the selected sample. Together with the Edinburgh agreement and the 18<sup>th</sup> September 2014, it was perhaps the most important event in the Scottish independence process timeline, as it finally placed in the collective mind of the United Kingdom the exact date on which their common history could change.

Because of the importance of this event, it is not surprising that users were prone to comment on it and to conceptualize that date as a milestone in Scotland's march towards independence. For instance, they looked at the announcement of the 18<sup>th</sup> September as starting a "countdown to freedom" which is to lead the country to its "date with destiny:"


@Uumellmahaye2 – 21 March 2013: The countdown to freedom is on, I cannae wait, we just have to convince the doubters first, plenty of time to do that #indyref

@allangrogan – 21 March 2013: Sept 18th 2014 date with destiny. Looking forward to a campaign of hope. Vote yes for better future. #yes #labour4indy #indyref

It was not such an epic moment for all the users tweeting about the event. In the case of those who opposed independence, the COUNTDOWN metaphor was used with a different purpose, as it initiated a period for Scotland staying in the union:

@DrewSm1th – 21 March 2013: So the countdown has begun, let's get on better.tg/Xs2Rlg #indyref #bettertogether @UK\_Together #countmein

Figure 32. Evolution of metaphor use on key dates in the Scottish independence process



Source: author

Figure 32 shows the decrease in metaphor use as the campaign moved forward and the conflictual aspects of the referendum negotiation diminished. This matches one of the objectives the present study aims to fulfil, which is to identify if the use of metaphor tends to decrease in those situations in which conflictual issues are more clearly defined.


With regard to Catalonia, 8 April 2014 was the day on which metaphor use reached its maximum (Figure 33). As mentioned in Chapter 6, this date was entirely dedicated to the conceptualization of the Catalonia/Spain relationship and the framing of the Spanish state as the opponent to Catalonia's progress and their people's right to decide. As it was the date on which the Catalan MPs went to Madrid to ask for powers to hold a legal referendum, this provided a unique opportunity to confront the two sides of the debate which, as has already been mentioned, did not give the issue the same relevance, at least on the discursive level.

As in the narrative promoted by pro-independence political actors, users commenting on this event also referred to Catalonia as being the abused party in a situation of domestic violence:

@josep\_sallent – 8 April 2014: The PP loves us so much that it refuses us our right to decide. In a relationship this has a name #wewanttovote #DebateConsultationTV3

@asalarich – 8 April 2014: If I hear again that Spain loves us, I will ask for evidence. Love neither destroys nor abuses the other #wewanttovote

Figure 33. Evolution of metaphor use on key dates in the Catalan independence process



Source: author

Describing this relationship as a MARRIAGE presupposes that Spain and Catalonia have equal status and are able to discuss political issues in a bidirectional fashion. Therefore, when comparing the situation Catalonia is currently experiencing (budgetary restrictions, denial to people's right to decide, welfare cuts, etc.) to that of an abused person, it is assumed that this is the result

of a careless and wicked partner. And “by law” these charges are sufficient to start a divorce process. Hence, according to both users and political actors, “abuse” legitimizes Catalonia’s right to secession.

Talking of a love relationship in which one of the couple is suffering from gender violence entails the discursive construction of the batterer (the Spanish state), who defends “what it thinks belongs to it” and has a “menacing attitude.” Because the target domains chosen by users have a direct influence on the actors the storyline of the independence process focuses on, the abstract objects that were most conceptualized need to be reviewed.


### 8.2.1. Target domains in online discourses on independence in Scotland and Catalonia

The target domains chosen by users to discuss the independence processes in Scotland and Catalonia tend to show how the political actors think about them. For instance, in Scotland independence was once again the target domain that tended to be most conceptualized, like the country. This was followed by the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom and the role of Westminster and the Better Together campaign. Likewise, the fact that the latter was more conceptualized than in political actors’ discourses responds to the presence of rejection statements towards independence in the analysed sample.

Assuming that the public does not construct their discourses in an attempt to persuade –at least not in the same way that political actors do–, but to express their opinion about a particular issue, these data are revealing. They let us intuit that these discourses are taking place in a similar way to those of political actors. Of course, it is not surprising that these target domains were used to talking about the independence issue, since they represented a wide spectrum of the main conceptual domains that could be linked with the development and/or

the actors of both processes. However, it must be noted that the frequency with which each target domain is used is the same as that of political actors.


**Figure 34. Metaphors per target domain in users' analysed statements in Scotland**



Source: author

It is noteworthy that, within the Catalan debate, the independence process was again the target that was most referred to, accumulating nearly 80 mentions in the selected corpus. Among those mentions, at least 61 compared the independence process to JOURNEY/PATH/WAY and showed that this was one of the focal points of the independence campaign in Catalonia. The process that was to take Catalan people to their desired destiny involved conceptualizing these people as the official discourse did: that is to say, as the main actors in the independence movement. SPAIN/SPANISH STATE/CONSTITUTION was one of the other targeted concepts and needs to be understood in its role as the institution that prevents both Catalonia and Catalan people from holding a referendum vote.

Figure 35. Metaphors per target domain in users' analysed statements in Catalonia




Source: author

### 8.2.2. Source domains in online discourses on independence in Scotland and Catalonia

If the target domains indicate that users' discourse resembled that of political actors in terms of the elements that were conceptualized to talk about independence, the use of source domains will show whether the content is also similar. Figures 36 and 37 show the source domains used to comment on the independence of Scotland and Catalonia. As pointed out above, JOURNEY/PATH/WAY was again amongst the most used source domains for talking about independence and, as in political actors' statements, portrayed the different kinds of journey the countries were undertaking. As for Scotland, "the road to independence" is presented as a straight route to the country being "free to walk [its] own path in life." This "is getting much closer" as the referendum draws nearer. In a different way, some users are concerned about the steps being taken and protest about why the UK government has let Scotland "come too far."

Figure 36. Metaphors per source domain in users' analysed statements in Scotland




Source: author



Although Scotland is going to decide its future in an arranged referendum, this will be an exciting journey judging by the warning made by a user to the pro-independence community on Twitter that “this is gonna be some ride”. So they need to be prepared to “head off in the right direction”, which takes Scotland to independence. This change in status, which is the last stop in Scotland’s journey, will turn Scotland into a “shining light” that will act as a guide for the whole planet to what it means to be a young, prosperous and efficiently governed state.

Figure 37. Metaphors per source domain in users’ analysed statements in Catalonia



Source: author

The unionists are accused of “block[ing] and delay[ing]” this journey, because they fear the outcome of the 18 September 2014 vote. They are themselves on a MARITIME JOURNEY that crosses a “sea of negativity”, which was the tenor of the Better Together campaign as the referendum got closer. Pro-independence users

urge them to abandon this ship, as “it is sinking”, meaning that focusing the campaign on threats rather than on positives for a No vote has nothing to gain. The MARITIME JOURNEY metaphor also applies to independence, as after the result of the 18 September referendum pro-union users tell the SNP government that “[their] plans are sunk.” Each metaphorical expression emphasizes the shipwreck of a boat; but in each case the boat wrecked is different. When used by pro-independence activists the shipwreck refers to the campaign for a No vote; when used by pro-union activists it is the possibility for an independent Scotland that is being sunk. This is a clear example of how a narrative can change depending on the political side that uses the metaphorical expression.

Within the Catalan debate, JOURNEY/PATH/WAY metaphors were mostly used to frame the process the country had started with the demonstration of the 11 September 2012, which was referred to by users as “the first sure step” towards independence:

@oriol\_baulenas – 12 September 2011: We are an example, we are massive and peaceful! Today is a historic day because of the demonstration, but, above all, because this is the first sure step #11s2012 #osona

Although euphoria was the prevailing feeling at the beginning of the process – users claimed that all Catalonia had to do was “to follow the straight path”, which was “a clear [one]”–, things got much more complicated as months went by and voting in a binding referendum became ever more remote. Hence, the irregular path that characterized the independence process in Catalonia was marked by the steps the country had to take before it arrived at the “final stage.” At the start of the process, users said that Catalonia was “closer to what it want[ed] to be”, but as the country continued on its journey the path became harder:

@petitapussa – 11 September 2014: #CatalansVote9N #11S2014 #11september #V Do not give up, Catalans, because the path is not going to be easy at all!

@caigueral – 19 September 2014: Let's support each other, because from now on we are going to face the hardest turns in the road #9N2014 via @VilaWeb

The journey towards independence is so tough that it is framed in terms of an epic odyssey in which Catalonia plays the role of the hero who has to overcome adversity if it is to accomplish its mission. Catalonia is compared to Odysseus and gaining independence to reaching Ithaca.<sup>140</sup> Bearing in mind that the Greek hero took 20 years to return home, this is not very encouraging. However, as there is “no other path” than the one that takes the country towards independence, the only thing Catalonia and Catalan people can do is to “start walking and take determined and decisive steps” without “looking back.” Every little advance during the political process the country is undertaking is seen as “a milestone to [Catalonia’s] path to #independence.” Of course, there are also drawbacks and “stage[s] that already have a negative result”, but it is in these difficult periods that Catalonia must “take a breather” and “continue till the end.” Holding a referendum is presented as giving Catalonia the “green light” to continue on their way to their final destination. On the other hand, rejection tweets containing JOURNEY/PATH/WAY metaphors focused on independence as a “setting up unnecessary barriers” and on Spain as a country that is always “behind schedule”, since “the fever nationalism is from the past century.” These tweets refer to the belief that the Spanish state is being too soft with Catalonia’s disobedience and that the Moncloa was not managing the situation with the toughness that was required.

For independence supporters, the central government had shown that it was unable to keep Catalonia voluntarily in the Spanish state and expressions like “there is no turning back”, “good bye Spain” or “let’s leave old-fashioned things behind us” stress Catalonia’s desire to move forward, without worrying about the consequences. Rather than trying to persuade Catalonia to abandon the path

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<sup>140</sup> In 1975, the famous Catalan songwriter Lluís Llach set to music Konstantin Kavafis’ poem “Ithaka”, which has turned into an anthem of the independence of Catalonia. Hence, it has been a recurring metaphor in political actors’ discourses. For instance, it was used by ERC in their political advertisements for the 2012 campaign (Moragas-Fernández and Capdevila 2015a).

of independence by, for example, offering it its own tax office, the Spanish state “sets the pace every day”, which indicates that the central government fosters independence claims instead of diminishing them.

@XS\_RibellesPuig – 29 September 2014: The state and the Constitutional Court do not understand anything. There is no turning back. We are tired of vexations and injustices. We want a real democracy #9N2014

The MARITIME JOURNEY metaphor is also present in users’ statements on Catalonia’s independence process. In this instance, Catalonia is starting a boat trip that will reach “a safe harbour” because it is guided by Catalan people, who have been “prepar[ing] the nets and the oars” and who are ready to “blow, row or jump into the sea to push” the vessel. After the parliamentary election of the 25 November 2012, which gave greater support to the Catalan right wing, Catalonia is going to “weigh anchor” and will start the trip. In the MARITIME JOURNEY towards the independence of Catalonia, political conflicts with the Spanish state are obstacles in the country’s way. Letting Catalan people vote will be the only way to overcome the conflictual situation if the boat in which Catalonia is travelling runs aground at some point in its journey.

CONFLICT/WAR metaphors continue to be among the most used to frame the debate on independence. It is interesting how users participating in this debate in Scotland introduced FREEDOM metaphors when sharing their views on the country’s situation. This domain, which was not used by political actors, conceives the country as not being free with its current status quo, which needs to change if Scotland is to be “free at last.” The referendum will give Scotland the opportunity to be free. Nevertheless, not all users see freedom as essential. Some question it:

@mardibum63 – 25 January 2012: #indyref I don't want to be liberated by any professional politicians. I want them to be honest

Other users are critical of independence because it “fights and divides Scotland” whereas pro-independence users understand the referendum as a chance to “fight for Scotland’s future” and, above all, “to fight Westminster” as the “status quo is anti-democratic assault on Scots & English.” As we can see, positives coming from users also highlight the civic component of the independence movement, since they see in the conflictual situation generated by the campaign an opportunity to rethink their country and to question dominant perceptions on the maintenance of the status quo.

Westminster was also portrayed as the institution that “conspired against Scottish democratic self-determination”, threatening and bullying Scotland to prevent the country from becoming independent. Labour and Liberal Democrats campaigning together with the Tories are labelled as David Cameron’s “expendable foot soldiers” and thus underline the conservative character the Yes side aimed to link with the No vote. Finally, the binary problem/solution was used to propose an alternative to the present situation, when it was argued that the “UK constitution's a mess” and that “federalism or independence sort out this mess.”

In the Catalan case, the narrative that presented Catalonia as Spain’s prisoner comes up again and again and the country is referred to as being liberated if it ever becomes an independent state. The metaphorical expressions that show this situation are those that conceptualize independence as a “clamour for an entire people’s freedom” or a “desire of being free.” The Spanish state is a “damn prison” and Catalonia will be serving a “life sentence” if it remains there. Independence is, of course, what attracts the attention of political actors, media and the public, but the struggle to hold a referendum was also on users’ minds:

@mdeconvolution – 16 October 2014: A success within the new #9N2014 is still more meaningful, since we are fighting against more setbacks than before. We do not need to get obsessed about legal validity

@jorpi9 – 16 October 2014: Sad though #presidentMas has changed a democratic bomb for a banger. He is a trickster #9N2014

We can also find historical references in users' statements, as they say that "our ancestors fought for something" and for that reason Catalonia, which once was "lost" ahead of Philip V of Spain, needs to be "recovered." Catalan people will "keep fighting" against the front of "a single and everlasting Spain" that has Catalonia under "siege." It is the same state that keeps on "threatening" Catalan people and wants to "silence" their voice, a price they are not willing to pay:

@sbadanch – 29 September 2014: You are not going to silence us, even though you reap our lives youtube.com/watch?v=\_kNbAh... #9Ndesobeim #convocats9N #9N2014

On the other hand, some Catalans "do not feel oppressed by Spain", a rejection statement that indicates that CONFLICT scenarios also influence the way in which users express their opposing views on a particular issue. As stated in this thesis, what could have been the No side in the independence debate in Catalonia did not even acknowledge there was a real "problem" and refused to even discuss the issue. This explains why there are only a few rejection statements in the corpus and also highlights those user comments that criticize this lack of acknowledgement:

@toni\_mesfosc – 27 September 2014: A serious state faces its problems and does not deny them. But this is what the Spanish state does when refusing Catalonia the vote #wearecalledup9N #presidentMasTV3

We have seen that GAME/SPORTS source domains are supposed to appeal to popular culture and to make the absorption of political contents easier. Now it is time to look at the people who are the recipients of these messages and see whether they use the same source domains to talk about the same issues and if they talk about them in the same way. In Scotland, for some users independence is "on the cards" and the Westminster government cannot do anything to avoid

it, so it has to sit down to the negotiation table and agree to a referendum vote with FM Alex Salmond, who has “regained the upper hand.” As in political actors’ statements, the referendum campaign is conceptualized as a sports competition that has already started –“game on for the campaign”– and that needs to be won in order to achieve the final prize: an independent Scotland and, therefore, a better country:

@Jock\_Abroad – 15 October 2012: "The more unequal a society, the greater the unhappiness of its citizens". Level the playing field by voting Yes in 2014. #IndyRef #YesScot

In the competition between the Yes camp and the No camp, the latter are “footballers pleading to the referee to red card an opponent” because they feel powerless as the match is ending and try to “play their last remaining ‘no’ card.” The Westminster government is “not being a good sport”, but neither is the SNP government, who according to users “can’t be both referee and player”, meaning it should not interfere in the legal issues surrounding the referendum pretending to be neutral while it is campaigning for a Yes vote.

As for Catalonia, independence is conceived not only as a game that will be won by a “wide margin”, but also as a “huge challenge” that has to be overcome as “the moment of truth” arrives. Therefore, it is important for Catalan people to “give it their all” and “not fail” when they vote in the referendum. Their “clamour” has to be heard everywhere, so they need to make an extra effort to bring their country the final victory. Their rival is embodied by the Spanish state, which is “shit scared” and cannot do anything to stop the Yes players. This immobile attitude has allowed Catalonia to “score in the top corner” and to finally hold a consultation. When transferring the football match to a chessboard, Catalonia appeared to be the player that had made the best “move” while waiting for Spain to make theirs.

As far as the FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP source domain is concerned, users also integrated the concept of a country that is growing up and a variety of love relationship scenarios. Within the Scottish debate, Scotland is presented as one of the children of “the UK family.” Departing from this wider metaphorical expression, users who back independence talk about Scotland as a child that “has grown up” and can “look after itself.” This reasoning leads them to say that Scotland “has earned the right to have its own nation status”, which brings us to Gellner’s (2006) perceptions on nations and nationalism where the definition of nation is linked to being a state. Scotland is prepared to act like an adult and “does not need [the UK’s] permission” anymore, but it is precisely this claim that makes it look like “a petulant child” to pro-unionists, who aim to “keep [the] UK family together.”

@SophMMac – 21 March 2013: #countmein to the campaign to keep our UK family together, will you join me? #indyref  
[bettertogether.net/blog/entry/the...](http://bettertogether.net/blog/entry/the...)

@Aminurahman – 18 September 2014: Big Day for #Scotland. Vote No. Stay with us my Scottish brothers and sisters. #indyref

As I have mentioned, users also conceptualized the relationship between Scotland and the United Kingdom as a LOVE RELATIONSHIP in which the former wants to break away from the latter. Although the motives for initiating the divorce procedures are that Scotland is suffering “the rants of an abusive husband threatening his spouse” and wishes to “break free from a Union built on lies”, the Twitter community highlights that “you’ll never see a potential separation as peaceful as this.” According to them, “divorce makes sense for both parties.” A mutually agreed separation will provide both Scotland and the rest of the UK –but especially England because of its historical ups and downs–, “fresh starts apart instead of a failing union”, so these two entities can “stay best of friends” and “build a new relationship” based on cooperation rather than power politics. However, users who do not back independence do not see the divorce issue the same way. They argue that Scotland has taken a unilateral



decision and “takes a great risk at separation.” The country “wants divorce but gets to keep the house and car without paying the mortgage or hire purchase” but, as we know, this is not possible. Thinking about independence in this way means that the country that has started the separation process will be forced to lose some of the financial benefits it has enjoyed during the marriage. Because they do not want to face this risk as citizens, they “hope the unhappy partner tries to work things out” to save the marriage and not have to undergo the consequences of divorce.

UNITED KINGDOM IS A NEIGHBOURHOOD is the other curious metaphorical expression we can identify in the users’ statements. But whereas independence supporters understand they will continue to have a relationship with the other nations in the UK, those against denounce that independence is “turning neighbours into foreigners:”

@RonaldMcCallum1 – 30 May 2014: I feel no bitterness towards the people of England, N Ireland, or Wales. They are my neebors, but I just want to run my own affairs. #indyref

@CCWJournalism – 18 September 2014: Scottish nationalism: turning neighbours into foreigners | @nickcohen4 specc.ie/lqleki via @spectator #indyref

Catalan users, for their part, used a variety of FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP source domains to define independence or Catalonia’s relationship with the Spanish state. The pro-independence movement is regarded as someone who “comes out of the closet”, as if they have been hiding their sexuality for several years, when independence was not a majority option. As well as the GAY source domain, there are other ways to refer to independence: for example, presenting the independent Catalonia under the domain of GIVING BIRTH. The Catalan republic is a person who is being born and the individual demonstrations in favour of this new life coming into existence are conceived as “births” that will facilitate the last and definitive one.

These demonstrations are also framed under the conceptual domain of SEX, which is also present in the Catalonia/Spain relationship:

@miquelstrubell – 11 September 2014: There were some Spaniards who believed last year's demonstration was a success because we felt horny. Today we have made clear that this was not the case #CatalanWay #croquetes

@quodlibetat – 9 November 2014: What is clear is that disobeying the Constitutional High Court, and the 78 regime in general, turns us on #9N #CataloniaWins

It is interesting that in the sample, the only reference to Catalonia being able to decide by itself was made in terms of the NEIGHBOUR metaphor, as users explained that “nobody asks your next-door neighbour” to decide on something for you. The CATALONIA IS A MISTREATED PARTNER and CATALONIA AND SPAIN ARE GETTING DIVORCED metaphors are still the ones that are most commonly used in the Catalan debate. The first one applies to a relationship based on “frustration”, in which Catalonia “does not want to be with [Spain], nor [Spain] does [want to be with Catalonia].” Although Catalonia and Spain are conceptualized in terms of a couple that do not love each other anymore, Spain does not want to let Catalonia go, and so opposes divorce. Catalonia is fed up with the situation and says that “enough is enough” as it has never received “a single show of affection from its partner”, who forbids its right to decide. Because “love does not involve knocking someone out or abusing them” Catalonia has decided to “separate from Spain.” Hence, the first metaphor takes us to the second, since Catalonia and Spain are presented as a couple that is getting divorced. There is “something that is not working”, so they will be “better separated.” As in Scotland, this is not the opinion of pro-union users, who argue that “there are more things that unite us than which separate us.”

We have seen that Scotland and Catalonia are empowered by being portrayed as being able to decide and carry out actions in the same way that human beings

do. PERSONIFICATION is the metaphorical device that enables users to say that Scotland is “young and brave” living in “a tired old planet” and that the country’s move towards independence is like a “well respected colleague who leaves to get a better job.” In both cases the perspectives of independence appear to be better than the ones the country has now and allow the general public to identify with Scotland. Who would turn down a better job offer? In a different way, Catalan users remark that the important thing for Catalonia is that it “has lost its fear” and has “transmitted a clear and diaphanous message” to a world that will soon “treat the nation as an equal.” Metaphorical expressions involving PERSONIFICATION can also be found when characterizing the unionist campaign in Scotland as someone who “can’t be trusted” and, therefore, who does not deserve the trust of Scottish people. As for Catalonia, the personified opponent is embodied by the Spanish state, which “is deaf and unfriendly” and “fears the ballot boxes.”

Among other source domains that were used to a lesser extent are HEALTH/ILLNESS, PERFORMANCE/SHOW/CINEMA, BUILDING, NATURE/WEATHER, FANTASY/DREAM, SOCIAL GROUPING and ECONOMY/BUSINESS (which was only present in the statements commenting on Scotland’s independence). In the case of Scotland, independence is said to be immersing the country in a “frenzy” that has to shake up the “apathetic majority” and get them to participate in the discussion about the referendum. This positive scenario contrasts with HEALTH/ILLNESS references about the independence process in Catalonia, in which independence is qualified as a “fracture.” Parodying the effect the 9 November had on the Spanish state, the pro-independence activist Antonio Baños referred to the participatory consultation as a “*catafilàctic* shock” playing on the well-known medical term “septic shock.” Some of the expressions that conceptualize the following target domains are Catalan people who are “sick of Spain” and of living in a “monarchical state that is dying” and Spain’s attitude towards Catalonia, which is determined by “political myopia” and for having damaged the 2006 Statute of Autonomy.

Some users resort to the PERFORMANCE/SHOW/CINEMA source domain and conceptualize the independence of Catalonia as a “grotesque show”. On the other hand, pro-independence users mentioned the famous roller coaster in the Port Aventura theme park, “Dragon Khan”, to describe the thrills of the independence process and made Catalan people the “protagonists” of the play Catalonia is performing. Similar expressions can be found in the Scottish debate. For example, independence process is said to have been “a rock ‘n roll time in life” which stresses the excitement involved. Scottish people are also “playing [their] part” in the campaign. In a process that has been on pause for a while, it is “time to hit the play button” and start watching the independence film.

Scotland and Catalonia are portrayed as countries that are under construction, and BUILDING metaphors are used in the Catalan debate to present the referendum as “the indispensable tool” for building a new country and the Spanish state as “the road roller that flattens the path for Catalonia.” Other interesting metaphorical expressions can be found in the NATURE/WEATHER source domain. For instance, independence is conceptualized as a “storm [that] is brewing” in Scotland while in Catalonia users refer to it as a “fruit that will ripen and fall.” Similar metaphors were also used to refer to the relationship between Scotland and UK/Westminster –“time to cut off the dead wood of tory/lib/labour”– and Catalonia and Spain/Spanish State/Constitution –“let’s cut the ripened wheat and the weeds with it.” Pro-independence users also refer to independence as a “dream” they want to come true one day whereas users who do not back independence qualify the ongoing dispute between stateless nations and nation states as “a nightmare of nations and homelands.”

SOCIAL GROUPING metaphors regard Scotland as a country that had been unfairly thrown out of the club of the state nations that form the world, but will “rejoin [it]” as soon as the referendum arrives. In Catalonia, they were used to emphasise that the country was “going hand in hand with all citizens” to ensure that the “united people’s” will was respected. Strengthening the union of this

group will be key if independence is to be reached and “Rajoy and his colleagues” are to be left behind. However, there were also some users that did not want to be classified as independentists or unionists, and who were more in favour of a federal solution. ECONOMY/BUSINESS metaphors can only be identified in the Scottish sample, and were used either to frame the No vote as “the biggest blank cheque in history” or to question whether Scotland “could afford to go alone” if independent.

In the sample selected, another ten more anecdotic source domains were identified: for example, RELIGION/BELIEF [(independence) could be heaven for Scotland, (unionist campaign) is the axis of evil / (Catalonia will not) turn the other cheek]; SCHOOL/DISCIPLINE [nobody can make democracy fail]; SCIENTIFIC [(right to decide) is the centre of gravity of Catalan politics, (Catalonia and Catalan people) are a symbiosis]; CHEMICAL [(Spanish constitution) smells like naphthalene]; CONTAINER [our inclusive nation (Scotland)]; MECHANICS/PHYSICS [Spain is broken]; CULINARY [thin down the consultation, cook (the result) over low heat]; AGRICULTURE [(Spanish constitution) has reaped freedom from Catalan people]; COMMUNICATION [Is there someone (Spain) on the other side?]; and INFORMATICS [Installing Scotland / (Catalonia) is virtually independent].

### 8.3. Reproducing political actors’ discourses or creating an alternative debate?

The analysis of Sample 2 has revealed a trend among users to use the same domains promoted by political actors to refer to the discussed issue. In general terms, this can also be stated regarding the narratives developed by the use of particular source domains. Although the scenarios for users’ metaphorical expressions have not been developed, results provided by the identification and explanation of the source domains in section 8.2.2 point out similar storylines as the ones drawn by political actors.

Initially, the results would be in line with the most critic views on the virtual public sphere, especially in the case of Catalonia, where users' statements were closer to the ones made by political actors. However, the analysis does also show that there were opportunities for a real debate between the opponent camps that took part in it; and also for intermediate positions that did not back neither reject a yes or a no vote. However, to identify this kind of statements within the online discussion on independence was unusual. In Scotland, they were represented by those participants who agreed with pro-independence claims against the Westminster government, but, at the same time, were against blaming the Union for all Scotland's troubles. As for Catalonia, those federalism supporters in favour of the possibility of holding a referendum embodied the exception to decisive positions for and against independence.

Moreover, results show that the greatest percentage of the analysed tweets in Scotland and Catalonia belongs to public/citizen's statements. This would demonstrate that individuals did actively engage with the discussion on independence and had an influence on their peers, according to what Twitter considered a top user. However, the qualitative approach to discourse from which we have analysed these statements proves that users' participation in the independence debate was far from being carried out in a dialogical way. For instance, how citizens used Twitter shows that they looked at the tool as a place for showing their opinion and for making public their political preferences, rather than a public arena for contrasting their views on an issue. In order to see whether these trends can be extrapolated, further research needs to be done. Conclusions reflect on this possibility and on other questions that concern what this thesis has aimed to address.

UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI

CLAIMING INDEPENDENCE IN 140 CHARACTERS. USES OF METAPHOR IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCOTTISH AND CATALAN P

Carlota Maria Moragas Fernández

# Conclusions

Reading furnishes the mind only with materials of knowledge;  
it is thinking that makes what we read ours.

John Locke, *The Common School Journal*

The present dissertation has aimed to resolve the various research objectives set out in the introduction. The findings obtained will be outlined here and the appropriate conclusions drawn.

## Concluding observations on the theoretical framework and methodology

This research has reviewed the role of metaphor in political discourses on contested issues and it has also considered why political discourses deserve to be an object of study. Thinking about communication as political action, and language and, especially, metaphor, as the tool through which this action is implemented, I have argued that political discourses are fundamental to the shaping of public opinion. They are the medium by which political actors communicate and legitimate their views (not only on controversial issues). Although they are not the only actors that participate in creating public opinion, “once a problem is defined in a particular way by the major power actors, this definition may take on a life of its own in the media, and become superimposed upon other issues” (Olien et al. 1995:304). So, political actors are regarded as the initiators of the discussion of conflict, beyond the conflict itself, and their goal is to get their ideas approved by the electorate. Within this framework, I have argued that metaphor is a valuable device for positioning political actors’ views on conflictual issues and establishing mental models that control how the media and the general public view a contested topic.



Taking a holistic perspective has enabled us to study the full scope of metaphor. The revision of the literature on metaphor as a persuasive and conceptual element showed that it could not be approached from just one of these perspectives in the field of communication studies. As underlined in Chapter 1, political discourses are persuasive by nature, so their use of metaphor cannot be disassociated from the rhetorical origin of the figure. But persuasion also lies in the conceptual content displayed by the association of a source domain to a target domain. Linguistics, which has traditionally taken into account the underlying experiential basis as the reason why individuals use metaphorical expressions, has ignored that there is a pragmatic component in the choice of the conceptual content that persuasive discourses aim to disseminate. We shall conclude that the concept of scenario is an attempt by linguistics to incorporate this pragmatic dimension into the purely syntactic and semantic one. It has been demonstrated that it is a valuable tool for developing a narrative on particular source domains because it draws the conceptual mappings between them and, above all, shows what these mappings entail and why they are used this way.

Different from irony, the main intention of which is to make audience infer the opposite to what is literally expressed, metaphor –which also flouts Grice’s maxim of quality– does require a minor effort of interpretation. As pointed out in Chapter 2, the strength of metaphor resides in its *taken-for-grantedness*. This, together with its ability to say as much as possible in just a few words, converts metaphor into a device that can frame a whole (political) reality. Hence, we agree with Burgers et al. (2016) when they say that figurative language can be regarded as a framing type, because in linguistic terms metaphor acts as a framing device (Gamson and Modigliani 1989), and also as a reasoning device since it displays relevant conceptual content.

Likewise, throughout the research I have shown that political actors make use of metaphorical expressions in an attempt to frame the public’s evaluation of the contested issue they are discursively constructing. And, by doing this, they assign new meanings to this issue that are connected with what the public

knows about the source domain involved in the comparison. For instance, the independence processes in Scotland and Catalonia were conceptualized mostly in terms of the JOURNEY/PATH/WAY source domain and the relationship between Scotland and the UK and Catalonia and Spain was mainly framed under the domains of CONFLICT/WAR or FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP.

Because it is a new medium in which these discourses can be analysed, Twitter required particular attention. To determine to what extent Twitter influenced how political discourses were produced and, of course, whether the 140-character structure favoured the use of metaphor as a device for linguistic economy, this investigation has also analysed how the tool can be put to the use of political communication. The relative novelty of social media means that the present study is one of the first research projects to look at metaphor on Twitter. Another important feature of this study is that it contrasts the source domains most commonly used by political actors with how individuals use metaphor, in order to see if they reproduce the discourse of the elites or if they create alternatives to the conceptual frames that dominate the public discussion on independence. This comparison needs to be circumscribed to the virtual public sphere, where social media become the meeting point of the various actors who participate in the creation of public opinion. Even though the case studies describe attempts to work on a truly online debate, the relevance pro-independence political actors and users attributed to social media was different in Scotland and in Catalonia.

For instance, in Catalonia 2.0 tools were used more to mobilize pro-independence activists, whereas in Scotland citizens' mobilization was more palpable in offline activities, such as public meetings or canvassing, and the social media acted as an amplifier of the political debate in the streets. The grassroots movements that inspired independence claims in Catalonia were, from the very beginning of the process, conscious of the importance social media had in calling people to action, specifically when they aimed to participate in the 11 September demonstrations. Therefore, in the absence of a

legal framework that would have delimited the development of the campaign, the debate was maintained alive in what can be regarded as a virtual public sphere, where arguments against independence were difficult to find. On the other hand, in Scotland the independence referendum, which was driven by a political decision, revived Scottish democracy in terms of public engagement (Mitchell 2016) and generated a debate that was more typical of a traditional public sphere.

Other authors have investigated independence discourses in Scotland or in Catalonia (Castelló and Capdevila 2015, Ballesteros Herencia 2015, Dekavalla 2016a), infotainment (Cramer 2014), TV coverage (Robertson 2016), political advertising (Mackay 2015, Moragas-Fernández and Capdevila 2015), and social media (Guerrero-Solé 2015, Buchanan 2016), but they have not compared the two independence processes. These studies were carried out from various theoretical and methodological backgrounds, but most of them take a qualitative approach to analysing the object of study. Those working with social media, however, rely mostly on a quantitative methodology. Researchers working in political communication within the 2.0 environment have underlined that the research carried out in this field should focus on the qualitative data social media can provide. In our attempt to analyse political discourses by focusing on words as the minimum units of understanding, we have aimed to contribute to the way in which Twitter as a political communication tool can be approached. As Jungherr (2014:4) states:

In reviewing the available literature on the use of Twitter in politics, it becomes quickly apparent that most research is data centered and focuses on the description of empirical evidence. Only a minority of studies tries to situate their findings explicitly in the context of larger theoretical discussions.

This dissertation has aspired to be the starting point for research within this paradigm, and this is why it has looked at Twitter not only as a suitable medium for campaigning for independence, but also as a platform where political actors

can display their ideology through metaphor and, therefore, struggle to maintain the established social order or, as in the analysed case study, to change their political status. I opted for this approach to discourse because I did not aim to measure criteria such as the influence each political actor has in this social media, or how offline electoral campaigns adapt to the 2.0 environment. Instead, I wanted to focus on Twitter as a discursive space and on the whole independence processes, not only on a two-week campaign.

This research has also contributed to addressing the methodological gap identified in the CMA interpretation stage. The present study has looked at scenario as a category that fits what Charteris-Black means by metaphor interpretation and has concluded that narrative semiotics is an appropriate method for systematizing the way in which this phase of the analysis is carried out. Results have shown that applying a simplified version of Greimas' actantial model for the construction of the scenario is a suitable method for analysing the strategic positioning of political actors through the use of metaphor. Because metaphorical expressions placed in 140 character statements cannot have a highly developed and complicated storyline –as, for example, TV series or advertisements can– the basic actantial model is sufficient to identify the main actantial roles in the narration and draw conclusions about the relations they have with each other. The narrative plan can only be developed by sharing the content of various scenarios detected from the same source domain.

CMA, which is different from frame analysis and other approaches to discourse analysis, narrowed the focus of the debate on independence and identified more precisely the terms under which it was undertaken. In addition, our focus on metaphorical expressions has enabled us to concentrate specifically on those statements containing masked ideological information. Our choice of CMA as a method for approaching political discourses has also proven to be a good one for the online platform in which the analysis was carried out. Twitter and its 140-character statements could only have been analysed in the terms Critical Discourse Analysis proposes if the corpus had consisted of a particular number

of tweets per day by the same political actor. And this was not always possible, mainly because the logic of Twitter is quite different from the logic of a parliamentary appearance or a speech at a rally.

Nevertheless, using microdiscourses as a unit of analysis also has some drawbacks, as it is difficult to grasp the meaning of a metaphorical expression if one does not have a sufficient knowledge of the context in which these statements are produced.

### Concluding observations on results and discussion

The present study has identified the metaphorical expressions that were used to refer to independence claims during the secession processes of Scotland and Catalonia. By identifying and then subsequently interpreting the most commonly used source domains we have explained the main ideas and strategies pro-independence political actors used in order to persuade the 2.0 electorate. This research concludes that these strategies did not differ much from the ones used in the offline referendum campaign, judging by the way in which political actors used Twitter, although some attempts to take advantage of the tool's properties must be highlighted.

One of our conclusions is that 140-character discourses stimulate the use of metaphorical expressions. This can be verified in political actors' discourses, and also in users' discourses, because the high percentages of metaphor use in both samples indicates that figurative language is inherent to people's mode of expression and was used to show their opinion on the independence processes of Scotland and Catalonia during the period of time analysed. Moreover, the use of source domains in the statements in sample 2 that were similar to the ones identified in sample 1 show that the conceptual frames promoted by political actors were shared by a significant number of the selected users.

### *Use of Twitter by political actors and users*

Results show that Twitter can be an appropriate place to construct political discourses, even though users need considerable knowledge of social media to take advantage of their multimodal nature. For instance, interactivity, as one of the main web 2.0 features, provides political actors with a space to find out what their voters are thinking and, therefore, is a useful tool for identifying trends in opinion or promoting the opinions they are interested in. Political actors have demonstrated that they know how to use Twitter devices and have included mentions, retweets, replies or hyperlinks to other media in their statements. However, the use they made of these devices was not really important in their discourses at a content level, and only grassroots movements like the National Collective or ANC and Súmate made a really creative use of Twitter properties [e.g. campaigns especially designed for social media as #nowisthetimefordoingit (#araéslhora) or #wearecalledup (#estemconvocats), to ask pro-independence users to protest against an unfair situation –#croquettes (#croquetes)– or to encourage individuals to show their opinion by retweeting or using a particular hashtag].

Nevertheless, the general impression is that political actors, especially politicians and political parties, are still reluctant to go beyond their set messages, perhaps because of the integration of the offline and online political communication strategies. We conclude that political actors acknowledged Twitter's importance as a medium for broadcasting their messages, but not for reinforcing the ideological component of their messages. For instance, statements that contained references to principles of civic nationalism or used irony to characterize the opponent frequently appeared in Sample 1. Messages about ethnicity or identity were less common and they tended to coincide with certain dates that encouraged patriotism.

The activity on Twitter was considerably higher in the Catalan case for both politicians and users. This suggests that the more the independence process was

regarded as a conflict the more the people defended independence claims on the network and the more polarized opinions were. In a social medium that requires you to explain: “What’s happening?”, with no other filter than the number of characters, users feel sure of themselves and they often feel they can engage in a debate mediated by a hashtag. The generalization of the hashtag as an element that enables users to participate in the online debate should promote a conversation between users from different ideological and cultural backgrounds. However, on some occasions the hashtag used for commenting on the independence process was biased and appealed only to those we have called pro-independence activists. Political actors should use hashtags that attract individuals who think differently so that the debate generated is a true one and not excessively polarized. For instance, the use of #indyref in Scotland, together with the dynamics of a referendum campaign with two clear camps, shows that “neutral” hashtags favour the divergence of opinions and improve the discussion on independence. It must be noted that, unlike the statements made by political actors in which Catalonia admired the Scottish independence process and aimed to vote in a binding referendum too, messages between Scottish and Catalan users about their feelings about the two processes can be found in Sample 2.

#### *Use of metaphor by political actors and users*

From a political communication perspective, our interest in metaphor focused on the persuasive and ideological dimension it gives to political messages, which enables political actors to create a particular narrative about the process and aspires to convince people to take up a stance on the issue in the way elites do. Our analysis of Samples 1 and 2 shows the source domains that were used by political actors to talk about independence. We take these as the reference in order to see if the ones chosen by individuals were the same.

In both samples, the major source domains were JOURNEY/PATH/WAY, CONFLICT/WAR, GAME/SPORTS and FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP. JOURNEY/PATH/WAY source domains were used to conceptualize the process as a journey that needs to

be made if the “final destination” of independence is to be reached. The link between this source and this target domain was surprisingly present in the two case studies and appeared in the analysis of both samples. For instance, in the case of Catalan political actors, 63 out of 93 metaphors conceptualized the independence process by using a JOURNEY/PATH/WAY source domain, while in Scotland there were 11 out of 23. In both cases, the independence process was the most commonly targeted concept when looking at the corpus of JOURNEY/PATH/WAY metaphors. As for users, in Catalonia the proportion was 61 out of 94 mentions to the independence process under JOURNEY/PATH/WAY source domain whereas in Scotland this was 11 out of 28. Findings are similar for the FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP source domain, in which the target domain most conceptualized by political actors is the Scotland/UK relationship or the Catalonia/Spain relationship, in a proportion of 6 out of 9 metaphors and 16 out of 28 metaphors, respectively. This is very similar to the statements made by individuals containing FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP metaphors (19 out of 30 in the case of Scottish users and 14 out of 24 in the case of Catalan users).

The schema followed by political actors and users in both countries responds to CMT observations on metaphor as the means by which we organize our thoughts, since a process that has to go through various stages before it finalizes is more easily comparable to a journey than to other domains of knowledge. The same can be said of the comparison between two political entities in dispute such as an ill-assorted married couple, as it is rooted in our experience of daily life. However, this was not always the case, as sometimes there was not a prominent target domain because of the wide range of targeted concepts within a single source domain. This was the case of CONFLICT/WAR and GAME/SPORTS metaphors identified in Sample 1 and Sample 2, in which the target domains tended to be UK/Westminster and Scotland or Spain/Spanish state/Constitution and Catalonia, accompanied by Scottish or Catalan people, the Unionist campaign or the referendum itself.



The diversity of target domains also helped in scenario construction because they showed the similarities and differences in the narratives of the Scottish and Catalan political actors and revealed details that we did not perceive if we limited our analysis to the first stage of CMA. It must be stressed that the scenarios constructed by the above mentioned source domains showed meaningful differences in how the independence processes were framed in Scotland and Catalonia. These discursive differences were largely due to an important contextual difference: Scottish pro-independence political actors defended a Yes vote as part of an agreed and binding referendum whereas Catalonia spent nearly two years arguing in favour of the nation's right to decide and finally held a non-binding consultation. The uncertainty of Catalonia's political situation and the lack of a real debate may explain why Catalan political actors used more metaphors than their Scottish counterparts because they needed to put greater emphasis on promoting their views.

According to the main findings of CMA analysis, and especially through the construction of the scenarios, we outline the following conclusions in terms of the political communication strategies they set in motion:

- Whereas in Scotland politicians asked the people to vote Yes in order to achieve independence and make their way as a state with full rights, in Catalonia the message was focused on the great percentage of people who supported the holding of a referendum in order to legitimate it in the eyes of the Spanish Government. However, the role of citizens was vital in the two processes because the final result in the referendum depended on their vote. For this reason, it was necessary to involve them in the process and to make them feel part of a team that has to win the battle or the match for independence.
- In Scotland, it was the users participating in the online debate who insisted on disassociating the independence project from FM Alex Salmond and the SNP in order to broaden the social basis for

independence and counterattack the Better Together strategy. Catalan political actors insisted on doing the same with President Artur Mas, who was seen by the Madrid elites as the driving force behind the independence process. This is why massive demonstrations supporting independence were among the concepts targeted to conceptualize the independence process.

- The extent to which the stateless nation was recognised by its nation-state influenced the discourse of political actors. As Iain McLean et al. (2014:3) point out: “the practice of putting proposals for constitutional change to the electorate for decision has become well established in Britain”, but this was not the case for Spain, which does not recognise Catalonia as a nation (Rocher et al. 2001), and, therefore, does not allow the country to hold a referendum. So, in the Catalan case, this meant the proliferation of metaphors that referred to the captivity of Catalonia, the inability to be part of a common project inside the Spanish state or the delegitimation of a state that has no authority over the country as it has proven to be antidemocratic and the result of a questioned transition.
- Catalan discourse on independence focused not only on the fact that Catalonia’s national aspirations were not recognised, but also on the economic and democratic benefits of living outside a non-democratic state that had an active policy of austerity. In Scotland, these benefits were presented by the rational arguments that dominated the public discussion, and this involved using fewer metaphorical expressions. Nevertheless, although there are metaphors that have a clear emotive component and appeal to the *pathos* –like the ones conceptualized under FAMILY/LOVE/FRIENDSHIP or SOCIAL GROUPING source domains–, others are related to the *logos*, as they are driven by the reasoned advantages of voting for independence (e.g. ECONOMY/BUSINESS, BUILDING or SCIENTIFIC). The *ethos* is left to the metaphorical expressions used to argue in favour of greater self-government in Scotland or the right to vote in Catalonia.

- Independence is for the brave and remaining in the nation state is the option of those who are afraid of change. In both cases, this idea, which associated a Yes vote with a progressive attitude, compared the campaign to a fight for a better country and considered those who aimed to remain in the current status quo as opponents of this goal. In the case of Scotland this proposal aimed to counter the Better Together “fear campaign”, which warned of what an independent Scotland would lose instead of what it would gain if it stayed in the United Kingdom.
- Independence is seen as a better future for Scotland and one that can only be ensured by choosing the correct path on 18 September. The referendum is the crossroads where Scottish people have to decide on the best path to follow. As for Catalonia, remaining in Spain is synonymous with remaining in the past and this conception is promoted by both political actors and users, when they refer to the Spanish state and its Constitution as “old-fashioned”, “smelling like naphthalene” and the “daughter of Francoism.”
- Independence is about governance in Scotland. The strategy of Scottish political actors was to present a Yes vote under pragmatic rather than romantic terms, in line with the *Utilitarian nationalism* vision promoted by Neil McCormick, which sees in independence an opportunity to improve the well-being of Scottish people. Scotland centred the debate on constitutional change whereas Catalonia focused on resolving the question of holding a referendum. It was democracy that was at stake in Catalonia and so political actors framed the discussion in terms of a struggle between the democratic government of Catalonia and the antidemocratic government of Spain. Because democracy is a positive value the world over, political actors used it to legitimate their decision to take their demands for a referendum forward. Therefore, while in Scotland the outcome of the independence process was a change in current status and the real possibility of becoming an independent state, in Catalonia the outcome was the chance to vote.

All these strategies were developed in order to maintain the mental frameworks on the public's political mind during the referendum campaign. Hence, for political actors it was crucial to repeat metaphorical expressions and their subsequent underlying narratives about the independence processes. And this was true for their statements on Twitter and on the other media as well. In order to influence public opinion during such a long period of time, they needed to be keen on convincing an audience that suffered from an information overload. Judging the way in which a polarized virtual public sphere reacted to their messages, they did it.

### Study limitations and future research

The first limitation of this study is also one of its strengths: transdisciplinarity. This is not a thesis on linguistics, semiotics or political science, but works with concepts that deal with these disciplines and tries to integrate them into the communication studies scope. This has driven me to work in fields of study with which I was not familiarised, but has turned out to be a great chance to develop my knowledge on the object of study as well.

The second limitation of this dissertation is a linguistic one. As well as my command of English, which is not the same as my command of Catalan or Spanish, the linguistic limitations of this dissertation are related to the translation of expressions in Catalan or Spanish into English. In this process, some metaphorical expressions unavoidably lose their meaning and readers may find them difficult to grasp. In order to address this limitation, the Appendices section of this thesis includes Table 5, which gathers together all the metaphors identified and includes both the original version and the English translation.

The third limitation has to do with the selection of the data in Sample 2. Analysing users' participation in the debate by using hashtags made it possible to filter the number of tweets to be analysed, but the methods for recovering past

information on Twitter need to be improved. In the present study this shortcoming has been addressed by selecting 150 statements per day at random, as this was sufficient for a qualitative approach, but a quantitative analysis would require the assistance of IT programmers who can design software for collecting data.

The last limitation is the period of time analysed, which starts as far back as 2011 and finishes in 2014. The study required the processes to have a start and a finish, even though they were not over. Therefore, it frames a particular moment in the history of Scotland and Catalonia from a particular discursive perspective and in a particular medium, which is also what a single researcher can manage. More wide-ranging research on the topic would require a team of researchers.

Future research should focus on managing the massive flow of data that Twitter provides in the form of the high number of tweets generated by users. It would be interesting to analyse data from a quantitative perspective in order to get a different kind of information. And to complete the research on the main actors who participate in the public sphere, it would be necessary to focus on how the media framed independence discourses.

In the future, research may also address the lack of pro-union political discourses in the analysis presented in this thesis. The decision not to include them in the analysed samples was a conscious one in order to narrow the focus of the research, but I believe it would be interesting to contrast the use of metaphor and the scenarios constructed by No political actors with the Yes camp, at least in the Scottish case.

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# Appendices



TABLE 5. SCOTTISH POLITICAL ACTORS

| SOURCE DOMAIN  | TARGET DOMAIN            | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]  |
|----------------|--------------------------|--|
| HEALTH/ILLNESS | Independence             | prevent them (Westminster ill-thought policies) from being foisted on the people of Scotland |
|                | Scottish people          | no one cares more about Scotland   |
|                | Scotland/UK relationship | a healthier relationship   |
|                | UK/Westminster           | ill-thought policies   |

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]                    |
|---------------|---------------|--|
| CONTAINER     | Referendum    | how does it fit into David Cameron's EU plans? |

| SOURCE DOMAIN               | TARGET DOMAIN   | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]   |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|
| PERFORMANCE/SHOW/<br>CINEMA | Scottish people | playing their part in history |
|                             | Referendum      | to put the final touches      |

TABLE 5. SCOTTISH POLITICAL ACTORS

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN            | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]   |
|---------------|--------------------------|---|
| CONFLICT/WAR  | Independence             | is about finding solutions  |
|               | Scotland                 | under threat from Westminster, Scotland's priorities must be acknowledged and fought for in Brussels, striving for a better country |
|               | Scottish people          | let's not give the Tories the "victory"   |
|               | Scotland/UK relationship | bully Scotland  |
|               | Unionist Campaign        | under pressure by EC  |
|               | UK/Westminster           | trying to block, holds back Scotland's economy, are spreading fear  |

| SOURCE DOMAIN              | TARGET DOMAIN            | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]  |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| FAMILY/LOVE/<br>FRIENDSHIP | Independence             | gives the power to make decisions  |
|                            | Scotland                 | to be given responsibility for 2014 vote, tired of being told what Scotland can't do   |
|                            | Scotland/UK relationship | (Independent Scotland will have) a friendly relationship with the UK, friendship will flourish, is not working, arguments are much less likely, moving further apart |

TABLE 5. SCOTTISH POLITICAL ACTORS

| SOURCE DOMAIN    | TARGET DOMAIN        | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]  |
|------------------|----------------------|--|
| JOURNEY/PATH/WAY | Independence         | bold and transformational step, there is an alternative (to the Union), a new dawn beckons for our country, a new and better path for Scotland   |
|                  | Independence process | Road to the referendum, road to independence, roadmap, begins process leading up to biggest decision, a major step forward, as we move towards, Scotland's journey, on the road to #18September2014, another Scotland is coming, reaches final stage |
|                  | Scotland             | is making its way in the 21st century, wants to get on (the world), faces a choice of two futures  |
|                  | No vote              | stymied situation  |
|                  | UK/Westminster       | Is going south, can't stop Scotland, Scotland cannot be stopped  |

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN  | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]  |
|---------------|----------------|--|
| BUILDING      | Independence   | build a better world, build a better country, power to build a better Scotland for all, What kind of society do we want to build together? |
|               | Referendum     | built in Scotland, designed, built and delivered in Scotland   |
|               | Scotland       | build a Scotland that is more prosperous and fair  |
|               | UK/Westminster | failing UK structure   |

TABLE 5. SCOTTISH POLITICAL ACTORS

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN        | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]                            |
|---------------|----------------------|--|
| GAME/SPORTS   | Independence         | give independence a shot, the challenges of the future |
|               | Independence process | Game on  |
|               | Referendum           | it's just hit them (unionist campaign)                 |
|               | Scottish people      | supporters are celebrating                             |
|               | Unionist campaign    | raise the game and meet us on a higher level           |

| SOURCE DOMAIN   | TARGET DOMAIN | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]   |
|-----------------|---------------|---|
| PERSONIFICATION | Independence  | common sense  |
|                 | Scotland      | needs so stronger voice, the choices it faces, the world is waiting for us, has earned the right to control its own destiny, could make better choices, Scotland decides, Scotland's future in Scotland's hands, Scotland gets the powers we need |

TABLE 5. SCOTTISH POLITICAL ACTORS

|  |                          |   |
|--|--------------------------|---|
|  | <b>Referendum</b>        | puts Scotland's Future in Scotland's hands  |
|  | <b>Scottish people</b>   | best placed to make decisions about Scotland's future, the right people to make decisions, when we can take our future into our own hands, best qualified to make decisions, no-one will govern Scotland better |
|  | <b>Unionist Campaign</b> | ugly face is being revealed   |
|  | <b>UK/Westminster</b>    | are dragging their feet over renewable obligations, leave decisions in the hands of Westminster, fails to remember, Downing Street will welcome it & start to cooperate, Westminster running scared             |

| SOURCE DOMAIN          | TARGET DOMAIN          | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]  |
|------------------------|------------------------|--|
| <b>SOCIAL GROUPING</b> | <b>Scottish people</b> | Help us make the positive case for #independence, join us, be part of history, its your independence, Help shape Scotland's future, There are many ways you can help, holding their part of history, do not wake up the day after the #indyref vote and wish you could have done more, be part of it, Let's make history, make it happen |

| SOURCE DOMAIN          | TARGET DOMAIN          | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes] |
|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>RELIGION/BELIEF</b> | <b>Independence</b>    | We can believe in           |
|                        | <b>Scottish people</b> | A convert to independence   |

TABLE 5. SCOTTISH POLITICAL ACTORS

| SOURCE DOMAIN    | TARGET DOMAIN            | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]  |
|------------------|--------------------------|--|
| SCIENTIFIC       | Independence             | 100% certain that the people of Scotland get the government they vote for  |
|                  | Scotland                 | (its decisions) have proven to be better (than those of Westminster)       |
| SOURCE DOMAIN    | TARGET DOMAIN            | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]  |
| ECONOMY/BUSINESS | Independence             | there are gains [when decisions are made in Scotland]                      |
|                  | Scotland/UK relationship | Scotland's paying for it   |
|                  | UK/Westminster           | [there is a] heavy cost [when decisions are made in Westminster]           |
| SOURCE DOMAIN    | TARGET DOMAIN            | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]  |
| FANTASY/DREAM    | Scotland/UK relationship | Tale of two governments  |
|                  | UK/Westminster           | the Tory nightmare   |
| SOURCE DOMAIN    | TARGET DOMAIN            | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]  |
| ORIENTATIONAL    | Scotland                 | a seat at top table  |
|                  | UK/Westminster           | out of touch, the rise of inequality and the loss of opportunity and trust |

TABLE 5. CATALAN POLITICAL ACTORS

| SOURCE DOMAIN  | TARGET DOMAIN                     | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|----------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| HEALTH/ILLNESS | Independence                      | La sobirania és vital (sovereignty is vital)   |
|                | Right to decide                   | no fractura (does not fracture), és normal (it is normal)                              |
|                | Catalonia                         | amb menys patiment (will suffer less), patiment (suffering)                            |
|                | Catalonia/Spain Relationship      | la sentència del TC va ser letal (The sentence of the Constitutional Court was lethal) |
|                | Spain/Spanish state/ Constitution | Miopia política (political myopia)   |

| SOURCE DOMAIN            | TARGET DOMAIN                     | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]  |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| PERFORMANCE/SHOW/ CINEMA | Catalan people                    | ser protagonistes (be protagonists), la protagonista (the protagonist), sentiu-vos actors (let yourselves be actors in it)  |
|                          | Spain/Spanish state/ Constitution | disfressen el problema (they dress up the problem), passar a color una fotografia en blanc i negre (colour a black and white photograph), en blanc i negre (in black and white) |

TABLE 5. CATALAN POLITICAL ACTORS

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN                | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]  |
|---------------|------------------------------|---|
| CONTAINER     | Independence process         | la societat ha obert el procés (society has opened this process)  |
|               | Referendum                   | La clau que obre tots els panys (the key that opens every lock)   |
|               | Demonstration                | omplir els carrers (fill the streets)   |
|               | Catalonia                    | futur dins Europa (inside Europe), difícil dins Espanya (difficult inside Spain), dins l'estat espanyol no podem viure plenament com a catalans (inside the Spanish state we cannot fully live as Catalans), debat enllaunat (prerecorded debate), no encaixa a Espanya (does not fit in Spain)   |
|               | Catalonia/Spain Relationship | hem buscat l'encaix (we've tried to fit in Spain), l'encaix no és possible (to fit in is not possible), refugiarse en la constitución para no resolver un problema (hiding behind the Constitution for not solving a problem)   |
| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN                | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]  |
| CONFLICT/WAR  | Independence                 | Independència és llibertat (Independence is freedom), l'anhel de llibertat ressonarà de nord a sud, i de llevant a ponent (the desire of freedom is going to resound from the North to the South, from the East to the West), llibertat (freedom), és guanyar un futur millor (is to gain a better future), el futur és una conquesta (future is a conquest), un futur de justícia i llibertat (in a future of justice and freedom) |
|               | Independence process         | bloquejar el procés (block the process), és l'hora de tenir coratge i valentia per encarar aquest procés (it's time for courage and bravery for facing this process), conflicte democràtic (democratic conflict)  |



TABLE 5. CATALAN POLITICAL ACTORS

|  |                           |  |
|--|---------------------------|--|
|  | <b>Fiscal Sovereignty</b> | batalla (battle)   |
|  | <b>Referendum</b>         | blindar el #9N2014 (safeguard the #9N2014), defensar el referendun (defend the referendum), les urnes són la solució (ballot boxes are the solution), resoldre aquest repte (resolve this challenge)   |
|  | <b>Catalonia</b>          | no ens hi podem entregar (we cannot surrender to them), democràcia, esperança, futur (democracy, hope, future), No defallirem (We will not give out), un poble que vol ser lliure (a people that want to be free), la nostra mà continua estesa (our hand will continue reaching out for an agreement), anem a estendre la nostra mà (we are going to reach out our hand), avui defensem el poble de Catalunya (today we defend the people of Catalonia), no estem disposats a retirar les urnes (we do not want to move away ballot boxes), cap moral d'esclau, només l'ètica d'un poble lliure (no slave moral, only the ethics of free people), no ens rendirem (we are not going to surrender), estem obligats a la victòria (we are obliged to achieve the victory), no tenim cap altra alternativa que guanyar (we have no alternative but to win), indestructibles, pugnem per decidir (we fight to decide), guanyarem (we will win), lluitar per una República Catalana (to fight for a Catalan Republic), per vèncer (to defeat), desobeïm (let's disobey), no defallim (do not lose strength), hem demostrat que no ens arronsarem davant de l'Estat (we have shown that we do not shrink in front of the State) |
|  | <b>Catalan people</b>     | Marxem (Let's march), Marxem cap al Parlament (Let's march on the parliament), ha ocupat Barcelona (has occupied Barcelona), no resignar-nos (not to resign ourselves), lluitar pel nostre futur (fight for our future), poder ser lliures (to be free), voluntaris de la causa catalana (Catalan cause volunteers), mai ens resignarem (we will never resign), to freely decide our future, hem patit moltes imposicions (we have suffered so many impositions), capacitat de resistència (resistance ability), prenem els carrers (let's take the streets), prenem places i carrers (let's take the squares and the streets), no podem fallar (we cannot fail), exèrcit de voluntaris (volunteers army), no serem mesells (we are not going to be numb), centenares y miles de apellidos que defienden Catalunya (hundreds and thousands of surnames who defend Catalonia)   |

TABLE 5. CATALAN POLITICAL ACTORS

|  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
|  | <p><b>Catalonia/Spain<br/>Relationship</b></p>      | <p>segar cadenes (to cut the chains), minimitzar l'adversari (minimize the opponent), ells tanquen o trenquen ponts (they close or break bridges), sentència humiliant (humiliating sentence), utilitza les eines que té en contra dels interessos de la ciutadania del nostre país (uses their tools against the interests of our country's citizenry), assetjament judicial contra ajuntaments sobiranistes (judicial harassment against sovereignist City Halls), ens van prendre la llibertat per les armes (they took our freedom by force), trencar amb totes les cadenes (in order to break all the chains), podem hacer que caigan otros muros (we can make other walls fall), dos bàndols (two blocs), resoldre el futur (resolve the future)</p>  |
|  | <p><b>Spain/Spanish state/<br/>Constitution</b></p> | <p>carregament (load), prohibicions absurdes (absurd prohibitions), atacaban (attacked), imposició, por, passat (imposition, fear, past), Talibanismo (Talibanism), ajudar la democràcia a Catalunya és ajudar a la democràcia de tot l'Estat (to help democracy in Catalonia is to help democracy all around the State), el Govern espanyol no vol dialogar (the spanish Government does not want to converse), demofobia (demophobia), confrontant al poble català mobilitzat (to confront the mobilized Catalan people), contra la demofòbia de l'Estat espanyol (against the demophobia of the Spanish State), silenciar la veu del poble (silence the people of Catalonia's voice), aixafar les urnes (trample ballot boxes), no podrà evitar la independència (cannot avoid independence), no poden impedir-nos decidir el nostre futur com a poble (cannot prevent us from deciding our future as people), qui soluciona les coses a cop de martell (who resolves the whole thing with the blow of the hammer), están en contra de la llibertat (they are against freedom), reprimeixen les estelades (they repress estelades)</p> |

TABLE 5. CATALAN POLITICAL ACTORS

| SOURCE DOMAIN              | TARGET DOMAIN                        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]  |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| FAMILY/LOVE/<br>FRIENDSHIP | Independence                         | un gran llegat (a great legacy)   |
|                            | Referendum                           | És el millor per Catalunya i l'Estat (is the best for Catalonia and the State)  |
|                            | Catalonia                            | No hem vingut aquí per demanar permís (We have not come here to ask for permission), som prou grans per a fer-ho (we are old enough to do it), Catalunya es vol governar per ella mateixa (Catalonia wants to be governed by itself), ja mai més demanarem permís per ser qui som (we will never again ask for permission to be who we are), demanar permís per ser lliures (ask for permission to be free)   |
|                            | Catalan people                       | som heureus (we are heirs), ser amos del nostre futur (masters of our future)   |
|                            | Catalonia/Spain Relationship         | que tractés Catalunya amb respecte (that would treat Catalonia with respect), Spain has let Catalonia down, it must let it go; así ni se quiere ni se puede seguir (we cannot continue this way, and we do not want to), cada viernes [el Estado] nos manda un mensaje de amor (every Friday the Spanish state sends us a love message), l'amor de veritat es basa en el respecte (true love is based on respect), estimem els espanyols i el castellà (we love Spaniards and castilian), ruptura (break up), adéu Espanya (goodbye Spain), Catalunya és propietat d'Espanya (Catalonia belongs to Spain), votar uneix/no votar separa (voting joins us, not voting separates us), marxar sense perdre vincles familiars amb la resta de l'estat (to leave without losing familiar bonds with the rest of the State), la historia en común que continuarà (our common history will continue), la democràcia uneix (democracy unites us), sensació de frustració (frustration sensation) |
|                            | Spain/Spanish state/<br>Constitution | filla de la reforma impune del franquisme (daughter of Francoism's unpunished reform), filla dels militars (soldiers' daughter), ganará un amigo (will win a friend), la maté porque era mía (I killed her because it was mine)   |

TABLE 5. CATALAN POLITICAL ACTORS

| SOURCE DOMAIN  | TARGET DOMAIN        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]  |
|----------------|----------------------|---|
| MOVEMENT/SPEED | Independence         | avenç (advance)   |
|                | Independence process | imparable (unstoppable), la mobilització del carrer es trasllada a les urnes (the mobilization of the streets moves to the ballot boxes), esperem que el procés vagi endavant (we hope the process goes forward), anirem endavant (we will go forward) / tirar endavant (walk ahead), no ens apartarem ni un mil límetre del full de ruta (We are not going to move one millimetre from the route map), seguirem endavant (we will continue forward), fem via (let's go fast), hem fet un pas de gegant (we have done a giant step) tirar endavant (go forward), no hem parat (we have not stopped), junts avancem més i millor (together we make more and better progress), procés que ve de la gent (the process comes from people), no s'atura i no parará (does not stop and will not stop) |
|                | Demonstration        | ens duu a la #consulta2014 i a la llibertat (takes us to #consultation2014 and to freedom)  |
|                | Catalonia            | no ens aturem (we do not stop), seguirem fins a ser el proper estat d'Europa (we will keep on until we become the next state in Europe), és on ens volen portar (is where they want to take us)   |
|                | Catalan people       | donarem gas (we will step on the gas), fugir d'aquesta constitució (escape from this constitution), la força de la gent empeny el país (people's strength pushes the country), aturar la voluntat democràtica del poble de Catalunya (stop Catalan people's democratic will), som imparables (we are unstoppable)   |

TABLE 5. CATALAN POLITICAL ACTORS

| SOURCE DOMAIN    | TARGET DOMAIN        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|------------------|----------------------|--|
| JOURNEY/PATH/WAY | Independence process | <p>el camí de Catalunya cap a la llibertat (Catalonia's way towards freedom), comenci el procés (the process to start, nova etapa (new period), cap a la plena sobirania (towards full sovereignty), encapçalar el procés (lead the process), Si fem el camí (If we go along this path), Hem recorregut un camí (We have gone along a path), un pas de dignitat i coherència democràtica (a step of dignity and democratic coherence), comença amb renúncies (has started with resignations), iniciar el procés (start the process), comença el camí cap a la llibertat (the path towards freedom is starting), procés que s'inicia (the starting of the process), inicia el procés (has started the process), el full de ruta cap a la consulta (the route map towards the consultation), no té marxa enrere (there is no turning back), no s'acaba amb la consulta, s'acaba amb l'#estatpropi (does not end with the consultation, it ends with our #ownstate), venim de lluny (we go back to a long time ago), ve de lluny i volem anar més lluny encara (who goes back to a long time ago and that wants to go even further), seguir fent camí (keep on walking along the path), Ara és l'hora (Now is the time), res l'aturarà (nothing will stop it), compte enrere (countdown), el procés segueix (the process continues), no és un punt i final, és un punt i a part (it is not a full stop but a new paragraph), el camí segueix (the path continues), una sòlida passa cap a un futur millor (a solid step towards a better future), això no s'acaba aquí (this does not end here), tanqueu aquest camí (close this path), el camí seguirà (the path will continue), canviar el curs de la història (change the course of history), el procés ha de continuar (process must continue), un pas que calia fer (a step that was needed to be done), aquí no s'acaba tot (this does not stop here), no l'aturarà una votació al Congrés (the Congress voting will not stop the process), ara és l'hora de la veritat (now it's the moment of truth), arribar fins on som (arrive where we are), un pas històric (a historical step), acabar-ho i acabar-ho bé (to end it and to end it well), riscos necessaris (required risks), som més lluny que mai, (we are further than ever), continuarem el camí (we will continue the path), ni un pas enrere (not a step back), ara és el moment (now it is the moment), fem un pas endavant (let's do an step forward), seguim endavant (let's continue forward), a res de poder-ho fer tot (it's not long before we can do anything we like), camí cap a l'autodeterminació (way towards self-determination), no té marxa enrere (there is no turning back), comencem una nova etapa per construir la República Catalana (we start a new period to build the Catalan Republic), hem passat una pàgina molt important (we've been through a really important stage), demà continuem (tomorrow we will continue), un pas més en el procés (a new step within the process), nova etapa (new period), el camí cap a la independència (the path towards independence), no és la darrera pàgina de la història de Catalunya (is not the last page in Catalonia's history), canviar el curs de la història (change the course of history)</p> |

TABLE 5. CATALAN POLITICAL ACTORS

|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
|  | <b>Independence</b>                      | la nostra pròpia sortida (our own exit) Som més a prop de viure en un país normal (We are closer to living in a normal country), el pas transcendental cap a la llibertat (the transcendental step towards Catalan people's freedom), és l'hora de la independència (it is time for independence), ara és el moment de l'Estat Propi (now its the moment for an own state)   |
|  | <b>Fiscal Sovereignty</b>                | Vies (ways)  |
|  | <b>Right to Decide</b>                   | Camí (path), el vehicle cap a la sortida de la crisi (the vehicle that leads the way out of the crisis)  |
|  | <b>Referendum</b>                        | votar és la via (to vote is the way), vies (ways), només hi ha un pla (there is only one plan), votar és l'únic camí, (voting is the only way) ha arribat l'hora de que Catalunya voti (it's time for Catalonia to vote)   |
|  | <b>Catalonia</b>                         | sabem on volem anar (we know where do we want to go), ha llegado la hora de Catalunya (the hour of Catalonia has arrived), superarem tots els obstacles (we are going to surpass all the obstacles), aquest país avança decididament (this country decidedly moves forward), empenem el vol cap a la llibertat (we set out on the flight towards freedom)  |
|  | <b>Catalan people</b>                    | És l'hora del poble (it's time for people), marcarem inequívocament el camí (we will unambiguously mark the path), fer avançar el procés (move the process forward)  |
|  | <b>Catalonia/Spain Relationship</b>      | Encrucijada (crossroads)   |
|  | <b>Spain/Spanish state/ Constitution</b> | deixem enrere la cultura de la transició (we must leave the transition culture behind us), no el parará cap estat, imposició, ni mordassa (won't be stopped by any state, imposition or gag), no condiciona ni altera el camí (this does not condition or alter the way), aturar la voluntat democràtica del poble de Catalunya (stop Catalan people's democratic will), ha tancat una altra porta (has closed another door) |

TABLE 5. CATALAN POLITICAL ACTORS

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN                        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|---------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| BUILDING      | Independence                         | construïm (let's build), construir el futur (to build future), projecte atractiu i sòlid (solid and attractive project), eines pròpies (own work tools), construir un nuevo país (build a new country), per construir un projecte de país (to build a country's project), construir un país mejor (build a better country), construir un país nou de tots i per tots! (to build a country for all) |
|               | Independence process                 | solidesa, enfortir (strength, reinforce)   |
|               | Right to decide                      | posem els fonaments (we lay the groundwork)  |
|               | Catalonia                            | aixecar el país (lift up the country), la construcció de Catalunya (the construction of Catalonia), construir una unitat estable i sòlida (to build a solid and stable union)  |
|               | Catalan people                       | És l'eina per tirar endavant (tools to get ahead)  |
|               | Spain/Spanish state/<br>Constitution | la Constitución com un mur (Constitution is a wall), hem enderrocat el mur de la por (we have demolished the fear wall), nosaltres també hem enderrocat un mur (we have also contributed to demolish a wall), que caigan los muros (let walls fall), el PP quiere levantar muros (PP wants to raise walls)   |

TABLE 5. CATALAN POLITICAL ACTORS

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN                                | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]  |
|---------------|--|---|
| GAME/SPORTS   | <b>Independence</b>                          | guanyem (let's gain), clam popular, clam massiu (massive clamour), guanyarem (we will win), se juga en Catalunya (it is played in Catalonia), un gran repte (a huge challenge), el clam de la gent (people's clamour)   |
|               | <b>Fiscal Sovereignty</b>                    | repte més important (most important challenge)  |
|               | <b>Referendum</b>                            | ha de ser un esclat de democràcia i llibertat (has to be a burst of democracy and freedom), el repte que posem a les vostres mans (the challenge we put into your hands), La consulta és el clam dels catalans (Consultation is the clamour of Catalan people)  |
|               | <b>Catalonia</b>                             | ens juguem més com a país (we risk it all as a country), no ensenyarem totes les cartes (we will not show our cards), guanyarem (we will win), haurem guanyat mitja partida (we would have win at least half of the round), ara cal guanyar (now we must win), ara toca guanyar (now we must win), hem de treballar per guanyar (we must work to win), Catalunya ha guanyat (Catalonia has won) |
|               | <b>Catalan people</b>                        | imprescindible per guanyar (indispensable for winning), fem el darrer esforç (let's make the final push), guanyarem el nostre futur (we will win our future), estem convocats (we are called up), el lideratge és del poble (leadership comes from the people)  |
|               | <b>Spain/Spanish state/<br/>Constitution</b> | Àrbitre (referee), joc brut (foul play), jugarà a desprestigiar (will play to discredit)  |



TABLE 5. CATALAN POLITICAL ACTORS

| SOURCE DOMAIN   | TARGET DOMAIN                | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|-----------------|------------------------------|--|
| PERSONIFICATION | Demonstration                | missatge potentíssim que enviem al món (a powerful message we send to the world), acte d'afirmació (assertion act), missatge massiu a l'Estat (massive message for the State)  |
|                 | Catalonia                    | recuperarem la nostra llibertat (recover our freedom), ensenyem al món quina és la voluntat del nostre poble (let's show the World our people's will), we can open the eyes to the World, el món ja ens mira (the World is already looking at us), que Catalunya voti (that Catalonia votes), Cataluña quiere hablar, quiere ser escuchada, quiere votar (Catalonia wants to talk, wants to be listened to, wants to vote), ens hem mirat al mirall i ens hem agradat com a país (we've looked at the mirror and we have enjoyed ourselves as a country), posar el futur del país en mans d la ciutadania (put the country's future in citizens' hands'), que el futur de Catalunya passi per les seves mans (that Catalonia's future should be in its hands)  |
|                 | Catalan people               | el poble ha parlat (people has spoken), el poble té la paraula (people has their say), demana i reclama poder parlar i poder ser consultat (claims and demands to allow them to talk and to be consulted), ho explicarem al món (we will explain it to the world), Avui els catalans ho hem demostrat (Today we, the Catalans, have shown it), No hi renunciarem (We are not going to renounce to it), Hem escrit una de les pàgines més glorioses de la nostra història (We have written one of the most glorious pages of our history), La ciutadania ha tornat a parlar clar (Again, citizens have clearly spoken), la societat ha obert el procés (society has opened this process), Qui ve avui a Madrid és el poble de Catalunya (Who today comes to Madrid is the Catalan people), Que un poble voti i decideixi (People must vote and decide), l'opinió del poble de Catalunya (Catalan people's opinion), que parli la voluntat popular (let popular will talk), la voluntat dels ciutadans (citizens' will), una amplia majoria de catalanes que parló a través de las urnas (lots of Catalans spoke through ballot boxes), demostrem la voluntat del poble (Let's show the people's will), el món ha de veure la nostra força, civisme i democràcia (The World has to see our strength, civility and democracy) |
|                 | Catalonia/Spain Relationship | que la cámara no cierre la puerta que el TC ha dejado abierta al diálogo (let the Chamber do not close the door the TC has left open for dialogue)   |

TABLE 5. CATALAN POLITICAL ACTORS

|  |  |   |
|--|--|---|
|  | <b>Spain/Spanish state/<br/>Constitution</b> | desprecia la voluntat pacífica, democràtica i majoritària dels catalans (disregards Catalans' pacific, democratic and majority will), pren decisions arbitràries (takes arbitrary decisions), actor sord, cec, immobiliista i negador dels drets del poble (deaf, blind, stagnant and people's rights denying actor), l'Estat no ha volgut arribar a un acord (the State did not want to achieve an agreement), ha optat per dimitir, desistir i inhibir-se de la democràcia (has opted for resigning, giving up and refraining of democracy) |
|--|--|---|

| SOURCE DOMAIN   | TARGET DOMAIN                                | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|-----------------|--|--|
| SOCIAL GROUPING | <b>Independence</b>                          | la suma de la societat civil i els nostres representants polítics (the sum of civil society and our political representatives)   |
|                 | <b>Catalan people</b>                        | no hi faltis, comptem amb tu (do not miss it, we count on you), Que no en falti ni un dels nostres (None of us can miss it), Junts ho farem possible (Together we will make it possible), voluntat col·lectiva (collective will), siguem voluntaris per un país nou (let's volunteer for a new country), units per un país nou (united for a new country), fes-te voluntari per un país nou (register as a volunteer for a new country), suma't a un país nou (join a new country), Només depèn de nosaltres (it only depends on us), al seu costat hi som tots els que estem amb la democràcia (the ones who back democracy are by their side), fer-ho realitat és el nostre deure (making it real is our duty) |
|                 | <b>Spain/Spanish state/<br/>Constitution</b> | no és el nostre Estat (it is not our State)  |

| SOURCE DOMAIN   | TARGET DOMAIN    | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]      |
|-----------------|------------------|---------------------------------|
| RELIGION/BELIEF | <b>Catalonia</b> | un prec humil (a humble prayer) |

TABLE 5. CATALAN POLITICAL ACTORS

| SOURCE DOMAIN     | TARGET DOMAIN                        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]  |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| SCHOOL/DISCIPLINE | Catalonia                            | no dispuesta a recibir lecciones (it is not willing to receive lessons) |
|                   | Spain/Spanish state/<br>Constitution | s'han equivocat (they've mistaken)                                      |

| SOURCE DOMAIN    | TARGET DOMAIN                        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|------------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| ECONOMY/BUSINESS | Independence process                 | el procés surt reforçat (the process emerges stronger)                                       |
|                  | Catalonia                            | no està en venda (is not on sale)  |
|                  | Catalonia/Spain<br>Relationship      | incompleix respecte als ciutadans de Catalunya (reneges on with respect to Catalan citizens) |
|                  | Spain/Spanish state/<br>Constitution | no treballa per nosaltres (does not work for us)   |

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|---------------|---------------|--|
| FANTASY/DREAM | Independence  | no és un deliri (it is not a delirium), fer realitat la nostra voluntat (making our will come true), el nostre somni (our dream) |
|               | Referendum    | aquest somni (this dream)  |

TABLE 5. CATALAN POLITICAL ACTORS

|                       |  |   |
|-----------------------|--|---|
|                       | <b>Catalonia</b>                             | no dormim en la nostàlgia del passat, sinó en l'anhel del futur (we do not sleep in past's nostalgia, but on future's yearning)   |
| <b>SOURCE DOMAIN</b>  | <b>TARGET DOMAIN</b>                         | <b>METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]</b>   |
| <b>ORIENTATIONAL</b>  | <b>Right to decide</b>                       | per sobre de la voluntat democràtica no hi ha res (there is nothing above democratic will )   |
| <b>SOURCE DOMAIN</b>  | <b>TARGET DOMAIN</b>                         | <b>METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]</b>   |
| <b>NATURE/WEATHER</b> | <b>Independence</b>                          | sortirem a la puja, xops de memòria, xops de llibertat (we will go in the rain, get soaked by memory, soaked by freedom)  |
|                       | <b>Demonstration</b>                         | marea humana (human tide), tsunami democràtic (democratic tsunami)  |
|                       | <b>Catalonia</b>                             | el país se'ns desfà a les mans (the country is melting in our hands)  |
|                       | <b>Catalan people</b>                        | la majoria del poble es mou i seguirà movent-se (people is moving and will keep doing so)s  |
|                       | <b>Spain/Spanish state/<br/>Constitution</b> | Una Espanya que deixa que la llibertat flueixi (want to see a Spain which lets freedom flow), ho enfonsen tot (they sink it all), Mascle-alfa (alpha-male), testosterona mesetària (tableland testosterone) |

TABLE 5. USERS ON SCOTLAND'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

| SOURCE DOMAIN  | TARGET DOMAIN   | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]                          |
|----------------|-----------------|--|
| HEALTH/ILLNESS | Independence    | Frenzy, Nations have survived and flourished on less |
|                | Scottish people | apathetic majority                                   |

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN  | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]                         |
|---------------|----------------|---|
| CONTAINER     | Referendum     | our inclusive Nation                                |
|               | UK/Westminster | would be kicking Scotland out and slamming the door |

| SOURCE DOMAIN               | TARGET DOMAIN        | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]  |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|--|
| PERFORMANCE/SHOW/<br>CINEMA | Independence         | time to hit the play button  |
|                             | Independence process | It's been a rock n roll time in life   |
|                             | Scotland             | Scotlands place on world stage, getting ready to welcome Scotland onto the world stage |
|                             | Unionist Campaign    | how YOU can play your part   |

TABLE 5. USERS ON SCOTLAND'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN            | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]  |
|---------------|--------------------------|--|
| CONFLICT/WAR  | Independence             | Scotland free at last, the freedom of their own country, onward to freedom, fight and divide Scotland, fight for Scotland's future, to deliver your freedom  |
|               | Scotland                 | ready to win, gets humiliated in front of the world, we don't shirk threats  |
|               | Scottish people          | foot soldiers walking away, nobody likes being bullied, have given their lives for our freedom, I don't want to be liberated by any professional politicians   |
|               | Scotland/UK relationship | Fight Westminster, politicians won't be able to blame Westminster any more, UK constitution's a mess. Federalism or independence sort out this mess, the blood soaked Union jack, let the fight begin in earnest |
|               | Unionist Campaign        | conspiring against scottish democratic self-determination, [Cameron's] expendable footsoldiers, defending the union  |
|               | UK/Westminster           | Status quo is anti-democratic assault on Scots & English, how hard they struggled, bullying & scare tactics will backfire, Nothing more than bullying tactics  |

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]                      |
|---------------|---------------|--|
| BUILDING      | Independence  | shaping Scotland's future, build a better future |

TABLE 5. USERS ON SCOTLAND'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

| SOURCE DOMAIN              | TARGET DOMAIN            | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]  |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| FAMILY/LOVE/<br>FRIENDSHIP | Independence             | Scotland to be looking after itself  |
|                            | Scotland                 | Doesn't need your permission, The world is waiting to offer Scotland the hand of friendship, has grown up, has earned the right to have its own nation status, lets be determined to right ourselves, a petulant child, wants divorce but gets to keep the house and car without paying the mortgage or hire purchase, Let's hope the unhappy partner tries to work things out   |
|                            | Scottish people          | do you want to govern yourselves or not  |
|                            | Scotland/UK relationship | part of the state Scotland is trying to break from, to have fresh starts apart instead of a failing union, break free from a Union built on lies, if we split the union we can be friends with England, the SNP's breaking up Britain campaign today, embrace the union of 305 yrs, why can't I have a vote about whether the Union should be broken up, We're not ripping things up. We're building a new relationship, benefits of the UK family, keep our UK family together, We have had enough of it, time to move on, the rants of an abusive husband threatening his spouse, Mummy and Daddies divorce better go through, they are my neebors, takes a great risk at separation, will stay best of friends, you'll never see a potential separation as peaceful as this, Stay with us my Scottish brothers and sisters, turning neighbours into foreigners, divorce makes sense for both parties, let's hope the unhappy partner tries to work things out |

TABLE 5. USERS ON SCOTLAND'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

| SOURCE DOMAIN    | TARGET DOMAIN        | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]   |
|------------------|----------------------|---|
| JOURNEY/PATH/WAY | Independence         | is getting much closer, is coming and it's coming soon!, We're getting there, date with destiny, plans are sunk, Free to walk our own path in life  |
|                  | Independence process | it's starting, the road to independence, roadmap, Strap yourselves in. This is gonna be some ride, marks the beginning of a better future, Go the Union. , Seriously. Go, to stop Scotland reaching this point, let's all head off in the right direction now |
|                  | Referendum           | the countdown has begun   |
|                  | Scotland             | will be going our own way in 2014, will be a shining light, going our own way, they've come too far!  |
|                  | Scottish people      | here we come  |
|                  | Unionist Campaign    | use the courts to block or delay the referendum, already sinking in a sea of negativity and lack of cogent, Abandon the good ship as its sinking  |
|                  | UK/Westminster       | tow it away   |

| SOURCE DOMAIN  | TARGET DOMAIN | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]                           |
|----------------|---------------|---|
| MOVEMENT/SPEED | Scotland      | won't stop us!, moving Scotland forward, is moving on |



TABLE 5. USERS ON SCOTLAND'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN        | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]  |
|---------------|----------------------|--|
| GAME/SPORTS   | Independence         | that's on the cards, has regained the upperhand, Level the playing field by voting Yes, everybody wins   |
|               | Independence process | Game. Set. Match, Game on for the campaign   |
|               | Referendum           | is the only thing to win   |
|               | Scotland             | [Scottish government] They can't be both referee & player, can not act as both the referee and player  |
|               | Unionist campaign    | footballers pleading to the ref to red card an opponent, Lamont play the 'English' card, Super bonus is challenge to No side on what No vote means |
|               | No vote              | together, we're going to go win this thing   |
|               | UK/Westminster       | Who's not being a good sport now, trump card, playing their last remaining 'no' card   |

| SOURCE DOMAIN   | TARGET DOMAIN | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]  |
|-----------------|---------------|--|
| PERSONIFICATION | Independence  | common sense, makes little sense, Scotland's future in Scotland's hands  |
|                 | Scotland      | A brave young Scotland / a tired old planet, well respected colleague who leaves to get a better job, Scotland's chance to decide our future, Scotland's future should be in the hands of Scotland, Scotland shall get to decide on what happens in our own country, have our own voice to the World |

TABLE 5. USERS ON SCOTLAND'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

|  |                          |   |
|--|--------------------------|---|
|  | <b>Referendum</b>        | Scottish people will finally get a say      |
|  | <b>Unionist Campaign</b> | Can't be trusted then, can't be trusted now |

| <b>SOURCE DOMAIN</b>   | <b>TARGET DOMAIN</b>     | <b>METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]</b>           |
|------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| <b>SOCIAL GROUPING</b> | <b>Scotland</b>          | 18th months until Scotland rejoins the world |
|                        | <b>Scottish people</b>   | We people will decide                        |
|                        | <b>Unionist Campaign</b> | Can we count on you?                         |

| <b>SOURCE DOMAIN</b>   | <b>TARGET DOMAIN</b>     | <b>METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]</b> |
|------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <b>RELIGION/BELIEF</b> | <b>Independence</b>      | could be heaven for Scotland       |
|                        | <b>Unionist Campaign</b> | The axis of evil                   |

| <b>SOURCE DOMAIN</b>  | <b>TARGET DOMAIN</b>  | <b>METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]</b>            |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|
| <b>NATURE/WEATHER</b> | <b>Independence</b>   | an independence storm is brewing              |
|                       | <b>UK/Westminster</b> | time to cut off the dead wood of tory/lib/lab |

TABLE 5. USERS ON SCOTLAND'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

| SOURCE DOMAIN    | TARGET DOMAIN | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]   |
|------------------|---------------|---|
| ECONOMY/BUSINESS | Independence  | Could we afford to go it alone?, decide who really runs their country |
|                  | No vote       | is biggest blank cheque in history                                    |

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes]   |
|---------------|---------------|---|
| FANTASY/DREAM | Scotland      | dream of waking up to a Scottish Scotland I voted, wake up Scotland |
|               | Referendum    | just got real   |

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN | METAPHOR [Scottish lexemes] |
|---------------|---------------|-----------------------------|
| INFORMATICS   | Independence  | Installing Scotland 3.0     |

TABLE 5. USERS ON CATALONIA'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

| SOURCE DOMAIN  | TARGET DOMAIN                        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|----------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| HEALTH/ILLNESS | Independence                         | Fractura (fracture), shock catafilàctic (catafilàctic-septic shock)                          |
|                | Catalan people                       | We're sick of Spain, pateix (suffers)  |
|                | Spain/Spanish state/<br>Constitution | Miopia política (political myopia), estado monárquico agonizante (a dying monarchical state) |

| SOURCE DOMAIN               | TARGET DOMAIN        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]                       |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|--|
| PERFORMANCE/SHOW/<br>CINEMA | Independence         | esperpéntico show (grotesque show)               |
|                             | Independence process | Dragon Khan                                      |
|                             | Catalan people       | La protagonitzarem (we will be the protagonists) |

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|---------------|---------------|--|
| CONTAINER     | Independence  | la independència de Catalunya la deixaria fora de la UE (the independence of Catalonia will take the country outside the EU) |

TABLE 5. USERS ON CATALONIA'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN                | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|---------------|------------------------------|--|
| CONFLICT/WAR  | Independence                 | Guanyem la nostra llibertat (Let's win our freedom), no defallirem (we will not give up), guanyarem (we will win), la revolta (the riot), la revolució (the revolution)  |
|               | Referendum                   | Votació èpica (epic vote), es lliuta contra més adversitats (we fight against more adversities), [Mas ha canviat] una bomba democràtica per un petard (Mas has changed a democratic bomb for a petard)   |
|               | Catalonia                    | El front mediàtic internacional s'ha guanyat (we have gained the international media front), Ha arribat l'hora de segar cadenes (it is time for reaping the chains), Sempre ens han donat per morts (they have always left us for death), quiero hacer uno sobre invadirlos (I want to do a referendum for invading Catalonia), aquest desig de ser lliures! (the wish to be free), la llibertat a tocar (one step away from freedom), dues hòsties a Espanya (two blows to Spain), Catalunya perduda, Catalunya recuperada (Catalonia was lost, now we recover it), seguirem lluitant (we will continue fighting)   |
|               | Catalan people               | no ens podem arronsar (we cannot shrink ourselves), un clam per la seva llibertat (a claim for their freedom), fem front a la repressió (we face repression), seguir lluitant, la llibertat d'un poble sencer (we continue fighting for the freedom of a whole people), la llibertat de tot un poble (the freedom of a whole people), el dilema que tenim davant: lliures o sotmesos (the dilemma we are facing: to be free or to be submissive), murieron luchando por la libertad, nosotros también (they died fighting for freedom, we too), units som invencibles (united we are invincible), No defallim (do not give out), el poble resistirem units (people will resist united), No ens arronsem (we do not shrink), serem invencibles (we will be invincible), perdre la por (lose fear), no se sienten oprimidos por España (do not feel oppressed by Spain), van lluitar per alguna cosa (they fought for something) |
|               | Catalonia/Spain Relationship | no només estem enfrontats entre Catalunya i Espanya (Catalonia and Spain are not the only ones confronted), Un estat seriós s'enfronta als problemes, no els nega (a serious state faces its problems and does not deny them)  |

TABLE 5. USERS ON CATALONIA'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
|  | <b>Spain/Spanish state/<br/>Constitution</b> | segueixen amenaçant (they continue threatening), el front de l'Espanya una i eternal (the front of the single and everlasting Spain), una cadena perpètua (life sentence), silenciar la veu d'un poble (silences the voice of a people), no habrá nadie que pueda parar el deseo de libertad (there is no one who can stop this wish for freedom), caurà el mur de l'opressió (the oppression wall will fall), hui han tornat a defensar el que pensen q és seu (today, they have once more defended what they think it belongs to them), una punyetera presó (a damn prison), No ens fareu callar malgrat ens segueu la vida (you won't make us be silent, even though you want to kill us), govern de Madrid amenaça (Madrid government threatens Catalonia), setge espanyol (the Spanish siege) |
|--|--|--|

| SOURCE DOMAIN  | TARGET DOMAIN                                | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|----------------|--|--|
| MOVEMENT/SPEED | <b>Independence</b>                          | impuls a l'autodeterminació (a boost for self-determination)   |
|                | <b>Independence process</b>                  | accelerar el procés de la independència (speed up the independence process), imparable (unstoppable), Ningú aturarà la democràcia (nobody will stop democracy), Ningú aturarà la voluntat de tot un poble (nobody will stop the people's will), Res ens pot aturar (nothing can stop us), no ens aturaran (they can't stop us), això no hi ha qui ho pari (nobody can stop this), endavant (forward), Que res ni ningú ens freni (nothing and nobody may stop us), No ens aturaran ni els unionistes ni ningú (nor nobody neither the unionists will stop us), el procés és imparable (the process is unstoppable), res el pot parar (nothing can stop it), no podrà frenar (nothing can brake it) |
|                | <b>Catalonia</b>                             | avançar cap a la llibertat (advance towards freedom), imparable (unstoppable), avancem (let's move forward)  |
|                | <b>Catalan people</b>                        | som imparables (we are unstoppable)  |
|                | <b>Spain/Spanish state/<br/>Constitution</b> | frenar el #9N2014 (brake the #9N2014 )   |

TABLE 5. USERS ON CATALONIA'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

| SOURCE DOMAIN    | TARGET DOMAIN        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]  |
|------------------|----------------------|---|
| JOURNEY/PATH/WAY | Independence process | <p>som més a prop (we are getting closer), seguir el recte camí (follow the straight path), cap a l'estat propi (towards the own state), hem fet un pas molt important com a país (we have done a really important step as a country), llum verda (green light), el punt de partida polític cap a l'estat propi (the starting point towards the own state), Està clar el camí de Catalunya (the path for Catalonia is clear, No hem de mirar enrere, sinó endavant (we cannot look back but forward), encara falta una mica (there is still a little time left), iniciem el camí cap a la #independencia (we start the way towards independence), un pas més a l'objectiu (one more step towards the objective), ni un pas enrere (there is no turning back), un pas més per la voluntat d'una nació (one more step towards the will of the nation), les xarxes preparades, els remes a punt (have been preparing the nets and the oars), road to freedom, un pas més (one more step), el camí per a poder exercir el dret a decidir (the path for voting), pas a pas (step by step), viatge (trip), anem a pel definitiu (we are reaching the final one), el moment és més a prop (the moment is closer), Un pas més per consolidar el process (one more step to consolidate the process), a milestone in our path to #independence, hem agafat alé (we have taken a breather), cal seguir fins al final (we must continue till the end), el camí cap a la llibertat (way towards freedom), pel bon camí (the right path), Som-hi! Ara si que ja no hi ha marxa enrere (Let's go! There is no turning back), això no ho para ni cristo (this cannot be stopped), avui hem de continuar el nostre camí (today we must continue our way), seguimos adelante (we go forward), Per Catalunya no hi ha Punt i Final fins el 9N (For Catalonia, there is not a full stop till the 9N), el procés no s'ha aturat (the process has not stopped), Això no s'ha acabat. Això només ha fet que començar (This has not ended, this is still beginning), era una etapa de resultat negatiu ja sabut, però que calia fer (a stage that already have a negative result, but that was necessary for the process), Continuarem amb pas ferm (we will continue with our decisive step), més a prop de votar (closer of voting), marxem ja (we are leaving), camí a la llibertat (way to freedom), el camí no serà gens fàcil (the path will not be easy), ni un pas enrere (not a single step back), perseverar en el camí (persist in the path), Un altre pas endavant (another step forward), un pas més (one more step), a partir d'ara venen les corbes més fortes (now we face the hardest turns in the road), obre el camí cap al #9N2014 (open the path towards the #9N2014), epepeia (epic odyssey), el vaixell arribarà a bon port! (the boat will reach a safe harbour) si cal bufarem, remarem o saltarem a l'aigua a empenyer! (we will blow, row or jump into the sea to push if necessary), ni un pas enrere (not a single step back), no hi ha marxa enrere (there is no turning back), una prohibició seva és un pas més cap a la llibertat (Spain's prohibitions set up one more step towards independence), deixem enrere els retrògrades (let's leave the old-fashioned things behind us), amb pas ferm (with a determined step), enterrar definitivament qualsevol temptativa de fer marxa enrere (bury any attempt to back out), mes a prop d'una CATALUNYA somniada (closer to a dreamed CATALONIA), fent camí a ritme "gostoso" (doing our way in a "gostoso" rhythm)</p> |

TABLE 5. USERS ON CATALONIA'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

|  |  |   |
|--|--|---|
|  | <b>Independence</b>                          | més a prop d'allò del què volem ser (closer to what we aim to be), ens hi estem acostant, i molt (we are getting really close), cada cop és més a prop (every time we are closer to it), poner barreras absurdas (setting up unnecessary barriers), ha començat el compte enrere (the countdown has begun), toca pensar en un anar més enllà (we need to think on going beyond independence), nous camins (new paths), ho tenim a tocar (we are getting closer), un pas més (one more step), darrera etapa (last stage), Passi-ho bé, Espanya, Bon dia LLIBERTAT (goodbye, Spain, hello FREEDOM), el nostre (tren) va amb retard i no se'ns pot escapar (our train is running late, and we cannot miss it), Ítaca a una passa (one step away from Ithaca), no hi ha CAP altre camí (there is no other path), avui comença tot (today everything begins) |
|  | <b>Demonstration</b>                         | final del viatge (the end of the trip), és el primer pas ferm (the first firm step)   |
|  | <b>Referendum</b>                            | llum verda (green light), desencallar el conflicte polític existent (refloat the existing political conflict), sabrem per on anem i què volem (we will know where are we going and what do we want), Ho tenim a prop (we are getting closer)  |
|  | <b>Catalonia</b>                             | nedant en la bona direcció (swimming in the right direction), demà al matí salpem (tomorrow we are going to weigh anchor), ara toca començar a caminar i mantenir el pas ferm i decidit (now is the time to start walking and to maintain a determined and decisive step), fotre el camp (we are leaving), el motor d'Espanya (Spain's engine), marxem (we are leaving)   |
|  | <b>Catalan people</b>                        | anem passant (we start clearing out)  |
|  | <b>Spain/Spanish state/<br/>Constitution</b> | siempre vamos atrasados (we are always behind schedule), ens marca el camí cada dia més (sets the pace every day), han dit #adéu a l'Estat de les Autonomies (they have said goodbye to the State of the Autonomies), més lluny d'Europa (farther away from Europe)   |



TABLE 5. USERS ON CATALONIA'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

| SOURCE DOMAIN              | TARGET DOMAIN                        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| FAMILY/LOVE/<br>FRIENDSHIP | Independence                         | l'#independentisme surt definitivament de l'armari (independence comes out of the closet), la república que nace (the republic that is being born)   |
|                            | Demonstration                        | Creien que havia estat un "calentón" (they thought we were horny), la #V que hem "parit" avui (the "V" we gave birth today)  |
|                            | Catalonia                            | El dia que catalunya va dir prou (The day in which Catalonia said that it was enough), separar de España (to separate from Spain)  |
|                            | Catalan people                       | lo que nos une entre nosotros (what unites us), no por lo q nos separa (what separates us), desobeir el TC ens posa (to disobey the Constitutional Court turns us on)  |
|                            | Catalonia/Spain Relationship         | país diferent del veí (a different country from the neighbour), s'ha de ser gilipolles per a odiar-te i no deixar-te marxar (you must be idiot to hate somebody and not letting it go), sense cap mostra de carinyo de la seva parella (without a single show of affection from its partner), estimant als veïns espanyols (loving our Spanish neighbours), ens estima tant que ens prohibeix la llibertat de decidir (Spain loves us so much that it denies us our right to decide), Això en una relació de parella té un nom (in a love relationship this has a name), Parlen una frase en català i ja ens estimen (they talk a single phrase in Catalan and they love us), Espanya ens estima (Spain lovea us), L'amor no és anular l'altre ni maltractar-lo (love does not involve knocking someone out or abusing them), hay algo que no funciona (there is something that is not working), una parella vol el divorci (a couple that wants to get divorced), units ja estem i així ens va, millor separats (we live together and this is how it goes, we will be better separated), no ens estima, però no ens vol deixar (Spain does not love us but does also not want to leave us), Frustració (frustration), ni nosaltres els volem ni ells ens volen (we do not want them and they do not want us), llarg afany de separar Catalunya d'Espanya (a long effort to separate Catalonia from Spain) |
|                            | Spain/Spanish state/<br>Constitution | ningú no pregunta al veí de dalt (nobody asks the upstairs neighbours)   |

TABLE 5. USERS ON CATALONIA'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN                     | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| BUILDING      | Independence                      | cauran murs... (walls will fall), hem de seguir treballant x construir la #RepubliCAT99 (we must continue working to raise the #RepubliCAT99)  |
|               | Independence process              | solidesa, enfortir (strength, reinforce)   |
|               | Referendum                        | l'eina imprescindible (the indispensable tool)   |
|               | Catalonia/Spain relationship      | el proper mur, el farem caure nosaltres (we are going to make the next wall fall)  |
|               | Spain/Spanish state/ Constitution | La piconadora espanyola aplanar el camí als catalans (the road roller that flattens the path for Catalonia), ni el celo pot aguantar Espanya (neither the adhesive tape can hold up Spain) |

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN                     | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| GAME/SPORTS   | Independence                      | guanya per golejada (won by a wide margin), la independència guanya (independence wins)  |
|               | Independence process              | l'hora de la veritat (the moment of truth)   |
|               | Referendum                        | Un 9 repte ens espera (a new challenge is waiting for us), Ho donarem tot (we will give it all). No fallarem (we won't fail)             |
|               | Catalonia                         | Catalonia wins, jugada (play), win independence, les ha colado un gol por toda la escuadra (has scored in the top corner)                |
|               | Catalan people                    | el clam dels catalans (the clamour of Catalan people), estem preparats (we are ready), Si caiem ens aixequem (if we fall we raise again) |
|               | Spain/Spanish state/ Constitution | Moure peça (do their move), estan cagats (they are shit scared)  |

TABLE 5. USERS ON CATALONIA'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

| SOURCE DOMAIN   | TARGET DOMAIN                        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]  |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| PERSONIFICATION | Catalonia                            | El món, que aviat ens rebrà com un igual (the world will treat the nation as an equal), recollir la veu del poble (picks up people's voice), has lost its fear, ha emès un missatge clar i diàfan (has transmitted a clear and diaphanous message)  |
|                 | Catalan people                       | El poble ha parlat (people has talked), el millor ambaixador de Catalunya (the best ambassador of Catalonia)  |
|                 | Spain/Spanish state/<br>Constitution | Espanya s'aixecarà amb una tempesta formada (Spain will wake up with a storm that is brewing), Espanya pot donar l'esquena a la realitat (Spain cannot turn its back on reality), Espanya només realitza privant de veu al poble (Spain does only act by preventing people talk), sord i ara, a més, hostil (deaf and, moreover, unfriendly), Tenen por a les urnes (they fear the ballot boxes), No faran callar la veu del poble (they won't silence people's voice), els que ens volen muts (they want us mute), criden com si els haguéssim trepitjat l'ull de poll (they shout as if we had stepped on their toes) |

| SOURCE DOMAIN   | TARGET DOMAIN                        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| SOCIAL GROUPING | Catalonia                            | anem a l'una (we are going together)   |
|                 | Catalan people                       | al paquet dels indepes (the independence side), La decisió és a les nostres mans (this decision is in our hands), Ara el poble ha d'estar junt i fent força (Now the people have to be together and to make an effort), celebrarem que som un poble unit (we will celebrate we are a united people), El futur depèn de cada un de nosaltres! (future depends on us) Implica't en el procés (join the process), petit país que unit és més gran (small country that becomes bigger when united) |
|                 | Spain/Spanish state/<br>Constitution | en Rajoy i els seus (Rajoy and his colleagues)   |

TABLE 5. USERS ON CATALONIA'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

| SOURCE DOMAIN     | TARGET DOMAIN                        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| RELIGION/BELIEF   | Catalonia                            | posar l'altra cara (turn the other cheek)  |
| SOURCE DOMAIN     | TARGET DOMAIN                        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
| SCHOOL/DISCIPLINE | Spain/Spanish state/<br>Constitution | Ningú pot suspendre la democràcia (nobody can make democracy fail)   |
| SOURCE DOMAIN     | TARGET DOMAIN                        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
| FANTASY/DREAM     | Independence                         | malson de nacions i patries (a nightmare of nations and homelands), realitzar un somni (make a dream come true) the dream should never die, una CATALUNYA somniada (a dreamed Catalonia), país dels nostres somnis (the country of our dreams) |
| SOURCE DOMAIN     | TARGET DOMAIN                        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
| NATURE/WEATHER    | Independence                         | la fruita acaba madurant i caient (fruit that will ripen and fall)   |
|                   | Demonstration                        | La marea independentista (the independence tide), remor de malestar nacional i social (a murmur of national and social discomfort)   |

TABLE 5. USERS ON CATALONIA'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
|  | <b>Referendum</b>                        | tsunami demòcratic (democratic tsunami)  |
|  | <b>Catalonia/Spain Relationship</b>      | comencem a segar: el blat madur i, amb ell, les males herbes (let's cut the ripened wheat and the weeds with it) |
|  | <b>Spain/Spanish state/ Constitution</b> | els llops ja ens guaiten des de la caverna... (the wolves are watching from their cavern)                        |

|                      |  |  |
|----------------------|--|--|
| <b>SOURCE DOMAIN</b> | <b>TARGET DOMAIN</b>                     | <b>METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]</b>  |
| AGRICULTURE          | <b>Spain/Spanish state/ Constitution</b> | ha segat la llibertat dels catalans (has reaped freedom from Catalan people) |

|                      |  |  |
|----------------------|--|--|
| <b>SOURCE DOMAIN</b> | <b>TARGET DOMAIN</b>                     | <b>METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]</b>          |
| CHEMICAL             | <b>Spain/Spanish state/ Constitution</b> | olor a naftalina (smells like naphthalene) |

|                      |                      |  |
|----------------------|----------------------|--|
| <b>SOURCE DOMAIN</b> | <b>TARGET DOMAIN</b> | <b>METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]</b>  |
| CULINARY             | <b>Referendum</b>    | aigualint la consulta (thin down the consultation), cociéndolo [el resultado] a fuego lento (cooking [the result] over low heat) |

TABLE 5. USERS ON CATALONIA'S INDEPENDENCE PROCESS

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN                        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]   |
|---------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| COMMUNICATION | Spain/Spanish state/<br>Constitution | hi ha algú a l'altre costat? (Is there someone –Spain– on the other side?) |

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]                                     |
|---------------|---------------|--|
| INFORMATICS   | Independence  | Virtualment ja som independents (We are virtually independent) |

| SOURCE DOMAIN    | TARGET DOMAIN                        | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]              |
|------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| MECHANIC/PHYSICS | Spain/Spanish state/<br>Constitution | Espanya està trencada (Spain is broken) |

| SOURCE DOMAIN | TARGET DOMAIN   | METAPHOR [Catalan lexemes]  |
|---------------|-----------------|---|
| SCIENTIFIC    | Right to decide | el centre de gravetat de la política catalana (the centre of gravity of Catalan politics) |
|               | Catalonia       | Simbiosi (Symbiosis)  |