2024-03-29T08:24:57Zhttps://www.tdx.cat/oai/requestoai:www.tdx.cat:10803/3940232017-09-03T14:25:36Zcom_10803_1col_10803_83667
TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa)
author
Milić, Ivan
authoremail
itmilic@gmail.com
authoremailshow
false
director
García-Carpintero, Manuel
director
Rosenkranz, Sven
authorsendemail
true
2016-09-27T11:26:50Z
2017-01-27T06:45:12Z
2016-01-28
http://hdl.handle.net/10803/394023
In this thesis, I propose and defend a theory according to which committing oneself to knowing the proposition expressed counts as an assertion of that proposition. A consequence of this view is the knowledge account of assertion, according to which one asserts that p correctly only if one knows that p. In support of this approach, I offer a strategy of identifying an assertion’s “normative consequences”, types of act that normally take place as a result of one’s making an assertion incorrectly. I outline two such phenomena: retraction and disavowal of knowledge. In continuation, I put the theory to test and critically examine four sets of objections against it, arguing that it can convincingly defuse them. Finally, I discuss two related issues: I maintain that by performing “aesthetic assertions” one also normally performs a non-assertoric speech act of recommendation, and argue for the possibility of “non-linguistic assertions”, whose content is expressed by gestures in appropriate contexts.
eng
Filosofia
Filosofía
Philosophy
Asserting as Commitment to Knowing. An Essay on the Normativity of Assertion
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
URL
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