

Migration Movements between Pakistan and South Western Europe: Pakistani migratory networks in Catalonia



Directors:

Angels Pascual de Sans, PhD

Ricard Morén Alegret, PhD

Montserrat Feixas Vihé

Grup de Recerca sobre Migracions

Departament de Geografia

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

October 2007

Cover picture: Gujranwala, October 2004, M. Feixas Vihé

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS



My gratitude goes first and foremost to all those who participated in my research, in Catalonia and in Pakistan, for their patience, their kindness, and their generosity.

I would also like to thank Minu Bhandara, Montse Duran, Andrzej Jezierski, Kay Sabu, Nasir Khan, Saba Khattak, Owen Lock, Lisa Miserendino, Sylvia Nakitto, Marie Cecile Osborne, Montserrat Terradas, and Pilar Vila San Juan for their encouragement, their insights, and their overall help.

And last but not least, I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to my Directors, Angels Pascual and Ricard Morén, for their guidance, their flexibility, and their long distance support.

El meu agraïment ple d'afecte i emoció també a la Maria Giralt, per la seva ajuda en els inicis d'aquesta tesi.

Picture credits: M. Duran/M. Pere Guilera, June 2007

A la meva mare,
i també
a en Tomàs i a l'Eduard

Index

	Page
1. Introduction	15
2. A theoretical framework	21
2.1 Main theories of international migration	22
2.1.1 <i>Neo-classical theory (equilibrium theory)</i>	22
2.1.2 The <i>new economics of migration</i>	23
2.1.3 <i>Segmented labour market theory</i>	23
2.1.4 <i>The dependency or historical-structural theory and the world system theory</i>	24
2.1.5 <i>The social capital theory</i>	24
2.1.6 <i>The cumulative causation theory</i>	25
2.2 <i>Transnationalism</i>	26
2.3 <i>Assessment and applicability of theories</i>	31
3. Hypotheses and Methodological Elements	37
3.1 <i>Hypotheses</i>	38
3.2 <i>Research design</i>	40
3.3 <i>Selection of universe</i>	41
3.4 <i>Interview guidelines</i>	43
3.5 <i>The interviewing process</i>	46
3.6 <i>The researcher's standpoint</i>	53
4. Pakistan: An analysis of key issues	57
4.1 <i>Geographical aspects</i>	57

4.2	<i>Population issues</i>	61
4.3	<i>Political considerations</i>	64
4.3.1	<i>State structure</i>	64
4.3.2	<i>Political evolution</i>	65
4.3.3	<i>Religious issues</i>	68
4.3.4	<i>Ethnic considerations</i>	71
4.3.5	<i>The Pakistan – India relationship</i>	74
4.3.6	<i>East Pakistan</i>	75
4.4	<i>Economic issues</i>	76
5.	Pakistan’s migratory phenomenon	79
5.1	<i>Origins and evolution</i>	79
5.2	<i>International migration: The legal framework</i>	84
5.3	<i>Present migratory policy</i>	88
5.4	<i>Remittances</i>	91
5.5	<i>Other forms of migration</i>	95
5.6	<i>Final considerations</i>	97
6.	Catalonia as a reception country	101
6.1	<i>Origins and evolution</i>	101
6.2	<i>Recent trends</i>	106
6.3	<i>The legal framework</i>	110
6.4	<i>Regularization Processes</i>	115
6.5	<i>“The Catalan integration path”</i>	117

7.	Pakistanis in Catalonia	123
7.1	<i>Personal domain</i>	128
7.2	<i>Professional/work environment</i>	131
7.3	<i>Social environment</i>	145
7.4	<i>Relationship with country of origin</i>	152
7.5	<i>On the migratory movement</i>	155
7.6	<i>Self-assessment</i>	158
7.7	<i>Final Considerations</i>	167
8.	The standing point of the sending families/communities	171
8.1	<i>Personal domain</i>	171
8.2	<i>Social environment</i>	176
8.3	<i>Economic aspects</i>	179
8.4	<i>On the culture of migration</i>	181
8.5	<i>Looking to the future</i>	183
8.6	<i>Final Considerations</i>	188
9.	Conclusions	191
10.	Epilogue	205
	Bibliography	211
	Annex A Interview Guidelines – Catalonia	221
	Annex B Interview Guidelines – Pakistan	225

Table Index

	Page
- Table/Graphic 1 Emigration from Pakistan to the Middle East and to other countries between 1971 and 2001	82/3
- Table/Graphic 2 Year Wise Workers' Remittances 1972 – 2003	91/2
- Table/Graphic 3 Workers' remittances in 000 USD 1998 – 2003	93/4
- Table/Graphic 4 Population in Catalonia 1717-18 - 2005	103/4
- Table/Graphic 5 Foreign population in Catalonia by continent (according to nationality) 1996 – 2005	107
- Table/Graphic 6 National and Foreign Population in Catalonia 1998 – 2005	108
- Table/Graphic 7 Nationals and Foreigners in Barcelona city 1996 – 2005	109
- Table/Graphic 8 Pakistanis in Spain versus visas granted	117
- Table/Graphic 9 Pakistani population (by nationality) in Spain, Catalonia and Barcelona city from 1991 to 2005	123/4
- Table/Graphic 10 Pakistani men and women (by nationality) in Barcelona Province from 1996 to 2005	126
- Table/Graphic 11 Pakistani children (by nationality) as compared to the total Pakistani population by nationality in Barcelona province from 1996 to 2005	127

Diagram Index

	Page
- Diagram 1 Participants by Age and Gender	128
- Diagram 2 Duration of Stay / Employment Status	135
- Diagram 3 Duration of Stay / Professional Status	135
- Diagram 4 Employment Status / Household Composition	137
- Diagram 5 Duration of stay / Household Composition	138
- Diagram 6 Legal Status / Household Composition	140
- Diagram 7 Employment Status / Household Composition	140
- Diagram 8 Duration of stay / Legal Status	141
- Diagram 9 Legal Status / Employment Status	142
- Diagram 10 Duration of stay / Housing Arrangements	147
- Diagram 11 Participating households by head of household, gender and age	172
- Diagram 12 Participating Households by actual head of household, as well as professional status and employment status	173
- Diagram 13 Correspondence between participants in Catalonia and heads of household in Pakistan	174
- Diagram 14 Personal Domain	175
- Diagram 15 Social Environment	177
- Diagram 16 Economic Impact of Migration	180
- Diagram 17 On the culture of migration	182
- Diagram 18 On potential migratory movements	184

All Tables and Diagrams have been made by the author

MAPS

	Page
Map 1 Pakistan Source: http://www.li.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_pol_2002.jpg 13.6.07	59
Map 2 Population Density Source: http://www.lib.utexas/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_pop.jpg 13.6.07	63
Map 3 Major Ethnic Groups Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_ethnic_80.jpg 13.6.07	73
Map 4 Pakistani Population in Catalonia 1996 – 2005 Made by Montserrat Terradas and Mont Cortada of <i>Universitat de Girona</i> , on the basis of data supplied by the author	125
Map 5 Routes used by Pakistani migrants to reach Western Europe Made by Montserrat Terradas and Mont Cortada of <i>Universitat de Girona</i> , on the basis of data supplied by the author	169

ACRONYMS

AJK Azad Jammu and Kashmir

BOE Bureau for Overseas Employment

GOP Government of Pakistan

ILO International Labour Organisation

IOM International Organisation for Migration

MPW Ministry of Population Welfare, Government of Pakistan

NWFP North Western Frontier Province

OEC Overseas Employment Corporation

OPF Overseas Pakistanis Foundation

PIDE Pakistan Institute of Development Economics

SBP State Bank of Pakistan

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Affairs

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

CODES

The following codes have been used to refer and identify individuals participating in the research:

M man

F woman

CV Ciutat Vella district of Barcelona

SM Sants-Montjuïc district of Barcelona

SA Sant Andreu district of Barcelona

MA Metropolitan Area around Barcelona

UR Urban

RU Rural

e.g. M25CV: a Pakistani male immigrant aged 25 and living in the Ciutat Vella district of Barcelona, F55UR: a Pakistani woman aged 55 and living in an urban area of Punjab

“Qui bé està, no es cuita moure”

Tirant lo Blanc, Joanot Martorell

“Throughout human history, migration has been a courageous expression of the individual’s will to overcome adversity and to live a better life”

Kofi Annan

1. Introduction

The right to move within and across borders is a right enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13, “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state”, and “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”. Yet, the control and in some cases the prevention of international migration is at the forefront of most international and national state political agendas, on its own or linked to such diverse issues as human rights, development, and terrorism, in a way that few other human rights are.

Maybe its prominence owes to the magnitude of the phenomenon since, according to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division¹, in 2005 international migrants numbered 191 million or 2.9 percent of the world population, nearly half of them women. Among them 13,469,000 were refugees.

Or possibly it is due to its wide geographical extent, given that international migrants are present all over the world, with Europe hosting 34 percent of them, Northern America 23 percent, Asia 28 percent, Africa 9 percent, Latin America and the Caribbean 3 percent, and Oceania 3 per cent.

¹ All figures mentioned in this page are official data available at (www.unmigration.org 12.12.06)

“South-to-South” migrants are as numerous as “South-to-North” migrants, as one third of them live in a developing country and came from another developing country, while another third live in a developed country and originated in a developing country.

Another explanation could be the economic impact of international migration. According to the United Nations, the money sent home by migrants worldwide in 2005 was USD 232 billion, more than all forms of international aid combined.

Yet another reason may be that international migration touches upon issues as diverse as human rights and human trafficking, unemployment and brain drain, sustained low fertility and population ageing, remittances and development, social integration and xenophobia, national security and terrorism, to the extent that it would be hard to find a country not affected by it, whether directly or indirectly.

And last but not least, the significance of international migration may be related to the States’ awareness of its potential impact to affect the character of the receiving society.

Whatever the case may be, because of the numbers involved, as well as its demographic, social, cultural, economic and political determinants and consequences, international migration may be defined as a global phenomenon.

Beyond the political agendas there is an intense controversy about international migration, with the debate coalescing around arguments for and against it. Some focus on the positive impact of international migration, for the receiving and sending communities, including the flow of remittances, transfer of skills, and increased economic growth for the sending and receiving countries. Others highlight the negative costs to the country of origin in terms of loss of human resources, particularly the “brain-drain”, reduced growth and productivity and lower return to public investments in education. To the destination countries the cost is expressed in terms of the potential increase of political, economic or social tensions. The most critical consider that migration consists primarily in the exploitation of irregular workers.

What is clear though is that at the centre of the debates there are human beings who, at some point in their lives, on their own or with their close family members, sometimes with their communities of origin, took the decision, or were forced to take the decision, to leave their homes and establish themselves elsewhere. In their new surroundings many have learned a new language and have adopted new mores, acquired new skills. Some have developed a new life, they have become part of the local society.

Most of them remain nonetheless deeply attached to their places of origin. In this new globalization era, international migration may no longer mean a long-term separation with limited contacts and few visits if any. The new communication and transport realities permit the establishment of a dynamic link between the migrants and their families. The dramatic lowering of telephone rates and the advent of internet allow practically daily contact for many of them. Affordable air fares make possible regular travel back and forth and they facilitate the arrival of new immigrants, often relatives or friends of those who arrived earlier. Global trade also implies that it is now possible to find consumer goods from all over the world in most of the cities hosting immigrants.

Immigrants thus establish transnational links that play an important role in sustaining the newly formed community as well as the community in the country of origin. According to some authors, these networks are instrumental in reinforcing and expanding the migratory movement.

In 1998 the United Nations defined an international migrant as a person who moves to a country other than his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year. However, there is no consensus on the definition of migrants, neither across countries, nor sometimes within each country. Eurostat has pointed out that there is a greater tendency to register migrants when they arrive in the country where they want to live, rather than when they leave their country. Furthermore, there is a need to distinguish between flows and people. Thus one person may move a number of times, and each movement will be registered separately.

It ensues that, because of the very nature of international migration, its fluidity, the States' limitations in assessing the real numbers of immigrants in their countries, and the efforts of the migrants' themselves to remain unaccounted for until they regularize their situation, population figures need to be considered with caution.

Amidst the myriad migrant communities in the world, this thesis focuses on a specific migrant community, Pakistani citizens living in Catalonia, sometimes on their own or with their families, some for many years and others who have arrived recently, and the networks they have established to consolidate and expand their presence.

But the dissertation goes beyond those who have travelled to Catalonia. It also explores the situation of their families and communities in Pakistan to better understand the process that led to the migratory phenomenon, the movement itself, the impact on those who have stayed behind, and the prospects for further movement.

Migratory movements feature prominently in the past and the present of both Pakistan and Catalonia. They both have experienced the departure of scores of people who have left more or less willingly for a variety of reasons, as well as the arrival of just as many.

Migration hence is not a new phenomenon either in Pakistan or in Catalonia, but the fast expansion of the Pakistani community in Catalonia in recent years, in the absence of cultural, historical or linguistic links, presents an interesting case study.

This research will study this community to try to understand how did the Pakistani migratory movement to Catalonia start, the reasons behind it, their present situation and the perspectives for the short and medium term.

My interest in this topic arose from my own connection with the sending and the receiving communities. While I was born and spent a significant part of my formative years in Catalonia, I have lived most of my adult life abroad, including over five years in Pakistan, during which I have developed a deep affection for the country and its people.

Upon my return to Catalonia in late 2002, I was surprised to discover a significant presence of Pakistani immigrants in Catalonia. It seemed a natural choice to focus on this community and their links with their areas of origin for my dissertation.

Because of the geographical location of my research subject, I wanted to conduct it at a Catalan university. Since I hold a degree in Political Science from the University of Geneva in Switzerland, and a master's degree in Public Policy (International Relations and Development) from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University (USA), I approached the departments of political science, law and geography at various institutions. Eventually, Professor Angels Pascual encouraged me to join her *Grup de Recerca sobre Migracions* in the Geography Department of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, even though I am not a geographer myself. I am very pleased to say that it has been a most fruitful relationship, despite the long distance imposed by my professional responsibilities.

Following this introduction, chapter two will present a theoretical framework briefly reviewing the most widely known theories on international migration to identify one or several with a predictive power that can apply to this case study.

Chapter three explains my hypotheses and the methodology used for the study, a qualitative research that required a combination of methodological practices, though centred on in-depth interviews with members of the Pakistani community in Catalonia and with the families and communities in Pakistan. The exercise was long, logistically complicated, and sometimes exerting. But the long hours and days it necessitated were a thoroughly enjoyable experience that reinforced my ties with Pakistan and its people.

Chapter four is meant to provide an altogether brief introduction to Pakistan. The country's rich history and culture deserves extensive and in-depth studies which go beyond the scope of this project. My intention has been to provide an overview for those not familiar with it, and to awaken their interest to pursue the discovery of Pakistan independently.

Pakistan has a long migratory tradition, even though movements to Catalonia are fairly recent. The history of Pakistan's migration, as well as an analysis of the present situation, including the Government's policies on international migration is presented in chapter five.

In chapter six I have aimed at outlining the migratory phenomenon in Catalonia so as to place the Pakistani migratory movement in the Catalan context.

Chapter seven contains the findings and analysis of my field research in Catalonia, while chapter eight presents the results of my fieldwork in Pakistan. Finally, chapter nine summarizes the findings and presents the final considerations.

As I was concluding the dissertation I decided to add an epilogue to reflect some thoughts prompted by my unplanned exposure to a somewhat comparable, *mutatis mutandis*, migratory movement, i.e. the migration of Asians to Eastern Africa, and more specifically to Uganda, where I am presently living.

2. A theoretical framework

Migration appears to be inherent to human nature. As such it has been the object of academic study since the 19th century with Ravenstein's laws of migration or, in Arango's terms, a collection of empirical regularities (Arango, 1985).

During the second half of the 20th century many theories, models and systems were advanced in an attempt to explain international migration reflecting the economic arrangements, social institutions, technology, demographics and politics of the industrial era when they were shaped.

They all aim at understanding the determinants of migration, i.e. the social, economic and political forces that generate and perpetuate international migration around the world, in order to produce a coherent, accurate, and valid theory, and eventually make predictions on the magnitude, duration, and character of international migration, and the adequate policies required to meet one of the main challenges of the 21st century (Massey et al. 1998).

However, new social and economic realities have challenged and continue to challenge those theories, and new ideas, concepts, and hypotheses are being discussed, though so far they have not resulted into a single theory. Thus, recent theories and approaches focus on the perpetuation of migration rather than on the causes of migration itself (Massey et al. 1998).

De Haan (2000) classifies theories in three main groups: those which focus on individual behaviour and emphasize positive aspects of migration, the Marxist and structuralist theories according to which politics and institutions are the determinants of migration and emphasize the negative aspects of migration, and the sociological and anthropological approaches, including gender analysis, which incorporate motives, institutions and structural factors.

More recently, some authors group theories on international migration under three main headings a) the motivations of people to cross international borders, b) the changes undergone by the migrants after their arrival in reception countries, and c) the impact of migrants on the reception countries (Portes, 2004).

The first heading corresponds grossly with the theories on the determinants of migration. The second one coincides to a certain extent with the theories focusing on the causes for the perpetuation of migration, i.e. they study issues such as adaptation, assimilation, pluralism and return migration. Finally the third heading has some linkages with the transnational approach, which will be subsequently examined.

2.1 *Main theories on international migration*

What follows is a summary of Massey et al.'s classification of the most well known international migration theories until the 1990s in their book *Worlds in Motion – Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millenium*.

2.1.1 *Neo-classical theory (equilibrium theory)*

One of the early theories on international migration is the Neo-classical or equilibrium theory developed in the 1960s by authors such as Ranis, Fei (1961) and Todaro (1969), and which links migration flows to differentials in wages and employment conditions between countries. Migration is thus part of the push pull approach, a means to establish equilibrium between regions of labour supply and labour demand.

Authors such as Todaro (1989) and Borjas (1989) have focused on individuals making a rational choice, i.e. a cost/benefit analysis leads them to expect a positive net return, usually financial, from their movement. Thus, individual human capital traits are key determinants of migration.

2.1.2 *The new economics of migration*

According to authors such as Stark and Bloom (1985), Katz and Stark (1986), and Taylor (1986), international migration is a strategic behaviour undertaken by families and households and/or communities to manage risk and to overcome market failures. This model predicts circular migration, as well as remittances and investments undertaken by migrants in home communities, which under neo-classical economics are anomalous features.

This theory claims that wage differential is no longer a necessary condition for international migration. Actually the economic development in the origin areas may increase pressure to migrate. In the same way, income distribution in the sending community may have a greater impact on influencing international migration than income in absolute terms, i.e. relative deprivation may impel people to migrate.

2.1.3 *Segmented labour market theory*

The segmented labour market theory or Economic Dualism developed by Piore (1979) and other authors argues that international migration stems from the intrinsic labour demand of modern industrial society (Massey et al, 1998). This theory holds that post-industrial economies are characterised by a dual economic structure that generates a built-in demand for immigrant labour. The focus is therefore not on the individual but on society, and the determining elements are not push factors in the sending countries -low wages or high unemployment-, but pull factors in the receiving countries -a chronic and unavoidable need for foreign workers-.

The economic dualism theory pays special attention to the existence of ethnic enclaves as a third employment sector, blending primary and secondary sector features, which also demands immigrant labour. This third sector contains low status, poorly paid and unstable jobs, rejected by native workers, but also jobs and opportunities with significant economic returns to education and experience, and prospects of upward social mobility for the migrant population.

2.1.4 *The dependency or historical-structural theory and the world system theory*

The dependency or historical-structural theory and the world system theory -at the opposite end of the neo-classical thought- is a Marxist approach on international migration presented by P. Singer in the 1970s. It links migration to the macro-organisation of socio-economic relations, the geographic division of labour and the political mechanisms of power and domination (Massey et al. 1998). Authors such as Portes and Walton (1981) claim that international migration is the result of the penetration of capitalist economic relations into non-capitalist or pre-capitalist societies. They consider migration a conflictive process that creates or reinforces inequalities, mainly through brain drain.

Building on the dependency theory, I. Wallerstein (1974, 1980) developed the world-system theory in the 1970s, according to which international migration stems from the penetration of capitalist economic relations into peripheral markets where non-market or pre-market social and economic structures prevail. Led by direct foreign investment and fomented by the creation of export-processing zones, the emerging market economy displaces people from traditional livelihoods and creates a mobile population likely to migrate (Massey et al. 1998:36).

Capitalist investment fosters changes that create a mobile population in peripheral countries while simultaneously forging strong links with core countries, thereby leading to transnational movements. Hence migratory movements are particularly likely between past colonial powers and their former colonies.

2.1.5 *The social capital theory*

This theory, as well as the cumulative causation theory discussed below, focuses on the causes for *continuing international migration*, and in particular on the determinants of international migration such as migrant networks and institutions that support transnational movements. It argues that, however initiated, migration is perpetuated by

networks of kinship and friendship and by social organisations devoted to the entry and circulation of migrants. They constitute sources of social capital that potential migrants can draw upon to reduce the costs and risks. As such, these networks raise the benefits of international movement. Although several authors described the relevance of networks in the development of international migration, and the importance of social ties forged between migrants and non-migrants as resources that facilitate migration, it was Massey (1987) who first identified migrant networks as a form of social capital.

Migrant networks refer to the sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship and shared community origin. These networks increase the likelihood of international migration because they lower the cost and risks of movement and increase the expected net returns to migration. (Massey et al. 1998).

In parallel to the migrant networks, institutions, both for profit and non-profit, develop to complement them. They provide services, some legal, like counselling, social services, and legal advice, and other illegal, including clandestine transport, counterfeit documents and visas, etc. Disparities between supply and demand for entry visas create a niche for entrepreneurs to create structures to promote licit and illicit entry services.

Migration thus, is or becomes a self-sustaining process and progressively delinks itself from the factors that originally caused it, be they structural or individual. The impact of wage differentials or employment rates is progressively overshadowed by that of the falling risks and costs.

2.1.6 *The cumulative causation theory*

The cumulative causation theory argues that migration changes the social and economic context within which individual and household decisions are made in ways that make subsequent migration more likely. Over time therefore, international migration tends to sustain itself (Myrdal 1957 and Massey 1990b).

Massey et al. (1998) claim that this cumulative effect may be noticed in several areas such as the expansion of networks, the distribution of income, the distribution of land, the adoption of a culture of migration where migration becomes a rite of passage, and the acquisition of lifestyles achievable only through migration.

According to the cumulative causation theory, social, economic and cultural changes brought about by international migration in sending and receiving countries give international migration a momentum outside the scope of governmental action.

2.2 *Transnationalism*

As Massey et al. were completing their review and classification of theories on international migration (1998), a new research line appeared around the concept of transnationalism.

Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc (1992) introduced an alleged new concept, transnationalism, as the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. In doing so, immigrants create social fields that cross geographic, cultural and political borders. Glick Schiller and Fouron (1999) further defined transnational migration as a pattern of migration in which persons, although they move across international borders, settle, and establish relations in a new state, maintain ongoing social connections with the polity from which they originated.

Since then, the concept has been the subject of intense debate among migration scholars. For some, like Portes (1997), transnationalism is the response to globalization from below. Transnationalism is a tool to approach the world system structures and to analyse everyday networks and patterns of social relationships that emerge in and around those structures. He posits that:

- The emergence of transnational communities is tied to the logic of capitalism itself. They are brought into play by the interests and needs of investors and employers in the advanced countries.
- These communities represent a distinct phenomenon at variance with traditional patterns of immigrant adaptation
- The phenomenon has greater growth potential and offers a broader field for autonomous population initiatives to deal with the depredations of world-roaming capital than other alternative ways because it is fueled by the dynamics of globalization itself.

Portes is one of the authors for whom transnationalism is something to celebrate, as an expression of subversive population resistance “from below”. In accordance with the social capital theory, he contends that immigrants possess a substantial social capital in terms of their networks of social relationships. The activation of these networks results in initiatives such as the identification and appropriation of job opportunities in far away locations, pooling of resources to lower consumption costs and produce enough savings for business or real state acquisition, informal credit associations, and the creation of transnational enterprises.

With time, transnationalism expands both in numbers as well as in the nature of the activities, from purely economic in the beginning to political, social and cultural.

For Portes, the long-term potential of the transnationalization of labour runs against growing international inequalities of wealth and power as well as intra-national ones in the countries of out-migration. It weakens the hegemony of corporate economic elites and domestic ruling classes. However, in the short term it can have the opposite effect by enlarging the disparities between communities that have migrants abroad and those that do not.

Other authors, such as Guarnizo and Smith (1998), view transnationalism as a useful concept to represent phenomena which are not new but which have reached particular intensity.

They acknowledge the presence of transnational flows and their impact on societies in terms of:

- The globalization of capitalism with its destabilizing effect on less industrialized societies,
- The technological revolution in the means of transportation and commoditization,
- A global political transformation such as decolonization and the universalization of human rights,
- The expansion of social networks that facilitate the reproduction of transnational migration, economic organization and politics.

Guarnizo, Portes, Haller (2003) have explained that there is a need to differentiate among the immigrants between those who engage in transnational activities from those who do not, i.e. not all immigrants are transmigrants. Thus they have redefined transnationalism as the rise of a new class of immigrants, economic entrepreneurs or political activists who conduct cross-border activities on a regular basis. These migrants are agents of change who support and promote local development initiatives.

The country of origin also plays a role in the development of transnationalism through the establishment of policies designed to maintain the loyalty of the expatriates, such as the provision of dual citizenship, and facilities for sending remittances and investing in their areas of origin.

As described by the cumulative causation theory on the workings of networks of migration, just as early departures pave the way for subsequent ones by lowering the costs and risks of the initial journey, transnational activities depend on the maintenance of a strong web of social contacts. The larger and more spatially diversified the network

of social contacts, the greater the chances for transnational activities. (Guarnizo, Portes, Haller 2003:1218).

The same authors admit that the main difficulty with the field of transnationalism is that its empirical base relies almost exclusively on case studies which focus on those who take part in the activities of interest, and exclude those who do not participate. The unintended result is to exaggerate the scope of the phenomenon; it seems as if everyone in the community under study participates.

Nonetheless, they claim that transnationalism has brought new views on international migration by challenging conventional analysis that focus exclusively on assimilation in the host society. Instead, transnationalism focuses on the ongoing relations of migrants with their countries of origin.

The transnational field is significant not only for home countries, but also for host countries, since it affects the way immigrants incorporate themselves and alters conventional expectations about their assimilation.

Despite transnationalism, acculturation to the host society may still happen and transnational activism does not preclude successful integration. In fact, immigrants most involved in transnational activities are likely to be better educated, longer residents, and more prone to be involved in local politics in the host country.

Overall, Guarnizo, Portes, Haller (2003:1239) consider that transnational activism is a constructive phenomenon through which people respond to long-distance social obligations and belonging, and seek to transform political practices in their sending countries. It endows immigrants with a renewed sense of efficacy and self-worth that facilitates their integration into the political institutions of their new country.

In contrast, authors such as Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) are critical of the alleged novelty of the transnational approach. They claim that the connectivity between source

and destination points is an inherent aspect of the migration phenomenon. The process is channeled by social networks that generate a multiplicity of imagined communities.

For them the real meaning of transnational is “extending beyond loyalties that connect to any specific place of origin or ethnic or national group”, and transnational relations refer to the links between institutions that go beyond and even encompass states. Yet, immigration scholars are using it to refer to long-distance, trans-state affiliations, or highly particularistic attachments.

They posit that migrants act within the framework set up by states, they are not acting alone or above the state, i.e.

- States seek to control movement across borders, there is no real “freedom of movement”. Hence, Portes, Guarnizo, Landolt 1999 definition of transnationalism in terms of “regular and sustained” cross border activities ignores the “environment” in which these movements may take place.
- The ability of migrants living “here” to influence events “there” is determined by the rules and laws of the countries concerned.
- The allegiance and political bona fides of persons whose social connections are framed by their connections to two countries are often challenged and elicit negative public, some times institutional, reaction.
- The connections between the “here” and “there” of migrants are affected by the relationship between the states concerned, particularly with regard to security.

Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) claim that present “transnationalism” focuses mostly on the US and the contemporary period, and ignores history. Moreover, proponents of transnationalism disregard the relationship between immigrant transnationalism and receiving states and civil society, probably because they are aware that dual loyalties may produce allergic reactions among the hosts.

Their conclusion is that while assimilationists contended that attachment to the world left behind inevitably fades as immigrants and their descendents gradually assimilate into their new countries, proponents of immigrant transnationalism have realized that connections between here and there are an inherent and enduring component of the long-distance migrations of the modern world. Due credit should be given to them.

2.3 *Assessment and applicability of theories*

It has been indicated earlier that the purpose of the international migration theories is to understand the determinants of migration in order to allow for accurate predictions to be made and the right policies to be adopted. It appears though, that none of the theories under review provide a holistic or comprehensive reasoning on the determinants of migration. However, they all contain elements that assist in the process of understanding the migratory phenomenon in general, and therefore they should be considered as complementary, as a set of different tools to apprehend a complex and ever changing reality. This is particularly the case for the social capital and cumulative causation theories, as well as the transnational approach.

The validity and the usefulness of these theories are linked to their predicting power, i.e. which theories are proved correct in an empirical way. In this case, the objective is to identify one or several theories that may explain the establishment and the persistence of particular international migration phenomenon, i.e. the migratory networks between Pakistan and Catalonia.

I have mentioned in the introduction that my choice of topic arose from my experience in terms of the years I have lived in Pakistan. However, my first contact with Pakistan and Pakistanis took place considerably earlier. In 1978-1979 I was a student at Bradford College in the U.K. That city was then home to the biggest Pakistani enclave outside Pakistan. Pakistani migrants were my neighbours, and there I had my first glimpses of Pakistani culture. So, when eight years later I moved to Pakistan to work with Afghan refugees, it was with a profound curiosity that I discovered the roots of the people with

whom I had shared the rigours of the West Yorkshire winter, and whose friendliness, vivid clothes, and spicy food had put a touch of colour in my life as a foreign student. When I returned to Pakistan in 1999 to work again with Afghan refugees, I had become a sort of insider, much more able to see beyond my initial approaches and to understand the complexities of the Pakistani society.

When living in Pakistan I realised that migration was an intrinsic part of Pakistani culture. I learned that most families seemed to have one or more relatives abroad. I also discovered that men on their own tended to go to the Gulf countries while families usually moved to the UK and in later years to the USA, Canada or Australia. I realised that the diaspora was very diverse. While generally people migrated to seek a better future, for some this meant higher wages, others were in search of rewarding professional careers, and many women went abroad in order to marry fellow Pakistanis, often their cousins, who had migrated earlier. Their origin was equally diverse, as migrants hailed both from rural areas as well as cities, and from all the regions in the country.

It was evident that many Pakistanis had developed transnational links. They had dual citizenship or at least residence permits in foreign countries. Pakistanis living in Pakistan travelled frequently to visit relatives abroad, elderly people escaped the scorching Pakistani summer for milder weather in the UK or the USA with their children settled there. Those living abroad went often back to Pakistan to participate in family events such as marriages or to spend festivities like Eid together. Most significantly, young people considered migration a regular option when planning their future.

As I studied the different theories on migration, I realized that they contained elements that tallied with my own experience and with the findings of my research. Thus as per the neo-classical approach, the expected wage differential and the probability of employment linked to the migrants' human capital, are often major elements in the decision to migrate. Similarly, the very real costs that migrants endure, in terms of transportation and access, but also change of language and culture, are obstacles duly factored into the decision-making process.

Similarly, the new economics of migration theory includes elements such as the transfer of the migration decision to a collective level, household or family, rather than the individual, and the investment of remittances at home which apply to the Pakistani migratory experience.

The segmented labour theory, though difficult to test, describes fairly accurately the situation of many migrants, and the world system theory explains some of the migratory flows, mainly to the UK, but it does not explain more recent movements such as the ones to the European mainland.

Whether one accepts transnationalism as a new concept or not, elements of the transnationalist approach are an obvious feature of the Pakistani migratory phenomenon. Second and third generation migrants² retain a very strong connection with Pakistan through the establishment of economic ventures and the maintenance of strong social contacts reinforced by marriages between residents abroad and members of their extended families in Pakistan.

However, none of the theories adequately addresses the specific case of migration between Pakistan and Catalonia.

As described in the neoclassical economic approach, there are notable wage and employment differentials between Catalonia and Pakistan. However, the gap existed long before the movement acquired a significant momentum. Furthermore, the migration costs related to coming to Catalonia are higher than those incurred in going to countries like the UK with which there are colonial links, or the USA, Canada or Australia, where in addition to linguistic closeness there are well established Pakistani enclaves.

² The author is aware that a number of academics refute the concept of second and third generation migrants on the basis that they have settled in the country of reception and are therefore no longer “migrants”. However, in this particular case, the nature of the settlement is at stake, and hence the concept is useful to identify the concerned individuals.

The new economics of migration claim that decisions on migration are made at the household or even community level for the purpose of maximising income and minimising risk does apply to Pakistani migration in general, if community is taken to mean the extended family. But this feature is not limited to international migration, rather it is a distinctive trait of the Indian sub-continent culture. The two other key features of this theory, remittances and investment at home, do apply to the Pakistani migratory phenomenon.

As far as the segmented labour market theory is concerned, because of its focus on the receiving country demand for import labour, it is not really useful to understand why Pakistanis, as a group, would come to Catalonia. It does explain though how the structural changes experienced by Catalonia have turned it into a consumer of international labour. In addition, this theory accurately predicts the emergence of Pakistani ethnic enclaves.

The absence of past colonial links and a limited economic relationship between Pakistan and Catalonia at present implies that the dependency or world-system theories are not applicable.

Thus none of the theories on the causes of migration explains the reasons that prompted the initial migratory movement from Pakistan to Catalonia. However, the theories on the causes for continuing migration contain elements that are useful in the identification of the determinants of migration, i.e. the existence of migrant networks based on kinship and friendship that facilitate the arrival and settlement of new migrants, thus reducing the costs and increasing the net returns, and of related institutions and their role in fostering migration, as well as the expansion of these networks as the number of Pakistani immigrants rapidly increases.

Similarly, the transnationalist approach helps understand some of the dynamics of the movement, but not the reasons that triggered it.

Thus, in order to determine the key elements of the decision-making process, it is necessary to closely look into the economic, social and cultural aspects of the migratory movement. It is also necessary to look into the existence of transnational migratory networks and their role in the migratory process.

3. Hypotheses and Methodological Elements

This thesis aims at predicting the likely development of the migratory movement between Pakistan and Catalonia. A second, originally unplanned, goal is giving voice to the participants in the research. The second goal emerged gradually in the course of my research, and it is the result of my interaction with the Pakistani community in Catalonia, and later with their relatives in Pakistan, since I could not but empathize with their plight, even while retaining my academic persona.

Both goals are among the seven major goals of social research, which is defined by Ragin (1994) as a dialogue between ideas –theory- and evidence -data- through which representations of social life are constructed. Ragin’s other goals are identifying general patterns and relationships, testing and refining theories, interpreting culturally or historically significant phenomena, exploring diversity, and advancing new theories.

To achieve the thesis’ goals, it has been necessary to study the present Pakistani migratory phenomenon in Catalonia, including the determinants that prompted it and the determinants of its continuing expansion. Its short and medium term perspectives may be subsequently assessed on the basis of the plans and expectations of the Pakistani community in Catalonia and of their relatives in their communities of origin in Pakistan, including the potential return movement to Pakistan.

The underlying assumption is that transnational relations have played and continue to play a key role in the development of the movement, and that they will play an equally significant, if not greater role in its future evolution.

For the purpose of this research, Pakistani refers to all those persons born in Pakistan or elsewhere of Pakistani descent, and who consider themselves to be Pakistani, irrespective of the passports they hold. Thus, for instance, Pakistanis who have requested or have already obtained Spanish nationality are still regarded as Pakistanis, unless otherwise indicated.

The term Pakistani immigrant or migrant in Catalonia refers to all Pakistanis, as per the definition above, living in Catalonia, whether they possess regular residence and work permits or not, and irrespective of the duration of their stay, which may well range from over two decades to less than a year.

3.1 *Hypotheses*

Following the definition presented by Ragin (1994) about the scientific method in constructing social research, my strategy to achieve these goals consisted first of all in a review of the relevant literature including theoretical approaches to migration and to transnational relations, as well as studies on migration in general and on migration issues in Catalonia and in Pakistan. This led me to establish the following hypotheses.

In Catalonia,

1. Pakistanis migrate to Catalonia prompted by the economic differential between the two countries and the perceived low risks/costs attached to it.
2. The existing migratory flow continues to expand on the basis of networks where kinship and other social relations play a major role. These networks constitute a social capital so valuable that it offsets risks and costs such as the lack of legal permission to enter or remain in the country, and the absence of cultural, historical and linguistic links.

In other words, the choice of Catalonia, as opposed to other destinations, is mainly determined by the presence of Pakistani relatives, friends, or acquaintances, which help new migrants arrive and settle there. This assistance may be legal, financial, material (such as accommodation and board), but also employment contacts, etc.

Other key factors in their choice are the perception that obtaining legal residence/work permits for those who arrive without them is relatively easy and fast as compared to other migration destinations, and the assumption that immigrants without legal residence/work

permits are able to live and find employment without excessive harassment from the authorities.

3. The migrants' objectives are a) to send remittances to their families in Pakistan, b) to accumulate sufficient resources to bring other family members over, and c) if required, to provide assistance/ facilitate the arrival and settlement of other Pakistanis

4. With time, networks expand and become stronger and the migratory movement grows exponentially, leading to a rapid and significant increase of the Pakistani population in Catalonia.

5. Catalonia is not a "definitive harbour" for Pakistanis, and after reaching Catalonia they continue to be attracted by "traditional" destinations such as the UK and the USA. They plan to move to those locations in the medium term, and they intend eventually to return to Pakistan.

In Pakistan,

1. The decision to migrate is made by the family, not the individual, as part of a family survival and development strategy, and on the basis of a cost benefit analysis. The migratory costs are borne by the family as a whole. It is a joint investment.

2. Assuming the first hypothesis is correct, the choice of the family member who initially migrates is made on the basis of the individual's ability/capacity to a) travel and establish himself/herself abroad, and b) generate income to share with the family members remaining in Pakistan.

3. The income generated by the family member(s) abroad has a significant impact in the well-being of the family in Pakistan in terms of housing, consumption goods, education, business (agricultural or others), etc.

4. The movement of a family member abroad is viewed as a first step in the movement of the whole family, or a significant part of it.³

5. The decision to facilitate a family member's movement is made taking into account economic costs, but it often ignores related costs such as the emotional upheaval and the potential "destruction" of the family.

3.2 Research design

While accepting that objective reality can never be captured (Denzin & Lincoln 2002 :8), but with the purpose of securing an in-depth understanding of the migratory phenomenon between Pakistan and Catalonia, I considered that the best research strategy was qualitative research. To do so, I used a combination of methodological practices as follows:

a) in Catalonia

- participant observation of Pakistani community
- interviewing of selected respondents with a semi-structured questionnaire, but open ended questions
- interviewing of Pakistani informants and informants from Pakistani and host community institutions
- Participating in community events such as celebrations, cultural gatherings, etc.
- studying of official statistics and census material

b) In Pakistan

- participant observation of Pakistani society
- interviewing of families of selected respondents with a semi-structured questionnaire but open ended questions
- informal exchanges with the same families

³ In Pakistani society, the term "family" includes married brothers and sisters as well as cousins, and their descendents, the links being reinforced by the common practice of marriage between cousins.

- focus group discussions with Pakistanis including those who participated directly in the research as well as their relatives, friends, neighbours and housemates
- interviewing of Pakistani associations such as “Asociación de Trabajadores Pakistaníes”, “The Muslim Society”, and “Camino de la Paz”
- interviewing of authorities, academics and institutions working on migration issues
- studying of official statistics and census material

3.3 *Selection of universe*

Since Spain became a popular destination for Pakistanis migrants in the early 1990s, the majority of them have settled in Catalonia. According to the data provided by the Spanish Statistics Institute, as it may be seen in Table 9 *Pakistani population (by nationality) in Spain, Catalonia and Barcelona city from 1991 to 2005*, Pakistanis in Catalonia were 44 percent of the total number of Pakistanis in Spain in 1991. This percentage has gradually risen and since 2003 it is between 63 and 64 percent.

The Statistics Department of the Municipality of Barcelona establishes the Pakistani population in Catalonia in 2005 at 20,028, of whom 18,488, or 92.3 percent, were in Barcelona province, and 11,997, or 60 percent, in Barcelona city. Much smaller communities could be found in Girona, Tarragona and Lleida.

The site selection was therefore determined first of all by the presence of the migrants themselves. At the same time, my own interests and constraints also played a role, since I wanted the focus of my research to be Catalonia, my environment when I started this dissertation, and a clearly identifiable entity in geographical, socio-economic and political terms. To expand the site to Spain would have imposed severe logistical constraints which were not justified in numerical terms.

Given the primary goal of this research, i.e. making predictions on the likely development of the migratory movement between Pakistan and Catalonia, I felt that the objectives of

the thesis would be better served by engaging in a qualitative research, i.e. trying to obtain in-depth information from a limited number of cases.

I therefore selected eleven Pakistani families or case studies, as per the following parameters, to ensure a large diversity of possible situations in which the members of the Pakistani community in Catalonia find themselves:

- Duration of their stay in Catalonia: I assumed that immigrants who had “settled” in Catalonia would have a different perspective on their present situation and future prospects than those who had arrived recently. After discussing with members of the community, I established the threshold at five years.
- Household composition (in Catalonia): I differentiated between those who lived with their family, and those who did not. This did not necessarily mean that they lived on their own, since they could be sharing accommodation with other people, often other Pakistani men.
- Legal status: immigrants who had legal residence/work permits and those who did not.
- Employment status: employed versus unemployed
- Professional profile: “manual” worker versus “non-manual”

In addition to these parameters, a key element in my selection strategy was the willingness to participate in the study. This implied not only readiness to spend time and share their views and experiences with me, but also a commitment to allow and facilitate contact with their family members in Pakistan.

To select the participants I proceeded in multiple ways. On the one hand I approached the « official » channels, i.e. the Pakistani Embassy in Madrid and the Pakistani Consulate in Barcelona. They were both very supportive and provided the name of several Pakistanis in Catalonia as potential informants. In parallel, I approached Pakistani formal and informal associations, mostly in Barcelona and the metropolitan

area. I also took advantage of spontaneous offers from individuals who had connections with Pakistanis to expand my network of relations.

Since, as it has been mentioned earlier, a significant part of the Pakistani community in Catalonia lives in Barcelona and the surrounding area, the majority of the selected cases happened to be residing there.

The eleven households I identified, including four single men and seven families, were all led by men. As it will be discussed in chapter 5, Pakistani migration is characterised by the fact that women may only migrate with their male relatives or to join them. Through my contacts with the Pakistani community I learned of the presence of a Pakistan migrant woman on her own, but I was not able to reach her. While living in Pakistan earlier on, I had met a Pakistani researcher who had spent some time at Barcelona University. Being single, she had come with her mother.

In Pakistan the sites were determined by the place of residence of the respondents' relatives, which in all cases it happened to be also the respondents' place of origin or residence prior to their departure from the country.

3.4 *Interview guidelines*

Observation was my most important research tool. The second one was the gathering of data through semi-structured interviews, with a substantial number of open ended questions. To assist me in this process, I developed two interview guidelines, one to be used in Catalonia and one in Pakistan.

The interview guidelines for Catalonia, attached as Annex A, are divided in six sections, A to F. The first three sections are concerned with who the participants are and their present situation, what they are doing and how they are living, i.e. establishing their identity, and their professional/working and social environment. Section D aims at examining the links with the country/place of origin, their nature and intensity, while

section E focuses on the reasons for their coming to Catalonia and the strategy they employed. The final section tries to assess their plans for the future.

The second guideline, attached as Annex B, examines the views of their relatives in Pakistan on the migratory phenomenon, including how decisions related to migration had been made, the material and non-material impact on their lives, and their intentions with regard to future migratory movements. This questionnaire has nine sections, labelled A to I. Sections A to C deal with the identity of the respondents and their socio-economic situation. Sections D and E aim at establishing the place of migration in the respondents' lives and the decision making process that led to the migratory movement of their relative(s) in Catalonia. Sections F and G assess the impact of migration in economic as well as social and emotional terms. Section H focuses on the link between the respondent/s in Catalonia and his/their relatives in Pakistan. Finally, section I tries to assess the potential migratory movements.

I carried out the first interviews for this research in Catalonia. Some of them were in English, others in Spanish, occasionally with a few sentences in Catalan. When the respondent was a family, all family members were interviewed separately with the exception of very small children (under 3 years). The questionnaire was simplified when interviewing children and questions modified accordingly. Individual interviews often became at some point group interviews or focus group discussions, where family members intervened during each other's interviews. The group sometimes included not just family members but also visiting friends and neighbours. In those instances my role fluctuated between interviewer and moderator. Once the formal interview was over, discussions could actually be sensibly more intense and informative, as it is explained below.

It is important to note that my own identity, given by my socio-economic standing and ethnic origin, my gender and my age, and most importantly my experience in connection with Pakistan, i.e. the years I lived there, and the knowledge I acquired of Pakistani culture, shape the way in which I see the country and its nationals, and therefore

influences my research. It does so in terms of my access to the households, particularly to their female members, as well as my relationship with the male members and their attitude towards me. But also in terms of perceptions, their perception of me and my perception of them and their society, including my understanding of the respondents' verbal and non-verbal replies, as well as my own observations.

My gender was a crucial element in conducting my research. As a western woman in Pakistan or among Pakistanis I was accorded a dual status. On the one hand Pakistani men addressed me as a kind of « honorary » man, talking to me as they would not to a Pakistani woman, which allowed them to be more frank. On the other hand they extended facilities and kindness to me as a woman, in a way that they would not to a western man, or to any man. This applies in particular to meeting their female relatives. Because I am a woman I had direct and mostly unhindered access to Pakistani women, once their husband and/or father gave the initial approval. Moreover, as described by Denzin and Lincoln (2002:48) on a gendered approach, once the rapport with the female family members was established, my respondents and I often became coequals, and the conversation would at some point “digress” to mutually relevant issues.

The fact that I have lived in Pakistan, and have direct knowledge of its social and political situation, of its traditions and culture, greatly facilitated the establishment and development of a rapport with the respondents. They felt they did not have to explain a number of issues that only a prolonged presence in the country would allow a foreigner to know. On the other hand, there was always a danger that respondents would assume « too much », and that certain issues would remain unknown and unexplained.

In the relations developed between the respondents and the researcher, respondents implicitly and explicitly expected and demanded understanding and respect, something that many of them felt the host society does not have towards them, their culture and their traditions. This led to the emergence of a second and unplanned goal, that of “giving voice”, i.e. providing the subjects with the opportunity to have their stories told, and their worlds represented (Ragin, 1994:32).

3.5 *The interviewing process*

I conducted the interviews in Catalonia between May and September 2003 and the interviews in Pakistan during September and October of the same year. Selecting the participants in Catalonia was not easy. As explained earlier, I had different sources of potential respondents. Usually I started with a name and a telephone number, and I had to explain over the telephone how I had been given their names and persuade them to meet with me. Most people were surprised, and often suspicious. Once or twice I encountered individuals who thought I was looking for a sexual encounter.

Agreeing on a time and place was also fraught with difficulties. Many of them worked very long hours and had very little free time. At times they lived in distant places that required me to travel for two to three hours. As a result most of the interviews took place on Sundays or, if during the week, late in the evening. Agreeing on a place was also a challenge. I was aware that if I suggested meeting a man in his place this could be construed as a sexual advance on my side. Nor could I ask them to come to my home, because they could not afford the cost and time involved, but also because it would have been culturally inappropriate. So the first encounter would take place in public places, the gardens of a museum, a coffee shop, a restaurant, a train station, and once on a beach. Depending on how the relationship evolved, second, sometimes third meetings would take place in their homes, especially in the case of those with families in Catalonia, or again in public places for men on their own.

The first meeting was usually devoted to identifying each other and establishing the “ground rules”. I explained who I was, what I was doing, and the purpose of my research. I always highlighted my years in Pakistan, which unfailingly prompted questions on their part as to where exactly I had been living and what I had been doing, and tested my knowledge of their country. After I had reassured them that I was not working for the police, and that they would in no way be harmed, I asked them whether they were willing to participate in my research, and what that entailed. I stressed that the interview in Catalonia was the first part of my research, to be followed by an interview of

their relatives in Pakistan. That was in general a turning point. If they hesitated I knew that I should look for someone else.

I used a tape recorder in subsequent meetings after obtaining their agreement. I showed them how it worked and made them listen to their own voices and none of the participants ever objected. Eventually I met them a third and even a fourth time, mostly in the case of families where a family member was absent on the day of the recorded interview.

The duration of the interview varied according to the subject. Usually between two to four hours. Frequently, by the second meeting the relationship had evolved to a friendly exchange. Several times they invited me to share a meal with them in their houses. I appreciated the gesture, very much part of the Pakistani culture, though I often felt embarrassed since I knew that many of them had very little money and they were making special efforts to be hospitable to me. I was also aware that to refuse their hospitality would be considered a rude gesture, and would probably preclude any further meetings, particularly it would rule out the possibility of ever meeting their relatives in Pakistan. Sharing a meal set a different tone to our interactions. They were much more at ease and they spoke freely about their experiences. It also allowed them to “check me out”, to evaluate and eventually “approve” of me, before they would make arrangements for me to meet with their families in Pakistan.

Talking to men on their own or to families were two very different experiences. With the men it was more or less friendly, but there was always a certain reserve. Usually, once I would meet their families the tone of the relationship changed dramatically. I was no longer a “stranger”. Women were in general very warm towards me, happy to talk to someone who knew where they were coming from, who understood their customs, who appreciated their clothes and the objects they had brought from Pakistan, and who understood their culture, their tradition and their values.

Once the more “formal” part of the interview was finished, we talked over a cup of tea or a meal. The roles were then reversed. It was their turn to ask me questions. The topics ranged from me, my family, my experience in Pakistan, to Catalan/Spanish culture, dressing codes, marriage, family relations, etc. They also sought my opinion about diverse issues, often related to their culture, trying to make me agree with their own points of view.

I often felt that they perceived me as a bridge between their world in Pakistan and their world in Catalonia. I could understand the challenges they were facing in Catalonia because I knew their background. The fact that I had obviously fond memories of my years in Pakistan and a deep appreciation for the country, its people and its culture, brought us closer to each other and undoubtedly facilitated the rapport between us.

They asked for my opinion to validate their own assessment of the Catalan reality, the good points and bad points, and to take comfort in the knowledge that though they might look “alien” in Catalonia, someone from Catalonia shared their conviction that they had every reason to be proud of their own culture and origins.

Before meeting them I always prepared carefully. I ensured that my clothes were appropriate. I purposely chose not to wear the Pakistani dress since I was not Pakistani and we were not in Pakistan and I feared that they might think that I was being condescending. But I always made sure that I was dressed modestly. I wore trousers with a buttoned-up, long-sleeved shirt down to my thighs. The purpose was two fold. On the one hand I wanted to dispel the possible impression that I was a loose woman, looking for something other than academic research. On the other hand, I wanted to confirm with my behaviour and my attitude that I knew who they were, their origins and their culture, and that I respected them. In addition, it was also a way of letting them know that I was very much aware of what was appropriate for a “lady”, which was how I wanted to be perceived by them.

They always observed me cautiously. Women in particular scrutinized me in our first meeting. More than once I was complimented on the modesty of my attire, especially by women who had recently arrived in Catalonia and were still under the “shock” of the Catalan women’s fashion.

When visiting families for the second or third time I always took a present with me, but not when I met with men on their own to avoid any misunderstanding.

I met some twenty potential respondents before I selected my eleven participants. In some cases they withdrew after I had already met with them twice. One young man was not prepared to have me meet his parents. One family withdrew after it surfaced that the main respondent was involved in a case of bigamy. He had married a Spanish woman some years earlier and, after informally separating, he had an arranged marriage in Pakistan. By the time he withdrew from the research, he had returned to his Spanish wife, with whom he had two children. In the meantime, his Pakistani wife had become pregnant and was expecting him to bring her over to Spain. Others would not have the time, or their search for a job would suddenly take them far away, or suddenly would be unreachable for no clear reason.

Some respondents were hesitant. They were concerned that talking to me might create problems for them, especially those who had not yet regularized their situation in Spain. Others felt flattered and were keen on sharing with me their experiences. That was particularly the case of those who had “done well”.

My first task was therefore to explain who I was, the purpose of what I was doing, and the scope of my research, basically to reassure them. Some understood it quickly, others took some time, but eventually I was confident that all of them felt comfortable with me and in no way threatened. That was very important given that I needed their agreement, and their help, to meet with their relatives in Pakistan.

I was totally dependent on them. The withdrawal of a participant as I was getting ready to go to Pakistan was a major preoccupation for me as I was concerned about the research threshold, i.e. how many participants could I afford to lose, and yet my research remain significant? Consequently, I was extremely careful in my dealings with them. From my perspective, throughout my field research I felt that I was engaged in a power relation with the respondents, with the scales tilted in their favour.

My research in Pakistan was very different. To start with I had time limitations. I could not stay there for more than one month to carry out the interviews, so it was imperative that I followed the schedule I had previously established. The families of my respondents lived all in Punjab, however, Punjab is a vast territory and I had to plan my movements carefully.

Prior to my arrival there I had compiled a list of all my contacts, i.e. the names and telephone numbers of the family members who had been requested by the respondents in Catalonia to facilitate my meetings with their families. They had all been warned of my arrival and the purpose of my visit, and only in one case I was unable to contact the respondent. They were all extremely courteous with me, many of them treating me more as a family friend than a researcher. This made me feel often embarrassed as I could not return their hospitality and kindness as they deserved.

Key in the success of my enterprise was the support of my friends and relations in Pakistan. Given the short time I had available, I would have never succeeded without their hospitality and support. They helped me identify and hire qualified interpreters and provided the kind of insiders' help that make life and work possible in Pakistan.

Contrary to the pattern I had established in Catalonia, I met with each family once only. Time did not allow for more meetings, but I felt that, through long and intense interviews, I was able to gather most of the information I required. In a couple of occasions I would have liked to be able to return to visit the families, not so much for the sake of the

research, but because I genuinely liked them and would have enjoyed to have the opportunity to remain in touch with them.

In some cases they were worried that my research might hurt their relatives in Catalonia. When I realized this, I made sure to reiterate the object of my visit and the purpose of my research.

I used the services of an interpreter who translated from Urdu or Punjabi into English in all the interviews but one, in which a family member insisted in translating for me. My first interpreter, for the area around Islamabad, was a social researcher herself and my discussions with her before and after the interviews were very useful as she opened my eyes to issues that as a foreigner I might have overlooked. For Lahore and the area around it I was assisted by a university student. Many of the families spoke some English, but not enough for the interviews to be successful. Having an interpreter facilitated communication but it had its own downsides. As I explained earlier, many times I was welcomed as an important guest, sometimes as a family friend, and their rules of etiquette imposed that so was the interpreter. This would occasionally hamper the interview procedures as there would be a number of simultaneous conversations taking place.

All interviews were taped with the consent of the interviewees. Initially they tended to be reticent but after I explained the purpose and made them listen to their own voices they relaxed and allowed the recording to continue. Because the interviews were more often than not group discussions, with children running around, food and drink being served, and visitors dropping in and out, transcribing the conversations later on was a daunting task.

In a few cases the interview lasted for about two to three hours. Mostly it was a day long affair, including meals, visits from and to other relatives and neighbours, and sometimes having to decline persistent invitations to spend the night at their places.

The interviews were conducted using questions around specific issues/themes as described earlier. Sometimes I used direct questions, often though we would talk about a number of topics and I would try to lead the conversation towards my research topics. Generally the discussions after the formal interviews were over provided better information, or at any rate they qualified the answers given earlier. That was especially the case with families in Catalonia, and with just about all the interviewees in Pakistan.

That meant that replies to the issues identified in the interview guidelines had to be “extracted” post facto when I analysed the text of the interview transcripts. This entailed the danger of my recollection not being exact, or accurate enough, but I could not disregard the wealth of information collected that way. When people felt less constrained they provided more and better information. On the other hand, because some time elapsed, often a few hours, between the moment they gave the information and the time I recorded it, some details may have been lost in the process.

Because of the warm reception I was given practically everywhere, sometimes I felt that I was taking advantage of my “hosts”. Invariably they wanted to talk to me to obtain information about their loved ones, especially in the case of mothers and wives. Although they all claimed to be in regular contact with them, they wanted to know whether they were really well and what were their living conditions. In two occasions there was some concern as to the nature of my relationship with the respondent, in both cases men on their own. It is worth noting that this was not overtly expressed, rather, it was the subject of a side discussion between women in the family that was later reported to me by the interpreter.

Several of the families gave me presents as I left, again a source of embarrassment for me despite being aware that their behaviour was dictated by Pakistani hospitality rules. Occasionally I was requested to take a present back for their relatives.

In addition, I interviewed a number of authorities, academics and officials in institutions dealing with migration issues as follows:

- Karamat Ali, Pakistan Institute for Labour, Education and Research,
- Dr. Olivier Brasseur, Representative, UNFPA, Pakistan,
- Dr. Shahid ul Haq, , International Migration Organization, Pakistan,
- Dr. A. Isfahan and J.M. Asif, PIDE,
- A.R. Kamal, Director, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics PIDE
- Alya Khan, International Labour Organisation, Pakistan,
- Vicente Mas, Chief Consular Section, Embassy of Spain
- Rashid Ahmed Mugal, Director-General for Migration, Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment,
- Saif Ur Rehman, General Manager, Overseas Pakistani Foundation,
- Armand Rousselot, Representative, International Migration Organization, Pakistan,
- Dr. I. Saifullah, International Labour Organisation, Pakistan,
- Khwaja Ijaz Sarwar, Federal Secretary, Labour, Manpower & Overseas Pakistanis,
- Antonio Segura, Ambassador of Spain, Pakistan,
- Pervez Tahir, Chief Economist, Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance,
- Onder Yucer, Representative, UNDP, Pakistan)

3.6 *The researcher's standpoint*

As noted by Ragin (1994:7), social research involves a three-way mixing of researcher, subject and audience, in which social researchers study society while being part of society, and those they study are also part of the audience. This mixing cannot but have an impact on the nature and conduct of research.

I have explained earlier about my concerns and behaviour as I conducted research because of the anticipated impact on the research itself. In this connection, I must mention my anxiety about people not showing up for interviews, whether in Catalonia or in Pakistan, whether as a result of my not being persuasive enough, or for any other reason. Given the total number of participants, I feared that any withdrawal might affect

the results of my research and maybe even invalidate its results. Past this immediate preoccupation, I was concerned about people telling me what they thought I wanted to hear, as I was also worried that they were modifying their recollections so as to impress me.

A separate apprehension was losing my academic distance: it was difficult not to empathize with people who were working so hard, who had struggled and were struggling so much to make a living. I felt ashamed of my country people for refusing to interact with good, honest people, and for unfairly labeling them as “terrorists”. Many of the respondents in Catalonia stated that I was the first Catalan person they had talked to for any length of time, shared a coffee, or a meal.

It was also difficult to face the pain of a mother who has not seen her son for some years and does not know when she will see him again because he has no papers and cannot travel, if he were to get the money to travel. I could not but feel empathy for women living with their in-laws, and whose every act and movement were subject to authorization from their relatives in the absence of their husbands.

At the same time, it was difficult to feel sympathy for people who showed disdain towards my culture, who made fun of deficient or non existing mechanisms to control the entry and permanence of aliens on the territory, and who abused the welfare and public health systems of their host country. It was also hard to remain distant when what I am, a western woman, was an object of derision, and was profoundly despised, even when they made it clear that somehow I was considered “something else”. It was even harder when I was requested to confirm my agreement with their views. My exchanges with the participants sometimes made me feel uncomfortable as I could see myself, or what I represented, through their eyes, i.e. a Catalan woman, which from their perspective it meant in most cases someone with no self-respect, no family values, and a purely materialistic approach to life.

As far as power relations between interviewer and interviewee were concerned, I had assumed, prior to conducting the interviews, that the interviewer has a certain power over the interviewee. The interviewer chooses the questions, transcribes the answers using his/her own filters, and interprets those answers.

However, I discovered that the interviewees had also significant power. First of all they had the power to refuse to be interviewed at any point in time and thus greatly jeopardize my research. They also had the power to choose whether to answer me truthfully or not, and sometimes I felt they were less than truthful. In this particular research, they also had power over me in terms of agreeing first and later arranging for me to meet with their relatives in Pakistan, and by doing so, allowing me to complete my research or not.

4. Pakistan: An analysis of key issues

Pakistan is a new country by European standards. It was born with the dawn of August 14th 1947, as British India disappeared and gave way to Pakistan and India. A birth much desired by a group of Muslim Indians led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah and much regretted by other proponents of independence from the British Empire, including Mahatma Gandhi.

Thus, Pakistan, the land of the pure, came into being less than sixty years ago. But this is not to say that its history, the history of its people, started then. It was most aptly articulated by the Pashtoon nationalist Wali Khan in the late 1980s when he declared, as quoted by Talbot (1999:1), “I have been a Pashtoon for 4,000 years, a Muslim for 1,400 years and a Pakistani for 40 years”.

In fact, the territory known as Pakistan was home to some of the earliest human settlements and it also witnessed the initial days of two of the world’s major religions, Hinduism and Buddhism. Among the civilisations that flourished in what is today Pakistan two stand out, the Harappa and the Gandhara cultures. The Indus Valley civilisation, known also as the Harappa or Mohenjodaro culture, appeared around 2500 BC along the Indus river valley in Punjab and Sindh. This sophisticated civilisation had a writing system, urban centres and a diversified social and economic system. The Gandhara civilisation, located in what is now northern Pakistan and near Peshawar, was flourishing when its ruler Porus was defeated by Alexander the Great in 326 BC (Nyrop, 1994).

4.1 *Geographical aspects*

Presently Pakistan has a territory estimated at 803,940 square kilometres, and is strategically situated east of the Persian Gulf, in close proximity to China and the Central Asian Republics. It shares borders with China, Afghanistan, Iran and India. The boundary with Iran was first delimited by a British Commission in 1893 separating Iran

from what was then British India Balochistan and was formally agreed in 1957 (Khan, 1991).

The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is some 2,250 kilometres long, from the Hindu Kush and Pamir Mountains to the Registan desert. It is known as the Durand line on account of Sir Mortimer Durand, the British India Foreign Secretary who drew it in 1893. Though the Amir of Afghanistan acceded to it at the time, its legitimacy has been questioned in later years by successive Afghan governments and by Pashtoon tribes living across the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.


From the eastern end of the Afghanistan border, there is a border line of about 520 kilometres between Pakistan and China determined through a series of agreements from 1961 to 1965, with the understanding that a new border treaty will be agreed after the dispute over Kashmir is resolved (Khan, 1991).

In the north east of the country Pakistan controls 84,159 square kilometres of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. This area consists of Azad Kashmir and most of the Northern Areas, where there are five of the world's seventeen highest mountains and some extensive glaciers. The boundary remains in dispute with India, and the Siachen glacier has been the scenario of fighting on a number of occasions since the early 1980s.

In Kashmir the dividing line between Pakistan and India is known as the Line of Control. It is some 770 kilometres long and it was initially a cease-fire line established with UN assistance in January 1949 after eighteen months of fighting. It was last adjusted and agreed upon by the two sides in the Simla agreement of 1972.

The border between the two countries continues southwards for about 1,280 kilometres following the Radcliffe Award line, named for Sir Cyril Radcliffe the head of the British boundary commission on the partition of Punjab and Bengal. This border is not formally disputed though the Indians had expected the line to run further to the west so as to

MAP 1



Source: http://www.li.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_pol_2002.jpg 13.6.07

allocate Lahore to India, and Pakistanis had hoped the line to run further to the east assigning Delhi and Amritsar to Pakistan (Nyrop, 1994).

In geographical terms Pakistan has three major areas, the northern highlands, the Indus River plain, with two major subdivisions corresponding to the provinces of Punjab and Sindh, and the Balochistan plateau. The northern highlands include parts of the Hindu Kush, the Karakoram Range and the Himalayas, with famous peaks such as the K2, the second highest in the world with 8,611 meters, and the Nanga Parbat, the twelfth highest with 8,126 meters. Several large basins cut the ranges like the Peshawar basin on the Kabul River and next to the Khyber Pass, a traditional entryway into the sub-continent for invading armies (Khan, 1991).

The Indus plain is a large and fertile alluvial area formed by silts from the Indus River, one of the great rivers in the world that rises in southwestern Tibet. It has a catchment area of nearly one million square kilometres and all of Pakistan's major rivers – the Kabul, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej - flow into it. The region has been inhabited by agricultural civilisations for at least 5000 years and it remains the granary of the country through the construction of two river dams, Tarbela on the Indus and Mangla on the Jhelum, and a vast surface irrigation system. Bordering the plain by the south and next to India, there is the Thar Desert, a remote and isolate zone sparsely inhabited by nomads (Nyrop, 1994).

The Balochistan plateau is bordered at the north by mountain ranges reaching heights of 3,700 meters. Valleys open on fairly large basins that allow human settlement. Towards the Southwest the landscape turns into sand-hills and desert areas. This is a dry area with weak rains, between 25 to 50 mm per month. Temperatures are below 0 degrees in winter and may reach over 45 degrees in summer during the day. Agriculture takes place in oasis like areas producing mostly fruits and using underground water through wells and underground irrigation systems known as karezes. Traditionally the inhabitants have relied on the rearing of stock leading to a semi-nomadic mode of living (Nyrop, 1994).

The climate in Pakistan is generally arid, with hot summers and cool even cold winters, with wide variations of temperature at specific locations, and with limited rainfall. There are, however, major differences between regions. Thus in the northern areas summers remain cool, whereas in Punjab and Sindh the temperature can exceed 50 degrees. There are four clear seasons, the onset and duration of each varying according to the region: a cool dry winter from December through February, a hot dry spring from March through May, the summer rainy season or Southwest monsoon period from June through September, and autumn in October and November (Nyrop, 1994).

4.2 *Population issues*

According to the Population Division of the Economic and Social Affairs Department of the United Nations, the world population increases by 1.2 percent every year, or some 77 million people. Six countries contribute to half of this growth, Pakistan is one of them. Thus, if in 1999 Pakistan had 2.5 percent of the world's population, by 2050 it is expected to have 3.9 percent.

Pakistan suffers therefore from major population pressures which have a major impact on the social and political environment of the country. These pressures are also responsible for the migratory movements from the rural to the urban areas and abroad.

The main tool to establish the population of Pakistan is the Population and Housing Census. The first population census was conducted in 1951 and since then it has taken place in 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1998. The population count has direct implications for resource distribution, allocation of legislative seats and distribution of civil servants and army quotas, and consequently, census data is a highly sensitive subject.

According to the UNDP Human Development Report 2005, by the end of 2003 the population of Pakistan was 151.8 million which made it the 6th most populated country in the world. The population growth rate rose from 2.6 percent for 1961-1965 to 3.5 percent for 1986-1990, and declined to 2.6 percent for 1996-2000 (UNFPA/MPW, 2003).

In absolute terms almost 109 million persons have been added to the population between 1961 and 2004. At an annual growth rate of 2 percent, the population is expected to double in 35 years. Every year, 3.9 million children are born and a million persons die, adding 2.9 million persons to the population (UNFPA/MPW, 2003).

Population density has increased from 42.5 persons per square kilometre in 1951 to 164 persons in 1998, and the urban population has increased in the same period from 6 million to 43 million (UNFPA/MPW, 2003).


The fertility rate in 2003 was 4.3 with 30,000 mothers dying on average every year due to causes related to child-birth. Most of these deaths are preventable but overall only half of the population has access to government health facilities. The infant mortality rate in 2003 was 88.7 per 1000 live births, which is to say that on average 785 infants under one year would die every day, as would 1,019 children under five years. Only one third of the children under five years have adequate body weight, and one fifth of them suffer from severe growth retardation (UNFPA/MPW, 2004).

About half of the total population is under the age of 20. The 1998 census counted 56 million children under the age of 15. A third of the young people approximately have never attended school, particularly young girls in rural areas, of whom 60 percent have never been enrolled in a school. Only 70 percent of young men and 40 percent of young women had completed primary education in 2002 (Population Council, 2003).

Despite a stated objective to achieve universal primary education since 1965, the goal has remained elusive due to a number of factors including rapid population growth and insufficient resources devoted to education. Primary education is characterized by low enrolment, the net enrolment rate is 46 percent and 38 percent for boys and girls aged 5 to 9 years respectively, and high dropout rates. The number of schools is insufficient to meet the needs. In many areas there are no education facilities, and in many cases there are schools for boys, but not for girls (UNFPA, 2003).

Map 2 below shows the population density across Pakistan.

MAP 2



Source: http://www.lib.utexas/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_pop.jpg 13.6.07

Gender disparities are severe. According to the 1998 population census 52 percent of the population is male and 48 percent female. The lower number of women is attributed to the preferential treatment given to male children. Girls are as a rule more undernourished

and have less access to immunization and health care, resulting in higher female child mortality (UNFPA, 2003).

Women are prevented from playing a significant role in society under the pretence of maintaining cultural and religious values. They are underrepresented in political processes, and they have low access to decision making whether in government, business, civil society and family. There is gender segregation in many workplaces, and they have unequal access to employment and promotion opportunities. Their mobility is severely restricted due to the norm of “Purdah”, which literally means screen or veil. Purdah is the practice that includes the seclusion of women from public observation by wearing concealing clothing from head to toe and by the use of high walls, curtains, and screens erected within the home.

4.3 *Political considerations*

To understand the country’s political development it is necessary to look at the structure of the state and its political evolution since independence. In addition, there are a number of key events and issues, some of which are interlinked, that need to be examined. They are at the root of policies and actions that have a direct impact on the living conditions of Pakistanis today, including, for many, the decision to migrate abroad. They include religion, the Kashmir conflict, ethnicity, and the secession of East Pakistan.

4.3.1 *State structure*

Pakistan is politically and administratively divided in four major provinces, Punjab, Sindh, North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), and Balochistan. In addition there are the Northern Areas, which used to be part of the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir in the pre partition days, and are federally administered, and the state of Azad Jammu & Kashmir, AJK, that is considered a separate entity.

Some 56 percent of the population live in Punjab, and 20 percent, 19 percent and 5 percent in Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan respectively. There are two official languages across the country, Urdu and English, and other major languages include Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushto and Balochi. The northern areas and AJK are sparsely populated.

Formally Pakistan is an Islamic Republic. It possesses a federal structure based in Islamabad with four provincial assemblies, as well as a federal parliament consisting of a Lower House, the National Assembly, and an Upper House, the Senate. Azad Jammu and Kashmir has its own national assembly. Some tribal areas are also federally administered, and there not all the national laws apply.

The federal government has a number of key political and economic powers, while the civil, judicial and social functions of government reside at the provincial level.

The present government engaged in a devolution process in 2001 aiming at transferring power from the federal government to the provinces, and from the provinces to the districts, and ultimately at strengthening representation and authority at the local level. The goal of this process is to improve service delivery through decentralisation with three broad and inter-related objectives: revitalize a political system greatly encumbered by entrenched interests, provide positive measures to enable marginalized citizens such as women, workers and peasants to access formal politics, and to stabilize the political scene by making the politicians more accountable to the electorate.⁴

4.3.2 Political evolution

While Pakistan came into being in 1947, its origins may be traced to 1906, when Indian Muslims founded the Muslim League. The idea of a separate homeland for Muslims was first tabled in 1940. At the time of independence, the partition of the Indian sub-continent exacted the life of hundreds of thousands of people, millions of persons were

⁴ Asia Development Bank, DfID, World Bank, *Devolution in Pakistan, An Assessment & Recommendations for Action*, July 2004, p. 1

compelled to move across the new border, and millions were left homeless. This bloody start may have been a sign of the political instability that would plague the new country ever since.

Just over a year after independence, in September 1948, M.A. Jinnah, the father of the country, died. In 1951 Jinnah's successor, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated and in 1956 Pakistan was proclaimed an Islamic republic. Two years later martial law was declared and the first General of a series, Ayub Khan, took power in October 1958. His resignation in 1969 followed Pakistan's second war with India. General Yahya Khan replaced him, but he lost his position in 1971 after a third war, this time over the secession of East Pakistan.

Following fifteen years of military rule, in 1973 a civilian became Prime Minister, the founder of Pakistan People's Party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Talbot 1999). Z.A. Bhutto's government gave the country a new constitution in 1973, but was marked by factional rivalries. General Zia-Ul-Haq staged a coup in 1977, and a year after he had Z.A. Bhutto hanged on charges of assassination of a political opponent and he imposed the islamisation of the country. General Zia was able to remain in power until 1988, when he died in a terrorist attack.

A few months later, Z.A. Bhutto's daughter, Benazir Bhutto, won the general elections and became the first woman Prime Minister of Pakistan. She was able to hold on to power for two years only, since in 1990 she was dismissed on charges of incompetence and corruption.

Her successor, the leader of Pakistan's Muslim League, Nawaz Sharif, was Prime Minister until 1993, when the military forced him out of power. General elections brought Benazir Bhutto back to power and this time she was able to remain Prime Minister for three years before the military forced her to resign in 1996 on corruption charges once more. Nawaz Sharif won the general elections in 1997 and was in power until October 1999 when General Pervez Musharraf overthrew him in a military coup.

In 2001 President Musharraf named himself President and was reconfirmed in his post in 2002, through a referendum, for five further years. The same year elections for the National Assembly were held in which the former Prime Ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, were prevented from standing. She was in self-imposed exile to avoid being arrested on a number of corruption charges, while he was in Saudi Arabia as part of a deal with the government.

A civilian, a technocrat who had earlier been appointed Finance Minister by General Musharraf, Shaukat Aziz, was elected as Prime Minister (Bennett-Jones 2002). Senate elections were held in early 2003, thus completing General Musharraf's plan for transition to democracy. Since then, however, President Musharraf has made significantly deviated from his planned return-to-democracy path.

Upon seizing power, General Musharraf was shunned as a dictator by many in the west. However, the 11 September events made him an invaluable partner for the west in the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan and the war on terrorism. Political and financial support has subsequently poured into the country, and has helped the government in some of its economic reform programmes.

In spite of this, the 2002 elections saw for the first time in Pakistan's history the rise to power of an alliance of Islamic parties that gained control of two of Pakistan's four provincial assemblies.

This has meant that President Musharraf has had to balance the demands from the US to crack down on extremism in Pakistan, and the demands from increasingly vocal and anti-American Islamic groups. Undoubtedly the challenges are many, and there is increasing concern that the military are not able to assert the Government's control over large areas bordering Afghanistan. This had led some to question General Musharraf's commitment to fight terrorism, especially as the number of Pakistani Taliban in the tribal areas grows.

Presidential elections are scheduled for November 2007 and General Musharraf wants to be re-elected for another five years and retain his post as army chief as a way to preserve his power. The opposition is challenging him, and his removal of Pakistan's Chief Justice in March 2007 has galvanised many into open defiance of the regime.

As of October 2007, a deal appears to be in the making between General Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto whereby they would reach a power sharing agreement. He may retain his position as President and Chief of the Army while she is likely to become Prime Minister for the third time, after the corruption charges against her and other prominent politicians are dismissed.

4.3.3 Religious issues

Religion, and more specifically Islam, is at the basis of Pakistan. The country was established to offer a safe haven to Indian Muslims who felt that they could not remain in an independent, secular India. The idea of a Muslim state in the sub-continent was first broached by a poet and philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal, in 1930. His idea later gave way to the "Two Nation Theory", i.e. two distinct nations in the sub-continent based on religion (Islam and Hinduism), with different historical backgrounds, social customs, culture, and social mores.

There is no evidence, however, that the founder of Pakistan, M.A. Jinnah, intended to create a Muslim state. Pakistan was proclaimed an Islamic Republic in 1956 only, years after M.A. Jinnah's demise. In fact, M.A. Jinnah in his 11 August 1947 speech declared that Muslims would stop being Muslims, and Hindus would cease being Hindus, rather, they would all be Pakistanis.

Defenders of a secular state claim that M.A. Jinnah actually intended to create a Muslim majority state in which religious minorities would be full members, a state in which Muslim economic, political and cultural interests would be safeguarded, but not an Islamic state (Talbot 1999:5).

Notwithstanding the secularists' views, Pakistan is a country where religion has played and continues to play a major role in political, economic and social terms. Ironically, although Islam was meant to be a uniting factor among those living in the territory prior to the partition of British India and those who sought refuge in it, over half a century later religion is one of the issues, along with ethnic, linguistic, and regional forces, which deeply divide the country.

Some 97 percent of all Pakistanis are Muslim. Officially, Sunni Muslims constitute 77 percent of the population while Shia Muslims make up 20 percent. The rest of the population belongs to the Christian, Hindu, Sikh and other minority groups, including the Ahmedi or Qadianis.

While the Sunni believe that the right successor of the Prophet was one of his companions, Abu Bakr, the Shia believe that Prophet Mohammed's successor should have been his son-in-law, Ali, whom they consider the first Imam or spiritual leader. The assassination of Ali in AD 661, and of his son and his followers in AD 680, led to the great schism between Sunnis and Shias. At the heart of the Shia Islam therefore, there is a sense of betrayal and a calling for martyrdom. It is often the faith of the poor and the oppressed, of those waiting for deliverance. It is also a messianic faith, awaiting the coming of the "hidden imam", Allah's messenger, who will reverse their fortunes and impose divine justice (Abbas, 2004).

The Sunnis at one point divided into four major schools of jurisprudence, of which the Hanafi school is predominant in Pakistan. The Shia in turn split in two major groups, both present in Pakistan, the Twelve Imam Shia, and the Ismaili community or Seveners led by the Aga Khan (Nyrop 1994).

General Zia reportedly intended to use Islam to unite the country. Instead, his forced islamisation brought deep divisions. Sectarian violence has been a scourge that has plagued Pakistan for some years, and especially the cities of Karachi and Quetta (Bennett-Jones 2002). Conflict between Sunnis and Shias started when the State tried to

impose Sunni laws concerning “zakat” on the Shias in 1980. Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam and consists in giving a percentage of one’s earnings and properties for charity.

With the memories of the Iranian revolution fresh in people’s minds, the Shia revolted forcing the government to back down. This in turn made the Sunnis revolt. Radical groups like Sunni Sipah-e-Sohaba and Shia Tehrik-e-Jafaria have their roots in the policies of those years (Abbas, Z., 2004). Since then violence between the two groups has become endemic, with well armed extremists from both communities killing members of each other’s faith.

But violence is not restricted to Sunnis and Shias. Christians are periodically targeted. Ahmedis or Qadianis, a dissident Islamic group or sect that follows the teachings of a 19th century cleric who maintained that he was a prophet, and that was declared heretic in the 1970s, remain extremely discreet, and Hindus often try to pass themselves for Muslims to avoid conflict.

Presently minority groups tend to live in separate enclaves. There is very little if any intermarriage, and in general non-Muslims feel strongly discriminated against. Very few non-Muslim reach positions of prominence in the political, social and economic spheres, although there is a ministry with specific responsibility for the well being of the minorities.

Of late religious violence has greatly increased with suicide attacks in numerous locations against government institutions, but also against people at large purportedly to destabilize the government of President Musharraf because of his role as an ally of the west in the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

4.3.4 Ethnic considerations

Next to religion, ethnicity is another dividing factor. Ethnicity is linked to the territory, or lack of it, the language and economics. Except for Pakistanis who migrated from India, known as “mohajirs” (refugees) or Urdu speakers, people tend to identify themselves as Sindhis, Punjabis, Balochis or Pashtoons, in reference to their place of origin, rather than Pakistanis. See Map 3 below. Language is an important element of ethnic identity, and there are more than twenty spoken languages and a vast range of local dialects. Close to 48 percent of the population speak Punjabi, 12 percent Sindhi, 10 percent Siraiki, a Punjabi variant, 8 percent Pushto, 3 percent Balochi, and 2 percent Hindko (Nyrop 1994). Urdu is the official national language, and it is the native tongue of the mohajirs, or some 17 percent of the population. Phonetically it is very close to Hindi, but while Hindi uses the Devanagari script, Urdu employs the Persian script.

Punjabis clearly dominate at present the economic and military spheres. This is the result of their numbers as well as history and the lie of the land. Punjab is the biggest and richest of the provinces. Their prosperity is linked to their agricultural and industrial development as well as army recruitment, features that are rooted in the colonial days, when the British favoured Punjab over other provinces for having stood loyal to them in the revolt that took place in 1857.

The secession of East Pakistan in 1971 reinforced the Punjabi dominance, and later they also benefited from General Zia’s projectionist measures that allowed increased infrastructure development and greater apportionment of Indus water shares (Talbot 1999:14).

The province may be divided in four distinct economic and cultural regions. The northern region around Rawalpindi or the Pothwar plateau, has 10 percent of the province’s population, and its low agricultural production is compensated by the army recruitment and migrant remittances from the Middle East. Central Punjab, with cities like Faisalabad, Lahore and Gujranwala, by virtue of holding 50 percent of the

population, has practically the control of the National Assembly, with 55 of the 112 seats. Most of the industry is located in this region, and it is the main agricultural producer. In South West Punjab there is 20 percent of the population and the economy is based on irrigated agriculture. Finally the Western district is the poorest region, with an agrarian society organised on a feudal basis (Talbot 1999:14).

Balochistan is the biggest province, yet the least populated one. It is a desert-like region, originally inhabited by the Baloch, who are divided in a series of tribes often at war with each other and with the Pakistani State. It is in a remote area of Balochistan that nuclear tests are carried out. In certain areas Pashtoons have become the majority and in Quetta, the province capital, there is a significant presence of Shia Hazaras, originally from Hazarajat in Afghanistan, who migrated in the 19th century. The presence of a Shia community in the province periodically results in a series of violent incidents with the predominant Sunnis. In addition, the region is rich in gas, and the nationalists accuse the government of exploiting its natural resources but neglecting its development. Several rebel movements have over the years challenged the central government over the control of the province's natural resources and the settlement of people from other areas of Pakistan. Feudalism is another feature of the province, which has some of the lowest human development indicators in the country, e.g. the female literacy rate in some areas is 1 percent. (UNHCR, 2002). Overall ethnic and religious tensions run deep.

The interior of Sindh is desert like and still inhabited by an extremely conservative society, including a number of Hindus who stayed after partition. Its capital, Karachi, was the country's first capital. It is a seaport and the economic centre of the country. In 1947 it received great numbers of Urdu speaking *mohajirs*, who took over the new country's bureaucracy. The local Sindhi population felt marginalised and tensions started to arise. However, the major conflict between the two communities developed later when the city received a major influx of Pashtoon labourers who competed for jobs with lower class *mohajirs*. Since the 1990s extremists groups have proliferated and they are engaged in criminal attacks against each other.

The North Western Province is probably the province that used to have the least ethnic tensions, save for pockets in southwestern areas where there are significant groups of Shias surrounded by Sunni communities. The fragile balance they had reached has been put in jeopardy since the 1980s and 1990s by the massive arrival of Afghan refugees and later of the Taliban and Taliban supporters, especially after September 11, 2001.

MAP 3



Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_ethnic_80.jpg 13.6.07

4.3.5 The Pakistan – India relationship

Another key issue to understand present day Pakistan is the conflict with India. From the very start the two countries have had a deep animosity against each other. India did not want Pakistan to be born, Indian leaders were hoping for a secular state that would be a home for all. But some Muslim Indians felt that such a state would not be safe for them and hence their pursuit of a separate Muslim state. Many Pakistanis are convinced that India seeks the failure of the Pakistani State and they think that Pakistan must devote itself first and foremost to ensure its survival in front of their gigantic neighbour. As it has been mentioned earlier, partition was a bloody affair. Some half a million people died, millions were forced to move, and to this day innumerable families remain divided by a line drawn by a departing Empire. But worse than that, partition left an unfinished business that has been at the heart of the continuing conflict between India and Pakistan, Kashmir.

The two wars that India and Pakistan have until now fought over Kashmir are the result of an independence process poorly managed by the British colonialists who allowed the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir to join India at the last minute despite the state's majority Muslim population. This is not to say that India and Pakistan are not responsible for the present violence afflicting the Kashmiri population, which has exacted an increasing number of civilian victims and has forced many of them into exile.

The first war started in 1947 after Pakistan supported a Muslim insurgency in Kashmir. India intervened at the Maharaja's request in exchange for accession of the state to India. The war ended in 1949 with the division of the territory and the establishment of a cease-fire line. The second war took place in 1965.

Linked to events in Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan, armed resistance in the Kashmir valley under the control of India broke out in 1989, with some Islamic groups calling for independence and some for union with Pakistan. According to India, Pakistan was behind these movements supplying weapons and intelligence.

The rivalry between India and Pakistan reached unprecedented levels when they conducted nuclear tests in 1998. Suddenly the world was facing a real nuclear threat. The US, Japan and a number of European States froze aid, loans and trade to both countries, which would have, in the case of Pakistan, a serious political, economic and social impact.

In 1999 Pakistani backed forces infiltrated into Kargil, inside Indian-administered Kashmir, provoking the launching of Indian air strikes. 50,000 people on both sides of the cease-fire line or line of control had to flee their homes. Eventually the infiltrating forces had to withdraw, and both sides claimed victory.

Tension though continued throughout 2001 and 2002, with a build-up of over one million troops on the Pakistani side. 2003 seems to have been a turning point where the two countries indicated their desire to establish a constructive dialogue leading to peace. Kashmir though remains an unfinished business, drawing a very significant part of Pakistan's resources away from the country's development.

4.3.6 East Pakistan

The secession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh are over thirty-five years old, but memories of the war are still fresh. At the time of its creation Pakistan was composed of two territories, East and West Pakistan, 1600 kilometres apart, with Islam as the common, supposedly uniting, factor. The territories presented major differences between them in terms of topography, climate, population density and religious composition. East Pakistan had 55.4 percent of the total population, some 45 million people, with a density of 390 per square kilometre, one of the most densely populated parts of the world, while in West Pakistan the density was 137 per square kilometre. In the West 97 percent of the people was Muslim as compared to 72 percent in the East. The agrarian structure was sharply different: about half of the land was divided in small, under five acre plots in the East, while in the West big landowners were the majority. The few industries the new country had were all located in the West (Talbot, 1999:24).

In West Pakistan, the existence of a very diverse community in terms of ethnicity and language led many of the new leaders to believe that for the state to succeed there had to be a strong central government and just one national language. They chose Urdu, the language of the Indian Muslims who had desired a separate nation, and the language of those who had migrated from India and who, despite being a mere 7 percent of the population, were at the time the political, cultural and economic elite of the new country.

The principle of parity between East and West Pakistan was imposed disregarding all the economic, social, linguistic and religious imbalances in the distribution of power (Talbot 1999:235). Over time, the discontent in East Pakistan grew as they felt increasingly marginalised by the united Pakistan government, eventually leading to civil war. Four million Bengalis fled as refugees to India in 1971, prompting India to intervene in support of East Pakistan's independence.

4.4 *Economic issues*

According to the UNDP Human Development Report 2005, Pakistan's Human Development Index rank is 135, between Bhutan and Nepal. Life expectancy at birth was established at 63 years, and the adult literacy rate at 48.7 percent at age 15 and above. The GDP per capita was US\$ 2,097. In comparison, Spain's Human Development Index rank was 21, life expectancy was 79.5, the adult literacy rate was 97.7 percent, and the GDP per capita was US\$ 22,391. For the decade 1990-2001 the percentage of Pakistani population living below 1 US\$ a day was 13.4 percent, and 65.6 percent below US\$ 2 a day. The share of the poorest 20 percent of the population in national income or consumption was 8.8 percent.

The vast majority of the population in Pakistan is therefore poor, and they are poor not only in terms of low income, but also in terms of lack of access to basic needs such as education, health, clean drinking water and sanitation. The official poverty line has been established by the Planning Division of the Government of Pakistan, GOP, on the basis of the minimum caloric requirements of 2,350 calories per capita per day. Accordingly, it

has been inferred that the incidence of poverty declined between 1986-87 to 1990-91 from 29 to percent to 26 percent. However, between 1992-93 and 2000-01 poverty increased to 32 percent. The reasons for this increase are attributed to the poor performance of the agricultural sector, affected by a major drought.

To address the increasing incidence of poverty the Government adopted in 2001 a comprehensive strategy based on accelerating economic growth and maintaining macroeconomic stability, investing in human capital, augmenting targeted interventions, expanding social safety nets and improving governance.

According to the Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic Adviser's Wing, Economic Survey 2002-03, agriculture is the dominant sector of the economy and in 2002-2003 it contributed 24 percent of the GDP and employed 48.4 percent of the total workforce. Almost 68.0 percent of the population live in rural areas and are directly or indirectly linked with agriculture for their livelihood. The agricultural sector is a major supplier of raw materials to the industry and a market for industrial products, and it contributes substantially to the export earnings. The major crops are wheat, rice, sugarcane and cotton, as well as tobacco and fruits.

For some years this sector has suffered from lack of public investment and severe drought. In addition, the fast population growth has led to a fragmentation of the agricultural land. In 1980 there were 4.1 million agricultural farms. Ten years later their number was 5.1 million. 74 percent of them were less than three acres, too small to be economically viable, pushing small farmers to migrate to the cities and abroad.

The manufacturing sector includes the automobile industry, food, beverage and tobacco group, textiles and apparel group, paper and board, metal products, machinery and equipment.

Pakistan exports both primary commodities, mainly rice, cotton, wheat, fish and fruits, and manufactured ones, particularly textiles, engineering goods, chemicals and

pharmaceuticals products, petroleum and sports goods, and carpets. Cotton is the main export, it contributes close to 60 percent of the total exports, which given the climatic variations, is a major source of instability. Just over a half of the exports go to seven destinations, USA, Germany, Japan, UK, Hong Kong, Dubai and Saudi Arabia.

The main imports are machinery and petroleum products, chemicals, edible oil, iron and steel, fertilizer and tea, and they originate mainly from USA, Japan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Germany, UK and Malaysia. They accounted for 75.2 percent of total imports in 2001-02. Overall there is a deficit in trade balance, which in 2002 was 2.0 percent of the GDP.

Over the years Pakistan has been a recipient of substantial amounts of foreign aid in the form of grants and loans. The value of this aid has greatly fluctuated according to the evolution of the political situation in the region, as well as Pakistan's own political developments. Thus in the 1980s and 1990s, as a front line state against the Soviet backed regime in Afghanistan, Pakistan received massive transfers of foreign aid. A significant part of this aid was relief assistance for Afghan refugees.

Aid though was dramatically reduced in the aftermath of the nuclear tests in 1998, and again after General Musharraf took power in 1999. Pakistan's alignment with the western nations following the 11 September 2001 attacks and the war against the Taliban led to renewed support from western countries that rely on Pakistan in their war against terrorism.

5. The Pakistani migratory phenomenon

5.1 *Origins and evolution*

Migration is a major phenomenon in Pakistan. As per the 1998 census, 10 million Pakistanis, or 8 percent of the official population of Pakistan, are either internal or international migrants. Remittances sent by international migrants constitute the largest single source of foreign exchange for the country equivalent to USD 2.4 billion or 4 percent of the GNP in 2002, (Gazdar (2003:1), and according to the State Bank of Pakistan, in 2003 they were USD 4.2 billion.

Migration is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan. In fact, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, migration is intrinsically linked to the history of the country, starting with the formation of the state of Pakistan. Indeed, the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 resulted in significant religious minorities in the two new countries, many of whom decided or were forced to migrate across the new border. Muslim migrants from India were accorded the status of « *Mohajirs* », an Urdu word meaning a person who has left home, though in Muslim terms it implies migration induced by persecution. *Mohajirs* settled mostly in the urban areas of Punjab and Sindh, while Hindus and Sikhs from these provinces emigrated to India. Fifty years later, the descendents of the early migrants, particularly those who settled in Sindh, continue to be identified as *Mohajirs* or Urdu speakers (Talbot, 2001:41).

A second defining migratory movement in the history of Pakistan took place in 1971. West Pakistanis and people of Indian Muslim origin who wanted to retain their Pakistani citizenship migrated to (west) Pakistan after the war from which Bangladesh emerged as an independent state.

To this day, there remains an unresolved migratory issue linked to the 1971 war. In pre-independence India the Biharis were an Urdu-speaking minority in the Bihar region who in 1947 moved to East Pakistan. In the 1971 civil war Biharis sided with West Pakistan, but at the end of the conflict they found themselves unwelcome in both countries.

Pakistan feared that a mass influx of Biharis could destabilize the country, and Bangladesh scorned them for having supported the enemy (Talbot, 2001:87). In 1990 a small number of Biharis were allowed to migrate to Pakistan, but according to the NGO Refugees International, between 250,000 and 500,000 remain stranded in camps across Bangladesh.

International migration in the sense of crossing a pre-established regular international border, and prompted by socio-economic conditions rather than politics, started in the early 1950s and was directed to the UK. Migrants originated mainly from Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) where there was a tradition of male emigration for seafaring and related activities. They were mostly young men with little education who took up low paid jobs. When the Kashmiri city of Mirpur was submerged as part of an irrigation project, there was a mass movement towards the UK (Gazdar, 2003).

In the 1960s another group of young males started migrating to the UK. In contrast, though, the majority of them were educated and were employed in the industrial and services sectors. Professionals among them, mostly young male doctors, went to the USA and Canada (Gazdar, 2003).

Following a revolt in 1969 against General Ayub Khan, and shortly after the 1971 civil war that ended with the secession of East Pakistan, the country's economy plunged. As the US government curtailed aid to the new government led by Z.A. Bhutto, Pakistan turned to the Muslim countries, and specifically to the Gulf States and Libya, for support. Together with an expansion of economic and technical cooperation, agreements were signed for the export of labour (Gardezi, 1995).

In terms of numbers and until 1970, migration had taken place on a relatively small scale, except for the region of AJK as indicated above. However, the political and economic crisis that took place between 1969-1971, coupled with the oil related economic boom in the Middle East, gave way to a massive export of labour power to the Middle East,

mostly to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, but also to other countries such as Iran, Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain and Omar (Gazdar, 2003).

In order to manage this export of labour, the government established on 1st October 1971 a federal department within the Division of Labour Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, which brought together the existing National Manpower Council, the Protectorates of Emigrants and the Directorate of Seamen's Welfare. This Bureau operated under the Emigration Act 1922 and Rules 1959, which remained in place until they were replaced by the 1979 Emigration Ordinance and Rules (Aasi, 2001).

The objective of this Bureau was and continues to be the processing of recruitment demands for Pakistani manpower through licensed Overseas Employment Promoters, and to regulate employment abroad mainly for countries in the Middle East. According to the Bureau of Emigration, the number of Pakistanis who were working abroad in 1970 was 2,262. Four years later their number was 16,328, and by 1981 there were 1.6 million documented migrant workers mostly in the Middle East.

Between 1971 and 2001 the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment registered 3,131,776 Pakistanis who proceeded abroad for employment. Of these, 1,790,291 went to Saudi Arabia, 668,762 to the United Arab Emirates, 222,925 to Oman, 116,061 to Kuwait, 68,568 to Bahrain and 59,123 to Qatar. Iraq was also a popular destination until the First Gulf War, and 74,292 Pakistanis migrated there between 1972 and 1990. The number of registered migrants to other destinations during that period is 131,751 or 4.2 percent of the total. Among them 910 Pakistanis registered to go to Spain.⁵

Following is a table that shows the total number of registered emigration to the Middle East, i.e. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Iraq, between 1971 and 2001, as well as to other countries:

⁵ Interview with Rashid Ahmed Mughal, Director General, Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, Overseas Employment Corporation, on 7.10.03

Table 1 Emigration from Pakistan to the Middle East and to other countries between 1971 and 2001


Year	M. East*	Others	Total
1971	3,372	162	3,534
1972	3,352	1,178	4,530
1973	7,988	4,312	12,300
1974	14,127	2,201	16,328
1975	19,876	3,201	23,077
1976	36,006	5,684	41,690
1977	120,828	19,694	140,522
1978	107,774	22,751	130,525
1979	114,678	10,829	125,507
1980	120,218	9,629	129,847
1981	154,369	14,034	168,403
1982	140,918	2,027	142,945
1983	126,779	1,427	128,206
1984	99,370	1,037	100,407
1985	87,354	1,107	88,461
1986	61,925	643	62,568
1987	69,160	459	69,619
1988	84,281	559	84,840
1989	97,559	1,128	98,687
1990	115,179	341	115,520
1991	146,859	485	147,344
1992	195,472	621	196,093
1993	156,101	1,632	157,733
1994	112,793	1,247	114,040
1995	121,352	1,268	122,620
1996	122,221	5,563	127,784
1997	152,102	1,827	153,929
1998	100,164	3,880	104,044
1999	78,823	1,673	80,496
2000	104,674	5,462	110,136
2001	124,351	5,690	130,041
Total	3,000,025	131,751	3,131,776
%	95.8	4.2	100

* Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Iraq

Source: Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, Overseas Employment Corporation, quoted in Workforce Situation Report 2001

According to the figures provided by the Bureau of Emigration for the period 1995 – 2001, the majority of migrants originated from Punjab, 49 percent, and NWFP, 27 percent, followed by the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 8 percent, and AJK, 7 percent. In terms of districts, Rawalpindi and Gujarat in Punjab, and Dir and Swat in NWFP, were the major producers of migrants (Tahir, 2003:26).

Graphic 1 Emigration from Pakistan to the Middle East and to other countries between 1971 and 2001



Source: Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, Overseas Employment Corporation, quoted in Workforce Situation Report 2001

The movement to the Middle East consisted initially in skilled workers required to do construction work such as drivers, masons, carpenters, technicians, electricians, mechanics and tailors, as well as unskilled manual labourers (ILO, 2001:25). Later, as some of the Gulf States became regional centres of commerce, they attracted both Pakistani capital and Pakistani professionals.

In the 1980s, with the completion of the major infrastructure work in the Gulf States, the demand for Pakistani workers started to decrease, and this, coupled with the increasing demographic, political, economic and social pressure in Pakistan prompted Pakistanis to seek other destinations. One of them was Spain, and within Spain, Catalonia, especially Barcelona.

It should be mentioned that following the 1973 oil crisis, some Pakistani workers in France crossed the border in search of economic opportunities. A number of them found their way to León, to work mostly in the mining sector. (López Trigal, 1991)

In parallel with the movement of workers, many Pakistanis fled social and political persecution during the 1980s. Urban middle class families started sending off their

children to North America for higher education, where the majority settled, calling for their family and dependents at a later stage. Their numbers though were modest when compared with the outflow of migrant workers (Gazdar, 2003).

In the 1990s a new trend developed for young men to travel to developed countries, including Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea, on visitor visas and overstaying illegally (Gazdar, 2003).

Besides the official, registered, migration, there have been and continue to be other movements of workers abroad. Thus, in 2001 Pakistani embassies reported a figure of 3.7 million Pakistanis residing abroad, over half a million more than the figure quoted by the Bureau of Emigration, as per the following breakdown: 1,701,804 or 45.3 percent in the Middle East, 1,095,858 or 29.2 percent in Europe, and 850,554 or 22.7 percent in the Americas (Ministry of Labour, 2001:30).

Given that many Pakistani workers travel abroad through their own means, oftentimes without a work contract and hence bypassing the Bureau of Emigration, the figure provided by the Pakistani embassies is likely to be closer to the real number and the actual location of Pakistanis abroad than the Bureau's statistics.

5.2 *International migration: The legal framework*

The main source of population data in Pakistan is the Population Census which is meant to be the authentic statutory record of all people resident in Pakistan. It is based on the District Census Report and it is supposed to take place every ten years. The latest one was in 1998 and was published in 2000. The gap between this Census and the previous one, 1981, is due to the political sensitivities linked to the Census. Allocation of resources among the provinces depends on the demographic balance between ethnic and linguistic groups, since they are based on population shares. (Gazdar, 2003:4). However, the Population Census does not take into account emigration from Pakistan.

This lack of data, however, does not mean that the significance of migration abroad is overlooked. In economic terms migration overseas was identified very early on as both a means to reduce the pressure on the labour market and as a source of remittances to alleviate poverty. Thus, the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment was established at the outset of the migratory movement to the Middle East, in 1971. For nearly eight years this Bureau operated under the migration law introduced by the British government in 1922, and which was replaced by Emigration Ordinance no. XVIII of 23 March 1979 and Rules of 26 May 1979. In addition, Pakistan adopted in 1990 the UN International Convention on the Protection of all migrant workers and members of their families, and ratified it in 2003.

The Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BOE) is an agency in charge of regulating, facilitating and monitoring emigration, in the sense of export of manpower for employment purposes. Its objective is to promote emigration of citizens of Pakistan (Chapter II, Section 4-A). To this end the BOE is the official link between potential migrants and foreign employers. Its Director General is called *Protector of Emigrants*.

The BOE is based in Islamabad and it has offices under the name of Protectorates of Emigrants in all the provincial capitals as well as Rawalpindi. All emigrating workers are required by law to register with the BOE/Protectorates, and these are supposed to scrutinise the documents of potential migrants before issuing them with a migration certificate. The BOE is also responsible for regulating the work of private sector employment agents, called Overseas Employment Promoters, who recruit workers for overseas employers.

The 1979 Ordinance establishes that for emigration to be lawful, an emigrant must be in possession of a letter of appointment, a work permit, an employment visa or an emigration visa. Yet another way is if the person has been selected for employment abroad through the Bureau or under an agreement between the Government of Pakistan and a foreign Government (Chapter III, Section 8 (2))

The Ordinance also provides for the Government to deny the right to emigrate if it is not in the public interest (Chapter III, Section 8 (3)), and establishes a punishment of five years imprisonment for whoever emigrates or attempts to emigrate without permission (Chapter VIII, Article 17). Trafficking of migrants is punished with an imprisonment for up to 14 years (Chapter VIII, Section 18).

It should be mentioned that increasing evidence of human trafficking and smuggling linked to illegal migration prompted the Government to establish an Inter-Ministerial Commission chaired by the Ministry of Interior to develop a comprehensive policy in this regard and to coordinate national and international efforts (Letter no. 13/54/2002-FIA.II of 14.4.03 Government of Pakistan, Interior Division).

The migration of women is regulated in Section 25, Code of Conduct for Overseas Employment Promoters, alinea 2 (xi), which stipulates that the minimum age for employment of women as domestic workers shall be 35 years. In special cases, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Federal Government may relax the minimum age limit by five years.

Together with the BOE, the Emigration Ordinance 1979 also established other institutions to deal with migratory movements abroad such as the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation (OPF). The main office is located in Islamabad and there are regional offices in all the provinces as well as in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Its objectives are to improve the social welfare of the Pakistanis working or settled abroad and their families in Pakistan, mostly through the management of a welfare fund created under the same Emigration Ordinance. This fund is supposed to be used to assist the relatives in Pakistan in terms of access to education, health care, housing, and business loans. It also helps in the rehabilitation of disabled returnees and the transportation of the bodies of those deceased abroad, and in 2001 launched a self-contributory pension scheme (OPF, 2003).

In addition, there is the Overseas Employment Corporation, which was established in 1976 and is responsible for government-to-government recruitment. The OEC was set

up to put an end to exploitative practices of the Overseas Employment Promoters and to streamline labour export.

Another key institution is the central bank or the State Bank of Pakistan, SBP, which is formally autonomous from the executive arm of the government. The SBP has a direct involvement in international migration because of the foreign currency remittances of Pakistani migrants. Their major concern is to channel an increasing part of the home remittances through the formal banking system instead of the informal money transfers traditionally preferred by workers abroad.

The Ministry of Interior has also a certain involvement in international migration since it is responsible for registering the legal status of a person with respect to Pakistan, i.e. whether someone is an overseas Pakistani. The Ministry is also responsible for issuing passports.

Pakistanis abroad have created a number of organisations in their countries of settlement, and some of them are also carrying out welfare activities in Pakistan. The main one is the Overseas Pakistanis Institute, established by Pakistanis living in the Gulf Region.

All these institutions are in possession of data concerning Pakistanis abroad. However, their figures and overall information relate to those migrants that travel abroad on regular contracts, and who channel their remittances through official channels. Furthermore, all of them focus heavily on the Middle East, and to a lesser extent on North America.

In summary, international migration from Pakistan operates under a State management system. The State has policies on protection and employment, institutional requirements such as recruitment laws, minimum standards, and a foreign employment authority, have been set. The market is regulated through bilateral agreements and the promotion of foreign jobs. Incentives have been established to remit through regular channels and for the return and reintegration of migrants. (Waddington, 2003) The challenge though is

that there are increasing signs that a significant number of Pakistani workers move outside the established channels.

5.3 *Present migratory policy*

Pakistani migration policy has generally focused on the regulated movement of skilled and semiskilled workers. Professionals move on their own, and unskilled workers tend to travel outside the government channels.

The present Government of President Musharraf considers international migration as a major source of revenue, as a means of alleviating the pressures on the labour market and as a potential tool for development.

As explained by Rashid Ahmed Mughal, Director of the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment in his paper “Labour migration from Pakistan and its role in socio-economic development” presented at the Seminar on labour migration and socio-economic development in Islamabad in September 2003, the Government’s strategy consists on maximizing the export of manpower in a planned and systematic manner, and on best terms and conditions of employment for workers. It also involves exploring traditional and non-traditional labour markets and strengthening the Overseas Employment Promoters system, which the Government considers channel 75 percent of all movements abroad.

Overall the Government’s goal is to establish bilateral agreements with receiving countries, which they consider assist both sending and receiving countries to better manage their employment policies and practices. Bilateral agreements also help in reducing irregular migration and trafficking and in ensuring better safety and security of migrants.

This new approach is the result of the changes that took place in the 1990s, i.e. a drastic decline in the numbers of migrants to the Middle East together with a change in the

labour demand for more professional and skilled workers from those countries, and linked to this, an increase in migration to the US, Canada and the European Union.

It is also subsequent to the 11 September events, and their impact on Pakistanis abroad, i.e. those in the US were considered a “high risk” group, and there was a severe tightening of control measures and freedom of movement globally, together with scrutiny of bank accounts and of all money transfers.

As part of the efforts to promote migration abroad, the Government plans include the development of human capital to reach international labour market standards and the improvement of the welfare of workers abroad.

The most common problems that Pakistani workers face, as identified by the Government, are non-implementation of Foreign Service Agreements, illegal termination of contracts, non-payment of wages/benefits, labour laws and exploitative practices, obtaining visas for family members, delay in payment of blood money/death compensation, and lengthy procedures to transport dead bodies.

To counter these problems, the Government has posted thirteen labour attaches in the Middle East and the UK, and plans to post more of them in several European countries. It has also established in 2001 a Complain Cell for Overseas Pakistanis in the Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, as well as an Overseas Pakistanis Advisory Council. The mandate of this Council is to suggest measures to improve the welfare of overseas Pakistanis, to motivate them to use official channels for remittances, to encourage deposits and investments in Pakistan, and to promote Pakistani exports.

To address the fact that the majority of overseas Pakistanis work in the informal sector and as a rule do not enjoy any social benefits, the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation has launched a pension scheme, with a minimum contribution of Rupees 24,000 a year (€ 300 approximately).

Pakistani embassies have a responsibility for exploring the labour market of their respective countries, assessing their needs, contacting potential employers, and overall aim at procuring jobs for Pakistani nationals. The Government's strategy includes tapping the labour markets of France, Germany, Greece, Spain and Italy, where they plan on establishing Welfare Offices to boost the export of labour and support Pakistani workers there.

Within Pakistan the Government has taken a series of measures to facilitate the transfer of money through legal channels, and they intend to improve conditions for private investment beyond private consumption. In addition, the Government is keen on accessing the knowledge and expertise of Pakistani expatriates through a number of programmes and activities.

According to the IOM⁶, it is only in recent times that international migration has been included in the Government's agenda. Previous governments had focused on labour as a commodity. Emigration was supposed to be a temporary phenomenon that generated revenues and alleviated unemployment. However, structural factors like the country's demographic pressure and insufficient development have rendered remittances essential to the country's economy.

The assumption that emigration was temporary meant that it was never integrated properly into national policies; in particular, there was no policy to link migration and development and to encourage the productive use of remittances. Thus, migration was taking place disregarding the "production costs" and the country's own needs.

What is more, prior to 1999, issues like smuggling of migrants and trafficking of women were totally ignored by the authorities. Partly because of security concerns, the present government is reported to be determined to tackle them.⁷

⁶ Interview with IOM Representative, Armand Rousselot, on 15.10.03


⁷ idem

5.4 Remittances

Remittances sent by overseas Pakistanis are vital both for the individual families remaining in Pakistan and for the country. At the macro-economic level they are a significant component of Pakistan's balance of payments and they contribute to cover the shortage of foreign resources. The Government, in addition, expects them to promote domestic growth and to contribute to the overall development of the country.

Table and Graphic 2 show the yearly remittances in US dollars from 1972 to 2003. Up to 1986-87 there was a steady increase of remittances, followed by a decline that reached its lowest point in 1999, and then a dramatic upsurge in 2001-02, just after the 11 September events, and an even higher rise in 2002-03.

Graphic 2 Year Wise Workers' Remittances 1972 – 2003 in US dollars



Source: State Bank of Pakistan, quoted in Pervez Tahir, Chief Economist, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, *Diaspora's Implications for Human Resources in Pakistan*, 2003

The substantial decline in remittances in the 1990s is partly attributed to the diminishing demand for labour from the Middle East. In addition, the Government's decision in 1998 to freeze foreign currency accounts, and a large gap between the inter-bank and open market exchange rates, discouraged many Pakistanis abroad from sending remittances

through official banking channels. It is suspected that many overseas Pakistanis resorted to traditional mechanisms such as the *hundi* or *hawala*.

Table 2 Year Wise Workers' Remittances 1972 – 2003

Year	USD million	Year	USD million
1972 – 73	136	1987 – 88	2,013
1973 – 74	139	1988 – 89	1,897
1974 – 75	2111	1989 – 90	1,942
1975 – 76	339	1990 – 91	1,848
1976 – 77	578	1991 – 92	1,467
1977 – 78	1,156	1992 – 93	1,562
1978 – 79	1,398	1993 – 94	1,446
1979 – 80	1,744	1994 – 95	1,866
1980 – 81	2,116	1995 – 96	1,461
1981 – 82	2,225	1996 – 97	1,409
1982 – 83	2,886	1997 – 98	1,489
1983 – 84	2,737	1998 – 99	1,060
1984 – 85	2,446	1999 – 00	983
1985 – 86	2,595	2000 – 01	1,086
1986 – 87	2,279	2001 - 02	2,389
		2002 – 03	4,237

Source: State Bank of Pakistan, quoted in Pervez Tahir, Chief Economist, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, Diaspora's Implications for Human Resources in Pakistan, 2003

It is widely accepted, including by the banking authorities⁸ that until 2001 between one third and two thirds of all money transfers by Pakistani workers abroad were taking place through the “hundi” network. This ancient system of moving money allows migrant workers to send money rapidly and efficiently to their families in Pakistan. They hand over the money to a dealer abroad who alerts his counterpart in Pakistan to deliver the money, sometimes the same day, without any paper trail. The system has been illegal for a number of years but, until September 11 2001, it was largely tolerated by the authorities.

⁸ The Dawn, 9 October 2001 article by M. Arshad Sharif, “\$4bn routed though hundi system annually”

The present Government, in an effort to attract remittances through the regular channels, has developed a programme which includes a number of incremental incentives, together with some dissuasive measures to crackdown on the *hundi/hawala* channels. It should be mentioned that there is a dual motivation to eliminate the hundi system. On the one hand to ensure the Government access to the remittances, and on the other, to prevent the funding of extremist groups, since it is alleged that groups such as Al Qaeda were able to develop by using these systems to move resources across countries. Still, many Pakistani workers, especially those who travel outside government channels, are reported as using it.

Overseas Pakistanis remitting foreign currency are thus entitled to separate counters at arrival and departure lounges at airports, free issuance and renewal of passports on an urgent basis, and duty free allowance of personal baggage within certain limits. Further incentives are expected to include *inter alia* special quota in public colleges and universities, and preferential access to balloting of plots in public housing schemes.


Despite the increasing presence of Pakistani workers in Europe, including Spain, their significance in the overall migratory movement remains very limited. Their share in the remittances reaching Pakistan through official channels, as illustrated in Table and Graphic 3, speaks for itself.

Table 3 Workers' remittances in 000 USD 1998 – 2003

Origin	1998-99	%	1999-00	%	2000-01	%	2001-02	%	2002-03	%
Spain	40	0.003	157	0.01	62	0.005	182	0.007	865	0.02
Europe	109,324	10.31	107,685	10.94	114,553	10.54	207,817	8.69	385,257	9.09
Elsewhere	950,826	89.68	875,888	89.03	971,955	89.45	2,181,051	91.29	3,850,728	90.88
Total	1,060,190	100	983,730	100	1,086,570	100	2,389,050	100	4,236,850	100

Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Statistics Department

Graphic 3 Workers' remittances in 000 USD 1998 – 2003



Source: State Bank of Pakistan, Statistics Department

The Government recognizes that overseas Pakistanis may acquire other nationalities, but they are prepared to provide foreign nationals of Pakistan origin a national identity card for Overseas Pakistanis, and a number of benefits such as unlimited visa-free entries into Pakistan, indefinite stay in Pakistan with exemption from reporting to the Police or foreigners' registration offices, the right to operate bank accounts in Pakistan, and facilitated immigration into/from Pakistan (Ministry of Labour, 2001:39).

At the micro-economic level, it is generally assumed that they benefit the individual migrants and their families, though few factor in the costs of migration in their analysis. Overall it is expected that a considerable part of the remittances is directed to investment, especially when there is a significant wage differential between domestic and overseas employment.

In practice it appears that initially most of the remittances are used for consumption purposes, including payment of debts often incurred to send the migrant abroad, better food and acquisition of consumer durables such as domestic appliances. Issues such as the pre-migration status of the family, the length of the stay abroad, the education level, the life-cycle of the migrant, and whether he is in his own or with his family, all play a role in the value of the remittances and their use (Arif, 2003).

Some claim that eventually, a significant part of the remittances is used for the acquisition of productive assets. According to a study carried out by G.M. Arif of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics in 1999 on Pakistani workers in the Middle East, the percentage of total earnings that was being sent to Pakistan was 78, even among those who had been abroad for six years or more.

The same study showed that migrants and their families directed a considerable part of their into investment and savings, and that there was a direct positive correlation between the level of acquisition of productive assets and the education level of the migrant, as well as the pre-migration economic status of the family.

5.5 *Other forms of migration*

While the focus of this research is international migration from Pakistan to Catalonia, it is important to mention the internal migration phenomenon.

The main pattern of internal migration is from the labour rich areas of North Western Frontier Province and rural Punjab to the urban centres of Punjab and Sindh and they follow a poverty-migration linkage. According to the 1998 Population Census, two thirds of the internal migrants were in urban areas. The main reason for migration was “moving with the head of household”, 43 percent, followed by “marriage”, 17 percent, employment 12 percent and business 9 percent. The majority thus migrated for family related reasons. (Gazdar, 2003:1)

The rural-rural migration is also significant. It includes displacement due to projects such as the construction of dams or irrigation schemes, migration from arid areas, migration of share-tenants, pastoralists, and seasonal migrants. In the latter two cases migration may in some instances take place across an international border. Thus, a number of people from the Kuchi group spend the summer in Afghanistan and the winter in Pakistan in search of pastures for their herds.

The exodus of high numbers of Pakistani workers towards foreign destinations has gone and continues to take place hand in hand with the numerous presence of foreigners in Pakistan. The National Aliens' Registration Authority under the federal Ministry of Interior, charged with registering all "aliens" living in Pakistan, estimated their figure in 2003 at 3.35 million. (Gazdar 2003:6)

As mentioned earlier, ever since the country came into being, there has been a steady flow of Muslim immigration, particularly from South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Burma and India. First as a result of the Partition, then with the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, and in the 1980s with the persecution of Muslim Burmese and the arrival of Biharis, Pakistan has continuously been a destination of choice.

The Census does not categorise migrants from South Asia, many of whom, like the ethnic Bengalis, have become Pakistani citizens. There are estimates though that there are over one million ethnic Bengalis, some 200,000 Burmese, and unknown numbers of Biharis living in Karachi (Gazdar 2003:13).

Afghan refugees constitute another very important group of migrants. Following the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, over two million Afghans entered Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan issued a declaration considering all of them as refugees and allowed them to settle in refugee camps mostly in the North Western Frontier Province, where they shared ethnic and linguistic links with the autochthonous population, and in lesser numbers in Balochistan. A few were settled in Punjab. Gradually, many Afghans left the settlements for the urban centres in search of employment. Though the majority of Afghan refugees have voluntarily repatriated to Afghanistan since 2002, there remain very significant numbers in Pakistan. This is partly due to the fact that many Afghans have returned to Pakistan for socio-economic reasons following a centuries-old migratory pattern.

Notwithstanding the religious and political underpinnings of these movements, the socio-economic roots, namely poverty in the sub-continent, must also be taken into account. Thus, vast numbers of Afghans, Burmese, Bengalis, and Biharis may be found in the slum areas of Karachi, and to a lesser extent Lahore, alongside poor Pakistani Pashtoons and Punjabis, all of them in search of better living conditions.

More recently, there have been other religiously motivated immigration movements, in small numbers, from more distant locations such as Philippines and a number of African countries, as well as the US and Europe. This may be attributed to the impact of Pakistani Muslim preachers travelling the world and known as *Tablig*, as well as the presence of renowned Islamic religious schools, *madrassas*.

5.6 Final Considerations

As it has been shown in this chapter, migration is an old phenomenon in Pakistan, though it was only in the 1970s that it experienced a rapid and dramatic increase as a result of deteriorating economic conditions and a new and strong demand for labour related to the oil boom.

Movements at the time were centred on the Middle East, and they concerned mostly the semi-skilled and unskilled workers. This trend persisted until the 1980s, when changes in labour demand and in the socio-economic conditions in the Gulf Countries compelled Pakistani migrant workers to search for other destinations, including Western Europe.

The complexity and diversity of the present migratory movement could be described by categorising international migrants in four groups: 1) people who use formal migratory channels, 2) people who travel to developed countries to study and stay after completing them, 3) people, mostly young men who enter developed countries illegally, and 4) those who enter developed countries legally and stay after expiration of their visas.

While the majority of migrants are men, their profile is not homogeneous. There is a group of highly qualified professionals and very many skilled and semi-skilled workers. Though they are all motivated by a desire to improve economic or social conditions, and many originate from relatively poor backgrounds, they do not proceed from the poorest segment of the population. In fact, they have completed as a rule at least twelve years of education, which puts them amongst the top seventh of the Pakistani population.

Migratory policy appears to focus on maximizing the benefits for the country, i.e. ensuring the maximum level of remittances through official channels, while adopting a rather paternalistic view of migrants. A case in point is the restriction on the migration of women workers.

Until recently, the Government considered labour as a commodity, disregarding the production costs, and for many officials involved in international migration, it remains so. They emphasize their responsibility in increasing the number of emigrants, insisting on the need to “produce” skilled workers, doctors and nurses, to better penetrate foreign labour markets, without any reference to Pakistan’s social indicators –literacy, mortality, and life expectancy- and the need that the population of Pakistan has for those same professionals.

Pakistani migratory authorities focus on movements through regular channels, and they remain relatively uninformed and unconcerned about movements other than to the Middle East and about non-registered migration. Until 2002 – 2003, there seemed to be some sort of a disconnect between the views of Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment and the real situation of Pakistani workers abroad. Thus at least until that time, official data may have been accurate in as far as the regular migration is concerned, but it ignored irregular movements and the influx of remittances outside the State Bank of Pakistan.

Because of this approach and the assumption that international migration was purely a temporary phenomenon, emigration was not integrated into national policies before 2000.

Overall, however, there appears to be total convergence between the Government's goal to expand overseas migration and the individuals' desire to move abroad in search of employment. It is therefore likely that the number of overseas Pakistanis will continue to increase rapidly in the foreseeable future.

It is worth mentioning that the interest of Pakistani academia on the migratory phenomenon was significant in the 1980s, when yearly outward movements reached their peak. A number of papers were written by distinguished Pakistani scholars from the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, PIDE, at the time. In recent years there has been limited interest, though with some notable exceptions like G.M. Arif from PIDE, Hassan N. Gardezi, a professor in Algoma University College, Canada, and particularly Haris Gazdar with the Collective for Social Science Research in Karachi.

6. Catalonia as a reception country

Europe is a fairly recent immigrant destination in terms of contemporary history. Until the Second World War, Europeans migrated to other continents in search of better livelihoods compelled by economic, social, political and religious forces.

The reconstruction of the devastated societies and the subsequent economic boom in Germany, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, etc. led these countries to favour the arrival of workers from southern Europe as well as from Morocco and Turkey, in addition to people from their former colonies, mainly India, Pakistan and the Caribbean for the UK, and Africa and the Caribbean in the case of France.

This first migratory wave came to a halt in 1973-74 as a result of the oil crisis. Foreign workers continued nonetheless to arrive in Europe through family reunion programmes (Aja, Díaz, 2005). In parallel, and possibly as a result of the restriction of migratory movements, the number of asylum-seekers from other continents in Europe reached unprecedented levels.⁹

A second migratory wave took place towards the end of the 20th century. Countries that had until then produced emigrants became destination countries because of the economic development brought about by their joining the European Union, while simultaneously experiencing a dramatic decrease of their birth rates (Aja, Díaz, 2005). The arrival of Pakistani workers to Catalonia is part of this second migratory wave.

6.1 *Origins and evolution*

In the introduction it has been mentioned that migration is not a new phenomenon either in Pakistan or in Catalonia. In subsequent chapters it has been stated that migration is an intrinsic element of Pakistani culture. The same may be said of the present Catalan culture: practically all Catalans at the start of the 21st century can trace their origins to a

⁹ www.UNHCR.org/statistics/45c063a82.html, 4.10.07

place other than the one where they were born and/or where they live.

For many, this means that their families participated in the rural exodus from within Catalonia to the urban and coastal zones which took place, like in most European countries, in the early 20th century and again in the 1960s and 1970s. But many others originate from other parts of Spain, since in addition to the internal rural migration mentioned, Catalonia has received huge migratory waves from central and southern regions of Spain throughout the 20th century.

From a historical perspective, the population of Catalonia has experienced a tremendous growth over the past three hundred years, except for the periods affected by epidemics, wars and economic crisis. According to Sancho and Ros (2000), the population of Catalonia doubled between 1718 and 1787, from 402,417 to 878,031, and again during the first half of the 19th century, with yearly average increases of around 10 percent. By 1860, the population was 1,673,823 and the growth rate had started to decrease, a trend that would continue until the end of the 19th century. The lowest yearly increase was of 2.7 percent in 1877. By 1910 Catalonia experienced a significant demographic growth again, a pattern that would continue until 1930, and again from 1950 to 1975, after the conclusion of the Civil War and its aftermath.


Thus, while the total population in Catalonia at the beginning of the 20th century was close to 2 million inhabitants, by the end of the Civil War in 1939 it was nearly 3 million. Between 1960 and 1972 the population in Catalonia grew by 37.15 percent, mostly as a result of massive migratory waves, whereas the overall population growth in Spain was 12.47 percent (Giner, 2000). By 1975 the population in Catalonia was 5.6 million, while Spain's population was 36 million. As of January 2005, the total population in Catalonia according to the municipal registers was 6,995,206, while the total population of Spain was 44,108,530. See Table 4 and Graphic 4.

Table 4 Population in Catalonia 1717-18 - 2005

Year	Population
1718	402,417
1787	878,031
1860	1,673,823
1877	1,752,093
1887	1,842,477
1900	1,966,556
1910	2,084,896
1920	2,344,910
1923	2,480,580
1930	2,791,474
1936	2,921,669
1940	2,891,720
1950	3,240,743
1960	3,925,508
1970	5,123,264
1975	5,663,137
1981	5,959,530
1986	5,977,008
1991	6,115,759
1996	6,090,040
2000	6,261,999
2003	6,704,146
2004	6,813,319
2005	6,995,206

Source: S. Sancho & C. Ros *La població de Catalunya en perspectiva històrica*, in Giner, S. *La Societat Catalana*, 2000, and INE, Spanish Statistics Institute

Graphic 4 Population in Catalonia 1717-18 - 2005



Source: S. Sancho & C. Ros *La població de Catalunya en perspectiva històrica*, in Giner, S. *La Societat Catalana*, 2000, and INE, Spanish Statistics Institute

As described by Pascual et al. (2000), during the first decade of the 20th century some 4,000 persons migrated yearly to Catalonia from the Iberian Peninsula. During the following decade the average number of immigrants was 20,000 a year. Overall, from 1916 to 1930 there was a period of rapid population growth, with a net average inflow of 35,000 persons a year, or over half a million people. This population originated from areas close geographically and culturally to Catalonia (Aragon, País Valencià, Murcia, and Almería), and they travelled in response to a significant increase of the demand for labour linked to the expansion of manufacturing and development of infrastructures, notably the underground train in Barcelona.

In the 1950s and 1960s an even greater wave of immigration took place. Close to 1.4 million persons, between 1950 and 1975, an average of 55,000 persons arrived in Catalonia yearly. This flow though was from more distant areas of Spain (Andalucía, Extremadura, Galicia, and Castilla), and was again responding to an increase of the labour demand related to the economic recovery after the Civil War and the expansion of the European economy after WWII.

According to Pascual et al, these migratory movements, i.e. from Spain into Catalonia, should be seen as a mechanism to reduce the pressure on the labour market since Spain

has historically been unable to match the growth of the labour force with the creation of employment opportunities (Pascual de Sans, Cardelús & Solana, 2000).

Next to the inflows from Spain, there have also been inflows from other countries during that period, i.e. up to 1975, linked to the industrialization process and the increasing presence of foreign companies, mostly from Europe (France, Germany, Netherlands, and UK). Their significance is not related to their numbers, since they have been relatively small, but rather to their impact, since these migrants occupy positions of command and control in the Catalan economy.

In parallel with these migratory movements, there have also been outward flows, in the early 20th century to the Americas, and in the 1960s to European countries. Most notably, at the end of Civil War some 100,000 Catalans fled from Franco's dictatorship towards America and Europe. Prior to the start of the war, many members of the high Catalan bourgeoisie, businessmen and industrialists, left Catalonia when the Republic was installed in 1936 (Giner, 2000:72).

However, except for the Civil War era and the period between 1981 and 1986, the migration rate remained positive throughout the century. As shown in Pascual et al's article mentioned earlier, the total population increase between 1901 and 1996 is closely related to immigration. In fact, in some periods like 1916-1920, 99 percent of the population increase may be attributed to migration, and during the period 1941-1945 immediately after the Civil War this percentage was 88.3. Gradually the percentage decreased, hence between 1951 and 1965 it was just over 60 percent, and it remained above 40 percent until the 1970s economic downturn.

This net immigration flows only stopped in the early 1980s, according to Giner (2000), as a result of three emerging trends:

- The global birth rate in Spain started to slow down, while the birth rate in Catalonia started to increase until the 1990s when it decreased again.

- Spanish emigration to Catalonia decreased firstly because emigrants chose other European countries as their destination
- The labour market in Catalonia was no longer in a position to absorb newcomers, as the global recession also hit Catalonia with high unemployment levels

As the number of Spanish immigrants into Catalonia decreased, there was simultaneously a substantive increase in the number of migrants returning to their places of origin, mostly Andalucía, Extremadura, Galicia and Castilla. Since then and until the year 2000, the net migration rate has hovered around zero (Pascual et al, 2000).

6.2 Recent trends

With the gradual recovery of the economy towards the end of the 20th century, immigration picked up again, but this time from foreign countries. However, the total population increases were nowhere near those of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The number of arrivals thus was 22,224 for the period 1981 – 1986, while it had been 629,160 for the period 1966 – 1970, and 540,224 for the period 1971 – 1975.

Some of the new arrivals were returning Spaniards who had migrated to western European countries in the 1960s and 1970s, but others were foreigners both from Europe and other continents, mainly Africa and Latin America. Pascual et al. 2000, have identified the following groups:

- Returning migrants, or their descendents, from Catalonia or Spain, who may have acquired foreign nationalities
- “Institutional movers”, migrants who move within political institutions or multinational companies or companies acting globally
- Pensioners, residential tourists
- Professionals such as academics, scientists, sports people and artists
- Unskilled and low-skilled workers


Table 5 and Graphic 5 show the number of immigrants by continent of origin and their evolution through the period 1996 – 2004.

Table 5 Foreign population in Catalonia by continent (according to nationality) 1996 – 2005

	Europe	Africa	America	Asia	Oceania	Stateless and others	Total
1998	43,032	60,298	29,154	16,056	215	48	148,803
1999	50,900	76,368	36,908	19,286	218	56	183,736
2000	55,482	90,633	45,693	22,908	196	84	214,996
2001	66,404	111,106	99,837	35,370	212	238	280,167
2002	76,760	129,204	82,628	39,508	234	127	328,461
2003	89,470	147,288	102,324	44,487	233	136	383,938
2004	104,925	169,549	136,151	51,475	256	118	462,474
2005	213,285	200,536	316,033	68,494	556	45	798,904

Source: INE Spanish Statistics Institute

Graphic 5 Foreign population in Catalonia by continent (according to nationality) 1996 – 2005



Source: INE Spanish Statistics Institute

Until recently, the number of foreign migrants was relatively small as compared to the national population. However, their presence has increased rapidly as shown in Table 6 and Graphic 6. In this connection, it should be mentioned that the figures in these tables correspond to those foreigners who have been registered with the municipal authorities.


In fact, as indicated by Morén (2002), official statistics in Spain can only offer a general approximation to the real composition of the immigrant population, since there are numerous “document-less” immigrants. It may therefore be safely assumed that there are many more foreign individuals than those in the official registers awaiting the opportunity to regularize their situation in the country.

Table 6 National and Foreign Population in Catalonia 1998 – 2005

Year	Nationals	Foreigners	% of Foreigners
1998	6,147,610	148,803	2.42
1999	6,207,533	183,736	2.96
2000	6,261,999	214,996	3.43
2001	6,361,365	280,167	4.4
2002	6,506,440	328,461	5.05
2003	6,704,146	383,938	5.73
2004	6,813,319	462,474	6.79
2005	6,995,206	798,904	11.42

Source: INE Spanish Statistics Institute

Graphic 6 National and Foreign Populations in Catalonia 1998 – 2005



Source: INE Spanish Statistics Institute

Like their predecessors, many new migrants tend to choose Barcelona, and especially Barcelona city and its surrounding area, as their destination. Table 7 shows how the increase in foreign population clearly exceeds the total increase of population in


Barcelona, and how the percentage of foreigners has gone from 1.89 percent to 11.93 percent in eight years.

Table 7 Nationals and Foreigners in Barcelona city 1996 - 2005

Year	Total	Nationals	Foreigners	% of Foreigners
1996	1,508,805	1,480,328	28,477	1.89%
1999	1,503,451	1,463,785	39,666	2.64%
2000	1,496,266	1,438,080	58,186	3.89%
2001	1,505,325	1,431,306	74,019	4.92%
2002	1,527,190	1,413,381	113,809	7.45%
2003	1,582,738	1,419,692	163,046	10.30%
2004	1,578,546	1,390,173	188,373	11.93%
2005	1,581,794	1,350,852	230,942	14.60%

Source: Ajuntament de Barcelona, Statistics Department

Graphic 7 Nationals and Foreigners in Barcelona city 1996 – 2005



Source: Ajuntament de Barcelona, Statistics Department

The origin of international immigrants is diverse. Until 2000, the majority of foreign immigrants in Barcelona were Moroccans, and their number was 3,196. However, Latin Americans have clearly taken the lead since then. According to the Statistics Department of the City of Barcelona, Ecuadorians have been number one in the ranking of nationalities as of 2001. Their number rose from 8,204 in 2001 to 31,828 in 2005, followed by Peruvians and Colombians who in 2005 were respectively 15,037 and

13,935. Moroccans remain nonetheless a significant force, with 14,508 individuals in 2005.

Pakistanis were number eight in the ranking in 1996, with 614 individuals. Their numbers have been steadily increasing, as it will be seen in the following chapter, and since 1999 they hover between the 5th and 6th positions.

The distribution of international immigrants in the city is not homogenous. Some neighbourhoods have a much higher percentage of foreigners than the rest. As an example, in 2002 49.1 percent of the foreign immigrants lived in three areas, Ciutat Vella, Eixample and Sants-Montjuïc, where they represented 26.7, 8 and 8.2 percent of the population respectively.

In conclusion, to paraphrase Pascual et al (1994), recent immigration is a continuation of an existing trend, though from different origins. Undoubtedly, recent immigrants share a number of characteristics with previous migrants, but at the same time they possess specific characteristics and pose new challenges to the Catalan society.

6.3 *The legal framework*

According to article 149.1.2a of the Spanish Constitution, the central State has an exclusive competency with regard to immigration, emigration and asylum. These matters may only be regulated by organic laws (*Leyes orgánicas*), as per article 81 of the Spanish Constitution. The central State has also exclusive normative and executive powers on all key areas of migration such as entry and exit, permanence and sanctions.

Given Spain's emigration pattern during most of the 20th century, the progressive arrival of foreign workers took place in a legal vacuum until 1985. By the mid 1980s the number of foreign residents was increasing at an average rate of 7 percent annually, and with Spain's admission into the European Community scheduled for 1986, the country had to conform to EC legislation that restricted non-EC immigration. Thus, Spain enacted its first law to regulate the arrival and presence of foreign workers, *Ley Orgánica*

de extranjería 7/1985. This law approached immigration as a temporary phenomenon and aimed at controlling mostly migrants who were already in the country. The law was overall rather restrictive on immigrant rights and made it rather difficult for immigrants to renew their permits (Ortega, 2003).

In 1996 this law was amended, whereby immigration was recognized as a structural phenomenon. The new legislation acknowledged a number of basic rights for foreign workers, including access to education, equality, legal counsel and an interpreter when dealing with the authorities. In addition, it established a quota system for temporary workers, as well as a permanent resident category, and a framework for family reunification.

The integration of immigrants was especially considered in a subsequent migration law, *Ley Orgánica* 4/00 which was enacted on January 12 2000. This law recognized the permanent dimension of immigration and as such focused on integration and the political and social rights of non-EU foreigners. Through a restrictive amendment the same year, Spain's policies on immigration and asylum were aligned with those of the EC in terms of access and control measures, integration of legal immigrants, and limits to unauthorized immigration (Ortega, 2003).

For the first time a law provided for the establishment of cooperation agreements with the main sending countries such as Ecuador, Colombia, Morocco, Dominican Republic, Nigeria, Poland and Romania. These agreements focused both on the formulas for accessing the labour markets in Spain, regulating the labour opportunities, and on the migrant labour and social rights. They also included provisions for seasonal workers.

Finally *Ley Orgánica* 14/03 was enacted on 20 March 2003 reflecting the requirements of the Schengen Agreement, including the reasons to deny visas. This law established that a visa allows entry into Spain as well as the right to remain and work in Spain for as long as it is valid. The law also contemplates the readmission agreements for people found to be without work/residence permits. These agreements consist in a commitment on the

part of the border authorities to readmit into their territory their own citizens or citizens of third countries that have entered illegally the territory of the country requesting readmission. The readmitting country is in turn responsible for sending the concerned individuals back to their own countries if they are not allowed to remain.

The law also considers the expulsion and the devolution of migrants. The expulsion refers to those persons against whom there is a judicial decision, while devolution refers to people who have been expelled and try to enter Spain illegally. If expulsion or devolution cannot be implemented in 72 hours, then the law states that migrants should be interned.

The expulsion of irregular migrants, under judiciary control, is also foreseen under the law. However, the State is often unable to implement expulsion orders partly because of the high cost, the impossibility of establishing the country of origin of migrants, and because countries of origin refuse to readmit their own citizens (Ortega, 2003).

Currently there are three ways to obtain a work and residence permit. First of all a foreigner may obtain a work permit through an individual contract. This requires that the employer requests a permit for a position which he/she has not been able to fill. If the permit is granted, then a request for a visa to work and live in Spain may be presented. Once the person has entered Spain a work contract may be issued.

A second possibility is by hiring immigrants through migratory agreements between Spain and countries of origin. This system aims at regulating the migratory flows by disseminating information on the characteristics of the labour demand and the selection of immigrants in their own countries. This includes provisions for the hiring of seasonal workers. Immigrants hired this way are able to enter the country legally.

The first agreement was signed between Spain and Colombia in 2001, followed by Ecuador and Dominican Republic also in 2001, Romania and Poland in 2002, and

Bulgaria in 2003. Moreover, Spain has signed special treaties that include migratory issues with Morocco and Argentina.

A third way is hiring workers through a quota system. This system was introduced in 1991 and it is based on the previous estimation of labour requirements and the streamlining of the mechanisms to allow their quick entry into the national labour market.

Until 2000, this allowed the regularization of workers who were already in Spain and would return to their own countries to collect the work permit once granted. The 2000 law, on the contrary, targeted people who were not in Spain. This law also established that the quotas would be set in coordination with the authorities of the different autonomous communities. Since the introduction of the 2003 law, hiring through contingents is directed towards countries with which migratory agreements have been signed.

At present this quota system is the main entry way for new immigrants in Spain. New work permits are issued every year, divided between the different areas of Spain and across sectors, for jobs for which no nationals are available. These permits must be obtained in the countries of origin. In parallel, foreigners may enter Spain to join their relatives as long as those have a residence/work permit. In both cases immigrants must renew their permits periodically until they obtain a permanent permit. International migrants may request a permanent permit after having had five consecutive yearly permits. Once in possession of a permanent permit, international migrants may live and work in Spain mostly like a national, though with no political rights.

Immigrants may also request a working/residence permit on the basis of being “settled” in Spain. This requires that the person has lived in the country for three years minimum, that he/she has a work contract, and a favourable report from the municipality where he/she lives.

The current legal framework establishes different types of residence permits. Thus foreigners may obtain a transit (*estancia*) permit for up to 90 days and a residence permit

which may be temporal or permanent. Additionally, special residence permits may be granted to students, stateless, undocumented aliens, minors and refugees.

Transit visas often lead to cases of irregular stayers, since foreigners may enter the country without visas, “enjoy” the access to a transit permit, and then overstay.

A temporal residence allows a foreigner to be in Spain for periods from 90 days to 5 years. The first permit cannot exceed one year, except for minors or in cases of family reunion. This permit may be granted after an immigrant obtains a residence/work permit or he/she joins relatives already in the country. This permit is also granted to foreigners who are well established in Spain, i.e. they have lived at least two years in the country, and have been working for at least one year, or they are related to foreigners already living in the country, or have been living in the country for three years and they have a work contract, or they are descendants of Spanish citizens, because they are in need of international protection, for humanitarian reasons, or when there are reasons of public interest or national security.

The permanent residence permit allows foreigners to live in Spain for an indefinite period of time and to work as if they were Spanish citizens. Those who may request it are foreigners who have been living legally and continuously in Spain for five years, people born in Spain who have lived three years in Spain when they reach their majority, people of Spanish origin, refugees, and foreigners who have contributed in a significant way to the economic, social, scientific and cultural progress of Spain.

Additionally, there are other forms of residence, such as for students, family reunion, and unaccompanied minors.

There are different types of work permits: self-employed, employee, seasonal workers, border workers, and they must be obtained before obtaining visas.

In practice international migrants may also obtain a work/residence permit through the regularization processes that the Government usually establishes every time the law on migration changes.

It should be noted that regular migrants enjoy the same rights as the nationals except for the right to vote and employment in the civil service. Irregular migrants have the right to access basic social services. In addition, for as long as they are registered in a municipality, irregular migrants also have full access to health care.

6.4 *Regularization processes*

A number of countries have for some years now been employing extraordinary regularization programmes to control and reduce irregular immigration by granting legal status to unauthorized immigrants. Spain is one of them.

The absence of a legal framework to regulate international immigration until 1985, the instability of the migratory policies introduced since then, together with the extraordinarily rapid rise in the number of international immigrants in response to a strong demand for low-skilled foreign labour, as well as a large informal economy, have all led to very high numbers of irregular migrants in Spain (Arango, Jachimowicz 2005).

This phenomenon has been aggravated by an inadequate administrative bureaucracy to manage immigration, a geographic and/or cultural proximity to dynamic source or transit countries, and the existence of well developed migration networks.

Spain has launched five extraordinary regularization processes, in 1986, 1991, 1996, 2000 to 2001, and 2005. These processes have all been part of larger legislative changes to migration policy. In addition, from 1994 to 1999, excluding 1996, foreign workers were regularized through a separate quota system, and there is a permanent, case by case, regularization programme. It ensues that “extraordinary” regularization programmes

have constituted the main source of legal foreign workers in Spain (Arango, Jachimowicz, 2005).

The latest regularization programme took place in 2005 on the basis of a decree of December 30, 2004 that modified the existing legal framework. This decree included provisions for a “normalization” for employers and their foreign workers with the objective of satisfying the demand for foreign labour through legal channels and at the same time cracking down on illegal employment.

In parallel with the 2005 regularization programme, the government introduced strengthened immigration enforcement mechanisms such as border control enforcement, workplace inspections and removals, and expanded legal avenues for economic immigration. The purpose of the reform was to encourage a significant part of the underground economy to join the formal labour market, and in that manner ensure fair competition between economic agents, increasing contributions to the State finances and limiting worker exploitation and abuse.

The “normalization” programme applied to foreign workers who had been residing in Spain for over six months and had no criminal records in their own country or in Spain. They also required a work contract for at least six months. In addition, the programme provided for the issuance of three-month visas to immigrants seeking employment, and temporary family reunification permits after one year instead of 18 to 24 months.

The programme was implemented over a period of 13 weeks, during which some 700,000 foreign workers applied for regularization and 90 percent of them approximately received a favourable determination (Arango, Jachimowicz, 2005).

As an example of the significance of the regularization processes, Table and Graphic 8 below, show the number of visas issued by the Spanish Embassy in Islamabad between 1996 and 2003 (up to June) and the number of Pakistanis registered in Catalonia those same years. Obviously, the majority of them entered the country without visas, or


overstayed their temporary visas, remained in an irregular situation and eventually, through the regularization processes, obtained their residence and work permits.

Table 8 Pakistanis in Spain versus visas granted

Year	1996	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	Jun-03
Temporary visas	547	489	493	677	404	578	531
Resident visas	356	938	533	716	842	829	460
Total visas	903	1,427	1,026	1,393	1,246	1,407	991
Pak in Spain	1,850	2,565	3,258	4,195	8,274	13,971	21,011

Source: INE Spanish Statistics Institute and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (letter dated 4.12.03)

Graphic 8 Pakistanis in Spain versus visas granted



Source: INE Spanish Statistics Institute and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (letter dated 4.12.03)

6.5 “The Catalan integration path”

As discussed in point 6.3, migration is beyond the legislative power of the “Generalitat de Catalunya”. However, there are a number of related areas such as social services including health and education, housing and culture which are under the direct responsibility of the autonomous Government of Catalonia. In this regard, LO 2/00

established the “*Consell Superior de Política d’Immigració*” to ensure coordination with and participation of the autonomous communities in Spain.

It has been repeatedly stated that immigration is not a new event in Catalonia. In fact, according to a survey commissioned by the Generalitat de Catalunya in 2001, “*Catalunya en la España actual: percepciones y actitudes ciudadanas*”, 55.5 percent of the Catalans were born in or their families originate from other parts of Spain.

It is generally considered that people who arrived in Catalonia up to the 1960s have successfully integrated. The same survey indicates that 67.5 percent of the Catalans consider that those immigrants have fully integrated into Catalan society. Among Catalans who were born elsewhere, 79.3 percent consider themselves to be fully integrated (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2001).

The arrival of international migrants represents a new challenge. As early as 1991 the Government responded to this new reality by approving the first Interdepartmental Immigration Plan to ensure the integration of the immigrants and to create the right conditions for their personal and social development.

Since then the Government has striven to articulate a model that promotes a balance between respecting diversity and ensuring social cohesion. Integration is thus presented as a doctrine that respects the rights of the immigrants as well as the rights of the receiving society to maintain its own cohesion and identity. Integration is therefore considered as the opposite of assimilation. It is the “Catalan integration path” (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2001).

At this point it is worth mentioning that as indicated by Morén Alegret (2007), there is a great variety of meanings of the concept “integration”. He nonetheless puts forward R. Baubock’s definition whereby integration refers to mechanisms and processes that immigrants may use to be part of a society, as well as the establishment of mechanisms to link migrants to a society. With regard to the integration of newly arrived migrants into a

receiving society is concerned, in the case of Europe, there are three different kinds of “integration” as per R. Baubock’s definition, i.e. legal, cultural and social integration.

Legal integration refers to the rights of the immigrants within the legal framework of a State. Cultural integration is present when there is both freedom and pluralism.

Integration then allows a diversity of faiths, political opinions, sexual orientation, and cultures, on the basis of the respect of human rights. Finally, social integration takes place when there is freedom and social wellbeing, thus allowing the individual’s participation in civil society. This requires a general state of wellbeing in terms of income, education and housing, without dependency links to the family or a job, and a common sphere of public life, i.e. without segregation or ghettos.

Conversely, assimilation is generally understood as the complete adaptation of the migrants to the values and systems of the receiving society, on the assumption that the receiving society would totally accept the newcomers, including mixed marriages.

According to the “Catalan integration path” model, both immigrants and nationals are expected to adjust in order to live together in a climate of mutual respect.

Thus the Government fosters the integration of immigrants through the provision of services such as health, education, social services, and access to the labour markets. It also fosters family reunification. In exchange, the Government expects immigrants to participate fully in society, directly or through associations of immigrants, supporting NGOs, trade unions, neighborhood associations, etc. The Government also expects immigrants to learn the Catalan language. To this end, Catalan language lessons for adults are given by numerous governmental institutions, while children are expected to learn it at school.

Despite the Government’s statements, and its efforts to respond actively and promptly to the challenge of international immigration, the rapid arrival of immigrants from distant horizons, and with significantly different cultures, is increasingly a source of anxiety for

the nationals. The concentration of immigrant populations in specific areas is changing the urban geography of all the main cities and towns in Catalonia.

The actual degree of integration of international immigrants was measured in a survey, *Estudi sobre el grau d'integració dels immigrants en la província de Barcelona*, carried out by the Department of methodology of behavioural sciences and the Psychology Department of the University of Barcelona in 2003 on behalf of the *Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament de Benestar Social*. This survey focused on immigrants from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Central and South America whom, because of their origin, could face social, cultural and work related difficulties. It was a quantitative survey that used a sample of 1,550 persons who were interviewed for 10 to 15 minutes each between July and November 2002.

According to this survey, the profile of the average immigrant was:

- He is under 30 years of age
- He has a good cultural level, with at least secondary level education
- He has been less than four years in Catalonia
- He has arrived on his own directly to Catalonia, and specifically to the same place where he is living
- He has a regular partner, lives with his family or with other people, and has dependent children.
- He rents a place to live.
- Housing conditions are acceptable.
- He would like to have a relative or more join him
- He speaks very little Catalan, has not attended any Catalan lessons, and if he is not a Spanish speaker, he has a basic knowledge of Spanish
- He intends to remain in Catalonia, or still thinking about it
- He does not feel discriminated and has not suffered any racist attack
- He has the health card, i.e. he can access public health care

- He is working in sectors which do not require a high level of specialization (construction, catering or domestic service)
- His standard of living has improved after moving to Catalonia
- He has not had any professional training
- He lives legally in the country

This fairly positive picture, however, should be put in perspective. The recent appearance of xenophobic political parties is a cause for concern, although for the time being they remain marginal as compared to similar parties in other European countries.

7. Pakistanis in Catalonia

As indicated in chapter 5, Catalonia is a fairly recent destination for Pakistani migrants. Even though some individuals arrived as early as in the 1950s or 1960s, it is only in the 1990s that they have come in sizeable numbers.

According to data from the Spanish Statistical Institute based on municipal registers (*Padró Municipal*), in 1991 the total number of Pakistanis in Catalonia was 436, of whom 427 were in the province of Barcelona. Their number had practically doubled five years later. By 2000 the population had more than doubled again, and in 2004 it was six times higher than in 2000.

Table 9 Pakistani population (by nationality) in Spain, Catalonia and Barcelona city from 1991 to 2005.


Year	1991	1996	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Spain	N/A	1,850	2,565	3,258	4,195	8,274	13,971	21,011	23,149	31,652
Catalonia	436	819	1,212	1,662	2,176	4,353	7,988	13,471	14,757	20,028
Barcelona Province	427	791	1,175	1,615	2,070	4,128	7,513	12,540	13,892	18,488
Girona Province	6	21	27	32	53	93	117	159	191	267
Tarragona Province	1	3	6	6	41	113	315	433	608	1,157
Lleida Province	2	3	4	9	12	19	43	52	66	116
Barcelona City	N/A	614	N/A	1,382	2,129	3,405	6,112	9,944	10,198	11,997

Source: INE, Spanish Statistics Institute and Statistics Department of Barcelona City Hall

As shown in Table and Graphic 9, though the number of Pakistani new arrivals increases both in Spain and Catalonia, in comparative terms the increase is much higher in Catalonia. Thus in 1996 they represented 44.3 percent of the total, in 2000 they were 51.9 percent, and in 2005 63.3 percent. Within Catalonia Pakistanis have a marked preference for Barcelona province, and especially for Barcelona city, since 85.5 percent of those living in the province of Barcelona in 1999 were in the city itself. This ratio

though has been progressively decreasing as the overall population continues to grow. Thus they were 82.5 percent in 2001, 81.3 percent in 2002, 77.5 percent in 2003, 73.4 percent in 2004, and 59.9 percent in 2005.

Graphic 9 Pakistani population (by nationality) in Spain, Catalonia and Barcelona city from 1991 to 2005.




Source: INE, Spanish Statistics Institute and Statistics Department of Barcelona City Hall

There are indications that this relative decrease of the population in Barcelona city is the result of people moving from relatively crowded neighbourhoods to metropolitan Barcelona as they achieve a certain degree of economic and social stability. Barcelona city though continues to be the main entry point for new arrivals.

Map 4 below presents the evolution of the Pakistani population in Catalonia from 1996 to 2005.

Pakistani Population in Catalonia 1996 - 2005




While the number of women has been steadily increasing, the ratio of women to men has actually decreased over the years, especially since 2001. As shown in Table 10 and Graphic 10, women were 24.5 percent of the total population in 1996, but only 20.1 percent in 2000, and 7.4 percent in 2003. Their number rose slightly in 2004 when they were 9.3 percent and again in 2005 when they reached 9.6 percent.

Table 10 Pakistani men and women (by nationality) in Barcelona province from 1996 to 2005

Year	1996	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Men	598	923	1264	1653	3557	6715	11607	12592	16,719
Women	194	252	351	417	571	798	933	1300	1,769
Total	791	1175	1615	2070	4128	7513	12540	13892	18,488
% of women	24	21.4	21.7	20.1	13.8	10.6	7.4	9.3	9.6

Source: INE Spanish Statistics Institute and Statistics Department of Barcelona City Hall

Graphic 10 Pakistani men and women (by nationality) in Barcelona province from 1996 to 2005



Source: INE Spanish Statistics Institute and Statistics Department of Barcelona City Hall

The evolution of the presence of children follows a similar pattern. In the 1990s they constituted about a quarter of the total population, but there was a significant drop from 2001 to 2003, with a slight increase in 2004 and 2005. Table no. 11 and Graphic 11 show the number of children, i.e. dependents between the ages of 0 and 18 years, and how their presence has evolved through the years.

The decrease in comparative terms of the number of women and children might be to the desire of Pakistani families not to subject them to the harsh conditions involved in moving irregularly from Pakistan to Catalonia. Another reason could be that since


families feel fairly certain of obtaining “papers” in a relatively short time, they prefer to send men on their own as a first step towards the relocation of the whole family.

Table 11 Pakistani children (by nationality) as compared to the total Pakistani population by nationality in Barcelona province from 1996 to 2005

	1996	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Children between 0 and 19 years	211	305	443	508	634	817	830	1,405	1,998
Total population	791	1,175	1,615	2,070	4,128	7,513	12,540	13,892	18,488
% of total population	26.7	26.0	27.4	24.5	15.4	10.9	6.6	10.1	10.8

Source: INE Spanish Statistics Institute and Statistics Department of Barcelona City Hall

Graphic 11 Pakistani children (by nationality) as compared to the total Pakistani population by nationality in Barcelona province from 1996 to 2005



Source: INE Spanish Statistics Institute and Statistics Department of Barcelona City Hall

The economic links between the two areas, however, remain fairly limited. As an example, the Generalitat’s Department of Trade and Tourism reported the total value of products exported to Pakistan in 1999 as Euros 21,241.52, and the value of imported products Euros 59,719.24. Four years later, in 2003, the value of the exported products had increased to Euros 30,552.24.

7.1. *Personal domain*

As indicated in chapter 3, point 3.3, five parameters were used in the selection of the participants:

- Duration of their stay in Catalonia, over or less than five years
- Household composition, with their families or on their own
- Legal status, regular versus irregular
- Employment status, employed versus unemployed
- Professional profile, employee versus self-employed

The diagrams shown in the sub-chapters below have been obtained by relating these parameters to each other. Participants are identified through a code where the first letter refers to their gender, M for man and F for woman, followed by their age and the initials of their place of residence. When the participant lives in Barcelona the initials correspond to the district, (CV Ciutat Vella, SM Sants-Montjuïc, SA Sant Andreu), and for those living in cities around Barcelona the initials are MA (Metropolitan Area).

The first part of the interview aimed at establishing the identity of the participants, including their ethnicity and their socio-economic status, as follows:

- Name, age, gender, civil status
- Place of origin/ethnic origin
- Level/type of studies
- Profession
- Family composition. Position in the family
- Spoken languages

The observed population ranges in age between 28 and 48, seven of them are in their thirties, three are in their forties, and one is under 30. Diagram 1 lists the main respondents and their relatives, including children aged 6 and above.

Diagram 1 List of participants by age and gender

Age groups		6-10	11-15	16-20	21-25	26-30	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50
Gender	male	M7SA M8SM M9SA	M13SM		M25CV	M28SM M30MA M30CV	M32MA M33MA M34SM M35CV	M36SA M37SM M37CV	M42SA M44CV	M48MA
	female	F6SM				F27SA	F34SM F35SM			

Although all of them were living in Punjab prior to leaving Pakistan, only seven identified themselves as Punjabis. Three of them indicated they were Mohajirs or Urdu speakers (M34SM, M28SM, M48MA), i.e. their families had migrated from India at the time of Partition. One respondent refused to identify himself as anything but Pakistani (M32MA) which, as indicated in point 4.4, it is not very common:

*“I’m from Afghanistan actually, but I’m living in Punjab, in Pakistan.
But I am first Pakistani, just Pakistani, not a Punjabi, not a Pashto, not
nothing, just I’m Pakistani”*

In terms of their academic profile, four participants claimed to have a university degree or higher education, one also had a master degree in journalism (M44CV), another one was a teacher (M37CV), a third one had studied computer science after obtaining his degree (M30MA), *“I studied till high standard, and then I attended courses for electronics”*, and the fourth one had a professional training as a machinist (M32MA).

Five of them had obtained their secondary level diplomas (M35SA, M28SM, M34SM, M37SM, M42SA), and of the remaining two, one admitted to having very little schooling, *“yo poco estudio colegio”* (M30CV), and the last one stated that he was illiterate (M48MA).

The purpose of enquiring about their profession was to establish the relationship, if any, between their education and training and their present occupation. Of those with a higher education level, only the person with a professional training held a relevant job (M32MA). The journalist was publishing a weekly pamphlet addressed mostly to the Pakistani community but made his living by running a *locutorio*. The teacher was working as a factory worker and the fourth respondent was employed as a shop assistant.

Of the five respondents who completed their secondary education, four were self-employed and defined themselves as businessmen. They ran *locutorios*, a shop, a restaurant, and a construction company. The fifth one worked as a mason (M35SA).

Finally of the two with little or no formal education one worked as a cook (M48MA) and the other one as a peddler (M30CV).

Overall the jobs they could access required limited formal education and there was very little relation between their education and training and the jobs they were holding. Those with higher levels of education were significantly overqualified for the jobs they had.

Exchanges relating to the family composition aimed at determining the existence of a nuclear or extended family and the location of the family members. This is an important element in the study of the links with the country of origin and the transnational relations developed as a consequence. The exchanges were also used to assess whether the respondent had migrated on his own, and if his family had migrated with him or joined him at a later stage. All the respondents identified themselves as belonging to extended families, with most of their members in Pakistan. They all asserted to maintain close links with them.

The languages spoken by the participants, or which they alleged that they could speak, were diverse. Some of them were related to their ethnic origin and others to the places where they had lived so far, either in Pakistan or abroad. They included Punjabi, Urdu,

Pashto, Potwari, Siraiki, Spanish, Catalan, English, Japanese, French, German, Arabic, Serbocroat and Albanian.

All of them could all speak Urdu and Punjabi, but just two of them spoke English. They could also speak Spanish with varying degrees of proficiency. Only four of them said they could speak some Catalan, though not well enough for the interviews to be in that language. Of the four, three had a university degree. One of them had attended language courses at an *Escola d'Adults*, while the other two had learnt it through their interaction with local people. The fourth respondent to speak some Catalan worked as a hawker and had learned it by interacting with his customers.

“Hablo Punjabi en casa, calle Urdu. Aquí, castellano, inglés, catalán, una mica“ (M30CV).

Overall, there was no marked interest in learning Catalan.

7.2 Professional/Work environment

In order to assess the professional and work environment of the participants, in terms of its evolution since their arrival in Catalonia and its relationship to their professional situation in Pakistan, discussions focused on four subjects:

- Their present economic activity
- The duration of their present economic activity
- Previous economic activities (in Catalonia and in Pakistan)
- Participation in workers' or other sort of professional associations

In terms of the first parameter, **duration of their stay in Catalonia**, of the four respondents who had lived in Catalonia over five years, three declared to be self-employed businessmen. One of them was a journalist, though he also ran a *locutorio*

(M44CV), another one had a restaurant (M42SA), and the third one was a multi-faceted entrepreneur who owned a *locutorio* and had his own construction company (M34SM). Only one of them defined himself as a manual worker, a mason (M35SA).

Initially, they had engaged in harsh and poorly paid economic activities, reportedly because their precarious legal status precluded them from opting for easier positions and from negotiating better conditions. Their jobs included distributing gas cylinders, working as parking attendants, shop assistants, casual labourers, hawkers, etc.

“Tengo el periódico, El Mirador de los Inmigrantes, tengo un negocio de artes gráficas, de diseño gráfico, imprenta, copistería. ... Antes he trabajado como vigilante de parking, también he trabajado como ayudante de camarero, camarero, maître en hostelería. ...” (M44CV)

As they were able to regularize their legal status and obtain temporary and later permanent residence and working permits, they could apply for and obtain better paid and easier jobs. In some cases they remained in the same sector, i.e. construction, but as entrepreneurs, or employees with higher salaries and better prospects.

“Ahora mismo tengo un locutorio, un internet club. ... Y empresario de la construcción. Empecé hace tres meses casi. ... Los primeros tres años trabajaba para tienda de indio como representante de electrónica y luego empecé a vender por mi cuenta al mayor. A las pequeñas tiendas. Y después hace cuatro años compré una tienda de todo a cien, tienda de regalo.” (M34SM)

Their occupations, both at present and since their arrival in Catalonia, were not related to their jobs in Pakistan, except for the journalist who used to work for a political newspaper in his home town. The restaurateur had held a variety of non-descript positions, in his own words, before opening his present business, and worked as a tailor and an electrician in Pakistan.

“No puedo decir que es mi profesión. Yo trabajé en Pakistán en taller. De sastre. Cuando venía a Francia también. Y ahora tengo restaurante”. (M42SA)

One of the businessmen used to be an executive with a pharmaceutical company (M37SM) while the second one had just completed his studies (M28SM), and both were being supported by their families. Their initial jobs upon their arrival were as employees in the electronic and souvenir retail business.

Not a single participant belonged to trade unions or acknowledged participating in any sort of workers, traders or professional association. One participant (M44CV) indicated that he was one of the leading members of a cultural association promoting the development of links between Catalonia and Pakistan. Their members gathered on Sundays to read poetry. They organised festivals to divulge Pakistani culture, especially poetry and music. He also had links with other associations and public institutions:

“Colaboro con la Fundación Vicky Sherpa, que es una fundación para la educación, digamos. Trabajo, colaboro con la fundación ‘Tot Raval’, una fundación que trabaja para el barrio del Raval, para la convivencia. Colaboro con temas de asociación cultural con el Ayuntamiento. Trabajo con SAIER¹⁰ que es una ONG de inmigrantes. Están la Cruz Roja, el Ayuntamiento, el Colegio de Abogados, conjuntamente son los que están ayudando a los inmigrantes... yo trabajo con ellos como intérprete y traductor“. (M44CV)

The wife of one of the entrepreneurs (F35SM) mentioned that she had started a women’s association but it did not have sufficient following. She claimed that most women were too busy to attend meetings, and in some cases their husbands did not allow them to participate.

¹⁰ Servei d’Atenció a Immigrants Estrangers i Refugiats

In separate discussions with one of the leaders of the Pakistani Workers' Association of Catalonia, it transpired that very few Pakistani migrants were prepared to join a regular association or trade union. This does not mean that they had adopted individualistic patterns of behaviour. Rather the opposite. They had very strong social and community bonds, based on family, kinship, religion, geography and other allegiances, but these links were mostly informal. They were possibly reluctant to engage in activities where they might acquire unwanted visibility until their status was regularized.

“... hay poco trabajo, ... porque hay gente y competición mucho, hay chino mucho, sabe que no tener papel y esto sí que... siempre cuidado, hay que mirar... Pero yo quiero papel, pero... aquí hay mucho problemas... dice que esperar, esperar, llevo tres años así....”
(M37SM)

Among the seven respondents who had been in Catalonia less than five years, four of them appeared to be involved in economic activities with a lower social status than they had in Pakistan. One of them used to be a computer operator in Pakistan while in Catalonia he worked as an assistant in an electronic shop or in a locutorio (M30MA). Another respondent had his own garment shop, but in Catalonia he was working as a cook (M48MA). A trained teacher worked as a manual worker in the construction and chemical sectors (M37CV), and the son of a well established manufacturing family ran his own shop (M37SM). Of the remaining three respondents, one was a qualified worker and worked as such in the construction sector (M32MA), another one was a student in Pakistan and had managed to open a locutorio with funding from his relatives both in Pakistan and Catalonia (M28SM), and the last one, who had barely completed his primary education, earned a living as a hawker on the beaches and streets of Barcelona (M30CV).

It appears therefore that the duration of their stay affects their employment status, in that unemployment is more common among recent arrivals. Diagram 2.

Diagram 2 Duration of Stay / Employment Status

Duration of stay	Employment Status	
	Employed	Unemployed
Over five years	M44CV M35SA M42SA M34SM	
Less than five years	M37CV M28SM M48MA M32MA M37SM	M30CV M30MA

It has also an impact on their professional status since, the longer their stay, the better their working and economic conditions. Recent arrivals are less likely to have secured a contract, and they must resort to ad hoc arrangements to eke out a living. Once they have obtained a work/residence permit, they can negotiate better conditions for themselves. Long stayers thus, after having worked for others for some years and in the process having obtained a work/residence permit, are more likely to be self-employed. In addition, they may if they so desire, join a professional association that can help them advance their interests. Diagram 3.

Diagram 3 Duration of Stay / Professional Status

Duration of Stay	Professional Status	
	Working for others	Self-Employed
Over five years	M35SA	M44CV M42SA M34SM
Less than five years	M37CV M48MA M32MA M30MA	M37SM M30CV M28SM

The second parameter, **household composition**, distinguishes between those who were living with their family in Catalonia, and those who were not.

This does not necessarily mean that the latter lived independently, or that they were single. Pakistani culture does not contemplate people living on their own. Men, married or single, will usually remain in their parents' household, whereas women will live with their parents until they marry, and then join their husband's family. Very rarely, and only in an urban setting and among the middle and upper classes, will a newly married couple establish a separate household. Remaining single is not a regular option, as marriages are generally arranged, often within the family. Households are consequently large, with members belonging to different generations of the same family.

In the migratory context, however, it may take several years for nuclear families to reunite, and many more years still for extended families to be together. Usually couples will live with their children only; occasionally they will have their parents live with them. Married siblings may live together temporarily, when newly arrived or if faced with difficult economic circumstances. Even when they have managed to bring the all or most of the family over, western housing does not allow for joint living.

People without their families, whether single or married, tend to share living quarters with other individuals, to whom they may or may not be related by links of family or area of origin, for the purpose of reducing living expenses. Often housemates are from Pakistan, but sometimes they are migrants from other countries, mainly North Africa.

Among the interviewees in this research project therefore there were people who were living with their families in Catalonia, i.e. husband and wife, plus children if they had any. There were also people, some of whom were single and others were married, whose families were in Pakistan. Family in this case refers to wife and children, as well as parents and siblings. Finally, there was a household composed of two brothers in which one of them, as the eldest son in the family, acted as the head of household and took responsibility for his younger brother whom he helped travel from Pakistan.

All four participants who lived with their families but one were businessmen or self-employed. Diagram 4.

Diagram 4 Employment Status / Household Composition

Employment Status	Household Composition	
	Single	Family
Self-employed	M44CV M28SM	M42SA M34SM M37SM M30CV
Working for others	M30MA M32MA M35SA M48MA M37CV	

Among them, two had been in Catalonia over five years and had become businessmen after years of working for others (M34SA, M42SA), while the third one had been in Catalonia less than five years but had been able to open his own shop from the start with funding from his family in Pakistan (M37SM). The household composed of two brothers stood out in that they had lived in Catalonia less than five years, they were single, they had never been able to obtain a regular job, and they made a living as hawkers (M30CV).

Two families had travelled together while the third one came in stages; the man came on his own and after marrying brought his wife over from Pakistan. The two siblings had come separately; the elder brother arrived first and was later joined by his younger brother.

It is worth mentioning that only in one case the wife was engaged in paid work, as a seamstress for the Pakistani community,

“... *trabajo en costura, pero este no me gusta... antes tenía que ir a trabajar tienda también, un día y dos días... antes una tienda de frutería, mi trabajo siempre, trabajo, ahora coser.*” (F34SM)

The other two ladies were housewives although one of them was taking language courses at the University.

Out of the seven interviewees living on their own, five had lived in Catalonia less than five years, and two over five years. Among the recently arrived individuals, three were married and two were single, though one of them was engaged to be married, and only one of them was de facto self-employed. The two who arrived earlier were both married, and one of them was a businessman while the other worked as a mason. Diagram 5.

Diagram 5 Duration of stay / Household Composition

Duration of stay	Household Composition	
	Single	Family
Over five years	M35SA	M44CV M42SA M34SM
Less than five years	M37CV M28SM M48MA M32MA M30MA M30CV	M37SM

The initial assumption was that all participants wanted to bring their family over but were actually hampered by the lack of visa, money, or both. However, in the course of discussions four of them indicated that they had no intention of having their families join them on a permanent basis.

In two cases it was a financial issue: the purpose of migrating was to send sufficient remittances to their extended families in Pakistan and having to support their immediate

family in Catalonia would hinder their objective. Culturally it would be unacceptable that a woman would share quarters with a man to whom she is not related. Separate accommodation is essential, and for many this is unaffordable.

One of them had actually had his family with him, and later sent his wife and children back, partly to save more money and partly to ensure that his wife would look after his parents in Pakistan.

“I’m not planning to bring my wife. ... If I have a family here I have to get a separate apartment and that’s very expensive.” (M37CV)

The other two cases claimed that they would not bring their family, or future family, to Catalonia because they did not want to expose their wives and daughters to the western culture.

I do not want to bring my family here because there is no education for children. I cannot bring my daughter or my wife. Our culture is totally different. ... For visit is ok.” (M30MA)

To summarize, migrants generally travel on their own and aim at bringing their family once they have settled, i.e. when they have regularized their legal situation and they have obtained proper employment. Diagrams 6 and 7.

Diagram 6 Legal Status / Household Composition

Legal Status	Household Composition	
	Single	Family
Regular	M44CV M35SA M37CV M48MA M32MA M28SM	M42SA M34SM
Irregular	M30MA	M37SM M30CV

This is linked to the duration of their stay, as recent arrivals are more likely to be unemployed or to have more precarious employment.

Diagram 7 Employment Status / Household Composition

Employment Status	Household Composition	
	Single	Family
Employed	M44CV M35SA M32MA M37CV M48MA M28SM	M42SA M34SM
Unemployed	M30MA	M30CV

Because obtaining a work/residence permit, a stable job and some financial security takes some time, in general it is long stayers who have their families with them. Diagram 5 above.

Although they may aspire to be together with their families, this is contingent upon making enough money to provide for their extended families. Some, however, fear that

that the environment in Catalonia is too threatening to the religious and cultural identity of their families, and they prioritize preserving their values over being together.

As far as their **legal status** is concerned, eight of the participants had legal residence and work permits, while three did not (M37SA, M30CV, M30MA). Among those who had legal residence, four entered the country with an immigrant visa (M32MA, M28SM, M37CV, M48MA), i.e. they obtained residence and work permits prior to their departure from Pakistan on the basis of previously obtained work contracts. Three of them obtained a tourist visa and overstayed (M34SM, M44CV, M37SM, M42SA), and one crossed the border without any visa (M30CV). All those who travelled on tourist visas or without any visa benefited from the 1996 and 2001 regularization processes.

Of the four people who entered the country with regular work visas, two had become entrepreneurs, one of them after spending several years working for others, and two were working for others, one as a cook and the other one as a specialized construction worker.

Given that the majority of them had entered the country without proper documentation and at the time of the interview most of them had regularized their situation, the duration of their stay was directly related to their legal status. However, more than the actual number of years in Catalonia, what counted was whether they had arrived before or after 2001, when the latest regularization process, at the time, had taken place. Diagram 8.

Diagram 8 Duration of stay / Legal Status

Duration of stay	Legal Status	
	Regular	Irregular
Over five years	M34SM M35SA M44CV M42SA	
Less than five years	M37CV M28SM M48MA M32MA	M30MA M37SM M30CV

Although in the theoretical construction of the universe for this research the parameter “**employed versus unemployed**” was included, at the time of the interviews it was not found to be useful. The point was rather whether the participants were making a living or whether they are dependent on others.

Thus, the three participants without work and residence permits, despite their irregular situation, were all making a living. One of them was running his own shop using a front man. Two of them declared to be “unemployed” (M30MA, M30CV). However, one of them was working as an assistant in locutorios or electronic shops when the opportunity arose, and the other one was making a living as a street seller and doing henna “tattoos” on sunbathers. A month later the businessmen was no longer “unemployed”. He had moved to Madrid to work as a regular shop assistant. Diagram 9.

Thus, irrespective of the duration of their stay, their legal status and their occupation, they were all financially independent, notwithstanding the precariousness of some of their occupations.

Diagram 9 Legal Status / Employment Status

Legal Status	Employment Status	
	Employed	Unemployed
Regular	M44CV M35SA M34SM M42SA M28SM M32MA M48MA M37CV	
Irregular	M37SM	M30MA M30CV

It is worth noting the very limited mobility among them after their arrival in Catalonia. As a rule they travelled extensively between their departure from Pakistan and their arrival in Catalonia, but once in Catalonia they remained in one place. In separate discussions with Pakistani immigrants not included in this study, it appears that there are a fair number of them working as construction workers in all-Pakistani teams. They work in an itinerant way throughout Catalonia and even as far as the Balearic Islands. However, they keep returning to their living quarters, usually in Barcelona or in metropolitan Barcelona.

Initially it was assumed that the participant's **professional profile**, i.e. involvement in blue versus white collar occupations, would be a defining parameter. However, this distinction was not found to be useful at the time of the interviews as it did not accurately describe the economic activities of the respondents and their professional evolution. Thus, it was combined with the following classification:

- Working for others
- Self-employed
- Student

Following is a list of their occupations at the time of the interview:

Working for others

- mason/construction work
- cook
- factory worker
- shop assistant computer/electronic field
- locutorio worker

Self-employed

- businessman (construction company, locutorio, restaurant owner/manager)
- hawker

- shopkeeper
- journalist
- casual worker/hawker

Student

- none

All the participants save one were working for others upon their arrival in Catalonia, without regard to their profession or level of studies in Pakistan. None of them, not even those who were students in Pakistan, were able to pursue studies in Catalonia, although some of them followed short-term language and professional courses provided free of charge by different institutions, such as *Ajuntaments*, *Escoles d'Adults*, and the *Generalitat*.

“I studied in the school, in Spain, about six months. Three months a language course. And after that there is also language but also a course of Word, Excel, informatica. It is a course of Generalitat.”
(M37CV)

For the great majority of participants with regular residence and work permits, their ultimate objective was to be self-employed, which often meant running a small business, a shop, or a locutorio. The reasons for this, other than the expected financial gains, are the higher social standing attributed to businessmen as opposed to manual workers, and the desire to be independent.

“In the near future I want to do some... my business, like markets. I want to sell clothes, also maybe children's clothes.” (M37CV)

In contrast, the interviewee working as a peddler considered himself to be unemployed, and his objective was to be employed in order not just to earn money but to regularise his legal status.

In summary, it seems therefore that there is a progression in the type of work and the working conditions of the participants related to the duration of their stay in Catalonia, their legal status, and their ability to secure funding as start-up capital. Accordingly, their objectives change over time: initially they are prepared to take on any job so as to make a living. At the same time if possible and otherwise later, they search for a regular contract in order to secure their legal immigrant status, and finally they aim to be self-employed.

It should also be mentioned that they were all engaged in economic activities, i.e. there were no students and even those who were unemployed or without work/residence permit, they had developed survival strategies until they found a job:

“La tienda no está a mi nombre, no! hay alguien conmigo, ... el tiene papel ... lleva 15 años aquí, pero hay mucho problema.” (M30SM)

*“Mi estado en España es así como un empleado, pero realmente yo soy socio de mi tío. ... el locutorio va con nombre de mi tío. Pero yo soy socio, como es familia, lo dirige el porque tenía todo, el montó... yo no dije que cambiar nombre, yo tengo confianza con él, por eso. “
(M28SM)*

7.3 Social environment

Their social environment was assessed through the discussion of the following topics:

- Living arrangements
- Participation in associations
- Family composition (in Catalonia)
- Religious practices for themselves and their children
- Schooling for their children
- Relationship with their surrounding environment

An analysis of their replies and comments shows that people upon arrival joined their relatives or acquaintances. In their absence, men who had travelled on their own shared living quarters with other migrants, preferably Pakistanis. A small, two or three bedroom, apartment of 60 square meters is often shared by eight people or more. Some respondents claimed that they knew of Pakistanis living in extremely overcrowded conditions, i.e. up to 50 persons were sharing an apartment by sleeping in shifts.

They retained these living arrangements until they achieved an economic position that allowed them to either bring their family.

“Yo ahora vivo solo. Pero antes vivía en un piso compartido con otros compatriotas, en el que vivía otra gente. Al principio, cuando estás en una situación no muy estable, necesitas ahorrar un poco para sobrevivir. Y esto es la inmigración, cuando hay gente que está fuera de su país y no tiene medios suficientes para ganar para vivir... »

M44CV

Some of them though, kept sharing their homes with other migrants, in this case with someone from Morocco, to save more money.

“I’m living with my friends, five friends, not relatives. There is one Moroccan, we are all renting together”. (M32MA)

One of the respondents had actually bought a small flat and had an Algerian migrant and a Spaniard as tenants in order to meet the mortgage payments. (M48MA)

Thus, nearly all of those who had lived in Catalonia **for five years or more** lived with their families or on their own, i.e. they no longer needed to share living quarters with non relatives, whereas more recently arrived interviewees had sharing arrangements. The one exception among the recent arrivals was a family that came together. In this case, the

cultural requirement that women may not live with males to whom they are not related took precedence over the need to save money. Diagram 10.

Diagram 10 Duration of stay / Housing arrangements

Duration of stay	Housing arrangements	
	On their own	Sharing
Over five years	M34SM M35SA M44CV M42SA	
Less than five years	M37SM	M30MA M30CV M37CV M48MA M32MA M28SM

One of the interviewees had created a number of cultural associations and participated actively in social events related to the migrant community,

“Tengo una asociación, una ONG, Punt Comú, un nombre catalán, que se dedica a cosas interculturales y a promocionar la cultura pakistani aquí”.(M44CV)

Otherwise, irrespective of the length of their stay, the participants claimed to have no time for activities not related to their work or their family.

All the participants were Sunni Muslims, though they belonged to different sects.¹¹ Among the long-stayers, none of them was going to the Mosque regularly, only on special days like Eid,

¹¹ As it has been mentioned in chapter 4, (4.3.3), 77 percent of Pakistanis are Sunni Muslims.

“... regularmente no voy (a la Mezquita), a veces, en Navidad, y alguna vez el viernes también”. (M34SM)

whereas the most recent arrivals went to the Mosque every Friday or whenever possible.

“Every day, no. But I pray everyday in my house five times. And when I have time... Saturday, Sunday, I go to the Mosque.” (M32MA)

In those occasions they would go to the Mosque run by their specific group or sect.

Those who have their families with them sent their children to the nearest public school.

“Van a la escuela Drassanes. Pero D. (the eldest son) desde este año se ha ido al instituto. O sea, ahora el peque se va a la escuela, el grande a instituto y la niña irá en septiembre.” (M34SM)

Children received religious instruction at home, usually from their father, though in one case it was the mother, who was well educated, who took care of it.

“... fue una vez (a la madrassa, Coranic school) pero al niño no le gustó porque es muy pequeña y había mucha gente. Y el Maulwi no enseña bien. Yo he dicho que ahora estudie en casa. Yo cada día les enseño. Mi hijo mayor lee el Corán. Tres veces. Y el pequeño. Pero es muy difícil en casa.” (M35SM)

In a few cases, when the father was too busy and the mother did not possess the required knowledge, they had an Imam come to the house and teach the children of several families in the neighbourhood.

“... no van, porque aquí no existe Madrassa.... Nosotros queremos hacer una, para calle, con local. Queremos hacer eso. Pero de

momento hay un Imam aquí que viene. Entonces el pasa cada día aquí. Y en mi casa hay cuatro o cinco niños y el da clase”. (M42SA)

Two of them had been to Mecca and performed Hajj and Umra respectively, the pilgrimages expected of devout Muslims, and the rest planned to do them as soon as they had sufficient time and money. Overall being a Muslim was a fundamental element of their identity.

In terms of their perception of the environment, and how they were perceived, recent arrivals claimed not to have any problem. Several said they had been helped by local people to find jobs. Interestingly enough, those who complained about being looked down upon at times were those with a higher level of formal education.

“Sometimes people say to people who do not belong to Spain ‘moro’ (Moor). They explained to me ‘moro’ is the same as Muslim, but I’m proud I’m a Muslim.” “People who are from Morocco create some problems for the Spanish people, like ‘ladrón’. But many people like Pakistan, they think most Pakistanis are good people”. (M32MA)

However, among the long stayers three out of four stated that they had felt rejected. In some cases nationals would not enter their businesses, in other cases people looked at them with disdain, and they had been called “moros”. Obviously, they strongly resented this. They perceived themselves as hardworking people, proud of their achievements and of the fact that what they had accomplished was the result of their personal efforts:

“Empecé una peluquería, con una chica española, yo no estaba, pero la gente (igual) no quería venir. Es de un Pakistani, es de ‘moro’, aunque no soy ‘moro’, dicen así.” (M34SM)

Some also referred to the change in attitude towards Muslim people after the 11 September events in New York,

“A partir de cuando viene guerra con América con Torres, cada día va guardia, siempre dice todos los musulmanes hacen así, y no tiene que decir así. No todos los musulmanes son igual, como cristianos, hay bueno y hay malo... Por ejemplo, ¿País Vasco también es cristiano no? pero no dicen que cristiano es ETA, que cristiano va matar personas, cristiano y ETA hacen bombas.” (M35SA)

Similarly after the 11 March train bombs,

“Cuando Atocha, dia 11 de marso, yo he tenido mucho miedo, mucho miedo... yo hablar con encargado que por favor yo no quiero ir en tren, yo vengo de autobús en tal sitio y viene mejor furgoneta a recogerme. Porque yo subo en Sants, y hay mucha gente, y yo llevo mochila con comida, ropa, todas cosas, y gente mirando nosotros con mochila con cara de miedo, susto.” (M35SA)

Those who had stayed longer in Catalonia though, felt more assertive and freely admitted that they were experiencing xenophobia and that they felt discriminated on account of their religion. They also thought that the nationals were jealous of their economic achievements.

“Gente de fuera, nosotros, venimos, trabajamos, no miramos horarios. Desde la mañana hasta por la noche. Y procuramos ahorrar, y después hacer algún negocio o comprar un piso y por eso hay gente que no le gusta porque mucha gente no puede hacer.” (M34SM)

As far as the **household composition** is concerned, of the seven respondents who did not have their family with them, five shared quarters with other people, and only two lived on their own. The latter had been in Catalonia more than five years and were fairly well established. One of them was trying to have his family join him. The second one used to have his family with him. He had brought his fiancée over, married her and had his two

sons born in Catalonia. However, for financial and family reasons, i.e. to ensure his wife would look after his parents, he sent them back to Pakistan.

Among the most recently arrived interviewees, three of them were married and one was engaged. Of them two intended to bring their families over whenever possible, i.e. when they obtained the visas and could afford it, whereas the other two did not want their families join them. In one case because of the financial implications, and in the other because he did not consider the western environment as appropriate for his wife and daughters. One of the respondents had bought an apartment and, pending the arrival of his family, he was renting rooms out to other migrants.

Among the four respondents living with their families in Catalonia, three had their own accommodation and only the household composed of two brothers shared quarters with other Pakistanis. Two of them had lived in Catalonia over five years, and one had bought his own apartment.

In terms of their **legal status**, among the three with no residence/work permit, they had all arrived recently, two shared living quarters with other men, while the third having arrived with his wife and daughter rented their own apartment. They were going to the mosque every Friday, when possible every day. The little girl attended a public school and her father was teaching her the Coran at home. They all felt that the local people treated them well and their main concern was regularizing their situation so that they would not be deported. As to the ones with a regular residence/work permit, they did not share any specific feature.

With regard to their **employment status**, the two who considered themselves to be unemployed had arrived recently and had no work/residence permit. They lived with other Pakistani migrants. One of them had a university degree while the other one had barely attended school. The first one used to be an entrepreneur but his business in Saudi Arabia failed and he moved to Catalonia, where he had some friends, after they told him it was easy to enter without a visa and find a job. His aim was to eventually have his own

business again but in the meantime he worked sporadically in locutorios or shops owned by other migrants. The second one travelled overland and sojourned in a number of countries prior to reaching Barcelona. While he was making a living of sorts by selling different goods in the streets, his main concern was finding a proper job that would allow him to regularize his situation.

7.4 Relationship with country of origin

To establish the existence of transnational links of the respondents with Pakistan, discussions revolved around the following topics:

- Type and frequency of contacts with relatives in Pakistan
- Frequency of travel to Pakistan
- Occurrence and frequency of visitors from Pakistan
- Mode and frequency of remittances
- Exchange of goods with Pakistan

All respondents claimed to be in close contact with Pakistan, mostly by telephone, a few by email and one or two also used regular mail. The frequency of telephone use varied, from daily calls, for those who run locutorios, “*I plug the computer and I chat with them everyday*”, to weekly or biweekly calls. The **duration of their stay** played a role, in that those who have been in Catalonia less than five years tended to call more often.

The impact of the duration of their stay in the frequency of their travel to Pakistan was also evident. Those who had no work/residence permits could not afford to travel. They were all recent arrivals. Travelling was also linked to their financial situation. Those who had been in Catalonia longer tended to be more comfortable, hence they were able to travel in one case yearly, and in the others every two or three years. There was one participant who had been in Catalonia over five years, and had a work/residence permit. However, because of his limited earnings as a mason, the need to send money to keep his family in Pakistan, and his desire to save so that he could start his own business, allowed him to travel only every five years or so. (M35SA)

Only three participants had hosted their relatives, two of them were long stayers and self-employed. One recent arrival did not have a work/residence permit, but he was self-employed. Having visitors from Pakistan was therefore linked to the financial position of the relatives in Pakistan, and not to the duration of their stay in Catalonia or their legal status.

“¡Han venido mi suegra, suegro, mi cuñado, tres cuñados, mis dos hermanos, toda familia cada vez!” (F34SM)

Most of the participants were sending money regularly to their relatives in Pakistan.

“When my family needs some money, at that time I send the money. According to their needs.” (M37CV)

Only two stated not to send practically any money. One of them was a long-stayer, well-settled, self-employed, whose parents were deceased and hence had no direct dependants in Pakistan.

“Antes sí, ahora ya no. Ahora muy poco porque ahora sólo mi padre está allí, así que mando un poco, no mucho pero sí que mando.” (M42SA)

The other one was the opposite case: he was recently arrived, did not have work/residence permit and he made very little money as a hawker “...a veces mando, muy poco...” ((M30CV) The rest sent money, some monthly, some every three months and some when needed. One indicated that he used to send money, but now he was saving to buy a flat and start his own business.

“¡Mando... depende! Alguna vez más, alguna vez poco... pero... hace un año yo guardando poco para hacer alguna tienda o alguna otra cosa porque ahora mucho años trabajando...” (M35SA)

“Yo quiero ir en Figueres porque mis amigos dicen que en Figueres tienen piso barato, yo quiero ir allí a mirar precio y para mirar que negocio voy a hacer, por ‘jemplo’ alguna tienda de alimentación,... o internet, o ‘shwarma’ o cosas así...” (M35SA)

These remittances represented a varying percentage of their earnings, from 10 to 75 percent, and the determining factors were the family’s requirements in Pakistan. Money was sent mostly through “friends”. A few admitted using the *hundi* or *hawala* system, a system to transfer money through informal channels, as explained in chapter 5.4, and three claimed to employ regular bank transfers.

Invariably those whose immediate family was with them sent less money. Those whose wife and children were in Pakistan sent the money to their own parents, not to their wives, whom in any case were living with their parents-in-law.

The link with Pakistan included also receiving goods from there through friends, mostly traditional clothes for their own use, also some food. However, not many goods were being sent to Pakistan because it was too expensive. Occasionally they would send presents with friends, often perfume or cosmetics, and toys and chocolate for children.

In conclusion, the relationship with the country of origin is linked to a number of inter-related factors. Thus, the duration of the stay in Catalonia is a determinant factor in the sense that the longer they are in Catalonia the greater the chances of having their families with them, and hence the need to provide for them in Catalonia and not in Pakistan. Also, as time passes, the desire to settle down and buy an apartment and open their own business increases. Consequently their ability to save and send remittances decreases. The nature of the links therefore changes. With time the value of the remittances each individual sends diminishes, but the travelling increases, especially when women and children have joined the head of family.

Sending or receiving goods is limited to presents for home consumption. It must be said that the extensive Pakistani diaspora has well developed commercial networks. These networks ensure a regular supply of Pakistani traditional goods to Pakistani communities all over. In the case of Catalonia, Pakistani and Indian shops are supplied by Pakistani and other Asian traders in the United Kingdom. As it has been explained in chapter 5.1, Pakistani migration to the UK started in the 1950s. Many of the immigrants have since then become very active entrepreneurs who have extended their business interests in continental Europe with the recent surge of Pakistani enclaves.

7.5 *On the migratory movement*

To assess some of the factors intervening in the migratory process, discussions were held about the following issues:

- Reasons for leaving
- Time of departure
- Choice of Catalonia as a destination
- Time of arrival
- Mode of travelling, incidences during the trip
- Source of information about Catalonia
- Support mechanisms
- Future plans with regard to the family
- Travelling documents (with or without visa, and kind of visa)
- Point of entry
- Present legal status
- Linkages to future movements

The analysis of the replies revealed that the parameters identified, i.e. duration of their stay, household composition, employment status, legal status and professional profile, were not significant.

The most frequently mentioned reason to leave Pakistan was the search for a better future for themselves and for their families, basically to earn money.

“(I left Pakistan) for better future, for money, of course for money... to ... sacrifice for better future for my children”. (M30MA)

“¿Por que me fuí de Pakistán? Muy sencillo: dinero, a trabajar.” (M42SA)

One respondent, a member of a political party, Pakistan People’s Party, also mentioned political difficulties, and two other participants indicated family reasons, i.e. complicated relations with the in-laws.

“Vivíamos en Pakistán con familia. La familia, cuando despierta, cuando duerme... ‘¿de donde venís?’ y si tenemos que ir a algún sitio preguntaba a la cuñada, ‘¿ podemos ir ?’, ‘ no, ahí no vas. Ahí vas.’ Siempre pedir permiso”. (M34SM)

One of them insisted that he had not migrated to earn money. For him the motivating factor was travelling and discovering the world. (M32MA)¹²

A number of them departed from Pakistan in the 1980s, others in the 1990s, and some after 2000. Four of them came directly to Catalonia, two had actually obtained a visa at the Spanish embassy in Islamabad, while the rest transited through other countries for some time.

They all declared that the decision to come to Catalonia/Spain was motivated by two main factors, a) the presence of a Pakistani friend or relative able to help them come and

¹² His family, however, claimed that their lives had greatly improved since their son was sending remittances to them. (M67UR)

settle, and b) the comparative ease to enter illegally and eventually obtain regular work/residence permits.

“Vine porque en Barcelona poder arreglar papeles. Tenía un primo aquí.” (M35SA)

“(I came) because I got some addresses from my friends... First I came here without any person. Two or three weeks later I got some friends here who are from my city, Lahore, ... So there is ... sometimes, when you have any person from your city or your country, they are the same like your brother or like your friend”. (M32MA)

Most of them had already decided to come to Catalonia when they left Pakistan. A few though decided to come to Catalonia when they were already in Europe, after learning of the regularization processes.

As it has mentioned earlier, four of the respondents already had their immediate family living with them, although in one case it was a household composed of two brothers. Two of them travelled together with their family. The other two had their families join them later, in one case after marrying and obtaining the corresponding visa, in the other case illegally, since the elder brother had not been able to obtain a work/residence permit for himself as yet.

Of the seven respondents living on their own, three were married or engaged and were planning to bring over their family as soon as the papers would be ready. Three participants did not want to have their family join them, mostly for financial reasons, but also in one case out of cultural/religious concerns. One respondent was single at the time and had no plans for marrying.

Only two of the eleven respondents entered Spain/Catalonia with a work/residence permit. The others either came with a tourist visa, or with no visa whatsoever.¹³ Their confidence in regularizing their situation was proved correct and most of them had availed themselves of the opportunities offered by the 1986 and 2001 regularisation processes. At the time of the interviews, only three were still without work/residence permits since they had arrived less than five years earlier, after the last regularization process had taken place. They were all eagerly awaiting the next one.

7.6 Self-assessment

An important part of the research was assessing how the participants felt about their experience, whether they considered they had achieved or were in the process of achieving the objectives they had set for themselves at the start of their movement, and what their plans for the future were. In this connection, it was also important to enquire about the existence of a migratory chain.

To this end the following issues were discussed:

- Degree of satisfaction relating to their decision to come to/be in Catalonia
- The best aspects of living in Catalonia
- The worst or hardest aspects of living in Catalonia
- Plans for the near/medium and long term, for the participant and his/her relatives (children/spouse/parents/siblings/extended family)
- Plans to return to Pakistan eventually
- Assessment of their migratory process in terms of advice to potential migrants
- Readiness to assist potential Pakistani migrants to come to Catalonia

The four long-stayers expressed great satisfaction about having come to Catalonia and to be living there. There were though nuances among them. The most satisfied ones were

¹³ According to the Spanish Embassy in Islamabad, only about one third of all visa requests were being approved. The majority of requests originated from Gujarat district in Punjab. Interview with the Chief of the Consular Section at the Spanish Embassy in Islamabad, Vicente Mas, on 15.10.03.

those who had their families with them and had become self-employed. “*Yo estoy contento al cien por ciento*” (M42SA). They appreciated everything, the fact that they were making money, the people, the climate, the health system, etc.

“Muy contento, muy contento. En principio quedamos... hostia, ¿dónde venimos? No sé como va a ir. Pero ahora estamos tan acostumbrados que siempre queremos quedar ahí. Ir a Pakistán tampoco podemos olvidar. Ir de vacaciones y pienso algún día cuando tenga suficiente dinero, cada dos meses, cada cuatro meses ir a Pakistán. Un mes allá, dos meses aquí. Así. No puedo dejar Pakistán ni puedo dejar España.” (M34SM)

The other two were happy, but one of them was not satisfied because he was having difficulties in obtaining a visa for his family to join him. The fourth long-stayer appreciated making money and the prevailing safety, since he claimed that in Pakistan there were kidnappings for ransom.

“Me gusta que aquí no tiene miedo de nadie... En Pakistán no hay dinero la vida muy difícil... pero si hay mucho dinero también tiene mucho problema, por ejemplo, alguna persona coger mis hijos... si no paga, mata.... Aquí no tiene problema, trabajar y vuelve a casa y... tranquilo toda la vida.” (M35SA)

Among the seven most recent arrivals three stated to be happy about their decision, but they could not quite explain the reason, “people are nice”, was often said. Of the three one had a work/residence permit and held a steady job. The other two had not been able to regularise their situation as yet, though both had their families with them. In terms of their employment/professional status, they were at opposite ends. One of them was running his own shop and the other one was a peddler.

The four recent arrivals had mixed feelings. They admitted that they had been compelled to come because of economic constraints, it was not a free choice. One participant claimed that his only concern was obtaining a work/residence permit, otherwise, everything was fine. The other three had regularized their situation and they held steady employment. Still, they were finding it hard to adjust.

One participant considered that Catalonia did not compare favourably with Germany. He had initially settled there but he was not able to obtain a residence/work permit. Having learnt of the regularization processes in Spain, he travelled to Catalonia where he obtained his work/residence permit in 2001.

In general they all admitted that Catalonia was quite different from what they had expected. The surprise was greater for those who came directly from Pakistan. A few had been migrants in other European countries and this lessened the impact.

In terms of what they liked best, most of them mentioned the people, irrespective of the duration of their stay. They also mentioned the “*joie de vivre*” in places like Barcelona, the climate, and underlying it all, the possibility to earn and save money. Those whose families were with them also mentioned the health and education systems.

There was a clear consensus as to what they liked the least: the local culture. In some cases they made specific references to women’s behaviour and attitudes, including the dress code and the “permissive” relationships between men and women. They also rejected the seemingly disrespectful attitude of children towards their parents, alcohol consumption, and xenophobic attitudes. A participant complained about the very high criminality rate, when compared to Germany. A second one stated that Catalonia was dirty and he much preferred Japan, where he used to work. Unfortunately, he had to leave when his work permit expired.

The duration of their stay and their legal status played a role in that long stayers tended to be more satisfied, after achieving most of the objectives they had set for themselves. At

the same time they felt free to be critical, whereas recent arrivals and participants with no work/residence permit, were much more reluctant to express any negative feelings.

With regard to their plans for the future, three of the four who had lived in Catalonia more than five years were determined to return to Pakistan at some point. However, they did not know when they would do so. In one case he made his return contingent upon the establishment of a democratic government. The fourth long-stayer would like to share his time between Pakistan and Catalonia. He claimed that he was too settled now in Catalonia to leave, but he could not envisage leaving Pakistan completely either. All of them wanted their children to complete their education here.

The more recent arrivals were focused on making money and bringing their families over. Making money generally meant becoming self-employed. Returning to Pakistan was not part of their immediate plans. Only one participant, who despite being in Catalonia for less than two years was comparatively well-settled, had his own business, and held a work/residence permit, was planning to return to Pakistan in the medium to long term.

The last two topics under self-assessment, i.e. advice to potential migrants and readiness to assist them, were instrumental in determining whether established migrants constitute a pull factor for potential migrants in the country of origin.

All interviewees confirmed that they had been approached by relatives and friends in Pakistan planning to migrate. Only in one case the advice provided was negative (M27CV). All the others, whether they were long-stayers or recent arrivals, employed or unemployed, with or without their family, and irrespective of their legal status and professional profile, had advised those who approached them to come over.

“Siempre, siempre que puede, yo ayudo... moralmente, información, si puede dinero, ¿por qué no? Es para que gente tenga dinero, para trabajo, para negocio.” (M42SA)

Some of them had nuanced their advice though. They had warned them of the difficulties involved, including the fact that they would have to accept demeaning jobs upon arrival.

One of them claimed that he had advised people to come only if they had “papers”.

“Primero le aconsejo que no. Pero si hay alguno que quiere, entonces le diré que venga totalmente legal, digamos que con oferta de trabajo, que yo puedo conseguir... a través de un amigo... que viviendo en un país sin papeles es duro. Que no tienes trabajo. Si tienes trabajo, es mano de obra barata, no te pagan bien, no tienes la menor dignidad. Entonces estas metido en problemas. Si alguien me pide, si lo veo realmente que ahí no está funcionando bien bien, lo ayudaré, esto está claro.” (M44CV)

It should be noted that “Papers” may mean a regular work/residence permit, but also a tourist visa. For many the important factor was to enter the country legally. Overstaying after the visa expires was perceived as less of a problem.

One of the participants, who was a well educated legal resident, with a regular job, and who had been trying for years to bring over his family, stressed the emotional costs involved in leaving the family in Pakistan, not to watch his children grow, not to be with his family in times of sorrow:

“Siempre les digo que desde lejos es muy bonito estar en Europa. Pero la realidad es bien distinta. Si están aquí con sus familias, si puedes vivir normal, me parece que estás muy bien aquí. ... Si no, tendrás que sacrificar mucho. Los niños tendrán que perder mucho, no puedes ver a los niños crecer, y si un día necesita a su madre, su padre, a su hijo..., no está ahí. Si tiene al padre muriendo, no puede ayudar. Por esto no tengo a nadie de mi familia aquí y no aconsejo que vengan

aquí. ... Que aquí ganar la vida cuesta, mantener dos casas es difícil.”
(M44CV)

All participants declared to be ready to provide actual help to potential migrants. In some cases they linked their help to having enough money to do so, in others they would go farther for close relatives,

“... for Europe you need a very big amount... if someone is very close to me then I can help, otherwise, I cannot help... I want to help another people also, but not a big amount.... Just a little amount.” (M32MA)

Even those who were facing the hardest challenges, with no proper jobs, no work/residence permit, and no family, were prepared to help others come over.

“Of course I’ll help them... What I can do for them, I will do.”
(M32MA)

One key parameter to define the population was the family composition in Catalonia, i.e. whether the participants were on their own or with their family. Four of them, as we have said, had their families with them, in two cases they arrived together and in the other two cases their families joined them at a later stage.

In order to apprehend the reality and the perceptions of those families as a whole, all the family members, excluding children under six, were interviewed.

Their replies on who they are, their social environment, the migratory movement and their self-assessment are particularly interesting. The two families who came together were enjoying a socio-economic status comparatively higher than the average Pakistani immigrant household. One of them was coming from a line of landlords and medium to high ranking government employees. The second one was hailing from a family of industrialists, clearly part of the country’s economic elite. Neither the husbands nor the

wives had ever worked prior to reaching Catalonia, though the men had been involved to a certain degree in the family businesses. Both women held university degrees. One of them was a teacher, though at the time of the interview she was a housewife, while the second one was working to supplement the family's income as a seamstress. The fact that upon their arrival they worked in their husbands' shops shows the economic pressure they were facing, as this kind of employment was beneath them. In general, there are considerably negative social connotations attached to working women in Pakistan among the lower and middle classes, especially in the retail business.

The other two cases, in which the head of the family came first, were from a working class environment. One of the households was composed of two brothers. Both dependants, the younger brother and the wife, studied up to but did not complete secondary school. The lady had become a housewife, and she had never worked outside the house. The young man was working with his brother as a peddler.

With regard to the environment, the two better educated women indicated that they usually wore their traditional clothes at home only (F35SM, F34SM)). They would wear western-style trousers and long shirts when going out so as not to attract too much attention. The third lady would always wear traditional dress. She mentioned that sometimes she would receive compliments, but occasionally she felt rebuked:

“Hay gente que dice, que bonito, otros miran con malos ojos”.

(F27SA)

The three women mentioned that occasionally they felt a certain level of aggression in the attitudes of local people around them. However, they were not unduly concerned. The young man claimed not to have any problem with his surroundings, and his efforts were focused on making a living and learning the language (Spanish) at an *Escola d'Adults*.

The families that arrived together did so with tourist visas, in their words, “*con papeles*”, which they obtained from the Spanish Embassies in Islamabad and Rabat respectively. In

the latter case they admitted that obtaining the visa was a hurdle race, involving payments to a number of go-betweens, from people ready to supply forged passports, unscrupulous travel agents, uninformed or naïve Spanish Embassy officials, and traffickers ready to risk their lives crossing the sea between Morocco and Spain on ‘pateras’.

The lady who joined her husband did so after obtaining the corresponding visa from the Embassy in Islamabad, and she did not experience any hardship during her journey (F27SA).

As to the young man (M24CV), his trip, like previously his brother’s, was extremely long, hard, dangerous and painful. It took him close to two years since his departure from Pakistan to reach Barcelona. He travelled overland, from Pakistan to Turkey crossing through Iran. From Turkey he went by boat to Greece and then Italy. The trip was also very dangerous. In his own words,

“Vi mucha gente morir en el barco, muy malo, muy malo”. (M25CV)

From Italy he took the train to Barcelona. Reportedly there were no border checks.

All the female interviewees, as well as their friends and neighbours who participated informally in focus group discussions, had a rather low opinion of local women because of their attire, and what they perceived as loose morals. The young man had no definite views on the issue. The ladies’ poor view of the local culture coincided with that of their husbands and in all cases crystallised in a clear determination to ensure that their children eventually marry within the Pakistani community, preferably with a family member from Pakistan.

Upon arrival all families developed survival strategies, in particular those who came with no visa or tourist visas. These strategies included as mentioned that the women would work with their husbands in a public place, their shops, despite this being culturally and socially undesirable. They also involved in one case seeking refugee status, which

guaranteed welfare payments for nine months until the case was rejected. But overall they relied on the Pakistani community, friends and relatives who had previously arrived in Catalonia.

In terms of their self-assessment, the three married women were satisfied, even happy, to be in Catalonia. They were most appreciative of being able to access health and education services free of charge for their children and for themselves. Those who held regular work/residence permits were pleased with their socio-economic status. In the case of the lady with the higher social standing, (F35SM), she complained about the public health system and mentioned that they had a private health insurance to facilitate access to specialized medical care.

They were critical though of the local culture surrounding them, the disrespectful attitude of children towards their elders, the life style, including the high rate of divorce, the women's inappropriate dress code, the contents of TV programmes, people consuming alcohol and pork.... And last but not least, they worried about the challenges in transmitting their culture and their values to their children in their present environment.

As to their plans for the future, the better educated women intended in the short term to further their formal education. In the long term two of them would like to return to Pakistan, while the third one and the young man did not want to go back.

Talking to the children was complicated by the fact that one parent, usually the mother, occasionally both parents, were present. They would intervene in the conversation and as a result, children's replies lacked spontaneity. In some cases they were clearly prompted by the adults next to them.

With this caveat in mind, it should be said that all children claimed to be happy in Catalonia, to enjoy school and to be good students. Whether they had been born in Pakistan or in Catalonia, they identified themselves as Pakistanis. Though they were attending public schools and were learning both Catalan and Spanish, they clearly felt

more comfortable speaking Spanish. They claimed that Spanish was the language they always used with their friends, also immigrants or of immigrant origin, either from the south or centre of Spain or from other countries. They used Catalan only at school.

Their plans involved completing their studies, starting their own businesses and “making a lot of money”. Some mentioned that they were planning to go to Pakistan, while others intended to travel to countries like the US or Canada, which in their words, offer better opportunities.

7.7 *Final Considerations*

As indicated in chapter 2, most of the theories on international migration focus on the determinants of migration, while more recent theories also look into the causes for the perpetuation of migration. Lately a number of authors have introduced the transnational approach. It is therefore pertinent that we analyse the participants’ comments on their migratory movement through the prism of the different theories.

It appears that, as established by the Neo-Classical or Equilibrium theory, the differentials in wage and employment conditions are a key determinant of the movement. Practically every individual claimed to have come to Catalonia because he/she could make a better living here. At the micro-level, given the costs and especially the risks involved for those who travelled without visas, having certain individual human capital characteristics such as determination and courage, as well as possessing a social capital including the connections to obtain financial resources either from their relatives or elsewhere, also played a role in the likelihood of the movement.

However, as mentioned in our critique of this theory, wage differentials do not provide sufficient justification for the movement since there are greater wage and employment differentials with many other western European countries and the USA.

Discussions with the participants corroborated the claim advanced by the theorists of the New Economics of Labour Migration, in that their migratory movement is the result of a strategic behaviour undertaken by the household. They also confirmed the (potential) circular migration pattern, since all have the intention of returning to Pakistan at some point.

The ethnic enclaves foreseen by the Segmented Labour Market theory have indeed started to develop and flourish in areas where the concentration of Pakistani migrants is higher such as Ciutat Vella in Barcelona.

But it is the Social Capital theory, and to a lesser degree, the Cumulative Causation theory which may explain the fast expansion of the Pakistani immigrant population, including its geographical concentration in well defined areas.

Indeed the movement has developed on the basis of networks. The existence of a link, in general kinship of any kind, has been a key determinant of the movement for all the participants. Information on modes of travelling and entering the country was provided by earlier settlers, and upon arrival they were all able to rely on the support of their compatriots, both in terms of accommodation as well as pointers to obtain employment or engage in some economic activity to earn a living.

As previous arrivals secure their social and financial position, they develop economic ventures that allow new immigrants to come. At the same time, these ventures rely on the arrival of new immigrants, thus constantly expanding the circle or network.

In doing so, the net cost for potential migrants is greatly reduced, thus making the likelihood of further movements much greater.

Finally, as stated by proponents of transnationalism, Pakistani immigrants have forged and are maintaining multi-stranded social relations linking Pakistan and Catalonia. There are however no indications that they have done so to counter globalisation from below.

Map 5 shows the routes frequently used by Pakistani workers to reach Spain and Catalonia.

Migratory routes from Pakistan to Catalonia



Rather, they replicate the capitalist system to the best of their ability, with the ultimate goal of being entrepreneurs themselves and accumulate wealth for their families.

In accordance with transnationalism, and as time passes, economic ties expand gradually and new social and cultural links emerge between the host/receiving society and the country of origin through the presence of the immigrants. However, no evidence could be found of economic links at this stage.

8. The standpoint of the sending families/communities

The selection of participants in Pakistan was simple, i.e. they were the relatives of the participants in Catalonia.

The objective of my interaction with them was to establish the decision-making process that led to the migratory movement and the impact of the movement on their lives, in order to subsequently be able to confirm or deny the validity of the hypotheses I established at the outset.

The first step consisted in ascertaining the identity of the participating households in terms of their family structure, their socio-economic status and their social environment, and to establish eventual linkages. To achieve this purpose, I used a questionnaire as a guideline for the interviews, attached as Annex B.

Out of the eleven households participating in the research in Catalonia, I was able to contact the families of ten of them in Pakistan. One family was unreachable and therefore I had to eliminate it from my study.

To identify the families I have used a code similar to the one used for their relatives in Catalonia, in which the first letter corresponds to the gender of the head of household, followed by the age. The following two letters refer to their place of origin in the Punjab, whether rural RU or urban UR, since as mentioned in chapter 7, all the participants in the study originate from Punjab, or at least they were living in Punjab before migrating to Catalonia.

8.1 Personal domain

All households followed the traditional extended family system, whereby the families were composed of the head of household, his or her children, and for those who had

married sons, their spouses and children. In some cases, the family included single or widowed women related to either the husband or the wife.

Diagram 11 below shows the participating households in Pakistan by head of household, gender and age. It should be noted that, when the main respondent in Catalonia was married and his wife was living in Pakistan, I have considered his wife as the head of household for purposes of identification. However, in practically all cases these women were not the actual heads of household in terms of decision making and managing of resources. Rather, they lived with their in-laws and it was the father who was the “real” head of household. In his absence, the head of household would be the brother of the migrant or another male member of the family.

Diagram 11 List of participating households by head of household gender and age

Age Groups		21-25	26-30	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66-70
Gender	Male								M58UR M58UR	M63UR	M67UR
	Female	F23RU	F28UR	F35UR F38UR		F45UR		F55UR *			

* uncertain about her own age

As shown above, over half of the heads of households were women aged 21 to 45, and they were the spouses of men who had migrated to Catalonia. Only one exceeded that age bracket, she was 55, a widow whose son had migrated. Male heads of households were generally the fathers of the migrants and their age was higher, between 56 and 70.

All the households but one lived in urban settings. Some lived in big cities such as Lahore or Rawalpindi, and others in medium-sized towns. Some families had only recently moved to the city from the countryside, one generation earlier. In a few cases the family had migrated from India at the time of partition, in 1947. Others were truly city dwellers, and had been living there for many generations.

Diagram 12 shows the participating households by the “real” head of household, indicating the age and professional status, whether employed, self-employed or retired.

Diagram 12 List of participating households by actual head of household age, as well as professional status and employment status

Age	Employed	Self-Employed	Retired
21 – 25			
26 – 30		M30UR	
31 – 35		M35UR	
36 – 40		F38UR M40UR	
41 – 45			
46-50			
51- 55			
56 – 60			M58UR M58UR
61 – 65			M63UR M63UR
66 – 70	M67UR		
70 – 75		M73RU	

When comparing Diagram 11 with Diagram 12, it may be observed that only in one case a woman remains as head of household, and she defined herself as a rice farmer, though she lived in an urban environment. Contrary to all other women whose husbands were abroad, she wanted to be interviewed on her own, with only her children in attendance, which showed a considerable degree of independence. Also, despite living in the same compound as her in-laws, her husband was sending remittances to her, not to his father.

Age-wise, there are two also distinct groups, but somewhat older than the ones identified in Diagram 11, one from 30 to 40, consisting of the brothers of migrants, and a second one from 58 to 73, which corresponds to the fathers.

It is interesting to note that four heads of households were retired, five were self-employed and one was working for others. The pensioners had previously been

employees and among them some were by then involved in retailing, without specifying which area. Among the self-employed three were shopkeepers and two were farmers. The shopkeepers had diverse businesses, one a bookshop, another one a bridal dress outfit and the third one a multipurpose outlet. The farmers were both small landlords, employing labourers to cultivate their land. Thus half of them were or had been employees and the other half were self-employed, a breakdown comparable to the one of their relatives in Catalonia.

To fully describe the status of the families, it is necessary to also mention the economic activities undertaken by women. All of them took care of their households, without remuneration, but a number of them were also engaged in gainful occupations. Some sew clothes for other people. The better educated ones, usually the daughters or sisters of the head of household in Catalonia, taught young children. In some cases they were teachers in private schools, in others they tutored children in their own homes.

For easy identification, Diagram 13 indicates the correspondence between the households in Catalonia and the households in Pakistan by head of household, and in the case of those households headed by a female, it also shows the male *de facto* head of household.

Diagram 13 Correspondence between participants in Catalonia and heads of household in Pakistan

Catalonia	M30MA	M42SA	M36SA	M44CV	M30CV	M37CV	M48MA	M32MA	M34SM	M28SM
Pakistan	F28UR M30UR	M63UR	F35UR M63UR	F38UR	F55UR M35UR	F23RU M73RU	F45UR M40UR	M67UR	M58UR	M58UR

Diagram 14 shows the level of studies, the profession and the languages spoken by the heads of household. Given the duality of heads of household in some cases, the diagram shows the details for both heads where appropriate.

One head of household had a university degree, eight heads of household had completed secondary education, and two had completed primary education. Overall, when comparing their educational achievements with those of their relatives in Catalonia, the latter appear to have on average a higher level of formal education, since four of them

held a university degree or higher education and five had completed their secondary education.

Diagram 14 Personal domain

Catalonia	Pakistan	Level of Studies	Profession	Languages
M30MA	a) F28UR	High School	Housewife	Punjabi, Urdu, English
M30MA	b)M30UR	BA *	Shopkeeper	Punjabi, Urdu, English
M42SA	M63UR	Matric **	Welder	Punjabi, Urdu
M36SA	a) F35UR	Fsci ***	Teacher	Punjabi, Urdu, Spanish, English
M36SA	b) M63UR	Matric	Mechanic	Punjabi, Urdu
M44CV	F38UR	FA ****	Farmer /landlady	Punjabi, Urdu
M30CV	a) F55UR	Primary	Housewife	Punjabi, Urdu
M30CV	b) M35UR	Matric	Shopkeeper	Punjabi, Urdu
M37CV	a) F23RU	FA	Housewife	Potwari, Punjabi, Urdu
M37CV	b) M55RU	Primary level	Farmer ex-civil servant	Potwari, Punjabi, Urdu
M48MA	a) F45UR	Primary level, incomplete	Housewife	Urdu, Punjabi
M48MA	b) M40UR	12 years	Shopkeeper	Punjabi, Urdu
M32MA	M67UR	Mechanical school	Mechanic	Punjabi, Urdu, some English
M34SM	M58UR	Matric	Cashier, retail	Urdu, Punjabi
M28SM	M58UR	Matric	Banking	Urdu, Punjabi

* BA, Bachelor of Arts, corresponds to a first university degree

** Matric is the secondary school diploma obtained after ten years of formal education

*** Fsci Fundamental of Science, diploma obtained after twelve years of formal education

**** FA Fundamental of Arts, diploma obtained after twelve years of formal education

In terms of profession, a woman was a teacher and another one a farmer, while the other four were housewives. All men, except three, were or had been engaged in manual

occupations. Among the three one had been in the banking sector, a second one was a former civil servant, and the university graduate was working in a bookshop,

All the interviewees spoke Urdu, the national language, and Punjabi. The ethnic Punjabi generally mentioned Punjabi first, while the Urdu speakers or “Mohajirs” mentioned Urdu followed by Punjabi. In this connection, it is interesting to point out that a number of ethnic Punjabis claimed that while their mother tongue is Punjabi, they spoke Urdu at home with their children so as to facilitate their school work.

“We speak Punjabi to strangers, but Urdu at home.” F38UR

“Con los niños hablo en urdu y en casa, con los otros, punjabi.” F38UR

In addition to Urdu and Punjabi, one family indicated as their first language Potwari, a language spoken in a well defined area between Punjab and NWFP. A few claimed that they spoke English, but in general their English was poor. In one case the wife of a migrant spoke excellent Spanish after having lived in Catalonia for three years. She had taken lessons while there and she maintained a superb command of it even after a year and half of not being in contact with any Spanish speaking person.

8.2 Social Environment

To establish their social environment, the discussion involved queries about their religious activities, their political involvement, the children’s schooling, and their living arrangements, including establishing whether they were tenants or owners of their premises. Diagram 15 below shows their replies by head of household.

Interestingly, no one admitted to any “religious activities”. As it has been mentioned in Chapter 4.3, the great majority of Pakistanis are strict Muslims in that they faithfully observe most of the tenets of Islam. Thus, during the interviews, household members went discreetly away at prayer times and returned after having performed their religious

duties. Obviously, they did not consider their religious practices as religious activism, which they associated with preachers in mosques or teachers in madrassas. In retrospect the question was probably not very clear. Also, it should be mentioned that after the September 11 events, there is an acute perception among Muslim people that they are being branded as terrorists because of their faith. Enquiries about religious activism are or may be easily construed as leading questions, hence their negative replies.

Diagram 15 Social environment

Catalonia	Pakistan	Political involvement	Religious activities	Living Arrangements	Schooling
M30MA	F28UR	N	N	Using a relative's house	Private – Urdu
M42SA	M63UR	Y Muslim League	N	Owners, built their own house, wife has her own room in the compound	Private – English and Urdu
M36SA	F35UR	Y Muslim League	N	Owners, built their own house	N/A
M44CV	F38UR	N	N	Owners. Separate apartment in family compound	Private – Urdu
M30CV	F55UR	N	N	Owners, shared by all family	Private – Urdu
M37CV	F23RU	Muslim League, not active	N	House built with remittances, shared by all family	Private - Potwari
M48MA	F45UR	N	N	Owners. Shared with brother's family	Private –Urdu
M32MA	M67UR	N	N	Owners. Family alone	N/A
M34SM	M58UR	N	N	Owners	N/A
M28SM	M58UR	N	N	Owners	P (Madrassa) – Urdu - Arabic

Members of three households, one of them a woman, claimed to be politically engaged with the Muslim League without specifying which faction of the very many that this political party has. Their activities, they explained, focus on attending neighbourhood meetings and giving support when required.

Practically all of them owned the house where they lived. One Mohajir family was living in the house they had been given at the time of partition.

“My father was given this house in 1947. Our family has always lived here.”

M40UR

In one case the house was built with the remittances sent by the migrant member of the family when he was working in Japan.

“The house is mine. I bought it with the money my son sent from Japan.”

M55RU

Two more houses had been purchased with the remittances sent by the respective head of household who had previously been working abroad. Only in one case the house belonged to another family member, also living abroad, and it was not clear whether they were renting it or they were staying as non-paying guests.

All school-age children attended private schools, including in one case a madrasa or Coranic school, and they used Urdu as the medium of instruction. Two children attended a school which also used English, and a third child used Urdu and Arabic. The latter was attending a madrasa or religious school, where the Coran is always taught in Arabic. .

“He is going to a madrasa and also studying home. He studies in Arabic.

He is also studying for his matric (secondary education) in Urdu.” M58UR

8.3 Economic aspects

Although it is generally assumed that economics are the key underlying reason for migration, four out ten households declared not to receive any remittances from their relatives in Catalonia, as shown in Diagram 16. Among those who claimed to receive remittances, only in one case these were regular, on a monthly basis.

However, despite their irregularity, five households stated that they used the remittances for food and other basic household expenditures and that they made a significant difference in their lives.

“Life is easier now, because there is more money.” F38UR

“Apart from missing him, life is much better now.” F45UR

In addition, one of the households also claimed to use part of the money for buying land, and in one case, all the remittances were saved.

It is interesting to note that while eight households in Catalonia indicated that they were sending remittances to Pakistan, only six households in Pakistan acknowledged receiving any money.

As mentioned earlier, men in Catalonia sent remittances to their fathers or the male member of the family in command.

“Manda dinero con amigos, a su padre, y yo comprar ropa, zapatillas...”
F38UR

The only exception was in the case of the female head of household.

Although a head of household proudly stated that their big house was “his”, paid for by his son’s remittances, in general families pooled all their resources and used them according to need. The person responsible for the management of these resources was the father or the elder male member of the family, who had to take into account everybody’s concerns and needs. Eventually, the major share of the family’s wealth will go to the son who takes care of the parents.

“We save the money to pay for future expenses like their (the sisters) weddings.” M67UR

Diagram 16 Economic Impact of Migration

Catalonia	Pakistan	Remittances	Frequency	Means	Use
M30MA	F28UR	Yes	Irregular	Banks, mostly friends	C: regular household expenditures
M42SA	M63UR	No	N/A	N/A	N/A
M36SA	F35UR	Yes	Irregular	Bank transfers, friends	C: regular household expenses I: land
M44CV	F38UR	Yes	Monthly	Bank transfers, friends	C: Education, paying debts, food, jewellery
M30CV	F55UR	No	N/A	N/A	N/A
M37CV	a) F23RU				
M37CV	b) M55RU	Yes	Irregular	Bank transfers	C: food, I: shop
M48MA	a) F45UR	Yes	irregular	Friends, hundi	C: Food
M48MA	b) M40UR				
M32MA	M67UR	Yes	irregular	Bank transfers	Savings
M34SM	M58UR	No	N/A	N/A	N/A
M28SM	M58UR	No	N/A	N/A	N/A

Like when discussing religious activism, some families were reluctant to provide details as to how the remittances reached them. Five mentioned bank transfers, three of them also indicated “friends”, and only one claimed to use the *hundi* system. In Catalonia though, several participants freely admitted to using *hundi*.

“The banking system is no good. It can take fifteen days or more. Hundi is much more effective.” M55RU

As it is explained in chapter 5.4, the system has been outlawed for some years, and has been actively persecuted since 2001 because of its alleged use by Al Qaeda. Thus, one may assume that even though only one household admits to using the *hundi* system, it is quite likely that the “friends” that others indicated as conduit for the remittances are actually an oblique reference to *hundi*.

8.4 On the culture of migration

As it may be seen in Diagram 17, migration is well embedded in the culture of the families participating in the research. All of them had, besides the family member or members in Catalonia, other relatives working abroad. In one case they had just one relative, five families had two or three relatives abroad, one family four, two more than five, and in one case twenty. These movements had mostly taken place between ten and twenty years earlier, and only in one case they had returned voluntarily to Pakistan. Others had returned because their contracts were not extended and were looking for other opportunities to migrate.

“I left Pakistan in 1971 and went to Siberia for two years, then I went to Saudi Arabia in 1990, and came back to Pakistan in 1999.” M63UR

“I have three brothers and my son abroad, one in Dubai, one in Bahrain and one brother together with my son in Barcelona.” M58UR

Furthermore, they all had friends and acquaintances in their communities who also had family members working abroad.

“Every family here has at least one relative abroad. 90 percent of them are in the UK.” M55RU

Diagram 17 On the culture of migration

Catalonia	Pakistan	No. of Migrants in the family	Migrants among friends	Migrants in the community	Destination for family members	Years	Returnees
M30MA	F28UR	>5	Yes	Yes	USA, Gulf States	Over 20	No
M42SA	M63UR	4	Yes	Yes	Saudi Arabia, Gulf States	Over 10 years	No
M36SA	F35UR	> 5	Yes	Yes	USA, Greece, Gulf States, Spain	Some 20, others 15, 10 years	Only holidays
M44CV	F38UR	2	Yes	Yes	Spain, USA	Over 10 years	
M30CV	F55UR	3	Yes	Yes	Spain	3-4 years	No
M37CV	a) F23RU	20	Yes	Yes	UK mostly	Many years	No
M37CV	b) M55RU						
M48MA	a) F45UR	1	Yes	Yes	Spain	3 years	No
M48MA	b) M40UR						
M32MA	M67UR	2	Yes	Yes	Saudi Arabia	Over 15 years	Yes, 1
M34SM	M58UR	3	Yes	Yes	Barcelona	Over 10 years	No
M28SM	M58UR	3	Yes	Yes	Spain	>10 years	No

Most of these migratory movements had been to the USA (three cases), Saudi Arabia (2 cases), the Gulf States (three cases) and Spain (six cases). One family had relatives in the UK, and another one in Greece.

It is worth noting that movements to countries such as the USA, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and the UK appeared to have taken place a long time ago, between twenty and ten years earlier, while movements to Spain were more recent, in some cases up to ten years, but mostly between three and four years earlier.

“One of the reasons for leaving is that the land is not fertile, the living is not very good, there are no jobs at home. Even if you have a job, you become more successful if you go abroad.” M55RU

8.5 Looking to the future

When looking to the future, seven families openly discussed their plans to engage in further migratory movements. The majority of them concerned the wife and children of migrants living on their own in Catalonia, but in some cases, mainly those whose relatives in Catalonia were single, it was a younger brother who planned to migrate.

“I want my son to go (and join his uncle), not myself or the rest of the family, only my son.” M40UR

In one case the potential migrant was ready to travel anywhere, whereas all others intended to go to Catalonia as soon as they had the required papers. Indeed, they all insisted they will use regular channels when they finally go abroad. As it has been mentioned earlier, from their perspective this could mean that they would be ready to travel on a tourist visa.

Overall, it appears that the majority of them wished to join their relatives as shown in Diagram 18.

“It is difficult to have good life in Pakistan, so it is better to migrate.”
M40UR

Diagram 18 On potential migratory movements

Catalonia	Pakistan	Migratory Plans	Who (as related to HH in Catalonia)	When	Where	How
M30MA	F28UR	No ***	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
M42SA	M63UR	Yes	Younger brother	Whenever possible	Anywhere	Regular channel
M36SA	F35UR	Yes **	Wife and children	In the course of 2002	Catalonia	Regular channel
M44CV	F38UR	Yes	Wife and children	When papers ready	Catalonia	Regular channel
M30CV	F55UR	Yes	Brother, others	?	Catalonia	?
M37CV	a) F23RU	Yes/No *	Wife and children	When papers ready	Catalonia	Regular channel
M37CV	b) M55RU					
M48MA	a) F45UR	Yes	Wife and children < 18	When papers ready	Catalonia	Regular channel
M48MA	b) M40UR					
M32MA	M67UR	Maybe	Younger brother	?	Catalonia	Regular channel, eventually
M34SM	M58UR	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
M28SM	M58UR	Yes	Fiancée, upon marriage	Undecided	Catalonia	Regular channel

* Wife would like to go, her husband though does not want her to go, too expensive, unable to save if his family join him.

** Wife and children have residence permit for Spain. They have to travel to Catalonia before their expiration date in order to have them renewed and maintain their resident status.

*** The head of household in Catalonia does not have residence permits, at the time of the interview he was unemployed. His possibilities for bringing his family over and taking care of them in an appropriate manner were nil.

However, their desire to migrate was in all cases tempered by reality. Thus, those whose relatives in Catalonia lacked a residence permit or did not have a job, were cautious as to their future migratory plans.

The case of a young woman whose husband was in Barcelona was rather poignant. She was anxious to join him, but he refused to allow her to do so, even though he had a residence permit and was employed, because he would then have to rent an apartment on his own and provide for her, which would reduce his capacity to save.

None of the families in Pakistan envisaged the return of their relatives, despite the fact that several of the participants in Catalonia clearly expressed their wish to go back.

8.6 *Final Considerations*

The analysis of the contents of the interviews/focus group discussions, together with the observation of the surroundings, the interaction of the families with their relatives, friends and neighbours, and post-interview discussions with the interpreters lead to the conclusion that the families of the migrant workers follow the traditional Pakistani/South Asia structure, in that they are large, they are inclusive, and they are rigidly hierarchical, with the eldest male in command.

They belong to the lower middle class, with one or two of them comparatively better off, and one markedly working class.

In general, and save for the exceptions already mentioned, they suffer from economic hardship in that they live modest lives and can not meet their basic needs, even though all but one own the house they live in. Thus many of them use the remittances to purchase basic items such as food. The fact that some families with children have chosen to send them to private schools rather than the state ones could show the high value they attach to education and their low appreciation of the state schools, since they claimed that they were doing so even before they started to receive remittances.

Judging by their environment, one could say that their situation is by no means exceptional rather, it is comparable to that of their relatives and surrounding communities. Migration appears to be a well embedded trait in their culture since the 1970s, when there was a major exodus of Pakistani workers to the Gulf States.

“People go abroad to get better lives. If you have economic problems, it is believed that you should move abroad if you want to do well.” M58UR

In one occasion, in Lalamussa, a small town in Punjab, walking down the street where a participating household lives, people were pointing at the doors of the houses while reciting the names of the countries where each family had relatives: Canada, the USA, Greece, Italy, Germany, Australia, Spain, the UK, ... practically every single family in the neighbourhood had one or more relatives abroad.

Another time, in rural Punjab, the family proudly showed their house, built with remittances from the eldest son, while pointing at the mansions dotting the landscape around their own property: Japan, Canada, Germany, UK, Greece, Italy... Each family had sent one or several of their sons to every one of these countries, and their work had paid for the opulent, sometimes incongruous, often empty mansions.

The decision to migrate appears to be perfectly logical from their standpoint. Given the need to provide for large families, the rising cost of living, the scarcity of well paid jobs, and the presence of relatives already abroad, migrating is an obvious choice.

“He went because his brother-in-law was there, for economic reasons. Later our son went because his uncle was already there to help him.” M58UR

Thus in most of the participating households, deciding to send a family member abroad was a family affair. In some cases the process was initiated by the migrant himself, others it was the head of family. In all cases it was eventually a joint decision, necessitated also by the fact that only as a family they could afford the costs linked to the migratory movement.

“I paid for his trip, even though I didn’t really wanted him to go. Now he sends money regularly, he is a very nice boy.” M67UR

“He decided on his own, but he consulted the family. The family paid for the trip, we sold property, some land.” F55UR

“He decided to go, I (the wife) had to agree. He borrowed money from friends.” F45UR

The first obvious impact of the decision to migrate was the economic well being provided by the remittances, though as it has been mentioned, four families were not receiving any money. In one case though, they indicated that they used to receive money but they did not need it anymore. Two other households claimed that they had never needed any money, and in the fourth household, their relatives in Catalonia were in a rather precarious situation themselves, and thus unable to save any money.

Generally the money received was used for consumer goods, though in a couple of cases it was used to help open a small business and to buy land.

The migrants’ mothers acknowledged in unequivocal terms the emotional impact of migration. They were all ready to forego the benefits of the remittances for the sake of having their sons back.

Fathers, as well as brothers and sisters, were very appreciative of the benefits of migration in their lives, and they seemed to accept the absence of their sons/brothers rather well.

Children, when they were old enough to express themselves, would declare that they missed their father, but in general they appeared to be well taken care of in the middle of such large families.

Wives had differing views on their husbands’ absence. As mentioned earlier, there was a young woman very eager to join her husband. Some women, when discussing whether they missed their husbands, would highlight that in their absence they had no freedom,

they had to ask their in-laws for permission to do such things as leaving the house, visiting their families, attending social functions, etc.

“I do not like living alone. I have to get my husband’s permission over the phone to go and visit my relatives. His family helps, but they have their own things to do. It is difficult to raise the children without the father’s regular presence.” F38UR

They also mentioned the difficulties of raising children on their own, especially boys.

“It is not bad, it’s only that it’s difficult raising seven children without their father, but my brother-in-law helps out.” F45UR

A deep concern, yet one that was not openly voiced, was the possibility of their husbands establishing other relationships abroad. Because they were shy, they would just hint at it.

Some times they would seem torn, they wanted to be with their husbands in Catalonia, but they also wanted to be with their family in Pakistan.

“Yo quiero vivir aquí, con mi familia, tengo dos niños, mucho molesta. Mis suegros no miran mis niños (si estamos en España). Quiero que vivan con ellos. Yo también quiero vivir aquí. Me gusta Pakistan. Todos mis amigos aquí. En España yo sola. Yo antes nunca vivir con mis suegros.” (F35UR)

In summary, families of migrants who have been able to regularize their situation in Catalonia are overall satisfied that their fathers, brothers, sons, migrated, as it is aptly described by the mother of one of the main respondents in Catalonia:

“He (her husband) came back and worked for one and a half years, and then for ten years he didn’t work because he thought the level was below him, and he was not going to accept any work. It was very difficult. My eldest child

was 14, and I had to start working (sewing) and we lived on that for ten years. Now with him (son) gone, life is easier, money makes a difference, though it is hard to have him so far away.” Mother to M35SA

However, the families of those who have not been able to obtain a residence/work permit are much more negative:

“They (sons/brothers) are not working because they have no papers. No, it was not a good decision to go.” F55UR

9. Conclusions

The stated goal of this dissertation has been to try to understand the likely development of the migratory movement between Pakistan and Catalonia. In trying to achieve this goal a second one has appeared, that of giving voice to the participants in the research on their behalf and on behalf of the Pakistani immigrant and would be immigrant community.

The process to achieve these goals has consisted first of all in an assessment of the Pakistani migratory movement to Catalonia, in terms of the causes that triggered it and the networks that sustain its continuing expansion.

It has also included an assessment of the short and medium term perspectives for this movement based on the trends so far, and the plans and expectations of Pakistanis already in Catalonia and their relatives in Pakistan.

As part of my research, I have also enquired about the existence of transnational links and their role in fostering further immigration from Pakistan to Catalonia.

The review of different theories and concepts on international migration has revealed that most of them contain elements that help understand the phenomenon, in that they shed light about one or more of the determinants and characteristics of this particular migratory movement, and therefore can assist in making predictions on its magnitude, duration, and nature. However, no single theory has been identified as providing a comprehensive explanation for the migratory movement of Pakistanis to Catalonia.

It stems from the analysis of the research findings that, as claimed by the neo-classical or equilibrium theory, the differential in wages and employment conditions is at the basis of the movement. People come compelled by economic forces. However, the nature of Pakistani society precludes the possibility of migration as an individual decision. Rather, migration follows a pattern of strategic behaviour undertaken by families and households

as put forward by the new economics of migration, though wage differentials remain a sine qua non condition.

Discussions with the participants in the study revealed the existence of migratory networks. It could not be determined whether these networks “prompt” migration. However, in line with the social capital theory, it has been established that these networks act as a source of social capital, and they are used by potential migrants and migrants already in Catalonia to reduce the costs and risks involved in their migratory process.

In accordance with the cumulative causation theory, each migratory movement seems to make subsequent movements more likely, in that each migrant is part of a network of relations for whom the relative costs and risks related to migration have been reduced.

As defined by transnationalism proponents, Pakistani immigrants have developed multi-stranded social relations that link the societies of origin and settlement, and they maintain very strong social connections with their country of origin. Furthermore, Pakistani immigrants do travel to Catalonia to respond to the needs of investors and employers in Catalonia, and they follow a distinct path from traditional immigrant adaptation in that there is very little adjustment, though the term “adaptation” needs to be properly defined.

However, to claim that the transnational links established by Pakistani immigrants constitute an autonomous population initiative to deal with the depredations of world-roaming capital would be a far fetched assertion. Rather, the evidence collected indicates that the links are used as a tool to reproduce a capitalist system of production for the benefit of the immigrants themselves and their families/communities.

On the other hand, and as defined by Portes (1997), Pakistani immigrants undoubtedly possess a substantial social capital in terms of their networks of social relationships. They use this capital to identify and appropriate job opportunities in Catalonia, and they pool their resources to lower consumption costs and produce enough savings for business or real state acquisition, informal credit associations, and the creation of transnational

enterprises. In the same vein, and as explained in chapter 5, the government of Pakistan plays a key role in the development of transnationalism through the establishment of policies designed to maintain the loyalty of the expatriates and to ensure a steady flow of remittances.

It is less clear though, whether these transnational practices do not hinder successful integration as transnationalism theorists claim.

The research I have carried out has allowed me to test the hypotheses I had put forward in Chapter 3 as follows:

In Catalonia,

1. Pakistanis migrate to Catalonia prompted by the economic differential between the two countries and the perceived low risks/costs attached to it.

The results of the research appear to corroborate the first hypothesis, i.e. Pakistanis come to Catalonia to earn a better living, and do so because the risks and costs attached to the movement are offset by their expected gains. Although overall the wage differential is key.

Most of the participants had practically no knowledge of Catalonia before coming, they had heard through friends and relatives that it was a good place to make a living. It is unclear though whether people are fully informed of the risks and constraints awaiting them. For many, the travails suffered during their trip and the difficulties of surviving in a new place, including finding a job and obtaining a work/residence permit, seem to have been underplayed prior to their departure.

Two of the parameters I used to analyse the range of situations in which the Pakistani immigrants find themselves appear to be fundamental in this regard, i.e. duration of stay and legal status. The longer their stay in Catalonia, the greater the chances of having

their legal status regularised. Once they have their status regularised, the higher the possibilities of having a better job, better pay, and better conditions. In turn this translates into more possibilities of being self-employed and having their families join them.

2. The existing migratory flow continues to expand on the basis of networks where kinship and other social relations play a major role. These networks constitute a social capital that offsets risks and costs.

This second hypothesis seems to be equally confirmed by the research findings. The great majority of people who are already in Catalonia had an anchor before proceeding, be it a friend, a relative or even an acquaintance, that was crucial in facilitating their arrival and initial introduction.

Although it would be an exaggeration to say that all Pakistanis in Catalonia are related to each other, it is not a coincidence that the great majority of them are from one province, Punjab, and many of them originate from the same district, Gujarat, or nearby. In fact, among the long-stayers, it would be hard to find one individual who has no relatives in Catalonia, whether brothers, cousins or in-laws. This being said, there is also a sense of shared identity, even among those who are not related, and they tend to refer to each other as “*paisano*”.

It is worth noting that these networks should not be construed as a limitless solidarity among Pakistanis in Catalonia and between them and potential migrants. Assistance is extended, primarily to relatives, in the form of accommodation, securing a job, a contract, real or fake, help in accessing services, etc. But very often the assistance comes at a price, and in some cases the purported aid might be close to exploitation. This is particularly the case of Pakistani entrepreneurs who offer genuine contracts, or in some cases casual employment, to other Pakistanis following clan or tribal patterns, without regard to the laws of the host country.

3. The migrants' objectives are a) to send remittances to their family in Pakistan, b) to accumulate sufficient resources to bring other family members over, and c) if required, to provide assistance/ facilitate the arrival and settlement of other Pakistanis.

This third hypothesis is partially confirmed by the research. The overall objective is to provide more and better for their families. But this is a medium or long term objective. Initially most of them need to recoup their or their family's initial investment to send them abroad, and only afterwards they can start saving for their families.

The issue of their paying to come over was rarely brought up openly. Rather they would hint at it, in the same way that the existence of traffickers was considered a given, not to be discussed, something everybody knows about, and it is too unpleasant, and possibly too dangerous, to discuss.

Thus to send remittances to the families in Pakistan is an objective, but as I have mentioned, it is not an easy one to meet, at least at the start. Furthermore, since the employment they can access is generally poorly paid, despite their efforts to save by living very humble and simple lives, there is just not very much money. The process of sending remittances appears to follow a curve, with a soft upward slope in the beginning, increasing sharply after the individual has obtained regular papers and accessed relatively well paid employment, and gradually decreasing as the family joins the head of household and the number of dependants in Pakistan reduces.

Most of the migrants do intend to bring their families over, once they obtain the required permits and they have accumulated the necessary resources. There are though some notable exceptions prompted by economic and family reasons, as well as cultural and religious concerns.

The third item under this hypothesis, to provide assistance and facilitate the arrival and settlement of other Pakistanis, should also be qualified. It does not appear to be an

objective per se, at least not originally, though it may well become one later one, though only applicable to close relatives. This should not be seen as a contradiction to the earlier statement about the existence of networks, rather, the networks exist and are used by the Pakistani community in facilitating migration, but they are not an objective in themselves.

4. As time goes by and the networks expand and become stronger, the migratory movement grows exponentially, leading to a rapid and significant increase of the Pakistani population in Catalonia.

The population figures presented in Table/Graphic 5 bear witness to the fourth hypothesis. The Pakistani community in Catalonia is definitely growing very rapidly, and could grow even more rapidly if or when the men who have arrived since 2000 bring their families over.

As it has been described in chapter 7.5, some Pakistani immigrants do not plan presently to have their families join them due to economic and cultural reasons. As time passes, however, and as they regularize their legal situation leading to better economic conditions, they may reconsider and agree to bring their families over. In the longer term, as the Pakistani community develops and further enclaves appear, more families are likely to arrive. In these enclaves they have started reproducing a social and cultural environment comparable to the one in their places of origin, which is more conducive to the arrival of Pakistani women and children.

One may safely conclude therefore that the Pakistani community in Catalonia will continue to grow, and that it will do so very rapidly, provided the political and economic conditions remain roughly the same. If, as I have said, Pakistanis come to Catalonia because on the one hand of the economic differential and on the other the low risks and costs attached to the migratory movement, the more Pakistani immigrants there are, the bigger the networks, and the lower the risks and costs. Hence, the number of new arrivals

is more and more likely to increase. In addition, given the present economic trends, the wage differential between the two locations will probably augment.

This leads to the question as to why did they come to Catalonia/Spain in the first place. The research findings indicate that the choice was made on the basis of a cost benefit analysis, i.e. they selected the destination which was the least costly and which brought the greatest benefits in the short term. Their analysis led them to the conclusion that the costs and risks associated with entering the country, either illegally or legally and then overstaying their visas, were and continue to be lower than for many other European destinations.

Experience has proven them right. The different regularization processes have offered the opportunity to most of the Pakistani migrants in an irregular situation to obtain their work and residence permits. In addition, because there have been several regularization processes in recent years, there is the expectation that there will always be another one. It is a matter of time, perseverance, and keeping a low profile to avoid being noticed by the police until then.

5. Catalonia is not a “definitive harbour” for Pakistanis, and after reaching Catalonia they continue to be attracted by “traditional” destinations such as the UK and the USA. In the medium and long run therefore, they plan to move to those locations and eventually return to Pakistan.

The fifth hypothesis remains elusive. It would be incorrect to say that Pakistanis in Catalonia feel so settled that they would not like to move elsewhere, especially to a country where other Pakistani communities have already been established. Catalonia remains an alien territory for them. There is no shared language or religion, and there is no cultural affinity. Given a choice, the majority of the Pakistani community would prefer to be closer to home, geographically and culturally, or at least amidst a larger Pakistani community. However, they are very much aware of the costs and risks involved in securing a new destination. Many of them are still in the early stages of their

settlement in Catalonia and the prospect of going anywhere else at present is too daunting.

Returning to Pakistan is the ultimate goal for the great majority. As it has been mentioning in chapter 5, there is a strong migratory culture in Pakistan which includes the image of successful migrants, identified by the huge empty houses in the middle of Kashmir or the Punjabi planes, who eventually return to spend their old age among their people. This is no doubt a source of inspiration and an ideal to which most migrants and would-be migrants aspire. Whether they will be able and willing to fulfil it remains to be seen.

In Pakistan,

1. The decision to migrate is made by the family, not the individual, as part of a family survival and development strategy and using a cost benefit analysis. The migratory costs are borne by the family as a whole, as a joint investment.

This hypothesis was confirmed by the research findings. In a few cases the decision to migrate was initiated by the individual who later moved, but in all cases the decision was sanctioned by the whole family. This implied that the costs related to the movement were borne by the family and not the individual. These costs included the travelling expenses, transport fares but also the fees for the “helpers”, and later taking care of the direct relatives left behind before the migrant was in a position to start sending remittances.

Thus the family as a whole takes responsibility for the upbringing of the children, as well as preserving the reputation and the honour of the absent husband by ensuring that the wife observes the traditional behaviour that is expected of her.

In return, the benefits accrued by the immigrant in the form of remittances also benefit the whole family, in that resources are pooled, under the management of the eldest male

member. Later on, these “benefits” may include facilitating the migration of younger relatives.

The choice of destination is made on the basis of information provided by migrants to other locations and migrants already settled in Catalonia. In that respect, theirs is an informed decision that takes account of the advantages and the problems of coming to Catalonia.

2. Assuming the first hypothesis is correct, the choice of the family member who initially migrates is made on the basis of the individual’s ability/capacity to a) travel and establish himself/herself abroad, and b) generate income to share with the family members remaining in Pakistan

Again this hypothesis was corroborated by the results of the research. It is always a man, women are considered to be too vulnerable, who first goes abroad. There is a common belief that women are too fragile and too susceptible to exploitation to go abroad. This is duly reflected in the Pakistani legislation on migration, whereby women under 35 years of age are not allowed to migrate on their own.

In addition, it is the family member who is most likely to succeed because of his status, education, and physical condition who migrates. Thus it is neither young boys nor older men who initially travel abroad, but men in the prime of the working age. Older and younger relatives as well as wives, daughters, and mothers travel only when the original migrant is well settled and can offer them suitable conditions.

When considering sending a second family member abroad to join the first one, the choice falls generally on a younger sibling, cousin or nephew, always a man. This young person will benefit directly from the social capital gathered by his preceding relative and he will help him in the recovery of the initial investment, and eventually contribute in sending money to support the extended family in Pakistan.

3. The income generated by the family member(s) abroad has a significant impact in the well-being of the family in Pakistan in terms of housing, consumption goods, education, business (agricultural or others), etc.

This hypothesis is confirmed at the macro level by the total amount of remittances that Pakistan receives annually, and at the micro level by the findings of the research.

However, this statement while correct needs to be qualified, in that not all the immigrants are sending remittances. Short stayers, those who have been in Catalonia less than five years, and those who do not have a regular status are frequently not in a position to save and send money. For those who send remittances to their relatives, this money appears to be used indeed mostly for consumption goods and education purposes. Sometimes land is purchased but it seems that is more as an investment than to start or develop a business. This is clearly at odds with the Government's desires to channel remittances towards productive investment and towards long term development, and explains the efforts deployed by the Government to influence the use of the migrants' savings.

Interestingly enough, while most of the participating families who are receiving money claim that the money is welcome and they are grateful for it, they insist that their level of well being has not been excessively affected by the remittances. Children, they say, were going to private schools before their father migrated, the house was already in the family, etc. At face value one could be tempted to conclude that their relatives had migrated on a whim, and not to respond to the needs of the family. It would be interesting to undertake a sociological research to enquire about their reluctance to admit the positive impact of the remittances. To hazard a guess, knowing the difficulties faced by the migrants, maybe they feel guilty about enjoying the fruits of their labour, and they would rather not admit it.

4. The movement of a family member abroad is viewed as a first step in the movement of the whole family, or a significant part of it.

Again, this hypothesis has been proven correct though with some qualifications. First it should be remembered that in the Pakistani society the term “family” includes married brothers and sisters as well as cousins, and their descendants, the links being reinforced by the common practice of inter-marriage. Often a brother or sister-in-law is also a cousin. In addition, living alone is considered an anomalous state. Being apart from the family is an undesirable situation and they will go to great lengths to ensure the unity of the family and if possible of the extended family. Since migration runs counter to this, families will make immense efforts to reunite.

However, economic constraints, and the need to recover the family investment, dictate that in many cases saving money takes precedence over the reunion of the family. Also, after having suffered the dangers of irregular travelling and the difficulties of settling in Catalonia, immigrants are not prepared to have their families do the same. Bringing their families over is conditional upon first obtaining their regular immigrant status, followed by the authorization to have their family join them. Once this has happened, reunion hinges on the ability to provide single-handedly for the family, since for the time being the majority of immigrants are not prepared to have their female relatives join the workforce.

Although some immigrants claim that they will keep their female relatives in Pakistan to protect them, it is likely that with time most of the immigrants will relent. In this regard, the proliferation of Pakistani enclaves, which in the eyes of Pakistani men provide a safer environment, plays a very important role in facilitating family reunion.

Eventually therefore, and provided that the conditions described earlier are met, most of the immigrants will bring their relatives to Catalonia.

5. The decision to facilitate a family member's movement is made taking into account economic costs, but it often ignores related costs such as the emotional upheaval and the potential "destruction" of the family.

This hypothesis was confirmed by the research, though it might be more accurate to say that such costs were underestimated rather than ignored. Also, the costs are not borne equally by all family members in Pakistan. Mothers are probably the ones who admit to suffering because of the absence of their sons the most. Children are also affected, but maybe they are not so aware of it as they are ensconced amid big, nurturing families. Wives bear the impact of their husbands' absence in diverse ways, probably related to the nature of their relationship with their husbands.

It should be said that, maybe because of the size and characteristics of the extended family system, there were no obvious signs of “destruction” in the participating families. Rather they seemed to have adjusted well to the temporary absence of one or several of their members by establishing new family dynamics that to a great extent filled the vacuum left by the emigrant (s).

Some Pakistani academics such as F. Bilquees and S. Hamid have actually carried out research on this aspect of international migration. From their perspective, the potential moral dangers involved in it should be highlighted. They are particularly concerned that the husbands' absence may induce wives to indulge in extra-marital relationships. Interestingly enough though, these academics do not dwell on the possibility that husbands may be establishing new relationships abroad, which given Pakistan's societal characteristics, is actually much more likely.

Final Considerations

My overall conclusions are that in the coming years Pakistani migration to Catalonia will continue and will probably grow exponentially through the arrival of mostly men, but also women and children, as long as economic and political conditions remain the same, or experience only minor variations. This growth will lead to the strengthening of existing Pakistani enclaves in Barcelona city, and the emergence of new ones in Barcelona and in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, and to a lesser degree in Girona,

Tarragona and eventually Lleida. These enclaves will function as a pull factor attracting many more Pakistanis to Catalonia.

Based on the research findings and the experience of Pakistani migratory movements to other European destinations, Pakistani immigrants are likely to remain separate from the local population. Their desire to integrate will focus on the economic sphere, and only a few, better educated individuals, will be ready to establish and develop cultural and social links with the Catalan society.

There is likely to be a strong resistance to adopt any mores of the host society and particularly to merge with it.

The Pakistani community as a whole will maintain very strong links with Pakistan through a variety of channels, but particularly through intra-family marriages with their relatives in Pakistan.

The majority of Pakistani women will establish most of their social relations within the Pakistani community and in the Pakistani enclaves.

Despite their longing for Pakistan and Pakistani society, the majority of them will remain in Catalonia and will settle here, thus sustaining the Pakistani migratory movement and contributing to its expansion through the strengthening of existing enclaves and the emergence of new ones.

The presence of Pakistanis in Catalonia is an irreversible fact. As far as possible avenues for further research are concerned, I consider that from the point of view of Catalonia, the integration of Pakistanis in Catalan society will be a huge challenge. It would therefore be useful if studies could be conducted to identify ways and means that facilitate the dialogue and the acceptance between the immigrants and the receiving society.

From my own perspective, and given my professional constraints, I would like to pursue my research on Pakistani immigrants in other countries, and eventually, to study the impact of emigration on the economic development of Pakistan.

10. Epilogue

As I conclude my dissertation, I would like to briefly discuss another migratory movement from the Indian sub-continent as an example, *mutatis mutandis*, of the potential evolution of the Pakistani presence in Catalonia.

Since January 2005 my professional activities have taken me to Uganda. In this country as well as in the rest of East Africa, namely in Kenya and Tanzania, there is a sizeable Asian community, that is to say people from the Indian sub-continent.

There have been trade links between East Africa and the Indian sub-continent for at least 2,000 years, but permanent settlers did not arrive until the 19th century. At that time the British colonial rulers prompted a massive movement of Indian indentured labourers to work in the plantations of East Africa, and a few years later to build the railway network.

Many Asians set off in dhows from Bombay and Karachi. Men often sailed first, leaving behind women and children. Families were separated for long periods of time before they were able to reunite. The seas were rough and the dhows fragile. Many dhows were wrecked and countless Asians lost their life at sea. The travel could take thirty days, but often it was two months or more. For the survivors it was a terrible ordeal.

Through their hard work, the descendants of the bonded labourers and other Asians that arrived in successive waves have risen through the ranks of society and nowadays many may be found in the highest economic spheres.

The movement of Asians into East Africa though has not stopped, and today the Asian community ranges from the great grand children of the initial settlers to newly arrived Indians and Pakistanis.

The affluence of the community, their expansion into the region, and their desire to remain separate from the autochthonous population have through the years bred envy and resentment.

The anti-Asian feeling is deep-seated. In March 1959, two years before independence, the Uganda National Movement called for the boycott of goods and services of Indians and the removal of Asian traders from villages and towns. Kampala had become an Asian city with the population getting browner at the end of the day when the black workers would leave town. Idi Amin is popularly quoted as saying years later, "If Uganda is independent, why does its capital look like Bombay on a Sunday?"

Thus, when Idi Amin expelled some 80,000 Asians in 1972 and gave them a few weeks to dispose of their assets and leave the country, many rejoiced. Part of the euphoria was due to the fact that Asian properties were confiscated and handed over to regime supporters. But the fact is that even though many people saw Idi Amin as a brutal dictator, he was also considered a nationalist and many applauded his goal, "Uganda for Ugandans", that is 'black' Ugandans.

However, the departure of the Asians signified the collapse of the economy, from banks to corner shops, and the same Ugandans who celebrated their departure very soon were regretting it.

Following the overthrow of Idi Amin in 1979, Ugandan Asians were invited to return home and many have come back. When the current President, Yoweri Museveni, took power in 1986 there were 5,000 Asians in Uganda. Since then their number has risen to 20,000. In most cases they have been able to recover their properties and once again they are the engine of the country's economy. The banking, insurance, and retail systems, the tourism sector, the flower export sector, are but a few of the areas in which they are prominent.

Many of the Asians in Uganda are Ugandan citizens. They were born here, so were their parents, they love Uganda and they have rushed back as soon as it has been possible. They are investing heavily in the development of the country and they intend to remain here. Through their professional endeavours they closely interact with the rest of the Ugandans on a daily basis, and they have close connections with the political elites which they support financially. Other Asians have arrived directly from India where they have been hired by corporate Ugandan Asian businesses. They constitute the core staff of Asian companies, where indigenous Ugandans occupy the lower echelons.

Whether third-generation Ugandan Asians or newcomers, the Asian community remains separate. “Hindustanis”, as they are known, retain the distinctive culture and identity of the Indian sub-continent. They speak Gujarati, Hindi, Punjabi, Sindhi, ... among other Asian languages. They often dress in shalwar kameez and in saris, they travel frequently to India and Pakistan. They marry among themselves or they bring brides and bridegrooms from India or Pakistan. Their children generally attend Indian or Muslim schools. They eat their traditional food which is available throughout the country. They worship in the Sikh, Jain or Hindu temples of Kampala and other cities in Uganda, or in one of the several mosques. Their enterprises are mostly staffed with Asians, especially the management positions. Their wealth and their distinctiveness set them apart. Some talk of a new “apartheid”.

The Ugandan Asian community and the Ugandan African community thus live side by side. They need each other, but they do not mix. In different ways, each of them contributes to the development of the country, but there is nothing to show that they will come together one day.

How strong the resentment of the indigenous Ugandans is came to the fore on 12 April 2007. That day, environmental activists and members of the opposition called for a peaceful demonstration in Kampala to protest against the President’s decision to give away a significant chunk of a hardwood forest, Mabira, to a sugar producing company owned mainly by a member of the Asian community.

The demonstration soon turned rowdy. Some started chanting songs against Indians accusing them of taking over the retail business and robbing them of jobs, and asking them to return to their country. Before long the protest became a hunt for Asians.

A young Indian man from Gujarat, Devan Rawal, who was walking nearby was stoned to death. A second Indian was severely beaten up before the police could rescue him. Protestors attacked and tried to enter a Hindu temple where some 90 Asians had sought refuge. Asian property was attacked and looted. In the following days many Asian businesses remained closed as they feared a repeat of 1972.

Since then there has been a lot of soul searching among Asians and Ugandans while trying to assign responsibilities for the events. A number of opposition leaders, including members of Parliament, together with ecological activists were arrested and remained in prison for several days. Hooligans were identified as the direct perpetrators of the different violent acts.

While the President and the opposition blame each other, the intelligentsia debates in the newspapers whether it was a case of racism or simple prejudice. The long-standing ambivalence of indigenous Ugandans towards Asians has been dubbed the “Asian Question”.

The Asian community in turn blames the wealthy tycoon who chose to ignore well-founded ecological concerns and has asked him to move his business to Congo or to the Sudan. At the same time, they are trying to ingratiate themselves with the indigenous Ugandans by stepping up their support towards local charities and through a public relations campaign which includes huge posters of Gandhi with quotes such as “The weak can never forgive. Forgiveness is the attribute of the strong.”

In the days and weeks that followed the 12 May events a truce was reached. The President has backed down from giving Mabira away, politicians have apologized to the Asian community, and the Asian community, as indicated earlier, is going out of its way

to show its commitment to the development of Uganda and the welfare of Ugandans.
Still, everybody is aware that the “Asian Question” remains unsolved.

Kampala, 19 October 2007

BIBLIOGRAPHY

All the bibliography mentioned below has been used in the writing of this dissertation. However, only the one most significant books and articles have been mentioned in the text.

AASI, N.A. (2001), (updated by) *Emigration Ordinance, 1979 and Emigration Rules, 1979*, Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment

ABBAS, Z. (2004),
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/372408

ABBASI, N., IRFAN, M. (1984), “Socio-Economic Effects of International Migration on the Families Left Behind”, *Studies in Population, Labour Force and Migration, Project Report No. 7*, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad

AJA, E. & DIEZ, L. (2005) “La regulación de la inmigración en Europa”, *Colección Estudios Sociales*, Num. 17, www.estudios.lacaixa.es

ARANGO, J. (1985) “Las leyes de las migraciones de E.G. Ravenstein, cien años después”, *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, 32: 7-26

ARANGO, J., JACHIMOWICZ, M. (2005) “Regularizing Immigrants in Spain: A New Approach”, in *Migration Information Source*, www.migrationinformation.org

ARIF, G.M. (1999), *Remittances and Investment at the Household Level in Pakistan*, PIDE Research Report no. 166

ARIF, G.M., (2003), “Labour Migration and Poverty Reduction”, paper presented at the PMI/IOM National Seminar on Labour Migration and Socio-Economic Development, 23-24 September 2003, Islamabad

ASIA DEVELOPMENT BANK, DFID, WORLD BANK (2004), *Devolution in Pakistan, An Assessment & Recommendations for Action*, Islamabad

BENNETT JONES, O. (2002) *Pakistan, Eye of the Storm*, Lahore: Vanguard

BILQUEES, F. and HAMID, S., (1981), “Impact of international migration on women and children left behind, A case study of a Punjabi village”, *Research Report Series no. 115*, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad

- BORJAS, G.J. (1989), “Economic Theory and International Migration”, *International Migration Review*, 23: 457-485
- BOURDIEU, P., WACQUANT, L. (1992), *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- BUREAU OF EMIGRATION & OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT, (2003), *Performance and Evaluation Report 1999 – 2003 (June)*, Islamabad
- BUREAU OF EMIGRATION & OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT, (2003), *Challenges in exploring new opportunities for labour migration*, Islamabad
- CHOLDIN, H.M. (1973), “Kinship networks in the migration process”, *International Migration Review*, 7: 163-176
- COOPER, B., (2005), “Norway: Migrant Quality, Not Quantity”, in *Migration Information Source*, www.migrationinformation.org
- DELGADO, M. (1998), *Diversitat i integració*, Barcelona
- DENZIN, N.K. & LINCOLN, Y. S., (eds.) (2002) *The Handbook of Qualitative Research*, Thousand Oaks: Sage
- DOMINGO i VALLS, A. (1994), “Evolució recent de la immigració a Catalunya, 1975 – 1991: continuïtat o ruptura?” paper presented to the II Congrés Català de Sociologia, Girona
- FAROOQI, F.A., TARIK, J. HAQ, R. & KHAN G. (1979), “Migration Patterns in Pakistan: Preliminary results from the PLM survey, 1979”, *Studies in Population, Labour Force and Migration, Project Report No. 6*, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad
- FEI, J.C.H., RANIS, G. (1969) *Economic Development in Historical Perspective*, New Haven CT, Yale University Press
- GARDEZI, H.N. (1995), *The Political Economy of International Labour Migration – A case study of Pakistani Workers in Gulf States*, Lahore: Gautam Publishers
- GARSON, J.P., LOIZILLON, A. (2003) “Changes and Challenges, Europe and Migration from 1950 to Present” in *The Economic and Social Aspects of Migration*, Brussels: OCDE
- GAZDAR, H. (2003), “A review of migration issues in Pakistan”, paper presented at the Conference on Migration, Development and Pro-Poor Policy Choices in Asia, Dhaka
- GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA, Pla interdepartamental d’immigració 2001-2004

- GINER, S.(ed) (2000) *La societat catalana*, Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya
- GLICK SCHILLER, N., BASCH, L. SZANTON BLANC, C. eds. (1992) *Toward a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity and Nationalism Reconsidered*, New York, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
- GLICK SCHILLER, N., FOURON G. (1999) "Terrains of Blood and Nation: Haitian Transnational Social Fields", *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 (2): 340-66
- GUARNIZO, L. E., M. P. SMITH (1998), "The Locations of Transnationalism." Pages 3-34 in *Transnationalism from Below*, vol. 6: *Comparative Urban and Community Research*, edited by Michael Peter Smith and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction
- GUARNIZO, L. E., PORTES, A. and HALLER, W. "Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants" Pages 211-248 in *American Journal of Sociology* Volume 108 Number 6 (May 2003)
- De HAAN, A. (2000), "Migrants, Livelihoods, and rights: the relevance of migration in development policies", *Social Development Working Paper No.4*, World Bank, Washington DC
- INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION, (2001) *Growth, employment and poverty alleviation, Prospects and Policy Challenges*, Geneva
- IOM (2003) *World Migration 2003 - Managing Migration*, Geneva
- IRFAN, M, (1981), "An introduction to studies in population, labour force and migration, a PIDE/ILO-UNFPA project", Research Series Report no. 118, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad
- JOLY, D. (1987), "Making a Place for Islam in British Society: Muslims in Birmingham", *Research Papers in Ethnic Relations No. 4*, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick, Coventry
- KATZ, E., STARK, O., (1986), "Labour migration and risk aversion in less developed countries", *Journal of Labour Economics*, 4: 134-149
- KHAN, F.K. (1991), *A Geography of Pakistan, Environment, People and Economy*, Oxford University Press, Karachi
- KHAN, S.R. (2004) *Pakistan under Musharraf (1999-2002) Economic Reform and Political Change*, Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore
- KIRMANI, M. H. & KIRMANI, S., (2002) *Oral Literature of the Asians in East Africa*, East African Educational Publishers Ltd, Nairobi

KINCHELOE, J.L. & STEINBERG, S.R. (1997), *Repensar el multiculturalismo*, Madrid: Ed. Octaedro, S.L.

LOPEZ TRIGAL, L. (1991), *La inmigración extranjera en León*, Universidad de León, León

MARTIN, S., MARTIN, P. & WEIL, P., (2002), “Fostering Cooperation between Source and Destination Countries” in in *Migration Information Source*, www.migrationinformation.org

MASSEY, D.S., (1990b), “Social structure, household strategies, and the cumulative causation theory”, *Population Index*, 56: 3-26

MASSEY, D.S. “Understanding Mexican migration to the United States”, *American Journal of Sociology*, 92: 1372-1403

MASSEY, D.S., ARANGO, J., GRAEME, H., KOUAOUCI, A., PELLEGRINO, A., TAYLOR, J.E., (1998) *Worlds in Motion – Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*, Oxford: Clarendon Press

MINISTRY OF POPULATION WELFARE/UNFPA, Population stabilization, a priority for development, 2004, Government of Pakistan/UNFPA, Islamabad

MINISTRY OF LABOUR, MANPOWER & OVERSEAS PAKISTANIS, Workforce Situation Report 2001, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad

MORÈN ALEGRET, R. (2001), “Turning the Channels: Local Government Policies and Immigrants’ Participation in Barcelona” in ROGERS, A., TILLIE, J. (eds), *Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers

MORÈN ALEGRET, R. (2002) Gobierno local e inmigración extranjera. Aproximación los casos de Barcelona y Lisboa durante los años 90, *Revista Migraciones*, número 11, Madrid

MORÈN ALEGRET, R (2005), “Immigrants and immigration policy-making. The case of Spain”, Country Report

MORÈN ALEGRET, R (2007), *Bon cop de mà? Món casteller, immigració estrangera i integració a Catalunya*, Fundació Jaume Bofill, Barcelona

MUMTAZ, S. RACINE, J.L., ANWAR ALI, I (2002) *Pakistan, The contours of State and Society*, Karachi: Oxford University Press

MUGHAL, R. A, “Labour migration from Pakistan and its role in socio-economic development”, paper presented at the Seminar on labour migration and socio-economic development in Islamabad, September 2003

- MYRDAL, G. (1957), *Rich lands and Poor*, New York: Harper & Row
- NEWLAND, K. (2003), “Migration as a factor in Development and Poverty Reduction” in *Migration Information Source*, www.migrationinformation.org
- NEWLAND, K. (2005), “Migration’s Unrealized Potential: The Report of the Global Commission on International Migration” in *Migration Information Source*, www.migrationinformation.org
- NYROP, R.F. (ed) (1984) *PAKISTAN, A country study*, Area Handbook Series, Washington DC: US Federal Research Division
- OCHIENG, W.R. (ed.) (1989), *A Modern History of Kenya 1895 – 1980*, Evans Brothers Limited, Nairobi
- ORTEGA PEREZ, N. (2003), “Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy” in *Migration Information Source*, www.migrationinformation.org
- OVERSEAS PAKISTANIS FOUNDATION, *A brief Introduction*, October 2003
- PAKISTAN INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS/UNFPA, *An Analysis of 1998 Population and Housing Census*, publishing date not available
- PAKISTAN POPULATION COUNCIL, (2003), *Adolescents and Youth Survey 2001-02*
- PATEL, Z. (1997), *Challenge to Colonialism, The Struggle of Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee for Equal Rights in Kenya*, The Standard Ltd, Mombasa
- PASCUAL de SANS, A. CARDELUS, J. (1990) *Migració i història personal, Investigació sobre la mobilitat des de la perspectiva del retorn*, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra
- PASCUAL de SANS, A., CARDELUS, J. (2000) “Migracions a Catalunya: entre la mobilitat i l’assentament” in Giner, S. (ed) *La societat catalana*, Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya
- PASCUAL de SANS, A., CARDELUS, J. & SOLANA, M. (2000), “Recent Immigration to Catalonia: Economic Character and Responses” in King, R. et al. (eds) *Eldorado or Fortress*, London: MacMillan
- PASCUAL de SANS, A., de MIGUEL, V. MOREN, R. SOLANA, M. (2002) *Migracions a Catalunya L’etat de la qüestió (1975 – 2000)*, Grup de Recerca sobre Migracions, Universitat de Bellaterra
- PIORE, M.J. (1977), “Alcune note sul dualismo ne mercato de lavoro”, *Revista di Economia e Politica Industriale*, 3:350-8

PIORE, M.J. (1979), *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor in Industrial Societies*, Cambridge University Press, New York

PORTES, A., WALTON, J. (1981), *Labour, Class and the International System*, Academic Press, New York

PORTES, A. (1997), "Globalization from Below: The Rise of Transnational Communities". WPTC-98-01. Princeton University

RAGIN, C. (1994), *Constructing Social Research – The Unity and Diversity of Method*, Northwestern, Thousand Oaks: University Press

RANIS, G., FEI, J.C.H. (1961) "A theory of economic development", *American Economic Review*, 51:533-65

RECOLONS, L. (2000) "Migracions entre Catalunya i l'estranger" in Giner, S. (ed) *La societat catalana*, Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya

RECOLONS, L. La immigració entre nosaltres, *Qüestions de vida cristiana*, 211, Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat

RECOLONS, L. (2003) "An overview on world migration", paper presented at the Colloquium on Population Ethics, Cairo

SANCHO, S & ROS, C. (2000) 'La població de Catalunya en perspectiva històrica' in Giner, S. (ed) *La societat catalana*, Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya

SARTORI, G. (2001), *Pluralismo, multiculturalismo y extranjeros*, Madrid

SATHAR, Z. A., MUBASHIR ALI, S., ZAHID, G. M., (1984), "Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the population in Pakistan: findings of the Population, Labour Force and Migration Survey 1979-80", *Studies in Population, Labour Force and Migration, Project Report No. 8*, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad

SHAH, N.S., "La emigración laboral pakistani: nuevos destinos en Europa" in in CIDOB no.68 Migraciones y relaciones internacionales entre España y Asia

SINGER, P. (1971), "Dinámica de la población y desarrollo" in *El Papel del Crecimiento Demográfico en el Desarrollo Económico*, México: Editorial Siglo XXI

SOLE AUBIA, M., RODRIGUEZ ROCA, J., "Pakistanies en España: un estudio basado en el colectivo de la ciudad de Barcelona" in CIDOB no.68 Migraciones y relaciones internacionales entre España y Asia

- SOLOMON, K. & BARTSCH, K., (2003), “The Berne Initiative: Toward the Development of an International Policy Framework on Migration” in *Migration Information Source*, www.migrationinformation.org
- SRISKANDARAJAH, D. (2005), “Reassessing the Impacts of Brain Drain on Developing Countries” in *Migration Information Source*, www.migrationinformation.org
- SOLANA, M., MOREN, R. de MIGUEL, V. (2002) ‘L’ estudi de les migracions a Catalunya des de la geografia i la demografia (1975-2000)’ *Documents d’Anàlisi Geogràfica*, 41, 2002 pp 145-164
- SOLE, C. (1981) *La integración sociocultural de los inmigrantes en Cataluña*, Centro de investigaciones sociológicas, Madrid
- SOLE, C. (1982) *Los inmigrantes en la sociedad y en la cultura catalanas*, Ediciones Península, Barcelona
- SOLE, C (1988) *Catalunya: societat receptora d’immigrants*, Institut d’Estudis Catalans, Barcelona
- SOLE, C. HERRERA, E. (1991) *Trabajadores extranjeros en Cataluña ¿Integración o racismo?* Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Madrid
- SOLE, C. (2001) *El impacto de la inmigración en la economía y en la sociedad receptora*, Instituto de Migraciones y Servicios Sociales, IMSERSO, Barcelona
- STARK, O., BLOOM, D.E., (1985), “The new economics of labour migration”, *American Economic Review*, 75: 173-178
- TAHIR, P. (2003), *Diaspora’s implications for Human Resources in Pakistan* Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis and IOM, Islamabad
- TALBOT, I. (1999), *Pakistan, A Modern History*, Islamabad: Vanguard Books
- TAYLOR, J.E. (1986), “Differential migration, networks, information and risk” in STARK, O. (ed.) *Migration Theory, Human Capital and Development*, Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press.
- TILLY, C., BROWN, C.H. (1967), “On uprooting, kinship, and the auspices of migration”, *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 8:139-164
- TJELMELAND, H., (2002), “The Norwegian Encounter with Pakistanis: Diversities and Paradoxes on the Road to Norway’s Immigration Stop” in OHLIGER, R., SCHONWALDER, K. & TRIADAFILOPOULOS, T., *European Encounters, Migrants, migration and European Societies since 1945*, Aldershot, England

TODARO, M.P. (1969), "A model of labor migration and urban unemployment in less developed countries", *American Economic Review*, 59: 138-48

TODARO, M.P. & MARUSZKO, I. (1987), "Illegal migration and US immigration reform: a conceptual framework", *Population and Development Review*, 13: 101-114

TODARO, M.P. (1989), *Economic Development in the Third World*, New York: Longman

UNDP, *Human Development Report 2003, 2004, 2005*

UNESCO, 2003, *Literacy Trends in Pakistan*, Islamabad

UNITED NATIONS Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *International Migration Report 2002*

UNITED NATIONS Department of Economic and Social Affairs *World Economic and Social Survey 2004, International Migration*, New York

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (UNESCO)/ISLAMABAD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IPRI), (2003), *The State of Migration and Multiculturalism in Pakistan*, Islamabad

UNFPA, *Pakistan Population Assessment 2003*

UNFPA/MINISTRY OF POPULATION WELFARE (MPW), (2003), *Population Stabilization, a Priority for Development*, Islamabad

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, (2006), *International migration and development*, New York

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, www.unhcr.org

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, (2002), *Global Report*, Geneva

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, (2006), *The State of the World's Refugees, Human Displacement in the New Millennium*, Geneva

UNIVERSITAT DE BARCELONA, GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA/DEPARTAMENT DE BENESTAR SOCIAL, (2003), *Estudi sobre el grau d'integració dels immigrants en la província de Barcelona*, Barcelona

URMILA, G., (2001) Norway: Pakistanis – the largest immigrant group, www.urmila.de, (25.9.07)

WALDINGER, R., D. FITZGERALD, (2004), "Transnationalism in Question." Pp 1177-1195 in *American Journal of Sociology* Volume 109 Number 5

WALLERSTEIN, I., (1974), *The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York: Academic Press

WALLERSTEIN, I., (1980), *The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy, 1600 – 1750*, Academic Press, New York

WEISS, A.M., GILANI, S.Z. (eds.), (2003), *Power and Civil Society in Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press

The WORLD BANK, (2002), *PAKISTAN Development Policy Review, A New Dawn?*, Islamabad

Interview Guidelines for Pakistani respondents in Catalonia

Interview Date and Place

SUMMARY

MAIN RESPONDENT:

GENDER:

TYPE OF HOUSEHOLD:

LEGAL STATUS:

JOB STATUS:

RELIGION:

LENGTH OF STAY IN CATALONIA:

PLACE OF RESIDENCE:

A. Personal domain Who are they?

1. Name, age, gender, civil status
2. Place of origin /ethnic origin
3. Level/Type of studies
4. Profession
5. Family composition. Position in the family.
6. What languages do they speak, feel comfortable speaking?

B. Professional/Work environment

1. What are they doing? (economic activity)
2. How long have they been doing it?
3. What were they doing before? (here and in country of origin)
4. Do they belong or participate in a workers' association?

If so, what kind?

C. Social environment

1. What are their living arrangements?

Alone/with family/with friends/others: Pak or non-Pak
Owner/renter

2. Do they belong or participate in some sort of association?

3. Do they attend regularly a place of worship?

4. Is their family with them?

If so, composition of the family group here

5. Do the children go to school? Which school?

6. How do they perceive their environment? Do they want to be part of it? Do they want their children to be part of it?

7. How do they think their environment is perceiving them?

8. Have they perceived ethnic or religious antagonism?

9. Do they go regularly to the Mosque? Which one (Shia/Sunni/Wahabi)?

10. Have they performed Haj/Umra? If so, when? If not, do they plant to? When?

11. Do children attend a madrassa? Where?

D. Relationship with country of origin

1. Are they in contact with their families in Pakistan?

2. What kind of contact do they have? (telephone, email, letters, visits, etc)

3. Do they travel regularly to Pakistan? Where to in Pakistan? When did they last travel to Pakistan?

4. Have they got visitors from Pakistan? When was the last visitor here?

5. Do they send money regularly to Pakistan? If so, which channels are they using?

6. What percentage of their earnings do they send?

7. Do they receive goods from Pakistan? What kind of goods? Are they for self-consumption/give away/sell?
8. Do they send goods to Pakistan? What kind of goods? Are they for self-consumption/give away/sell?
9. What means do they use to send/receive goods?

D. On the migratory movement

1. Why did they leave Pakistan?
2. When did they leave Pakistan?
3. Why did they come to Catalonia/present location?
4. When did they arrive?
5. Did they come directly from Pakistan? If not, what was the itinerary?
6. Who told them to come here/gave them information about Catalonia?
7. Did someone help them come here?
8. How was their trip?
9. Is all their family here with them? (define family: “close or immediate” as opposed to “extended family”)
10. If not, do they plan to bring them over? (including fiancé/fiancée)
11. How (with “papers” or without) and where did they enter Spain/Catalonia?
12. Have they got regular work/residence papers?
 - If so, how did they get them? Before leaving Pakistan / already in Catalonia
 - How long did it take to obtain them?
 - Did they obtain them individually / part of a regularization process?
 - Do they plan to obtain Spanish nationality? why
13. Have they been asked to help other Pakistanis come over/obtain legal papers?
 - Relatives/ friends?
 - How many?
 - Have they been successful?
 - How many have they effectively helped?

How do/did they do it?
What are the main obstacles/difficulties?

F. Self-assessment

1. Do they feel satisfied about coming/living in Catalonia?
2. Is it as they expected?
3. What are the best aspects/ what do they like the most?
4. What do they like the least?
5. What are their plans for the near/medium term?
 - for themselves
 - for their relatives (children/parents/siblings/extended family)
6. Do they intend eventually to return to Pakistan? Why? If they do, when?
7. Where do they see themselves in 5, 10, 20 years?
8. Would they advise their relatives/friends to come over?
9. Would they be prepared to help them come over?

Interview Guidelines for Relatives in Pakistan of Pakistani migrants in Catalonia

Interview Date and Place

RELATIVE OF (in Catalonia):

SUMMARY

MAIN RESPONDENT (in Pakistan):

GENDER:

PLACE OF RESIDENCE:

RELATIONSHIP WITH MAIN RESPONDENT IN CATALONIA:

Father / Mother / Wife / Brother / Sister / son / daughter / brother-in-law / sister-in-law / cousin / other, specify

A. Personal domain Who are they?

1. Name, age, gender, civil status
2. Place of origin /ethnic origin
3. Level/Type of studies
4. Profession
5. Family composition. Position in the family.
6. What languages do they speak, feel comfortable speaking?

C. Economic Situation

1. What are they doing? (economic activity, earnings/salary, working hours, etc.)
2. How long have they been doing it?
3. What were they doing before their relative migrated to Catalonia?

C. Social environment

1. Political involvement
2. Religious activity
3. What are their living arrangements?
 - a) who do they live with?
 - b) do they own/rent accommodation? Is there a mortgage?
 - c) is whose name is the accommodation (rental contract or mortgage)?
4. Are they the same as before their relative migrated to Catalonia?
5. Do the children go to school?

What kind of school?

 - a) Private vs. state school, religious school (madrassa)
 - b) Medium of instruction English vs. Urdu
 - c) Is it the same as before their relative migrated to Catalonia?

D. On the culture of migration

1. What do they think about migration?
2. How many people have migrated in the family?
3. Who are they?
4. Where to and when? For how long? In which conditions?
5. Has any of them returned to Pakistan?
6. If so, who, why and when
6. Do they have a relative/friend who has also migrated (in addition to respondent in Catalonia)?
7. Do they know someone who has migrated from their community or village?

E. On the decision to migrate

1. Why did the main respondent migrate?
2. Who decided he/they should migrate?
3. Who paid for the expenses? Did someone from outside the family help them?
4. Why did this particular family member (or family sub-unit) migrate rather than someone else in the family?
5. Why to Catalonia?

F. Economic impact

1. Do they receive remittances from their relative/s?
2. How often? Channels employed. (bank transfer, friends, hundi)
3. Does this money make their life better/easier?
4. How is the money used?
 - a) Consumption
 - Housing (rent)
 - education
 - paying debts
 - marriage/dowries
 - food
 - jewellery
 - others (describe)
 - b) Investment
 - business (what kind)
 - land purchase
 - building/buying of house

G. Emotional impact

1. How does he/she feel about the migration of his/her relative(s)
2. Is life better or more difficult? Why?
3. How is it dealing with the children in their father's absence?
4. Overall, does he/she think it was a good thing for their relative(s) to migrate?

H. Relationship with Catalonia

1. Are they in contact with their relative (s) in Catalonia?
2. What kind of contact do they have? (telephone, email, letters, visits, etc)
3. Have they visited Catalonia?
If yes,
 - a) Where to in Catalonia?
 - b) When did they last travel to Catalonia?
 - c) What did they think of it?
 - d) What is their perception of Catalonia and its people?
10. Do they receive goods from Catalonia? What kind of goods? Are they for self-consumption/give away/sell?
11. Do they send goods to Catalonia? What kind of goods? Are they for self-consumption/give away/sell?
12. What means do they use to send/receive goods?

I. On potential migratory movements

14. Is any family member planning to leave Pakistan?
15. If so, whom, and to where?
16. When do they plan to leave Pakistan?
17. Why?
18. How are they planning to do it?
19. Have they initiated the procedures? (legal or otherwise) explain
20. Do they plan to travel with papers or do they plan to get papers once they arrive in Catalonia or elsewhere?
8. Would they like to move to Catalonia? Why?
9. What are their medium term plans?
10. What are their long term plans?